



The Greenlandic Voices in Foreign and Security Policy

**PERSPECTIVES FROM DANISH AND
GREENLANDIC POLITICIANS AND
OFFICIALS**

**MASTER THESIS BY KATJA DAHL HORSFELDT
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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Abstract

This master thesis focusses on the Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy and how it is articulated by Danish and Greenlandic experts, including diplomats, officials, and politicians. Through an ontological phenomenological constructivistic philosophy of the research and interviewing as method, this thesis explores the research question: How are the Greenlandic voices articulated in foreign and security policy by Danish and Greenlandic experts?

The analysis is structured by three operationalized key units extracted from the theoretical framework of securitization by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde (1998). This theoretical framework has been chosen to map out how the issues inside the foreign and security policy field concerning Greenland and Denmark are complex. Moreover, the theory is used to find existing dualisms that has a risk of developing into a security issue. Lastly, the theory in its traditional form with key units of securitization is used to analyze whether there is a potential securitization concerning how the Greenlandic voices are articulated in the foreign and security policy.

The empirical data consists of eight interviews with Danish and Greenlandic experts with professions inside the political and diplomatic sector, supplemented with relevant secondary documents, such as policy papers, reports, laws, and declarations which address the foreign and security policy field of the Kingdom of Denmark.

The first part of the analysis finds that Greenlandic commercial interests and the Danish administration's competences on the foreign and security policy areas are in a grey zone. Moreover, the analysis shows that the Joint Arctic Command, as an actor inside the field of security, is balancing between the military and societal sector because of the focus on strengthened relationship with the Greenlandic society. Thirdly, the relationship with the US appears as two-faced because of development opportunities for Greenland as well as the risks followed by the spillover effects.

The second part of the analysis concludes that inside the dualisms and security issues, several of the informants emphasized the demand of Greenlanders representing the Greenlandic voices rather than Danish or American analyses of the Greenlandic voices. The differences between Greenlandic and Danish approaches could in some of the conflicting dualisms result in shadows of a security issue, however these are never fully a security issue because of the Greenlandic administration (before the Greenlandic election) and the Danish administration had a better relation than seen before.

The last part of the analysis uses the key units of securitization and concludes that a stronger basis for foreign and security policy knowledge is securitized by several of the informants and accepted by the Greenlandic and Danish administrations. The stronger basis for knowledge on foreign and security policy is threaten by fact-resistant decision-making but also Danish and American analyses.

The Danish and Greenlandic experts' articulation of the Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy is first articulated by examples that show how complex the issues and topics are, because they weave into each other. Likewise, the articulation of the Greenlandic voices emphasizes how Greenlanders should represent Greenland and have more influence. Lastly, the voices request a stronger knowledge foundation about foreign and security policy since it is crucial when Greenlandic decision-makers have increased influence.

Keywords: Greenland, Denmark, foreign and security policy, ontological phenomenological constructivism, securitization, multisectoral, security, dualisms, interviews, Greenlandic voices

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Introduction

In February 2021 the first foreign and security opinion poll conducted in Greenland was presented at the university of Greenland, Ilisimatusarfik, in Nuuk. In the physical and digital auditorium additional interested people were present and followed the presentation as well as the discussion afterwards. The audience counted students, politicians, and professionals, that are following the foreign and security policy area in Greenland and the Arctic very closely (Ilisimatusarfik, 2021a); (Ilisimatusarfik, 2021b).

Could this opinion poll or survey be seen as the starting signal – the pistol shot – that launch a more public debate about the foreign and security policy opinion of Greenland? Additional interesting results were and have been highlighted both in the discussion at the presentation, but also when having conducted interviews in relation to the thesis.

Some of the highlighted results have been the domestic challenges in Greenland are most present in the awareness compared to the global challenges. Nevertheless, there is a general positive relation to alliances with the superpower, the US and have an ambivalent attitude regarding China. Lastly, the creators behind the opinion poll stress that it is the first nation-wide survey and therefore, only captures some of the nuances concerning the Greenlandic opinions on foreign and security policy (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021).

As Ackrén and Leander Nielsen (2020), the researchers behind the opinion poll, emphasize the survey only shows a glimpse of the Greenlandic opinion – however, the opinions of Greenland are being followed closely by stakeholders from all over the world (Ilisimatusarfik, 2021a); (Ilisimatusarfik, 2021b). With the publication of the opinion poll, questions rose: How are these results on Greenlandic opinions from the survey fitting with the opinion of Copenhagen? Are the results covering both the civil and political opinion or would these opinions be two separate categories? Are these results surprising?

The foreign and security policy is still on the table of Copenhagen “[...] *under Danish jurisdiction according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark [...]*” (Naalakkersuisut, u.d.), but with the agreement between Denmark and Greenland; that the Danish Government

will involve the Government of Greenland when there are foreign and security policy matters of Greenlandic concern (Naalakkersuisut, u.d.).

How are foreign and security policy matters of Greenlandic concern estimated by Copenhagen and how is Greenland estimating the 'matters of Greenlandic concern'? To get a more nuanced picture and context in relation to the Danish and Greenlandic relation in the Kingdom of Denmark, the aim of this thesis is to interview relevant stakeholders in the political, diplomatic, and official domain, in Denmark and Greenland, and thereby analyze qualitatively how the Greenlandic voices are articulated in foreign and security policy by Greenlandic and Danish experts. Is Nuuk and Copenhagen on the same page on foreign and security policy matters? What are dominant in the foreign and security policy discourses of Denmark and Greenland? Are the discourses alike or not?

When Greenland becomes more independent, Greenland is also to be found at the table of foreign and security policy. Rahbek-Clemmensen and Jedig Nielsen (2020) argue, that there is a shift in the Greenlandic approach to geopolitics, with the increased sovereignty. The point develops further with Greenlandic focus on the economic situation, where they also must deal with the geopolitical landscape, which generates dissonance in the Kingdom (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig Nielsen, 2020, p. 85).

This is similarly described in a report by Runge et al. (2020) about security policy dynamics in Arctic (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020). Here the increased link between Greenlandic commercial interests and foreign policy is explained as "grey zones" which also exists between Copenhagen's competences on the security policy areas and the Greenlandic home taken area of infrastructure and mining. Because these grey zones exist, the Greenlandic politicians are inevitable getting in contact with both foreign and security policy issues (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020, p. 32).

Copenhagen and Nuuk must therefore agree on, how to approach the grey zones. Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig (2020) emphasize how this can result in tensions, exemplified with the

relation to the US. Here, Copenhagen and Nuuk do not always agree on the demands for the US presence in Greenland. This is referred to as how to play the “Greenland Card”, where the argument is that Denmark tent to reduce the value of the Greenland Card and Greenland trying to raise the value and demand more of the US presence (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig Nielsen, 2020, p. 90).

By this example, it highlights Denmark’s position as “middleman”, trying to navigate in the demands from Greenlandic and the US, and the intergovernmental cooperation in relation to the Arctic region (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig Nielsen, 2020, pp. 90-91).

Research question

With starting point in the grey zones, the Greenlandic opinions making clear demands of the US presence and the dynamics in the relationship between Denmark and Greenland - the focal point of this thesis will be an analysis of the articulation of the Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy in Danish and Greenlandic perspectives. Based on the introduction and the questions raised in the introduction, the research question’s formulation is as following:

How are the Greenlandic voices articulated in foreign and security policy by Danish and Greenlandic experts?

By “Greenlandic voices” it references to the Greenlandic involvement or para-diplomacy so to speak. Since the foreign and security policy area is on the Danish table due to the not home taken areas of Greenland, Greenland is however participating on some foreign and security related issues if it is connected to Greenland. The Greenlandic voices are therefore covering the Greenlandic effort on those issues as well as issues that are in the home taken areas but are in a grey zone with foreign and security areas as emphasized by Runge Olsen et al. (2020).

Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig (2020) moreover refers to the “[...] *Greenlandic voices have already criticized Denmark for not allowing Greenland to partake in discussion with the American president at the 2019 NATO Leaders Meeting in London*” (Kongstad & Maressa, 2019 mentioned in (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig Nielsen, 2020, p. 85)). By this quote it is indicated how the grey zones have risen with increased Greenlandic engagement to the international

politics and decision-making, when concerning foreign and security policy with relevance of Greenland (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Jedig Nielsen, 2020, p. 85). Moreover, the quote underlines how “Greenlandic voices” should be in definite plural because there are more than one Greenlandic voice and the underlying fact, that there *are* Greenlandic voices, opinions, and different positions towards issues concerning foreign and security policy.

