# Deconstructing the European Union's Securitization of Belarus

Master's thesis - MSc in Social Sciences, Development Studies & International Relations

Gustav Jensen
Aalborg University

Abstract

This paper is a single case study on the situation in Belarus after the 2020 election and subsequent protests. The paper uses securitization theory to analyze a resolution from the European Parliament from october 2021 on the situation, one year after the violent protests. This resolution was selected for research, as it is the last resolution of the European Parliament of 2021, and references all previous resolutions, European Council conclusions, and the state of the Union address by President Ursula von der Leyen. Therefore, the resolution of 7 October is very trustworthy as a source of the opinions of the European Union as a whole. The purpose of the analysis is to examine the framing of Belarus as a security issue, by looking at it as a security constellation consisting of a variety of pre-existing security issues. The paper does this by employing a content analysis, to analyse the resolution systematically to find securitization attempts. Securitization attempts are identified in the analysis by looking for a framing of a threat against a referent object and proposed measures to mitigate the threat. The paper finds that the European Parliament uses securitizations of threats against human rights, Russia, nuclear safety, and terrorism. It does so in order to increase the urgency and severity of Belarus as a security issue. This paper shows how the EU attempts to use securitized issue in a security constellation, but it does not show if any or all these securitizations are successful. In order to determine if the securitization attempts have been successful, one would have to analyze the sanctions imposed and measures taken against Belarus, to see if they correlate with the securitizations. Another method would be to analyze the intended audience's reception of the securitization attempts.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Aleksandr Lukashenka was re-elected for a sixth term as president of Belarus in August 2020, in an election that has not been recognised by the EU and seen as being "neither free, nor fair" (Council of the EU 2022). Thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to protest the election and challenge the alleged election fraud, in the largest protests seen in the country since the independence of Belarus in 1991 (Rosenfeld 2022). Since then the EU has progressively introduced sanctions against the Belarus regime with increasing severity; especially after Belarus began aiding migrants from the Middle East in fleeing to the EU through Belarus. But how exactly does the Council of the EU justify these sanctions? How does the Council of the EU view the threat coming from Belarus? According to the Council of the European Union, the sanctions have been imposed in response to:

"among other things, unacceptable violence by the Belarusian authorities against peaceful protesters, the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes and hybrid attacks at the EU's borders" (Council of the EU 2022)

The EU is framing Lukashenka and the Belarus regime as a threat not only against its people but also against more abstract notions of democracy and human rights, and as a direct security threat against the EU through migration and hybrid attacks.

This paper seeks to explore the framing of Belarus as a threat by the EU, by looking at how the EU uses a multitude of security threats to lend power to their overall framing of Belarus as a threat. Such aggregated threats are known as a "security constellation" in securitization theory - a theory of understanding threats as constructed through speech. Belarus has been framed as a security constellation by the EU in order to increase the sense of urgency and the seriousness of Belarus as a security issue. By analysing resolutions from the European Parliament, this paper will show how the EU attempts to increase the seriousness and urgency of the issue of Belarus as a threat to the EU - by associating Belarus and the Lukashenka regime with several security issues.

Through securitization theory and the Copenhagen school of security theory, especially the theoretical additions of macro-securitizations and security constellations, this paper will attempt to create an overview of the existing historical and contemporary securitizations utilised in the European Union's securitization of Belarus. The securitized issues have been utilised through discourse by the EU and its member states to strengthen the perceived threat of Belarus and the Lukashenka regime. Therefore the problem formulation of this paper is:

_____

Which security issues does the European Parliament use in its security constellation of Belarus, in order to justify its sanctions against the regime?

_____

Understanding security constellations will help us to understand how past securitizations or security issues can provide new or additional justification in an otherwise unrelated conflict or issue and be used to escalate conflicts. Understanding security constellations and the influence of past securitizations on new issues also helps to understand the importance of "de-securitizing" society and the collective discourse. On the premise of securitization, that any securitized issue enables extraordinary means beyond the normal state, any security in a state is, therefore, a necessary evil and the aim of the normal state should be to de-securitize society by limiting the number of securitizations or (publicly accepted) security issues and use of extraordinary means beyond the normal state.

Most countries have a "state of emergency", martial law, or varying forms thereof written into their laws, wherein an urgent emergency or national threat, normal civil law or processes of democracy are put aside in favour of more direct leadership (Armitage 2002). These contingency policies are the ultimate consequence of a successful securitization attempt, as they set aside what is considered the normal state, i.e. a state where everything is working optimally and as intended. We have seen it during the migration crisis of 2015 when many EU countries closed their borders and utilised an emergency article in the Schengen cooperation to do so, we saw it more recently with the Covid-19 pandemic, where many countries across the globe invoked some sort of state of emergency and classified Covid-19 as a threat to society (Center for Civil and Political Rights 2020). In the European Union, member states bordering Belarus have been calling for urgent action and changes to legislation in response to the instrumentalization of migrants and military exercises in Belarus, and the Union itself has imposed harsh sanctions against Belarus (Council of the EU 2022). As Belarus is/was a member of the EU's Eastern Partnership, imposing harsh sanctions against the country and individuals is extraordinary and hurts the cohesion and economy of the EU itself. At the same time, Lukashenka and this partnership subsequently enabled the extra-territorialization of security by the EU to Belarus (The stability of Belarus is through the Eastern Partnership also the stability of the EU) (Bruns & Happ 2016).

Background

Since the election in August 2020 of Aleksandr Lukashenka, protests and civil disobedience have occurred across Belarus against injustice and election fraud in the largest protests seen in Belarus since the Belarussian independence from the USSR in 1991 (Rosenfeld 2022). Leading up to the protests of 2020 were years of economic stagnation and anti-worker social reforms; increased pension age, new labour laws, and stagnating wages and social welfare provisions. The people of Belarus lacked fundamental civil rights, and when the regime attacked their social and economic rights,

the situation became intolerable in 2020. The protests of 2020 were in a large part a release of years of pent-up frustrations and a wish for change. There was a "critical mass" of unrest in Belarus, and the reelection of Lukashenka and the allegations of fraud functioned as a catalyst for the protests and the release of these built-up frustrations (Buzgalin & Kolganov 2021; Carlsen 2021).

The background and context of Belarus and the protests of 2020 are important factors in the European (EU) understanding of the Belarus regime as a security issue and the securitization of Belarus. A not insignificant proportion of the Belarussian people are historically leaning towards the west and integration into the EU, therefore the people of Belarus becomes an extraterritorial EU security issue, which is an important context for the relevance of this paper.

Historical & Cultural Context

Belarus has a long history of being torn between east and west; Belarus played a part in the establishment of Kievan Rus in the ninth century and remained a part of the old Russian state until the 13th century, it then became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which later merged with Poland into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, late in the eighteenth century it became part of the Russian Empire once again, and was even later one of the founding members of the USSR, but in the interwar period was divided with western Belarus being under Polish jurisdiction (Buzgalin & Kolganov 2021: 441; White, Biletskaya & McAllister 2014:1). The current opposition in Belarus often brings up the military conflicts of the 16th to 18th century between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia as a struggle for Belarussian independence from Moscow (but fail to acknowledge the lack of Belarussian independence in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) (Buzgalin & Kolganov: 442). This means that there has never been a shared national identity, with the Polish Belarussian, the Catholics, inclined towards the West and the Russian Belarussians, the Orthodox, inclined towards the East, the shared Belarussian identity is rather something imposed on its people in the Soviet period (White, Biletskaya & McAllister 2014: 1). Huntington described this divide between eastern and western Belarus in his theory of civilizations; he believed the cleft between west and east

was so pronounced that national unity might be impossible to sustain (Huntington 1996; White, Biletskaya & McAllister 2014: 2).

The division of Belarus is evident in the country's two flags, an official red-green that is often connected to the soviet past, and a historical red-white flag connected to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the middle-ages. There are also two coats of arms; one that resembles the Soviet coat of arms, and one with the medieval knight Pagonja (Carlsen 2021: 149). The red-white flag and the medieval coat of arms come from the time of German occupation in 1918 during the first world war with the founding of the nationalist Belarussian People's Republic (BPR), this is also the time the Belarussian opposition sees as the country's independence, but in reality, the BPR was a German puppet structure and the state never existed in practice and the BPR did not enact sovereignty over Belarus and its borders were not clearly defined, not even unilaterally. It is also the symbols of the nationalist BPR that are mostly used by the protesters of the 2020 protests (Buzgalin & Kolganov 2021: 442).

White, Biletskaya and McAllister (2014) researched this division of identity - the cleft between east and west and found that a not insignificant proportion of the Belarus population (47% in 2012) thought of themselves as "modern Europeans'', although a substantial 68% thought themselves closer to Russians than to Europeans (31%) more than 60% also thought it would be a good or very good idea to join the EU in 2011, but another source from 2014 found only 27% in favour of an EU membership while 51% were opposed (IISEPS 2014; White, Biletskaya & McAllister 2014: 9-15). So the numbers vary greatly, but the general sentiment in Belarus is that its people are torn between East and West. This explains how Belarus on one hand can see the largest protests since their independence protesting election fraud and Lukashenka, while at the same time strengthening their ties with Russia.

