

AALBORG UNIVERSITET

Master Thesis

The end of peaceful collaboration and ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ in the light of Russian aggression in Ukraine during the 2022 invasion. To which extent should Russian aggression in the case of the Ukraine be interpreted as a threat to continued Arctic security?



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Contents

1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION	3
2. METHODOLOGY	5
3. CONCEPTS	8
4. THEORY	12
5. Analyzes.....	22
5.1. SECONDARY DATA ANALYZES	23
5.2. Quantitative Data Analyzes	44

1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

Tension between Ukraine and Russia have been known since 2014, Russia's annexation of the Ukraine region called Crimea. Better known as the Ukraine Crises. No one expected that on 2022 February 24th Russia would invade Ukraine again, in an act of war. The world was and still is shook with disbelief that this can happen in 21st century, where Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation will command his military force to invade Ukraine through the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Which he called "a special operation". The reason given for the special operation, according to Putin was: "we want to free the people of Ukraine". (Fisher, 2022) The aggression by Russia is still ongoing in the state of Ukraine, and most of the world's attention is solely focused on the events taking place in that region at the moment. However, there is an equal if not bigger threat due to this declaration of war in the North.

Through the years the Arctic region was seen as an exceptional place; shielded from the conflicts occurring outside of the region. Seen as a vast, remote and isolated area to the outside world, the Arctic was seen as 'exceptional' to the West. The term 'Arctic exceptionalism' will be further discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, but it is important to acknowledge from the beginning that the North was seen as exceptional because it was presumed to be a place of peace and collaboration between the Arctic and non-Arctic states. (Zellem, 2020)

Now, however the Seven Arctic states, US, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, are starting to question and doubt Russia, as well as the solidarity of Arctic security, once more. Looking back at the Ukraine Crises in 2014, its impact in the Arctic, according to a number of scholars, was felt somewhat slightly at that time: mildly increased military, economic and diplomatic tensions between the major Arctic power states (Russia, US), compared to the non-Arctic regions (D. C. Burke, 2017, p. 2). Many authors debated in their articles using different theories and outcomes on what a possible spillover from Ukraine might mean for the Arctic. One such author did a review on many different scholarly views upon the matter after the Ukraine Crises in 2014: Mikkel Runge Olesen wrote a review in *Danish Foreign Policy Review* on 'The end of Arctic exceptionalism? A review of the academic debates and what the Arctic prospects mean for the Kingdom of Denmark' (2020). Here, he grouped the authors and their views into three different categories. The first, he labelled 'the warners', writers who share the same point of view that the Arctic was never special in any way, or is no longer special, and "the power of dynamics is best understood by assuming zero-sum strategic thinking with the great powers". Zero-sum dynamics, suggests that only one group or state can have a win and each state is therefore operating primarily out of self-interest. (Olesen, 2020, p. 107) 'The warners' stress the same point of view where they see Russia's actions, increased amount of militarization in the Arctic by the power states (not only Russia but also the US) as a threat to 'Arctic exceptionalism' and security. These authors shared the assumption of zero-sum dynamic strategy between the power states in the Arctic.

Olesen also discusses what he coined 'the reassurers', who use a plus-sum term, in which both sides can gain something from one another. Differently from 'the warners', these authors shared the belief in a plus-sum dynamic and believed that Russia is not a threat to Arctic security as

Russia gains largely from peaceful collaborations between the Arctic states. The potential spillover after the Ukraine crises is a serious worry, but if needed manageable by strengthening Arctic institutions. In this case, plus-sum dynamic meaning, that both sides can work together and can gain something from working together. (Olesen, 2020, pp. 108-110)

The last group, is the 'worried'. This group has no certain and long-lasting core for their statement, they are mostly doubting and are 'worried'. Authors from this group, focus more about the left damage for 'Arctic exceptionalism' after Ukraine Crises, and undermined commitment of the Arctic stability. (Olesen, 2020, pp. 110-111)

According to Olesen (2020) it was hard to determine the potential conflict between the Arctic states and to predict the outcome for the region's future after the Ukraine Crises, but the author argued that it is much dependent on perceptions of zero-sum and plus-sum competition in the Arctic. As well as whether the region manages to separate itself from the conflicts occurring outside the Arctic. Additionally, the author states that it was visible in his research that 'the reassurers' perspectives on Arctic exceptionalism have weakened in recent years – a weakness that was already visible back in 2020. For this, he gives two reasons: spillover from the Ukraine Crises in 2014 and sanctions on Russian oil and gas production by the West, as a result of crises in the Ukraine; the increasing growth of Russian military, Chinese interest in the Arctic, as well as the US response in 2018-2019.

'The warners' predictions in 2007-2008, where they were stressing of Russia being a big threat to the Arctic security seemed to also be incorrect. Instead, Olesen (2020) argues that Russia is the state which gains the most from Arctic collaboration. 'The warners', assumptions, operated against Russia's interest to raise a threat against the current peaceful cooperation between the Arctic states. Thus, threatening the idea that crises in the Ukraine caused by Russia, back in 2014, cannot be held against it in the Arctic. He further argues, by giving examples of Russia's sustained obligation to UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. If spillover from great power rivalry elsewhere reappears as a number one threat to 'Arctic exceptionalism' and as the reason for conflict in peaceful Arctic, will likely be not about the Arctic region. (Olesen, 2020, pp. 118-119) This was the analysis provided by Mikkel Runge Olesen, Senior Researcher of Foreign policy and diplomacy after Ukraine Crises in 2014, and before 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

I find Olesen's (2020) approach on 'exceptionalism', collaboration and security of the Arctic to be very interesting and relevant to present-day events, and would like to follow his work and adapt it to current discourses taken on the Arctic. Cooperation in and about the Arctic, between Russia and other Arctic states, stayed peaceful and ongoing until now. Still, the largely looming threat to the Arctic exceptionalism and peaceful collaboration between the Arctic states was a topic that had been under discussion most back in 2014, however, due to the recent war in Ukraine, the deliberations have started once again. Conversely, the difference in conduct between 2014 and now is quite noticeable; previously the Arctic Council managed to keep ongoing cooperation with Russia and other Arctic states relatively well as opposed to today where the Arctic Council has "paused its work due to aggressive action taken by Russia towards Ukraine". (Schreiber, 2022)

Considering Russia's history with Ukraine, the current conflict between the two countries, and the relevance of present events in today's world, the idea for my problem formulation and the title of my master thesis emerged: *The end of peaceful collaboration and 'Arctic exceptionalism' in the light of Russian aggression in Ukraine during the 2022 invasion. To which extent should Russian aggression in the case of the Ukraine be interpreted as a threat to continued Arctic security?*

Furthermore with this paper I would like to address ***what presently demonstrated Russian actions mean to the Arctic: what can be its outcome for the Arctic reality as 'exceptional'? What changes, if any, will be seen in the Arctic cooperation and what does it mean for the Arctic security?***

2. METHODOLOGY

For this thesis will be used both epistemological and ontological approaches. As I will be mainly focusing on social entities such as the Arctic region and will try to answer the question of whether the Arctic exceptionalism as well as the Arctic security is facing a threat due to present war between Russia and Ukraine. As stated by Bryman(...) Ontological considerations focus on social entities, the question of 'whether' social entities should and can be thought upon as objective entities which have a reality external to social actors, or 'whether' they can and should be considered social constructions built up from perception and actions of social action. (Bryman, p. 28) More specifically, objective ontological position will be used as I want to see how social phenomena, being the Arctic exceptionalism and Security, will be confronted by the Russian aggression shown in Ukraine, and what will be the consequences.

To be able to properly learn more about what recently demonstrated Russian actions mean to the Arctic in the concept of its exceptionalism and regions security situation, it is necessary to introduce the methodology for this paper, as well as its structure. This paper will be divided into six/even chapters: Introduction and Problem Formulation, Methodology, Concept, Theory, Analysis and Discussion/Conclusion.

In this thesis, Introduction and Problem Formulation is combined together in one chapter. In the chapter, Introduction and Problem Formulation, the reason and relevance of this paper will be explained and more specific details on what led to this problem formulation will be given. Moreover, goals of this thesis will be outlined, in this chapter. To learn to which extent, Russian aggression in the case of the Ukraine, should be interpreted as a threat to continued Arctic security and will it be the end of Arctic exceptionalism.

In the second chapter, methods of methodology will be introduced, which will help to go through the whole process of this paper's research. The reason for the used methods and data collection will be explained.

With the help of Concept chapter, will be able to learn more about important concepts for this master thesis, such as 'Arctic exceptionalism'. It is important to distinguish different theories and perspectives on what the exceptionalism in the Arctic region means, as well as specify what definition will be used in this paper.

In the theory, the fourth chapter, I will try to explain important terms necessary to understand the problem such as security in the Arctic and explain the relevant theories which will help to see to which direction, the result of this paper will be leading: realistic or liberalistic. Thus, theories on liberalism, realism and its branches neoliberalism and neoliberalism will be introduced. These theories will bring a context to the research and analysis.

In discussion chapter, will be trying to see which liberalistic or realistic frameworks fit best to Russian, the Arctic 7 and US sides.

Finally, the results of analyses will be concluded in the last chapter – Conclusion. I will summarize all the knowledge gained from analysed data, which will hopefully help to answer the problem formulation of this paper.

Method of data collection

For theoretical basis, will be used mainly qualitative data collection (?) such as academic articles, transcripts, observations and similar documents drawing from public, institutional and private domains as for example university library's database and scientific, academic and research portals.

I was considering on doing the interviews, as it would have given more insight from how the situation within Arctic security is visible by people with awareness about Arctic and International politics, but it was not enough time to proceed with this data collection method, thus I chose to stay with qualitative data collection found via media (speeches) and academic articles.

2.3. Ethical issues:

As I am originally from Lithuania, country which has a history with Russia, there might be ethical conflicts with my personal judgement. As I am a citizen of country which escaped Soviet Union, I am not likely to believe that Russia, led by the President such as V. Putin, can likely put all the guns down and leave Ukraine peacefully, as well as continue to contribute to the peaceful collaboration and security in the Arctic any longer. President V. Putin has always loudly talked about reinstating Soviet Union, thus it is no surprise that he attacked Ukraine. The country that was in a Cold war with Russia since 2014.

On the other hand, I will try to remain within ethical bounds and not act on my own emotions and will be fair and critical to my theoretical and analyses findings.

2.4. Methods of data analyses

In this paper the analyses will be done using two types of analyses, meaning two different methods of analyses will be applied to be able answer the problem formulation of this thesis:

Secondary Source Analyses, Quantitative Analyses. Two different types of analyses will help to answer raised problem formulation on if the aggression shown by Russian in the Ukraine means the end of Arctic exceptionalism and if it raises a threat to the Arctic security and collaboration . With different methods of data analysis I will be able to see the better point of view of what is the current situation in regards of raised problem formulation. I wouldn't be able to see the whole picture using only one method of data analyses.

Inductive theory: is used when the researcher findings for the theory on particular topic, awakens interest in doing research. "The findings are fed back into the stock of theory and the research findings associated with a certain domain of enquiry". (Bryman, p. 21) Inductive theory draws interest from observations and findings, in my case news about Ukraine war and the Arctic Council 'pause', and adds it to the theory to find its relevance and come to the conclusion from its findings and theory.

Secondary Data Analyses.

The first method of analyses will be secondary data analyses. Different articles will be analyzed about Arctic security and exceptionalism to better understand a possible future to the Arctic what potentially awaits for the Arctic, after the end of war between Russia and Ukraine, in 2022. Policies and literature about military of the US and Russian in the Arctic will be analyzed to contribute to the data found by applying QA and to answer problem formulation. Secondary source data analyses will help to deepen knowledge on theoretical aspects of militarization of US and Russian in the Arctic as well as the Future of the Arctic, as well as the relationship between the main actors of this paper Russia and US. Situation between Russia and NATO will also be explored, as US is a part of NATO alliance, together with 4 other Arctic states.

Articles different authors will be analysed on the events occurred after Ukraine Crises in 2014, reactions from the US, Arctic 6 (few examples will be given), and NATO, as Ukraine Crises became one of the reasons for NATO increasing involvement in the Arctic.

Quantitative Data Analyses.

Second method of analyses will be quantitative analysis (QA). This type of analyses allows to analyze mathematical and statistical modeling, measurement to understand a particular behavior. "Quantitative analysis provides analysts with tools to examine and analyze past, current, and anticipated future events. Any subject involving numbers can be quantified (...)". (Kenton, 2020) This particular method of analyses will be mainly focusing on the Arctic security and Arctic militarization. As QA is mainly used to analyze statistics and quantities of numbers, it will be used to analyze statistic of the United States and the Russian Federation militarization in the Arctic through the years. This part of data analyses will help to see if the threat to the Arctic security and exceptionalism was increasing through the years in the Arctic or the number of militarization jumped because of recently showed Russian aggression.

While looking for data on military assets and military capabilities, I have experiences difficulties which led with very minimalistic data, which didn't allow me to do a brief analyses at the end. Besides difficulty, on finding data it was hard for me to understand some of military

terminology, due to lack of personal knowledge and have zero background in security or military area.

What is more, the original plan was to do the triangulation analyses, unfortunately I had to remove the discourse analyses, as I didn't manage to finish is due to time consuming and lack of health. Thus, I have read and had notes, but they were too raw to add to this paper. I was also unable, to properly adjust my analyses with theoretical part due to mental health problems, even after extension. Nonetheless, I believe myself to be well acquainted with the topic.

3. CONCEPTS

Within this chapter useful knowledge on what is 'Arctic Exceptionalism' will be gained. By using different theories on the mentioned concept and what will the Arctic exceptionalism mean to this paper, will be better understood. Knowledge gained within this chapter will help to better understand the relevance of this concept today and its importance. In addition to the theory on Arctic exceptionalism, within this chapter three concepts on Arctic states will be also introduced. The three concepts will be used in the upcoming Analyzes chapter, thus it is important to know what these concepts will mean for this paper.

'Arctic Exceptionalism'

The idea of "Arctic exceptionalism" is a way of romanticizing the Arctic region by highlighting its exotic and unique properties. "The Arctic is seen as a vast desert-like area where the forces of nature challenge human capabilities; as a pristine wilderness whose beauty has made it a focal point of environmental conservation (...)" (J. Käpylä, 2019, p. 153) The region was seen as remote and untouched area, which led others to think of it as 'exceptional'.

According to authors Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola (2019), who also view the Arctic region as "a "zone of peace" and "territory of dialogue" (...). (...) the Arctic has become understood as a "distinctive region in international society". (J. Käpylä, 2019, p. 153) Meaning the region isn't a part of world politics and is described as an apolitical space for regional governance, ongoing co-operation and peaceful co-existence. (J. Käpylä, 2019, p. 153) According to given examples by Käpylä and Mikkola (2019), the Arctic region was not involved in any conflicts, but was all about cooperation and communication between the Arctic states. This demonstrates the regions history of isolationist policy.

Furthermore, the traditional history of the Arctic region is shaped by global trade (furs, minerals, whales and etc.), where "agents of trade from fleets to Crown chartered companies, (...) acting as quasi-sovereigns". (Zellem, 2020, pp. 113-114) With the help of trade between the Arctic region and the outside world, the Arctic continued to grow its stability and collaboration outside the Arctic. Its importance was growing internationally both in political and economic way. Nonetheless, through the history between the Arctic states and non-Arctic states, there were always a common understanding for the need of demonstrating sustained efforts on protecting the Arctic wildlife and environment. (Zellem, 2020, p. 115). This is another example of why the Arctic was seen as an exceptional.

