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# ARCTIC CAPABILITY PACKAGE THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG?

A mapping study of Danish-Greenlandic defence and security politics  
focusing on an increasingly complicated policy process



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## **Abstract**

The past year has been turbulent when following Greenlandic-Danish security politics. The slow policy process of the Arctic Capability Package (ACP) caused major disagreements between the Danish government in Copenhagen and the Greenlandic semi-autonomous Naalakkersuisut (Self-government) in Nuuk. In February 2021, the ACP was presented at a press conference, where only Danish parliamentarians were present, causing dissatisfaction in Greenlandic political circles. This led to protests from Greenlandic politicians about the lack of the legally obliged inclusion of Greenlandic authorities in the security policy processes concerning Greenlandic territory. The Danish government and the Naalakkersuisut signed an additional Principle Agreement, that specified and altered parts of the original ACP in May 2022. The analysis in this thesis is based on interviews with experts and actors from the policy process as well as the official documents leading to and forming the ACP: the Arctic Analysis of 2016; Principle Agreement of the ACP.

This thesis studies the complex policy process of the ACP through the framework of the policy cycle as it is described by Howlett and Ramesh (2003). The five stages of the policy cycle constitute the main structure of the analytical approach, yet it becomes increasingly complex due to the untraditional procedure of the development of the ACP. In addition, this project employed Bacchi's (2009) version of the "What's the problem represented to be?" (WPR) in the first stage of the policy cycle, agenda-setting. The WPR supported the mapping of the problem which the Danish government presents within the ACP. The WPR was utilised to ensure that the thesis focuses on the right problem without being biased and promoting any political ideologies when analysing the policy cycle. Furthermore, the decision-making stage applies Hayes' (in Morcol, 2007) version of Lindblom's (1965) theory of incrementalism.

The discussion utilises the findings in the analysis for a reflection of the challenged communication flows between Greenlandic and Danish authorities. The chapter also discusses how postcolonial ties and the contrasting military traditions in Greenland and Denmark can be argued to affect current policy processes and legal structures.

This project concludes that a poor flow of communication and information are one of the main reasons for the overwhelming complexity of formulating and implementing an Arctic security and defence policy in the Kingdom of Denmark. The Greenlandic policy actors have been found to be limited in their access to information and consultation, thereby also in the decision-making process. This is caused partly due to the vague definitions in the legal

foundation of Greenlandic inclusion security policy formulation concerning the Arctic region of the Kingdom of Denmark.

**Keywords:**

Arctic Security; Greenland; Kingdom of Denmark; Danish Realm; Policy Cycle; Naalakkersuisut; Danish Government; Security Policy; Incrementalism; Communication Flow; WPR; Postcolonialism

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## 1 Introduction

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of February, 2021 the Danish Ministry of Defence presented a new political agreement named the Arctic Capability Package (ACP) on military programs and instalments in the Faroe Islands and Greenland for the sum of 1.5 billion DKK. This agreement was presented as a strengthening of the Danish Defence capabilities in the Arctic and the North Atlantic containing high-tech capabilities for surveillance, increased military presence as well as a new form of military training in Greenland, which was considered to benefit the entire Danish Realm. The ACP puts the agreement from the 2019 Supplemental Agreement to the Danish Defence Agreement 2018-2023 into concrete action. The Danish government believes that the Kingdom of Denmark holds great responsibility when it comes to the defence and security in the Arctic and North Atlantic, which it trusts would greatly benefit from the ACP. The framework of the ACP is meant to strengthen the Danish Defence's capabilities to track and monitor the activities in the region. This was thought to be mainly done by investing in high-tech unmanned systems and capabilities, such as drones and satellites. The increase and strengthening of capabilities in the Arctic and the North Atlantic is intended to provide both military and civilian benefits, which is referred to as the dual-use feature. Moreover, the ACP included the strengthening of the capabilities of the Danish Defence to support civil society through search and rescue operations, emergency operations, environmental surveillance, fisheries control, monitoring of the climate and research, etc. Furthermore, the ACP included a new basic military training which sought to establish and strengthen Greenlandic citizens' opportunity to be included in the defence of Greenland. In the presentation of the ACP the Ministry of Defence stated that "The Danish Ministry of Defence has a close dialogue with ... Greenland" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021).

Despite the fact that the Ministry of Defence was in communication with Greenland, Greenland declined the idea of the ACP on the 7<sup>th</sup> of June, 2021, four months after the presentation of the ACP. The main reason for the arguably late decline of the policy was due to the election taking place in Greenland. After the election, a new Naalakkersuisut (the semi-autonomous, Self-government in Greenland) came to power and Pele Broberg became the new Naalakkersuisoq (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Pele Broberg did not want to recognise the ACP and stated that Greenland was not interested in either drones, military training, and education nor Danish military presence in Greenland (Transportavisen, 2021). After the Greenlandic statement, the policy process was halted. However, after rephrasing and specification of content

of the ACP, an additional ACP Principle Agreement was signed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of May, 2022, by Vivian Motzfeldt, who became the new Naalakkersuisoq on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

The policy process of the ACP is still ongoing, thus, it has been a developing matter throughout the writing process of this project. In the midst of writing this project, the ACP was agreed upon by Greenland and Denmark and co-signed. What we thought would have been a lengthier process came to an end, or more precisely, moved on to the next stage of the policy process. Before Motzfeldt signed the ACP, it went through a longer process. The policy process becomes interesting as it could have been shortened immensely as the Danish government does not have to wait for a Greenlandic approval. However, the ACP was paused for over a year, and thereafter changed so that both states were in agreement on the implementation of the policy. However, The Danish constitution states that “[The King acts on behalf of the realm on international matters]<sup>1</sup>” (Danmarks Riges Grundlov, § 19, stk. 1), the ‘King’, however, is interpreted as the Danish government. The Danish constitution thus states that Denmark decides on international matters in the Danish realm, thereby including Greenland. Moreover, the Greenlandic law on autonomy states that “[the authority given to Naalakkersuisut in this chapter, does not limit the Danish authorities constitutional responsibility and authority on international matters, as foreign- and security politics is a matter of the realm]<sup>2</sup>” (Selvstyreløven, §11, stk. 3). Even though Greenland has autonomy to a certain extent, it does not and has never included international matters and security policies. Therefore, the halting of the ACP was done as a gesture to Greenland when it declined the policy. This indicates what we find to be a compelling relationship between the two nations since Danish law explicitly articulates that Greenland does not have the right to decide for itself. However, Denmark still wants approval from Greenland, thus we developed the following problem formulation: *How does the complex security relationship between Denmark and Greenland affect the Arctic Capability Package?*

The topic of Greenlandic autonomy and Arctic studies is not new to us, as we have written two previous research projects on Greenland in relation to Denmark and the Arctic. Our first in-depth project on Greenland has the title: “Block Grant - A hindrance towards an independent economy of Kalaallit Nunaat?” (2020). This project focused on Greenland’s role

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<sup>1</sup> Danish original text: “Kongen handler på rigets vegne i mellemfolkelige anliggender”

<sup>2</sup> Danish original text: “De beføjelser, som gives Naalakkersuisut i dette kapitel, begrænser ikke de danske myndigheders forfatningsmæssige ansvar og beføjelser i mellemfolkelige anliggender, idet udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik er rigsanliggender.”

as a former Danish colony and the financial support granted to Greenland since the official decolonisation in 1954. The project looked at how Denmark wants to support development in Greenland, but with Danish economic aid, the Greenlandic economy will remain dependent on Denmark. Furthermore, it analysed how Danish economic modernisation in Greenland only makes it more difficult for Greenland to get out of this dependent relationship. Our last project also focused on the Arctic region and had the title: “Nobody is arming the ice - A study of intra-arctic framing of military activities” (2021). In this project, we looked at military activities in the Arctic and how Arctic exceptionalism can further explain the concept of the Arctic being a low-tension area, as well as how Arctic exceptionalism has been an essential part of the construction of an Arctic security region. Thus, we have done a lot of research on the topic of Greenland’s autonomy as well as the increase of military activities in the Arctic. Based on the two previous projects and long-lasting interest in Arctic security and the Greenlandic-Danish relationship, our research led us to this topic. We believe that it is important to look at the Greenlandic perspective of international political matters, despite it not being a constitutional right for Greenlandic policymakers to have an influence.

This project functions as a mapping study of the ACP. We find the mapping of this policy process important since it is an elaborate and complex procedure. Arguably, the ACP is more complex than most policy processes due to the security relationship between Greenland and Denmark. Thus, we find that the ACP needs greater attention in order to fully understand Greenlandic and Danish interests concerning Arctic security and how the ACP operates as a response to these.

## **1.1 Literature Review**

The topic of Greenlandic-Danish security policy procedure does not have a long tradition in academia. However in recent years, Arctic security has gathered more attention in academic communities. Nonetheless, Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen and Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen (2021) edited a collection of work by a range of experts and researchers in the field of Arctic studies and Greenlandic and Danish security policies, “Sikkerhedspolitik i Arktis og Nordatlanten”. This work served as the extensive source of background in this project, yet is not directly applied nor quoted.

The majority of the literature utilised in this project serves to construct the analytical framework or provide theoretical concepts for more in-depth analysis. Additionally, the vast majority of data scrutinised is collected through personal communications and interviews conducted by the authors themselves. Additional quotes from people unavailable for in-person



interviews have been gathered from reliable news sources and government websites. Lastly, the government sources directly formulating and describing the policy in question have been a crucial source for this project.

## **2 Background**

The following chapter will present the history of Greenlandic-Danish security relations. The chapter will be separated into three periods in time: from Danish colonisation until the instalment of a Self-government in Greenland, from the Self-government Act until the presentation of the ACP by the Danish parliament, and from the first ACP press conference to present day. A historical background provides an overview of the events surrounding the ACP, from preceding political agreements to the most recent developments taking place during the writing of this project. Furthermore, the background supplies the project with a historical context that contributes to the understanding of contrasting traditions in Greenland and Denmark, respectively.

### **2.1 Greenlandic-Danish Colonial Relations**

Greenland is a relatively new actor in international affairs and even more so when it comes to security politics. To this day, Nalaakkersuisut does not control all aspects of Greenlandic administration. The bureaucratic construction of having parts of Greenlandic decision-making taking place in Copenhagen has lasted for centuries. In order to fully understand the dynamics of the Greenlandic-Danish relationship in the aspects of upholding sovereignty, one must look prior to the Self-government Act of 2009. Therefore, the following section will provide a brief overview of the political history between Greenland and Denmark.

Greenland had, for centuries, not been in the minds of the administration in Copenhagen until a Danish-Norwegian priest, Hans Egede, led an expedition to baptise the descendants of the viking settlers, who had arrived in Greenland to later go extinct. In 1721, Egede's crew arrived in Greenland and established a trading post, later to become a colony.

In 1857, a local Greenlandic authority, Forstanderskaberne, was established and had participation from representatives appointed by the local population. Albeit, the Danish constitution, Grundloven, ensured Danish citizens with voting rights, it did not include people living in the colonies of the Kingdom of Denmark. The administration of the Greenlandic colonies was restructured in 1908 and included the establishment of two county councils. While the county councils could suggest policies for the Danish administration, they had no autonomous authority. In the following decades, the Danish government sought to gain

international recognition as the ruling entity of Greenland. The United States (US) government officially recognised Danish sovereignty in Greenland in 1917 as an unofficial element in the cession of the, current day, United States Virgin Islands.

The 1941 Greenland Treaty granted American forces permission to establish military bases in Greenlandic territory. At the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations (UN), Denmark signed the UN Charter in 1945. The legal status of Greenland became a topic of discussion as the UN Charter promoted decolonisation and led to Greenland being registered as a colony in the UN system, thus obliging the Danish government to work towards improving the conditions of the Greenlandic people. As a step towards decolonisation, Greenland became an integrated part of the Kingdom of Denmark on June 5<sup>th</sup> 1953 when the new Danish constitution came into force, thus ending the official colonial status of Greenland. The administration of Greenland now had to mirror that of the other Danish counties.

In 1975, the Danish-Greenlandic Home-rule Commission was founded. Concluding their work in 1979, a Home-rule Act was passed, with a 75% majority in a Greenlandic referendum, establishing Greenland as a semi-autonomous region with increasing repatriation of fields in the public sector. The Home-rule Act of 1979 also introduced the Block Grant, which constituted significant funding for the development of a separate Greenlandic semi-autonomous administration.

A Greenlandic-Danish commission working on how to introduce greater Greenlandic autonomy was founded in 1999. The commission started drafting the legal framework for Self-governance and a pathway towards full independence. In 2008, the Danish government, together with the Greenlandic Home-rule, formulated a new Self-government Act that increased the Greenlandic administration's degree of autonomy within the Kingdom of Denmark. The Self-government Act launched an extensive repatriation of public administration from Danish authorities to Greenlandic. As the Act came into force on June 21<sup>st</sup> 2009, many of the policy fields listed in the Act were repatriated to Greenlandic authorities, however, the fields of foreign and security policy were never listed as available for repatriation.

## **2.2 Self-governance in Greenland**

In the Arctic Strategy 2011-2020, the streamlined chain of command surrounding the Danish Armed Forces' missions in the Arctic was founded, named the Arctic Command. This joint service was to cover both activities in and around Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Another element in the strategy concerns educating the local population in Greenland to participate in

the surveillance and defence of the Arctic territories of the Kingdom of Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, pp. 20-21).

The Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 includes the decision to conduct a comprehensive analysis of how to solve future tasks in the Arctic. The analysis was to serve as a foundation for the coming development of Danish defence capabilities in the region. The report was published in June 2016 and has been referred to as the Arctic Analysis of 2016. The Arctic Analysis covers numerous aspects of military tasks in the Arctic and provides recommendations for the upcoming defence agreement within the set financial framework from the Defence Agreement 2013-2017. Existing capabilities in the Arctic are suggested to be strengthened through more efficient practices. The report concludes that it is most likely that the future of the region is characterised by “cooperation and competition in the Arctic rather than confrontation and conflict” (Arctic Analysis, 2016, p. 15). The group behind the analysis identified the purposes of the Danish military presence in the Arctic as the exercise of sovereignty, search and rescue capability, protection of the marine environment, response and surveillance of marine pollution, medical assistance, and industry inspections (Arctic Analysis, 2016, p. 16).

On January 28<sup>th</sup> 2018, a majority in the Danish parliament presented a new Defence Agreement 2018-2023. The new agreement includes an entire chapter describing the initiatives that should strengthen the Danish presence and surveillance of the Arctic territories in the Kingdom of Denmark.

In August 2018, the president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, approached the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, about purchasing Greenland from Denmark. The Danish Prime Minister declined the offer stating that “[Greenland is not for sale. Greenland is not Danish. Greenland is Greenlandic. I still hope, that this is not meant seriously]”<sup>3</sup> (Politiken, Indland, 2019).

On January 29<sup>th</sup> 2019, the Supplemental Defence Agreement of 2019 funnelled an additional 1.5 billion DKK to the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic and North Atlantic regions of the Kingdom of Denmark, meaning the Faroe Islands and Greenland. However, the funds are not exactly allocated to specific investments. In April 2019, Mette Frederiksen (Danish Prime Minister) expressed that Greenland should have a larger say in foreign affairs after a four-day visit.

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<sup>3</sup> Danish original text: "Grønland er ikke til salg. Grønland er ikke dansk. Grønland er grønlandsk. Jeg håber vedholdende, at det ikke er noget, der er alvorligt ment"

On February 11<sup>th</sup> 2021, a large coalition of parties in the Danish parliament presented an agreement in which the 1.5 billion DKK was directed towards investments in improving surveillance and emergency response capabilities in the Arctic territories of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Arctic Capability Package. However, at the press conference, none of the Danish parliamentarians elected in the Faroe Islands and Greenland were there to present the ACP.

### **2.3 Presentation of the ACP**

After the ACP was presented by members of the Danish parliament, the following year was a turbulent one in Greenlandic politics. The ACP constitutes an investment package in the surveillance and response capabilities in and around Greenland. In the initial agreement, the majority of the budget of the ACP was directed towards surveillance, radars for surveillance in Faroese airspace as well as drones and satellites for ground and sea situational awareness in Greenland.

At the press conference, where the ACP was presented, representatives from all the parties in the Danish parliament, who negotiated the ACP, were presenting the package. None of the Greenlandic nor Faroese members of the Danish parliament were present. The Minister of Defence, Trine Bramsen, nevertheless emphasised the necessity of Faroese and Greenlandic support for the ACP (Thorin & Kristensen, 2021).

On April 6<sup>th</sup> 2021, the election for the Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut) meant that a new government came to power in the following weeks. The new Naalakkersuisut was composed of the parties, Naleraq and Inuit Ataatigiit (IA). While the leader of IA, Múte Bourup Egede, became the Premier and Chair of Naalakkersuisut. The position as Naalakkersuisoq for foreign affairs, trade, climate, and business went to Pele Broberg from the coalition party, Naleraq. In the new Naalakkersuisut's policy and principle program, it is stated that Greenland should not lay territory to further military instalments; "[from the geographical positioning of Greenland in the Arctic region, we will demand more influence on defence policies. We want to underline that Greenland should be demilitarised, and that nothing should be decided about us, without us]<sup>4</sup>" (Inuit Ataatigiit & Naleraq, 2021).

On May 16<sup>th</sup> 2021, Pele Broberg chose to stay away from a press conference with the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeppe Kofod, and the Faroese Minister of Foreign Affairs,

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<sup>4</sup> Danish original text: "Ud fra Grønlands geografiske placering i det Arktiske område, vil vi kræve større indflydelse på forsvarspolitikken. Vi vil understrege at Grønland skal demilitariseres, og at der ikke kan ske noget om os, uden os"

Jenis av Rana. The decision to evade a press conference with his Danish and Faroese counterparts was reasoned by a dissatisfaction with the level of Danish influence in Arctic affairs, stating that “[Greenland, that is us. The Arctic; that is us]<sup>5</sup>” (Sermitsiaq.AG, 2021).

On June 7<sup>th</sup> 2021, Pele Broberg expressed how Naalakkersuisut was unsatisfied with the content of the ACP. Naalakkersuisut suggested that the ACP should promote civilian rather than military capabilities. A few days later on June 10<sup>th</sup> 2021, the Faroese Lawman (leader of the Faroese government), Bárður á Steig Nielsen, the Greenlandic Premier, Múte Bourup Egede, and Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen met for a meeting of the realm. They presented the establishment of a Contact Committee, consisting of government officials and ministerial level politicians from all three nations of the realm. On June 15<sup>th</sup> 2021, Pele Broberg partly withdrew his previous standpoint, emphasising that Naalakkersuisut had not expressed neither support nor opposition to the ACP. Naalakkersuisut continued to negotiate with the Danish government. On September 27<sup>th</sup> 2021, the policy area of foreign affairs and climate was transferred to the office of the Greenlandic Premier, Múte Bourup Egede. Pele Broberg remained in his position as Naalakkersuisoq, but now is responsible for the fields of trade and business.