The choice of word in relation to “articulated” is based on that the specific verb should give a suitable base for using the theoretical framework of securitization, which will be emphasized later. Within the framework of securitization, there is a focus on speech act and articulation of a threat. By using the verb “articulation” it thereby creates a foundation of looking for a how a threat is rhetorically expressed (cf. (Buzan et al., 1998); (Gad U. P., 2017a, p. 108)).

The research question addresses “foreign and security policy”. This formulation is very wide but is in this case to focus on the issues concerning Denmark and Greenland. The term “the Kingdom of Denmark” will be used in the thesis, while being aware of the formulation covering both Greenland, Denmark, and the Faroe Islands (UM, u.d.). The Faroe Islands is not in focus and will only be mentioned sporadically by few examples. In relation to the Kingdom of Denmark’s foreign and security policy, the attention will be on the issues concerning Greenland or issues related to the Arctic.

Another formulation used in the research question is “Danish and Greenlandic experts”. This will cover the informants participating in the interviews which are used as the primary data. At first, the “experts” were extended to cover both diplomats, politicians and officials and scholars and people from the commercial sector dealing with Danish-Greenlandic relations, however, this group of experts were reduced to make a clearer focus. It was further reduced to the politicians, diplomates, and officials because the aim is to understand the specific sector, dealing with decision-making and being in touch with the Greenlandic voices.

Delimitations

Aware of the formulation of the research question, it is naturally important to make some delimitations, so the reader does not drown in topics related to the foreign and security policy area in the Kingdom of Denmark. First the topic is focused on the recent time of five years, yet not delimitation from historical perspectives or references. The perspective will be found a political, diplomatic, and official level, which also is connected to the informants, that is interviewed. By taking starting point in interviews there is also a natural delimitation in the data selection. Both because there is a limit of what the interviews can contain, and because there is a limit of how much can be asked in the interviews.

As Greenland and the Arctic are a changing and dynamic political area to study, there are always news appearing, that could be of interest for the thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis had a deadline to be delivered before and therefore recent events such as the election in Greenland, the visit of the US MFA and the ministerial meeting in Arctic Council the 20th of May 2021 (Arctic Council, 2021) are not analyzed in dept but some of them only mentioned sporadic. The author is aware of how the recent election of the new Greenlandic administration in the coming time will manifest their coalition policy, which could give new information to address the topic. However, it is a too speculative variable to analyze but could be an interesting case to discuss in the thesis defense.

Another point to the Arctic as research area and as being a very dynamic area, several research areas are delimited, that counts the focus on the military and security discussion on China and Russia, the EU engagement in the Arctic, as well as the intergovernmental cooperation of the Arctic states (Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the US) (Weber (ed), 2020). However, the delimitation of the mentioned, does not exclude being emphasized or mentioned in examples in the thesis.

The attention due to the data will be on Greenland, Denmark, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland inside the Kingdom of Denmark and US presences in Greenland.

The last delimitation is about the discussion of independence of Greenland. This was often mentioned in the interview/data and used in stressing different arguments. It is delimited by the author because the discussion is complex and opens for angles that do not fit the focus of thesis, nevertheless, the significance of the independence discussion does implicit link with other relevant and processed topics.

With these delimitations settled, the following section will state the methodological choices and delimitations.

Methodology

In the section of methodology, the aim is to illuminate the philosophy of the research, the methods, the approach and additional methodological perspectives and reflections of the thesis. Throughout the methodology section there will be continuously delimitation to reflect upon other relevant methodological choices. The first methodological choice is about the philosophy of the research, where the starting point is in social constructivism due to the emphasis on “articulation” and “Greenlandic voices” in the research question formulation.

Philosophy of the research

In the border between social science and philosophy is social constructivism. Social constructivism has during the last decades been used more and more especially in the humanities and social science. There are additional versions of social constructivism, some more controversial than others (Collin, 2015).

Social constructivists often find themselves in a de-constructivistic discourse, which means they are critical on the dominant order and want to challenge the “inevitable facts” decided by the ruling order. This is connected to the philosopher Ian Hacking’s different graduations of “de-constructivistic effort”, where the first and most used of the graduations is to *reveal*. With the revelation, the aim is to show how a certain order is contingent and can be changed. The social constructivists can analyze and reveal through academia how societal perceptions

and traditions are contingent and on the conditions of social factors and thereby inspire to change it. A clear example of this is gender studies (Collin, 2015, pp. 328-329).

Collin (2015) differences between the epistemological and ontological constructivism (Collin, 2015). Epistemological constructivism understands that the perception of the world and scientific acknowledgement is socially constructed, whereas the ontological constructivism claims that the actual world is a construction (Collin, 2015, p. 326). From that argument the ontological constructivism can seem like an extreme version of constructivism, when the belief is based on that the whole reality is a social construction. Most constructivists are of the belief – as well as the author – that the ontological constructivism should be applied in a more limited way, where the *reality* only with reference to the *social world*, and not the physical world, is a construction (Collin, 2015).

Collin (2015) emphasizes one of the main directions of epistemological social constructivism represented as Marxism, which is based on a materialistic orientation, with class and production relationship, and a societal reality that is prerequisite for the way we think (Collin, 2015). On the other hand, is the ontological social constructivism that is represented by phenomenology which is oriented on the human mind as the creator of reality (Collin, 2015). According to Collin (2015) these two main directions cannot meet since Marxism is materialistic and phenomenology is idealistic (Collin, 2015). Marxism sees the *societal reality* as the foundation of how humans think, while phenomenology sees *thinking* as the foundation for societal reality (Collin, 2015, p. 341; 345).

To make the point stand clearer Collin (2015) gives examples of Marx' epistemology and the ontological phenomenological constructivism (Collin, 2015). According to Marx, the capitalistic society constructs a reality and belief for the working class. Using Christian believe, the working class are to believe that they will be rewarded in heaven with their hard work on earth – and with that awareness – the working class is less inclined to rebel against the capitalistic order. The ontological phenomenological constructivism goes further, also by highlighting religion, as the catalysator for creating a societal reality, when religion is the construction or defining certain ways of living. In a church the rituals, actions, the priest's

words, the church attenders' intentions all construct actions with a certain meaning. The intentions create actions, and the sum of all the actions and interactions represent the societal reality (Collin, 2015, pp. 340-341).

In this thesis, the last mentioned – the ontological phenomenological constructivism – is what constitutes the dominant understanding and philosophy of this research. By this, it means, that the ontological constructivism is to be found in a limited way, that is delimited to the *societal world*. The construction of reality in the social world mainly exists in the social reality, while the physical reality exists independently (Collin, 2015, p. 344). The societal reality is therefore created by virtue of the human experience of a reality. A phenomenon exists, when it is socially accepted and supported by a social act (Collin, 2015, p. 345).

The philosophy of the research understands from the ontological phenomenological constructivism, that idealistically look at the human way of thinking constituting reality (Collin, 2015, p. 341). Next section is about explaining the method choice of doing interviews.

Methods: Interviews

The interview can be used to generate experiences, opinions and life stories of people and is often used in humanistic and social science (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a, p. 33). The methods of interviewing were earlier focused on how the interviewer had to be as neutral as possible, but due to the often use of interviews, one must now acknowledge that the interview is an active interaction between two or more people. Therefore, one must be attentive on the interview as a social practice found in specific settings. By using the interview as method, it is possible to get close to the individual that are interviewed, and his or her understandings (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a, pp. 34-36).

The primary data of this thesis consists of eight semi structured interviews conducted on individual basis. The aim of the interviews has been to make them as an interaction between the questions structured by an interview guide (see appendix, p. 53). With the semi structured interview, the interview guide made it possible to follow up on interesting points made by the interviewed individual (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a, p. 43). The interview guide has been produced with inspiration from Tanggaard & Brinkmann (2020a) pp. 44-46, yet with the author's own modifications. The interview guide is therefore lined up with an introduction

and then divided into two columns: research topics and interview questions. It has been conducted in this way because the eight interviewed individuals have been categorized after their professions. The politicians had a standard interview guide and the individuals on official level had the standard interview guide with one-two more specific topics. The different categories have been chosen to get a nuanced picture on the foreign and security policy area and some of the decision-makers behind it.

