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Master's Thesis

Protecting civil populations from mass atrocity crimes:

A case study investigation of the international community's ability to utilise policy tools of the 'Responsibility to Protect' to protect the civil population in Ethiopia from mass atrocity crimes

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Abstract

The Ethiopian government is not able to protect its civil population from mass atrocity crimes, why that responsibility bestows to the international community according to the international norm the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). This dissertation conducts a case study on the United Nations Security Council's (international community) ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P to protect the Ethiopian civil population from crimes amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. It is investigated how the following coercive and non-coercive policy tools have been utilised: 1) Mediation and Political Dialogue, 2) Public Advocacy, 3) Criminal Investigations, Fact-Finding Missions, & Commissions of Inquiry, 4) Referral to the ICC, 5) Monitoring or Observer Missions, 6) UN Charter Chapter VII Authorised Use of Force, and 7) Sanctions. The case study is investigated by applying the theories of institutional liberalism and realism. The institutional liberalist approach enables the perception that institutions affect state behaviour and enhance the interest of all people. The realist theory enables the reflection that self-interest, sovereignty, and unequal power balance affect the international community and its abilities.

It is found that the international community's ability to utilise policy tools, both coercive and non-coercive, is significantly limited by state sovereignty, the self-interest of the Ethiopian government, and unequal power balances existing within the international community. The sovereign rights and interests of the Ethiopian government limit the international community's ability to intervene non-coercively as respect for sovereignty is bestowed significant importance in the UN Charter. The Ethiopian government does not possess a self-interest in cooperating with the international community. As the international community depends on cooperation to utilise the majority of the non-coercive policy tools, the self-interest of the Ethiopian government composes a challenge. The unequal power balance within the international community is constituted by the veto powers of five permanent member states. The veto powers of the Russian Federation and China constitute a specific challenge for utilising the policy tools of the R2P as the two countries have vocalised disapproval of international intervention in the conflict. Thus, it is found that the international community's ability to affect the state behaviour of Ethiopia is challenged. It is discussed that the architecture of the international community affects the potential of the R2P and the ability of the international community to respond to the Ethiopian conflict.

Keywords: The Responsibility to Protect, R2P, Ethiopia, Tigray, The United Nations, The United Nations Security Council.

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List of Abbreviations

AU: African Union

EHRC: Ethiopia Human Rights Commission

ENDF: Ethiopian National Defence Forces

EPRDF: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front

HoA: Horn of Africa

HRC: Human Rights Council

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICJ: International Court of Justice

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OHCHR: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

SG: Secretary-General

TPLF: Tigray People's Liberation Front

UN: United Nations

Under-SG: Under-Secretary-General

UNHCR: The United Nations Refugee Agency

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

Problem area

During the final year of completing my master's degree, I interned at the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa. During my internship, the civil war currently transpiring between the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), ethnic militias, Eritrean forces, and the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) escalated. The civil war will constitute the focal point for this dissertation as I during my internship started to reflect upon the international community's ability to react to situations of conflict and civil war.

During my internship, I was a part of the bilateral team at the Danish Embassy with duties specifically related to good governance, human rights, and the postponed Ethiopian national election of 2020. These duties proved to become influential and conflictual as my internship progressed. The civil war between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF was not new when I initiated my internship. As my internship progressed it, however, escalated and indeed proved why it is categorised as a civil war (D'Costa 2022). The atrocities that the Tigrayan civil population were exposed to intensified and became a greater matter of discussion and concern within the international community. At the bilateral team, the civil war became the focal point for most of the conducted work. Reporting on the war and the progress of TPLF became of grave importance, and the political situation became the focus of attention for majority of the conducted work. Despite my internship solely lasting for three months, the effect of the war was obvious. It was apparent, that the international community had not anticipated the fast advance of the TPLF and that the atrocities of the war would expand to Afar and Amhara, Tigray's neighbouring regions. As my duties during the internship mainly concerned the war, its progress, and its effects, I developed a grave concern about the outcomes of the war. The humanitarian effects of challenging security and political situations constitute my main field of interest and have guided me in previous academic and professional work. This interest of mine increased during my time at the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa.

The victimisation of the Tigrayan population was continuously documented during my internship. Humanitarian assistance entering Tigray was under a de facto blockade leaving Tigrayans to suffer an extreme lack of food, sexual violence became a frequently utilised weapon in the war, unlawful arrests and forcibly disappearances of Tigrayans were executed by governmental forces in Addis Ababa, simultaneously, internet service and phone signal were cut off preventing communication to and from Tigray among an abundant number of other violations towards the civil population (World Food Programme 2022; Nichols 2021; Amnesty International 2021; Human Rights Watch

2021; Harding 2021; Keaten & Anna 2021). From a joint investigation between the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), it was documented that every implicated actor in the war had engaged in human rights violations that may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes (The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission & the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2021). This documentation caused me to wonder how the international community is able to interfere in situations where the civilian population is exposed to atrocity crimes amounting to war crimes performed by the government. Despite the atrocities being documented by trusted institutions (read: Amnesty International, EHRC, OHCHR, and Human Rights Watch), the international community did not seemingly initiate means to prevent further atrocities committed towards the civil population. It is, evidently, not the first time in history that populations are exposed to atrocity crimes. Therefore, international frameworks to halt mass atrocity crimes committed towards civil populations do exist. In 2005, the United Nations (UN) ratified the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a global principle. The R2P enables the international community to protect civil populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. It is a normative framework that delegates the responsibility to protect civilian populations from atrocity crimes to the sovereign states and in situations of states' noncompliance, to the international community. The R2P emerged as a response to the international community's failure to protect civil populations from mass atrocity crimes in Kosovo and Rwanda (Bellamy 2006; Gholiagha 2015; Thakur 2019:67). The UN is the author of the R2P why I, naturally, reflected upon this institution when considering the response of the international community. The UN is an institution consisting of multiple bodies where the UN Security Council (UNSC) is the body that considers cases of R2P concern. From these considerations, it is within this dissertation aspired to answer the following research question:

- *How has the United Nations Security Council been able to utilise policy tools of the R2P to protect the Ethiopian civil population from mass atrocity crimes committed during the conflict?*

Consequently, it will be critically investigated which challenges and limitations the UNSC has encountered when utilising policy tools of the R2P to protect the civil population in Ethiopia. It will, equally, be investigated how the UNSC has been successful in utilising policy tools and protecting the civil population.

Presentation of dissertation

The dissertation is constructed by a methodological section presenting the considerations underlying the methods utilised within the research. The section includes a presentation of a case study as a methodological tool, considerations regarding the included data to establish the case study, theoretical considerations, and, ultimately, the delimitations of the conducted investigation.

Subsequently, the object of analysis is presented. The object of analysis is constituted by three components: The Ethiopian civil war, the R2P, and the international community. The historical development of the Ethiopian political landscape, the civil war, and the consequences of the war will be presented as the first part of the object of analysis. The R2P as a normative principle, the debate surrounding the norm, and the operationalisation of the norm from theory to practice within this dissertation will be presented as the second component of the object of analysis. The third component will be the operationalisation of the term ‘international community’ within this dissertation.

The subsequent part will constitute the analysis. Within the analysis it will be investigated how the international community has utilised non-coercive and coercive interventions available under the R2P in the case of Ethiopia. I will analyse the strategy of the international community from the approaches of liberal institutionalism and realism, respectively. The institutional liberalist approach enables the perception that international institutions affect state behaviour while the realist theoretical strand enables the inclusion of the concepts of self-interest, sovereignty, and unequal power balance. Based on the findings, I will discuss the consequences of the war and the international community’s strategy, both the international, humanitarian, and regional consequences. I believe that discussing the findings of the analysis will entail a greater understanding of the multiple effects that the war and the international community’s response have had. Ultimately, the conclusion will sum up the findings of the research.

Methodological approach

This section will present the methodological considerations of this investigation. Firstly, the case study as a methodological framework is presented followed by considerations concerning the documents included to establish the case study of this dissertation. Subsequently, the theoretical considerations of the investigation are reflected upon. The section is concluded with considerations concerning the delimitations of the research.

Case study as the methodological framework

The international community's ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P to protect the Ethiopian civil population from atrocity crimes is investigated from a case study approach. The case study approach enables an investigation of: multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy institution, programme, or system in a 'real life' context (Thualagant 2016). The case study is constituted of three components: The Ethiopian civil war, the R2P, and the international community. The Ethiopian civil war is presented within the first section of the object of analysis. The section will thoroughly examine historical political events, the ignition of the war, events transpiring between the active parties of the conflict, and a description of documented atrocity crimes committed towards the Ethiopian civil population. Comprising the Ethiopian conflict from these components will contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the civil war and its atrocities. The second component of the case study is the international community's ability to intervene in conflicts based on the R2P. The section will present the background of the R2P, the debate surrounding it, and how it is operationalised in this investigation. The R2P as a norm is presented to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the international community's ability to protect civil populations on the basis of this international instrument. The third component of the case study is the international community. It is deemed a necessity to determine which institutions constitute the international community within this dissertation why the operationalisation of the term is presented in the final section of the object of analysis. Actions taken by the international community to halt atrocity crimes in Ethiopia are presented structurally throughout the analysis and will, thus, not be presented in the section describing the object of analysis.

The case study of this dissertation is arguably constituted by numerous components, both political, ethnic, and historical, and exudes complexity. Investigating the international community's ability to utilise policy tools available under the R2P to protect the Ethiopian civil population from a case

study approach will ensure an inclusion of this complexity and the unique perspectives that constitute this specific case.

A case study approach will enable an in-depth investigation of how the international community has responded to the atrocity crimes committed towards the civil population in Ethiopia. Consequently, the findings of this dissertation will be context-dependent on this particular conflict. Producing a context-dependent investigation will enable the achievement of comprehensive knowledge amounting to expert knowledge, in this case of the international community's ability to protect the Ethiopian civil population based on the R2P (Flyvbjerg 2006). Producing context-dependent knowledge brings the possible consequence that the findings will not necessarily be directly transferable to other contexts. It will, nevertheless, be viable to compare and draw similarities as well as differences to other cases of conflict and civil war (Flyvbjerg 2006). I will return to this topic in my discussion. Bina D'Costa (2022) postulates that an absence of academic insights into the conflict remains why context-dependent knowledge becomes a necessity within the academic research of the Ethiopian conflict. D'Costa determines it essential to explore the R2P in the context of Ethiopia. I utilise this postulate to support the importance of achieving context-dependent and expert knowledge on the specific conflict in Ethiopia. I, equally, argue that the relevance of achieving expert knowledge is supported as the conflict is currently transpiring. Hence, an evaluation of the international community's actions to minimise the consequences and halt the atrocity crimes is of prompt relevance.

Data within the case study

This case study takes its point of departure in a desk study, and is, therefore, constructed by existing data. Consequently, the study draws on previous research, reports conducted by non-governmental organisations, reports conducted by bodies within the UN, policy documents, as well as articles obtained from the internet. Multiple documents are included to establish the case study, the following section will briefly present the selection of included data and the methodological considerations of this selection.

Data establishing The Ethiopian civil war

To present the Ethiopian civil war, documentation concerning the political history of the country is mainly constituted by articles obtained on the internet and research by Tefera Negash Gebregziabher (2019). Gebregziabher investigates critical junctures for the TPLF why it is considered valuable for the presentation of the political history of Ethiopia in this dissertation.

I have critically reflected upon the sender of the articles obtained from the internet to ensure minimum bias within the articles, not favouring a specific actor in the conflict. Applying a critical lens has contributed to a neutral presentation of the political and historical facts of Ethiopia which comprises a significant factor for the ignition of the civil war. The consequences of the civil war, additionally, constitute an essential component of the Ethiopian conflict. This part is constituted by reports documenting the mass atrocity crimes committed during the war. The included reports are produced by the non-governmental organisations of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the EHRC as well as the UN agencies of OHCHR and the HRC. These reports have been included as I argue that these organisations and institutions are independent and trustworthy in their documentation. The findings have been criticised by the Ethiopian government, I, however, refrain from this critique and consider the inclusion of these documents as valuable for determining the case of the Ethiopian conflict. The reports conducted by the non-governmental organisations and agencies of the UN describe how mass atrocity crimes amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing have been committed during the war. It is the findings within these reports that constitute the argument for investigating the civil war from the instrument of the R2P, as the norm is considered an international instrument to protect the civil population from these exact crimes.

Data establishing The R2P

The R2P constitutes both a theoretical norm and an analytical concept to investigate which policy tools have been utilised by the international community to halt mass atrocity crimes in the Ethiopian war. In the description of the norm as an object of analysis, the norm's theoretical origin is firstly presented followed by the operationalisation of the norm as an analytical concept within this dissertation.

To establish the R2P as a theoretical norm, the World Summit Outcome Document is included. The document presents the framework of the norm, constituting the reason for including this document. Academic research on the norm is, additionally, included to depict the underlying reasoning for the international community to adopt the norm and to introduce differing notions concerning the norm's challenges, abilities, and prospects. The research is included to ensure a comprehensive understanding of how the R2P is a debatable topic within the academic arena of international relations. Research concerning both the positive and negative connotations of the norm is included to ensure an inclusive understanding of the academic environment surrounding

the norm. I have critically reflected upon the credentials of the authors to ensure that the research could contribute with valuable insights to the debate concerning the norm.

The norm is operationalised as an analytical concept by including research conducted by Patrick Wight and Yuriko Cowper-Smith, an annual report by Ban Ki-moon, the former Secretary-General of the UN, and a definition of R2P policy tools produced by the UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. I have included this documentation to determine which policy tools to include in my operationalisation of the R2P. I believe that the combination of the included documentation has enabled me to develop a conceptual understanding of the R2P as an analytical concept.

The research by Wight and Cowper-Smith investigates if the international community possesses mechanisms to halt atrocity crimes in Ethiopia and Myanmar. The research is published by the *Global Responsibility to Protect*, a premier journal for the study and practice of the R2P. The journal encourages diversity of opinion concerning the norm why the research is considered valuable, and without unproportionable bias. The annual report by Ki-moon concerning the implementation of R2P was published in 2009 and operationalises the norm. The document is included as it provides specific policy tools and explicates strategies of intervention. It is published by the UN making it a document bearing positive connotations towards the international community as well as the abilities and prospects of the norm. I have applied a critical lens when utilising the document, being aware of who the author is. The UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect determines numerous policy tools for the international community to utilise under the three pillars of the R2P. I have included a limited selection of these policy tools. The investigation will include seven policy tools available under the third pillar of the R2P. This delimitation has shaped the analysis to focus on policy tools of specific relevance within the context of Ethiopia.