On March 14<sup>th</sup> 2022, the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, visited Greenland. She discusses defence and security policies with the Greenlandic administration and states that decisions about the Arctic should be anchored in the people of the Arctic and should be discussed internally in the Unity of the Realm.

Foreign Policy Strategy 2022 addresses directly how the Kingdom of Denmark continues to pursue an Arctic region that is characterised as a low-tension region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). About the security situation in the Arctic, the strategy states that

“[the Danish government, in collaboration with Greenland and the Faroe Islands together with the US as our most important security ally, seeks to work for stability as well as peaceful and sustainable development in the Arctic and North Atlantic to the benefit of all parts of the Danish Realm. Rising tensions in the Arctic pose a threat towards

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<sup>5</sup> Danish original text: “Grønland; det er os. Arktis; det er os”

the entirety of the Danish Realm and global security]6” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).

In May 2022, the coalition of the Naalakkersuisut was dissolved and a new coalition between the parties, Siumut and IA, started renegotiating the principles of the ACP 2021. Finally, on May 10<sup>th</sup> 2022, the Danish Minister of Defence, Morten Bødskov, and his Greenlandic counterpart, Naalakkersuisoq for foreign affairs Vivian Motzfeldt (Siumut), signed a document that elaborates the principles of the ACP. The Agreement on the Principles of the Arctic Capability Package elaborates on the content of the ACP. While the majority of the ACP’s points followed the initially negotiated framework, the Principle Agreement specifies that the military training was reformulated as a civil defence education (ACPAP, 2022).

## **2.4 Regional Security**

The Arctic has for decades been described through concepts such as "Arctic Exceptionalism", which emphasises the region as being characterised by a low level of tensions between states. As late as in the "Statement on Cooperation in the Arctic", the Danish government articulated the necessity of maintaining the Arctic as a region of peace and cooperation, where conflicts are solved according to international law (Kofod, 2020).

Following the end of the Cold War, the eight states having territory north of the Arctic circle adopted a series of agreements together with a number of organisations representing the indigenous peoples living in the Arctic. The agreements were concerned with environmental protection, emergency response, and pollution monitoring programmes. These agreements became the predecessor of the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996 with the Ottawa Declaration.

In relation to the disagreements about the extent of the continental shelves of the states bordering the Arctic Ocean, a Russian submarine planted a titanium flag on the ocean floor on the geographical North Pole. In order to avoid raising tensions, the Danish government invited the littoral states to a summit in Ilulissat, leading to the formulation of the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008. By signing the declaration, the parties promised to follow and accept any decisions

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<sup>6</sup> Danish original text: ”Regeringen vil, sammen med Grønland og Færøerne og med USA som vores vigtigste sikkerhedspolitiske allierede, arbejde for stabilitet og fredelig, bæredygtig udvikling i Arktis og Nordatlanten til gavn for alle i regionen. For stigende spændinger i Arktis udgør en trussel mod hele rigsfællesskabet og den globale sikkerhed.”

made by international institutions, such as the UN, about new territorial boundaries of the continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean.

On February 24<sup>th</sup> 2022, Russian troops launched an invasion of neighbouring Ukraine. While the conflict occurred outside the Arctic region, it had large implications for the relationship between Russia and the NATO allies, including the Kingdom of Denmark. The west launched extensive sanctions against the Russian economy, including the Greenlandic trade of fish and seafood to the Russian market. The invasion of Ukraine led to fear among other Arctic states of Russian aggression as well as a conclusion that Russia did not intend to follow international law, undermining the Ilulissat Declaration. The crisis between the Arctic states culminated in the other seven member states of the Arctic Council pausing all the organisation's activities without any prospect of resuming in the near future.

### **3 Methodology**

This project follows the strand of interpretivist approaches to international relations as the data employed will be subject to interpretations of the authors. As the purpose of this project is to understand the process of the ACP, we study how policy actors interact with one another and how they may have varying understandings and explanations of the course of events.

As a project based on a social constructivist foundation, we recognise that the world of international relations is constructed and moulded by ideas, norms, beliefs, and values (Lamont, 2015, pp. 19-20). We also acknowledge the intersubjectivity of research, that the very study itself may have altered the subject and thereby the results and findings of this project as well.

#### **3.1 Project Tree**




Figure 1: The project tree exhibits the structure of this project, Serving to clarify the thought process as well as the paper structure. The project tree displays all the theoretical and



*methodological elements of this project, and how they combine and lead to a conclusion of the problem formulation. The figure also marks which elements are explained in which chapters.*

### **3.2 Choice of Theory**

When a public policy is announced by a government, there are a vast amount of decisions and actors behind the process of defining the policy and to further implement it. These actors consist of both individuals and organisations, both political and social. The policy cycle has simplified the matter of analysing this entire process, and aids to further understand the actors of stages within the duration of a policy. Michael Howlett and Ramesh's (2003) model of the policy cycle functions as an analytical tool which examines the complexity of the policy process by breaking it up into five stages, where each of these stages are analysed in detail (p. 11). Each of these stages focuses on the different actors involved in the policy cycle during the different stages, and thereby we can look at how the different individuals and organisations have had an influence in the policy cycle of the ACP.

Howlett and Ramesh (2003) state that one of the difficulties in studying public policy-making is the many different approaches from various schools of thought. These differ in the sense of the level of analysis, method of analysis, and unit of analysis. Some social scientific theories are focused on the macro-level, which seeks to explain all phenomena within their purview. Whereas, others are focused only on specific subsets of the social life, also called the micro level of analysis. Moreover, social theories also differ when it comes to the method of analysis. This includes deductive theories developed to focus on the basis of the application of general presuppositions, concepts, or principles to specific phenomena and inductive theories, which are developed largely on the basis of generalization based on observations of empirical cases. Furthermore, there is the unit of analysis, where the theories differ in what they focus their attention on. This can be either individuals as the basic social actor whose behaviour and actions will be explained through the social theory, or groups as the relevant analytical unit, or even larger social structures, which are perceived to have an independent impact on individual and collective actions (pp. 20-21). By simplifying the procedure of finding a fitting social science theory, Howlett and Ramesh (2003) shortened the list of a large amount of variations into six methods of theory constructions, which only focus on general, or macro-level, social theories (p. 21). Howlett and Ramesh (2003) argue that this is plausible due to the interest of analysis:

“This is acceptable because academic disciplines such as economic and political science are interested in all social behaviour and activities and tend to view public policy-making as only a subset of such behaviour, amendable to the general theories and explanations prevalent in each field” (p. 21).

The six representative theories are categorised as either deductive or inductive, and the unit of analysis focuses on one of the three: 1) individual, 2) collectivity, or 3) structure.

This project aims to look at the different interest groups within the political process and how these are all recognised, or the lack thereof, by the government. Therefore, the best fitting theory for this project is *group theories: pluralism and corporatism*. Pluralism and Corporatism are both inductive approaches that are often used to analyse policy-making. Most often, pluralism is utilised as a political science when looking towards the US, as it originates from there, thus it is also fitted to the American political institutions and processes. On the other hand, there is corporatism which originates from Europe, which is also why we will utilise this variety of group theory for the project (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 37). Corporatism focuses on the different groups within the state and their interests, furthermore, it highlights the hierarchy of the different groups, in the manner of how the government responds to their needs. Corporatism is a system of interest intermediation where the essential units are organised into several singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised by the state. When the state recognises the groups, they are granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories. In exchange, the state expects the group to observe certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 42). One of the things that makes corporatism different from pluralism is that the groups are not thought of as free-forming, voluntary, or competitive. The groups must be recognised by the state in order for them to have a role in policy-making. Thus, the corporatist theory believes that public policies are shaped by the interaction between the state and the acknowledged groups thereof (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 42).

A policy presents a problem within the society, which the policy cycle helps to further investigate. However, we want to ensure that the problem framed in the policy is correct before going into further analysis, moreover, we want to ensure that we do not bring in our own political and ideological beliefs when looking at the policy. Thus, we will be utilising Bacchi’s notion of “what’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR). This approach to policy analysis

offers an alternative perspective to analysing a presented policy and focusing on the framed problem within. This theory is heavily focused on the government's active creation of a policy by looking at what is understood implicitly. Bacchi's notion of understanding policies is that all policies contain implicit representations of a problem by nature (Bacchi, 2009, p. 1). We will utilise this theory within the policy cycle to highlight the framed problem within the ACP, and to ensure that we have a theory that proves our findings of the represented and framed problem by the Danish government.

Incrementalism seeks to explain the behaviour of policy decision makers, by focusing on the importance of previous policies in the decision-making process. Thus, incrementalism argues that the active actors consider errors of previous policies, and present new and improved versions of the policy. However, incrementalism acknowledges the limited resources there are in order to further investigate the policy alternatives and thereby recognise the influence which political compromises entail. Incrementalism can thus help investigate how the policy actors within the decision-making stage have thought of the policy, and decided upon the decision of further putting the policy through the policy process.

### **3.3 Choice of Data**

In this project, five main sources of information will be drawn upon: 1) academic literature describing the political situation in the Arctic, 2) official documents explaining the legal proposal of the ACP, 3) the reports that formulated suggestions and recommendations, 4) interviews with people close to the policy process, and 5) the official policy itself. The official presented "Agreement on Arctic Capabilities" will serve as the policy, however we do acknowledge that there are fact sheets which are made to be read together with the policy. These will not be perceived to be part of the policy itself, but merely as additional information. It should be noted that the ACP is a non-legal translation, and the Danish Ministry of Defence describe it as "unofficial", as it can not be utilised in a court of law. However, we do not see any obstacles in using the unofficial translation, since we do not focus on the discursive utilisation within the ACP but the proposed actions of the policy. All these sources will serve as qualitative data for the analysis. Firstly, we took a starting point in the official agreement text of the ACP. We followed the references and found the reports and policy briefs that provided the main recommendations that led to the content of the policy paper itself.

#### **3.3.1 Interviews**

Document-based research falls short in providing any arguments and reasoning behind decisions and actions as well as opinions on the exact topic in question. This is where conducting an interview adds depth to this study. Allowing key actors involved in the process to explain their understanding of both published documents as well as previously unwritten accounts of the chain of events becomes an excellent source of data for analysing communication flows and misunderstandings that may have occurred throughout the policy process (Tansey, 2007, p. 767).

As part of our data collection, we have conducted interviews with a number of sources close to the policy process of the ACP. Tansey (2007) reflects on how expert interviews, rather than randomly sampled interviewees, are better sources of information when the study is concerned with process tracing (pp. 768-769). For a process tracing study, target interviewees with a relevant position for the process in question should be prioritised above larger groups of responders. In order to reduce the randomness and redundancy of the collected data, interviews are conducted with people close to the policy process, thus, the research becomes more meaningful (Tansey, 2007, pp. 766-767). As this project is based on a number of interviews with people either directly participating in the policy process of the ACP or being close observants of the development of Greenlandic-Danish security affairs.

Elite interviews serve primarily as confirmation of already collected information from other sources. We have sought to conduct a wide range of interviews, including both academics, politicians, diplomats, and government officials. Elite interviews aid our study in the policy process as we get detailed accounts on parts of the reasonings behind certain decisions and developments. The interviewees provide data for collecting a nuanced depiction of the actions and their incentives. The testimonies of elite interviewees allows us to patch together an overview of the policy process and the conflicts that arise at each step of the policy cycle. We can, through the interviews, gather data about disagreements and shifting interests of the different actors involved, data that is out of reach by exclusively conducting document-based research (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). Elite interviews thereby become a great source of insight and subjective information that can be utilised in addition to data such as reports, analyses, and policy papers. The document-based research and the interviews thus constitute complementary approaches to patching together a more detailed and nuanced tracing of a policy process.

This study has conducted a number of interviews, all of which can be categorised as semi-structured. While we sought to cover certain topics and perspectives in each interview, all interviews were partly driven by what the interviewees wanted to share. The interview transcriptions can be found in the appendices and it should be further noted that we did not

alter the transcripts, therefore the grammar and wording can seem out of place at times. Asking the interviewees open-ended questions allows for rich details in the interviewees' account of the topic. It allows them to speak freely, and from the angle that they want to address, thus providing an additional level of data for analysis. Semi-structured interviews allow for cross-referencing between multiple interviews. This quality is essential for the analytical framework utilised in this project. As the analysis is built upon the policy cycle and is divided according to the respective steps of the policy cycle, data with some extent of comparability becomes necessary. Still allowing the interviewees to address what they find relevant, as well as preparing open-ended questions prevents the interviews from becoming fully structured. A fully structured interview would contain the risk of reducing the scope of the answers (Lamont, 2015, pp. 83-84). Furthermore, structured interviews would require the same line of questions across all the interviews to allow for quantitative analysis and comparison of the responses. As the participants in the interviews conducted, as a part of this project, come from various backgrounds and obtain widely different roles in the policy process, standardised questions would not be very useful. Therefore, the interviews follow a semi-structured interview guide, unique for each interview. However, some of the questions and most of the topics resurface in all of them.

When conducting interviews as a source of information, one must keep in mind the reliability of sources. Attempts to map out any causation or reasoning behind how a policy process unfolds can be difficult as multiple perspectives on the same event may provide multiple explanations. Therefore, it is important to seek how much of the information gathered from the interviews can be considered reliable. The concept of triangulation becomes useful in the endeavour of separating subjective opinions from wider recognised information. Triangulation serves to guard the project against misleading information or analysis gathered from interviews to avoid a misinforming conclusion (Lamont, 2015, p. 79). With only a small number of interviews at our disposal, triangulation becomes even more crucial for our data collection. As certain topics or arguments may intentionally or unintentionally not be mentioned, the other perspectives on the same incidents become foundational for deeming the information subjective or objective (Trueb, 2014, p. 4). Interviews provide solid data for triangulation, which becomes a research goal in itself when conducting a process-tracing study. It supports the cross-checking of information from multiple sources that have no interest or chance of being coordinated (Tansey, 2007, p. 768). The interviews conducted for this project include people with a significant investment in the framing of the decision and policy process. Therefore, we have, to the furthest possible extent, pursued to have all stakeholders and actors

in the policy process participating in interviews. By including multiple angles and actors, the gathered data becomes increasingly reliable according to the concept of triangulation.

As our data collection was primarily interviews, we found it suitable to apply for a research grant to aid us with the potential data gathering in Greenland. We found that access to Greenlandic data was rather difficult without being in-person and so we sought to find a research grant that covered expenses associated with a study trip. Thus, our data collection culminated with funding from North2North, a strand of the University of the Arctic, which is a network of research institutes, organisations, and universities with a major focus on education and research in the North. As Aalborg University is part of this international association, we got into contact with the University of Greenland as our 'host institute' and managed to be granted funding. We were allocated financial subsidies for a week-long trip to Nuuk, where we conducted in-person interviews. We received the funding rather late into the thesis process, but nonetheless, it would have been difficult to understand the policy process and gain access to the data we found essential without it. Moreover, the grant allowed us to experience and better understand the nation of which we have spent a lot of time studying, learning the culture as well as the people.

### **3.4 Analytical Process**

The analysis will be structured according to Howlett and Ramesh's construction of the policy cycle, which focuses on the policy process and its relationship to applied problem solving. The model consists of five stages, and therefore, the analysis will be separated into five sections in correspondence to each stage. Each part of the analysis will further investigate the data in accordance with the policy process stage.

Each of the five stages will be explored to the furthest possible extent, however, we are aware that due to the nature of where the policy is currently in the policy cycle, we will not be able to go into detail with how the policy has unfolded itself in certain stages. Nonetheless, we will use gathered data from experts and politicians to theorise how the policy might possibly unfold in certain stages of the policy cycle, e.g. the evaluation stage, which is too far out in the future, thus, we could not have any data that can be utilised for this stage.

Within the policy cycle, there are different actors at play at the different stages. It is important to make out that in the analysis we look at different actors, as it differentiates throughout the policy cycle, and that different actors have an influence on the policy at different times. The different influential actors start out being broad and thereafter narrow down, however, after the decision-making stage - which is in the middle of the cycle - the different

actors involved increase once more: The first stage, agenda-setting, includes the combination of both social and state actors' interests (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 122). In the policy-formulation stage, it includes official policy actors, which have a say in how the issue is framed into a problem, and thereby presented as a policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 143). The third stage, decision-making, is the most exclusive stage as it is restricted to actors who have the capacity and authority to make the public decision (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 164). At the implementation stage, there is once more an increase of actors involved in the policy process. This stage involves authoritative decision makers, both political and administrative. These decision makers are joined by actors of the relevant policy subsystems (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 188). The last stage of the policy cycle, evaluation, includes actors both of the government and the policy subsystems, as well as the public as they are just as valid in the evaluation of the policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 207).




Figure 2: The five stages of the policy vary in the scope of actors that influence or operate in each stage. The diagram displays how the scope of actors narrows around the stage of decision-making, where only actors with political power operate. The figure contains the actors that we have observed as playing a role in each of the stages. The lists of mentioned

*actors are not necessarily exhaustive. Note also that the policy cycle is cyclical, meaning that the stage of agenda-setting still follows the evaluation stage.*

It is important to make out the different actors in each stage of the policy cycle, as we have interviewed different actors within the policy process, and their statements can only be utilised in certain stages of the analysis.

Within the first stage of the policy cycle, we will go into a further analysis utilising Bacchi's WPR approach, in order to gain an accurate depiction of the framed problem which the policy seeks to solve. Bacchi's theory will be a way of proving the framed problem and delve into further detail as to how the government has come about this policy. The reason for using Bacchi's theory for the first stage is to ensure that the framed problem throughout the rest of the project has data which supports our claim of the presented problem in the policy cycle.

In the decision-making stage of the policy cycle, we will include incrementalism. Incrementalism is utilised in order to investigate Denmark's choice to include or not include Greenland in the decision-making process, and thereby also get a better understanding of the complex policy process relationship between the two nations.

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Title and positions</b>
<b>Civil Servant a, b, c</b>	Ministry of Defence; formulators of the ACP
<b>Henrik Gram Pedersen</b>	Major in the Danish Armed Forces; Professor at the Royal Danish Military Academy; Co-author of Arctic Analysis 2016
<b>Jens Heinrich</b>	Leader of the Greenlandic representation in Copenhagen
<b>Sara Olsvig</b>	Former member Inatsisartut; Former Greenlandic member of Danish Parliament; Ph.D student at Ilisamatusarfik
<b>Mette Frederiksen</b>	Prime Minister of Denmark



<b>Rasmus Leander Nielsen</b>	Professor at Ilisimatusarfik; Head of Nasiffik - Centre for Foreign & Security Policy
<b>Pipaluk Lynge-Rasmussen</b>	Member of Inatsisartut; Chair of the Defence and Security Policy Committee

*Figure 3: The table above displays the people that have been quoted in this paper based on personal communication, that be either personal interviews or public addresses.*

### **3.5 Limitations**

The project has been limited due to a number of factors, primarily in our access to relevant data. Starting this project we knew that gathering data would be complicated, especially since the ACP was paused, and therefore was still unfolding. However, we decided that we would rely on gathering our own data by way of conducting interviews with different actors within the policy cycle. These actors included bureaucrats and politicians, which also limits us to an extent. A bureaucrat's job is to be neutral when it comes to political opinions, and therefore, when we interviewed them we were aware that there was a slight limitation as to what they could and would answer. Moreover, a politician will always promote their own political agenda, regardless of their seemingly objective answers, we were still limited in the manner the politicians talked about the problems, as they would frame it in accordance with their political views.

