Fighting the #AntiRefugeeBill

Civil Society Mobilisation Against the Nationality and Borders Bill and the Hostile Political Environment for Migrants in the UK

Brynn Spelliscy (20202225)
Mahela Madeleine Nilsson (20202224)
Maria Kleivan McIntyre (20202228)

Instructor : Tamirace Fakhoury
Submission date: May 31st, 2022

Global Refugee Studies
Department of Culture and Global Studies
Aalborg University, Copenhagen

Abstract

The current immigration system of the United Kingdom's 'hostile political environment', is one that is increasingly not conducive for migrants living within its oceanic borders. On July 6 2021, under the direction of Home Secretary Priti Patel, the UK Government introduced the Nationality and Borders Bill, which proposed considerable interventions into the legislative system that manages all kinds of people on the move. The introduction of this Bill was met with a severe backlash from civil society due to its austere treatment of migrants and refugees in the UK – so severe that its proposal mobilised a social movement in an attempt to derail the Bill from progressing through the legislative process.

Drawing on data collected from Twitter between July 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022, this thesis examines how migrant-centred UK civil society organisations mobilised online against the Nationality and Borders Bill. The research investigates how these organisations mobilised collectively against the Bill through the lens of social movement theory. This theoretical framework is complemented using the concepts of digital repertoires of contention, core framing tasks and migrant solidarity in order to elucidate the different tactics and strategies employed by the entities involved in the mobilisation. The analysis of this online mobilisation consists of a mixed-methodological approach to the data: providing both quantitative and qualitative insights to the case study. The first set of analysis explores a dataset of 124 civil society organisations categorised by their level of establishment, followed by an in-depth look at three individual in-depth case study analysis of three UK CSOs who are influential actors within the mobilisation network on Twitter. This project concludes that although this movement did not succeed in their collective goal of impeding the progress of the Bill, they did however have success in other aspects of their mobilisation. This thesis contributes with an insight into how civil society organisations in the UK have mobilised via Twitter attempting to derail the Nationality and Borders Bill. Thus it contributes to bridging the knowledge gap between UK civil society organisations and online social movement mobilisation.

Key words: UK, Nationality and Borders Bill, online mobilisation, hostile environment, #AntiRefugeeBill

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank our supervisor Tamirace Fakhoury for her sharp observations, careful guidance and positive reassurances throughout the process of writing this thesis.

Most importantly, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to our loved ones, who have supported us continuously through this academic venture.

We would also like to thank Jonas Høiness for extending his artistic genius to our projects in designing our cover pages over the past two years.

List of Abbreviations

API:	Application Programming Interface
CSO:	Civil Society Organisation
EU:	European Union
GDPR:	General Data Protection Regulation
JCWI:	Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
MP:	Member of Parliament
NABB:	Nationality and Borders Bill
NHS:	National Health Service
SoMe:	Social Media
UK:	United Kingdom
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Content overview

1. Introduction

Despite the European Union only hosting about 0.6% of the over 80 million forcibly displaced people in the world, anti-immigration sentiment has been growing in the region (European Commission, 2021). This can be observed in the increased popularity of far-right populist parties during recent elections – including in the United Kingdom (BBC News, 2019; Ray, 2021). On June 26th, 2016 the Brexit campaign won the national referendum to leave the EU. The campaign received much critique for using fearmongering, xenophobia, and racism to rally Leave voters in order to "protect" the country from migrants and refugees (Wallace, 2018; Golec de Zavala *et al.*, 2017; Baglioni *et al.*, 2020).

As an extension of the sentiment displayed during the Brexit campaign, the controversial Nationality and Borders Bill (NABB) was passed in the British Parliament on April 27, 2022. The Government stated that the official aim of the Bill, was to "increase the fairness of the [immigration] system to better protect and support those in need of asylum" while "remov[ing] more easily those with no right to be in the UK" (UK Parliament, 2022). However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) publicly stated that "this Bill would undermine, not promote, the Government's stated goal of improving protection for those at risk of persecution" (UNHCR, 2022a). Aside from receiving international critique, the Bill was met with profound opposition from civil society in the UK.

At the beginning of the research for this thesis, the fate of the Bill was still undecided and it was intriguing to follow both the development of the political process, as well as the backlash from civil society. We were eager to examine the mobilisation of UK CSOs against the Bill to discover how this mobilisation was approached and whether it was effective. This curiosity sparked the following research questions, which guided this thesis:

RQ: How did civil society organisations in the UK engage with online mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill?

> ***SubRQ1:*** *What strategies did UK CSOs use in their Twitter mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill?*

SubRQ2: *How did UK CSOs frame the Nationality and Borders Bill in their Twitter communication?*

SubRQ3: *What tendencies could be observed in the online mobilisation of UK CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill based on their organisational level of establishment?*

SubRQ4: *What differences could be found between the most influential UK CSOs within the online social movement against the Nationality and Borders Bill?*

This study maps UK civil society organisations' (CSOs) mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill, with a focus on their digital strategies and discursive framing of the Bill. This was achieved by tracking the online mobilisation that occured on Twitter in the months leading up to the final vote. Based on tweets from 124 different CSOs, the analysis is twofold; first we attempt to identify tactical tendencies and strategies connected to different organisations levels of establishment, and second, we explore the mobilisation efforts made by the top three most influential CSOs partaking in the movement against the Bill – also referred to as 'power users'.

The first part of the analysis (Chapter 6) is based on the manual coding 250 tweets randomly selected from three defined categories related to organisational level of establishment (grassroots, mid-level and well-organised), amounting to a sample of a total of 750 tweets. The second part of the analysis (Chapter 7) is three individual in-depth case studies based on the coding of all tweets relating to the Nationality and Borders Bill posted by the three power users. The three selected CSO power are listed below, in order of their influence within the resistance network on Twitter:

CSO 1: Refugee Action is a nationally recognised organisation based in Manchester, England that has been supporting refugees and asylum seekers in the UK since 1991. *Refugee Action* strives to create a fairer and more effective asylum system in the UK, creating inclusive and welcoming spaces for any and every migrant. At the time of data collection (April 15, 2022), Refugee Action had 65,417 followers on Twitter.

CSO 2: Detention Action is an organisation based out of the Greater London area, established in 1993, and works to defend the rights of migrants in immigration detention centres. The organisation advocates against the injustices being served to the over 20,000 individuals being detained in UK detention centres each year. At the time of data collection (April 15, 2022) Detention Action had 25,739 followers on Twitter.

CSO 3: The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) is a well-established organisation that has been active in supporting migrant rights and challenging discriminatory policies since 1963 in the surrounding region of London. The ways in which *JCWI* supports migrants is by way of providing legal aid and advice at any stage of the legal process. At the time of data collection (April 15, 2022), The Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants had 41,194 followers on Twitter.

2. Contextual Background

This chapter contextualises this thesis by outlining England's tumultuous relationship with migration, followed by an introduction to the shrinking spaces of solidarity in the UK. After which, the civil society sector in the UK is introduced and finally the Nationality and Borders Bill is explained through key critiques.

2.1 Historical Context

The UK has a complicated relationship with migration. The British Empire lasted for almost 400 years and was the largest in human history (Britannica, 2022). Approximately one hundred years ago, in 1920, it covered 24% of the total land area on Earth, while it likewise ruled over almost a quarter of the world's population (Taagepera, 1997; Maddison, 2001). The British appetite for expansion led to much outward migration from the country to its colonies where economic exploitation and the enforcement of their language, legal system, and culture took place (Rahman *et al.*, 2018).

After WWII, the UK experienced severe labour shortages, in part due to emigration to "old" Commonwealth countries (such as New Zealand, Canada, Australia) and the Government passed the British Nationality Act 1948, that gave the right to settlement to "a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies", after which a campaign for workers to move to the UK was started in the Caribbean (British Nationality Act 1948; McDowell, 2018). The many people who came to the UK from the Caribbean in the years between 1948 and 1973 were later called the Windrush generation after the 'Empire Windrush' ship that brought the first of them over. They mainly took jobs in the National Health Service, construction, and public transportation and many brought their children with them, stayed, and made England their home (McDowell, 2018). When they arrived, they did not receive any legal documents, but the state kept records of their arrival dates on landing cards (Gentleman, 2018). However in 2017, it came to light that hundreds of Commonwealth citizens had been "wrongly detained, deported and denied legal rights" (The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, n. d.) as a result of the 'hostile environment' – a policy approach introduced in 2012 by then Home Secretary Theresa May (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021). This scandal was later dubbed "The Windrush Scandal". The victims of the Windrush Scandal had lived legally in the UK for decades, worked and paid taxes but

when employers suddenly had to conduct immigration status checks they struggled to prove their status. As the Home Office in 2010 had decided to destroy the landing cards, it was impossible for the victims of the Windrush Scandal to prove that they were legally in the UK (Gentleman, 2018). This devastated the lives of many ordinary people such as:

"61-year-old Paulette Wilson who used to cook for MPs in the House of Commons. She was put in Yarl's Wood removal centre and then taken to Heathrow for deportation, before a last-minute reprieve prevented her from being sent to Jamaica, which she last visited when she was 10 and where she has no surviving relatives" (Younge, 2018).

2.2 A 'Hostile Environment'

Contrary to the common approach of publishing a White Paper before the introduction of a major policy reform, Theresa May first mentioned this shift in immigration policy in a newspaper interview where she was quoted for saying "the aim is to create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants" (Grierson, 2018). There is no official definition of the 'hostile environment' and no specific policy document. Instead it is expressed in different legislations, such as the Immigration Act 2014, that outsourced border control to i.a. landlords, bankers, and marriage registrars by requiring them to conduct immigration status checks of customers (Immigration Act 2014). This has since been criticised for increasing racial profiling and discrimination (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021). The Right to Rent Scheme, which was a continuation of this policy introduced with the Immigration Act 2016, added provisions that made it a criminal act, punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years or fines up to £3000 for private landlords to rent to irregular migrants (GOV.UK, n.d.). It was found by the High Court of England and Wales to violate human rights law and cause racial discrimination against British people of colour and foreign nationals with legal rights to stay in the country (Dearden, 2019).

Furthermore, the Immigration Act 2014 removed a clause from the 1999 Asylum Act that contained some of the key protections for Commonwealth citizens residing in the country, which was one of the main factors leading to the Windrush scandal (Taylor, 2018). While the Government later tried to rebrand their policy approach to 'the compliant environment,' the initial term stuck and has become synonymous with "a generalised state-led marginalisation of

immigrants" in academic and media discourses (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021, 521). After investigating the limited information published by the parliament and the Home Office on the aim of the 'hostile environment' policies, Griffiths and Yeo found them to be: "to discourage people from coming to the UK, to stop them overstaying visas, to prevent irregular migrants from accessing services and drawing from the public purse, and to make it easier to remove people" (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021, 530). However, due to the "lack of clear objectives or official monitoring," they suggest that "the policy approach is propelled less by practical considerations around cost, resources and numbers, than 'feeling rules' appealing to notions of belonging, fairness and national sovereignty" (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021, 530).

Picking up on the notion of belonging, it is interesting to note that one of the measures used to push irregular migrants to voluntary departure was posters with the text "In the UK illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST" placed on vans that were driven around ethnically diverse neighbourhoods in London, as well as in shops, community halls and minority newspapers, all commissioned by the Home Office (Griffiths and Yeo, 2021). While the official aim of the 'hostile environment' is to get rid of irregular migrants, a report from JCWI found it to have the opposite effect, as it makes it very difficult for migrants to navigate the increasingly complicated immigration system, forcing them to "reapply for the right to remain in their homes and jobs every 2.5 years at a cost of thousands of pounds per person each time" (Gardner and Patel, 2021, 3). 82% of the irregular migrants surveyed in their study had entered the country legally and later fallen out of status. Their research found that many people became undocumented for different reasons beyond their control, such as domestic violence, mental or physical health issues, or lack of funds to pay the staggering high administration fees (Gardner and Patel, 2021, 3). Once migrants have lost their legal status, they become much more vulnerable to exploitation and violence. This is amplified by the effects of the 'hostile environment' in which "almost everyone who should keep them safe - like the police, the NHS, social services, and even some charities - have become part of the system of immigration enforcement and surveillance" (Gardner and Patel, 2021, 2). The 'hostile environment' policy approach has therefore resulted in increased precarity for migrants in the UK, even for those who reside in the country legally, while also proliferating racial discrimination of British people of colour.

2.3 Case Introduction: The Nationality and Borders Bill

The aim of this thesis is to investigate how CSOs mobilise for migrant rights. This is achieved through a case study that centres around the British government's newest 'hostile environment'-policy proposal: the Nationality and Borders Bill. The Bill, which passed into law during the time of writing, was met with massive criticism from human rights groups, legal experts, organisations working with refugees and migrants in the country, as well as UN human rights experts (Lefley, 2022; Mayblin, 2021; Achiume *et al.*, 2022). In a comprehensive legal analysis UNHCR laid out their main critiques of the bill, which they found to undermine the 1951 Refugee Convention, even though the UK partook in drafting the Convention and has been ratified.

One of the fundamental changes set forth in the Bill is that it separates refugees into two groups. Only those who can fulfil additional requirements would belong to 'Group 1', and thereby be granted the protection that all refugees are entitled to according to the 1951 Convention. UNHCR underlined that "the attempt to create two different classes of recognised refugees is inconsistent with the Refugee Convention and has no basis in international law" (UNHCR, 2022b, 4). One of the requirements to be recognised as a 'Group 1' refugee is that individuals must "come to the United Kingdom directly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened" [Clause 11(2)(a)]. However, according to UNHCR "requiring refugees to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach would undermine the global, humanitarian, and cooperative principles on which the refugee system is founded" (UNHCR, 2022b, 3). They further highlighted that most refugees are already being hosted in countries neighbouring their country of origin and as that overwhelms the hosting capabilities of the first safe countries, it is only to be expected that some refugees will continue to migrate further away. To prevent this only exacerbates the existing unbalance (UNHCR, 2022b). As the UK is party to the 1951 Convention, it has legally binding obligations to all refugees under its jurisdiction, regardless of their mode of arrival. Yet according to the Bill, most refugees would be defined as 'Group 2' refugees as it would have been necessary to have passed through other countries on their journey to the UK (UNHCR, 2022b).

'Group 2' refugees would receive a precarious temporary protection status, that does not allow for settlement for at least ten years, which is "deliberately imped[ing] their integration and

naturalisation, rather than facilitating it as required by Article 34 of the Refugee Convention" (UNHCR, 2022b, 5). The discrimination of 'Group 2' refugees also entails the restriction of their family rights, thus preventing family reunification even though this "would run counter to decades of international consensus" (UNHCR, 2022b, 5). These and other factors led UNHCR to conclude that the 'Group 2' status is "a recipe for mental and physical ill health, social and economic marginalisation, and exploitation" (UNHCR, 2022b, 9). Furthermore, the Bill criminalises asylum seekers who arrive without a visa from countries where residents are normally required to obtain such to enter the country. This offence would result in imprisonment for a maximum four years, making it incompatible with the 1951 Convention as it stipulates that illegal border crossing is acceptable if the individual is an asylum seeker (UNHCR, 2022b). As UK law does not contain the possibility to apply for a visa for seeking asylum "no one from a country whose citizens normally need a visa would be able to come to the UK to seek asylum without potentially committing a criminal offence," which is deeply problematic as 90% of those are granted asylum in the UK belongs to this group (UNHCR, 2022b, 16).

The final point of critique that will be covered in this chapter, is the one that has received most media attention and been the main focus of several demonstrations against the Bill: Clause 9 (White, 2021). This clause would allow "the Secretary of State to deprive a person of their British Citizenship without giving them notice, if it appeared to her that it was in the public interest to do so. It would also retroactively validate deprivation orders already made without notice" (UNHCR, 2022b, 22). According to UNHCR this "creates a real risk of arbitrary deprivation of nationality" which could potentially lead to an increase of stateless individuals, including children, which is inconsistent with the UKs legal obligations under 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (UNHCR, 2022b, 23). The points covered here far from exhaust the critique set forth by UNHCR, instead this summary is intended as an introduction to the Nationality and Borders Bill, and as context for our investigation of the mobilisation against it.

2.4 Civil Society in the UK

The definition of civil society is contested but it ”has been widely adopted as a synonym for the variously termed ‘nonprofit’, ‘third’, ‘voluntary’ or ‘NGO’ sector; the sphere of organised activity which is neither governmental nor commercial in its auspices” (Harris, 2017, 352).