Figure 1: Overview of the informants and the time of the conducted interviews

Name	Type	When	How
Justus Hansen (JH)	Politician	9th of March	Teams
Anonymous source from the Government of Greenland	Official	23rd of March	Teams
Aaja Chemnitz Larsen (ACL)	Politician	25th of March	Phone
Anonymous source from the Government of Greenland (<i>only background interview</i>)	Official	8th of April	Teams
Liv Inuk Oldenburg Lynge (LI)	Coordinator and project manager (<i>statements are of own opinion, and does not reflect her position</i>)	13 th of April	Skype
Thomas Winkler (TW)	Ambassador	14 th of April	Phone
Sofia Geisler (SG)	Politician	15 th of April	Skype
Anonymous source from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Official	29 th of April	Zoom

The interviews were recorded and transcribed, except from the background interview on the 8th of April with the sources from the Government of Greenland, which was materialized as raw notes. Figure 1 describes how some of the informants are anonymous and one interview was both anonymous and non- transcribed, which highlights how interesting it can be analyzing inside the field of the politics and diplomacy. It also showed how there are dynamics – who can speak their mind and who are formulating the answers with care – and how there ostensibly exists a clear hierarchy in relation to speaking public. Overall, the interviews showed how the officials interviewed were formulating their statements with care whereas the politicians often answered quick and seemed to speak their minds (cf. appendix). The distinction between how the informants and the way they expressed themselves could also highlight how the topic of foreign and security policy in Danish and Greenlandic perspective is in some ways a sensitive topic, which also is something that is aimed to analyze in the thesis.

However, it also gave a nuanced picture on the political and diplomatic field, where the data, representing different parts of the hierarchy, gave insights of the who can speak public and how.

As mentioned, the interviews were transcribed. Tanggaard & Brinkmann (2020a) point out there might be a *translation* when it comes to transcription (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a). This point can be relevant in two ways. First, the point of Tanggaard & Brinkmann (2020a) is that the spoken language and the written language have a lot of differences which might affect the final transcription since some face articulations or irony can be hard to track in a transcription (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a, p. 50). The second way, that the transcription becomes a *translation* is in its most literally way, namely a translation from Danish to English. Since Danish is the first or second language of informants, it was a decision made to give them the possibility to express themselves the most comfortable way, that also fit with the author's language skills. When using quotations from the interview in the thesis, they will appear in English, translated by the author and with the original Danish transcription as a footnote. The fact that the transcription emerges as a double translation could occur as problematic but is strengthened by the fact that the transcriptions have been made by the author herself, and not more than a day later than the interview to have the things fresh in mind. This process has been done after the guide by Tanggaard and Brinkmann (2020a), where they further underline, that less would get lost, when transcribing short time after the interview is conducted (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020a, p. 51).

The interviews will not stand alone as data; however, it is the primary data conducted and used in the thesis. To support the statements from the interview and secure a stronger representativity, relevant policy paper and reports will be used as well. Moreover, documents and documents analysis are often made in combination with interviews or surveys (Lynggaard, 2020, p. 185), which also will be the case in this thesis. The document analysis can moreover help map out either stability or change in a time of period, which supplements well with the method of interviewing because the documents can tell something very precise about the opinion at the exact moment, they were produced in (Lynggaard, 2020, p. 185; 189). The chosen documents referred to in this thesis are secondary documents, which means they all are public available and are categorized as laws, declarations, reports and policy

papers (Lynggaard, 2020, pp. 187-188). In figure two, relevant policy papers, reports and laws are summed up in to make an overview of the secondary documents which are referred to and which were found relevant, either because an informant emphasized the exact document or because the document could address an argument delivered by the informants.

Figure 2: Relevant policy papers, reports & laws gathered by the author

Original title	Type	Context	Year
"New political agreement on Arctic Capabilities" ("Aftale om en Arktis-kapacitetspakke")	Agreement: It is a framework agreement on strengthening the Armed Forces' capabilities in the Arctic on both the civil and military front with new capacities and initiatives (The Danish Government, et al., 2021).	The agreement is made on the context of a changing Arctic and the parties behind the agreement agree on that the Kingdom of Denmark has responsibility for the defense and security policy of the Arctic and are therefore focusing on improved capacities (The Danish Government, et al., 2021).	2021
"The First Foreign – and Security Policy Opinion poll in Greenland" By Maria Ackrén & Rasmus Leander Nielsen	Opinion poll: The results show that there is not an immensely concern about geopolitics. The Greenlandic population tend to be more concerned about domestic issues, which also can be confirmed when looking at the debates at the parliament (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021, p. 1).	The first foreign-and security policy opinion poll led by scholars from University of Greenland, Ilisimatusarfik and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung to get an impression of the Greenlandic attitudes towards foreign and security policy (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021).	2021
"Efterretningsmæssig risikovurdering 2020: En aktuel vurdering af forhold i udlandet af betydning for Danmarks sikkerhed" By Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE)	Report: Intelligence risk assessment by the Danish Defense Intelligence Service	An annual and unclassified risk assessment with focus on the Defense Intelligence Service's highest priorities. That concerns the situations in the Arctic, Russia, China, the cyberthreat and terror threat (FE, 2020)	2020
"Statement on Improved Cooperation in Greenland – Including at Pituffik (Thule Air Base)"	Agreement: The agreement is signed by Carla Sands, the ambassador of the US to the Kingdom of Denmark and Kim Kielsen, Premier of Greenland in October 2020 (Washington D.C., Copenhagen, & Nuuk, 2020).	The agreement is a result of year-long negotiations between the US, Denmark, and Greenland on the service contract on Pituffik. One of the documents was an American and Greenlandic agreement on further collaboration (um, 2020); (Washington D.C., Copenhagen, & Nuuk, 2020).	2020
"Nye Sikkerhedspolitiske Dynamikker i Arktis – Muligheder og udfordringer for Kongeriget Danmark" By Mikkel Runge Olesen et al.	Report: The analysis is divided into three parts, where the last part is analyzing the possibilities and challenges together with recommendations (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020)..	DIIS (Danish Institute for International Studies) has undertaken the MFA's request an analysis on security dynamics in the Arctic. DIIS made an independent research-based analysis with recommendations (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020).	2020
"Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis" By Danish Ministry of Defense	Report: Analysis and recommendation on how the Ministry of Defense can secure the interests and	An analysis of how to strengthen the Ministry of Defense's work and tasks in Arctic. Also known as the "Arctic-analysis" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016).	2016

	responsibilities of the Kingdom of Denmark in the Arctic (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016).		
<i>"Danmark, Grønland og Færøerne: Kongeriget Danmarks Strategi for Arktis 2011-2020"</i> by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DK, Greenland and the Faroe Islands)	Report/strategy: The Kingdom of Denmark's strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020	The strategy aims to strengthen the foundation for cooperation on the opportunities and the challenges which the Arctic region is fronting (Udenrigsministeriet, 2011).	2011
"Act on Greenland Self-Government" ("Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre")	Law: Self Rule Act of the Government of Greenland based on agreement between the Government of Greenland and the Danish Government as equal parties (Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre, 2009).	The Self Rule Act recognize that the Greenlandic people are a people under international law with the right to self-determination and the desire to promote mutual respect in the partnership between Denmark and Greenland (Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre, 2009).	2009
"Ilulissat Declaration"	Declaration: The Danish MFA and Premier of Greenland agreed with representative from the five Arctic coastal states the Ilulissat Declaration in Greenland 28 th of May 2008.	Representatives from the five coastal States: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the US met in Ilulissat and accepted to protect the Arctic Oceans and cooperate about it, through bilateral agreements, Arctic Council, and international forums (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008)	2008
"Igaliku agreement"	Agreement: The agreement consists of the paragraphs that concern defense areas, NATO-agreement concerning status for military forces and local cooperation (retsinformation.dk, 2005).	Agreement made between the US Government and the Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland about the defense of Greenland (retsinformation.dk, 2005).	2004

The figure additionally serves as a service to the reader to get a quick overview, but likewise to give a better flow in the analysis when the policy papers, reports and laws were described already.

In the next section the aim is to describe the approach, which involves the methodological strategy of analysis: How is the theoretical framework meant to be used and how is the data involved and being approached? This will be answered in the following.

Approach

The approach is through the theoretical processing and operationalization to an analysis strategy. The theory is securitization that has close connections to discourse (cf. securitization's referring to "speech act" (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26)), and

therefore, this section will deliver clarification on how the theory as analysis strategy has elements of discourse which differ from mainstream discourse analysis. Before beginning the discussion, few points are to be made about the grounded theory as approach delivered by Watt Boolsen (2020).