Our choice to utilise interviews as data for the project has limited us to a certain degree, as not all the actors we sought to interview were able to participate or even responded when we reached out to them. Furthermore, the data which we wished to have was not always accessible to us. An example of such is that we asked for access to documents of the minutes from the meetings concerning the ACP both from the Arctic Command, Ministry of Defence, and meetings at the political level between Greenland and Denmark, however, we were not able to collect such minutes as we were told that they had not been transcribed.

The policy cycle of the ACP has changed throughout the period we have been writing this project, therefore, we would have wished to talk with some of the interviewees again, to get new information on the changes, however, this was not always deemed possible. Not being able to follow up on our first round of interviews limited our access to opinions about the changing political landscape during our writing period. Additionally, the Inatsisartut and Naalakkersuisut changed throughout the policy process of the ACP, therefore, there have been different political actors involved on the Greenlandic side. This has limited us in the sense of

the actors we would have liked to include, some did not respond, and others could not speak about their previous positions, hence we had to work with old public statements.

Another minor limitation has been the language. Certain policy statements have been published in Danish, and thereby we had to translate some official documents and statements which are included in the project. When a translated text is used in the analysis we will indicate it by using square brackets, and then in a footnote we will have the original Danish text. This is done in order to showcase to the reader the original text, to further ensure that its context of it is not lost in translation. However, we have not perceived this as a great limitation to the project since two of us have Danish as a mother tongue, and we have great academic English skills.

## **4 Theory**

### **4.1 Public Policy – The policy cycle**

When a public policy is announced by a government there are numerous decisions made during the process of defining the policy, and these decisions are made by a vast number of individuals and organisations within the government (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 9). The policy cycle has simplified the analysis of a policy by only focusing on the relevant factors and actors involved; this entails a series of stages within the duration of a policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 11). The idea of simplifying the policy process by breaking the policy-making process down into stages was first presented by Harold Laswell. (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 11). Laswell divided the policy process into seven stages, which did not only describe how public policies were made, but also how they should be made: “1) intelligence; 2) promotion; 3) prescription; 4) invocation; 5) application; 6) termination and 7) appraisal” (in Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, pp. 11-12). The first part of the policy process began with intelligence, which entails the collection, processing, and dissemination of information. The following stage is promotion, which focuses on promoting particular options by those involved in making the decision. The third stage, prescription, the decision makers prescribed the chosen course of action. Following in the fourth stage, the prescribed course of action was referred to as a set of sanctions that was developed to penalise those who failed to comply with the prescriptions of the decision makers. The policy was then applied by the courts and bureaucracy and ran its course until it was terminated or cancelled. Lastly, the results of the policy were appraised or evaluated against the aims and goals of the original decision makers (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 12). Laswell’s formulation of the policy process was the foundation for many future models


of the policy process, which only improved and expanded on the topic of analysis when looking at public policies. Thus, an excessive number of different models of the policy cycle has been made throughout the years.

Howlett and Ramesh have formulated a variant of the policy cycle which focuses on the policy cycle and its relationship to applied problem solving. This model consists of five stages:

Applied Problem-Solving	Stages in Policy Cycle
1. Problem Recognition	1. Agenda-setting
2. Proposal of Solution	2. Policy Formulation
3. Choice of Solution	3. Decision-Making
4. Putting Solution into Effect	4. Policy Implementation
5. Monitoring Results	5. Policy Evaluation

*Figure 4: Each stage has its own focus on a problem. The figure displays the stages in the policy cycle with the corresponding problem-solving. The table is based on Howlett & Ramesh (2003, p. 13).*

Howlett and Ramesh's (2003) model of the policy cycle functions as a great analytical tool in understanding the complexity of the policy process by breaking it into five stages, each of which can be analysed alone or in relation to other stages within the cycle. The first stage, *agenda-setting*, refers to the process by which problems come to the attention of governments. The second stage, *policy formulation*, refers to how policies are formulated within the government. The third stage, *decision-making*, focuses on the process where governments adopt a particular course of action. The fourth stage, *policy implementation*, relates to how governments put the actual policy into effect. And lastly the fifth stage, *policy evaluation*, focuses on the processes by which the results of the policy are monitored (p. 13).



*Figure 5: The Policy Cycle consist of five stages of development in a policies life-span. A policy might reach evaluation or be rejected at any stage before then. The figure also includes the specific theories which will be applied in the analysis of agenda-setting and decision-making, respectively. Evaluation and Implementation has been shaded as the ACP has yet to reach these stages of the cycle.*

#### **4.1.1 Agenda-Setting**

The first step of the policy cycle investigates why and how some issues appear on the governmental agenda for action and others do not. Thus, this part of the cycle focuses on the issue and/or concern presented by the government. These presented issues or concerns can come from international actors, domestic actors, or both, or even pressed upon by the government itself (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 120). Agenda-setting, even though it is only one step in the policy cycle, is a rather long process. The issue or concern can originate in a variety of ways and undergo a long procedure before even being considered for resolution (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 120). This step of the policy cycle has a decisive impact on the entire policy process and its future outcomes, especially in how the government recognises the issue to be of such great character that it must be perceived publicly as a problem to the state

(Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 120). Thus, agenda-setting is believed to be the construction of a problem in the realm of public and private discourse.

This first stage of the policy cycle has a decisive impact on the policy process itself and its future outcomes. The manner of how a problem is recognised has a further influence on how it will be addressed by policy-makers (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 120). When the problem has been recognised by the government, the government accepts the problem to be a public problem and thus recommends a solution in the form of a policy. Therefore, it is important to look at how the government operates and thinks as this is of great significance when it 'frames' the problem and thereby the policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 121). The 'problems' that are subject to agenda-setting are constructions of public and private discourse, meaning that problems come into discourse and thereby into existence as ideologies. The problem signifies which actors are useful and which are dangerous. Furthermore, it defines which actions will be rewarded and which will be penalised. The problems are crucial in determining who exercises authority and who must accept it (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 121). These framings are not always agreed upon amongst different policy actors, therefore, there is often a clash of frames when it comes to agenda-setting, which simply indicates that policy actors do not always agree on what should and should not be a public problem (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 121).

In order to fully understand the agenda-setting, one must understand how the demands for a policy are made by individuals, groups, or both, and how they are met by the government, and the interaction vice versa. The conditions of where these demands come from must also be taken into consideration in order to understand the emerging policy discourse. Lastly, an important factor is the comprehension of the interests of both social and state actors, including institutional and ideological contexts in which they frame and present a problem (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 122).

#### **4.1.2 Policy Formulation**

The second stage of the policy cycle is policy formulation. This stage of the policy cycle focuses on what happens after the government has acknowledged the existence of a public problem. After the policy actors have decided upon the framing of the problem, they must present a course of action. Policy formulation aims at resolving the policy actors' perception of what is needed in society. Therefore, this stage involves assessing various solutions to the framed problem in the previous stage (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 143). In agenda-setting, the proposal of a solution may already have been presented, yet, this is not always the case. Thus, various solutions are discussed amongst the policy actors, until they have decided upon

one that is accepted amongst policy-makers (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 143). However, it must be said that even though a solution is agreed upon, it does not mean that all policy actors have the same beliefs in the manner of how the problem should be solved or even framed to the public.

When policy actors search for a solution to a problem, it implies that certain actions are considered to be technically capable of correcting a problem. If a problem is believed to be too difficult to solve, it will simply be eliminated by the policy actors (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 144). The way in which options are excluded from consideration by policy-makers in policy formulation indicates the policy options chosen for implementation at the decision-making stage of the policy process (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 144). Moreover, certain actors in the policy process can be advantaged over others if they are given a bigger say in how the policy formulation should come about. An example of such could be scientists or government specialists (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 144).

Policy formulation involves the recognition of technical and political constraints. Furthermore, the policy actors must recognise the limitations which decide what actions are truly capable of aiding the state with the 'problem' presented. These constraints are categorised as either substantive or procedural. Substantive constraints are essential to the nature of the framed problem itself. A substantive problem is categorised as 'objective' in the sense that redefining them does not make the problem go away. By solving the presented problem, it requires state money, information and personnel, the exercise of state authority, or any combination of these. On the other hand, procedural constraints have to do with procedures involved in adopting an option or carrying it out. These constraints can be either institutional or tactical. Institutional constraints can be those of the organisation of the state and the society, the established patterns of ideas and beliefs within it or a mixture of these. Certain beliefs or societies may inhibit some policy options and promote others which are more favourable to them (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 145).

#### **4.1.3 Decision-making**

The decision-making stage of the policy process emerges from formal or informal statements from public actors' intent to take action to the presented problem in the previous stages. This stage is rooted in the previous stages of the policy cycle (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 162). In the decision-making stage, the number of relevant policy actors decreases substantially, whereas the previous stages could include both state and societal actors in the policy process. However, when it comes to deciding upon the course of action, it is restricted to actors who

have the capacity and authority to make a public decision. At the micro level of decision-making, various rules often set out which decisions can and cannot be made by policy actors, as well as the procedures that must be followed as there are certain rules and standards for a policy to go through (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 164).

Regardless of who is the decision maker, only a few general types of decisions can emerge from this process. There are three types of choices: negative, positive, and non-decisions, these decisions can either perpetuate the policy status quo or deviate from it. 'Positive' decisions alter the status quo, whereas 'negative' decisions are the conscious choice to maintain the status quo, moreover, negative decisions are instances of seized policy cycles. Lastly, 'non-decisions' are options to deviate from the status quo which are entirely excluded from consideration, meaning that certain options are filtered out of the agenda-setting or policy formulation stages (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 165).

#### **4.1.4 Policy Implementation**

After a problem has been framed and presented publicly, various options have been explored in how to aid with the problem, the government and the policy actors have made a choice of which kind of aid is needed and the following step is converting the decision into practice. This stage, policy implementation, is where the decisions of the policy actors are translated into action. At this stage, one often experiences the creation of programs, policies, or both. While the general terms of the policy might have been agreed and understood long before, it is at this stage where it is required to be set into motion (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 185).

Within the state, there are authoritative decision makers, both political and administrative, who have significant influence within the implementation stage of the policy process. The decision makers are joined by additional members of the relevant policy subsystems (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 188). Target groups are intended to be altered by government action, meaning that they are expected to play a major direct and indirect role in the implementation process. Target groups often have great political and economic resources, which affect their role in the implementation of the policy. Powerful target groups which are in danger of being affected negatively by a policy can impact the implementation by supporting or opposing it. Therefore, it is often seen that regulators try to find a compromise with the hope of easing the implementation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 189)

Within policy implementation, there are different actors and activities to look at. Different bureaucratic agencies at contrasting levels of government act in this stage: national, provincial, and local. They are involved in implementing policy, however, each of these

agencies have their own interests, ambitions, and traditions which can further affect the implementation process and thereby shape the future outcome (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 187). Politicians are important actors when making the decisions affecting the implementation process as a lot of the day-to-day activities of the administration typically fall within their field. In most countries, there is a set of common laws, which are a set of principles governing the society, and how the people within it can or cannot act. Some of these laws come as 'acts', which usually designate a specific administrative agency as empowered to make the regulations which are needed in order to succeed with the implementation of the principles and aims of the enabling legislation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 187). The acts may also create a certain set of rules that must be followed with this stage, this may include offences and penalties for non-compliance with the law (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 187).

Regulations are made to give effect to these general principles. Thereafter, the regulations are prepared by civil servants who are employed by administrative agencies, often in conjunction with target groups (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, pp. 187-188). Regulations help cover most of the standards, including the criteria to be used to administer policy and how target groups should behave or perform. Summed up, this means that the command is given by an authorised body and the administration must control the target group in order to ensure compliance, this is believed to be the general form of implementation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 188).

#### **4.1.5 Policy Evaluation**

In this stage of the policy cycle, the solution will be assessed by the government as well as interested members of the policy subsystems, including the public, who make their own assessment of the workings and effects the policy has had. The assessment made by the public has the largest effect on the future of the policy as the public make out if they are in support of or in opposition to the policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 207). Therefore, the concept of policy evaluation refers to the stage of the policy process at which it is determined how a public policy has managed in action. A way to evaluate the policy is to look at its intentions and the results thereof. After the evaluation of a policy, the problem, and solution it presents, the policy may be rethought completely if the evaluation proves that the policy failed with its intentions. If the policy is rethought, it may circle back to the agenda-setting or another stage within the policy cycle. Reconceptualisation may entitle minor changes within the policy or even a fundamental reformulation of the framed problem, including terminating the policy altogether (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 207).



There are several actors within the policy evaluation process, it almost always involves bureaucrats and politicians within the government, who deal with the policy in question, most often it includes organised non-governmental members of policy subsystems (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 209). Furthermore, it may also involve the public, as it is the public that will have the ultimate say on a government's policy record when they vote at elections (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 209).

There are two extremes when it comes to policy evaluation. Firstly, policy analysts working in departments or specialised units in the administration, who routinely apply formal techniques such as cost-benefit analysis or maybe performance measures in order to assess the program outcomes and assess the policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 209). An analyst can have an impact on the subsequent rounds of policy-making due to the different roles they can play in the evaluation process. They can have an effect on the framing and assessment of the policy's success by how they apply various measures, indicators or even benchmarks to program outputs, sometimes serving as critics or advocates of approaches to problems. Moreover, they can serve as brokers linking policy-makers to implementers or to those outside the formal institutions of government, who are generating new knowledge on social problems and the techniques for resolving or attempting to resolve these problems (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 209). On the other hand, there are public protests which are arranged by interest groups who make their own evaluation of the policy. This kind of evaluation is perceived as informal and external to the policy loop. This sort of evaluation may involve critiques of both the substance and process of the policy, moreover, it can lead to changes in administrative organisations and procedures. This may affect the amount of access to information by the public (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 209).

Besides these two extremes, there are also a variety of other means of policy evaluators in government and society. These include the judiciary, which is able to review legislative and administrative actions in order to determine the extent to which policies can live up to the established principles of social justice and conduct (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 210). Furthermore, it also includes efforts on the part of administrators to bring public views into the evaluative process through the use of such procedural instruments including focus groups, surveys, inquiries, and task forces (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 210). In conclusion, evaluation includes both informal and spontaneous responses to policy measures. Therefore, it also involves, not only authoritative decision makers and members of policy subsystems who are active at the formulation and implementation stages of the policy process, but also those in the agenda-setting stage (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 210).

## 4.2 What's the Problem Represented to be? (WPR)

Bacchi's (2009) notion of "what's the problem represented to be?" constitutes an approach to policy analysis. This approach offers an alternative perspective as opposed to the typical concept that the development of policy is the government's method of dealing with so-called 'problems' (Bacchi, 2009, p. 1). This generic type of policy analysis is heavily focused on the government's reaction to problems, whereas WPR aims to view policy as a government's active creation (Bacchi, 2009, p. 1). Building on this, Bacchi (2009) argues that this manner of understanding policies is not purposeful "manipulation or misrepresentation," but rather it is a necessity for developing policy, based on the notion that all policies "contain implicit representations of 'problems'" by nature, through seeking change in the status quo (p. 1).

Moreover, the relevance of WPR as a tool is highlighted through the idea that how a 'problem' is represented leads to several implications such as "how the people involved are treated, and are invoked to think about themselves" (Bacchi, 2009, p.1). Bacchi (2009) underlines that policy development constitutes new dimensions to consider in terms of policy 'problems', demonstrating the key importance of the "creative or productive role of government in shaping particular understandings of 'problems'" (p. 2).

In order to better understand WPR, Bacchi's approach consists of six interrelated questions, which should be applied to whichever problem representation. These questions are presented as:

1. What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences?  
Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?  
(Bacchi, 2009, p. 2)

### 1) What is the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy?

Bacchi's first question in the WPR looks at the problem representation. Bacchi (2009) argues that "how you feel about something determines what you suggest doing about it" (pp. 2-3),

thus suggesting that the proposed policy intervention reveals how the actors think about the presented problem. Moreover, Bacchi does not believe policy makers to be the ‘problem solvers’, on the contrary, the ‘problem’ is a significant part of the policy process, the ‘problem’ is chosen and framed because the actors have an idea as to how to fix it. The WPR approach works “backwards” from the proposal in order to reveal what is truly framed as the ‘problem’ within the policy (Bacchi, 2009, p. 3). The goal in the first question in this approach is therefore to identify the implied problem representation in the specific policy proposal. This could be done by looking at where the funds are targeted within a proposal (Bacchi, 2009, p. 4).

**2) What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?**

After the problem has been identified within the policy, one must look at the understanding which underpins the identified problem representation (Bacchi, 2009, p. 5). The second question looks at which presuppositions or assumptions are implied within a presented problem. This does not entail the assumptions or beliefs held by the policy makers, instead it focuses on the ones lodged within the problem representation. This entails a look into the cultural values of the society in which the policy is proposed (Bacchi, 2009, p. 5).

**3) How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?**

The question within Bacchi’s approach seeks to highlight the conditions that allow the problem representation to take shape and to assume dominance within society (Bacchi, 2009, p. 11). The question has two interconnected objectives; the first being the reflection on the specific developments and decisions which have contributed to the formation and the identification of the presented problem, the second seeks to recognise how the problem representation exists both over time and across space, thereby implying that things could have developed entirely differently (Bacchi, 2009, p. 10). Therefore, the meaning of this question is to trace the history of the problem representation by looking at how the policy has moulded through time, by doing so it is possible to get a full understanding of the evolution of the problem.

**4) What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?**

The objective of this question is to raise reflections, consideration issues, and perspectives silenced in the presented problem (Bacchi, 2009, p. 13). This question focuses on what fails to be problematised. Thus, this part of the approach draws attention to tensions and contradictions in problem presentations by highlighting the limitations of the problem and how it is presented (Bacchi, 2009, p. 13).

**5) What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?**

The goal of question five is to identify the effects of specific problem representations so that they can be critically assessed (Bacchi, 2009, p. 15). This question focuses on how the WPR approach starts from the presumption that some problem representations create certain difficulties for members of certain social groups (Bacchi, 2009, p. 15). Therefore, the aim is to be able to point out which aspects of a framed problem has unfavourable effects for certain groups (Bacchi, 2009, p. 18).