The UK has a long and rich history of civil society mobilisation in the form of “charity, mutual help, volunteering and advocacy” that can be traced back several centuries (Savage and Pratt, 2013, 2). The contemporary civil society sector is the result of a long formalisation process that has systemized volunteer work and community activities, changing their cooperation with and relationship to the state over time, while civil society organisations have a clear role in “driving social change” (Savage and Pratt, 2013, 3). In the 1970s, funding for anti-poverty community groups was increased, and they played an important role in movements for the extension of rights and support for marginalised groups (Savage and Pratt, 2013). However, the civil society environment changed in 1979 when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative Government won the national election. Thatcher's time in office, that lasted until 1990, was marked by neoliberal politics that championed a privatisation agenda and a reduction of the State’s social provision responsibilities (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Savage and Pratt, 2013). While the process of privatisation provided new opportunities for some CSOs, the Government also reduced funding for welfare and shifted their style of support from grants to delivery contracts (Savage and Pratt, 2013). This has led to concern for organisations’ ability to push for social change while competing for government funding and expanding their area of responsibility (Savage and Pratt, 2013).

After years of privatisation, many welfare areas,which used to fall under the scope of the State, including asylum and refugee support, have now been outsourced to CSOs. Meanwhile, these are continuously being defunded (Baglioni *et al.*, 2020). As the majority of asylum seekers in the UK are not allowed to work, they depend on economic support from the state, and while it is the State’s responsibility to avoid asylum seeker poverty, the support of £36.95 per person per week is insufficient to achieve this (Mayblin and James, 2019). Even though the state insists that the economic support granted refugees and asylum seekers is adequate, Mayblin and James identified 142 UK-based CSOs that specifically works with alleviating poverty and destitution for migrants and asylum seekers. They highlight that the increase in organisations with this focus

does not correlate "with the numbers of asylum applications received by the UK government, but with an ever more restrictive approach to the economic rights and entitlements of forced migrants in the UK" (Mayblin and James, 2019, 18). Next chapter will further elaborate how CSOs challenge the 'hostile environment' through their work and mobilisation.

2.5 Sub-Conclusion

This chapter sought to contextualise the case study of CSOs mobilising against the Nationality and Borders Bill presented in this thesis. First it introduced the greater history related to British colonisation and thereafter it relayed some of the effects of the 'hostile environment' policies. In order to provide the reader with a general understanding of the legislation that is being resisted, this was followed by a careful presentation of the Bill itself. After presenting the threats and grievances that have fuelled the mobilisation investigated in the study, the chapter concluded with an introduction to civil society in the UK.

3. Literature Review

The so-called 'hostile environment' for migrants in the UK has been shrinking spaces of solidarity but not without contestation by activists and organisations working with migrant based solidarity. In this chapter we review relevant literature for informing our research and answering our overall research question: *How did civil society organisations in the UK engage with online mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill?* First, it introduces the research conducted on CSOs mobilising specifically in a UK context. Thereafter, it explores different strands within academic literature related to the relationship between social movements and the digital world.

3.1 Fighting the 'Hostile Environment'

While several studies have analysed the effects of the 'hostile environment' on issues such as health (Feldman, 2020; Potter, 2017; Essex *et al*., 2022; Giorgia Donà, 2021; Hiam *et al*., 2018) and everyday bordering (Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2018; Griffiths and Yeo, 2021; Flynn 2015) of affected residents, less has been written about the civil society resistance against it.

In a case study of civil society actors in London, Toğral Koca found that their capacity to "contest the differential inclusion/exclusion enacted in bordering remains limited in the face of constraints produced by neoliberalization and existing political dynamics" (2021, 65). She highlights how the UK Government through the 'hostile environment' has effectively contrived a system of bordering that goes beyond physical boundaries and includes both state and non-state actors. As the expansion of borderwork creates constant obstacles and limitations for diverse groups of migrants and racialized minorities affected by the policy developments in the UK, the role of CSOs practising migrant solidarity is of increasing importance. However, as CSOs are simultaneously experiencing increasing demands and decreasing funding it makes it difficult for them to challenge the root of the problem and instead leaves them to develop short term solutions (Toğral Koca, 2021). As an extension of this point Toğral Koca hightlight that eventhough civil society actors attemt to open up spaces of solidarity they sometimes "also reproduce and align themselves with established bordering processes and state structures" (Toğral Koca, 2021, 77). This mainly happens though the unequal power hierarchy between funding dependent CSOs and the state that "supports complicit projects which serve statist and control-oriented activities" as exemplified through the homeless charity St Mungo's that shared data from migrant rough

sleepers with the Home Office (Toğral Koca, 2021, 78; Taylor, 2019). In her interviews with grassroots activists and volunteers, they "argued for the need to trace the differences between large NGOs and grassroots organisations – which are smaller communities, but are much more independent and effective at the local level", a challenge we found interesting to pursue in our study (Toğral Koca, 2021, 78). In relation to funding, small organisations might face economic constraints but on the other hand retain a greater degree of freedom than more established civil society actors that "have to tone down their discourse and activities in line with established bordering processes in order to compete for the available funding" (Toğral Koca, 2021, 77).

Zooming in on grassroot activists who partook in campaigns that challenged the 'hostile environment' such as "Docs Not Cops, Homes Not Borders, and Against Borders for Children" Vickers investigates what can be learnt from their perceptions of the policies they fought and their root causes, as well as the activists' strategies for change (Vickers, 2020, 428). Some of them argued "that the profits generated through Britain's largely-privatised immigration detention system provide a direct incentive to expand and prolong detention" while others identified the racial division of the working class as a distraction from the politics of austerity and neoliberalism (Vickers, 2020, 434). As one activist said: "as long as you've got white, working-class populations who think that their conditions of precarity and austerity and low wages and unaffordable houses are as a result of migrants and not the state, we're fucked" (Vickers, 2020, 439). From these perspectives, Vickers understands the policies that the activists were contesting as rooted in 'racial capitalism' which he describes as a system where "the concentration of power [is] in the hands of a small minority and the exploitation of the majority are sustained through processes of categorisation and selection of labour that are heavily racialised" (Vickers, 2020, 436). When mobilising against that level of structural inequality, the gains for grassroots campaigns were limited, though participants described short-term victories such as successfully countering individual deportations.

At the opposite end of the CSO spectrum, City of Sanctuary works at the municipal level but tries to "resist the conditions for exclusion and inclusion which they inherit from the state" (Wilcock, 2019, 141). Their strategy for resisting the 'hostile environment' is by countering it with hospitality through social initiatives such as "storytelling nights, board game evenings,

blogging workshops, community gardening, conversation clubs and the facilitation of school visit" (Wilcock, 2019, 143). While these activities have a strong community building effect, City of Sanctuary has been criticised for their wilfully apolitical stance, even though they lead the still ongoing 'Lift the Ban' campaign which started in 2018, it seeks to extend the right to work to asylum seekers. They applied tactics such as letter-writing and petitioning but their campaigning did "not extend to the protection of other criminalised migrant groups" (Wilcock, 2019, 143). As they represent the most institutionalised form of resistance which includes municipal governments and local councils, they can counteract the directives of the state but only within certain limits (Wilcock, 2019). This leads Wilcock to argue that the CSO's activities can be understood through Foucault's concept of 'counter-conduct' which "differs from resistance, disobedience, or revolt because it does not involve a complete refusal of the process of government" (Wilcock, 2019, 145). Adopting radical political tactics and increasing their scope to include illegalised migrants would entail ending the collaboration with local councils and jeopardising their funding. Instead, City of Sanctuary's focus is on subverting the State's 'hostile environment', through creating a culture of hospitality and friendships across nationalities (Wilcock, 2019). This form of resistance should not be discounted as the Home Office received around 2,100 public allegations per week in 2011, after the Prime Minister David Cameron asked the public to report "suspected illegal immigrants" and stated that "together we will reclaim our borders and send illegal immigrants home" (Wilcock, 2019, 147).

Based on the abovementioned studies, we see how CSOs supporting migrants in the UK navigate different obstacles and limitations related to their level of establishment and funding. While there have been several campaigns that protest a number of policies enacted through the 'hostile environment' their gains have been limited. Furthermore, we found no prior research that maps collaborative mobilisation between CSOs against such policies.

3.2 Perks and Pitfalls of Online Mobilisation

The study of social movements mobilising online has focussed on a range of different aspects. Firstly, a long line of papers have been written regarding large movements such as the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement (Lee *et al.*, 2017), the Arab Spring (Lotan *et al.*, 2011; Murthy, 2013) and the Occupy Wall Street movement (Kavada, 2015; Tan *et al., 2013;* Caren and Gaby, 2011).

Here, the predominant focus is in trying to ascertain the importance of social media and online strategies of mobilising these movements, in an effort to determine the measurable success accredited to online communications platforms and technological advances (Kidd and McIntosh, 2016).

Secondly, scholars have explored mobilisation strategies, and whether organisations encouraging people to engage through their online channels actually achieves that **(**Turnbull-Dugarte *et al.*, 2021). A recent study tested the efficiency of sending 'mass emails' in order to mobilise supporters of an anti-Brexit CSO to contact their local MPs. They found that 3.4% of the people who received the email actually contacted their representative, while only 0.1% of those in the control group who were not contacted by email did the same (Turnbull-Dugarte *et al.*, 2021). While the strategy did not yield mass engagement from supporters it still resulted in 3,344 emails sent to MPs, due to the sheer number of people asked to participate and the technique itself represents a low-cost communication form for the CSO (Turnbull-Dugarte *et al.*, 2021). This provides an evidence based foundation of an online mobilisation strategy that results in people engaging with the movement. Whether their engagement is related to an increased motivation in the public or the lowering of the bar of participation is more difficult for scholars to ascertain (Turnbull-Dugarte *et al.*, 2021; Kidd and McIntosh, 2016). Kidd and McIntosh argues that more time is need to accumulate evidence on the transformative power of social media but warns that the "transformative potential is often reduced over time as hegemonic forces like capitalism, class, race, and gender adapt to the technologies and re-appropriate that potential" (Kidd and McIntosh, 2016, 792).

Another issue that has been subject of scholarly discussion is the relationship between users on social media platforms in relation to online mobilisation. As these movements follow a loose structure moved forward by multiple actors, there are seemingly no leaders, although some users get significantly more retweets than others and therefore have more power to frame issues and start popular hashtags (Brünker, *et al.*, 2020; Stieglitz *et al.,* 2017). This is exemplified in the #MeToo movement where celebrities popularised the hashtag, illustrating how some users exercise more power within online networks. The term 'power users' is used to classify these movement participants, defined as the profiles that "receive the highest numbers of retweets

within a network (Brünker, *et al.*, 2020, 2359). It has been recommended to include an investigation of power users when researching online mobilisation as popular tweets constitute the posts with the greatest outreach to audiences (Stieglitz *et al.,* 2017).

Based on these studies we can observe that a certain level of uncertainty persists in the field due to its young age and constant development.

3.3 Sub-Conclusion

In this chapter, we reviewed a selection of the literature that informed and guided our study. While some articles related to the role of CSOs practising migrant solidarity in the UK and the obstacles inhibiting their political influence, others focused on the ideological beliefs of grassroots activists resisting the 'hostile environment' and the lessons to be learned from them. One study focused on the limitations of the mobilisation strategy applied by one specific CSO, City of Sanctuary, which is i.a. is included in the dataset of this thesis. While there are many studies of online social movements, we identified a gap in the literature in the intersection between this subject and UK based CSOs. In the preparation for this thesis, we found no literature mapping the Twitter-based resistance of CSOs in the UK, and therefore decided to use the mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill as our case study.

4.Theory

This chapter introduces the main concepts and theories that guided this thesis. The first part introduces the main analytical concepts from social movement theory that was applied in this study, followed by an introduction to digital mobilisations tactics, proceeded with an introduction to framing analysis, and lastly a conceptualisation of migrant solidarity.

4.1 Analytical Concepts from Social Movement Theory

In order to best explore how the CSOs mobilised, the focus was narrowed down to the strategies and tactics that they employed, their reasoning for choosing these strategies, and how they interacted with the political environment. To shed light on this, the notion of repertoires of contention was applied, with a specific emphasis on digital repertoires of contention as the research is centred around social movement mobilisation through Twitter. Furthermore, the actor-centred approach is introduced in order to inform the research of what the organisations' strategies reveal about their self-image, ideology and ethical foundation (Doherty and Hayes, 2019).

4.1.1 Responses, Tactics and Repertoires of Contention

When exploring social movements' responses and tactics to imposed threats, they can be regarded through the lens of Charles Tilly's (1993) concept of *repertoires of contention*. These repertoires describe widely used strategies for mobilisation, known types of responses to events, and notable tactics for navigating a political environment. Moreover, it sheds light on how different actors can inspire each other, learning from the mistakes and victories of others, building on their knowledge and momentum. According to Tilly, it is possible to recognise these patterns of structured routines in movement mobilisation, that have proved successful in the past. These repertoires of contention are a way of making claims through public unscripted performances, which are so characterised by routine and repetition, that participants in the movement and organisations engaging with them easily adopt appropriate roles and behaviour. The routinised nature of these strategies and tactics makes it possible for them to spread across time and space, inspiring other organisations (Doherty and Hayes, 2019).

As it so often is with theories that focus on patterns, repertoires of contention have been criticised for being negligent of the individualistic aspects of strategic choices and contextual variations of mobilisation occurring in different societies (Doherty and Hayes, 2019). This removed focus from the individual's agency can in some instances be reductionistic, but for the purpose of this research, applying this lens fits with the goal to map out and compare strategic moves across organisations in a quantitative manner.

Furthermore, this research on the mobilisation tactics and strategies of CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill can be investigated through an *actor-centric approach*. This provides space to examine the choices made by these organisations in selecting tactics and "how movements stage and pursue them" (Doherty and Hayes, 2019, 276). Moreover, the approach reveals how they frame their cause and collective identity and the motivation behind their strategies, all the while referencing and providing meaning to the movement's "ideas, cultures and traditions" (Doherty and Hayes, 2019, 276). From this end, these chosen tactics are negotiated through interactions and relationships between movements and the external actor, in this case the UK Government. As explained by Doherty and Hayes, "the relationship between actor and action must be central to our understanding of the contours and meanings of a particular event" (Doherty and Hayes, 2019, 277). Applying this approach contributes to the understanding that the choice of tactic is strategic in itself and dependent on the capacity and strengths of the movement. This actor-centric approach becomes a useful tool in the qualitative analysis of the CSOs in this research.

4.1.2 Digital Repertoires of Contention in Social Movements

Building on the more traditional repertoires of contention found in social movements, this research seeks to explore a technological approach to social movement mobilisation. From this, *digital repertoires of contention* will be examined, namely through the means of social media activism using Twitter's public platform. Drawing on Van Laer and Van Aelst's research on online social movement action repertoires, *internet-supported* and *internet-based digital repertoires* will be analysed in regard to the mobilisation of CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill. While these digital repertoires are an ever-growing way to engage in collective action against a common threat, the forms of digital repertoires differ. Van Laer and Van Aelst

explain that where one type repertoires complements traditional on-the-ground social movement tactics (internet-supported repertoires) the other describes movements that are solely located on the internet (internet-based repertoires) (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). The dataset within this research includes an array of CSOs with different levels of participation in the movement against NABB. The analysis will explore both internet-supported and internet-based repertoires and map out which tendencies can be observed in the online mobilisation.

Digital repertoires of contention act as a means to expand the engagement in a social movement. In this sense, geographical location no longer acts as a barrier for an individual to engage in protest against a threat. From 2021 to 2022, the CSOs included in the dataset used and promoted a variety of different digital repertoires to engage with the British public in their involvement against NABB. The repertoires included but were not limited to: tweeting to call on local Members of Parliament to vote against NABB, acting as an alternative news source for updates on the Bill, and informing the public of when and where in-person protests would be taking place. While on-the-ground tactics persist such as demonstrations, sit-ins and occupations, using Twitter as a digital means of information dissemination to the readers and the public creates a space and the ability for different demographics to mobilise.

In order to fully grasp the ways in which CSOs mobilise, it is crucial to accept and incorporate into the research foundation the significant role the online world plays in today's social movements. To make the relationship between digitisation and social movements clear, newer research on the matter refers to a shift from *collective action* to *connective action*. This concept stresses the importance of "digital media as organising agents" in and of themselves (Walker and Martin, 2019, 172). This is, i.a., reflected in the way movements can emerge and mobilise great amounts of people without having been formally organised. The easy access to communication platforms, the flexible nature of online participation and the option of ensuring funding through e.g. crowdsourcing, makes organising possible even for less established movements (Walker and Martin, 2019).

