

ABSTRACT

This paper works with a problem formulation concerning the relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova. The problem is lighted from different angles.

First of all there is a thoroughly examination of how the current situation in Moldova is and how it has developed over time. This is included to understand what the challenges facing Moldova are and how this may affect the way the EU views Moldova as a partner.

This is followed by a description of the EU's activities in the area. The EU Neighborhood Policy (ENP) forms the main branch of this part of the paper, since the relations between Moldova and the EU can be affected by the EU's policy towards the neighborhood as a whole. This includes a view on the two branches within the ENP: the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. The purpose of including this aspect is because the EU is not one heterogeneous actor, but an international organization of different states that may have different interests. Furthermore, the EU's cooperation with Moldova is described along with some critical aspects.

The theoretical base of the paper consists of a span of international relations theories, in accordance with the pragmatic philosophy and theoretic pluralist view that the paper builds on. Some of the normally opposing theories of international relations are used here to illuminate the problem at different levels. The (Neo-)Realist perspective is used to see what interests the two actors have in each other on a grand scale. As a contrast to this, Liberalism, and within this tradition a theory of Transnationalism, is used to understand how the different actors within the two units, the EU and Moldova, interacts with each other.

Within these two levels of analysis the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, is applied to create a further structuring of the chapters and create an understanding of some of the challenges and interests involved in the process. This theory works with a concept of securitization and security within five different sectors. This theory is relevant, since one of the main purposes of the ENP is to create a stable and secure neighborhood. The

sectors are then used to provide a structure to understand the security challenges concerning the two parts and thereby to understand the interests they have in each other.

To put the interactions into a larger scale some perspectives of Critical Theory are applied to understand the unequal relations between the actors. This is especially through looking at the relations within a light of World System Theory, a theory that sees the world as consisting of a powerful core and a less powerful periphery.

In total these aspects lead up to an understanding of how the relations between the EU and Moldova are.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA – Association Agreement

AfEI (alternative abbreviation AIE) – Alliance for European Integration

CPRM – Communist Party Republic of Moldova

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

EaP – Eastern Partnership

ENP – European Neighborhood Program

ENPI – European Neighbor and Partnership Instrument

EU – European Union

EUBAM – EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

FTA – Free Trade Area

HDI – Human Development Index

IR – International Relations

MASSR – Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

MSSR – Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic

NIS – New Independent States

PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

UfM – Union for the Mediterranean

UN – United Nations

UNDP – UN Development Program

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

WTO – World Trade Organization

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1 INTRODUCTION

Walking around in Chisinau one can see a lot of EU-flags on flagpoles in the parks and on billboards. But Chisinau is not in the EU, it is the capital of the Republic of Moldova¹.

When asking people if they know Moldova the answers can vary a bit. Some say a definite “yes”, some know them as a previous Soviet republic, others say, “Moldova, they are the ones with the funny hats, right?”, but quite often the name Moldova doesn't ring a bell. However, with the inclusion of Romania into the EU, Moldova became a neighbor of the EU and the troubles facing the small, relatively poor state in the borderlands, came closer to the EU.

Moldova has in its very short history as an independent country faced a lot of issues, of which some of the most well known are the conflict of the separatist area, Transnistria, and the illegal cross-border activities. These are issues that the EU can hardly just ignore taking place in its neighborhood.

With the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) aiming at creating a stable and secure neighborhood, it is relevant to look at how the EU copes with its new neighbor and this is the purpose of this paper.



Billboard in Chisinau, Moldova

¹ The Republic of Moldova is from now on just referred to as Moldova

2 PROBLEM FIELD

This project revolves around the relations between the EU and one of its new eastern neighbors, Moldova. Moldova has, in spite of its rather short time as an independent state, had quite different social, economic and political situations and it is interesting to see how the EU deals with this neighbor.

The writing of this paper is in itself a knowledge-generating process, so as I have gained knowledge about the problem, I have altered the problem formulation. Initially the interest of the project was how the political integration with the EU affected the social and economic development of Moldova. Then, realizing that this problem formulation was too broad to cover thoroughly in this thesis and that it would be difficult to say if there was any causality between the political integration and the development, I chose to focus on the political aspect. The focus was then for a long time on how Moldova's prospects of integrating with the EU looked. However, it was still a very broad focus and since there was a risk that it would be rather speculative, I chose to narrow it down. The final realization was that the part of the research that covered the relations between the two actors was a study in itself and therefore this became the final focus of the project.

2.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

The final problem formulation of the paper ended up being:

How are the relations between Moldova and the EU and how have they developed since the independence of Moldova in 1991?

To get closer to an understanding of this problem, some research questions have been formulated, to form out small part-analyses that in the end leads up to the final analysis and conclusion.

2.1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions of this paper are:

- *How has the development been in Moldova until now? And how is the current situation?*

- *What kind of cooperation does Moldova and the EU have?*
- *What interests do the EU and Moldova have in each other?*
- *How do the different actors act and interact on a domestic and a transnational basis?*
- *How do the power-relations affect the way they interact?*

2.2 CLARIFICATIONS

In this paper there are some uses of words that need to be clarified. These are briefly presented in this chapter.

First of all it is necessary to define what is meant by Moldova. The term Moldova can cover different spatial demarcations. Besides of the Republic of Moldova there is also a province in Romania that is called Moldova. Unless other is stated Moldova refers to the Republic of Moldova. The use of the term also depends on the context. Most of the time it refers to the whole country, but when the conflict with Transnistria is covered, there are some situations where the country is seen as two opposing entities and here Moldova only refers to the area west of the river Nistru (Dniestr).

Also there was the question of what to call the area to the East of the river. Since the questions of languages has a lot of importance in Moldova, with some speaking Moldovan/Romanian and others speaking Russian or Ukrainian. The river dividing the two parts of the country is called Nistru in Moldovan and Dniestr in Russian. Therefore there are also two names for the area Transnistria in Moldovan and Transdnistria in Russian². Since it was necessary to make a choice I went for the the Moldovan version, Transnistria, of the reason that it is on the language of the majority in Moldova. This is not because I find the Russian version less correct, but simply because I had to choose one.

Finally there is the question of how to refer to the EU as an actor. Since the paper works with the EU neighborhood, most of the activities take place through the institution of the EU Neighborhood Program (ENP). Therefore there are some places where there is a question whether to write the EU or the ENP. Here I have chosen to see the EU as the main organization and as an actor acting through its different institutions, while the term ENP is used when describing this institution within the EU.

² Wikipedia Transnistria (2011): <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria>

2.3 RELEVANCE

With the expansions of the EU, new policies were created to deal with the new neighbors of the EU. Most influential is the ENP. Part of the initiatives towards the new neighbors are projects to create stability and security. Therefore it is interesting to look at the relations and the interests involved – especially the security interests. This paper aims to clarify aspects of the relations between Moldova and the EU. When Romania joined the EU the borders moved East and Moldova became one of the new neighbors of the EU. It is relevant to see how the relations are between the EU and one of the members of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Moldova, which is relatively poor compared to the other European countries.

Moldova is through the ENP being integrated into some EU policy that are expected to create progress for the country. There are different actors who have interest in this progress. First of all there are the people of Moldova. In 2006 30,2% of the population of Moldova was living under the absolute poverty line and 4,5% under the extreme poverty line. Before 2015 these numbers should be 20% and 3,5% according to the revised national targets³. Even though the country has in periods experienced economic growth and the number of Moldovan citizens living under extreme poverty has decreased, the absolute poverty has increased in the same periods due to an increase of poverty in the rural areas where they experienced poor returns from the agricultural goods⁴.

Secondly the Alliance for European Integration (coalition of Liberal Party, Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party), who won the election in 2010 has an interest in the conditions improving. They claim that some of their main goals are to recover from the social and economic crises. To improve the conditions they also seek closer ties with Europe and they currently work on getting an association agreement with the EU⁵.

Also the EU has an interest in the conditions in Moldova improving, since Moldova is the center for a lot of transnational crime like trafficking of humans as well as organs⁶ and Moldova has a

³ UNDP (2011): <http://www.undp.md/mdg/MDG1/poverty.shtml>

⁴ UNDP (2010a): [http://www.undp.md/presscentre/2010/MDG%20Report%20II/1 Poverty E 9 septembrie 2010.pdf](http://www.undp.md/presscentre/2010/MDG%20Report%20II/1%20Poverty%20E%209%20septembrie%202010.pdf)

⁵ See Appendix C

⁶ Gvnet (2010): <http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/Moldova.htm>

semi-autonomous state Transnistria, inspired by Soviet, within its borders⁷, which can be a problem for the EU having so close to its borders.

Therefore it is relevant to go into depth with how the relations between the EU and Moldova are and to really understand this, it is also relevant to look at how they have developed over time.

2.4 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This chapter presents the ideas that this paper is founded on. The main philosophical base is pragmatism, where especially John Dewey is a source of inspiration. Besides of Dewey also some thoughts by Robert K. Merton and James Bohman are included on respectively the role of theory and methods in social science.

Within pragmatism the accumulation of knowledge is seen as a process. This process starts with the researcher wondering about a phenomena and is in this way it has a subjective point of departure. However, this wondering has to be defined and made observable in a process of constant reasoning where the first ideas for solutions can be rejected as the knowledge is accumulated. The results of this process should be interpreted into a common sense context of theory⁸

Concerning the role of theory in this process Merton has been used as a source of inspiration, more specifically the concept of theoretical pluralism. The idea is that even though theories build on very different ideas they can be mutually enriching, it does not necessarily mean that they are incompatible. The differences can be mutually enriching, since they can give a broader base for understanding the issue⁹. This also has some ontological concerns for the paper. The different theories build on different assumptions and thus the paper is not based on a stable ontology. However, having in mind the ideas of pragmatism, knowledge is a process and therefore there might be some risks in building on static ontological assumptions and therefore this paper prioritize the pragmatic epistemology over any kind of ontology. The assumptions of the different theories are discussed in the theory section, though, but this is most of all to understand the similarities and differences rather than a base for the research.

⁷ Wikipedia Transnistria (2011): <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria>

⁸ Dewey (1938): p. 105ff

⁹ Merton (1996): p. 34f

In a similar way a pluralism is also seen as a strength in the methodological area. By combining a range of methods it is possible to cover different aspects of a problem and give a more thorough description of the problem¹⁰. This paper will apply a diversity of methods as described in the following section about the methodology of the paper.

¹⁰ Bohman (1999): p. 477

2.5 METHODOLOGY

It is important that there is a sufficient empirical basis to cover the problem. This chapter describes the different methods applied and how they are used to cover different aspects of the problem.

This paper builds on different kinds of methods. For the part about how Moldova has developed and how the situation is now, statistics and history books are used. The history books can illustrate the context the development has happened in, while the statistics can be a very concrete indicator of the situation and recent social and economic development. Also some texts on the internet are used as a supplement for explaining the current situation. When choosing these texts, I have tried to as high a degree as possible to judge their reliability and chosen those that work the closest with the topic.

When describing the relations between Moldova and the EU the initial idea was to interview some politicians and political experts. However, since the people who knew the most on the subject were difficult to get interviews with, but there were speeches on the topic at some recent conferences where a range of international politicians and political experts were among the speakers and this was seen as a proper alternative to the interviews. There are two conferences that have been used for this paper. The first is a conference held in Copenhagen March 22nd 2011 arranged by DIIS and the Danish Foreign Ministry under the title: *“The EU’s Eastern Neighbors – the Road to Viable Reforms and Efficient Assistance”*. From this conference I have transcribed three speeches from my recordings: 1. the Danish Foreign Minister, Lene Espersen, 2. the EU Commissioner for the ENP, Stefan Fühle, and 3. the Minister for Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Iurie Leanca. This conference is later in the paper just referred to as the conference in Copenhagen and is placed as Appendix A.

The second conference was the Moldova-EU Forum in Chisinau March 30th 2011. From this conference, later referred to as the conference in Moldova, I have used my notes. These notes are placed in Appendix B.

The use of speeches in stead of interviews of course causes some methodological concerns of whether these data are as reliable and valid as the interviews would have been. One difference is that the speakers have more time to plan what they are going to say and thereby their response is not as direct as it would have been in an interview. However, the fact that they are more well prepared can also be an advantage in some contexts, since the risk that they say something wrong because of the time pressure is reduced when they are prepared. A second problem could be that since it is speeches, the answers of the questions from the interview would not be

answered. Since there were a lot of speakers each question was answered by at least two speakers. The biggest problem, which would be a problem as well in the interviews, is that the people it is easiest to get contact with are supporting the Alliance for European Integration (AfEI), while it would be best to also have the Communists views on the situation as well and what their view on the integration with the EU is. They have not answered the emails and it is difficult to find information in English from them – so the supplement here is to find their policy on their homepage and get it translated online. I have found the political plans of the four political parties that are most important at this time and translated the general overview via google-translate. An English version would have been preferred, but since the different political party didn't have this on their official pages, I considered this rather unorthodox method as the best alternative. These short introductions to the political programs are placed in Appendix C, first the three parties in the AfEI (Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Party and Liberal Party) are described and then the Communist Party. This is used to understand the present political situation in Moldova.