The Arctic became an example of exceptional and peaceful collaboration between states, demonstrating successful international diplomacy, co-management cooperation and balance between two worlds: traditional (Western states) and contemporary (the Arctic states). According to Barry S. Zellem (2020), the collaborations between the Arctic states (in this case Alaska-Canada), its cross-border management, international partnerships and collective transboundary relationships, demonstrates a way for how the rest of the world could be governed. The rest of the world could learn from a peaceful and effective collaboration between different Arctic states. States can learn from one another while working together, by co-management of lands, resources and economic activities. (Zellem, 2020, pp. 122-123)

The peaceful collaboration between the Arctic states was present even during the end of WWII and felt tension between the United States and Soviet Union, in 1944. Even after the relations of these two states escalated into Cold war, the collaboration and visits between the indigenous communities was present and known, for example between “the Inupiat living on Big and Little Diomed Islands”. (Rowe, 2018, p. 21) During the Cold war, the Arctic region was the main arena for power conflict, between the states. The security issue was noticeable in the Arctic politics. However, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev’s released two important reforms on Soviet Union (Perestroika (restructuring) and Glasnost (openness) which led to his inspiring speech in Murmansk. In 1987, M. Gorbachev gave a speech calling for “(...) a “zone of peace” in the Arctic. (T. S. Axworthy, 2013, p. 8) In his speech former President Gorbachev talked about making the Arctic a place of peace, regions demilitarization and opening the Northern Sea Route for international relations and collaboration. (Trade, 2001, p. 49) This speech became significant in Arctic history as it was the first peaceful step towards diplomatic thinking after the Cold War. The Arctic became a prototype for a different kind of international norms, different kind for power relations, where you sit together and operate. This speech became a new kind of peaceful operation between the Arctic states, as it inaugurated a period of collaboration and peaceful settling of disputes by rules and agreements, rather than threats and conflicts. Furthermore, after this speech took place, a new international forum which will be important for cooperation between the Arctic States, was created: The Arctic Council.

Three Arctic countries played a leading role in creating the Arctic Council (AC): Finland, Russia and Canada. After hearing Gorbachev’s speech in 1991, an environmental and scientific co-operation program, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was created after initiative shown by Finland. In response to Finnish initiative and Murmansk speech, Canada suggested a new dialogue forum – the Arctic Council. This forum would involve AEPS environmental program but would also allow broader cooperation between the Arctic states. (T. S. Axworthy, 2013, pp. 8-9) The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum for the eight Arctic States: The Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and USA), Sweden, Finland and Iceland). (Kuersten, 2016, p. 390) The Arctic states are defined “(...) as states have territories within the Arctic and thus carry the role as stewards of the region. Their national jurisdictions and international law govern the lands surrounding the Arctic Ocean and its waters. The Northern provinces of the Arctic States offer a home to more than four million people, whose health and well-being is on the top of the Arctic Council’s agenda”. (Secretariat, 2022) These states, “(...) came together with civil society to replace an Arctic Cold war

framework of non-engagement and military competition with one of multipolar co-operation through a collaborative agenda-setting forum”. (T. S. Axworthy, 2013, p. 8)

The Council was formally established in 1996 and also included Indigenous peoples organizations as permanent participants. Within the council decision-making is based on consensus between the Arctic State members. AC also includes environmental NGOs and science organizations. International and European laws, as well as national legal systems, also have impacts in the decision-making in the Arctic. Every three years, each Arctic State gets a chairmanship where the particular state can focus on a common framework plan on related issue or possibility in the Arctic region that they work on, during their chairmanship period. (J. K  pyl  , 2019) The Arctic Council was limited to only operate and promote the cooperation between the Arctic states and Arctic communities within the issues of sustainable development and environmental protection. This not only made the Arctic “(...) a de facto ’internal affaire ’of the community of Arctic Council states (...), but also excluded ’high political ’matters with geopolitical implications, most notably military security, from the AC agenda”. (J. K  pyl  , 2019, p. 154) Development of the Arctic Council is one of the reasons that made the Arctic exceptional; a zone for peace and collaboration.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), works in a way as a global treaty for maritime sustainability and prevents potential conflicts for coastal claims. It was signed in 1982 and has led Arctic policy making. According to authors M. Jarashow, M. B. Runnels and T. Svenson (2007) this convention is the most efficient system which helped to maintain the balance of the increased interest to the Arctic states. (M. Jarashow, 2007, p. 1589) It replaced four Geneva Conventions (1958) and has a more global perspective on addressing the various phases of the maritime areas and ocean issues, such as pollution, as well as coastal and seabed related matters. UNCLOS promotes that the ocean space concerns must be seen as global and inter-related, and is a framework for marine and maritime activities. (IUCN, n.d., p. 1) The United States didn’t sign the treaty, differently than Russia, but still follows its laws accordingly.

Furthermore, another important declaration was signed in 2008. During the political level meeting, initiated by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Premier of Greenland, the Ilulissat declaration was signed between the Arctic Five. This declaration provided a framework for a responsible management of the Arctic Ocean and protection of the marine environment, which includes ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research and many other activities. (DECLARATION, 2008) The Ilulissat declaration states, “(...) “a clear consensus regarding the use of the Law of the Sea as the fundamental mechanism for the delineation of the outer continental shelf, between the coastal states of the Arctic Sea”. (Soendergaard, 2017, pp. 75-76) It expressed the willingness to solve matters in the Arctic, in a peaceful matter according to the international law. Both UNCLOS convention and Ilulissat declaration became important for the Arctic region and a symbol of Arctic exceptionalism.

During the past decade, the Arctic has re-appeared more and more on the international politics agenda. The rapid global warming and changing environment in the Arctic, allowed better access to the region. Because of melting Arctic Ocean ice, the region is no longer known as a harsh and remote geopolitical frontier. It is now less isolated to the outside world. New sea routes were

opened and the heightened interest in the region increased on an international level, as a result. Therefore, tension between the Arctic states was already felt back in 2007 when Russia planted its flag under the North Pole. (J. K  pyl  , 2019, pp. 154-155)

Thus, the Arctic managed to stay ‘exceptional’ and avoided spillover from the affairs outside the region. Here are few mentions on when the Arctic managed to stay exceptional and not ‘touched’ by the conflicts between other states. Even when it involved the Arctic states military demonstrations towards other states. According to Byers (2017), significant disagreements between Russia and other Arctic countries have not deterred Arctic cooperation, over the years of the Arctic Council work. One of the given examples, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, funded by the United States, which was adopted at the Arctic Council shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Council and its members managed to stay neutral from its members (US), demonstrated aggressive actions towards another state (Iraq). Spillover to the Arctic, from the West was avoided, even though when one of the Arctic states (Russia) tried to boycott US assessment proposal as a protest against the states actions, towards Iraq. Another example given by the author is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, adopted by the Arctic Council shortly after Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, which the US and other Arctic countries strongly opposed. Nonetheless, the Councils work continued. (Byers, 2017, p. 384) The fact that the Arctic Council managed to continue its work and cooperation between the Arctic states, shows that with avoiding a spillover of ‘wars’ happening outside the Arctic, the Arctic region stayed exceptional.

The Arctic States

With the help of this brief section of the Concept chapter, I will be able to explain particular concepts in regards to the Arctic states, which will be later used in the thesis Analyzes.

The Arctic 5: The five Arctic littoral states, represents the Arctic 5: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States of America. These Arctic states work together to address Arctic issues. (Kuersten, 2016).

The Arctic 6: For this thesis, this concept will be used when talking about the Arctic states, excluding the two Arctic states: Russia and the United States. This will be relevant in the upcoming analyses chapter, where particular sources will be analysed focusing on Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Canada, as the Arctic 6.

The Arctic 7: This concept will be used in this paper, while talking about the Arctic states, while excluding Russia. This will be, also relevant in the upcoming Analyzes chapter, then talking about Denmark’s, Norway’s, Iceland’s, Sweden’s, Canadas and US reaction to Russian actions towards Ukraine, during 2014 and present. As well as, while talking about Russian military build-up in the Arctic region.

With the help of given examples of the Arctic exceptionalism in this chapter, the relevant information of the concept was provided to gain a better insight on what the term of Arctic exceptionalism means according to different scholars. Moreover, these given examples helped to determine what it is meant by Arctic exceptionalism in this paper and why it is important to the

problem formulation. The gained knowledge, is relevant for the upcoming analyzes, especially while trying to answer one of this paper research question, on what can be the outcome for the Arctic exceptionalism, in the light of Russia-Ukraine war.

In this thesis, the Arctic exceptionalism is a place for peaceful collaboration by the eight Arctic states. The Arctic region is a place for peaceful dialogue between states, no matter the conflicts outside the Arctic.

4. THEORY

In this chapter different articles and theories by different scholars will be introduced to gain relevant information which could help to answer the problem formulation of this paper. Theory on 'Arctic Security', will help to gain relevant knowledge on what Arctic security means for this paper, as well as to learn relevant information, regarding the problem formulation of this paper: threat to the Arctic security due to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Relevant theories will be chosen to explore the security threats addressed in this paper, further in the upcoming chapter of analyzes.

Theories on international relations: liberalism and realism, will help to relate to previously mentioned author Olsen and his theories on 'the warners', 'the reassurers' and 'the worried'. With the help of different authors, I will be able to step away from the Arctic region and see what the security situation from outside the Arctic is, and what Arctic Security means in this paper.

Arctic Security

With this chapter I will be able to learn more about security theory, which will be relevant to this paper in the analyses chapter addressing the Arctic security.

Due to the Arctic region being remote and far away from other states geographically and politically, its lack of infrastructure, dominant harsh climate, the Arctic was held to be 'exceptional' and imagining conflicts in remote area like Arctic, seemed somewhat unrealistic. (Olesen, 2020, p. 103) In book *Security* (1998), three authors Buzan, Waever and de Walde, present an analyses framework for a security studies, by following a 'wider' agenda approach. Meaning, security threats being open to different types of threat and not just war or direct force. These authors explored security threats that are the result of military and nonmilitary threats. It was hoped to find a more radical view of security studies and to construct a concept of security that meant something more than a threat or a problem. As security issues can arise in different areas, and could be defined as a security issue and not just political, it had to fit three criteria. (B. Buzan, 1998, pp. 4-5) Understanding that 'security threat', can come not only from conflicts which involve military, is important for this paper. Especially while taking in account that in the Arctic 'security' can mean, not just national security but also making sure the secure operations of search and rescue operations or preventing any possible environment issues.

According to Buzan et.al. (1998) the international security is a rational matter. Theories about international security are mostly on how human addresses and relate to threats and vulnerabilities. Threats felt both from international and domestic environments. These theories

also stressed security dilemmas, power balance and regimes, as well as arm races. The widest context of security studies, is the global level. This type of concept is useful in analyzing ‘the great powers’, such as US or Russia, which helps to address the effects to the global environment, economy and society. (B. Buzan, 1998, pp. 11-12)

The Arctic region comprises about one-sixth of the globe and is home to almost four million people. Nonetheless, only recently the Arctic was addressed about its security both in policy and scientific research matters. Strategic matters involving military issues were never really absent from this region. As it is well known, the power competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was already felt during the Cold War. Furthermore, the melting of Arctic ice and rising sea level, increased growing tension not only between the two above mentioned Arctic states but also by other states. The new access to the Arctic natural resources has caught an eye of the non-Arctic states as well. (G. H. Gjørv, 2020, pp. 1-3)

The Ukraine Crises in 2014, changed the relations between Russian and Western countries drastically. The Russian annexation of Ukraine territory Crimea, left many states unhappy and since that time Ukraine-related sanctions posed on the Russian Arctic by the Western countries have been visible. (Olesen, 2020, p. 103) Additionally, Russia’s high priority for military exercises in the Russian Arctic region has been particularly unsettling. In May 2019, concerns by US Secretary of State M. Pompeo were voiced, regarding the increased interest shown in the Arctic by Russia and China. As a result, the Pentagon’s Arctic Strategy warns about “the Arctic being used as a ‘potential vector both for attacks on the homeland and for US power Projection’”. (Olesen, 2020, p. 104) The speech given by former US Secretary of State, is important for this paper, as it shows voiced concerns about Russia’s military build-up and increasing military exercises. Pompeo warned that Russia's intentions in the Arctic, where it has launched a massive military expansion campaign, could be destabilizing given the country's track record. (World, 2019)

Concept of ‘security’ gives a motive for politics to take actions beyond established rules to address the apparent threat, while treating it as a special kind of issue. Differently from social security, international security is closely linked to the ‘traditions of power politics’. Security is all about survival in the traditional understanding what a security issue context is. Posing as a threat to existential threat, security has been an excuse to use force and extreme emergency measures to handle the threat. (B. Buzan, 1998, pp. 21-24)

When considering the ‘wider’ agenda of security studies, the threat to survival and human life will vary from different sectors and levels of analyzes: the military sector (threat is other state or political entity), the political sector (sovereignty/ideology of the state itself), the economic sector (bigger organizational companies might be a threat), the social sector (nations and religions functioning independently from the state), the environmental sector (survival of individual species/habitat, climate change and biodiversity issues). (B. Buzan, 1998, pp. 21-22) Security, is not just power relations but much more and can grasp a much broader concept, as seen in the examples of security sectors. Moreover, these given examples of security sectors is known and present in the Arctic region. Especially with melting ice and the opening Arctic waters. The Arctic states will need to shift their ‘security’ towards protecting its natural resources, which for

example is crucial for Russia, as resources found in its Arctic region is a very important part of states economy.

According to Joachim Weber (2020), it is important to acknowledge that military presence was always active in the Arctic region. Author seconds to Gjørsv (2020), stating that the competition between the US and Russian on power and security was present since the Cold War. The changing geostrategic environment in the Arctic, has raised concerns for militarization. (Weber, 2020, pp. 201-202) According to Dahl (2014), The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) emerges as a natural candidate to provide the Arctic with the necessary security structure, as a result of changing environment and increased tension between US and Russia. NATO member nations cover 50% of the circumpolar region, and four out of five Arctic littoral nations are NATO members. Meaning, the region is home to several NATO allies. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, pp. 19-20) The Arctic plays a significant role in the national security priorities of Canada, Denmark, Norway, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. NATO has played and will continue to play a role in the Arctic due to its Article 5 commitment, which states: “that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all — is at the core of the Alliance, a promise of collective defense.” (NATO U. M., n.d.) The Alliance's recognition that the Arctic region will require more attention in the future was significant because it represented the first serious consideration of the Alliance's interest and role in the region since the end of the Cold War. (Lippert, 2019, p. 57) NATO promotes democratic values and allows members to consult and collaborate on defense and security issues in order to solve problems, build trust, and, ultimately, prevent conflict. Thus it states, on the official NATO online page, that through political and military means, it ensures the freedom and security of its members. (NATO, n.d.)

Both NATO and Russia have been increasing their military capacities and exercise in the region significantly, over the recent years. Russia's execution of a strong Arctic Policy, which included reopening of numerous Soviet Union era bases in the North as well as increased movement of newer and more powerful military equipment in the Arctic region, raises tension between the Arctic states and NATO. As a response to Russian actions in the region, NATO has also increased their presence in the North. (Weber, 2020, pp. 201-202) This information is relevant, as for this paper it is important to know more about NATO for further papers analyses.

Getting back to theoretical part of security, most states are threatened by their neighbor states rather than a more distant power, as according to the authors “security independence issues travels faster over short distances than over long international ones. “The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system is one of regionally based clusters, which we label security complexes.” (B. Buzan, 1998, p. 11) The mentioned security complexes are security relations that has shaped regional patterns in each complex through its history of region relationship between power, harmony and aggression. “A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. (B. Buzan, 1998, p. 12) For example, Ukraine and Russia relationships through the history. Dynamics and structure of security complexes are regulated by the states inside that region, perspective on security and its interactions with it.