When using grounded theory in practice, the open coding is the first step in classifying the data. This means beginning from the very basis and by asking: 'What is going on?'. This step in the analysis process will develop into another sort of coding, namely by making coding(keywords) illustrated in an operationalization of the theory. The process therefore moves naturally from open coding in the data and from an inductive approach to deeper into the material and a deductive approach (Watt Boolsen, 2020, pp. 315-316).

In this thesis, the theoretical framework has been operationalized and categorized into key units. After the first step addressing "what is going on?" the theoretical framework was operationalized, and three operationalized key units were extracted. When processing and analyzing the data, the key units were given colors which easily categorized a certain statement in the interviews. The first extracted key unit focuses on the "multisectoral landscape" (cf. coming theory section) and was therefore given the color, green, because of the association between "green" and "landscape". The second key unit focuses on "security as failed politics" (cf. coming theory section) and got the color "red", symbolizing "security/threat/emergency". Last and third key unit about "securitization as a speech act" (cf. the coming theory section) focusing on the *articulation* of a threat, was given the color "blue", because blue often associates with *communication*. By giving the operationalized key units colors, it was easier to structure the almost 60 pages of the transcribed interviews.

A last reflection to be made and highlighted is also stressed by Watt Boolsen (2020). She reflects on the combination of data and how data is constructed, where it is essential to understand the context (Watt Boolsen, 2020). One of the informants kindly pointed out that the Greenlandic language is strongly entrenched through non-verbal communication, which made it more important to conduct the interviews with both microphone and video. Unfortunately, technicalities and poor internet connection has challenged the ability to meet the non-verbal communication as much as possible in these covid-19- times.

After reflection upon the approach and the structuring of the analysis, the next is about discourse analysis. This reflection is brought into the methodology section to address a (possibly) natural method-theory combination namely between discourse analysis and securitization, which other students have done before (cf. master's thesis by (Jacobsen, 2014)). In the following, there will be described discourse analysis approaches and how they are deselected, used with limitations and/or to be found indirectly.

Discourse analysis

In Jørgensen & Phillips (1999) and in Phillips (2020) three approaches to discourse analysis are presented, which counts Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory, critical discourse analysis by Norman Fairclough and discourse psychology from the perspectives of Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999); (Phillips, 2020, p. 382). The aim of this section is not to go through them in details, but to extract the main points of discourse analysis. This extraction will mainly take starting point in critical discourse analysis by Fairclough and to some extent discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe. Discourse psychology is delimited because it concerns social psychology and the cognitive psychology where the methods mainly are experimental (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999, pp. 105-107), which is out of this topic.

Fairclough is following the social constructivistic condition on that reality is contingent (Phillips, 2020, p. 380). Behind the discourse analysis of Fairclough is a model of three dimensions: 1) text, 2) discursive practice, 3) social practice, where the connection between the text and the social practice goes through discursive practice. The three dimensions are used to support each other, both when finding arguments but also to underline or strengthen certain arguments when it can be found in several dimensions (Phillips, 2020, p. 390). The textual analysis of Fairclough is highly based on use of vocabulary, grammar and how a sentence is built, which will not be focused on in this case because the interviews are conducted in Danish, transcribed, and translated to English when used in quotations. This processing of the data has the risk of changing to a point where it would not be fair to analyze on specific use of certain words or how and where the interviewees made a comma or a full

stop, since the author has had an influence on how it appears in the written form (Phillips, 2020).

The social practice is delimited as well, since it focuses on social structures and power relations (Phillips, 2020), which are two essential notions, but are to be related in the dimensions of the theory and not the discourse analysis approach. For instance, as when using the key units of securitization theory and defining the “referent objects”, “securitizing actor” or “functional actor” (cf. the coming theory section), the aim is to implicitly touch upon the social practice.

For that reason, the degree of discourse analysis is to be found in the discursive practice for instance, where questions like: *“Which discourses are the speaker using and how are these articulated?”* or *“which knowledge, identity and social relations are constructed in these discourses?”* (Phillips, 2020, p. 392). Asking these questions in relation to the theory of securitization and the overall philosophy of the research – social constructivism – the general discourse and its practice are what will be used embedded as approach in the thesis.

Overall, the critical discourse analysis moreover has the general agenda on revealing power relations where certain discourse practices are contributing to promote certain interests and/or reproducing certain relations (Phillips, 2020, p. 395). If the choice fell on critical discourse analysis by Fairclough, the perspective of securitization would be challenged on its key units of analysis. Therefore, is only a degree of the discourse practice relevant for the approach and it must be understood as a general variety and not as if one would use the punctual version of critical discourse analysis.

When it comes to discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, some degree of the approach can be highlighted and delimited. As the discussion in the section on social constructivism, Marxism presented an epistemological constructivism and in discourse theory, (post)Marxism can be found (Phillips, 2020, p. 396). Here the central point is characterized by key units such

as hegemony (supremacy) and antagonism (conflict) that are analyzed with use of “*floating signifiers*” and “*nodal points*” (Phillips, 2020, p. 397). These units are interesting and could be relevant and connected to the philosophy of the research if the choice of social constructivism was delimited to Marx’s epistemological constructivism. Nevertheless, it is not – since this thesis is based on the ontological phenomenological constructivism (cf. section of Philosophy of the research).

To sum up this discussion, the approach is through the operationalization as strategy of the analysis, that will be elaborated in the coming theory section. Instead, the discussion on discourse analysis was to make it clear how some degrees of the theory and method of discourse are to be found, but not in the punctual version – rather in an implicit way or with units from securitization that might touch upon the same structures however not in exact description or philosophy.

Perspectives

After giving a review of the method and approach to the analysis, the following section will elaborate seven factors, with reflection upon the quality in the thesis. The seven quality indicators are made by Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie in their article from 1999 on studies in phycology but presented in Tanggaard & Brinkmann (2020b) in a broader way and therefore used here (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b). The following are mainly meant to be a sum up of the methodology section and can also work as a final clarification on method and approach.

Perspective

By specifying the perspective, the reader should not have doubt about what the philosophy of the research is or what methods are used (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 661). The theory of securitization, which are to come next, plays an important role of this thesis. Not only is the securitization and the philosophy of research connected in their understanding of (social) construction of reality; it is also through securitization the operationalization has starting point and the approach is therefore deductively at first glance. Nevertheless, as argued, the first steps in the analysis process are beginning in the data which can be

considered inductive. Here the aim is to let the basic findings from the data meet the operationalization. The first step “what is going on” (cf. (Watt Boolsen, 2020, p. 315)), or very generally giving certain sections from the interviews keyword, the inductive approach has begun. Nevertheless, this will meet the operationalized theory of securitization, and the theory-driven, deductive approach will take over and be the dominant approach of the analysis.

Another perspective to reflect on, is the choice of method: the interview (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 661). There has been some reflection during the methodology section already, but some of them might stand clearer here: First, with starting point in the research question, there should be limited doubt about who this thesis aims to focus on: The Danish and Greenlandic experts, and how the Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy is articulated by them. In the research question clarification, it is emphasized that experts refer to politicians, officials and employees working in state departments. Some might argue, that “experts” and their articulation can be analyzed differently, but in this case, the aim was to go deeper than the official articulation which often can be hidden behind the politicians’ party manifests and the policy papers which the officials rarely sign with their name on. By using the interview, the interviewees could speak anonymously, give a background interview, or speak one-to-one with the author in the semi-structured interview, which made it possible to work around additional topics. The interview has also been chosen to get the nuances and the grey areas of the Greenlandic voices in the foreign and security policy out in the open. It has been important to speak with some of the people dealing these matters. That would be less possible to get access to by only looking at policy papers, party manifests, articles, debates in the Danish Parliament or the Greenlandic Parliament. To make a safe bet, the interviews are supplemented with documents, articles, debates, and policy papers, see figure 2.

A third reflection on the choice of interviews as primary data, is connected to how they have been conducted. Because the thesis is being written in the times of covid-19, all of them are digital or by phone, since it has not been possible to meet face to face. The choice of digital and phone interview is therefore on practical terms rather than an actual methodological choice. In the perfect world, it could have been favorably to conduct the interviews face to face in the light of the argument delivered by one the interviewees, namely that a lot of

communication is non-verbal. Due to bad internet connection or no possibility for video at the interview, this non-verbal communication has been non-existent in some of the conducted interviews.