As mentioned the initial idea was to interview politicians and experts in EU-Moldova relations. The interview-guides are placed in Appendix D. The questions were made when the focus was still on Moldova's prospects of integrating with the EU, but many of them are also relevant for the present problem formulation. One respondent, Leonid Litra, who is Deputy Director of the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) in the Moldovan research group, Viitorul, agreed on answering the questions via mail and these answers are placed in Appendix E.

Besides of this, different articles and documents are applied to clarify aspects of the ENP and the relations between Moldova and the EU.

For the ENP the main source is Palgrave's *"The European Neighborhood Policy in Perspective – Context, Implementation and Impact"* - a book written with the main purpose of evaluating the ENP. To go into depth with the different projects within the ENP, I have tried to draw as much as possible on official documents of these projects. Finally, when describing some of the issues of the ENP and its dealings with Moldova, I have used some of the prominent scholars of Moldova-EU relations, Nicu Popescu and Giselle Bosse.

2.6 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter gives a short introduction to the theories applied in this paper and why these theories have been chosen. The theories are described more thoroughly and discussed in other

chapters. The paper builds on an International Relations (IR) framework and therefore this chapter starts with a brief introduction to IR Theory.

There has often been a divide in IR Theory between three competing traditions: Realism, Liberalism (also called Rationalism) and Critical Theory (also called Revolutionism or Neo-Marxism). They build on different assumptions and work with different sides of the phenomena¹¹.

(Neo-)Realism emphasizes on the state as an actor and how states struggle for power. Opposed to this Liberalism sees the state as a multitude of actors and thus focus on an inter-individual level. Criticizing both of these approaches Critical Theory focus on the inbuilt injustices in the world system and provides with a more normative aspect¹².

This paper acknowledges the differences between the approaches, but it does not see the schism as a constructive one and thus rejects a dogmatic reading of the theories. In stead an attempt to find a strength in the differences is made in applying the theories for different aspects of the analysis. Neo-Realism can help explaining the interests of different states on the international scene. Liberalism, on the other hand, is appropriate to describe some of the actors within the state or between states interact, which can give an understanding of some of the issues concerning a diverse country, like Moldova, and a big international organization, like the EU. Finally, Critical Theories can help putting the issue into a bigger global scale-context and illustrate some of the issues confronting a small state when cooperating with a large international organization.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (later just referred to as Copenhagen School) is included, represented by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. This is included, since one of the main aspects of the ENP is building a stable and secure neighborhood. By not only focusing on the classic militaristic aspect of security, but also includes aspects of social, economic, political and environmental security. These different aspects can help understanding some of the interests are involved when the two parts negotiate. The Copenhagen School draws on elements from the different traditions in IR, but has Realism as its point of departure and it will be used as a contrast to Realism in the analysis.


2.7 PROJECT DESIGN

¹¹ Knutsen (1997): p. 258

¹² Knutsen (1997): p. 252ff

This section describes the process from the problem formulation to the Analysis. Figure 2.7.1 illustrates how this process looks.

Figure 2.7.1: Project Design



The project design takes point of departure in the problem formulation. This is, as described in the problem field, split into 5 research questions. Of these, the first two are illuminated empirically, the first one building on the section of the context of Moldova and the second one in the section of the ENP. The empirical analysis summarizes the empirical sections and combines them in a different way. This first analysis is part of the base for working with the last three research questions. The analysis of these three is based on a theoretical foundation of international relations theories. The theoretic analysis is described more in detail in the chapter about the Strategy for the Analysis¹³. Finally all these part analysis sections lead up to the final analysis, where I try to get closer to an understanding of the problem formulation.

¹³ Chapter 7

3 CONTEXT OF MOLDOVA

The history of the Republic of Moldova is affected by its placement in what was known as the borderlands, where it for many years through time was occupied by varying powers. Back in the 19th century the situation was dominated by the three major powers Russia, Prussia (later Germany) and Austria. In 1812 with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Russia annexed this area under the name Bessarabia (this area is not completely the same as modern day Moldova, but approximately)¹⁴. Until then Moldova was a principality together with a province in present day Romania, which today also holds the name Moldova¹⁵. In this paper the name Moldova refers to the Republic of Moldova. Bessarabia was a complex area with three different alphabets and five different religions. The area was mainly inhabited by Moldovans (around 54.7%), but there were also large populations of Russians, Ukrainians and Jews as well as smaller German and Gagauz populations. Regarding language the Romanian/Moldovan language, spoken by Moldovans, was the dominating one followed by the Russian language. The Moldovans were mostly peasants and illiterate, so as a written language the Moldovan/Romanian language was not very important¹⁶.

In the early years after the occupation, the Russian Empire let Bessarabia enjoy some kind of autonomy (as it had had under the Ottoman Empire), but in 1828, when Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire, Bessarabia was incorporated completely into the Russian imperial system¹⁷.

In the following decades Bessarabia shifted between Russian and Romanian occupation. Both occupying forces attempted nationalization campaigns, but it was a limited success. It has even been suggested that the Romanian oppression was a more powerful tool towards a “Russification” of Bessarabia than the Russian campaigns were, since most Moldovans saw the Romanian rule as more oppressive than the Russian one¹⁸. After the February Revolution in 1917 Bessarabia was dominated by Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks¹⁹, who wanted an

¹⁴ Prusin (2010): p. 14ff

¹⁵ Teague (2004): p. 14

¹⁶ Prusin (2010): p. 14ff

¹⁷ Prusin (2010): p. 25f

¹⁸ Prusin (2010): p. 26ff

¹⁹ Menshevik: a fraction among the Communists following the Russian revolution, opposing Lenin's Bolsheviks (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Menshevik>)

autonomous Bessarabia within the Russian Federation and with Moldovan (Romanian in Cyrillic) as the official language²⁰.

In 1924 the area which is now Transnistria was combined with some areas of present day Ukraine to form the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), which had the main function as a propaganda machine towards the Romanian controlled Bessarabia²¹. A full incorporation of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union happened in 1939, after Germany and USSR had signed a non-aggression pact which allowed USSR to incorporate all the areas previously under the Russian Empire. Transnistria and the areas of Bessarabia were united to form the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), while the other areas of the MASSR were returned to Ukraine²². Some of the Southern districts of Bessarabia were also given to Ukraine, making the MSSR landlocked and thereby reducing the threat it might cause if it should one day choose to join Romania. The fear that Moldova wanted to join Romania was very present and any sign of nationalism or discontent with the Communist Party was suppressed²³.

Few years after the incorporation into the USSR an assimilation took place where 230.000ha of land were distributed to 185.000 families and the Moldovan language was to be written with Cyrillic script. 80.000 people chose to leave the country²⁴. A big part of Moldovan policy was dictated from Moscow, among them the economic. Moldova has very fertile land with a big agricultural production, but it does not have many minerals and it had to receive its energy from Russia. During the Soviet time the investments there were in an industrialization in Moldova were mainly placed in Transnistria while the industrial investments in the rest of the country were close to none²⁵.

3.1 POST-SOVIET MOLDOVA

The following chapters describe the development of Moldova since the independence. The main focus is on the political history, but there will also be included some economic and social details.

²⁰ Prusin (2010): p. 68

²¹ Lupu (2009): p. 77

²² McCauley (1994): p. 156f

²³ Teague (2004): p. 20

²⁴ McCauley (1994): p. 157

²⁵ Teague (2004): p. 20

In the late 1980s the policies in the USSR started to lose up under the Gorbachev-government. Moldova started to move towards independence, but it wasn't sure which form it would be in²⁶.

The Popular Front, who were suggesting a unification with Romania, enjoyed a support from a big part of the Romanian-speaking majority (around 64,5%). This works as a symbol of the strong focus on ethnicity there was in Moldova at that time. However, this might have alienated the minorities. In August 1990 Gagauzia declared itself an independent republic, followed by Transnistria a short time after. The year after, the anti-Gorbachev coup in Russia increased the ethnic polarization. The Moldovan government denounced the coup and declared the independence of the Republic of Moldova on August 27th 1991. The secessionists reacted on this by declaring support for the coup and their independence from Moldova²⁷.

Mircea Snegur, who was already an established figure in the MSSR, was, with support from the Popular Front, appointed leader of the state by the parliament. However, in spite of the strong ethnic sentiments in Moldova, it was not only a split in ethno-linguistic lines, there was also some disagreement between "Romanian" and "Moldovan" identity. Therefore it was difficult for the more radical pro-Romanian aspects of the Popular Front to come through. The craving for reforms took over the focus from the ethnic questions. To be able to work around the Popular front, Snegur argued for direct presidential elections and could unopposed take office in December 1991. The Popular Front was still able to exercise some kind of influence, but not to the same degree as before²⁸.

In spite of the more moderate streams in Moldova, the tension in Transnistria increased. The leader of the separatists, Igor Smirnof, tried to build ties to Russia and started with a more aggressive strategy towards getting independence from Moldova. Encouraged by the nationalists in the Moldovan parliament, president Snegur sent in the Moldovan military to try to disarm the separatists. This attempt failed, partly due to the Russians supporting the separatists. It escalated into a civil war in May 1992 until a cease fire was signed two months later supported by Russia, who supported a degree of Transnistrian autonomy within Moldova²⁹.

²⁶ Teague (2004): p. 21f

²⁷ Crowther (2004): p. 27ff

²⁸ Crowther (2004): p. 29f

²⁹ Crowther (2004): p. 30f



Graffiti in Chisinau where someone has written Moldova and Romania. The word Romania has been crossed out. This can illustrate some of the disagreement about the Moldovan identity, whether it is Romanian or Moldovan. Graffiti like this can be found many places in Chisinau.

In June 1992 a new, moderate government under Andrei Sangheli was elected, taking distance to the Popular Front and promising economic reform. Snegur chose to move towards the same line as Sangheli and the Moldovan Ambassador in Russia, Petru Lucinschi, returned to Moldova to be in charge of the legislature. Members of the government, who was mainly Moldovan speaking and of rural background, went together to form the Agrarian Democratic Party (ADP). Together with the Socialists on the left wing, they suggested a slow transformation into market capitalism, cooperation with Russia and integration into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, a cooperation between previous Soviet states) cooperation and calming down the ethnic tensions. The right wing parties, National Christian Party and Popular Front, had the integration into Romania as their highest priority. The left wing won the election in 1994 – the Socialists dominated in the cities, where there were a majority of Russian-speakers, and ADP in the Moldovan speaking rural areas. The coalition won in both the executive and legislative branch of the government and could thus bring some kind of temporary stability, enabling them to make a post-Soviet constitution where the power was split between the president, the parliament and the court. It focused a lot on the minorities and accepted a degree of autonomy in Gagauzia. The ADP led government was willing to make reforms and privatized parts of the agricultural production and this gave Moldova a good reputation among the Western governments³⁰.

There was instability in the Moldovan government, though. Some of it might have been caused by the personalities, who were all dominant figures in the old Soviet system, or by the lack of a parliamentary tradition. Up to the elections in 1996 Snegur turned around towards a more Romanian nationalist policy, more rapid economic reform and a faster integration with the West.

³⁰ Crowther (2004): p. 32ff

At the election he lost to Lucinschi, who, due to his closer relations to the Russians, was expected to be able to get a settlement of the Transnistrian issue. A government with mainly members of the old government was formed under Ion Ciubuc. The government had difficulty to come to agreement in itself and the parliament kept on blocking reforms. This unstable situation had massive consequences for the Moldovan economy³¹. It also failed to come with a solution to the Transnistrian issue. Therefore a lot of the Moldovans fled to what they saw as the best alternative, the Communist Party (CPRM) led by Vladimir Voronin. To keep the Communists from winning the other parties gathered together to form the Alliance for Democracy and Reform (ADR). The parties within the ADR were quite different, though, and they had difficulties agreeing. They didn't manage to create stability and within a short range of time it had different prime ministers – first Dumitru Diacov, then Ciubuc and later Ion Sturza. They tried to bring reforms, but were suffering from the different parts of the ADR not being able to agree. After Sturza, a compromise candidate, Dumitru Braghis, was chosen to make the balance between being reformist, but without being so reformist that the Communists voted against him. However, it was limited how much he could do about the deadlocked situation and the weak Moldovan economy. Finally the Christian Democratic Party suggested a “parliamentary republic”, where the influence of the president was limited. They were backed by the Communists. In 2000 a law suggesting the parliament electing the president by three fifths majority was passed. If no candidate got the majority then there would be repeats after three days, fifteen days and if no candidate had a majority by then, the president should dissolve the parliament and call for legislative elections³².