Lastly, international relations describes the concept of security as a complex and universal phenomena, which has different perspectives, such as soft security; environmental security; negative/hard security and human security. The 'hard security' will be the most relevant to this paper, as this perspective of security represents military dilemma in regards to the Arctic security. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic went from hard security to soft. (M. Scopelliti, 2016, p. 673)

With the help of this chapter, broader knowledge was learned about security sectors. The gained knowledge from different theories on security helped to identify what 'Arctic security' means for this paper. In this paper, we will be mainly focused on military sector: military, state and nation, national security, as well as hard (military build-up in case of a potential conflict between the states) and soft (environment, economic) security.

International Relations

To better address the problem formulation of this paper, it is important to know the background of relevant theories, which will help the further development of this paper. As well, as to better explain Mikkel Runge Olesen (2020), above mentioned theories of 'the warners', 'the reassurers' and 'the worried'. The two international relations theories, that will be further introduced in this chapter, were chosen because of its theoretical relevance to the above mentioned Olesen's theories.

International Relations (IR), is both exciting and diverse field of study. "(...) it addresses the most pressing problems shaping the lives of everyone on the planet: matters of war and peace, the organization of the global economy, the causes and consequences of global inequality, the pending global environmental catastrophe (...)." (P. Owen, 2020, pp. 6-7) IR discipline is so diverse, it covers international politics, security, economy, history, law and international organization within its study field.

There are different versions throughout history in regards to how the International Relations discipline came to be. One example, given to the book authors of *The Globalization of World Politics* (2020), states that IR discipline was born as a result of the First World War, in 1919 after International Politics department was established at the University of Wales. Scholars believed, if they could find the reason that caused the war, they would be able to prevent it from happening again. In other words, scholars at the University of Wales, now Aberystwyth University, believed that IR discipline is the study field for "making the world a better place". (P. Owen, 2020, p. 7) There are so many different theories on International Relations or Politics which makes it hard to decide which of these theories will fit the best for raised researched questions and problem formulation of this paper. That is why, learning different proponents of specific theories is important.

Further, within this chapter two relevant International Relations theories for this thesis, will be introduced: realism; (neo)liberalism.

Realism and Neorealism

One of well known, International Relations (IR) theories is – *realism*. This particular theory claims, to see the world as it really is. Realism sees actions moving only in one direction, from human interactions to institutional organizations, the outcomes from these interactions will always be the same. (Waltz, 2008, p. 57)

People who follow this IR theory are called realists. “The ‘real ’world as seen by realists is not a very pleasant place”. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 8) Following, realist’s point of view, humans are selfish, and some believe to be, the worst beings in this world. The desire for power is rooted deep inside of human nature and is seen as an end itself. The need for power arises not only because humans are born bad, but because they want things. For example, Russia wants to have control over NSR route in the Arctic region. According to Waltz (2008), other realist (such as Hobbes) argues that there are three reasons which arises fights among men: competition, diffidence and need for glory. “Competition leads to fighting for gain, diffidence to fighting to keep what has been gained, glory to fighting for reputation. (...) Even if one has plenty of power and is secure in its possessions, more power is nevertheless wanted.” This three obstacles were believed to be a cause for war.” (Waltz, 2008, p. 79) Realists, are also sometimes called ‘pessimists ’as they see the world as a selfish and dark place.

According to realism, the main actors, following this theory, are the states which are lawfully sovereign actors. “Sovereignty means that there is no actor above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways”. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 9) Meaning international corporations and organizations must work within its ‘inter-state ’relations, which are regulated by human nature and actions. Because realists see humans as selfish, they see the International Politics as a struggle for power among states. Each state prioritizing and trying to maximize its national interest, while preventing other states from dominating. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 9) As a result, realist believes that for leaders to believe in a peaceful political change would be foolish. Other bodies, such as individuals and organizations also exist, but their power is limited. As realism believes the state being the main national body who tries to prioritize the once needs, realism is important in relations of talking about war. During the time of war, national interests, encourages the state to speak and act as one. Moreover, when it comes to decision making, all the decisions will be made to address the states need and interest. Realists are concerned with their own state’s needs, not other states. Realism believes that states live in a concept of anarchy”(...) in the absence of anyone being in charge internationally. (...) there being ‘no one to call ’in an international emergency (...).” (S. Atunes, 2018, p. 1) They don’t expect help from other states, they only expect help from within their state.

Another important aspect in realism is a ‘balance of power’. The idea of the balance of power describes the state which is making decisions to grow their capabilities while comparing and undergoing the capabilities of other states. Meaning, peace and stability might be achieved between the states only if there is a power balance. If the state will try to gain more power, it might trigger a war with other states. (S. Atunes, 2018, p. 3) Russia’s strict military reaction to the Ukraine’s possible joint of NATO exemplifies this concept.

Realists also state that the competition between the states are not only for power but also for security. The nature of this competition is viewed in *zero-sum terms*, which means “more for one

actor (...) less for another". (P. Owen, 2020, p. 139) Meaning that zero-sum dynamics apply when each state 'plays' for itself at national level and for own state benefit. (Ghimis, 2013, p. 49) Zero-sum games are the polar opposite of win-win situations (such as a trade agreement that significantly increases trade between two countries) or lose-lose situations (such as war). Meaning one person's gain is equivalent to another's loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is zero. However, in real life, things are not always so clear, and gains and losses are frequently difficult to quantify. (Kenton, 2022)

Neorealism is a different variant of realism, which developed during the 1970's and 1980's. This theoretical approach, addresses "the importance of the structure of the international system in affecting the behavior of all states". (P. Owen, 2020, p. 10) Neorealist believed that theory can't explain or reason events happening by accident, as theory can explain the occurring event only if it was identified through occurring regularities and repetitions. "By defining the structure of international political systems, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international politics, thus makes the theory about it possible". (Waltz, 2008, p. 56) Neorealism, portrayed an international system as a whole, having structural units and systems. "For neorealist, interacting states can be adequately studied only by distinguishing between structural and unit-level causes and effects. Structure becomes a new object of inquiry, as well as an occasion for argument. In the light of neorealist theory, means and ends are differently viewed, as are causes and effects". (Waltz, 2008, p. 76) The essential departure from traditional realism for neorealism is the fact, that neorealism believed the idea of teaching about international politics as a system with defined structure. Moreover, realism can't explain the disconnection between the causes and effects of particular event, while neorealism can. Thus the main difference between realism and neorealism is that whereas realism focuses on human and domestic factors, neorealism, focuses on the structures of the international system as determining state behavior. To add more, neorealism allows for some collaboration when it serves the state goals. (Waltz, 2008, pp. 74-77)

In the book "Realism and International Politics"(2008) Waltz states that similarly like realism, neorealism saw power as a tool in regards of defining actions of states, which has taking risks towards other states depending on how much or how little power they hold towards other states. For example, countries with less power might experience aggressive attack from a more powerful country, like Ukraine from Russia. On the other hand, if one state seems to hold a lot of power compared to other states, the states might feel rising threat and start increasing their military and move their efforts towards the dominant state. Although, it is important to acknowledge the importance of power statement, in this approach the ultimate distress of states is security. Differently from realism, neorealism didn't see the need for power as an end to itself but rather as a possibility to increase their capabilities. (Waltz, 2008, pp. 56-57) As well as shows relevance to the papers problem formulation, where concern for Arctic security will be addressed.

In *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Kenneth Waltz described international politics as a struggle for power. According to Waltz, continuous security competitions, inter-state conflicts and struggles to achieve international cooperation between states, came as a result of a lack of main power above sovereign states. He further argues, that states with great power are especially

alert about other states capabilities and possible threats to overpower them. Thus, threat to states security (as an example United States and Russia). (P. Owen, 2020, p. 137) From the neorealist point of view, the primary actors in the International Relations are the states and they exist in a condition of anarchy, as a result of the absence of international authority. Authors like Owen (2020), stresses this approach implies that states are being consumed by power, security and the need to survive. “(...) the states do not and should not have patience for ethics or norms; and that the distribution and balance of power tell us just about everything we need to know about patterns in world politics”. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 193) Waltz (1979), keeps arguing that states wish to survive, might vary between the ambition to conquer the world and living peacefully among others. Where the ground for states security is not certain but rather depends on impulses lying behind state actions. (Lundborg, 2019, p. 232) This is a good example, as one of the reasons for existing competition between two powerful states the United States and Russia. What is more, neorealist theoretical framework is to show ‘the real world’ phenomena. It seeks to illuminate different aspects of “(...) extraordinary vast, complex, nuanced, networked, and contradictory creature.” (Venugopal, 2015, p. 5) Meaning, the real world is not as black and white as portrayed by others.

These two theories will be used later in the analyses to define the conclusion of problem formulation, as well as to try and recognize which point of view is represented by scholars in their articles used for the analyses.

Liberalism and Neoliberalism

The term “liberal” was used in English to indicate aristocratic traditions, pursuits and characters. The term itself wasn’t used in the politics until the beginning of nineteenth century. (Bell, 2014, p. 693) The beginning of liberalism as we know it now, started from the basis of authoritarian order and the protests against it. Protests against religious, economic, social and ethical belief, was the historic start of Liberalism. (Hobhouse, 1911, p. 10)

Today, *liberalism* is known as a pretty successful model of government, its ethics are well infiltrated in Europe and the Americas political institutions. “Liberal internationalists believe that power politics itself is the product of ideas, and—crucially—ideas can change”. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 104) This theory is based on the moral argument of the highest goal of government being to ensure each individual the right to life, liberty and property. The main concern of liberalism, is to make sure that constructed institutions will protect individual freedom while limiting and measuring political power. Liberalist believe in democracy and that monarchy and dictatorship cannot maintain and protect individual freedom and life quality. Another concern that liberals stress about is militaristic foreign policies. Author J. Meiser (2018) in his article gives two examples of why liberals face issues with military in International Politics. One of the given example is, the possibility of the need to increase the military power in the state. Increased military power might be used to fight foreign states, but also used against their own people, which goes against liberal believes. In fact, most liberal states limit their military power, as a result, to assure its citizens control over the military. (Meiser, 2018, p. 1)

For liberalist, wars of territorial expansion or imperialism, when states try to build their power by invading foreign territories is unbelievable and disturbing. By invading foreign territories, you need to build up your military and strengthen your state at the expense of your people, while trying to maintain political control of other state and its people. Liberals, stress the main core problem of needing to develop a political system which would allow people to protect themselves from the threats of foreign countries. “The primary institutional check on power in liberal states is free and fair elections via which the people can remove their rulers from power, providing a fundamental check on the behavior of the government. A second important limitation on political power is the division of political power among different branches and levels of government – such as a parliament/congress, an executive and a legal system.” (Meiser, 2018, p. 1) These are the examples of a few ways on how to check the balance of the power in the state which will allow to prevent any rising threat to the individual liberty and freedom.

Democracy is a big part of liberalism. Liberalist believes that democratic states are more likely to keep peace and are able to successfully collaborate with each other. Moreover, Meiser(2018) states, that domestic liberal institutions and norms are built to prevent and restrain the violent power between states. Unfortunately, there is no ‘international police force ’that would be able to enforce this law and prevent international conflicts. Still, the aggressor is aware of institutions such as the United Nations (UN), who can release economic sanctions or use military force against the oppressor, if needed. The aggressor state would be also losing all the benefits that peace can offer: international trade, foreign aid and diplomatic recognition. (Meiser, 2018, p. 2) To relate to this statement, we can reflect on Olesen’s (2020) ‘the reassurers’, as liberals believed sanctions and missing out on peace benefits would be able to stop any state from invading another state.

Liberalists believe society to be a contract of modern-day institutionalist arguments. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 194) Besides democracy, liberalist favor international collaboration, human rights and rule of law. If the state acts against the mentioned norms, they are then subject to a consequence. For example, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 the invasion of Iraq was done outside the UN rules, after the world expressed their anger, the image of the US decreased significantly in a global scale. (Meiser, 2018, p. 2) Thus, the Arctic Council pause, as a result of Russia-Ukraine war. Arctic states, not sure if they can trust Russia to continue the peaceful cooperation in the Arctic region.

Differently from neorealism, *neoliberalism* shared a more positive point of view of international politics. Neoliberalism approach demonstrated that states are cooperating with one another in order to further extend their interests, which went beyond security. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 193) Discussion of neoliberalism was occasionally referred in economic and political movements that was important in the end of 1970s. The above mentioned economic movement, reflected on deregulation of markets and free movement of capital while emphasizing on fluidity and globalization. The political movement, represented the small amount of democracy which controlled the role of government in the light of securing property rights and ensuring good functioning of markets. With this political agenda was associated the understanding of civil society as individual entities which relate on one another, while pursuing their own self-interest.

Whereas freedom and self-determination is attractive “However, the promise of neoliberal freedom comes with costs that (at the extreme) include an antagonism toward social commitment that erodes democratic participation.” (G. Adams, 2019, p. 191)

Neoliberalists, argue that all the states could benefit from a peaceful collaboration. Their theory focuses “(...)on the problems of whether and how states might cooperate for mutual advantage despite the absence of supranational government (anarchy)”. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 327) According to this approach negotiations between the states take an important role in achieving successful international cooperation.

Because a main obstacle to cooperation was the absence of trust among states, states construct international institutions that can perform various trust-enhancing functions, including monitoring and publicizing cheating. (P. Owen, 2020, p. 193) International institutions like the Arctic Council or the United Nations, are a good example of such international institutions in the Arctic regions, especially the AC. The Council is promoting peaceful cooperation between the Arctic states, and that each state can be benefit from working together.

This is where plus-sum, or also known as positive-sum, dynamic comes in action, where both sides get something from collaboration. In game theory, a positive-sum game is one in which the total of gains and losses is greater than zero. A positive sum occurs when resources are increased in some way and an approach is developed that meets the desires and needs of all parties involved. (Britannica, n.d.) For example, Arctic states benefit working together on search and rescue research or on new environment projects.

Sum up chapter on IR theory

After these International Relationship theories were introduced, some particular similarities to Olesen’s (2020) theories on ‘the warners’, ‘the reassurers’ and ‘the worried’, introduced in the introduction chapter, can be seen within the description. The resembling features from the theory part of this paper will help to set a more solid ground for the Olesen’s given theories on the Arctic exceptionalism and security.

Realism and ‘the warners’

Looking back at Olesen(2020) and his introduction of ‘*the warners*’, realists are somewhat similar to them. ‘The warners’ are portrayed as a mostly pessimistic group of people that follow zero-sum approach in which every state acts independently and selfishly. Their job is to warn the state of upcoming threats. One of the given examples by ‘the warners’ theory by Olesen in his report:

Rob Huebert (2010) investigated the ongoing dialogue between the Arctic States, during the period of 2007-2020. Differently, from Borgerson(2008) he questions the sincerity of the Arctic states in the light of “mismatching between state rhetoric and investment” in the Arctic military. Huebert also argues, that the Russian military recovery should have been expected since there was a visible recovery in the state’s economy, and doesn’t see it as a threat to the Arctic security.

Instead, the author ‘warns’ about the increased amount of militarization in the Arctic region and talks about how it might be a danger for a zero-sum security dilemma style (?), following the Ukrainian Crises and the danger of possible ‘spillover’. Huebert stressed, that situation between the Ukraine and Russia (in 2014) will have serious consequences for cooperation between the Arctic states in the Arctic region. No matter if Russia decides to take matters in the Arctic or not. Furthermore, he calls the ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ in the 1990’s and 2000’s (...) the consequence of temporary Russian weakness”. (Olesen, 2020, pp. 105-106)

Liberalism and ‘the reassurers’

Similarly, to provided examples by author Mikkel Olesen, realism theory is mostly referred as a pessimistic approach and is known to be concerned about the power and security of the state.