**6) How/where is this representation of the ‘problem’ produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?**

The last part of the WPR approach directs attention to practices and processes that allow certain problem representations to dominate. Thus, it must be questioned whether the means through particular problem presentations to reach the targeted audience can achieve legitimacy (Bacchi, 2009, p. 19). In summary, this question pays attention to the means through which a framed problem can become dominant as well as the possibility of challenging the framed problem as being too harmful to certain parts of society (Bacchi, 2009, p. 19).

### **4.3 Incrementalism**

The debate about how to explain the behaviour of policy decision makers goes back half a century. The two opposing models emerged: 1) Rationalism is grounded in the notion that policy makers will always attempt to maximise the output of their policy, meaning that they seek the largest wanted effect for the smallest costs possible. Rationalists will therefore explore all available alternatives to conclude which policy is most effective. 2) Incrementalism, on the other hand, stresses the importance of previous policies in the decision-making process, arguing that policy makers consider errors of the past and thus present policies not too different from the status quo. Incrementalists acknowledge the limited resources for investigating all policy alternatives and recognise the influence from political compromises (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, pp. 165-171).

The discussion of whether a decision-making environment is primarily characterised by incrementalism or rationalism can be determined based on two dimensions. Firstly, decision-making is characterised by the objectives of the actors participating in the decision-making. The objectives of the multiple actors can be examined to be either predominantly conflictual or consensual. A conflictual set of objectives is formed by a misalignment in the articulated end goal of a policy. If the participants of the decision-making process disagree about the values that should be expressed in the policy or simply a disagreement in the success criteria for the policy in question. On the other hand, if the actors responsible for making the

decision reach or already are in agreement about what values define the policy, the objectives can be regarded as consensual (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, p. 43).

The second dimension in which one can study a decision environment is according to the distribution of knowledge among the participants in the decision-making process. Hayes (in Morcol, 2007) argues that policy makers rarely have full comprehension of the topic of a policy (p. 44). While some decision makers may have extensive knowledge or be convinced that they have, participants may often experience that they do not agree on the knowledge base of the policy. The knowledge base should be understood as the fundamental set of beliefs about cause-effect relationships. This dimension can be determined to be largely consensual if the participants each have extensive background knowledge as well as a shared logic about the consequences of the respective policy (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, p. 44).

By studying the two dimensions of decision-making theory, one can combine the results of conflictual or consensual objectives and knowledge. The merger of these dimensions leaves us with a matrix that exhibits when a decision-making environment should be considered dominated by rationalism or incrementalism.

<p><b>Rational decision making:</b> Consensual Knowledge Consensual Objectives</p>	<p><b>Problems of knowledge base:</b> Conflictual Knowledge Consensual Objectives</p>
<p><b>Problems of value conflict:</b> Consensual Knowledge Conflictual Objectives</p>	<p><b>Normal incrementalism:</b> Conflictual Knowledge Conflictual Objectives</p>

*Figure 6: The table shows the typology of the decision environment. The combination of the two dimensions of decision-making analysis leaves us with four different types of environments, two of main theoretical strands, rationalism and incrementalism, being represented in combined consensual and conflictual environments, respectively. Based on Table 3.1 (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, p. 44).*

As mentioned, incrementalism argues that new policies are only marginally different from previous policies. This is to ensure that a policy experiences wide societal support, as the previous policy has been accepted to a point where it could be implemented. Policies are therefore not revolutionary nor do they redefine the premise of the given policy field. (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, pp. 40-41).

As policy makers become wellversed about a certain line of policies, they become less inclined to change direction. Incrementalism argues that policy makers prioritise to build on a foundation of policies with which they are familiar. Thus, new policies will not diverge significantly from the policies already in effect (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, p. 42).

This project will employ the notion of incrementalism as a foundation for trying to explain the decision-making process of the Danish government and Naalakkersuisut, respectively. Their interaction and conflict or consensus will be subject to analysis in the decision-making stage of the policy cycle. As an extended step in the policy cycle, the decision-making will be scrutinised based on the incrementalism approach to analysing decision environments. Statements and quotes from politicians and the centre of the decision-making process will be the data laying the ground for the decision-making stage of the policy cycle.

## **5 Data Analysis**

The data analysis of this project will be divided into five stages each in correspondence to the five stages of the policy cycle.

### **5.1 Agenda-setting**

Greenland has, for a long time, been of lower priority to the Danish political agenda, however, in the recent years there has been a greater change in this aspect. Olsvig, PhD student at Ilisimatusarfik, believed that the Danish interest increased in accordance to the international interests in Greenland:

“With the Russian flag planting in 2007 and then in 2008, it comes the Ilulissat Declaration and Great Power competition is suddenly also visible in the Arctic, right? So, the US has also had the need to catch up with everybody around them, becoming more and more clear on their Arctic policies and strategies. So, they have had a need to catch up on that which has then sort of created a situation where the US is also calling to Denmark to do things that they didn't think they maybe they realized we're not done well enough. For example, the surveillance of Greenland territory” (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:13:43)

By this, Olsvig implies that the US was a big actor in the agenda setting stage, as they nudged Denmark to act in their territory due to significant interest from other states including Russia.

Moreover, not only are there Arctic states that have a greater interest in the territory, but also China has had its eyes on the Arctic. Olsvig points this out by stating that "... there's a development over the last 10 to 15 years where a lot of other states and also non-Arctic states that call themselves near-Arctic, for example China" (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:13:43). Olsvig uses the term 'near-Arctic' states for countries who do not have any territorial rights in the Arctic, however, they do see themselves as beneficiaries and thus state themselves to be near-Arctic, even though geographically they do not have any relation to the region.

The Arctic has gotten a lot of international attention in the last couple of years, especially Greenland. It can be argued that one of the reasons why the ACP came about was due to this increased attention. A civil servant from the Ministry of Defence stated that

"I think the Arctic was very much on the agenda in the media and the public, and we had Trump with the wanted to buy Greenland, so Arctic was ... very much a theme. And it was a concern about the increased Russian and Chinese presence in the region. So, I think it was a major political priority to say, OK, we have a possibility to make some enhancements to this area and put it on the agenda" (personal communication, March 23, 2022, 00:35:57).

The same civil servant believed that there had been a certain international pressure to do more in Greenland, and with all eyes focused on the Arctic it gave the Danish government greater interest (civil servant b, personal communication, March 23, 2022, 00:38:59).

The ACP is described as having a dual usage in terms of both answering to these international pressures and interests as well as improving Greenlandic social welfare. The Danish government has, for some time, presented Greenlandic social welfare, especially the lack of education and opportunities for young people in Greenland, as a significant issue. Heinrich, a Greenlandic diplomat, stated that "there was a Greenlandic desire to raise the educational level and [the ACP] would include a training program for young Greenlanders or mainly men. And that would be a positive step" (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:02:38). This is perceived to be a matter of importance from both the Greenlandic and the Danish side, as it is believed that this could improve the social welfare of Greenland. However, Heinrich does point out that the part of the ACP which focuses on the increase of military presence is not beneficial to the Greenlandic people in the same manner: "... But from the

Greenland government, there is a wish to have this training of young people, not as a military training, but as what you call it, search and rescue angle” (personal communication, March 25, 00:02:38). By stating this Heinrich points out that Greenland and the Naalakkersuisut do not want any more military presence, as they want to remain a peaceful actor in the Arctic. Another actor within the agenda setting stage of the policy cycle, professor at the Royal Danish Military Academy, Major Gram Pedersen, pointed out that “if you take what is the major issue is in Greenlandic politics, it's actually social welfare. It's education, it's the internal problems with youth education, crime and stuff like that” (personal communication, March 24, 00:12:17). Heinrich and Major Gram Pedersen, as two of the presenting actors we have within this stage, point out the major concerns of the Greenlandic people and the government. Therefore, it can be argued that since the topic of education in Greenland is of such concern it was taken up by the Danish government, in order to aid them in solving the problem.

The increased international interest and the Greenlandic social welfare have both been presented as concerns both by the Danish government as well as the Naalakkersuisut. The intention of aiding with these issues is created as a joint effort, and the ACP is better described to have a dual usage. Moreover, this presentation of the ACP indicates that the problem is crucial in the matter that international powers, e.g., Russia and China, are getting closer to the Arctic region, and being more open about their interests. The dangerous actors are thus the international powers engaging more in the region, as this is presented to be the reason for surveillance. Furthermore, the social welfare in Greenland and the possibilities for the youth's need to be improved. This also makes out who are supposed to be the exercising authority, the Danish military, and who must accept the new measures, the Greenlandic youth who will participate in the basic military training.

### **5.1.1 What is the problem represented to be in the ACP?**

Bacchi's WPR approach in this part of the analysis is utilised in order to ensure that the interviewees' statements and beliefs to be the problem is backed up by this theory. Bacchi's approach looks at a government's active reaction, this one being the ACP, and how it frames a problem in the society, as it is believed that a policy implicitly entails a problem with the status quo. This part of the analysis will be divided into six questions, each trying to figure out how the problem is represented within the ACP.

#### **1. What is the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy?**



The ACP states that due to the rapidly changing situation in the Arctic, which is all due to global warming making greater access to natural resources as well as opening new trading routes, many states have increased their focus on the Arctic region. The ACP highlights this by pointing out one of the great powers who are showing greater interest: “Russia is increasing its activity and military build-up in the region” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021). By stating that Russia is increasing its activities and military in the Arctic, the Danish government is implying that Russia is a great threat in the Arctic region, and therefore Denmark must take action. It is even stated that this is “a responsibility we must take seriously” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021). The solution to this problem is believed to be a matter of ensuring security in Greenland: “The Danish Defence will be strengthened with new capabilities to monitor the increased activity in the region” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021). It could be argued that the main issue which the ACP presents is the increased accessibility that other states will have to Greenland. However, by looking at where the funds of the ACP are being invested, it could be argued that the ACP is focusing mostly on the problem of ‘enemies’ entering and claiming parts of the territory which they are not entitled to. The funds of the ACP are mainly being targeted at increasing surveillance in Greenland by giving 1.5 billion DKK to increase the Danish Defence and to support civil society, in addition, the policy will have operating expenses of 300 million DKK annually. The biggest investment of the ACP is the long-endurance surveillance drones in Greenland costing approximately 750 million DKK (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021). Therefore, it can be said that the problem which the ACP presents is Russian increased actions in the Arctic, and therefore, there must be an increased Danish military presence, which in this case is increased surveillance in Greenland, as it is indicated that the solution is investing in drones.

Furthermore, one of the other investments which the ACP focuses on is basic military training in Greenland, this is further described as

“a new basic military training will be established in cooperation with Naalakkersuisut in order to strengthen Greenlandic citizens’ opportunities to take part in the defence of Greenland. The training will also support the emergency management and the voluntary force in Greenland” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021).

This investment is given 50 million DKK, even if this is not one of the bigger expenses of the ACP – arguably due to the large expenses of the unmanned drones and the radar system in the

Faroe Islands – it is still a large investment of both social welfare in Greenland and local military capabilities. Therefore, it can be argued that another problem which is represented in the ACP is the Greenlandic youth's opportunities in Greenland, and by investing in local education it could hopefully assist in removing this social problem.

## **2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?**

The problems presented within the ACP are the increased Russian activities in the Arctic and the lack of opportunities and education in Greenland. In the case of the former, it could be argued that the underlying assumption made by the Danish government is that Greenland is a vulnerable territory due to the peaceful Greenlandic notion and the lack of military presence, as well as the lack of surveillance, which only enhances Greenland's vulnerability in the case of Russian aggression in the Arctic. This point is also made by Major Gram Pedersen who believes that the Greenlandic history and the lack of wars in the state have influenced their perception of international affairs:

“If you look at Europe, well all states actually, the Europe we know today have actually come out of a lot of wars. So, a state in Europe has a king, has an army and thereby has a sovereignty and survive as a state. And that's a part of our history. ... So it's a natural, it's a cultural thing how the state is and that a military and war is a part of history. That's not the same with the Arctic region. The Greenlandics, the Innuits and indigenous people don't come from a state that is built on wars and building up an army, they have another cultural background” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, *00:17:57*).

As Major Gram Pedersen states it is not part of the Greenlandic history and culture to protect itself with the utilisation of military or aggression. Thus, it goes against Greenlandic culture to increase a military presence. It is not only the international assumption that Greenland is peaceful, but also the desire of the Greenlandic people to be perceived as such. Lyng-Rasmussen, Greenlandic Parliamentarian and the Chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee in Inatsisartut, stated that

“[people still think that we live in igloos. And that is the image we would like to maintain, in the sense that we are peaceful. We are not violent. Not that, we don't have high statistics, but we are not the type

that would go to war]<sup>7</sup>” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:32:38)

With this statement Parliamentarian Lyng-Rasmussen confirms the Danish government’s assumption of the Greenlandic cultural values of maintaining the image of being a peaceful nation.

The second presented problem within the ACP is the lack of opportunities and education in Greenland. This problem is based on the Danish government’s assumption that the Greenlandic people do not take an education due to the lack of accessibility. This assumption is also recognised by Henrik Dahl, spokesperson from the Liberal Alliance party, who was one of the Danish parliamentarians presenting the ACP: “Especially, I take positive note that the agreement provides the young people in Greenland with the possibility for good training” (Ministry of Defence, 2021). By stating that the ACP provides the possibility for good training, Dahl is implying that there is a greater lack of it, thus confirming the above-mentioned assumption. Moreover, Major Gram Pedersen also points out this assumption from the Greenlandic point of view:

“[Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament] ... and I talked, and she was like, ‘OK, why? Why do we say no to free education in Greenland, when we actually are in lack of education possibilities for young people?’” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:12:17).

Chemnitz Larsen may not present the entirety of the Greenlandic peoples’ values, but as a Greenlandic politician she does democratically represent the Greenlandic people, furthermore, she does have some knowledge of the Greenlandic society and what it could possibly benefit from. Thus, her statement can be argued to indicate some aspects of the Greenlandic opinion on the lack of education and opportunities in Greenland and thereby the cultural values.

### **3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?**

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<sup>7</sup> Danish original text: “folk tror stadigvæk, at vi bor i igloer. Og det er den image, vi gerne vil beholde, in the sense, at vi er fredelige. Vi er ikke voldelige. Altså ikke, vi har statistikker der er ekstremt høje, men vi er ikke typerne der gerne vil i krig”

When looking at how the representation of the problem came about, it is important to look at the history and evolution of the policy. The policy had its start back in the Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017, where it was decided that there should be a conduction of a comprehensive analysis of the future tasks in the Arctic. This analysis was meant to be utilised as the foundation for the development of the Danish defence capabilities. The analysis was published in 2016 and thus given the name Arctic Analysis of 2016. On January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2018, a majority in the Danish parliament presented a new Defence Agreement 2018-2023. This agreement included a chapter focusing on the initiatives which intend to strengthen the Danish presence and surveillance of the Arctic region in the Kingdom of Denmark. The following year, the Supplemental Defence Agreement of 2019 funnelled an additional 1.5 billion DKK to the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic and North Atlantic regions, however, it was not allocated. In April of 2019, the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, stated that Greenland should have a larger say in foreign affairs (Background, pp. 4-10). This is what arguably qualifies as the ACPs most recent history and portrays how the ACP got moulded through the past years.

Arguably, the idea of creating a policy which focused on surveillance in the Arctic came from the Arctic Analysis 2016. The analysis itself states that this is not a new interest of the Danish government: “The missions and responsibilities of the [Ministry of Defence] in the Arctic areas of the Kingdom of Denmark have been formed and developed over several decades” (Arctic Analysis, 2016). However, it can be argued that the Arctic Analysis focused more, than seen before, on the surveillance of Greenland. Rasmus Leander Nielsen, Professor at Ilisiatusarfik and head of the Center for Foreign and Security Policies, states that “there was rumour that there was something on the way. And we knew that the Danish Ministry of Defence had something in the pipeline that included the Arctic and also going back to former Arctic Report 2016” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:00:23). Leander Nielsen states that the ACP has been a work in progress for some time, but he argues that it originated from the Arctic Analysis of 2016.

It is important to note that the ACP has been moulded by the Arctic Analysis of 2016, however, it has also been moulded by the regional development in the Arctic. The environmental changes in the Arctic with the ice melting and leading the way for new trading routes have led to greater interests in the region, especially economic interests, and international investments. The increase in global interest has further led to global tensions when it comes to regional security. Therefore, it can be argued that more activity in the Arctic has led to more security, moreover, increased security brings with it more activity, thus creating a circle of reactions. Thereby, the ACP has been moulded both by the Arctic Analysis 2016

creating a blueprint for future missions of the Danish Ministry of Defence in the Arctic, however, this only came about due to the need for more surveillance and security in the Arctic.

#### **4. What if left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences?**

##### **Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?**

The silence of this problem representation is the Greenlandic point of view on the matter of the ACP, especially how the problems should be handled. On the one hand, we have the Danish government’s decision to increase its military presence in Greenland due to the problem of Russian aggression in the Arctic. However, Greenland is not interested in increasing military presence, as it wants to ensure its peaceful image in the Arctic. Pele Broberg, member of Inatsisartut and former Naalakkersuisoq for Foreign Affairs, stated that

“[Here in the Arctic, we do not have the tradition to be armed ... Greenland is one of the cofounders of the Arctic Council, and one of the main concerns is to ensure that Arctic is not a zone of conflict. We follow this doctrine. Therefore, we are not interested in military material]<sup>8</sup>” (Filtenborg, 2021).

Broberg highlights that military in Greenland goes against the cultural beliefs against aggression, or what could be perceived as aggression, in the territory, as Greenland believes in the Arctic being a non-conflict zone. The current chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee, Lyng-Rasmussen, agrees with Broberg’s statement:

“But not military. I’m always very careful of saying military or surveillance because as long as we say more military or more weapons or anything like that, I know that it would be a wrong step towards what [Greenland] is wishing for, if we are wishing for peace” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:05:23).

It is important to note that the two politicians are from different parties: Naleraq and Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA). The two parties agree that Greenland should be more sovereign, however, they

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<sup>8</sup> Danish original text: “Her i Arktis har vi ikke tradition for at være våbenførende, ... Grønland er en af medstifterne til Arktisk Råd, og et af hovedområderne er, at man vil sikre, at Arktis ikke er en konfliktzone. Den doktrin følger vi. Derfor er vi ikke interesserede i militært isenkram”

are very different in other aspects of their political ideologies. Therefore, these two statements reflect the beliefs of a broad spectrum of the population of Greenland.