The Communists won the election in 2001 with 71 seats, a large majority of the seats, which allowed them to choose the president and to amend the constitution if they pleased. Voronin was appointed president and a new government was formed under Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, who chose to keep some members of the previous cabinet, which signaled a relatively moderate approach. However, not all the policies were seen as moderate. Voronin sought closer ties with Russia and the CIS and suggested a change of the language law and a Union with Russia and Belarus, which were rather controversial suggestions. Furthermore the Communists made themselves unpopular with the World Bank and IMF where they chose to reverse local administrative reforms and go back to the Soviet framework. Voronin also declared Russia to be the one to solve the Transnistrian issue³³.

³¹ As described later in this chapter

³² Crowther (2004): p. 38ff

³³ Crowther (2004): p. 43f

In spite of the fear for Russification, the Communists continued to stand strong in the population. However, in 2002, when the relations with the West had turned bad and there was limited help from Russia, Voronin and the CPRM chose to change their policies. CPRM pulled back the most controversial policies in e.g. the ethnic questions and Tarlev agreed to keep the budget within the IMF framework. Moldova received World Bank funding and slowly the economy started to improve. This could also partly be influenced by the recovery of the Russian economy³⁴. Even though CPRM moved closer to the West, it still relied on Russia to solve the Transnistrian issue. In 2003 Russia proposed the so called “Kozak Memorandum”, which would allow Russian forces to stay in Transnistria until 2020³⁵. Voronin showed willingness to sign the Kozak Memorandum, but after massive protests in Moldova and pressure from EU High Representative, Javier Solana, he chose not to sign³⁶.



CPRM continued to enjoy popular support and since it cooperated with the EU the opposition couldn't really use the European platform against it. At the election in 2005 CPRM again got a majority of the votes and only needed 6 seats to keep power. Supported by the Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party, Voronin could take another term as president³⁷.

The relations between Moldova and the EU remained relatively good in the following years, until the April elections in 2009. At the elections in April 2009 CPRM won the elections, but with a too small margin to appoint a president. Following the election results people went to the streets to

³⁴ Crowther (2004): p. 45f

³⁵ Popescu (2005): p. 30

³⁶ Lupu (2009): 41

³⁷ BBC (2005): <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4322617.stm>

protest. Initially the protests were peaceful, but later confrontations happened between the protesters and the police. The episode still contains some loose ends. In some way the parliament was put on fire and the different actors accuse their opponents of doing it. Many protesters were arrested and there have been reports of many human rights abuses by the Moldovan police³⁸. This caused a lot of criticism from the Western powers³⁹. For the re-elections in July 2009 the opposition parties joined together in the Alliance for European Integration (AfeI), who won the elections, but also with a too small margin to elect a president. However, Voronin's retirement in September 2009 enabled AfeI to appoint Mihai Ghimpu as acting president⁴⁰. In November 2010 there was another election, which the AfeI won with a bigger support, but again with a too small margin to appoint a president⁴¹.

The present status of Moldova is still fragile. Though the AfeI have a majority it is not big enough to appoint a president. However, Marian Lupu from the Democratic Party is acting president and Vlad Filat from the Liberal Democrats is prime minister. This current government of the three parties within the AfeI is well liked among the EU⁴².

Regarding the economics the situation was, as mentioned, problematic in the 1990s. Especially in the early 1990s the economy suffered with a peak in negative growth in 1994 of approximately -30%, which is shown in Figure 3.1.2. Since the 2000s, where the parliamentary situation has stabilized and the relations with the West has improved, the economic situation has made a change for the better. Since 2000 there has only been negative growth in 2009 following the crisis.


³⁸ Spiegel (2009): <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,618087,00.html>

³⁹ ENP Progress Report (2010): p. 2ff


⁴⁰ Wikipedia Moldova elections July 2009 (2011): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldovan_parliamentary_election,_July_2009

⁴¹ Rianovosti (2010): http://en.rian.ru/trend/moldova_election_2010/

⁴² See e.g. Appendix B

Figure 3.1.1: GDP

Source: World DataBank


Figure 3.1.2: GDP growth (percent)

Source: World DataBank

Furthermore, Moldova has since the independence suffered a decrease in population, which can be seen from Figure 3.1.3. This is partly due to many Moldovans migrating to other countries, many of them by getting Romanian citizenship and going to the EU. This also means that Moldova depends more on remittances than any other country in the world because of a big part

of their work force living in other countries. In 2004 it was 27% of the GDP in Moldova that depended on remittances ⁴³.


Figure 3.1.3: Population



Source: World DataBank

According to the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a UNDP index over the living standards of different countries, Moldova has, after a drastic decrease in HDI through the 1990s, managed to provide a growth through the 2000s bringing it up to world average standards, but is still lacking far behind the average of Europe and Central Asia. In 2010 Moldova had a HDI of 0,623 which is rank 99 out of 169 countries. The progress in HDI of Moldova can be seen from Figure 3.1.4 below. Of the indicators included in the HDI it is especially due to the low income of the citizens, while on parameters of health and education the score is decent.

⁴³ Cuc (2005): p. 1

Figure 3.1.4: Human Development Index

Source: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MDA.html>

4 THE EU FRAMEWORK

The EU is one of the focal points of this thesis. Therefore it is important to define how the EU is seen in this paper. Since the EU includes enough aspects for several projects in itself, it is important to narrow the focus down to the elements of the EU cooperation, which are the most relevant for the problem of this paper. These are the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Also there will be some focus on some of the instruments these organs use towards the neighboring countries.

4.1 EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY

The ENP was created in 2003 in the context of the 2004 EU enlargement focusing on four geographical regions, the Western Newly Independent States (NIS)⁴⁴, the Caucasus and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states⁴⁵. Since Moldova is one of the NIS, it is the parts of the ENP which aims at the NIS that will be the main focus of this section.

The ENP can be seen as linked with the EU's first Security Strategy, which aims at creating stability in the neighborhood of the EU and the create regional stability. One of the reasons for creating the ENP was that the countries who would be new EU neighbors were seen as unstable, with low living standards and a lot of organized crime and with the enlargement the EU would need a policy towards these new members. When High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten wrote a letter to the Commission in August 2002 suggesting a neighbor policy, it was evident from the communication that the policy was intended to cover the four regions mentioned above and leave out the countries, which was to be included in the enlargement. In this way the countries that were covered by the policy were supposed to be kept from gaining membership, while at the same time providing them with the increased possibility to extend their cooperation with the EU bilaterally⁴⁶. The ENP has as a purpose to share some of the benefits of the new member states with their neighbors, thereby *"[...] strengthening stability, security and well being for all concerned."*⁴⁷.

⁴⁴ Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine

⁴⁵ Whitman 2010: p. 3ff

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ ENP Strategy Paper (2004): p. 3

The ENP is supposed to build on cooperation between the EU and the neighboring country. In the ENP Strategy Paper from 2004 it says:

*“The method proposed is, together with partner countries, to define a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated into jointly agreed action plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts.”*⁴⁸.

The background for the cooperation with the member states of the ENP varies. One measure, which is mentioned quite often and might be of increasing importance is the “more for more” principle, where the states who does a lot of reforms should receive a lot of support in return⁴⁹. This fits well with the initial formulations from the Strategy Paper that “[t]he level of ambitions of the EU's relationships with its neighbors will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.”⁵⁰.

The progress according to the Action Plan is revised in the framework set up in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreement and, based on this, the European Commission reports on the progress on a regular basis. According to these reports the EU and the partner country tries to adapt the Action Plan⁵¹. The Action Plans are valid for three to five years and in the meanwhile progress is monitored in the Country Progress Reports. As far as it is possible, the goals contained in the Action Plans are supposed to be defined in a way where it does not turn into a checklist, but includes more qualitative elements that encourages multiple answers to the problems assessed. If a country has done well according to the goals set up in the Action Plan, it can apply for additional funds at the Governance Facility. The Governance Facility is supposed to reward the progress achieved⁵². Here it is especially progress in the areas of “[...] democratic practice, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law[...]” that are taken into account⁵³.

⁴⁸ ibid

⁴⁹ Popescu (2011) (web)

⁵⁰ ENP Strategy Paper (2004): p. 3

⁵¹ ibid

⁵² Governance Facility (2006): p. 4f

⁵³ Governance Facility (2006): p. 5

There is also an economic factor in the ENP. This encourages the partner countries to approach to the EU economic model, learn from best practices and combat corruption and fraud. This is in itself expected to give some degree of economic progress, but besides of this it is expected that the market integration gained through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers will create gains and increase welfare. It is also expected to create stability and attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The reforms are also expected to increase the linkage with the WTO framework and thereby give increased market access. Within the ENP the implementation is tailored according to the partner country's situation, to create the most secure and effective economic growth. Furthermore, the partner country is expected to create the policies in a way that can help decrease poverty and inequality. Within the agricultural sector the countries are encouraged to adapt their production to EU standards, to be enabled to access the EU market. Also the transport sector is seen as an important area of cooperation, since this can generate more tourism and trade and to improve information and communication technology to avoid "a technology gap". The partner countries are, furthermore, encouraged to improve their research systems, so they can participate in a cooperation on this area as well⁵⁴.

One aspect, which is seen as an important part of most Action Plans, is border management. *"The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security"*, and *"Action Plan priorities could furthermore include co-operation on migration, asylum, visa policies, measures to combat terrorism, organised crime, trafficking in drugs and arms, money laundering and financial and economic crime"* (ENP Strategy Paper 2004: 17)⁵⁵.

Some of the important tools the ENP apply are called TAIEX and Twinning. Their purpose is to make it easier to cooperate through adapting the legal framework of the partner country to the one of the EU, so the cooperation is less likely to be dominated by constraints⁵⁶.

The support given by the ENP is organized in the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a framework with the purpose to give the assistance to partner countries in the most efficient way (ENPI 2006: 1). The ENPI works through a range of initiatives, where some of the most important in the case of Moldova are described in the chapter about the EU's initiatives in Moldova⁵⁷.

⁵⁴ ENP Strategy Paper (2004): p. 14ff

⁵⁵ ENP Strategy Paper (2004): p. 17

⁵⁶ ENP FAQ (2011): http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#4.5

⁵⁷ Chapter 4.3

The Strategy Paper suggests that the partner countries can also benefit from regional cooperation on a wide range of areas including economy, social policy, trade and infrastructure⁵⁸.

The countries in the ENP have been divided into two groups, the Eastern Partnership (EaP)⁵⁹ and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)⁶⁰. Russia is in a group by itself and has bilateral negotiations with the EU. The UfM was proposed in 2007 by Nicolas Sarkozy, who was back then running for President of France. Fearing that the UfM would create spheres of influence within the EU, Germany entered the process and negotiated an initiative, which was based on an extended cooperation with the EU rather than a replacement of elements within the EU cooperation. The UfM was finally established in July 2008⁶¹.

As a counterpart of the UfM, the Eastern Partnership was prepared by the Polish government led by Donald Tusk and presented jointly by Poland and Sweden in May 2008. It was finally launched one year later in May 2009⁶². It is proposed by the Commission that the EaP should be under the ENP framework and it should be mainly bilateral. However, there is also the possibility for multilateral cooperation between the countries, which *"[...] is based on four 'policy platforms' on democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security and contacts between people."*⁶³.

It is evident that there are different geopolitical interests in play. One example is a letter this year formed by some of the EU countries bordering the Mediterranean, suggesting that funds should be moved from East to South⁶⁴.

4.2 CRITIQUE OF THE ENP

The ENP framework has been criticized from different sides. This section presents some of the points criticized by scholars working with the ENP, Giselle Bosse from the University of

⁵⁸ ENP Strategy Paper (2004): 20f

⁵⁹ The EaP consists of the NIS and the Caucasus

⁶⁰ The UfM consists of the countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean

⁶¹ Whitman (2010): 8ff

⁶² Whitman (2010): p. 11

⁶³ Whitman (2010): p. 11f

⁶⁴ Popescu (2011)

Maastricht and Nicu Popescu, PhD, senior research fellow linked to the European Council on Foreign Relations.

One of the concerns Popescu mentions is related to the new principle, “more for more”. He sees the principle of giving countries more according to their performance as “fair”, but warns that there might be a risk that it is a “slippery” concept. One of the problems is to define more in the terms of reforms, since it can be reformist without being democratic and vice versa. There can also be the problem that some reforms can be reversible and he therefore suggests that maybe it should be “much more money for many more reforms”, so the reforms that are made will turn out sustainable in the long run⁶⁵.

Popescu also comments on the geopolitical division, where there currently is a division between the South and the East where the different countries promote their area of interest. There is, however, also a division between near and far, where it is also inbuilt how big a threat the country constitutes. In that way a country like Palestine receives much more money than a closer country, like Moldova. He accepts that there is a geopolitical dimension that can be combined with the “more for more”, but suggests that the close and far dimension should be more apparent, instead of the East and South dimensions⁶⁶.