Neoliberalism represents an example of ‘the reassurers’, which was given in the introduction chapter by author Mikkel R. Olesen (2020). Similarly, to neoliberalism, ‘the reassurers share a positive attitude and see the need for peaceful collaboration as a key reason to avoid conflict between foreign states. No state would risk a peaceful collaboration and gain that it brings to both sides. One of the examples given of ‘the reassurers is by author Kathrin Keil (2013). She argues that Russia has by far the biggest interest in the Arctic, due to the importance of oil and gas for the state’s economy and would not risk ruining collaboration between the Arctic states. (Olesen, 2020, p. 108)

‘The worried’

Meanwhile, the last group of people described by Olesen, ‘the worried’ represents all of previously mentioned International Relation theories: (neo) liberalism and (neo)realism. ‘The worried’, incorporates views from both groups and is usually lacking a clear core or point of view. (Olesen, 2020, pp. 110-111)

To learn more about how ‘the worried’ goes from one theoretical framework to another it is possible from Juha Kapyla and Harri Mikkola (2015) given example, where they were talking about events regarding Arctic cooperation during the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. “(...) they focused on the Arctic Sunrise.....Ukraine Crisis with Ukraine, has damaged the concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’. Russia chose to ignore UNCLOS regulations. Sunrise Crises has created distrust with Russia, damaged cooperation practices, and undermined commitment of the Arctic stability. The Arctic still remains its exceptionalism in some way but is vulnerable to US initiatives, as seen in 2019”. (Olesen, 2020, p. 111) This example, shows that ‘the worried’ using arguments from different theories, their thoughts jumping from realism to liberalism and back. ‘The worried’ stresses the pessimistic point of view which are known for realism, by stressing Russia’s choice of ignoring UNCLOS regulations. Meanwhile, like liberals, ‘the worried’ also stresses positivity about the Arctic still remaining as exceptional, no matter the damaged cooperation between the states.

These theories will be useful for further analyses in answering the problem formulation about Arctic exceptionalism and security. Also, these theories will help to identify to which IR theoretical framework recent events in the Arctic, in the light of Russian aggression towards

Ukraine, more relate to: (neo)liberalism or (neo)realism. Insight on different perspectives on what is happening in the Arctic and better understanding/options for assessing the future in terms of Arctic security, will be gained by applying these theories in the analyses chapter. Furthermore, I will be able to learn about what are the possibilities that security wise, the Arctic will develop according to neorealist or liberalist theoretical framework.

5. Analyzes

As mentioned in methodology chapter, this thesis will use three different types of data analyses. First type of analyses will be, *secondary data analyses*. With the help of secondary source analysis, I will be able to better present the situation of Arctic exceptionalism and security before the war in Ukraine in 2022. Furthermore, by analyzing these theories, I will be able to attempt a predictions, based on similarities and the current political scenario, how the war might end between Russia and Ukraine. Most of the analysed secondary data literature and online articles, will be already existing literature available on Ukraine Crises of 2014: what was the consequences, if any, in the Arctic, how the Arctic states treated this event and if it had consequences for relationship with Russia. Furthermore, the chapter will be divided in sections which will be concentrating on Russia –its position in the Arctic and situation of militarization, the United States – how the state views Arctic and militarization in the Arctic, NATO and Russia relationship, as it is relevant to the topic and a must to learn about NATO's position and scope on the Arctic, as well as its relationship with Russia, since NATO's four members are Arctic states. And lastly, the articles found on current war between Russia-Ukraine, in 2022. Perspectives from Russia, NATO and the Arctic states.

By using *quantitative data analyses* I will gain a better understanding on the part of my problem formulation related to the threat to continued Arctic security. Military build-up in the Arctic will be analysed from found secondary source literature, mostly during the secondary data analyses. Military build in the Russian Arctic, the US Arctic and Arctic 6 will be addressed.

However, it was not easy to find that much data on US, NATO and the rest of Arctic 6, differently from Russia, there were no particular statistics or numbers which would indicate the amount of military assets located in the American Arctic, or Danish/Norwegian and etc. Arctic regions.

Moreover, at the end I have encountered difficulties in finding data on Russian military as well. It seems, that the online sources would freeze or the message with “this page is no longer available” would pop up on my browser. Because of this, I believe that due to the still ongoing war it is strategically tried to hide the data from the outsiders, just in case if someone would be spying from the aggressor's side. Similarly to this, I believe the same reason to be on why I couldn't find a more specific data on military assets, of the rest Arctic states.

Nonetheless, the quantitative data I was able to access will be provided on: naval, air-defense bases in the Arctic of Russia, US and Arctic 6. With the help of quantitative data analyses I will be able to assess the danger of possible conflict and Russia-Ukraine spillover in the Arctic, as well as power relations in the Arctic.

Discourse analyses, will help to learn how three different perspectives (Russia, US, The Arctic 6) are being represented in the light of Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Through discourse, I will be able to analyze speeches by different politicians on the matter of current war, and how it is predicted to reflect on the Arctic exceptionalism and security now.

All three analyses will be combined with one another. It is important to start the analyses from the secondary source, as the data found during this analyses will help to do further planned quantitative and discourse analyzes. Data for quantitative analyses will be drawn and second from findings of secondary source analyses. As a result to this, with the help of discourse analyses, which will be also intertwined with findings from secondary data analyses, I will be able to analyse a primary source data.

At last, after analyzing different data, I will be able to go back to Olesen (2020) and apply his theory about ‘the warners’, ‘the reassurers’ and ‘the worried’. As well as, my liberal and realism theories to see which theoretical framework and the results of data analyses will suit the best. In this case, ‘the warners’ being (neo)realists, ‘the reassurers’ are (neo)liberalists and ‘the worried’ are in between of liberalism and realism.

5.1. SECONDARY DATA ANALYZES

In this chapter, different secondary sources and academic articles, documents will be analysed to learn more about a possible end to the Arctic exceptionalism and collaboration due to Russian aggression towards Ukraine. With gained knowledge from critical academic analyses, I will be able to provide trustworthy and probable conclusions. The war in Ukraine is still ongoing and what is going to happen is not yet clear. What this war will mean and already means to the Arctic region and its known practices, will be analysed in this chapter. Only some of analysed sources (news, recent online analyses, etc.) will say something about the effects of the current crisis. For other secondary sources of an older date I’ll have to ‘extrapolate’, imagine the extension of their arguments and discuss possible outcomes on the basis of them. Articles on military, Ukraine Crises 2014 (outcomes, results), NATO and Russia relationships, NATO increasing its military in the Arctic, Sweden and Finland joining NATO, will be analysed here.

5.1.1. 2014 Ukraine Crises and the Arctic

In this subsection chapter of secondary data analyzes, academic articles will be analysed to gain knowledge about the events which took place in the Arctic region due to Ukraine Crises in 2014. This short chapter section, is relevant to this paper, as I will try to learn more about what was happening in the Arctic during the period of Russian annexation of Ukraine in 2014, before the present Cold war, between Ukraine and Russia. Knowledge about the Arctic exceptionalism, collaboration between Arctic 7 with Russia, as well as situation in terms of Arctic security will be gained, due to events that took place in 2014.

Russia’s decision to increase military build-up and capabilities in the Arctic, has been seen as a potential threat to security by the Arctic littoral states, even before Ukraine Crises took place in 2014. The actions towards Ukraine in 2014, proved the validation of the statement above, that

the Russian military build-up might be a serious threat to a peaceful Arctic region. (Wezeman, 2016, pp. 21-22) The annexation, as well as Russia's support for rebels in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, heightened tensions between Russia and the other Arctic states, which led to the tension reaching its highest point since the Cold War. (Byers, 2017, p. 385) As traditional realist assumptions would predict, the crisis halted most military and economic cooperation. However, as this section demonstrates, cooperation in other areas has largely continued. Scholars, such as Sergunin (2017) adds that, Ukrainian crisis in 2014, left a negative impact on the level of cooperation and trust between Russia and its Western partners. Following the annexation of Crimea, the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Norway imposed travel bans on some Russian government officials and major shareholders in Russian banks, as well as restrictions on access to Western capital and technologies and arms embargoes. They also prohibited Western companies from supplying goods, services, or technologies to Russia's Arctic offshore oil projects. In retaliation, Russia, the EU's second largest food export market, imposed sanctions on food imports. However, some trade, most notably in Russian gas, continued. (Byers, 2017, p. 386)

To continue, as due to Western economic sanctions, the regional trade and traffic via the Northern Sea Route (NSR), has significantly fallen and promising projects in the energy sectors between Russian and other states stopped. The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, S. Lavrov, stated unequivocally that the West's hostility was unprecedented. Foreign Minister, continued stressing that “(...) political attitudes are being made to consider Russia as an enemy. This has not happened since the Cold War, and we have developed a partnership with NATO”. (Hjermann, 2022, p. 128) This statement was given as a Russia's response back in 2015, in regards of Western sanction on Russia. After going towards more present events, a pattern where Russia is 'being a victim' will be more visible. Furthermore, the military cooperation between the Arctic states has stopped as well. (A. Sergunin, 2017, p. 172) According to Wezemen (2016), the apparent 'rift' between West and Russia, as a result of Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia, caused other Arctic countries to be more concerned about the motives of Russia's military modernization in the Arctic. (Wezeman, 2016, p. 1) One of given examples, Norway's cooperation with Russia. Back in 2014, Norway has suspended all scheduled bilateral military activities with Russia until the end of May 2014, as a result of Russian military force used against the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The statement stressed that Russia's annexation towards Ukraine was “a clear violation of international law and an unacceptable course of actions that must have consequences”. (Government, 2014) The above-mentioned military activities included participation in naval exercise (“Northern Eagle”), planned visit by high-ranking Russian military commander and visit by the Russian Navy, have also been postponed from the original time slot due to the occurred events. (Government, 2014) Just one month later, NATO-Russia cooperation was suspended, as well as “No Russians participated in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtables in 2014 and 2015”. (Byers, 2017, p. 385)

Norway as one of representative states of the Arctic, has recognized Russia's shown aggression towards Ukraine in 2014, as a potential threat for the Arctic security. In fact, the revision of Norwegian Arctic military policy was linked to the anti-Russian discourse in 2014 and the Crimea events, which resulted in increased military budgets and ideas about the need to curb Russia on all fronts, including the Arctic. The changes in collaboration with Russia, was

Norwegian Arctic Strategy put in practice. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 4) Another example given by Lippert (2019), where he states that the annexation of Crimea in early 2014 heightened the need for Arctic nations to change their minds on Russia, and radically impacted the perception of Russia in general. For example, Canada has traditionally refused to participate in NATO operations in the Arctic. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, however, this view has shifted. Before the Ukraine Crises, the alliance's initial focus appeared to be on strengthening security-related coordination, such as search and rescue, instead of increasing its military presence in the Arctic. (Lippert, 2019, p. 61)

It was stressed that 2014 confrontation between Russia and the West, was the reason for increased militarization in the Arctic and the possible tension between NATO and Russia. It was feared of a possible spillover from Russian and NATO increased tension, to the Arctic. Since the Western economic sanctions on Russia, ties between Russia and NATO—of which the other four Arctic littoral states are members—have deteriorated considerably, leading to what Former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev described as a "new cold war" in early 2016. (Wezeman, 2016, p. 1) Lippert (2019) seconds by stating, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, showed that NATO no longer viewed Russia as a strategic partner, but rather as an adversary. The acquisition of Crimea served as a clear reminder to most North Atlantic countries that Russia sees no reason to abide by international law. As a result, NATO's position on Arctic security challenges started to change. (Lippert, 2019, p. 4) One of the found examples, of NATO increased involvement in the Arctic region, is NATO troop movements and reinforcements by taking control of the so-called GIUK gap -- an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean between Greenland, Iceland and Britain. ” (G. Fouche, 2018) Furthermore, as stated by Byers (2017), Canada began building an Arctic naval refueling facility and five to six Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships in 2015. In the same year, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland agreed to further "develop defense capabilities" in a military cooperation agreement prompted by Russia's annexation of Crimea. (Byers, 2017, p. 385)

However, based on article by Rahbek-Clemmensen (2017), the smaller Arctic states, such as Denmark and Norway, in comparison to Canada, were hesitant to punish Russia in the Arctic, in a more drastic matter. Denmark and Norway both attempted to maintain good relations with Moscow in the Arctic to the extent that it did not contradict NATO's overall strategy against Russia. The author gives example, of the peaceful relationship between Russia and Denmark, when Denmark consulted Russia before submitting its continental shelf claim in December 2014 to ensure that Moscow would accept the claim being evaluated by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017, p. 11) This small gesture by Denmark, demonstrated the still existing collaboration and dialogue between two Arctic states, without a spillover happening outside of the Arctic region. Even with the existing sanctions on Russia from the West, the Arctic states managed to maintain collaboration with Russia in most of the major areas and focus on the soft security. (A. Sergunin, 2017, p. 172) Byers (2017), adds to Sergunin (2017), by saying that many aspects of regional cooperation were maintained. Including collaboration in search and rescue, fisheries, continental shelves, navigation, and participation in the Arctic Council. (Byers, 2017, p. 376) Surprisingly, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, didn't disrupt the work of the Arctic Council. The Russian delegate attended all of the Senior Arctic Officials semiannual meetings in 2014 and 2015, as stated by Byers (2017). It is also important to acknowledge, that in April 2014, Canada

boycotted “(...) the meeting of an Arctic Council task force on black carbon as a response to ‘Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and its continued provocative actions in Crimea and elsewhere (...)”, which was supposed to be held in Moscow. (Byers, 2017, p. 387). However, Canada’s intentions never suggested to append the Councils work, as its importance to the Arctic region was acknowledged. Furthermore, every decision made by the Arctic Council, continued to require Russia’s support, as it did before Ukraine Crises in 2014. (Byers, 2017, p. 387) Wezeman (2016), also agrees and adds that the Arctic remained as an exceptional example of continuing to work together even during the dispute outside the Arctic. (Wezeman, 2016, pp. 21-22) This can come as a no surprise, as it is not the first time then the Arctic council is staying neutral and continues the Council work without addressing its member states actions in the West. For example, like mentioned in the Concept chapter on Arctic exceptionalism, in case of US-Iraq and Russia-Georgia conflicts outside the Arctic.

