

The European Union and Bosnia & Herzegovina



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Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security & Defence Policy
EC	European Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (Now CSDP)
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPM	European Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
RS	Republic Srpska
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreements
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
WB	Western Balkan

Abstract

The thesis asks the question: How can we understand the European Union's change of foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century using Bosnia & Herzegovina as a case study and has the policy inflicted on Bosnia & Herzegovina by the EU been successful?

After having established that the EU policy hasn't changed dramatically but has had an extra layer of military capabilities build on top of it, the thesis goes on to analyse why the EU has chosen to begin building military capabilities.

There is no easy answer to this question, but the three perspectives; neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and social constructivism each give convincing explanations as to why the EU has chosen to begin to build military capabilities. From a neo-realist point of view, it is simply because hard military power is superior to soft power. This also explains why EU began using its military capabilities in e.g. Bosnia & Herzegovina almost as soon as they had been developed. Although neo-liberals tend to not only to focus on hard power like neo-realists, they also share the notion of an anarchic world and therefore also share the view that it is in any states interest to optimize its own security situation, and therefore it makes sense for the EU to build military capabilities in order to gain security. Social constructivism suggests two reasons for the EU to build military capabilities, the first being that new threats which require new security solutions have been articulated, forcing the EU to react, and the second one being the trauma that the EU experienced when unable to stop the conflict that tormented Western Balkan throughout the nineties.

When judging whether the EU's policy has been a success the thesis argues that two sets of criteria can be made. You can look at the EU's ability to prevent the different ethnic groups of waging war at each other in which case the EU's policy is to be regarded as a success since the country is relative stable and peaceful. If you on the other hand evaluate BiH's level of development and democracy a whole other picture emerges, a picture of a country torn by inner conflicts that makes reforms impossible.

This leaves us with the conclusion that the new military means, whose job it is to uphold peace, are working while the policy of conditionality which should drive the country forward and help build up the countries democracy and generally help BiH to come closer to the values of the EU, has failed. This is because the policy of conditionality requires two things to work: It requires a strong effort from the EU's side making it very clear what it takes for the country to gain advantages, and it requires that the cost for the countries politicians for following the EU conditions are low. Neither has been the case in BiH. The EU has not devoted sufficient energy to Bosnia & Herzegovina and the costs for the BiH politicians for following EU conditions are high since the electorate have a tendency not to vote for politicians, who seek to

cooperate with one another. So Bosnia & Herzegovina remains an unsolved puzzle, with no easy way out for the EU.

“The security of Europe depends on stability in the Balkans. They are also a test-case for Europe's enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy. Nowhere more than the Balkans is the EU expected to deliver.”, (Solana, Javier 2001).

Introduction

The European Union's role in the world is a highly relevant and interesting subject to dig in to. Since the Common Foreign and Security Policy, was launched together with the Maastricht treaty back in 1993 there have been many failures and few successes in the EU's attempt to stand together and wage a common foreign policy and to help secure peace around the world and especially in its own region. The CFSP was launched in a time where the international political system had just undergone a major change with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a time which was characterized by great optimism in the Western world, some people even started talking about the end of history, where liberal democracy would spread around the world and wars cease to exist. It was also a time where the EU only consisted of 12 countries and where no one even in their wildest dreams would have foreseen that this number would grow to 27 within two decades.

Many things have changed since then, history turned out not to be quite as dead as some people thought and hoped it to be and several of the former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet states changed from one political system to a completely different one much faster than most people thought possible. The optimism that marked the 90'ies disappeared together with the twin towers when terrorist attacks hit the US. The world changed once again and the terrorist attacks marked what seems to be a new era with a more complex security situation than the bipolar situation of the cold war, leaving the 90'ies behind as a bracket in history, and the EU with a new and more complicated and diffuse security situation (Bengtsson 2010: 3). Along with this change in the world and in the EU there has also been a change in the European Union's security policy, the EU has developed new capabilities and shown that they are willing to use these capabilities around the world and especially in the its own vicinity.

This is the focus of my research, in order to gain understanding of this subject I have chosen Western Balkan and more specifically Bosnia & Herzegovina as a case. The main reason for focusing on the Western Balkans¹ is that it is an interesting region for anybody who is interested in the European Union, its history and especially its foreign and security policies. There are two main reasons for this, the first being that the

¹ When using the term Western Balkan I am referring to the countries of the region which are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

civil war² in Yugoslavia was the first time that the EU really showed its lack of power and initiative when it comes to maintaining peace and security in its own neighbourhood. Before the conflict escalated Luxemburg's foreign minister, Jacques Poos, stated that *"The hour of Europe has dawned"* (Silber & Little 1996: 159). This quickly turned out not to be the case and instead the EU, torn by internal differences, (Dover 2007: 243), watched as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart in a bloody conflict that killed more than 100,000 people (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 261), and which wasn't ended until NATO led by the US finally intervened. The second reason why the Western Balkan region is especially interesting for anybody with an interest for the EU is that the region was also the first place where the EU used its newly obtained military capabilities at the beginning of this century and showed that despite its lack of great military power it was able to help secure peace and to some extent help build up states. Since 2000 the region has been the scene for several ESDP³/CFSP operations which have helped stabilise the region and helped build up institutions (ibid: 265). In that way the Western Balkans has materialised the change that has happened in the EU's security policy at the beginning of this century. It can therefore be said that the Balkans have been the testing ground both for the CFSP and for ESDP (Juncos 2005: 94), with totally different outcome as the result. As former EU commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten phrased it in a speech back in 2001:

"Whether we succeed or not [in the Balkans] is a key test of our nascent common foreign and security policy, of our ability to project stability beyond our borders and into our immediate neighbourhood", (ibid: 104).

Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) can be seen as an example of the EU's lack of ability to solve the conflict in the Balkan's. During the 90'ies the country suffered while the EU and the rest of the world society stood passively by and watched. Now BiH is laying ground to the biggest and longest lasting EU military operation, and is as such a good example of the change of policy the EU has gone through.

The above mentioned is a few of the reasons why the Western Balkan region and BiH in particular is interesting, not only because of its own history which is interesting enough, but also because of its recent history's effect on the European Union and its security policy. With this in mind the task that is set will be to investigate the EU's change of role, in Western Balkan, and more specifically in Bosnia & Herzegovina, from

² Some people reject calling it a civil war since they argue that it was in fact not a civil war, but different wars between independent countries who had left the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the rest of Yugoslavia. Although this is a very interesting discussion I have chosen not to go in to this discussion and will instead use the more used term, civil war.

³ The ESDP changed into CSDP – Common Security & Defence Policy, with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

an indecisive spectator, to an active force using military and civilian capabilities in order to secure peace, and furthermore to discuss whether the policy conducted has been successful.

Historical Background

The background of this project can be divided into two more or less interconnected subjects. The first is the new security situation that the EU has had to find its role within, since the end of the cold war, the expansion of EU with new members and thereby also new neighbours and its new role as a union with some, although limited, military capabilities. The other, referring more specifically to the case at hand, is the wars that have torn the former Yugoslav republics apart through the last two decades.

As already mentioned in the introduction the international political situation in which the EU finds itself has changed significantly since the launch of the CFSP. The world in which the EU now has to navigate has been turned upside down together with the whole concept of security (Bengtsson 2010: 3). The CFSP was launched in a time where the EU consisted of only 12 western European states and where everybody was still trying to understand the new international political landscape that had emerged with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. These changes that has affected especially Central and Eastern Europe has put the EU in a new position. In addition, many of these Central and Eastern European states have joined the EU thereby moving its borders to the east and totally encapsulating the Western Balkan states. But it hasn't just been the surrounding world that has changed in this period of time, the EU has also emerged as an more active actor when it comes to foreign and security policy (ibid: 4). Through the last decade the EU has become more and more involved in international conflicts around the world (ibid: 4) and especially in its own sphere of interest. Bosnia & Herzegovina is no exception in this change. The EU's new role as a more significant actor on the international political scene makes it interesting to try to see how we can better understand EU's new role and whether it is effective in the case of BiH.

When in 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia and in 1992 Bosnia Herzegovina declared their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the stage was set for a number of conflicts that would leave the region torn, broke down and with a series of conflicts which are still causing problems today.

This was a wake-up call for the EU, as it is stated in the EU's security strategy from 2003:

"The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent."
(Council of the European Union 2003: 1).

Throughout the conflict the European Community tried several times to mediate and stop the conflict and did actually succeed at this in the case of Slovenia (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 262), where the EC's facilitated negotiations leading to the Brioni Agreement which ended the war in Slovenia (ibid: 262). However, the EC/ECP's lack of military powers was soon to be exposed in the conflicts in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EC's attempts to stop the conflict proved fruitless (ibid: 263). This did not change with the introduction of CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht treaty did not strengthen the EU's "(...) *crisis management capabilities (...)*" (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 263), and therefore did not help the EU in solving the crisis better than the EPC⁴ had done, (ibid: 263).

The EU's powers were strengthened with the development of the ESDP which was introduced in 1999 in Helsinki and further developed at the European Council in Nice 2001 (Dover 2007: 245). The ESDP made it possible for the EU to play a greater role in both peacekeeping and state building around the world. This in effect led to the first ESDP civilian operation, the still functioning "*EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina*" (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 265), where the EU took over from the UN in leading the countries police reform (ibid: 265). Later that same year the EU's first military operation was launched taking over from NATO in stabilising Macedonia, (ibid: 265). Since then the EU has had several both military and civilian operations around the world including the still running EUFOR-Althea operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which the EU took over from NATO in 2004 and which is the biggest EU military operation (ibid: 265), and the civilian EULEX mission in Kosovo which was launched in 2008 and is also still running (EU commission 2010 a⁵). The EU's operations are made possible by the Berlin Plus arrangements which was agreed upon in December 2002 and which has made it possible for the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities for its operations. (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 176).

