INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER

Master's Thesis by Sebastian Bergmann Tillner

The distance between us is a mystery to us all,

The difference between us is so small

There are no answers, only questions

And we're all strangers to the truth

The Alan Parsons Project

Abstract

This thesis aims to develop an understanding of intersubjectivity in relation to the implicate order as proposed by the physicist David Bohm (1980). Intersubjectivity is briefly to be understood as intersubjective fields, but this term is readily replaced in chapter 2. The implicate order is a multidimensional higher reality from which all matter, the explicate order, and consciousness is projected through and in turn serves as a substitute for intersubjective fields, as the implicate order encompasses undivided wholeness; everything that was, is and is going to be is *enfolded* through this order. As all observable elements in the universe are regarded as projections of the implicate order non-causality and non-locality (chapter 2.3.2) prove central terms in developing psychological models and theories on a metaphysical ontological foundation. The human is regarded as a 'sub-totality' meaning we are part of undivided wholeness. This further question the argument of assuming subjective experience as confined *within* the human body and allows for understanding experience unfolding through the implicate order, meaning that subjective experience is not localized to a particular human being and is therefore fundamentally regarded as intersubjective. Existential phenomenology is used as a bridge between the world of physics and that of psychology through the work of Ernesto Spinelli (2015). This allows for the development of three levels of existence: the implicate order, worlding and worldview. The explicate order is substituted with worldview, as the latter term is developed in understanding human meaning-making on a structural level regarding embodied existential insecurities (see chapter 3.4.6). Worlding encompasses the implicate order unfolding into experience on a pre-reflective level, which cannot be explained through language, as such an act will inherently objectify worlding on a worldview level.

The thesis is situated directly within cultural psychology through dynamic semiotic field theory as proposed by Branco & Valsiner (2010) with an emphasis on intersubjectivity and critique of lacking social dimensions in the original model. Dialogue is emphasized in its original meaning '*through meaning*', giving emphasis to worlding unfolding *through* the implicate order. The structural constituents of worlding and worldview and their dialogue in-between are depicted in figures 4.1, 4.3 and 4.6. The sublime is further understood as a mediator in the transformative process of worldview as discussed in chapters 4.5 and 4.6. This thesis calls for understanding theories as worldviews that are deeply contextualized and emphasizes the creative process of both psychological research and therapy.

Table of contents

1. Introduction

Through my personal experience, I have always been fascinated by what is happening *between* people and have not yet found a satisfactory way of understanding it. One thing is arguing that people are social beings, but another thing is truly understanding the nature of this sociality. Lately, I noticed the work of Judith Blackstone (2007), who developed a method of embodied psychological and relational healing, and her work on intersubjectivity in the psychotherapeutic process. She argues that all experience has an ultimately subjective nature and there is no objective reality. Further, she emphasizes that as the experience is organized in a psychotherapeutic setting "an openness or availability to experience emerges. With some guidance, this openness can progress to reveal the self-existing dimension of nondual consciousness" (Blackstone, 2007) thus creating an intersubjective field. This is possible through the argument of the self not existing in isolation and that it is possible to temporarily obtain a nondual consciousness, where distinctions between subject and object cease to exist. I therefore argue that subjectivity and intersubjectivity are inseparable, as we humans do not exist in an isolated vacuum but are constantly surrounded by elements that we do not label as ourselves.

Following this, I argue that a coherent, well-founded nature of the physics in question is important to truly understand the nature and possibilities of an intersubjective field. Using physics to develop new theories is not strange to psychology, as Fairbairn created his theory of object-relations with the argument of the then dominating psychoanalytical theories were based on a Newtonian understanding of physics, and with the introduction of theory of relativity, new assumptions had to be made (Gomez, 1997). However, physics is often perceived to describe a reality that is objective and separate from the observer.

Over the past years, I stumbled upon the classic work in physics by David Bohm (1980), who has some insights I found to be very much compatible with those of psychology. He is arguing that everything is implicitly connected and brings forth a way of perceiving the world that I argue is adequate for the scope of understanding intersubjectivity (Bohm, 1980). The following quote entails some of Bohm's central thoughts:

> So what is needed is for man to give attention to his habit of fragmentary thought,
> to be aware of it, and thus bring it to an end. Man's approach to reality may then
> be whole, and so the response will be whole [...] Rather, all our different ways of

thinking are to be considered as different ways of looking at the one reality, each with some domain in which it is clear and adequate. One may indeed compare a theory to a particular view of some object. Each view gives only an appearance of the object in some aspect. The whole object is not perceived in any one view but, rather, it is grasped only implicitly as that single reality which is shown in all these views. (Bohm, 1980, p. 9f)

As Bohm did, I am breaking up with the fragmentary way of looking at the world that, sadly, has become dominant within psychology. By assuming that we are looking at one whole, the argument of different ontologies being fundamentally incompatible falls short. Still accepting the practical applicability of different psychological theories, the aim is not to prove them wrong, but rather have an eye out for the imposed limitations of ontology in relation to the whole. Seeing theories as dynamic views rather than static facts, the potential for progressing psychological insights is unfolded. As we are studying the human being, it is therefore necessary to accept *all* theories on the subject as mutually constituting the whole human being. As this task is extremely overwhelming and impossible due to the multitude of theories, it is therefore necessary to make limitations in which theories to include. The art in developing such theories is not falling into the pitfall of tunneling in on one particular view, but rather constantly staying open to adaptation to theories that challenge the theory at hand. Therefore, I argue that the validity of a theory is inseparable from its ability to correspond with other theories; keeping in mind that no theory is ultimate and universal, always leaving room for dialogical change to constantly further the understanding of the object at hand. I too am therefore limited in how much I can include in this time-constrained thesis, which is reflected in my problem formulation:

> *How can intersubjectivity be conceptualized in relation to the implicate order?*
>   1) *What implications does this have in an existential therapeutic context?*
>   2) *How can dynamic semiotic field theory help understand intersubjectivity?*

On the basis of this problem formulation, I design the overall structure of the thesis to first understand the implicate order (Bohm, 1980) and its implications as an ontological framework for further understanding intersubjectivity. Subsequently I am placing this ontological framework within the context of existential phenomenology as I find no

major contradictions between the work of David Bohm (1980) and that of Ernesto Spinelli (2010), thus directly incorporating theoretical physics within a psychological paradigm. As the direct link between theoretical physics and existential phenomenology has been unfolded, I further aim to situate the thesis within a wider cultural psychological framework with emphasis on dynamic semiotic field theory (Branco & Valsiner, 2010) to conceptualize the psychological processes involved in intersubjectivity on a semiotic level.

2. Bohm: The Insights of a Physicist

David Bohm is an American physicist who worked together with Oppenheimer on the Manhattan project. He was a prodigy within the world of physics and professed as Albert Einstein's spiritual son. Bohm was a previous member of the communist party, causing him to be expelled from the US due to the threat of him being a Soviet spy (Peat, 1996). As he was moving away, Niels Bohr came to be the big shot within Quantum physics. Bohr led the idea that in the world of quantum physics, probability is a fact; also known as the Copenhagen interpretation (Stapp, 1997). Bohm, as Einstein, did not accept this as being the truth, and even today mainstream quantum physics use this assumption; mainly due to its practical applications. In 1952 Bohm went on to write a paper stating the hidden variables of quantum mechanics, stating that there are forces at work beyond the mainstream models of quantum mechanics (Bohm, 1952). Ironically, Bohr among other leading physicists had a meeting, discussing this paper and unable to find any flaw they simply ignored it. Bohm went on to develop his ideas further away from the rigidity and reductionism normally associated with physics (Peat, 1996).

2.1 Bohm's Critique of Contemporary Physics

For understanding development of new orders and theories in general, Bohm draws on Piaget's terms accommodation (cutting to a pattern, fitting, conforming to rules etc.) and assimilation (to make an inseparable and comprehensive whole (that includes oneself) (Bohm, 1980). Note how the observer is part of the process, meaning they cannot be separated from the process at hand. In the world of physics, Bohm (1980) points out some fundamental incompatibilities with the two dominating orders; theory of relativity, a large-scale theory of the entire universe, and quantum mechanics that focuses on explaining the tiniest parts that constitute the world. Firstly, in an extremely simplified manner, theory of relativity operates with a notion of "world tubes" *and* a signal between these. Because the signal is key in theory of relativity, it compromises undivided wholeness (as implied in other aspects of the theory), because it implies a "different and more abstract sort of analysis based on a kind of independent and autonomous 'information content' which is different in different regions" (Bohm, 1980, p. 173). By differentiating the signal from the world tubes and assuming its autonomous content it is thus separated from the undivided whole, leaving a hole in the order. Furthermore, the heavy reliance on fields that each have a center distinct

from each other builds on the cartesian mode of thought where it is again implied that these fields have an autonomous existence.

On the other hand, quantum mechanics uses a language describing the 'quantum state of a system' thus implying that we are thinking about something with an autonomous and separate kind of existence (Bohm, 1980). Thus, it is heavily implied in both theories that distinct entities exist unrelated to each other, and we will try to solve these issues in a psychological context in chapter 3, but first we need to take a look at Bohm's solution to these problems.

2.1.1 Starting from Undivided Wholeness

Firstly, Bohm (1980) rebelled against viewing theory as truth that is predominant within much of the scientific world. He instead advocates for viewing theories as ever evolving ways of seeing the world; worldviews. Quantum physics was at the time plagued by a final understanding of truth in theory. The Copenhagen Interpretation is heavily founded on statistics and random behavior of particles, which Bohm and Einstein among others refused to accept (Peat, 1996). The argument for the finality of quantum physics can be traced back to our inability to measure sub-quantum[1]. Bohm goes out of his way to argue a way in which this can be done by proposing new theories and ideas for building measurement instruments that can probe the sub-quantum realm and possibly not interfere in the same manner (Bohm, 1980).

Bohm (1952) argues that there are hidden variables within the domain of quantum mechanics, and to put it as simply as possible, traditional quantum mechanics is limited to a specific domain, discarding it as a universal truth. He argues that an order smaller than what's observable fluctuates in a denumerable infinite way which is unobservable to our current instruments and in turn "evens out" on the observable plane, creating the stable world as we know of. These fluctuations are *hidden variables*, which are sub-quantum, and can help explain the apparent randomness of the quantum world. In a very elaborated manner, he fuses the notion that a wave can move infinitely with a theorem stating that a "clock" ("... a kind of inner time for each region of space" (Bohm, 1980, p. 123)) is constituted by smaller "clocks", though he does add that it is not fully true, as it would not only by affected by its constituting smaller "clocks", but all of space as well. The general idea is that you get these relatively autonomous formations in space (Bohm, 1980). To my understanding this can be upscaled to

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[1] Sub-Quantum physics has been studied after Bohm's time as seen in i.e., Nistor (2009); however, to my understanding the same critique of quantum mechanics in regard to viewing separate systems is still present.

atoms, molecules, cells, organs, humans, groups, etc., where these formations have relative autonomy, but yet are constituted by smaller relatively autonomous formations and cannot be separated from the whole. These 'space clocks' will further be referred to as *sub-totalities*, a term Bohm himself uses, as it implies being part of the whole. This notion stems from Einstein's theory of relativity, which is permeated by an undivided wholeness that complicates the physical world in all kinds of manners. Essentially, the movement of every part of the universe is dependent on the rest of the universe (think of vortices in a stream that are moving in relation to the whole body of water, sea floor, weather conditions etc.) and we end up with a more Aristotelian and organismic worldview (Bohm,1980). What we're doing here is moving away from a mechanical rectilinear order, meaning that we previously separated the world into straight lines and separable entities that can be taken apart and put back together like a machine (as implied in classical physics and to an extent that of i.e. the behaviorist and cognitive paradigm within psychology), to a more *organismic curvilinear order.* This is done by assuming that the universe is constituted by waves that inherently even out to become measurable elements, but nonetheless cannot be separated from their surroundings due to the infinite fluctuations of these waves, thus making such a separability irrelevant (Bohm, 1980). A more large-scale example of this undivided wholeness can be seen with the war happening in Ukraine and how it affects the entire world on multiple levels; economy is changing and even on the subjective level there is a potential for fear due to nuclear threats etc.. It is important to specify that everything is *implicitly* connected through undivided wholeness. The goal is to achieve harmony between all manners of being, which is a word Bohm (1980) uses countless of times when describing the desired process of any sub-totality in relation to the whole. Striving a for a whole by synthesis of different theories has also been proposed within the scope of psychology by Diriwächter & Valsiner (2008), making the gap between physics and psychology ever smaller.