Data establishing the operationalisation of the international community

To operationalise the concept of the international community, Hedley Bull's definition of the international society is included. Bull determines the international society as states bound by a common set of rules in their relationship with each other (Bull 1977:13). To ensure a precise understanding of how the international community is operationalised in the dissertation, Bull's definition is considered a valuable tool. Bull is considered a prominent scholar from the English School, a theoretical lens not applied within this investigation. It is essential to emphasise that the theory of Bull is not included when operationalising the term 'international community', rather is

the definition of what constitutes an international society. Despite not being a theoretical lens applied within this dissertation, it is strongly emphasised that Bull's definition of the international society is valuable for operationalising the international community in this investigation.

Theoretical considerations

To understand the essence of R2P and the international community's ability to utilise the policy tools of the norm, institutional liberalism and realism are included as the main theoretical strands within this dissertation. The theory will be elaborated during the analysis to reflect upon the specific policy tools utilised by the international community. The following section is a brief introduction to the theories and considerations concerning the theoretical framework.

Institutional liberalism will enable a thorough understanding of how the international community, as an established and accepted institution, contains powers to intervene in situations of conflict, and to affect the member states' patterns of behaviour. Thus, it enables the investigation of the abilities of the international community to protect the civil population in Ethiopia. Including this theoretical strand enables a theoretical framework that bears positive connotations towards the international community. I utilise institutional liberalism by including research by Robert O. Keohane. According to Keohane's exposition of institutional liberalism, it is believed that the interest of most, if not all, people, is enhanced through sustained cooperation why institutions serve an essential purpose. Institutions are perceived as means to improve the conditions of human life and facilitate more valuable lives for human beings (Keohane 2012). To challenge these positive connotations on institutions, realism as a theoretical strand is included. Realism challenges the underlying logic of institutional theories, providing the opportunity of viewing the international community with a critical lens, at least a lens that notes how the international community can be perceived as challenging. Thus, it enables an investigation of the limitations for the international community to protect the civil population in Ethiopia. Within this dissertation, Mainly John J. Mearsheimer is included to present the realist theoretical strand. Mearsheimer presents how international institutions reflect the current power distribution and are affected by the states possessing the most power. Mearsheimer argues that institutions have a limited influence on state behaviour (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). The theory enables the inclusion of the theoretical concepts of sovereignty, self-interest, unequal power balance, and anarchy to investigate the international community's ability to intervene non-coercively and coercively in the conflict of Ethiopia to protect the civil population. The two theoretical concepts will enable the avoidance of one-sided

investigation, but rather successfully enable a comprehensive investigation taking multiple understandings of the international community's abilities into consideration.

Delimitations

Theoretical framework

Delimiting the investigation to include the two chosen theoretical strands of institutional liberalism and realism, naturally, brings delimitations to my investigation. Within this dissertation, the neo-imperialistic notions that come with developing a human rights norm will not be included. It will not be explored how the norm reflects the global power imbalances and enables leading military and economic powers to justify intervention in developing countries (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022). Nor will it investigate how the R2P can be perceived as an instrument of the West to preach a moral truth that other member states of the UN must comply with (Burchill 2013:71). Investigations on the neo-imperialistic notions of international norms have been debated and investigated in previous academic research. An investigation of such would, however, still be of relevance in Ethiopia, especially due to the national campaign of #HandsoffEthiopia launched by the Ethiopian government. A national campaign displaying an Ethiopian governmental disapproval of the international community intervening in the conflict (Fisher 2022; The Ethiopian Herald 2021). Investigating the neo-imperialistic notion of the R2P could contribute to an analysis of how the Ethiopian government must comply with a norm 'of the West', while simultaneously enabling an analysis of how the Ethiopian government perceives and relates to this compliance.

In the presentation of the Ethiopian conflict as the object of analysis, ethnonationalism is introduced as an influential factor in the development of Ethiopia as a state. I will, additionally, refrain from including this as a theoretical concept in my investigation. I argue that this would result in an exploration significantly diverging from the current research question and result in historically embedded research.

Including these theoretical strands could enable alternative investigations and findings on the transpiring conflict in Ethiopia. Yet, it would be investigations with dissimilar aims to what is desired within this investigation. The Ethiopian civil war gives the potential for multiple research projects why I encourage fellow academics of international relations to initiate investigations with varying aims of research on the Ethiopian conflict.

Political history of Ethiopia

To ensure a comprehensive understanding and description of the Ethiopian civil war as part of the case study, it is found necessary to include a section on the political history of Ethiopia. As the civil war is deeply rooted in the political history of the country, it would not be possible to provide a sufficient introduction to the civil war as a case study without including this matter. Within this dissertation, the focus will be on the contemporary political history of Ethiopia. I will delimit from including political history related to the brief colonial rule of the Italians and the military rule of the Derg regime, rather focus will be on contemporary factors. Therefore, the description of the contemporary political system in Ethiopia will take its point of departure from 1991 when the military junta was toppled. I argue that including factors from 1991 onward will constitute a more comprehensive understanding of the contemporary political situation and understanding of the civil war.

The R2P

Within this dissertation, the R2P will be the sole international principle of investigation. The R2P constitutes an international norm for sovereign states and the international community to protect victims of mass atrocity crimes amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d. A). The norm has been included in this investigation due to its aim of protecting the civil population from precisely what the Ethiopian population is currently experiencing.

Naturally, by solely including R2P, I refrain from including other instruments available for the international community to protect civil populations in situations of conflict. Namely, I refrain from including Resolution 2417 from 2018 concerning the UNSC's strong condemnation of the starvation of civilians and unlawful denying of humanitarian access as warfare tactics (United Nations 2018). By including this resolution, it would be possible to investigate how the active parties of the current conflict have utilised famine as a weapon of war by putting humanitarian assistance to the Northern parts of Ethiopia under a de facto blockade. Researching this topic could provide insight how the Ethiopian government and the TPLF have denied humanitarian access into Tigray, how this has left the civil population in famine-like conditions, how it can be perceived as a war crime, and more importantly how the international community has acted. Including this resolution would, however, reformulate the scope of this investigation, possibly proposing a dissimilar focus to what is found in this dissertation.

Ethics and the R2P

The R2P as a norm is ethically defined. The norm portrays a generally accepted standard of proper behaviour, based on a shared value system of the international community (Thakur 2019:226). The norm emerges from the debate on the ethics of intervention versus non-intervention in response to the international community's idle response to protect civil populations and repeated failure to oblige to international humanitarian law in the cases of Kosovo and Rwanda (Bellamy 2020; Thakur 2019:61). I refrain from investigating the ethical conception of the norm and from discussing the ethical perspective of international intervention versus non-intervention. Such investigation would be of great importance, especially within an Ethiopian context. It would, however, depend on a theoretical strand considering ethics in international relations. I argue that the findings of this investigation will enable a further discussion on the ethical perspective of the international community's strategy to the Ethiopian conflict and encourage my colleagues to conduct such a discussion.

Throughout the presentation of the methodological considerations, it has been established that I aspire to conduct a case study analysis on the international community's response to the Ethiopian civil war from the analytical concept of R2P and the theoretical strands of institutional liberalism and realism. The following section will present the object of analysis.

Object of analysis

The object of analysis is constituted by three components, the Ethiopian civil war, the international instrument of the R2P, and the international community. These components provide the data of the case study, and will be presented, respectively. The Ethiopian civil war is presented from the political history of Ethiopia, the ignition of the civil war, and its appertaining consequences for the civil population. The R2P is described through the origin and framework of the norm and research debating its abilities. How the norm is operationalised as an analytical concept is, subsequently, reflected upon. Lastly, the operationalisation of the international community as a term is presented.

The Ethiopian civil war

Political history of Ethiopia

In 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) managed to dismantle the military Derg regime and achieve governmental control of Ethiopia. The toppling of the Derg regime initiated a 28-year rule of the EPRDF. The EPRDF consisted of four political parties, the TPLF constituted the dominating pillar within the coalition (Veen 2016; Gebregziabher 2019; African Center 2020). During EPRDF's reign, the party monopolised power, resulting in a political environment where opposing political parties were excluded and with scarcely detectable political competition (Veen 2016). Initially, TPLF was considered a liberation movement with the aim of liberating the Ethiopian population from the Derg regime. The organisers of TPLF consisted of people from the Tigray ethnic group, and ethnonationalism was the primary ideological orientation of the party. Consequently, a reformed constitution was ratified in 1994, determining the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as consisting of nine states: delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned (Constitute 1994: 14). Post the ratification of the constitution, the country was drawn along ethnic lines where the autonomy was devolved into nine regional states (Constitute 1994). Dividing the country based on ethnic lines initiated the institutionalisation of ethnic federalism as the political system (Gebregziabher 2019). It is by scholars argued that ethnonationalism was of great importance within the political thought of the TPLF, as the party claimed that the Tigray ethnic people had been the victims of systematic oppression by the previous imperial regime of Haile Selassie (Gebregziabher 2019; Woldemariam 2018). Thus, ethnicity has been, and prevails, a significance factor for the development of the political history of Ethiopia (Gebregziabher 2019).

In 2015, civil protests emerged to show discontent with ERPDF's monopolisation of political affairs, the lack of rule of law, and acute human rights violations occurring within the country without holding perpetrators accountable (Human Rights Watch 2016). During the protests, the Ethiopian defence forces utilised disproportionate means of force trying to disperse the peaceful protests (ibid.). The anti-government protests lasted for three years until 2018, consequently, the prime minister at the time was forced to resign. The ERPDF elected Abiy Ahmed as the new chairman of the political party (Al Jazeera 2018). With the anti-governmental protests and the resignation of the former prime minister, the reputation of the ERPDF was fractured. To address the dysfunction of the party, Ahmed decided to rebrand the political party and dissolve the four constituent units of the coalition. Instead, the political party merged into a single pan-Ethiopian national party. The TPLF did not support the transformation why they disembarked the coalition. With the unification of the political party, a quarrel with the TPLF was initiated (BBC News 2021A).

Ignition of the civil war

Initially, the rule of Abiy Ahmed led to positive development with a greater focus on human rights violations happening within the country and the implementation of new political initiatives to adhere to human rights. At the beginning of his reign, Abiy Ahmed was engaged in peace and reconciliation processes, granted amnesty to political prisoners, abolished press censorship, focused on empowering women, released political prisoners and journalists, and formally ended the border conflict with Eritrea restoring diplomatic relations. These positive changes granted him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 (The Nobel Prize 2019). The positive changes were drastically challenged in November 2020. Due to the outbreak of COVID-19, the planned regional election in 2020 was postponed from the governmental side. The Northern region of Tigray defied the central government and held its own unauthorised regional election causing a feud between the governing party, the Prosperity Party, and the Tigrayan administration, simply put (BBC News 2021B). In the beginning of November 2020, the ENDF was mobilised to enter Tigray as the Ethiopian government accused the TPLF of mounting an attack against federal military bases placed in the Tigray region (Reuters 2021). The TPLF denied responsibility and determined the accusation as being a pretext for the Ethiopian government to justify an invasion of the Northern region (Al Jazeera 2021). This ultimately ignited the civil war. During the subsequent weeks, troops from neighbouring Eritrea were mobilised to reinforce the ENDF in Tigray. The international community raised concern about Eritrean forces entering the region, with great justification (Center for Preventive Action 2022; Yusuf 2022).

Since the entering of Eritrean forces, it has been documented how Eritrean troops have continuously committed atrocities in Tigray with reports on lootings, massacres, sexual violence, the blocking and looting of food aid, and the attack on and abduction of Eritrean refugees located in Ethiopia. In some cases, atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity (Al Jazeera 2021). These reports on atrocities, ultimately, pressured the Ethiopian Prime Minister to expel the Eritrean troops from Ethiopian territory. Despite the assurance of withdrawal, Eritrean troops continued to commit atrocities on Ethiopian grounds (Walsh 2021; France24 2021; Farge 2021).

During the almost two year-lasting war, multiple military operations have been deployed to achieve the desired goals of both the ENDF and the TPLF. In June 2021, the TPLF achieved presence within the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara from where they did not withdraw until December 2021 (The Guardian 2021). The progress of the TPLF was evident, why Ahmed in August 2021 urged eligible national Ethiopians to join the armed forces and the fight against the TPLF (Mersie 2021; VOA News 2021). In November 2021, it was documented that the TPLF had progressed its military presence towards Addis Ababa. The TPLF claimed control of a town just 220km northeast of the capital why Western nationals were urged to leave the country (Berlingske Tidende 2021) – including us interns at the Danish Embassy. Fighting between the two parties continued until March 2022 where the Government of Ethiopia declared an indefinite humanitarian truce and the Tigrayan authorities committed to a cessation of hostilities effective immediately (United Nations Secretary-General 2022). During the truce, international aid was allowed to enter Tigray to assist the 5.2 million people in need of assistance (Mlaba 2022). The humanitarian truce was seemingly a step in the right direction to prevent further atrocities for the civil population. Unfortunately, after five months of truce, fighting erupted in the Northern parts of Ethiopia, both parties accusing the other of breaching the truce (The Guardian 2022). Despite the humanitarian truce lasting for five months, the situation continues as dire, and the humanitarian needs across all parameters is continuously high with alarming levels of food insecurity in the Northern regions (OCHA 2022). What is evident is that the population of Ethiopia will remain the greatest victim of the war.

Consequences of the civil war

The civil war has caused famine, numerous casualties and deaths, massacres, instability, ethnic tension, lack of access to Tigray, millions of internally displaced people, a national state of emergency, and countless human rights violations, especially towards women and girls (BBC News 2021B; The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission & the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights 2021; International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B; Amnesty International 2021; Amnesty International 2022; Reuters 2021; Paravicini & Houreld 2021). The following section will elaborate on atrocities as a result of the war reported by Amnesty International, the EHRC & the OHCHR, the Human Rights Watch, and the HRC, respectively.