Lukashenka has been in power for 27 years, according to Carlsen (2021) the general perception of Lukashenka has been acceptable during that time. Most Belarussians have, during that time, seen less crime and less extremism compared to their neighbours in Ukraine and Russia. According to research, there is a high degree of trust in the president, the church, and the army while the trust in local organisations and

politicians is low. It seems like the people of Belarus have put their trust in the "classical, Slavic virtues: God, the Tzar, and army chief" (Carlsen 2021: 168)

The 2020 Election & Protests

Lukashenka won the election with 80% of the votes, a number many thought suspiciously high with protests to follow. Lukashenka has for many years been called "Europe's last dictator", and he met the protests with police and violence (Carlsen 2021). On election night August 9th the opposition had a massive voter turnout, with many at the end being unable to vote because of long queues and inefficient execution. The voting booths were open for a week up to August 9th, but the opposition had encouraged their voters to only vote on the last day - a tactic that would prove wrong as police forcibly removed the disgruntled voters when the booths closed. In Minsk, the disgruntled voters assembled in the city to spontaneously protest the night of August 10th, but the authorities were ready and had already sent the military into Minsk. The authorities shut down the internet, a move they reused several times during the coming protests, to prevent protests from organising (Ibid.). The opposition candidate Svjatlana Tsikhanovskaja officially complained about election fraud through the election commission and disappeared without a trace, the head of the KGB said they had accommodated her wish to be taken to the Lithuanian border to be reunited with her children. Svjatlanas's husband remained detained in Belarus. The protests continued for months and were continually responded to with violence and disappearances. The use of water cannons, teargas, and rubber bullets was widespread, videos emerged showing how the police beat on the protesters, while reports of torture of political prisoners came out (Ibid.).

Response from the EU

The EU responded quickly by not recognising the election and calling it fraudulent after an OSCE report called the election below the standards for OSCE countries (European Council 2022). Just days after the election, the EU met to discuss imposing sanctions on Belarus against those responsible for the violence. The EU member states Poland and Lithuania provided bilateral help to protesters, by helping them to get visas and scholarships to Poland, supporting independent media and Belarussian NGOs, and Lithuania provided medical help for injured protesters (Euronews 2020).

On August 14th 2020, 5 days after the election, foreign ministers of the European Union met to discuss the situation in Belarus, the ministers sent a signal of support for the protesters and urged the Belarus authorities to end the violence. On August 19th 2020 the EU declared that they did not recognize the results of the Belarus election and that they saw the election as fraudulent and "neither free nor fair" (Council of the EU 2022). On October 1st EU leaders agreed to impose sanctions on Belarus, and provide economic support for a democratic Belarus - a day later 40 individuals from Belarus were restricted from travelling to the EU, and their assets in the EU were frozen (Council of the EU 2020). The list of individuals targeted by sanctions has since then grown to 183 individuals and 26 entities (Council of the EU 2022b). On June 4th 2021, the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk and the detention of journalist Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega, led to the EU ban on all Belarussian air carriers, banning them from overflying, landing in, or taking off from any territory of the EU member states (Council of the EU 2021).

Theoretical Framework

This chapter will explore the theoretical framework of the paper. Specifically, the Copenhagen school of security studies: Securitization theory, macro-securitization and security constellations. The purpose of the theoretical framework is to provide a means of understanding and defining complex concepts. The theoretical framework links this research through space and time with other research using the same framework and broadens the scope and application of the theory.

Securitization

What is security? The recurring theme in the literature is security as the freedom from threat, relevant threats being those that threaten the sovereignty of a political unit (Wæver 1993: 6) *"Security problems are developments which in a particular rapid or dramatic way threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state"* (ibid.: 7) Not just threatening to harm it, but something threatening to deprive the state of its capacity to manage itself; disturbing the current political order. In securitization theory, a security problem is defined as such by 'speech acts'. *"The power holders can use the instrument of securitization; by definition a problem is a security problem when they declare it to be"* (ibid.). The state can claim a special right, by naming a certain development as a security problem. Special rights that in the final instance always will be defined by the one using it; it is an unsolvable problem that those administering this principle can easily use it for self-serving purposes. By saying *security* a state moves the particular issue into a specific area; claiming a special right to use extraordinary means necessary to stop this development (ibid.).

According to Wæver (1993), security, or having security, means that security problems have been identified and measures were taken against them. While in-security, is the issue of having identified security problems but no measures taken against them. This also implies a state of 'non-security', where there is no security or in-security - where there is no security problem. Securitization theory differentiates itself from classical security studies by seeing security as inherently negative in and by itself; where classical security studies see "the more security the better", securitization theory takes the opposite approach (Wæver 1993: 8-9). The presence of security implies a security issue with extraordinary measures taken against it beyond the normal state, beyond the normal state meaning measures that go beyond what is conventionally accepted, against or beyond the legal, democratic or moral framework; while in-securities are identified security threats but with no measures yet taken against them, therefore, naturally, any presence of security in any form is negative, it either goes against the normal state, or it is a recognized threat that has not been dealt with. Because securitization is a constructive approach of looking at security problems as something declared by *someone* then it becomes paramount to understand *who* securitizes and *why,* because the principle of moving a problem to be a security problem can easily be used for self-serving purposes

by the securitizing agent. Therefore, securitization theory is also deeply interested in de-securitization; how does a security problem move away from being a security problem. As securitized problems have a special right to use extraordinary means that go beyond what is normally accepted, de-securitizing is the aim of going back to the 'normal state' (Ibid.).

Securitization as a theory grew out of the Cold War, and the subsequent changing security challenges beyond the traditional state vs. state, by a need to widen the concept of security. Traditional security studies argue that security is strictly military by the threat of or use of force, with states as the central referent objects and actors. Whereas the researchers seeking to widen the concept of security sought to include threats to and from the environment, economy etc.; to expand the concept of security to be more issue-driven, and include several referent objects, not just state actors. After the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear conflict and war diminished, and security studies were forced to look at security differently, widening the scope to include non-state actors as part of the military game. (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: 1-3)

Securitization is central in this paper, by exploring the who/what is the referent object (the thing being threatened), what is the threat, and who is the securitizing agent (the actor instigating the securitization attempt), and understanding the measures proposed by the European Parliament against Belarus. As the issue of Belarus is not a conventional threat of military power by one state against another, securitization provides a framework for understanding the issue as a wider contextual threat beyond the state. Identity, culture, or more abstract institutions can also be under threat (e.g. a Christian or western culture under threat by Islamic influence or integration (Watson 2009; Wæver et al. 1993)). The referent object does not necessarily have to be a state, but can be ideas, people, culture etc., the securitization process can be applied to referent objects at the systemic, state, or individual level (Butler & Wolf 2020: 15). Threats are defined through speech acts that, when/if accepted grants rights to use extraordinary measures against the perceived threat - a politically or socially accepted speech act labels an issue a security issue, removing it from a normal political matter into an existential threat where extraordinary means are justified (ibid.).

Macro-Securitization & Security Constellations

Traditionally securitization has dealt with how nation states securitize an issue, identifying a threat against its sovereignty. But, sometimes international security is structured over a higher order of conflict, spanning multiple states, and aligning several securitizations underneath it. Think for example of the Cold War, an overarching conflict between the two ideologies and systems of the West and East. Other examples of macrosecuritizations (or attempts thereof) are the Global War on Terror after 9/11 or climate change (Buzan & Wæver 2009).

The traditional "middle-level" securitization of the Copenhagen school is similar to the realist view of national security concerns of states - the securitizing actor is most often the state or nation, and the referent object under threat is sovereignty or identity. Actors and securitizations remain mostly egotistical and self-centred, but, macrosecuritization and security constellations allow for analysis above the middle-level, and securitizations can bind together several states against a shared threat or referent object. Security constellations can work to strengthen the urgency and agency of a perceived threat, horizontally (enlarged referent object) or vertically (enlarged threat), by strengthening the argument of a threat making it more persuasive and increasing the legitimacy, or increasing the number actors involved. Macrosecuritization covers securitizations of referent objects at a higher level, e.g. universal religions or political ideologies, for example, the Global War on Terror was framed as a threat against a "Western" way of life (ibid.).

Perhaps a metaphor can help explain securitization and security constellations; imagine you open the fridge to make dinner and notice it is almost empty. You think to yourself: "This is an issue, I should go shopping soon but it can wait until tomorrow", but then you remember your mothers advice that you should eat healthy and regularly lest you die from hunger or bad health; you then decide you better go shopping and actually cook some healthy food. Now the issue of an empty fridge has been securitized - it has moved from being a regular issue, to be an issue of security. Imagine you are a nation state, the empty fridge is a political issue, e.g. economic recession, and your personal health reflects national security. Now, imagine that you remember that your partner can

get rather irritated and angry when hungry, they might even throw a slipper at you if they are not fed! And you forgot you had children too, that also depend on you to provide nutritious and healthy food for their own health and well-being, and they will wreak havoc if they do not eat. So you decide to get groceries delivered to your house regularly so your fridge will never again be empty. Now your partner and your children have been securitized as threats to your personal security, and the securitization of them increases the urgency and severity of the securitization of the empty fridge. Your partner and children are both securitized as threats to you when they get hungry because of an empty fridge, but at the same time, they also act as additional referent objects whose security is threatened by the empty fridge. This is a security constellation where the severity of the general securitization is increased both vertically (enlarged threat) and horizontally (enlarged referent object).