2.1.2 The Need for a New Order: From Physics to Psychology

Because both aforementioned branches of physics have their use and describe the world to a satisfactory degree within certain contexts, Bohm (1980) does not believe it necessary to invent new mathematics or disband the existing theories altogether, but we rather need to think about order in a different manner. With the starting point of undivided wholeness, we need an order that encompasses *everything*, but by doing so we run into an issue of infinite complexity that is fundamentally impossible to understand in a manner where it's

controllable. We also need to throw out the reliance on continuity, as quantum mechanics has shown us that particles can move instantaneously from one location to another and be connected to each other without any signal between them, breaking the limitation imposed by the speed of light (Bohm, 1980). Bohm (1980) suggests two orders to solve these problems, the *explicate-* and the *implicate* order. The explicate order is what *unfolds* into our perception and encapsulates the explicate understanding of the world through theories etc, whereas the implicate order is *enfolded* in everything; it encompasses all that was, is and will be (Bohm, 1980). One way to understand these orders is by an example of the movement of light through space. "i.e., in each region of space, the order of a whole illuminated structure is 'enfolded' and 'carried' in the movement of light" (Bohm, 1980, p. 190). The structure, which we are observing, let's say the moon, is to be understood as a process of the moon's structure being enfolded and carried through space by reflecting the sun's light, which is then unfolded as these light waves connect with our eyes. Note, that by paying close attention to this example, the Kantian cave parable is essentially recreated; we are not directly observing the moon on its own, but rather an order enfolded into light rays emitted from the sun which then through a complex process turns into visual imagery unfolding through our consciousness. Bohm creates a term for movement that carries an implicate order: *the holomovement*, which is "*undefinable and immeasurable*" (Bohm, 1980, p. 191). We are therefore put in a position, where the theoretical boundaries inherently limit our ability to fully and universally understand and explain movements through space and time, as the holomovement is per definition undefinable and immeasurable. Despite its fundamental immeasurability, the indefinity of the holomovement makes way for not limiting ourselves by laws of physics in our understanding of the human being, giving more creative room for theories to unfold.

Due to the holomovement and undivided wholeness, Bohm argues that we should move away from the ordinary physical notion, which arose with Galileo, of making physical theories that apply to

> the motion of an object in a vacuum [...] so we might now note the distinction
> between a lens and a hologram and consider the possibility that physical law
> should refer primarily to an order of undivided wholeness of the content of a
> description similar to that indicated by the hologram (Bohm, 1980, p. 186).

The metaphor of a lens refers to an instrument of observation that is separate from the object at hand, whereas the hologram refers to an instrument of observation that observes all possible aspects of a given object. We can therefore substitute the object at hand in the hologram with a region in space and time; a sub-totality.

Because we are no longer looking at separable objects, the cartesian grid that is explained by calculus (Bohm, 1980) is therefore no longer an adequate basis for theories. As a way of moving forward Bohm (1980) adds:

> Rather, one has to observe the new situation very broadly and tentatively and to 'feel out' what may be the relevant new features. From this, there will arise a discernment of the new order, which will articulate and unfold in a natural way (and not as a result of efforts to make it fit well-defined and preconceived notions as to what this order should be able to achieve) (p. 186).

We need to start from the phenomenon at hand and observe it as neutrally as possible, trying our best to avoid the pitfalls of trying to make the new order fit older preconceptions about the world. It is necessary to stay open to new orders and radical shifts in order to achieve progress in this direction.

> Evidently, it is not easy to change this, because our notions of order are pervasive, for not only do they involve our thinking but also our senses, our feelings, our intuitions, our physical movement, our relationships with other people and with society as a whole and, indeed, every phase of our lives (Bohm, 1980, p. 224)

We are simply at a disadvantage at moving forward, due to these dominating orders being deeply enfolded in our very being and how we perceive and interact with the world. I hereby argue that these dominating orders (i.e., understanding the world through cartesian grids) act as limitations for what is accessible to our subjective experience. This basic assumption is crucial and will be further elaborated and discussed in relation to relevant psychological theories in chapter 3.3, but before we can engage in this mind-boggling discussion, we need to establish a common ground through relevant theoretical insights.

2.2 The Explicate Order

The simplest way to understand the explicate order is through an example Bohm (1980) uses himself of a person looking at an older television. The visual imagery is transported through waves, where the images to which the context on the screen is enfolded and implicate. The receiver in the television has the function of unfolding and explicating this implicate order in the form of visual imagery (Bohm, 1980). From thereon he argues that all we perceive is bound by an implicate order that is not immediately perceptible and might differ from the explicate order observed (see further example in Bohm, 1980, pp. 188-190). A clear example of this from a psychological perspective is through the use of defense mechanisms, where perception can be distorted from what is at hand (Bailey & Pico, 2021). Most importantly is that by interacting with the explicate order it is transformed through processes of enfoldment and unfoldment through the implicate order, meaning no static explicate order can exist in its totality (Bohm, 1980).

How would these ideas from Bohm's physics have analogies to psychology? One might perceive a partner to be very angry, although nothing in their behavior expresses such anger, but the person can project their own anger onto the partner, thus distorting perception. The partners' anger is in this case explicate, whereas the person's own anger is implicate. Here it becomes apparent that we cannot separate oneself from the phenomenon at hand, because the person has a different view of the situation than the partner does, which is heavily rooted in the implicate order. If we take this example a step further, we can assume that this anger has previously been explicate by the person in a previous relation but has in turn become implicate as this previous encounter is not perceptually part of the person's current view. The implicate anger can thus become explicate once again through exploration of the phenomena, accepting other possible orders than the dominating explicate order at the time of inquiry.

At a large-scale psychological standpoint this can also be addressed by the influence of culture on specific theories through the WEIRD problem (Muthukrishna et al., 2020), where the vast majority of psychological insight is based on a small fraction of the population, thus having questionable validity when applied to other cultural contexts.

An example from the world of physics is the incompatibility of quantum mechanics and theory of relativity, where they both lose their applicability, when applied to the contexts of one another.

That being said, we have now established that the explicate order is not *one* singular order, but rather an infinite number of orders that operate within their respective contexts. Note that this context might be narrower than what the theory itself indicates (Bohm, 1980). We can now abstract the explicate order to be our *understanding* of the world; our *worldview*. As we are limited in our perceptual abilities, not everything is part of the explicate order directly, but can become so with the aid of instruments of observation, such as a microscope, where we can now see and explicate things that otherwise are hidden to our perceptual repertoire. In a psychological context such a method of observation can be introspection, where new aspects of the order have the potential of coming to light. Bohm's own explanation of the explicate order is as follow:

> What distinguishes the explicate order is that what is thus derived is a set of recurrent and relatively stable elements that are *outside* of each other. This set of elements (e.g., fields and particles) then provides the explanation of that domain of experience in which the mechanistic order yields an adequate treatment (Bohm, 1980, p. 226).

The explicate order is thus heavily tied to mechanistic preconceptions. Bohm (1980) does however argue that it is extremely important not to take explicate orders as ultimate truths and assume separate autonomous existence of elements derived from this order, but rather understand these elements in relation to the undivided whole.

Following the argument of "recurrent and relatively stable elements", I argue that humans can be understood as an explicate order as well. It is indeed fruitful to understand humans as separate, as this is the very basis for psychology, where we are, indeed, trying to understand the human being. However, by this definition we are no longer restricted to viewing humans isolated from the rest of the world, but rather constituent of and constituting a multitude of explicate orders. Think of how the human can be separated into further explicate orders, such as neural activity, biological systems, cognitive processes, behavior etc. These are but some examples that inhabit some of the dominating psychological domains. If we follow Bohm's (1980) idea that we need to avoid the pitfall of assuming an independent existence of these orders, they are not separable, but rather constituting the whole of the human being, which in turn constitutes larger wholes, such as groups, societies etc. This point is extremely crucial for moving forwards with psychology as a whole.

2.3 The Implicate Order

The implicate order is a bit tricker because it is not directly perceptually available in the same manner as the explicate order but is rather *enfolded* into everything and carried by the holomovement, as argued in chapter 2.1.2. One might argue that all theories are merely abstractions of certain aspects of the implicate order that are relevant within their respective limited contexts (Bohm, 1980).

For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on three aspects: 1) the implicate order is undefinable and immeasurable, 2) Time and space are abstractions of the implicate order, 3) consciousness is understood as a projection from the implicate order. The first point is heavily linked with the holomovement, and due to the holomovement being undefinable and immeasurable, the same must apply to the implicate order as it is part of said movement.

2.3.1 Time and Space as Abstractions of the Implicate Order

The second point about time and space being abstractions from the implicate order is based on the argument that our experience is unfolding in the present moment. Bohm (1980) uses an example of listening to music, where we are not listening to it one tone at a time, but rather the notes that have become enfolded in the progression of the music.[2] The anticipation of what is to come plays a role to and cannot be separated from what was and what is. It is therefore fundamental to understand movement through time and space. In physics, Bohm argues, that we typically view movement as:

$$v = \frac{x_2 - x_1}{t_2 - t_1},$$ (Bohm, 1980, p. 255)

This depiction of movement does not cohere with our experience of movement. Bohm argues that:

> "Our actual experience is, however, that when a given moment, say t_2, is present and actual, an earlier moment, such as t_1, is past. That is to say, it is gone, non-existent, never to return. So if we say that the velocity of a particular now (at t_2) is $(x_2 - x_1)/(t_2 - t_1)$ we are trying to relate what is (i.e., x_2 and t_2) to what is not (i.e., x_1 and t_1)" (Bohm, 1980, p. 256).

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[2] Listening to music is also used as an example to understand subjective experience in Valsiner (2010).

Bohm (1980) argues that we do not experience the world in intervals, but rather at the constant present moment. It is possible to circumvent the intervals by simply reducing the distance between t_2 and t_1 to being infinitely small. But then we run into another issue, as we don't experience a time interval of zero length as well as the necessity for movement to be continuous. This way of understanding movement is thus incompatible with quantum physics, as movement in general is discontinuous. Bohm suggests that we instead understand movement in terms of the implicate order: "In this order, movement is comprehended in terms of a series of interpenetrating and intermingling elements in different degrees of enfoldment all present together" (Bohm, 1980, p. 257). Time is no longer central in understanding movement, but rather *degrees of enfoldment*. The present moment is put as the center of experience, which has grave implications for the creation of psychological models that I will elaborate in chapter 4. For now, let's keep in mind that movement is not necessarily continuous. Elements that are not present still exist at a different degree of enfoldment (both past and future), and elements are not bound to be one place at a time due to the underlying theory of wave-fluctuations (see chapter 2.1) and non-locality. The idea of non-locality (and non-causality) refers to

> Two entities, such as electrons, which initially combine to form a molecule and then separate, show a peculiar non-local relationship, which can best be described as a non-causal connection of elements that are far apart. (Bohm, 1980, p. 222)

This principle essentially opens the playing field wide open, as distance between elements no longer plays a role, and we can disregard this distance in terms of what can and cannot influence a region in space and time.

2.3.2 Consciousness as a Projection of the Implicate Order

Coming back to psychology, this leads us onto the next question about consciousness' place in this thesis. Before we talk about consciousness, it is important to understand the difference between life and inanimate objects. Bohm (1980) argues that life itself is a force, which is deeply enfolded in the implicate order by his examination of atoms. He argues that a carbon

molecule does not suddenly become 'alive' when it becomes part of a plant, nor does an oxygen molecule become inanimate as it is transformed through respiration. The natural state of matter is therefore inanimate, and life is something that permeates all aspects of our observable universe. The world and universe can thus be understood as one large organism moving through this life-force, which highly resembles the Aristotelian view (Bohm, 1980). This view can be seen as an underlying theme throughout Bohm's (1980) work:

> [...] for in the implicate order the totality of existence is enfolded within each region of space (and time). So, whatever part, element, or aspect we may abstract in thought, this still enfolds the whole and is therefore intrinsically related to the totality from which it has been abstracted" (p. 218).

So, what does this exactly mean to us? First of all, because there are no borders, there is no sharp distinction between one element and another. The idea of borders then resides within the classification of the world as a tool for us to better navigate the complexity as it unfolds. Furthermore, thought is understood as abstractions of the whole and in turn *intrinsically* related to it. We can thus no longer see thought in its isolated form, but rather understand it as a movement, like any other, which in turn is inseparable from the implicate order (Bohm, 1980). Whether thought exists prior to it being observed is has been a massive discussion stemming from the early days of Psychology (Humphrey, 1951), and by attributing thought to the implicate order, a pre-observable existence of thought is further acknowledged. I argue that thought, feeling, desire, and other aspects of consciousness can be understood in the same terminology as the holomovement; immeasurable and undefinable.

Now let's take it a step further, by building upon the example of non-locality and non-causality from earlier, where we assume that particles are projections from a higher multidimensional reality (Bohm, 1980). Bohm (1980) uses an example of a fish tank, where you have two cameras pointing at it from different angles (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 *A sketch containing a fish tank and two separate cameras and their respective screens.*

The transparent tank containing the fish is a three-dimensional reality, whereas the cameras produce two-dimensional imagery of the three-dimensional fish tank. If we look back upon the concept of non-causality, where we can interact with one particle in one place and get a simultaneous reaction from a particle that is linked with it and placed somewhere else, we can apply the same idea here. Let's say the fish is facing camera A, meaning A will have a frontal view of the fish and B will have a sideways view of the fish. If the fish then moves, now facing camera B, the views will have changed. A and B are not connected in other ways then they are both observing the same fish tank, but as the fish moves, so does it on both screens, meaning there is a non-causal relationship between the two screens that are two-dimensional projections of a three-dimensional reality (Bohm, 1980). The same principle can be applied to the example with electrons from earlier. Electrons can be seen as three-dimensional projections from a higher-dimensional reality, meaning the electrons themselves as they manifest to our methods of observation, do not constitute the highest level of reality. If we push this argumentation further, we can argue that all the constituents of the three-dimensional reality that manifests to our senses are merely a projection of an underlying multi-dimensional reality with unlimited potential - this is the essence of indefinability and immeasurability as we are simply limited in our senses to perceive beyond the three-dimensional reality. Consciousness is then understood in the light of the holomovement, where movement of wave-like particles have entire structures enfolded within them, meaning that such an enfolded structure has the possibility of emerging to our consciousness. Bear in mind that Bohm (1980) does not limit the holomovement to already known elements, such as electrons, protons etc.