On the other hand, there is the problem concerning the lack of education and opportunities in Greenland. The Danish government seeks to aid with this problem by establishing a new basic military training, which is believed to strengthen Greenlandic citizens' opportunities (Agreement on Arctic Capabilities, 2021). Olsvig points out that this military training is not the type of education that Greenland needs:

“I don't see in Greenland that there has been a thorough debate on concluding that there should be a development of a military education in Greenland, educating Greenlandic persons to being soldiers. And I think it is very important to differentiate between the two, and I have not seen that happen yet” (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:06:18)

The Danish government might offer new opportunities for the Greenlandic people; however, it is not the Greenlandic request to have greater opportunities to take part in the defence of Greenland. The military training goes against their peaceful culture, especially since the desired outcome of this training is to create more soldiers who are already located in Greenland.

##### **5. What effects are produced by the representation of the problem?**

In this case, the social group that will experience the effects of the represented problems within the ACP is the Greenlandic population, as it does not have a say on policies concerning foreign affairs. Moreover, when looking at the political relations, the presented problems also affect the political actors in Greenland, as they go against the peaceful ideology which Greenland aspires to uphold, however, the political actors can not live up to this since this is overruled by the Danish government.

This representation of the problem and the framed solution thereof is increasing the military presence in Greenland. A concern on the Greenlandic behalf is that this will affect how other states in the Arctic perceive these actions, and thereby create a security dilemma. Lynge-Rasmussen points out how the increase in military may cause a security dilemma:

“When Mette Frederiksen said that American troops will be on Danish ground we were frightened, because as soon as someone puts a military base or reacts in some way, if it is America, Russia or China, they all

react the same, getting closer to the Arctic” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

Lynge-Rasmussen’s statement about American soldiers is in regard to Prime Minister Frederiksen, who made an agreement with the US about defence cooperation between the two states (Berlingske, 2022). This was presented as American military on Danish soil, therefore, the lack of explaining exactly what Danish soil entails frightened the political actors in Greenland. Lynge-Rasmussen was especially worried that the other great powers might misunderstand ‘Danish soil’ to be equivalent to ‘the Kingdom of Denmark’, and that this could further imply that there would be American soldiers in Greenland, which would create a reaction from the other great powers to move closer to the Arctic and increase their military in the region. Lynge-Rasmussen further elaborates on the fear of international interests in Greenland:

“[I fear what a military presence might mean to us and if [the Greenlandic people] understand what it means to us. We know that the great powers have always been mobilised towards the Arctic. Which is also why I believe that we carry a huge responsibility, us sitting in the parliament and as ministers. What we decide for them, and on behalf of them. So you can always discuss what the normal Greenlandic beliefs about drones and emergency preparedness. Because I know, that if we found oil and began exporting it. then I know that the USA might have another face towards us, because we have oil. ... But we should not be naive about what the USA also would do. That we are also individuals or special. We may belong to Denmark and the Western world, but we also have our own interests and our own wishes about independence and peace and cooperation]”<sup>9</sup> (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:46:55).

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<sup>9</sup> Danish original text: “Jeg frygter lidt for hvad en mere militær tilstedeværelse betyder for os og at de forstår hvad det betyder for os. vi ved at stormagterne hele tiden har været mobiliseret mod Arktis. Det er også derfor jeg mener, at vi bærer et kæmpe ansvar, os som sidder i parlamentet og som ministre. hvad vi beslutter for dem, på vegne af dem. Så man kan altid diskutere, hvad den almene grønlander mener om droner og beredskab. Fordi jeg ved, at hvis vi fandt olie og begyndte at eksportere det. Så ved jeg at USA måske har et helt andet ansigt

Lynge-Rasmussen mentions that there is a general fear of the great powers and their increased interest in Greenland. She explains how Naalakkersuisut have the responsibility to protect the Greenlandic ideology of a peaceful nation and that it is Naalakkersuisut's job to protect the people of Greenland against these global interests. In conclusion, the creation of the presented problem within the ACP has created a fear that more international interests in the Arctic and Greenland will bring with it a security dilemma, which will only further increase the military presence.

#### **6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been questioned, disrupted and replaced?**

In this last part of the analysis, it is appropriate to look at the means through which the represented problems reach its target audience and thereby achieve legitimacy. In the case of the ACP, the target audience is the people of Greenland. In this case, one should understand how there is a lack of communication from the Danish government to Naalakkersuisut, and thereby, a complicated flow before reaching the Greenlandic people. Lynge-Rasmussen point this out:

“I've noticed some frustrations of the lack of us being invited and in dialogue with the Danish government. And when I mentioned that I was in Brussels to visit NATO in March, and I met with an [official]. And I spoke about that it was frustrating that our member of this party in [the parliament], Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, always has to, like she finds out that there's a meeting about the Arctic, or Arctic military or NATO, an hour before the actual meeting. And she has to pressure through getting involved and getting a seat at the table” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49)

This is an example of how Greenland is not taken into consideration in the communication of international affairs. Despite not having any constitutional rights to interfere with the policy, Lynge-Rasmussen still believes Greenland should be allowed a seat at the table. Moreover,

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mod os, fordi vi har olie. ... Men vi skal heller ikke være naive til hvad USA også kan finde på. At vi også er individuelle eller specielle. Vi tilhører godt nok Danmark og den Vestlige verden, men vi har også vores egne interesser og vores egne ønsker om selvstændighed og fred og samarbejde.”



Lynge-Rasmussen looks towards the Danish Parliament for the lack of these communication flows:

“I am not blaming our government, I am blaming much more on the Danish Parliament [for not] involving us. So I am hoping that telling them that this is not a first class deal for us, will be a better one for the next time” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:25:21)

This last part of Lynge-Rasmussen’s statement highlights her belief that including Greenland in the negotiations on policies affecting Greenland will have a more desirable outcome for both parties, as they can make an agreement that benefits both nations, and does not need to go through a long complicated policy process.

Heinrich also points out the poor communication flows between Denmark and Greenland, especially in the sense that information is passed on to Greenland too late in the process:

“there is a wish from Greenland to get more information to be included on an equal basis. And again, it is a work in progress. So I think you could say there are difficulties on how to do the work and we of course, feel it here also that we might get the information shortly before a decision has been communicated. And the same goes for people in Nuuk, in the government administration. So there is a frustration that it's not optimal at the moment and communications and inclusion” (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:15:44).

Heinrich, as well as Lynge-Rasmussen, mention the Greenlandic interest of being included in the policy process, and other affairs, which may concern or be of interest to Greenland. However, Greenland is limited and excluded from such affairs by the Danish government. Lynge-Rasmussen even states that often, when it comes to international affairs, Greenlandic officials receive the information from official news sources as it is not communicated directly to Nuuk from the Danish government (personal communication, May 13, 2022).

It could be argued that this lack of communication between the Danish government and Naalakkersuisut was the reason why the policy was declined by the Greenlandic side, and thereafter, halted for over a year. The then Naalakkersuisoq, Pele Broberg, declined the ACP stating that Greenland was not interested in military presence within Greenlandic territory.

However, if Greenland had been more included in the construction of the ACP, then the intentions of the policy could have been phrased differently and thus the policy process could arguably have been significantly shorter. Instead, the ACP was halted and later rephrased so that the current Naalakkersuisoq, Vivian Motzfeldt, could actually sign the policy on behalf of Greenland. In short, the representation of the problems in the ACP was defended only by the Danish government, which caused a Greenlandic disruption of the policy. This, hereafter, obligated the Danish government to rephrase and replace the ACP if it wanted to have the Naalakkersuisut on board with the policy.

To sum up the agenda-setting stage of the ACP, the Danish government constructed the discourse considering the represented problems and by not including Greenland in how to represent the problem of, firstly, Russian aggressions in the Arctic, secondly, the lack of opportunities in regard to education in Greenland. The Danish government failed to construct the policy in a manner that made it inclusive of the society it would affect. The construction of the policy thereby also determines the exercising authority, being the Danish government, and the accepting party, the Greenlandic people. This relationship between the two countries is so deeply rooted due to the constitutions giving the Danish government the rights to decide on international affairs in regards to Greenland. The people who this policy is affecting are mainly Greenland and its people, and this is especially seen in the effects and reactions the policy has brought with it, mainly them being negative - in the sense of them being based on fear. Moreover, it is important to note that it was international demands of Denmark to act in the Arctic region, which led to Danish policy actors reacting and creating the ACP.

## **5.2 Policy-formulation**

In this stage, the analysis will be split into two different sections; the first being direct policy formulation, and the second being indirect policy formulation. The choice to separate the two is done to highlight the position of the policy actors and their power within the policy process. Thus, the direct section will mainly contain content from government officials, as well as official policy papers as these forms of data are from sources that actually have the direct control of how the policy can be formed. The indirect section will mainly contain data from experts who have provided input into the policy process by way of acting as a consultant for direct policy actors, thus putting emphasis on the relevance of their presentation of course of action.

In terms of direct policy formulation, as mentioned, the actors that are relevant are official government actors that are able to provide courses of action. In this case, these actors

are more advantaged as they have a larger say in the process. There are several areas of thought within this stage, firstly, civilian use. According to civil servants in the Ministry of Defence, one of the most important aspects of formulating the ACP was highlighting the dual-use feature, specifically the inclusion of civilian aspects. It was stated that

“civilian use can be more surveillance [that] will secure sailing around him and maybe Greenlandic companies can beat the procurement or they can work in what do you call it, maintenance? So that's the civilian part... And then there's the military contractors, obviously. And so. It's a dual use, if it's not possible, then if it's only military and company, civilian will still do it. But the main purpose is that we can do dual use” (personal communication, March 23, 2022, *00:04:21*).

This specific aspect of the policy formulation aims at resolving the perception of what is needed for the Greenlandic community, from the Danish perspective. The mention of civilian aspects evidences the consideration on the Danish side to acknowledge benefits for the Greenlandic population, whilst still deciding what actions are truly plausible of aiding the state with the ‘problem’ presented.

Another aspect of direct policy formulation is that of education. From the Kingdom of Denmark’s perspective, a policy suggestion was the military education or conscription of Greenlandic civil society by way of a local training facility. According to civil servants in the Ministry of Defence, there was intent to include

“basic Educational benefits. [...] It's just so they can. Yeah, yeah. Have the [“basic military training”] in Greenland. Yeah. And then see if they want to go further and then they have to go to Denmark to do the education for officer” (personal communication, March 23, 2022, *00:18:45*).

This proposal intended to satisfy the Greenlandic need for increased education among civil society. It was also mentioned in the Principle Agreement whereby it stated “In addition, the new education in Greenland could increase the number of locals being employed in the Danish Armed Forces after completing their training” (Ministry of Defence, 2022). Lynge-Rasmussen acknowledges the notion of the education options on the Kingdom of Denmark’s side, but proposes that Greenland should benefit more. Notably, the perception that

“[Greenland] should get more out of it, not in money, just by having some participation in that. I know that there's a 20 Something young people to have a [civil defence education] in that package as well. But I said 20? it could be hundreds” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

From the Greenlandic view, the policy should encompass more benefits, and thus is perceived as insufficient.

As mentioned in the background, the policy was halted due to some disagreements on the Greenlandic side; in terms of education proposals, the military perspective was not satisfactory (Background, pp. 4-10). This point is then clarified through the civil servants' further statement on the basic training, identifying a policy proposal change to a larger civilian benefit;

“But the basic training that we were talking about before has a huge civilian part in it for civil preparedness and rescue. So they can also use it to become a fireman or something else in the Greenlandic society afterwards” (personal communication, March 23, 2022, 00:19:50).

Arguably, this solution is aimed to give the Greenlandic society financial benefits, on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark. Lynge-Rasmussen also notes that she is “extremely happy that it's not more military presence, it's more of civilian surveillance and [civil defence]” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:00:31). As the theory identifies, not all policy actors have the same beliefs about how the problem should be solved or even framed to the public, and in this case, it is clear that the Greenlandic side does not agree with the proposal of increased military education. The policy formulation stage intends to resolve policy actors' perception of what is needed in society. There is evidently a disconnect in what these two governmental groups see as needed within the community; an increased military presence as opposed to civil preparedness.

Another noteworthy area of policy formulation is economic development. The Kingdom of Denmark argues that the halting of the ACP was due to the economic requests on behalf of Greenland. Thus, when asked about the reasoning behind the policy standstill from Greenland's perspective, civil servants from the Ministry of Defence stated that “[Greenland] don't want to change anything. They just want to make sure that the Greenlandic society get some economic benefits out of our presence” (personal communication, March 23, 2022,

00:12:52). It is clear that the Kingdom of Denmark understands the lack of financial benefits as the cause for the freeze in the policy process, and thus aimed to create some economic incentives, via the educational proposals. One can argue that this is the reason behind the formulation of the ACPAP which states that “A preliminary assessment expects that the initiatives in Greenland will bring around 20 new jobs in Greenland, primarily in Nuuk and Kangerlussuaq” (ACPAP, 2022). Although, arguably, Greenland’s parliament does not agree with only financial incentives. Instead, Lyng-Rasmussen states

“I'm not thinking money, or how much money we're giving to the military. It's our island that is talked about, it's our Arctic that is talked about. And in our image, we don't think, How much money do we put this in this and that thinking NATO or military, I think, in our image, just can we have a saying? can we have within which I responded, we just want to be a part of the democracy. Having a saying at all. If we give a million 100 million or zero Kroners, we want to be invited when it comes to us. And that's why I think it's very important to have a saying this ACP. And if I can get to the ACP. And what we've get got out of it, I think we can have whatever it was presented to us in the [committee. I was thinking maybe we could have gone with much, much more when it when it's our island” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

Lyng-Rasmussen highlights the lack of importance of the direct financial gains, instead, focuses on the democratic process itself of formulating the policy, due to the rights the Greenlandic politicians believe they should have in their nation. She does mention that with this democratic say, she would lobby for more, but ultimately, she underlines the importance of being part, or lack thereof, of the policy formulation stage.

In terms of indirect policy formulation, there are several main themes at play. Firstly, physical limitations, namely in terms of air surveillance. As has been previously stated, surveillance or situational awareness has been made out to be a key notion in the agenda setting stage and thus finding a suitable policy to accommodate this is relevant. As part of a general analysis of suitable methods, in terms of physically and militarily, a notion that has been thought of is air surveillance, which was mentioned at the NATO in the Arctic hearing in Danish Parliament (personal communication, 23 March, 2022). In response to this, Major Gram

Pedersen evidences the flaws of this solution through highlighting the basic physical obstacles at play:

“The radar track cannot see. Therefore, it's not by saying, Oh, I put a radar here in Tasiilaq and I put one in Nuuk, then I can cover the southern part of Greenland. No, you can't. So, therefore, it's an academic solution just to sit in when parliament says, well we need more air surveillance in Greenland. How? and it would be extremely expensive because you don't have the infrastructure you need it. You don't have the data connection and it's an extremely harsh environment you have to build it. And so, the easy part will be to say OK will buy some airborne air surveillance. That's extremely expensive. Airborne air surveillance cannot be on 24-7. It can, but then you need it like five aircrafts, you need to seven crews. You need a base for it.” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:06:30).

Through the explanation given, it is clear that the original method of air surveillance is unable to overcome physical and financial obstacles, and therefore it is not a viable solution. These limitations he has evidenced directly correlate with the notion found under the policy formulation stage due to technical constraints. Specifically, this constraint is classified as a substantive tactical problem as it does not make the issue of lack of surveillance go away due to the physical limitations of the airborne system itself. Moreover, substantive problems require state money and personnel – which in this case, as mentioned, seems to be of significant difficulty. Tactically, the solution proposal by the parliamentary bodies in the hearing is not viable, as Major Gram Pedersen, a military expert on Arctic security studies, points out that the surveillance is physically unable to reach the important zones of visualisation.

Building on this, another main theme within indirect policy formulation is that of situational awareness, specifically in terms of solutioning this issue. Therefore, one can regard this as a proposal that recognises the prior limitations and thus acts as a policy suggestion or support to aid the state. In this regard, sea surveillance can be a solution, as describes Major Gram Pedersen:

“[ACP] is mostly focused on surveillance at sea because at the moment you cannot do air surveillance by radar or satellite, sorry by satellite or by drones. So that's [...] either an airborne radar or a ground based or

sea based radar. So, soon we're starting. We are starting the process of getting better surveillance in the Arctic and we're not there, but it's a good beginning.” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:02:48).

Through the proposition of sea surveillance, the problem of having a lack of situational awareness can be better mitigated. Furthermore, Major Gram Pedersen highlights that with better situational awareness, “then [The Kingdom of Denmark] can actually use our assets where needed” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:05:07). This presentation of a course of action allows certain interested parties to better benefit from the policy, even adding the extra layer of the better utilisation of current resources.

The policy formulation stage gears itself towards coming up with several adequate solutions to the problem at hand. In terms of the education problem presented in the agenda-setting stage, Major Gram Pedersen proposes that any military prospects be stationed in Greenland itself:

“I still have it hard to try to figure it out, because they also talk about politically in Greenland, that they would like more, why It's not Greenlandic people who sail the boats. But we would love to recruit them because we also we in lack of personnel. So I think that the political issues in Greenland is it's hard to get [...] then we have to recruit 70 personnel to be in Kangerlussuaq, which is not that attractive instead of Aalborg. So I think that the approach they have to it is a bit strange” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:12:17).

Major Gram Pedersen’s point is in reference to the halting of the policy due to the refusal of military education, the issue he seeks to solve has a clear solution; hire local civil society which will then, in turn, aid societal problems.

Another aspect mentioned within education is a form of constraint, perhaps also in hindsight of Major Gram Pedersen’s initial education policy proposal. Major Gram Pedersen highlights political constraints, specifically a substantive institutional problem associated with the education proposals within the ACP. In reference to the education proposal change, he mentions that

“We will start off an education. Basic military, not conscripts, but basic by volunteers. And that gave some protest in Greenland. And then we changed it that the education should be more in the [“Civil Defence”] But then we stopped it totally due to political pressure. I think, no actually, that we had the full. We were ready to roll out the programme in a year and we actually changed it” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:11:48).

The political institutional constraint, in this case, goes against the established patterns of beliefs and ideas within Greenland, the low-tension notion engrossed within Greenlandic society inhibits this policy option. The halting of the ACP ties in well with this development in the process as the political constraint in question comes from Naalakkersuisut which stops any development, but, as mentioned above, the restructuring of the education towards more civil preparedness was a major change in response.

### **5.3 Decision-making**

In this section, the decision-making process of the ACP will be scrutinised based on interviews with relevant actors as well as quotes from the press conference, where the agreement was first presented. This stage is characterised by confusion about the actual progress of the policy as the ACP's policy cycle was paused from February 2021 until the signing of the Principle Agreement in May 2022.

The stage of decision-making is concerned with the process in which a few actors decide the actual composition of the policy. In this stage, actors have the authority to make decisions based on their position as either members of parliament or government. The following section will firstly examine the positive and negative decisions, followed by an analysis of how descriptive incrementalism decision-making theory can be employed to explain the outcome of this stage.