As will be shown below in the *Digital Repertoires Quadrant,* digital repertoires illustrate the different levels of threshold for population engagement. Whereas in the past, to be connected to a

social movement physical presence was necessary, digital repertoires broaden the accessibility for collective action (Brünker et al., 2020). These tactics also change the level of effort required for involvement in movement mobilisation. Van Laer and Van Aelst explain that within digital repertoires, the level of risk and commitment varies, "minimal commitment and risk thus consisting of a low participation threshold," whereas higher risk and higher intensity of action exemplifies a higher threshold (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010, 1151). Digital repertoires allow the opportunity cost of movement participation to become effectively lower when an individual can participate in the social movement from the comfort of their home behind their computer, or effectively in the palm of their hands through their phone. Furthermore, these repertoires also allow for lower opportunity cost for the movement itself in that resources, such as time and money, are lessened when a physical demonstration, sit-in, etc. are not required of the mobilisation. From this, digital repertoires can be argued to allow for a more accessible sense of social movement mobilisation.

Figure 4.1: Digital Repertoires Quadrant

	Internet-Supported	Internet-Based
High Threshold	**2** **More violent action** **Sit-in/occupation** **Transnational demonstration/meeting**	**4** **Hacktivism** **Culture jamming** **Protest website/ alternative media**
Low Threshold	**1** **Legal demonstration** **Consumer behaviour** **Donate Money**	**3** **Email bomb/ virtual sit-in** **Online petition**

This quadrant entitled "A typology of a new digital action repertoire" created by Van Laer and Van Aelst exemplifies how different online repertoires can vary in their threshold level, whether they are internet-supported, or alternatively internet-based movement tactics (2010). As can be seen, internet-based engagement such as signing an online petition provides a low threshold of risk for the participant, whereas internet-supported mobilisations such as in-person demonstrations and occupations can amplify the risk and cost for the movement participant as well as the cause itself. In the analysis (Chapters 6 and 7), the contents of the quadrant are modified to reflect the dataset collected from Twitter to illuminate the digital repertoires mobilised by UK based CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill.

While internet-supported and internet-based repertoires of contention allow for ease of accessibility to activate and engage with a broader audience in order to meet movement goals, digital repertoires also come with limitations. One such common criticism towards online mobilisation is that the 'internet makes it too easy', something often referred to as slacktivism which is explained as a "lazy form of activism whereby individuals limit their participation to social media activity rather than onsite involvement" (Smith *et al*., 2019, 182). Additionally, online activism creates a digital divide, meaning that there is a hierarchy involved in access to online resources (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010).

While this scepticism and these limitations towards digital repertoires may persist, these online tactics can be considered as part of the evolution of social movement mobilisation, as Earl states, "it's here, it's digital, get used to it" (2019, 289). Online mobilisation and online support of in-person mobilisation is an ever growing tendency in the present day social movement mobilisation. While "popular contemporary objection to online protest is to presume that it is likely to be ineffective", organisations such as the CSOs in this research are evolving and discovering ways to activate, broaden their collective action base and navigate the online environment (Earl, 2019, 298).

As seen in Van Laer and Van Aelst's typology quadrant, alternatives to traditional media sources, such as Twitter, have shifted parts of social movement mobilisation to internet-based mobilisation. The traditional role of mass media in disseminating the messages and promoting the work of CSOs, has diminished dramatically. Organisations are no longer reliant on mainstream media, since they are now able to communicate directly through their own channels. This makes them less susceptible to the media's tendency of sensationalism and spares them from needing to adhere to the news criteria or guiding their agenda to overlap with that of mass media (Walker and Martin, 2019).

Although Twitter as a modern form of communication has lessened the dependency on the mass media, it also provides new restraints. It is now not the agenda of newspapers but the algorithms on social media platforms that decide, what kind of content is disseminated and promoted, and to whom. The content produced by the CSOs now, rather than adhering to the news criteria, have

to “fit the guidelines of corporatized social media” in order to reach a broad public (Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown, 2019, 440). It is important to keep in mind, when analysing the content and assessing the different strategies of political communication, that these platforms are not neutral blank canvases to be drawn on, but a carefully monitored sphere, where moderators and account administrators hold the power to decide, what goes viral and what does not (Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown, 2019).

4.1.3 Framing

The theoretical notion of framing is one that may be differentially conceptualised throughout a variety of academic fields and is a key component of social movement theory. To this end, the concept of framing in social movements is borrowed from Goffman’s definition and is a concept that provides meaning “in relation to social and object interaction” (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 393). This “is rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle [where] meanings arise through interpretive processes mediated by culture” (Snow *et al.,* 2019, 393). Framing allows for the focussed attention on a specific subject, or object, in a planned and articulated manner that is carefully constructed for a specific perception of the issue at hand. Framing functions like a picture frame in that what we see “in our sensual field is ‘in-frame’ and what is [left out of the picture] ‘out-of-frame’” (Snow *et al.,* 2019, 392). Snow *et al*. explain that frames can be a transformative function used by “reconstituting the way in which some objects of attention are seen or understood as resting to each other or to the actor” (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 394). Applying these frames to social movements creates a “problematization of meanings with relevant events, activities, places, actors, suggesting that those meanings are contestable and negotiable and thus open to debate and differential interpretation” (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 394).

Framing helps in providing the answers to questions such as: “What is going on here? What is being said? What does this mean? And how should I (or we) act or respond?” (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 394). From this, the frames that have been identified in the dataset and used by the CSOs in the UK are portrayed in a way in which to make the reader focus their attention on the discriminatory nature of NABB itself. The framing of tweets over the parliamentary process of the Bill can be conceptualised as a discursive process that aims to draw focus on the restrictive

and austere measures that it will bring forth to migrants and refugees to the UK. Furthermore, these frames are applied to amplify the need for collective action and mobilisation.

In this research, the concept of framing is used to help answer the research questions and to garner a better understanding of how migrant-centred CSOs in the UK have mobilised against the Bill. From this, the second analysis chapter (Chapter 7) will shed light onto how these organisations apply three core framing tasks to engage with their readers on Twitter in framing the Bill. These core tasks include: *diagnostic framing*, *prognostic framing* and *motivational framing*.

Through the lens of *diagnostic framing*, Snow *et al*. explains that this framing involves two different components. The first being "a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life or system of government as problematic and in need of repair or change" (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 396). The second, an "attribution of blame or responsibility for the problematized states of affairs" (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 396). This framing task uses the act of blaming to imply that a level of injustice has been thrust upon an aspect of civil society, and that consequently responsibility must be laid on the offender. Simply put, diagnostic framing asks the questions "'what is or went wrong?' and 'who or what is to blame?'" (Snow *et al*., 2019, 396). It is from these questions that identify injustice and where to lay blame that the collective can mobilise for their cause.

Secondly, evidence of *prognostic framing* has been used in the tweets published by the CSOs in their pushback against NABB. This framing task may be conveyed in a more productive way in that there is the identification of a problem combined with a proposed solution, "including a plan of attack and the frame-consistent tactics for carrying it out" (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 396). Trends of prognostic framing can be identified throughout the tweets in the dataset. This may be more conducive for Twitter users to mobilise in that there is a clear description of the problem accompanied by a way in which the collective can mobilise towards a solution.

The final collective action core framing task discovered within the dataset is *motivational framing*. Snow *et al*. explains that this function of framing transcends both diagnostic and prognostic framing, and in its elaboration for a call to action, it allows space for the agency of the

movement itself. It involves the construction of "'vocabularies of motive' that provide prods to action by overcoming both the fears of risks often associated with collective action" (Snow *et al*., 2019, 397). Motivational framing aids in the understanding of the problematization in that it addresses the extent of the issue or threat along with accentuating the importance of acting now rather than later. Further, it highlights "the probable efficacy of joining the movement and the moral priority of doing so", while enhancing an individual's agency if they are to mobilise (Snow *et al*., 2019, 397). This framing task appeals and draws on the emotion of the participant.

4.2 Migrant Solidarity

In the context of the 'hostile environment' towards migrants in the UK, civil society initiatives and organisations that practise migrant solidarity are an important counterpoise to the dominant political discourse on migration issues. As the focus of this study is how CSOs mobilise against discriminatory policies, solidarity is naturally a core concept. However, solidarity is difficult to define as it can be perceived "as a 'floating signifier'" that is "as an expression with fundamentally different and potentially conflicting meanings depending on the particular discourse" (Schwiertz and Schwenken, 2020, 409). While the concept is used by many different actors and over a range of fields, it is generally with positive connotations (Schwiertz and Schwenken, 2020; Fleischmann, 2020). Fleischmann argues that solidarity can be understood as a 'contested imaginary', because the word in itself is highly ambiguous, opening up for subjective interpretations shaped by "personal needs and interests as well as by claims made in the name of the greater public good" (Fleischmann, 2020, 25). While solidarity is often understood in connection to inclusion, the flip side of the coin is the included exclusion. Solidarity has its limits; it is often expressed as solidarity with one group at the expense of another.

This leads Schwiertz and Schwenken to argue that the concept can be divided into *solidarity from above* and *solidarity from below*. Solidarity from above refers to the concept's importance for the national welfare state and institutions such as the EU, that mainly applies it as solidarity between citizens or between member states, something that excludes migrants from institutionalised solidarity (Schwiertz and Schwenken, 2020). They highlight how the use of solidarity from above is glaringly obvious when it comes to migration policies at the EU level in

which “debates about the distribution of refugees [is] framed as ‘burden sharing’” (Schwiertz and Schwenken, 2020, 409).

The opposite of this, solidarity from below, they define as “developed in a tradition of struggles aimed at overcoming forms of exclusion on the national level and by creating links and feelings of closeness between people from very different origins as well as with different interests and perspectives” (Schwiertz and Schwenken, 2020, 409). It is in this vein that we chose to define the concept of solidarity related to our case. While the British government excludes forced migrants from institutionalised solidarity, migrant solidarity is ‘performed from below’ by the civil society organisations and initiatives that steps in to fill the gap.

In continuation of this point we also recognise della Porta and Steinhilpers conceptualization of contentious solidarity which is “characterized on the one hand by shrinking civic spaces and on the other hand by opposing civil society resistance” (2022, 2). The political polarisation around migration has diminished the status of practising migrant solidarity and decreased the public funding of civil society organisations that do so (della Porta and Steinhilper, 2022). Furthermore, both state and non-state actors use “a diverse *repertoire of repression”* to shrink spaces of solidarity through actions that “range from “soft repression” through the stigmatisation of acts of solidarity to toxic media discourses, political pressure by reactionary groups in and outside parliaments, to push for a penalization of civil society activities” (della Porta and Steinhilper, 2022, 11). We understand the Nationality and Borders Bill as an example of this repression, and the mobilisation against it as a fight against the shrinking spaces of solidarity.

4.3 Sub-conclusion

This chapter defined the theoretical framework of this thesis. It explored key components of social movement theory and concepts to be applied in analysis of the mobilisation of UK CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill. The main focus was on repertoires of contention, with an emphasis on digital repertoires, as the data collected for this research was sourced from Twitter. Furthermore, it covered how the concept of migrant solidarity was understood in this study. The aim of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive theoretical basis on which we build our research.

5. Research Methods

In this chapter we first present key information about our data collection and coding process which applies to the whole analysis (Chapters 6 and 7). It then branches off into two parts relating specifically to the separate parts of the analysis.

5.1 Research Design

In line with much research within the field of social movement studies, we applied a mixed methods approach to map the online mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill. We used descriptive statistics to create an overview of the data and identify patterns, while also applying a content analysis of the mobilisation strategies and frames that we identified in the coding process. This study presents two analyses chapters, both based on data retrieved from Twitter. The full dataset can be found in Appendix A. The first analysis (Chapter 6) is based on a dataset of 750 manually coded tweets, with the aim of uncovering tendencies in mobilisation strategies connected to organisational level of establishment. This datasample can be found in Appendix B. The second analysis (Chapter 7) is based on three individual in-depth case studies of the three most influential organisations in the dataset, also called power users. The Twitter data supporting this analysis can be found in Appendix C. We found it interesting to zoom in on these CSOs, as the frames they use when describing the Bill, or calling to action against it, becomes the dominant discourse. Below Figure 5.1 provides a visual illustration of the data sampling process.

Figure 5.1 Overview of the Data



5.2 Collection Period

The dataset is based on tweets from the period July 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022, which were retrieved from Twitter's application programming interface (API) on April 1, 2022. This timespan was chosen to ensure that relevant data was not omitted and to minimise the collection of irrelevant data. Due to time constraints, unfortunately we could not extend the data collection period till April 27, 2022, when the Bill passed the final vote before achieving Royal Assent, shifting the Nationality and Borders Bill to the Nationality and Borders Act. However, the data covers the entire period from when the Nationality and Borders Bill first gained media attention until the reactions that came in the wake of the Bill passing the final programme motion in the House of Commons on March 22, 2022. It is significant that the data was collected during this period, as it almost encapsulates the entire mobilisation period of the movement, thereby including potential shifts in strategies as the Bill moved through different stages of Parliament.

5.3 Twitter Data

We chose to base the analysis of this thesis on data retrieved from Twitter, as it is an online public platform where CSOs communicate directly with both the people they are trying to mobilise and the politicians that they are trying to influence. The tone on Twitter, and on social media in general, is less formal and more immediate than in classic news media outlets. Twitter is a platform dominated by affective statements that "mix fact with opinion, and with emotion, in a manner that simulates the way we politically react in our everyday lives" (Budabin and Hall, 2022, 103). This is significant as the informal setting and the direct access to their audience allows for the organisations to better apply different strategies for mobilisation.

Moreover, the fact that many organisations working for the same cause are all inhabiting this online space, makes it possible for them to unite under a common hashtag, draw inspiration from other members of the movement, and build on each other's momentum. In this case we observed how most organisations used the hashtag #AntiRefugeeBill when referring to the NABB, essentially renaming it online for purposes of mobilisation. Thereby hashtags become "ideological resources" that followers use to "indicate identity, beliefs and group membership" (Kreis, 2017, 500).

In general, much of the political conversation has moved away from regular media outlets to social media – as observed during the Trump presidency in the United States, where a large amount of his addresses to the public were communicated in tweet-format. This indicates that Twitter is not only a forum of a high frequency of communication on important political topics, but it is also a platform that facilitates direct interaction between actors and engagement across temporal and spatial limits.

5.4 Data Extraction

The research data was collected and processed using the software RStudio. Due to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) related restrictions on data retrieval, we were necessitated to limit the scope of our data collection. Knowing that we wanted to retrieve tweets related to the Nationality and Borders Bill, a decision between a limitation on timeframe or on number of users had to be made. Following the GDPR restrictions, we were either to retrieve all tweets

mentioning the Bill from all Twitter-users, but only dating back four days, or we were to limit our data pool to a list of selected CSOs, without a time limit. We decided that a longer time period would provide us with more useful data, although it meant shifting the nature of our data pool away from the overall conversation about NABB towards a more organisational focus. As our work progressed, we realised that this focus was much more in line with our research objective and informed our research question more accurately.

5.5 Selecting Civil Society Organisations

Prior to embarking on this research project, we had no connection to any UK based organisations working with migrants. Therefore, we initially conducted an explorative online search, where we used Google to identify relevant organisations. From that stage we started researching organisations on Twitter and adding organisations from their networks to our list. While reading similar studies on this topic we learned about the UK Charity Commission where all organisations with an annual income of at least £5,000 are registered and can be found using relevant search words (Mayblin and James, 2019). Through this database we added around 50 organisations to our list and at the end of this research stage we had compiled 200 civil society organisations working with migrants in the UK. Out of these 200 CSOs, only 124 used their Twitter-profile to communicate about the Nationality and Borders Bill. As the remaining 76 profiles had not tweeted on the topic during the collection period, we eliminated them from our dataset.

5.6 Search Words

The dataset only includes tweets that mention the Nationality and Borders Bill, though not necessarily by that name. In order to limit our dataset to relevant tweets, we decided on a list of four relevant search words related to the Bill (NABB; bordersbill; nationality; antirefugeebill) which were used to download tweets through Rstudio via Twitter's API. The words were selected based on an explorative search of Twitter for the most common hashtags and words related to communication on the Nationality and Borders Bill. The Twitter scraping based on these search words resulted in a dataset consisting of 3166 tweets in total.

5.7 Coding Manual

After collecting the tweets, they were divided into two datasets: one of 750 tweets for the first analysis (Chapter 6) and one of 323 tweets for the second analysis (Chapter 7). The sampling process will be elaborated later in this chapter (paragraph 5.9 and 5.10) . We created a coding manual to manually code both datasets.