The EU's failure in their attempt to stop the conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina and its later attempts with handling the fragile peace and establishing institutions, through several both civilian and military operations, makes it a perfect case for trying to investigate the EU's change in policy and in role, from a powerless bystander to a more decisive actor with some military capabilities.

Problem formulation

How can we understand the European Union's change of foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century using Bosnia & Herzegovina as a case study and has the policy inflicted on Bosnia & Herzegovina by the EU been successful?

⁴ The European Political Cooperation was the forerunner to the CFSP and was a coordination of the EU's foreign policy.

⁵ List of EU operations found on the EU commissions homepage.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this project is that the EU's foreign policy went through a significant change in the beginning of this century.

The goal of this project is to try to investigate which changes the EU's foreign policy went through and why using BiH as a case study. This will lead in to a discussion on the success of the EU's policy towards Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Core questions

In order to answer the problem formulation I have identified the following questions that I will have to answer.

- What characterised the EU's foreign policy earlier and how has this changed through the last decade?
- What is the EU's security strategy in the Western Balkan region and how can this be said to have changed?
- What led to the EU's change of policy from purely using soft power to developing hard power capabilities and using these actively around the world and in BiH?
- Has the EU's policy in Bosnia & Herzegovina had the desired effect?

Methodology

Approach

The method chosen for this project can be said both to be deductive and inductive. This means that the aim is to see how we can better understand the EU's involvement in its sphere of interest and its change of policy, using already well established theories, in this way the project will be theory testing. On the other hand the hope is also to be able to build on to the already existing theories and maybe combine the theories used in order to gain a better understanding of the subject at hand, namely the EU's change of policy from pure soft power to a more proactive line using also hard power instruments. In order to do this I have chosen to use Bosnia & Herzegovina as my case study. BiH and the region as a whole, has been the stage of several attempts to intervene from EU's side and as such it functions as a perfect case for analysing the EU's policy towards its vicinity and the changes in this policy. The way I will be using BiH will be as a kind of "symptom" of a more general change in the EU's policy. I will try to look at the EU's change in policy and then use BiH as an example of this change in policy. The fact that BiH was among the first countries where the European Union tested its new capabilities makes it perfect for this. I realize that generalisation

on the basis of this one case is problematic. However it has its reasonableness if the case is looked upon as a best case for analyzing the change in policy. No other place is the EU's change in policy more apparent than in the BiH, because of the change from the failed efforts of the 90ies to the military accomplishments of the 00ies. After having analysed the EU's change of policy, I will discuss how the EU's policy has functioned in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Are the new capabilities that have been introduced to be seen as a success in the case of BiH, or are the older more soft power focused instruments still to be preferred in order to promote the values of the European Union?

Empirical material

The empirical foundation of this project will mainly be literature on the subject and reports from EU's institutions together with statements and speeches from high ranking EU politicians and officials, in order to cast light on the EU's motives for changing its foreign policy. Also the EU's strategy papers will be a source used to better understand the EU's involvement in the world and more specifically BiH. It would of course have been preferable to have access to internal EU documents on the decision making that led to the build up of the EU's military assets; this could have given a bigger insight as to what drove the idea of obtaining military capabilities. The problem with the official documents is the chance that they show what the EU wants to present to the outside world, in order to obtain a certain image and not what is actually the real driving force behind the decision. This bias should be taken into account in the analysis. However for want of better the EU does publish quite a substantial amount of documents explaining the EU's official position.

Delimitation and specification

The project will deal with the supposed change in EU's security policy that happened around the turn of the century. BiH will be used as case a study in order to exemplify the changes that according to the hypothesis happened to the EU foreign policy. Although BiH is the main case of this study the West Balkan region as a whole will also be used to exemplify as the policy towards BiH in many ways resembles that of the rest of the region. The project will only slightly touch upon the prior policies towards the country; this however does not mean that there won't be drawn strings back in time. As already mentioned the whole region is loaded with history and the EU has had several unfortunate experiences in the Western Balkan countries as a whole, making it perfect for comparing policies now and then. However, there will not be a thorough review of the wars that tormented the region up through the 90'ies, or the EU's failures in preventing this. Nor will there be a thorough review of the history of EU's foreign policy, since the focus will be on the supposed change it went through roughly ten years ago.

The project will end out with a discussion on the effects of EU's policy in BiH; however it will not result in any guidelines as to how the EU can optimise its efforts in BiH.

I will throughout this project as far as it is possible view the EU as a block and not as a number of institutions and countries all trying to pull in separate directions. I am aware that this might be difficult since the internal conflicts of the European Union are many, but as far as possible and desirable I will try to view the EU as united actor and carry out my analysis from this point of view. This goes perfectly in line with Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan's *regional security complex theory* that I am inspired by, and their division of the world into regional powers, great powers and super powers. Buzan and Wæver view EU as one, in characterising it as one of the "great powers" (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 36).

I have chosen to delimitate my project to BiH in an attempt to try to explain something general about the EU's foreign policy and its changes using BiH as an example of the change the EU's foreign policy has gone through. The later history of the region and more specifically of the country at hand and the EU's many different attempts to intervene in the region makes it a perfect case for saying something more general about the EU's change in foreign policy towards its neighbouring countries/regions. At the same time BiH as well as the Western Balkans in its whole, is in the backyard of the EU, totally encapsulated by EU states making it an important and very concrete security issue for many of the EU's member states. Conflicts in the Western Balkans are bound to inflict on the neighbouring countries. The amount of energy put into the operations by the EU also makes it interesting to discuss whether the effort has had the desired effect on BiH.

EU and the world

The EU's self image

The EU's self image when it comes to foreign policy is rather complacent; the EU has a tendency of seeing itself as a morally just organisation which is fighting for the good, (rule of law, democracy, human rights, etc.), in a world filled with morally inferior states that need conversion. Luckily the EU is there to help them along the way to become decent democracies that live up to the European Union's high standards when it comes to values as human rights and rule of law. This of course is a rather one-sided and caricatured description of the EU's self image. However you don't have to read through many festive addresses from EU politicians to see that the above given caricatured version of the EU's self image has not come from nothing. The EU sees itself as the force of goodness, working for peace around the globe, as the former High Representative, Javier Solana has phrased it:

“The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peacebuilder in the world.”, (Chaillot Paper, October 2008: 432).

The EU is a force of good and should help build peace around the world. And the EU is quite clear on the values that lie behind this effort:

“The EU’s soft power comes from its common values, or norms, namely the principles of democracy, the rule of law, social justice, human rights and the commitment to a market economy, as well as social solidarity, sustainable development and the fight against discrimination.”, (Richardson, Hugh 2008).

In its own self image the EU sees these values as a driving force, unlike other countries that might be driven by their own interests:

“Our common foreign policy cannot just be interests-based. Protecting and promoting values, which are part of our history and very dear to the hearts of our citizens, must continue to be a priority. The values of solidarity, of tolerance, of inclusiveness, of compassion are integral part of European integration. We cannot give up on them”, (Solana, Javier 2002, found in: Juncos 2005: 97).

Even when the subject is getting military capabilities this is linked to the fight for the European Union’s values as this quote by Solana shows:

“ (...)our credibility in being able to offer a comprehensive response depends on our ability developing a military crisis management capacity at a European level [...] We are not in the business of doing this for its own sake. But in support of the values and principles for which the European Union is respected world-wide”, (Solana, Javier 2000, found in: Juncos 2005: 99).

In other words the EU is not trying to build up military capabilities simply for its own sake but in order to promote its values, and thus help countries who have yet to discover the benefits of the European Union’s values.

The EU’s civilian and military capabilities

Although the ESDP’s roots can be traced all the way back to the Masstricht Treaty from 1993, (DeBardeleben 2008: 239) and, you could argue, even further back to the launch of the EPC in 1970, the EU’s road towards building up military capabilities didn’t catch speed before the French-British summit meeting held in St. Malo, France in December 1998. At this meeting Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair and

the French President Jacques Chirac made the Joint Declaration on European Defence, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 175), wherein they state that:

“(...)the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”, (Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998).

This agreement later led to the European Councils decision made in Cologne in 1999 to develop the ESDP, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 175), under which the EU's military and civilian operations fall. Later that same year the “headline goals” were adopted at the Helsinki European Council (Dover 2007: 245). The main headline goal was to create a force of 50.000-60.000 troops, who within 60 days would be able to be deployed for at least one year , (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 177).

Rather than building up its own military capabilities the EU military operations were decided to make use of NATO capabilities such as communication and intelligence. This was made possible by the Berlin Plus arrangements which decides the relationship between the EU and NATO when it comes to crisis management, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 176). These arrangements has both strengthened the EU's powers and limited it at the same time. It has strengthened the EU's military power in the way that it has made it possible for the EU to carry out military missions around the world as seen in for example BiH, but at the same time it has given Washington (and other non-EU NATO members) power over the ESDP and underlined that the European Union's security policy is still dependent on the US, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 176). This is secured through the requirement in the agreement that all NATO members must unanimously approve of the EU usage of the NATO capabilities before this usage can take place.

The civilian part of the ESDP was developed on a joint Swedish and Finnish initiative, (Ibid: 181). At the June 2000 European Council meeting in Feira, the EU countries committed themselves to being able to *“(...) provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations.”* by 2003, (June 2000 Conclusions of the Presidency). The Feira European Council furthermore defined the priorities of the civilian capabilities to be; police, rule of law, and civil administration and protection, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 182). These four objectives were later supplemented with two more: Developing monitoring missions and generic support capabilities for the EU's special representatives, (Ibid: 182).

Together the civilian and the military parts of the ESDP now CSDP have launched 24 operations, 14 of which are still ongoing including the EUPM and the EUFOR ALTHEA both in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

The European Union's strategy and policy in relations to Bosnia & Herzegovina

After the end of the wars that tormented the Western Balkan throughout the nineties had ended, it was clear that in order to secure the peace it was necessary not only to be present as a military power, but that fundamental changes of the societies were needed in order to secure a lasting peace (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 266). This cleared the way for the EU to play a bigger role in the region, not as a superior military power but with legal, political and economical instruments at its side, and still with NATO as the security guarantor (ibid: 266).