This is where the implicate order becomes extremely freaky, as we have no way of discerning reality other than what appears to our senses. An openness to experience is crucial as it unfolds; especially when it does not conform to the dominating explicate orders at hand. This is a way of legitimizing psychological phenomena that are previously thought to be deeply subjective and separate, such as that which manifests in our thoughts and senses but is immediately inaccessible to other people. By assuming undivided wholeness, non-locality and intersubjectivity from this standpoint, such a border between subjective experience seizes to be relevant on an ontological level. On the other hand, we must not disregard the locality of subjective experience, which is dominant to our being, thus making new ground for understanding dualism. This dualism can be understood in the light of cartesian dualism, to which Bohm has an interesting perspective regarding the distinction between thinking substance and extended substance:

> "By using the term 'thinking substance' in such sharp contrast to 'extended substance' [Descartes] was clearly implying that the various distinct forms appearing in thought do not have their existence in such an order of extension and separation (i.e., some kind of space), but rather in a different order, in which extension and separations have no fundamental significance" (Bohm, 1980, p. 249).

Thus, Bohm argues that Descartes in his own argumentation was closer to a notion of the implicate order, where separation is meaningless, rather than the dominant interpretation of mind and matter being separate entities. By using the term order rather than space, we imply that everything happens within the same overarching space, but in different forms and abiding to different laws. Thus, cartesian dualism in its, arguably, original form, is similar to the implicate order, as matter and consciousness is fused within this notion (Bohn, 1980). I further argue that the intersubjective field, as mentioned briefly in chapter 1, is to be understood as unfolded through the implicate order. As I have criticized theory of relativity for its use of fields (see chapter 2.1), I will disregard the term intersubjective fields and substitute it with the implicate order, as I find the latter to have a larger potential. Intersubjectivity is fundamental to the implicate order.

2.4 Conceptualizing Reality

As an ending point of this chapter, I will share some of Bohm's (1980) thoughts on reality. Being able to discern what is real and what isn't is a core part of psychology, and phenomena such as psychosis are heavily tied to this question. But what is reality? And how can we understand it in the light of the thesis so far? Bohm (1980) describes the following:

> What, then, is the origin of the word 'reality'? This comes from the Latin 'res', which means 'thing'. To be real is to be a 'thing'. 'Reality' in its earlier meaning would then signify 'thinghood in general' or 'the quality of being a thing'. It is particularly interesting that 'res' comes from the verb 'reri', meaning 'to think', so that literally, 'res' is 'what is thought about'. (Bohm, 1980, p. 69)

Reality is thus referring to *things* and what is thought about, meaning we can substitute the term reality with the explicate order as this consists of our understanding of things (see chapter 2.2). Note how the phrasing used by Bohm regarding the earlier meaning of the verb 'reri', 'what is thought about', is not directly interchangeable with essence, as essence refers to things in themselves. Thus, adopting the verb-derived "reri", reality includes the process of thinking. As earlier argued (see chapter 2.3), thinking is a process that cannot be reduced to mechanical concepts but is rather to be understood through the implicate order. By adopting this notion of reality, we are not restricted to an independent reality of 'thinghood', which allows us to grasp the process of thinking as real in itself. Thinking cannot be separated from all other processes due to undivided wholeness, and the process of thinking is thus inseparable from our experience as a whole.

3. Existing Through Undivided Wholeness

Where the previous chapter primarily focused on the insights of the physicist David Bohm (1980), this chapter will lean more towards insights from existential therapy as proposed by Ernesto Spinelli (2015), one of the most influential existential therapists of our time (Correia, Cooper & Berdondini, 2014). Many of the issues that have been raised and sought answered by Bohm are found in the work of Spinelli, and for the purpose of this thesis, I will use existential therapy as a bridge between the world of physics and psychology. Throughout the chapter, we will notice the importance of conceptualizing psychological phenomena in a well-founded metaphysical framework. I will now introduce some of the core concepts from Spinelli and along the way fuse them with the work of Bohm to create a coherent basis for understanding intersubjectivity.

3.1 Three Principles of Existential Therapy

Spinelli (2015) proposes that existential therapy relies on three core principles: *Relatedness, Uncertainty and Existential Anxiety*. These principles stand in vast contrast to the psychoanalytic notion of *the unconscious*, which refers to "separate and discrete mental processing systems - in contrast to that of conscious processing" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 31). Spinelli further points out that Western science is heavily influenced by a duality between subject and object[3], which allows the investigator to remain detached from the object they are observing. The western stance on dualism prefers mutual exclusiveness, where something is either one thing or another; not both. This contrasts with findings in theories of physics addressing the wave-particle duality (Spinelli, 2015), where an electron can have both the properties of a wave and a particle at the same time, thus situating existential therapy within the world of physics. Spinelli therefore argues that the world is rather consisting of both/and stances, rather than the mutually exclusive either/or. This issue can be traced to the construction of the English language (and many other languages for that sake), which are heavily noun-focused (Spinelli, 2015). The very act of articulating something through language is thus inherently shaping our way of understanding and structuring the world, where we refer to the world, primarily through nouns, consisting of discrete and separable entities in a thing-like manner. Thus, expressing both/and statements about *being* "confounds

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[3] See Bohm's discussion of cartesian dualism in chapter 2.3.2

the meaning of the statement and confuses its intent" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 36)[4]. If we on the other hand are able to overcome the obstacles of the paradoxical and complementary both/and stance, Spinelli (2015) argues that existential phenomenology becomes much easier to access and understand. Note the focus on the verb *being* expresses a process-like movement, which is an attempt to bypass the staticity implied by nouns. I further argue that the both/and stance is probably the closest we can come to non-duality in regard to language. Now moving on to the three core principles.

3.1.1 Relatedness

Relatedness can be understood in the same manner as undivided wholeness, as Spinelli argues "At its simplest, surface level, relatedness argues that everything that exists is always in an inseparable relation to everything else" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 37). The idea of something being *within me* as the boundaried organism I am is replaced by an understanding of interaction *between* boundaried organisms such as the self and others and the self and the world. Spinelli (2015) uses an analogy including a cup of tea to exemplify relatedness:

> Imagine a cup of tea. Now, imagine that the tea is '***being*** tea' in that it is the tea through which all beings emerge. Each spoonful 'bit' of ***being*** tea expresses and gives rise to a unique, special, unrepeatable, individual being. And, as well, each spoonful 'bit' of ***being*** tea that is extracted and held up to investigation and then returned to the cup of ***being*** tea is never exactly the same as any previous or future spoonful. No individual spoonful 'bit' of ***being*** tea is somehow *more **being*** tea than any other. Nor is it *less* than any other. Every 'bit' of ***being*** tea is unique and every 'bit' of ***being*** tea *is* the ***being*** tea. (p. 38)

I believe Spinelli's analogy is excellent in conjunction with Bohm's (1980) views. It exceptionally shows how each 'bit' of tea, which we can adequately call a sub-totality, is unique and distinct from all other sub-totalities present in the context of the cup of tea, although they are no more or less *being* than each other. It further showcases the arbitrariness of sub-totalities, and the sense that it here relies on exactly how much tea is in question. No matter the amount of tea it cannot, as a sub-totality, be separated from the rest of the tea, the

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[4] Bohm (1980) actually dedicates an entire chapter in his book to overcome some of the problems of the English language by proposing a new type of language; the rheomode.

cup and nevertheless everything else around it. It might cool down a bit once you take a spoonful up, which incorporates temperature, and all of a sudden, the act of taking a spoonful of tea up to later put it back in is inseparable from processes associated with temperature. This is further an argument of undivided wholeness (see chapter 2.1.1), as the spoonful of tea cannot be viewed as an entity that exists autonomously from its surroundings. Nevertheless, although different from before, this spoonful is still *being* tea. Spinelli (2015) further adds that if we imagine the bit of tea to declare total independence from the cup of *being* tea, it will allow the *being* tea to deny or forget its source point.

Now, let's go on to understand how *being* tea can be understood in regard to *being* human. By seeing the human as a sub-totality, much like the tea is a sub-totality, I argue that we cannot argue that we are separable from our surroundings. By classifying *being* in any form in regard to relatedness and undivided wholeness, the sharp distinction between different *things* ceases to exist. Following the argument of *being* tea, I argue that *being* human is inseparable from the totality of *being* human. And *being* human is inseparable from everything that surrounds it. Thus, claiming that I am the sole reason for my *being*, as well as claiming that I am separable from the totality of *being* is contradictory to this argument. Relatedness is thus crucial in defining the human as a sub-totality, where we might as well look at the brain, the liver, a toe-nail etc. as such a sub-totality with its own *being*. Following this, I argue that declaring a *thing* in itself is arbitrary, nevertheless necessary.

Referring back to the ultimate argument of separation, where everything is constituted of atoms (or even that which is smaller), we can in the same manner argue that *being* atom is inseparable from the surrounding *being* atoms that subsequently constitute both tea and me. As *being* atom is inseparable from *being* human, everything related to atoms must nonetheless constitute *being* human. I am therefore not only *being* human in relation to others *being* human, but rather *being* is inseparable from everything; the implicate order. Note that *being* is heavily tied to the life-force that is part of the holomovement (see chapter 2.1.2), which is a key argument to how something other than biological matter has the capacity of *being*.

Language appears to be one of the major barriers in achieving a more harmonious *being* in the world. Spinelli (2015) refers to Gergen (2009)[5], who proposes a language where nouns are replaced with flow-like action-based processes. This allows us to move away from viewing the world as entities that are discrete in nature and rather emphasize continuous *forming*. Spinelli (2015) further quotes John Ziman who states that he has not come across any evidence that the subjective mode of consciousness forms prior to its intersubjective counterpart. From this view, *intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity*. Arguing that the *I* is not the origin of action, but that it is rather a relational achievement, Spinelli (2015) introduces Martin Buber (1964), who makes a distinction between two types of relation between self and other: *I/It* and *I/Thou*. The *I/It* relation refers to *the other* being objectified by superimposing the *I's preferred meaning stance* on *the other*, which encompasses control and separateness. The *I/Thou* stance on the other hand approaches "*the other* as an interrelated co-subject through which mutually revealing, unpredictable and impermanent meaning possibilities unfold" (Buber, 1970, 2002 quoted in Spinelli, 2015, p. 43).[6] The *I/It* stance is inherently objectifying and separating, distancing the *I* from *the other*, which stands in contrast to relatedness/undivided wholeness. As earlier argued, because the *I* is inherently connected with *the other*, this stance not only objectifies *the other*, but also objectifies the *I* itself. The *I/Thou* stance adopts relatedness and incorporates it into the relation, making way for a co-existing inseparable inter-relation. Truthful meanings are not something that are 'out there' or separable from the *I*, but rather co-constituted in an unpredictable manner that adopts *uncertainty* (Spinelli, 2015), which will be elaborated shortly. Both these stances are expressions of relatedness, where Buber argues that "'I–It' engagements seek to express relatedness through its denial, while 'I–thou' relations move ever towards its embrace" (Buber, 1970, 2002 quoted Spinelli, 2015, p. 44). The stance adopted by the *I* therefore indicate the level of acceptance of relatedness. Note that this is not an either/or stance, as both these can, to my interpretation, co-exist at the same time at different levels.

3.1.2 Uncertainty

The next principle, uncertainty, means that I can in no way with complete certainty predict and control how certain stimuli are going to express themselves to me, nor can I with certainty control my actions (Spinelli, 2015). Think about quantum mechanics for instance,

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[5] Gergen (2009) even mentions Bohm in his book on page 193.
[6] I have quoted Buber in Spinelli (2010), as I have a danish version, and I believe it would only serve to confuse the reader to use a danish quote.

where the Copenhagen interpretation relies on probability as fact, thus implying uncertainty at the current lowest observable level (Stapp, 1997). Imagine saying that "I am certain something is uncertain". This stance, ironically, also adopts certainty, which contradicts uncertainty, to which Spinelli (2015) proposes adopting an alternative stance of *the uncertainty of uncertainty* to emphasize the inseparable interweaving between certainty and uncertainty. He further proposes there can only be *uncertain certainties* and *uncertain uncertainties*. This fits well with the previous dynamics between the explicate- and implicate order, as we can state that theories/worldviews are limited in their certainty to a particular context, but due to the nature of the implicate order, the nature of the context is uncertain.