Context of the interviews

The second perspective is the context of the interviewees (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 661). During the process, there have been conversations with two scholars and a Greenlandic official which were not a part of the interviews but only used for background clarification and guiding. Eight (eleven with the scholars and the Greenlandic official) interviews have been conducted and were semi-structured with an interview guide, divided in two columns with three to four topics. The first column consisted of the questions closely connected to the theory and specific topics, whereas the second column was the questions to be asked (cf. appendix, p. 53). That means it was questions formulated in a language free of the theory, that made the interviewees able to answer without the direct theoretical context. One of eight interviews are to be characterized as background interviews and was not transcribed and will have no clear reference, such as name or title according to arrangement. The seven other interviews are transcribed, where two of the seven interviews will remain anonymous and the last five will refer to the interviewees' names and title, see figure 1.

All these interviews have been agreed on with a "participant-information and declaration on consent", that has been accepted verbally before the beginning of the interview and was sent to the informants the day before the interview. If the informants had any comments, it was added specific to the declaration. The interviewees have been selected through several approaches. Some have been chosen on preunderstanding and already known material of the political landscape of Greenland and Denmark. Others have been chosen by looking at webpage magtelite.dk based on the article: "Elite of Greenland" ("Magteliten i Grønland") (Sivertsen & Grau Larsen, 2020) where one of the figures divide the elite in "politics" and "stat" which was specific relevant in this case. Thirdly, the last approach to find relevant interviewees was through recommendation from personal and professional contacts. I have been deeply grateful for the interviewees that have participated and contributed to the primary data of the analysis.

Examples

In the analysis, the data will anchor as examples to emphasize the points based on the informants' statements. As earlier mentioned, there have been two "translations" of the statements: Since the statements have been transcribed and translated, some unreliability can appear. The analysis will not be a text-oriented analysis but based on the statements' whole and thereby tried on reducing the shadow of unreliability (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 662). This problematic also leads to next the perspective: credibility check.

Credibility check

To make sure, that the statements are not mistranslated or misinterpreted, the aim is also to simply check with the interviewee if something is unclear; to go check with other statements from other informants that are in the same field and lastly, use the supplementary data and triangulate with the extern and public data (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 662).

Coherence

Here it is important to make sure the arguments and perspectives have nuances and are connected to the overall topic, research question and strategy of analysis (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 663). The aim has been to have a connecting thread through the thesis that is mostly hold together in the connection between the choice of methodology and theory. For instance, Collin (2015) that correspond with social constructivism and discourse analysis (Collin, 2015), Buzan et al. (1998) make connections to securitization's speech act and discourse or connect the philosophy of constructivism with securitization when describing how one can "do" or "speak" security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 27).

Adequacy and limitations

This thesis will only be able to give *some of* the many nuances of this topic: The Greenlandic voices in the foreign and security policy from the perspectives of Danish and Greenlandic politicians and officials. There would be additional other relevant stakeholders to interview or other perspectives than the politicians or the officials. Nevertheless, it is also a balance on

time and resource, and therefore must contain delimitations (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 663). Furthermore, this thesis was written in the time of election in Greenland, and that could limit some statements from the interviewees or some arguments from the analysis. Reflections upon the choice of informants and the number of the informants are also relevant but have to some degree been based on the art of the possible.

Resonance

The last perspective on the quality of qualitative studies is resonance. Here one of the points is how the perspective should have extended the understanding of the topic and the research question. Other angles of resonance are discussed by several scholars, where the one side argues that qualitative studies should be relational and be of use for the human needs: Is the study helping or expanding existing knowledge? The second side of the angle argues, how quality can be measured by being moral and ethical – which opens for further discussion. A new and third angle highlights how many can lose oneself in the details of reliability, validity, and generalization instead of bringing meaning and being useful (Tanggaard & Brinkmann, 2020b, p. 664). The ambition of this thesis is to expand the knowledge about the complexity of the political and diplomatic sector and open for discussion on how the Greenlandic voices are to be found in the foreign and security policy.

The sum of the whole discussion upon “Perspectives” and the quality of the thesis have been to clarify essential criteria for the reader before introducing the theoretical framework of securitization, the process of operationalization and the analysis.

Theory

Securitization is a theory of the Copenhagen School and when looking at the core of the theory, it is about a securitizing actor that is making a “securitizing move” which involves a rhetorically constructed threat that for any price, and with every means, must be dealt with. The threat threatens the referent object, which are found in one or more sectors such as political, economic, military, societal or environmental. Finally, an audience will “accept” the

securitizing actor's move and buy that the referent object is threaten on its existence. The securitization is successful when the "move" and the "accept" are present. The securitization must involve extraordinary means otherwise it is a politicization of an issue (Buzan et al., 1998); (Gad U. P., 2017a, p. 108).

In the following, there will be a short literature review on how different scholars have used securitization theory connected to Arctic and/or Greenlandic issues. After the review, the "conventional" securitization theory by Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998) will be elaborated. Lastly, the theory section will have an operationalization where the theory apparatus will stand clear and have not only a structural effect but also work as the strategy of analysis.

[Securitization and nuances on the theory connected to cases of the Greenland and the Arctic: A literature review](#)

Writing a project or thesis, one must acknowledge that many excellent scholars and researchers have examined the area before oneself, and that the students stand on the shoulders of the experienced ones. This literature reviews comes in line with the theory chapter since the Greenlandic and Arctic political landscape have been analyzed from the theoretical framework of securitization by many others.

Jacobsen and Herrmann (2017) offer a widened security perspective in Arctic International Relations (IR), where they go through the multidimensional aspects of and multidisciplinary approaches to Arctic security (Jacobsen & Herrmann, 2017). In the 80ties and 90ties the IR literature on the Arctic area was mainly from a descriptive approach and later from an institutionalist perspective. This changed to poststructuralism and until today, where securitization is a widespread analytical tool. They point out the military, the societal and the environmental sector as the essentials when looking at the securitization in the Arctic (Jacobsen & Herrmann, 2017, pp. 8-9).

Exner-Pirot (2013) further unfolds the case of the Arctic and highlights how – in the Regional Security Complexes perspective by Buzan and Wæver –economy and security mostly are the

“raison d’être” when it comes to development of political regions, but not in the Arctic (Exner-Pirot, 2013). Instead, the regional security complex of the Arctic is environmental security (Exner-Pirot, 2013, p. 122). An argument for this focus on environmental security can also be connected to the overall knowledge hierarchy of the Arctic, which are flatter, compared to a state-centered region, with data-monopoly at the state- or foreign affairs department and at the military (Exner-Pirot, 2013, p. 126). This is also why, the focus is on Arctic Council, which has gone from decision-*shaping* to decision-*making* and has the possibility to put the right attention on the environmental security by de-securitizing other issues (Exner-Pirot, 2013, pp. 132-133).

Gad (2017a) delivered an analysis based on securitization theory with focus on the case of Greenland and identity politics (Gad U. P., 2017a). Here one of Gad’s starting arguments is that the national identification can be a two-sided coin, or “Janus-faced process” where the “us” against “them” is present. He highlighted how the central narrative in the Greenlandic identity course is built on “being Greenlandic” and have an original Inuit culture, with “being Danish” and have focus on modernization as the opposite (Gad U. P., 2017a, pp. 105-107). One of the points from the analysis emphasized how “the system” speaks Danish which makes it difficult for a Greenlandic speaker to work there (Gad U. P., 2017a, p. 111). This conflicting identity discourse is analyzed with securitization but with amendments. As the final part, Gad (2017a) discusses and analyzes whether Greenland will develop into a nation state like Iceland, Kuwait, or Luxemburg all dependent on how the language conditions develop. He further emphasized how identity and language identity will be an ongoing political issue that weaves into the process of independence (Gad U. P., 2017a, pp. 114-117).

Another angle on securitization is presented by Rasmussen and Merkelsen (2017). They make a narratological analysis of a securitization in the case of contemporary Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy (Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2017). Here they look at the actant model and the core concepts of securitization to identify the main conflict. The actant model in its simplest is as following (see figure 3). The king is the sender, the object is the prince,

whom Cinderella, as the subject, desires, and her desire is threatened by the stepmother and stepsisters.