This stage of the policy process becomes more complex by the fact that the Danish authorities, despite their legal rights, will not proceed to implement an Arctic defence policy that meets strong opposition in Greenlandic political circles. According to the Self-government Act, the legal power to decide resides with the Government in Copenhagen. However, the same law states that Naalakkersuisut should be included to the furthest possible extent (Selvstyreløven, 2009, § 11-13). The Selv-government Act "[does not restrict the Danish



Government's responsibility nor jurisdiction on foreign and security policies]<sup>10</sup>" (Selvstyreløven, 2009, § 11 stk. 3). Thereby, it is cemented that the Government in Copenhagen legally can decide unilaterally the policies that are classified as such. The policy field of foreign and security policies are categorised as matters of the Realm and thus cannot be distributed to sub-national authorities. On the other hand, if the Danish government deems a defence or security policy as especially significant for Greenland, the responsible Danish Foreign Minister defines the framework of the inclusion of Naalakkersuisut. In negotiations where both Denmark and Greenland are involved, the Danish government maintains legal authority, however with the most extensive inclusion possible of Naalakkersuisut (Selvstyreløven, 2009, § 13). The legal framework thus obligates the Danish government to include the Greenlandic authorities, albeit, without Naalakkersuisut having any direct authoritative power without the government's authorisation.

Nevertheless, the Danish government will not implement policies that affect Greenland without the consent of the Greenlandic Self-government. Attempting to map out the actual inclusion of Greenlandic decision makers in this stage of the ACP's policy cycle, we talked to the leader of the Greenlandic representation in Copenhagen, Heinrich. Without being included in the policy process himself, he recognises that "the former Greenland government (..) was included. But the new one from April last year wasn't included, and that was part of the problem. Hmm. Yeah, not having the dialogue, not being included on how to structure the agreement" (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:05:46). The frustration of not being included to a satisfactory extent in the decision-making of the ACP is something that is repeated in Greenlandic political circles. As mentioned in the background, the policy process was complicated by a Greenlandic shift in government. While the Siumut-led Naalakkersuisut was in communication with the Danish government about the ACP, the Naalakkersuisut that took office in April 2021 expressed criticism towards the ACP. A current member of Inatsisartut and chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee stated:

"I know that the frustration from [IA's member of the Danish Parliament] and our Naalakkersuisut [Chair] always has to push through and like can you please invite us next time and please let us have a

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<sup>10</sup> Danish original text: "De beføjelser, som gives Naalakkersuisut i dette kapitel, begrænser ikke de danske myndigheders forfatningsmæssige ansvar og beføjelser i mellemfolkelige anliggender, idet udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik er rigsanliggender."

saying in this. So I know that the frustration from the parliament from the Naalakkersuisut ministers and our [member of the Danish Parliament] has been a very difficult thing to get involved in when it gets to us" (Lyng-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

She recognises the lack of inclusion and gathers similar opinions from her colleagues in both Danish Parliament and Greenlandic Naalakkersuisut. This stands in opposition to the legislation about involving Greenland to the furthest possible extent. Additionally, the quotes above aid in the clarification of where the decision-making power de facto resides.

In an open forum, where the Prime Minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen, agreed to take questions on foreign and defence policies, we had the opportunity to address this issue directly. When asked about how the government handles what appears to be conflicting external interests (NATO and the US on one hand, and Naalakkersuisut and members of Danish parliament elected in Greenland, on the other hand) towards military presence in Greenland, the Danish Prime Minister replied that:

"[we have the Unity of the Realm with three equal nations, however the Constitution defines how the foreign policy of the kingdom is formulated in Copenhagen. That is the legal framework of the Unity of the Realm. You are right, that Greenland and the Faroe Islands, understandably, wants to have a bigger say in defence, foreign and security policies. We take this wish seriously and have launched a committee that shall discuss foreign policy, including all the three nations]<sup>11</sup>" (personal communication, March 28, 2022).

While the Prime Minister acknowledged the concern raised by Greenlandic politicians and diplomats, she underlined how the final authority undoubtedly resides in Copenhagen.

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<sup>11</sup> Danish original text: "Ét, vi har et Rigsfællesskab med tre ligeværdige lande, Grundloven er defineret sådan at udenrigspolitikken føres af Kongeriget København. Det er det, kan man sige er den legale ramme omkring Rigsfællesskabet. Så har du helt ret i, at der er et, i mine øjne forståeligt, ønske hos Grønland og Færøerne om at spille en større og stadig mere selvstændig rolle, og også en stadig mere aktiv rolle på forsvars-, udenrigs-, og sikkerhedspolitikken. Det tager vi meget alvorligt, og har under denne Regering, for første gang i vores historie, lavet et udvalg imellem de tre lande, der alene arbejder med udenrigsområdet."

Thereby, the Danish parliamentarians are the key actors in the decision-making stage as they, through their power in parliamentary votes, possess the authority to accept or reject a fully formulated policy. At the press conference where the ACP was first presented, the Minister of Defence, Trine Bramsen, stated that:

"we have seen increasing foreign activity in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. Therefore, we need better surveillance and presence in the area. Not to escalate conflicts. But because it is necessary to take the threats seriously. This is done in close cooperation between Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2021).

Bramsen claims that the ACP has been formulated in "close cooperation" with the Greenlandic and Faroese authorities. This statement contradicts the experiences articulated by Greenlandic officials and politicians. Regardless of the involvement of Greenlandic decision makers, the experience of being excluded from forming policies concerning Greenland stands. The establishment of the Contact Committee constitutes a recognition of the relatively limited involvement of Greenland. Additionally, it should be pointed out that no representatives from neither Greenland nor the Faroe Islands were present at the press conference featuring the ACP. This fact underlines the decision-making lies unilaterally in Copenhagen with minor involvement of Greenlandic politicians.

At the press conference on February 11<sup>th</sup> 2021, representatives from the Danish Parliament expressed their support for the ACP. All the parties in the Danish Parliament supporting the agreement had a representative speaking at the press conference, all of which referred to the ACP as what Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 165) refer to as a positive decision. The positive decision of the ACP becomes evident as the policy has recently moved beyond the decision-making stage. However, it can be argued that the lengthy pause of the policy process between February 2021 and May 2022 leads to a halting in the policy cycle, thus pointing to the ACP constituting a negative decision. However, after the signing of the ACPAP, the policy proceeded to the implementation stage, decisively turning the ACP to a positive decision. This aligns with the ACP slightly altering the status quo of Arctic capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces, leading to the descriptive application of incrementalism as a decision-making theory. As we have highlighted how the decision-making power lies with the Government in Denmark and marginally involves the Greenlandic authorities, the process and logic of deciding the content of the policy emerged as an issue.

### 5.3.1 Incrementalism

One can argue that the Arctic Analysis of 2016 serves as a comprehensive study of all feasible policy alternatives, thus pointing to rationalism as a potential explanatory model for the process of the ACP. Within the decision-making stage of the policy cycle, it includes the actors of the Danish government, as well as Naalakkersuisut as an informal actor. The theory of incrementalism points out how the multiple actors are in possession of different information as a key factor in understanding how varying interests adjust the policy to some extent of compromise (Hayes in Morcol, 2007, p. 10). Hayes (2007) points out that policy makers must limit themselves to feasible policy options (p. 10).

Determining whether the ACP constitutes an example of overweighting rationalism or incrementalism, the actors involved in the decision-making process become a decisive factor. The policy process of the ACP differs from most other policy processes due to the complexity of the Greenlandic-Danish relationship. In the decision-making stage, the Danish Parliament, despite consisting of multiple political parties, is considered a single actor. The negotiations about the content of the ACP emerged between the Danish government and the Naalakkersuisut rather than internally in the Greenlandic and Danish parliaments, respectively. Regarding these two actors, as parties in a negotiation, raises the question about what type of decision environment surrounded the ACP and the ACPAP.

A Greenlandic parliamentarian expressed her contentment that "it's not more military presence, it's more of a civilian surveillance and ... civil defence, which we all need here in Greenland with the vast stretch in our huge island" (Lyng-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:00:31). The Greenlandic standpoint sees objectives of the ACP that are in conflict with the objectives of the Danish government. A civil servant in the Ministry of Defence expressed the goals of the ACP as: "the key perspective is to strengthen the surveillance to get a better understanding of the both military activity in the Arctic and North Atlantic area, as well as governmental civilian activity that will probably be the main overall purpose" (civil servant a, personal communication, March 23, 2022, 00:03:00). An essential conflict in the objective of the policy lies in whether it should serve as an increased military presence or primarily focus on civil defence.

The bargaining process between the Greenlandic and Danish governments was hastened by international events. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, changed the time perspective in which defence policies in Denmark had been implemented, including the ACP. The year-long pause in the policy process of the ACP was changed to an urgent need to settle larger defence agreements such as the ACP. Several actors underline how

the Russian invasion of Ukraine served as a trigger for bringing the protracted decision-making to a conclusion. The Chair of the Greenlandic Foreign and Security Policy Committee stated how "the Russian attack on Ukraine has made it a thing that we should hurry about, I mean, decided upon much faster than we've maybe imagined" (Lyng-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:03:24).

There are two aspects to examine, knowledge and objectives, when determining a decision environment as either primarily rational or incremental. These aspects can either be consensual or conflictual between the decision-making actors. This paper will examine the relations between the Danish and Greenlandic politicians, respectively.

The objectives for a policy can be detected in policy-makers' statements about what they want the policy to achieve. From the Danish side, a number of politicians expressed their support for the content of the ACP in pursuit of goals such as having stronger enforcement of Danish territorial integrity. This objective was suggested to be reached through the strengthening of military presence in and around Greenland and the Arctic. The Minister of Defence, Bramsen, articulates it as:

"We have seen an increase in foreign activities in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. For this reason, we need better surveillance and presence in the region. Not to escalate conflicts. But because we need to take the threats seriously" (Ministry of Defence, 2021).

The defence spokesperson of the Liberal Party (Venstre), Lars Christian Lilleholt, agrees:

"Denmark has a special responsibility for defence and security in the region and with the agreement we strengthen our presence and show that we take the demands and expectation of our NATO allies seriously. The agreement is one step towards a more robust defence with the required capabilities" (Ministry of Defence, 2021).

The spokesperson of the Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre), Martin Lidegaard, also concurs with the opinion of the minister, articulating that "we have stressed that this agreement needs to provide a dual-use. Firstly, it sends a strong signal that the Kingdom takes responsibility for the defence of its territory" (Ministry of Defence, 2021). Also, the Arctic spokesperson of the Liberal Party (Venstre), Christoffer Aagaard Melson, supports the ACP's content of increased military presence in the Arctic region, stating that "We have an obligation

to know what takes place in our own territory, both in terms of defence and preparedness. With the agreement we take a big step to live up to that obligation" (Ministry of Defence, 2021). All the statements above stem from the press conference where the ACP was presented, and thus are direct comments on the content as it was presented in February 2021. The Danish politicians had reached an agreement on one of the goals of the ACP to be living up to the obligation of having a stronger presence, as well as increased military capabilities available in the Arctic region.

In contrast to this objective, the Greenlandic political sphere emphasises how the military presence should not be a goal of neither Greenlandic nor Danish policies, including the ACP. After the signing of the Principle Agreement, the Chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee in Inatsisartut stressed how she is:

"extremely happy that, it's not more military presence, it's more of a civilian surveillance and (...) yeah, civil defence, which we all need here in Greenland with the vast stretch in our huge island. (...) what I've learned from being in USPU, "udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitisk udvalg", we know that the huge part of the huge countries like United States, Russia, and China always has been doing this, like developing military presence in the Arctic and the other, like, expanding their military presence in Arctic since the beginning of the ice melting. So knowing that I'd rather have a neutral how to say it, relationship towards military presence and not increasing it" (Lyng-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:00:31).

A Greenlandic diplomat agrees with the caution of placing military in the Arctic:

"It is mainly on this fear of adding to tensions. And yeah, having a military mobilization in the Arctic is not a good thing as Greenland sees it. It is on account of the Illulisat declaration, this idea of using dialog and peaceful solutions to problems and conflicts" (Heinrich, personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:11:18).

The Greenlandic perspective is thus significantly more hesitant towards increasing the military presence in and around Greenland.

Through the statements above, two different standpoints appear. A Danish perspective, in which an increased military presence is not only a means to solve other tasks, but also an objective in itself. The objective is reasoned by an articulated necessity of having enhanced enforcement of Danish territorial sovereignty. In opposition to this, Greenlandic representatives express concerns about military capabilities that do not have direct and primary purposes to civilian service. Additional military presence and activities that ensure the integrity of the Kingdom's territory should thus be avoided. These conflicting objectives of what the ACP should achieve indicates that an incremental decision-making environment surrounded the policy.

The knowledge of the participants constitute the second dimension according to which we can determine whether the ACP and the additional Principle Agreement was decided upon in an incremental environment. If the participants' knowledge about the topic of the policy and its alternatives is extensive and available to all participants, then it can be considered consensual. If the participants, on the other hand, have contradicting beliefs about cause-effect and ends-means relationships, the knowledge base is to be regarded as conflictual.

Danish decision makers agree that they make a gesture by including the Greenlandic authorities in the decision process. Several of the Danish parliamentarians highlighted the Greenlandic participation in the decision-making process of the ACP. One parliamentarian, Aagaard Melson, affirmed that "We are pleased that the process has taken place in close dialogue with, and involvement of, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland. We stand much stronger when we stand united in the Realm" (Ministry of Defence, 2021). A perspective that was repeated by the Minister of Defence as she explained how the implementation of the ACP "will take place in a close cooperation between Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. I am very pleased that we have entered a broad political agreement on strengthening efforts in the Arctic and the North Atlantic" (Ministry of Defence, 2021). In addition, the ACP itself proclaims that:

“the Danish Defence will make use of the possibilities of using an Air Greenland aircraft in the context of the Danish Defence’s tasks in Greenland. At the same time the close cooperation with Greenlandic institutions will be strengthened. Political support from the Faroe Islands and Greenland to the radars and construction work is of key importance. The Danish Ministry of Defence has a close dialogue with

the Faroe Islands and Greenland and looks forward to their responses and a continued close cooperation” (ACP, 2021).

In addition to the statements in and about the ACP, the Prime Minister emphasised that close collaboration with Greenland and the Faroe Islands is a part of the policy process, underlining that more discussion between the three nations of the Realm is inevitable. When we asked about how the Danish government weighs the importance of Greenlandic opinion when formulating the ACP, the Prime Minister stated that:

"[everyone interested in the Arctic knows that, once the sea ice starts to melt, new shipping routes will be accessible. Then the Arctic will permanently change. Therefore, we must come up with a response if we experience further Russian aggression in the Arctic region. We do this in close collaboration with Greenland and the Faroe Islands. You are right that there have been disagreements, and probably also some opposition. I just returned from Greenland, I was there last week and we spent a long, long time discussing security policies. And we can expect more discussions within the Unity of the Realm]<sup>12</sup>" (M. Frederiksen, personal communication, March 28, 2022).

In the Prime Minister's statement, the understanding of the close collaboration with Greenland resurfaces. Combined, the quotes above present a consensus among Danish decision makers that Greenland has been involved to the legally obligated furthest possible extent (Selvstyreløven, 2009, § 13). The knowledge base on which the Danish decision makers decide is a comprehension that they have managed to include Greenlandic representatives to an extent that ensures Greenlandic ownership and acceptance of the ACP.

The Greenlandic participants in the decision-making process do not share the perspective of the Danish politicians. Even though it is stated repeatedly by the Danish

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<sup>12</sup> Danish original text: “Og for alle der interesserer sig for Arktis, så ved de, at når isen på et tidspunkt begynder at smelte, så kommer der helt nye sejlruiter. Så vil Arktis være forandret for evigt. Og derfor skal vi finde vores vej i at have et modsvar, hvis vi ser en yderligere aggression fra russisk side omkring Arktis. Og det gør vi så i tæt samarbejde med både Grønland og med Færøerne. Og det er rigtigt, at der har været både nogle uenigheder og sikkert også hos nogen, noget modstand. Jeg er lige kommet hjem fra Grønland, var der i forrige uge og der diskuterede vi sikkerhedspolitik rigtig, rigtig meget af tiden. Og vi kan godt forvente flere diskussioner indenfor Rigsfællesskabet.”



members of parliament, obligated through legislation, and phrased as an intention in the ACP and the documents preceding it that security policies about Greenland should be formulated and decided upon on collaboration with Naalakkersuisut, the knowledge base has not reached consensus of whether it has included Greenland.

The Naalakkersuisoq of foreign affairs, Broberg, who took office a few months after the presentation of the ACP, was very critical of the inclusion of the new Greenlandic administration. In June 2021, around four months after the press conference, he stated that:

"Greenland remains one of the few places in the world, where people do not have influence on their own foreign and defence policy. At the moment, the way Denmark has governed through the years in conflict with UN resolutions and human rights resurface in the public debate. Therefore, no. This agreement has nothing to do with us. The agreement was negotiated between Danish political parties, between Danish politicians." (Filtenborg, 2021).

Directly addressing the decision-making process, Broberg voices how he finds the negotiations to have taken place without significant participation of Greenlandic representatives. The current chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee in Inatsisartut explains how Greenlandic representatives in multiple political organs have continuously sought to reach greater influence on foreign and defence policies:

"But I know that our "[leaders of] Naalakkersuisut" always have gone to Denmark and our [member of Danish Parliament] always has tried to have a dialogue, but from what I've seen from our [Premier] and [member of Danish parliament], Aaja Chemnitz Larsen and Múte Bourup Egede. They've always tried to get involved, but the Danish government has been very difficult on [collaboration]. ... And as for what I've know, that always have given us information of how it's going, but maybe the [foreign and security policy committee] could have been much more informed. But knowing what the [foreign and security policy committee] is capable of and how much access they have or how little access they have. I know that the former [chair of the committee] always has tried to have a more saying as a [committee] just like the [foreign policy committee] in Denmark. But due to the Danish

constitution, we can't just make that our rights due to the Danish constitution. ... Yeah. So I'm not really thrilled of how much we've been involved in this ACP. But it's also because of the small right we have” (Lynge-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:15:25).

Lynge-Rasmussen addresses the issue of Greenlandic inclusion in decision-making on several levels. Firstly, she addresses how the Greenlandic Premier and the Greenlandic-elected member of the Danish Parliament have pushed for inclusion, or at least information about the ongoing policy process of the ACP. Yet according to Lynge-Rasmussen's knowledge, the Danish government has not included, invited, nor informed Greenlandic politicians concerning the work of the Danish ministries and committees in the Danish parliament. Secondly, Lynge-Rasmussen stresses the structural obstacle in gaining full involvement and a sufficient knowledge base to both participate and make well-informed decisions. The statement above, thereby, strongly points towards an unequal insight to the policy field, leading to a conflictual environment in the perspective of the knowledge base of the participants. The ideas of the necessary level of Greenlandic participation in the policy-making process meets the legal requirement of including Greenland thereby constituting a discrepancy in the knowledge base. While the Danish participants find the inclusion of the former Naalakkersuisut to be satisfactory for Greenland, the Greenlandic participants do not agree that the means reach the end goal of inclusion to the furthest possible extent. Lastly, the applicability of descriptive incrementalism is confirmed by the fact that the ACP constitutes one policy in a longer myriad of increased investments in the Arctic capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces.

