AALBORG UNIVERSITET

Master's Thesis

Red Menace over South Asia?

A Comparison of Maoist Guerrilla Movements in Nepal and India

Development and International Relations, Spring Semester 2011

Written by: Martin Churavý

Supervisor: Mammo Muchie

Abstract

Complex phenomenon of social movements operating under various labels on the razor's edge between underground anti-system groups and established political organizations within genuinely democratic as well as within authoritarian political regimes all over the globe presents important and highly actual theme for research. The so-called Arab Spring, which we have been witnessing from December 2010, is, after all, nothing but one concrete manifestation of that phenomenon.

The main purpose of this thesis is to enrich the existing amount of information in regards to social movements in general by presenting a comparative analysis of two particular cases from the vibrant region of modern-day South Asia. Taken together, they can offer an interesting view of two remarkably similar social movements subscribing themselves to the Maoist legacy and initially evolving along almost analogical trajectories: from formally recognized political actors to underground guerrilla movements opposing the central government via instruments of violent resistance. In the case of Nepal, the rebels eventually managed to undertake a full-circle journey and were included within the mainstream political arena again. Indian insurgents, on the other hand, never really left the underground positions. Instead, they keep on waging the armed struggle against dominant socio-politico-economic order in their country.

In order to identify possible factors responsible for such difference, a brief historical context of both cases in hand is firstly outlined. Subsequently, comparative analysis applying the theoretical framework of contentious politics designed by Charles Tilly as well as related insights of Weinberg and Pedahzur is unfolded. Although both approaches can be subsumed under the broad umbrella of social movement theory, the former provides us with detailed explanation of evolution and ramification of each movement's respective performance with respect to usage of violent techniques of conveying their demands. The latter is more concerned with optimal conditions for transformation of political parties into terrorist groups and vice versa.

Significantly differing general perception of the notion of legitimacy vs. illegitimacy (or legality vs. illegality) shaped by slightly discrepant historical experiences with interactions between government and anti-systemic forces in both inquired cases is positively identified as the searched independent variable within their otherwise comparable political cultures.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

AICCCR – All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries

BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party

CPI (M) – Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CPI (Maoist) – Communist Party of India (Maoist)

CPI (ML) – Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

CPN (Maoist) – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

FDI – Foreign Direct Investments

INC – Indian National Congress

INC (I) – Indian National Congress (Indira)

ISI – Inter Services Intelligence

MCC – Maoist Communist Centre

MNC – Multinational Corporation

PLA – People's Liberation Army

PW – People's War

PWG – People's War Group

RNA – Royal Nepalese Army

SPA – Seven Party Alliance

TNC – Transnational Corporation

UPFN – United People's Front of Nepal

"Guerrilla life is like swimming in a river of people and against the current of the state and established systems. A guerrilla is required to possess the military discipline of the armies of the Roman Empire and the fighting spirit of slaves under the leadership of Spartacus." [1]

–Varavara Rao

"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

–Mao Zedong

1. Introduction

In the West, Maoist ideology may be widely considered as a rather archaic and, for the most part, outlived utopian concept with little relevance for political or social life of today. Within the non-Western part of the world, on the other hand, it is still perceived as comparatively vital worldview drawing attention of a significant number of devoted followers as well as professionally interested scholars.

Specifically in Asia, the actual forefront of the armed struggle against revisionist forces declared once by Mao Zedong, shifted from the country of its origin – the People's Republic of China – particularly towards South Asia. Maoist guerrilla movements are notably active in India, Bangladesh, and, until recently, Nepal. Apart from that, the Communist Party of Philippines leads an armed resistance through its military wing. There are also comparatively less significant insurgencies going on in Turkey and Peru nowadays.

I personally firstly came across the issue of Maoist extremists (locally better known as Naxals or Naxalites) during my stay in New Delhi, India, where I conducted my internship at the political section of the Embassy of the Czech Republic from August 2010 till January

---

[1] Rao in Satnam 2010: 199

2011. Along with relatively very well-known and medially covered case of international territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the fullest attention of the embassy was also dedicated towards a problem of apparently influential Maoist movement operating in the eastern and southern parts of the Indian subcontinent. Although they undoubtedly present the single gravest threat to Indian inner security, their case is almost unknown outside the region of South Asia. Thus, my major task was to closely follow up the latest development in the field and write analytical reports about it continuously in order to keep the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague updated.

In November, I even decided to fly all the way to Kolakata, West Bengal, in order to meet one of the most respected Indian experts on the matter and broaden my horizons in that respect. His name is Pradib Basu, Ph.D., and he used to be an active sympathizer of the original ideals of Naxalite movement himself. Later in his adult life, however, he has developed more critical perception and, finally, condemned all the violent practices and actions gruesomely affecting lives of innocent Indian civilians. Moreover, during my stay in Kolkata, he kindly introduced me to several of his distinguished colleagues from the field of academia who gave me very many inspirational tips for further research.

After this brief introduction, section dedicated to explicit articulation of problem formulation coupled with several more supplementary contextual facts is presented. The problem formulation is related to the striking fact that while Nepalese Maoist movement underwent a process of full transformation into a regular political party, Indian Naxals still fight an armed struggle for their cause. Then, compendious historical background with special respect to modern political development of both inquired cases – Nepal and India – follows. Clarification of fundamental methodological considerations and research design in regards to applied comparative method is revealed in the next chapter. After that, basic aspects and characteristics of social movement theory in general and the concept of contentious politics described by Charles Tilly as well as the contributory approach developed by Weinberg and Pedahzur in particular are explained in details. Application of theoretical lenses on both actual cases, attempts to observe their respective dynamics and identify possible breakpoints presents content of the consecutive (analytical) part. Furthermore, several selected recommendations largely based on Amartya Sen's conception of justice and final reflection over the subtle content of the term legitimacy are added before the conclusive summarization.

2. Problem Formulation

My initial problem formulation is related to one particular, seemingly paradoxical, observation. In spite of their historical, cultural and (to certain extent) political similarity as well as close geographical proximity and extraordinarily vivid transborder interactions, the Maoist movement in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal has been more or less successfully integrated into the mainstream political life and its representatives are regularly attending and competing against established political subjects within the framework of general, democratic elections. Maoist rebels in the Republic of India (Naxalites), on the other hand, still furiously oppose such attempts by strong resistance and continue in armed struggle. In this thesis, I analyze both cases in order to identify possible key factors responsible for that counterintuitive difference.

In order to better understand both movements, it is necessary to explore specific historical contexts and motives behind their original formation as well as other particular determinants that have deeply influenced and shaped their evolution until today. They both were primarily concentrated within peripheral areas significantly marked by comparatively lowest living conditions and severely discriminatory factors of multiethnic societies. Furthermore, they both draw their inspiration from general dialectics of Marxism-Leninism specifically modified by Chinese Maoist legacy and adapted on local conditions (concretely the Prachanda path in Nepal and the path of Naxal ideology in India). Besides, they learnt a gret deal from practical examples of several left wing extremist guerrilla movements in South Asia[2] and Latin America (e.g. *Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso*), according to which they believed that their final goal should be to abolish the official government institutions and replace them with an ideal of purely egalitarian, communist/socialist regime.

The Maoist guerrilla movement in neighboring Nepal has been successfully integrated within the mainstream political life, where as the Indian Naxal Maoist movement is considered illegal and is de facto classified as a terrorist organization excluded from joining mainstream Indian Politics. What are the differences and similarities between the Nepalese

---

[2] There is certain evidence of existing mutual links between Maoists in India and Nepal along their common border and especially in the northern Indian state of Bihar.

and Indian Maoist movements and why is the Nepalese one included in mainstream politics and whilst the Indian is excluded?

3. Background Information

During official population census in 1991, more than 60 different ethnic groups as well as 70 diverse languages and local dialects were identified within Nepal. Countless ethnic groups and communities of various cultural heritages can also be found in today's Indian society. In this context, it is also important to mention the influence of dominant Hindu religion and factually persisting conservative cast diversification, which has been gradually developed over thousands of years, of contemporary Nepali as well as Indian society. Broad ethnical heterogeneity coupled with deeply enrooted sense of natural stratification of human beings according to the traditional, hierarchical cast structures have been contributing vehemently to very many acts of discrimination and injustice committed against socially immobile members of lower casts and the so-called untouchable ethnic minorities (e.g. Dalits) throughout history[3] (Dixit, Ramachandran in Schwanková 2009: 25-26).

It should be taken into an account that even though the areas they cover as well as their population size differ vehemently[4], Both India and Nepal are formally secular, federal democratic republics at this moment. They lie in culturally as well as historically similar region of South Asia and their societies are characteristic by the absolute majority of people who subscribe themselves to one of plenty of pervasive Hindu belief systems. Yet still, given its enormous population size, India presents comparatively much larger market and, therefore, it plays much bigger role in global economy of today. As such, India is also more profoundly integrated within far-reaching processes of contemporary form of globalization. On the one hand, this position gives India tremendous economic strength as well as influence on other important markets worldwide. It, however, makes it relatively more dependent on processes that are out of its ability to control. It also makes it more problematic to hypothetically get rid of the whole interconnected network of relations with a number of various huge transnational

---

[3] *„The failure of governments to accommodate rising political demands within an institutional context can culminate in political violence. Such dangers are especially acute in poly-ethnic societies when politicized and discontented ethnic minorities encounter few institutional channels for expressing political dissent"* (Ganguly 1996: 1).
[4] While India covers a total area of 3,287,263 sq km and has nearly 1.2 billion inhabitants, total area of Nepal is only 147,181 sq km with approximately 30 million of inhabitants (www.cia.gov).

and multinational corporations (TNCs/MNCs) operating according to strictly neo-liberal/capitalist paradigms focused solely on profit maximization within its own territory. Relative international isolation of Nepal, on the other side, enables its leaders to act more independently on ups and downs of global market but, at the same time, it can also significantly inhibit its economic growth as well as attempts to alleviate its population above the poverty line.

Similarly, in line with the Human Development Index for the year 2010, India managed to improve significantly and is currently subsumed amongst medium human development (developing) countries on 119th position; Nepal, despite its modest uplift, is still ranked as a low human development (developing) country and ended up on 138th position (http://hdr.undp.org). However, according to the Gini coefficient, which measures the level of intrastate inequalities of wealth distribution, the gap between India (134th position) and Nepal (144th position) at intervals from 1992 to 2007 was smaller almost by half (http://hdrstats.undp.org).

"The policy significance of this (…) point is that as economic modernization proceeds, growing levels of literacy, [formal] *higher education, and media exposure will contribute to increased political mobilization. This heightened political awareness will inevitably contribute to greater political demands. As Samuel Huntington cogently argued, the processes of economic modernization generate increasing demands for political participation by opening up new opportunities for physical, social, and economic mobility.(…) Furthermore, as Myron Weiner has demonstrated, accelerating mobility in the context of scarce resources in a poly-ethnic society can lead to mobilization along ethnic lines and result in inter-ethnic tensions.(…) Faced with such increased demands and other ethnic tensions, states can resort to coercive strategies, which are, inevitably,* [nothing but] *short-term palliatives"* (Ganguly 1996: 1).

Furthermore, while Maoist movement in Nepal fought the governmental agents principally for land rights of its citizens (i.e. equal ability of all Nepali people to obtain, possess, and utilize lands at their discretion), Naxalites in India proclaim to fight for inalienable rights of tribal peoples whose traditional way of living is existentially threatened primarily by huge mining MNCs/TNCs, which are powerfully supported by central government in New Delhi as well as by practically all local governments irrespectively to their official political affiliations, ruthlessly exploiting Indian rich natural resources and by doing that systematically blocking an equitable access to them for the poorest and most vulnerable segments of local population.

It is, therefore, very important to understand that despite using the same label (i.e. Maoist), both movements slightly differ from each other in reality. Moreover, neither of them should be perceived as a simply homogenous, monolithic block strictly obeying certain explicit, rigorous set of given rules. They should rather be seen as kind of universal umbrella organizations within which several streams of miscellaneous thoughts can be distinguished.

At the time being, it appears that while Indian Naxalites work strictly according to the battle plan prescribed explicitly by Chinese leader Mao Zedong[5] (we can even distinguish the shift from the so-called hit and run tactics towards more open conflicts with governmental authorities and strategies applicable not only for rural but also for urban areas nowadays; this new strategy strongly resembles classic infamous terrorist practices), the movement in Nepal decided to give up the armed resistance at certain point and finally accepted an offer for rejoining forcibly interrupted peace talks and round table conference negotiations.

3.1. Brief Outline of Modern History of Nepal

Although nearly one third of the country was lost in the so-called Anglo-Gurkha War against British Empire between 1814 and 1816 and, according to the Treaty of Sagauli, it was concluded that representatives of East India Company will reside there and administrate it, (unlike neighboring India) Nepal has never entirely been under direct British colonial rule (Vavroušková 2003: 147-154).

Political parties in Nepal were generally founded during 30s and 40s of the last century as a form of expression of opposition to long-lasting oligarchic rule of the Rana

---

[5] Mao's writings regarding guerrilla warfare served as a source of inspiration as well as a general guidance for very many insurgent groups operating in the second half of 20th century. In 1937, Mao published his most influential contribution in this respect called On Guerrilla Warfare. He divides guerrilla warfare into three phases. The first one is characteristic by "hit and run" tactics in order to gain weapons, ammunition, recruit new members and strive to conquer certain areas from where the guerrillas could temporarily operate. The second phase is supposed to be all about attempts to generate certain power balance between guerrillas and government forces. At that stage, it is essential to prove inability and inefficiency of government by organizing constant attacks against military and police stations and their personnel, conducting sabotages and training a conventional kind of army for the latest phase of war during which guerrillas are expected to finally defeat their enemy militarily. All military actions were always supposed to lead towards virtually revolutionary political goals (Thompson 2002: 18).

dynasty[6]. This fact is quite significant for Nepali political units and makes a difference between them and the vast majority of other Third World political parties that started to appear as an integral part of broader struggle of their nations for independence against colonial rulers from the West. Besides, different sorts of violent people's movements (including peasants) struggling against oppressive administrations across the entire country have very deep roots in modern history of Nepal as well as in the mindsets of its inhabitants.

3.1.1. Path towards Parliamentary Political System

After the World War II, economic development of Nepal stagnated and persisting feudal relationships within predominantly agrarian society made any sort of real progress barely possible to happen. Famines, misery, epidemics of fatal diseases and high child mortality rate were frequent at that time. The rule of Rana dynasty, which gradually exhausted financial resources of the country, greatly depended on support from British government as well as on continuation of British Raj in India. Situation on international scene, which was favorable towards the idea of independence of South Asian nations, revitalizes (non-violent as well as violent) activities of civil disobedience organized by opposition in Katmandu and pro-democratic anti-Rana movements in Indian exile. Under such circumstances, the rightful King of Nepal Tribhuvan decided to leave the country and found a refuge on Indian soil in 1950. Government of freshly independent India, which actively supported Nepali democratic movement from the very beginning of its existence, stood up for king Tribhuvan and did not recognize his immature successor. Prime Minister Nehru mediated bilateral talks that led to a compromise agreement which guaranteed free pardon to all insurgents, acknowledged Tribhuvan as the only King of Nepal and agreed with realization of general elections for constitutive Assembly in 1952. Until the elections could actually take place, provisional government consisting of representatives of both opposing political groups was supposed to administer public affairs. Political fragmentation at the central level and social unrests in peripheral parts of the country continued nonetheless. Because of apparent inability to deliver democratic reforms by the provisional government, Tribhuvan impose Provisional Constitution, which legally restored supreme executive, legislative and judicial authority as well as the role of commander-in-chief amongst sovereign competences of king, in 1951. One year later, Tribhuvan forbade activities of political organizations and fostered direct,

---

[6] The Rana dynasty reduced the influence of the Shah royal family and factually ruled the country from the position of hereditary Prime Minister from 1846 to 1951 (Whelpton 2005: 237).

undisputable monarchical reign. Increasingly popular Communist Party of Nepal, which was officially banned, harshly criticized existing monarchical order and called for its dissolution. The most influential political subject, Nepali Congress, unleashed a new wave of civil disobedience in cooperation with communists at the time when the king was hospitalized abroad and the country was ruled by the crown prince Mahendra. He became the lawful ruler after his father's death in 1955 (Vavroušková 2003: 161-167).

Mahendra soon delegated a coalitional government that legalized political parties (including the communists) and promised to organize general elections. Although Nepali Congress won the elections, its attempts to introduce progressive agrarian reforms were blocked by conservative forces in the country. In 1960, the political stalemate culminated and led Mahendra to step in quite radically. He declared a martial law, grasped the power, imprisoned members of the government, abolished the constitution, delegated his own council of ministers, and established a modified absolutist regime with no political parties known as panchayat system. Severe economic problems together with a very high level of corruption still troubled its functioning. In 1962, Maoist faction separated from (illegal) Communist Party. Maoists found support and understanding mainly amongst youth and radical Nepali students at Indian universities. After the death of Mahendra in 1972, his son Birendra initially sought to continue in the same political direction. Gradually, though, the system was forced by increasing domestic popular pressure to undergo several pro-democratic reforms (Vavroušková 2003: 167-174).