Amnesty international: I don't know if they realized I was a person

Human rights violations in the form of sexual violence against ethnic Tigrayan women and girls have been documented by Amnesty International in their report. According to the findings, sexual violence has been used as a repetitive weapon in the war and has been performed by the ENDF, Eritrean Defence Forces, the Amhara Regional Police Special Forces, and Fano, an informal Amhara militia group. It is documented that sexual violence has been accompanied by shocking levels of brutality, including beatings, death threats, and ethnic slurs. Some of the victims were held in captivity by the perpetrators for the use of sexual slavery, others were raped in front of their children and other family members (ibid.). Within the report it is registered that: Given the context, scale, and gravity of the sexual violence committed against women and girls in Tigray, the violations amount to war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity (Amnesty international 2021:5).

Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties

Human rights violations performed during the war have additionally been documented in a joint investigation between the EHRC and the OHCHR. The report found that: there are reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict in Tigray have, to varying degrees, committed violations of international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law, some of which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity (The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission & The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2021).

Amnesty International: Ethiopia: Summary killings, rape and looting by Tigrayan forces in Amhara

Amnesty International has released a report documenting deliberate killings of civilians, gang rape, sexual assault of women and girls, and looting of private and public property in the Amhara region performed by groups affiliated with the TPLF (Amnesty 2022).

Human Rights Watch and the Amnesty International: We Will Erase You from This Land, Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia's Western Tigray Zone

In a joint investigation by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, it is documented how: Amhara regional officials and regional special forces and militias, with federal forces' complicity, are responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans from Western Tigray (Human Rights Watch & Amnesty International 2021:2). It was found how: the civilian authorities, and Amhara regional security forces, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, committed numerous grave abuses as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tigrayan civilian population that amount to crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. These crimes include murder, enforced disappearances, torture, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, sexual slavery and other sexual violence, persecution, unlawful imprisonment, possible extermination, and other inhumane acts (ibid.).

Report by the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia

Within the report conducted by the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, it is found that there exists reasonable ground to believe that serious violations and abuses of humanitarian law and international human rights law have been committed since November 2020. It is documented that there exist grounds to believe that these violations amount to war crimes. The commission has grounds to believe that the federal government of Ethiopia and its allies have committed crimes against humanity in the region of Tigray. It is conclusively reported that some of these crimes are still occurring (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B).

From this description of the documented atrocity crimes committed in Ethiopia, it is evident that the population of Ethiopia is exposed to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The population ought to be protected from these atrocity crimes based on the R2P. It is argued that the Ethiopian government is not able to protect the civil population from crimes committed by the parties opposing the government or the governmental forces. The initial interest for investigating the topic of the civil war in Ethiopia stems from the idle response of the international community to protect the civil population. The idle response caused me to wonder about the possibilities of the international community interfering in situations where the government does not protect the civil population from atrocity crimes, rather it performs crimes of such a degree itself. The following section will, therefore, present the R2P, an instrument for the international community to respond to atrocity crimes committed towards civil populations.

The Responsibility to Protect

Due to my cause of wonder, the first step in this investigation concerned understanding which international treaties, agreements, and principles exist to protect civil societies in situations of conflict where atrocity crimes amounting to war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity had been committed. In this case, performed by all involved parties of the conflict, including the Ethiopian governmental forces.

The R2P framework

The R2P is an international norm adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit. The norm was unanimously adopted by the member states of the UN and is presented in the World Summit Outcome Document. The norm is defined within article 138th and 139th of the document, and is defined as follows:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States

build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (United Nations General Assembly 2005:30).

Adopting the norm provides a political normative framework based on principles of international law for preventing and responding to situations of the atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d. A; United Nations Secretary-General 2012:16). The norm is constituted by three pillars: Pillar one) The protection responsibilities of the State, Pillar two) International assistance and capacity-building, Pillar three) Timely and decisive response (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:2). In situations where states are unable to meet the responsibility of protecting their population from atrocity crimes, the international community must adhere to the second and third pillars of the norm. By accepting the R2P as an international principle, member states of the UN comply with the commitment to assist states that are unable to meet the obligations of responsibility. Protection is promised through various methods of action, both coercive and non-coercive. In the article 'Implementing the Responsibility to protect', Ki-moon determines that when states are the aggressors and violators in a conflict, the most beneficial response from the international community would be timely and decisive action (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:15). Hence, if the state can be perceived as the aggressor and as violating the civil population by implying atrocity crimes upon them, the R2P warrants action from the international community. This argument constitutes the reasoning for building this investigation on the third pillar of the normative principle of R2P. The norm clearly states that the international community ought to interfere in situations of conflict amounting to what is occurring in the Northern regions of Ethiopia.

Scholars argue that the development of the R2P as a political framework and normative principle is strongly contested and can be perceived as a result of the genocides committed in the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. More specifically, a result of the international community's non-intervention in these atrocities (Thakur 2019:61; Evans 2008; Bellamy 2014:95; Henderson 2018; Gholiagha 2015; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d. A). By adopting the R2P, the international community pursues to minimise the possibility of repeating the devastating outcomes of historic atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d. A). During the atrocity crimes committed across the globe in the 1990s, and the international community's idle response, the international community operated from the principle of so-called 'humanitarian intervention'. Multiple scholars

present the principle of humanitarian intervention as privileging the perspective, preferences, and priorities of the intervening state rather than being a people-based approach prioritising the protection of the civil population (Thakur 2019:132; Henderson 2018). Humanitarian intervention primarily considered the rights of the sovereign states rather than the responsibilities appertaining sovereignty (Henderson 2018). In the year 2000, in light of the committed atrocity crimes and the absence of UN intervention, the principle of humanitarian intervention was re-examined. To avoid history to repeat itself, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the general perception of state sovereignty and enquired the international community to find common ground in upholding the principles of the UN Charter, and acting in defence of common humanity: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? (Annan 2000:48; Henderson 2018).

The R2P takes its point of departure from the re-examination of humanitarian intervention. The R2P as a normative principle has caused policies of intervention to focus on the responsibility to protect the population of a sovereign state rather than focusing on that state's sovereign rights. By welcoming the R2P as an international norm, sovereignty is reformulated to include responsibility. Ramesh Thakur (2019) presents the R2P as a people-centred approach to atrocity crimes taking into account the needs and interests of victims rather than of the sovereign states. Thakur classifies the transition from *the rights* of the state to *the responsibility* of the state as one of the most influential developments in the last two decades of world politics (Thakur 2019:1). With the R2P, sovereignty is not solely given, it comes with responsibilities to protect people threatened by mass atrocity crimes. This responsibility of the states is presented in the three pillars that constitute the R2P. By the former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, it is clearly emphasised that the first pillar of the R2P situates the main responsibility of protecting populations from atrocity crimes with the sovereign states. This responsibility derives from both the perception of state sovereignty within the UN Charter and the legal obligations that appertain the member states of the UN (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:7f). Nonetheless, it is by Ki-moon emphasised that the reformulated perception of sovereignty does not imply a weakening of the states' autonomy. R2P must be perceived as an instrument to help states succeed in situations of conflict, strengthening their sovereign status (ibid.). It has been elaborated why redefining sovereignty to include responsibility is of significance:

Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility...has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the

safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And, thirdly, it means that the agents of the state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001:13; Henderson 2018).

Wide disagreements around the R2P as a normative principle have existed since the ratification and adoption of the norm in 2005. Diverging opinions on its possible influence as a norm and the actual implementation have been especially present in the debate, voiced by both member states of the UN and policy scholars. Some research finds that the norm will struggle with growing into a customary international law due to the majority of member states not desiring to be legally bound to interfere when atrocity crimes are inaugurated upon strangers (Reinold 2010). This point of view has later been contested as research locates the norm at the second stage of the norm life-cycle, developed by Finnemore and Sikkink, due to its institutionalisation in the UN machinery: The transition from stage one to stage two was facilitated by R2P's institutionalisation in the UN machinery, with the appointment of a special adviser for the responsibility to protect and the creation of an informal Security Council working group on civilian protection (Reinold 2012; Ödegaard 2021). Adrian Hehir (2010) presents the notion of the norm contributing very little substance or prescriptive merit, it has rather changed the discourse concerning humanitarian intervention. The norm is classified as sound and fury, signifying nothing, and failing to provide a viable or innovative approach (ibid.). Bellamy, a fonder scholar of the R2P, refutes this claim by displaying how the norm has been invoked in multiple cases, e.g. within a Libyan context ultimately resulting in coercive intervention to halt the mass atrocities committed toward the civil population (Bellamy 2014:95-98). The notion of being a norm without substance is further refuted as Bellamy argues that the R2P has reshaped the international responses to mass atrocities as the UNSC now routinely accepts its responsibility to evaluate its protecting authority of vulnerable populations (Bellamy 2014:101, 111). The investigation of this thesis is highly inspired by this debate on the ability of the international community to invoke the R2P and act accordingly to the norm.

Operationalising the R2P

I will refrain from solely including the R2P as a theoretical framework, instead the norm will be utilised as an analytical concept. I will use the following section to explain how the norm is operationalised in this investigation.

Within this dissertation, I will position myself, and find inspiration, from Patrick Wight and Yuriko Cowper-Smith to determine the specific utilisation of the R2P. In their research of mass atrocities committed in Ethiopia and Myanmar, and the international community's mechanisms to halt these, they operationalise the principle of the R2P as a practical framework developed from its coercive and non-coercive interventions. The specific strategies can be found within the UN Charter under chapters VI, VII, and VIII (United Nations 1945:8-11). The research does not include an investigation of all coercive and non-coercive strategies, instead, policy tools presented under the third pillar is included. Pillars one and two consider preventive response to mass atrocity crimes. I argue that the situation in the northern part of Ethiopia has deteriorated to such a degree, that actions under the first two pillars of the R2P are no longer of relevance to include in this investigation. The situation can no longer refer solely to the Ethiopian state's sovereign responsibility to protect its population or preventive actions of capacity-building. It is of greater relevance to investigate the third pillar concerning the international community's ability to respond to the mass atrocity crimes committed towards the civil population in Ethiopia. Therefore, I, like Wight and Cowper-Smith, will investigate policy tools available under the third pillar of the R2P. According to Wight & Cowper-Smith, an investigation including such measures enables an assessment of the real-world implications of intervention or non-intervention.

I have included the UN Charter chapter VI, VII, and VIII to determine which policy tools are available under the third pillar of the R2P. These chapters of the charter determine the non-coercive and coercive means of intervention to utilise in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. These policy tools have, additionally, been elaborated by the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. The Office presents ten policy tools under the third pillar, I will include a selected number of these. Namely, I will operationalise the norm as an analytical concept by including the policy tools: Mediation and Political Dialogue, Public Advocacy, Fact-Finding Missions & Commissions of Inquiry, Referral to the ICC, Monitoring or Observer Missions, UN Charter Chapter VII Authorised Use of Force, and Sanctions (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect n.d). Lastly, I include the annual report by the UN Secretary-General on R2P from 2009 to conceptualise the norm. This report considers the actual implementation of the R2P why it is included in utilising the norm as an analytical concept and not solely as a theoretical or political framework (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d. B).

The possibility of utilising both non-coercive and coercive intervention has brought wide debate, polarising supporters and those opposing intervention. Wight and Cowper-Smith position the R2P

within the sphere of liberalism, realism, and neo-imperialism and develops a framework of R2P that considers the three theoretical strands. According to Wight and Smith, liberal theorists operate from the premise that the rules and norms promoted by international institutions make cooperation more effective and reduce the likelihood of violent conflict, while realists often treat states or regimes as the primary players in international relations and see sovereignty as the main pillar of the international system (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022). I, once again, find inspiration from Wight and Cowper-smith why will analyse the case study from a theoretical framework that considers the positive and challenging connotations of the R2P. I will, however, solely include the perspective of institutional liberalism and realism.

Consequently, the R2P has been operationalised by including research utilising the R2P and official documents presenting the policy tools available under the third pillar of the R2P. The operationalisation of the R2P as an analytical concept enables the investigation of how the international community has been able to protect the civil population in Ethiopia by utilising the investigated policy tools. The norm is, additionally, operationalised from the theory of institutional liberalism and realism, noting its abilities and challenges.

Operationalising the International Community

Prior to initiating the analysis, it is of great importance to consider the definition of the term ‘international community’ as it has been mentioned a staggering number of times within this dissertation. In the following section, it will be reflected upon what the term includes, and how it is understood in this research.

The R2P solely prevails due to a common acceptance of the international community as determining legal and normative codes of conduct. The international community is a wide term often paraphrased in international relations, but the exact definition can be categorised as vague or debatable. Governments and organisations often refer to the international community, which can be considered rather unspecific and raises the question of who constitutes the international community. As I will consider the international community that relates to the R2P, the definition of the term within this dissertation is naturally linked to the UN. The UN is considered the author of the normative principle of R2P. To operationalise the international community, I will include Hedley Bull’s definition of an international society: A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1977:13). The

UN is currently constituted by 193 Member States, all guided by the purposes and principles presented in its founding Charter from 1945 (United Nations n.d. A; United Nations n.d. B; United Nations 1945). Based on the theory of Hedley Bull, Adam Watson (1987) argues that grounds for considering the UN as constituting a global international society exist. I, as Watson, perceive the UN as constituting an international community based on the definition of Bull. The UN is an international community consisting of an abundant number of bodies and subsidiary organs with varying aims of the organisation why it can be of challenge to fully grasp the UN as an international community. The UN is part of the UN system, which, in addition to the UN itself, comprises many funds, programmes, and specialised agencies, each of which has its area of work, leadership, and budget (United Nations n.d. C). The institution works within the scope of multiplicity, why it is an international community affected by manifold bodies, subsidiary organs, international and domestic politics, sovereignty, and interest of the state and non-governmental institutions among many other factors. Hence, I deem it necessary to narrow the definition of the international community within this dissertation considerably.

The UN consists of multiple bodies. The main bodies are limited to the General Assembly, the Security Council (UNSC), the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat (United Nations n.d. B). Relevant to include in this dissertation is the UNSC as it is the body of the UN that considers cases of R2P concern. The council is constituted by 15 Members whereas five are permanent and 10 are non-permanent (United Nations n.d. B). The UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and is responsible for determining the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. All member states must oblige to the decisions of the council. In some cases, the UNSC can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorising the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security (United Nations n.d. B). As the UNSC is the UN body that relates to conflicts of R2P concern and bears the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the UNSC constitutes the international community of investigation of this dissertation. Challenges to perceiving the UNSC as constituting an international community exist. The UNSC exists as a UN body, thus, constituted of sovereign member states. It must be reflected upon how the member states constituting the UNSC as well as being bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other additionally act upon domestic legislation and self-interest. I will return to this concern during the analysis and discussion.