Existing Securitizations

The purpose of this section of the theoretical framework chapter, is to provide a brief description of some of the pre-existing securitizations that will form the basis of the coding scheme for the analysis. This is in no way an extensive or particular thorough examination of these pre-existing securitizations; the sole purpose is to provide some context of some central themes of the analysis. The existing securitizations described in this section is not an exhaustive list of all securitizations, it is not even an exhaustive lsit of the securitizations attempts found in relation to the situation in Belarus; this is merely a list of existing securitizations that were stumbled upon during the research for this paper.

The Securitization of Terrorism

This part of the analysis will bring attention to how the EU uses the securitization of terrorism to reinforce the securitization of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus. Buzan and Wæver (2009) use the Great War on Terrorism (GWoT) as an example of macrosecuritization and security constellation, when they expand upon the securitization theory to also include higher-level securitizations and constellations. Kaunert and Léonard (2019) describe how the EU has securitized terrorism after 9/11 when Bush

declared the GWoT with the words: "*'This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.' 'We will rally the world.'*" (Kaunert & Léonard 2019: 266).

The Securitization of Threats Against Human Rights

Bonacker et al. (2013) found in their research on the role of human rights in conflicts that:

"The invocation of human rights, in particular in the early stages of a conflict, often represents a securitizing move and is therefore likely to lead to conflict intensification in the short and possibly medium term" (Bonacker et al. 2013: 38).

Human rights are a cornerstone for the EU's relations and foreign policy towards its neighbours and the near and far abroad. In the Lisbon treaty of 2007 international security and human rights became one of the core foreign policy priorities of the EU (Marchetti & Tocci 2013: 183-184). The 2003 EU Security Strategy argues that the task of the EU is to contribute to stability and good governance in the immediate neighbourhood (Marchetti & Tocci 2013: 183-184). This is crucial in the understanding of the EU's securitization of threats against human rights, both in relation to current events in Belarus and also in general, as it perceives the protection of human rights in its neighbourhood as part of its own security policy. Marchetti and Tocci (2013) argue that there are two reasons for the EU's securitization of human rights: firstly, the rationale that if human rights are violated (especially in its immediate neighbourhood) then the union's own stability and security are also threatened; secondly, that human rights have a universal validity on its own and is a vital part of the EU's own identity (ibid.).

The Securitization of Migration

Buzan and Wæver (2003) identify several securitizations of the European Union post-Cold War, including immigration, illegal migration and trafficking. Migration is securitized as a threat to a national identity, and the welfare state models of member states in the

EU; it is furthermore securitized as terrorism, drug trafficking and crime. Migration becomes a securitization and a sort of scapegoat for a variety of issues and supports a package of practices of "internal security" (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 359).

Research by Vélez and Krapivnitskaya (2020) show how the EU migration policy was not prepared for the 2015 refugee crisis, and a collective action failure at the domestic level. Prior to the refugee crisis of 2015, migration was considered part of national policy, but tranformed, due to the crisis, into EU foreign policy. Vélez and Krapivnitskaya (2020) show how migration was securitized by analyzing foreign policy debates in the European Parliament to see how many times migration was brought up as a security issue before and after the refugee crisis in 2015. Their results show a clear escalation of a security narrative after 2015 when it comes to migration (Vélez & Krapivnitskaya 2020).

Valeria Bello (2022) argues that the issue of migration have always had heated reactions in the international system of nation-states. Yet the post-Cold War reactions takes the migration issue to new places by securitization. Human mobility has been securitized by state and non-state actors who hold prejudicial cognition of ethnicity and nation, and the securitization of migration have been used to legitimize the tightening of borders, and to push back against globalization; but, there is equally forces who push the narrative in the other direction and attempts to de-securitize migration. (Bello 2022). This interplay between securitizing and de-securitizing agents create a spiralling, ongoing securitization of migration, instead of a binary securitization that either is or is not.

Methodology

This paper seeks to "deconstruct" the European Union's securitization of Belarus as a security constellation. Securitization theory provides an understanding of security discourse as constructing threats through discourse, the theory's later addition of security constellations, adds an understanding of larger securitizations as consisting of multiple securitized issues both existing and new. Through this theory, this paper seeks to analyse which securitized issues are part of the securitization of Belarus, utilised by the EU in their

argumentation. To that end, the paper includes an analysis of relevant documents from the European Parliament.

This paper employs a deductive approach, by using the existing securitization theory, and testing it on a case study of the European Unions securitization of Belarus. The case study is concerned with the the nature of the case in question, in this case the situation in Belarus following the 2020 election, and it entails a vigorous examination of the setting of the case (Bryman 2016: 61), as seen by the background chapter of this paper. In a case study, the case is the object of interest by itself, and the research of a case study aims to provide an in-depth examination of the case, this means being concerned with the unique features of the case (ibid.). In this case the aim is to achieve an in-depth understanding of the European Union's justifications and means of constructing Belarus as a security constellation through securitization theory.

As securitization theory is a theory that believe threats are constructed through speech acts, and that security and threats only exist when a threat has been framed as such; this paper naturally adopts a constructivist ontology. The constructivist ontology entails understanding the world as a social product (Bryman 2016: 30)

Content Analysis

This paper seeks to explore the security constellation of Belarus constructed by the European Union, by analyzing pre-existing securitizations in the greater framing of Belarus as a threat. This chapter explains the use of content analysis in this paper in order to identify securitization attempts.

Content analysis is an approach to analyzing documents and texts, by quantifying content systematically in predetermined categories in a replicable manner (Bryman 2016: 283). The best known definition of content analysis is probably the definition made by Ole Holsti in 1969:

"Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti 1969: 14).

This definition has two qualities, objectivity and being systematic. Objectivity i this sense is to do with the fact the rules are clearly specified in advance; there is transparency in the process of assigning the raw material to categories. There is minimal bias, as the author is simply applying the rules specified. The quality of being systematic can be translated to consistency, that the rules are applied with consistency to ensure minimal bias. Hopefully, if these two qualities are employed, the analysis could be conducted by anyone and yield the same results. Contrary to other definitions of content analysis, Holsti's phrase "identifying specified characteristics", opens a door to interpretation of content, meanings that lie beneath the superficial content. This is in contrast to other definitions that are concerned with uncovering the apparent content - what it is clearly about. (Bryman 2016: 284)

Those are important points when considering the methodology of this paper, which purpose it is to look for pre-existing securitizations. First of all, securitization theory already have established clear rules of identification: The mention of a threat to a referent object, followed by proposals for measures taken against the threat. For the purpose of uncovering a security constellation made up by pre-existing securitizations, the analysis is identifying securitization that are known and established prior to the election and protests in Belarus in 2020.

The rules of analysis are closely related to coding. Coding is the discipline of assigning text material to categorie; plucking sections of a document or other text material out and putting it into a category. The coding of text material makes it easier to compare, to quantify,

Choice of Data

"A content analysis can only be as good as the documents on which the practioner works" (Bryman 2016: 305). Documents chosen for a content analysis, should be assessed based on certain criteria, such as authenticity, credibility, and representativeness.

The type of data used in this paper to analyse the security constellation of Belarus are documents; documents being material that can be read and has not been produced

specifically for research. This is a very broad definition of documents, therefore the documents selected for research in this paper are selected according to relevance. In order to analyse a securitization attempt by the EU of Belarus, the paper needs documents that have the EU (or a relevant body of the EU such as the Council of the EU) as the author/actor (the securitizing agent). Furthermore, the documents must concern the situation in Belarus since the 2020 election and protests. Since securitization is dependent on speech acts, the documents must convey messages intended for an external audience, which holds the power to grant the actor (securitizing agent) the right to use extraordinary means; in democracies, this will most often be the public or parliamentary members.

Documents can be distinguished as either personal or official documents; personal documents are produced by individuals for personal use such as diaries and letters, and official documents produced to convey messages or information such as reports, press releases, or advertisements (Bryman 2016: 546). As stated earlier this paper is interested in documents that convey messages to an audience, therefore personal documents are not of interest, and only official documents are relevant. Official documents can furthermore be distinguished between official documents deriving from the state and official documents deriving from private sources such as private companies and organisations. As this paper is researching securitization by the European Union it is obvious to use official documents deriving from the EU (a supranational state body).