Table 5.1: Coding Manual

Type	Clusters and Variables	
Message type	Cluster: Call to action ● Protest (all events) ● MP (write your local MP) ● Petition ● Survey Cluster: Motivation ● Artistic activism ● Solidarity action (ex pictures from protests) ● Reaction ● Follow (us to join the movement/ mentioning or describing the movement)	Cluster: Information sharing ● Statement (stating their opposition the bill, opinion based) ● Informational video ● Article ● Testimony ● Briefing (report/analysis)
Framing of the Bill	Cluster: Discrimination ● Anti-refugee ● Racist ● Women ● LGBTQIA ● Children ● Slavery ● Minorities ● Fascist Cluster: Legal argument ● HR (human rights violations / breach of International law) ● End of asylum (tweets stating this both directly and indirectly by referring to subverting the protection of asylum seekers i.a. by criminalising them) Cluster: Emotional argument ● Dirty politics ● Hostile ● Brutal ● Shame ● Cruel ● Inhumane (opposite of compassion)	Cluster: Logical argument ● Dangerous (danger, kill, harmful) ● Economic (the cost of imprisonment / implementing the bill will be very expensive) Cluster: Solidarity ● Win ● Stand (together against the bill (take action / the fight isn't over) Cluster: Extra ● Offshore (detention centers) ● No frame

When creating the coding manual, we worked inductively and identified Message Types and Frames according to the collected tweets. While we wanted the coding process to result in as nuanced and informative data as possible, we also had to settle on frames that were not too specific to fit several tweets. The method guiding the coding process and the meanings of the different categorisations will be further elaborated below.

5.7.1 Message Type

The Message Type refers to the overall intention of the tweet, and can roughly be divided into three clusters: *1) call to action, 2) information sharing, and 3) motivation*. The first cluster contains tweets that are attempting to convince the reader to take action against the Bill, such as emailing their MP, signing a petition, or joining a protest. The second cluster contains tweets with the main aim of spreading information about the Bill with content ranging from videos, briefings, articles, and reports to emotional statements about the feared effects of the Bill. The final category contains all the tweets with the aim of motivating followers to continue the fight. These are mainly pictures from protests or community events, tweets that thank people for coming out and supporting an event and reactions to both good and bad news, thus keeping spirits high and momentum going.

5.7.2 Frames

The 'frame' refers to the discursive angle or argument that is used to strengthen the overall message of the tweet. How grievances are framed is an important element of mobilising the general public (Snow *et al.*, 2019). Frames focus attention on certain aspects of an issue and creates a shared understanding of what is at stake while motivating others to join the fight. For example, the message type can be *protest* and the framing of the Bill can be that it is *racist*. By connecting the word racist to the Bill, the CSO posting the tweet hoped to generate strong feelings of condemnation and injustice that will motivate the reader to take to the streets in protest.

The frames that were identified can be understood as *collective action frames* which are defined as "relatively coherent sets of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that legitimise and inspire social movement campaigns and activities" (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 395).

The process of identifying frames was long and complicated as each tweet would often have multiple frames. For instance, a tweet might frame the Bill as *cruel*, *inhumane*, and *harmful* to victims of modern *slavery*. In that case we would pick the frame we identified as the strongest, which would be *slavery* based on the shock factor of this word compared to *cruel* and *inhumane*. During this process the goal was to identify the frame that was given the most weight, for instance by being present in the first or final sentence of the tweet or by being mentioned the most times.

However, the process of identifying frames is to a large extent subjective. To ensure consistency and intercoder reliability, we therefore conducted several coding checks: discussing the meaning of the frames, reading through each other's coding, and highlighting tweets where we were unsure about the strongest frame. We started by coding the 323 tweets in the power user dataset for the second part of the analysis (Chapter 7 – see Appendix C), after which we coded the 750 tweets in the larger dataset related to the first part of the analysis (Chapter 6 – see Appendix B). After, we returned to the power user dataset to streamline the coding as new frames had been identified since the initial coding. Finally, when the coding process was completed, we divided the identified Message Types and frames into clusters, creating a comprehensive overview and understanding of the data.

The frames can be divided into five clusters:

1. *Discrimination* contains all the frames that highlight the harmful or discriminatory impact the Bill will have on specific social groups.
2. *Legal argument* contains the two frames that focus on the Bill's breach of international law. The first frame, *HR,* covers all the tweets that specifically mentions that the Bill or parts of it will lead to human rights violations, that clause 9 goes against the Stateless Convention, that the Bill violates the 1951 convention, or simply highlights the importance of rights as arguments against the Bill. The second frame, *end of asylum*, contains all tweets that directly state that the Bill will result in this, but also the tweets that do so indirectly by stating that the Bill will punish refugees instead of protecting them.

3. *Logical argument* contains the frames that argue against NABB based on it being dangerous, sometimes to the extent of causing death, or on it being near impossible or very expensive to implement.
4. *Emotional argument* contains the frames that intend to spur strong emotions of injustice, shame, and anger against the bill.
5. *Solidarity* contains the frames that aim at rallying support and increasing motivation for the cause through tweets about community, standing together with refugees, support in the British public and the successes of the movement.

5.8 Positionality and Limitations

5.8.1 Positionality and Ethical Considerations

When conducting as extensive a research project as this, relating to a topic of such complexity and importance, it is crucial to keep in mind the positionality that we have as researchers. We would like to note that none of us have lived refugee experience and that we are aware of our privileged status as university students in Denmark, which is a cultural context far removed from the case that we are analysing. In exploring this case without any prior connection to the UK immigration system or the access to local interview subjects, we acknowledge that we might have held biases or blindspots when collecting and engaging with the data.

Moreover, we recognise that our personal political views have been a continuous force of motivation throughout this research process as we sympathise with the agenda of the CSOs mobilising against the Nationality and Borders Bill, thereby placing this study within the activist academic tradition.

Lastly, regarding the online nature of the data informing this thesis, we positioned ourselves as technologically ambivalent tending towards optimism, as the entire premise for us choosing this area of study was that we recognised its presence, importance and potential (Kidd and McIntosh, 2016).

5.8.2 Limitations

The scope of this thesis was constrained by a variety of limitations from the beginning of the writing process. Firstly, as aforementioned we did not have prior contact with migrant-centred CSOs in the United Kingdom, thus limiting our collection of CSOs to blind online searches in

order to build up our dataset. This also affected our ability to conduct interviews with volunteers, as no staff members were willing to participate in an interview, from our initial campaign of 'cold-calling' different organisations throughout the UK. Secondly, as we only had four months to conduct this research project, time constraint has been a major factor in limiting how many aspects of the online mobilisation against NABB that we have been able to include in the analysis. In choosing to only explore data derived from Twitter and no other online platforms, the analysis just provides one perspective of the online mobilisation driving the movement against the Bill, thus not painting the full picture. Though we would have liked to investigate the links between our dataset and the mobilisation taking place outside the online realm, we did not have time to identify secondary data on this. Furthermore, due to these time limitations we did not have the possibility to discuss regional differences within the UK, something we find especially regrettable as Scotland and Wales actually rejected the Bill.

As inequality exists everywhere, including within the civil society sector, we could have explored how accessible and inclusive the CSOs were for individuals belonging to different social groups, even though we collected a diverse sample of 124 organisations practising migrant solidarity. While our data illustrates the tactics the CSOs applied against the Bill, it can not explain why their mobilisation did not succeed in scrapping the Bill, as this would rather require an analysis of the democratic processes in the UK and the relationship between civil society and lawmakers. Even though it would have been very interesting to examine the differences between organisations led by migrants and organisations led by British citizens practising migrant solidarity, this was outside the scope of this thesis. Instead this could be an interesting topic for future research.

Finally, by being new to both the workings of Twitter and the handling of advanced software for scraping and coding data, our data collection was a process of trial and error which impeded the writing process. We were faced with a series of technological hurdles in collecting and coding our dataset, ultimately resulting in the elimination of half of our dataset after it had already been manually coded, thus reducing it from 1500 tweets to 750 tweets.

5.9 Coding CSOs by Organisational Level of Establishment

The goal of the first analysis (Chapter 6) was to identify differences between the tactics and frames used by organisations of different levels of establishment. We therefore categorised the 124 CSOs in our dataset into three levels: grassroots organising, mid-level organising and well-organised.

Grassroots level organisations are smaller scale CSOs that deliver their work within one locale or in one geographically set area. These organisations focus on one specific topic within a broader cause, and generally have only one project in progress. These tend to be younger movements, and one possible indicator for this is that the grassroots CSOs in our dataset are not yet registered charities in the UK, due to their small budget. According to Walker and Stepick, grassroots organisations are defined as "advocacy groups active at the local level to improve the quality of life and life chances for local residents" (Walker and Stepick, 2014, 959). The work delivered by these organisations is very focused and oftentimes limited to a group of volunteers and no paid staff members. An example of grassroots level of organising within the dataset is the newly established volunteer movement Channel Rescue, a volunteer driven organisation with the main focus of monitoring the waters of the English Channel for vessels carrying immigrants to the southeastern shores of England.

Mid-level CSOs are defined in the dataset as organisations where their work is based in one locale or one region, but may have a variety of projects in progress at any given time. Additionally, these organisations will be registered charities in the UK, and may also have accreditation from the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner. These CSOs are recognised within their geographical communities with hired staff in addition to community volunteers, are able to provide annual reports and financial reports, and typically have a publicly available mission statement. An example of a mid-level organisation in the dataset is Samphire Project, regionally located in Kent, England. Samphire Project has been a recognised CSO in the community for almost twenty years, they have a registered charity status, and their work has transitioned from one sole focus of supporting immigrant detainees to numerous community engagement projects to support immigrants.

Finally, well-organised CSOs within the dataset are larger-scale operations. They are typically nationally established registered charities or with registered company status in the UK. How these organisations are differentiated from mid-level CSOs is that they are not restricted to one locale, but work in multiple locations. These CSOs may have organisational chapters located in different regions of the UK. Additionally, these larger CSOs may be national networks or coalitions of organisations working within the same realm of the same social movement. An example of such a coalition of CSOs in our dataset can be identified as Together with Refugees. As these organisations are well-organised, with tiered levels of governance, they tend to show political clout within their movement, where they often publish their achievements within publicly available financial reports.

We found it necessary to filter the CSOs into these different categories as it may provide insight into how these different organisations are able to mobilise with the capital they possess, whether it is funding, community support, national recognition, board of directors or trustees, or paid employees.

5.9.1 Sample

After we had researched enough about all 124 organisations to divide them into the three categorisations, we generated a random sample of 250 tweets from each category, using an online sample generator called Research Randomizer[1]. The dataset for the first analysis (Chapter 6) therefore consists of 750.

5.10 Choosing Power Users

In the second analysis (Chapter 7), we conducted an in-depth investigation of the top three power users out of the 124 CSOs we had collected. Power users are "participants who receive the highest numbers of retweets within a network" (Brünker *et al.*, 2020, 2359). As they are the most influential users within that given network, these CSOs exercise great influence in the online debate in which they participate, and are therefore an important subject of study when examining Twitter mobilisation.

[1] www.randomizer.org

To identify the top three power users in the network of CSOs mobilising against the Nationality and Borders Bill, we had to identify the three organisations that held the highest retweet count of their original content in our sample. The result was (1) Refugee Action that had received 3313 retweets on a total of 134 original tweets; (2) Detention Action that had received 2663 retweets on 112 original tweets; and (3) Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants that had received 2490 retweets on 77 original tweets. The three power users will be further introduced in Chapter 7.

5.10.1 Sample

The sample included all original tweets from these three organisations, resulting in a total of 323 tweets.

5.10 Sub-conclusion

This chapter provided an intimate insight into the comprehensive dataset on which our thesis depends, demonstrating every element related to its creation and our interaction with it. It gave an introduction to our research design and research methods, along with an outline of our analysis guide and the thoughts behind the selection of our analysis subjects. Moreover, it guides the reader through our data collection, explaining the process of coding and processing our data. Furthermore, it listed the considerations behind our choices, the limitations to this study and the hurdles we encountered along the way.

6. Analysis: Part 1 – Comparing Mobilisation Strategies and Organisational Levels of Establishment

As aforementioned, the analysis of this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the analysis is dedicated to providing a quantitative overview of the larger tendencies within the data set. This acts as a backdrop for the second part of the analysis (Chapter 7) which dives deep into the mobilisation of the three power users. This chapter begins with a descriptive analysis, mapping out the timeline and key events of the legislative stages of the Nationality and Borders Bill. Thereafter it takes a look at tendencies in mobilisation strategies and framing used in the online mobilisation against the Bill. This is done by conducting a comparative analysis between tendencies in different categories of organisations based on their organisational level of establishment.

Table 6.1: Organisational Level of Establishment Matrix

Grassroots Level	• Work is in one locale/one geographically set area • Generally a younger movement • Focus of organisation is on one specific topic within the broader movement • Generally a younger/newer unestablished movement
Mid-Level Accreditations: OISC CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES	• Work is based in one locale or region, but may have variety of projects on-the-go at any given time • Registered Charity Number and/or Registered Company Number • May show OISC (Office of Immigration Services Commissioner) accreditation symbol • Provides financial reports on website • Hired staff in addition to volunteers • May provide annual reports on website

Well-Organised
 	
Accreditations:
OISC
CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES
	• Well-established, larger scale entity
	• Works in a multiple locations, not restricted to one locale
	  ○ Multiple projects ongoing
	  ○ May have chapters in different regions of the UK
	• Registered Charity Number and/or Registered Company Number
	• May show OISC accreditation
	• Nationally recognized, national network of organisations/umbrella organisation
	• Tiered system of governance (staff, board, trustees, volunteers)
	• Displays annual reports/ financial reports

As seen above, Table 6.1 contains a brief overview of some of the key distinctions and indicators which separate the CSOs in this study into three levels of establishment, as will be elaborated further in the analysis of this chapter.

6.1. Distribution of Data

The distribution of the CSOs' tweets over time is visualised in Figure 6.1, illustrating the amount of tweets posted relating to the Nationality and Borders Bill as the Bill progressed through the legislative process. The overall tendency was one of a steady increase and peaks in activity related to a number of events and milestones, related to the Bill and to migration in general (Table 6.1). Most notably was when the CSOs in the dataset were calling on their followers to contact their local Members of Parliament to scrap the Bill in December of 2021. Another peak related to the CSOs posting encouraging tweets when the House of Lords rejected key exclusionary clauses of the Bill at the end of January 2022. Furthermore, the highest spike in Twitter activity was seen on March 22, 2022, when the MPs voted on the Bill for the final time in the House of Commons, with the majority voting in favour of NABB.

Figure 6.1: Nationality and Borders Bill Tweet Frequency: July 2021 - March 2022



Figure 6.1 is a visualisation, based on the full dataset of 3166 tweets. It portrays the tweeting frequency from the UK CSOs about the Nationality and Borders Bill from its inception in July

2021 to March 2022, just after the final vote in the Bill in the House of Commons. Below, Table 6.2 provides a brief timeline into key events throughout the lifetime of the Bill. It portrays both milestones of the different stages of the Bill throughout the legislative process that have ignited reaction from the CSOs on Twitter, as well as providing a brief insight as to when the CSOs Twitter activity spiked over the course of the year. This timeline seeks to act as guide throughout the analysis in that it elaborates on the information found in Figure 6.1, as well as corroborates different elements of the analysis.

Table 6.2: Timeline of Key Events

Jul'21	● The Nationality and Borders Bill was introduced to the House of Commons July 1, 2021. Power users tweeted to bring attention to the public about the restrictiveness of the Bill for immigrants and refugees to the UK. ● Late July Bump: Second Reading of the Nationality and Borders Bill on July 19, 2021 in the House of Commons (UK Parliament, "Parliamentary Bills"). Power Users tweeted for public support to stop the Bill by encouraging citizens to contact their MPs.
Aug'21	● UK Government creates scheme to resettle 20,000 Afghan refugees, CSOs call for higher numbers, and use this as a moment to incite traction to stop the Bill.
Sep'21	● Public Committee Stage of the NABB in Parliament. As the Bill started in the House of Commons, "the committee is able to take evidence from experts and interest groups from outside Parliament" (UK Parliament, "Committee Stage"). Activists and individuals involved with the Power Users speak in Parliament during Committee Stage.
Nov'21	● Call from Power Users to contact their MPs as NABB is in the House of Commons for debate.
Dec'21	● NABB moves to the Reporting Stage in the House of Commons, Power Users called to citizens and followers to contact their MPs to scrap NABB. Power Users also shared comments from MPs on NABB to raise awareness in the public sphere.
Jan'22	● NABB returns to Parliament on January 5th, 2022, this time it is moved forward to be debated in the House of Lords. Power posting occurred to spread support to stopping the NABB. ● January 27, 2022, House of Lords openly debated different clauses of interest for Power Users in Parliament.