Figure 3: Actant model of Cinderella made by the author with inspiration from Rasmussen and Merckelsen (2017)

Sender: King	Object: Prince	Receiver: Cinderella
Helper: The birds/the mother	Subject: Cinderella	Opponent: Stepmother/Stepsisters

Rasmussen and Merckelsen (2017) then analyze in relation to securitization on how the Kingdom of Denmark, in different policy papers and reports, is defined as a “major Arctic power” in the “Taksø-report”¹. This, they stress is so - that the Kingdom of Denmark is a major Arctic power – due to Greenland (Rasmussen & Merckelsen, 2017, pp. 84-95). They aim to analyze how Denmark (as a synonymous with “The Kingdom”) desires the position as a major Arctic power, by analyzing the desired object in the actant model:

Figure 4: “The Danish aspiration as a great Arctic power” (Rasmussen & Merckelsen, 2017, p. 96)

Sender: The Kingdom	Object: Arctic Great Power	Receiver: Denmark
Helper: Greenland as territory	Subject: Denmark	Opponent: GL independence

In the empirical case of Danish and Greenlandic uranium policy, they argue that China could be an opponent in the narrative of Denmark because China contributes to and, in some ways, might strengthen Greenland’s way to independence. In securitization terms this means that China’s economic support to Greenland’s independence is the existential threat, the referent object is Denmark’s position as an Arctic great power and The Kingdom is the securitizing

¹ Ambassador, Peter Taksøe-Jensen, made an analysis of Danish foreign and security policy in 2016, which also was mentioned as the “Taksøe-report”. In relation to the Arctic area, the Taksøe-report manifested how Denmark and Greenland constitute an “Arctic Great Power” (um.dk, u.d.); (Breum, 2016).

actor trying to make a securitizing move (Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2017). As an example, Rasmussen and Merkelsen (2017) use Grønnedal, where the Government of Greenland in 2016 approved a Chinese company's bid on the old military base, but this was overruled by the Danish Prime Minister (Rasmussen & Merkelsen, 2017, p. 97).

While the so-far-mentioned scholars have focus on securitization, Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg (2017) have analyzed the Ilulissat Declaration as preemptive de-securitization by the states to avoid a securitization of the Arctic (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 16). Not only do they analyze geopolitics but also aim to unfold 'desecuritization' as a concept.

Firstly, they argue, that desecuritization contains and generates a 'shift'. This 'shift' is at first glance connected to an issue moving from the top of the agenda as a security issue, down the scale to regular political issues. Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg (2017) emphasize how the 'shift' does not happen without debate and when switching from a security issue to general policy is initiated, controversy is generated when the issue changes status (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 16). This has concretely unfolded by the Russian flag planting in 2007 on the bottom of the North Pole, where the five Arctic states constituted the Ilulissat Declaration to deescalate the journalists and academic's attempts on putting the event on the security debate (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 25). By closing the rising attempts on making the flag planting a security threat, the states might succussed in reducing the conflict on state level (horizontal conflict) but as Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg (2017) argue, the 'shift' generated conflict, controversy, and debate on another level (vertical), namely relation to indigenous peoples of the Arctic (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 24; 26).

By desecuritizing between states, it opened for the discussion on the right to claim sovereignty, which was questioned by indigenous peoples who have a more hybrid understanding of the concept of the land in the North (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 24; 26). With these arguments the concept of desecuritization is not as simple, as it might appears and a desecuritizing act can generate new controversy on a different level.

The last perspective on securitization theory and the Arctic domain is presented by one of the lead authors of “Security: A New Framework For Analysis” (1998) by Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde. Ole Wæver is, in an afterword, giving his analysis and comments on the Arctic security constellation. Here Wæver points out that security perspectives in the Arctic have tradition- (indigenous culture and life) and future (climate change) oriented security, whereas the military security concern is what Wæver characterizes as operating “[...]at two ghostly levels: one is the underlying frame of a Cold War past that cannot be put fully to rest because it continues to be a structural underlying speculative reality.” (Wæver, 2017, p. 122). The other level Wæver refers to is the new possibilities the melting ice has open for, e.g., new shipping routes (Wæver, 2017, pp. 121-123).

In the case of Greenland, Wæver highlights how the referent object is “a process” where the direction is almost settled, but not the route or speed of the process. In this process sensitive political cases e.g., about uranium and mining are often surrounded by a latent securitization (Wæver, 2017). With the climate change and the opening of the sea in the high North, the climate change, if securitized, will impact other sectors and the issue will be cross-sectoral, going from climate change in the environmental sector, to the societal, military, economic and political sector about sovereignty, geopolitical competition and economic positioning (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126). If identity is securitized, Wæver argues that the referent object will have nuances whether it is a concept of state (polity) or non-state (community). The same is for climate change, it can be approached in two ways; one in terms of culture and identity and the other in terms of addressing the responsibility the established states have in relation to climate change (Wæver, 2017).

This is exemplified in the before mentioned about Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg’s point about the effort on reducing conflict on the horizontal level by entering the Ilulissat agreement, but with the desecuritization, the shift generated debate on the vertical level, where indigenous peoples questioned the understanding and approach to sovereignty in the Arctic (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 24; 26). This, Wæver points, will be a tension that is likely to develop and will be increased as climate change intensify and indigenous peoples get strengthen statehood (Wæver, 2017, p. 124).

Securitization by Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde

With the book by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) "Security: A new Framework For Analysis", the concept of security was enlarged to further sectors than the traditional political and military sectors. The use of sectoral approach is, underlined by the authors, central to the framework because it keeps the possibility open for interoperability between traditional and new approaches to security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 195-196). Said in other words, the crucial difference from the old security studies, with a narrow mono-sectoral approach, is that the framework of Buzan et al. is wide and multisectoral (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 207).

By using a multisectoral approach, the dynamics of securitization can come to light, and one will be able to map the patterns from different actors in different situations and sectors (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 87). The multisectoral approach can identify different types of interaction. The environmental sector is identified by human activities and the relation to the planetary biosphere. The societal is identified by collective identity and the economic sector is identified by trade and finance. Lastly, are the traditional security sectors identified by the military sector with the use of force and the political sector as dealing with authority and recognition (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 7).

Inside security issues, dynamics of amity or enmity can be found. These dynamics and power relations can shift constantly or only have shifts occasionally. When it comes down to the core of it, security is concentrated about survival, when facing a threat. What the threat concretely contain might not be the same in the different sectors (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 12-13; 21; 27). When something is seen as a security issue that are threaten on its existence, Buzan et al. (1998) emphasize that, it is a discouraging result because it means the regular politics have failed (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Regular politics should be able to deal with issues before they develop into a security issues (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 29). Moving to how a security issue become the top priority on the political agenda, it must be threatened on its existence and be framed and articulated as the absolute security threat. In the process of articulating an absolute threat, it is natural that the issue pushes other issues

away and when that happens security arguments show themselves as a strong instrument (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 176-177).

Securitization and desecuritization

If a securitization is meant to be successful, it has three steps, where the first is the articulation of the existential threat, then action of emergency and lastly, the effect on interunit relations. The securitization can be used to understand who securitizes, on what threats, for what referent object, why and under what conditions (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 26-27; 32). As mentioned above, the politics fail when something is securitized, and therefore, the aim should be a desecuritization, where the emergency situation or threat is shifted to more normal bargaining procedures under regular political terms (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 4). The desecuritization is therefore just as interesting to analyze as securitization, but Buzan et al. (1998) point out that securitization is more central because of its validity in terms of security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 39). Securitization is a “[...] *political battlefield on what counts as security issues and thereby what is acted on in a security mode*” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 86). How to identify this ‘battlefield’? To get closer and be able to analyze the security dynamics, there are overall six key concepts or units of security analysis to be particularly highlighted, which it will in the following.

Key units of security analysis

Buzan et al. (1998) describe in their chapter 2 three units of security analysis, that counts: “Referent objects”, “securitizing actor” and “functional actor” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Nevertheless, one can find more key units for a security analysis, which the authors also emphasize, but perhaps not as explicitly as the three first mentioned. The other units are as following: “Existential threat”, “extraordinary means” and “the audience” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36). The last three units are so to speak implicit when speaking of the first three concepts. For example, when zooming in on “referent objects” which are articulated and declaring by a “securitizing actor” to be *existential threatened*. The threat underlines the referent objects’ legitimate right to survival, which also legitimates the right to use *extraordinary means* to secure the survival of the threatened referent objects. In

traditional security studies, the referent object has often been the state and its sovereignty or in a more hidden way, a nation, and its right to identity (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 5; 36). The “securitizing actor” was in traditional security studies sometimes *also* the state, which means the state articulated its *own* survival. When states attempt to securitize, Buzan et al. (1998) describe how this will influence and make actors act in a different mode than normally because the actor might feel threatened (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). It is a political move and decision to securitize or try to. However, it is also a political choice to accept the securitization or the attempt on making one (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 28-30).