Analysis

As previously described, the response of the international community is analysed from the policy tools available under the third pillar of the R2P. The analysis will reflect these policy tools why the analysis is divided into seven sections, each investigating the implementation of a particular policy tool in the context of the Ethiopian conflict. The sections are as follows: 1) Mediation and Political Dialogue, 2) Public Advocacy, 3) Criminal Investigations, Fact-Finding Missions, & Commissions of Inquiry, 4) Referral to the ICC, 5) Monitoring or Observer Missions, 6) UN Charter Chapter VII Authorised Use of Force, and 7) Sanctions. The theories of institutional liberalism and realism are included within each section to investigate the abilities and limitations of the international community to protect civil populations from mass atrocity crimes committed during the inter-state conflict.

Mediation and Political Dialogue

It is greatly emphasised that actions of the international community, to respond to the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, should prioritise non-coercive interventions from the international community (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:18; United Nations Secretary-General 2012:7; Bellamy 2015). The UN Charter chapters of VI and VIII provide for the diplomatic and non-coercive interventions of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means (United Nations 1945:8; United Nations Secretary-General 2012:7). Much attention has been given to mediation as a response to situations of conflicts why I will initiate the analysis by investigating how this diplomatic tool has been inaugurated in the context of Ethiopia (United Nations Secretary-General 2012:7; Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022).

Mediation as a diplomatic tool has been essential for the UN in various state conflicts at all stages, not solely as a preventive instrument. Instead, mediation constitutes a diplomatic tool to prevent conflicts from escalating into armed conflict, after the outbreak of violence, and during the implementation of peace agreements (United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs n.d.; Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland 2017). The UN describes mediation as: a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements (United Nations 2012:4). According to Keohane, communication within the international community promotes member states to adhere to group goals which emphasise the importance for the international community to engage in mediation and political dialogue with the Ethiopian government (Keohane 2012).

It is, from the theory of Keohane, argued that if the international community can engage in successful political dialogue with the Ethiopian government, adherence to the R2P would be promoted. This theoretical notion is supported by previous research on mediation as a policy tool in inter-state conflicts. Patrick M. Regan & Aysegul Aydin (2006) conclude that diplomatic intervention (read: mediation and political dialogue) constitutes an effective means to positively alter the course of an inter-state conflict. It is specifically found that mediation can dramatically alter the duration of a civil war. Patrick M. Regan & Allan C. Stam (2000) conclude how mediation as a policy tool can reduce the anticipated duration of a civil war under some conditions. These investigations support Keohane's theoretical argument that communication within the international community constitutes a component of great matter (Keohane 2012).

The international community has not been able to create grounds for mediation with the parties of the Ethiopian conflict. Here, I argue that it is essential to refer to the consent that constitutes the essence of mediation. Since the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed communicated great disapproval of the international community's possible interference in the conflict (Ahmed 2020). Ahmed encouraged the international community to respect state sovereignty which was displayed in the governmental campaign of #HandsOffEthiopia. A campaign emphasising the importance of national solutions to the conflict (Ahmed 2020; The Ethiopian Herald 2021; Fisher 2022). The disapproval of international intervention was, additionally, emphasised by the expulsion of seven UN officials from Ethiopia based on the accusation of their meddling in internal affairs (Endeshaw 2021). One of the expelled UN officials was working for the OHCHR who, at the time, was conducting a joint investigation with the EHRC on the human rights violations committed by all parties during the war (ibid.). The Secretary-General António Guterres denounced the expulsion while simultaneously accusing the Ethiopian government of breaching international law (United Nations 2021C). The expulsion, notably, challenged the possibility of political dialogue and mediation between the UN and the Ethiopian government. Thus, it becomes evident that challenges with mediating and political dialogue exist due to the Ethiopian government's disapproval of international meddling in the conflict. It is, questionable, why the Ethiopian government disapproves of cooperation as the policy tool of mediation and political dialogue can positively affect the duration of the civil war and adherence to the R2P. These challenges relate to host-state consent and sovereignty. Consent from all included parties, including the implied state, is essential for the international community to utilise mediation and dialogue. The international community is not able to coercively enforce mediation as a policy tool due to the consensual component of the non-coercive policy tool.

The sovereignty of the Ethiopian state poses an additional challenge to mediation and political dialogue. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the national interest of sovereign states wins out over the international objective when a conflict between these two factors exists (Morgenthau 1967:509). One must argue that conflict between the Ethiopian sovereignty and the objective of the international community exists. The sovereign interest of non-meddling by the international community has, as depicted, been prioritised by the Ethiopian government rather than the international code of conduct to protect its civil population from mass atrocities and welcome support from the international community when protection is impossible. Including realist theory enables the argument, that the national interest and sovereignty of the Ethiopian state wins out over the international objective of adherence to the R2P. Ultimately, the consensual component of mediation and the Ethiopian state enforcing its sovereign rights and national interests have prevented the utilisation of non-coercive mediation and political dialogue between the international community and the Ethiopian government. From the theoretical perspective of realism, I argue that the international community's ability to intervene in the Ethiopian conflict through mediation can be considered fallible.

In August 2021, Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian president and African Union (AU) High Representative for the Horn of Africa, was by the AU appointed as a special envoy to mediate between the two conflicting parties, the national government of Ethiopia and the TPLF (Mutambo 2021; Berhe 2021). In the previous description of how the international community is operationalised within this dissertation, it was emphasised that the UNSC was the international community of investigation. I include AU's appointment of Obasanjo as special envoy to mediate as the UNSC supports this effort (United Nations 2021H). Including this regional mediation enables the argument that the Ethiopian government has engaged in communicative cooperation. According to Keohane, cooperation enhances the interest of most people why this cooperation could potentially serve an essential purpose (Keohane 2012). The theoretical perspective of Keohane, equally, enables the reflection that mediation between the regional body of the AU and the Ethiopian government could create substantial ground for the Ethiopian government to adhere to the R2P and halt the atrocity crimes committed towards the civil population in Ethiopia (Keohane 2012). Despite the possible positive significance of the mediation, it has been criticised for bringing little progress, being partial, not contributing with solutions, and by Obasanjo himself as slow but steady (Mutambo 2021; Berhe 2021; Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022; BBC News 2022A). The war is, additionally, still transpiring enabling the argument that the mediation has not resulted in the desired outcome.

Consequently, I argue that mediation and political dialogue continue a challenged non-coercive tool for the international community and regional bodies to implement in the Ethiopian civil war to halt atrocity crimes. The ability of the policy tool is especially limited by the Ethiopian government's lack of interest in cooperating with the international community.

From a realist perspective, it is argued that states operate in a self-help system. Within a self-help system, alliances can be formed, they will, however, bear the notion of temporality. Alliances are agreed upon only under circumstances where it is considered temporarily convenient and where considered the interest of the state. The state will ultimately act according to its self-interest and survival as it is considered beneficial to be selfish in a self-help world (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). The appointment of Obasanjo as a mediator has been praised by the international community, and the Ethiopian government has been appreciated for engaging in this cooperation (United Nations 2021H; United Nations 2021F). The Ethiopian government has, arguably, been appreciated for cooperating as the international community, as Keohane, perceives cooperation as a means to improve the conditions of human life and facilitate more valuable lives for the civil population in Ethiopia (Keohane 2012). From the realist perspective, I argue that it is the self-interest of the Ethiopian state to accept Obasanjo as a mediator to accommodate the international community to some level, thereby, minimising the possible consequences of noncompliance to the R2P. This argument is further supported as Robert O. Keohane reflects that cooperation persists when actors are visibly adjusting their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others (Keohane 1984:51). As argued, the Ethiopian government has vocalised disapproval of intervention by the international community. Thus, cooperating with the AU can be perceived as the Ethiopian government adjusting its original behaviour to meet the preference of the international community. The Ethiopian government has stated that mediation is only possible with Obasanjo as the facilitator. The involvement of the UN is greatly disapproved (Middle East Monitor 2022). Despite this, the international community appreciated the Ethiopian government for engaging in political dialogue and mediation with the regional body of the AU and Obasanjo (United Nations 2021H). Thus, it is the self-interest of the Ethiopian government to adjust its behaviour to accommodate the international community.

Throughout this section, it has become evident that the sovereignty and self-interest of the Ethiopian state greatly affect the international community's ability to implement the non-coercive tool of mediation and political dialogue. It has been depicted how the international community is dependent on the Ethiopian government's cooperation to utilise the policy tool of mediation and

political dialogue. In the situation of Ethiopia, mediation and political dialogue become a policy tool of complexity to implement for the international community as the Ethiopian government has not been willing to engage in cooperation besides with the AU.

Public Advocacy

Wight and Cowper-Smith argue that the necessity for alternative diplomatic measures arises when the situation of conflict has moved beyond preventive diplomacy (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022). The situation in Ethiopia has arguably escalated into a situation of conflict where preventive tools are no longer adequate means of intervention. Public advocacy is considered a non-coercive and non-preventive method under the third pillar of R2P, why the following section will investigate if the international community has been able to utilise this policy tool in the context of Ethiopia.

Keohane argues that the international community is constituted of four components: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. These components do not follow a hierarchical legal order, instead, Keohane perceives them as equally influential for the expectations and values existing within an international community. It is reflected that all components contain injunctions about behaviour, prescribing certain actions while proscribing others (Keohane 1984:59). From this theoretical perspective, the R2P prescribes a certain norm of behaviour that states ought to follow to be included in the international community. Norms are, according to Keohane, as essential as rules (ibid.). Thus, despite the R2P being a norm and not legalisation, the norm still enables the international community to explicate how the behaviour of the Ethiopian state diverges massively from what is accepted, thereby, engaging in public advocacy. The norm further enables the international government to address how the national government of Ethiopia should adhere to the concerns explicated by the international community despite no formal resolution being adopted as norms are equally influential as rules according to Keohane (Keohane 1984:59).

According to Ban Ki-moon, former Secretary-General of the UN, public advocacy constitutes: an important tool to focus attention on situations of concern (United Nations Secretary-General 2012:8). It is the inherited responsibility of the Secretary-General to voice situations of threats to the maintenance of peace and security, including mass atrocity crimes, to the UNSC (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect n.d.). It is emphasised how addressing situations of concern has previously resulted in bodies of the UN referring to the concept of R2P in their resolutions (United Nations Secretary-General 2012:8). In the case of Ethiopia, no resolutions have been adopted, the current Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and

the Under-Secretary-General, Rosemary DiCarlo, have, however, voiced concerns over the conflict in Ethiopia. These concerns were raised at the 8812th, the 8843rd, and the 8899th meeting of the UNSC concerning Peace and Security in Africa, respectively. (United Nations 2021G; United Nations 2021A; United Nations 2021B). The meetings were conducted over a span of four months in 2021, not one meeting related to the situation in Ethiopia has been conducted in 2022 by the UNSC. The statements of the SG and Under-SG have had the aim of informing the UNSC about the situation in Ethiopia, to raise concerns related to security threats while simultaneously calling upon action from the international community. At the 8812th meeting, DiCarlo voiced how failing to implement actions to end the violence would lead to disastrous consequences (United Nations 2021G). At the 8843rd meeting, Guterres described the situation as a humanitarian catastrophe unfolding before the eyes of the international community while concurrently condemning the atrocity acts committed by all active parts of the conflict (United Nations 2021A). Guterres conclusively urged the international community to pledge to act to advance the national cohesion and peace of Ethiopia. At the 8899th meeting, the last conducted on the matter of Ethiopia by the UNSC, DiCarlo described how the situation in Ethiopia had reached disastrous proportions, a concern she voiced at the first UNSC meeting on the situation in Ethiopia. At all three meetings, an Ethiopian representative was present and responded to the accusations (United Nations 2021B). Prior to the formal meetings on the situation in Ethiopia, two press statements on the matter had been issued by the UNSC in April 2021 and November 2021, respectively. The statements had aims alike the UNSC meetings, altering the escalating situation in Ethiopia (United Nations 2021D; United Nations 2021E).

It is by Ki-moon emphasised how states continuously inflicting civil populations mass atrocity crimes must be made aware of its fatal consequences (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:16). The Under-SG and SG have, arguably, made the Ethiopian representative aware about the fatal consequences of continuously inflicting the Ethiopian civil population mass atrocity crimes. The Under-SG and SG have mainly focused on the humanitarian consequences of continuously inflicting the civil population mass atrocity crimes. I argue that focus should rather be upon which consequences it will have on the Ethiopian government's ability to engage in the international community in order to affect state behaviour. It is evident that the SG and under-SG have lived up to the inherited responsibility of informing the UNSC on the situation in Ethiopia by communicating grave concerns at the conducted meetings. Voicing the concerns of the Ethiopian conflict and addressing such to the international community, of which Ethiopia exists as an integral part, can be perceived as public advocacy and diplomatic criticism (Pattison 2015). According to

research by James Pattison (2015), diplomatic criticism is considered a plausible and preferred alternative to different diplomatic methods of addressing mass atrocity crimes while simultaneously being a preferred alternative method to doing nothing. It is, essentially, argued that the international community must engage in diplomatic criticism when states do not protect their civil populations from mass atrocities (ibid.). Thus, engaging in diplomatic criticism entails criticising the behaviour of the Ethiopian state as contravening the internationally accepted norm of R2P. Diplomatic criticism enables the naming-and-shaming of states breaching international codes of behaviour, for instance, the R2P. A representative of the Ethiopian government was invited to participate and respond to the concerns and allegations of mass atrocity crimes presented at the meetings on Peace and Security in Africa. Raising concerns about the situation in Ethiopia, with specific emphasis on the condemnation of atrocity crimes performed by all active parties, to the Ethiopian representative, arguably, constitutes a means of diplomatic naming-and-shaming. Ultimately, by raising concerns about the situation in Ethiopia while condemning the acts of all active parties, the SG and Under-SG invoke the non-coercive method of public advocacy and public criticism.

However, I argue that diplomatic criticism and public advocacy have, ultimately, not brought other actions than awareness raising. There still exists a notable discrepancy between the concerns raised at the meetings and the actions of the international community. This reflects Ki-moon's explicit description of how there exist a great number of cases in which the member states of the UNSC have not matched the public advocacy of the SG resulting in a lack of response to warnings (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:15f). According to Ki-moon: Talk is not an end in itself, and there should be no hesitation to seek authorisation for more robust measures if quiet diplomacy is being used as a delaying tactic when an earlier and more direct response could save lives and restore order (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:24f).