The nature of personal or state documents is such that one cannot assume the documents reveal the truth about an organisation or a culture (Bryman 2016:560). Documents create a reality in and of themselves, depending on the context in which it was produced and who produced them, as well as the context in which it is read. Documents, when understood as fluid in meaning depending on the way in which they are written and contextualised by the author, can provide an advantage or benefit to the author. Furthermore, documents should not be viewed as singular, but as a whole in relation to other documents. Documents are invariably referring or responding to other documents, in this way, other documents within the scope of the research form the context of the document being read (referred to as intertextuality) (ibid.). This is an important point for the research of securitizations in this paper, as the meaning of a document is highly

dependent on the author and the context in which it was written. This means that references to past securitizations and threats, draw on the intertextuality of previous issues. As documents should be understood in their context and fluid in their meaning (depending on the way in which they are written and contextualised by the author) they should not be regarded as a truthful depiction of reality, but rather as biassed (ibid.: 503). But it is the bias of the documents which grants room for analysis, as speech acts and securitization are inherently constructivist in their creation of a security reality through discourse.

The documents chosen for analysis in this paper have been narrowed down to the resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus from the European Parliament. The European Parliament resolution functions as recommendations for the Commission of the EU to implement, and as the official opinion of the EU.

Operationalization Of Theory

This paper aims to use the Copenhagen school of security theory of securitization and security constellations to find and "deconstruct" the EU's discursive construction of the Belarus regime and its actions since the 2020 election and protests as a security threat. The working hypothesis is that the EU has, in its justification of sanctions against Belarus and its regime, aggregated several different security issues, both directly related to the 2020 protests and aftermath but also historical security issues, to strengthen the securitization attempt and justify the use of extraordinary means. Whether the EU has been fully successful in its securitization, or in all its attempts at aggregating different security issues, is of less importance, this paper explores the *attempts* and will afterwards discuss its success.

In order to determine attempts at securitization of a security issue, an analysis of relevant speech acts is necessary (speech acts being anything conveying a message from an actor to an audience, e.g. press releases, discussions, speeches, documents; *something* where *someone* is attempting to influence the opinion of *someone else*). The analysis of securitizing attempts will focus on three things: The perceived threat, the referent object (the object being threatened), and the target audience. This could for

example be a press release intended for the public of the EU (the audience) from the EU Council (the securitizing actor) describing a threat from instrumentalized migration (the perceived threat) against the EU's internal stability (the referent object); this would constitute a securitizing attempt, whether or not it was a successful attempt is less important for the purpose of this paper. An analysis of the success of a securitizing attempt would entail an analysis of whether or not the audience accepts the proposed threat as a real threat. The outcome of a successful securitization would be the enabling of the securitizing actor to make use of extraordinary measures against the threat - if measures are not taken against a securitized issue it becomes an in-security.

Coding

Coding is basically coupling pieces of text material to keywords or themes, relating to the content of the text-piece. Thereby breaking up a large document or text into smaller components, that is easily identifiable by the assigned code; thus also making the text-pieces easier to compare, connect, and categorize in relation to each other (Andersen, Hansen, & Klemmensen 2012: 177). It is almost impossible to analyze documents and other text material, and devise coding schemes, without some interpretation on the part of the researcher. In the coding and analytical process the researcher must draw upon everyday knowledge (Bryman 2016: 305). One way to deal with this is to make the coding scheme, and the analytical process as transparent as possible, in accordance with the ideals of content analysis and of social science research in general; of authenticity, credibility, validity, and reliability described below.

The coding of the analysis in this paper, is based on a mostly closed coding strategy. A closed coding strategy means that the codes have been preestablished prior to analyzing the material, this entails a precise definition of codes in relation to the theory, and for them to be attached to specific pieces of text; this is part of ensuring a high validity and reliability of the research. But, it is always good practice to go through the material with an open coding first to find interesting codes that might initially have been missed by the closed coding; the result is then the closed coding scheme with the codes known from the theory, and the most interesting codes from the initial open coding (Andersen, Hansen, & Klemmensen 2012: 182).

The coding used is defined by the research question and the securitization theory. As described, in securitization theory there are stringent criteria of what constitutes a securitization attempt; a threat towards a referent object, and then proposed measures against the threat. Identifying securitization attempts is the initial coding, also called the parent node in the coding hierarchy. The subsequent coding (called the child node) are categories of already established pre-existing securitizations, such as terrorism, migration, threats against human rights, and Russia; these categories have been established previously in this paper in the theory section.

Table 1: Coding Scheme

Parent node	Child node	Description
Securitization attempts	Terrorism Migration Russia Threats against human rights Nuclear power	Complete securitization attempts containing a threat, a referent object, and proposed measures (in any order), within the same paragraph/statement
Fragmented securitization attempts	Terrorism Migration Russia Threats against human rights Nuclear power	Incomplete securitization attempts lacking one of the characteristics of a complete attempt

Parent node	Child node	Description
Proposed measures		Statements only pertaining to proposed measures, such as calls to action, sanctions, support etc.
Threats		Statements only mentioning threats
Referent objects		Statements only mentioning the who/what being under threat

Validity, Reliability, & Generalization

The defintition of science is the systematic production of new knowledge; with the principle of always building cumulative on top of the already existing knowledge; new results supplement the existing, and they are connected by a coherent theoretical framework. To make this system of the production of new knowledge function, research must be accesible to evaluation, application, and replication. In principle, research is only valuable if someone other than the researcher can be sure the research is conducted systematically and by recognised, tried and proven methodology. On top of this research results that are only conducted once are rarely trustworthy, and must be repeated in different contexts. Therefore, it is a guiding principle of all research that it must be transparent and explicit in its methodology. This replicability is a condition of serious and valid research. (Andersen, Hansen, & Klemmensen 2012: 98)

     The theory is central in any empirical research; questions are grounded in theory, and the theory provides a framework and the context of all previous and future research - a connection through time and space. The operationalization of theory is what grants research validity; theoretical definitions are what is meant by a concept, operationalization

of theory is thus how that concept is measured - what *operations* to perform in order to be able to measure this concept (Ibid.).

Securitization theory used in this paper, provides a very clear operationalization of identifying securitization attempt (the act of moving an issue up to be a matter of national security), this has been specified in the theory chapter of the paper, in the subsection "operationalization of theory"; but in essence a securitization attempt contains an actor introducing an issue as a security threat to a referent object (traditionally the national state), and then a proposal of some sort of measure to contain the threat. The fact that securitization theory itself provides a transparent and simple operationalization makes the validity of research based on securitization theory very high, because there is a clear connection between theory and operationalization. Securitization theory is a constructive theory of creating, or elevating an issue to, a security issue in order to take extraordinary measures (which translates to political power), the operationalization of which is a simple scheme of analysing what in securitization theory is called speech acts - documents, texts, speeches, any form of communication.

Reliability is closely related to validity; validity being the relationship between theory and operationalization, reliability is the consistency of repetition of the operationalization and methodology (Andersen, Hansen, & Klemmensen 2012: 102-104). The rather simple and transparent operationalization of securitization theory in turn gives research based on the same theory a high reliability; because the simplicity and systematic approach of the operationalization makes the replication of the research reliable - it ensures consistency in repetition. In a content analysis, a way to test the reliability, is for the same researcher to repeat the coding of the material twice, or to have other researcher code the material using the same operationalization, thereby testing if the subsequent results match, and verify the reliability of the methodology (ibid.). The coding of the empirical material has been done repeatedly and vigorously.

Generalization is an ambition for most social science research, to be able to generalise findings to a broader context (Andersen, Hansen, & Klemmensen 2012: 105). This paper has a specific research question and scope, the European Union's framing of the situation in Belarus following the 2020 election as a security issue; and its purpose is to shed light on this particular issue, but in a broader sense also to widen the

understanding of security constellations and large macrosecuritizations. But as it is a single case study, on a specific case, it is difficult to generalize the findings.

Research Limitations

Studies based on content analysis are sometimes accused of being insignificant and irrelevant, by having emphasis on what is measurable rather than what is theoretically significant (Bryman 2016: 305). This criticism is also valid for the research in this paper; what is the theoretical significance and relevance of uncovering the security constellation of Belarus, simply by measuring and categorizing the percieved threats articulated by the European Parliament? This paper does not research the effect of these securitizations within the security constellation of Belarus, other than a theoretical review of security constellations as a way to add strength to a securitization. This paper also does not research the succes of these securitization attempts, one is to articulate and frame an issue as a security issue and connect it to the situation in Belarus, another is for it to be accepted by the intended audience for it to have an effect. In order to understand the success and effect of these securitization attempts, one would have to study the implementation of extraordinary measures and their connection to a specific securitization within the security constellation.

It was a conscious decision of this paper to not include the invasion of Ukraine, it was decided to analyze a resolution from late 2021, as at the time the writing of this paper started, the situation in Ukraine was rapidly developing, and this could have complicated the project.

Analysis

The following section will analyse a resolution from the Euroepan Parliament on the situation on Belarus. Selected by the criteria established in the methodology chapter on choice of data. The purpose of the analysis is to identify securitization attempts made within the EU system, as stated in the previous sections of this paper, by identifying

references to an existential threat towards a referent object and proposed measures to mitigate the threat.