The EU's policy towards the WB countries in general and BiH specifically, in many ways resembles the policy that was conducted with the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, where conditionality was the main feature in order to help develop democracy, market economy, rule of law and human rights (ibid: 267). In the case of West Balkan a set of additional conditions have been set up to ensure that the countries of West Balkan cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, comply with the demands of the various peace treaties that ended the wars and that they are generally committed to having friendly relations with the neighbouring countries (ibid: 267). But what really separate the case of the 10 new member countries⁶ and BiH is the EU's civilian and military missions in the later. Where the EU relied solemnly on the policy of conditionality in the case of the 10 new member states, EU has also in the case of BiH played a more proactive role engaging not only by setting the rules but by interfering in the form of civilian and military missions.

The main pillar in the EU's policy towards the BiH is the Stabilization and Association Agreements, which are part of the EU's Stabilization and Association process which is eventually meant to lead to membership of the European Union for the participating countries. The first Stabilization and Association Agreement with a West Balkan country was signed with Macedonia in April 2001 (DeBardeleben 2008:222), and the latest agreement to have been signed is the one between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed in June 2008 (EU commission 2010 b⁷).

The SAA functions as the contractual framework for the relations between the EU and the country with who it is signed (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 266). The goal of the SAA is to draw closer the participating countries to the EU using an eventual membership as the carrot in the end (DeBardeleben 2008:223). Using the carrot-and-stick approach the EU seeks to get the countries to meet the different

⁶ When referring to the "10 new member countries", I am referring to the countries accepted as members in 2004 and 2007, excluding Malta and Cyprus, that is; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

⁷ EU commissions homepage, the EU's relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

criteria set by the European Union. Besides the final carrot which as mentioned is membership of the EU, the EU has a list of other rewards that are given along the way as the different standards are met, i.e. visa liberalization which in the Western Balkan region was granted to Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia last year and which has recently been given also to Bosnia & Herzegovina. (Council of the European Union 2010) Another reward given along the way is the status as candidate country, so far this status has only been granted to two of the Western Balkan countries namely Croatia and Macedonia, and BiH still seems to be quite some years away from obtaining this status.

In order to monitor any progress made by the participating countries the commission launches a set of papers every autumn giving an overview of the EU's enlargement policy and evaluating which progresses have been made by the individual countries and which challenges are still ahead.

The policy conducted by the European Union is well in line with the Thessaloniki agenda for West Balkan from June 2003 and with the EU's overall security strategy as it is outlined in the Unions strategy paper "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*" which was published in December 2003. The strategy underlines that it is in the EU's interest to have well managed neighbouring states, as the following passage points out:

"Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.", (Council of the European Union 2003: 7).

The implementation of the European Union's policy also fits with the strategy outlined in "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*" where the tools for reaching the goals of the strategy are outlined:

"Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order." (ibid: 10)

The policy of conditionality that the EU is conducting towards its neighbourhood countries including the countries of Western Balkan is also mentioned in the strategy paper. The paper emphasises conditionality as an "*(...) important feature (...)*" (ibid: 10) that "*(...) we should further reinforce."*, (ibid: 10). All in all the EU's strategy when it comes to BiH, and its implementation of this strategy is still focused mainly on the notion of soft power, focusing on building up institutions and using legal, economical and political tools more than military power to draw closer the countries to the EU and to help them on the road towards liberal democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

To sum up, the policy that the European Union is conducting in the Western Balkan region is in many ways the same as was conducted towards the Central and Eastern European countries that became members of the EU in 2004 respectively 2007. It is a policy of conditionality where progress in areas such as human rights, rule of law and democracy are followed by carrots in the form of for example aid and trade preferences (DeBardeleben 2008:223). When it comes to the policy of conditionality the main difference between the policy conducted towards the new Central and Eastern European members and the policy conducted towards the Western Balkan countries is the extra set of conditions referring to the turbulent past of the region that have been put on top of the well known conditions drawn up in the Copenhagen criteria.

However, The major change when it comes to BiH is the military and civilian operations that the EU has conducted in order to build up the country and in that way help secure a lasting peace in the region. This policy has been laid on top of the already well known tools of conditionality, in this way the policy towards BiH has in many ways actually been the same as it was with the new EU countries, just with an extra layer having been added.

The EU's missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina

As earlier mentioned the first civilian ESDP operation is the still running EU police mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina, (EUPM), that took over from NATO in BiH back in January 2003 and which helps build the countries police. The mission at the moment consists of 122 international police officers and international civilian staff together with 157 local BiH staff, but started out with more than 500 people. The main focus of the mission is to help BiH in the fight against corruption and organised crime (EUPM 2010a)⁸. The idea is to educate the BiH police and through mentoring to build the police system, as the EUPM homepage states it: *"EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. It does so in particular through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities"*, (EUPM 2010b)⁹. The EUPM is a still running and has so far been extended until the end of December 2011, (ibid).

Bosnia & Herzegovina also laid ground to the second EU military mission in the Western Balkan region, the first being the Concordia mission in Macedonia. The military mission in BiH is the still running Althea operation. The Althea operation was made possible through the Berlin Plus agreements and the loan of NATO capabilities and was *"(...) the first substantial and prolonged operational test of this new capacity, "*, (Dobbins, et. al. 2008: 170). The Althea operation started off with almost 7000 troops when it took over the

⁸ EUPM Factsheet from Commissions webpage on EUPM.

⁹ EUPM homepage.

responsibility from NATO, (EUFOR Althea 2010)¹⁰, making it by far the biggest EU military mission ever, this number has since been decreased so that there are now just around 2000 troops in the country, (EUFOR Althea)¹¹. The mission's main goal has been to uphold peace and to secure compliance of the Dayton peace agreement. As the Concordia mission, the Althea mission is regarded a success (Dobbins, et. al. 2008: 234) and has been a major leap forward for the EU's efforts of being able to take responsibility for peace in its own region, (ibid: 169).

When looking at the European Union's policy in BiH from the turn of the century until present, it is clear that it is a mix of old and well known tools already used in connection with the accession of the new central and eastern European member states and a range of new tools made possible by the introduction of ESDP which made it possible for the EU to; *"(...) move from a declaratory foreign policy focused on diplomacy to a more action-orientated foreign policy focused on more proactive crisis management."*, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 57), and by the Berlin Plus agreements which made it possible for the European Union to draw on NATO capabilities.

It can therefore be said that the EU's policy towards its neighbourhood countries not so much has changed; it is more a question of an extra level having been build on top of the already existing policy of conditionality. A more proactive level where the EU on top of its already well known policy of conditionality also plays a role via both military and civilian operations in the countries, they are trying to influence. This has as mentioned been seen not only in BiH but also in e.g. Macedonia which lay ground to the first ever EU military operation and in Kosovo where the EU now has a civilian mission. In terms of security policy it can be said that the EU has moved from a policy solemnly based on soft power to a policy which combines the use of soft power with the use of more hard power.

Despite this new level having been added to the EU's foreign policy, it is important to bear in mind that the EU is still a dwarf when it comes to hard power capabilities. First of all, it is dependent on NATO capabilities for its military operations and therefore reliant on the other NATO member states and second of all, the missions that the EU has carried out have been relatively small, the Althea operation which is the biggest and longest lasting operation that the EU has carried out, was still only one tenth of the size of the NATO mission which was deployed in BiH after the coming in to force of the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, (Dobbins, et. al. 2008: 170). On top of this, the EU operations we have seen so far have been in areas *"(...) already pacified to some degree by others."* (Dobbins, et. al. 2008: 233). However it is also important to

¹⁰ EUFOR Althea homepage.

¹¹ EUFOR Althea Factsheet from the Commissions website on the Althea mission.

remember that the progress that has been made, from declaratory foreign policy to a more action based one has been made in a very short time and by what Keukeleire & Macnaughtan calls: “ (...) *an organization infamous for its mainly declaratory nature, its slow and problematic decision-making and its paralysing internal divisions.*”, (Keukeleire & Macnaughtan 2008: 57).

It therefore seems safe to conclude that the EU has come a long way since the failures that marked its foreign policy attempts in the nineties, but that it is still a long way away from being independent from NATO and its hard power capabilities, and that the EU is still a pygme when it comes to hard power. The EU's biggest asset still seems to be its policy of conditionality with the eventual promise of EU membership as the carrot that drives the changes.

Theories

In order to try and understand the EU's change in foreign policy and the change it has gone through, the two major international relations theories; realism and liberalism will be used in their refined versions, neo-realism and neo-liberalist institutionalism, apart from these two major theories I will also apply social-constructivist theory. However, I will not be using the theories blindly but try to modify them in order to make them more applicable to the case at hand. I will among other things incorporate some of Barry Buzan and Ole Wævers theories on Regional Security Complexes based on their work, “Regions and Powers” from 2003.

Buzan and Wæver argue that since the end of the cold war, the lack of two competing superpowers both wanting to interfere in every region of the world has given a bigger room for more local powers to influence their own region (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 3). In the given case, this means that the lack of superpower competition in every corner of the globe gives room for the EU to play a role in its own neighbourhood, a role that would have been impossible just 25 years ago when the world was still divided more or less into two blocks competing on every level and all around the world.

On top of this Regional Security Complex, I will try and apply the theories of neo-realism, neo-liberalist institutionalism and social constructivism to the case in order to analyse the EU's change in policy to see if these theories can explain the EU's change of security policy. Since the EU does not function inside a closed box where everything stays the same, I will of course also have to take into consideration changes in the outside world which might have helped trigger this supposed change of policy.

When using neo-realism, I will try also to incorporate Nietzsche and his thoughts on slave morality to see if these in any way can help to better understand the change in EU's foreign policy.