3.1.3 Existential Anxiety

The last principle, *existential anxiety*, is a direct consequence of *relatedness* and *uncertainty* as it "expresses *the lived experience of relational uncertainty*" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 58). Anxiety has heavy negative connotations and is commonly associated with unwanted and disabling levels of unease, stress, worry and nervousness. However, the principle of existential anxiety adopts a broader notion of "a much more generally felt experience of incompleteness, which is expressive of an inherent openness to the unknown possibilities of life experience" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 58). The negative connotations to mental disorders and disability are therefore challenged as existential anxiety can both be exhilarating and debilitating, which makes risk-taking movement possible as well the possibility of inducing a fear-fueled paralysis. Spinelli (2015) proposes a notion of homeostasis as an analogue of existential anxiety, as it refers to how the body attempts to preserve a state of balanced stability or equilibrium. He adds "As a condition of life, the body is in a perpetual state of disequilibrium endeavoring to achieve permanent balance" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 59). Note the terms *perpetual* and *permanent*, which refer to the extreme poles of a movement-staticity spectrum. Thus, disequilibrium is heavily tied to the impermanence of, well, everything, and the aim of the body is to achieve permanence. Spinelli's argument is that the body's aim is impossible, and to my understanding, existential anxiety arises in the span between the aim for *impossible permanency and lived impermanence*. He further argues that *all* responses to the relational uncertainties of existence are encompassed by existential anxiety, and this anxiety often induces feelings of confusion, despair and bewilderment (Spinelli, 2015). Note that Bohm (1980) uses the same term of 'confusion' arising in his description of when an explicate order is inadequate in its understanding of the context at hand. Spinelli further

argues that anxiety cannot be removed from our experience of existence, as any attempts to deny, resist or reject such anxiety often generate anxiety expressed through, for example, restrictive and rigid patterns of thought and behavior or even a persistent trying to seek out the novel and unknown (Spinelli, 2015).

Anxiety cannot be eliminated, which is why a coherent understanding of anxiety is extremely important. I do slightly differ from Spinelli's (2015) analogy on homeostasis, as it refers to bodily states, and therefore is restrictive in the understanding of how we handle anxiety due to the restrictive bodily focus. The underlying idea is that of *balance*. Because balance implies a 'balance-point', where equilibrium is achieved, I find the term slightly inadequate, even if we imply a constant movement of such a point. Going back to Bohm (1980), it is impossible to measure such a point due to the truly mind-boggling metaphysical assumptions about the implicate order. I find the term *harmony* more adequate to address a state of perpetual equilibrium, as it in a broader sense implies movement and is more resistant to observable analogies; balance is heavily tied to mass, size and shape, which arguably are projections of- and therefore not the actual *being* in question. I will therefore use *harmony* in the stead of *homeostasis* throughout the rest of this thesis.

3.2 Worlding and Worldview

In an attempt to convey the difference in our lived pre-reflective experience and our reflective understanding of our *being*, Spinelli (2015) uses the term *Worlding* and *Worldview*. Throughout the following chapter, I will elaborate his thoughts and fuse it with the whole of the thesis to get a better understanding of our *being*. At a surface-level, we can understand the terms in regard to figure 3.1.

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                    EXISTENCE
                        |
                        |
WORLDING  -------------------- THE WORLDVIEW
    |                           |
    |                           |
  PROCESS                    SUBSTANCE
    |                           |
  VERB-LIKE                  NOUN-LIKE
    |                           |
NO-THING-NESS             SOME-THING-NESS
    |                           |
BEING-ALWAYS-BECOMING         AM-ING
    |                           |
MEANINGLESSNESS             MEANING
    |                           |
INSEPARABILITY             INDIVIDUALITY
    |                           |
INSTABILITY/INSECURITY     STABILITY/SECURITY
    |                           |
  AMBIGUITY                  IDENTITY
    |                           |
  CHAOS                       ORDER
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Figure 3.1. *Spinelli's way of discerning between worlding and worldview.*

Spinelli himself notes that the worlding site is limited and limiting, but is potentially helpful to understand the expression of

> existence-as-action, ***being***-always-in-the-process-of- becoming. This action-
> existence precedes any attempts at its becoming essentialised, and is therefore
> ambiguous and unstable insofar as its being 'captured' into a worldview structure
> has yet to occur. (Spinelli, 2015, p. 104)

I understand this interaction between worlding and worldview as Spinelli's (2015) argument to how essence precedes existence, as worlding exists prior to it being conceptualized and given the properties of essence thus turning it into a worldview. This will further be discussed in the following chapter.

The worldview on the other hand is described as "The worldview constructs a temporally and spatially essence-bound version of worlding." (Spinelli, 2015, p. 105). Worlding and worldview are different versions of experiencing the world, where the former is chaotic and meaningless and the latter orderly and meaningful. I argue that the chaotic worldview can be understood as *nondual consciousness* as proposed by Blackstone (2007) (see chapter1). Note the expression of temporally and spatially essence-bound is referring to our physical

understanding of space and time. This will further be discussed in chapters 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and we will move back to the important aspects of figure 3.1 in relation to this thesis.

3.2.1 Essence and Existence

Spinelli writes that the central argument of existential phenomenology is "existence precedes essence" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 109), which stands in contrast to western philosophy, as we usually assume the opposite; essence precedes existence. Here the term essence refers to *things* or *entities*. My understanding of this is that we observe *things* and assume that they have an existence because of their observation. But if we look at human nature or identity, we notice that these are outcomes of processes and not foundational conditions of existence (Spinelli, 2015). Looking at figure 3.1, we see that existence precedes both worlding and worldview. Now let us examine how these fits into the broader scope of this thesis.

Looking back at Bohm (1980) once again, we find similarities between essence and existence and that of the explicate- and implicate order. I argue that we can substitute essence with the explicate order, as this in a broad sense refers to understanding observable things (see chapter 2.2). At the same time, we can substitute existence with the implicate order, as these are the underlying processes of the explicate order. The idea of existence *preceding* essence is temporally laden as it assumes one thing happens before the other. As earlier argued in chapter 2.3.1, time is not the dominating order when it comes to experience. The term *preceding* can thus be substituted with *projects*, as we have earlier argued that the explicate order is a projection of the implicate order in chapter 2.3.2. Moving back to the original phrase, we can now say that *existence projects essence*. This way, we still acknowledge the necessity of existence for essence to occur and at the same time, we are able to make some assumptions about existence/the implicate order, which are important for later development of psychological models with the aim of getting a deeper understanding of intersubjectivity.

3.3 Unfolding Worlding

Elaborating on the description of worlding, Spinelli (2015) refers to a pre-reflective *being* that he describes in the following manner:

I employ the term *worlding* as that mode of existence which is always-becoming, ever-shifting, process-like and linguistically elusive. Worlding is the experience

of existence at a pre-reflective level. As such, *any* attempts to convey worlding can only be indirectly expressed through allusion and metaphor. No direct means of expressing worlding is possible simply because whatever means were to be employed would be reflectively derived. (p. 103f)

I argue that worlding stands in contrast to thinking due to the description of it being 'linguistically elusive'. As our thought and understanding of the world, arguably, is primarily derived from language, the static noun-focused grammar of said language falls short of directly conveying experience at a pre-reflective level, as any such attempt would be on a reflective level. We can only grasp this way of *being* through metaphors and allusions, as our language simply falls short. Worlding is inherently inaccessible to us apart from when it occurs. He further adds:

> As soon as the unified action being somehow 'notices' this shift, the action-focused experience seems to evaporate and the being is returned to an existence that divides the act from the being who enacts it, that separates self from other or self from world. (Spinelli, 2015, p. 103)

His use of the term 'unified action being' is a way of circumventing the static noun that 'action' in itself is. By adding the verb 'being' he highlights the movement of the action. Now, let us imagine that I have an experience of complete unity and I notice this experience. By the very act of expressing, it through normal language, I can choose to refer to it as "I had this experience of unity" and in doing so I am distancing the *I* that was experiencing it from the experience itself. Inevitably this experience becomes something distinct from the *I*, which compromises unity. One might argue that the very act of 'noticing' unified action being shifts the relation in the direction of an 'I/It' relationship as the I and the other is, at least partially, objectified.

Worlding is heavily tied to an action-based experience of *being* and has connotations to that of the implicate order, which I will now elaborate.

3.3.1 Worlding and the Implicate Order

Despite their similarities, I argue that worlding and the implicate order serve different purposes in a psychological context. The implicate order serves as a broad scope for

understanding the metaphysics allowing undivided wholeness that is not local to any one subject but permeates everything. In contrast, worlding is narrower as it has its offset in lived experience *being*. I therefore argue that worlding can be understood as the experience of enfolding and unfolding of the implicate order at a pre-reflective level. Interestingly, the very act of describing the implicate order is in itself objectifying and therefore violating it, but at the current moment it serves as the best basis of understanding the conditions of *being*. This is a further argument as to why the implicate order per definition is immeasurable and undefinable as argued in chapter 2.3.

3.3.2 Embodiment

Although worlding cannot be described and grasped by language, it is nevertheless experienced as embodied unified action, as we experience every aspect of *being* through our bodies (Spinelli, 2015). In regard to worlding and embodiment, Spinelli writes the following:

> At a worlding level, our *embodiment* is pre-reflective and action-centred. It is, as far as our language can express it, the 'feeling-flow-of-action-being'. In this sense, the embodied experience of worlding need not be 'thing-like'. Instead, it is diffuse bodily experience prior to its being located within a structure labelled as 'the body'. (Spinelli, 2015, p. 114)

As embodiment is pre-reflective it is per definition immeasurable and undefinable, because trying to measure and/or define it would bring it to a reflective level and violate its nature. The term 'feeling-flow-of-action-being' can best, to my interpretation, be understood as the pre-reflective sense of feeling the world that cannot quite be grasped or explained, but we know it is there and is in constant movement. Where Spinelli's (2015) idea of embodiment becomes really interesting for the purpose of this thesis, is the sentence 'prior to its being located'. On the back of this, we can thus argue that bodily experience need not be limited to the physical confinements of the structure that is 'the body'. This makes some interesting room for understanding embodiment in the light of the implicate order.

For us to experience something at any level there must be some resemblance of consciousness, allowing us to draw inferences between consciousness and embodiment.

We earlier argued that consciousness is a projection of the implicate order, which is a higher-dimensional reality (see chapter 2.3.2), meaning that embodiment is also to be understood as a projection from the implicate order. As the higher-dimensional reality does not abide the spatial and temporal laws that we are confined by through our action-movement, our pre-reflective embodied experience can therefore be understood as having the possibility of unfolding 'outside' of our bodily structure at *any place and time*. It is first, when we notice this experience of worlding that it evaporates, and it is impossible to make sense of. Such experiences must nevertheless be impossible to comprehend and leave us confused and overwhelmed. My interpretation of embodiment in this sense in regard to existential anxiety (see chapter 3.1.3) is that our worlding experience oftentimes is very dissonant from the worldview with which we try to understand our embodied experience, leaving us incomplete, as we allow ourselves to be separated from our very *being* in the world. What this, per definition, incomplete worldview encompasses will further be unfolded and elaborated in the following chapters.

3.4 Unfolding Worldview

Worldview is a term that is not local to Spinelli (2015), and I use it in conjunction with Bohm's (1980) description of the explicate order (see chapter 2.2), whereto I will use worldview and the explicate order synonymously throughout the rest of the thesis. Where Bohm (1980) is rooted within the world of physics, and his theory on the explicate order is well-founded in regard to theories of physics, Spinelli (2015) is more focused on the lived experience of how we understand our *being* on a psychological level.

3.4.1 Temporality

As the worldview is temporally and spatially essence-bound (Spinelli, 2015), we will start off by elaborating what the temporal aspect of this entails in regard to the thesis. Note that notions of temporality and spatiality may differ between different worldviews, and that the following chapters refer to the apparent metaphysical nature of these terms. Spinelli's (2015) way of understanding temporality is heavily tied to the Bohm's (1980) idea of unfolding and enfolding within the present moment, and he adds

How we relate to time, our dialogue with it, reveals us as beings whose existence is 'captured' as essence *in* time and yet, just as significantly, it can also be said that time is *in* our being (Spinelli, 2015, p. 95)

By saying that our existence is captured as *essence* in time, we acknowledge the inescapable flow of time that we are bound by; and by stating that 'time is *in* our being', we acknowledge the past, future and present as unfolding as part of our being. In other words, the observable and measurable elements of moving *things* through time can be understood in discrete and quantifiable periods of time. But the *experience* of time differs from this, as previously argued in chapter 2.3.1. Spinelli (2015) focuses on the therapeutic aspects of not viewing time as static or historically fixed, but rather reconstructed in the given moment. Adding to this he adds "*the past exists in the present*" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 97), and that the past is future-directed, further strengthening the argument that the past unfolds into the present moment of experience. Reconstructing the past helps us maintain who we are at the present moment.

There is but one question; where does our experience of time occur? One might argue that such experience is deeply subjective and inaccessible to others, but by understanding temporality in regard to the implicate order, nothing is inherently inaccessible to a given subject (see chapter 2.3). I argue that *the past, future and present existing at the given moment are deeply enfolded within the implicate order, which encompasses a potential for it to be unfolded at any given region in time and space*. In other words, your memories are potentially accessible to me and might unfold through worlding, but as this notion of accessibility is very strange to (at least) a western understanding of what can happen, it will likely be overridden by my dominating worldview.

Imagine that one of your childhood memories suddenly unfolds to me, but as I am unable to make sense of it through my worldview, I can merely disregard it as "a strange experience" and think nothing further of it.

3.4.2 Spatiality

For the purpose of understanding spatiality, our positioning in space, Spinelli (2015) writes:

> While we exist in space, space is neither static nor separate from us; its
> dimensions and shape are not merely physical but also, and always, imbued with,
> and reflective of, our existence concerns. (p. 101)

Space itself thus cannot be viewed as distinct and existing in itself as it abides the principles of relatedness. The perception of a given space might differ between different observers. Think of two people entering a relatively tight space, where the first of the two people suffer from claustrophobia. The first person will likely experience the space as being smaller than it actually is and feel a certain level of anxiety, whereas the second person likely will merely observe the space being relatively small without it inducing the same level of discomfort.