Analysis of the European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression

The analysis of the European Parliament resolution of 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression, will go through the document from top to bottom, one section at the time, and assign a coding according to the coding scheme (see Table 1) established in the methodology chapter. For the remainder of the analysis the European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression will simply be referred to as "the resolution".

The resolution is written as a series of paragraphs or points, that can be read as individual statements. The resolution starts off on the first two pages (see Appendix A: 1-2) with 13 points stating what the resolution is regarding. It is stated that the European Parliament in the resolution has regards to its previous resolutions on Belarus, the European Council conclusions on Belarus from May and June 2021, the conclusions on Belarus of the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2021, and the 2021 State of the Union address by President von der Leyen. This tells us that the resolution first of all will be the most comprehensive resolution on the situation in Belarus up until October 2021 including elements from previous resolutions and council conclusions, and that it is reliable as an official source of the European Union's attitude on the situation in Belarus.

The resolution continues in paragraphs labelled A-U (see Appendix A: 2-5) to offer background and context to the resolution, these are paragraphs establishing facts; including reports of human rights abuses, repression of the Belarus people and the opposition, the instrumentalization of migrants, the forceful landing of an international flight with false pretence etc. See for example paragraph A:

> *"[...] the Belarusian authorities are continuing their repression against the Belarusian people, [...] or to the widespread human rights violations taking place in Belarus; whereas the EU and its Member States did not recognise the results of the presidential election"* (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 2)

Here the European Parliament describes how the Belarussian authorities are represseing the Belarusian public. This is not a complete securitization attempt, it has mentioning of the threat of repression, it has the citizens of Belarus and human rights as the referent object, but is has no proposed measures to implement against the threat for it to be a securitization attempt. As it stands paragraph A of the resolution is just a statement of how it sees the actions of the Belarusian authorities, and as such stands as an incomplete securitization. This does not mean that this paragraph is not part of a securitization of repression and threats against human rights, when considering the whole resolution this paragraph ties in with the remaining paragraphs concerning human rights and repression, to form a larger securitization of threats against human rights.

Paragraph B continues with a long list of human rights violations, and violations against the people of Belarus, below is merely an excerpt from the end of the paragraph after a long list of human rights violations:

> *"[...] human rights defenders, opposition politicians, civil society, independent journalists and other activists are systematically subjected to violent repression; whereas thousands of Belarusians have been forced or otherwise compelled to leave their homeland and seek safety abroad"* (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 2)

In this quote there is the mentioning of a threat of repression against the civil society, the political opposition, journalists and other members of Belarusian society. This is an incomplete securitization attempt with the mention of a threat of repression, and the Belarusian people and civil society as the referent object.

In paragraph C of the resolution there is another incomplete securitization attempt:

"Member States, in particular Poland and Lithuania, have provided shelter, medical treatment and scholarships for thousands of asylum seekers fleeing persecution by Lukashenka for their democratic aspirations" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 2)

This paragraph contains a threat of persecution by Lukashenka, and a referent object being the fleeing Belarusians with democratic aspirations. In short: Threats against human rights, but once again without any proposed measures or call to action. Paragraph D carries on:

"[...] the Belarusian regime is running a repression campaign against civil society and human rights defenders aiming to silence all remaining independent voices in Belarus; whereas close to 250 civil society organisations have been liquidated or are in the process of being liquidated, including the Human Rights Center Viasna, [...]" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 2)

Again, there is the mention of a threat from the Belarusian regime, a threat of repression, together with a description of the referent object as being civil society - this is once again an example of an incomplete securitization attempt, with threats against human rights.

In paragraph E of the resolution, there is another long list of examples of repression against named individuals in Belarus. Below is an excerpt of the paragraph, exemplifying the securitization attempt:

"[...] the Belarusian authorities are continuing their crackdown on and harassment of independent Belarusian journalists and are engaging in deliberate attempts to hamper objective reporting" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3)

The European Parliament accuses the Belarusian authorities of harassment of journalists in Belarus, and are in general preventing objective reporting. Paragraph E of the resolution is another example of an incomplete securitization attempt; the European

Parliament is framing the harassment of Belarusian authorities as a threat towards journalism in Belarus, therefore it is another example of a securitization of human rights.

Paragraph F of the resolution, continues with the securitization of human rights:

"[...] with leaders and members of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union (BITU) and the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BKDP) being arrested, fined and subjected to searches by the KGB; whereas Belarus rates as one of the worst countries for working people in the 2021 ITUC Global Rights Index" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3)

Again, there is an incomplete securitization attempt of threats against human rights; the Belarusian KGB (secret police) is being accused of arresting and conducting searches on Belarusian trade unions, but again no proposals for mitigating measures.

Paragraph G of the resolution continues with the securitization of threats against human rights, this time through threats to the Polish minority in Belarus:

"[...] Aliaksandr Lukashenka continues his campaign against the Polish minority, having imprisoned Andżelika Borys and Andrzej Poczobut, two leaders of the Polish community, attacking Polish-language schools and running a propaganda campaign based on false historical narratives" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3)

Here it can be seen how the European Parliament continues to securitize human rights violations, this time violations from "Belarusian authorities" have been replaced by Lukashenka himself, and this time the threat is against the Polish minority as the referent object. As with the previous paragraphs so far, this paragraph is lacking any proposed measures, therefore it can only be classified as an incomplete securitization attempt.

Paragraph H of the resolution pertains to police brutality of the police in Belarus, killings of protesters, and in general an absence of rule of law:

"there is no indication that Belarusian authorities are investigating the thousands of reports of police brutality filed since August 2020, or the killings of protesters; whereas

the widespread impunity for human rights violations perpetuates the desperate situation of the Belarusian people; whereas the absence of the rule of law impedes their right to a fair trial; whereas Belarus is the only country in Europe to still carry out capital punishment" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3)

The above paragraph is once again an incomplete securitization attempt of human rights violations. The threat is police brutality, killing of protesters, impunity for human rights violations, capital punishment and an absence of the rule of law; the referent object under threat is again the Belarusian people.

Paragraph I of the resolution is interesting as it concerns the diversion of the Ryanair flight FR4978 in order to detain a Belarusian journalist and activist:

"[...] on 23 May 2021, Ryanair flight FR4978, an international passenger flight [...], was forcefully diverted to Minsk on the orders of Aliaksandr Lukashenka on the false pretence of a bomb threat, in breach of international conventions and jeopardising the safety of the more than 170 passengers and crew on board; whereas in Minsk, the Belarusian authorities detained passenger Raman Pratasevich, a Belarusian journalist and activist, and his companion Sofia Sapega" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3)

There is here the threat against the safety of the passengers and crew of the diverted flight from a false bom threat, which could be interpreted as a direct security threat by terrorism; but there is also a threat of wrongful detention of a journalist and activist, which could be interpreted as a violation of human rights. So this will count as an incomplete securitization of terrorism, with the referent object being the passengers and crew; and as an incomplete securitizations of human rights violations.

Paragraph J of the resolution concerns the instrumentalization of migrants and the situation at the EU border to Belarus:

"[...] Lukashenka publicly threatened to flood the EU [...] with migrants and drugs; whereas this threat was implemented by instrumentalising migrants for political

purposes, [...] whereas at least five migrants have died from hypothermia and exhaustion and several migrants have become stranded for weeks at the EU's external border with Belarus [...] whereas the situation at the EU's border with Belarus remains tense, with many and diverse provocations from the side of Belarusian officers and soldiers" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 3-4)

Here the European Parliament describes how Lukashenka publicly threatens "to flood the EU" with migrants and drugs, and then describes how this situation has had dire consequences for migrants stranded at the border, but also how the situation at the border has let to tension and provocations from Belarusian soldiers. This is an incomplete securitization of migration, with the instrumentalization of migrants as the threat; and on one hand the migrants as the referent object, but also the traditional security of the EU. This shows how the instrumentalization of migrants can be coupled more directly with a military threat and escalation.

Paragraph K of the resolution is related to the one above:

"whereas in her State of the Union address of 15 September 2021, the Commission President called the instrumentalisation of migrants a hybrid attack by Belarus aimed at destabilising the EU" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 4)

The European Parliament attempts to securitize the instrumentalization of migrants as an attack on the stability of the EU. The paragraph is still lacking any mention of proposed measures to be taken to mitigate the threat, so it is still an incomplete securitization, but it is pretty clear in its coupling of migration and the stability of the EU.

The paragraphs labelled L, M, N, and O (see Appendix A: 4) of the resolution are all describing human rights violations of Belarusian individuals; including killings of member of Belarusian civil society, wrongful arrests, impunity for human rights violations, and Belarusian athletes forced to flee the country after criticizing their Belarusian coaches. These paragraphs will be categorized as referent objects.