#### **5.4 Implementation**

In this project, the implementation process will not be based on actual events but rather on experts' and politicians' views on the unfolding of events, as the ACP has not been fully implemented at the time of writing. Therefore, we will use gathered data from experts and politicians to theorise how the policy might possibly unfold in the implementation stage. This stage includes a range of actors, including politicians, civil society and other such engaged stakeholders who can either administer, support, or oppose the active stage of the policy. Thus, it is important to examine the impact on these groups.

A good starting point is the consideration of civil society in terms of implementing the ACP. When asked about the implications the ACP may have upon the different culture of the

Greenlandic people and society and whether there had been sufficient preliminary research done upon the effects on this group, Major Gram Pedersen states “I don't think it's been at any's mind when you decided the package. I think you had the package was invented or decided by, I think, two major reasons” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:20:42) to which he refers to NATO and the US pressure. As an expert that had been consulted by the Danish government, Major Gram Pedersen has some legitimacy in terms of how he thinks the policy process itself will impact the implementation stage. In order to triangulate this data, one could refer back to policy formulation, whereby Inatsisartut was not consulted sufficiently upon the ACP itself and therefore the implications, regarding the policy formulation, would have been avoided. Therefore, it can be argued that there could be unexpected implications, whether that be support or opposition due to a lack of sufficient research.

Building upon this, one could then consider how historical differences may impose implementation troubles. Specifically, the notion of military in Greenland, and how this does not necessarily fit with Greenland's cultural history and thus aspects of the ACP may face some friction. Major Gram Pedersen explains that

“the Europe we know today have actually come out of a lot of wars. So, a state in Europe has a king, has an army and thereby has a sovereignty and survive as a state. And that's a part of our history. So, for all of us Europeans, it's a natural part of our history. ... So, it's a natural, it's a cultural thing how the state is and that a military and war is a part of history. That's not the same with the Arctic region. The Greenlanders, the Inuit's and indigenous people don't come from a state that is built on wars and building up an army, they have another cultural background” (personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:17:57).

Although one is not able to extrapolate upon the future implications with current knowledge - at the time of writing - the historical perspective likely suffices in explaining the different culture and therefore potential opposition. By taking a policy created and developed internally with Danish policymakers, the Greenlandic aspect is missing and thus cultural differences are not taken into consideration. The notion of applying a Danish background to the policy process might underline the postcolonial relationship Greenland shares with the Kingdom of Denmark.

To delve further into the cultural aspect, it is relevant to explore the notion of Arctic exceptionalism, the idea that the Arctic warrants new mechanisms of dealing with political

issues, and does not contain behaviour or conflicts from other parts of the world. Therefore, some actors and parts of civil society might feel as if the ACP is the start of a decrease in treating the Arctic differently. As Professor Leander Nielsen states,

“you still have people that say that this is the wrong way to do it, to get into the conflict. There is ... the concept or term of Arctic exceptionalism, that all the spill-over effects of conflicts elsewhere, we should be really careful to keep Greenland and the Arctic as exceptional as possible. And you will still hear those arguments that some of this, doesn't like voices like the people who write on the newspaper article, like KNR, are saying this has nothing to do with us. We have a peace loving country. ... Greenland is a special case without the normal conflict. And you have also heard that from some politicians and from the general public” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:11:24).

The concept that politicians and civil society actors do not recognise the need for militarisation may lead to an opposition of the ACP. Furthermore, he explains that there is already opposition to posts regarding the ACP in the local Greenlandic media through Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa (KNR), and this may foreshadow some of the future reactions with full implementation. Perhaps, this is also due to the assumption among civil society that the ACP is a method of militarising the Arctic and it does not see a threat for there to require this action, and so the actions of the ACP would not be received well. Other groups, such as politicians, have also voiced concerns which may influence other societal actors, given that they can be seen as a powerful target group. Lastly, Arctic exceptionalism and the notion of a separated Arctic political sphere is one that has potential to cause future conflict because the public do not recognise the need nor alignment of the ACP.

Building further upon the current views of military instalments linked to the ACP from the political target group, there has been criticism from the previous Premier of Greenland at the time of the initial policy release, which could be a presupposition to the reaction of the implementation. Professor Leander Nielsen highlights this perspective, relaying that “There was a lot of critique. Kim Kielsen went out with a press release, and he sounded like you couldn't tell from that press release, but he was pissed with the policy” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:19:09). As Kielsen was the Premier during the initial policy

presentation in February 2021, his reaction to the presentation of how the policy will run is an extrapolation of what could be expected from the political group later into the process.

However, one could argue this potential opposition could be towards the implications of the policy process itself and not the actual policy; as Professor Leander Nielsen states

“And [Nuuk and Torshavn] don't oppose the idea per se, but they were really critical. So, it's both Nuuk and Torshavn um that that not necessarily were against the whole idea and more money into the Arctic, that's nice, but it was how and we see that iteratively that that something comes out of also and also go back to the history, things just get pulled out of all over the head” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:19:09).

The opposition is not necessarily the importance of the statement but rather the criticism of the process. Therefore, the implementation of the policy may be met with disapproval due to the methods of which it was created. Again, the historical perspective is brought up and this may also be a hindrance to the smooth implementation process, as the Greenlandic side feel as if it has not had a say in the initial process, therefore, its views will likely not align with the policy implementation. As part of the theory, these powerful target groups will often be met with regulators in order to compromise and ease the implementation process. The Danish government acts like a regulator in this sense, and, as stated within the Principle Agreement, “The implementation of the initiatives will be addressed in frequent meetings where civil servants and relevant experts will participate. Moreover, the progress of the projects will be reported at meetings at the political level” (ACPAP, 2022). Hence, there will be a way of combating opposing views on implementation through dialogue and reporting, which may develop a smoother policy implementation process.

As the theory states, the implementation process contains several actors with several interests which can further affect the process and outcomes, and thus there is a need to compromise to keep certain parts of the society in agreement. As part of this, it is important to explore the economic implications of the ACP. Specifically, the implementation of the policy and the economic benefits it could bring. Professor Leander Nielsen underlines that when presenting the policy, “the Greenlandic politicians really wanted to stress the benefits for Greenland, especially economically” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:19:09). The implementation of the ACP can bring economic activity for the local agencies within

Greenland, which is what the powerful target group of politicians have explained, using their significant influence towards society. The relevance is that this can ease the implementation process by finding compromise with certain actors and thus may lead to more support of the policy. Further explained within the policy document itself, it is stated that “due to the complexity of public procurement, the Danish Armed Forces continuously work to promote the prospects of small and medium-sized companies participating in the procurement process” (ACPAP, 2022). As well as the fact that “there is a broad support for the new investments to support the Greenlandic industries and contribute to economic development in Greenland, including employment of locals” (ACPAP, 2022). The impact of this would be very beneficial socioeconomically, adding to the support of the ACP, as stated by politicians.

Further reiterating this is Professor Leander Nielsen’s description of the ACPAP, which he finds to be a document that “really panned out or stressed out what's the benefit especially economically for Greenland and that's basically the most of the agreement is like - an appendix to the document they come out a year and a half, 15 months ago” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:11:24). The Greenlandic politicians continuing to highlight this could be a positive implication of implementation, boosting Greenlandic economy, and through the economic opportunities created for local companies, it brings the support of local agencies. Additionally, as mentioned prior in the policy formulation stage, there was the potential for 20 new jobs in Kangerlussuaq and Nuuk which further enforces the point developed.

On the other hand, the economic effects may also bring a sense of opposition, as the political restraints the ACP may cause economic issues domestically in Greenland. As the leader of the Greenlandic opposition in Copenhagen, Heinrich, highlights:

“There is a need in Greenland to attract investment and this rise in tension could mean that Greenland won't get the desired investments and that is a fear in Greenland. Officially, Greenland is not refusing investments from Russia or China on the current state, of course not from Russia. But there's a need for collaboration and attracting investment from countries” (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:12:08).

The implementation of the military equipment and increased military presence can be seen as a form of engaging Greenland in political affairs which may redirect potential economic investments due to political alliances. As Heinrich underlines, there is a fear in Greenland that

through the ACP implementation, Greenland is siding with a certain political agenda and thus is unable to access other economic options, therefore leading to disdain for certain agencies involved.

The implementation stage is the act of practice of the policy, and the increase of military activity and equipment has several geopolitical implications. Largely, the security dilemma – whereby the growth in one state’s security leads other states to worry for their own security based on the perceived threat. Subsequently, as both parties increase their security measures, escalation and potential conflict may occur. Increased military expenditure without gaining a high-level of national security is not an outcome in any parties’ interests. The security dilemma is a potential effect of the ACP, or at least the perception of it. Professor Leander Nielsen states that “one of the coalition parts of the Naleraq that was flat out against this idea, that they were seeing that Denmark pushing through the security dilemma, Pele said that on a number of occasions” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:19:09). The rejection of the ACP as a policy on the grounds of enforcing a security dilemma, perceived by politicians, is a crucial notion as politicians play the role of an influential social group. Thus, parts of civil society may also have the same presuppositions regarding the opposition of the ACP’s implementation.

The politicians’ viewpoint on the security dilemma is further extrapolated upon when Lyng-Rasmussen reacts to the Danish Prime Minister’s statement on having soldiers on Danish soil:

“As soon as someone puts a military base or reacts in some way, if it's America, Russia or China, they all react the same, like getting closer to Arctic. And when she said Danish soil, I was very frightened. Does she mean Greenland or Faroe Islands? Or is it just Denmark? ... Do they think Greenland and Faroe Islands are the same [Danish Realm]? They just think Denmark, but when they print those in the newspapers, I'm thinking ... what if it's lost in translation, and Russia thinks that we have military American forces and more of them in Greenland? What it will look like in Russia's eyes?” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

Lyng-Rasmussen underlines how the domestic issue of the ACP becomes an international implication; misinterpretations of investments and instalments as offensive, Greenland faces the worry of Russian rebuttal or security fears. The practicality of the soldiers does not

necessarily have an impact, but rather the notion that Greenland is now part of said perceived threat. With this phrasing and development of the ACP, she is worried Greenland is an involuntary participant of the security dilemma and the conflict and escalation from parties such as Russia. This is very noteworthy as it creates a sense of fear, insecurity, and opposition that correlates with the implementation of the ACP.

The repercussions of aspects of the ACP may become serious international conflicts if defensive capabilities become perceived as offensive capabilities. Beyond the fear of the Greenlandic society, it may develop a spiral of international aggression, which Greenlandic administration becomes a player within, without having the expertise to do so. As Professor Leander Nielsen reiterates

“But the whole idea that like even though is... and this is defensive like drones to have surveillance but again the spiral conflict could go, run amok. So that is one of the problems. This could spur like a spiral effect of the security dilemma of international provocation. Yet so. So even though it's defensive, then the misconception, or Russia misread this. And do armament, like they are building up their bases in the Arctic and we are afraid of that and we have to do something about it and then we end up in a new problem. But that's also like the missing thing that the Greenland has never really had the discussion what to do about... how to become a security actor” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:07:04).

He highlights the plausibility for the new problem of increased provocation due to the misconception by Russia. The new problem would then be that Greenland has not had, nor has been a part of, discussions with relation to acting as a security actor. In summary, the potential implication of misunderstanding the aims and capacities associated with the ACP, leads to the danger of an international political escalation.

## **5.5 Evaluation**

Analysing the evaluation of the ACP can prove to be a very difficult task as the implementation process has not yet been completed at the time of writing, and thus evaluation remains an affair of the distant future. However, one can analyse the evaluation proposals to hypothesise this process. This stage involves all actors across several different levels in public administrations and society. In terms of political decision makers, the actual policy describes how the ACP



“initiatives will be addressed in frequent meetings where civil servants and relevant experts will participate. Moreover, the progress of the projects will be reported at meetings at the political level” (ACPAP, 2022). In terms of the extremes of evaluation, this is the first form whereby formal techniques are employed, which are described as routine assessments. This analysis can then be used to change the next round of the policy process or cycle by impacting or framing the policy’s success, criticism, outputs, and indicators.

Ideally, this is how evaluation may be executed according to the ACPAP. However, as described within the decision-making stage, there are often issues with regard to the conflictual knowledge base between actors within the ACP and the policy cycle. In order to combat this, another form of evaluation could be the ‘Contact Committee,’ which several of the interviewees mentioned. This committee is understood as a “working group, which would focus on security and foreign policy issues. As far as I know I don't think it has been really up to speed” (Major Gram Pedersen, personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:43:41). Although it has not currently been implemented, it is a form of evaluation that works as a middle ground of the two extremes of policy evaluators. It is aimed to work with the governments or parliamentary members of the three nations of the Danish Realm in order to better share knowledge and understanding. Although not designed specifically for the ACP, it may be utilised nonetheless.

Additionally, due to the communication issues associated with the policy process of the ACP as well as historical issues, Professor Leander Nielsen suggests that the Contact Committee is an example of evolution towards better communication and information flows. As he states, “it's been especially in the early 2000s, like the whole press process leading to the self-rule government, there was a lot of things put down writing and then it evolved and also states in the self-rule act, that it's in practical terms, whatever that means. So it's difficult to put everything in writing and you can put a [Contact Committee], it's a good idea,” (personal communication, May 10, 2022, 00:30:52). the self-rule act and other such legislation are often difficult to engage with practically, as seen through the ACP policy process In order to better assess the ongoing security situation, this working group could be a potential evaluation scheme. Although it is arguably based upon the complex policy processes and challenged flow of information, it would also act as a means to decrease issues associated with the ACP.

## **6 Discussion**

The following discussion is rooted within the findings of the analysis. This chapter will proceed by reflecting on those findings in the perspective of the problematic communication flows

characterising the Greenlandic-Danish security policy process. Additionally, the postcolonial aspect of the Danish Realm and how it affects the current procedures of developing common defence policies. Lastly, the contrasting military traditions of Greenland as an Arctic nation and Denmark as a nation stemming from a militarised European history will be reviewed in the light of the ACP. These themes surfaced in the interviews conducted for this project as well as in the analytical writing, thus highly relevant for further reflection.

## **6.1 Communication Flows**

A profound finding throughout the interview process and analysis was the notion of communication flows and the issues that surround it. It is a subject that has hindered the policy process, failing to optimise the level of democratic procedures, as well as arguably changing the policy outcome. Moreover, it is found in several of the interviews conducted and thus warrants a mention.

To begin with, Greenland's laws in themselves do not meet the requirements in terms of the legitimacy of how they function. Therefore, Olsvig, a former parliamentarian in the Naalakkersuisut, states there is an initial domestic policy-making problem. She states that the reason the ACP was stalled was due to "the complexity of the reality of Greenland," specifically, "Is the decision making around it legitimate or not?" (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:15:16). To which, she answers no. Unlike the Danish policy process where "You have a higher degree of legitimacy in your decision making in Denmark because you are obliged to somehow seek a mandate in the Parliament, whereas in Greenland the law does not secure that," the problem further escalates because

"the Danish Constitution is applicable to Greenland. Of course, we are all Danish citizens. We all have Danish citizenship, and Greenland is part of the Danish state. ... But it doesn't protect the Greenlandic Parliament the same way as it protects the Danish Parliament on these issues. So it's up to the Greenlandic system itself to formulate laws that make sure you have that system and the current law on the way that the government of Greenland and in the Parliament of Greenland works does not contain the same provision on the government of Greenland, being obliged to seek advice with parliament. And that is a weakness" (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:17:48).

The perspective one can understand here is that of Danish generalisation; by generalising and applying the system to Naalakkersuisut, what equates is a drastic loss of legitimation. It can thus be said that Greenlandic laws need to be adapted to better support the passing of policy, so as to avoid a communication gap, which ultimately leads to a problematic democratic system.

This systemic problem continues beyond domestic Greenland if one delves deeper within the process, specifically within the Danish constitution and the decision-making procedure in itself. Olsvig states:

“The Danish and Greenlandic government can, if they want, say, well, we work government to government. And the Danish Government can say, well, we have the Danish constitution and paragraph 19 and 20. They are very clear that it's the state, it's the king, the state, that decides on these matters. So, it's like we can include them if we want. You know, they do not necessarily feel very obliged to include Greenland. [...] And the third thing that is weak in the system is that the system is built to have decision making in Denmark and then informing Greenland if they want. It's not built to have decision making in Greenland and then have those decisions being transferred and applied in Denmark. And an example is that if you do everything in Danish, you will have parliamentarians in Greenland that will not be able to read it, but they probably will have to have some translators to help them understand what it means and therefore, and that's a general rule in Greenland, everything that parliamentarians in the Parliament of Greenland work with is in Greenlandic and Danish. So there are some really structural issues with the way decision making structure is built today” (personal communication, April 8, 2022, *00:19:15*).

As has been outlined, there are evidently structural problems in the communication between Denmark and Greenland. Firstly, the Danish government has no legal obligation to include Greenland, despite matters that directly impact the state such as the increase of military or education policies in the ACP. Instead, it is more of a moral option which is extremely problematic for a nation that has Self-government on other domestic matters. The question one

could pose is when will there be structural change or development within the Danish constitution, moreover, should Greenland have a right to sit at their own table?

Secondly, as the system is developed for Denmark, Greenland is often ostracised on decisions that should be domestically agreed upon. As mentioned, language still remains an issue, one could argue this is a clear example of Greenland's colonial past. The need for updating the system is thus made evident, if a democratically elected parliament is unable to have a say in their own issues because of a basic language barrier, indicating clear colonial ties. Heinrich further extrapolates upon this idea, commenting "if you look at that historical relationship, it is hard to find ways to find solutions and to reach each other and obtain this equality and respect. So I would imagine the same being the case here" (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:07:23). In referral to the process of the ACP, Heinrich brings up the historical relationship within the Danish Realm, and the question of respect and equality is a very valid topic, perhaps one that would maybe improve in correlation with the communication issue in itself.

Furthermore, the communication between Denmark and Greenland is problematic when it comes to being invited to any defence dialogue regarding Greenlandic territory and Arctic military presence. Lynge-Rasmussen outlines her observations that the

"other parliament members have been very frustrated on being or not being involved in this as a Greenlander or being the island in Arctic that this has been about since? Yeah, the ice began to melt. I've noticed some frustrations of the lack of us being invited and in dialogue with the Danish government. ... it was frustrating that our member of [IA] in [the Danish Parliament], Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, always has to, like she finds out that there's a meeting about the Arctic, or Arctic military or NATO, she finds out an hour before the actual meeting. And she has to pressure through getting involved and getting a seat at the table. So I know that the frustration from our [member of Danish Parliament] and our [Premier Múte Bourup Egede] always has to push through and like can you please invite us next time and please let us have a saying in this" (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:07:49).