Criminal Investigations, Fact-Finding Missions, & Commissions of Inquiry

The following section will analyse the policy tool of establishing criminal investigation, fact-finding missions, and commissions of inquiry. This policy tool can be considered a more robust and direct measure than public advocacy, thus possibly saving lives and restoring order (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:24f).

Within the UN Charter, under article 34, the UNSC is issued power to: investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuation of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the

maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations 1945:8). Commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions can be mandated by the different bodies of the UN. Ultimately, to promote accountability and counter impunity (United Nations Human Rights Council 2022A). Mandating commissions and missions are increasingly implemented to respond to situations where international humanitarian law and international human rights law is violated (ibid.). In the case of Ethiopia, no fact-finding mission has been inaugurated by the UNSC. However, it has been initiated by the HRC and OHCHR. I will include the fact-finding mission in Ethiopia established by the HRC why the following section will investigate how it has been possible to create grounds for this investigative mission in Ethiopia.

On the 17th of December 2021, the HRC adopted the S-33/1 Resolution on the situation of human rights in Ethiopia (further: Resolution). Within this resolution, it was decided to establish an International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (further: Commission) (United Nations Human Rights Council 2021A). The Commission's mandate is to impartially investigate violations of international human rights law, humanitarian law, and international refugee law in Ethiopia committed since the 3rd of November 2020 (United Nations Human Rights Council 2021A). Including the Commission enables an investigation of how the international community of the UN has implemented a non-coercive method under the R2P despite it not being by the UNSC. Prior to exploring the Commission, it is of interest to question why this Commission was established by the HRC and not the UNSC.

Five member states of the UNSC are granted special status due to their essential contribution to the establishment of the Charter. Each permanent member possesses veto powers enabling vetoing against resolutions, arguably providing the permanent member states with powerful capacities (Callahan 2022; The Institute of International and European Affairs 2022). According to John Mearsheimer, the international community, rather than being an equal society, reflects the unequal power dynamics existing between member states. Institutions are perceived as reflecting these power dynamics present prior to the formation of institutions and the self-interest of states (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). The two permanent members of the UNSC, China and Russia, have displayed dissatisfaction with international interference and prefer less involvement on the issue of the Ethiopian civil war (Security Council Report 2021). Due to their vetoing powers, their disapproval becomes of significance. Adopting a resolution would formally present the opinion of the UNSC and would, arguably, challenge the Ethiopian state's sovereignty, ability to act according to self-interest, limit its abilities within the international community, and enable the international community to invoke means of the R2P (United Nations Security Council 2022A). Adopting

resolutions invoking the R2P and enabling intervention illuminates how the international community can violate the rights of sovereign states (Wight & Cowper-Smith). Self-interest and respect for sovereignty constitute why China and Russia are anticipated to veto a resolution invoking R2P in an Ethiopian context, thus preventing the establishment of an investigative mission under the UNSC mandate (Security Council Report 2021; Sany & Sheehy 2022; Harter 2022). (ibid.).

Contrary, the HRC consists of 47 members whereas no member state possesses veto powers. Resolutions can be adopted in consensus, by vote, or be rejected (The International Service for Human Rights 2020; United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations 2020). HRC's resolution on the situation in Ethiopia was adopted by a recorded vote of 21 to 15, with 11 abstentions. Notably, the Russian Federation and China voted against the adoption of the resolution (United Nations Human Rights Council 2021A). I argue that this constitutes a reason underlying the establishment of a commission investigating the situation in Ethiopia under the HRC rather than the UNSC. Establishing a commission investigating violations of human rights was simply not possible under UNSC due to the veto powers of China and Russia, hence, the unequal power dynamics in the UNSC. The UNSC not adopting resolutions concerning the Ethiopian conflict reflect the power dynamics within the international community. Thus, the absence of adopting resolutions can be perceived as the interest of the most powerful states within the international community, rather than all member states. Including Mearsheimer's reflection on international institutions entails insight into how the most powerful states create and shape institutions (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). In this case, it enables the argument that China and Russia have no self-interest in adopting a resolution invoking R2P measures to halt the mass atrocities committed in Ethiopia (ibid.). This depicts how the international response to cases of R2P violations depends on the powerful states' self-interest in invoking coercive and non-coercive means of intervention. This supports the argument, that self-interest within the international community do prevail, consequently resulting in the hindrance of protecting the civil population of Ethiopia under the R2P. This further reflects how the self-interest of member states is present within the international community and influences the abilities of UN bodies differently.

The veto powers of Russia and China do, however, not necessarily constitute the sole reason for investigating the deteriorated situation by the HRC. An additional reason underlying the establishment of the commission under the HRC can be due to a joint statement by 40 UN member states raising concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in Ethiopia. Within the resolution, the countries express deep concern about the humanitarian and security situation

in Tigray and urge all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect all civilians (United Nations Human Rights Council 2021B).

According to Keohane, national states desire to avoid negative evaluation and retaliation by the surrounding international community why states often comply with international rules rather than breaking them (Keohane 1984:98f). Hence, selfish national states have an interest in complying with the set of rules existing within the international community due to the possible negative response from the international community and the fear of being punished (Keohane 1984:103). It should be noted that the Ethiopian government has not complied with the international norm of the R2P, hence proving issues with the theory of Keohane. It is emphasised that states *often* comply with international rules, why this non-compliance to the R2P should be perceived as the exception and not the rule according to the theory of Keohane. Establishing a commission to investigate the human rights violations committed in Ethiopia can be perceived as a negative response from the international community due to the Ethiopian government not complying with the international norm of the R2P. By mandating a commission to investigate the violations committed during the war, it is evident that the actions committed by the Ethiopian government and other active parties are negatively evaluated by the majority of states in the HRC. Ultimately, the case of the Ethiopian civil war constitutes an argument for challenging Keohane's perspective that states prioritise adhering to international rules caused by fear of punishment and retaliation. However, it should not be disowned completely. The Ethiopian government allowed the investigation of the HRC to transpire on the sovereign ground of Ethiopia (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022A). This can be perceived as a means for the Ethiopian government to adhere to the international resolution adopted by the HRC, supporting the argument that states often comply with international rules rather than breaking them. Adhering to the resolution could, and granting access to the Commission, ultimately, benefit the self-interest of the Ethiopian state. In this case, the self-interest being minimising the possibility of the international community negatively evaluating the Ethiopian government. Hence, the argument of Keohane becomes relevant. Despite the Ethiopian government granting the Commission access to the country, the members of the Commission were restricted from visiting war-afflicted areas, why the research was conducted remotely from Addis Ababa (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B:3). The self-interest of the Ethiopian government does become of significance to include as the Ethiopian government adhered to the mandate of the Commission to investigate the human rights violations committed during the war, however, restricting the investigation based on self-interest.

Consequently, the non-coercive policy tool of establishing a fact-finding mission has been utilised. The mission was, however, affected by the sovereign rights and self-interest of the Ethiopian state. As this dissertation investigates the international community of the UNSC, it must be emphasised that the mission was not enabled by the UNSC, and it did not investigate the R2P violations. From the fact-finding mission it was, however, documented how crimes amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed which constitute crimes under the R2P. According to Ki-moon, investigations of violating acts should not be considered a substitute for timely and decisive protective actions to save lives why the next section will investigate the implementation of what Ki-moon considers timely and decisive matters in the context of Ethiopia (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:23).

Referral to the International Criminal Court

A timely and decisive action under the third pillar could be a referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:23). The jurisdiction of the ICC is in accordance with the Rome Statute, enabling the investigation and judgement of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Referral to the ICC of prominent individuals with the responsibility of performing atrocity crimes is possible as sovereignty does not bestow impunity (*ibid.*).

The Ethiopian situation has not yet been referred to the ICC (International Criminal Court n.d. A). I argue that the possibility exists as all parties have, as earlier depicted, violated the R2P and multiple international laws. This possibility is additionally supported as the mandate of the Commission is to: identify those responsible [...] in support of ongoing and future accountability efforts (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B:4). The mission of the Commission is not a criminal investigation, it, however, provides the international community with comprehensive information on both the performed atrocity crimes and more importantly the accountable parties, enabling referral to the ICC. The Commission published a report in September 2022 on the findings from the fact-finding mission in Ethiopia. This report supports earlier findings on atrocity crimes committed in Ethiopia by all active parties. It is documented that the ENDF and TPLF have violated international law by committing crimes amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that members of the ENDF have committed the following war crimes: violence to life and person, in particular murder; outrages on human dignity, in particular humiliating or degrading treatment; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects; pillage;

rape; sexual slavery; sexual violence; and intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The TPLF committed war crimes of same character with exception of sexual slavery and starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B:13f). Thus, it is concluded that the de facto blockade of humanitarian assistance to the northern regions was a warfare method of the Ethiopian government. It is, additionally, documented that the commission has reasonable grounds to believe that members of the ENDF have committed the following crimes against humanity: extrajudicial killings, rapes, and sexual violence as part of a widespread attack directed against the civilian population of Tigray. The Commission has additional grounds to believe that:

[...] the Federal Government has committed the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, and rape and sexual violence. Moreover, the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the Federal Government and allied regional State governments have committed and continue to commit the crimes against humanity of persecution on ethnic grounds and other inhumane acts intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health based on their ongoing denial and obstruction of humanitarian assistance to Tigray (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia 2022B:14).

The report supporting previous findings, arguably, constitutes a valid reasoning for referring the accountable individuals from the ENDF and TPLF to the ICC. Despite having valid grounds for enabling such a referral, I argue, that challenges prevail. I base this argument on the fact that atrocity crimes and accountable parties have been documented by trusted organisations prior to the report by the Commission, yet without causing a referral to the ICC. Challenges prevail as it must be reflected upon if a referral is a valuable policy tool for the international community to utilise. Referral might be considered a challenge as it would, arguably, be perceived as threatening the Ethiopian government. It is, continuously, emphasised by the international community how political dialogue constitutes a preferred method of halting atrocities, a policy tool currently challenged due to the lack of cooperation from the Ethiopian government. Referring the accountable parties to the ICC, including governmental forces, could challenge the minimum cooperation currently present. According to Keohane, genuine cooperation improves the rewards of both players, in this case, the players being the international community and the Ethiopian government (Keohane 1989A). Arguably, the possibility of achieving genuine cooperation could be jeopardised if the international community refers the accountable parties to the ICC. The international community would, thus, minimise the possibility of being rewarded as desired.

The international community, as Keohane, considers cooperation as a means to improve the conditions of human life and facilitate more valuable lives for the civil population in Ethiopia. Thus, referring accountable parties to the ICC could bring consequences for the improvement of human conditions in Ethiopia (Keohane 2012). Without referring accountable parties to the ICC, perpetrators of international law and norms are, however, not held accountable. Referring the accountable parties, specifically the governmental forces, thus, constitute a policy tool of complexity as it must be considered what is most valuable for the international community: Cooperating with the Ethiopian government or holding perpetrators accountable.

On the 2nd of March, the Office of the Prosecutor, an independent organ of the ICC, received referrals from 39 countries desiring a thorough investigation of the situation in Ukraine (International Criminal Court 2022). Less than two weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the international community was united by the notion that such action would require criminal investigations and referral to the ICC. The war in Ethiopia has lasted for nearly two years, and no referrals have been submitted. In the case of Ukraine, the referrals were submitted by 39 member states of the Rome Statute, possible under Article 14 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court 2011:9). Referral to the ICC concerning the situation in Ethiopia is, however, not possible by member states of the international community as Ethiopia has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and does not constitute a State Party to the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court n.d. C; International Criminal Court n.d. B). The ICC is, thus, solely able to prosecute and exercise its jurisdiction based on a referral from the UNSC (International Criminal Court n.d. C). The unequal power dynamics and veto powers of the permanent states could imply that referral to the ICC would be challenging as the powerful states of Russia and China have previously displayed disapproval of international intervention in Ethiopia. The UNSC's ability to refer situations of concern to the ICC has according to Ramsden and Hamilton (2017) been continuously challenged by the misuse of veto powers. Thus, the misuse of veto powers does not solely constitute a challenge within the Ethiopian conflict. Including the realist perspective enables the argument that referral to the ICC by the international community is challenged due to unequal power balances. This argument has been posed multiple times in the analysis, yet it is, equally, emphasised in relation to this matter as it constitutes a reasonable challenge for referring the situation of Ethiopia to the ICC. I will debate the impact of the architecture of the international community within the discussion.

Lastly, I argue that it is of the essence to critically reflect upon the possibilities of the ICC. Realists would invoke the argument that the international society is an anarchic system. The anarchic system is understood as an ordering principle that prescribes the central authority to the sovereign states. No government of government exists; hence no bodies of central authority above the national states exist (Mearsheimer 199-1995). The ICC as a judicial institution does not possess an enforcement body, the institution relies on countries to support the judgements of the Court: particularly for making arrests, transferring arrested persons to the ICC detention centre in The Hague, freezing suspects' assets, and enforcing sentences (International Criminal Court n.d. C). Referring and sentencing accountable parties in Ethiopia would enable the international community to limit the possibilities of the Ethiopian government by freezing international assets. Sentencing accountable individuals of the national government could, subsequently, limit the international community's ability and desire to continuously cooperate with the government. Despite this, it can be a challenging perspective within Ethiopia as one accountable party for performing atrocity crimes is the national government. I consider it highly unlikely that the Ethiopian government will arrest individuals from its governmental party or transfer accountable individuals to detention centres in Hague. It might be a possibility to cooperate with the government in relation to holding members of the TPLF accountable. I, however, argue that the ICC relying on the Ethiopian state to arrest the accountable individuals bears the notion of utopianism. Keohane subscribes to not equalising effectiveness with institutionalisation. As an example, Keohane emphasises how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a highly institutionalised system yet with modest significance. It is argued that the role of the ICJ is to articulate conventions yet states frequently fail to implement its decision (Keohane 1989B). I utilise this conviction of Keohane to argue that there exist grounds to question the effectiveness of the ICC, thus, complicating the implementation of the court's decisions. It is, ultimately, argued that in the case of Ethiopia, the ICC does not possess central authority, rather that authority bestows the sovereign state of Ethiopia. The ICC exist as an institution determining the accountable parties, but it does not have the authority or capacity to enter the sovereign territory of Ethiopia to apprehend accountable individuals.

Consequently, the international community is able to refer the situation in Ethiopia to the ICC as reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed by all active parties of the war. The situation has, however, not been referred to the ICC. Various reasons underly the lack of referral with specific focus on the possibility of further challenging cooperation and the unequal power balances within the international community.