The main point of critique of Bosse is linked to the terms “partnership” and “governance”. The ENP has a clear governance aspect, where the countries in the ENP are expected to implement policies to adapt to the EU policy framework, which can be seen as a sort of “rule transfer” through their commitment to the *aquis communautaire*⁶⁷ and rules linked to EU norms. Another problem is that the relation is top-down, where there is a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders. It is not necessary like that in the ENP, but there can also be more horizontal rule dictation, where the partner country is allowed to participate in the process. However, so far it appears that it is mostly the EU trying to create stability by transferring its own rules and values to the neighboring states, while the reciprocity is more limited⁶⁸.

Bosse criticized⁶⁹ the lack of progress that has happened in Moldova despite its membership of the ENP and the EaP. However, it is worth to mention that she sees the Moldovan government as

⁶⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁶ *ibid*

⁶⁷ The EU body of law, later just referred to as the *aquis*. Wikipedia *Aquis* (2011): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_acquis

⁶⁸ Bosse (2010): p. 1292ff

⁶⁹ Bosse also refers to others who have done so

part of the reason for the lack of progress⁷⁰ and her article is written before the 2010 elections. Therefore there might be some changes in the policies compared to when she wrote her article. The next three sections focus on the current initiatives between Moldova and EU, first by describing the Action Plan for Moldova, then describing how the progress has been judged by EU and finally by describing what initiatives the ENP has started in Moldova.

4.3 EU INITIATIVES IN MOLDOVA

EU's Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) is a program aiming at tackling the cross-border crime. It was launched in November 2005 after a joint request from the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine to the European Commission and it is fully funded by the ENPI. The UN Development Program (UNDP) is a partner in the implementation of the EUBAM. It works on building capacities of the border administrative system in Ukraine and Moldova to make it easier for legal trade and travel while protecting the citizens against and preventing illegal cross-border activities. The mission has been extended in 2007 and 2009 and is to expire in 2011 if no extension is made. The mission has mandate to advise, to be present and observe, but it does not have any executive mandate and it is not allowed to intervene in politics. One of the major focuses is to create a sustainable situation in Transnistria⁷¹.

Already in the 1990s Moldova signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This type of agreement is mainly aimed at economic and financial cooperation and financial assistance⁷². Since January 2010 Moldova has been negotiating an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU⁷³. There are many similarities between the contents of the PCA and the AA, but some important differences are that the AA is seen as an important step towards getting an agreement on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and that the AA has a higher degree of reciprocity than the PCA. However, the AA is also more difficult to achieve. Where the PCA requires a qualified majority the AA can be blocked by a member state or a majority in the EP⁷⁴.

Moldova already has some kind of economic integration with the EU. It enjoys some free trade benefits through Autonomous Trade Preferences, granted in 2008 and in 2009 more than 50%

⁷⁰ Bosse (2010): p. 1292

⁷¹ EUBAM (2011)

⁷² Petrov (2011) (web)

⁷³ Sleptova (2011) (web)

⁷⁴ Petrov (2011)

of Moldova's exports went to the EU. At this point Moldova already benefits from some lower tariffs, with a DCFTA it would also get access to cooperation on e.g. competition and energy-related issues and get closer integrated into the economic parts of the EU acquis. In the end the primary benefit from a DCFTA is expected to be an increased capability of attracting foreign investments⁷⁵.

4.4 ENP ACTION PLAN FOR MOLDOVA

There have been some different frameworks for EU-Moldova cooperation. First there was a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, initiated in 1994 and working from 1998. The ENP Action Plan, which was approved in February 2005, builds on this cooperation⁷⁶. This section briefly describes the Action Plan for Moldova, which describes what is expected by Moldova within the ENP. There are a long range of initiatives and among these the Action Plan mentions some as the main priorities. These are:

“

- *sustained efforts towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict;*
- *further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law; ensuring the conduct of parliamentary elections [...] in Moldova in accordance with European standards;*
- *ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and the freedom of expression;*
- *further reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity;*
- *resuming cooperation with IFIs [(International Financial Institutions)]; implementing actions aimed at poverty reduction, to strengthen private sector led growth and for fiscal sustainability;*
- *improving the investment climate through appropriate structural reforms aimed at ensuring non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable business conditions and by the fight against corruption;*
- *progress towards a system of efficient, comprehensive state border management on all sectors of the Moldovan borders including the Transnistrian sector;*

⁷⁵ Sleptova (2011)

⁷⁶ ENP Progress Report (2010): p. 2

- *working towards EU granting Autonomous Trade Preferences, by ensuring effective control of the origin of goods from Moldova;*
- *stepping up the fight against organised crime, including trafficking in human beings;*
- *ensuring the efficient management of migratory flows, including initiating the process towards the conclusion of a readmission agreement between the European Community and Moldova.*⁷⁷.

The progress on the goals of the Action Plan is evaluated in the Progress Report, which is described below.

4.5 EU'S EVALUATION OF MOLDOVA

This chapter gives a short resume of the conclusions of the most recent ENP Progress Report for Moldova.

The most recent Progress Report from 2010 covers the year 2009. This was a year where the relations between Moldova and the EU suffered quite a setback after the elections in April 2009, where Moldova failed to elect a president. After these elections riots broke out and it ended out with confrontations between the rioters and the police. There have been reports of the police violating some of the rights of the rioters. This is in contrary to many of the priorities of the ENP and the relations between Moldova and the EU suffered. However, after the elections in July that year, where a new government was elected the relations improved again. The new government had a clear European integration profile and did an effort to effectively implement structural reforms

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⁷⁷ ENP Action Plan for Moldova (2004): p. 3f

⁷⁸ ENP Progress Report (2010): p. 2ff

5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter briefly sums up the first part of the paper that focus on empirical observations and introduce some simple analytical considerations. Revolving around the two first research questions, this chapter describes the development of Moldova up to the current situation and how the cooperation with the EU has been in these periods.

Moldova has a short history of independence. Since the 19th century it has mostly been part of Russia – first as part of the Russian Empire and later under the USSR. In between there was only a short period under Romanian rule. The relations with Russia and Romania have continued to have a big impact on Moldova.

When Moldova gained independence the political landscape was dominated by the ethnic divisions in the country. Some of the Romanian speaking population wanted unity with Romania, which caused the minorities, most notably the Ukrainian, Russian and Gagauz minorities, some fear. However, during the Russian occupation Moldovan identity had been promoted to limit Romanian influence, so the majority wanted to stay as one united Moldova.

In spite of the majority not joining Romania, secessionist streams among some of the minority groups had already caused the establishment of two separatist areas, Transnistria and Gagauzia. Transnistria was the part of Moldova that had been the most privileged under the USSR and the area with the most industry. The Moldovan government tried to stop the rebellion by force, but it failed and it ended up with Russia going in on Transnistrian side and stopping the conflict by sending peacekeeping troops. The issue of Transnistria is still a big problem for Moldova because of trans-border crime. This is one of the background motifs of the EUBAM, an EU mission to stop the crime crossing the Moldovan and Ukrainian borders.

The political parties in Moldova struggled up through the 1990s agreeing on a direction for Moldova to develop in. The disagreement of how much to reform the country and how quickly as well as the issue of Romanian or Moldovan were some of the big issues. This caused the varying government coalitions to be rather unstable and these governments had a difficulty managing the economy and creating a viable social situation, which might be one of the reasons for the still quite low GNI and for the large migration away from the country. The one thing the political parties could agree on was that they did not want the Communists to gain power, so they united in the ADR to stand stronger in the elections in the late 1990s, but they still couldn't agree on many other political goals than keeping the Communists from power. Though they signed a PCA with the EU and thereby had some relations the relations weren't strong.

Up through the 2000s the Communists had a majority in the Moldovan Parliament and were able to create stability and a certain degree of growth. Initially the Communists were rather focused on the relations with Russia, but when Russia tried to get Voronin to sign the Kozak Memorandum, a treaty that would give Transnistria a lot of autonomy and Russia a lot of influence in the region, the EU intervened. Together with the pressure from the Moldovan population the pressure from the EU managed to stop Voronin from signing. Since then Moldova and EU slowly built up relations. These relations suffered after the election in April 2009 where there have been stories about Moldovan demonstrators getting their human rights violated by the Moldovan police.

At the elections in July 2009 the opposition had united into the Alliance for European Integration (AfEI) and won the elections with a small margin. The AfEI have been in government since then, but only with an acting president. Their strong European integration agenda quickly made them popular with the EU⁷⁹. There is a lot of optimism about the new Moldovan government from EU side and so far they seem very reform willing and ambitious, for example Lene Espersen said at the conference in Copenhagen: *"(...) Moldova, one of the most eager reformers should be rewarded even more. The assistance by the EU and its member states must constantly be assessed to ensure that we receive value for money and reach our common goals."* ⁸⁰.

The political parties within the AfEI don't agree on all points, though. These parties have sprung out of the old parties from the 1990s and there are still some of the old disagreements. For example the Liberal Party wants to join EU by becoming part of a greater Romania, which would most likely mean the exclusion of Gagauzia and Transnistria, while the Liberal Democrats and Democratic Party wants Moldova to stay united and join the EU in the present form with Transnistria and Gagauzia⁸¹. Furthermore the Democratic Party, who is ideologically linked to Social Democracy and the Socialist International, tries to unite the center left population, while both the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democratic Party are center right parties⁸². One could then fear that the AfEI would suffer the same destiny as the ADR did. However, in spite of the differences within the AfEI, it seems that the parties focus mostly on the common European agenda that are also part of their programs and make the reforms necessary to achieve this goal⁸³.

⁷⁹ See e.g. Appendix B

⁸⁰ Espersen, Appendix A: p. 3

⁸¹ Appendix C: p. 2ff

⁸² *ibid*

⁸³ *ibid*

Moldova has been part of the ENP since 2003 and of the EaP in 2009. The EaP was created as a counterpart of the UfM for the Eastern neighbors. In the beginning Ukraine was seen as the frontrunner of the Eastern neighbors following the Orange Revolution⁸⁴, but with the change of governments in Ukraine and Moldova, the latter started to catch up with Ukraine and is now seen as one of the success stories in the ENP⁸⁵. Currently Moldova is negotiating about an Association Agreement, which would give a higher degree of reciprocity from the reforms and can lead to a DCFTA. Since these frameworks are made in a WTO context they are expected to make the country more attractive for foreign investors.

The Moldovan government also has high expectations from the cooperation with the EU and is supporting the new “more for more” principle. Even though they expect that the reforms in itself will be able to create progress⁸⁶, they also want to have a clear view of what they can get from the EU for making these progressive reforms, like the countries in Central Europe had, when they were making reforms in the 1990s. As Iurie Leanca said: “[...] *Central European countries, while they were reforming their countries, modernizing their countries in the 90s and before joining the EU, they had very strong motivation to reform their countries in a more efficient and a speedier way, because they have the clear perspective of joining the EU [...]*”⁸⁷. In his speech he also states that Moldova would like to have the perspectives of membership within range as they implement their reforms: “*I ask him [ENP Commissioner Fühle] as an old friend to make sure that at the end of his first term in his capacity Moldova will be addressed not within the neighborhood policy, but in the enlargement*”⁸⁸. It is then clear that Moldova wants to have some kind of incentive to make the reforms that the EU proposes worthwhile.

⁸⁴ Appendix B

⁸⁵ Appendix B

⁸⁶ See Leanca, Appendix A: p. 12

⁸⁷ Leanca, Appendix A: p. 13

⁸⁸ Leanca, Appendix A: p. 17

6 THEORY

The following chapters describe the theoretical foundation of the paper. This paper, based on a pragmatist philosophy of science and a theoretical pluralism, includes a range of different theoretical perspectives and let them interplay with each other. First, two of the main traditions within international relations theory, Neo-Realism and Liberalism, are introduced. Then, World System Theory is included as a critical perspective. Furthermore, the Copenhagen School of security studies is described. Finally, the theories are summed up and discussed in a theoretical discussion.

6.1 NEO-REALISM

This chapter gives an introduction to the international relations theory of Neo-Realism. First the origins within the realist tradition is described, to create an understanding for the background of the theory. Then the differences between Realism and Neo-Realism are presented.

Realism is a very broad tradition with many offspring. In spite of the differences within the tradition there are some common assumptions, of which some of the most distinct are the focus on political issues with the state as the influential actors and they see the world as a constant power struggle between states. Though there are some intellectual inspiration from classical philosophers, like Hobbes and Rousseau, realism as a tradition in international relations is often considered to start with Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr in the 1930s-40s. Since then a range of versions of realism has emerged. Of these one of the most influential has been Kenneth Waltz's Neo-Realism⁸⁹.

According to Kenneth Waltz, some of the main differences between classical realism and Neo-Realism is the way causality, power and structure are seen⁹⁰.