In 1990, the king lastly initiated negotiations with oppositional groups and legalized activities of political parties. New democratic constitution was adopted later that year, too. Even though Nepal was still economically relatively underdeveloped country, in 1990 it underwent a substantial political transformation from almost medieval warrior kingdom to modern constitutional monarchy with pluralist system of political parties. Nepali Congress won the historically first free general competitive elections after more than three decades, which took place in 1992, and easily formed a government by itself. However, the government was not able to meet all the obligations they had given to their supporters during pre-election campaigns and, in the end, it collapsed in 1994. Neither the United Marxist-Leninist Party (considered as the moderate leftist party), nor any other successive conglomerate of political entities was capable of finding an efficient remedy for chronic

socio-political problems as well as economic difficulties the country was suffering from (Vavroušková 2003: 174-176).

Chaos, political instability, overwhelming rural poverty, increasing unemployment, long-term neglect of social and welfare issues by extractive and predatory state systems, nepotism, persisting discrimination on the basis of cast, ethnicity, confession, language or gender and structural exploitation of inhabitants led to the eruption of armed Maoist rebellion (also known as People's War or New Democratic Revolution) led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (Maoist)), which had abandoned electoral politics and initiated the whole bloody insurrection[7], in one of the poorest, remote hilly region of Northwestern part of the country on February 13th, 1996. The party was led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Comrade Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai. Clashes between Maoist rebels and armed government forces quickly spread all over the country. Their proclaimed goal was to abolish the monarchy and establish a communist state system similar to the Chinese model defended by "Chairman" Mao. During repeated rounds of talks (from August to November 2001 and from April to August 2003), Maoists clearly demanded elections to constitutional assembly that would eventually adopt brand new constitution and transform the whole system according to their ideals (e.g. people's sovereignty, secularization, federalism and, later on, even aspects of pluralist democracy against which they violently protested at the beginning). The conflict took 10 years and cost more than 12 000 human lives, left around 100 000 displaced people and countless number of destroyed livelihoods (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/south_asia/, Schwanková 2009: 35).

On June 1st, 2001, King Birendra with his family was murdered in his royal palace in Katmandu. Crown Prince Dipendra allegedly responsible for the bloodshed committed suicide afterwards and as a new king of Nepal was, therefore, inaugurated Bihendra's younger brother Gyanendra (Vavroušková 2003: 176-178).

From the very beginning of the process of democratization, political parties were not able to deliver durable solutions to serious social issues tormenting Nepali society. Most importantly, they were not able to solve the problem of Maoist insurgency. In reaction to such

---

[7] In fact, this was historically second Maoist uprising in Nepal. The first one, which is often compared to the original Naxalite movement in India, took place in 1971 and it was brutally suppressed by the Panchayat regime soon after its commencement (Joshi, Mason 2007: 406).

unsatisfactory results, King Gyanendra decided to dissolve the parliament and suspend the Prime Minister from office and replace him as well as the rest of the government by people of his choice. In 2005, Gyanendra let arrested leaders of all political parties, restricted press freedom and assumed executive power in the state directly. He claimed that the country needed security and peace before it could have democracy. The situation took approximately one year and was finally resolved by joint pressure of the so-called Seven Party Alliance that associated seven most prominent Nepali political subjects in order to end the autocratic rule and restore the democratic regime and its institutions (Schwanková 2009: 32, Bohara et al. 2006: 109).

At that very moment, Maoist rebels used the opportunity and entered negotiations with the parliamentary government on how to put an end to the civil war. Although agreement was finally reached in November 2006, Maoists still insisted on unconditional abolition of the monarchy. Then in December 2007, parliament passed a bill that, in fact, formally declared Nepal a federal republic (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/south_asia/).

The very last parliamentary elections took place in April 2008. The CPN (Maoist) not only participated in those elections but they even managed to win it by a large margin and, therefore, their leader Prachanda, who had led the movement throughout roughly a decade-lasting guerrilla war, became Prime Minister of Nepal. The Maoist-led coalition government was disintegrated and toppled in 2009, though. From that moment onwards, every attempt to form a stable government was doomed to fail and the country is in the state of political deadlock and confusion nowadays (Ibid.).

3.2. Brief Outline of Modern History of India

India officially gained her independence from the British colonizers on 15th August, 1947. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, promulgation of the partition of the British Raj and the independence of its successor dominions of India and Pakistan along the religious division line[8] was lawfully declared. The act of partition disrupted many vital economic and infrastructural connections

---

[8] While India was formally supposed to be a secular state (with the absolute majority of Hindu populace), Pakistan proclaimed itself as an Islamic republic.

and caused confusion and severe economic consequences in several parts of the Indian subcontinent. It was, moreover, accompanied by bloody ethnic clashes during hectic processes of forced migration of whole communities who had suddenly found themselves in a minority position within a hostile environment of either of the two newly established state units. In addition, a border conflict about disputed territory of Kashmir between India and (West) Pakistan broke out at that time (Strnad et al. 2003: 823).

One of the most prominent figures of Indian struggle for Independence – Mahatma Gandhi – was assassinated by a Hindu extremist in January 1948 for his repeated pacific attempts to restore harmony between Hindu and Muslim segments in the region. In 1950, the Indian Constitution came into force and the former dominium became the Republic of India[9]. Given the fresh experience of Pakistan, prevailing feeling of necessity to integrate princely states, and the fact of religious and ethnic diversity of Indian peoples, the constitution inherited a strong centralist character. The political institutions were deeply influenced by the British model of parliamentary system of governance (Ibid.).

Indian National Congress (INC) decisively won historically first general elections to the lower chamber of the Indian Parliament, which took place in 1951. INC then confirmed its undisputed position in 1957 and 1962. The party as well as its leader – Jawaharlal Nehru – had been enjoying wide popularity from the times of colonial oppression. Under the rule of INC, Indian economy underwent a number of agrarian reforms and experienced significant progress in the heavy industrial sector. Nehru's secular ideals and modern policies contributed to partial inhibition of religious hatred. The end of Nehru's rule was marked by an armed conflict with China over problematic mountainous territory of Aksai Chin in 1962 (Strnad et al. 2003: 824).

Nehru's only daughter Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister in 1966. INC under her command achieved another victory in general elections one year later as well as in snap elections in 1970. Meanwhile, in 1967, a violent peasant uprising in a remote Bengali village called Naxalbari marked the birth of the world's largest Maoist guerrilla insurgency. After the transformation of East Pakistan to Bangladesh (which India basically allowed to happen), India's dominant regional position became unquestionable. However, after accusations of

---

[9] It still belongs to the Commonwealth of Nations.

illegal manipulations during pre-election campaign followed by her initiation of declaration of state of emergency, (in spite of positive growth of Indian economy) Indira Gandhi lost her position after elections in 1977, which were won by oppositional Janata Party. Nevertheless, after relatively short and unimpressive reign of Janata, Indira Gandhi came back to the highest level of Indian political life in 1980 with its new party called INC (I)[10].

From the end of 1970s, more and more Sikhs demanded their own national state. During the first half of 1980s, the number of seditious incidents caused by their extremist factions in Punjab increased. As a response to that, Indira Gandhi ordered a commencement of a military operation against the centre of Sikh's resistance in the pilgrimage city of Amritsar in 1984. Two Gandhi's bodyguards, who committed her assassination in Delhi later that year, revenged that massacre. Indira's son Rajiv immediately became the next Prime Minister of India whose position on the political scene was substantially underpinned by the general atmosphere of condolence for his loss. Although INC (I), indeed, received a record-breaking majority of the seats in the national parliament during December's elections, the tense situation in Punjab continued in varying degrees till the first half of 1990s (Vrbová 2007: 43-47).

Rajiv Gandhi faced harsh criticism and allegations of corruption scams from aggregated oppositional forces called the People's Front led by ex-member of INC V.P. Singh. After the 1989 general elections, Singh was strong enough to secure a minority government supported by the Communists and Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from outside. However, the minority government lasted only one year and it resigned after receiving a non-confidence vote in the parliament. During the 1991 election campaign, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil extremist suicide bomber for New Delhi's interference in the civil conflict between Tamils and Sinhals in Sri Lanka (Vrbová 2007: 48).

INC won the elections and put together a coalition that served the full five-year term, during which several essential liberal reforms were keenly promoted in order to open the Indian economy to global investment and trade. Because of mounting political corruption scandals affecting even certain members of the leading coalition, the oppositional BJP emerged as the single most powerful political subject after the 1996 national elections. After a

---

[10] 'I' stands for Indira.

short period of changeable coalition governments, BJP repeated its electoral victory in 1998 and, once again, in 1999. The government continued in market-oriented economic reforms and sound fiscal policies and India experienced a huge economic growth. In 2004, INC-led alliance won the general elections and formed a coalition with regional parties and socialists as well as with outside support of India's Communist parties. Despite the change of government and rhetoric, new Prime Minister Manomohan Singh basically continued in the processes of further economic liberalization, deregulation and (to limited extent) privatization. Finally, in the very last general elections, which took place in 2009, INC-led political block convincingly defended its dominance within the contemporary Indian political arena. Besides, the rapid economic expansion has considerably increased global political and diplomatic influence   of   India   at   the   dawn   of   21st century   (http://history-100.blogspot.com/2009/08/history-of-republic-of-india.html).

Yet it has been more than four decades since the threat posed by the Naxalites has appeared for the very first time in relatively remote corner of the country and neither the local governments in regions affected by the Naxalite movement nor the central one in New Delhi has been capable of delivering any sort of durable solution. On the contrary, nowadays, it appears that the movement is still very much alive and it most probably presents bigger threat to the inner security of the state than ever before in its post-colonial history.

4. Research Design

To choose proper research framework is an essential step on a path towards any serious scientific investigation. In general, research methods are eventually supposed to help to reveal if (and to what extent) selected abstract categories and their presumed mutual interrelations defined by particular theoretical scheme are based on relevant empirical evidence.

4.1. Methodological Considerations

First and foremost, it is necessary to terminologically and conceptually distinguish methodology and method. While methodology points to general philosophical principles and processes of creation and interpretation of knowledge, method is merely a tool of scientific

investigation providing the methodology with various sets of techniques, instruments, and strategies of particular data collection, functional means of testing abstract hypothesis, and so on and so forth.

Also, it should be noted here that the way of creation of knowledge can never be completely value-neutral, purely factual and objective. To paraphrase Robert Cox, it always serves someone and/or some purpose. This is especially true in cases of studies engaged in certain conflict situations that usually postulate at least two diametrically different (subjective) interpretations of referenced events. In addition, stakes are comparatively very high in armed conflicts over state power.

That is tightly connected with the question of normative respects as well. Maoist ideologues claim to liberate the oppressed parts of society from insufferable yoke of proliferated, corrupted, inhumane, and exploitative political system and lead them all towards shining future of tomorrow. Armed struggle, which for most of the rebels signify a measure of last resort in their firm resistance against no longer tolerable level of injustice, is, thereby, judged as an execution of justice. Spokesmen of central government, chief executive officers of involved gigantic multinational corporations, and mainstream mass media opinion-makers, on the other side, try to defend their own vision of the best model of societal order and condemn any subversive elements potentially threatening the very foundation of its legitimate existence as perilous terrorists and frequently incline to blame them for all the misery and suffering in their countries. In such context, one can easily found himself confronted with two totally distinct types of discourses with barely any mutual intersection whatsoever.

Another related difficulty can represent simple fact that a great amount of relevant literature about Naxalism in India and Maoism in Nepal was never translated into any other than local languages (Hindi, Bengali, Nepali, etc.). Momentarily available publications, articles, and other sources of secondary nature in English might present only very limited and biased part of the whole multilayered story.

Last but not least, dealing with delicate information regarding lives and deaths of people caught in the midst of violent interstate conflict requires certain amount of sensitivity towards potential ethical repercussions, too.

4.2. Principles of Qualitative Methods

In sharp contradistinction to quantitative methods, which derive their basic paradigms from the field of natural sciences, qualitative ones do not primarily work with numerical data. Within the realm of social sciences, they mostly work with variables that are not principally quantifiable. Through their lenses, one should ideally be able to observe given phenomena in their unique, unrepeatable as well as multiform and complex essence which can never be merely quantified. Furthermore, whilst quantitative research ordinarily deals with quantitative (e.g. statistical) data about relatively large number of cases, qualitative one is rather concerned with mainly qualitative variables in a reasonably smaller, exclusive number of cases. Besides, qualitative research can be distinguished from quantitative one by at least two specific epistemological standpoints; causal explanation, which is also largely used by adherents of the quantitative approaches, and interpretative understanding. Each of them is based on totally different prepositions related to fundamental rules of scientific cognition of outer world's assumed nature.

Interpretative approach is utmost doubtful about possible revelation of hidden casual inter-relationships within the social reality. Instead of that, it prefers an idea of mutual constitutive character of social phenomena. In the end, it does not strive for ideally objective description of chosen phenomenon from distant perspective but it seeks to reconstruct purely subjective insight of involved participants of that event and then to interpret it thoroughly.

Explanatory approach, on the other side, presupposes certain level of unity between natural and social sciences. According to it, both of them principally ought to be able to clarify hidden casual connectedness of surveyed reality. Even though a classical experiment, which would eventually prove the ultimate validity of hypothesis under examination, is not, strictly speaking, achievable in social sciences, it can be partly overcame by gathering as much historical data as possible in order to retroactively reconstruct a fictional experiment that, through a process of analytical explanation, might finally indicate the existence (or nonexistence) of casual relationship (Drulák 2008: 27).

4.2.1. Case Study in General

Every single moment within the constant flow of cognizable social reality is literally influenced by myriads of contributing factors. Thus, the main purpose of case study is customarily not to describe the entire system and the ways it functions but to capture this multidimensionality through very detailed analysis of clearly defined and strictly delimitated subject, institution, phenomenon, process or any situation of interest and evaluate their causes, effects and roles they perform within the system. Apart from gaining really profound insight into the phenomenon in hand, it can subsequently serve as an instrument towards further testing other related hypotheses or even creating brand new ones by the medium of induction method which can derive generalized conclusions out of them (Říchová in Cabada, Kubát 2004: 88).

Naturally, case studies are comparatively more efficient in identification of scope conditions, during which the concerned phenomenon typically occurs, then in defining the exact proportions of causal significance of each and every variable involved in its final realization. On the other hand, either due to the fact that the final state might have been caused by more than just one factor or it could eventually be achieved as an unexpected result of a inimitable synergy of several diverse reasons, it is not always possible to positively specify necessary or sufficient condition(s) for its materialization in different cases (Kořan in Drulák 2008: 40).

Besides, the subject of inquiry regularly differs from the case itself. While the subject is a general phenomenon, whose nature the inquiry is supposed to reveal, the case is basically a particular event that is used in order to analyze certain general hypothesis more holistically and intensively. By taking into account more and more cases of specific social, economic, geographical and temporal conditions, we may also slightly contribute to the endless process of empirical enrichment, deepening of analytical insight and further improvement of existing limited theoretical equipment in the field. It should be stated, though, that the level of applicability of generalized concepts is directly proportional to accurate defining of conditions and circumstances that determine the concept itself as well as its application within different contexts (Říchová in Cabada, Kubát 2004: 91).

Accordingly, whilst the subject of this thesis tackles the broad issue of various forms of contentious politics on the macro-level in general (and within the region of contemporary South Asia in particular), the two concrete, illustrative cases in hand are the Republic of India vis-à-vis the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and the key distinguishing features of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI (Maoist)) vis-à-vis the CPN (Maoist) respectively.

Moreover, parsimonious specification of dependent variables as well as reasonable identification of searched independent variables (and/or mediating ones) within a carefully chosen theoretical framework are tightly related to the subject of inquiry. Consequently, if they are defined too vaguely at the beginning, it is usually very difficult to accurately assess their values later on. In this thesis, the independent variable is identified with a prevailing notion of legitimacy, whose content has been socially constructed in accordance with specific historical processes of formation of respective national political cultures.

Next important step is to evaluate all the involved variables in order to make them mutually comparable. The ability to define a truthfully plausible scale of values has a connection with qualitative operationalization of the concept that is analyzed. Not only theory itself, but an inductive insight is equally required at this point. From a purely strategic point of view, all the selected cases should, furthermore, offer enough independent, mediating and dependent variables in order to fit smoothly into presumed theoretical scheme.

Apart from all that, the question of fruitful cooperation between used method and theory(ies) can be also perceived as the question of compatibility between ontological assumptions stated by the theory and epistemological considerations of the method as well as its own ontological prerequisites.