My understanding of Spinelli's (2015) argument for spatiality, is that it is founded in the lived experience of *being* in relation to space. The same can be said about Bohm (1980), as his theory is also based on the experience (see chapter 2.3.1); but Bohm does add another layer to spatiality in regard to the explicate order being a projection of the implicate order. This strengthens the argument that space is not static and separate, but at the same time allows a certain region of space, or a sub-totality, to appear at different regions of space simultaneously. Relatedness in regard to spatiality is thus not limited to subjective experience.

As these two previous chapters have unfolded and discussed what is meant by spatiality and temporality, a gap still exists between the metaphysical world and how we navigate it. I will therefore discuss what we, arguably, are able to control and how these interplays with the preceding assumptions.

3.4.3 Control

Control has been heavily discussed with regards to locus of control with an initial systemic either/or mentality, where Bisgaard (2021) calls for moving away from the classical 'internal' *or* 'external' to a dialogical approach in its complexity with a dynamic approach incorporating the semiotically mediated and situated human mind. Locus of control in this context is understood as a dynamic both/and stance that is subject to each specific context, where it reflects past experience in anticipation of the future. As 'locus' is implicit in 'control', I will simply use the term 'control' in its situated, past-to-future-oriented-meaning.

I argue that control is heavily interwoven with uncertainty, as mentioned in chapter 3.1.2, and due to uncertain uncertainty being a core principle, certain control can never be accomplished. I argue that control is inseparable from order and stability/security (see figure 3.1), and therefore could readily be applied to the worldview. As worlding consists of opposites to worldview, we can apply *uncontrollability* to worlding. I choose to add these terms, as I argue they are inescapable in conjunction with relatedness. I cannot fully control other people nor myself.

Understanding these concepts in regard to spatiality and temporality, we are inherently limited in what we can control. I cannot choose to be at any given time, nor can I fully control where I am. A banal example is that I want to go from my apartment to the other end of town. I am limited in my movement through space and time that I cannot appear at the apartment two minutes prior to this given moment, and I also have to traverse the distance between the two places. If I am waiting for the bus, I cannot control whether it will be exactly on time or arrive ten minutes late, nor can I control the speed of the bus. I am bound by an order dictating what I can and cannot do, and what I can and cannot control. This order can be unfolded through the laws of physics, which make it possible to predict how long it will take me to get there with a level of uncertainty; but nevertheless, is this order, or worldview, incomplete as I will never fully be able to predict and control everything that might interfere with my movement. I might sprain my ankle on the way, or the bus driver might have fallen ill; I cannot know for certain, but I can assume some *notion of control* over the given situation in regard to my worldview.

Moving to an example of uncontrollability in regard to worlding. Acknowledging my uncertain uncertainty, in a spontaneous moment some distant memory appears to me, and I completely forget where I am and what time it is for but a brief moment. I am powerless in regard to when, what and where worlding occurs. I can try to induce it i.e., through meditation, but I can never for certain know if or when I will have such an experience. As the perception of control is part of the worldview, I further argue that control is a reflective action. Uncontrollability is thus the natural state of worlding, and our *being* and control is something we assume as to make sense of our *being*. Through this meaning-making process, trying to control *some thing* inevitably fosters an I/It relation, as I argued earlier in chapter 3.1.1 that the I/It relation encompasses control.

3.4.4 Embodied Existential Insecurities

As worlding and worldview are opposites and the latter is our reflective understanding of the world, it must as adequately as possible explain worlding and at the same time remain sufficiently structured for us to navigate in (Spinelli, 2015). Think of the previous example regarding meditation; my worldview encompasses potential for worlding to occur outside of my control, but I am nevertheless somewhat prepared for what might appear in a relatively controlled setting. However, "If the stability of the worldview is an attempt rather than an achievement, then our worldview experience is *existentially insecure*.", which to my understanding refers to that if my worldview is rigid and attempting to fit worlding into it, it is at the risk of destabilization at the occurrence of contradicting experiences, leaving it *existentially insecure*. These insecurities are embodied in the sense that they are not purely cognitive or conceptual, but always interweave action, feeling and thought. They can be encompassed in "concerns surrounding *continuity, dispositional stances and identity*" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 119). Continuity refers to a continuation of *being* or staying alive. Dispositional stances refer to how we perceive things are or should be. Identity refers to how we understand and classify ourselves and others.

3.4.5 Primary Structures

To better understand the worldview and the practical implementations of it, Spinelli (2015) introduces three primary structures that are as follows:

The *self-construct* reflects worldview experiences from the structural focus of 'self' or 'I'. [...]

The *other-construct* reflects worldview experiences whose structural focus is either concerned with

a. that which is about or directed to 'an other' or 'others' in general.[...]

b. the ways in which 'an other' or 'others' impact upon the self-structure.[...]

The *world-construct* reflects worldview experiences whose structural focus is either concerned with

a. that which is about or directed to the 'world', be it in terms of its living and non-living components and/or its physical, environmental, biological, social, cultural, moral and spiritual dimensions. [...]

b. the ways in which 'the world' impacts upon the self-structure. (p. 122f)

The self is regarded as a construct that is part of the worldview and therefore not something existing in itself. Understanding this in relation to sub-totalities as earlier mentioned (see chapter 2.1.1), we can further argue that the *self* refers to the sub-totality that is a human, but is not limited to this, and can be constructed in any shape or form. The *other-construct* can in this way be understood in regard to dialogicality, which I will elaborate in chapter (4.4), as it at a surface level can be understood as a bi-directional interaction between something classified as distinct from the self. The same can be said about the *world-construct*, albeit this refers to larger and potentially more abstract constructs, such as morality and spirituality.

3.4.6 Fusing Embodied Existential Insecurities and Primary Structures

For the purpose of understanding the interplay between embodied existential insecurities and primary structures, Spinelli (2015, p. 124) formed a grid to visualize their interaction (See figure 3.2)

	SELF-CONSTRUCT	OTHER-CONSTRUCT	WORLD-CONSTRUCT
INSECURITIES CONCERNED WITH CONTINUITY	I need to binge in order to stay alive.	You'll kill your self if you keep eating that junk. Your look just destroys me.	Mother Earth is dying. An apple a day keeps me healthy.
INSECURITIES CONCERNED WITH DISPOSITIONAL STANCES	I'm not allowed to ever make mistakes.	Young people today don't seem to hold any values. You have no clue as to what I believe.	Bodies have no moral qualms. Thatcher's Britain shaped the person I've become.
INSECURITIES CONCERNED WITH IDENTITY	I'm a cat-person.	You're a complete stranger. You think I'm a saint.	Reality is a particle thinking it's a wave. And *vice-versa*. No genome chart is ever going to define me.

Figure 3.2 - visualization of embodied existential insecurities and primary structures

As the focus of this thesis is on intersubjectivity, I will further elaborate the insecurities concerned with the self-construct and the other-construct. In regard to intersubjectivity, I argue that these structures are duality-based in the sense that they are explicated as being

something different than one-another, which contrasts the nondual worlding experience. I therefore argue that intersubjectivity is primarily dualistic on a worldview level.

We now have a basis for understanding what is meant by the *self* on a worldview level through the examples in figure 3.2. Starting with insecurities concerned with continuity, these can be substituted with perceived criteria for staying alive. I could say that "I need to finish this thesis before the deadline or I will die", which might be a bit much, but I create a criterion that is finishing this thesis before the deadline, which if not upheld will subsequently lead me towards death or *non-being*. Note that this example and the ones appearing in figure 3.2 are all rigid, and might be phrased in a more plastic way, such as "I don't know whether I can continue to live, if I don't finish this thesis before the deadline." This way I circumvent the apparent certainty of the former statement and am more flexible if I fail to meet the constructed criteria.

Following in line with my previous example, we can formulate an insecurity regarding dispositional stances: "I'm not allowed to make any errors throughout my thesis". If I find errors after I have handed it in, this will cause me great distress due to the rigidity of the constructed criteria. In the same manner as before, I can instead phrase it as: "I do my best not to make any errors throughout my thesis". The plasticity of this statement allows for preemptively relieving the anxiety associated with the inevitable errors, leaving me better suited to tackle the uncertain uncertainty of how this will all turn out. We can then take it one step down to insecurities concerned with identity, where I can construct the following criteria: "I am a very smart person." Now let us imagine that whoever reads this thinks I am not a very smart person and confronts me about it, I will feel great levels of distress and existential anxiety. However, if I formulate the criteria as follows: "I *believe* myself to be a smart person", I am acknowledging that is my experience, leaving it more resistant to contradicting experiences.

Moving onto the other-construct, the insecurities are bi-directional in the sense that my insecurities are relating to what I perceive about others and what I perceive others to perceive about me. We can change my examples of insecurities regarding the self-construct and direct them towards an other, such as "I need to finish this thesis before the deadline or my supervisor will kill me". Thus the issues of a rigid worldview arises at all levels. Importantly are how contradictory worldview stances can exist within this schematic, giving importance not only to looking at one of the structures or insecurities, as they co-exist and are deeply

interwoven (Spinelli, 2015). Existential anxiety does thus not only occur in the interaction between worlding and worldview but can also be the cause of the worldview contradicting itself at different levels.

3.5 Worlding and Worldview - a Unified Polarity Continuum

Up to this point I have made relatively sharp distinctions between worlding and worldview to make the concepts more comprehensible, but if we take a look at how it plays out in experience *being*, they co-exist and cannot be separated. They are thus "perhaps most adequately considered as extremes in a unified polarity continuum" (Spinelli, 2015, p. 105). This therefore also applies to the aspects of worlding and worldview, such as *meaninglessness* versus *meaning*, *chaos* versus *order*, *process* versus *substance* etc. Spinelli (2015) further argues

> that the interplay between worlding and the worldview enhances the likelihood of the continuation of **being** [...] The combination of worlding and the worldview permits experiential strategies that navigate between the extremes of unrelenting Order and unceasing Chaos. (p. 112f)

If we have trouble comprehending the overwhelming and chaotic nature of worlding, the scales of balance can be tipped in a manner that threatens our existence, and we can introduce a more rigid and orderly worldview to maintain a harmonious existence. On the other hand, if we are stuck in a too rigid worldview, we can chase chaotic experiences to tip the scales in the other direction. Harmony in this case refers to the plasticity of the worldview to fit the worlding experience in a satisfactory manner. We can readily apply Bohm's (1980) argument that we should adopt curvilinear orders to better understand reality (see chapter 2.1.2) as curvilinearity implies a greater level of plasticity of the given continuum, wherefore this can help alleviate existential anxiety. The problem of disharmony arises when the worldview is cemented in a rigid structure that is resistant and deflecting experience that challenges it (Spinelli, 2015). What is meant by *deflecting experience* is further explained in the following chapter.

3.5.1 Dissociation and Sedimentation

Now that we have addressed worlding and worldview and argued that experience can be deflected, I will use the terms *dissociation* and *sedimentation* (Spinelli, 2015) to further understand this dynamic. *Sedimentation* refers to a worldview that

> continue[s] to maintain the existing structure's experiential inadequacy or inconsistency [...] sedimentations must override any experientially derived challenge that is construed as threatening or destabilising of their certainty, security and fixedness (Spinelli, 2015, p. 126).

In this sense, experience that is contradictory to the sedimented worldview is overridden and therefore either reflectively denied as being something else which is more coherent with the worldview, or left out completely, through *dissociation*. Think of the example in chapter 3.4.4 where I state that "I am smart". This statement can readily be understood as a sedimentation due to its rigidity. If the sedimentation is challenged, I can choose to either ignore it or disregard the other as "not knowing what they are talking about". Spinelli (2015) further argues that sedimentation is necessary to view *self-, other-* and *world constructs* as relatively permanent and fixed essences. How sedimentation occurs and the nature of it is widely discussed, but he argues it is evident that it occurs.

Dissociation in this regard refers to "the worldview's maintenance of a sedimentation by its distancing from, denial or disownership of the impact and consequences of experiential challenges upon it" (Spinelli, 2015, 126). Note that these processes are not necessarily consciously available as the reflective process involved in maintaining the sedimented worldview can itself be distanced from. These processes are necessary to maintain the relative stability and certainty of the worldview and can occur at all times regardless of our awareness towards it. Spinelli (2015) further adds that some sedimentations are extremely fixed and resistant to redefinition due to them being so deep-rooted that only extreme challenges have the potential of changing them. The worldview's structural bases are founded on these deep-rooted, core or foundational sedimentations that in turn influence all other later sedimentations. Uncertainty in this regard can then be applied to destabilizing these sedimentations, as we cannot for certain know how it will affect the other aspects of the worldview nor its duration or extent (Spinelli, 2015). For example, if I change the worldview

stance that "I am smart" to "I believe myself to be smart", I have no way of predicting how this ripple throughout the rest of my being, as "being smart" might constitute a foundational sedimented worldview, leaving me at the mercy of uncertain uncertainty.

Fusing this idea of the worldview with the implicate order, allows us to see worldviews, sedimented or not, as *enfolded through the implicate order*, and thereby manifest themselves through experiences of worlding.