Regional Security Complex Theory

As earlier mentioned Buzan and Wæver argues that since the end of the cold war, room has been given for powers such as the EU to play a greater role in their own region. What Buzan and Wæver does is to develop a new way of analysing the international political system rejecting the polar system, which worked well under the cold war and which defined the international political system as either, unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, where uni, bi or multi refers to the number of superpowers: One, two or many. Instead they divide the actors of the international political system into the categories: Superpowers and great powers who work at a system level and regional powers that are only active on a regional level, (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 34). It is this model of the international political system that will be used throughout the project, it will be used as a base on top of which the theories used to analyse the EU's change of policy will be placed.

To be seen as a superpower in Buzan and Wæver's model requires political, military and economical capabilities allowing the power to be involved in almost every region of the international political system in one way or the other. To be seen as a superpower you also need to see yourself and to be seen by others as a superpower, (ibid: 34-35). Using this definition only the US comes out as a superpower just as it does in the polar-system.

Great powers don't need the same kind of military, political and economical capabilities as superpowers. They will often have the power to intervene also outside their own region but this is not a necessity for being categorised as a great power, (ibid: 35). What is necessary to be categorised as a great power is to be treated as a potential superpower. This is what separates them from regional powers. Great powers are seen by other significant powers as potential superpowers in the foreseeable future, (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 35). By using this definition Buzan and Wæver comes to the conclusion that there are four great powers in the international political system: Russia, China, Japan and the EU. The EU is here regarded as a great power not because of its capabilities but because it is seen by others and talked about as a potential superpower, (ibid: 36) and despite its lack of "stateness" and internal political cohesion.

Regional powers are treated by other powers more or less as local a phenomenon, meaning that they are not seen as players on a global level but are only regarded as actors with influence inside their own regional security complex, (ibid: 37). Inside each security complex there can be a uni-, bi- or multipolar situation with powers that are not seen as influential actors on the global scene.

Buzan and Wæver's point of dividing the world into different regions with each their own security complex is that according to them most countries have their main focus on countries in their own vicinity, or as they put it:

"(...) seen from most countries of the world, the relevant strategic setting is not primarily at the system level – the first priority is regional.", (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 41).

On top of this they argue that most security interaction happens between members of the same regional security complex:

"(...) security regions form subsystems in which most of the security interaction is internal; states fear their neighbours and ally with other regional actors", (ibid: 41).

This, according to Buzan and Wæver, makes the regional level the most suitable for analysing most subjects of security, (ibid: 43). Regions is here understood in the term of security this does not mean that it makes sense to use the same division into the same regions in i.e. cultural or other contexts, (ibid: 44).

The idea that most security issues are regional seems quite plausible when looking at the EU and its many neighbourhood programs designed to help bring stability to its neighbouring countries and regions and to draw them closer to the EU.

In this project the focus will of course be on the European "security interdependence", using the European Security complex as the base on which the theories will be added.

Neo-realism

Neo-realism builds on a series of core assumptions. First of all neo-realists sees the international political system as anarchic; this means that there is no overriding power that has monopoly of power in the way that the state has monopoly of power in the individual state, (Hyde-Price 2007: 30). This also means that the international political system is a self-help system; there is no overriding power to keep order so every state is on its own when it comes to its own security. Because the system is basically anarchic, war is also an inherent risk that all states have to take into consideration. Since the system is one of self-help and war always a threat there will be a tendency for competition in security, as states try to build up capabilities they can rely on in a conflict situation. Every state's main concern is its own safety, therefore every state will, if possible try to maximize its own power or at the very least try to keep a status quo where their relative power stays the same. The perfect situation for a state in the anarchic system that is world politics, according to realist's, is to be able to destroy or at least eliminate all other states that might pose a threat. This will allow the state to become a hegemony in its own region, (Hyde-Price 2007: 33).

That the system is generally anarchic does not mean that there cannot be cooperation in the international political system, but it means that if there is, it will still be determined by the anarchy of the system as a whole, (ibid: 31). So the existence of international organisations as the EU does not mean that the system is not anarchic, it only means that the very existence of the EU is conditioned by the fact that the system is anarchic and that the influence such organisations will have on the security system is marginal, (ibid: 32). Another point made by the neo-realist's is that states will only cooperate if they feel that they gain more by cooperating than what those they cooperate with does. This goes for all greater powers whereas smaller powers focus more on their absolute gain from cooperating, (ibid: 33).

The second core assumption that neo-realists have is that states are the primary actors. Again this does not mean that e.g. organisations or cooperate companies cannot have influence, but it means that states are the most important actors. States lay down the rules for non-state actors and when international organisations such as the EU get to play a role, it is only as a tool for powerful states, (Hyde-Price 2007: 31).

The third core assumption is that all states are basically the same, a state is a state. Every state functions in the same way in the international political system. There may be democracies and dictatorships or other kind of states, but in the international political system, they will all act in the same way. The states have been socialised in to the political system and will all act alike. A result of this is that all great powers have substantial military capabilities, (ibid: 31). The fact that neo-realist's regard all states as functioning in the same way also means that they all have the same major concern; security of the state. This again does not mean that there can be no other goals for a state; it simply means that all other goals will be subordinate to the security of the state. A state might have it as its goal to spread certain ideas, or norms, or to build up a special kind of system internally in the country, but this will only be done as long as it does not clash with the interest of maximising the states own security.

The last assumption is that states are both rational and unitary actors. Though this is not always the case, the assumption is kept in order to simplify as to make the theory more easily applied. Neo-realism does this so that the theory can help explain the actions of states over time in broad terms. Neo-realist's in this way assume that states acts as unitary actors, who think and behave strategic in order to achieve own goals (Hyde-Price 2007: 32).

A point made by neo-realist's that is especially interesting to look at when analysing the EU's foreign policy is "milieu shaping". Since states have an interest in having stable neighbours so that problems that the neighbouring states might have wont spread, neo-realist's claim that states will try to shape their neighbourhood in order to achieve a safer environment, (Hyde-Price 2007: 34). There are in the world

today some overriding problems, such as terrorism and pollution, and since there is no overriding power in the world that can take care of these issues, states will try to influence other states to solve the problems, so that they won't spread.

Neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalism, (here after neo-liberalism), shares a lot of common ground with neo-realism, (Lamy 2005: 213), and the discussion between the two theories is therefore not a discussion between paradigms but a discussion within a paradigm, (ibid: 217). Neo-liberalism can be said to have been created as an extension to neo-realist theory, using some of the same assumption but taking more things into consideration.

Neo-liberalism as neo-realism has it as a core assumption that states are the key actors when it comes to international relations, but unlike neo-realists they also give room for international organisations to play a significant role. In fact neo-liberal institutionalist's (here after institutionalist's) sees international organisations as institutions that can help develop cooperation between states, (ibid: 213). Institutions such as e.g. the EU can therefore work as a mediator in order to get the actors in the system (the EU) to cooperate. They therefore highly criticise realist's lack of belief in the power of institutions.

"Realism's insistence that institutions have only marginal effects renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations.", (Keohane, R. O. & Martin, L. L. 1995: 47).

If institution's doesn't matter, why are they then being build up by rational actors is the institutional objection.

However neo-liberal institutionalist's acknowledge that institutions do not matter under all circumstances, e.g. *"It is true that when only two states exist and they have perfectly conflicting interests, institutions will not be significant"* (ibid: 44). If states do not to any degree have common interests, they won't matter but if states have common interests, institutions can develop and have influence.

Like neo-realist's, neo-liberal institutionalist's sees the world as a bunch of competing states in an anarchic world. Where they differ is in determining what this leads to. Here institutionalists differ from neo-realist's in concluding that this competition leads to cooperation between states. Institutionalists claim that institutions, (such as e.g., organisations, agreements and unwritten rules that states follow), and regimes, (in the form of social institutions based on norms), helps the actors in the system to work together in order to achieve national interests, (Lamis 2005: 214). In this way neo-liberal institutionalist's sees the world not as a "zero sum game", but as a "plus sum game" where everybody can actually earn from working together.

Cooperation according to neo-liberalists will first and foremost happen in areas where countries have common interests. Therefore, international institutions will easily be formed in areas where many countries have the same interests, such as free trade. Free trade is an interest valued by many international actors and therefore an organisation has been put up to help mediate this, (ibid: 214).

Another area where neo-liberals differ from neo-realists is on their focus on other than power capabilities. Neo-liberals tend to focus more on economical, environmental and other non-hard power issues than neo-realists who do not ascribe much significance to these. They see foreign policy not just as hard power security issue, but also as a way of securing the countries interests in other areas, for example in environmental and economical areas. (ibid: 216) The reasoning is that problems like pollution or organised crime can spread easily over borders, therefore in a globalised world, it is in the interest of other countries to help stabilise countries that might otherwise cause a threat in some area. The same can be said of economical storms that, in a globalised world where most countries keep their economies open, can easily spread. And this is where the institutions can help countries with shared interests to have an arena for dealing with these problems. Institutions matter.

A last point of criticism towards neo-realist theory from the neo-liberalists is the one-sided focus on relative gains. According to neo-liberal institutionalist's, concerns over relative gains will be of little importance as long as the absolute gains or the potential for these are bigger, or if more than two countries are involved, (Keohane, R. O. & Martin, L. L. 1995: 44). This means that relative gains will have minor importance in an institution as the EU where many countries are trying to work together, here the focus of the individual actors will more be focused on the potential for absolute gains.

Social Constructivism

The credo of social constructivism is that; "Anarchy is what states make of it"¹². The world is anarchic if the actors act as if it was, but it is possible to act otherwise, and thereby change the system. Social constructivists see the world as socially constructed and therefore also changeable, (Barnett 2005: 268).

If the countries choose to believe that the international society is anarchic, then they will act accordingly, and the world will indeed be anarchic, but if the states decides that rules should apply, and if the states believe in the rules and believes that others will follow them they will also act accordingly and the international society will be one of order.