In general, case studies can be virtually located at certain relatively blurry zone in between two extreme poles presented by the so-called grounded theories on the one side and ethnographic/anthropologic approaches on the other. While grounded theory approaches choose data with minimal theoretical background and accomplish its observational processes with formulation of a brand new theory, research that is conducted according to ethnographic method is, on the other hand, driven by clear theoretical postulations that have been identified from the very beginning (Drulák 2008: 23).

4.2.2. Comparative Case Study in Particular

Comparative case study is an empirical-analytical method focused on an intense examination of (sub-)global cases of real-world manifestations of certain social phenomena and regularities as well as exceptionalities of their developments. In order to do so, it requires applying at least two relevant cases for its across-case (comparative) analysis. This very procedure has basically been using from the beginnings of asking for quintessence of political as well as social life as such. First documented examples come from famous Greek thinker Aristotle of Stageira who lived in ancient city-state of Athens nearly two-and-a-half millennia ago. Comparative case study has developed significantly through the history and it finally established itself as a method sui genereis within the field of political science and international relations in 1960s[11]. The most notable sign of viability and constant progress can probably be demonstrated on variety of classical as well as modern scientific methods that it uses nowadays (Karlas in Drulák 2008: 62).

Hypothetically, comparative case study is equipped enough in order to team up with understanding approach just as well as with explanatory one. However, because of its relative closeness to a genuine scientific experiment, it has mostly been used by researchers who subscribe themselves to explanatory approaches. It can, to a great extent, control casual influence of independent variables and it is perfectly suitable for investigation of social reality at the same time. This unique ability is caused by a process of consequent observation of differences between values of variables across diverse cases. This process enables researchers to identify those cases that, despite the fact that they share a number of common independent variables (i.e. constants), they all have been marked by different values of dependent ones. Therefore, there can be no direct casual relationship between them. Such strategy, which is emblematic for the vast majority of actual comparative studies, is closely linked to methods of elimination named after an important British utilitarian philosopher and economist of the 19th century, John Stuart Mill (Karlas in Drulák 2008: 64).

---

[11] The revival of comparative study was also partly inspired by the proverbial "wind of change" and the global wave of gradual decolonization which consequently drawn the attention of social scientific community towards non-Western socio-political systems and its (unmatchable) informal constitutive components (Říchová in Dvořáková et al. 2005: 33).

4.2.3. Introductory Notes to Mill's Methods of Elimination

Two of above mentioned methods, better known as the method of agreement and the method of difference, are deliberately designed for focused comparison of essentially different or essentially similar cases. Using either of them requires searching for cases of comparable character. In this sense, comparability means that similar value of the vast majority of independent variables provides for considering them as constant ones. Those variables can be clearly taken as control parameters. The more variables are identified with control parameters, the more precise is detection of the casual impact of independent variables. Comparability can be achieved geographically, synchronically as well as diachronically. Synchronic composition is usually a slightly more static kind of analysis which explains the phenomena within different global locations in relatively short perspective. The one used in this thesis, which studies two parallel cases in very limited period of time connected with actually slightly divergent rise, evolution, inner transformation and continuous existence of Maoist guerrilla movements in India and Nepal, contains several necessary elements of dynamism as well (Karlas in Drulák 2008: 68).

4.2.4. Description of Method of Difference

In the contrast to the method of agreement, which compares several cases with the same dependent variables and only one independent one, the method of difference is concerned with cases that significantly differ in dependent variable and, at the same time, in only one independent one. According to the method of difference, casual is every variable that can not be excluded as a variable upon which both instances agree. It practically means that if two cases differ in dependent variable as well as in one independent one, we can identify the relationship with the casual link and the independent variable with the casual one. Through the process of exclusion of all those independent variables, which have the same value in both cases, factors that are not able to explain the difference might be effectively eliminated (Karlas in Drulák 2008: 70-71).

In other words, the method of difference is based on two cases of the Maoist guerrilla movements in India and Nepal that, in spite of their fundamental (albeit by no means absolute) similarity, are marked by one specific distinction (i.e. dependent variable). Indeed, while in Nepal Maoists recently managed to quite successfully join the highest levels of

mainstream political arena, in India they happened to be perceived as the single gravest threat to inner stability of the country by the vast majority of its top political leaders (The Hindu 2010: 1).

The ideal goal of this thesis, therefore, should be, in accordance with applied theoretical construction, to identify the key reasons behind such tremendous disparity and to shed more light into its mechanisms. A slightly different general perception as well as definition of the notion of legitimacy (or even legality in that matter) constructed through differing historical experiences within otherwise relatively similar political cultures of Nepal and India can serve as a possibly illuminating explanation here.

From the ontological point of view, comparative case study can be applied by proponents of both, holistic as well as individualist approaches. While it largely operates with macro-social structures, it also possesses mechanisms to adequately acknowledge the role and impact of concrete actions committed by individual actors within specific situations (Karlas in Drulák 2008: 64).

In this thesis, the result is well-known from the very beginning. The real task, then, is to reveal the casual link that leads to it. That can be achieved through application of suitable theoretical framework on the chosen cases.

5. Theoretical Part

In both inquired cases, the key actors, which should be theoretically grasped, are Maoist movements. They can basically be described as avatars of broader elusive phenomenon of social movements different from state within which they operate (whether their members insist on working strictly against its institutions – like in India – or not – like in Nepal, where they decided to become a part of it). The theoretical framework, therefore, generally appears from conventional postulates of modern social movements slightly adjusted to the reality of the so-called Third World. Since this thesis deals with very particular social movements that apply (or until recently used to apply) violent means of communication with central government in order to achieve their goals, a particular theoretical approach called contentious politics, which was carefully developed by reputable American historical

sociologist and political scientist Charles Tilly, would serve as an adequate framework for further analysis of their performances. In order to comprehend not only the mere dynamics of both movements within the realm of contentious politics but also the hidden reasons and non-trivial processes aiming to their respective transformation from initially non-violent conventional political parties into organizations challenging the entire existing order via means of violent coercion and (in the case of Nepal) back again, pertinent complementary theoretical approach designated by two erudite political scientists Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur is added.

Although original debates over the issue of modern (Western) social movements can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, the theoretical tools capable of accurate capturing it were not fully developed for a long time. The rise of interest in such phenomenon reflects much broader philosophical discussion within the entire field of social sciences in general and International Relations in particular. Till the end of the 1980s, the focus of the absolute majority of widely read scholars was concentrated towards national-states that were mainly perceived as homogenous units operating strictly rationally under the omnipresent context of global anarchy. Their inner mechanisms either stayed out of attention or were considered as undiscoverable "black boxes" (Phongpaichit 1999: 1).

The initial spark, which disputed the dominant position of that perspective, was the collapse of the Soviet block and the sudden end of the long-lasting Cold War that none of the mainstream theoretical approaches had been able to reliably predict at that time. Such revelation generated a new and highly nutritious environment for alternative ways of critical thinking of so many imaginable non-state dimensions of the world around us and its constituents. Colorful scale of social movements is undoubtedly a part of it (Drulák 2003: 117).

In addition, from the second half of the 20th century, guerrilla and ethnic/religious conflicts as well as other forms of civil wars predominated over traditionally waged interstate wars. Last decade, moreover, witnessed a trend of rise of threatening and/or using violent manners by paramilitary units, guerrilla troops, dead squads, secret police and other forces of irregular nature. It also recorded an increasing number of state-supported violence against civilians (especially against entire social segments stigmatized on the basis of religious, ethnic or political identity). There is an evident global shift from classical (or even neo-) realist

portrait of violence between two unmistakably identifiable nation-states by means of national armed forces towards actions committed by far broader scale of violence specialists within the regimes themselves (Tilly 2003: 65-73).

5.1. Discourse on Social Movements

In general, social movement theory seeks to explain internal logic and reasons for various forms of social mobilization to occur as well as their political, social, economic, and cultural consequences. The first notable wave of social movements erupted in the United States of America in the 1960s. List of issues articulated by proponents of those movements stretched from anti-militarist and anti-segregationist through environmentalist to women's as well as gay and lesbian rights agenda. Preliminary efforts of scientific community to accommodate so variable manifestations under certain neat theoretical common denominator resulted in the so-called breakdown theory focusing mainly on irrational instincts and grievances as their sources. James Davies, Ted Gurr, or Denton Morrison belong among advocates of this approach. Later on, the focus was shifted rather towards inner organizational structure and applied strategies of the movements in relation to reasons for their eventual success or downfall. Because the key reason was identified with an ability to use available (human, material, ideational, etc.) resources, this approach was called resource mobilization theory. While authors like Myer Zald or John McCarthy, who are originators and propagators of the economic version of this approach, Charles Tilly and Dough McAdam are considered as pioneers of its political version focusing more on the political struggle instead of merely economic factors. The shift of attention from the sphere of civil society to the realm of politics was further elaborated by the political process approach. It perceives the movements through their periodic interactions with the state and probability of their success in dependency on opportunities stemming from the character of those interactions as well as on the character of power relations within the political system (Phongpaichit 1999: 1-2).

Theoretical debates over the issue of social movements did not attract quite the same attention within the Western European scientific circles until the 1970s. European discourse, which had been comparatively more deeply influenced by Marxist tradition of political economy, however, was mainly concentrated on why these non-class-based movements arose. They asserted that movements involve matters of identity and socially constructed norms and that the critical struggle takes place within the realm of civil society. This discourse paved the

way to what is now called the new social movement theory[12] amongst whose most inspirational proponents belong Jurgen Habermas or Alain Touraine. According to Touraine, the post-modern state and its mechanisms, the capitalist market, and the mass media systematically reduce the liberty of individuals. For Haberman, expanding forces of market economy and state structures colonize the private and public spheres of individuals (the so-called lifeworld) in which meanings and values reside. *"For both Habermas and Touraine, the main role of social movements is the mobilisation of (…) human beings in their full role as free and creative members of a pluralistic society, as opposed to victims or objects of state and market domination. (…) [Thus,] …social movement is a collective form of action to contest the abuses of political and economic power, and to change the political and market institutions in order to produce a better society"* (Phongpaichit 1999: 3).

From the late 1970s onwards, the debate started to penetrate into the Third World countries of Latin America and Asia as well. Approximately from 1990, the explosion of rural-based movements re-emphasized the issue of resource scarcity in synthetic connection with identity of repressed minority groups within non-western contexts. As such, it is obvious that social movements are closely related to the studies of contentious politics initiated by classic works of Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Dough McAdam, and William Gamson and further embroidered by many others (Phongpaichit 1999: 5).

5.2. Adjustment of Theory of (Post-)Modern Social Movements to 3rd World Reality

First of all, like many other Western-based theories, the Theory of Social Movements is also burdened by a problem of ethnocentrism and ethno-determinism. Hence, several aspects should be taken into consideration before the theoretical section goes any further. Herein, only few of them are elaborated.

The theory was originally postulated with specific respect to Western post-modern societies that are typical, among other features, by the fact that the absolute majority of their workforce is well educated, skilled and employed within service sector. However, because of

---

[12] More recently, we mostly speak about the so-called New Social Movements that present newly created identities substantially influenced by post-material values and worldviews contradicting the tyranny of currently prevailing social values and norms.

the ongoing process of globalization, the same forces, which are usually opposed by social movements in developed, post-industrial, Western states, can be, in a way, identified in developing countries of South Asia as well. Unleashed market fundamentalism, state's financial dependence on the foreign direct investments (FDI) from MNCs/TNCs, the inglorious race to the bottom, or sneaking domination of consumerist lifestyle can be encompassed among these forces. Moreover, most of the negative consequences of dominating position of Western world during the process of globalization are much more serious for non-Western societies (Phongpaichit 1999: 6).

Another difference is that while Western social movements, which typically consist of middle class citizens, are mostly concerned with the quality of life, their non-Western equivalents formed largely by unprivileged and socially alienated peasants of the lowest social status still often strive for the most basic material aspects of life (e.g. rights to body, rights to livelihood, rights to land) as well as for an access to them. Nevertheless, because of a number of highly sophisticated channels of modern transcontinental communication, huge influence of global mass-media and, at least partly, shared cultural contexts with the Western world; several non-Western popular movements are not entirely immune against the influence of their Western counterparts. Therefore, they often demand a unique mixture of both of the conveniences simultaneously every now and then (Ibid.).

Correspondingly, a considerable number of Third World social movements dedicated a great deal of time and energy to build democratic structures (and especially mechanisms of general elections) in hope that these institutions will allow participation, bring about development, remove oppression and, thus, overcome many of persisting injustices and inequalities within their societies. In the context of contemporary stage of the process of globalization, however, those presumptions seem to be quite divorced from reality. That is mainly because of the fact that *"…*[t]*he state subjugates itself to the forces of the market and globalization and in the process denies equality and liberty to the majority of people"* (Phongpaichit 1999: 7).

Additionally, Western thinkers, fully in accordance with historical tradition of Western liberalism and values of the French Revolution, mostly write about social movements from perspectives that are concerned with the idea of expansion of individual liberty. However, non-Western societies have a slightly different historical experience and perception. Western

accent on individual liberty has much weaker intellectual roots in, for instance, Asian philosophical traditions and political practices that generally place more emphasize on the role of social groups and collective interests of whole communities (Ibid.).

5.3. Contentious Politics by Charles Tilly

According to Tilly, almost every collective act of violence, which is (and always has been) by nature inevitably present in every socio-political system on Earth, is basically characterized by episodic social interaction that directly hurts other human beings or unanimated things; it is committed by more than one person; and it is a result of, at least partly, coordinated approach. Hence, it excludes purely individual actions, any kind of detriments of immaterial quality as well as accidental or unanticipated harms. Moreover, collective acts of violence differ from individualist ones qualitatively. They are influenced by dissimilar social relations, structures and processes. Despite very many different conditions and specific contextual circumstances, under which they can be realized, all instances of collective acts of violence result from analogous causations and their combinations in dependence on particular given situations (Tilly 2003: 13-14).

There are three main sources of violent behavior: ideas, behavior and social interaction. Ideas about just and appropriate usage of instruments of violent coercion, differences between social classes and so on may, indeed, contribute to collective acts of violence. In accordance with other scholars, violent behavior has been inherited to human genetic code and further cultivated by gradual process of evolution and natural selection. Yet, there is another perspective that strongly emphasizes the key role of interpersonal relations, which form human personality and create the overall context for exchange of ideas as well as collision of incongruous attitudes. Although, in reality, those three reasons seldom appear in a pure form (though they can usually be hierarchized according to their respective relevance, one is mostly confronted with a certain combination of them) Tilly privileges the mechanism of relations whose impacts are also partly conditioned by cognitive and contextual mechanisms (Tilly 2003: 14-17).

A focus on the dimension of social interactions is related to the idea of contentious politics[13]. The term is derived from the fact that it deals with contradictory claims and interests of participants that are usually, one way or another, related to governmental structures. It is based on discontinuous, collective, public appeals on government as a counterpart involved in collective violence either as an observer, concurrent player, demanding side or recipient of demands. The complex and naturally inseparable relationship between government and violence is usually unequal. If the government is very weak, it is more often that the level of interpersonal violence is comparably higher within a population under its jurisdiction and vice versa. Irrespectively to the actual scope of their power, all governments try really hard to keep the control over several concentrated instruments of violence such as army, armed guards, prison officers and so forth (Tilly 2003: 35).

Governments themselves also accept and partly contribute to construction of particular identities. Those identities serve as functional boundaries between governmental agents and people who are generally considered as integral parts of the political regime (but not part of the current government and its funds) as well as between the entire pro-system oriented political representation altogether, subjected citizens, outer political agents and others who might (not always peacefully) try to challenge the system from diverse directions in order to reach to certain desirable resources the ruling government possesses and sometimes even monopolizes (Tilly 2003: 38).

Another important aspect is recognition of wide scale of inequalities between diverse segments of contemporary societies. Two most dominant relational mechanisms, which create and perseveringly sustain such unequal environment, are exploitation and accumulation of opportunities. Exploitation comes into play when powerful, interconnected group of individuals controls resources and draws inadequately high profits from them through coordinated efforts of other people whose additional value in the process is not entirely reflected in their remunerations. Accumulation of opportunities happens when members of certain delimited network possess an access to a source that is precious, exclusive, profitable, and whose value is related to the scale of operability of the whole network (Tilly 2003: 19).

---

[13] Not every case of contentious politics necessary produces violence. Nevertheless, every act of collective violence contains certain element of contention (Tilly 2003: 35).

Exploitation as well as accumulation of opportunities works much more effectively when (like in the case of both India and Nepal) the borders of such groups copy other cleavages (e.g. class, national, ethnic, racial, religious or gender-based) that are widely recognized by society and underpinned by a certain set of related judgments, narratives, practices and social relations. Those cleavages can deepen the processes of exploitation and accumulation of opportunities and, at the same time, the cleavages are further perpetuated by them because they bring comparatively higher benefits for the members of allegedly higher categories. Governments and ruling classes always, to certain extent, exploit and accumulate opportunities at the expense of dominated and otherized ones in order to stay in power. Inequality based on governmental control plays a crucial role in collective violence because it is usually worth fighting for either in order to gain the power to do so or to maintain it (Tilly 2003: 19-20).