Feb'22	• Support and retweets of the House of Lords voting to scrap different elements of the Bill.
Mar'22	• The House of Lords voted to eliminate several austere clauses of interest for the Power Users. Power Users used this opportunity to build on this positive movement from the Lords to galvanise mobilisation from the public to contact their MPs to stop the Bill. • Power-posting to remind followers that the Bill would be returning to the House of Commons for the MPs to vote on the Bill.

6.2 Comparing Different Levels of Establishment

This section of the analysis focuses on uncovering tendencies of how the level of establishment of an organisation influences the ways in which organisations communicate on Twitter regarding the Nationality and Borders Bill. It is based on a sample of the data derived from Twitter, defining the character of the communication based on the two variables Message Type and Framing, while exploring patterns and relationships between communication character and organisational levels of establishment. The sample consists of a collection of 750 tweets: 250 tweets from each of the three categories of organisations – grassroots, mid-level, well-organised.

First, it centres on how the type of content an organisation produces can be related to the level of establishment of the organisation by exploring Message Types as *repertoires of contention* and viewing them through the lens of *the digital repertoires quadrant*. It then looks at frames based on an *actor-centric approach* and at what can be derived about the organisations' strategies based on how they articulate and form their messages, in regards to who their targeted audience is.

6.2.1 Message Type

For the purpose of analysing the mobilisation strategies in this thesis, the Message Types have been incorporated into the Digital Repertoires Quadrant, creating a relevant version for this research (Figure 6.2). For all three organisational levels of establishment, the tendency was the same with the most prevalent quadrant in the dataset being Quadrant 3 (low threshold / internet-based), the second most prevalent being Quadrant 2 (low threshold / internet-supported) and the least prevalent being Quadrant 1 (high threshold / internet-supported). The Quadrant 4 (high threshold / internet-based) was not at all exemplified in the data sample.

Figure 6.2: UK CSO Digital Mobilisation Quadrant



Figure 6.2 is adapted from Van Laer and Van Aelst's Digital Repertoires of Quadrant entitled "A Typology of a New Digital Action Repertoire" (2010), to fit the needs of this research. The quadrants contain the Message Types that were identified in the tweets located in the collected dataset. The visualisation acts as a tool to guide the reader through the analysis in order to further understand the threshold levels of different mobilisation tactics. This UK CSO Digital Mobilisation Quadrant will be referred to in both Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the analysis.

Figure 6.3: Quadrants by Level of Establishment



Table 6.3: Quadrants by Level of Establishment

	Well-organised	**Mid-level**	**Grassroots**	**Total**
Quadrant 1	1	11	9	**21**
Quadrant 2	37	26	67	**130**
Quadrant 3	212	213	174	**599**
Quadrant 4	0	0	0	**0**
Total	250	250	250	**750**

The Message Types displayed in the dataset were repertoires used pre-internet which were translated directly from analogue mobilisation strategies into a digital sphere. The reason for low threshold / internet-based types of mobilisation to be so dominant was mainly due to the large number of tweets related to information dissemination, while the overwhelming presence in the low threshold / internet-supported were based on the numerous tweets related to protests (Table 6.1). It can be argued that the fact that Quadrant 1 was so sparsely represented in the dataset, was due to low threshold repertoires being easily translatable to a digital sphere. Prior to the rise of online mobilisation in social movements, actions such as signing a petition, would generally be low threshold analogue activities, but due to their compatibility with online platforms and the

shift to increased online mobilisation, these Message Types were translated directly into being internet-based.

This tendency of moving mobilisation strategies from an offline sphere to an online one does not come into play in regard to the high threshold mobilisation activities of Quadrant 2 and 4. This can be attributed to the fact that high threshold activities are already demanding of individual participants in the movement. The act of moving these types of mobilisation strategies from an analogue environment to an online platform, requires not necessarily more resources, but new digital skills. This would demand that movement participants had been digitally educated to an extent that allows for them to partake in complex online activities – something that is not yet to be expected from the average citizen. Thus, moving too many high threshold activities online would make the movement less accessible.

The most conspicuous difference between the three organisation types relating to quadrants were that grassroots organisations focussed more on Quadrant 2 than Quadrant 3 as compared to both mid-level and well-organised organisations (Figure 6.2 and Table 6.3). The reason for this could be related to the fact that grassroots organisations do not have as many resources for creating informative material, thus focusing their energy on mobilising the public for protests.

When observing the different Message Types present in the dataset, repertoires of contention provides a relevant lens (Doherty and Hayes, 2019). On a general level, some of the repertoires present in the mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill are recognised from other social movements, like inviting people to join a protest, encouraging people to write their Members of Parliament, asking people to sign petitions, etc.. This general framework for contestation and mobilisation are well-known in social movements in general, and are transferred directly from a more analogue time, to the present of social media. This is how the social movement against NABB partakes in a long-standing tradition of civil society mobilising, thus interacting with and building upon the work of previous movements.

On a more specific level, there is also the point of organisations within the movement retweeting each other's posts and learning from each other by using the same wording and hashtags. Hashtags exemplify online and specific repertoires of contention. Although hashtags of course are

but a part of the online infrastructure of Twitter and are created in order to somehow "categorise" conversations on Twitter, they can also be laden with meaning and political message. In this way, hashtags are optimal for connecting in general but also specifically for creating a mobilising community, as people can easily participate in the movement by using a certain hashtag. In the dataset, the most prevalent hashtags were #AntiRefugeeBill, #BordersBill, #NationalityandBordersBill, #StopNABB and #RefugeesWelcome.

Figure 6.4 Message Types - All Levels of Organisation



Figure 6.5 Message Type Clusters by Level of Organisation



The most prevalent Message Type in the dataset was *statement*, which might stem from the fact that this Message Type fits perfectly with the format of Twitter; a platform for writing a concise text, relaying an opinion. This makes Twitter perfect for making bold statements and political claims, while being easily accessible to anyone wishing to join the conversation (Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown, 2019). The downside to this accessibility is that it does not provide the automatic legitimacy that a statement would have had, as if it were written in a newspaper (Rojas and King, 2019). Legitimacy must thus, within the constraints of the platform, be found elsewhere – this being i.a. through likes, retweets, followers. Moreover, one needs to create an appropriate type and amount of content that fits with the community guidelines of the platform, in order to be successful in mobilising on Twitter. In this way, although Twitter has many great qualities and in some ways are perfect for mobilising, it is also a very restrictive platform that demands for users to cater their content to fit with certain success criteria (Rohlinger and Corrigall-Brown, 2019). This relates to journalistic media, since this was the medium that previously acted as the primary platform for CSOs to express their political vision. Thus CSOs are no longer restricted by needing to adhere to the rules of journalistic media, because they no longer depend on them to the same extent (Walker and Martin, 2019).

CSOs linking to an article in their tweet can be seen as a way of combining the old and new ways of engaging with journalistic media and exemplifies their new role; instead of news media being used as a way of disseminating information, they are rather used on Twitter as a means of legitimising political statements. In the dataset it was apparent that CSOs still use news media, by adding a link to a relevant article in their tweet – either articles, in which they are quoted, or just an article that supports their statement. This was true for all three organisation types, with it being most prevalent in well-organised CSOs (32 tweets), than grassroots CSOs (20 tweets) and lastly mid-level CSOs (14 tweets) (Table 6.5). This could be attributed to the fact that large CSOs were frequently quoted in journalistic articles, motivating them to share these articles. It could also relate to these well-established CSOs having a larger focus on maintaining their legitimacy, since this is one their main strengths.

Figure 6.6 Message Types Related to Information Sharing by Levels of Organisation



6.2.3 Framing

In the dataset, a clear difference was observed between the types of organisations in regard to their framing of the Bill. When comparing the well-organised and mid-level CSOs with the grassroots organisations, there was a tendency for the latter to be more radical in their rhetoric. An example of this was the use of the word *racist* to describe the Bill, which occurred significantly more often in tweets from grassroots organisations (Figure 6.6). The use of words such as *slavery* and *racist*, was an example of frame bridging, as it created a link between the

fight against the Bill and other previous movements such as the historical fight for the abolition of slavery. Furthermore, it applied frame extension in that it connected this specific movement to the overall mobilisation against racism (Snow, *et al.*, 2019).

Figure 6.7 Most Prevalent Frames by Levels of Organisation



Looking at large, well-organised CSOs, it was clear that their language choice was less radical, which could be related to them wishing to not lose their political clout – afterall, "organisations must satisfy certain environmental demands to retain their legitimacy" (Rojas and King, 2019, 208). On the contrary, maintaining legitimacy from the general public was not something less organised CSOs prioritised to the same degree, which was e.g. reflected in their sharp, irreconcilable rhetoric. This illustrates that their targeted audiences are communities invested in anti-racist matters, who prefer for the CSOs to state their opinions directly. Further, it exemplifies a strategic difference between the three organisational levels of establishment in that they seek legitimacy in different groups and based on different criteria. Moreover, since many grassroot organisations are not publicly funded, they may not need to censor themselves in order

to sustain funding. Also, in using *racist*, the grassroots organisations are in a way talking from a minority standpoint to a minority standpoint, whereas larger organisations are catering to a larger audience and thus do not want to alienate the majority of the public. In a sense, they are mobilising completely different parts of the population, with large organisations trying to mobilise the people who are not yet involved with the movement and who are not personally implicated by the Bill, and grassroots organisations trying to mobilise the segment whose lives it would change drastically.

6.3 Sub-conclusion

This chapter presented findings from the dataset in a quantitative manner, uncovering tendencies in online mobilisation strategies present among CSOs in the movement against NABB. Notably, it conducts a comparative analysis between organisations belonging to three different categories based on their level of establishment, pointing out the difference between how grassroots organisations mobilise in comparison to more established ones. The chapter provides intell into the relationship between the nature of their mobilisation and their organisational structure and acts as a useful informational backdrop for the three in-depth case studies to be conducted in the following chapter.

7. Analysis: Part 2 – Individual In-Depth Case Study Analyses

Building on the analysis of how the CSOs in our dataset possess different levels of establishment which can influence their mobilisation strategies and tactics, the second part of the analysis seeks to provide a deeper insight into how individual CSOs mobilise within the collective movement. The aim of the chapter is to provide an in-depth understanding of the most Twitter-influential CSOs mobilising for migrant rights against the Nationality and Borders Bill, so as to gain a better grasp of the social movement contesting it as a whole. These three organisations, *Refugee Action, Detention Action* and *The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants,* are analysed based on their use of Message Types and Frames in communicating about the Bill on Twitter. From this, the threshold level of their mobilisation can be identified along with their digital.

7.1 Case: Refugee Action

With over 65,000 Twitter followers, Refugee Action is a large-scale, well-organised and nationally based CSO with chapters spread throughout different communities of the United Kingdom. From this, the CSO has the capital and the capacity to branch out through a variety of avenues to share their knowledge on immigration related subjects and issues at play in the UK. Oftentimes, Refugee Action works and partners with like-minded CSOs to mobilise for their different projects. Thereby signifying that it is a joint effort and that there is strength in numbers and knowledge with this mobilisation to scrap the Nationality and Borders Bill. It can also be viewed as a way to reach more individuals to mobilise for their cause, collaborating to meet goals and achieve organisational milestones. This analysis is based on 134 tweets posted by Refugee Action.

7.1.1 Message Type

Based on the findings from the retrieved tweets in the dataset, the majority of Refugee Action's published text fell into the Message Type cluster of 'information sharing'. It was clear from their tweets scraped from Twitter that the CSO employed different tactics related to information disseminating about the Bill. Of their 134 original tweets published over nine months, the most prevalent Message Types were *statement* with 43 tweets, followed by *informational video* with 21 tweets and then *article* with 15 tweets. From these clusters of Message Types, it could be identified that the majority of Refugee Action's mobilisation tactics fell into Quadrant 3,

exemplifying a common trend of low threshold / internet-based mobilisation. This tactic has allowed the CSO to expand their reach of messaging across the UK.

Figure 7.1: Refugee Action - Message Types



In reviewing the dataset, Refugee Action was the only power user in this research that had either a link to further information or educational videos embedded into every single one of these 134 tweets. It was clear that this CSO had drawn on its past successful repertoires and digital repertoires such as the #LiftTheBan movement and applied them to their mobilisation tactics against the Bill (Lift the Ban Coalition, 2018). As previously stated, Lift The Ban is a collective action movement for asylum seekers' right to work in the UK (Refugee Action, “Lift The Ban”). In their work, Refugee Action linked the #AntiRefugeeBill to the #LiftTheBan in order to connect the 260 coalition members, which includes charities, trade unions, businesses, etc. to the mobilisation against the Bill.

These drawn on repertoires and forms of mobilisation were both internet-based and internet-supported actions. As Refugee Action has previous experience in countering the UK

Government, it may have made it easier for them to angle their comments and statements regarding contentious clauses within the Bill in ways that were impactful. In their messaging, this CSO used both bold language and presented severe claims, while still ensuring to steer clear of more 'radical' words such as *racist*. This tendency was also observed in the first part of the analysis (Chapter 6), where grassroots organisations were shown to be significantly more prone to using this kind of language compared to larger organisations.

As stated above, Refugee Action embedded a variety of media within their tweets. In the following tweet categorised in the dataset as a *statement*, the CSO incorporated a video from Home Secretary Priti Patel. In her self-published video she stated that she finds the anti-immigration sentiment in the British public hostile. She then went on to explain how NABB would bring about a positive change for immigrants in the UK and that she hopes that it would change the sentiment in the public towards being more open to immigrants. In reaction to this statement from the Home Secretary, Refugee Action tweeted the following:

> *"Let's go back to @PritiPatel. She said the Government would lead the world in giving refuge and creating safe routes. Today, she's published an #AntiRefugeeBill that provides no refuge, ends asylum and creates no safe routes. Join us and #StandUpForAsylum:"*
> [Video and link to Refugee Actions Campaigns page embedded in original tweet]
> (Published July 6, 2021)

As can be seen in the tweet above, Refugee Action was overt in calling out and tagging politicians, such as Priti Patel, for what the organisation considered false statements. Where the organisation was strategic in their messaging was that while they overtly discredited the statements provided from the government, they tactfully provided alternatives and solutions, and linked their petitions, campaigns and informational guides to their tweets.

This tweet provides an example of how retweeting can be an effective platform specific function for mobilisation. First of all, it provides an impactful way of building and supporting an argument, in that having Priti Patel present her statement in her own words creates a much

starker contrast to the reaction from Refugee Action. Secondly, in retweeting her post, it creates a direct path from Refugee Action's audience to Priti Patel, allowing for the movement to easily engage with her and make their thoughts known, thus fueling the mobilisation.

Building on Refugee Action's *statement* tweets, the CSOs next leading Message Type was *informational video*. Refugee Action published these tweets as an information source for helping readers break down the complexities of the Bill, through short informational videos that were easy for viewers to understand. The CSO's ongoing projects and campaigns are involved in a variety of aspects of immigrant and refugee life in the UK. For this reason, the organisation's staff and volunteers consists of a team of experts ranging from individuals who have legal background, to those who have experience in migrant resettlement, and even policy and parliamentary experts. By engaging with this set of expertise, Refugee Action exercised its strength in knowledge and prided itself in helping to debunk what it called the Anti-Refugee Bill (Refugee Action, "Why We Call it the Anti-Refugee Bill"). Below is an example of one such *informational video* tweet, whereby the CSO created short clips explaining what it considered the truth about the Bill as a counterpoint to the Government's proposed policy:

"#AntiRefugeeBill: HOW MANY PEOPLE?
Numbers of asylum claims have gone down, but Priti Patel says the system is 'overwhelmed'. Mariam explains how the Government creates that impression.
The numbers aren't unmanageable, the system is terribly managed."
[video embedded into original tweet]
(Published November 15, 2021)

Refugee Action utilised their team of experts to create these videos that were posted alongside their statements to "scrap the Bill", which also worked as a way to provide more concise information in a manner to debunk points of contention delivered by the Government. By applying this digital repertoire to their mobilisation, short videos were a way of attracting more users, for them to click and learn, with the goal of garnering more support for the movement against NABB.

7.1.2 Framing

Based on our findings, we discovered that the most common frames applicable to the tweets published by Refugee Action throughout the lifetime of the Bill were: *Anti-Refugee* with 41 tweets under the 'discrimination' framing cluster, the 'legal argument' cluster of *end of asylum* was utilised 36 times and *dirty politics* in the 'emotional argument' cluster, with 17 tweets framed in this way. The CSO was careful in their strategy of using language and applied framing tactics to their published tweets, and from that, possibly controversial frames such as *racist* were not identified at all. This may be in correlation with the fact that throughout the 2000s, Refugee Action was one of a small handful of migrant-based CSOs that were "given large contracts by the Home Office [and] took over delivery services" from the Government for migrant-related needs (Toğral Koca, 2021, 77). The choice of language applied in what Refugee Action published could be due in part to the overall precarious funding situations that CSOs find themselves in. From this, the use of language and frames that could stir up controversy with possible funders or future funding partners may have had an effect on the extent of how oppositional the CSO was willing to be in their mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill.