Social constructivists in this way believe that ideas, norms and values can play a role in the way that actors behave in the international political system. If enough people or states believe in human rights for example other countries can be forced to following them in order not to be a pariah in the international political

¹² Anarchy is what states of it, is the title of an article by Alexander Wendt, the leading social constructivist theorist.

society, (Barnett 2005: 260). In this way ideas can in fact matter. Throughout history there have been numerous examples of ideas or norms having an effect on international politics for example the norm that was created after the Westphalian peace that states do not interfere with each other's internal affairs, (Barnett 2005: 264), or the change of the international societies view on colonies, from something natural to something that is morally unjust. (ibid 264)

Analysis

Shaping Neo-realism to fit EU

In order to use Neo-realism to analyse the change in the European Union's policy towards the Western Balkan countries we are forced to cut a few corners. First of all we have to see the EU as one actor, as if it were a state, in doing so inspiration can be taken from Buzan and Wæver who claim that: *"The EU can be judged by how others respond to it. If others treat it as a great power, then it qualifies as such regardless of its ambiguous, sui generis political status."*, (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 29).

We will therefore analyse the case at hand using the presumption that the EU is a unitary actor, despite the fact that the EU countries often disagree to a point where it either effects the foreign policy of makes a common stand impossible, we just have to remember what happens every time the Russian's cut of the gas for Europe, to see that this presumption does not hold in reality.

Also with inspiration from Buzan & Wæver I will see the EU as a great power, something which it normally is not by neo-realist theorists. I will try analysing the matter at hand on a regional level seeing Europe as a closed security complex and not so much taking the US, which is the only super power and therefore the only power able to interfere in any security complex around the world, or other powers into consideration.

Although we are cutting some corners you can argue for the sanity in this by comparing it with a 1:1 map, it might be precise but you can't use it for anything in the same way you can't use a complete theory that just describes the world as it is, therefore you have to simplify as you do with a map, well aware that you will lose some accuracy, but instead it will be made applicable. Therefore it makes sense to cut these corners when analysing the EU's foreign policy.

Analysing the EU's foreign policy in relations to Bosnia & Herzegovina using neo-realist theory

According to neo-realism the main concern for any state is survival, staying safe and if possible maximising its relative power capabilities. Therefore it is only natural that the EU is trying to build up military capabilities, making it relatively stronger. The instability that characterised West Balkan throughout the nineties and well into the first decade of the 21st century constituted a risk for the European Union e.g. in the form of organised crime threatening to spread to the EU or the possibility of a failed state becoming a safe haven for terrorist's. As pointed out by the former high representative Javier Solana; *"The Balkans and the Middle East are examples of instability which are direct threats to the security of Europe."* (Solana, Javier 2001). Therefore, the EU in order to prevent these threats from spreading is building up military capabilities in order to act proactive and stabilise the region that composes a threat. On top of this the EU is also trying to draw closer the countries using economical, and safety arguments to get the countries to draw nearer to the EU and to eventually be swallowed up by the EU. The EU has to some extent helped stabilise Bosnia & Herzegovina and in that way, they have gained security. In other words, the EU is expecting to gain relatively more security than others from interfering in BiH which explains their efforts to build up military capabilities and using them actively. These "others" could for example be Russia which like the EU is regarded as a "great power" by Buzan and Wæver and who dominates the EU's neighbouring security complex. By drawing BiH towards itself, EU is gaining relatively more security than Russia.

The thought that stable neighbouring countries are in the EU's interest and that the EU should work proactively to obtain this goal is often seen in the EU's rhetoric: *"It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed."* , (Council of the European Union 2003: 7), and: *"Europe has to be prepared to contribute vigorously to extending the scope of international law, to strengthening the institutions of world governance and to developing closer regional cooperation."*, (Solana, Javier 2003). The EU's initiative to build military capabilities, and the fact that they started using them as soon as it was possible, not only in BiH and the rest of WB but around the world, seems to support the neo-realist claim that states will always try to maximize its relative security. The claim can also to some extent be said to be apparent in the EU's rhetoric when explaining its strive for military capabilities. The main player that the EU in this case is gaining more security than is Russia. In stabilizing and trying to draw nearer BiH and the rest of the WB countries to the EU, the EU is trying to include Western Balkan in the European security complex that is dominated totally by the EU and not letting it develop its own West Balkan security complex in which the EU would not have full control and where Russia might play a substantial role.

While the EU's hard power capabilities are of a relatively new date, the EU has used milieu shaping as a strategy long time before it developed military assets. The milieu shaping happens through, among other things, the policy of conditionality where the EU uses aid and trade in order to shape their neighbouring states. The EU sets up a list of goals for the countries to achieve on matters such as human rights, rule of law, democracy and so on. As these goals are met, they give benefits e.g. in the form of visa liberalisation or trade agreements, these tools have been used heavily in the Western Balkan region which have been met with even more conditions than the Central and Eastern European countries who have joined the EU through the last decade. The milieu shaping is also very apparent in the EU's rhetoric, the head of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in a speech addressed to the EU's neighbouring countries in 2007 said; *"The closer you want to be to the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations."* , (Barroso, José Manuel 2007). This is a quite clear example of the EU arguing for its neighbouring countries to come closer to the EU, by making reforms and incorporating its values. The message is clear, "if you do as we say, we will increase our support for you". From a neo-realist perspective the EU is trying to milieu shape in order to gain a secure neighborhood something that is in any great powers interest. In this way, you can see the EU's milieu shaping as an integrated part of its security strategy where milieu shaping is a way of obtaining security, drawing neighbouring countries closer and eventually obtaining them in the union, in order to dominate its own security complex and becoming a hegemon in its own region, in the way that neo-realists argue is in every states interest.

It might seem odd seen from a neo-realist perspective that the EU is focusing on areas like human rights. The lack of human rights in the EU's neighbouring countries can hardly be said to be a security threat for the EU. However, neo-realist theory does not rule out the possibility for other interests than security issues to be of importance, it just points out that these will always be of lesser importance, and only relevant as long as they do not interfere with security aspects. In this way milieu shaping on e.g. the human rights area can be seen as an interest that comes after the most important interest of security. If we jump to another part of the world for a moment, we can see that the EU sometimes evades its focus on human rights in order to conduct *Realpolitik*, just as foreseen by neo-realists. This can be seen e.g. in the EU's relations with China, where concerns such as human rights have had to yield for other interests, (Hyde-Price 2004: 9) The same thing a neo-realist will argue would happen in BiH if there should ever be a situation where the EU would have to choose between security or the fight for its core values.

While it is easy to explain the EU's reason for trying to "milieu shape" its neighbouring countries via different tools and to explain the EU's grounds for building up military capabilities, it seems a lot harder to

explain the way the EU has done this. As earlier mentioned, the EU's military operations have been made possible by the Berlin Plus arrangements. These arrangements have strengthened the EU by making it possible for the EU to conduct military operations using NATO capability thus strengthening the EU and making it a more substantial player on the world scene and not least inside its own security complex. However the Berlin Plus arrangements also gives all NATO countries the veto power over the European Union's military operations. It seems to be quite hard to explain using neo-realist theory, that a state will put its ability for conducting military foreign policy in to the hands of another state. Since the international political system is anarchic and all states are on their own, it goes against what you would expect, seeing the world from a neo-realist perspective, for a state to develop military capabilities that are subject to veto from other states. It might be possible to understand if the EU was a small state, but since the EU consists of several substantial powers such as, Germany, France and Great Britain, it seems rather difficult to explain from a neo-realist point of view that the EU is willing to lay parts of its foreign policy in the hands of other states. If we were still to try to explain this from a neo-realist perception of the world, you could argue that there seems to be no interstate threat between the US and the EU making the security situation muted and therefore allowing the EU to focus on the absolute security gains that they are receiving in their own vicinity rather than the fact that they are giving the US and other NATO countries a veto right over there common military foreign policy.

If we are to explain the EU's strong focus on soft power we can look to the American Political commentator Rober Kagan who in his article "Power and Weakness", (Kagan 2002), from 2002 argues that the EU's reason for not focusing on hard power is its relative weakness in this area. As he phrases it: *"Europe's military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power."*, (ibid). He even goes as far as to argue that the EU is deceiving itself into believing that it is doing it out of morality and not as a result of weakness; *"Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested."*, (ibid).

In the same way, you can if drawing in Nietzsche's thoughts on slave morality while still using neo-realism, argue that the EU is making virtue of what is really a necessity, in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" Nietzsche writes: *"They are clever, and their virtues have clever fingers. But they lack fists; their fingers do not know how to form into fists."*(Nietzsche 2002: 181). The EU of yesterday had no military assets (fists), and the EU of today have very little military assets. Therefore the EU has made a virtue of using soft power, (Hyde-Price 2004: 3), making its only option in to a virtue, and thus articulating soft power as morally superior to

hard power, as done by the former Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, Hugh Richardson, in a speech from 2008, where he states that;

“Military force is too blunt an instrument to deal with complex non-traditional security issues and the challenges of institution building.”, (Richardson, Hugh 2008).

If we are to use Nietzsche’s thoughts here, this means that when the EU, as here done by Richardson, argues that military force is inefficient in today’s security situation, they are really making a virtue of necessity. Using this reasoning the reason for the EU to emphasise the virtues of soft power is not because soft power is superior but because it has no other choice, and the reason why the EU is beginning to develop military assets now is simply because hard power is superior to soft power. Since every state’s main concern is its own security and survival and since the most effective way of securing this is to develop own military capabilities, the EU is now trying to develop military assets that can help them shape their sphere of interest in a way so as to make the European Union itself more safe. This is supported by the fact, that as soon as the EU had build up military capabilities, it started using them as we have seen in among other places Bosnia & Herzegovina. In 2006 the at that time, Director General for External Relations in the European Commission, held a speech where he praised the use of soft power, but at the same time stressed, that if the EU wants to play a role a substantial player independent from the US, it is forced to make changes:

“The EU is therefore a real player on the world stage because of its wide-ranging and comprehensive set of “soft-power” tools. Nevertheless, the EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never get the ability to shape world events that most of them say they want unless they are prepared to pay the extra cost, either in financial terms, or in terms of institutional and political reforms that will give them the kind of hard power enabling the EU to act entirely independent of the US security umbrella.” (Landaburu, Eneko 2006).