3.5.2 Authenticity

As a final remark on Spinelli (2015), I will introduce his idea of *authenticity* and *inauthenticity*, as it is heavily discussed in the world of existential psychology. Authenticity usually refers to *being true to oneself*, but as the self is a construction, how does it make sense to be true to something we, ourselves, have constructed? Instead, he argues that "authenticity is a challenge to remain open to and embrace *that which is there in the way that it is there*" (Spinelli, 2015). Thus, authenticity can be regarded as embracing worlding and inauthenticity can be understood as *being* through a sedimented worldview. If we are fully authentic, we will be enveloped in unceasing chaos that can be extremely anxiety inducing. Therefore, being authentic is not a goal in itself, but rather a term to be understood in regards to how much worlding is *being* at the given moment. Inauthenticity is suddenly a necessity for the continuation of *being* and both words lose their respective overly positive and negative connotations. The goal should be to have a harmonious existence within the boundaries of authenticity and inauthenticity.

3.6 Existential Anchor

To better understand foundational worldviews, I employ a new term, an *existential anchor*. *Existential* refers to our basis of experience in regard to foundational worldviews coupled with the ever-encompassing *existential anxiety*, and *anchor* refers to being able to explore worlding without being consumed by chaos; just like a ship can drift with the stream as far as the anchor allows it. The use of the word anchor is heavily inspired by Bowlby's theory that it is only when the child "is confident his base is secure that he dares press forward and take risks" (Bowlby, 1988, p. 11). By a secure base is meant that the child is certain that they will be comforted and have their needs tended to, when they return (Bowlby, 1988). How the child handles the overwhelmingness of the world is thus placed somewhere outside their

physical body, and I argue that this interaction, whatever it includes, becomes *enfolded* into the implicate order, where it later has the potential of manifesting itself through worlding. We are inherently intersubjective from birth. The child-other interaction during infancy can further be understood as being pre-reflective on a motor-level, as the child does not know that they are using their muscles, which muscles are being used and to not use the ones they have not yet learned to use (Baldwin, 1892). I argue that reflectivity is heavily tied to volition (as proposed by Baldwin, 1892), as articulating needs and desires requires the ability to consciously process said needs and desires. Relatedness on a worldview level, where the world is perceived as consisting of objects, can best be understood in relation to Baldwin's (1892) theory on persistent imitation, where the child tries to alleviate distress by persistently imitating previous actions that have achieved the goal at hand. Satisfaction occurs when the child succeeds in reproducing a 'copy' of what they are trying to do, and when said copy has been achieved the reaction often becomes habitual (Baldwin, 1892). I argue that persistent imitation forms the basis for the creation of early worldviews that have a high chance of becoming sedimented and foundational. It is through these interactions that a secure base has the potential of being created, and early interaction with the world, arguably, proves important in establishing the 'base' that the worldview is later built upon. The more secure or stable the basis, the better it can withstand inevitable challenges without being broken apart.

As a secure base entails stability and certainty, the early experience is synonymous with sedimented worldviews. "I *need* to know that I will be safe when I come home." I argue that this overt focus on sedimentation stands in contrast to the instantly emerging worlding, where at birth, there arguably is no constructed resistance to chaos as no apparent worldviews are yet created. We are born into chaos and *fixate* onto particular apparent objects, typically the mother at first, and from there on the potential of exploring more of worlding occurs. We can now understand worldviews as not being purely reflective, but also emerge on a pre-reflective level, albeit inexpressible. I further argue that these pre-reflective worldviews, due to them not directly appearing to our conscious experience, are immediately enfolded into the implicate order, where they exist disregarding time and space. Interestingly, this way of understanding enfoldment falls well in line with *internalization*, but as internalization implies an inside and outside of a subject, I choose to circumvent the term. By understanding enfolded worldviews as existing within the implicate order they *coexist* with the *self* at the present moment. I further argue that they can both *uncontrollably* unfold through worlding, or *reflectively* be unfolded through reconstruction of memories.

Thus, it can be said that the child's, or persons, foundational worldview, whether it is secure or not, co-exists with them throughout time and space in the present moment with constant potential of unfoldment. Further, due to the nature of the implicate order, these are not located *within* some structure of the self, but rather *the self is structured around the foundational worldviews*. What is enfolded in one person's worldview might unfold to *an other* in a way that is difficult to understand, due to our general western worldview being fixated on duality between individual subjects that have an interior and exterior.

As an ending remark, I argue that we can understand the 'length' of the *existential anchor* in contrast to how well the dominating foundational worldview allows a person to *explore worlding* and comprehend it in a harmonious manner. If the existential anxiety becomes too overwhelming, the subject can then return to the secure base that co-exists enfolded in the implicate order and seek comfort. If comfort is not accessible, I argue that the worldview will be more rigidly structured to ensure not being torn apart på chaos. One might say that the longer the rope of the existential anchor, the deeper waters can be explored without falling adrift in the vast seas of chaos.

4. The Explicate Order and Semiotic Field Theory

Where the previous chapters explained three important concepts: The implicate order, worlding and the explicate order/worldview, I will now, at the risk of violating said concepts, try to operationalize them in a coherent and unified model. Before we can do that, I will supplement the worldview with semiotic field theory to understand the dynamics between the three concepts as existing through undivided wholeness. The goal is to synthesize new models that incorporate the metaphysical assumptions about the implicate order and worlding into a more profound and unified understanding of the explicate order.

4.1 Why Semiotics?

Semiotics refer to understanding the world through signs. Eco (1976) elaborates on the chemist and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce's notion of signs. He differentiates between two kinds of objects to understand signs:

> There is a dynamical object that "by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation" and there is an immediate object that is "the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign. (Eco, 1976, p. 1461)

The dynamical object is the act of doing something in order to have a certain perceptual experience, such as mixing certain chemicals to attain new properties of the given object (Eco, 1976). The immediate object on the other hand is the very product of representations of the sign and therefore shaping our experience of said object. He further adds that *meaning* is "the translation of a sign into another system of signs" (Eco, 1976, p. 1464). By fusing meaning with signs, a direct link between semiotics and worldview (as referenced in chapter 3.2) is bound. Eco (1976) refers to objects, and as argued in chapter 2.1, I substitute this with the term sub-totalities, as this is more in line with the implicate order. I therefore argue that the worldview is to be understood as a system of signs, and that these signs refer to sub-totalities in the dynamical sense, where we interact with the given sub-totality to shape it into fitting our worldview, and in the immediate sense that our experience of a given sub-totality is shaped by our worldview. We may *perceive* these sub-totalities as objects from the worldview standpoint, but it does not change the nature of *what is being perceived* in its

undivided totality. Signs can be categorized through the holomovement (see chapter 2.1.2) in the sense that much like photons have imagery enfolded into them, which is unfolded upon observation, signs are enfolded with an infinitude of elements that unfold upon observation. The very act of observation is through reflective thought and therefore subject to the worldview, causing new elements to be enfolded into sign as they are unfolded in an uncertain unpredictable manner.

I further argue that signs themselves are not static points in time and space, but due to their dynamical nature, we can perceive them as *dynamic fields* (as done in Branco & Valsiner, 2010), which also goes well in hand with intersubjective fields (Blackstone, 2007).. In chapter 2.1, I criticized theory of relativity for its focus on fields as this assumes a center of the field and therefore can be understood as entities; however, this is not an issue with regards to signs, as we are referencing our *experience of worldview*, which is very much centered on specific perceived *objects* as having specific and general characteristics. Using fields as a way of understanding our reflective experience is thus loyal to the perception of objects and acknowledging that the object does not exist as *one* thing, but rather multiple interpretations within dynamic semiotic fields and the implicate order. Signs themselves are therefore also classified as sub-totalities for clarity.

4.2 Gefühston and Einfühlung

To further understand the discrepancy between worlding and worldview (see chapter 3.2), where the latter is structured through dynamic semiotic fields, I draw on Valsiner's (2010) idea that "we feel *into* the world" (p. 43). In reference to this thesis, I understand this *into-ness*, as our feeling is deeply enfolded in the world; the implicate order. Valsiner (2010) argues that the *ambivalence* experienced between our feeling and rational nature, making us want to prove that we are rational. I argue that rationality in this sense is in regard to the confinements of the worldview. He further adds:

> This aspect of our living makes it impossible to operate with the primacy of the rational (cognitive) side of our psychological functioning. This affective primacy is encoded into the affective nature of the simplest building blocks of our psyche—sensations. The most elementary sensations that specify "something is out there" are flavored with feeling—they have Gefühston [...] "the tone-of-

feeling." It is on the one hand a constructive reaction to the sensation trigger that leads to immediate subjective reply and constitutes the material for generalization (and, eventually, hyper-generalization) processes. (Valsiner, 2010, p. 43)

The impossibility to operate with primacy on a cognitive level is heavily intertwined with the discussion in chapter 3.5 between worlding and worldview in the sense that the cognitive level can be understood as elements of the reflective worldviews. The affective primacy can be closer tied to worlding as sensations are pre-verbal and pre-reflective. *Feeling* and *Gefühston* is thus heavily tied to worlding in its pre-reflective and pre-verbal sense through the notion of 'the tone-of-feeling', which indicates difficulty describing it.

[T]he "feeling in" (Einfühlung) by the person into the situation. Pre-verbal generalization allows for the organism to maintain previous experiences for further use, but does not require their encoding through signs (Branco & Valsiner, 2010, p. 246).

As Valsiner (2010) states that Gefühston is the basis for all Einfühlung, I argue that Gefühston refers to the pre-reflective state of *feeling* before it emerges, therefore making it more akin to worlding and I will further use it synonymously with worlding; Einfühlung subsequently is the transformative process of worlding and worldview colliding as it is more subjectively action and movement oriented.

4.3 Dynamic Field Model

The interaction between the different elements constituting *being* are depicted in Figure 4.1 in a two-dimensional dynamic field model to visualize the interactions and their respective movements. This model can also be understood as visualizing subjective experience *being*.

Figure 4.1 *A dynamic field model of the interactions between worlding and worldview enfolded in the implicate order.*

The interaction with worlding and worldview is deeply enfolded and unfolding in the implicate order as depicted by the arrows moving around the border of worlding. The interaction is more complex than depicted, but as this model has the purpose of visualizing the interaction between the different elements it has been heavily simplified in a two-dimensional dynamic field model. Multiple instances of the elements depicted can occur simultaneously and due to the principle of non-locality and non-causality allows for the field to emerge at multiple places throughout time and space simultaneously. The immeasurability and indefinability of the implicate order makes such a model inherently impossible, why this is merely a simplified visualization in a metaphorical sense. In figure 4.1 the following elements are shown:

1. The implicate order is borderless on the outsides of the model to show undivided wholeness that permeates everything. It is immeasurable and undefinable, but nevertheless makes the ground for all experience and all experience exists within it. All experience is deeply enfolded in this order to emerge through worlding.

2. Enfolded worldviews exist in the implicate order before emerging to worlding pulsating between unfolding into worlding and deeper enfoldment in the implicate order.

3. The worldview constitutes our reflective *being* in the world, which can be understood as our reflective experience of the world through signs. It is constantly changing in relation to sedimentations and contradictions.

4. Worlding is our pre-reflective experience of *being*, which can be understood as a *feeling* that cannot be put into words. It is deeply enfolded in the implicate order and the implicate order is directly unfolding within this *space*. It also houses the immediate enfolded worldviews that are present at the given moment.

5. Einfühlung shows the transformative motion of worlding becoming worldview and how we become aware of the *feeling* unfolding through worlding to become parts of the worldview after reflective integration.

6. The core sedimentation in its brick-like shape shows the resistance to movement and blockage of worlding unfolding into worldview.

7. Dissociation shows how worlding-about-to-become-worldview is blocked from unfolding into worldview through (core) sedimentation, causing it to search for another entry into the reflective worldview.

8. (Core) sedimentations have the possibility of changing as something contradictory to the worldview structure enfolds as worlding, rippling through the entire *being* with uncertain uncertainty as to the consequences of it.

I have made a parenthesis around the word 'core' as it refers to a sedimentation that is not necessarily a core sedimentation. This model is heavily limited in its depiction, and I want to emphasize that multiple occurrences of each of the elements within this model occur simultaneously in an undefinable and immeasurable way. Further by understanding the different elements of model 4.1 as sub-totalities, they both constitute each other and are constituted by each other. Thus, each element of the model can be understood as having the entire structure enfolded in them. Note that I am using the term *enfolding* instead of *internalization*, as this circumvents the separateness followed by the inner-outer dichotomy as implied by the latter (see chapter 3.5).

4.4 Dialogicality

As I have argued that internalization has an inherent separateness to it due to the inner-outer dichotomy, I argue dialogicality is subject to the same critique due to the subject-object dichotomy. The very word 'dialogue' stems from the Greek words 'dia', meaning 'through' and 'logos' meaning 'word' or 'meaning'; dialogue means '*through* meaning'. To understand dialogue, I use Bühler's organon model (see figure 4.2) (Valsiner, 2007, p. 85).