Figure 7.2: Refugee Action - Framing



While Refugee Action was not afraid to point and state the blame for restrictive policies in the UK, from reviewing the framing tactics in the tweets published by the CSO, we could understand that the CSO applied a *motivational core framing task* to their work. This approach of creating straightforward ways in which individuals can mobilise as part of the movement provides a sense of agency for the individuals in joining the connective action. Refugee Action employed a "construction of 'vocabularies of motive'", which can create and use a sense of emotion that is often central to their published tweets (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 397). Motivational framing appeals to emotions, and applies a sense of moral priority of joining the movement.

An example of this framing task can be seen in the following tweet that was published by Refugee Action in November of 2021, during the time frame when the MPs in the House of Commons were debating the Bill:

> *"Today we handed in petitions with more than 100,000 signatures protesting the #AntiRefugeeBill. We know it's anti-refugee, you know it's anti-refugee and now @BorisJohnson has been told clearly that we see the Nationality and Borders Bill for what it is. It must be scrapped."*
> [Photo embedded into original tweet]
> (Published November 16, 2021)

This tweet was coded with a *solidarity* Message Type and identified with an *anti-refugee* frame. In applying this *motivational framing* lens, Refugee Action utilised emotionally persuasive language to appeal to the empathy of the reader, coaxing them into sharing the responsibility of the movement. By evoking the phrases such as 'you know it's anti-refugee', the CSO passed responsibility into the hands of the reader. This language places the reader of the tweet in a position where they feel as though it is a simple task to become involved in the movement by signing an online petition. In this way, Refugee Action drew on strategically structured language to engage with and mobilise the broader public into joining the movement.

Furthermore, Refugee Action added pointed tagging tactics in relation to their framing. As seen in the above tweet, the CSO clearly defined who was to blame in allowing the Bill to come into fruition, and stated that they would work to make sure the individuals in power had sufficient

knowledge of how to oppose the Bill. The strategic forms of tagging oftentimes went hand in hand with their tweets that were framed in ways to mobilise the public against the Bill, whether this was by way of laying blame for the restrictiveness of the policy, or tagging as a form of encouragement to politicians who held oppositional views of the Bill.

Larger scale and well-organised organisations may show mobilisation tendencies similar to those of Refugee Action in that they have the experience, the capital and the manpower to strategically engage with their readers and followers on Twitter.

7.2 Case: Detention Action

Detention Action is categorised in this research as a mid-level organisation based out of London, England, with roughly 25,000 followers on Twitter. Established in 1993, the CSO works to "defend the rights and improve the welfare of people in immigration detention" (Detention Action, "About Us"). In regard to NABB, the CSO was actively working and tweeting against Clause 28 – Schedule 3 which included the implementation of offshore immigration detention centres for those wishing to make their way to the UK (UK Parliament, "Nationality and Borders Bill", 82).

7.2.1 Message Type

Based on our findings in the dataset, the majority of the tweets produced by Detention Action throughout the legislative process of NABB fell into the cluster of Message Types categorised as 'information sharing'. The CSO chose to employ this tactic of disseminating researched and proven information, along with statistics relating to NABB. Moreover, this functioned as a way of comparing the proposed Bill to similar immigration schemes that the CSO found to be ineffectual and austere, namely the Australian system of offshore detention. From these findings, it was clear that as a CSO, Detention Action's mobilisation tactics had the tendency to be a combination of low threshold, internet-based strategies in regard to mobilising against the Nationality and Borders Bill.

From this, of the 112 tweets derived from Twitter, fifty-six of these were coded as *statement* messages, making this the most prevalent Message Type for Detention Action. Also falling into

the same cluster of 'information sharing', the next most popular Message Type was *article* (13) and *informational video* (10).

Figure 7.3: Detention Action - Message Types



The tweets coded as *statements* were most commonly applied with frames of *offshore* (23), followed next with *politics* (6), and *economic* (4). Detention Action tended to make use of stark rhetoric that was bold and earmarked towards their specific organisational interests. Additionally, their tweets were often targeted towards specific clauses that affected the realm of work relating to the CSO. These *statement* messages were oftentimes interlaced with the use of the 'anti-refugee' hashtag, as well as containing quotes from MPs who supported and also promoted the end of the Nationality and Borders Bill. Examples of these messages coded with *statement* were as follows throughout the progression of the Bill:

"Can you imagine a Government Bill that criminalised victims of fraud, but claimed to prevent fraud? Criminalised victims of assault, but claimed to prevent assault? This is what the #AntiRefugeeBill does by criminalising people seeking asylum."
(Published February 1, 2022)

Detention Action created statements in their tweets in a way where it could oftentimes be seen as a tactic to incite reaction and frustration in the reader as a motivation for mobilisation. Furthermore, as stated by Chávez, "the significant function of rhetoric within the context of a [social] movement activity is to generate coalitions", and in applying this to context of Detention Action, it can possibly be construed as tactical efforts to use shocking numbers and truths behind NABB to generate a reaction for mobilising more supporters who may be following other aspects of the Bill (2011, 2).

As previously stated, *statement* was overwhelmingly the most prevalent Message Type for Detention Action, amounting to almost half of the tweets. An interesting observation regarding this strategy, was the engaging nature of their communication, in that they were frequent users of the tagging function. The CSO frequently tagged different politicians as a form of support highlighting the impactful work they had done in regard to pushing-back against NABB, all while sharing quotes and statements from the politicians themselves. The following tweet was coded as a *statement* Message Type paired with the tagging of a Lord, specifically Lord Kirk Hope of Harrogate:

"Refreshing to see @LordKirkHope in the Lords now, opposing the #AntiRefugeeBill and rightly correcting misconceptions and propaganda around #offshoredetention by making clear that, in Australia, it simply did not work."
(Published January 5, 2022)

The assumption of the motive behind these *statement* tweets, that mention politicians and highlight decisions made in agreement with the ideals and mission of Detention Action, was to encourage the general public to be aware of the progress being made. Furthermore, encouragement of these decision makers acted as a form of positive reinforcement of their work so far, while also holding them accountable in the future (Hutter *et al*., 2019).

Furthermore, supporting their low threshold / internet-based mobilisation tactics, Detention Action had a tactical tendency to engage in a series of power-posting leading up to significant milestones of the lifetime of NABB. Power-posting is a term that can be used in the realm of social media to explain when a user posts a number of posts "in order to gain privileges that may be accorded to heavy users of the forum" (Ince, 2013). By loading the platform with a swath of tweets, Detention Action's goal was to not only keep the readers informed of the current situation regarding the Bill, but it was also a way in which a topic, hashtag, or tag could begin to trend. Additionally, it was during these instances that the Detention Action chose to tag individual politicians and other CSOs to broaden the scope of their messaging and readership. Comparing the dataset to the timeline of NABB, reveals examples of this power-posting with the use of tagging individuals: in the 24 hours before the final vote of the Bill in the House of Commons on March 22, 2022, Detention Action tweeted twenty-three times, and in 14 of these tweets, the CSO tagged individuals Government officials. The following tweet was coded as a *statement*, and exemplifies the rhetoric used during the power-posting period leading up the the final vote in The House of Commons:

> *"In the debate on the #AntiRefugeeBill, @SKinnock points out that rather than presenting smart, effective ways to tackle trafficking and people smuggling, this Government is going after people seeking asylum, criminalising and persecuting #refugees fleeing war and persecution."*
>
> (Published March 22, 2022)

In this case the targeted messaging was aimed at Stephen Kinnock who is the MP for Aberavon riding, which yet again exemplified the CSOs positive reinforcement tactics. This is an interesting strategy on the part of the organisation in that their published tweets do not in general contain a high quantity of tags, but only in times leading up to these milestones do they engage in this tactic. The dataset revealed that this digital repertoire also occurred leading up to the November debate in the House of Commons, as well as when the Bill returned to Parliament in January of 2022, but this time to the House of Lords.

7.2.2 Framing

Based on the findings, the most prevalent Frame Types related to Detention Action fell into two different coding clusters. From the 'legal argument' cluster and with the highest amount tweets, 66 tweets were coded as *offshore*, that being followed with a drastically lower amount of tweets categorised under the 'discrimination' cluster as *anti-refugee* with 10 tweets. Only seven instances were found of the *economic* frame in the dataset. This was surprising as the CSO had actively been logging the economic consequences of offshore immigration detention centres on their website, drawing on the experiences from the Australian Government's offshore scheme which has cost the state more than $1 billion per year (Refugee Council of Australia, 2022, "Offshore Processing Statistics").

Figure 7.5: Detention Action - Framing



As Detention Action is hyper-focused in its interests in reforming the immigration detention scheme in the UK, they have maintained a trained eye on framing and disseminating information on Clause 28 in NABB, which relates specifically to their work. Their *offshore* framed tweets were aimed towards the elimination of this clause and this frame was present in more than half of

their tweets. In their communication regarding the offshore detention aspect of NABB, Detention Action was not afraid to lay blame and call out the responsible legislators. This approach can be problematized as *diagnostic framing* to NABB in that it asks the questions of "what is or went wrong? and who or what is to blame?" (Snow *et al.*, 2019, 396). An example of this diagnostic framing is as follows:

"Australia's Government have, for 9 years running, failed to increase the number of #refugees they'll resettle directly. Despite claiming #offshoredetention; push-backs would free them up to do so. Remember this when Priti Patel makes the same promise about the #AntiRefugeeBill"
(Published March 29, 2022)

By drawing on these recent experiences from another state who has implemented this offshore immigration detention scheme, the CSO was able to provide their followers with real statistics and the effects this has had on the Australian Government. Referring to a similar project that has already been implemented, such as the Australian offshore scheme, through a critical lens helped to answer these diagnostic framing questions through lived experiences in hopes that the readers would be able to imagine this situation in a UK context. In this regard, the question of 'What went wrong?' was supported by statistics that for nearly a decade, the Australian goal of refugee resettlement from the offshore detention centres had not been achieved (Refugee Council of Australia, 2020). Furthermore, tactical rhetoric of blaming the Australian state was then related to the UK context by suggesting who would be to blame if a similar offshore scheme was implemented. This usage of the *offshore* frame diagnosed and defined this core aspect of NABB as an injustice, and from that could prove to act as a catalyst for collective action and mobilisation against the problem.

Detention Action's repertoire of relating NABB to the Australian offshore immigration detention scheme was consistent throughout CSO's digital mobilisation against the Bill. It incited curiosity for readers as it drew on past and present situations happening in a former colony of the UK. Framing and publishing tweets with this tendency of diagnostic framing enabled the organisation to answer the question of 'who is to blame?' as a starting point for mobilising readers of the public against a common threat.

7.3 Case: Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants

The third power user is The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), which is a large, well-organised CSO, with more than 40,000 followers on Twitter. The organisation was established in 1967 in Southall, London, by "240 representatives of immigrant communities and anti-racism groups" (JCWI, "Our Story"). JCWI both provides legal support for migrants in the UK and works to challenge the "policies that lead to discrimination, destitution and denial of rights" through advocacy, campaigns and reports (JCWI, "Our Story"). Within the data collection period a total of 77 tweets posed by JCWI mentioned the Nationality and Borders Bill and were therefore included in this dataset.

7.3.1 Message Type

Based on the findings from the dataset, it was discovered that the main tactics JCWI deployed against the Bill were information dissemination and calling the public to action. The two most used Message Types fall within the 'information sharing' cluster: *statement* was the most prevalent with 24 tweets coded in this way, while *article* was the second most posted with 14 coded tweets. Referring to the UK CSO Digital Mobilisation Quadrant (Figure 6.2), the majority of the tactics employed by JCWI belonged to Quadrant 3, meaning that their digital repertoires mainly consisted of low threshold / internet-based mobilisations.

Figure 7.6: JCWI - Message Type



The third most tweeted Message Type was calls to join *protests* with 12 tweets coded in this way; a repertoire relating to the high-threshold / internet-supported Quadrant 2. These tweets were posted at key times during the parliamentary process of the NABB and called for their readers to mobilise beyond online means and join collective protests in the streets. Specifically in January 2022, calling on their readers to join well-organised protests in London's Parliament Square was used as a tactic to keep public awareness high while the Bill was passing through the House of Lords. An example of this high-threshold, internet-supported *protest* coded tweet was published on December 19, 2022:

"*Big protest against government's new Borders Bill today - vital resistance against a Bill looking to criminalise refugees and strip sway ethnic minorities' rights.*
Get yourself down there if you can - 1pm, 10 Downing Street! #StopNABB"
(Published December 19, 2022)

With the use of bold, negative language towards the Bill, insinuating their positionality towards what was deemed an austere policy, while prompting their readers to go beyond the means of online mobilisation. This tactic heightened the level of risk involved for movement participation for the individuals. JCWI was able to draw on previous successful repertoires to support their online mobilisation tactics with these in-person actions.

Finally, while referring to the Figure 7.6, one can observe that the least published material was *briefings* (2), *testimonials* (2), *reports* (1) and appeals for people to *follow* their twitter account (1). While it is difficult to assess the reason why JCWI prefered sharing statements and articles over reports and briefings, it can be hypothesised that the organisation's online popularity makes hunting for followers less of a priority.

7.3.2 Framing

After reviewing the dataset, The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants employed different framing tactics from the previous power users. Unlike Refugee Action and Detention Action, the CSO employed connective action in applying unifying frames to their tweets. The three most common frames that JCWI applied in their tweets were to *stand* together against the Bill (16),

anti-refugee (13) and *end* of asylum (8). Dissimilar to some CSOs that employed the use of hardline language consistently, JCWI used encouraging jargon as a means to garner more support and relate that if the population mobilised against NABB, there would be hope for the migrants and refugees to the UK.

Figure 7.7: JCWI - Frames



Stand together against the Bill is a strong solidarity frame, and it was often applied together with information about the danger posed by the Bill to create a sense of urgency for standing together against it. An example of this tendency is this *statement*, with the Frame Type *stand* together against the Bill, posted on the 11th of December 2021:

> *"The #AntiRefugeeBill is a brutal attack on people who move. Asylum seekers, migrants - even their children - human beings, treated as political cannon fodder. We will not give up. We need to stand together to fight for a fair and welcoming society. Will you join us?"*
>
> (Published December 11, 2021)

In line with most communication about the Bill across organisations they referred to it as the *#AntiRefugeeBill*, which in itself is a strong frame. The use of emotive language, such as the phrases “brutal attack”, “political cannon fodder”, and highlighting children as victims, aimed to generate feelings of outrage towards the Bill, which were then used to inspire the reader to stand together with the organisation against it.

The frame *anti-refugee* was, as mentioned above, present in most tweets through the renaming of the Bill as the *#AntiRefugeeBill.* To achieve a nuanced and informative dataset the tweets were therefore only coded as *anti-refugee* if this was the only or strongest frame present, as in this tweet which was coded as *article* with an *anti-refugee* frame:

“Welcome support from local authorities across the country against Priti Patel's #AntiRefugeeBill”
(Published July 29, 2021.)

This tweet was more neutral than the previous example. Its main intention was sharing information about the support against the Bill in the form of an article. Other than the strong frame present in the *#AntiRefugeeBill,* was interesting to note the assignment of guilt to Home Secretary Priti Patel, as pinning the problem to a specific person has been found to increase frame resonance within the movement (Snow *et al.*, 2019).

The *end of asylum* frame falls into the legal argument category and it is not surprising that this was one of the most used frames by JCWI as the organisation is recognized as experts in the field of asylum (JCWI, “Legal Advice”). An example of this frame was this tweet from the March 8 which had a Message Type of *article* and the frame *end of asylum*:

*“What's happening right now shows the reality of what it means to flee - people cannot wait months & months for visas to be granted. People need safe routes to rejoin family now. And government *must* scrap its #BordersBill which will criminalise refugees.”*
(Published March 8, 2022)

The sentence about refugees' inability to wait for visas referred to the two tier refugee status proposed by Clause 11 of the Nationality and Borders Bill, which criminalises asylum seekers

who arrive in the UK through irregular border crossing. According to the Explanatory Notes to the Bill the purpose of Clause 11 ‘is to discourage asylum-seekers from travelling to the UK other than via safe and legal routes’ (para. 159). This has been widely criticised by legal experts as “No ‘safe and legal routes’ exist by which asylum-seekers can travel to the UK to apply for asylum, and the UK does not presently allow applications for asylum to be lodged from outside the UK” (Cantor *et al*., 2022). Furthermore, Clause 11 runs contrary to Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention which “establishes an obligation not to impose penalties for ‘illegal entry or presence’ on refugees who meet its terms” (Cantor *et al*., 2022). The tweet links to an article to build up the argument that the state is already failing refugees from Ukraine by not creating safe routes, and that this choice will lead to criminalisation instead of protection of the refugees who manage to make it to the UK.