The annexation of Crimea had no effect on navigation between Russia and other countries, including those in the Arctic. A decade-old practice of Western cruise lines chartering Russian government-owned ice-strengthened vessels for Arctic voyages, as well as commercial vessels from Western states, continued unabated. Furthermore, the International Maritime Organization adopted (in two parts) the 'Polar Code,' which provides new safety and pollution rules, in November 2014 and May 2015. (Byers, 2017, p. 387) One of the given reasons, why the Arctic region was able to avoid a Ukraine Crises spillover in 2014, is the ‘transgovernmental and transnational connection’ within the work of AC. The Senior Arctic Officials meet twice a year as a group, and less frequently in working groups and task forces, as well as non-Arctic Council initiatives. These diplomats form an 'epistemic community,' meaning they know each other well, are familiar with the structure and functions of the Arctic Council, and share an understanding and commitment to the mutual benefits of cooperation within that institution. Furthermore, the Council benefits all member countries by providing a forum for collective problem solving, such as search and rescue and black carbon. Furthermore, the AC's existence, as well as the acceptance of non-Arctic states applying to become observers, confirms and protects the member states' position as the leading actors in Arctic international relations. (Byers, 2017, pp. 391-393)

5.1.2. Russian and US Military in the Arctic

It is hard to sustain defense operations due to unpredictable and hostile environment, in the Arctic region, to begin with. Big distances, and lack of infrastructure support between the Arctic coasts is part of the issue on sustaining defense operations in the mentioned region. (T. Greenhaw, 2021, p. 1) Thus, it doesn’t stop Arctic states from building up their military capabilities in the Arctic. Authors A. D. Trebukh et. al (2020), seconds T. Greenhaw (2021) on difficulty to support stability in the region defense, and stresses that “(...) we may describe the current state of affairs in the Arctic as a situation of a fragile military stability, (...)” (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 2)

The melting ice in the Arctic, not only creates many challenges, but also can be beneficial and provide opportunities to create military advantages. (T. Greenhaw, 2021, p. 4) A. D. Trebukh et al. (2020) also, believed that it is important to understand that every Arctic state understands military presence in the Arctic differently, thus every Arctic states shall understand “(...) the soft security agenda in the Arctic is much more important”. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 3) As

mentioned in the theory chapter on Security, soft security is important, as in its relevance to states needs to protect its regions wellbeing of economy and environment. It's worth noting that, over the last two decades, the focus of Arctic policy and Russia's threat perceptions has switched from hard to soft security. Moscow is less concerned about the possibility of a large-scale nuclear conflict and is instead focused on threats and difficulties posed by climate change and growing rivalry over Arctic natural resources and sea routes, rather than the military. Russian security forces are now responsible for a variety of tasks, including cleaning up the Soviet-era environmental disaster, search and rescue (SAR) missions, countering oil spills, poaching, smuggling, and illegal migration. (A. Sergunin, 2017, p. 172)

The recent spending increase may be aimed at rebuilding rather than strengthening capabilities. Second, much of Russia's nuclear deterrence is based on the Kola Peninsula due to the year-round ice-free conditions of the Barents Sea, which provides access to the world's oceans. These forces, which include nuclear-missile submarines, are not Arctic-specific; they are simply deployed north of the Arctic Circle. In this regard, they are similar to US missile defense interceptors based in Alaska, but they are aimed at North Korean threats. Third, climate change is increasing non-state activity in the Arctic, necessitating a greater need for search and rescue and 'constabulary' capabilities. This is not to say that an armed conflict cannot occur in the Arctic or, more likely, spread to the region from elsewhere. Military force, however, remains of limited relevance in Arctic international relations, consistent with the continued existence of elements of complex interdependence. (Byers, 2017, pp. 385-386)

Military build-up and changes, has been also seen in other Arctic states. Such as Norway and Denmark acquiring new combat aircraft, the Canadian Rangers being strengthened, the main Norwegian land units moving to the north of Norway. According to Wezemeny et al. (2016), these changes within the Arctic states, including the new Russian Arctic units, have little or nothing to do with power projection into areas of the Arctic with unclear ownership. Meaning, they should be seen as a threat. Rather, they are used to patrol and protect recognized national territories that are becoming more accessible, as well as to protect against illegal activities. Other changes, such as the introduction of new but unarmed icebreakers, are more concerned with environmental protection, civilian shipping in the Arctic, and search and rescue research to support national claims to a "extended continental shelf" under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). (Wezeman, 2016, p. 22)

Although, after WWII, the Arctic region didn't experience serious security threats, as conflicts between US and USSR (at the time) seemed to be over, due to global warming and better access to natural resources, as a result of melting ice, the Arctic region's importance internationally and geopolitically kept growing. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 3) Here are some examples on how the U.S. and Russia has recognized this opportunity and has increased military in the Arctic. This part of analyses will help to learn more about the militarization growth in the Arctic region. More particularly how two power states US and Russia have been increasing their militaries in the Arctic and what reasons for the increase was given. This will be learned by analysing different academic articles and website through the years (2014-2022).

Russia in the Arctic

Russia has the biggest Arctic coastline in comparison to other Arctic states. State's national identity is strongly intertwined with the Arctic. To protect its borders Russia kept increasing its military capabilities, "(...) to ensure the security of their borders and territories". (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 2) Trebukh et al. (2020), argued that the main reason for Russia's military modernization was always related to security of its region. Russia's military buildup in the Arctic, was no threat to other states, as long as there's no threat to Russia's borders. According to Westerlund (2019), Russia has two potential priorities, while talking about military strategy in the Arctic. The first one is to be able to control sea in the Barents Sea, and to support Russian strategic nuclear missile armed submarines (SSBN). Second, reason mentioned by Westerlund et. al. (2019), is tactical awareness of and missile defense, should a war start in the Arctic and escalates to exchanges of intercontinental ballistic missiles. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 67)

S.Kaushal et. al (2022) in more recent paper, seems to agree with the previous author. He wrote, that most Russian military literature underlines the importance of protecting critical infrastructure against air and naval power of other states, as well as its rich natural resources found in the region, which are crucial to the state's economy. The Russian Arctic accounts for 20% of the country's exports, so it's no wonder that the region is vital to the country's economy. Russia's Arctic plan envisions luring capital to the region to maximize its economic potential as climate change makes assets such as hydrocarbon resources more accessible. Russia has substantial economic and strategic interests in the Arctic. According to estimations, the Russian Arctic contains 86 trillion cubic meters of gas and 13 billion tons of oil. These resources are crucial for Russia's export-oriented energy industry, which is described in the country's most recent official planning document as the "central pillar of Russia's economy in the future decade." (S. Kaushal., 2022, pp. 11-12).

Kaushal et. al, continues to agree with Trebukh et al., that for Russia it is the most important to protect its borders for a possible threat from the outside, and one of the main reasons for the need of military build-up being, security. Thus, the importance of protecting the area which holds most of Russia's rare earth metals and fossils, to be the center of attention in military planning. Author continues stating, that Russia has historically relied on relative inaccessibility of the region, as a way of states security, as well as to secure its undersea component of nuclear triad. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 7) As the changing climate in the Arctic, altered the region, the five coastal Arctic states had to make adjustments in their maritime and border security systems. Russia, having the largest Arctic coastline, started to increase and develop its coastline infrastructure and security way before 2014, by investing in nuclear icebreaker fleet and other military technologies. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 55) This is why it is important to secure and be prepared to defend the region and its resources, should any threat to the mentioned above arise. One of the examples of the Arctic region importance to Russia, is the region safeguarding, being the main task in the 2014 Russian Military Doctrine. The state has been ferociously investing into infrastructure and growing the military, in its Arctic region. To be more précised, Russia has upgraded its military in terms of its bases, naval and air asset reallocation to the North. (T. Greenhaw, 2021, pp. 1-2) Furthermore, the aggravation of processes associated with unequal global growth and increased competition in the development of the Arctic and world ocean resources is directly linked to Russia's Arctic strategy. The notion emphasizes the relevance of the power component, which was still very important, at the time, as well as opposition from the United States of America and its allies, who want to preserve their dominance in world affairs.

(A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 3) This also seconds to the Arctic security's theory chapter, which stated: When considering the 'wider' agenda of security studies, the threat to survival and human life will vary from different sectors and levels of analyzes: the military sector (threat is other state or political entity), the political sector (sovereignty/ideology of the state itself), the economic sector (bigger organizational companies might be a threat), the social sector (nations and religions functioning independently from the state), the environmental sector (survival of individual species/habitat, climate change and biodiversity issues). (B. Buzan, 1998, pp. 21-22) Meaning it is important for Russia's survival to protect its resources and coastline.

Russian Military build-up in the Arctic.

Russia reopened a Northern Fleet (NF) base in 2014 and announced the re-establishment of a permanent military presence in the Arctic. Ten warships and nuclear-powered icebreakers were dispatched to the NSR to begin the construction of a new naval base, at that time. Severny Klever, a new naval base, at Kotelny Island, was announced to be housing missile launchers and air defense equipment. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 127) This was the beginning of what is now the biggest Russian military base in the Arctic. However, the melting ice cap provides less protection for submarines, making them visible to enemy satellites and aircraft, according to Sergunin (2017). The Russian Arctic, particularly the Kola Peninsula, continues to be critical to Russia's national security. This region is well suited for strategic naval and air operations due to its proximity to potential US/NATO targets. Furthermore, the Kola Peninsula still houses two-thirds of Russia's nuclear strategic submarine fleet. Russian military analysts also emphasize the AZRF's importance in air defense and preventing a US surprise attack over the North Pole. (A. Sergunin, 2017, p. 173)

The Northern Fleet, is the main military force in the Arctic of the Russian Federation. Defense force, is mainly concentrated to the Kola Peninsula and the Archangelsk area, which includes, three important naval formations: the Kola Peninsula Flotilla, the White Sea naval base, the Submarine Forces and naval aviation AADA with army troops. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 40) The Northern Fleet alone has six conventional assault submarines (SSK), eleven nuclear attack submarines (SSN), three cruise missile submarines (SSGN), and eight ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), all of which are regarded "among of the most silent and deadly in the world". (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 128) Kaushal et al (2022), adds, regarding the eight SSBN, that the main reason for these submarines is to serve as military defense assets. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 12) Besides new missile systems placements in the region, the Northern Fleet, located in Murmansk, has been raised to the status of Joint Strategic Command (2015). Meaning, the Northern Fleet, now controls air and sea-based assets, as well as gained control over Russia's Arctic Islands (Alexandra Land, Kotelny Island). (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 7) Although, the increased militarization in the Arctic by Russia, during recent years, can be taken as capability and power demonstration, some can say it is just for a national defense. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 8) This could be second with Sergunin and Konyshev (2017), in their article which was talking about how the concept of militarization in the Arctic has a different meaning, comparing to what it meant during the Cold War in the 90s. The authors stressed, that military build-up is a necessity as to proclamation of Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean; protection of Moscow's economic interests in the North; prevention of illegal migration and potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and

infrastructure targets; and performance of dual-use functions such as SAR operations, monitoring air and maritime spaces, providing navigation safety, and mitigating risk. (A. Sergunin, 2017, p. 186). Below, you can find a map, on “Selected units of the Northern Fleet in 2019”. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 39) With the help of this map, we can see how big and how strategically important is the Northern Fleet for Russia. What is more, the number of military vessels given on the top of the map, help to visualize military force and will be useful for further quantitative analyses, once secondary data analyses will be done.



Figure 1. The Northern Fleet, F. Westerlund et. al. 2019, p. 39

Besides the strategically important Russia's base called Northern Fleet, other important bases are such as Gadzhiyevo Naval Base, Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base and Vidyayevo Naval Base. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 39) Trump et al. (2022) adds that, Russia has restored five Arctic Circle bases that had fallen into disrepair following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as stationed 10,000 elite Spetsnaz special operations personnel in the region since 2019. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 127) Kaushal et al. (2022) seconds to Trump et al. (2022) by giving more examples on Russian military growth and capabilities. Over the recent years Russia has been seen to be significantly investing in military infrastructure inside the Arctic. Total of 13 air bases were reactivated and built. To be more precise, the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) and the Bastion-P anti-ship missile systems were placed within the Arctic region. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 7) This example, given by authors like S. Kaushal et. al, without any doubt could potentially raise a threat to other Arctic states, as Russia continues to build up its military force in the Arctic, by this day. To better understand how serious the level of militarization is, it is important to understand that the warhead of such missile system, like Bastion-P, can carry nuclear or conventional warheads. (Bastion-P, n.d.) Thus, meaning that Russia is building up its nuclear power in the Arctic, not just simply securing Russian region for economic and security benefits, but also demonstrating its power.

The United States in the Arctic

Comparing to other Arctic littoral states, the US Arctic is comparably smaller and populates than other states. The US Arctic territory includes the northern parts of Alaska, Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 27) “Of the four million people living in the wider definition of the Arctic, most are located in the Russian or Norwegian territories. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 28) In accordance to the US Arctic being way smaller than other dominant Arctic states like the mentioned Russia and Norway, its military capabilities and involvement in the Arctic region were much smaller and no match to other states, back in 2014 and even now. After the collapse of Soviet Union, with the exception of global missile defense infrastructure centered at Fort Greeley and the US government's continued scientific research activities, the Arctic has lost most of its strategic military purpose and US foreign policy importance. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 28) According to the book of *National Security and Global Politics*, which was released back in 2014, the United States was the only, out of other 7 Arctic states, which didn't have any large-scale economic development and strategy plans, as well as being the only Arctic littoral state with a very small military presence in the Arctic.

This is second by B.D. Trump (2022), where he stresses in his article about the Arctic being the only area of operations where the US is being outcaste and outnumbered. For instance, Russian surface warships have already proved their ability to conduct complicated combined operations, in the High North. Meanwhile, the US Navy maintains a policy that only allows submarines to operate beyond the Bering Strait. This attitude toward Arctic activities has been dubbed as "American hesitation", according to Trump (2022). The lack of US military capabilities compared to other states, like Russia, is assumed to be due to the fact that America's territorial waters around and above Alaska are less economically important than states like Russia. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 53) Meanwhile, as it was previously mentioned by Kaushal et al. (2022), the Arctic is a very important part of Russia's economy.

The United States was aware of its weak presence in the Arctic and as a result, made sure to include three strategic paths in the states Arctic Strategy, to change that. The three strategic paths were to raise awareness of the region, increase the number of Arctic military operations, and strengthen the security regime in the region, so that the US and NATO's combined forces can maintain their competitive military advantages and protect their territories from potential threats. Moreover, The United States Arctic Strategy for 2019 paid special attention to the fact that the US leadership is extremely concerned with the increased presence of Russian armed forces, which is manifested in military exercises, the creation of new types of armed forces, the development of Arctic infrastructure, and the construction of a number of military bases along the Russian Federation's Arctic coastline. When it came to implementing its Arctic policy, US is very focused on diminishing Russia's position in the region through a variety of tactics, including allowing the use of armed troops, indicating an uncompromising attitude toward Russia and its interests in the region, according to Trebukh (2020) (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 4). As stated in the US Arctic Strategy, “U.S. interests include maintaining flexibility for global power projection, including by ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; and limiting the ability of (...) Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition that advances their strategic objectives through malign or coercive behavior” (Strategy, 2019, p. 5).

Besides, maintaining flexibility within the global power image in the Arctic region, as well as making sure of the navigation freedom for possible collaboration between the Arctic states, it is

vital to build strategic partnerships based on trust and pragmatic interest in order to stabilize international relations in the Arctic. In this environment, a trilateral conversation between Russia, US, and Norway geared at increasing confidence-building measures rather than mutual deterrence, should become a tool for sustaining military stability in the Arctic. In addition to this, US Arctic Strategy, stressed the need to increase Arctic awareness in its state, the need to strengthen the Arctic security regime, allowing the US and the combined forces of the NATO to maintain competitive military advantages and secure their territories from potential threats. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 5) The last part of the statement, given in Trebukh et. al. (2020), can be interpreted as to the need to mirror military capabilities with Russia, in case of any potential threat to NATO or its alliance states. Overall, the US, when implementing its Arctic strategy, always places a key stake on diminishing Russia's position in the region using a variety of tactics, including allowing the use of armed troops, indicating an uncompromising attitude toward Russia and its interests in the region. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 4)

US Military build-up in the Arctic.

The United States military, was only in its early stages of infrastructure modernization in order to build-up states military capabilities in the Arctic, during the year of 2021. (Lopez, 2021) Nonetheless, in the American Arctic, the US Global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) has a substantial strategic relevance. BMDS includes three US air force bases in the Arctic: Fort Greely and Fort Clear in Alaska, as well as Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. The United States of America's missile defense is provided by these three locations. According to A.S. Dahl et al. (2014), “during 2014, Fort Greely in Alaska was home for “(...)the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, the 59th Signal Network Enterprise Center, the US Air Force 12th Space Warning Squadron (...) and members of the Alaska National Guard.” (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 30) Meanwhile, Thule Air Force base, being the most northern military installation, provides satellite control and space awareness from most of the Arctic. Thule base is also a part of the Ballistic Early Warning System (BMEWS) and takes an important part in US ability to observe and respond in case of emergency situations in the region. The Fort Clear in Alaska, “(...) serves as the Western US counterpart to Thule Air Base as part of the BMEWS”. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, p. 30) According to Dahl (2014), article released back in 2014.