Governments are habitually on the side of those who profit from existing inequalities. Firstly, the majority of members of government directly belong amongst them. Secondly, those who profit from the status quo are better equipped in order to organize and influence the functioning of current governments. Thirdly, the flow of vital governmental sources (like taxes, armed forces, military equipment, supplies, information, etc.) is dependent on the unequal structure of given system and they would be threatened by any dispute of its legitimacy (Tilly 2003: 20).

Consequently, political activities, like dealing with mineral rights or exclusive control over holy places, can be seen as attempts to generate, defend or question non-governmental systems of exploitation and accumulation of opportunities. Ultimately, the level of convergence between categorical differences propagated by government on one side and by non-governmental actors on the other codetermines the character of collective violence (Ibid.).

Fundamental factor already presents the very act of official un/recognition of non-governmental actors themselves, their identities as well as acknowledgement of rightfulness of their demands. Individuals professionally interested in (and personally benefiting from) de/activation of mutual barriers, jointing and dissolving different social groups and networks,

coordination of destructive campaigns[14], and representation (often under the threat of violence) of particularly defined social entities at times of outbreak of certain form of collective violence are called political entrepreneurs. They are typically accompanied by (or even identical with) the so-called violence specialists who control means of destruction. They are identifiable in every sort of government (e.g. soldiers, policemen, guards, executioners). Many violence specialists operate partly under governmental supervision (paramilitary units of different kinds) or outside governmental sphere of influence at all. Some of them work in direct opposition against government and its institutions (e.g. terrorists, guerrilla forces, hijackers, pirates, exactors) and others may even attempt to establish unofficial structures parallel to governmental ones (like Naxals in certain districts of eastern parts of India or Maoists in western Nepal for example). Mutual intersection between political entrepreneurs and violence specialists consists of regional warlords, international arms dealers, mercenary and insurgent leaders and so forth. In general, wherever participation in organized violence indicates a possibility of grasping more economic and political power, the level of collective violence is considerably raised there (Tilly 2003: 40-49).

Thereto, demands of majority of contemporary agents of collective violence are more focused on ensuring a genuine political autonomy for subjugated nations or promoting more inclusive, fair and balanced policies for oppressed and marginalized people they usually very ostentatiously claim to represent as a whole vis-à-vis officially established governmental structures. Moreover, if areas inhabited by those people happen to be rich on desirable natural resources (like in the illustrative case of Indian mineral belt), it can easily result in further race for profit maximization, continuous process of social, political and economic exclusion, armed resistance and tragic deterioration of their living conditions (Tilly 2003: 73-74).

There are many different forms of social organization of collective violence in reality. None of them is, however, a stable unit resistible to change. It is, in fact, fairly ordinary that one particular manifestation of collective violence metamorphoses into another one in relatively very short period of time. In order to explain such dynamics, Tilly provides a two-dimensional scheme that is supposed to spatially map out practically all kinds of interpersonal violence. The first dimension is called salience of short-run damage. It measures an extent of causing and suffering from damages within given interaction. While in its lower extreme

---

[14] While mechanisms of social inclusion obviously help the process of coordination of collective violence on the macro scale, separation supports it on the micro level (Tilly 2003: 84).

position, acts of only occasional damages with modest (almost non-violent) nature are concentrated, acts of severe violence with highly damaging effects committed practically during every kind of mutual interaction between inquired entities are placed in its upper extreme counter-position (Tilly 2003: 22).

The second dimension represents the level of coordination between the participants of violence. It may vary from only improvised signalization between two perpetrators of accidental vandalism to mass participation in highly centralized organizations that act according to sophisticated scenarios. All in all, the more coordinated behavior and the more relevant damages incurred during interactions, the more destructive consequences of them should be expected (Tilly 2003: 23).

5.3.1. Ideal Categories of Acts of Collective Violence

According to above-mentioned scheme, Tilly presents a specific typology of interpersonal violence. First of all, he distinguishes individual aggression from collective acts of violent behavior as a special sub-category of interpersonal violence. Then, he introduces six partially penetrable categories of collective violence: violent rituals, coordinated destruction, opportunism, brawls, scattered attacks and broken negotiations (Tilly 2003: 24).

Violent rituals can be described as situations where at least one identifiable and relatively coordinated side of the conflict is acting according to certain scenario that states that in order to win, its members are supposed to hurt themselves or the others within a set of strict limits of commonly accepted arena (e.g. humiliating ceremonies, collective suicides, public executions, extreme full-contact sports, clashes between hardcore fans or brutal rivalry amongst members of gangs).

Coordinated destruction refers to a situation where individuals or organizations specialized in mastering of instruments of violence purposely hurt people and destroy belongings (e.g. wars, acts of collective sacrifice, genocides, and several kinds of terrorism). Coordinated destruction can be characterized by high level of coordination of agents of open violence as well as by high level of salience of damaging acts during the vast majority of interactions between two challenging sides. Individuals or organizations specialized on using compulsory means typically execute programs oriented towards damaging people or their

possessions. It is a product of activation of boundaries, identity-related narratives, and relations as well as involvement of diverse social actors that together produce on average higher level of damage than other forms of collective violence. Coordinated destruction partly interferes with the sphere of broken negotiations because in both instances the specialists on violence are engaged and threats may easily spill-over into violent conflicts and vice versa over time. It also partly overlaps the category of violent rituals because they both often, to a different degree, proceed according to certain rigid scenarios or destructive programs. Coordinated destruction can be further divided into three main subcategories: lethal contests, campaigns of annihilation, and conspiratorial terror. In accordance with Tilly, conspiratorial terror can be caused by relatively small, very well-organized group of insurgents who, by effective using of violent subversive actions, fight a seemingly more powerful enemy. In case that such terror has serious political consequences, it can reveal hidden vulnerability of the enemy and eventually present a dangerously viable alternative to it. Lethal contest requires at least two organized groups of specialists on violence trying to limit (or ideally eliminate completely) each other's ability to damage in mutual collisions. Campaigns of annihilation describes acts of genocide or ethnic purges ordered mostly by state authorities against certain consciously contradistinguishing minority social unit (Tilly 2003: 108).

Opportunism is understood as a behavior of individuals or groups who make use of immediate means of violence in order to reach their habitually forbidden goals during moments when the power of law and order enforcers is weakened or temporarily ineffective (e.g. robberies, piracy, looting, forays).

Instances when originally peaceful gatherings turn into a clash of at least two persons against either another one or his/her possessions can be classified as brawls (relatively softer street fights, hassles, etc.) (Tilly 2003: 24-25).

The category of scattered attacks signifies small-scale, generally non-violent interactions during which several members react to certain obstacles by violence (e.g. sabotages, ambushes against objects of symbolic value or very important persons, arsons). Scattered attacks typically appear either in non-democratic regimes or in regimes with a changing ability to govern that can also alternate the character of threats and opportunities influencing the life of their governed populations.

Finally, broken negotiations happen in times of collective negotiations that invoke resistance, which consequently leads to harm to people, and/or demolition of possession (e.g. demonstrations, governmental repressions, military coups or attempts to demand a ransom). Violence may often serve only as a threat in cases like that. In fact, broken negotiations are characterized by combination of medium or high level of coordination and relatively low level of salience of short-run damage. Unlike scattered attacks, broken negotiations require substantially higher level of coordination. It also differs from coordinated destruction because non-violent interactions present much larger part of its social processes where violence is usually considered only as a marginal byproduct of otherwise relatively well-organized and foremost peaceful exchanges. High level of coordination can also be manifested by the fact that negotiations themselves are often accompanied by relatively disciplined mass demonstrations that unify and energize dissatisfied people who belong to the same identity group and collectively claim principally consonant demands which are commonly apperceived as too controversial, divisive or sensitive in one way or another. Demonstrations ideally take place at certain symbolic as well as visible, public locations. For completeness' sake, even initially serene demonstrations can eventually generate violence and lead to destructive riots. Broken negotiations should be understood as a particularly dynamic and flexible category. Collapses and violent interruptions of negotiations are organic parts of processes and mechanisms that ipso facto define it. They can be caused, for instance, by change of relations between contending sides, which may be achieved by direct or indirect intervention of a powerful external actor, or by transformation of subject of their contention. Also, if mediations as well as agreements between armed cadres opposing central government and deprived local population go far enough, the later may be recruited en masse for fighting their commonly acknowledged enemy and broken negotiations may actually quite readily evolve into coordinated destruction (Tilly 2003: 193-197).

Transition of situation from broken negotiations to coordinated destruction is usually caused by sudden activation of existing borders, relations, and narratives that contribute to an increase of the level of salience of damage during all interactions between antagonistic social entities. The activation can also be accelerated by rise of stakes, increment of sense of uncertainty as well as by involvement of specialists on violence (Tilly 2003: 215-216).

Figure 1 Tilly's typology of collective violence

The figure 1 captures the positions of different manifestations of collective violence and their relative distances from each other in accordance to the level of coordination as well as salience of short-run damage they actually present. Apart of spatial location of every single category, which is symbolized by an ellipse, by itself, it is also their mutual proximity/distance and interrelations what matter there. All the categories are demarcated by dashed lines, which signify their blurry delimitations, and they share certain intersections with each other in order to highlight their partial permeability and possible transition from one category to the next in relative dependence on combination of transformative levels of the two determining axes.

This categorization localizes the types of collective violence from the point of view of transient social processes, which constitutes them, and not from the perspectives of motives and emotions of their perpetrators. It does not entirely exclude the role of individuals, though. Nor does it presuppose that all forms of violence come from the same, deeply individual inclinations. In addition, none of the categories should be understood in absolute terms whatsoever. For instance, extremely high level of coordination as well as salience (i.e. violent

ritual) is mostly a result of the fact that clashes between two opposing sides activate countermeasures of those who are supposed to keep their mutual interactions within acceptable limits. Occasionally, however, two fighting armies, instead of conducting acts of coordinated destruction, may also happen to display the characteristics that are typical for violent rituals in order to standardize and regulate their interactions. State of relatively very low coordination and high salience (i.e. brawl), on the other side, does not always emanate from originally peaceful gatherings of people where several individuals start to fight each other. It is, in fact, the series of such situations that might lead to those results (Tilly 2003: 25-27).

Moreover, Tilly states that in cases of relatively coordinated forms of violence (violent rituals, coordinated destruction and broken negotiations), realization of newly-formed boundaries between 'us' and 'them' plays comparatively more significant role than other traditionally existing social relations (including the hostile ones) and vice versa. The social context systematically influences the level of salience of damage, too. Accessibility of instruments of violence as well as the very existence of the so-called specialists on violent behavior (e.g. armed units) can contribute notably to increasing the level of salience during the acts of collective violence (Ibid.).

Though they partly overlap each other, Tilly explicitly distinguishes violence from illegal activity and crime. There are many non-violent crimes and illegal activities out there. Moreover, not every illegal activity is, strictly speaking, criminalized (e.g. petty offense). A considerable part of violent behavior is even conducted in the name of law and public order. Besides, throughout history, control over the instruments of violence was naturally often, to certain extent, shared between governmental agencies and other entities of diverse forms and entitlements (for example corsairs, paramilitary forces, mercenaries, militia, home defense, guerrilla troops, security services, bodyguards, mafia). Those entities operate within interspaces between fully acknowledged state army on the one side and purely private usage of violence on the other. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between different forms as well as ways of using of violence and officially established governmental institutions. State support (or repression) strongly influences the character and the level of intensity of collective violence in almost every political system (Tilly 2003: 28-29).

The political system itself plays a significant part in the power equation as well. Political regimes and nature of collective violence within them are partly determined by two particular aspects: ability to govern and democracy[15]. Ability to govern refers to the level of governmental control over resources, activities and population living within any concretely demarcated and governed area. Democracy traditionally means the scale of possibilities available for members of any governed population to maintain equal relations with their leaders, to effectively control their actions and to be protected against their wanton acts of violence. The level of collective violence with involvement of state forces naturally increases directly proportionally to the level of ability to govern. It, on the other hand, decreases inversely proportionally to the level of democracy (with notable exception of systems in the process of democratization where the waves of collective violence can be witnessed more often). Regimes with low level of ability to govern experience much broader scale of contentious interactions because their leaders lack mechanisms to control the demand inputs and their political relations are more inclinable to changes from non-violent to violent ones. That is because their overall infectivity can neither consistently prevent the escalation of violence, nor can it enforce uncompromising fulfillment of obligations. Whereas systems marked by low level of democracy and high level of ability to govern tend to authoritarian practices, systems with low level of democracy as well as ability to govern are characterized by arrangements typical for the so-called fragmented tyranny[16] (e.g. rule of bandits and warlords hostile towards rather powerless central government and/or relatively independent on its decisions). Systems with relatively high level of democracy and ability to govern are situated within the imaginary zone of citizenship. Scale of officially tolerated acts of collective contentiousness widens with the progress of democratic manners but diminishes with the rise of ability to govern in every system of governance (Tilly 2003: 49-55).

Basically, every mechanism consists of its environmental, cognitive and relational components. Environmental mechanism changes relations between given social circumstances and their outer ambient. Cognitive mechanism works through changes of individual as well collective images. Last but not least, relation mechanism deals with connections between social units (Tilly 2003: 29-30).

---

[15] That is to say ability to govern within democracy vs. within ruling dictatorship.

[16] Although both cases in hand publicly proclaimed to be democratic during the examined period of time, the level of actual democratic accountability as well as ability to govern differed enormously from place to place.

Instead of searching for all-time valid laws of violent events, this theoretical scheme sought to explain material mechanisms as well as principles responsible for deviations in the very character of collective violence in dependence upon time, place and social circumstances. It is focused on repetitious casual mechanisms (activation of boundaries between 'us' and 'them' by deliberate selection and fundamentalist emphasis on one of many identities every group of people possess and calculatedly playing the xenophobic card afterwards, intensity of mediation within as well as across such conflicting groups or the level of polarization of a broader socio-political space) with similar immediate impacts on micro-level that can lead to completely different effects on macro-level due to their various combinations and sequences (Tilly 2003: 28-29).

All things considered, the following application of the above introduced theory on the two concrete cases from real world would serve as another challenging test of its real-life applicability as well as potential adaptability.

5.4. Political Parties vis-à-vis Terrorist Groups

In the broadest meaning of the term, single, though often complicated, crushingly extra-parliamentary social movement born of mass social and political protests may hypothetically give an impulse to undertake patterns of collective behavior specific to institutionalized political parties just as well as to terrorist groups (and, from time to time, even both at the same moment). Established political parties regularly competing against each other within the set of standard procedures of free democratic elections in order to be able to influence future processes of government formation on the one side and officially banned (anti-systemic) terrorist groups using means of violence (or threat of violence) mainly against targets of symbolic value in order to enforce their demands, which are usually incompatible with the norms acknowledged by the majority in power, on the other are usually considered as mutually antithetical.

Yet, under different than democratic political framework, the fine line between the two does not always have to be as clear-cut as it may appear at the first glance. In fact, members of pro-democratic movements are habitually prosecuted and charged with seditious conspiracy and the like in anti-democratic regimes all over the globe. The so-called terrorists ordinarily portrayed by mainstream media, on the other hand, may subjectively evaluate their

own struggle against prevailing socio-political order as the only available (albeit utmost extreme) way towards liberation from long-term oppression, injustice and various forms of exploitation. Furthermore, there are examples of social groups (or their branches) that conduct activities typically classified as terrorist ones and, simultaneously (at least temporarily), sought to function within the realm of conventional politics.

Therefore, in spite of generally perceived distinction between political party and terrorist group based on a particular type of organization, scholars Weinberg and Pedahzur prefer to concentrate the attention towards a particular kind of activity diverse social group actually perform. According to them, terrorist group or terrorist organization is basically "…*any human group that relies on terrorist violence as its primary means of political expression…*" (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 3). Political party, then, can be defined as essentially non-violent "…*institution that (1) seeks to influence a state (…) and (2) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, to some degree, attempts to aggregate interests*" (Ware in Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 5). As such, the dividing line between political parties and terrorist groups suddenly appears fairly permeable and potential transition from one to another, thus, should be taken into account as a very realistic option.

In the process of decolonization of the so-called Third World countries, moreover, the distinction was even more disguised by the fact that several national liberation movements resorted to (violent as well as non-violent) insurgent practices in order to expel the colonial powers from their territories. Population of those countries, hence, directly or indirectly witnessed the changeable nature of both of the aforementioned categories.