From a neo-realist point of view or using Nietzsche’s slave moral what the EU is doing is making a virtue of necessity, the EU is simply trying to articulate the only force it has, as being morally superior:

“To be kindly when one is merely too weak and timid to act otherwise, to be humble when any other course would have unpleasant repercussions, and to be obliging when a less amiable gesture would provoke the master's kick or switch— that is the slave's morality, making a virtue of necessity.” (Kaufmann 1975: 371-372).

The EU uses soft power because it is weak on hard power, not because soft power is superior to hard power neither morally or in terms of success.

That the EU is still focusing so much on soft power, a neo-realist would argue, is because of the EU's military capacities inadequacy, the EU is aware that even though it has built up some military capabilities, it is still a military dwarf and therefore still to some extent makes a virtue of necessity in focusing mainly on non-military powers.

The EU's foreign policy in Bosnia & Herzegovina from a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective

It seems safe to conclude that as a point of departure neo-liberalism has an easier job explaining the European Union and its involvement in its neighbouring countries. Where it was necessary to make adjustments to neo-realist theory and to simplify things by seeing EU as a unitary actor in order to be able to use neo-realist theory, it is much simpler to analyse the EU from a neo-liberal institutionalist point of view, since neo-liberal theory already takes into account international organisations. Neo-liberalists are of the opinion that institutions matter and can play a vital role in international politics. Therefore, it is not necessary to make amends when using neo-liberalist theory on EU. According to neo-liberalist theory the countries of the EU are simply cooperating because they have common goals, and since international relations is not a zero-sum game, they can all benefit from this cooperation.

Neo-liberalism also makes room for other interests than security to play a role in the interaction between states therefore economical or environmental interests can also play a role.

From a neo-liberal aspect it makes good sense to try to stabilise the neighbouring countries, the EU has every interest in stable neighbours and since neo-liberalists believe that other interests than security can have a substantial impact it makes sense that the EU is trying to shape its neighbours by using its policy of conditionality. The EU is simply trying to manage problems or potential problems other than classical security issues. But also from a security perspective does it make sense to neo-liberals that EU is involved in BiH and the rest of the WB region. Not just because the world is anarchic and security is in any state's interest, but also due to the notion neo-liberals have that democratic countries are generally more stable and do not go to war with each other, hence the democratic peace. Therefore it makes good sense for the EU to try to export its values of democracy etc. to BiH.

Neo-liberalists, although more focused on non-security issues than neo-realists, do not disagree that the world is anarchic. And you can actually from a neo-liberal perspective argue in the same way that neo-realists do that it is in every state's interest to maximise its security and therefore it makes perfectly sense

for the EU to develop military means. Neo-liberalist's can also without any problems explain why the EU is laying its ability to conduct military operations into the hands of NATO and its member countries. This is simply because the EU can gain an absolute security advantage, while neo-realists focus almost solemnly on relative gains, neo-liberalists focus more on absolute gains and from this point of view there is nothing peculiar about the EU giving other states veto over its foreign policy as long as they gain some military might by doing so. By trying to export its values to the region of Western Balkans the EU is also at the same time broadening its own Security Complex, in which it is the dominant figure and in addition, broadening the area dominated by the EU and inhabited by democratic countries more or less with the same values, and therefore also shielding more countries of against Russian influence.

The EU's own reasoning and a social constructive approach

The EU's own explanation for its change of policy is clear when you look at official documents and speeches given by EU politicians; new challenges require new measures. Because the EU faces new security threats, they are forced to develop new measures in order to meet these new challenges. That the EU's security situation has changed since the end of the cold war is a fact often mentioned, as it is stated in the European Security Strategy from 2003;

"Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.", (Council of the European Union 2003: 3).

In other words, there is a whole new security situation, a new security complex, since the end of the cold war and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The main threat is no longer a threat of invasion, but a series of dynamic threats such as failed states that risk becoming nests of terrorist groups and organised crime, (ibid: 7). These new threats have forced the EU to develop new measures in order to deal with the problems:

"(...) if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable.", (ibid: 11).

The new threats of the 21st century requires the EU to; *"(...) use the full panoply of tools - economic, political, military - at its disposal to confront the threats as they emerge."*, (Solana, Javier 2003)

This is what the EU has started to do in the Balkan countries, including BiH;

"The European Union and Member states have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans.... Restoring good government to the Balkans,

fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.”, (Council of the European Union 2003: 7).

Although the EU has developed some military capabilities and in this way changed its foreign policy, it is clear that the military parts of the foreign policy are still not strong and not what the EU boasts itself of. What the EU sees as its own strength is its multi-faceted capabilities, combining a whole mixture of different instruments to deal with conflicts, as it is also pointed out in the Security Strategy of 2003; *“(…) none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”*, (ibid: 7).

In other words the EU's own reasoning for building up new capabilities is to be able to execute a foreign policy on all levels using all kinds of different means in order to reach its own goals, just as it can be seen in Bosnia & Herzegovina where the EU has used multi-faceted means in order to achieve stability.

Despite the EU's build up of military capabilities there is no doubt as earlier indicated that what the EU prides itself of is not mainly its military assets. The former Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Japan, Hugh Richardson as late as in 2008 talked about; *“(…) the limitations of hard power (...)”*, and that: *“The EU has reaped tremendous rewards from its soft power, the result of which is an enlarged union of 27 Member States and unprecedented peace and prosperity on the European continent.”*, (Richardson, Hugh 2008). This was said at a time where the EU had already completed several military missions that it itself considered as successes. Solana said something alike shortly before the new European Security Strategy was to be launched, where he stated that: *“Threats cannot be tackled by purely military means.”*, (Solana, Javier 2003). All this is of course not a big surprise the EU's still quite modest military capabilities taken into consideration, and the EU's relative success in enlarging the European Union with 10 new former communist countries, who it had more or less pulled towards its own values using purely soft and no hard power.

Social constructivist views matches quite well both with the EU's strong focus on soft power in its actions and in its rhetoric. As former External Director General, Eneko Landaburu has phrased it; *“We are a ‘pole of attraction’ for our region – countries along our borders actively seek closer relations to us”*, (Bengtsson 2010: 45). Seen from EU's point of view, the EU has some norms and values and a way of “life” that is attractive to its neighbours, in this way the “idea” of Europe, which is not something concrete that you can hold and feel but a set of abstract norms and values, plays a role in attracting other countries bringing them nearer the European Union and the values that are shared inside the union. On top of this the EU also goes out more proactively and promotes its own values in order to bring closer its neighbouring countries from

the assumption that these values will help stabilise the countries and that a stable neighbourhood is in the EU's interest. The EU is trying to; "(...) *work closely with the Western Balkan countries to further consolidate peace and to promote stability, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human and minority rights.*", (The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans 2003). Or as former Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn phrased it: "*Enlargement is the essence of the EU's soft power to gradually extend peace, democracy and prosperity in Europe*", (Bengtsson 2010: 45).

As we have seen, the EU explains the build up of military capacity as an answer to new security threats that the union is facing. From a social constructivist point of view, one could argue that new challenges have been discursively constructed whereby the need for new weapons to tackle these problems has been developed. So the articulation of new threats could be argued to have contributed to creating a need for new military assets. From a social constructivist point of view the articulation does not necessarily need to be bound in any real changes in the security situation, it can be, but the important thing is that it has been articulated like that creating a need for new solutions.

Another way the build up of military assets could be understood from a social constructivist point of view is through the EU's failures to stop the wars that tormented West Balkan throughout the 90'ies and especially Bosnia & Herzegovina. There is no doubt that the EU's lack of ability to stop the conflict and the fact that the US once again had to address a problem in the backyard of Western Europe was seen as a great defeat for the EU. As written in a pamphlet published by the Centre for European Reform: "*The 1992–95 Bosnian war proved particularly traumatic for the EU. Only a few months after the EU had proclaimed its commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the Maastricht summit in December 1991, Bosnia went up in flames.*", (Andréani, Bertram & Grant 2001: 12).

Therefore, the build up of military assets and the fact that when they had been acquired, they were almost immediately put to use in Macedonia and in BiH, can be seen as a response to this. From a social constructivist view the EU's build up of military capabilities can be seen as a response to the humiliation the EU put itself through when in the nineties, it stood by as a whole region fell apart and thousands of people were killed in the worst fighting's seen in Europe since the end of world war 2. The EU leaders keen on not ending up in the same situation once again decided to develop military means in order to be able to fight challenges of the sort that broke down the Western Balkan region throughout the last decade of the previous century. As Javier Solana has put it; "*When the Yugoslav wars broke out in the 1990's we watched as our neighbourhood burned because we had no means of responding to the crisis. We learned our lesson and organised ourselves, acquiring a set of capabilities coupled with decision-making procedures and a security doctrine.*" (Solana, Javier 2009).

Therefore it also seemed very symbolic that the EU chose this very same arena as they had shown so hopelessly unable to save from civil war just years earlier as the testing ground for the new capabilities developed.

Concluding on analyses of theories

As mentioned earlier both of the leading theories within international relations, that is neo-liberalism and neo-realism, belongs to the same paradigm making the common ground larger than the things that part them. This also means that the explanations they give for the EU's change of policy are quite alike.

When it comes to neo-realism there are some obvious problems and limitations when using the theory in relations with the EU, since quite some adjustments has to be made to the theory and reality in order to make neo-realism applicable, first of all to see the EU not as a collective of individual states trying to agree, but as a unified coherent state in its own.

However, this problem aside, neo-realism gives a convincing explanation as to why the EU has added a military layer to its foreign policy towards BiH, starting also to use military means, even though these are under the veto power of other countries. This put together with Kagans thoughts on EU US relations and Nietzsche's thoughts on slave moral even gives a plausible explanation as to why the EU in its rhetoric has been and still is stressing the virtues of soft power. Neo-realist theory also gives a reasonable explanation for the milieu shaping that the EU is trying to conduct in the Western Balkan states.