According to online source and its author David Auerswald (2021), every Arctic Strategy is constrained by the regions harsh weather conditions, which limits the options for any increase of infrastructure, in this paper – military infrastructure. The US Arctic Strategy is not an exception in the matter. Communications, global location, and domain awareness are all difficult to achieve in the Arctic due to the high latitudes and harsh weather. The United States' Arctic security infrastructure consists of (...) aging early warning radars in Alaska and Greenland, missile defenses and significant 5th-generation fighter aircraft in Alaska, submarines in Arctic waters, and modest rotational forces in Iceland and Norway”. (Auerswald, 2021) The aging US infrastructure in the Arctic, is a result of the United States interest in the region. Auerswald (2021) in his article, continued by stating that none of the previous US Arctic strategies, had high priority for the US government. Thus, non of the US military strategies for the Arctic included the need for a major new spending or a permanent deployment to the Arctic region. The newest US Arctic Military Strategy, 2019-2021, being no exception. (Auerswald, 2021)

The US Department of Defense (DOD) and the US Coast Guard have increased their focus on the Arctic in their planning and operations in recent years. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as the Air Force and Coast Guard, have all issued Arctic strategy documents. All U.S. military services are conducting increased exercises and training operations in the region, some in collaboration with NATO allies and non-NATO Nordic countries, with the goal of "reacquainting U.S. forces with—and responding to changes in—operating conditions in the region, rebuilding Arctic-specific warfighting skills that eroded during the post-Cold War era, strengthening interoperability with allied forces in the region, identifying Arctic military threats, sending Russia and China signals of resolve and commitment regarding the Arctic. " (Report, 2022, p. 45)

Russia and NATO relationship in the Arctic

As mentioned before in theory, it seemed like a natural thing, according to some authors, that NATO would provide the security structure in the Arctic. One of the reasons given, the five of Arctic states being members of NATO, meaning fifty percent of Arctic territory belong to NATO member states. Thus, as stressed by A.S. Dahl et.al, there was no consensus between NATO nations on NATO having any role in the Arctic region, before the Ukraine Crises in 2014. However, one of the given reasons on why NATO didn't have a bigger role in the Arctic, was because it was worried about a possible conflict with Russia, as a result of NATO involvement in the region. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, pp. 54-55) NATO and its alliance states were cautious of their presence in the Arctic, and what it might imply for Russia way before any superb military build-up in the region or Russian invasion to Ukraine. Thus, Russia's actions towards Ukraine, was what pushed NATO to take a bigger role in the Arctic region.

Julie Wilhelmsen and Anni Roth Hjermann (2022), says that tension between USA and Russia has been felt since the Ukraine crises and the annexation of Crimea, in 2014. According to authors, before the present Cold War between Ukraine and Russia, re-militarization has been already felt not just in Europe but also in the Arctic regions. Before the Ukraine Crises in 2014, NATO was already present in the Arctic. NATO was monitoring military activities in the region, as well as coordinating joint training exercises which seeked to build cooperation in the Arctic region. In fact, NATO participation in the Arctic was seen as a potential collaboration with Russia, building up a non-military relationship within joint-training. Mentioned joint-exercises mostly involved search and rescue operation between Russia, the United States and Canada. (A. S. Dahl, 2014, pp. 54-55) However, the 'low-tension' between Russia and NATO was quickly replaced with increased number of military exercises and growing number of military bases and installations, after the 2014 events. (Hjermann, 2022, pp. 114-115) Hjermann et. al. (2022), continues to stress on how security experts tried to minimize the 'hostile' threat coming from Russia's side, by measuring the so-called threat, which is often taken as less than it is in reality. (Hjermann, 2022, pp. 114-115) This author provides a good examples in the following article on what is realism and zero-sum approach, and how it is applied to the current situation between Russian, NATO and Arctic 6 (not Arctic7, because USA will be represented as NATO). BUT ALSO WORRIED?

"The Balance of Power Between Russia and NATO in the Arctic and High North"(2022) by S. Kaushal et.al, states that the growing importance of the Arctic and High North has been reflected

by increased Russian military build-up in the Arctic region. By examining the power balance between the NATO and Russian forces, in their paper, the authors tried to measure Russia's capabilities on supporting different types of strategic and military tactics. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 1) Kaushal et al. (2022) states, even if Russia has increased its military capabilities, the state still has significant weaknesses and its control over High North is uncertain. One of given examples in the article is the lack of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets capabilities and a not very strong air-defense over the Central Arctic. This is due to the lack of good infrastructure in the region. According to Kaushal et al. (2022) this gives NATO advantage against Russia and makes Russia's fear of Western military strike capabilities against Russian Arctic region understandable, according to these authors. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 2) Trebukh (2020) who wrote, that the aggravation of processes associated with unequal global growth and increased competition in the development of the Arctic and world ocean resources is directly linked to Russia's Arctic strategy, adds to the previously mentioned power balance importance. The author continues, that the concept emphasizes the relevance of the power component, which was still very important, at the time, as well as opposition from the United States of America and its allies (NATO), who want to preserve their dominance in world affairs. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 3) Russia seems to always see the United States as a potential threat to states security, this can be proven by US being mentioned in Russia's Arctic Strategy.

Due to significant climate changes, the opening of Northern Sea Route (NSR), which connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by traveling along Russia's northern coast (Byers, 2017, p. 381), has altered economic and strategic geography of the Arctic region, as stated by Kaushal et. al. (2022) NSR opened new and better accesses to the mineral resources in the High North, which could lead to potential disagreements over the freedom of navigation and taken as an act of threat by other Arctic states. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 6) One of the given examples, which portrays existing competition between two great powers, Russia and USA, is when the Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov and Former Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin, recognized and noted that having a control over a theoretically vital maritime artery in the Russian Arctic, could be a great strategic and economic opportunity for Russia. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 6)

Furthermore, Russia has stated that it is willing to use military force if required to preserve its interests in its territorial waters. Thus, as Russia has been restoring and expanding Cold War outposts on the Kola Peninsula in the country's far northwestern corner, other Arctic state was also increasing its military presence in the High North. Norway, in response of Russian military build-up and potential threat to navigation freedom as well as its territory security, started to improve its militarization in the Norwegian Arctic. One of the given examples, of the felt threat by other Arctic states on behalf of Russia, was back in 2018. In October 2018, NATO has organized a military exercise, which was the biggest military exercise in over a decade, in Norwegian Arctic. Knowing Russia's mistrust with NATO involvement in the Arctic region, during the NATO military exercise, their GPS radars were interrupted. This 'interruption', was interpreted as Russia's attempt to sabotaging NATO's military exercise, according to the Finnish Prime Minister. As a response to a potential threat which was taken in account by GPS triggers during the mentioned military exercise, the US has threatened to send military boats across Arctic commercial waterways for the first time. The state has also started to send more troops to the region on long-term rotations. What is more, Britain promised "a 10-year deployment of troops to Norway and four RAF Typhoons to patrol Icelandic skies". (B.D. Trump, 2022, p.

52) This is a perfect example, of existing mistrust between the Arctic states and the need to demonstrate the power within its military assets. Another author adds, that these buildups are needed to demonstrate the opponent, the high cost of a potential military operation. Meaning that these restraining measures done in peacetime, is to avoid a probable aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, by lessening the possibility and severity of military threats being carried out. (M. B. Petersen, 2021, p. 502) Although, it needs to be taken into account that Russia is doing the same thing with its military build-up.

On the other hand, Russian General V. Gerasimov, in 2020 stated that the United States withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, on August 2, 2019, was so the US could remove bans and restrictions on building up its missile capabilities. (Hjermann, 2022, p. 128) The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 between the United States and Soviet Union. The main goal for this treaty was to minimize and abstain from all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges ranging from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty was the first time the world's superpowers agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. According to the website of Arms Control Association, the reason for US withdrawing from the INF Treaty, was the continuous Treaty violations from Russian side. These violations started back in 2014, when Russia, according the online source, has launched cruise missile having a range of 500 to 5,500 km. (INF, n.d.) Although, this Treaty doesn't touch upon the Arctic, but it is important to be mentioned, as to its relevance for continues Russian power demonstration. As well as, to be able to give more examples on why other states, have been on 'high alert' in regards to, Russian military build-up.

Moreover, it is important to acknowledge, that it is always stated from the Russian side that, their military build-up is always seen as a potential threat, and their actions (increased military practices) are misunderstood. All they are trying to do is to protect their coastlines, thus the important resources to the state's economy. Of course, ensuring security is important, especially when any other states military build-up is seen as power dominance and wish to suppress Russia. This can be added to general Gerasimov, statement that, during the NATO summit in London, on December 3–4, 2019, "Russia is assigned the status of an enemy". (Hjermann, 2022, p. 128) As mentioned before, Russia is always victimizing itself and justifying its own actions, but not others. Especially not NATO.

As previously mentioned, a potential threat to the freedom of navigation was noted by the United States of America, as a result of Russia's statement. US Navy Arctic Strategy, released in 2019, reflected the possibility of Arctic region becoming a place for a dominant competition of maritime by the two states, in the future. A speech given by former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, also reflected on US feeling threatened by Russia. (S. Kaushal., 2022, pp. 6-7) Trump et al. (2022), added that, as Russia retained operational control of the NSR, and its icebreaking fleet is stationed along the route during the winter months to assist shipping boats, all foreign ships traversing the NSR had to be escorted by Russian icebreakers, as well as pay the fee, which could cost hundreds of thousands of American dollars. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 127) These actions by Russia were 'greeted' as illegal and provoking actions, by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 127)

Russia has big plans to create ports along the Northern Sea Route, which would cut the distance between China and Europe in half, and has increased its military presence along its Arctic coast. Which, as a result has raised tensions between the other Arctic states. The threats to tension were brushed off by Foreign Minister of Russia, who suggested that the heads of the Arctic Council's respected armed forces meet on a regular basis to calm any tensions that may arise, according to online source of May 2021. Foreign Minister Lavrov, also dismissed the NATO and its alliance states concerns of the increase of Russian military build-up in the Arctic. Lavrov, then stated: "It's long been well known to everyone that this is our territory, this is our land, we are responsible for ensuring that our Arctic coast is safe. And everything our country does there is absolutely legal and legitimate." (N. Skydsgaard, 2021) This statement given by Lavrov, wasn't likely accepted by the US. U.S. Secretary of State A. Blinken, stressed back in 2021, that Russia continues its unlawful maritime claims, within regulating foreign vessels transiting NSR route, which are inconsistent with international law. Blinken also stressed, that increased militarization will lead to bigger problems, such as a threat to "(...) the shared goal of a peaceful and sustainable future for the region". (N. Skydsgaard, 2021) This most likely, represents the zero-sum and realist perspectives. As Russia without being straightforward is trying to gain value from the Northern Sea Route to its economy, on behalf of other states. Hence, the required fees from other states to pay Russia, if they cross the NSR route.

What is more, this seconds to the previous authors who stressed that Russia is violating international law. According to online source, the United States has been requesting Russia to submit its regulatory structure, in regards to maritime claims of NSR, for review to the International Maritime Organization, for some time now. However, Russia kept delaying its submission. In addition to this, in a statement given by Blinken, the claim submitted beforehand "(...) does not give due regard, as required by international law, to navigation rights and freedom to the territorial seas and exclusive economic zone". (N. Skydsgaard, 2021) Thus, meaning that Russia's claims to maritime continued to be unlawful, and confirms Russia undermining the international law, according to US.

Peteresen (2021) states, that according to Russian strategists, a major threat to its national security, are certain states and their alliances which seeks total dominance in the high seas, including in the Arctic zone, as well as felt overwhelming naval superiority. One of the implied alliance is NATO, which has been focus of concern in the Arctic, by Russia, for awhile now. The biggest threat was seen, not just the alliance's increased interest in the Arctic region itself, but also the military build-up by Russia's borders. Meaning NATO increased its military in the US Arctic, where it started developing military infrastructure. (M. B. Petersen, 2021, p. 497)

Russia, never had big trusting relationship with NATO and US, and vice versa. "With every year – 2018, 2019, 2020 – more and more NATO activities are given alarmist interpretations. In 2018, the focus is on how Sweden and Finland are drawn into NATO structures, how new cyber-operation centers are being established (...), how systems for the early storage of weapons and property are being created in Europe, how the INF Treaty is being "destroyed"(...)" (Hjermann, 2022, p. 128) Hjermann (2022) stresses that Russia has felt threatened by NATO through the years. Furthermore, the signing of a bilateral defense cooperation agreement between Norway and the United States in April 2021 was considered as a completely consistent with NATO's

policy of military build-up and active involvement in the Arctic. (Hjermann, 2022, p. 131)
Russia took this signed cooperation as a possible threat to its security.

Meanwhile, Norway emphasized the Arctic's military and strategic relevance in light of the growing number of players in the region, the most important of which is Russia, which has gone from a partner to a threat as a result of increased activity in the Arctic. In order to ensure its own security in the Arctic, Norway emphasized the following principles: deepening cooperation with NATO, because the Alliance provides a clear and predictable basis as well as a level of security that Norway cannot achieve on its own; the Norwegian armed forces should promote reliable deterrence and assist in supporting Norway's role and influence in the Arctic; increasing investment in its Northern territories to maintain security, particularly in the area of coast guard. Nonetheless, Norway was attempting to avoid escalating tensions with Russia in the area of security. In the financial, economic, and other realms, it is now reverting to pre-crisis levels of contact, indicating the possibility of lowering tensions in the region. Russia and Norway's bilateral ties have always been positive, according to Trebukh (2020), and they began to strengthen again following a rough period that began in 2014. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 4)

Overall, Russia has a significantly more established Arctic infrastructure than the United States and NATO members. Russia alone has 38 operational icebreakers, some of which are nuclear-powered. In comparison, ten other countries (the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, China, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) have a total of only 22. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 53) However, Trebukh (2020), states, that it is important to emphasize that any Russian military build-up is transparent and solely defensive in character. Despite its opposition to the buildup of military infrastructure and NATO's approach to its borders, Russia portrays itself as a peace-loving country that poses no threat to the region's security. (A. D. Trebukh, 2020, p. 3)

Besides the Russian claim to NSR and increased military build-up in the Russian Arctic, the Barents Sea region of the Arctic, where Russia meets Norway, NATO state member, has become another seam of tension between NATO and Russia, during the early February of 2022. The tension started to feel before the Russian troops invaded Russia, but already during the military build-up by Ukraine border. The mentioned, Barents Sea region is home to the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet in Severomorsk, as well as a main base for a valuable technology and mining hubs. As this is nothing new, the tension between NATO and Russia kept rising due to Russian military exercise increase in the region. In response to, Russian military exercise, NATO has also increased its military exercises close to the region, through the recent years. (A. Tingstad, 2022, p. 2) As mentioned in the theory of International Relations, countries keep increasing their military to match the other states capacity. If they don't mirror their military capabilities, they might become a threat. Hence, the important aspect from realism theory. As stated in the theory chapter of this paper, the 'balance of power' is a very important key point. The idea of the balance of power describes the state which is making decisions to grow their capabilities while comparing and undergoing the capabilities of other states. However, if the state will try to gain more power, it might trigger a war with other states. (S. Atunes, 2018, p. 3)

The recent militarization exercise increase in the Arctic by Russia, and Russian actions towards Ukraine, made US to start thinking on what typed of military capabilities in the Arctic they would need to, in case the crises arises in the Arctic. As mentioned before, in this secondary data

analyses chapter, the main issue of increasing military capabilities in the Arctic regions is the harsh climate, vast distances and the lack of good infrastructure. The United States, is no different in this context. Authors Tingstad and Savitz (2022), gives a few examples of potential struggles for the US in the Arctic, in case the conflict arises. First potential hardship, mentioned by the authors is the lack of Arctic investments. US needs to increase investments to the region, which will “(...) ensure access, mobility, support infrastructure, domain awareness, and communications across multiple domains in the region”. (A. Tingstad, 2022, p. 2) It is also acknowledged, by Tingstad et. al. (2022), that US needs to invest in other areas as well, not just icebreakers, as they have been doing it for years now. Furthermore, it is stressed the importance of investing more towards the joint exercises in the Arctic region with other Arctic states, like Denmark, Canada and Norway. As alliances and good partnerships, might play a crucial part in case of a conflict if one appears between Russia and US. (A. Tingstad, 2022, pp. 2-3)

With this subchapter, I was able to learn more about other Arctic states perspectives on, seemingly, ongoing rivalry between two powerful Arctic states, the United States of America and the Russian Federation. What is more, these subchapters focusing more on Russia's and US perspectives on the Arctic and the militarization aspects in the region, gave a better understanding on how the two states understands the need of militarization in the Arctic. I was also able to learn more about the importance of power balance and what it means in terms of security.