Monitoring or Observer Missions

It is within the mandate of the UNSC to authorise United Nations-led peacekeeping operations to fulfil the UNSC's responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations constitutes a measure that can be utilised to oblige and achieve this aim of work (United Nations 2008). As this specific policy tool has not been implemented in Ethiopia, the following section will investigate the ability and possibility of employing such a mission into an Ethiopian context.

Peacekeeping operations have since 1948 been deployed in more than 60 peacekeeping missions, why it constitutes one of the most visible symbols of the UN's role in international peace and security (Thakur 2001). Thakur explicates how multiple peacekeeping missions have had critical roles in the management and termination of conflict in Africa, Asia, Central America, and Europe (ibid.). Each conflict has its specific nature, why missions of peacekeeping must adhere to its surroundings. It is within the mandate of the UNSC to establish which operations a peacekeeping mission is required to perform, this dependent on the situation of conflict. Peacekeeping operations are usually deployed to support situations where parties of a conflict have committed to a peace agreement or during the implementation of a cease-fire (ibid.). Within the Ethiopian context, a peacekeeping mission could have been appointed to oversee and assist in the implementation of the humanitarian ceasefire. After five months of humanitarian truce, armed fighting, unfortunately, erupted in the northern parts of Ethiopia in August 2022. It causes one to wonder if a deployed peacekeeping operation to oversee and assist implementation of the humanitarian truce could have enhanced the duration of the truce, possibly enabling the ceasefire to bring stable political order in Ethiopia. In speculations as such, one must be aware of the complexity of deploying peacekeeping missions. Multiple examples of beneficial and challenging operations of peacekeeping exist.

One factor constituting the complexity is state sovereignty. State sovereignty can cause varying challenges. Research by Akpan and Olisah (2019) depicts how peacekeeping operations in Africa are challenged and enlist the self-interest of sovereign states within the international community as posing an influential challenge. According to the research, member states of the international community tend to reflect upon their national interest and consider how deploying a peacekeeping operation can affect their national interest, both directly and indirectly, before adopting resolutions on situations of concern. Consequently, member states tend to deal with situations of great security concern as a normal game of international politics (ibid.). Sovereignty poses an additional challenge

for peacekeeping missions as mandating peacekeeping operations requires host state consent. Deploying a peacekeeping operation would be dependent on achieving consent from the Ethiopian government. I must, once again, refer to the Ethiopian government's strategy of invoking its sovereign rights and disapproval of international meddling in the war. According to Latif and Khan (2010), in establishing the mandate for intervention, state sovereignty plays an essential role. The research shows how host state consent to peacekeeping operations comprises an issue of national sovereignty versus human security. Sovereignty becomes of relevance as host state consent for peacekeeping operations provides the legal basis for such operations, and is essential for the international community to prevent violating Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945:3; Tsagourias 2006):

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations 1945:3).

According to Wight and Cowper-Smith, the Ethiopian government has refused to accept the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission. Thus, it would not be possible to deploy a peacekeeping mission based on host-state consent (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022). Including theory on realism once again allows the argument that the sovereign state of Ethiopia prevails as the central authority in the international community. Even if the sovereign state of Ethiopia was to give its consent, it is not guaranteed that the peacekeeping mission would be able to enter the territory seized by the TPLF as the Ethiopian government does not possess authority in that area. Entering Tigray and the war afflicted areas of Amhara and Afar has been a constant challenge during the war, with both parties accusing each other of enforcing the humanitarian blockade. Access has been limited and humanitarian assistance as well as NGOs have experienced difficulties in accessing war-affected areas. In 2021, the organisations of Médecins Sans Frontières and the Norwegian Refugee Council were demanded to suspend their missions in Ethiopia comprising yet another demonstration of state sovereignty (Médecins Sans Frontières 2021B; Norwegian Refugee Council 2021). I take these acts into account to portray how the Ethiopian government has enacted critically towards international non-governmental intervention, an intervention that is considered neutral and impartial. It supports the argument that achieving host state consent to deploy peacekeeping operations in war-afflicted areas is considered improbable within an Ethiopian context.

A last reflection concerning utilising this policy tool relates to the aftermath of deploying a peacekeeping mission. According to Akpan and Olisah, challenges for keeping peace when the deployment of a peacekeeping mission is terminated exist. According to the research, most UN peacekeeping missions are incapable of implementing a successfully transit to the host government without the likelihood of a relapse to conflict. Relapse into conflict often relates to a lack of security and rule of law in the host country (Akpan & Olisah 2019). Thus, it must be reflected if the Ethiopian country possesses the needed security and rule of law for a continuation of peace after the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. It has been, continuously, documented how crimes amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing have been committed in the war-afflicted areas by all active parties. Thus, it is argued that these areas do not currently possess the required security and rule of law to prevent relapse into conflict if peace was restored through a peacekeeping mission. Therefore, it must be considered for how long a peacekeeping mission ought to be deployed to restore rule of law and security in war-afflicted areas before utilising this policy tool. The complexity of deploying a peacekeeping mission, thus, relates to sovereignty, host-state consent, and reflections concerning the likelihood of relapse to conflict.

UN Charter Chapter VII Authorised Use of Force

Deploying a peacekeeping mission does not constitute the sole peace activity for the UN to implement, a wide spectrum of activities exists, including peace enforcement. Peace enforcement involves a range of coercive measures, including military force (United Nations 2008:18). Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the international community to establish coercive action in situations where the UNSC has determined the existence of a threat to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (ibid.; United Nations 1945:9-11). I will use the following section to investigate the deployment of military force within an Ethiopian context. What is evident, is that the coercive method of military intervention has not been implemented in the case of Ethiopia. Therefore, the following section will investigate the nature of a military intervention, and how it could affect the situation in Ethiopia.

It is of importance to recognise that the R2P exists within an international community that, according to its Charter, must respect the national sovereignty of states. When adopting resolutions enabling coercive intervention, the sovereignty of a state is not considered the factor of most importance. Libya constitutes an example of such and remains controversial for the international community and the ability to invoke future interventions of the R2P. In response to Muhammad

Gaddafi's military response to the civil population uprising in 2011, the UNSC authorised the use of force to protect the civil population by invoking the R2P in the adopted resolution 1973. Within the resolution the civil population was positioned as requiring protection, thus authorising all necessary measures, including military force under the UN Charter Chapter VII (United Nations Security Council 2011). Subsequent the adoption of the resolution, airstrikes toward military targets in Libya were conducted by a NATO-led alliance (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2021). According to Thakur, the intervention in Libya has depicted the tensions that international coercive intervention. He further argues that: post-Gaddafi violence, killings, and anarchy have retroactively delegitimised the NATO intervention under Resolution 1973 (Thakur 2019:151).

Mearsheimer argues that power and surviving as a sovereign state constitute the main interests of states (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). From this realist perspective, disowning the sovereignty of a state could, arguably, entail an escalation of war as a state government will defend its sovereignty from external attacks. The situation in Libya constitutes an example of this. States experiencing threats to their sovereignty from the international community will, according to the realist theory, act with aim of surviving as a sovereign state, possibly resulting in an escalation of the war to protect and defend the sovereign borders and rights. Hence, the international community interfering in the war without the consent of the Ethiopian government could cause greater damage than good. Especially, if the government was to protect its sovereignty through a military response, which I argue constitutes a highly possible response from the Ethiopian government. Throughout the analysis, it has been depicted how international interference within the war has been met with severe critical disapproval from the Ethiopian government constituting the argument that military intervention would not be met with methods of non-coercive nature. Consequently, the war could escalate and in the worst case be prolonged. This outcome is supported by previous research concluding how military intervention in inter-state conflicts increases the duration of a war (Mason & Mitchell 2016:95,102; Mason & Fett 1996; Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000; Cunningham 2006). Some evidence in the literature suggests that supporting rebel forces can decrease the duration of a war, a common understanding that external intervention will result in increased duration of a war, however, prevails (Regan & Aydin 2006). Wight and Cowper-Smith document how military intervention has the greatest potential, rather than methods of diplomacy, to halt atrocities in real-time, however, bringing the consequences of major blowback and the exacerbation of human suffering (Wight and Cowper-Smith 2022). Fabrice Weissman supports this notion, elaborating that deploying troops into war-afflicted areas does not equal the protection of civilians. Weismann

develops this argument from previous cases of military intervention where it is evident that the civil population had losses during a coercive intervention (Weissman 2010). Hence, the international community must consider the current and long-term consequences and casualties of the civil war in Ethiopia before utilising military intervention. The international community must reflect upon if the importance of halting atrocity crimes immediately exacerbates the human suffering it might entail in the long term.

Weismann further depicts how previous acts of military intervention have entailed the international community to support one party in the war and show tolerance towards the war crimes committed by this party (Weismann 2010). If the international community was to intervene in Ethiopia, it raises the question of which side ought to be supported. Both parties of the conflict are documented performers of mass atrocity crimes towards the Ethiopian civil population. Achieving peace in Ethiopia by supporting either side would, thus, come with the consequence of tolerating the war crimes committed during the war performed by either the ENDF or the TPLF. If the international community was to support the national government to restore peace and security in Ethiopia, it would entail the tolerance of executions, sexual violence, unarbitrary abductions, and ethnic cleansing committed by the ENDF. I argue that it would be of great difficulty to establish consensus within the international community to support the Ethiopian government during a military intervention. However, the other party to support is the TPLF, a categorised terror organisation by the Ethiopian government and violators of human rights and international humanitarian law (Omondi 2021). I argue that it would be equally challenging to support a categorised terror organisation during a military intervention. Thus, military intervention, based on supporting one party of the conflict and prescribing the others as the perpetrators, constitutes a great challenge for the international community to utilise this policy tool of the R2P.

Additional methods of military intervention are possible. Occupation and partial occupation, buffer zones, and protection of areas with a high density of vulnerable populations are presented as means of military intervention. Complete occupation enables the entire area of conflict to be secured, establishing an environment for the civil populations to receive humanitarian assistance. Partial occupation enables the establishment of secure zones to aid the civil population humanitarian assistance. In buffer zones, military personnel are deployed to prevent the perpetrators to attack victims. Protection of areas with a high density of vulnerable populations entails units being deployed around population concentrations that are likely to be targeted by perpetrators (Sewall, Raymond & Kardos 2010). These methods of military intervention present

the international community with alternative strategies to intervene militarily. Within the Ethiopian conflict, the international community could, by adopting one of these methods, avoid supporting perpetrators of R2P violations while simultaneously accessing, supporting, and protecting the civil population currently exposed to and victims of mass atrocity crimes. Utilising the methods of military intervention, however, still constitute means of invasion, imposing on the sovereign rights of the Ethiopian state. It is, additionally, essential to reflect that the military units would be deployed to utilise military violence to protect the Ethiopian civil population. Weismann argues that this entails the creation of a new political order through violence and why military deployment should not be a method of intervention by the international community (Weissman 2010). Hence, supporting the previous argument that military intervention constitutes a complex method for the international community to intervene in situations of conflict. The ability of the international community to interfere in the Ethiopian war is not solely restrained by the sovereign rights and powers of the Ethiopian government, it is additionally restrained by the results of previous military interventions and research reflecting how coercive intervention can prolong the war and cause civil victimisation.

My last reflection concerning military intervention relates to Mearsheimer's theoretical notion of unequal power dynamics existing within the international community as previously presented in the analysis (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). Authorising the international community to invoke its right to military intervention in situations of great concern to peace and security is dependent on the five permanent member states of the UNSC (Wight and Cowper-Smith 2022; Gunatilleke 2016). Due to the vetoing powers of the five permanent members, the authorisation of military intervention cannot be deployed in situations where a permanent member state utilises its veto powers. Within the context of Ethiopia, I must, once again, refer to China and Russia's disapproval of international intervention in the conflict. Since Libya, a resolution that was adopted without any member states opposing, it is argued that China and Russia will hesitate to allow the adoption of resolutions allowing the implementation of all necessary means in order to protect the sovereignty of states. Thus, sovereignty, the self-interest of the permanent member states of the UNSC, the risk of prolonging the war, and previous cases of military intervention to protect civil populations must be taken into account when considering the possibilities of the international community to interfere by coercive military means.

Sanctions

The last means of coercive intervention to include in this investigation is sanctioning. Sanctions aim at influencing governments and individuals to alter their behavioural patterns (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.). As the conflict in Ethiopia is considered a threat to international peace and security, the UNSC and its member states can impose sanctions on the accountable parties, might it be economic, bilateral, or targeted sanctions.

The effectiveness of economic sanctions is highly contested why imposing such should be critically reflected upon before utilised by the international community. Previous research documents how economically sanctioning a country can bring devastating economic consequences, economic consequences amounting to the war itself (Pattison 2015). Research depicts how intervening through economic sanctions can prolong the duration of civil wars (Regan & Aydin 2006). Imposing bilateral sanctions upon the government of Ethiopia could restrict trade and the export, supply, and delivery of military items (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022; Department for International Trade & Export Control Joint Unit 2021). Targeted sanctions could have aimed at restricting the possibilities of specific individuals, individuals perceived as accountable for performing atrocity crimes committed towards the Ethiopian civil population, or supporters of accountable individuals. Such a strategy of targeted sanctioning aims at restricting the elite while imposing minimal hardship on the civil population (Drezner 2011). Imposing sanctions on accountable individuals has been accepted as a strategy of good practice by the UN (ibid.). Including the international community's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine enables the depiction of how both bilateral and targeted sanctions can be imposed as a response to threats of international peace and security. Sanctions with the aim of affecting the behavioural patterns of the Russian Federation. International sanctions have been imposed on the trade of Russian oil and gas, the import of Russian luxury products and gold, while simultaneously targeting prominent individuals and supporters of the Russian regime (BBC News 2022B). The international response to the Russian invasion depicts how the international community is able to intervene through sanctions when countries and regimes do not act accordingly to international norms, principles, and agreements. From the theory of institutional liberalism, sanctioning can be perceived as a means to constrain the activity of states not prescribing to the existing set of rules (Keohane 1989A).