It is from these exemplary tweets that we can understand that The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants had a tendency to apply *prognostic framing* to their mobilisation within the movement against the Nationality and Borders Bill. This makes mobilisation easier for the audience in that the CSO had clearly identified the issues with NABB, and laid out a solution by inviting the audience to join the collective action.

When looking at the least used frames, a pattern emerged: the frames that were part of the ‘discrimination’ cluster were scarsely represented. They rarely highlighted specific social groups that would be especially harmed by the Bill, or used strong words such as *racist*. Relating this observation to the findings in the analysis of the organisations of different levels (Chapter 6), the choice to refrain from using potentially offending language such as words like ‘racist’ to describe the Bill might be connected to the level of the organisation. As JCWI has more than 40,000 followers, their tweets need to appeal to a broader audience than tweets from grassroots organisations with less followers. Furthermore, in order to achieve political influence in their campaigning work it might be a tactic to build alliances across a broad political spectrum and avoid offending potential allies due to alienating language. However, with that being said, they did use the word *racist* twice, but it seemed that it is reserved for extreme situations as exemplified in this tweet from December 9, 2021:

"The #BordersBill is a dangerous piece of legislation which will lead to more deaths, misery, limbo and neglect - no-one should be celebrating it. We will continue to fight it - & the racism and division it represents - alongside the growing #TogetherWithRefugees movement"

(Published December 9, 2021)

(see Image 7.1 for retweeted content)

Here, the stressful context of the tweet was that it had passed the third and final reading in the House of Commons, which pressured JCWI to post a strongly worded response. Even though it was a setback, the fight was not over yet as the Bill after this vote was passed on to the first reading in the House of Lords on December 9, 2021. There were several strong frames at play here. Highlighting that the Bill would lead to more deaths was powerful, and when immediately followed up with "*no-one should be celebrating it"* the Home Secretary was being depicted as devoid of empathy. This was also done without even mentioning her, which was an interesting aspect of the usage of Twitter as a platform, as Priti Patel's statement was simply attached as a retweet. Directly calling the Bill 'racist' was a rare and powerful move from the side of JCWI, and invoking this word together with a pledge to fight the Bill along with with the growing #TogetherWithRefugees movement turned the defeat into motivation to continue the mobilisation against the Bill.

Image 7.1

7.4 Sub-conclusion

While the power users highlighted in this chapter of the analysis share a collective goal of abolishing the Bill, the dataset revealed a differing in their predominant message types and their framing strategies. Their manners of strategic mobilisation related to the different aspects of the CSOs organisational structure, targeted audience and key objectives. In illuminating the detailed aspects of the mobilisation conducted by these influential players contesting NABB, the intricacies of the movement were brought to light.

8. Discussion

Building on the analyses, this chapter seeks to elevate the findings illuminated in Chapters 6 and 7 by exploring which achievements were yielded through the mobilisation of the CSOs. It explores the potential political windows of opportunities that were presented to the organisations during their mobilisation against NABB, and discusses whether these were seized in a satisfactory manner. The chapter concludes with a section on critical reflections of online mobilisation, and suggests possible areas of interest which could serve as subjects for future studies.

8.1 Goals, Gains and Political Opportunities

8.1.1 Goals and Gains

In order to shed light on the goals of the organisations', taking an actor-centric approach can be useful, in that it provides a lens for understanding key aspects of the organisations' self-image and targeted audience based on their communication (Doherty and Hayes, 2019). When trying to assess whether the movement was a success, it is easy to judge this on the fact that the Bill went through in the end, but in breaking down the different elements and goals of the CSOs partaking in the movement, the picture becomes more nuanced. Although the overall goal of the social movement was to inhibit the Bill from passing, the different organisations also had complimentary sub-goals, that differed from each other's.

Based on our dataset we identified three different types of goals: 1) preventing the Bill from passing 2) creating awareness about the Bill and educating the UK population on its content, 3) influencing the content and thus the final outcome of the Bill.

Obviously the first goal was the common goal for all organisations and the movement in general. Although this goal was not reached, the fact that Scotland and Wales actually rejected the Bill should still be counted as a major achievement for the movement.

Regarding the second type of goal, the large number of information sharing tweets posted by mid-level and well-established organisations showed that the goal of awareness raising and debunking of the government's framing of the Bill guided their work greatly. Moreover, because

the UK news media environment is so hostile towards immigrants, even the act of contesting the dominant news discourse destabilises the hegemonic narrative (Cinalli *et al.*, 2021). Whether this leads to an actual change of public opinion is unclear but just the mere fact that the organisations are nuancing the discourse on immigration should be counted as a symbolic gain.

Moving on to the third type of goal, the movement saw a couple of legislative wins along the way, e.g. the House of Lords voting to remove Clauses 9 and 11. For some organisations, fighting for the exclusion of these clauses specifically related to the whole profile of the organisation, with their work being directed towards reaching this goal. This of course meant a large personal victory for them, when the House of Lords voted in their favour, but an equally devastating blow when the clauses were included in the final Bill. An example of this was the power user Detention Action, who fought for cancelling specifically clause 28 regarding off-shore detention, which meant that they did not succeed in one of their main goals.

8.2.2 Political opportunities

Did the organisations take full advantage of the political windows of opportunity presented to them during their mobilisation?

It can be argued that there were some political shifts happening on the international scene, that the CSOs in our dataset could have tapped into and used in their mobilisation to a larger extent. Firstly, not many of the organisations in the dataset took advantage of the political window of opportunity that was created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Europe, there was suddenly a positive sentiment towards a group of refugees. Of course, the positivity was aimed at European refugees; not refugees from Africa or the Middle East, who continue to be stigmatised. Still this shift in attitude towards refugees and the willingness to help people outside of their national group, was a rarity. The event provided an ideal opportunity for mobilising through this momentum by linking the Ukrainian refugees with the people who would fall victim to NABB, thereby engaging an even broader public by extending the positive frame from one group to the other. However, out of the 3166 tweets in the total dataset, that contains all tweets relating to NABB from all 124 CSOs, only 142 tweets mentioned ‘Ukraine’.

Secondly, the British Government received strong critique from other countries, especially France, for their handling of the Ukrainian refugees arriving in the UK. This was an opportunity for mobilising against the Government and perhaps even tap into a transnational European movement. Based on what was observed in the dataset, the UK CSOs did no such thing. Instead, they focused their attention and efforts on their national legislative situation, referring mainly to UK news media and national political actors. While they could have reached out to international like-minded organisations, they engaged solely with other UK-based CSOs, keeping the fight local despite them having digital tools to overcome geographical barriers and international momentum to do so.

8.3 Moving Forward Into an Online Future

As our research showed, the organisations to a large extent made use of the same repertoires of contention and were in that way quite homogenous. Moreover, the high threshold strategies were solely of an analogue nature, while low threshold strategies were mainly online-based. We observed that the mobilisation strategies used today are the exact same as the repertoires that have been used for many years, only with some of the low threshold strategies being moved to an online sphere. One can argue that the organisations might not be taking full advantage of the digital opportunities available to them in creating new and innovative ways of mobilising. As of now, they have only really moved offline elements to an online sphere, but none of their strategies were born out of the digital world.

Could this be related to the people leading the movement and working in the CSOs not being digitally native? Or is it rather related to the lacking digital abilities of their targeted audience? This is yet to be ascertained, but there is a possibility that the reason that the internet is not being used as creatively as it could be right now, is that there is a generational disconnect between the potential of the internet and the people who are engaging with the movement. In the coming years, it will be interesting to see the development in strategies and see whether the organisations find creative new ways of taking advantage of the opportunities of mobilising online.

As for pitfalls and potential of online mobilisation, it will require continued study to try and assess whether online mobilisation sparks more motivation and is more effective than analogue

mobilisation. For example, are people more susceptible to a political message, when they are exposed to it through their personal SoMe channels in the comfort of their own homes? Or will the message even reach them if they are not already convinced, since the nature of SoMe channels is the creation of echo chambers?

Moreover, due to the bar of participation in online activism being set so low, there is a risk of online tactics resulting in the legitimacy of the movement being watered down. Do petitions have less of an impact now that they are signed online, because the legislator knows that the signatures belong to a group who might not be as dedicated to the cause as they used when petitioning was an analogue action?

An increasingly relevant pitfall will potentially be that the digital age makes people lose interest at a faster rate than previously, which might curb the ability of CSOs to keep the momentum of a movement going for long periods at a time – something that often is needed for creating radical structural changes. The questions posed in this discussion would be interesting to explore in future research of online mobilisations.

9. Conclusion

This thesis centred on the social movement against the Nationality and Borders Bill, focussing on the online mobilisation strategies of civil society organisations in the UK. Based on an extensive dataset containing 3166 tweets from 124 different UK CSOs, the thesis answered the following research question: *How did civil society organisations in the UK engage with online mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill?*

Guided by four sub-research questions, the thesis explored the nature of their online mobilisation by analysing the organisations' strategies for mobilising in the movement against the Bill. Though the analysis was twofold, both parts aimed at answering the following two sub-research questions: *What strategies did UK CSOs use in their Twitter mobilisation against the Nationality and Borders Bill?* and *How did UK CSOs frame the Nationality and Borders Bill in their Twitter communication?*

The first part of the analysis (Chapter 6) presented the data in a quantitative manner, commencing with a discriptive overview of the timeline highlighting the legislative development of the Bill. Furthermore, it conducted a comparative analysis of the mobilisation strategies and framings of the Bill based on three organisational levels of establishment. The chapter sought to answer the following sub-research question: *What tendencies could be observed in the online mobilisation of UK CSOs against the Nationality and Borders Bill based on their organisational level of establishment?*

A key finding of this analysis was the fact that each level of organisation used the same Message Types, but with a difference in frequency. Where the well-organised and mid-level organisations focused on information dissemination and mobilising for protests somewhat equally, grassroots organisations engaged less with information dissemination and more with getting people on the street. These mobilisation strategies were both online-supported and online-based, but common for all organisations was that the used online-based strategies were not as demanding as those that were online-supported. It appeared that engaging with the movement through both digital and analogue mobilisation tools were deemed necessary by all types of CSO's (Kidd and McIntosh, 2016).

Regarding frames, the analysis showed that grassroots organisations were more prone to point out discriminatory aspects of the Bill and mentioned *racism* more frequently than mid-level and well-organised organisations. Moreover, the rhetoric and communication by well-established organisations were more streamlined and calculated in their framing of the Bill.

The qualitative analysis of Chapter 7 zoomed-in and examined the Message Types present in the tweets published by the movement's three most influential CSOs on Twitter. Additionally, it explored the ways in which these CSOs tactically approach their goals. In doing so, it answered the fourth and final sub-research question: *What differences could be found between the most influential UK CSOs within the online social movement against the Nationality and Borders Bill?*

As illustrated in the analysis, there was diversity in both the Message Types and Framing tactics from each power user. While they shared the goal to derail the Bill, each power user was driven by their own agenda and therefore advocating for the elimination of different key clauses before the Bill would reach its final parliamentary stage. Furthemore, each of the power users approached their mobilisation in different ways. Refugee Action illuminated how embedded media and links to petitions, protests and extensive knowledge dissemination, provided their audience with an ease of access to understanding and participating in the social movement. Detention Action exemplified an approach whereby a singular clause within the Bill was the sole focus of their mobilisation against the Bill. Lastly, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants illuminated that their tactics were to disseminate information based on their expertise on the subject matter, rather than to gather followers. While it is understood that the three individual case-studies are not indicative of *every* CSOs mobilisation tactics, this research approach was an attempt to explore the mobilisation strategies and tactics of three highly Twitter-influential CSOs in the movement.

That being said, there were commonalities discovered in the strategies of the power users. It was revealed that the power users shared the tactical approach of power-posting leading up to and during notable times during the legislative process of the Bill. With this practice they attempted to essentially clog the Twitter network with their posts in order to relay to the general public the injustices and the repressive nature of the Bill for migrants. It was also discovered that within this movement against the Bill, the messaging produced and published by the power users relied

heavily on low threshold / internet-based mobilisation tactics, which related largely to their focus on information dissemination.

Due to NABB having passed into a legislative Act during the time of this research, it was difficult for this study to assess success within the movement. What can be viewed as a possible gain for the movement is the complementary tweeting relationship between the power users through their framing and choice of language surrounding the Bill. Each of the power users approached the mobilisation of their individual goals in different manners, which could be viewed as a way of creating space conducive for an inclusive collective action, leaning on the notion that 'there is something for everyone'. Some individuals are activated by diagnostic tactics, whereby laying blame speaks to them. Other individuals respond better to constructive, motivational tactics whereby the urgency is stated; what needs to collectively be achieved is attainable; and the steps an individual participant can do to further the cause are clear. It was discovered that the power users' approaches to framing of Bill spread across the spectrum of needs, complementing each other in their mobilisation tactics, showing that Refugee Action utilised motivational framing, Detention Action most commonly applied a diagnostic framing task and finally JCWI framed their tweets in prognostic ways.

Based on the insight gained in the analysis, the discussion (Chapter 8) delved into the goals of the CSOs and reflected critically upon the achievements gained throughout their mobilisation against the Bill. It found that although the overall goal of hindering the Bill from becoming law was not achieved, the CSOs did experience successes of a different character. They succeeded in challenging the hegemonic discourse through information dissemination, and in contributing to both Scotland and Wales rejecting the Bill. Building on this, the chapter considered political opportunities, which potentially could have resulted in creating an even bigger impact, had they been appropriately seized. Additionally, it assessed the future of online mobilisation, posing key questions of interest to inspire future studies within the field.

As this thesis covers but a confined area of the extensive and intricate dynamics of social movements, it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the subject in its entirety. It does however, present a considerable amount of data and findings that contribute to the wider literature of online social movements, uncovering yet another corner of an engaging field of study.

10. Bibliography

Achiume, E.T., Aoláin, F.N., Melzer, N., Mullaly, S., Upreti, M. (2022). *Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls*. United Nations. Retrieved from: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27073 .

Baglioni, S., Biosca, O. and Montgomery, T. (2020). "Against the Tide: Transnational Solidarity in Brexit Britain" in *Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crises* (1st ed.), C. Lahusen et al. (Eds.), pp. 181-207. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-49659-3_7.

BBC News (2019). "Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide", *BBC News Online,* November 13, 2019. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 (Accessed 7 March 2022).

Britannica, T. (2022). "British Empire", *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Empire (Accessed March 10, 2022).

British Nationality Act 1948. [online] Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/56/enacted> (Accessed 3 March 2022).

Brünker, F., Wischnewski, M., Mirbabaie, M. and Meinert, J. (2020). "The Role of Social Media during Social Movements – Observations from the #metoo Debate on Twitter", in *Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.* Hawaii. 10.24251/HICSS.2020.288.

Budabin, A. and Hall, N. (2022). "Shrinking digital spaces**:** The hijacking of #refugees welcome campaigns on Twitter"in *Contentious migrant solidarity* (1st ed.), della Porta, D. and Steinhilper, E. (Eds.) pp. 100-120. New York: Routledge.

Cantor, D., Fripp, E., Storey, H. and Symes, M. (2022). "Clause 11, Nationality and Borders Bill: Why Two-Tier Refugee Status is a Bad Idea", *Refugee Law Initiative*, March 28, 2022 Available at: https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2022/03/28/clause-11-nationality-and-borders-bill-why-two-tier-refugee-status-is-a-bad-idea/ (Accessed 2 May 2022).

Caren, N and Gaby, S. (2011). “Occupy Online: Facebook and The Spread of Occupy Wall Street” in *Social Science Research Network Electronic Journal*, October 2011. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1943168

Chavez, Karma R. (2011). “Counter-Public Enclaves and Understanding the Function of Rhetoric in Social Movement Coalition-Building” in *Communication Quarterly,* vol. 59, 1–18.

Cinalli, M., Trenz, H., Brändle, V., Eisele, O., and Lahusen, C. (2021). *Solidarity in the Media and Public Contention over Refugees in Europe,* (1st ed.). New York: Routledge.