A small glimpse on how Norway reacted to Ukraine annexation in 2014 was given, as well as changes in Canada, due to Russian military build-up, has been briefly mentioned. The given examples, on how the Arctic 7 and the Arctic Council treated Russia after Crimea annexation in 2014, gave an example of potentially existing Arctic exceptionalism, without Russia-Ukraine spillover on the Arctic region. The continuing collaboration in some areas, gave a good insight on future perspectives of what could be expected, if similar conflict arises.

5.1.2. The Arctic and 2022 Cold War

This part of secondary data analyses chapter, will be focusing more on recent events in the Arctic, caused by Russia's invasion to Ukraine on February, 24, 2022 which led to the present Cold War between the two states. This subchapter will mainly focus on the effect of Arctic Council statement, regarding the pause of its work. As well as, its work and collaboration with Russia. AC has always played an important role within assuring cooperation between the Arctic 8 states. Now, it is even more important, due to Russia's invasion to Ukraine, to address the reaction and effects of the Councils decision to pause its organizations work.

As previously mentioned in the concept chapter where it was talking about Arctic Council and recent mentions of the Council in the analyzes chapter, Arctic Council, plays an important role in the Arctic. Even when relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated, as a result of Western sanctions (on Russia's banking, financial sector, defence and technology, as well as Russia's oil industry (Buchanan, 2022)) on Russian economy, the Arctic Council's work served as a reminder that multilateral cooperation can persist even in the face of global conflict. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the collaboration came to a stop. Seven of the eight Arctic Council members indicated that they will "halt" their participation with the

organization a week after the battle began. Russia, which has the chairmanship of the council until 2023, has been shunned. This has never happened before, through the Arctic Councils operating years. (G. Gricius, 2022) In addition to this, The Barents Euro-Arctic Council countries have also announced a halt to cooperation with Russia. (Vyakhireva, 2022) “(...) Pausing the work of the Arctic Council was an understandable response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet in doing so, the other Arctic countries lost a valuable line of communication with Moscow. In time, it will be important to resume the council or establish a new institution in its place.” (G. Gricius, 2022)

One of the reasons given for AC pausing its activities, is Arctic 7 mistrust with Russia holding power of the current chairmanship of Arctic Council. With Russia as the Council's chairman, the Rules of Procedure grant them broad powers to set the agenda and tone of the organization, which the other Arctic States cannot accept from such a flagrant violator of human rights and international law. (Greenwood, 2022) The Arctic 7 was worried, that Russia might undermine rules in the Arctic and overstep even more with the increased amount of military assets, which will lead to even bigger tension among the Arctic states.

Although, even if AC didn’t seem to find a better response to Russian aggression towards Ukraine than pausing its activity temporarily, the Arctic Council is looking for solutions on how it could resume its work in the future. On the other hand, to find solution might take longer than wanted. While the released statement on behalf of 7 Arctic states, in regards of AC pause, it is likely that the temporary activity of the Council will remain on pause until 2023, when Russia will give the Arctic Council chairmanship to Norway. (Buchanan, 2022) Nonetheless, the pause of AC has disrupted the ongoing communication with Russia in regards of the needed dialogue for peaceful collaboration, especially in regards to search and rescue operations. Moreover, excluding Russia from cooperation between the Arctic states, might cause bigger problems, associated with maintaining regional security. (Vyakhireva, 2022)

Russia should be given a clear choice: either voluntarily withdraw from the Arctic Council for the time being, or the other seven Arctic States will establish a parallel forum, dooming the current Arctic Council forever. Which according to the declaration of the Arctic Council Rule of Procedure of Rules 7 and 3, would be possible. Rule 3 states, “Six of the Arctic States shall constitute a quorum for purposes of holding a Ministerial or Senior Arctic Official (SAO) meeting.” Rule Seven goes on to provide a procedure for holding meetings and making decisions without all eight states present: all decisions of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies, including decisions to be taken by SAOs, must be made by consensus of all eight Arctic States, according to the Declaration. (AC, 2015, p. 4) According to Greenwood (2022), that in the event that a Ministerial or SAO meeting is held without the attendance of all eight Arctic States, decisions may be taken by consensus of all Arctic States present, subject to confirmation in writing by the absent Arctic States within 45 days of receiving notice of the decision, in accordance with Rule 3. (Greenwood, 2022) This would be beneficial to Russia as it would be able to still correspond with Arctic Council and making decisions within the matters of the Arctic. Thus, even if Russia wouldn’t agree to the solution above, the Arctic 7 continues to look for different alternatives for collaboration with Russia. Rather than the geography of the Arctic region, cooperation in the Arctic is recommended to be based on the shared values and principles of the seven Arctic states that signed the statement. This means creating a new

interaction system, both under the auspices of the Arctic Council and within current platforms, as well as exploring the possibility of creating new ones. ((Evtikhevich), 2022)

On the other hand, if the decision of a new parallel body formed by seven NATO-member Arctic States, would take place in reality, it may appear to be quite hostile to Russia, making these Rules of Procedure revisions more tenable for a Russia that is becoming increasingly isolated. This compromise also provides for future involvement with Russia, if the circumstances warrants it, inside the framework of the current Arctic Council, without fanfare or treaty. (Greenwood, 2022)

Going a little back, the Arctic Council never had a need to pause its work before the present Cold War, according to Ali et. al. (2022), the pause is understandable. Author continues by stating, that 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, can be considered as the biggest military mobilization, since the World War II, which involves siege warfare, which includes siege warfare, increasing tactics such as putting nuclear forces on alert, and subjecting the Russian economy to massive Western sanctions in order to achieve military objectives. (I. Ali, 2022) This is second by, K. Dodds (Arctic relations) statement in one of online sources in regards of present events happening in the Arctic: “The Arctic is facing its biggest crisis in 35 years”. (G. Dickie, 2022) Dickie, clearly giving the an imige of not so bright future, for the Arctic and its future exceptional collaboration. The article by Dickie et. al. (2022), continues to stress how Putin’s action towards Ukraine, has sabotaged the Russia’s bright vison for the Arctic. This is particularly referred to the former presidents M. Gorbachev speech in 1987, mentioned in the Concept chapter of this paper, where M. Gorbachev gave a passionate speech about the possible future where “(...) the North should be “a pole of peace”. (G. Dickie, 2022)

Ukraine-Russia 2022 Spillover to the Arctic

International specialists claim that Arctic uniqueness no longer exists. During the Arctic Frontiers 2022 conference, panelists agreed that there is no such thing as a "Arctic Council" without Russia. Although there are options for collaboration in the A7 format, their efficacy will be restricted. If new exceptionalism occurs, it should continue in the same direction in order to maintain the current trend toward Arctic green development and human security, as well as a future discussion path. Simultaneously, it is possible that, for the sake of the Arctic, not just military but also high politics will have to be left out of the parentheses. (Kobzeva, 2022)

Spillover to the Arctic might be expect, as a result of Western wish to keep crippling Russia with more sanctions. (Buchanan, 2022) As stressed in the recent sections of the secondary data analyzes chapters, the Arctic is a crucial part for Russia’s economy. As the West tries to force Russia to stop the war with Russia by putting huge sanctions on the state and cripple its economy. Western sanctions put on Russia is much bigger than the once that was put during the Ukraine Crises in 2014. One of the scholars, E. Buchanan (2022), in her article provides a list of events that is going on in the Russian Arctic now, in light of a threat to be put under the Western sanctions: “Projects under threat include a 20% stake in Yamal LNG, a 10% stake in Arctic LNG-2, and a 10% stake in LNG transshipment hubs along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The

future of Ob LNG, also in the Gydan Arctic peninsula, is uncertain as well. Shell has already signalled plans to exit Russia's energy market, which will hit Moscow's immediate plans for the Gydan Arctic peninsula ventures with Russia's GazpromNeft. The UK's Beyond Petroleum (BP) has confirmed plans to exit its 19.75% stake in Russia's oil major Rosneft. There will no doubt be implications for Rosneft's famed Arctic Vostok Oil Project precinct." (Buchanan, 2022) These given examples, by Buchanan shows, that the Russia-Ukraine spillover to the Arctic is already being felt in the region. What is more, the author continues to worry, that isolating Russia from Arctic debate and key forums such as the Arctic Council will have long-term consequences. According to the author, if Russia won't be able to collaborate with the Arctic and western states, it will look for new collaborations. New potential players, could involve UEA, China and India. Author continues to stress, that the possible increased involvement of the above mentioned states is very real, since these three states demonstrated support for Russia during the meeting at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), on February 25, 2022. Where the states voted for denouncing Russia's aggression towards Ukraine. (Council, 2022) While 11 of the UN Security Council's 15 members voted in favor of the resolution to "deplore" Russian aggression in Ukraine, China, India, and the United Arab Emirates all voted no. These three new Arctic stakeholders sent a message to the rest of the world about their objectives and beliefs. (Buchanan, 2022)

Another possibly felt spillover in the Arctic is NATO military exercise, on March 2022, Cold Response. The Cold Response, which according to information provided in the official NATO website, "(...) is a bi-annual drill, organised and hosted by the Norwegian Armed Forces have, since 2006 (...)", in the Arctic region. (NATO, 2022) This military exercise, provides NATO Allies and partners with an irreplaceable opportunity to put their skills to the test against some of the harshest weather conditions. As well as, forces NATO troops who train there to learn the lessons of arctic warfare quickly. (NATO, 2022) Even, if the military exercise was planned to take place way before the Russia-Ukraine war, it is visible that this military exercise, is not just for learning how to deal with a potential threat in a cold climate, but to also show Russia, that they can hold on the attack against any aggression, if needed.

NATO organized Cold Response exercise on March, 2022, has raised concerns. In fact, Russia is concerned about NATO's increased military activity in the Arctic. The Cold Response exercise, took place in Norway, very close to the Russian border and involved approximately 30,000 soldiers from 27 countries. According to Russia's Senior Arctic Official N. Kurchinov, this military exercise has nothing to do with contributing to Arctic region's security. (Kadam, 2022) Kurchinov, later also addresses the matter of recent discussion about Sweden and Finland thinking of joining NATO. He stated to the news portal: "Certainly, the expansion of NATO at the expense of traditionally non-bloc countries will not contribute to security and mutual trust in the Arctic, which Russia consistently advocates". (Kadam, 2022) Russia is worried for a valid reason. If Sweden and Finland join NATO, as both are seriously considering doing, all Arctic states except Russia will be members of the military alliance. NATO would then be able to conduct a strategic re-evaluation of how the Arctic fits into the alliance, and the decisions NATO makes would determine the future relationship. (YORK, 2022)

Russia appears to be attempting to avoid any conflict escalation in the Arctic region. Despite this, Russia's response to NATO exercises with Finland and Sweden in early March was muted –

it issued a statement in protest and conducted its own military training exercises on the same day. On the other hand, through the history of NATO and Russia relationship, we can see that Russia has always protested when NATO did military exercises close to its borders. Besides protesting statements, Russia has never demonstrated any actions that could lead into a possible conflict between Russia and NATO, in the Arctic. (YORK, 2022)

Meanwhile NATO states, that Russia's recent attack is a threat to a global security and there is no surprise that the Arctic states are feeling threatened and worried for their region security. The Alliance members seems to be united in seeking to counteract Russia's attempts to undermine international security and stability, and is actively speaking about the readiness to address chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, if needed. (NATO, 2022) What is more, during 2022 Spring session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting, Sweden and Finland's wish to join NATO was acknowledged, by Njall Trausti Fridbertsson (Head of Iceland's NATO delegation), "Finland and Sweden are important security providers in Europe. When becoming members of NATO, they will further strengthen the deterrence and defence of the Alliance. A question about the high north. We are all aware that the high north is becoming increasingly important in the strategic security and economic dimension. Therefore, we must anticipate that Russia will respond to current events in various ways, including the high north. With Finland or Sweden joining, seven out of eight Arctic states will be in [the] NATO Alliance, which I believe will directly affect Russia's calculus and possible responses in the region. While our common goal is stability, low tension and cooperation in the high north, we must consider the possibility of Russia deciding to employ a more confrontational force posture in the region." (NATO, 2022) From this statement on official NATO website, it is visible that the Alliance is happy to gain even more power in the Arctic, thus surpassing Russia. Fridbertsson, in his statement, tries to give a glimpse of hope that they are still hoping, and there might still be hope for peaceful cooperation between the NATO members and Russia, in a way also states that it is ready for upcoming conflict. He seems, to be pretty certain, like a true realist that it's not gonna end well, and the cooperation won't likely to continue.

Besides this, it is stressed by some scholars, that Cold War between Russia and Ukraine won't escalate to further spillover to the Arctic, as the Arctic region is too important for Russia's economy. It would be too big of a risk and too many losses for the state to sabotage cooperation and trade with the other states in the Arctic region, as the sea routes bridge it with Europe and Asia. Here Trump et al. (2022) quotes, Medvedev who spoke about the need of peaceful collaboration in the region: "The Arctic possesses rich mineral resources. The Northern Sea route, the shortest navigation itinerary linking Europe and Asia, passes through the Arctic. That is why the stable and sustainable development of the region – based on cooperation and unconditional respect of international law – has an exclusive importance". (B.D. Trump, 2022) The liberalism and plus-sum dynamic game appears, when talking about Russian economy and Arctic resources.

Need for collaboration

According to James DeHart, coordinator for the Arctic Region Office at the U.S. Department of State, “(...) despite the break with Russia, the seven western circumpolar countries remain committed to their long-term goals for the region”. (Quinn, 2022)

According to David Balton, executive director of the White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee, “(...) the climate crisis and other issues confronting northern communities and Peoples mean that Arctic cooperation cannot be suspended indefinitely. The Arctic Council's mission cannot be carried out without Russian participation. The hope is that we will find our way back. But that is largely up to Russia, not us”. (Quinn, 2022)

These too important actors in the Arctic, both address the urgency and need to reestablish collaboration and Arctic Council work. The Arctic region managed to continue ongoing cooperation within the Arctic states, without spillover from Western events taking place outside the Arctic. Including Ukraine Crises in 2014. In fact, the Arctic was hailed as a haven of collaboration around the world, one of the few places where tense Russia–West tensions have yet to destabilize the environment. (Buchanan, 2022) Thus, after the events that took place on February 24, 2022 and continues aggression demonstrated by one of Arctic littoral state – Russia, even Arctic Council can no longer stay ‘neutral’. Thus, as the article quoted one of the Arctic researchers, “The spirit of Arctic exceptionalism and cooperation is in jeopardy.” (G. Dickie, 2022)

Moreover, currently Russia is holding not only the chairmanship of Arctic Council but also the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF). ACGF a non-profit organization dedicated to assuring the safe, secure, and environmentally responsible passage of ships through Arctic waters. Its work is very important in maintaining security, as well as for ongoing collaboration between US and Russia’s Coast Guard work and research for safe and rescue. (G. Dickie, 2022) Without Russia's participation, it will be impossible to find solutions to many of the Arctic's problems, including ecology, cultural economics, health care, emergency preparedness, and the protection of the interests of the indigenous peoples of the North. ((Evtikhevich), 2022) These authors believe for a possible collaboration, but how and when, that is not certain yet.