Paragraph P of the resolution introduces another threat to the EU:

"[...] in an already tense climate, in September 2021 Russia and Belarus held the massive Zapad 2021 joint military exercise [...], putting further pressure on the EU's borders; whereas Russia and Belarus established a joint air force and air defence training centre in Grodno, less than 15 kilometres from the border with Poland; whereas on 9 September 2021, Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow and announced the approval of 28 further programmes for integration at economic and fiscal level, as well as the creation of a 'joint defence sphere', which represents another step towards merging the Belarusian and Russian armed forces and the possible permanent deployment of Russian troops in Belarus; whereas Lukashenka has announced plans to acquire USD 1 billion worth of weapons from Russia by 2025,[...] whereas on 9 September 2021, Lukashenka and Putin also agreed to set up a unified oil and gas market and to deepen economic integration, increasing the risk that Lukashenka will continue to trade off Belarus's sovereignty in exchange for more support from Russia"
(European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 4)

In this long quote the European Parliament introduces the securitization of Russia as a threat, by framing militry cooperation between Belarus and Russia as putting pressure on the borders of the EU. By framing Russian and Belarusian integration as a "risk" it is clear that the European Parliament does not view this as a positive development.

Paragraphs Q and R (see Appendix A: 4-5) concerns Belarus' ties to the EU, as Belarus has suspended its participation in the Eastern Partneship initiative, and has ordered much of its diplomatic corps in the EU to return to Belarus. Paragraph S (see Appendix A: 5) concerns the special drawing rights of 1 billion USD from the International Monetary Fund. These paragraphs does not directly translate as a securitization attempt.

In paragraph T of the resolution the European Parliament moves on to securitize nuclear power:

"whereas Belarus started the commercial operation of the Belarusian nuclear power plant (NPP) in Astravyets without addressing all the safety recommendations contained in the 2018 EU stress test report; whereas the Belarusian side is not transparent and does not provide trustworthy information about events at the NPP site, reconfirming that

the Belarusian NPP is unsafe and poses a serious nuclear safety threat" (European
Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 5)

In this paragraph the European Parliament expresses concern over a nuclear power plant
in Belarus. The nuclear power plant is being securitized by the EU as a nuclear safety
threat, but it is still an incomplete securitization attempt by itself without any proposed
measures.

The resolution then continues with paragraphs 1-40 (see Appendix A: 5-11). Some
of the paragraphs contain whole securitization attempts with a threat, a referent object
and proposed measures to be taken against the threat, some of the paragraphs concern
just the proposed measures, some of them just the threats and argumentation hereof,
and some of them just the referent object; but while there are many securitization attempts
of different threats, they are all part of the larger securitization of Belarus.

In paragraphs 1-9 of the resolution (see Appendix A: 5-6) the paragraphs are not
immediately recognisable as clear securitization attempts by themselves, but are part of
the securitization of Belarus as a whole. They mainly function as a recollection of events
and transgressions against the people of Belarus by the Lukashenka regime, thereby they
can be seen as part of the securitization attempt of threats against human rights. In
paragraph 1 of the resolution (see Appendix A: 5) the European Parliament reiterates its
solidarity with the people of Belarus, and repeats that the European Union and the
Member States did not recognise the results of the 2020 presidential election and do not
recognise Lukashenka as president of Belarus.

In paragraph 2 of the resolution the European Parliament condemns repression of
the people of Belarus:

*"[The European Parliament] Continues to condemn the repression, torture and ill-
treatment of the peaceful people of Belarus, [...] and demands an immediate end to the
violence and repression"* (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 5)

This can be seen as a securitization attempt of threats against human rights, the threat
being repression and violence and the referent object being the people of Belarus.

Although the European Parliament demands an end to the violence and repression, the paragraph lacks actual proposed measures in order for this to be a securitization attempt by itself.

Paragraph 3 of the resolution (see Appendix A: 5) continues along same lines - as part of the continued securitization of threats against human rights in Belarus:

"[The European Parliament] Insists on the need to ensure fundamental freedoms and human rights, [...] and the ceasing of all repression, persecution, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearances and torture" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 5)

The above quote is mostly a list of violations of human rights in Belarus, and not a securitization attempt on its own.

Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the resolution condemns actions taken against named political opposition leaders, staff of Human Rights Center Viasna, and the Polish minority in Belarus; including unjust court sentences and incarceration, and calls on the European Commision and the member states of the Union to monitor the situation of political prisoners in belarus. In paragraph 9 of the resolution the European Parliament calls for support to the political opposition in Belarus in organising free and fair elections. Thus, paragraphs 1-9 of the resolution can be seen as a collective securitization of the threats against human rights taking place in Belarus, they concern repression and violence against the people of Belarus, threats to individual freedom such as freedom of speech, and the rule of law and unfair court sentences for the political opposition.

In paragraph 10 of the resolution the European Parliament attempts to add the securitization of terrorism to the general securitization of Belarus:

"[The European Parliament] Considers the hijacking and forced landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 in Minsk to be an act of state terrorism and therefore calls for the EU to apply restrictive measures against the persons or entities in Belarus and Russia that are responsible, with a view to combating terrorism" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 6).

In this example the threat is terrorism, and the suggested measures taken against it are restrictive measures against the persons or entities responsible. This is an example of an existing securitization (the securitization of terrorism) used by the European Parliament to justify the use of "restrictive measures" against entities and persons in Belarus (and Russia). The existential threat, in this case, is state terrorism enacted by the Lukashenka regime.

In paragraph 11 of the resolution (see Appendix A: 6), the resolution states:

"[The European Parliament] Urges the European Council to agree at its next meeting on 21-22 October 2021 on a comprehensive and strategic approach to sanctions against the Belarusian regime, which should include a shift from a step-by-step approach towards a more determined sanctions approach based on the systemic nature of repression and serious violations of human rights" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 6)*.*

This is an example of a clear securitization attempt; the securitizing actor, the European Parliament in this case, is urging the audience, the European Council, to take measures to meet the threat of repression and violations of human rights (the referent object). In this example, we can identify the actor, the audience, the threat, and the referent object, and by urging the European Council to act at its next meeting (only days after the resolution) there is also an included sense of urgency - a characteristic of an ideal securitization attempt. This ties in to the previous paragraphs condemning violations of human rights, and supports the securitization of the same.

Paragraph 12 continues along the same notes by reiterating the sense of urgency:

"[The European Parliament] Welcomes the Council's decision to adopt the fourth package of restrictive measures and urges it to proceed with the fifth package of sanctions with the utmost urgency by focusing on individuals and entities involved in the crackdown and repression in Belarus and on individuals and entities involved in human trafficking" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 6)

We see the securitizing actor (Parliament) proposing additional measures to be taken against the threat (repression and human trafficking), but without specifying a referent object. Repression implies the referent object to be the people of Belarus and in more general terms: Human rights. Trafficking implies the referent object to be human rights as well, but in the context of the attempted securitization by the EU of migration as a threat to EU security and stability, the referent object of human trafficking as a threat can also be implied to be just that - the security of the European Union.

The European Parliament continues to call for action in paragraph 13 (see Appendix A: 6-7): *"calls on the Council to further strengthen the EU's targeted economic sanctions"*, and regret the low impact previous measures have had on the Belarussian economy. In the same paragraph, the Parliament proposes a ban on the import of goods often produced by inmates in Belarus: *"[...]and to ban imports of products which are often produced by inmates in penal colonies"* (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 7), while not a complete securitization attempt, it should be read in the context of the entire resolution as a securitization attempt, given that the resolution condemn the treatment of prisoners and the sentencing of the political opposition, the reasoning for this call to ban the import of products often produced by inmates, are concerns to violations of human rights in Belarus.

Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the resolution can be categorized as proposed measures, as the European Parliament continues to advocate harsher sanctions, including declaring Belarussian officials *persona non grata,* and refuse the accreditation of Belarussian diplomats - as well as banning Belarus MP's and officials from any international or bilateral events.

In paragraph 15, the parliament advocates a safer work environment and better protection from propaganda attacks for EU diplomats and staff in Belarus:

"[...] and to take additional measures to ensure a safe working environment for EU diplomats and EU delegation staff in Minsk, particularly protection against propaganda attacks by the Lukashenka regime" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 7)

This is a securitization attempt, where the threat is "propaganda attacks by the Lukashenka regime", the referent object is EU diplomats and delegation staff, and the proposed measures are increased protection.

In paragraph 16 the resolution states:

"[The European Parliament] Strongly condemns the Lukashenka regime's instrumentalisation of human beings for political purposes, in breach of international norms and Belarus's bilateral treaties with its EU neighbours; underlines that Belarus's state-sponsoring of illegal crossings at the EU's external border, coupled with a disinformation campaign, is a form of hybrid warfare aimed at intimidating and destabilising the EU" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 7).

The above statement from the European Parliament is a securitization attempt of the "instrumentalisation of human beings" by the Lukashenka regime. This attempt has the threat of state-sponsored illegal crossing at the border of the EU plus disinformation, with the stability of the EU as the referent object. The statement by the European Parliament even uses the term "warfare" and intimidation to further emphasise the urgency and threat of the securitization attempt. But, as the statement is lacking any proposed measures it is an incomplete securitization attempt on its own.