Lynge-Rasmussen outlines the general exclusion of Greenlandic representatives within Greenlandic-Danish relations, whereby even the Greenlandic Premier does not get adequate

time, preparation, or an invite to the discussion that directly impacts the situation in a nation he governs. When taken into consideration, this notion can explain the policy halt of the ACP – there had been no agreement because as Lynge-Rasmussen states:

“the politicians and [civil servant] said to me, well, we'll get to the details afterwards. And that's how it's gone. It was in March that I experienced those kinds of treatment of our wanting to get involved. So I know that it was very difficult for us to get involved at all. So I'm not blaming our government, I'm blaming much more of the Danish Parliament involving us. So I'm hoping that telling them that this isn't a first class deal for us, will be a better one for the next time” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:25:21).

She directly states that in the policy process she is only informed of news after the event and not in the buildup thus does not get a say, or knowledge. The ACP had already been passed in February of 2021 in the Danish parliament yet had not been signed on the Greenlandic side until May of 2022. Lynge-Rasmussen's statement may well play into the events that unfolded. Heinrich goes on to further explain this argument by stating that

“there is a wish from Greenland to get more information to be included on an equal basis. And again, it is a work in progress. So I think you could say there are difficulties on how to do the work and we of course, feel it here also that we might get the information shortly before a decision has been communicated. And the same goes for people in Nuuk, in the government administration. So there is a frustration that it's not optimal at the moment and communications and inclusion” (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:15:44).

It is clear from the comments thus far, there is a serious lapse in communication flows and this does not just affect Inatsisartut, but the Greenlandic society as a whole.

Undeniably, it is extremely important for at least the knowledge of the planned policies or events to be shared with a state or its officials if said nation is involved, even without a say. Greenland, though, does not always get access to this. Lynge-Rasmussen states “I would say everything that has to do with ACP and the Ukraine-Russia thing. We've mostly found out about the information from the newspapers roughly” (personal communication, May 13, 2022,

00:15:25). As a self-governing nation, it is understandably difficult to make any judgements on situations regarding Greenland without being fed adequate information. As stated, parliamentarians do not get updates from the Danish administration, and require general news sources, therefore highlighting failures of communication within the Danish Realm.

On a final note, these communication flow issues are of relevance due to the implications they muster. Beyond the obvious lack of democratic processes, the Kingdom of Denmark's defence policies directly impact other industries in Greenland. As Olsvig highlights, when matters of security policy are discussed:

“you can talk about the airports, we can talk about mineral resource development. Even fish today, you know, with the export to Russia export to China are beginning to be considered as something that has to do with security policy. Infrastructure in general, cyber connections and so on” (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:20:56).

The implications of security politics spillover into other domestic areas. Thus, it is simply not viable to state that all these decisions are only a matter for the Danish government. Ultimately, one is able to see the huge structural problem from the construction of the self-government act in itself, and the damage it causes to domestic Greenlandic politics. As Olsvig articulates; “you're not taking decisions on the basis of what is actually going on in Greenland. So it's a very serious problem” (personal communication, April 8, 2022, 00:22:10).

## **6.2 Postcolonial ties**

The Greenlandic-Danish relation dates back centuries. For as long as Greenland has been governed by Denmark, the security and defence policy has been dictated by Copenhagen. Nonetheless, the Greenlandic regional administration experiences an increasingly greater degree of autonomy. As Greenland gradually moves towards more independence, political circles in Greenland demand to also get more influence on security issues concerning the Arctic. This project dives into a policy cycle of a recent defence agreement and attempts to map out how Greenlandic policy-makers were involved in the process. An unclear division of authority combined with inconsistency in institutional norms and questionable flows of information between Copenhagen and Nuuk convolute this process. A misalignment in the understanding of whether Greenland has been involved to a sufficient extent resurfaces the question of how postcolonial ties affect the policy procedure in contemporary security and defence policies.

Postcolonialism contains the acknowledgement that former colonies and their former colonisers maintain a bond that continues to be characterised by an unequal power relation. The strand of postcolonialism also analyses how historical colonial relationships still impact the interaction between governments today (Sylvester in Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2017, pp. 175-185). However, it is to note that an analysis of Greenlandic-Danish relations is characterised by the maintenance of legal ties as Greenland is not a fully independent state. While the colonial status of Greenland was abolished in 1953, the subjection of the local population to Danish culture, societal structures, and the economic system were sustained. Within the past few years, there have been several instances of atrocities against the Greenlandic population resurfacing in the public debate leading to attempts of reconciliation, apologies, and compensations. A current member of Inatsisartut articulate that:

"So there's a lot of things going up on how the Danish has treated us as a colony. And I think it would be a wave with those things kept popping up in the surface that will make the Danes maybe rethink their colony status on us, always tell us that you have self-government or you're not a colony. But the things that had happened before and still are going on, like disrespecting us and not viewing us as a companion or the same, a [Unity of the Realm], it's much more their saying, and they will inform us afterwards. I'm hoping that that will shift to much more equal and collaboration" (Lynge-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:25:21).

Lynge-Rasmussen draws a connection between colonial history and the current debates about resolving issues of the past. One could argue that the Greenlandic-Danish relations have reached a time of reckoning, where discussions about the atrocities committed by Danish administrations are brought out in the open. The current Danish government seems to have acknowledged the necessity of addressing these problems and have issued official apologies on behalf of the Danish state. The past few years have, however, seen minor adjustments in the political representation of Greenland in international affairs. Firstly, the delegation from the Kingdom of Denmark at the Arctic Council has had a Greenlandic representative as the first speaker, followed by the Faroese and lastly a Danish representative since June 2021. The seating order was meant to reflect the importance of perspectives of the three nations in the Unity of the Realm. Secondly, a so-called "Contact Committee" was founded at the same time,

a forum for policy makers and high-ranking officials from all three nations in the Danish Realm to discuss security and defence policies. A former NATO diplomat and researcher in the field of Arctic defence policies explains that:

"And then there was a decision that in the Arctic Council that in the future, Greenland will be sitting at the table representing the Kingdom of Denmark. Even though, if you go into the UN charter, they actually cannot sign any official paper, because they're not a sovereign state. So that's actually interesting. And then I think one of the best examples or statements was when you had the meeting last summer between Faroe Island, Greenland and Denmark, that you had established this working group, which would focus on security and foreign policy issues. As far as I know I don't think it has been really up to speed. ... But I think that's the best signal that this government we have now will actually aim for. Instead of forcing the ACP through and maybe further military engagement in the Arctic. They would rather have an agreement with the Faroe Islands and Greenland about the steps and try to get an understanding why we have different focus on the Arctic region" (Major Gram Pedersen, personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:43:41).

While the initiatives exhibits the Danish government's intentions of involving Greenland to a greater extent in the hitherto complex structure of the policy process, the policy process of the ACP suggests that it takes more fundamental reforms to make the historical inequality a thing of the past.

In Greenlandic political circles, the effort from the Danish government is recognised. However, the recognition is followed by a strong criticism of the conventional bureaucratic procedure of Danish policy makers. As the current Chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee in Inatsisartut explains it:

"I believe ... that Denmark to this day treats us as those you inform afterwards. But that [the Prime Minister] is very concerned with this. But it is simply the other minister who perceive us that way and continues forgetting to invite us. But that [the Prime Minister] really wants to. As you mentioned, they can easily disregard us since it is their



policy field, that has not yet been repatriated and all that. With everything going on at the moment, the postcolonial, Russia's attack on a democratic country, they probably want to improve their procedures in Denmark. If they want to maintain a united West against Russia, that is. I think that Denmark really tries to improve how things have been done until now, where we were informed afterwards. But also since the ACP is about us and our island." (Lynge-Rasmussen, personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:32:38).

The parliamentarian addresses a criticism of the norms in the Danish administration, arguing that a change of legal procedure may be insufficient and that a change of norms in all branches of government is required to reach a functioning and fair policy process. The existing process is developed from a base of colonial and postcolonial norms of policy-making. In order to truly abandon the postcolonial structures in the policy process of Arctic foreign and security policies, significant alterations in the approach to communication and information flows is a fundamental necessity.

As analysed above under the agenda-setting stage of the ACP's policy cycle, the representation of problems in the ACP includes an insinuation that the Greenlandic people are in need of more educational opportunities. It is important to distinguish between different types of education. Whilst Greenlandic politicians also support the notion of better opportunities, the type of educational program does not align with the ACP-formulated, basic military training. Several of the interviewees address a historical difference when it comes to military tradition in Greenland compared to Europe.

"That if you look at Europe, well all states actually, the Europe we know today have actually come out of a lot of wars. So, a state in Europe has a king, has an army and thereby has a sovereignty and survive as a state. And that's a part of our history. So, for all of us Europeans, it's a natural part of our history. Denmark and Sweden, we are the countries in the world that has been most to war ever, you know. So it's a natural, it's a cultural thing how the state is and that a military and war is a part of history. That's not the same with the Arctic region. The Greenlandics, the inuits and indigenous people don't come from a state that is built on wars and building up an army, they have another cultural background"

(Major Gram Pedersen, personal communication, March 24, 2022, 00:17:57).

Understandably, one cannot avoid the historical differences between the Inuit people of Greenland and Denmark as a nation with European history. Arguably, the states in Europe were formed through eras of intermittent wars between authoritative entities. According to Major Gram Pedersen, these entities developed into states partly due to those conflicts. In this evolution, states developed military traditions of armies and warfare. He argues that the people of the Arctic do not share this history. As peoples without a long standing tradition of Westphalian state-building, the Inuit history is thus based on an altogether separate cultural base. The head of the Greenlandic representation in Copenhagen, Heinrich, shared his thoughts on this:

"I think this idea of Greenlanders being people without knowledge of violence and war is not right. There is historically, also, a lot of violence and so forth. Even though, you don't have a word for war ... Greenlanders are like any other people in the Arctic with cultures and identities." (personal communication, March 25, 2022, 00:00:48).

Even though the European understanding of warfare has no historical precedent with the Greenlandic people, it should not lead to a stereotype of Greenlanders not being familiar nor capable of violence. The Greenlandic society has no background or tradition in militarisation. This should, however, never lead to the conclusion that Greenland, as a nation and unified actor, is unqualified for participation in international affairs. Therefore, the defence and security policies about Greenland ought to strike the delicate balance between considering the unmilitarised tradition while ensuring that Greenlandic national and territorial integrity remain inviolable.

As discussed in this paper, several factors point to the Greenlandic-Danish procedures concerning foreign and security policies to continuously be characterised by the historical relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen. A current Greenlandic parliamentarian, Lynge-Rasmussen, states that:

“given that we want self-government in the future and we want it more and more. And as I said before the spiral episode and the UN watching over the countries and their colonies, how they treat their colonies, post-

colonies. I think that they are getting much more what they can do and what they must do, if they want to show that they are not a colony master or [colonialists]” (personal communication, May 13, 2022, 00:32:39).

It remains to be a decision of the government and parliament in Copenhagen whether the postcolonial structures should be abolished completely as Greenlandic politicians repeatedly are calling for an abandonment of those systems. A greater inclusion and consultation with Greenlandic representatives in the formulation of defence policies may prevent future instances of projecting Danish military tradition onto the Greenlandic population.

## **7 Conclusion**

This project sought to answer *how the complex security relationship between Greenland and Denmark affected the Arctic Capability Package*. The analysis led to several findings about what characterises the Greenlandic-Danish security relationship. Firstly, the structure of the security policy process is defined by a confusing set of legislation, ranging from the Danish Constitution to the Greenlandic Self-rule Act and the Arctic Capability Package itself. Ambiguous formulations and vague descriptions of the division of authority defines the procedures in the legislation about security policies concerning Greenland. The numerous committees, offices, and institutions, both Greenlandic and Danish, that ought to be included in the process challenges the communication flow resulting in an ineffective exchange of information. As the tendency of informing Greenlandic policy-makers after decision-making has emerged as a norm in Copenhagen, the security relationship can be traced to certain practices of postcolonial history between Greenland and Denmark. Building upon the postcolonial perspective, the cultural differences appear as Greenland and Denmark have contrasting historical traditions of militarisation. The contradicting understandings of the purpose of the military in Greenland reach a compromise partly due to incidents in international relations as well as pressure from the allies.

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Greenlandic-Danish security relationship have affected the policy process of the Arctic Capability Package in a number of ways. The problems represented in the Danish-formulated policy includes a depiction of Greenlandic society as in crucial need of greater opportunities, thus a military training program was a solution to some of the local welfare issues. This conflicts with the Greenlandic self-interpretation of how society should develop without an increase in military presence. The

complicated communication flows and the complex legal system deriving from a historically unequal relationship have resulted in difficulties for Greenlandic representatives to be recognised as formulators and decision makers in the policy process of the ACP. The export of procedures from the Danish policy process to Greenland have not been accompanied by the necessary reforms requiring the involvement of Inatsisartut in decision-making. This projection of the Danish system onto Greenlandic procedures leads to an unlegitimised outcome of the policy process, resulting in the ACP being regarded as a product of an undemocratic practice.

The policy process of the ACP relies on a highly complex legal foundation. According to the Danish Constitution, the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Denmark is dictated by the government in Copenhagen. However, the Greenlandic Self-rule Act allocates a limited power to act internationally to Naalakkersuisut in vaguely defined situations that are defined by the Government, thus prolonging the bureaucratic process of an issue reaching its decision-maker. While the practice of the Danish Government and involvement of Naalakkersuisut does not counteract the imprecise legal structures, Greenland could achieve significantly greater inclusion in the policy process within the same framework.

The policy cycle has served as the primary structure and framework for this study, providing us with a lens through which we could efficiently map out the process of the ACP. By employing the stages of the policy cycle as focal points for analysis, we were able to detect when and how the procedure of the ACP encountered major obstacles. Throughout the analysis, the deficient communication flows surrounding Greenlandic security policies recurred as a theme in several stages of the policy cycle. In order to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the agenda-setting and decision-making stages, we decided to apply two additional theories, WPR and incrementalism, respectively. The approach of the WPR theory provided a model according to which we could determine the underlying assumptions and problems of the formulated policy. In the decision-making stage, the concept of incrementalism equipped the framework of this project with a system to understand the decision environment in which the ACP was settled.

Initiating the policy cycle analysis, the stage of agenda-setting and the further employment of WPR unveiled two major problems. Firstly, the problem of Russia constituting a threat to the Arctic regional security. Secondly, the ACP presents a problem of the Greenlandic population experiencing a lack of educational opportunities. This project found that, according to the formulation of the ACP, an increased military presence in Greenland and a locally situated military training program can serve as a response to both of these problems. However, this solution is accompanied by a fear among Greenlandic policy actors that an

increased military activity will cause disturbances in regional stability. Not only did we find that a militarisation of the Arctic territories of the Kingdom of Denmark would conflict with Greenlandic aspirations and interests about maintaining the Arctic as a low-tension region. Furthermore, Greenlandic policy actors fear that a buildup of military in Greenland may trigger and fuel a security dilemma in the Arctic region.

In the second stage of the policy cycle, policy-formulation, we distinguished between the direct and indirect policy actors. Indirect actors, that be researchers in the field of Arctic security, stressed the necessity for situational awareness. The Danish Government, being a direct actor, suggested policies characterised by dual-use, meaning that it improves both civil and military response capabilities. Another direct actor, Naalakkersuisut, was found to insist on revising such proposals to be more appropriate for Greenlandic society and the promote democratic policy procedures. The complication of the policy-formulation largely stemmed from the Greenlandic demand for a greater inclusion in the process.

As the ACP reached the decision-making stage of the policy cycle, it becomes important to determine which policy actors have the authoritative power to actually decide the content of the policy. Legally, the Danish Government and Parliament possess the complete control of the decision-making. However, they are obligated to involve the Greenlandic administration, the extent of this involvement is legally unclear. Therefore, Greenlandic policy makers obtain a consulting role in the decision environment, while still participating in the unofficial bargaining. The disagreement about whether Greenlandic politicians has been sufficiently included and the uneven distribution of background information about Arctic security results in the decision environment being classified as predominantly conflictual in terms of knowledge base. Furthermore, the goals of the Greenlandic and Danish policy makers, respectively, also reflect an environment with conflictual objectives. Therefore, the decision-making environment of the ACP is primarily incremental.

While the ACP has not yet fully reached the stage of implementation, based on the formulation of the ACP, we can conclude that several factors are likely to impact the implementation. Based on our gatherings, we can expect the different cultural and societal structures as well as the contrasting traditions of militarisation between Greenland and Denmark to significantly affect how smoothly the ACP will be implemented. Also, Arctic exceptionalism and the Greenlandic self-perception of the Arctic as a unmilitarised low-tension region may result in local opposition to the execution of the ACP. After implementation we should anticipate that the ACP will impact both the economy of Greenland and foreign trade.

Lastly, Greenlandic politicians bear a concern about how the implementation may instigate a regional security dilemma in the Arctic.

Similar to the implementation stage, the evaluation stage of the ACP has yet to be reached, therefore any conclusion of this stage is outlined by an element of uncertainty. Based on the collected statements and the Principle Agreement of the ACP presents various ways in which the policy is projected to be evaluated. Additionally, the recently founded Contact Committee, with participants from all three nations in the Danish Realm, presents itself as the ideal forum for a future official evaluation. The establishment of the Contact Committee and its increasing importance with the development of the policy process of the ACP can be regarded as a preliminary evaluation.

This project discusses how the export of Danish procedures and traditions without the necessary legislation leads to both problematic policies as well as undemocratic bureaucratic procedures. Based on our interviews and findings from the analysis, we argue that the partial implementation of Danish policy processes disrupts an already malfunctioning communication system.

Weighing the arguments gathered from our interviewees, the postcolonial relation between Greenland and Denmark undoubtedly continues to constitute a significant factor in the power relation of security policy making. Therefore, reforms or entirely new legislation must be initiated to adjust for the unreliable communication flows before the postcolonial tradition in Arctic foreign and security policy process can be claimed deposited. The contrast between Greenlandic and Danish history also appears in relation to military tradition. This sustains the differences in the understanding of the role of military presence in Nuuk and Copenhagen, respectively. The responsibility of abolishing the postcolonial systemic projection of Danish military tradition onto an unmilitarised Greenlandic society, thus, lies with the Danish Government.

As indicated in Figure 2, this project concludes how the inclusion of Greenlandic policy actors continues to be characterised by minimal consultation and systemic sidelining. Our analysis proves that the Naalakkersuisut and the Greenlandic people are primarily involved with the two most generally inclusive stages in terms of relevant actors. This implies that Greenland solely possesses influence on the agenda-setting and evaluation stage, thus resulting in a relation between Greenland and Denmark that is defined by a structural limitation on the influence of Greenlandic policy actors on security policies concerning the Arctic, exemplified in the policy process of the Arctic Capability Package.

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