Sanctions of either kind have, despite possible, not been imposed in the Ethiopian conflict by the international community. Targeted sanctions have, however, been imposed by the United States. On September 17th, 2021, President Biden imposed sanctions on: Certain Persons With Respect

to the Humanitarian and Human Rights Crisis in Ethiopia (The Executive Office of the President 2021). What is emphasised is the sole targeting of specific individuals and not the civil population of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the greater Horn of Africa (HoA) (U.S Department of the Treasury 2021). It is stressed that the sanctioning of specific individuals does not limit the Ethiopian civil population and the humanitarian support to war-afflicted areas (ibid.). Abiy did not welcome the targeted sanctions positively. In an open letter directed to President Biden, Ahmed addressed how the situation in the Northern regions of Ethiopia is misinterpreted and expresses his discontent over the lack of ability to perceive the conflict as a war on terror (Ahmed 2021; Gavin 2021). According to Keohane, governments: protecting the autonomy of their decision-making processes from outside penetration, will have more difficulty participating in international regimes (Keohane 1982). From the theoretical perspective of Keohane, I argue that the Ethiopian state emphasising its autonomous rights constitutes a challenge for the state to participate in the international community. The sanctions of the U.S. constitute an example despite not being imposed by the greater international community of the UNSC or additional member states. I include the sanctions imposed by the US to depict how targeting specific accountable individuals can pose a legitimate coercive intervention into the war in Ethiopia. A coercive means that does not aim at the civil population of Ethiopia, but instead the individuals accountable for performing atrocity crimes. However, according to Wight & Cowper Smith, the US's sanctioning of specific individuals has not reduced the genocidal policies against individuals of Tigrayan heritage (Wight & Cowper-Smith 2022). This is supported by Venda Felbab-Brown arguing that no high hopes of the sanctions dissuading the warring parties from persisting in their dangerous course should exist (Felbab-Brown 2021). These arguments could arguably constitute valuable reasoning for the international community not intervening in the Ethiopian civil war through sanctioning specific individuals.

The absence of sanctions could, equally, be considered as depicting the power distribution within the international community. It is by Felbab-Brown emphasised that China and the Russian Federation might undercut sanctions of the UN, once again enabling the realist argument of self-interest and unequal power balances existing within the international community and, ultimately, affecting the international community's ability to intervene in the Ethiopian conflict. It enables the argument, that imposing sanctions on specific accountable individuals was solely possible by the US as a member state; imposing sanctions by the international community would not have been possible due to resistance from the two permanent member states of China and Russia. Since 2011 China and Russia have vetoed resolutions invoking the R2P a collective number of 27 times supporting the argument that a valid reason for believing the Russian Federation and China would

undercut sanctions within the Ethiopian conflict (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2022B; United Nations Security Council 2022B). According to research by Jared Genser (2018), the most significant component for the international community's ability to engage in situations of conflict based on the R2P relies at the institutional structure of the UNSC, the veto powers of the five permanent member states. It is noted how the most conspicuous failures of the UNSC concerning not intervening in time, or with sufficient force, to protect the victims of genocide and crimes alike regard the misuse of veto powers by permanent member states (ibid.). The ability for utilising policy tools in the conflict of Ethiopia is, thus, affected by what the realist theory considers as unequal power distribution within the international community; the veto powers of the five permanent member states of the UNSC.

This section has depicted how various strategies for utilising sanctions exist. I argue that, if sanctions are to be utilised, sanctions must target prominent and accountable individuals, not the civil population. The civil population has been the victim of mass atrocity crimes why imposing sanctions affecting the civil population would be a tragedy. Sanctioning could, arguably, reflect how the international community condemns the mass atrocity crimes committed by all parties. It should, however, be reflected if sanctioning would result in haltering the mass atrocity crimes. Research argues that it would not.

Discussion

Throughout this section, the topics of the architecture of the international community, the civil population as the greatest victim of the war, and regional instability in the HoA will be discussed.

UNSC architecture and the potential of the R2P

My first topic of discussion relates to the architecture of the international community. Within the analysis, the architecture has been analysed as limiting the international community's ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P an abundant number of times. Within the analysis, it has been analysed and depicted how the international community's ability to coercively or non-coercively intervene in the Ethiopian conflict greatly depends on the power distribution within the international community and the self-interest of the five permanent states, especially China and Russia. Based on this reflection, I aspire to discuss the veto power of the five permanent member states and its effect on the ability to respond to the Ethiopian conflict, and conflicts of the same character, based on the R2P.

The vetoing powers of the five permanent member states prevail a topic frequently questioned concerning the institutional structure of the UNSC (Callahan 2022). Most recently, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyj, questioned Russia's ability to veto resolutions concerning Russian war crimes committed in Ukraine. Zelenskyj argued that the UNSC is incapable of holding Russia accountable due to the Russian state's veto powers (Theissen 2022). It is documented that the vetoing powers being utilised, or solely threatened to be utilised, have stalled resolutions invoking the R2P resulting in the continuation of mass atrocity crimes (Genser 2018). This reflection has, additionally, become evident throughout the analysis concerning China and Russia's disapproval of international intervention in the Ethiopian conflict, arguably, resulting in the continuation of mass atrocity crimes. As reflected in the analysis concerning the international community's ability to impose sanctions, the permanent member states of China and Russia have inaugurated their veto powers a collective number of 27 times since 2011. Hence, the two member states are the sole sources for obstructing the adoption of 27 resolutions attempting to maintain international peace and security. It is documented that veto powers are utilised to safeguard national interests, to sustain a principle of foreign policy, or to promote an issue of special concern of that particular state (Security Council Report 2020). Thus, the ability to protect civil populations against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity substantially reflects the interest of the permanent states. The vetoing powers of the permanent member states undermine the legitimacy of the UNSC and enable the shielding of perpetrators from being held accountable.

Jared Genser determines the veto powers as unacceptable (Genser 2018; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2022B).

According to research by Genser, the UNSC is able to successfully engage in situations of conflict based on the R2P when three conditions are fulfilled. The first condition is defined as: no government obstruction from the state where mass atrocity crimes are occurring, or, if government obstruction does occur, then P5 [the permanent five member states]-level interest exists that can overcome government obstruction (Genser 2018). Within the specific conflict transpiring in Ethiopia, governmental obstruction of international intervention has been documented. Based on the research by Genser, in order for the international community to engage in the Ethiopian conflict on the basis of the R2P, the interest of the five permanent member states must occur. It has been analysed and documented that China and Russia do not possess an interest in international intervention in the Ethiopian conflict, thus, complicating the ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P. Ultimately, the vetoing powers of the permanent states complicate the international community's ability to address and halt crucial violations of the UN Charter and international law (Thompson, Landgren & Romita 2022). The international community is, thus, prevented from referring perpetrators to the ICC, investigating violative actions, and condemning attacks due to the utilisation, or threats of utilisation, of veto powers (Thompson, Landgren & Romita 2022). In the case of Ethiopia, the veto powers of Russia and China have resulted in the international community merely symbolically protesting the mass atrocity crimes (International Crisis Group 2021). Engaging in the Ethiopian war on the basis of the R2P is a conflictual matter due to the vetoing powers prevailing within the international community.

I, consequently, discuss how the veto powers do not solely affect the ability of the international community to intervene in situations of conflict. I, additionally, debate that veto powers enable a questioning of the potential of the norm. The adoption of the R2P has according to Alex Bellamy caused the international community to utilise the norm as an institutionalised concept (Bellamy 2014:111). Within Bellamy's research, it is argued that the international community incorporates the norm into decision-making, debates, and responses to genocide and mass atrocities. The norm has initiated profound underlying changes to how the international community responds to mass atrocity crimes why it constitutes not merely a convenient vocabulary for powerful states to employ when deemed beneficial (ibid.). One must, nonetheless, simply discuss Bellamy's notion that the R2P has changed the international community. Since the adoption of the norm in 2005, the R2P has been referenced in 87 resolutions. In the majority of the resolutions, the international

community merely emphasises, reaffirms, recalls, or reiterates how states are responsible for protecting the civil population from mass atrocities (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2022A). Referencing the R2P in resolutions ensures that the accountable parties are informed about the international community's awareness of the conflict, it does not necessarily enable the international community to respond. By adopting resolutions emphasising, reaffirming, recalling, or reiterating how states are responsible for protecting the civil population, the international community does, as Bellamy argues, incorporate the norm into the international debate on peace and security. The norm is, thus, an influential component for the debate of the international community. Within the case of Ethiopia, no resolutions referring to the R2P have been adopted. Hence, it must be discussed if the R2P has initiated sufficient change within the international community to respond to situations of peace and security concern. It has by multiple organisations and bodies of the UN been documented how the Ethiopian civil population is exposed to atrocity crimes by all active parties of the conflict. Mass atrocity crimes that the R2P enables the international community to act upon. Despite this knowledge, no resolution to emphasise, reaffirm, recall, or reiterate how the Ethiopian government is responsible for protecting the civil population from mass atrocities has been adopted. I, therefore, stress the importance of discussing the sufficiency of the change within the international community documented by Bellamy.

Despite Bellamy's positive notion of the norm, challenges are, equally, addressed within his research. Repetitive failure to address situations of R2P concern or the norm's association with controversial practices could constrain the abilities of the norm (Bellamy 2014). I argue that the norm has previously been associated with failure to address situations of concern and situations of controversial practices, with specific attention to Syria and Libya (For Libya see p: 45; Genser 2018; Nuruzzaman 2013; Thakur 2019:151). The vetoing powers of China and Russia have been documented as preventing the implementation of sanctions or referral to the ICC within the Syrian conflict despite the Syrian regime's documented targeting of civilians and obstruction of humanitarian aid (Genser 2018). The international community failed to unite actions towards the Syrian regime to protect the civil population, mainly caused by the vetoing powers of Russia and China (ibid.). From the situation in Syria, it is possible and of relevance to draw parallels to the influence of the vetoing powers within the conflict in Ethiopia. The two conflicts share common features (read: government versus rebel forces). What is a specific similarity is the international response and ability to intervene. Drawing parallels enables the reflection that the norm has, prior to the Ethiopian conflict, been challenged by the vetoing powers. From this perspective, it is

deemed questionable if the international community will be able to unite fronts to respond to the mass atrocities in Ethiopia, mainly due to the vetoing powers of Russia and China, and the history of Syria will repeat itself. The international community must reflect on how the vetoing powers of Russia and China constituted a crucial hindrance to an international response more than 10 years ago and prevails as a current hindrance for international community to halt atrocity crimes in Ethiopia. I support how the international community is constituted by members critically reflecting on the consequences of international intervention. Coercive intervention in inter-state conflicts should not necessarily be a prioritised means of meddling. It is, arguably, important that the international community includes permanent member states that value and prioritise state sovereignty and protect state territory from international coercive intervention. The veto powers of the permanent member states, thus, prevent the international community from engaging exaggeratively in conflicts. Simultaneously, engaging in inter-state conflict should constitute an actual possibility in conflicts where the civil population is continuously exposed to mass atrocity crimes. Due to the veto powers of the five permanent member states, with a specific focus on China and Russia in the context of the Ethiopian conflict, the possibility of engaging in conflicts is challenged. Thus, challenges of the veto powers prevail. The possibility of responding sufficiently should, arguably, not be dependent on the self-interest of the five permanent member states rather the interest of altering mass atrocity crimes committed against the civil population. Providing member states who are critical of international intervention with veto powers creates an environment where the norm is prevented from achieving its full potential as intervention is solely an option if the permanent member states have a self-interest of intervention. The potential of the norm is, thus, dependent on the future actions of the permanent member states and the international community's ability to prevent the misuse of veto powers.

France, with the support of Mexico, and the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency Group have initiated two separate initiatives to prevent the permanent member states' vetoing powers from hindering future international involvement based on an R2P concern. The aim of each initiative is to make the five member states to refrain from utilising veto powers in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes on a larger scale, and mass atrocity crimes (Thompson, Landgren & Romita 2022). Agreeing on such an initiative would enable the constitution of a modified veto where the norm has better grounds for halting mass atrocity crimes. Currently, solely the permanent member states of France and The United Kingdom have supported both initiatives. When discussing the modification of veto powers, it must be reflected if veto powers protect state sovereignty. One must not automatically accept international intervention in worldwide conflicts

with R2P concerns without reflecting on the sovereignty of states. In the cases of Syria and Ethiopia, the use of, or threat to use, veto powers has prevented international coercive intervention, thus protecting the territory of the sovereign states. Veto powers are, nevertheless, not protection of sovereignty based on democratic processes. Sovereignty is possible to protect without veto powers as resolutions are solely adopted in cases where a majority of member states vote in favour of a resolution. Limiting veto powers in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity would, thus, enable international intervention based on democratic principles. State sovereignty is considered valuable within the UN Charter, it is, nevertheless, reflected that in cases where the expected behavioural patterns are not complied with, the international community is able to interfere coercively or non-coercively. For states to constitute a member of the international community, this rule must be complied with. I, therefore, argue that in cases where member states of the international community do not comply with the R2P, protecting state sovereignty should not comprise the topic of most concern.

It has been discussed that the limited ability of the international community to intervene in the Ethiopian conflict reflects a broader tendency. It is not solely within the context of Ethiopia that the structure of the international community is preventing a halt of atrocity crimes. Other cases of conflict have been included to portray how the norm is not able to achieve its full potential due to the institutional structure of the international community and the possible misuse of the veto. It has previously been reflected that utilising a case study as the methodological framework could bring the consequence of not being able to directly transfer the findings to other contexts. I argue that the findings concerning the structure of the international community hindering international response to the Ethiopian conflict are directly transferable to other contexts. It has, additionally, been possible to compare and draw similarities as well as differences to other cases of international intervention in cases of conflict.

The civil population as the greatest victim of the war

What is evident, and an important topic of discussion is how the civil population of Ethiopia constitutes the greatest victim of the conflict. Throughout this dissertation I have employed an instrumental approach to investigate the response of the international community, I have abstained from analysing the humanitarian consequences. These consequences must, however, be discussed as we must remember the humanitarian aspect of the war.

My interest to investigate the Ethiopian conflict was initiated due to the obvious lack of international response to the documented atrocity crimes committed by all active parties. I was concerned that the complexity of the UN would ultimately result in a continuous idle response from the international community. I was eminently aware that continuous idle response would imply catastrophic consequences for the civil population. As reflected in the object of analysis, multiple trustworthy organisations and institutional bodies have compiled documentation to conclude how the civil population is the victim of crimes amounting to crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. The female civil population is in particular considered great victims of the war why this section will discuss the consequences for this group of the civil population.