In addition, during the Cold War period, communist parties were particularly active in many Third World countries. In several instances they were also involved in guerrilla warfare. After the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, a lot of factions specifically within South Asian communist parties (e.g. Naxalites in India or Maoists in Nepal) condemned the Soviet Union as the revisionist force and found stimulating inspiration in Maoist decisive commitment to violent "revolution within the revolution".

There exists a wide scale of possible factors that might lead a political party (or one of its wings) to decision to abandon peaceful practices of influencing the political life in their country and, instead, resort to instruments of open violence. One of the most influential

triggers of such decision can be termed a crisis of national integration. It resembles political conditions within which certain cohesive ethnic, religious, or language minority's rights or interests are (although perhaps articulated by already existing political party) considered to be inadequately reflected or deliberately ignored by concrete decision-making body. If the political influence of that group is not strong enough in order to ensure the fundamental rights of its members (for example, through obtaining certain kind of meaningful local autonomy), it may urge the organization to replace the hopeless pursuit of votes with the use of tactics commonly recognized as terrorist ones. "*And often excessive use of repressive force by the authorities escalates violence and inadvertently radicalizes the very cause they hope to combat*" (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 18).

Another potentially powerful factor additionally contributing to the development of party-related terrorist activities is connected with the presence of polarized multi-party systems. If a bulk of political parties localized on the far left/right position of the ideological spectrum, one of them might more likely incline to shift towards extreme (anti-systemic) point and start to wage a campaign of terrorist violence in order to clearly distinguish itself from the other competitors and, ultimately, gain necessary support for its goal from its target group. In general, political parties with a significant portion of young and highly active members are comparatively more willing to conduct steps like that (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 19-20).

Last but not least, ideology certainly plays an important role, too. In accordance with large amount of reliable empirical data collected by Weinberg and Pedahzur, political parties associated with the communist revolutionary tradition tend towards engaging in terrorist violence more often than parties belonging to any other ideological family (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 30).

On the other side, there may be just as equally wide scale of various features hypothetically resulting in group's eventual decision concerning the dereliction of political violence and enter into the arena of non-violent party politics[17]. This might be caused, among other things, by a certain substantial transformation (introduced by internal or external

---

[17] It should be noted, though, that this process is never permanent and there is always a possibility (albeit statistically rather modest) of reversibility of either the entire party or one of its relatively independent sub-units back to the armed struggle and vice versa.

reasons) in prevailing political order which consequently (and not necessarily designedly) approximates the system closer to its challengers. It could also be promoted by government's offer to provide the members of terrorist group with a promise of general amnesty and/or other benefits (e.g. legitimate status, power-sharing, maintenance of commitments) in order to bring them back within the mainstream politics and replace bullets by ballots. The general rule states, notwithstanding, the longer any relevant armed insurgence takes place, the stronger is the polarization between its perpetrators and representatives of central government, and, understandably, the less is the latter willing to reach a compromise with a view to invite the former back amongst themselves. Intense counter-insurgency operation, then, could (under favorable circumstances) force the terrorists to definitely conclude their violent practices as well (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 21-22).

Other aspect contributing to the similar effect can emerge from within the terrorist organization itself. This, for instance, may be related to practical difficulties of operating on a clandestine basis which is an indispensable component in order to avoid detection by hostile authorities and achieve a moment of surprise. However, while operating in secrecy, many regular communication channels (e.g. mass media) between terrorist group and its potential followers might be either blocked completely or seriously deform to suit government's purposes. In order to justify usage of violent actions and explain reasons behind them, terrorist groups acting within democratic settings may consider a strategic option to form an above-ground political wing that will contest elections, mobilize supporters and proclaim policy statements as conventional political parties do (Ibid.).

6. Analytical Part

Theoretical scheme of politics of collective violence developed by Tilly enriched by related insights of Weinberg and Pedahzur can serve as a very useful tool in order to illuminate the evolution of both surveyed South Asian Maoist movements. At the beginning, prevailing behavioral patterns of both insurgent groups could be characterized by many features typical for scattered attacks. Later on, however, relentless resistance of Naxals in India transformed its modus operandi into coordinated destruction and, nowadays, it has shifted even to its extreme form known as the so-called lethal contest. The course of

contentious politics of Maoist partisans in Nepal, on the other side, was eventually opportunistically shifted from practically the same sphere of coordinated destruction towards the realm of broken negotiations that ultimately led to their integration into the mainstream political life. In order to put the events into a necessary context, a brief historical outline of each country's performance during the second half of 20th and the first decade of 21st century precedes the analyses themselves in chapters 3.1. and 3.2.

6.1. Analysis of Evolution of (Maoist-driven) Collective Violence in Nepal

6.1.1. Predispositions for Insurgency

Ethnically heterogeneous Nepali society was specifically more vulnerable towards the risk of an excessive outbreak of process of horizontal inequality that discriminates well-defined social groups based on their minority ethnicity, race, language, religion or any other form of marginalized otherness. In Nepal, the line defining people of less-privileged casts in many cases overlaps with several ethnic cleavages. Excluded and oppressed social groups were also concentrated within peripheral geographical districts of mid-western and far-western parts of the country with very limited prospects to substantially improve their living conditions economically[18] as well as socially. Moreover, the vast majority of the local political elites in areas rarely penetrated by Nepalese state authorities did not really change their already customized ironfisted political practices after the democratic transition had taken place at the national level. Relatively high unemployment rate and lack of opportunities at higher levels of central civil service for ethnic peoples in combination with the problem of landlessness (or nearlandlessness), landlordism, and clientelism deeply hampered the lives of affected inhabitants. Furthermore, underdevelopment aggravated by proliferation of corruption of poor state apparatuses and unfair practices associated with official land redistribution, little effective state land reforms[19], the actual menace of debt trap, and long-standing unsolved issue of bonded labor made the option of riskful violent resistance claimed

---

[18] *"Mid-western districts such as Rolpa, Jajarkot, and Salyan had 25, 19, and 17%, respectively, of the average income in Kathmandu. In the far-western district of Achham, the average income was only 24% of Kathmandu in 1996"* (Murshed, Gates 2005: 5). Those areas, which had already had certain positive historical experiences with communist movements, then naturally became solid strongholds of Maoist insurgency.

[19] That was also caused by the fact that rural elites controlled an estimated 90% of the seats in the first Parliament (Joshi, Mason 2007: 409).

by Maoist ideologues and recruiters[20] far less unattractive. Horizontal inequality, which had been caused by historical residues as well as by more contemporary discriminatory arrangements and political failures, naturally breaded grievances and social tensions. It was adroitly used by Maoist ideological propaganda that perceives fight for the fundamental rights and freedoms of rural poor, abolition of feudal property rights, class struggle against Nepali traditionally exploitative elite casts[21] and irremediably corrupt state bodies concentrated mainly in Katmandu Valley, and anti-Indian[22] orientation of foreign policy as key aspects of its aspirations. Maoists managed to politicize the general discontent, unified voice in the rural areas and translate it into collective force that gave enough convincing perception of direct addressing those grievances (Murshed, Gates 2005: 4-8).

Moreover, given the fact that at the beginning of Maoist uprising, Nepal was still at a fairly early stage of its democratizing procedure, burdened by the heritage of its long-lasting autocratic rule and relatively unadvanced political culture, unconsolidated legal environment, and low amount of social capital, the probability of civil conflict was comparatively high[23]. What is more, while the transition certainly did not fundamentally change the process of Nepalese politics, it has transformed the perception of caste-based, feudalized relations from being an acceptable social feature into one that represents a distinct grievance (Gordon 2005: 584).

Unaccustomed democratic regime, which offered an unprecedented level of freedom of expression as well as public demand for information, was defenseless against abuses by various extremist and radical groups. They soon started to indoctrinate frustrated people and influence public opinion by their populist rhetoric and campaigns supporting violent solutions. The 1990 constitution itself, moreover, was not able to meet certain basic demands

---

[20] Interestingly, women, who traditionally do not have the right to kill any sentient creature, were outstandingly prominent in recruiting profile (Lecomte-Tilouine, Gellner 2004: 14).
[21] Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, etc. who constituted only 37.1% of the population but their human development indicators were about 50% higher than the occupational caste groups and disadvantaged Tarai or hill-dwelling ethnics (Murshed, Gates 2005: 4-8).
[22] Because of the fear of potential Indian annexation of Nepal (originating from the case of Sikkim that was merged into India in 1975), Maoists interpreted any Indian interference as an act of imperialism and portrayed India as a hegemonic regional force manipulating the state for its vested interests (Mishra 2004: 634).
[23] *"Indeed, Herge at al. (…) find that political transition is a primary factor in increasing the risk of civil war"* (Murshed, Gates 2005: 4). Even more specifically, danger of war grows primarily out of the transition from an autocratic rule to a partly democratic one, especially when governmental institutions regulating political participation are relatively weak (Acharya 2001: 3).

of truly pluralist democratic society[24]. All in all, high expectations originally raised by Nepali imperfect democratic regime failed to deliver because the ruling elite (not necessarily always intentionally) did not address several mounting problems of its marginalized, destitute and vulnerable people who, consequently, tended to turn to Maoists for help.

In addition to political instability associated with unconsolidated institutions and chronic extreme poverty, rugged and hardly accessible mountainous terrain, which could offer a safe shelter from the superiorly armed forces of the state, increased the probability of the onset of civil conflict[25] (Fearon and Laitin in Bohara et al. 2006: 111).

6.1.2. Origins of Scattered Attacks

At the very end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, diverse communist factions actively participated in their struggle under the umbrella organization of United National People's Movement. Because they were generally unsatisfied with the political development after the transition to multiparty democratic system, which, in their opinion, embodied so many undesirable features of crisis of national integration, they formed a political front called United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN) that was supposed to effectively contest other political parties in general as well as in local elections. After their unimpressive performance during the first general elections and practical continuation of general indifference towards burning social issues of particular minority ethnics by then the most powerful political party, more and more disapproving voices within the UPFN started to appear. As time passed, moreover, worsening personal and ideological clashes led to a split of the UPFN into two fractions. The one led by Prachanda and Bhattarai decided not to participate in the 1994 elections, formally accepted a doctrine of armed revolution and, subsequently, created an underground outfit (i.e. the CPN (Maoist)) on that platform in 1995. Their decision to temporarily exit the zone of conventional politics and step into the path of violent resistance was, to certain extent, also motivated by their desire to escape from relatively polarized multi-party political system that unavoidably led to counter-productive concentration of several programmatically affinitive political parties on the left-fringe of the ideological spectrum.

---

[24] For instance, according to the constitution, the King was considered as incarnation of god Vishnu and Nepal as the only Hindu kingdom all over the world. It prioritized one language, one culture and one religion and it did not recognize gender equality.

[25] *"The work of Buhaug and Gates* [, furthermore,] *(...) suggests that (...) wars and conflict in the context of a mountainous region (...) are increased in duration and intensity"* (Murshed, Gates 2005: 4).

Hence, actual electoral support for their political goals from potential target constituencies was uselessly fragmented amongst them (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.html).

In February 13th, 1996, the Maoist uprising began[26] by violent ambushing police outposts in peripheral, mid-hilly districts of Rukum, Holeri, and Sindhuligadi, Western Nepal. Continuing threats and disperse attacks against police forces, noncombatant civilians affiliated with the government (e.g. influential local political leaders and members of village committees, wealthy money-lenders, royalist landlords, tax-collectors, loyal teachers, police informers) as well as civil society activists operating in the region. All the atrocities were carried out in the name of defending inalienable rights of ethnic minorities reputedly suffering from the discriminatory feudal and imperialist system which the Maoists had plighted to overthrow. Prominent amongst their demands were also land reform[27], radical redistribution of land ownership[28], job quotas for ethnic minorities, and formation of a constituent assembly in order to draft a new, more righteous constitution (Bohara et al. 2006: 114-116).

Central government in Katmandu did not address[29] most of the problematic socio-economic issues heavily criticized by Maoist leaders and, instead, perceived the unrests like a peripheral problem of law and order caused by indigenous ethnic minorities (particularly by downtrodden Kham Magars) and reacted simply by using rough force of its police patrols trained for containment operations. Such a hard-line approach paradoxically even increased popularity and sympathies for Maoist subversive efforts amongst ordinary rural people and members of ethnic minority groups in countryside. Further, recurrent intraparty clashes and

---

[26] „*The immediate reason given by the Maoists for declaring the 'People's War' was the failure of the Nepalese Government to respond to a memorandum presented by its representatives to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on February 4, 1996. The memorandum listed 40 demands related to "nationalism, democracy and livelihood". These included among others the abolition of royal privileges and the promulgation of a new constitution, and the abrogation of the Mahakali treaty with India on the distribution of water and electricity and the delineation of the border between the two countries*" (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.html).

[27] It is quite important to consider the fact that approximately 82% of Nepal's work force was employed in stagnating agricultural sector, mainly as small landholders, tenants, or landless peasants (Joshi, Mason 2007: 394).

[28] "*According to the 2001 population census, about 25% of* [Nepalese] *households are landless, about 28% are marginal cultivators (...), and about 20% are small cultivators (...). The portion of ethnic minorities that are landless is greater than their proportion of the national population; the share of ethnic minority households that are marginal cultivators and small cultivators is below their share of the national population*" (Joshi, Mason 2007: 410).

[29] In fact, liberalizing economic reforms favored by most of the governments back in the day increased existing inequalities and eventually created new types of real and perceived ones (Deraniyagala 2005: 61).

serious antagonisms amongst representatives of the state considerably weakened the state authority (Schwanková 2009: 89).

The first phase of the conflict, which could be, in essence, identified with Tilly's category of scattered attacks, took approximately five years and ended by ceasefire and negotiations with the government in July 2001. During the first two years, the 'people's war' seemed to be expanding comparatively slowly. "*' [P]eople's war' related incidents occurred in only six districts in 1996, and eight in 1997. (…) However, when the Maoists started taking up the ethnic agenda* [more systematically] *in 1998, the support base of the Maoist expanded dramatically. In the year 1998, the Maoist influence spread to 26 districts*" (Pyakurel 2007: 132). In the end, Maoists were able to establish their authority in three insulated districts of mid-western region (Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot) (Singh 2010: 203).

Consistent with the theoretical attributes of scattered attacks, acts of collective violence committed by the CPN (Maoist) during that time occurred as a reaction against central government. Maoists blamed it for its apparent lack of interest in respect to uneven distribution of wealth, creation and maintenance of patterns of unbearable exploitation, and accumulation of opportunities posing an existential threat to lives of rural poor and landless (like in the case of downgraded ethnic minorities surviving on the peripheries of Nepal with only very limited possibilities to pose their justifiable claims on the center). State of relative detente after the transition to democracy was interpreted as a signal that the public institutions are suddenly vulnerable to forms of (violent) resistance, which could have been unthinkable ever before.

The attacks themselves were relatively rare, segmented, decentralized and usually typical for low intensity and disorganization in higher than local levels. Occasional violent actions against security forces, particular civilians and objects that symbolized state control took place within predominantly non-violent interactions, during which the rebels easily intermingled with ordinary peasants and either pretended or simply continued to be one of them, and were accompanied by large illegal propaganda campaign and exemplar demonstrations of power. The relationship between rebels and state forces was asymmetrical at the very beginning and, therefore, comparatively weaker Maoists had to turn to tactics of inconsistent resistance using dense local woods and barely accessible areas with absence of reliable infrastructure, particularly roads, for their benefit. Armed police forces soon proved

mostly ineffective in order to neutralize the progress of the rebellion. In 1998, government commenced highly sophisticated operation called Killo Sierra II that was supposed to target all potential sectors of the movement (including activists, sympathizers or innocent villagers). The operation, during which around 200 people were killed, moved even more people to join the Maoist ranks (Schwanková 2009: 93).

Indeed, government obstructions and armed repressions were supposed to briskly reduce the level of expression of dissatisfaction and collective demands for change by increasing potential risks connected with such public complaints and popular willingness of doing so was expected to decline inversely with it. This time, however, the rise of state repressions paradoxically led to a proportional rise of collective actions (in terms of intensity as well as scope) involving a great deal of society. In accordance with Tilly, such process occurred more due to several circumstances. Obvious disunity of Nepalese state authorities responsible for formulation and implementation of overall counter-insurgent strategy could be identified as one of the contributing factors to that. Another one was the fact that direct attacks of repressive forces were mainly targeted against individuals, objects and activities associated with identities and commonly shared images of collective survival of marginalized communities whose members were, subsequently, more compliant to make sacrifices. Escalation of the conflict, furthermore, imminently intensified and activated interpersonal networks of mutual assistance within similarly affected social communities with harmonious interests and segregated them from the others even more categorically. In this respect, Maoists purposefully instrumentalized several existing pressure groups that had been passionately fighting against all-pervading ostracism of Nepalese ethnic minorities (Tilly 2003: 172-174; Boquérat in Gayer, Jaffrelot 2009: 50).