The same securitization attempt of instrumentalization of migration continues in paragraph 17 with proposed measures:

"[The European Parliament] calls for the EU, its Member States and international organisations to step up their efforts towards dismantling these state-ordered human trafficking flows, including by placing diplomatic pressure on the countries of origin of migrants and by imposing sanctions on Belarusian officials, individuals and entities involved, as well as on international criminal networks operating on the EU's territory responsible for transfers to final destinations" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 7).

This adds the needed proposed measures to the other incomplete securitization attempt of migration for example in paragraph 16. It also to the securitization attempt a stronger sense of urgency, by a "call to action" to the EU, member states, and international organisations to step up their efforts, by means of diplomacy and sanctions against the individuals and entities involved.

In paragraph 18 the securitization attempt continues to grant some insight into which measures the European Parliament is requesting implemented against the threat of the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Lukashenka regime:

"[The European Parliament] calls on the Commission to urgently table targeted legislative proposals providing Member States with the necessary safeguards to swiftly and effectively react and respond to migration instrumentalisation campaigns by non-EU countries, in particular by ensuring strong and effective protection of the EU's external borders and by providing effective measures to prevent irregular crossings as well as elaborating ways to stop the abuse of the asylum system by any hostile third country or criminal network" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 8).

The above quote reinforces the urgency of the situation, further emphasising a securitization attempt, as well as proposing extraordinary measures implemented, such as legislative changes meant to enable member states to safeguard against migration and protect the EU's external border. These are, however, not just legislative proposals that target the current crisis of the Lukashenka regime, but legislative proposals meant to protect the EU's external border from migration from any non-EU country. Thereby the securitization of migrants by the Lukashenka regime is utilised by the European Parliament to advocate the urgent implementation of general legislative changes to the EU's external border and migration.

Paragraph 19 of the resolution continues the securitization of migration and human rights:

"[The European Parliament] Is concerned over the deaths of people at the border between Belarus and the EU [...]; calls on the authorities of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania

and other affected Member States to ensure that EU asylum and return law and
international human rights law are respected [...]" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix
A: 8)

This is of course concern over the instrumentalization of migration and violation of human
rights by Belarus, but it could also be seen as a slight criticism of the neighbouring
countries (Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania) and their handling of the migration from Belarus,
as the last half of the paragraph only concerns those countries, and not Belarus (as they
are not a member of the EU and not under EU law):

"[...] including access to asylum and access of media, civil society organisations and
legal aid providers to the border area to the largest extent possible, and to take into
account the guidance by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and bodies of the Council
of Europe; calls on the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties to ensure
compliance with relevant EU law" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 8)

But this could also work to underline the threat and danger of Belarus' instrumentalization
of migration, by exemplifying the difficult situation this brings upon the neighbouring
countries and the Union.

In paragraph 20 the European Parliament continues its securitization attempt of
migration and trafficking, by calling on member states to:

"[...] improve their [Member States] cooperation on border management, the fight
against human trafficking, cigarette smuggling and other security challenges created or
aggravated by the Belarusian regime" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 8).

In this paragraph migration, human trafficking, smuggling, and other security challenges
are aggregated into a larger securitization of border management issues aggravated by
the Belarussian regime. It is seen again the Belarusian regime mentioned as instigating
threats from trafficking and other security challenges. Other security challenges must

reference the other threats mentioned in the resolution: hybrid attacks, cooperation with Russia, and the instrumentalization of migration.

In paragraph 21 of the resolution, the European Parliament regrets the IMF's special drawing rights of 910 million USD, which the parliament fears will not help the people of Belarus, but rather support the Lukashenka regime.

"[The European Parliament] Regrets the IMF's unconditional special drawing rights of USD 910 million, which will not serve the people of Belarus [...]; calls on the Member States to coordinate with international partners in multilateral organisations [...] to restrict the disbursement of funds to the Lukashenka regime and freeze all cooperation with it; takes note of the continuous investments by non-democratic countries, notably Russia and China, in Belarus;" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 8)

It is seen here again how the European Parliament calls for action, and couples Belarus with "non-democratic" countries such as Russia and China. The illegitimacy of the Lukashenka regime and the cooperation with Russia and China is being used to justify the call for member states and international partners to restrict the disbursement of funds. This is a securitization attempt where the threat is anti-democracy and existing securitizations of Russia and China; the referent object is the people of Belarus, but could also be "western" democracy as a whole, by connecting Belarus with "non-democratic" countries, Russia and China.

Paragraph 22 of the resolution uses multiple existing securitizations; Russia, threats against human rights, and migration:

"[The European Union] Reiterates the urgency of exposing Russia's support for Lukashenka's brutal crackdown on the people of Belarus, as well as its involvement in the hybrid actions of Lukashenka's regime against the EU, including the use of migrants for political purposes, and holds the Kremlin accountable for such actions" (European Union 2021; Appendix A: 8)

Cooperation between Russia and Belarus is seen as a threat directly against the EU and against the people of Belarus by supporting the Lukashenka regime. Russia is also being coupled to the instrumentalization of migrants from Belarus. Thereby Russia is being used to increase the severity of the threats to human rights of the people of Belarus, instrumentalization of migrants, the direct threats against the EU. On top of that, the European Parliament reiterates the urgency of action.

In the following quote from paragraph 23 of the resolution, the European Parliament references a joint military exercise between Belarus and Russia, and attempts to securitize it as a threat:

"[The European Parliament] Notes with concern the aggressive scenario of the Zapad 2021 military exercise and the poor opportunities to observe it; reiterates that this exercise, as well as other, similar large-scale exercises, underline Russia's offensive posturing and determination to use its capabilities in a hostile fashion; reiterates its call for EU strategic autonomy and a genuine European Defence Union as part of a strengthened NATO" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 8-9).

The Zapad 2021 military exercise is a joint military between Belarus and Russia. Note how, in a resolution on Belarus, Russia is being used to call for increased European defence and strategic autonomy (independence and self-reliance in defence and other strategic policy areas, including independence from Russian gas). Mentioning Russia in connection with a resolution on Belarus creates connotations of the Cold War and a Russian threat in Europe. Russia and its "offensive posturing" and hostility are being coupled with Belarus to increase the seriousness of the threat, and urgency of action. The military exercise with Russia is framed as a direct threat against the EU, by calling for EU strategic autonomy and a European Defence Union, making it clear that it sees the cooperation between Belarus and Russia as a direct military threat.

Paragraph 24 of the resolution on Belarus carries on along the same lines, condemning the dealings between Vladimir Putin and Lukashenka and cooperation between Belarus and Russia:

"[The European Parliament] Condemns the continuous dealings between Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin to prepare road maps for greater integration between Belarus and Russia, including the progressive militarisation of Belarus, and sees this as a violation of the sovereignty of Belarus, as the Belarusian people are being deprived of their right to determine the future of their country" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 9).

The European Parliament (the securitizing agent) sees the dealings and integration between Russia and Belarus as a threat to the sovereignty of Belarus and the rights of its people (the reference object). This is an incomplete securitization attempt, it has the threat of integration between Russia and Belarus, and the referent object as the sovereignty of Belarus, as well as the rights of the Belarusian people.

Paragraph 25 of the resolution is a paragraph proposing measures to be taken in relation to the securitization of repression and human rights:

"[The European Parliament] urges the Council, the Commission and the VP/HR to devise a coherent and comprehensive strategy towards Belarus, based on current emergency support to victims of repression, […] support to Belarusian civil society, human rights defenders, independent media, trade unions and democratic forces in the country and abroad, cooperation with neighbouring countries on urgent humanitarian issues, [...] and joint international action to address impunity" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 9)

The European Parliament here further attempts to securitize violations of human rights in Belarus, by calling for support for victims of repression, Belarusian civil society etc.

In paragraphs 27-38 (see Appendix A: 9-11) of the resolution the European Parliament praises the work of democratic forces in Belarus, and *"Continues to support the Belarusian people in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights, democratic representation, and political participation in a free and sovereign Belarus"* (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 9). It is a continuation of the securitization of threats against human rights in Belarus by continuing to call for support for democratic forces in Belarus. The European

Parliament advocates for representatives of democratic Belarus (in opposition to the un-democratic Lukashenka regime) to be included in high-level meetings of the EU (see Appendix A: 10); the parliament calls for investigations into the crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime, and includes a call for EU businesses to exercise diligence and respect human rights when operating in Belarus. In short, the European Parliament proposes a wide array of actions to take against the Lukashenka regime and to support democratic forces in Belarus; these proposed measures all add to the securitization of violations of human rights in Belarus.