The acceptance can only be given by a relevant *audience* which is the final step in a successful securitization and consist of shared values and concerns on that the referent objects are threatened. The securitizing actor, which often is an actor of influence that is aware of its own position and ability to get the ‘acceptance’ and therefore can affect the definition on security (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 31). When making the security analysis, one must be aware of the risk, that one might put too much attention on the securitizing actor and the articulation, yet the audience and their acceptance is the final and fundamental step in the securitization (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 41).

With the multisectoral approach to security analysis, which securitization practices, the state can be found as the securitizing actor across sectors, because the state is present in all sectors (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 175). This underlines how the sectoral approach, and the securitizing actor can be a way to map links and interactions, for example, if a securitization succeeds it might echo in other sectors (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 42-43).

An empirical example is the “liberal project” also known as neoliberal globalization that appears to have reduced military activity by wide spreading international trade that has established interdependence globally, however instead raised a number of other security issues, that can be analyzed from the multi-sectoral (environmental, societal etc.) frame (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 212); (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 464). This is where the final key unit can be described; “functional actor”, which is an actor that influence the

dynamics and decisions of the relevant sector. Buzan et al. (1998) use a polluting company as an example on a functional actor in the environmental sector, where one can by the process of elimination rationalize: The polluting company is not the securitizing actor nor the referent object that are threatened, *but* an actor whose decisions are *crucial* for the environment (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36). The three key units of security analysis have now been described and the other three concepts relation to the key units.

Speech act

“[...] the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26) and is a process that is legitimized using rhetoric. In the core of the concept of a securitization speech act, it is about two things in the relationship between language and society. One, there must be basic elements of a speech and secondly; A group (audience) that acknowledge and accept the speech (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 28). More concretely, one can look for the basic elements of the speech internally such as how the construction of the existential threat is articulated, how is it emphasized as the ‘plot on no return’ and how the construction is special for the sector(s). In terms of those, the relationship between language and society, means securitization is socially constructed (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 31-33).

Reflection on securitization, discourse and (social) constructivism

The connection between securitization and language theory with the use of speech act makes it ideal to use securitization with elements of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis has been elaborated in the methodology section and will only be touched sporadically since the aim of the following is to reflect on the bond between choice of theory, approach, and philosophy of the research.

Buzan et al. (1998) underline, how securitization, apart from the multisectoral approach, differs from traditional security studies, namely by their constructivistic approach to understand the process of how security issues are securitized (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 19). With keywords such as *construction* or *deconstruction* of an existential threat, *speech act*, *acceptance* by an *audience* that requires some sort of speech and *social*

interaction are some of the concepts that underline how securitization and constructivism are connected. Especially the acceptance by the audience and the social interaction links with the phenomenological constructivism that focus on the social reality and the existence of a phenomenon that comes when it is socially accepted and socially supported (cf. (Collin, 2015, p. 345)). The authors of securitization theory describe how the use of constructivism gives them a better degree of explanation when trying to understand: “[...] *why actors operate the way they do, both now and very likely also tomorrow.*” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 205-206).

As argued in the methodology section, the securitization and ontological phenomenological constructivism are used with some degree of Fairclough’s dimension of discursive practice (cf. the Methodology section). In securitization, the securitizing actor aims to – through security rhetoric – legitimize a securitization of a specific area (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 28). By the discursive practice of Fairclough (cf. the methodology section), it is possible to ask questions that will help identify the security rhetoric – the speech act - and analyze whether the securitizing move is socially accepted by the audience: “*Who can ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues under what conditions, and with what effects?*” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 27).

Operationalization

The theory section began with a short introduction to securitization, followed by a literature review, where the nuances of securitization theory were connected to cases of Greenland and the Arctic, and lastly a deeper clarification of the key units and securitization’s connection to the philosophy of the research. The operationalization will make the nuances and analytical arguments from the literature review harmonize with the core theory of securitization by highlighting keywords or key units that will work as the strategy of analysis. By doing so, the aim is to make sure, that the theory fits as good as possible with the topic, when relating it to the scholars’ analytical arguments.

The arguments collected in the literature review are furthermore chosen so the research question can be analyzed with help from the most relevant empirical and analytical nuances.

Dualisms and actant model as summarizing tool

Exner-Pirot (2013) asks where the knowledge is founded: Is the hierarchy flat or state-centered? (Exner-Pirot, 2013, p. 122). Gad (2017a) speaks of the two-faced process, where it is “us” versus “them” in the identity politics: “Us”: *Greenlandic, Inuit, original culture* versus “Them”: *Danish, the system, modern* (Gad U. P., 2017a, pp. 105-107). Thirdly, in the example on de-securitization, Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg (2017) underline how “the shift”, that is generated by de-securitization can cause controversy between the horizontal – state level- and the vertical- indigenous level (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 24; 26). Lastly, Wæver (2017) presents how security perspectives in the Arctic is between traditional and future oriented, and moreover circulates around “process” that are being dealt with in different sectors on both state and non-state level (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126).

These findings can be put into dualisms and be summed up as following:

Figure 5: Dualisms extracted from the literature review conducted by the author.

Flat hierarchy	State-centered
Us	Them
Greenlandic	Danish
Inuit	The system
Original	Modern
Vertical level	Horizontal level
Traditional oriented	Future oriented

Moreover, “process” is centered between the dualisms as argued by the scholars in the literature review (cf. (Wæver, 2017)). With these dualisms and “process” as the center put out clearly, the aim is to use these and be aware of them *as already existing analytical results*, so the analysis of this thesis does not repeat them but learn from them and aim to work further on. However, the dualisms will be hard not to come around in the analysis and are most likely to be found in the interviews and the supplemented data.

Lastly, the actant model in relation to securitization was accentuated in the literature review. This will be used as a summarizing tool in the end of the analysis to illustrate clearly what the result(s) of the analysis is/are in relation to the research question: *How are the Greenlandic voices articulated in foreign and security policy by Danish and Greenlandic experts?*

Strategy of analysis

Multisectoral landscape: With this chosen operationalization of the theory the aim is to begin in the larger multisectoral picture, where the dynamics can come to light. The aim is to map out the possible patterns based on the actors in different sectors and how they might interact.

Security issue as failed politics (cf. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 4)): This unit of the operationalization is also meant to weave into the dualisms that have been summed up based on the literature review's analytical arguments. Here the grey zones between regular politics and security issues will be examined by the dualisms from the literature review as well as the dynamics of amity and enmity there are to be found in the dynamics and shifts in power relations due to securitization theory.

Articulating a security threat is a strong political instrument - Securitization as a speech act and an acceptance of it by a relevant audience (cf. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 31)). In the third and last part of the operationalization, the aim is to go deeper into the key units of the theory which also will make it easier to make the sum-up with the actant-model of securitization.

The analytical strategy begins in the larger picture with the multisectoral landscape, for next to dig into the dualisms and dynamics, and lastly to analyze more specific on the key-units of securitization where *speech act* and *acceptance by the audience* are the principal pillars.

Analysis

The analysis will, as highlighted, be structured after the operationalized strategy of analysis units. In the next section, three topics will be emphasized as examples of the multisectoral landscape. Thereafter, the second operationalized unit about "Security issues as failed politics" will be analyzed by looking for dualisms and whether the dualisms develop into security issues. Lastly, the key units of securitization will be applied in the traditional version to search for a potential securitization and whether a relevant audience will accept it.

Multisectoral landscape

The first part of the analysis will begin in the multisectoral landscape and map out the dynamics in the sectors and how there are interactions in the sectors. As emphasized in the introduction of the thesis, Runge Olsen et al. (2020) stressed that there are “grey zones” on two levels: Firstly, on the home taken area on commercial interests and Copenhagen’s competences on the foreign policy area. Secondly, on home taken areas such as infrastructure or mineral resources and Copenhagen’s competences on security policy (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020, p. 32).

Grey zone of Greenlandic commercial interests and politics

The first “grey zone” on Greenlandic commercial interests and Copenhagen’s competences on foreign policy is a noteworthy example and is in between the economic and political sectors, also found in the interviews. Here Liv Inuk Oldenburg Lynge (LI)² highlighted in the interview, that the case of the Faroe Islands and Huawei³ raised the question in Greenland on: What is Greenland allowed to do and what not? (LI, appendix, p. 25).