As it started to coordinate its activities more and more professionally, the CPN (Maoist) slowly decided to implement several elements of new social order within the village areas under their unswerving control. They introduced the practices of collective ranching and redistribution of harvest taken from big local landowners there. From 1998, they established their own administrative and executive institutions (e.g. people's committees) in areas of constant support also known as 'guerrilla zones' or 'liberated zones'. In few areas, they even managed to build 'revolutionary governments', 'people's tribunals' and institutions providing services that either replaced the official ones completely or work concurrently with them. They also usually destroyed bondage papers, canceled debts, and even forced number of

tillers not to pay taxes to the state coffers. Instead, they came up with idea of the so-called revolutionary taxation from which they financed their own operations (Schwanková 2009: 94).

Incidents of kidnappings, torments, rapes, bomb blasts, forced migration, military use of children, mysterious disappearances, murders and executions without any trials present a dark side of the Maoist rebellion. Within the guerrilla zones, local people had no choice but to subjugate and follow the Maoist laws. While individuals who refused to collaborate with Maoists were stigmatized as class enemies, those who eventually decided to support them were treated as enemies of the state. During their largely unsuccessful attempts to encircle the Maoist-controlled zones, Nepalese Police, too, often unscrupulously abused civilians suspected of sympathizing with the Maoists. Just like in several hot spots over India, many Nepalese rural people, too, found themselves trapped in between two sides fighting one another with very little chance to break that iron circle of violence. "*Thus, a lack of effective commitment to human rights and due process has undermined elements of the intelligence campaign and efforts to encourage the disarmament and demobilization of insurgents*" (Gordon 2005: 593).

Moreover, domestic political situation, where governments were changing with average tenure of one year, was highly unstable at that time. Quarrelling, intra-factionalized, personality-based, and power-hungry Nepalese political parties, which had emerged from underground after the panchayat era lacked party discipline and institutional stability, were not able to articulate consequential, common anti-Maoist policy. The CPN (Maoists), which still boycotted participation in general elections, organized a general strike that hit the country in April 2000. Several anti-government protesters and Maoist supporters together with oppositional political leaders were captured by police (Ibid.).

In 2001, general public was shocked by the massacre of royal family of Nepal. According to proclamations made by Maoists, the main reason behind the regicide was that assassinated king Birendra had purportedly refused to deploy the army against Maoist insurgents. The CPN (Maoist) immediately used the overall atmosphere of confusion and accused newly inaugurated king Gyanendra together with the Prime Minister Koirala and Indian and American secret services of masterminding the massacre. On such basis, Maoists

argued for abolishing the monarchy and its archaic prerogatives[30] and replacing it by republican system of governance with the national army under the direct control of democratically elected government as soon as possible (Ibid.).

Not very long after the royal massacre, the level of coordination and the salience of short-run damage caused by Maoists as well as by their enemies in certain isolated parts of Nepal transcended the sphere of scattered attacks and entered the zone of coordinated destruction. Also, sensation of self-realization and self-confidence emerged and increased considerably within the networks of patronage and solidarity amongst participants of insurgency at that time. Consequently, the Prime Minister Koirala resigned and was replaced by Sher Bahadur Deuba. In July 2001, Deuba declared a ceasefire and initiated negotiations with the rebels (Singh 2010: 203).

6.1.3. Transition to Broken Negotiations

Before the acts of coordinated destruction could spread all over the country, the political situation had changed significantly and, as a result, directly shifted the nature of collective violence towards the category of broken negotiations. The level of violence on the both sides, to a great extent, truly dropped during the time of uneasy dialogue[31] between the central government and the CPN (Maoists) who proved to function as a clearly distinguished, coherent, valued, and involved social entity with numerous constituencies within less fierce atmosphere, too. They used several legal ways offered by democratic arrangements as well as few illegal opportunities to openly persuade the general public about the desirability of their demands. The vast majority of their efforts in this respect were conducted by mainly non-violent means. Simultaneously with the peace talks, which seemed to show no sign of decent, mutually acceptable deal on the horizon, the CPN (Maoist) quickly started to organize a mass demonstration right in the capital city of Katmandu.

Predominantly tranquil process of negotiations was interrupted by terrorist attacks on the United States of America from 11th September, 2001, that changed the overall mood amongst political elites and encouraged the Nepalese government to fight terrorism more

---

[30] According to the constitution, the monarch had the right to declare emergency and mobilize the army anytime.
[31] While rebels insisted on their original demands (e.g. abolishing the monarchy, establishing republic, drafting new constitution), Nepalese government just could not accept that.

rigorously. In reaction to that, Maoists called off the intended mass demonstration. Continuing negotiations were, however, marked by deep distrust and suspicion from both sides. In the end, the CPN (Maoist) abruptly broke the truce after two rounds of talks and viciously assaulted military post in Dang on November 23rd, 2001, killing 40 security personnel (including 14 soldiers) (Schwanková 2009: 95; Mishra 2004: 637).

6.1.4. Transition to Coordinated Destruction and Back Again

In reality, the unexpected assault on the military post caused immediate augmentation of violence[32], profoundly divided the opposing sides in terms of both projected and actual hostility[33], raised the overall level of uncertainty and urgency on the nation-wide scale, and signified the beginning of involvement of the Nepalese Royal Army called up by the King Gyanendra himself (as the army's supreme commander) on the one side vis-à-vis the armed and trained wing of the CPN (Maoist) called People's Liberation Army (PLA)[34], Nepal (founded in 2001) on the other. The act itself was branded by the Prime Minister as a betrayal of trust, the CPN (Maoist) was officially banned as a terrorist organization[35], and any further continuation of negotiations was conditioned by laying down the arms of the rebels. A state of martial law, under which an anti-terrorist act legalizing preventing imprisonment of people suspected to be involved in terrorist activities was adopted and powers of the military were significantly enhanced, was declared just three days later. In fact, all that together triggered almost a textbook transition towards coordinated destruction (Schanková 2009: 95).

From November 2001 to January 2003, the frequency of violent clashes between armed Maoist rebels and the national army escalated rapidly[36] and (despite initial difficulties in coordination among police, army and officially authorized armed paramilitary elements) the nature of the battles became more professional. Maoists started to utilize relatively sophisticated e-mail and internet technologies for their communication and coordination

---

[32] More than half of all the casualties of the conflict occurred after the declaration of the State of Emergency in November 2001 (Gordon 2005: 581).

[33] *"According to senior sources within the RNA, the speedy resumption of hostilities by the Maoists demonstrated that they had used the ceasefire to prepare (in terms of intelligence and the mobilization of combat and logistic resources) for (...) an increase in the scale and range of military targets"* (Gordon 2005: 586).

[34] Prachanda had proclaimed himself 'Supreme Commander of the People's Army' and de facto became a veritable challenging alter ego of the king (Lecomte-Tilouine, Gellner 2004: 18).

[35] At that time, Nepalese Prime Minister visited Great Britain and several other Western countries in order to seek financial support for fighting the Maoists. President G.W. Bush promised him to dedicate USD 20 million for this purpose (Schanková 2009: 95).

[36] During only one week in February 2002, Maoists killed 127 government officials (Schanková 2009: 95).

within as well as across the national borders (operating partly from Indian soil). Another striking feature of the movement was a remarkable degree of logistical organization involving the infiltration of areas controlled by the enemy, uninterrupted flow of arms and ammunitions or publication of revolutionary texts and distribution of propagandistic pamphlets. Moreover, coordinated destruction dissolved (albeit not irreversibly) all the previously existing social networks that did not correspond with identities newly activated by Maoist party line. It sharpened the boundaries, increased mutual polarization between Maoist and non-Maoist blocs, and destroyed cooperative mechanisms across the two adversary forces. People's War's growing military capacity also contributed to the general perception of its legitimacy, highlighting selected images of people's empowerment by joining the armed struggle. In addition, because the Nepalese regime was not able to consistently govern its entire territory, it became more vulnerable to eruption of coordinated destruction within its domestic politics for the fact that such circumstances had given insurgents more possibilities to establish their own systems of exploitation and accumulation of opportunities as well as to organize specialists on violence on a larger scale. (Lecomte-Tilouine in Gayer, Jaffrelot 2009: 84; Tilly 2003: 107-109).

The case of Nepal, furthermore, still contained several unquestionable features of scattered attacks because while relatively disciplined and armed militias were appearing and disappearing with certain amount of unpredictability, Nepalese police and military units were functioning continuously as a professionally organized, formally strictly hierarchical, and uniform force throughout this period of the whole conflict (Ibid.).

Soon enough, the situation in the country spilled over towards the sub-category of conspiratorial terror. By their strengthen resistance, the CPN (Maoist) actually did manage to dispute the conventional political structures in Nepal, decidedly accelerate the process of their disruption, and identify several other potential allies in order to counterbalance the asymmetrical relationship at the expanse of the established state authorities.

The progressive inability to contain the 'red' insurgency and dangerously increasing number of its victims led the King to dismiss the Parliament, semi-permanently postpone the elections and replace the Prime Minster by a new one named Chand[37] in 2002. In the

---

[37] The deepening crisis finally led to his resignation in the very next year (Gordon 2005: 588).

infrequent moment of unanimity that followed, six main political parties condemned King's act as antidemocratic and unconstitutional. Right from the very beginning of the next year, a second ceasefire was concluded[38] and both state and Maoist use of violence declined sharply as negotiations were under way. *"In January 2003, when the Maoists returned to the negotiating table[39], the entire far western, mid-western and western regions had virtually passed out of government's control and at least sixty-eight of this country's seventy-five districts were severely affected[40] by insurgency"* (Singh 2010: 203). The restored negotiations, however, ended up by another unsolvable stalemate after seven months and three consecutive rounds of unfruitful talks. The ongoing political vacuum in the country certainly contributed to such outcome, too.

6.1.5. The Lethal Contest

On August 27th, 2003, the violence was resumed and the conflict entered its "bloodiest phase" which even further degraded the human rights standards by their serious abuses on both sides. By 2003, the Government of Nepal estimated that the Maoist insurgency had 5,500 active combatants, another 8,000 militia, 4,500 full-time cadres, 33,000 hardcore followers, and roughly 200,000 sympathizers (Joshi, Mason 2007: 395). As a response to that, the Nepalese Royal Army hastily increased the number of its combatants from 50 000 to nearly 65 000 and pressed for creation of several rural militia groups in a desperate attempt to offset the lack of numbers and retain control of the countryside. Such attempts, however, more likely intensified the process of polarization within the Nepalese society. Even though military operations of 'cordon, search and destroy' yielded episodic successes, it did not deteriorate the Maoists from conducting other major attacks and large-scale operations partially relying on use of conventional terrorist practices (e.g. threats and bombings) (Gordon 2005: 594-595).

---

[38] "*The Maoists' commitment to the peace remains questionable. Some analysts within the RNA suggest that (...) the negotiations represented* [merely] *an attempt to influence the wider population*" (Ibid.).

[39] Donor support also played a minor role in coaxing the Maoists to the negotiating table as well as propping up the official authorities (Gordon 2005: 591).

[40] *"A considerable number of retired Gurkha soldiers of the British and the Indian Army inhabit many of the Maoist-affected areas and Nepalese security agencies have suspected that these former soldiers along with those retired and deserters from the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) have(...) involved in training the insurgents"(...) Reportedly, weaponry in their possession include AK-47 rifles, self-loading rifles, 303 rifles, country guns, hand grenades, explosives, detonators, mortars, and light machine guns. Nearly 85 per cent of these weapons are reportedly looted from the police and RNA"* (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.html).

In the end, *"…[t]he government presence was progressively limited to the urban centers and district headquarters, and all the districts, including Kathmandu, were covered by the Maoist arc of violence"* (Singh 2010: 203). In December, 2004, the rebels even successfully managed to create a week-long blockade of the capital. Also, many additional violent clashes between students and activists on the one side and police forces on the other occurred across the Katmandu Valley (Schankowá 2009: 96).

During this latest phase, several features of the lethal contest evolved. More specifically, it was a version of lethal contest referred to as guerrilla war. In the land of Buddha's birthplace, two inimical camps were trying to exterminate each other by any means necessary.

6.1.6. Escape from the Realm of Contentious Politics

Long-lasting inability of the existing political parties to prospectively abate the grueling conflict and defeat the Maoists once and for all led the King Gyanendra to another set of radical measures. On February 1st, 2005, he decided to dismiss the government and seized direct rule of the country himself. Along with that, he declared the state of martial law again. By his controversial active interference, the King put the last violent phase of the entire conflict to its actual end because he unintentionally brought political parties and the CPN (Maoist) closer to each other than ever before during the history of the violent insurgency. Given only very limited room for further maneuvering, vastly unsatisfied Nepalese political representation suddenly started to consider Maoist repetitive demand for abolishment of the monarchy more seriously and perceive it as a realistic method of solution. Maoists headed by their leader Prachanda[41] saw it as a unique opportunity, slightly softened their original fundamentalism and stopped insisting on strict fulfillment of the point about necessity of transition to the Maoist type of democracy at any cost. Prachanda justified this change of behavior on the basis of respect towards the inevitable global trends, the supreme free will of the vast majority of Nepalese people, and ostensible anti-dogmatism (Schankowá 2009: 96).

In November 2005, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) came to a 12-point arrangement with the CPN (Maoist) on the common anti-royalist approach. First, the both sides agreed on

---

[41] The fact that Prachanda was widely recognized as an undisputed leader with the ability to speak for (and to) the CPN (Maoist) was eminently helpful feature during negotiations with the representatives of government.

boycotting local elections in 2006 and later that year, they organized a four-day-long strike that was attended by many people (including women, children, members of guilds, and politicians) demanding complete renewal of their civil rights and shouting anti-monarchical and pro-democratic slogans; several top Maoist leaders were released from prison, the terrorism-charge against the CPN (Maoist) was withdrawn, and it agreed upon the United Nations' involvement in arms management in the country (Hachhethu et al. 2008: 53).

On April 24th, hundreds of thousands of people went to the streets of Nepal to demand the end of the monarchy. At the very same day, the King finally decided to step down, revive the parliament, designate G.P. Koirala as a Prime Minister, and agreed upon arranging the elections to constituent assembly. In June, the SPA and the CPN (Maoist) concluded on a historical deal that included creation of a provisional constitution which canceled the so-called people's governments within the Maoist controlled areas[42] (Schanková 2009: 96).

Since neither then materially as well humanely and strategically loosing central government nor the CPN (Maoist) was apparently strong enough to resolve the situation purely by martial force in the near future, they both welcomed the radical political development that marked several important points of their prospective mutual convergence. Besides, pragmatic agreement upon fulfillment of half of Maoist principal demands presented an acceptable price for abandonment of violent practices, dismissal of PLA, and undergoing the process of transition to conventional political party directly influencing and participating in standard decision-making procedures. Needless to say, by becoming legitimate political power, the CPN (Maoist) and its praised ideals were able to reach comparatively wider popular recognition as well as appreciation and its leaders could fully enjoy advancement of their social statuses (from rogue bandit chieftains to statesmen) at home as well as abroad.

In November, the CPN (Maoist) signed a peace agreement, which officially ended[43] the civil war, and became a staunch part of the restored (yet provisional interim) civilian government. The lethal contest broke out into broken negotiations and, finally, resulted in the present fragile peace settlement (Ibid.).

---

[42] Over 90% of the rural areas were under the control of the people's governments in 2006 (Basnett 2009: 4).
[43] There are still few extremist Maoist groups up in arms left in Nepal who extort money and commit murders.

6.1.7. Perspectives

The decision made by the leaders of the CPN (Maoist) to adopt institutionalized tactics and rejoin the electoral politics was certainly not an easy one. Nor was it permanent. Nevertheless, by doing that, the CPN (Maoist) factually re-legitimized existing institutional settings. Although the absolute majority of rebels followed that decision, there will always be a chance that either one affected faction or the party as a whole might be tempted to react to confrontation with imperfect reality of Nepalese day-to-day politics by cancelling the negotiated settlement and re-entering the realm of violent practices.

Based on abundant empirical evidence gathered by Wienberg and Pedahzur, the resumption of terrorist operations under the command of the CPN (Maoist) is, however, very improbable to take place in the nearest future. Successful transformation of the CPN (Maoist) into the dominant political party backed by convincing victory (220 out of 575 elected seats) in the latest general elections can presumably guarantee certain stability for the time being. Further political development (especially in regard to the long-lasting political stalemate and persistent misgovernance) of the party remains greatly uncertain nonetheless. Representatives of the CPN (Maoist) may also just seek to blackmail the other political partners by a threat of return to the path of armed violence unless their conditions are fulfilled. Prospective course towards which Nepalese leaders will choose to navigate the post-settlement situation in their homeland offers no guarantees.

6.2. Analysis of Evolution of (Maoist-driven) Collective Violence in India

During its comparatively longer history, the Naxalite movement has come through a sinusoid-like development that can be divided into three distinguished parts characterized by slightly different methods, tactics, rhythms, and degrees of applied violence.