Figure 4.2 *The Organon Model as proposed by Bühler*

The Model is composed of four major elements and interaction between them; the sender, the receiver, the object-states and the triangle in the middle where it all coalesces. The sender *expresses* themself on the basis of *personal* subjectivity and sends a message. The receiver actively reconstructs the message which is encoded in signs that in turn constitutes the *appeal*; the impact of the message on the receiver. Both the sender and the receiver are located in an external world, object-states, which is reflected through language; *representation*. "However, given the non-sameness of these two positions (sender, receiver), the same objective world can never [be] the same from two different personal standpoints" (Valsiner, 2007, p. 85). The non-sameness of subjective worlds is heavily emphasized as a core assumption in this model, which is depicted through the separation between the sender and the receiver. This contradicts intersubjectivity as I earlier argued that the self, and therefore subjectivity, does not exist in isolation, but is deeply embedded in the implicate order.

I argue that the organon model thus includes some primary assumptions that cannot be disregarded. 1) the subjective states are fundamentally different; 2) subjects are situated in an external world; 3) referencing said external (or subjective) world is semiotically mediated. By referencing an external world, a similar internal world is implied, which constitutes the inner-outer dichotomy, which is conflicting with the implicate order (see chapter 3.5). The emphasis on the subjective states being fundamentally different further localizes the subjective world in an *inner* place that is bordered from the external world. Further, the object-states are not directly depicted as constituting this inner place but emerging as a medium for dialogue; *I therefore argue that dialogue itself must be part of the subjective world and said object-states exist as elements of the subjective state.* This position has some serious implications for the depiction of dialogue, and I want to emphasize the *through* part of dialogue; dialogue is *being through* us.

By further understanding object-states, the top part of model 4.2, as worldviews (wherefore I will further refer to them as such), I argue these are deeply enfolded into our very *being through* the implicate order and thus constitute the subjective state. The implicate order further allows us to understand worldviews as not localized *within* a particular subject, or sub-totality, but existing in undivided wholeness with the potential of unfolding at any given region in time and space due to non-locality and non-causality. I argue that subjective states are synonymous with *consciousness*, wherefore these can be understood as sub-totalities as well (see chapter 2.3.2). Said subjective states - or experience - have been visualized in figure 4.1, and since the sender and receiver both possess (inter)subjective experience, figure 4.1 can replace both sender and receiver (as depicted in figure 4.3). As I argue that subjective experience can unfold at any given point in time and space due to the implicate order, the sharp distinction between sender and receiver is removed as elements of the sender's subjective experience have the potential of unfolding *through* the receiver's subjective experience and vice versa. By emphasizing the *through*-aspect of dialogue we eliminate the inner-outer dichotomy through assumptions of the implicate order.

Figure 4.3 *Dialogue through (inter)subjective experience enfolded in the implicate order*
I have tried to visualize a way of understanding dialogical transformation in relation to figure
4.2. This all un- and enfolds through the implicate order, meaning that the elements of
Einfühlung, sedimentation, worlding and worldview (see figure 4.1) can occur non-causally
simultaneously through both subjective experiences. I have made a parenthesis around 'inter'
in front of 'subjectivity' as I argue that all subjective experience is fundamentally
intersubjective; I will however continue using subjective experience when it is referring to
the immediate experience of the one person. I will further emphasize that this model is
heavily simplified and leaves out many elements enfolding and unfolding in the present
moment. The main purpose of this model is to visualize *the overlap between subjective
experience through the implicate order.*

1. I have named this subjective part *subjective experience 1*, which refers to one
   subjective experience of a sub-totality. To keep the model fairly simple, I have only
   incorporated two subjective experiences, but this might as well entail an infinitude of
   such experiences. For further explanation of subjective experience 1 see figure 4.2.
2. *Subjective experience 2* encompasses all the same elements as the first one. The slight
   overlap between the two subjective experiences serves to visualize their inherent
   inseparability and show the potential for worlding to emerge in both subjective

experiences. What is unfolding might itself be the same element that is projected from the implicate order (see chapter 2.3.2 for clarification), but through the reflective understanding of the unfolding experience it might differ. The sedimentation (red square) in the center of the model serves to depict the differences in subjective experience as a consequence of different sedimentations shaping the subjective understanding of worlding unfolding. The act of describing experiences in any way is done *through* the semiotically structured worldview with all it entails and the chance of two people having the exact same worldview is near impossible, which is how I understand the emphasis on subjective states being fundamentally different. I therefore argue that the reflective aspect of subjective states are fundamentally different in the sense that they are sub-totalities projected from the implicate order, and each sub-totality is inherently unique and therefore different from all else while being inseparable through the implicate order.

I argue that the transformation of a given worldview can be understood in two primary ways: transformation of the worldview and transformation of core sedimentations. These two cannot be separated, but I argue it is important to exemplify both.

3. Transformation of the worldview entails a transformative process that initially bypasses the core sedimentation, that in turn in enfolded in the subjective experience in a manner that is somewhat congruent with the worldview until it reaches the core sedimentation, where it is dissociated and deflected back into the worldview. This transforms both subjective experiences, albeit it might not be explicated, through both being enfolded through the implicate order.

4. Transformation of a core sedimentation can initially be resisted through both subjective experiences but circumvents the core sedimentation in a manner that challenges it to such a degree that the sedimentation itself is forced to change to uphold a desired level of harmony. This transformative process ripples through the implicate order in an uncertain uncontrollable manner that in turn can cause great levels of existential anxiety. An example from this can be a core sedimentation labelled "My father loves me", while the person has also been subject to abuse by the hands of said father; a confrontation with such abuse might challenge the initial core sedimentation in a manner that is uncertainly uncontrollable and has the potential of moving any direction.

Change and movement are fundamental aspects of these intertwining experiences which stand in contrast to the rigidity of core sedimentations. I therefore argue that the perceived

subjective separateness is a consequence of this rigidity that tries to control what unfolds in our subjective experience. Note that I am attributing the potential of exerting control to something beyond the self-construct. The discrepancy between undeniable movement and perceived staticity can in turn be understood as the difference between chaos and order falling under the respective categories of worlding and worldview (see chapter 3.2). The clash between these forces in turn arouses *feelings* of contradiction and ambivalence - the distinction between either/or or both/and stances. Said ambivalence constantly arouses existential anxiety in the present moment due to the necessity of a worldview to navigate the world. The transformative processes can be seen as unpredictably delving into chaos, which with uncertain uncertainty can arouse great levels of overwhelmingness and existential anxiety.

Understanding this model in the scope of psychological practice, the term *existential anchor* from chapter 3.6 gains its importance. Assuming that subjective experience 1 belongs to the client and subjective experience 2 belongs to the psychologist (see figure 4.3), we can understand the intertwined transformative process directed at the client in the scope of this thesis. As I argued, the existential anchor has a 'length' based on how secure the person is; the perceived level of stability that the person can 'return' to at any given point. The psychologists' role is to establish such an anchor with enough 'length' for the client to venture into perceived problematic core sedimentations and return once they *feel* too overwhelmed. Thus, the psychologists' role is to navigate within the field of *uncertain uncontrollability* to establish a sense of *uncertainly certain security* through the client to combat the potential *feeling* unceasing chaos. As our subjective experience can be understood as a projection of the implicate order, which disregards laws on temporality and spatiality, elements from the past, future or other places have the potential of unfolding through worlding, where the psychologist subsequently must disregard their own sedimented worldviews on what is and is not possible in navigating this *undefinable and immeasurable space as it unfolds.* The psychologists' task is to transform existing worldviews through Einfühlung *through* the client for these transformed worldviews to be more harmonious with the clients' existence as a whole. In other words, the psychologist must 'feel out' the situation, as Bohm (1980) suggests, and act accordingly. Referring back to the discussion on authenticity in chapter 3.5.2, it is not a goal in itself to have a worldview that is more or less true to the experience of worlding. This must be accomplished by the psychologists' deep-rooted *feeling-into-the-other* with the purpose of establishing desired levels of harmony.

I therefore argue the importance of an I/Thou relationship as this entails the client's entire *being*, which I argue is very fruitful and important to achieve such levels of harmony. By simply understanding the client through the scopes of theory an I/It relation will inevitably emerge, as the client is somewhat tainted and reduced to the theoretically founded sedimented worldview of the psychologist. I do, however, argue that theory makes for an excellent tool to combat and *organize* the unceasing chaos that is emerging and might serve as an important tool in the creation of an existential anchor. This can be understood as the 'organization' of experience in a therapeutic setting (Blackstone, 2007). Lastly, I emphasize that the transformation of said worldview and existential anchor as a self-other construct is not limited to the context in which it un- and enfolds but co-exists throughout time and space as part of subjective experience, even if deeply enfolded through the implicate order.

4.5 The Sublime

To conceptualize the both/and feelings we experience, I incorporate the *sublime*, which is a curvilinear transformation of otherwise opposites of *feeling* as shown in figure 4.4. This further fall well in line with Bohm (1980) arguing the need for a curvilinear organismic order, as has also been mentioned in chapter 3.5.


Figure 4.4 *transformation of linear distinction between opposite feelings transformed curvilinearly through catalytic conditions (Valsiner, 2019, p. 47).*

To understand this curvilinear transformation, Valsiner (2019) writes:

> The original distinction made by opposition pain<>pleasure—which can be viewed as linear—becomes under circumstances (unattainable desire) curvilinear, until the original seemingly distant opposite meet in a new relationship, the tension of pain<that feels > pleasurable (or its equivalent reverse pleasure < that feels > painful). Such tensions—based on the de-linearizing the original linear opposition—produce the sublime. (p. 47)

The opposition of feelings can thus be understood as semiotically mediated with the constant potential of change. I argue that *unattainable desires* are fundamental for understanding the sublime, and that this unattainability creates a need for the worldview to delineate the previously perceived opposites in a new curvilinear order. To build on the example of pleasure and pain, we can assume that a person has an interaction with an *other* which is supposed to be pleasurable but contains great levels of pain. The previous expectation of pure pleasure is challenged and must be restructured to incorporate the experienced levels of pain - this experience can serve as a catalytic condition under which the need for curvilinearity arises. Thus, a new 'category' as *pleasure of pain* can unfold that in turn constitutes the sublime. The sublime is thus a tool of dealing with the initial ambivalence in experience and to alleviate distress the worldview is delineated to incorporate a both/and stance that induces lower levels of existential anxiety.

The development of the sublime in dialogue can thus be understood as the transformative process (3. as depicted in figure 4.3) with the purpose of retaining stability of core sedimentations. The sublime transformation has the purpose of circumventing the contradictions and ambivalence arises as consequence of the core sedimentation being challenged, where a both/and curvilinear stance is adopted to maintain the core sedimentation while also keeping experience from being dissociated, leading to uncertainly unpredictable changes in the entire worldview structure.

> Instead, it is the distressful pleasure that keeps a person in a continuous relation to the given object. The latter is appealing and horrifying at the same time. The affective anticipation of the unreachable—horrifying, yet in principle possible— creates the specific sublime state of the object. (Valsiner, 2019, p. 48)

The sublime exists in the tension between the *in principle possible but unreachable* as an attempt to make the worldview linear to restabilize the worldview. Looking back at the opposites of worlding and worldview (chapter 3.2), we can apply the curvilinearity of said opposites to any element within the two structures, such as *order in chaos* and *chaos in order*. The stability as procured by the worldview is *unreachable but in principle possible*, which I argue is what we strive for. The sublime can therefore be understood as the *curvilinear transformative process of maintaining a harmonious relation between worlding and*

worldview. The world as we experience it pre-reflectively is chaotic, but our reflective organization of it is orderly. *Thus, every instance of opposites must therefore exist curvilinearly.* Referring back to chapter 3.5 on worlding and worldview, I therefore argue that worlding and worldview is to be understood as a *curvilinear unified polarity continuum*.

4.6 The Sublime, Embodied Existential Anxieties and Primary Structures

As every experience contains some level of sublimity due to the inherent curvilinear unified polarity continuum between worlding and worldview, we can use embodied existential anxieties and primary structures to understand the transformative process of worldview structures *through* the sublime. By further understanding all experience as unfolding and enfolding during this transformative process, I further argue that the transformative process occurs on a pre-reflective as well as reflective level, giving rise to *feelings* with the purpose of retaining *unobtainable stability of the worldview*. The curvilinearity must be part of the distinction between self-, other- and world-construct, leaving them closer tied and with the possibility of fusing with one-another as shown in figure 4.5.


Figure 4.5 *The curvilinear transformative process in interaction with self- and other-construct, having the potential of self-other becoming one being enfolded in linear worldview structure.*

I have visualized the potential of self and other becoming one and thus being enfolded in the worldview structure. If the worldview structure does not permit that self and other can

become one (as with the organon model in figure 4.2), the self- and other are understood as separate on the reflective worldview level and the experience can be understood as belonging to the other on said level. This can cause new tensions if the experience is contradictory with the new worldview, creating a dialogical leap, to another structure. An example is: 'I hate myself' in interaction with another person. If this contradicts my worldview, the tension can be overcome in the interaction with an other by enfolding my self-hate into the experience and relieving the tension by transforming the experience as belonging to the other. If I experience the other doing something that contradicts my worldview experience, such as saying "I love you", the worldview is thus challenged by contradiction and the experience can either be overcome through dissociation by disowning the experience; or transforming the worldview to a state of "the world hates me". This curvilinear transformative process is the very essence and creation of the sublime, albeit if it unfolds in a rigid worldview that persists on its linearity.