According to Dickie and Gardner (2022) article, released after the Arctic Council has paused its work for the first time in 25, due to Russia’s demonstrated aggression, the bubble surrounding the Arctic exploded. Indeed, this is the first time in AC history, then all 7 Arctic states agreed on suspending all activities of the Council, as a protest to Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. In 2014, during Ukraine Crises, only two Arctic states (Canada and US) boycotted the collaboration with Russia. (Zellen, 2022) However, 2014 events are incomparable to the present events, according to an online source. Canada’s and US boycotte in 2014 towards Russia was about a refusal to participate in only one of the Council's working groups at the time, not a ministerial meeting, like it is currently in regards of the AC pause. Nonetheless, the significance of 2014 episode and its aftermath should not be overstated, ((Evtikhevich), 2022) For the last 25 years, the leadership of the Arctic managed to maintain a semi peaceful collaboration between the Arctic states, including Russia. In fact, Arctic was highly praised and exceptional in this accord.

According to Arctic Scholar Mike Swigunski (2022), Engaging Russia within an expanded set of regional institutions – an invigorated Arctic Council, but also a new military forum – would

precipitate a cooperation spiral, increasing cooperation that could help lessen tensions elsewhere. Even if collaboration were confined to the Arctic, this would boost global security. Furthermore, author continues to stress that cooperation in the Arctic between Russia and other states should not be allowed to disappear, even if the trust between Russia and the West will never be the same. (Swigunski, 2022)

By following authors Trump et. al. (2022) article, it could be hoped that the current tension between Russia and the rest Arctic 7, shouldn't have a bigger spillover to the Arctic. Tension between the Arctic states, is not a new thing. According to Trump (2022), disagreements on continental shelf claims between Canada, Denmark/Greenland, and Russia over the ownership of the North Pole seabed, have been present before the Cold War started. The Arctic states managed to keep it without it escalating to a bigger conflict, which could potentially involve military assets. Author continues, by stating that its unlikely to become much more than a diplomatic source of friction. This is due to the enormous costs and limited benefits that claiming the seabed would bring to any state. We can interpret, that similarly to the claiming of the seabed, going to war with another Arctic state, would have huge consequences on another states economy and would be a bigger lose than gain. Additionally, the Arctic governments lack both the economic and geopolitical motivation to launch major operations. (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 55) Hence, here is relevant to mention the hardship of bad conditions and the need for a better infrastructure in the region. Thus leading, to hope that the tensions in the Arctic will calm down and won't escalate further.

5.2. Quantitative Data Analyzes

Quantitative analyses will be used to answer the problem formulations raised question, if there's a threat to continued Arctic security, because of Russia's recent actions towards Ukraine, and increased military modernization in the Arctic region. In comparison to other Arctic states. The quantitative data analyses will serve as, subsection of secondary data analyses.

Thus, secondary resources will be combined with found quantitative data, which will help to learn more about the potential military build-up in the Russian Arctic through the years, since the Ukraine Crises in 2014. It was initially hoped, that with found secondary sources for this paper's quantitative analyses I will be able to also show the difference between the military capabilities of the United States and Russia, as well as the Arctic 6. Unfortunately, mostly found and available data was mainly in regards of Russian military and its capabilities in the Arctic. As a result, of little amount of data found on the United States militarization capabilities, there will be more detailed data on Russia's military capabilities provided in this subsection of secondary data analyses.

Russian Military Capabilities in the Arctic

As previously mentioned, in the chapter above of secondary data analyses, it is easy to say that Russia's military capabilities in the Arctic region, suppresses other Arctic states capabilities. Through, the data of militarization build-up and help of quantitative data analyses, I will be able to demonstrate the amount of military assets Russia possess in the Arctic. Bellow in this part of analyses I will be able to demonstrate the worrying amount of military assets that Russia

possesses in the Arctic. This is a very raw data, as unfortunately I had limited time to work on it and couldn't get access to another stakeholders (like US) military data, to be able to give a better examples of the differences between the ammunition the two power states poses.

The Northern Fleet (NF) is a Russian Navy operational-strategic association. Nuclear-powered missile and torpedo submarines, missile-carrying and anti-submarine aviation, and missile, aircraft-carrying, and anti-submarine ships, form the foundation of the contemporary Northern Fleet. (Fleet, n.d.) As previously mentioned in the secondary data analyses chapter, the Northern Fleet is the main military base of the Russian Arctic. Defense force, is mainly concentrated to the Kola Peninsula and the Archangelsk area, which includes, three important naval formations: the Kola Peninsula Flotilla, the White Sea naval base, the Submarine Forces and naval aviation AADA with army troops. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 40) According to data found in Trump (2022) article, this the number of military assets in the Northern Fleet base: 6-conventional assault submarines (SSK), 3-cruise missile submarines (SSGN), 8-ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)

Besides the strategically important Russia's base called Northern Fleet, other important bases are such as Gadzhiyevo Naval Base, Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base and Vidyayevo Naval Base.

According to Airbus Defense and Space and authors, found date in 1 May, 2021, *Delta-*, *Akula-*, *Borei*-Class Submarines were present at Gadzhiyevo Naval Base. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 2) More specifically: 2-BOREI CLASS SSBN, 4- DELTA IV CLASS SSBN, 2- AKULA CLASS SSN

As well as, 2-*Victor III*-Class, and 2- *Sierra II*-Class, Submarines at Vidyayevo Naval Base, was recorded on 11 February 2021. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 5)


Furthermore *Oscar II*-Class SSGNs, was recorded at the Zapadnaya Litsa Naval Base, 22 March 2021. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 4)

2- BOREI CLASS SSBN, 4- DELTA IV CLASS SSBN, 2-AKULA CLASS SSN-2, where found on 1 May, 2021 at Russia's Gadzhiyevo Naval Base. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 2) *Kilo*-Class Submarines at the Polyarny Naval Base on 1 May 2021, by Airbus Defence and Space and authors. (S. Kaushal., 2022, p. 7)

According to 10 May 2021, 9 Russian Warships were recorded at Severomorsk Naval Base. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 12) The Naval Forces are made up of four fleets and one independent flotilla, each with one or more units such naval bases, submarine commands, and army corps. These are made up of a variety of forces. Air and land units are also part of the Naval Forces. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 29) The Naval Forces has around 270 combat vessels in 2019, including 55 submarines and 212 surface ships. (RussianShips.info, 2019). Westerlund (2019), adds “(...) of hydrographic research vessels and a larger auxiliary fleet. In 2019, more than 450 vessels make up the latter, ranging from small harbour tugs to large ocean-going tankers.” (F. Westerlund, 2019, pp. 29-30)

Russian Air-defense: According to findings by Airbus Defence and Space and authors, on 18 April 2021, two IL-38 MPAs were recorded at Severomorsk-1 base. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 7) Through the year of 2021, the number of Mixed Aviation Backfire Bombers at Olenya Air Base stayed mostly the same. 32 *TU-22s* bombers, were recorded at Russian Air Base, Olenya. (S.

Kaushal, 2022, p. 13) Furthermore, according to findings by Airbus Defence and Space and authors, on 18 April 2021, two IL-38 MPAs were recorded at Severomorsk-1 base. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 7)



• *Figure 2 Map of Russian Integrated Air Defense Simulation (IADS), from S. Kaushal, 2022, p.9*

From the map provided in *Figure 3*, nine Russia's IADS in the Arctic are recorded based on open data and imaging of Russian facilities. (S. Kaushal, 2022, p. 19) "Integrated air defence systems (IADS), (...) are complex, multilayered defense systems incorporating a range of ground-based and aerial sensors, as well as surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems". (Bronk, 2020)

Russian Coastal Defense: Furthermore, back in 25 September 2019, by Maxar Technologies and authors, was found that Russia was improving its Sea Denial Network – Bastion-P TELS, on Kotelnny Island and on Alexandra Land base. Two new BASTION P TELS in Kotelnny were recorded. The amount of new Bastion-P Tels on Alexandra wasn't clear from recorded date via satellites. (S. Kaushal, 2022, pp. 10-11) Bastion-P TELS are "(...) Russian mobile coastal defense missile system", also called by K-300P. (Bastion-P, n.d.) In the West this coastal defense missile system is more known as SSC-5 or Stooze, according to Military-Today page. The warhead of such missile system weights 200-250 kg and can carry nuclear or conventional warheads. (Bastion-P, n.d.)

From this raw data and numbers, we can see that Russia has a strong military presence in the Arctic. In fact, this is even not the newest data of military assets in Russian Arctic. No one can be certain what kind of new military upgrade in the Arctic Russia is planning at the moment, especially if Russia becomes the only Arctic state being not part of NATO alliance. Which might lead to bigger tensions and conflict. According to Westerlund et. al. (2019), Russia would face the naval forces of a peer adversary in a fight with NATO. The Northern Fleet's ambition, in order to support the six available SSBNs, will most likely be sea control operations in the

Barents Sea, involving surface ships, naval aviation, and attack submarines, as well as some 200 stand-off missiles for sea targets, 30 of which will be land-based, 40 on surface ships, and 50 air-launched. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 67) The Arctic is critical for Russia's strategic nuclear forces' naval component in a regional battle with NATO. Russia is likely to be able to launch an operation with just one GOF in a month's time. (F. Westerlund, 2019, p. 69) Moreover, as stated in a previous chapter, and I quote: "Russia has a significantly more established Arctic infrastructure than the United States and NATO members. Russia alone has 38 operational icebreakers, some of which are nuclear-powered. In comparison, ten other countries (the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, China, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea) have a total of only 22". (B.D. Trump, 2022, p. 53)

The United States Military Capabilities in the Arctic.

As briefly mentioned in the previous secondary data analyses, regarding the US military in the Arctic region, US doesn't have a very strong presence comparing to other Arctic states. Especially Russia. Nonetheless, the United States, have 6 military bases in the Arctic. Five of the US military bases are located in Alaska (Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Clear Space Force Station, Eielson Air Force Base, Fort Wainwright and Fort Greely), and the last one is located in Greenland (Thule Air Base). (Knickmeyer, 2022) There is no available data that I could find in this short period of time that would provide more specific numbers on the military assets inside the three mentioned bases, like it is shown above within Russian military. Nonetheless, here is some of raw statistics I was able to find:

US Icebreakers: The US Coast Guard currently poses one 399-foot heavy icebreaker and one 420-foot medium icebreaker, according to the United States Coast Guard website. (USA.gov, n.d.) The purpose of the two icebreakers are to maintain access to both polar regions while also supporting the country's economic, commercial, maritime, and national security needs. (USA.gov, n.d.)

What is more, in addition to these military bases, according to the 2017 article, by Snow, there were ongoing investments for building new hangars to house sub-hunting Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft. Furthermore, there was mention of development at the air station in response to Russian stealth submarine provocations near the GIUK Gap. The GIUK gap (Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom) is a naval chokepoint with enormous gaps between the three countries. The gap serves as a critical gateway for Russian submarines to access the Atlantic Ocean, and it was a major turning point for German U-Boats during World War II. (Snow, 2017) Thus, the GIUK Gap, is a vital entry point for Russia's northern fleet into the Atlantic Ocean, as well as a refueling point for US and NATO aircraft conducting their own missions and monitoring increasing Chinese activities in the Arctic. (McLeary, 2019) GIUK Gap is a very important strategic point not just for US but also NATO. The United States are currently working towards modernizing and building up its military presence in the Arctic. But according to the mentioned, and other articles that I didn't get a chance to mention in this paper, US is struggling in modernizing Arctic infrastructure and assets due to harsh climate and lack of experience, which compared to this state other have more.

The Arctic 6, Military Capabilities in the Arctic

The above statement about the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Finland, China, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea having a total of 22 nuclear powered icebreakers; and found data on the online source, one of the Arctic states Denmark, has 33 F-16 fighters, and was planning to acquire 27 new fighters with the help of NATO, back in 2020 (Kramnik, 2020), I was unable to find a lot of information on other Arctic 6 military assets, or any other specific data which would provide me with more data to do quantitative data on specific military bases, as I was intending to do in the beginning. Nonetheless, as from this little data it is certain that Russia wins within the military power in the Arctic region.

Besides the two sources above, I was able to find a diagram which demonstrates Russia's, Canada's, Finland's, Denmark's, US and Norway's (please, don't mind China) statistics of their icebreaker and ice patrol ships in the Arctic region. Data below, in Figure 3. (Taylor&Francis, 2022)




Figure 3 Arctic 6 icebreakers and ice-capable patrol ships.

From the data provided in this image, it is clear that Russia has the biggest number of icebreakers in the Arctic region – 55, together with nuclear icebreakers. According to the image source, “Icebreakers may have limited direct defence and security roles, but are important enablers of presence. Russia is adding to its nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet and building potentially heavily-armed ice-capable patrol ships. The United States plans to commission new icebreakers from 2025, while”. (Taylor&Francis, 2022)

6. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

In this brief chapter I will be able to summarize and provide all my analyzes findings and add it to realism/liberalism theories.

According to the Polar Connection article, by Zellen (2022), even after Canada and US boycotted Russia's participation in AC, during annexation of Ukraine in 2014, the two Arctic states soon joined the rest AC members and continued collaboration with Russian Arctic. This was because the long tradition of Arctic cooperation at the AC, was at most importance. (Zellen, 2022) This example, provides hope, that even after present events, the Arctic Council might find a way and solution to continue the important collaboration with Russia. Especially due to quickly warming climate in the Arctic, the cooperation between the Arctic 7 and Russia is very important. Zellen (2022) continues to stress, that the AC mission is more important than the events happening outside the Arctic region. To continue the peaceful Arctic region governance and continue the needed projects and infrastructure build-up, Russia's participation and consensus is a must. Which was present and active due to the work of the Council. (Zellen, 2022) Indeed, as Russia upholds the biggest coastline of the Arctic territory.

Similarly like Olesen (2020), stated within his paper on perception about how the Arctic exceptionalism is viewed by different actors, meaning are they 'worried', 'warning' or 'reassuring' that everything will be okay at the end and the Arctic will manage to stay exceptional and continue its collaboration between the Arctic states and Russia, I cannot tell for sure.

What is clear, is that Arctic exceptionalism is already tainted by the AC decision to pause its work, due the Russia-Ukraine 2022 war, which meant that the Council is addressing the issues happening outside the Arctic, as well as the issue within the military field. Which, if you go back to my concept chapter and analyzes chapter, mentions that AC is not involved and excludes itself from the military affairs.

Furthermore, Finland and Sweden wish to join NATO also threatened not just 2022 Cold War spillover effect on the Arctic region, but also to the 'exceptionalism' of the Arctic. Because before Finland and Sweden didn't think about being part of NATO so drastically.

Furthermore, the trust between the Arctic states and Russia has been disrupt, since Ukraine Crises in 2014, due to Russia's military increased build up. But still the cooperation was ongoing. I believe that the cooperation between the Arctic states can still happen, but the Arctic Council needs to step in again and take the 'reins'. The Council needs to figure the way how to restore its mission and collaboration with Russia. In addition to this, I don't think there can be another Arctic Council or other organization that would seek to do similar work as AC did. Especially, I don't believe the trust between the state would be recreated, if a new organization appears.

I do understand Russia's claims, about NATOs increased involvement and ongoing 'new member' recruitment, but I do also understand, as I saw the numbers of Russian military assets in

the Arctic, why other states are getting concerned. Thus, Russia's actions towards Ukraine are immoral and concerning.

In conclusion, I stand for 'the worried', the golden middle of liberalism and realism in the IR theory. The future seems concerning, but the voiced understanding of the need for collaboration with Russia and that some scholars believe the spillover to Arctic will stop, gives me hope that the future might be bright.

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