6.2.1. Predispositions for Insurgency

The area of Naxalbari (situated in Darjeeling district) was deliberatively chosen for its historical experience with aggressive peasant movements with political overtone, a large portion of population comprised of traditionally marginalized and structurally handicapped

so-called Scheduled Castes and Tribes forced to drudge on local fields. Another fortunate aspect presented its strategic location near borders with ideologically affinitive China from one side and Nepal with then East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh), which both could eventually serve as safe heavens for the rebels in case of direct unconquerable state repressions, on the other. Though India was formally independent and democratic republic, deeply rooted patterns of behavior from colonial era persisted to a great degree in many remote and/or peripheral areas. Such absence of tight state control factually extended unofficial coercive powers of local leaders and, at the same time, limited possibilities of subordinated people to utilize legal instruments for demanding their rights. All these circumstances combined contributed to the possibility of increment of the scattered attacks. In comparison to other forms of collective violence, however, the attacks of Maoists were at first of relatively low salience of damage and they took place on the margins of prevailing non-violent interactions. During the days, Naxlites could find discreet refuge in Dalit hamlets, where they held political meetings at nights (Jaoul in Gayer, Jaffrelot 2009: 25).

6.2.2. Origins of Scattered Attacks

In the 1960s, an internally inhomogeneous, far left extremist faction of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) personified by Charu Mazumdar and his righthand man Kanu Sanyal along with handful of their closest followers (responsible for future violent escalation of events in Naxalbari) started differentiate itself by inflammatory warnings about vicious social situation in West Bengal. Their deep disdain and disappointment with inability of local politicians to respond to what (they perceive) was crisis of national integration was even intensified when CPI (M) became an integral part of ruling coalition called United Front at the beginning of 1967. Instead of largely expected positive effect of such development, which could have allowed the extremist fraction to identify easily with the leftist government, relative ideological proximity between the two actually had exactly the opposite effect, driving the former deeper into revolutionary tenets. Later same year, they established the so-called All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). After definite secession of the CPI (M), which preferred to continue to seizure the political power and transform the socio-economic system in West Bengal through the instruments of democratic elections, the AICCCR gave rise (albeit not without fierce internal disputes and altercations) to a new subject named the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI

(ML))[44]. Leaders of the CPI (ML) were convinced that the only remaining way how to ensure popular backing and achieve their visionary goals is to go underground, embrace violent tactics, and methodically annihilate all the major representatives of corrupted system (Basu 2010).

The cataclysmic uprising in the village of Naxalbari in March 1967 triggered the first phase, which then lasted till it was temporarily surpassed in 1972. It manifested in itself many characteristic features of the scattered attacks. A relatively small number of insurgents activated by their revolutionary leaders were conducting small-scale (and initially rather inconsistent) subversive attacks (less than ten events were documented during the first year) committed exclusively on the local level as a reaction on their fundamental dissatisfaction with the existing social order. In particular, they stubbornly demanded radical land redistribution at the expanse of rich landlords. Those isolated acts of violent resistance were mainly targeted against places, objects, and individuals of symbolic value representing asymmetrically greater and far more skillful state power (e.g. looting rides against kulaks and confiscation of their harvest, collisions with the armed personnel of rural police stations). "*Although the tribes were poorly organized and their arsenal rudimentary (flails, sickles, spears, bows and arrows, etc.), they managed to take the landowners by surprise and make off with firearms*" (Jaoul in Gayer, Jaffrelot 2009: 23).

Highly uneasy social conditions shared by local inhabitants radicalized particular common identities as well as activated relatively decentralized underground networks of solidarity and mutual assistance in order to revenge old injuries and exploitative abuses. *"Led by the new rebels and armed with indigenous weapons (…), local tribals swooped down on landowners, forcibly occupying their land. The sickle with which they had slaved away in the fields became a potent weapon against oppression"* (Misra, Pandita 2010: 12).

Ideologues of early Naxalism categorically prohibited direct participation at any form of public elections at any level of state hierarchy. They chose to be in opposition to practically all semi-legal and legal forms of struggle and uphold armed struggle as essentially the only imaginable way of achieving their ideal goals. *"This resulted in their abandonment of not only different forms of people's struggles, but even trade unions, peasant associations,*

---

[44] The vast majority of today's revolutionary movements, which called themselves Naxalites, evolved from the CPI (ML).

student unions, cultural organizations etc.” (Charkabarti in Basu 2010 p. 113). Since all other forms of mass struggle were gradually boycotted, armed struggle seemed to remain the only method that left as an official line of Naxal policy after all. Thus, massive spread of killings of individuals labeled as the so-called annihilation of class-enemies (e.g. police or army personnel, police informers, big landlords, commercial forest contractors, and different sorts of 'bourgeois' party members), which remained the major method of mobilization of people, was identified with the class struggle soon after that (Ibid.).

Even though the concrete insurrection in Naxalbari was neutralized by governmental forces very quickly, it left its legacy for entire suppressed agrarian and tribal community all over the country and it was, furthermore, positively acknowledged from the highest positions of the Communist Party of China. This phase, which peaked between 1970 and 1971, also included coordinated attempts to organize the newborn movement, its rapid expansion amongst other discontented land laborers from the point of its origin in West Bengal to other underdeveloped parts of the country. It received especially warm acceptance namely in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala or Punjab, mobilizing potential target groups of poor, landless, dispossessed and dependent peasants as well as young, idealist university and college students and intelligentsia (notably in Calcutta) through various extensive (and sometimes even coercive) propagandistic campaigns and compelling demonstrations (Singh 2010: 144).

At the beginning, state political representation did not realize the complexity of the problem and paid little attention towards slowly rising level of violent assaults across the region. As the number of violent incidents caused by Maoists was increasing and the overall security situation was progressively deteriorating, the officially elected policymakers were pushed to reconsider their attitudes. The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the upper house of the Indian Parliament with a powerful speech in which she argued for merciless fighting the Naxalites with all the might and every mean at their command till the bitter end in order to bring the rebels to their knees. Hence, the first phase finally ended by massive actions of comparatively better organized and prepared police units[45] partly applying harrying tactics in 1972. Devastating impact of the operation was even reinforced by killing or imprisonment of most of Naxalite underground activists and top commanders including the most prominent

---

[45] That is to say involvement of political entrepreneurs deciding about wider deployment of specialists on violence.

ideological and charismatic leader of the movement Charu Mazumdar who tragically died in police custody later the same year (Singh 2010: 7-14; Misra, Pandita 2010: 13).

6.2.3. Second Phase of Scattered Attacks

The next phase, which took approximately from 1972 till 1991, was characterized by self-criticism, polemics, calumny, and various acts of physical and ideological fragmentation within the movement itself as well as by relatively significant decrement of massive violent activities. Several survived Naxalite leaders released from prisons after the state of Emergency, which had been controversially exposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975 and which had vigorously tightened the state's control, tried to regroup, use the schismatic mainstream socio-political situation and economic crisis[46], and come up with renewed strategies at the end of 1970s. They started to be actively involved in their armed struggle through the treacherous tactics of scattered attacks against the government again (mainly in Bihar and Telugu part of Andhra Pradesh[47]) by 1980 (Singh 2010; Banerjee 2010).

The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed in one of the most severely poverty-stricken state of Bihar (including the state of Jharkhand then) in 1975 as a revival of a tradition of string of stirring against exploitative upper-caste landlords-jotedars protected by their private militias. They even managed to run an embryonic form of (illegal) parallel administrative machinery, confiscate weapons, harvests and landed properties from large landowners, redistribute the seized land to landless sharecroppers, and levy their own revolutionary tax over large domains under their sway. Later on, it extended its violent, armed operations over areas in Assam, West Bengal and several others. *"In Andhra Pradesh, the People's War Group (PWG[48]) (...) have redistributed close to 2,020 square kilometers of land across the state to landless farmers right through the 1980s. By 1990, it had become a major rebel group, launching deadly attacks against the police and paramilitary forces in its area of influence"* (Misra, Pandita 2010: 14). From its epicenter, the movement progressively spilled

---

[46] *"Unable to put up with the pressure of spiraling increase in indirect taxes and in the rise of prices of essential commodities, wide expansion of blackmarketing, inflation, unemployment among the educated young men and gradual increase in the paucity of foodcrops, the masses became aggrieved and resorted to movement"* (Banerjee 2010: 412).

[47] Political observers mostly agree upon the fact that the efforts of Naxalites in order to spread their influence to areas in northern parts of the country, especially Delhi, Haryana and Punjab failed to produce any substantial results, probably because of increasing prosperity among farmers and working classes there (Adige 2010. 40). In Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, one the other hand, Naxalites just exacerbated existing fray of inter-caste conflicts.

[48] PGW was one of the continuing offshoots of the original Naxalbari movement.

over to adjoining states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa as well as to Bihar, West Bengal, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Since the early 1980s, incidents of class violence have occurred in forested, contiguous districts with intensely increasing frequency and causalities. The wave of Naxal violence reached its climax in 1991 when it was hit hard again as a result of pressing anti-Naxalite police operations coordinately undertaken in the affected zones (Ivey in Öberg, Strøm 2008: 88; Singh 2010: 208).

6.2.4. Final Phase and Transition to Coordinated Destruction

The last phase, which immediately followed up and which is still going on, is, on the other hand, typical for its generally synergic tendencies and renewed rise of aggressive militancy that coincide with the time when Manmohan Singh ushered in a brand new set of policies of economic liberalization from the beginning of 1990s onwards. As a reaction to a series of negative consequences of the governmental policies, the two most powerful rebellious groups – the MCC and the PWG – started to discuss prospects for possible unification in order to spread their influence to larger territories. They also started to organize several mass movements together no later than from 1992. The PWG acknowledged that it can not resist the government armed forces all by itself and that it is necessary to mobilize the majority of people (not only in Andhra Pradesh) in order to encircle the enemy on several fronts (Singh 2010).

In 2001, there was a paradigm shift in terms of restructuring of the movement and reinforcement of its arsenal as well as of evolution of its strategic thinking towards further militarization illustrating its ascending strength and confidence[49]. Around that time, the PW (i.e. expanded PWG) established fraternal links with other Maoist parties within South Asia (namely Nepal[50] and Bangladesh) as well as in Africa or Latin America. It also struck relations with Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, which assisted its cadres with training in the use of infamous improvise explosive devices. Ultimately, it led to historically

---

[49] „[O]*n October 1, 2003, they demonstrated their potential by blowing up the vehicle of the most heavily guarded political figure in Andhra* [i.e. the Chief Minister]" (Singh 2010: 222).
[50] There was even an ambitious plan to create the so-called Compact Revolutionary Zone of Maoist supremacy extending from Nepal through Bihar and Chhattisgarh all the way to Andhra Pradesh.

important merge of the PW and the MCC and (probably inspired by the advances of the CPN (Maoist)) to creation of the CPI (Maoist)[51] in 2004 (Ibid.).

Approximately from the year 2000, India has been experiencing the most dramatic culmination of insurgent activities in terms of their geographical domination, the level of joint coordination as well as clear determination to resort to open violence. Both the high level of overall coordination of the perpetrators of recent attacks as well as the salience of their short-run damage during various kinds of interactions place the latest phase closer to the upper right corner of Tilly's theoretical scheme. The processes of activation of highly divisive borders (horizontal, inter-caste class solidarity propagated by Naxalites at the expanse of vertical, intra-caste solidarity promoted by landowner militias), narratives (referring to mythical folk heroes), and relations coupled with debilitation of the ones that do not correspond with them took place back then. Also, involvement of other social actors producing relatively higher level of damage could be identified in a number of incidents. The character of violence caused by Naxals at that time included all the defying attributes of conspiratorial terror. Naxalites themselves – strongly supported in their categorically unyielding position by a virtual collapse of lower-level governance in vast areas of the country – have undoubtedly become the single most important adversaries of 'New India' (Singh 2010: 226).

Contemporary India is an example of a country characterized by many striking extremes; a country where the most sophisticated technology literally meets absolute poverty, backwardness and deeply enrooted superstition. Distribution of wealth among its population is highly uneven. So is the distribution of natural resources within different Indian federal states and districts. The vast majority of mineral-producing regions used to be characterized by relatively huge tribal population that often lived beneath the poverty line dispersed in deep and largely impenetrable forests. Presently, within districts such as Bardhman in West Bengal, Dhanbad in Jharkhand or Jajpur in Orissa, once rich forest areas are considerably reduced due to massive mining activities, which have been going on for a long time. Traditional ways of living of the native tribal populations as well as their priceless natural heritage were consequently devastated by that. Furthermore, mining activities within the forest areas has increased substantially during the last decade (Bhushan 2006: 3).

---

[51] „[A]ccording to a Maoist ideologue, [the CPI (Maoist) became] *'as big as the Congress or (...) BJP', India's two main political parties at the time*" (Misra, Pandita 2010: 14).

This continuous hazardous trend coincides with the fact that mostly tribal population, whose livelihoods are existentially dependent on the very existence of wild forests and unpolluted reservoirs of water, originally inhabits mineral-rich areas. In addition, a number of developmental projects were lately introduced by the central government as well as by the governments of particular Indian states irrespectively to their political affiliations in order to bring progress towards rapid industrialization to local people and to help them to catch up with the so-called mainstream society. However, those ongoing mining activities as well as insensitive developmental projects caused immoderate forest degradation and irreversible loss of vital parts of local ecosystems and brought the marginalized tribal population as well as other impoverished segments of Indian society to the point of economic vulnerability, social insecurity, cultural decay, harsh personal humiliation and overall desperation. Projects that were originally supposed to bring wealth, prosperity, accessible health care, edification and modernity to the least developed parts of the country repeatedly failed to trickle down to the most needy ones. For certain social groups, paradoxically, the very implementation of those projects caused actual decline of their living standards, increase of environmental insecurity and brought about an unbearable suffering and basic human rights violation (e.g. displacement of whole tribal community for the purpose of mining, building new facilities and enlarging infrastructural networks).

One of several unintended consequences of such governmental approach has been the revival of Naxalism in the stricken regions. In the present time, *"…40 per cent of the mineral-rich districts in the top six mineral-producing states are affected by the movement, which is opposing the mining industry"* (Ibid.). Unstable and unpredictable entrepreneurial environment created by the rising number of sudden attacks as well as other acts of insurgency organized by the movement presents a considerable risk for the regular flow of FDI to the whole area. Naxalites can often count on sympathies and even material support amongst tribal peoples who were forced to abandon their traditional homelands and move into police camps in order to make enough room for "mainstream" developmental projects organized by huge MNCs/TNCs and further propagated by the central government situated far away from their everyday hardship. Under such circumstances, the central government faces a constantly growing trust deficit amongst (not only tribal) population in Indian mineral belt.

6.2.5. The Lethal Contest

Right now, parts of India are experiencing a gradual evolution of the conflict from the stage of conspiratorial terror towards the lethal contest (in its particular version of guerrilla war) between two almost symmetrically appearing rivals deliberately attempting to destroy one other by any means available. Execution of one of the captured and disarmed police officer in cold blood that took place in Bihar just last year clearly signalizes a significant change in actual modus operandi of Naxalites. This strategy strongly resembles standard terrorist practices. We can even distinguish the shift from the so-called hit and run tactics, which usually used to be applied in order to minimize any possible risk of being captured, towards more open conflicts with governmental authorities and strategies applicable not only for rural but also for urban areas nowadays. This unprecedentedly new strategy might implicate that contemporary Naxal troops are far better materially equipped as well as spiritually prepared for open encounters with heavily armed Indian police forces and several unofficially countenanced paramilitary units (e.g. feared counter-strike movement Salwa Judum). In support to that, the single most bloodthirsty attack in the whole history of the movement, during which 76 trained police officers were indiscriminately killed and 50 others seriously wounded, happened in the Maoist-affected district of Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, last April. Immediately after the massacre, the Union Minister for Home Affairs P. Chidambaram offered his resignation (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981122,00.html).

Furthermore, in the year 2009, Naxalite were actively operating approximately in 220 (of 640) districts across nearly 20 Indian union states covering roughly 40% of the country's entire territory. For the time being, they were mainly concentrated within the so-called Red Corridor that spreads over 92 000 square kilometers in the eastern and central part of India. In this Red Corridor, besides the armed battalions, Naxalites have already established organs of power and mass organization that are seriously attempting to implement an alternative self-reliant model of development (involving detailed plans for thorough cultural and educational reform containing curricula derived from traditional tribal knowledge). Once it proves to be realistically achievable, they are planning to extend their model to other parts of the country (including huge, vibrant Indian megalopolises) as well (Bhattacharyya in Basu 2010: 271).