As this process is enfolded into the implicate order it is not bordered by the one person's subjective experience but has the potential of unfolding in the other's subjective experience as well thus makes it intersubjective. *Therefore, the notion of "you hate me" as said by the first person can unfold in a manner of "I hate you" through the other person*. This process of unfolding then occurs through that person's worldview structure as a whole, which then in turn transforms said worldview. Note that these interactions need not be verbal or in any way perceptually available, as they can unfold and enfold disregarding time and space through the implicate order.

As I have argued that the worldview is inherently curvilinear, a sharp distinction can no longer be made between embodied existential insecurities (see chapter 3.4.4). Thus, the transformative process through sublimation must have the potential of moving between insecurities concerned with continuity, dispositional stances and identity in a similar fashion as that depicted with primary structures in figure 4.5. Referring back to my examples in chapter 3.3.4, the worldviews "I'm not allowed to make any errors throughout my thesis" and "I am a smart person" cannot meaningfully be separated, as they both arguably revolve around the same core sedimentation, which is revealed through its unfolding through being challenged. I therefore argue that *the transformative process through sublimation is to be understood as a curvilinear reorganization of experience through worldview, which in turn is enfolded and unfolded in a manner that is the most harmonious at the present moment with*

the purpose of alleviating overwhelming existential anxiety; the purpose of which is to retain an *uncertainly unobtainable stability* of the subjective experience.

4.7 Hypergeneralization

Throughout this chapter I have made the argument that the worldview is semiotically structured and in turn enfolded through the implicate order; in this following chapter I will elaborate this process in a hierarchical dynamic field theory to visualize a way of understanding the transformative processes that constitute subjective experience. Figure 4.6 is heavily inspired by the figure seen in Branco & Valsiner (2010, p. 246) and reconfigured to fit the scope of this thesis.


Figure 4.7 *Processes of generalization and hypergeneralization through affective regulation being enfolded through the implicate order.*

I have added another level to the initial model; level 0 the implicate order, as this is key to understanding intersubjectivity in the sense that everything is bound through this level. This development stands in critique to the lack of social dimensions in the original model proposed by (Branco & Valsiner, 2010) thus disregarding intersubjectivity. I will now explain the different levels of this hierarchical model starting from the bottom:

0) Situating dynamic semiotic fields within *the implicate order* allows for an understanding of subjective experience not to be located *within* the person, but rather existing as elements of undivided wholeness through which everything flows. Some aspects of this level are unfolded to level 1 while other aspects resist such unfolding through dissociation due to deep-rooted core sedimentations.

1) *The pre-reflective embodied level* constitutes worlding with the potential of unfolding to the next level upon being noticed. Some elements, however, resist the potential of being noticed through core sedimentations and are enfolded back into worlding or the implicate order. Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate how this process can be understood.

2) Upon first being noticed the feeling exists on a *pre-semiotic level*, meaning it has not yet been actively encoded through signs. This is the conscious experience of *Einfühlung* that upon *noticing* has the potential of moving to level 3. The original model emphasizes differentiation *feeling* based on *physiological arousal* (Branco & Valsiner, 2010), where I argue that *embodied experience* entails not only physiological arousal, but all manner of elements that can unfold into experience to be *noticed*.

3) The initial feeling is then labelled through *specific emotion terms* such as "pain" or "pleasure", which then in turn is enfolded into level 2, which transforms the experience through *new constrained feelings* that are later subject to be re-labelled in new specific emotion terms and are in turn enfolded in both worlding and the implicate order. An example of this is illustrated in figure 4.4.

4) The specific emotion terms are enfolded through *generalized categories of feeling*, which I argue are normatively derived as this level appraises the specific emotion term in regard to its desirability moving onwards to level 5. Note that something being "bad" does not necessarily make it undesirable. The general categorization of the feeling in turn is enfolded in level 2, where it transforms the general pre-semitic feeling similar to that of level 3.

5) The *hyper-generalized affective semiotic field* is indescribable due to its incomprehensible complexity and can therefore only be alluded through metaphor, to which any attempt of doing so will be constrained by reflective action; it constitutes the basis for worlding as it exists pre-reflectively (see chapter 3.3). It is only reflectively accessible through level 4 as describing it metaphorically requires a contextual generalized expression. This level is deeply enfolded through the implicate order and does not only transform the new constrained feeling, but feeds directly into level 1.

Noticeable in this model is that worlding does not only occur on level 1, as I argue the hyper-generalized affective semiotic field constitutes the basis for worlding to even occur. My best effort to describe the movements depicted in this model is as a pulsating-spiraling-flowing-through-instability-and-stability. Level 0 is unceasing chaos and moving through to level 3 we are narrowing the scope of experience reducing it to specific relatively stable emotion terms; after which the scope widens through generalization and hypergeneralization moving to undefinable experience. Note that this is but depicting a fraction of an infinitude of similar processes occurring at the present moment only adding to the complexity of the human psyche.

Intersubjectivity is to be understood *reflectively* on the 3rd and 4th level, where distinctions such as "I" and "other" are constructed and therefore the experience of separateness is enfolded from there. Level 0 through 2 and level 5, however, are pre-reflective, meaning that such constraints to subjective experience are not present; albeit being enfolded. Referring back to chapter 2.4, I argue that our experience of what is *real* is located within the 3rd and 4th level, as these refer to 'things' that are thought about. I further argue that all these processes can occur on a pre-reflective level without us *noticing*, whereas only the 3rd and 4th level have the capacity for reflectivity. As I argue signs are sub-totalities, our reflective interaction with the subjective experience is thus also subject to I/It and I/Thou relations, giving importance to the rigidity of specific emotion terms at level 3. If we do not adopt a curvilinear understanding of emotion, we risk objectifying embodied experience engaging with our subjective experience through an I/It interaction. Even the deeply subjective experience is therefore to be understood as intersubjective. This objectification can be understood in light of sedimentations, and is therefore inevitable, however I do argue the importance of accepting the chaotic and indescribable nature of feeling for a more

harmonious existence. Whether understanding feeling in a particular way is too rigid or too ambiguous cannot be universally ruled as it comes down to the particular moment of experience, and therefore creates a *never-ending dance between order and chaos unfolding subliminally*.

5. Implications for Psychological Research and Practice

As this thesis has moved between incredibly abstract assumptions about the world as a whole and how we interact with it, I have dedicated this chapter to further discuss the direct implications for psychology in regard to research and practice.

5.1 Psychological Research

The argument of the implicate order serves crucial in what ontological stances, I argue one should adopt when doing psychological research, as undivided wholeness is absolutely central. By understanding consciousness and worldview as projections of the implicate order (see Chapters 2.3 and 4.7), intersubjectivity can be understood on two levels - reflective, where we are perceived as separate, and pre-reflective through the implicate order. Thus, separateness between us can be understood as a *fundamental worldview construct.* The implications of the implicate order further disregards universal truths and such worldview constructs, regardless of what they are describing, are to be understood as describing the world to a satisfactory degree within a certain context with the purpose of fostering harmony (see chapter 2.1.2). Context becomes absolutely central in discerning the validity of a given (psychological) theory and straying further from the particular context of where the theory is derived from thus challenges the validity of said theory. I therefore argue that transparency is an absolute necessity to validate a given theory as well as critical examination of the particular boundaries of the theory at hand. The acceptance of no universal truths and deep-founded contextual boundaries further promotes the development of lenient and malleable theories that reflect an uncertain level of uncertainty in the applicability of the given theory. Such theories allow for more creativity within the practical setting of psychological therapy as theories are understood as worldviews in constant transformation.

I further argue that psychological research should be as true to our subjective experience, and as I have argued that worlding and the implicate order exist on the pre-reflective level (see chapter 4.7), psychological research should strive to include pre-reflectivity as this would otherwise undermine crucial elements of (inter)subjective experience. The inclusion of worlding and the implicate order as an ontological basis for developing theories further helps

understand intersubjectivity and conceptualize *being through us as undivided wholeness*. As humans are social beings, intersubjectivity is a given at any present moment, whereto I argue that the concepts of this thesis can readily be fused with other domains of psychology. Albeit I primarily move within the confinements of existential therapy and cultural psychology with ontological assumptions founded in physics as proposed by David Bohm (1980), I do argue that this theory and models can readily contain other branches of psychology. The theoretical framework as proposed by this thesis acknowledges different theories as worldviews, meaning they all coexist through the implicate order.

I see great potential in this thesis especially by further developing the concepts in relation to the work of Hermans' (2010) and his dialogical self theory by further conceptualizing I-positions as sub-totalities enfolded in the implicate order.

5.2 Psychological Practice

Moving onto this thesis' implication for psychological practice, it is a fundamental necessity to acknowledge the given theories' boundaries regarding the context at hand - even the limitations of my own theory. The psychologist and client do not *exist* as separate entities but are constructed as such through worldview. As I proposed that everything is enfolded in the implicate order no sharp distinction can be made between any two people such as psychologist and client. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge that there are no sharp boundaries between people and worldviews with all their respective (core) sedimentations. If one is to only engage with another person on a reflective level the dialogue will be fallible to an I/It relation as this will inevitably objectify the other. Therefore, I argue that it is important for the psychologist to be aware of the limitations of reflectivity and pursue harmony between contradictory embodied experiences in the scope of *uncertain uncertainty*. The psychologist needs to regard experience that falls outside theories and personal worldview as valid and *existing* and help the client to achieve desired levels of harmony, which does not exist universally, giving much attention to the transformative process through both psychologist and client. It is therefore imperative that the psychologist is *feeling into the shared embodied experience existing through the implicate order*. This emphasizes the creativity of the psychologist as we cannot rely purely on theoretical worldviews as this would inevitably objectify both parties and disregard the unceasing chaotic complexity underlined in *any* intersubjective interaction, and therefore *all interaction*. Einfühlung (see figure 4.7) proves

crucial to this process as the area between worlding unfolding and the reflective worldview, which in turn creates the basis for reflective challenge of worldview. I argue, because we are bound by the implicate order, the psychologist's primary task is to *maintain adequate stability through unceasing chaos unfolding through being* to help lengthen the rope of an existential anchor (see chapter 3.6). This is to help the client *adequately challenge conflicting (core) sedimentations in an effort to achieve a desired level of harmonious worldview that can adequately encompass contradictory and ambivalent embodied experience* and foster I/Thou relations. Through this creative and *uncertainly uncontrollable* psychological practice, theory serves as an important tool to alleviate existential anxiety by creating an *uncertain sense of stability* from which further unfolding of core sedimentations can be explored.

6. General Conclusions

Throughout this thesis the question of *how intersubjectivity can be conceptualized in relation to the implicate order* has been explored through the work of theoretical physicist David Bohm (1980) in chapter 2. I conclude that situating a psychological ontological framework within a theoretical physical context proves absolutely helpful with regards to the implicate- and explicate order (the latter of which I later refer to as worldview). The explicate order serves as our reflective understanding of the world, which encompasses all theoretical as well as personal worldviews (see chapter 2.2) and the implicate order encompasses undivided wholeness and inseparability of all existing elements through the holomovement disregarding contemporary laws of time and space giving importance to elements en- and unfolding in the present moment (see chapter 2.3). Understanding human beings as sub-totalities gives less attention to the boundaries of the human body as to what constitutes *being human* and allows for further elaboration in what can constitute a self-other and self-world relation in regard to intersubjectivity (see chapters 3.3.5 and 4.6).

As to the question of *what implications this has in an existential therapeutic context*, I rely on Spinelli's (2010) core principles of existential therapy: relatedness, uncertainty, and existential anxiety (see chapter 3.1) and his concepts of worlding and worldview (see chapters 3.2 through 3.4) to situate the ontological framework based on theoretical physics within existential therapy. I argue that *being* can be understood on three levels through 1) the implicate order, 2) worlding and 3) worldview, where the first level encompasses everything; past, future and present co-existing in the present moment with potential of unfolding into the second level of worlding; embodied pre-reflective experience. Upon noticing worlding we situate experience within the third level, the reflective worldview. Intersubjectivity is thus to be understood on a pre-reflective level as relatedness through the implicate order unfolding into worlding, and on a reflective level through the confinements of worldview. I further argue that it is fruitful for any psychological theory to encompass *all* these levels in some manner. Through dialogue between these levels, sedimentations (see chapter 3.5.1) can be understood as elements within the worldview creating a sense of stability enfolded in the implicate order. Sedimentations can thus be understood as the primary dividing element in a fragmentary understanding of the world; however, they are necessary to retain worldview stability. Following, I argue that authenticity is to be understood as how much worlding is *being* at the present moment, and as complete worlding *being* encompasses unceasing chaos, inauthenticity is inherently necessary to retain worldview stability - neither is a goal in itself

(see chapter 3.5.2). I argue that the worldview is constantly transforming as sedimentations are inevitably challenged and thus prove key in understanding how we can live more harmoniously.

On the question of *how dynamic semiotic field theory can help understand intersubjectivity*, I argue that transformation of worldview is inherently sublime (see chapter 4.5) as the worldview strives for stability, which contradicts the implicate order and worlding. Curvilinearity of opposites thus allows for maneuvering chaos by adopting both/and stances when necessary to harmony and fostering I/Thou relations. Linearity of opposites is however necessary to combat existential anxiety and protect worldview structure when necessary for harmony.

There are no direct answers to any question, and I conclude the psychologist needs to regard experience that falls outside theories as valid and *existing* and help the client to achieve an adequately harmonious *being*, which does not exist universally, giving much attention to the transformative process of both psychologist and client. The are no answers, only questions.

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