Where classical realists were interested in the causes of concepts like war, the neo-realists see causes not like one way movements, but as interconnected between the interacting units and the structures. In this way Neo-Realism can have explanatory elements for changes as well as continuities⁹¹.

⁸⁹ Jørgensen (2010): p. 78ff

⁹⁰ Waltz (1990): p. 32ff

⁹¹ *ibid*

Concerning the view on power, states were in classical realism seen as power-maximizing actors, since if the relative power fell compared to other states, it could be a threat. In Neo-Realism it is seen as rational to seek the middle way between too much power and too little. Waltz agree with the classic realists that if a state is too weak there is a risk that a stronger state will attempt to use force, but on the other hand, if the state is too powerful other states might try and unite against it. One of the main concepts of Neo-Realism is the international structure, which they see as formed out of the power distributions⁹².

The views on structure are rather different in classical realism and Neo-Realism. Where classical realists focused on states acting differently because of the differences in how they are composed neo-realists see this as being a wrong conclusion and in stead focus on how structures affect outcomes. Neo-Realism sees the internal diversity within states as a similar organizing principle⁹³.

There have been some criticism of the neo-realist position and examples of cases where the theory didn't fit with reality. To this criticism Waltz reminds that *"[...] a theory is not a statement about everything that is important in international-political life, but rather a necessarily slender explanatory construct."*⁹⁴ and that *"Theories cannot remove the uncertainty of politics, but only help us comprehend it"*⁹⁵. This shows that Waltz is aware that Neo-Realism can't cover all perspectives within international relations and within any theory there will be some degree of uncertainty.

6.2 LIBERALISM

This chapter presents the tradition of Liberalism within international relations. First the broad tradition is presented. Then one of the theories within the tradition, Transnationalism, is described more in depth.

Liberalism as a tradition is more optimistic than realism. There are a broad span of currents within Liberalism, but they share the view that cooperation can help bring peace and prosperity to the world. Besides of cooperation, also reforms of international relations can help the progress on its way. According to some currents in Liberalism it is less likely that democratic

⁹² Waltz (1990): p. 35f

⁹³ Waltz (1990): p. 36f

⁹⁴ Waltz (1990): p. 32

⁹⁵ Waltz (1990): p. 37

states will start a war, at least against other democratic states. Furthermore, interdependence between states can help create a more peaceful environment, since a state is less likely to attack a state it has close relations with⁹⁶.

Liberalism is a tradition that goes long back, but, especially since World War II and the Cold War where some of the assumptions within the classical liberal tradition had difficulty explaining the situation, new movements within Liberalism have emerged. They take different points of departure within the tradition, for example some focus on peace and democracy, while others focus on cooperation between governments⁹⁷. Of these I have chosen to focus on Transnationalism, a theory that goes beyond state-state relations by also emphasizing the importance of societies within the international scene⁹⁸, which can provide this paper with an aspect to understand the importance of the sub-groups in the relations between EU and Moldova. For the transnational theory section in this paper a text by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, who are some of the noted scholars within liberal tradition, are the used. Though the main focus are on transnational interactions, they also include some domestic aspects that are also relevant for the problem field of this paper.

When Nye and Keohane try to go beyond the state-centric paradigm they don't seek to downplay the importance of the state, which they see as an important actor, but they want to emphasize that there are other actors that influence international relations. Since people can identify with other entities than the nation-state, a lot of international activities take place without the interference of a government and therefore it is important to also consider the non-government actors⁹⁹.

In Transnationalism the focus is on global interaction. Global interaction refers to the movement of items across state borders. These are divided into four categories: communication (movement of information or transfer of ideas); trade (movement of physical goods); finance (movement of money); and travel (movement of people). Some interactions are between two or more states, these are called inter-state interactions. Other interactions could be between non-government actors, i.e. individuals or organizations, and these interactions are referred to as transnational interaction. Transnational interactions also cover interactions between a government and a non-

⁹⁶ Jørgensen (2010): p. 57f

⁹⁷ Jørgensen (2010): p. 59ff

⁹⁸ Jørgensen (2010): p. 69

⁹⁹ Nye (1971): p. 330ff

government actor. An important type of actors is societies. Societies can try to influence their government. They can also try to affect foreign governments or cooperate with foreign societies. Only when there are actors from other countries involved the interaction is referred to as transnational, while the ones within the state border are domestic¹⁰⁰.

The transnational interactions may affect the international political scene in different ways. Nye and Keohane work with five different types of effects of transnational interaction:

- *Attitude changes*: can happen as an effect of different kinds of interaction, e.g. trade with a country can change a groups perception of that country or a group can promote a set of ideas to another group.
- *International pluralism*: when national and international organizations have common interests they can gather into a transnational organization. These transnational organizations then have a platform to attract more national organizations and attempt to affect government policies.
- *Dependence and interdependence*: the governments might become dependent on the services an organization can provide or an interdependence might simply emerge from a transnational cooperation, where some policies might have too negative consequences for a government to follow.
- *New instruments for influence*: can be provided through a transnational cooperation. This can be research facilities that provides governments with a knowledge or some trade cooperation creating a new trade framework.
- *Autonomous or quasi-autonomous actors*: can refer to organizations that have gained so much power through influence or resources that it gains some kind of autonomy to act almost like a state on the international scene¹⁰¹.

6.3 CRITICAL THEORY

This chapter briefly introduces some aspects of Critical Theory, where the main emphasis is the World System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, but also other aspects are included to create a broader understanding of the issues.

¹⁰⁰ Nye (1971): p. 332f

¹⁰¹ Nye (1971): p. 336ff

The label Critical Theory spans widely and is sometimes referred to as Neo-Marxism. Within international relations it usually revolves around the inequality in the world. One of the most notable branches is dependency theory, a span of theories trying to explain the inequality between countries often with a critique of colonialism and imperialism, which are seen as a factor for the rich states to keep power over the poor. However, this is not something all Neo-Marxists agree on, since some also say that imperialism can generate some genuine development, but these haven't been as wide-spread as the dependency theories. Within dependency theory there have been developed some terms to understand the distinction between the rich and powerful states on one side and the dependent states on the other side. This can link Wallerstein to these theories within dependency theory¹⁰².

Rather than applying a state centric perspective, Wallerstein focus on the world as an organized and hierarchical system. The roots of this world system stems from the capitalist world-economy, which encouraged an endless accumulation of capital. This requires a constant attempt to acquire new knowledge and technology, and to produce new materiel. The most advanced and specialized goods normally gives the highest profits. Therefore countries normally try to keep an advantage in their specialized production. This kind of production is referred to as "core" production and in the world system those countries that have an advantage in specialized production and mainly produces core goods, are referred to as core countries. Those countries that don't have the capacities to produce these kinds of goods and focus on production of non-specialized goods are referred to as the periphery. Countries where about half of the production is specialized and the other half non-specialized are called the semi-periphery¹⁰³.

There is a constant struggle to gain an advantage in a type of specialized production where especially the semi-periphery can be rather aggressive. Often when new technological advances are made, some of the old technological production moves from the core to the semi-periphery, where the production is cheaper. At the same time a competition is going on between the semi-periphery and the periphery on the non-specialized goods. This keeps the periphery in a difficult situation, where they are stuck in a situation with low profit production¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰² Degnbol-Martinussen (1997): 85ff

¹⁰³ Wallerstein (2004): p. 1ff

¹⁰⁴ Wallerstein (2004): p. 23ff

Another perspective Wallerstein elaborates on, in a text about geopolitics, is the concept of culture, whether it is something national or if a world culture is possible. The concept of culture is difficult to define and to limit, since it has something to do with the groups individuals belong to, but at the same time each person can belong to a broad range of groups and these can change over time. Therefore culture is seen as something alterable rather than something fixed¹⁰⁵.

Wallerstein argues that culture can be linked to different levels of units. The most dominant ones are nations, but there can also be smaller groups based on ethnicity or some other common factor. Besides of this some argue that with international organizations like the United Nations (UN) and common values, e.g. the human rights that are seen as universal, there can be a movement towards some kind of world culture. Wallerstein thus sees two main divisions within the concept of culture, one between the world culture on the one side and the nation-states on the other side, and another one between the nation-state and the smaller groups within it. In both of these divisions the nation-state seems to have the upper hand¹⁰⁶, but it is worth to notice that *[c]ulture has always been a weapon of the powerful*¹⁰⁷ and in the context of the world-system the powerful is the core.

6.4 COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

The following chapters will describe the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. First, to understand the background of the theory, a general picture of the context of security studies that the Copenhagen School was formed in, is described. Then follows a general description of Copenhagen School. After that some of the most important aspects of the Copenhagen School will be described more in depth. Finally, some of the points of critique are presented and discussed.

6.4.1 TRENDS IN SECURITY STUDIES

The Copenhagen School was developed in the early 1990s, just after the Cold War ended. Until then the so called Traditionalist approaches were dominant. The Traditionalists saw the state as the key actor and had a focus on the military threats. However, there was a increasing

¹⁰⁵ Wallerstein (1991): p. 184ff

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*

¹⁰⁷ Wallerstein (1991): p. 184ff

movement of scholars who wanted to include other elements, like international crime and issues regarding sovereignty. These new positions became known as Wideners. The Wideners accused the Traditionalists of having a too narrow focus and ignoring some relevant security issues. At the same time some Traditionalists argued that with a too wide scope there was a risk of watering out security, if the label security could cover almost anything¹⁰⁸.

6.4.2 INTRODUCTION TO COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

The Copenhagen School tries to find the middle ground between the wide and narrow approaches. The proponents of Copenhagen School label themselves in different ways, but it can be seen as a moderate wideners approach. They agree with the Wideners that a narrow focus on militaristic factors of security is not sufficient to cover the present landscape, but they also agree with the Traditionalists' point that if there aren't any limits for what security contains there can be a risk that the concept of security will be watered down¹⁰⁹.

The source of Copenhagen School used in this paper is *"Security: A New Framework for Analysis"* by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. The three scholars provide with different aspects of which those I choose to focus on in this paper are sectors and securitization.

6.4.3 SECURITIZATION

The concept of securitization is concerned with the process of how an issue becomes part of the political or the security agenda.

There are different degrees of how an issue can be seen. First there are the non-politicized issues. These are issues that haven't reached the agenda. Other issues become part of the agenda and these can either be politicized or securitized. The politicized issues are issues that aren't seen as emergencies and can therefore be dealt with by using legal measures. If an issue gets securitized it can reach the state of emergency and in that case means that aren't normally within the legal framework can be used¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁸ Buzan (1998): p. 1ff

¹⁰⁹ ibid

¹¹⁰ Buzan (1998): p. 23ff

In the securitization process there are different units of concern. First of all there is the object that is to be securitized, the so called referent object that needs to be protected from some threat, described by the sectors. Referent objects can take different forms, e.g. states, communities, markets or the physical surroundings. The unit who defines the referent object as a security issue is known as the securitizing actor. Before the securitizing actor defines the referent object as something that needs to be protected, it is not a security issue, since it has not been defined as one on the agenda. Besides of the securitizing actor it can also be necessary to include other actors in the analysis, actors that don't define the referent object as something that needs to be securitized, but still affects the securitization agenda¹¹¹.

Once the threat is over or the actors choose to remove an issue from the securitization agenda, a process called de-securitization¹¹².

6.4.4 SECTORS

The Copenhagen School identifies five different sectors they see as the primary: military, political, societal, economic and environmental¹¹³. In this paper I have chosen to place the main emphasis on the first four, since they appear to have a bigger impact on the relations between EU and Moldova, but the environmental is introduced briefly.

Military

Like the Traditionalists, the Copenhagen School finds it important to include the military aspect as the threats to the state is seen as a central aspect of security. Here the focus is not on the troops placed in different places. Only if there are some threats to the security of a state itself it is relevant for the the military security¹¹⁴. In this paper it is used in a relatively broad sense, where the Transnistrian conflict is seen as a potential military threat.

Political

¹¹¹ *ibid*

¹¹² *ibid*

¹¹³ Buzan was skeptical towards the conceptualization of environmental and economical sectors. Buzan (1998): p. 2

¹¹⁴ Buzan (1998): p. 49ff

Political security is concerned with threats to the sovereignty of a country and the organizational stability of a state. It can cover a large range of threats, this could be various kinds of pressure to the government or the ruling ideology. Since this is a rather broad concept there may be places where there are overlaps with the other security sectors. In those cases where there are overlaps, the threat would be included into the other sector (e.g. if there is the use of military means it would be included in the military sector). Thus the political sector only focus on threats concerning issues like the legitimacy of the government or the support for the policy¹¹⁵.

Societal

The Societal security is concerned with the issues identity of communities, that could be that of a nation (in the sense of an ethnic or religious group). If the community sees themselves as a “we” they can see outside factors as a threat towards them and their identity as a group. Such threats could be linked to e.g. migration, regional integration projects or secessionist fractions¹¹⁶.