According to several Indian intelligence agencies, there are supposed to be around 20 000 armed cadres (sometimes denoted as 'red army'), 50 000 ordinary adherents, and

countless unclassified sympathizers of the movement in India[52]. Intensified operation of Indian law and order enforcing units (popularly nicknamed as the Operation Green Hunt), which has been conducting in the wildwoods of the Red Corridor from November 2009, caused a partial retreat of Naxalites towards south and revival of their outlawed activities in Andhra Pradesh. In July 2010, local police forces tracked down and shot the third highest ranking Maoist leader Cherukuri Rajkumar better known by his nom de guerre Azad. His death triggered another spiral of vengeful violence (http://naxalite.co.tv/).

6.2.6. Perspectives

Despite the temporary crisis of leadership, Naxalites continue in their treasonous campaigns and any sort of mutually acceptable compromise is far away from being met in the foreseeable future. In the middle of 2010, the security situation seemed so bleak that the government (perhaps inspired by the examples from Nepal and Sri Lanka) seriously considered deployment of the Indian National Army into the anti-Naxalite operations (http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-31/india/28309913_1_antony-army-deployment-internal-security).

Worst of all, many ordinary members of the poorest segments of Indian society find themselves literally sandwiched between the armed struggles of revolting Naxalite movement against the heavily armed state forces and a number of state sponsored private paramilitary units. There is no viable perspective left for such double-threatened destitute peasants and their livelihoods. Their inclination towards either of the two mutually opposing sides is essentially enforced only through their existential fear and the highest level of desperation as well as the intoxicating atmosphere of defeatism (http://www.newageweekly.com/2010/05/massacre-in-dantewada-continues-by-cr.html).

---

[52] There is also an evidence of indirect material support of Naxalites from Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), whose long-term objectives conform to keeping the Indian government under constant pressure, through organizations like illegal separatist group ULFA in Assam or certain militant factions of the Communist Party of Bangladesh. However, given the fact that insurgent operations conducted by Naxalites are comparatively economically modest, this external support is certainly not determining in any manner. Moreover, even Naxalites themselves are eager to receive no more than absolutely necessary amount of supplies from any officially recognized foreign government because it could jeopardize the legitimacy of their dissident struggle in the eyes of their sympathizers on whose continuing material as well as complex logistic support they are truly existentially dependent (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101117_pakistan_and_naxalite_movement_india).

The cacophony of contemporary crises (political, economic, social, cultural, constitutional, administrative, imaginative, etc.) that shapes the actual political situation not only in Northeastern parts of India manifests even more serious potential for explosion of revived class as well as other forms of hatred than at the time of Charu Mazumdar. During times of severe systemic crisis, most seriously affected stratum of population is usually the poorest and disadvantage one. In this respect, Naxalites might be glamorized by many[53] as apostles of change who are trying to redeem all the suffering fellow human beings by offering them the so-called New Democracy, a brand new alternative model to 'semi-colonial/semi-feudal' political regime equipped with dominant capitalist economic system. Promised Maoist model, on the other side, is supposed to establish truly egalitarian socialist society under people's democratic rule through the agrarian revolution that would became an integral part of the world socialist revolution ushered in by ideas of the Paris Commune, the Great October Revolution and the Chinese Revolution (Banerjee 2010: 126).

6.3. Recommendations

Human history offers many examples of smashing defeats over terrorist groups by deployment of rough armed forces accompanied with massive campaigns of imprisonment and execution of their masterminds. Nevertheless, more than a few members of contemporary central government as well as several chief ministers of Naxalite- affected Indian states (e.g. Nitish Kumar of Bihar) recently explicitly recognized economic background and uneven development of people and areas Naxalite purport to fight for as one of priority issues to be addressed in order to effectively neutralize the unyielding red menace. Besides ongoing operations of order forces, appropriate attention should also be paid to an increasing number of members of tribal population and oppressed social classes who do not welcome the latest wave of violence levying its toll on innocent civilians. Their persisting support to Naxalite combatants, which originates mainly from mixture of fear and hatred, could be transformed into large public protests against those who claim to act on their behalf. "*Such protests, if they*

---

[53] According to the latest opinion polls, moreover, 52 % of population living within the Naxalite affected areas answered that the violence and killings carried out by Maoists is justified. On the other hand, 57 % of those polled believe that killings of Naxals are mostly unjustified. *"Over half of those polled said the Naxalites worked for the good of the area, another one-third said they had the right intentions but the wrong means. Only 15% of the respondents were willing to describe the Maoists as just goondas"* (The Times of India 2010 p. 15). Furthermore, in contradiction to government's claims, Naxals are not seen as mafia and extortionists by 64 % of people. The majority also claim to have experienced considerably higher exploitation after the Maoist left from their region and one out of every two people think that Naxals finally forced government to focus more on development of the region, even if unwittingly (Ibid).

continue for an extended period, may demoralize a terrorist organization, stimulate internal dissent and eventually bring about implosion" (Weinberg, Pedahzur 2003: 106).

Although liberal democracies obeying the rule of law are generally not as well-equipped as authoritarian regimes for unrestricted fighting terrorism within their territories, they are not helpless, either. In India, there is an institution of parliament that is open to critical dissent, number of opposition parties, and relatively free media. Moreover, the fact that the government is accountable to the public might ideally give the ruling party the necessary incentive in order to accent the existing social problems. Even though the proportion of Indian society directly affected by Naxalism is still rather small, it could become a potential political leverage to desired social change through the reach of public reasoning that can attract, energize, and move a great deal of general public. *"Public discussion (...) can make the fate of the victims a powerful political issue with far-reaching effects on the climate of media coverage and public discussion, and ultimately on the voting of others – a potential majority"* (Sen 2010: 343-344).

In this sense, it is recommended by Nobel Prize laureate of Indian origin Amartya Sen to actively engage in reasonable public dialogue not the few hard-core ultras and rigorous ideologues of Naxalism, whose fundamentalist belief in justifiability of using violent means for noble goals is inconvertible, but all the sympathizers who provide them with quiet acceptance and on whose complex infrastructure the very success of Naxal's subversive activities vitally rely (Sen in Sakhuja 2010).

In addition, under propitious political conditions serving their goals, a substantial part of present-day rebels themselves might reconsider their comeback to party politics in order to become a part of certain power-sharing arrangement. Few attempts in this direction have already been evidenced. So far, however, none of them ever attracted any significant portion of Naxalite member base and was typically met with distrust among the long-established politicians and spiteful accusations of treason among the rest of the rebels. Besides, truly required political reforms would most probably caused obstructions for the flow of foreign investments to the country and endanger its much-praised short-term economic growth.

The success of multifaceted Indian society will depend on deliberate and inexhaustible encouragement of interactive and inclusive political processes, creation and cultivation of

values of tolerance, mutual respect, human dignity, and compassion as well as on appreciation of plural identities of human beings within the realm of public life in order to transcend its prevailing narrow-minded, profit-oriented, or community-centered horizons.

6.4. Reflection

Modern history of Nepal has been marked by several reoccurring (and often massively supported) attempts to topple down established (though usually highly politically volatile) ruling government and to transform the political regime in accordance with certain ideal image of state and society. One of the historically most influential political players in the country, Nepali Congress, which had led the 1950 Democratic Movement that successfully ended the Rana dynasty, together with communist parties struggled side by side against the army during the last days of undemocratic Panchayat system and contributed vehemently to the process of democratization and transition to constitutional monarchy with multi-party system.

Nepalese Maoists themselves went through particularly complicated evolution as well. From illegal political subject operating partly from Indian exile, Maoists became officially recognized political party at the beginning of 1990s. However, they soon returned back to illegality and were banned as a terrorist group by the authorities later on. After three rounds of interrupted talks, both sides finally found certain kind of mutually tolerable modus vivendi and the CPN (Maoist) became rightful political party once again. The ruling government, on the opposite side, was suffering from severe inner disagreements and did not display much legibility or efficiency during the time of the conflict, either.

The proverbial border line between the notion of legitimacy and illegitimacy (and partly even between legal and illegal), therefore, has blurred largely and even the very terms have become relatively ephemeral and obscure within the Nepalese political culture as well as within mindsets of ordinary local people and statesmen over those turbulent years and decades of revolutionary changes.

Despite several minor political turbulences, the post-independence history of India, on the other hand, can be characterized by quite unusually high level of political stability as well

as predictability which has not been achieved in any other South Asian country so far. Even the occasional political battles predominantly took places within the fixed, constitutionally strictly determined boundaries of genuinely democratic polity.

Although INC has been alternated in its leading position three times altogether, it still remains the single most important player within the highest level of Indian political arena and the influential role continually performed by members of famous Gandhi-Nehru dynasty has, to a great extent, shaped the image of independent Indian statehood to outside world as well as to Indians themselves. After 1947, every power shift, which eventually led to temporary removal of INC from that dominant position and its following transformation into a powerful oppositional force, moreover, happened through the regular mechanisms of relatively free and internationally acceptable standards of democratic elections.

Lastly, in spite of the fact that few segments of Maoist movement have gradually decided to abandon armed struggle and join the mainstream politics (e.g. the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation), the vast majority of revolting Maoist cadres has always been principally uncompromising in their strong anti-establishment demands and basically unwilling to negotiate about possible withdrawal from illegality. Thus, the very border line between the notion of legitimacy and illegitimacy (or between legal and illegal) as well as those artificial norms themselves have remained comparatively very clear and unequivocal within the mindsets of Indian political representatives and common citizens as well as within the overall national political culture during the years of rather stable (albeit not uncomplicated) process of self-directed state-building.

In the times of relative normalcy, the government's actual ability to deliver desired good governance is considered as a key issue by the majority of Indian active voters. In spite of so many pockets of severe social unrest across the country, the blind attempts to dissolve any officially established political order and to replace its prominent representatives at all costs do not quite match with the prevailing (majoritarian) socio-political atmosphere in today's largest democracy in the world.

7. Conclusion

Comparison of Maoist guerrilla movements in Nepal and India presents a very interesting picture. While comparably larger India is considered as one of the emerging economies with aspirations transcending the regional boundaries of South Asia, Nepal still remains rather on the periphery of international system. Nevertheless, both countries offer number of remarkably similar features. Complex socio-political and cultural conditions nurturing insurgent activities of far-left extremists subscribing themselves to Maoist ideology can be associated among them. Moreover, strategies of both movements could initially be characterized by practically analogical beginnings, during which originally peaceful political subjects took a titanic decision to resort to violent resistance against established order.

Yet in the case of Nepal, the CPN (Maoist) underwent a full circle journey from the point of non-conformity and categorical exclusion out of conventional political life, through participation in bloody civil war, towards the final (or at least temporary) stage of complete inclusion within the sphere of mainstream politics. The vast majority of Indian Naxalites, on the other hand, did not leave the underground armed struggle. Nowadays, they even oppose the central government with fighting intensity and rage that spin the spiral of violence faster than ever before and admittedly pose the single gravest threat to inner security situation over the past 60 years of India's post-independent history.

The comparative analysis of evolution of both respective cases implies that the uniqueness of Nepalese one supposedly lies in relatively more frequent redefinition of the notion of legitimacy (or legality). Lastly, it was the Nepalese king himself who decided to shift all the conventional political parties outside the virtual border of legality and, consequently, brought them to the same side with the outlawed Maoist partisans. Such substantial political change offered both camps exhausted by fratricidal (yet still relatively shorter in contrast to more than four decades lasting Naxalite-Maoist insurgency) war an unprecedented opportunity to formulate unifying (i.e. anti-royalist) statement and, for the first time, act together against common foe.

Finally, there seems to be hardly any room left for potential peaceful reconciliation at least partially imitating the path of the CPN (Maoist) in India within the foreseeable future. Oddly enough, India, which regularly presents itself as the largest democracy in the world, ascendant

soft power, and spiritual inheritor of ancient philosophical tradition of open-armed non-violence (*ahimsā*), appears helpless in order to successfully accommodate the rebelling Naxalites within its democratic structures. Those very structures – if implemented truly assiduously – should be, by definition, much more optimal instrumental framework for inclusion of various social movements than any other political regime imaginable.

Bibliography:

Acharya, I. (2001): Negotiation as a Means of Resolving the Maoist Conflict, Minnesota State University;

Adige, S.R. (2010): Maoist Consolidate Control, Political Events, November 18, New Delhi, India;

Banerjee, T.K. (2010): The Naxalite Movement: Currents and Crosscurrents, Kolkata, Progressive Publishers;

Basnett, Y. (2009): From Politicization of Grievances to Political Violence: An Analysis of the Maoist Movement in Nepal, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science;

Basu, P. (2010): Discourse on Naxalite Movement 1967-2009: Insight into Radical Left Politics, Kolkata, Setu Prakashani;

Bhusan, C. (2006): Rich Lands, Poor People: The Socio-Environmental Challenges of Mining in India, Centre for Science and Environment;

Bohara, A. et al. (2006): Opportunity, Democracy and the Exchange of Political Violence, The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 237-257;

Cabada, L., Kubát, M. (2004): Úvod do studia politické vědy, Plzeň, Eurolex Bohemia;

Deraniyagala, S. (2005): The Political Economy of Civil Conflict in Nepal, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, 47-62;

Drulák, P. (2008): Jak zkoumat politiku, kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích, Praha, Portál;

Drulák, P. (2003): Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, Praha, Portál;

Dvořáková et al. (2005): Komparace politických systémů, Praha, Vysoká škola ekonomická;

Ganguly, S. (1996): Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 76-107;

Gayer, L., Jafferlot, C. (Ed.) (2009): Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, London, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd.;

Gordon, S. (2005): Evaluating Nepal's Integrated "Security" and "Development" Policy: Development, Democracy, and Counterinsurgency, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 581-602;

Hachhethu, K. et al. (2008): Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State of Democracy, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance;

Joshi, M., Mason, T.D. (2007): Land Tenure, Democracy, and Insurgency in Nepal: Peasant Support for Insurgency versus Democracy, Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 393-414;

Lecomte-Tilouine, M., Gellner, D.N. (2004): Regicide and Maoist Revolutionary Warfare in Nepal: Modern Incarnations of a Warrior Kingdom, Anthropology Today, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 13-19;

Mishra, R. (2004): India's Role in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 627-646;

Misra, N., Pandita, R. (2010): The Absent State: Insurgency as an Excuse for Misgovernance, New Delhi, Hachette;

Murshed, M.S., Gates, S. (2005): Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 121-134;

Öberg, M., Strøm, K. (Ed.) (2008): Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict, Abingdon, Rotledge;

Phongpaichit, P. (1999): Theories of Social Movements and their Relevance for Thailand, Thailand Research Fund;

Pyakurel, U.P. (2007): Maoist Movement in Nepal: A Sociological Perspective, New Delhi, Adroit Publishers;

Satnam (2010): Jangalnama: Travels in a Maoist Guerrilla Zone, New Delhi, Penguin Books India;

Schwanková, Z. (2009): Maoistická guerilla: Komparace dvou maoistických hnutí ve vybraných zemích třetího světa, maoisté v Nepálu a Světlá stezka v Peru, Praha, Philosophical Faculty, Charles University in Prague;

Sen, A. (2010): The Idea of Justice, New Delhi, Penguin Books India Pvt. Ltd. ;

Singh, P. (2010): The Naxalite Movement in India, New Delhi, Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd.;

Strnad, J. et al. (2003): Dějiny Indie, Praha, Lidové noviny;

Thompson, L. (2002): Manuál pro boj s teroristy, Praha, Nakladatelství Ivo Železný;

Tilly, Ch. (2003): Politika kolektivního násilí, Praha, Slon;

Vavroušková, S. et al. (2003): Dějiny Bangladéše, Bhútánu, Malediv, Nepálu, Pákistánu a Srí Lanky, Praha, Lidové noviny;

Vrbová, J. (2007): Indie, Brno, Masaryk University;

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. (2003): Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, London, Routledge;

Whelpton, J. (2005): A History of Nepal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;

Internet Sources:

http://hdr.undp.org [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://hdrstats.undp.org [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/south_asia/ [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://history-100.blogspot.com/2009/08/history-of-republic-of-india.html [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981122,00.html [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://naxalite.co.tv/ [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-31/india/28309913_1_antony-army-deployment-internal-security [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://www.newageweekly.com/2010/05/massacre-in-dantewada-continues-by-cr.html   [last entry June 13, 2011]

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html [last entry June 13, 2011]

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.html [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101117_pakistan_and_naxalite_movement_india   [last entry June 13, 2011]

http://asiasociety.org/business-economics/development/amartya-sen-and-idea-justice   [last entry January 12, 2011]

Newspapers:

The Times of India (2010): In Naxal Land Govt Faces Trust Deficit, New Delhi, Tuesday, September 28th

The Hindu (2010): Pranab Sees Naxalism as the Biggest Threat to Nation's Security and Peace, New Delhi, Wednesday, December 29th

Other Sources:

Personal consultations with Associate Professor Pradib Basu, PhD at Scottish Church College (Calcutta University) and at his cozy home at the outskirt of Kolkata in November 26, 2010.

Appendix