The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions explicitly forbid rape as a warfare method utilised in conflicts. International Humanitarian Law, additionally, restricts combatants to solely attack military targets, attacking civilians is unlawful during wartimes (Askin 2006). It is, unfortunately, factual knowledge that women and girls are disproportionately affected by violent conflict. Pre-existing gender inequalities and discrimination are reaffirmed and intensified during situations of conflict (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d.). This knowledge prevails in the international community why multiple resolutions concerning the importance of protecting women and girls in violent conflicts have been adopted (United Nations Women 2015). By adopting resolutions focusing on gender, the international community strengthens its efforts to end sexual violence in conflict (United Nations Women 2015). The UNSC adopted the landmark resolution 1325 in 2000 acknowledging the disproportionate effect that violent conflict has on women and girls. Within the resolution, it is emphasised how all parties of armed conflict must take special measures to protect women and girls from rape, gender-based violence, and sexual abuse (United Nations Women 2015; United Nations Security Council 2000). Resolution 1888 by the UN reaffirms the importance of protecting women and girls in conflicts as:

[...] sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 2009:3).

Thus, the sexual violence committed in Ethiopia will be a significant factor for the restoration of international peace and security. It is of great importance to discuss the impact of the sexual violence committed in Ethiopia and hold perpetrators accountable. This should be in the interest of the international community.

Resolution 1888 enables the international community to engage progressively in the challenge of women and girls being especially exposed to sexual violence. The Ethiopian conflict, however, constitutes a case of how sexual violence as a warfare method prevails. What is evident is how tactically targeting women and girls has indeed been utilised as a warfare method during the Ethiopian war. The reports by the Commission, the EHRC & OHCHR, and by Amnesty International document how sexual violence has been a method of warfare utilised by both the ENDF and the TPLF. The sexual violence committed during the Ethiopian war enables the debate concerning the actual impact of the resolutions. The resolutions have entailed a focus on the violent crimes that women and girls are victims of during conflicts. The resolutions have, however, not been able to prevent the atrocity crimes or enabled the international community to intervene in the Ethiopian war. The complexity of intervening in inter-state conflicts refers to the sovereignty of the Ethiopian state and the possibility of prolonging the war and exacerbating civil casualties. The international community is, thus, left with the ability to intervene in the war by implementing diplomatic policy tools. Within the Ethiopian conflict, implementing diplomatic policy tools is achieved through the investigations initiated by the HRC and the OHCHR. The investigations have informed the international community about the atrocity crimes committed during the war, and the accountable parties. Such investigations are, arguably, of great importance. It does not end the atrocity crimes, yet it could enable the international community to hold perpetrators accountable.

The conflict in Ethiopia is a transpiring case, why it remains a possibility that the international community will hold all parties accountable when the war is terminated. Such possibility is challenged by a concern raised within resolution 1888 stating that solely a limited number of perpetrators of sexual violence in war have been brought to justice (United Nations Security Council 2009:2). It can be deemed questionable if the international community will be able to hold perpetrators of sexual violence committed as a warfare method within the Ethiopian conflict accountable.

Kelly Dawn Askin (2006) argues that in situations of conflict, where women and girls are targeted and sexual violence is utilised as a warfare method, the military and political leaders have a significant responsibility. In situations of violent conflicts where military and political leaders, explicitly or implicitly, encourage or simply ignore the abuse of women, the regularity and the brutality of the crimes increase exponentially. It has been documented that the military forces of the TPLF and the ENDF have committed extremely violent sexual crimes during the war, why one must reflect upon the responsibility of the military and political leaders of each grouping. Sexual violence has been committed continuously, which points to the leaders either encouraging or ignoring the horrific acts based on the research of Askin. Despite the underlying reasons, perpetrators of sexual violence must be held accountable due to the encompassing consequences that sexual violence brings to the victims and families. Crimes of sexual violence are most often accompanied by additional violent crimes such as beatings, forced nudity, enslavement, inhumane conditions, and destruction of homes, families, communities, and livelihoods. Damages to the reproductive health of the survivors and unwanted pregnancies are likewise considered features of rape as a warfare method (Askin 2006). Previous research has investigated the ability to determine crimes of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Crimes including rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, torture, persecution, mutilation, enforced sterilisation, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, forced marriage, cruel treatment, and inhumane acts are listed in the statute of the ICC (ibid.). Thus, the ICC is able to prosecute gender-based crimes concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Multiple of these enlisted crimes have been committed during the war in Ethiopia creating legal grounds for prosecuting and holding perpetrators accountable. The ICC can prosecute civilians and superiors accountable for the committed crimes. In the context of Ethiopia, the government is, arguably, aware of the sexual crimes committed on the ground. Different organisations have documented these atrocity crimes why it is possible for the ICC to prosecute the military and political leaders as they are responsible for not halting the sexual violence. Even leaders who were not present on the ground are possible to prosecute and hold accountable (ibid.). Despite the ability to hold leaders responsible, it must be reflected upon if accountability is a reality.

As previously mentioned, the Ethiopian state does not constitute a State Party to the Rome Statute, hence, it is solely possible for the UNSC to refer the situation to the ICC. Member states are not able. The veto powers of the permanent member states once again constitute a challenge. In case the situation is referred, challenges to prosecuting perpetrators of violent sexual crimes exist. According to Koenig, Lincoln, and Groth (2011), for the ICC to prosecute, a number of obstacles

must be surmounted. It is argued that these requirements of the Court entails that a limited number of perpetrators will be held accountable for their crimes. Thus, national criminal prosecutions are of great significance in holding individuals accountable for their committed criminal acts. As previously emphasised, there exist few grounds to believe that the Ethiopian government will cooperate with the ICC to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence from the governmental forces. This enables the argument that it is, additionally, considered highly unlikely that individuals from the governmental forces will be held accountable by national criminal prosecutions.

According to Koenig, Lincoln, and Groth, it has been a struggle to determine to which degree high-level officials should be held accountable for the crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus, it would be a challenge to determine the accountability of high-level individuals from the ENDF and TPLF. By holding high-level officials from all parties of the Ethiopian war accountable, even for violent crimes committed by subordinates, the sexual violence committed during the conflict would be recognised as a warfare method and not a random crime of opportunity. Thus, sexual violent crimes could be considered directly or indirectly encouraged by leaders (Koenig, Lincoln, and Groth 2011). Holding high-level individuals accountable for the committed crimes in Ethiopia would, arguably, enable the survivors to have a voice, and could be perceived a means to positively impact the restoration of international peace and security. Despite this, it is considered unlikely that the situation is referred to the ICC. This, once again, relates to the fact that it is solely the international community who can refer the situation to the ICC constituting a challenge due to China and Russia's disapproval of international intervention in the conflict. Thus, there exist grounds to believe that perpetrators of sexual crimes will not be held accountable, neither high-level officials nor subordinates.

Instability in the Horn of Africa

The international community must reflect on how stability in the HoA is greatly affected by the Ethiopian conflict. Due to the country's stabilising role in the HoA, this section will discuss the regional impact of the war.

A few years ago, Ethiopia was determined the great hope of Africa and was perceived as an influential factor for the stability of the HoA (Brown 2021; Maru 2017). Ethiopia achieved this categorisation due to its military strengths, participation in regional peace and security operations, and by being the second most populous country in Africa (ibid.; Bekalo 2022). The country had one of the fastest-growing economies in the world bringing positive prospects for the future of

the country and the neighbouring countries (Brown 2021). The conflict has, arguably, challenged the economy of the country and its ability to continue a stabilising power within the region. The ability to constitute a stabilising component of the region could, additionally, be challenged by international intervention in the war. Employing military forces could in particular contribute to unforeseeable chaos and escalation. Engaging in international war will inflict physical and moral injury while simultaneously being dangerous, expensive, and bringing uncertain outcomes (Bellamy 2022). If a military intervention was to prolong the war, as earlier reflected upon, the risk for increased instability in the region, arguably, exists. Nevertheless, instability in Ethiopia prevails without the intervention of the international community.

According to Samuel Ayele Bekalo (2022), instability has since the beginning of the war escalated due to political turmoil. The instability affects the livelihoods of the Ethiopian population, in 2021, conflict and violence triggered the displacement of 5.1 million individuals within the country. This number is the highest annual figure recorded for any country (International Displacement Monitoring Centre 2022). The humanitarian situation for displaced people continues as dire. Due to the widespread destruction of infrastructure, both private and public, access to basic services such as healthcare, water, and education continues limited (ibid.). The situation of stability in Ethiopia immensely affects both the socio-economic and security situation of the HoA (Bekalo 2022). Bekalo urges the international stakeholders to engage in a timely and constructive manner as a failure to do so would increase the instability within Ethiopia and the wider HoA. According to Bekalo, international and regional stakeholders must engage by addressing immediate humanitarian needs through political dialogue and negotiated consensus to achieve lasting peace. Failure to do so will have consequences (ibid.). It has been previously documented that the Ethiopian government disapproves of international interference consequently restricting the possibility of mediation and political dialogue, and research depicts how coercive interference, such as economic sanctions and employment of military forces, prolongs the civil war. One is left with the question of how the international community can intervene to halt the atrocity crimes while simultaneously not contributing negatively to the stability in Ethiopia. It must be reflected upon if the international community can contribute to preventing the war from escalating and instead constitute a stabilising component of the war. What is evident is that the conflict could escalate instability in the region.

Multiple consequences of increased instability exist. Bekalo's research depicts how failure to intervene to uphold stability will lead to regional consequences for the HoA and could result in

increased refugee flow as experienced post the Arab Spring. It is emphasised that the region and the international community cannot afford such (Bekalo 2022). As of February 2022, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded that 73,000 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers had crossed the border to Sudan since the outbreak of the war in 2020. Most of these individuals had crossed the border due to the conflict in Tigray (Mixed Migration Centre 2022). The influx of refugees into Sudan poses a difficulty as the country is financially struggling. To prevent the refugee influx from Ethiopia affecting the Sudanese economy negatively, it is of great importance that the international community assists in the form of food, shelter, and medicines. A consequence of a lack of assistance could be an over-burden on the Sudanese economy (The Arab Weekly 2020). Doctors Without Borders stresses the importance of rapid international assistance as the camps in Sudan lack adequate shelter, food, water, and other essential relief (Médecins Sans Frontières 2021A). Medicine is of special importance. Upon arrival to the camps, the Ethiopian refugees are often in need of humanitarian assistance due to the exhaustive journey burdening the health services in Sudan (ibid.). Thus, the conflict in Ethiopia has the potential of contributing to economic instability in Sudan if the international community is not able to assist with humanitarian assistance due to the unstable economy of the country. If the international community is unable to provide humanitarian assistance, it is, additionally, possible that the humanitarian conditions within the camps will exacerbate as Sudan is not financially able to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance in the camps.

An additional challenge related to increased refugee flow from Ethiopia relates to the journey of the refugees. UNHCR reported how several unaccompanied children have arrived at the camps, most of them were separated from their families during the flight (ibid.). UN experts warn that children in the Tigray area are at particular risk of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation due to them being separated from their families (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2022). The experts, additionally, report how women and girls from the Tigray, Afar, and Amhara regions are significantly vulnerable to abduction and trafficking for the purpose of sexual slavery during their flight from the conflict posing an additional consequence of the increased refugee flow (ibid.). The risk of human smuggling does not end when arrived the refugee camps. It has been reported how young adults have been lured by smugglers to leave the camps to go to Europe. Testimonies from young adults who tried to make the journey to Europe document stories of abuse, regular beating, forced labour, and sexual abuse (Khalif 2022). Thus, increased refugee flow creates the lucrative businesses of smugglers, contributing to the

exploitation of especially women and children and a possible increased influx of Ethiopian refugees to Europe.

The consequences of the civil war are many leaving one with the question on how the international community can respond sufficiently to halt mass atrocity crimes committed towards the civil population. Throughout the analysis and discussion, limitations to the international community's ability to respond by utilising policy tools of the R2P has been presented. It has become evident, that response by the international community is complex despite the documentation of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Thus, the R2P constitute a theoretical framework to respond to atrocity crimes, but in practice is it challenged by the complexity of the international community.

Conclusion

When the R2P was adopted, the ambition of the international community was to halt atrocity crimes amounting to what is currently transpiring in Ethiopia. The mass atrocity crimes committed during the Ethiopian civil war are well-documented, yet the international community is restrained in its ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P to protect the civil population.

It has been documented how the R2P in theory enables the international community to respond to mass atrocity crimes, in practice, the ability of the international community to respond is challenged. Especially challenging the international community's ability to protect the Ethiopian civil population based on the R2P is sovereignty, self-interest, and unequal power balances. The Ethiopian government has continuously vocalised disapproval of international intervention in the conflict. The sovereign rights and interests of the Ethiopian government limit the international community's ability to respond non-coercively as respect for sovereignty is bestowed significant importance in the UN Charter. In the context of Ethiopia, it is documented that the national interest of the sovereign state of Ethiopia wins out over the international objective of protecting the Ethiopian civil population from mass atrocity crimes as the R2P commands. Utilising a majority of the non-coercive policy tools mainly depend on the consent of the Ethiopian government. Consent depends on the Ethiopian government's interest in cooperating with the international community, an interest that the Ethiopian government does not possess. Thus, it is challenging to utilise non-coercive policy tools dependent on state consent and cooperation to affect the Ethiopian state's behaviour. Yet, the international community has been able to respond non-coercively to the conflict by raising concerns and condemning the committed crimes. The non-coercive policy tools utilised by the international community have to some degree influenced the behavioural patterns of the Ethiopian state, however, predominately informed the international community about the deteriorating situation.

The international community has not utilised coercive tools to respond to the conflict and protect the civil population from mass atrocity crimes. Coercive policy tools can be utilised without state consent and respect for sovereignty. As the Ethiopian government does not wish to engage cooperatively with the international community, coercive tools seem like the only policy tools for the international community to utilise. Utilising such policy tools, however, entails tremendous consequences for the civil populations such as prolonging the war and exacerbating civil losses. Utilising coercive policy tools is, additionally, dependent on the consent of the five permanent member states of the international community. It has been documented consistently how the

architecture of the international community challenges the utilisation of policy tools available under the third pillar of the R2P. Especially the permanent member states of China and the Russian Federation constitute a challenge for the international community to protect the Ethiopian civil population as the two countries have vocalised disapproval of international intervention in the conflict. The misuse of veto powers limits the ability of the international community to protect the Ethiopian civil population based on the R2P and for the norm to achieve its full potential. Ultimately, the international community's ability to utilise policy tools of the R2P to protect the civil population of Ethiopia from atrocity crimes is limited.

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