Economic

Economic security revolves around the market and its interplay with the state. It can be a difficult sector to grasp, since the market is dependent on many international factors. Economic threats can thus be international as well as local. Economic threats can be linked to the management of the economy, of changes in the demand for the exported goods of a country or other factors that may affect the economic base of a country¹¹⁷.

Environmental

This sector is somewhere in between social sciences and natural sciences, working with the physical base of security. It covers many aspects from holes in the ozone layer to over-consumption of goods or poisoned water. It can be linked to issues like ecosystems, energy, changes in population and food¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁵ Buzan (1998): p. 141ff

¹¹⁶ Buzan (1998): p. 119ff

¹¹⁷ Buzan (1998): p. 95ff

¹¹⁸ Buzan (1998): p. 71ff

These sectors form out one of the bases to understand the interests that are involved in the focus on security on the agenda.

6.4.5 CRITIQUE OF THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

Within the framework of security studies the Copenhagen School has faced some criticism, mostly from Wideners, who thinks that Copenhagen School should be more inclusive. However, here I will only emphasize on one of the most prominent critics of Copenhagen School, Bill McSweeney, who sees an inconsistency in Copenhagen School having Neo-Realism as a point of departure and then have a deconstructionist agenda¹¹⁹.

Especially the concept of societal security has been criticized by McSweeney, for being too vague. According to McSweeney, the Copenhagen School concept of societal security mainly focus on the security implications of a rather fixed conception of identity within the societal security. Hereby the complexity of societies and process of forming identities are ignored¹²⁰. This is a point that is considered in the theory discussion next chapter.

6.5 THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

The chapters above describe four different theoretical perspectives. In this chapter I try to show how these can be used to strengthen each other through their internal diversities.

The theories work on different levels of reality. Where Neo-Realism is focused on state-to-state relations, Liberalism takes other actors, like organizations or societies, into consideration. In contrast to both of these approaches, World System Theory sees the world as one system of inequality between a core and more peripheral states. This means the units of analysis in the various theories are different and therefore they should be used in different contexts. Here Copenhagen School can provide some common grounds at least between Neo-Realism and Liberalism, since the Copenhagen School sees the state as the most important actor, but also includes other actors and focus more on the process of creating security than on the actors. The concept of securitization is also very important in this matter, since this is a very important part of understanding the process of security – what actors there are, how they act on and articulate perceived threats as a politicized or securitized issue.

¹¹⁹ McSweeney (1996): p. 82

¹²⁰ McSweeney (1996): p. 83ff

One difficulty of combining the theories is their difference of ontology, but, though their views of the world can be seen as opposing each other, this is not necessarily so. The rather pessimist world view of the neo-realists suggest that states are struggling for power and that cooperation between states are mainly a means to accumulate more power. On the other side Liberalism focus on progress and peace, but they also say that actors' interest in cooperation is not necessarily altruistic. This can then be seen as a world where the different actors try to create progress for themselves and for the state progress can be in the form of power-accumulation. This fits well with the World System Theory, where some states are in a better position to create profit than others and the states have an interest in being on top of this hierarchy. Since Wallerstein sees culture as something that mainly benefits the strong it can then be expected that the core has a cultural dominance over the periphery.


For an actor it is important to be in a secure position. For the state this often means that there aren't any physical threats towards it (i.e. military or environmental threats), for a government that their political power is not endangered, while for a society it can mean that their identity and way of living is not threatened. For the EU and Moldova, which are both units with a lot of internal diversity still in the process of defining an identity it is important to take McSweeney's criticism into account and thus identity should not be seen as something fixed, but as something that may change over time.

How the theories are used in practice is described in the next chapter of the Strategy of the Analysis.

7 STRATEGY FOR THE ANALYSIS

This chapter describes the structure of the theoretical analysis and the final analysis. Figure 7.1 shows a graphical illustration of the structure:

Figure 7.1: Strategy for the analysis



As the figure shows the analysis consists of three parts: 1. about the mutual interests, 2. about the actors and 3. about the power relations between the EU and Moldova. All the parts of the analysis builds on the empirical framework¹²¹, but they apply different theories.

1. *Moldova-EU interests*: describes what interests drive Moldova and EU to a cooperation. This section partly builds on how the situation in Moldova is and has developed and partly on the cooperation there is between Moldova and EU at that given time. To understand this, theories of Neo-Realism and Copenhagen School of Security Studies are applied.

¹²¹ Chapters 3-5

2. *The actors*: this section is a view of the more complex pictures. Different actors in Moldova and the EU have different interests. Liberalism, and within it Transnationalism, gives a brief picture of the different types of interactions with the purpose of understanding how the actors can benefit from cooperating while Copenhagen School helps describing why some actors have an interest in cooperation according to their own security situation, especially focusing on the political and societal sectors.
3. *Moldova-EU power-relations*: is an analysis that cast a more critical view on the cooperation between the two actors. It builds on the first analysis and applies Critical Theory to see if there is a structural inequality in the negotiations between the two parts and how they react on these.

Each of these part-analysis sections end with a summary that will help leading up to the final analysis. In the final analysis, the threads from the three different parts of the analysis are gathered to come closer to an understanding of the problem formulation: *How are the relations between Moldova and the EU and how have they developed?*

8 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

8.1 MOLDOVA-EU INTERESTS

This chapter builds on the research question *“What interests do the EU and Moldova have in each other?”*. Here the EU and Moldova are seen as two units that have each their interest that they follow. The analysis takes point of departure in Neo-Realism, but the sectors from Copenhagen School helps shaping the analysis. Besides the EU and Moldova as the two important securitizing actors, one more actor, Russia, that is very influential in the region, is included as an opposing power to the EU.

First the EU's interests in Moldova is described according to the sectors. Then Moldova's interests in the EU. Finally the two parts are summed up in a short analysis concluding this sub-chapter.

8.1.1 EU INTERESTS IN MOLDOVA

In this section the EU is seen as a unity with interests, more or less like the neo-realists see the state, even though the EU is not an actual state. This is justified with the EU having initiatives like the ENP and in those a kind of common foreign policy. For the ENP this policy is one that builds on creating a stable and secure neighborhood. This makes an analysis of the security threats that Moldova can pose to the EU relevant. The threat in the different sectors are described below. Here it is worth to note that in this chapter societal security is left out, since this sector is concerned with the societies, communities and the like, and thus fit better into the analysis of the different actors involved in Moldova-EU relations. Also, the political threats are left out, since this sector focus on the government, rather than the state and in the cases of EU and Moldova this might also be linked to the societal sector, since the government in these two units appear to be affected by the different societies and it is therefore also included in the chapter about the actors.

Military

As a small and relatively poor country Moldova as a state doesn't have the military capacity to pose a big threat to the EU. However, the instability in the country has caused a lot of illegal

trade and some of this includes weapons. There have been rumors of illegal arms in Transnistria¹²² and there has even been an example of smuggling of uranium in Moldova¹²³. Therefore the instability in Moldova is a bigger threat to EU military security than the country's military could be. This might be one of the reasons why one of the main EU initiatives in Moldova, the EUBAM, aims at securing the borders against illegal cross-border activities. The importance of these issues from an EU viewpoint is seen clearly from the ENP Action Plan where both the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the security of the Moldovan borders are mentioned as some of the most important issues.

Furthermore, the fact that Moldova is in the interest sphere of Russia, which is a powerful state, can also have an impact on the military sector. On the one hand it can be an incentive for the EU to have an interest in strengthening Moldova so the power relations between EU and Russia don't change to Russian advantage, since this would mean a weaker foundation for negotiating with Russia. The EU as a major actor in international politics therefore has no interest in letting Russia become too influential in Moldova, which can be one of the reasons that the EU activities in Moldova started to intensify in 2003, when Russian negotiators tried to make Voronin sign the Kozak Memorandum, which could mean a strong Russian presence and influence in Transnistria until 2020 as well as a lot of power to the Russian friendly Transnistrian government.

However, on the other hand it also means that the EU has to be careful with Moldova. Too close relations between Moldova and the EU could risk to upset Russia and this can pose a potential risk. Therefore the relations between Moldova and the EU has to find the right balance between being too active and being absent. This fits well with the view from Neo-Realism that the actors on the international stage need to find the right balance between having too little and too much power.

Economic

The economy of Moldova is not a big one and can seem insignificant for a big economy as that of EU. However, having an unstable economy in a neighbor country can still be a concern. Moldova has a lot of problems with poverty, corruption and trafficking of humans and goods. The illegal activities taking place within the borders of Moldova and across the borders into the EU can then have a significance for the EU.

¹²² UNHCR (2002): <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country..FREEHOU..MDA..473c540919.0.html>

¹²³ CNN (2010): http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-24/world/moldova.uranium.discovered_1_yellowcake-uranium-radioactive-material?s=PM:WORLD

Also the relations mean that the EU can spread out its economical agenda to other states, influencing another economic area and thereby opening up to and acquiring access to another market. One concern, however, is that Moldova as a poorer country has lower wages and this can enable cheap production. It is therefore natural that the EU evaluates if Moldovan production of some kinds of goods can threaten the EU's production in that area. Built into the Autonomous Trade Preferences is a possibility of leaving out some products, so if the EU finds some parts of Moldovan production a threat to its own products, they can choose to say that these products are not included in the free trade¹²⁴.

It is also important to remember that the EU has suffered economically from the financial crisis. It is then natural if there are some concerns when it comes to including other countries in an economical cooperation. If the threat is real or not can be difficult to judge, since there is an uncertainty of how the world will recover from the crisis, but according to the concept of securitization the most important is how the threat is perceived and articulated by the securitizing actor. There is within the EU a concern about the risks of enlargement of the EU during a time of economic crisis, but this is an issue that becomes clearer if we look at the specific actors within the EU and the issue is therefore described more thoroughly in Chapter 8.2.1.

Environmental

When it comes to the environment the troubles tend to transcend borders. In the recent years there has been an increasing focus on the environment. EU has it as one of its agendas to improve the environment and tries to implement it in their plans as well. The security on this point is especially that the agricultural goods from Moldova lives up to a standard that is in line with the goals of the EU and with the purpose of protecting the European consumers. It is therefore included as a part of the Action Plan of Moldova that the origins of the agricultural goods need to be clear.

8.1.2 MOLDOVA'S INTERESTS IN EU

As a small country Moldova has a lot of interests in building close relations with the stronger powers in its region. The sectors can help describe some of the interests it can have in relations with the EU.

¹²⁴ EC (2011): <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/moldova/>

Military

For Moldova the situation in Transnistria, even though it is not an open conflict as it was in the start 1990s, is still a big issue. The military capacities of the country is still too low to defend itself from the threat that the forces in Transnistria could pose and with the Russian forces on the side of the separatists it can be difficult for Moldova to see an end to the issue. For periods different Moldovan governments have tried to build closer ties to Russia in hopes that Russia would help them solve the issue, a strategy most apparent during the early years of Voronin's rule, but also one of the backgrounds for electing Luchinski was his close ties to the Russian government¹²⁵. In spite of the efforts of Russian friendly Moldovan governments, the Russian government has had a tendency of supporting the separatists in Transnistria¹²⁶. One reason for this might be linked to the threat that Moldova would seek closer ties to Romania, in which case Russia would have an interest in a weak Moldovan state.

The involvement of the EU as a mediator in the conflict, trying to find a one state solution can then be an important step to come to a viable solution for Moldova. Russia is still seen as an important part of the solution, since their influence over the Transnistrian government is strong. For years the framework for the negotiations on the Transnistrian issue was "2+1" consisting of the two opposing parts and Russia as a mediator – a framework where the Transnistrian side had an advantage. Later Ukraine and OSCE were included as mediators and the EU and the USA had status of observers – the so called "2+5" framework. There has also been efforts of direct involvement of the EU and this is now one of the main frameworks for solving the conflict¹²⁷.

Economical

Up through the 1990s the economy of Moldova suffered, partly because of unstable governments and partly because of the relations with Russia. Going from having Russia as one of the main trading partners, it was a big problem when the Russian economic trouble made it more difficult to export to Russia¹²⁸ and Russia also turned out to be an unreliable trading partner¹²⁹.

¹²⁵ As mentioned in the Context of Moldova

¹²⁶ Popescu (2006): p. 1ff

¹²⁷ ibid

¹²⁸ USAid (2001): <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/md/>

¹²⁹ Economie Moldova (2006): <http://economie.moldova.org/news/russian-trade-sanctions-against-georgia-moldova-and-ukraine-12562-eng.html>

Sometimes Russia has put a ban on Moldovan wine, which is one of the most important exports of Moldova, and there have been suspicion that this is a way of sanctioning Moldova for its politics¹³⁰. With the ties to the EU growing stronger, Moldova now has another strong trading partner and right now some of the main importers of Moldovan goods are within the EU¹³¹. The economic reforms bringing closer ties to the EU and reforms making it easier for Moldova to export goods to the EU are therefore expected to be important steps to stabilize the Moldovan economy¹³².