Also it gives a plausible explanation as to why the EU in the face of the neo-realist notion that states always are on their own in security matters, has chosen to give NATO veto power over its military foreign policy in order to gain security in its own vicinity. The explanation being that the security situation between the US and EU is muted and that the transfer of power therefore presents no real loss which makes the action a relative gain of power.

The same explanation for building military capabilities as given by neo-realist's can be given using neo-liberal institutionalist theory. The EU wants to gain security and since neo-liberals focus mainly on absolute rather than relative gains, it makes perfect sense for the EU to build military capabilities even though they are build in a way so that foreign countries are getting veto over these newly obtained assets. The EU's involvement in BiH also makes sense from a neoliberal point of view, both when it comes to security but also because of the EU's different non security interests in BiH and the Western Balkan region as a whole.

Furthermore, Neo-liberalism has the advantage that it is not necessary to make adjustments to the theory in order to make it applicable on the EU, on the contrary neo-liberal institutionalism believes that institutions such as the EU can play an important role in the world.

When looking at official EU documents and speeches from EU politicians and officials, you can find statements supporting each of the theories touched upon in this project, however most of the argumentation goes in line with a social constructivist thinking where post material values play a bigger role. If we are to believe the EU, they are led by their values. This in turn also means that when the EU is focusing so much on soft power, it is not as a neo-realist might argue a question of making a virtue of necessity but because the EU finds these norms and values important and because they believe they can help change BiH to the greater good of all.

So we end up with three theories that all in their own way try to explain the same thing.

And in the same way that the EU's foreign policy has more than one face, using both soft and hard power, so is it with explaining the EU's foreign policy. There is more than one side to it and using more than one theory enhances the understanding of the EU's building of military capabilities and its continuingly strong focus on soft power. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism gives a convincing explanation as to why the EU is slowly trying build up own military assets, while both social constructivism and neo-realism gives us different but both rather compelling accounts as to why the EU focus so much on its soft power.

It therefore seems that to be able to explain the EU's shift from a pure soft power regime to a mixed soft and hard power regime, you have to try to blend these three different theories, in order to fully understand the EU's policy.

I have tried using a lot of quotes throughout this analysis in order to try to support different theories. However, many of the quotes can be used in support of more than one theory making, making it even harder to make a final conclusion. On top of this comes the "spin" problem, what is spin and what is reality? When EU politician state that they are doing this in order to be able to cope with new challenges is this then to be believed or should we go looking for other interests that might have triggered this change, this is a whole other question that could take up a project in itself.

Discussion on the effects of the EU's policy in Bosnia & Herzegovina

When discussing whether the EU's interaction in BiH has been a success, it is important first to specify what you are focusing on. Is it the EU's ability to carry out military and civilian missions that helps to secure peace in the country? Or is it the EU's ability to help create settings that can lead to reforms that will help

bring the country closer to the norms and values shared by the EU countries and help build up the country's economy? Or in other words is it a success that the European Union has been able to uphold the relative peace that was created with the Dayton peace agreement 15 years ago, or does it take a nearing to the EU and its values and a development of the democracy in the country for the EU's policy to be regarded as a success?

If we look at the first way of defining success, namely that the country is relatively stable and peaceful, there is no doubt that the EU's operations have been to a large extent successful. One of the targets of the Althea mission was to; *"(...) contribute to the safe and secure environment" in BiH*, (Council of the European Union 2004). And Bosnia and Herzegovina is with the help of EU relatively stable and peaceful: *"The EU sustained security and economic growth in Bosnia"*, (Dobbins, et. al. 2008: 155), therefore the EU's involvement in BiH and the Althea operation in itself can be regarded as successful, (ibid: 234). So using this way of measuring the success of the EU in BiH the EU's involvement must be regarded as successful. The EU might have started off with a rather easy job using this way of measuring, because BiH was relatively stable when the EU took over control but the EU has managed to uphold this relative peace and stability which must be regarded as a success.

However, this is only one way of looking at EU's involvement in Bosnia & Herzegovina. If we instead focus on the things that the policy of conditionality was supposed to strengthen such as the democracy and its institutions, a quite different picture emerges. Though Bosnia & Herzegovina is a relatively stable and secure country both to live in and to visit as a tourist, its democracy and institutions are now in a state where it is seriously suggested that it is nearing a status as a so called failed state, (Newsweek 2009 and Politiken 2010) a label normally preserved for countries such as e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan and the DR Congo, countries where no overarching power has control of more than small parts of the country and where the situation is close to total anarchy. Although characterisation of BiH as a near failed state comes from the press where "big" words are often used to enhance understanding, there is no doubt that Bosnia & Herzegovina are having major problems partly due to an inadequate constitution and underdeveloped institutions.

In the 2010 Bertelsmann Transformation Index¹³, BiH is ranked 39th out of 128 countries thereby being the lowest ranked country in the region just below newly independent Kosovo, even more worrying is it that according to the report, BiH has experienced *"(...) no significant changes"*, (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010), through the last two years. In fact BiH *"(...) falls short on democratic substance: active citizens participation,*

¹³ The Bertelsmann Transformation Index, is a ranking system made by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Center for Applied Policy at Munich University, that ranks the level of democracy, market economy and political governance of development and transition countries. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 1).

horizontal and vertical accountability, true freedom of media, issue-driven public discourse, policies and political dialogue.”, (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 2). In other words BiH is a democracy more of name than in substance. The same picture emerges if we look at Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index”. In 2003 BiH scored 3.3 on a scale where 10 is the least corrupt, placing them better than both Albania, Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro, (Transparency International 2003). However, in 2010 all of these countries have overtaken BiH whose score had fallen to 3.2, making Bosnia & Herzegovina the lowest scoring country in the region except for Kosovo, (Transparency International 2010).

Also the EU Commission itself admits in its yearly progress report from 2010 on Bosnia & Herzegovina that the progress made by BiH in many important areas are quite small as the following quotes underline: *“Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress in addressing the **political criteria**.”*, (EU Commission 2010 c), *“Regarding **democracy and the rule of law**, there has been little progress towards constitutional reform and towards creating functional and effective institutional structures.*”, (ibid), and, *“There has been limited progress regarding **human rights and protection of minorities**.”*, (ibid). There seems to be no doubt that in the extent BiH is moving forward it is at a low speed.

The problems BiH are facing are not new. They go all the way back to the Dayton peace agreement from 1995, and the constitution that came out of it. When in 1995 the war in BiH ended, it was not because things got settled but because the international community stopped the war. The fighting stopped but the underlying conflicts remained. A *“(…) uniquely complicated political system”*, (Bieber 2010: 314), was created giving little power to the federal state while important areas such as control of both army and police remained in the states entity’s, (Bieber 2010: 315). The focus of Dayton was not to make a strong state but to prevent any group from taking power over the others: *“Dayton established a system of government at state level that was not designed to produce strong or effective government but to prevent the majority from taking decisions that adversely affect other groups.”*, (Foreign Policy initiative BH: 26). In this way the problems that BiH is now facing can be said to have been embedded in the Dayton peace agreement and the constitution that came from it. It is a state designed to fail. The conflicts are manifested in many ways from the small provocations such as the impossibility of buying Bosnian beer in the Croatian dominated West of the country and the ever waving Croatian flags in the same area to the constant threat of Republic Srpska under the leadership of Milorad Dodik declaring independence.

Since the end of the war little progress has been made in order to modernise the constitution and bring closer together the different ethnical groups. The no less than six elections held in the country between 1996 and 2006 have done little to overcome the conflicts and to bring closer together the ethnical groups, (Bieber 2010: 316). The same can be said about the recent election held October the 3rd this year. Although

the Bosniaks mainly voted for more moderate candidates working for compromises, the Croats and Serbs continued the tradition from former elections and voted for the nationalistic parties, (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2010).

It is in this morass of ethnical divisions and lack of well functioning institutions that the EU has had to navigate trying to conduct the policy of conditionality which has shown be to quite successful in other parts of South East Europe while strengthening their effort through the use of military and civilian missions.

So it seems that while the EU's military and civilian operations is to be regarded as a success and have been done so both by the EU itself and by lookers on, the policy of conditionality has not had the desired effect. It has not been the driving power for the politicians to make reforms, like formerly seen in e.g. Latvia (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 514), and other central or South European transition countries. Neither has it had the effect of bringing striding parties together like in Slovakia, (Bieber 2010: 191) or influencing the people to vote for more moderate politician's who could bring closer BiH to EU also like seen in Slovakia where the result of the 1998 election can be argued to have been influenced by the EU's impact on the electorate, (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 515).

This leaves us with the rather surprising conclusion that the old tools that to some extent has helped bring a whole range of countries, such as the ten new East and Central European countries and BiH's neighbours in Croatia and Serbia closer to the EU seem to have failed in the case of BiH, while the newly developed tools that the EU has added on top of its well known policy of conditionality seems to have worked to the extent that it has helped sustain peace. It might not have helped strengthen the BiH institutions but never the less, it has helped maintain peace in the country to an extent where BiH is regarded a relatively safe place to live and visit.

This leaves us with the question of why this is. How can we explain the lack of effect of the policy of conditionality?

First of all, it might be in its place to mention that the policy of conditionality is not always the master tool automatically generating change that the EU would like to see it as. Although there are good examples of the policy having been effective as also mentioned above, and although the EU often boosts of its positive effects, studies also show that there are limitations to the policy. An example of this is the case of Slovakia where the EU's policy had no apparent effect in the years between 1994 and 1998 under the administration of Vladimír Mečiar, (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 504) or in the case of what is often referred to as Europe's last dictatorship, Belarus where it seems, the European Union's policy has had absolutely no effect on President Aleksander Lukashenko's regime, (Sedelmeier 2010: 527).