Paragraph 39 of the resolution on Belarus, introduces a new securitization, the threat of nuclear safety:

"[The European Parliament] Stresses the importance of addressing the nuclear safety threats posed by the Belarusian NPP [Nuclear Power Plant] in Astravyets; insists that Belarus engage on the nuclear safety of the Belarusian NPP in complete transparency and commit to the full implementation of the recommendations made in the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group peer review of the plant; until that is the case, it supports banning imports of energy from the Belarusian NPP into the EU market and reflecting this position in the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism" (European Parliament 2021; Appendix A: 11)

The Belarussian NPP Astravyets is a nuclear power plant built in 2012 close to the border of Lithuania. By raising this seemingly unrelated issue of the safety of the NPP, the European Parliament couples the fear of a nuclear disaster close to the EU border with the overall threat of Belarus. This is a classic securitization attempt by introducing a threat (nuclear safety) and emphasizing urgency by using wording such as "Stresses the importance", and the parliament proposes potential measures to be taken against Belarus if it does not commit to implementing nuclear safety on EU terms.

Results

The analysis identified several securitization attempts byt the European Parliament as part of the securitization of Belarus. The European Parliament attempts to securitize human rights violations, by describing repression against protesters, members of civil society, the political opposition, journalists, and even athletes. The Parliament then proposes extraordinary measures, that go beyond what is the normal state, such as sanctions, unprecedented support for democratic forces and so on.

Another securitization attempt by the European parliament is the instrumentalization of migrants by belarus. The European Parliament describe in the resolution how Belarus enables migrants from the Middle-East to move through Belarus into the EU. The European Parliament frames this as being a direct attack at the EU, by attempting to destabilise the union. The European Parliament extraordinarily urges the Commission to provide legislation for the Member States affected by the instrumentalization of migrants, to be able to better protect the border of the EU to Belarus.

Cooperation with Russia is being framed as a threat by the European Parliament, and sees this as a direct threat to the EU. The Parliament calls for increased deterrence and containment of Russia as a result. This is also being used to advocate, by the European Parliament, for an actual European Defence Union, and a stronger NATO.

The European Parliament attempts to securitize terrorism in relation to the diverted Ryanair flight. They called it an act of state terrorism, for Belarus to force the flight to land by fabricating a bomb threat. This made the European Parliament call for restrictive measures against the people responsible.

The last securitization in the resolution, is that of nuclear safety. The European Parliament want the nuclear power plant in Belarus to comply with European safety standards, and sees the plant as a threat to nuclear safety. Until they comply, the Parliament will support banning Belarus nuclear energy imports from the EU market.

Discussion

The findings of the analysis could show that the European Parliament uses securitization in order to justify extraordinary means against Belarus, and that it does so as a security constellation, where Belarus is not just seen as a direct threat to the EU. Instead Belarus is seen as a threat on multiple levels, towards multiple referent objects, not just the security of the EU. But, the analysis of this paper, has only shown that the European parliament has attempted to justify extraordinary means, it does not show whether or not the Parliament was successful or not. This could have been shown, by analyzing the implemented measures as well. From the analysis we know that there are specific proposed measures linked to specific securitization attempts, so a way of checking if that specific securitization attempt was successful, is to check if that specific measure has been implemented. Another, perhaps more difficult, method would be finding a way to analyze whether or not the securitization attempt by the European Parliament has been accepted by the intended audience; one way of doing something like that could be to ask the European public or the Commission of the EU if they, for instance, believed the diversion of the Ryanair flight to be an act of terrorism, or the migration from Belarus to be a form of hybrid attack aimed at destabilising the EU.

The analysis showed a securitization attempt of human rights by the European Parliament, but human rights is a very broad category. Under the human rights umbrella, there were a multitude of referent objects under threat, and a multitude of different threats; which all shows that security constellations are perhaps like a pyramid, where one can just keep moving further down and broaden the scope. Under the category of human rights, one could have several different kinds of repression being securitized, for instance, the resolution mentions killings, arrests, the liquidating of civil society organizations etc., the referent object could be categorised into several different object, like freedom of speech, democracy, free press, and so on. All of these example add to the securitization of human rights violations, and the securitization of human rights violations add to the securitization of Belarus.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is clear from the analysis that the European Parliament securitizes several security issues, in order to increase justification for its proposed sanctions against Belarus. The European Parliament uses a securitization of human rigths, of terrorism, of Russia, and of nuclear safety. However, we do not know if the securitizations have been succesful without a more in-depth analysis of the sanctions imposed on Belarus.

Although this paper has found the use of a security constellation when it comes to Belarus, and has identified some of the securitizations within that constellation, the European Union is a large organization, and this paper has only analyzed one resolution from the European Parliament. This means that it is possible that the security constellation of Belarus is larger, and there are more securitizations that have not been identified.

References

- Andersen, L. B., Hansen, K. M., & Klemmensen, R. (2012). *Metoder I Statskundskab.* 2.ed. Hans Reitzels Forlag. Aarhus.

- Armitage, J. (2002). *State of emergency: An introduction*. Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 19(4) pp. 27-38.

- Bello, V. (2022). *The spiralling of the securitisation of migration in the EU: from the management of a 'crisis' to a governance of human mobility?* Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 48:6, pp. 1327-1344. Routledge.

- Bonacker, T., et al. (2013). *Human rights and the (de)securitization of conflict*. In *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights,* pp. 13–46. United Nations. New York.

- Bruns, B., & Happ, D. (2016). *EU Extra-territorialization and Securitization: What Does It Mean for Ukraine and Belarus?* Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography. Leipzig.

- Bryman, A. (2016). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

- Butler, M. J. & Wolf, Z. (2020). *Introduction: Revisiting securitization and the 'constructivist turn' in security studies.* In *Butler, M. J. (2020). Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights,* pp. 3-27. Routledge. New York. Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitization Theory.*

- Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2009). Review of International Theories, vol. 35(2) pp. 253-276. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

- Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, Colorado.

- Buzgalin, A. V., & Kolganov, A. I. (2021). *The Protests in Belarus: Context, Causes and Lessons*. Critical Sociology, Vol. 47(3) pp. 441–453. M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University. Moscow.

- Carlsen, A. V. (2021). *Belarus - Hviderusland vil forandring*. Forlaget Solidaritet. Copenhagen.

- Center for Civil and Political Rights (2020). *Tracking tool – Impact of States of emergencies on civil and political rights*. URL: http://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/tracking-tool-impact-of-states-of-emergencies-on-civil-and-political-rights (last retrieved 13/04/2022).

- Council of the EU (2020). *Belarus: EU imposes sanctions for repression and election falsification.* Press Release. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/10/02/belarus-eu-imposes-sanctions-for-repression-and-election-falsification/ (last retrieved 19/04/2022).

- Council of the EU (2021). *EU bans Belarusian carriers from its airspace and airports.* URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/04/eu-bans-belarusian-carriers-from-its-airspace-and-airports/ (last retrieved 19/04/2022).

- Council of the EU (2022). *Restrictive measures against Belarus*. URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus/ (last retrieved 19/04/2022).

- Council of the EU (2022b). *EU relations with Belarus.* URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/belarus/ (last retrieved 19/04/2022).

- Euronews (2020). *Belarus: EU announces sanctions against Belarus over 'violence' on protesters and electoral 'falsification'.* Euronews.

- European Parliament (2021). *The situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression. European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression*. Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0420. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0420_EN.html (last retrieved 05/09/2022).

- Holsti, O. R. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Addison-Wesley. Reading.

- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster. New York.

- IISEPS (Independent Institute for Socio-Political and Economic Research) (2014). *Dinamika belorusskogo obshchestvennogo mneniya po nekotorym sotsial'no- ekonomicheskim i politicheskim problemam (po rezul'tatam oprosov NISEPI, %)* [Dynamics of Belarussian Public Opinion on Some Socio-Economic and Political Problems (from Results of Surveys of the IISEPS, %)]*.

- Kaunert, C. & Léonard, S. (2019). *The collective securitisation of terrorism in the European Union*. In *West European Politics*, Vol. 42:2, pp. 261-277. Routledge. London. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2018.1510194

- Marchetti, R. & Tocci, N. (2013). *Redefining European Union engagement with conflict society.* In *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights*, pp. 181-203. United Nations. New York.

- Rosenfeld, B. (2022). *Belarusian public opinion and the 2020 uprising*. In *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 38:1-2, pp. 150-154. Routledge. New York. DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031528

- Vélez, D.C. & Krapivnitskaya, E. (2020). *The EU migration policy securitization process: from a domestic to a foreign dimension.* Studia z polityki publicznej, Vol.7 (4(28)), p.105-122. SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Warsaw.

- Watson, S. D. (2009). *The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging moats and sinking boats.* Routledge. New York.

- White, S., Biletskaya, T. & McAllister, I. (2014). *Belarusians between East and West.* In *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 32:1, pp. 1-27. Routledge. New York. DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2014.986872
- Wæver, O. (1993). *Securitization and Desecuritization*. Working Papers. Centre for Peace and Conflict Research. Copenhagen.
- Wæver, O. et al. (1993). *Identity, Migration And The New Security Agenda In Europe.* Centre for Peace and Conflict Research. Copenhagen.

Appendices

- Appendix A: *(P9_TA(2021)0420) European Parliament resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression (2021/2881(RSP)).*