Dearden, L. (2019). “Right to Rent Scheme Violates Human Rights Laws and Causes Discrimination, High Court Rules”, *The Independent*, MArch 1, 2019. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/right-to-rent-scheme-human-rights-violation-racist-foreign-citizens-court-a8802666.html (Accessed 15 March 2022).

della Porta, D. (2014). *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

della Porta, D. (2018). “Contentious Moves: Mobilising for Refugees' Rights”, in *Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Contentious Moves*, della Porta, D. (Ed.) pp. 1-38. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

della Porta, D. and Steinhilper, E. (2022). “Shrinking spaces and civil society contenstation: an introduction” in *Contentious Migrant Solidarity* (1st ed.), della Porta, D. and Steinhilper, E. (Eds.) pp. 1-37. New York: Routledge.

Detention Action (2021). *About Us.* Available at: https://detentionaction.org.uk/about-us/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Detention Action (2022). *Community Support Project.* Available at: https://detentionaction.org.uk/community-support-project/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Detention Action (2022). *Allies for Justice* Available at: https://detentionaction.org.uk/about-us/lived-experience-campaigning/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Detention Action [@DetentionAction]. (2022, January 5) *Refreshing to see @LordKirkHope in the Lords now, opposing the #AntiRefugeeBill and rightly correcting misconceptions and propaganda around #offshoredetention* [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/DetentionAction/status/1478812550125035522

Detention Action [@DetentionAction]. (2022, February 1) *Can you imagine a Government Bill that criminalised victims of fraud, but claimed to prevent fraud? Criminalised victims of assault* [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/DetentionAction/status/1488555860615909382

Detention Action [@DetentionAction]. (2022, March 22) *In the debate on the #AntiRefugeeBill, @SKinnock points out that rather than presenting smart, effective ways to tackle trafficking* [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/DetentionAction/status/1506271912636338176

Detention Action [@DetentionAction]. (2022, March 29) *Australia's Government have, for 9 years running, failed to increase the number of #refugees they'll resettle directly* [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/DetentionAction/status/1508733317675466752

Doherty, B. and Hayes, G. (2019). "Tactics and Strategic Action" in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 271-288. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Donà, G. (2021) "Race, Immigration and Health: The Hostile Environment and Public Health Responses to Covid-19", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 44(5), 906-918.

Earl, J. (2019). " Technology and Social Media"in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 322-337. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Essex, R., Riaz, A., Casalotti, S., Worthing, K., Issa, R., Skinner, J., and Yule, A. (2022). "A Decade of the Hostile Environment and its Impact on Health", in *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine,* 115(3), 87–90. DOI: 10.1177/01410768221078327

European Commission (2021). "Statistics on migration to Europe", *European Commision* Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en (Accessed 7 March 2022).

Fakhoury, T. (2016). "Securitising Migration: The European Union in the Context of the Post-2011 Arab Upheavals" in *The International Spectator,* 51(4), 67-79.

Feldman, R. (2020). "NHS Charging for Maternity Care in England: Its Impact on Migrant Women", in *Critical Social Policy,* 41(3), 447-467.

Fleischmann, L. (2020). *Contested Solidarity: Practices of Refugee Support Between Humanitarian Help and Political Activism*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Flynn, D. (2015). “Frontier anxiety: Living With the Stress of the Every-Day Border”, in *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture* (61), 62–71.

Gardner, Z. and Patel, C. (2021). *We Are Here: Routes to Regularisation for the UK's Undocumented Population*. London: Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants.

Gentleman, A. (2018). “*Home Office destroyed Windrush landing cards, says ex-staffer*”, *The Guardian*, April 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/17/home-office-destroyed-windrush-landing-cards-says-ex-staffer (Accessed 15 March 2022).

Golec de Zavala, A., Guerra, R., Simão, C. (2017). “The Relationship Between the Brexit Vote and Individual Predictors of Prejudice: Collective Narcissism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation” in *Frontiers in Psychology* (8), 1-14.

GOV.UK (n.d.) “Penalties for Illegal Renting”, *Government of the UK*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/penalties-illegal-renting (Accessed 16 March 2022).

Grierson, J., (2018). “Hostile environment: anatomy of a policy disaster*”*, *The Guardian*, August 28, 2021. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/27/hostile-environment-anatomy-of-a-policy-disaster (Accessed 4 March 2022).

Griffiths, M. and Yeo, C. (2021). “The UK’s Hostile Environment: Deputising Immigration Control”, in *Critical Social Policy*, 41(4), 521–544.

Harris, M. (2017). “UK Civil Society: Changes and Challenges in the Age of New Public Governance and the Marketized Welfare State” , in *Nonprofit Policy Forum*, 8 (4), 351-368.

Hiam, L., Steele, S. and McKee, M. (2018). “Creating a ‘Hostile Environment for Migrants’: The British Government’s Use of Health Service Data to Restrict Immigration Is a Very Bad Idea”, in *Health Economics, Policy and Law*, 13(2), 107–117.
DOI: 10.1017/S1744133117000251.

Hutter, S., Hanspeter, K., Lorenzini, J. (2019). “Social Movements in Interaction with Political Parties” in n T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 322-337. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Ince, D. (2013). “Power Posting”, *Oxford Dictionary: A Dictionary of the Internet (3 ed.)* Available at:

https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191744150.001.0001/acref-9780191744150-e-4317 (Accessed: April 20, 2022)

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, (n.d.) *Windrush scandal explained*. [online] Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. Available at: <https://www.jcwi.org.uk/windrush-scandal-explained> [Accessed 4 March 2022].

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (2022). *Our Story*. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/our-story (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (2022). *Our Advice Services*. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/legal-advice (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (2022). *Legal Advice*. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/Pages/Category/legal-advice (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (2022). *Our Vision*. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/our-vision-foreword (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (2022). *Ending the Hostile Environment*. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/ending-the-hostile-environment-manifesto (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants [@JCWI_UK]. (2021, July 29). *Welcome support from local authorities across the country against Priti Patel's #AntiRefugeeBill* [Thumbnail with link attached]Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JCWI_UK/status/1420745272011882500

Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants [@JCWI_UK]. (2021, December 9). *The #BordersBill is a dangerous piece of legislation which will lead to more deaths, misery, limbo and neglect* [Thumbnail with link attached][Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JCWI_UK/status/1468881267148140545

Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants [@JCWI_UK]. (2021, December 11). *The #AntiRefugeeBill is a brutal attack on people who move. Asylum seekers, migrants - even their children - human beings* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Twitter.https://twitter.com/JCWI_UK/status/1469596316183502853

Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants [@JCWI_UK]. (2021, December 19). *Big protest against government's new Borders Bill today - vital resistance against a Bill looking to*

criminalise refugees [Thumbnail with link][Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JCWI_UK/status/1472480864437248005

Joint Council for the Welfare of Migrants [@JCWI_UK]. (2022, March 8). *What's happening right now shows the reality of what it means to flee - people cannot wait months & months for visas* [Thumbnail with link attached][Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JCWI_UK/status/1501135311748972544

Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the Collective: Social Media, the Occupy Movement and its Constitution as a Collective Actor. Information, Communication & Society. 18. 1-15. 10.1080/1369118X.2015.1043318.

Kidd, D. and McIntosh, K. (2016). "Social Media and Social Movements", in *Sociology Compass*, 10(9), 785-794.

Kreis, R. (2017). "#refugeesnotwelcome: Anti-Refugee Discourse on Twitter", in *Discourse & Communication,* 11(5), 498–514.

Lee, F., Chen, H. and Chan, M. (2017). "Social Media Use and University Students' Participation in a Large-Scale Protest Campaign: The Case of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement", in *Telematics and Informatics*, 34(2), 457-469.

Lefley, E. (2022). *What is happening with the Borders Bill?*. Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. Available at: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/blog/what-is-happening-with-the-borders-bill (Accessed 14 March 2022).

Immigration Act (2014). [online] Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/contents/enacted> (Accessed 4 March 2022).

Lift the Ban Coalition (2018). *Lift the Ban Report: Why People Seeking Asylum Should Have the Right to Work*, October 2018, retrieved from https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Lift-the-Ban-report.pdf (accessed May 2, 2022).

Lotan, G., Graeff, E., Ananny, M., Gaffney, D. and Pearce, I. and Boyd, D. (2011). "The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows During the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions", in *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 1375-1405.

Maddison, A. (2001). "The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective" in *History Review*, 10(2), 274-276.

Mayblin, L. (2021). “The Nationality and Borders Bill 2021: From Empty Threats to Further Erosion of the Right to Seek Asylum”, *Border Criminologies*, July 9, 2021. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/07/nationality-and (Accessed 14 March 2022).

Mayblin, L. and James, P. (2019). “Asylum and refugee support in the UK: civil society filling the gaps?’, in *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, 45(3), 375–394. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1466695.

McAdam, D. and Tarrow, S. (2019). “The Political Context of Social Movements” in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 19-42. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

McDowell, L. (2018). “How Caribbean migrants helped to rebuild Britain*,” British Library*. Available at: https://www.bl.uk/windrush/articles/how-caribbean-migrants-rebuilt-britain> (Accessed 3 March 2022).

Nationality and Borders Bill (2021). Nationality and Borders Bill - Bill 141, UK Parliament Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-02/0187/210187v1.pdf London: The Home Office.

Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (2022). “Regulated Organisation - Applications/Guidance/Practice Notes”, *Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner*. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-the-immigration-services-commissioner, (Accessed March 17, 2022).

Peck, J., and Tickell, N. (2002). “Neoliberalising Space”, in *Antipode, 34*, 380–404.

Potter J (2017). “Border Control in a Healthcare Setting is Not in the Public’s Best Interests”, in *Journal of Public Health,* 39, 219–220.

Rahman, A., Ali, M., and Kahn, S. (2018). "The British Art of Colonialism in India: Subjugation and Division", in *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 25(1), Article 5. DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/2018.1439

Ray, M. (2021). “United Kingdom Independence Party”. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Kingdom-Independence-Party (Accessed March 10, 2022).

Refugee Action (2016). *About Us*. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/about/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Refugee Action (2016). *What We Do*. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/what-we-do/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Refugee Action (2021). *2019-2020 Impact Report*. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/impact-2020/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022).

Refugee Action (2021). *Why We Call it the Anti-Refugee Bill*. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/why-we-call-it-the-anti-refugee-bill/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022)

Refugee Action (2018). *Lift The Ban*. Available at: https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/lift-the-ban/ (Accessed: April 15, 2022)

Refugee Action [@RefugeeAction]. (2021, July 6). *Let's go back to @pritipatel. She said the Government would lead the world in giving refuge and creating safe routes* [Video attached][Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/RefugeeAction/status/1412424825461743620

Refugee Action [@RefugeeAction]. (2021, November 15). *#AntiRefugeeBill: HOW MANY PEOPLE? Numbers of asylum claims have gone down, but Priti Patel says the system is 'overwhelmed'. Mariam* [Video attached] [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/RefugeeAction/status/1460218287086870543

Refugee Action [@RefugeeAction]. (2021, November 16) *Today we handed in petitions with more than 100,000 signatures protesting the #AntiRefugeeBill. We know it's anti-refugee* [Image attached] [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/RefugeeAction/status/1460637128401072141

Refugee Council of Australia (2020). *Seven Years On: An Overview of Australia's Offshore Processing Policies* Available at: https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RCOA-Seven-Years-On.pdf (Accessed May 10, 2022).

Refugee Council of Australia (2022). .*Offshore Processing Statistics*. Available at: https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/operation-sovereign-borders-offshore-detention-statistics/6/ (May 17, 2022).

Rojas, F. and King, B. (2019). "How Social Movements Interact with Organisations and Fields: Protest, Institutions, and Beyond" in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd

ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 205-219. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Rohlinger, D.A., and Corrigall-Brown, C. (2019). "Social Movements and Mass Media in Global Context" in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 131-148. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Savage, O. and Pratt, B. (2013). "Briefing Paper 38. The History of UK Civil Society", *International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC)*. Available at: https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Briefing-Paper-38-The-history-of-UK-civil-society.pdf (Accessed March 16, 2022).

Schwiertz, H. and Schwenken, H (2020). "Introduction: Inclusive Solidarity and Citizenship Along Migratory Routes" in *Europe and the Americas, Citizenship Studies*, 24(4), 405-423. DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2020.1755155

Smith, B., Krishna, A., and Al-Sinan, R. (2019). "Beyond Slacktivism: Examining the Entanglement Between Social Media Engagement, Empowerment, and Participation in Activism" in *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 13(3), 182-196. DOI: 10.1080/1553118X.2019.1621870

Snow, D. A., Vliegenthart, R., Ketelaars, P. (2019). "The Framing Perspectives on Social Movements" in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 392-410. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Stieglitz, S.,Mirbabaie, M., Schwenner, L., *et al.* (2017). "Sensemaking and Communication Roles in Social Media Crisis Communication", at *13th Annual Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik* , 1333–1347.

Taagepera, R. (1997). "Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia", in *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(3), 475-504. DOI:10.1111/0020-8833.00053.

Tan, L., Ponnam, S., Gillham, P., Edwards, B. and Johnson, E. (2013). "Analyzing the Impact of Social Media on Social Movements: A Computational Study on Twitter and The Occupy Wall Street Movement" in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on ASNAM, p. 1259-1266. DOI: 10.1145/2492517.2500262.

Taylor, D. (2018).” UK Removed Legal Protection for Windrush Immigrants in 2014”. *The Guardian*, April 16, 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/16/immigration-law-key-clause-protecting-windrush-immigrants-removed-in-2014 (Accessed 4 March 2022).

Taylor, D. (2019). “Charity says sorry for giving rough sleepers' details to Home Office”, *The Guardian*, November 5, 2021. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/nov/05/charity-st-mungos-says-sorry-for-giving-rough-sleepers-details-to-home-office (Accessed 27 May 2022).

Toğral Koca, B. (2021). “Bordering, Differential Inclusion/Exclusion and Civil Society in the UK” in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 46(1), 65-81.

Turnbull-Dugarte, S., Townsley, J., Foos, F. and Baron, F. and Baron. D. (2021). “Mobilising Support When the Stakes Are High: Mass Emails Affect Constituent-to-Legislator Lobbying”, in *European Journal of Political Research*, 61(2), 601-619.

UK Parliament (2022). “Lords Examines Nationality and Borders Bill at third reading”, *UK Parliament*, December 2021. Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2021/december-2021/lords-debates-nationality-and-borders-bill/ (Accessed 15 March 2022).

UK Parliament (2022). “Committee Stage” Available at: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3023/stages/15686, (Accessed: March 15, 2022)

UK Parliament (2022). *Parliamentary Bills*. Available at: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3023, (Accessed: March 15, 2022).

UNHCR, (2021). *Figures at a Glance*. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html [Accessed 3 March 2022].

UNHCR (2022a). “The Nationality and Borders Bill”, *UNHCR.* Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/uk-immigration-and-asylum-plans-some-questions-answered-by-unhcr.html (Accessed 15 March 2022).

UNHCR (2022b). “Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, As Amended, January 2022”, *UNHCR*. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/61e7f9b44 (Accessed: March 15, 2022).

Van Laer, J. and Van Aelst, P. (2010). "Internet and Social Movement Action Repertoires: Opportunities and Limitations," in *Information, Communication and Society* 13(8), 1146-1171.

Vickers, T., (2020). "Activist Conceptualisations at the Migration-Welfare Nexus: Racial Capitalism, Austerity and the Hostile Environment", in *Critical Social Policy*, 41(3), 426-446.

Walker, E.T. and Stepick, L. M. (2014). "Strength in Diversity? Group Heterogeneity in the Mobilisation of Grassroots Organisations," in *Sociology Compass*, 8 (7), 959-975.
Walker, E.T. and Martin, A. W. (2019). "Social Movement Organizations" in T*he Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd ed.), D.A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), pp. 167-184. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Wallace, T. (2018). "Policy-Driven Evidence: Evaluating the UK Government's Approach to Immigration Policy Making", in *Critical Social Policy*, 38(2), 283–301.
DOI: 10.1177/0261018317726251.

White, N. (2021). "Downing Street Protest Against 'Racist' Nationality and Borders Bill", The Independent, December 19, 2021. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/protest-nationality-borders-bill-b1978675.html> (Accessed 15 March 2022).

Wilcock, C. (2019). "Hostile Immigration Policy and the Limits of Sanctuary as Resistance: Counter-Conduct as Constructive Critique", in *Social Inclusion, 7*(4), 141-151.

Younge, G. (2018). "Hounding Commonwealth citizens is no accident. It's cruelty by design*"*, The Guardian, April 13. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/13/commonwealth-citizens-harassment-british-immigration-policy (Accessed 15 March 2022).

Yuval-Davis, N., Wemyss, G., and Cassidy, K. (2018). "Everyday Bordering, Belonging and the Reorientation of British Immigration Legislation", in *Sociology*, 52(2), 228–244.