Environment

Concerning the environment one big threat to Moldova is that it is a country without many natural resources and therefore it relies on other countries. Especially Russia has been an important partner supplying Moldova with gas and energy. However, some of the sanctions Russia has made to Moldova when facing political disagreement, is to cut off the gas-supply¹³³. The dependence on Russian gas is a big problem for Moldova and therefore the link to the EU gas and energy network has been a high priority for Moldova¹³⁴.

One fear is that if Moldova opens up through the Association Agreement it will end up as an importing country, so it is important for Moldova that the EU promotes the agricultural sector in Moldova, which constitutes a big part of Moldova's GNP¹³⁵.

8.1.3 SUMMARY

Since Moldova is a small state and the EU is a big power one could question what EU gains from the cooperation. Where it is clear that Moldova can gain a lot by having EU involved in solving the Transnistrian issue, so it is not only Russia who can dominate the discussions and from gaining access to a bigger market, the benefits for the EU can be more difficult to see. However,

¹³⁰ Economie Moldova (2010): <http://economie.moldova.org/news/a-new-wine-war-of-russia-against-moldova-in-the-making-207936-eng.html>

¹³¹ CIA (2011): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html>

¹³² Sleptova (2011)

¹³³ NewEurope (2005): <http://www.neurope.eu/articles/Russia-tells-Moldova-no-more-cheap-gas-supplies/38377.php>

¹³⁴ Leanca, Appendix A: p. 14

¹³⁵ Appendix B: p. 17ff

the EU does not have an interest in instability and insecurity in its neighborhood and it can also be problematic for the EU if Russia gains too much power in the region and therefore the EU can gain some kind of security from stabilizing the area.

8.2 ACTORS INVOLVED IN MOLDOVA-EU RELATIONS

This part of the analysis goes into depth with the different actors within Moldova and the EU, who can have diverging interests and tries to get a view on the 4th research question: *How do the different actors act and interact on a domestic and a transnational basis?*

This analysis has its point of departure in Liberalism, but also builds on the Copenhagen School with the elements of securitization and the political and societal sectors. Here the different societies within Moldova and the different countries of the EU play an important role for the political and societal security. First the different interests within the EU are presented, followed by a chapter about the political and societal situation in Moldova. After this there will be a short section on the role of the civil society and after that the part-analysis ends with a summary.

8.2.1 ACTORS WITHIN THE EU

The EU consists of 27 different countries and often their interests can be diverging. Therefore it is interesting to make an analysis according to the different interest spheres within the EU. In this part-analysis the focus is on inter-state relations between Moldova and the different countries of the EU.

The difference in interests of the foreign policy agenda of the different countries within the EU are evident from the way the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership were formed. The UfM started as an initiative by France to support their interests within the region of the Mediterranean. This is also in the interests of the other EU countries surrounding the Mediterranean, like Italy and Spain. The EaP is the Eastern counterpart of the UfM, initiated by Poland and Sweden, of which especially Poland, as a neighbor of Ukraine, has shown a lot of interest in the EaP. Also Romania has shown a lot of interest, since two of its neighbors, Ukraine and Moldova, are involved in this partnership. In the middle countries like Germany tries to secure that the UfM and EaP doesn't split the EU's relations with its neighbors into small spheres of interest¹³⁶. That the ENP is cautious about how they work with the different areas of

¹³⁶ Whitman (2010): p. 4ff

the neighborhood can be illustrated by these words by Commissioner Fühle: “[...]we don't want to create two groups among the EU members, those supporting the South and those supporting the East, and these two groups clashing each and every time about each and every Euro to be invested in our neighborhood, there needs to be a certain solidarity.”¹³⁷.

So far a lot of the ENP policy has been concerned with geography and there has been examples of France trying to move funds from the East to the South and with the recent events in Northern Africa¹³⁸ a lot of the attention has moved to the South. This can be illustrated by the conference in Copenhagen that was about the Eastern neighbors of the EU, but in spite of the topic being the East, several of the speakers talked a lot about the Southern neighborhood¹³⁹. However, even though they mentioned the importance of the South at this point, they also said that they shouldn't forget the East. For example, Commissioner Fühle started his speech with mentioning the importance of the focus on the South not being at expense of the East: *“Thank you for the pleasure in your presence, to talk about better neighborhood policy and talk not only about the South, which is, as you can imagine, very much now at the center of our focus.”*¹⁴⁰.

One new initiative that has been presented recently to decrease the importance of geography is “more for more”. This initiative aims at rewarding the most reformist countries by granting them the most funds, thereby giving them an incentive to implement the reforms. The countries that are at this point seen as the most reformist are Moldova and Ukraine, and since they are the direct neighbors of the Eastern EU countries these countries might be very much in favor of this policy. The Eastern EU countries, as well as Moldova and Ukraine, mentioned at the conference in Copenhagen, and at the Moldova-EU Forum in Chisinau the following week, that they think that the “more for more”-principle is a step in the right direction¹⁴¹.

One of the important interactions of the ENP is communication, in the sense of transfer of values. When the ENP was established one of the main goals was to create a stable and secure neighborhood and an important step of achieving this was through advocating for democracy

¹³⁷ Fühle, Appendix A: p. 10

¹³⁸ EU (2011): <http://eu.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/04/29/arab-spring-causes-europe-to-rethink-schengen-agreement/>

¹³⁹ See Espersen and Fühle in Appendix A

¹⁴⁰ Fühle, Appendix A: p. 6

¹⁴¹ See Appendix A and Appendix B

and human rights. Besides of the events following the elections in April 2009, Moldova has been seen as one of the less problematic neighbors, though there are still some problems, especially in Transnistria¹⁴². The three other kinds of interactions, trade, finance and traveling, are seen as more problematic in the case of Moldova. Moldova has a lot of issues when it comes to fighting corruption and the illegal transport of humans and goods¹⁴³. This is especially a concern for Romania, as the only EU country bordering Moldova, but it also affects other countries. Therefore it is natural that Romania is one of the main advocates for focusing on the situation in Moldova¹⁴⁴.

Even though the threats in the different sectors are more apparent for the neighbor country, Romania, the threat, real or perceived, may also affect other countries. Regarding the integration of the ENP, there is a discussion within the EU of what this integration should include. At the conference in Moldova one of the commentators from the Netherlands mentioned the issue that the current international situation makes some of the EU member states skeptical towards talking about enlargement¹⁴⁵. It is not certain if Moldova is considered as one of the main threats in this area, but it is natural if there is some concern regarding economic integration with a poorer state. The Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, acknowledged that there is some tendencies towards skepticism and protectionism within the EU and even though he is an advocate for expansion he is aware that this is a time where it is necessary to tread carefully¹⁴⁶. The Moldovan Prime Minister also recognized that some actors within the EU are worried, but he doesn't think that Moldova is the cause of this concern¹⁴⁷. However, there are some examples that might talk against this perception of Moldova not being one of the main concerns. Some of the old EU states that are often richer than the new EU member states have expressed a concern about the crime that may cross the borders. One recent, very clear example is the intention to close the Danish border, where one of the main arguments for doing so is Eastern European gangs¹⁴⁸. Fears like these might also slow down Moldova's chances of obtaining a visa free regime.

¹⁴² Politicom (2010): <http://politicom.moldova.org/news/human-rights-in-transnistria-long-term-realities-and-recent-events-210797-eng.html>

¹⁴³ CIA (2011)

¹⁴⁴ See Appendix B

¹⁴⁵ See Appendix B

¹⁴⁶ Tusk, Appendix B: p. 2f

¹⁴⁷ Filat, Appendix B: p. 2

¹⁴⁸ EFD (2011): <http://www.efdgroupp.eu/news/267-permanent-border-control-at-entry-points-to-denmark.html>

8.2.2 ACTORS WITHIN MOLDOVA

Moldova is a country still in the phase of creating a national identity. The country consists of a Romanian/Moldovan majority and then some minorities of which the Russian is the most apparent. This has caused a lot of insecurity both in the political and societal sector.

In the societal sector it is clear that the groups feel threatened by each other. Even the majority does not have a stable ground for its group identity, since they do not agree on whether they are Moldovan or Romanian. The Moldovan group was to a high degree shaped by the Russian rulers and the Romanian rulers as well – the Russians out of fear that Moldova would seek ties with Romania and the Romanians by being so aggressive in their nationalization campaign that they alienated the Moldovans. On the other side the same group has a language quite similar to the Romanian one and a long time back there was a historical link with part of Romania under a common rule, which is the background for some to consider the Moldovan identity as Romanian. It is therefore difficult for Moldova to develop a national identity, since there isn't even within the majority a consensus of what defines their nation and besides of this majority there is a range of minorities who are alienated from especially the part of the majority who claims a Romanian identity. Thus each of these ethnically based groups sees the other groups as a potential societal threat.

The Moldovan political parties are marked by this fractured national identity. It was a big problem in the 1990s, where the reformist parties couldn't agree whether to be Romanian or Moldovan and this can be one of the reasons why some minority groups tried to form their own national territories within the state, Transnistria in the form of a Soviet like identity and rule, and Gagauzia, where the Gagauz people were allowed their own language and some kind of autonomy. This can be seen as a kind of securitizing act against the threat of being Romanized. Since the Transnistrian issue is one of the serious concerns of Moldova and a concern for the EU as well, this is something worth taking into account as one of the societal security threats towards the Moldovan identity.

The ethnic issue is one that has affected the political sector as well. The societal threats that the different groups posed to each other made ethnicity one of the main concerns of the political parties, some Moldovan, some Romanian and some more Russian oriented. It is an issue that is still relevant in the present political landscape, where the AFeI contains parties supporting a

Moldovan identity as well as one that wants ties with Romania. This, combined with the difference in ideology, is a potential political threat to the government. However, the disagreement with the Communists currently appears to be bigger than their internal disagreements. Also the AfEI agrees that they want closer integration with the EU and this can be something that unites politically. The European perspective also has the potential to be a uniting factor regarding societal security if the Moldovan people start to consider European as part of their identity.

As mentioned in the theory section about political security it is often interlinked with the other sectors. The case of Moldova is no exception. The societal sector, as described above, was for many years seen as one of the most important elements in the political sector. However, since the very ethnically based policy created a lot of security issues for the other sectors, some of these other threats might have become more dominant issues for the political security as well. One of these is the economical situation following the critical problems in the 1990s where the political parties couldn't agree on reforms and the economic stability might be one of the important issues. It is expected that the political ties with the EU will bring prosperity¹⁴⁹, so this might be an important base for the political security of the Moldovan government, so the situation does not turn out like it did with the ADR, who did not manage to bring create progress.

8.2.3 CIVIL SOCIETY

Another aspect of negotiation that the ENP wants to implement is the civil society. In Copenhagen Commissioner Fühle mentioned that he sees the civil society as an important actor and that he hopes for a dialogue *"[...] with the international platform of the civil society forum in the countries on one side and the authorities on the other side and hopefully by the time the EU delegations will then remain only a spectator or facilitator and hopefully we will have as a result of this approach an inclusive process of reforms within our partner countries where the authorities are engaged actively with the civil society representatives."*¹⁵⁰.

The inclusion of civil society enables to take the viewpoints of different groups into consideration in the plans, which can then be a tool for a higher degree of societal security of the

¹⁴⁹ Sleptova (2011)

¹⁵⁰ Fühle, Appendix A: p. 9

partner countries. Taking into account the political instability that there is in many of the partner countries it can also be some kind of back up for their activities in case the government should shift. Having this in mind, a focus on the civil society might have a potential of providing some kind of political security for the ENP, since it can make some of the activities less dependent on the government. Viewing this with transnational theory in mind, the civil society could in this way be important actors in concerning interactions of attitude changes and international pluralism. On the other hand from the quotation of Fühle it appears that the most important aspect of the Civil Society Forum should be the negotiations between the Moldovan government and the civil society and this could be a sign that it is rather intended to have a national focus.

8.2.4 SUMMARY

In the relations between the EU and Moldova there are a lot of different actors that have influence. First of all the EU is not a nation-state, but an international organization consisting of several nation-states who can each have their own interest in certain areas of the the European neighborhood. Secondly, Moldova doesn't fit well into the nation-state category either, at least not at this point. Moldova is a country that contains a range of nations and also contains within its borders some semi-autonomous states partly as a consequence of the divide of the national identity. The different actors might have different goals, but some of these goals can require that they cooperate with other actors.

8.3 MOLDOVA-EU POWER-RELATIONS

This chapter puts a critical view on the relations between Moldova and the EU to see if the difference in the power-relations of the two actors affects the way they cooperate.