A study carried out on the case of Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey concluded that: *“(...) it is the material bargaining mechanism and the condition of low domestic political costs that ultimately determine the success of EU conditionality.”*, (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 514). In other words if the EU's policy of conditionality is to have any effect, it takes two things. First of all, the EU needs to be very clear on what BiH can gain from following the EU's requirements, not just some vague promise that one day they could become members, and second of all, there has to be low costs for the BiH politicians to follow the EU's recommendations.

In the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina both things seems to be the problem. On the one hand, the EU and its individual member countries are rather half-hearted in their efforts to help BiH and to present clear goals and rewards in case of compliance and on the other hand, it seems that the costs for, at least some BiH politicians, to follow the EU's guidance is too high.

To start with the first, it seems that after the problems with Bulgaria and Romania after their admission in to the European Union in 2007 and the problems with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, that there is a fear from the EU leaders of taking in new members before everything is running more smoothly both with the implementation of the new treaty and with all the new countries that have joined since 2004. On top of this came the financial crisis and the concomitant problems with Greece being on the brink of bankruptcy. All this has made the EU's efforts and willingness to draw closer the Western Balkan countries smaller. The rationale seems to be that if the union is not running optimal then focus should be on getting the union to work better before devoting more energy on potential candidate countries such as BiH. This policy might be reasonable in terms of getting the EU to function better, but has the downside that the EU is losing influence in the Western Balkan countries, (Korski 2010). The leaders in WB are beginning to doubt the seriousness of EU and the value of fulfilling the demands coming from the EU, (ibid). On top of this, the EU seems to be having trouble setting clear conditions in order for BiH to gain progress and benefits from the EU, (Bieber 2008: 7), making it even harder for the BiH politicians to comply.

The other condition identified to be present for the policy of conditionality to be effective also seems to lack. It seems that at least for some BiH politicians the costs of complying with EU conditions are quite high. One of the problems in the case of BiH is that the EU is trying to build a state that isn't supported by everybody within the country. Why comply with conditions that will strengthen a state that you rather saw weakened? (ibid: 6). This seems to be the case for the politicians from Republic Srpska. They are opposed to a strengthening of the BiH federation and therefore lack incentives to comply with conditions that will help centralise the state and ease decision-making. As latest seen at the election this fall, the voters in Republic Srpska still vote for nationalistic parties whose politicians are against a more centralised federal

state some of them even arguing for an independent RS. This makes the cost for the politicians of Republic Srpska for working against decentralisation high, and thus sabotages the EU's policy. The same has been the case for the politicians from the Croat entity. Here the voters have also quite consistently voted for the more nationalistic parties working against a stronger state with more power to the federation. This was also the case at the recent election held this fall, (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2010).

On the other hand, the parties favoured mainly by Bosniaks have been fighting for a stronger and more centralised state making them unpopular amongst the Croat and Serb minorities. This leaves BiH with an electorate more or less split into the three major ethnic groups the country is divided into. With a system that is designed not to function well but to prevent any of the groups to gain control over one of the other, this makes any decision making hard and makes the political price for any of the political elites to make compromises in order to comply with EU conditions too high for the policy to function well. The success of policy in BiH therefore seems to strand on the EU's lack of commitment combined with an ethnically split population, making the outlook for BiH seem rather gloomy.

Despite of this there have been areas where the policy has functioned, such as on the visa liberalisation area. Here the EU Commission in their 2010 status report states that: *"In the framework of the visa liberalisation dialogue, steps have been taken to fulfil all the benchmarks set in the roadmap."*, (EU Commission 2010 c), and as earlier mentioned visa liberation has recently been granted to BiH. What differs in this case from other policy areas is that what is obtained by following EU guidelines is very clear, and that it is not an area that can easily split the electorate or the politicians such as e.g. the conflict between centralisation and decentralisation.

Conclusion

The hypothesis of this assignment was that the EU's foreign policy went through a significant change at the beginning of the 21st century, and the challenge set forth was to try to explain this change of policy by using Bosnia & Herzegovina as a case. First of all, the study shows that the EU's policy has not so much undergone a total change as it has been further developed. For a large part, the EU's foreign policy when it comes to its near abroad, and therefore also to BiH, has stayed the same. The main part of the EU's policy towards its neighbourhood is the policy of conditionality, using trade, aid and the general attraction of the EU as the carrot that is supposed to draw closer the surrounding countries and at the same time setting up conditions in order for the countries to "conform" to the EU's values that they are trying to promote. What is new is that the EU on top of this policy of conditionality has added an extra layer of civilian and military operations that it can draw on in cases where more hard power is needed. This has been made possible by

the Berlin Plus arrangements which allows the EU to make use of NATO capabilities provided that no NATO country goes against this.

This development can be seen in many ways and understood from different perspectives. Both neo-realism, neo-liberalism and social constructivism gives convincing explanations as to why the EU has chosen to develop its policy by developing military capabilities and carry out both civilian and military operations. From a neo-realist perspective the EU is building up military capabilities because military capabilities are superior to the soft powers that the EU boasts itself of and that it had solemnly been using up until the new capabilities came in place in the beginning of 2003. The EU might be arguing that soft power is superior both in effect and morally and that the reason for developing these military assets is to cope with new security threats; however this is just a way of making a virtue of necessity. The EU is no military super power and will not become one within the foreseeable future, if ever, so instead of focussing on what it can't do, it argues that what it is forced to do due to its lack of great military power, is superior both morally and when it comes to a positive outcome and in this way makes what is really a necessity into a virtue. The EU is interested in BiH only because of security issues, and because it can gain relative power over other actors such as Russia. The reason why EU is using NATO capabilities and thereby allowing NATO to have veto power over their military capabilities is that the security situation between NATO, (read, the US), and EU is muted meaning there is no security competition between the two. Where neo-realism falls short is when it comes to the assumption that international institutions only play a minor role. If we put this aside and regard the EU as a state neo-realism has a fully plausible explanation as to why the EU has begun to develop military capabilities.

As already mentioned, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism exist inside the same paradigm, with few things dividing them. However, one of the main things is their view on institutions. Neo-liberals believe in the power of institutions and therefore have an easier job in explaining EU, thus making it unnecessary to make any adjustments to the theory in order to apply it to the case at hand. Another point that divides the two is the neo-liberals focus on other than security matters. From a neo-liberal point of view, EU has a whole bunch of interests for interfering in BiH, from more soft ones having to do with environment, economy and the like to the more hardcore security aspects such as the threat of crimes or conflicts spreading to neighbouring countries. In this way the EU not only gains security but also nurtures other interests. From a neo-liberal point of view the EU's build up of military assets can therefore be seen as a way of maximising its own security, nurturing own interests, and to some extent shielding others off, and strengthening its ability to solve conflicts like the one in BiH. The reason they allow other countries to have

veto over their foreign policy is, that the even though NATO is getting a say in EU's security policy the EU is still gaining absolute advantages making it worthwhile for the EU to develop the military side.

At last we have social constructivist theory which differs quite a lot from the two other theories used in this project. Social constructivism gives us two different ways of understanding the EU's interest in acquiring military assets. First of all, it can be seen as a result of a change in discourse where new threats have been articulated. In the constructivist way of thinking what is important is not so much the concrete threats that the EU might be facing but the way these are articulated. It can therefore be argued that around the time where the EU started to build up its capabilities, a new discourse had been constructed articulating a new security situation that had to be taken into account. Whether the change in the security situation took place is of lesser significance, what matters is that they are articulated as such and therefore given importance.

Another way of understanding the EU's change of policy in the same line of thinking is as a result of the trauma it was for the EU to stand on the sideline while the backyard was burning unable to do anything before at last NATO, led by the US, intervened. In order to prevent the same situation from happening again, the EU therefore started to develop military assets so that the EU will have a chance of interfering if a similar situation should occur. Therefore, it also seemed very symbolical that the first place the EU tried its new capabilities was on the Western Balkan.

As we have seen, all the three theories used all gives us more or less convincing explanations as to why the EU has started to build up military capabilities. Although some scholars will oppose the blend of different theories, I find that it is necessary not to solemnly focus on one theory in order to explain the EUs actions. Many things have played a role in the build up of military assets,

When it comes to evaluating the EU's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are two criteria you can use. You can look at the present security situation in the country or you can try to look at the condition of the democracy in BiH and whether any progress is happening. If we use the first criteria, the EU's involvement can be regarded as a success. The country is relatively stable and safe to live in. Therefore the EU's military involvement which had as a target to uphold peace and stability can be regarded as a success, which it also it both by the EU itself and by commentators.

However, if we instead move our focus to the condition of BiH's democracy, institutions and the development of these, things look quite different. The different entities have trouble cooperating and it has been impossible to make the changes to the constitution that is needed in order to make decision making more effective. The tensions between the different ethnical groups still exist and Republic Srpska regularly

threatens to leave the federation. The country scores low in international measurements of the state of the democracy and no progress seems to be made on this front. All in all, the country suffers from major problems when it comes to the state of the institutions, the democracy and the ability to make common decisions for the whole country. Using these criteria the EU's efforts have failed miserably.

There can be identified two reasons for this failure: One lies with the EU and one lies with the BiH politicians and electorate. If the EU's attempt to develop the democracy in BiH and draw closer BiH to the EU and its values is to have the desired effect, two things are needed: The EU needs to set up clear conditions and rewards that can be obtained if the conditions are met and the political costs of following these recommendations have to be low. In the case of BiH both things are missing. The EU has failed in directing sufficient attention to Bosnia & Herzegovina and making it clear how rewards can be earned by following the EU guidelines and the political costs for the BiH politicians in following the recommendations are too high. The electorate especially in the Croatian entity and in Republic Srpska have time and again chosen to elect politicians who are against giving more power to the federation making it hard for the politicians to cooperate on making the state's institutions stronger and allowing more power to be given to the federation.

Once again it seems BiH is a wakeup call for the EU. The policy of conditionality is not a universal tool that can be applied anywhere with the automatic result that the country to which it has been applied will move closer to the EU through reforms.

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Short description of the authors of the main sources used

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