The EU as a unity is part of the core within the world-system. The EU has a lot of agricultural production, but it also has a long history of industrialization and produce a plenitude of special goods.

Quite opposite Moldova is historically an agricultural country and during the Soviet era, when many parts of the USSR were industrialized Moldova didn't get a lot of investments in a

development of the industry, at least not outside of Transnistria. In stead it was depending on exporting its agricultural goods to the rest of the Soviet block. Moldova still doesn't have a lot of heavy industry and it doesn't have a lot of specialized production¹⁵¹. This puts it in a weak position internationally as what could be characterized as a periphery country.

This means that the EU is in a more powerful position internationally and this can affect the cooperation between the EU and Moldova. This would be natural according to the theories of Wallerstein, also regarding the culture, the EU can be dominating, since culture is seen mainly as a tool of the strong and there has been some complaints from the partner countries about the ENP being made without their involvement, by the EU on its own. Commissioner Fühle notes: “*Many of them complained that the neighborhood policy as established 6 or 7 years ago, was actually imposed on them rather than this policy being a result of the joint consultation between the European Union members on one side and our partners on the other side*”¹⁵².

The ENP mainly being a creation of the EU, rather than a mutually agreed project, can be illustrated by the critique by Bosse that the relations doesn't build on a reciprocity, but rather that Moldova should first of all implement elements from the EU acquis and then await and see if they will get some privileges in return for the reforms. This has also led to some criticism of the ENP from the partner countries who wants to be sure they can benefit from applying the reforms¹⁵³.

It can be seen as a moderating element that the process of forming out the Action Plan revolves around negotiations between the EU and the partner country. The ENP often refer to “shared values”¹⁵⁴, but these build mostly on the norms and rules of the EU and applies tools like TAIEX and Twinning, so it is in a way a cultural dominance of the bigger power. Moldova is, of course, through the negotiations on the Action Plan, in a position to prioritize the elements within the norms and can also say no, but this could cause the integration process to slow down. This we have seen in the case of Ukraine, where the integration process into the EU cooperation was quite active in the period following the Orange Revolution, but after the reform friendly government crumbled and the return of a more Russian oriented government, the negotiations started to stagnate¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵¹ From Appendix B we can get a picture of a still very agriculturally based country – also see CIA (2011)

¹⁵² Fühle, Appendix A: p. 9

¹⁵³ Besides of Leanca in Appendix A, see e.g. Natalia Gherman, Appendix B: p. 11

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. Dirk Scheubel, Appendix B: p. 11

¹⁵⁵ E.g. Borys Tarasyuk refers to Moldova “catching up” with Ukraine, Appendix B: p. 14

It seems that the EU are aware of the issue. At the conference in Copenhagen, Commissioner Fühle asked *"I'm not saying that the member states are ready for accepting a political decision about the European perspective at this point of time, but shouldn't we make an extra step, a step forward compared to the current situation? Shouldn't we provide them certain incentives indeed to implement – initiate and implement reforms?"*¹⁵⁶. The values are still often mentioned, but the focus on the need for reciprocity is there.

The way of deciding the reciprocity with the partner countries is moving from a very geographically based approach towards a "more for more" principle. This can give the countries more of an incentive, but, as Popescu notes, it can also be a slippery concept. What more is is something that is up to a subjective judgment. It has the potential to give the countries a further incentive to implement reforms and being able to expect some kind of reciprocity for those reforms. However, this also gives the EU an increased possibility to influence the domestic policy of the partner countries and to spread out the norms and values of the EU. In a way this then gives EU more power to increase their influence in the neighborhood.

8.3.1 SUMMARY

Within the framework of world system theory EU can be characterized as a core-country, while Moldova can be considered as part of the periphery. It is clear that this means a difference in the power-relations between the two actors and this can enable the EU to affect Moldova culturally. One way where this inequality can be seen is through the cooperation, where Moldova is supposed to implement values from the EU acquis without being sure to expect any kind of reciprocity.

¹⁵⁶ Fühle, Appendix A: p. 11

9 ANALYSIS

This final analysis collects the threads from the different part-analyses to get closer to an understanding of the problem formulation of this paper: *How are the relations between Moldova and the EU and how have they developed since the independence of Moldova in 1991?*

An important step to understand the relations between Moldova and the EU is to understand Moldova and how it has developed. The history of Moldova is closely linked to that of its bigger powers in the region, mainly Russia and Romania and the Republic of Moldova hardly had any experience of being an independent state until 1991. This has caused a lack of a common national identity, where there especially through the 1990s was a struggle between the different minorities and a majority that couldn't agree on whether it was Romanian or Moldovan – a division that the Russian rulers had promoted for many years. This national uncertainty, and with it a societal insecurity, has made Moldova a divided country, which is seen clearest through the case of Transnistria, a separatist state formed in the early 1990s by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians who feared a union with Romania.

Even after its independence Moldova continued to have a close connection to Russia and the other previous Soviet states in the CIS. Russia is one of the main trading partners of Moldova, but has shown to be an unreliable partner. Russia supported the Transnistrian government in the conflict, even when the Communists were in power in Moldova, and at times disagreements between Moldova and Russia resulted in Russia sanctioning Moldovan trade or closing the gas-supply. Russia was in this a threat to several of the sectors that the Copenhagen School of Security Studies works with. The relations between Russia and Transnistria could pose a threat to the military security of Moldova as well as a threat to the societal and political security through promoting this division. Furthermore, the unstable situation with the dependence on Russia also meant a threat to the economic and environmental sectors, since there was a constant threat that Russia would sanction Moldova if they disagreed with the political line. Therefore it is natural that Moldova seek other partners, like the EU.

For many years Moldova was not much of a concern of the EU. Moldova is small and poor and until Romania joined the EU it was relatively far away from the borders. Also the risk that connections between Moldova and the EU might upset Russia, since Moldova as a previous Soviet state was in the Russian area of influence, can have made the EU less willing to interfere in the country. However, with Romania being part of the EU enlargement and Russia trying to

get more influential through the Kozak Memorandum in 2003 the EU started to get involved in Moldova. Russia gaining power in Moldova would tip the power-balance in the region a little in the Russian favor and with neo-realist theory in mind this can be one of the reasons why the EU interfered.

With the establishment of the ENP, the EU tries to create a stable and secure neighborhood and when Romania joined the EU, Moldova became part of this neighborhood. The ENP was created as a counterpart to the enlargement policy, to keep countries that were seen as unstable out of the enlargement, but still within influence of the EU. For a long time the ENP focused on a cultural influence through the partner countries implementing the EU *acquis* and the reciprocity for these reforms were not that high on the EU agenda. Also instruments like TAIEX and Twinning gives a picture of the EU as the dominant partner trying to teach the partner countries how to deal with the different problems, which would fit well with a critical theory perspective. In a context of Transnationalism this can be seen as interactions in the form of communications focused on attitude changes, international pluralism and maybe even dependency, in the sense that the EU promotes its values to turn the neighbor states into a value community based on democracy, human rights and a view of being European. The lack of reciprocity has caused some dissatisfaction from various of the ENP partner states, among them Moldova, who wants to have some kind of reciprocity and preferably the prospects of EU membership.

The EU is aware of this dissatisfaction and knows the risk of ignoring the problems. Following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine had a very reform-willing government, but the lack of progress has caused the speed of the negotiations and reforms to decelerate. Since the EU has an interest in the neighborhood implementing reforms to bring stability and security it has an interest in cooperating with the governments that are willing to implement such reforms and might try to avoid that a reformist government gets replaced by a government less willing to implement such reforms, like it happened in Ukraine. Currently Moldova has a very reform-willing and European oriented government. Where it seemed like the EU only cooperated with the Communists out of necessity, the EU expresses that they are very much in favor of the AFeI, who are currently in government, and this might have a positive impact on the negotiations. However, the AFeI knows that they are seen as very reformist and this might encourage them to pressure more for reciprocity, which would be in congruence with the "more for more"-framework that several actors within the EU suggests to imply on the ENP. Therefore, it is also natural that the Moldovan government speaks warmly of this policy.

The reforms that are the main priorities in the Action Plan of Moldova are reforms to bring stability in different sectors. The Transnistrian conflict can, even though it is not currently a violent conflict, pose a military threat to both Moldova and the EU, through the illegal activities

taking place across the borders, including smuggling of arms (and even uranium). Also the economic sector is very dominant in the Action Plan with a lot of initiatives to bring foreign investments to Moldova, improve trade relations and reduce poverty. This might also help solving some of the other issues. The increased trade might give Transnistria an incentive to reintegrate with Moldova and the reduction of poverty can help stopping some of the illegal activities taking place, like trafficking of humans and goods. These issues might be more apparent in the area close to Moldova and it is clear that when it comes to the ENP the different countries within the EU have different interests, which is one of the reasons for the establishment of the EaP and UfM.

10 CONCLUSION

This paper has aimed at understanding the relations between Moldova and the EU. The different countries within the EU have different areas of interest and therefore the neighborhood is split in two parts: the Union for the Mediterranean, which was initiated by France, and the Eastern Partnership, initiated by Poland. It is mainly the relatively new EU member states who support Moldova, especially the neighbor country Romania.

In spite of the divided interests the EU as a unity has an interest in a stable and secure neighborhood, which it tries to promote through the ENP. It is clear that this is an uneven relation with the EU as the powerful actor and for a long time this meant that Moldova was supposed to implement elements of the EU acquis without being able to expect reciprocity. This has caused some dissatisfaction and the EU is aware of this.

There are also some EU projects in Moldova. These focus a lot on the economical stability of the relatively poor country and military security through dealing with the issue of Transnistria. In this situation Moldova is still very affected by the past, where it was dominated by Russia. This past has left the country without a common national identity and this has caused a lot of the political instability that was part of the reason for the economic collapse in the 1990s. Between 2001 and 2009 the Communists were in power in Moldova and they managed to create some sort of stability and economic growth. Initially the Communist government were oriented towards Russia, but with Russia siding with Transnistria it was a difficult partnership. The EU was not eager to cooperate with the Communists and there was limited cooperation until 2003, where the EU intervened to stop the signing of the Kozak Memorandum that would have meant a recognition of Transnistria and with that massive Russian influence in the area. It appears that the partnership between Moldova and the EU at that point was of necessity rather than of a want to cooperate.

With the new European oriented and reform willing government it seems that the attitudes have changed and this can be a chance to build closer relations. The Alliance for European Integration are very ambitious with its goals when it comes to the EU policy, both regarding the reforms they are willing to make, but also when they ask for reciprocity. The “more for more” policy that the ENP is trying to promote can benefit the reform-willing government of Moldova, since this can mean that Moldova can expect to get more in return for the reforms it makes.

11 PERSPECTIVES

This paper has worked with the relations between Moldova and the EU. Moldova is a rather new neighbor to the EU and there are still many aspects to be investigated, among these the prospects for Moldova in the cooperation with the EU – where is it going? This was one of the main interests of this paper. However, this question could not be illuminated properly based on the empirical foundation of this paper. It would require a more thorough investigation of the issue, but still there are some aspects I would like to put forward here.

With the present government there is some optimism regarding the integration aspects of Moldova with the EU. As mentioned in the paper the relations seem to be rather good and Moldova is by EU politicians being referred to as a success story. Also when I read through the answers by Leonid Litra in Appendix E I see a careful optimism. With the good relations between the AfEI and the EU there is a reason for this optimism.

However, the wish that Iurie Leanca speak of – that he hopes that Moldova can soon enter the enlargement process, might still be very optimistic. Even though it is some years ago and the situation in Moldova has improved a lot in these years, the perspective from Heather Grabbe of the Centre for European Reform might still be the case *“Belarus is too authoritarian, Moldova too poor, Ukraine too large and Russia too scary for the EU to contemplate offering membership any time soon.”*¹⁵⁷, because, in spite of the economic growth, Moldova is still facing problems with poverty, it still struggles with corruption and even though the EUBAM has had a positive impact there are still illegal cross border activities and the conflict with Transnistria.

Also, some people ask, “what if the Communists take over power again?” This scenario is not unlikely, since, like its predecessor, the ADR, the AfEI also has some internal disagreements. At the conferences the different speakers don’t have many positive words towards Voronin and the rest of the CPRM and from the CPRM-program in Appendix C, it appears to be mutual. It can seem as a paradox that the Communists are referred to as anti-European, since the relations between the EU and Moldova were built up in the time when the Communists were in power in Moldova. However, this seems to have been a relation more of need than of wanting to cooperate. So when one asks if the relations between the EU and Moldova will be ruined if the Communists came back to power

¹⁵⁷ Economist (2004): http://www.economist.com/node/2628212?story_id=2628212

my answer would be based on the empirical grounds and theories of this paper be, that the relations might suffer, but since both parts have an interest in cooperating the relations would not be ruined completely.

The relations between Moldova and the EU are partly based on interests in stability and this might be something that will affect the relations in the future as well.

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