Justus Hansen (JH), member of Parliament of Greenland for Demokraatit (The Democrats, Greenland’s Liberal Party), refers to his party’s slogan: *“‘We are open for business’. Of course, on our conditions because we are the ones living in this country [...]. Of course, also for the sake of the foreign investors”*⁴ (JH, appendix, p. 3). With this statement he elaborates on how investors are important if they can see all the possibilities on for instance the area of tourism and extension of Greenlandic airports. Later Justus Hansen also explains that the infrastructure is an essential factor when it comes to foreign policy and referring to increased submarine activity through Danmarkstræde between Iceland and the East coast of Greenland (JH, appendix, p. 3).

² The statements from Liv Inuk Oldenburg Lynge are of own private opinion and does not reflect her position as coordinator and project manager at InterForce Greenland

³ The case of the Faroe Islands and Huawei refers to that several states have warned against Huawei, because the company might be spying on behalf of the state of China. That made some Danish politicians comment on, that the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs should prevent the agreement on the argument that is it security policy (Ritzau, 2019).

⁴ *“ ‘Vi er jo åben for business’. Selvfølgelig på vores betingelser, fordi det er os der lever i det her land [...] Selvfølgelig også med hensyn til udefrakommende investorer.”* – Translation by the author

Justus Hansen's example "open for business" and the positive attitude towards foreign investors places the example in the economic sector that focus on development. Nevertheless, Justus Hansen also connects infrastructure and foreign policy in relation to the need for surveillance and New political agreement on Arctic Capabilities (cf. Figure 2) (JH, appendix, p. 3). By doing so the example develops to a multisectoral case, where dynamics in the economic, political, and military sector are present, and could therefore also be in a "grey zone" (cf. (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020, p. 32)).

Turning to the question formulated by Liv Inuk Oldenburg Lynge: 'What is Greenland allowed to do and what not?' another case can be put in a multisectoral perspective. Fishing and Fisheries policy are mentioned in several of the interviews. In this case arguments from Aaja Chemnitz Larsen (ACL), member of the Danish Parliament for Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA – socialist party of Greenland) worth highlighting as well as an argument delivered by an anonymous source in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Chemnitz Larsen accentuates how it is possible due to the Self Rule Act of the Government of Greenland (cf. (Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre, 2009)) to act and make fishing agreements. Within the possibility she also emphasizes how it can be expanding the existing frames, but that the expansion does not have to mean changing neither the Self Rule Act nor the Act of Constitution (ACL, appendix, p. 18). This would, according to Chemnitz Larsen, make Greenland a more attractive partner also for Denmark but *"[...]it would need that Denmark "loosens some rein" on the foreign policy area⁵"* (ACL, appendix, p. 18).

The anonymous source in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also expresses how Fisheries policy is a home taken area of Greenland but also foreign policy: Stressed in the example, that Greenland is not a part of the EU sanction regime due to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and are therefore able to trade with Russia. *"[...] seen in isolation, this is fisheries policies, but when it undermines the EU's sanction regime; well, then it slowly begins to look like foreign policy"⁶* (Source in Danish MFA, appendix, p. 45).

⁵ *"[...] det kræver at man [Danmark] [...] løsner nogle tøjler på det udenrigspolitiske område"* – Translation by the author

⁶ *"[...] isoleret set, er det fiskeripolitik, men når det går ind og undergraver EU's sanktionsregime, jamen så begynder det langsomt at ligne udenrigspolitik"* – Translation by the author.

The two statements by Aaja Chemnitz Larsen and the source from MFA are both underlining how fisheries policy is between home taken area of Greenland and foreign policy which is Copenhagen's competence. This stresses how it is a case of the multisectoral landscape that moves between domestic policy and foreign policy, which is a nuance between the political and economic sectors. The fisheries policy is not only multisectoral, but it also brings out the dynamics and actors on several levels, both the national interests of Greenland, the regional interests of Europe and the international commitments of Denmark as an international state.

In the interviews, additional examples of commercial interests of Greenland and foreign policy of Denmark, show how several home taken areas of Greenland are multisectoral inside the sectors of political, economic and military, and therefore consisting of dynamics and additional actors on national, regional and international level. It also confirms the argument of Runge et al. (2020) on how home taken areas are in "grey zones" (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020).

[Joint Arctic Command: An example on an actor balancing between sectors](#)

Another case, that was discussed in the interviews, was about Joint Arctic Command (JAC) and its role in Greenland. Here an actor is balancing between sectors mainly the military sector and the societal sector. In the abovementioned the focus is on commercial interests and politics, but the multisectoral approach can also be used in the analysis of an actor: Joint Arctic Command. Through the interviews, several of the informants gave a nuanced picture of the actor. Justus Hansen pointed out how JAC both is working inside the Kingdom of Denmark to secure a better cooperation, but also works on an international level with for example Canada (JH, appendix, p. 3).

This point is unfolded by Liv Inuk, which can be categorized into the sectors, here she underlines how JAC is dealing internally in Greenland with civilian task and are communicating to make a local anchoring. Further, she added that, her work is, among other things, to work for the partnership between the Defense and the civilian business community (LI, appendix, p. 29-30). This point, as delivered by Liv Inuk is in the military, political and societal sector, where communication and the establishment of partnerships are essential to secure the good relation.

However, taking a closer look, the political sector is strengthened when going through the report “Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsninger i Arktis” (2016) by the Danish Ministry of Defence (see Figure 2). The report is also known as the “Arctic-analysis”, and here the report concludes with additional recommendation on for example “education and recruiting” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 153). In the Arctic- Analysis from 2016 it was underlined, that there was a need for volunteering. More concretely, the conclusion pointed at two pilot projects (“Grønlandsvogterne” and “Grønlands Frivillige Styrke”), that were inspired by Danish and Canadian experiences with having arrangements with volunteers looking out for potential sea pollution or arrangements like “Canadian Rangers” that can support the Defense or the local emergency services (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016, pp. 156-157).

JAC is therefore dealing with the military tasks, that has during the last five years, based on the Arctic-Analysis recommendations, gone through new political initiatives that have enlarged Joint Arctic Command’s role in Greenland.

This was also pointed out in another interview with a source from the Government of Greenland, when asked about the New political agreement on Arctic Capabilities (see Figure 2; (The Danish Government, et al., 2021) and whether it was going to build a sort of Greenlandic defense by some of the initiatives cf. a new defense education with compulsory military service similarities. Here the source from the Government of Greenland argued that it rather could be understood as a strategy for developing a positive attitude towards the Danish Defense: “[...]It is not a military strategy, it is about PR”⁷ (Source in the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 14)

This analysis fits well with the Arctic-Analysis recommendations from 2016, that further argued that “The Defense’s Day” (“Forsvarets Dag”) should increase the knowledge of the education possibilities inside the defense and further, some of the elements from the pilot project “Junior Rangers” (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016, pp. 154-157).

⁷ “[...] Det har ikke noget med militær strategi at gøre, det har noget med PR-strategi at gøre” – Translation by the author

As the two above-mentioned pilot projects from the Arctic-Analysis, the closer relation between the civilian Greenland and the Danish Defense are welcomed if it mainly focuses on for example Search and Rescue (SAR) and does not contribute to a militarization of Greenland, according to Sofia Geisler from Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA – socialist party of Greenland). Since the IA now is holding additional of the seats in the Government of Greenland as well as Múte Bourup Egede (IA) is the Premier of Greenland as the recent election in Greenland settled, the IA and their politics are in favorable conditions and well-supported because of the recent election, especially on their politics against the mining project at Kvanefjeld (cf. (Herløv, Bilstoft-Knudsen, & Kromann, 2021)). Geisler therefore emphasized the anti-militarization line:

[...] as long as it has not something to do with militarization of the Arctic area, but focus on knowledge, that is reflected in Search and Rescue- services and environmental clean-up [...] then [a cooperation between Joint Arctic Command and the civilians] is a really good idea to get established⁸ (SG, appendix, p. 46).

With the statement from Geisler, the tasks of JAC, the relations with the civil community in Greenland and international cooperation are therefore broad and multisectoral. In the overall picture JAC is balancing between the military sector, which is the traditional sector for the organization of the Danish Defense, but in the recent years, both the analysis, recommendations and the quotes from the interviews highlight how JAC is changing. This change is due to the political sectors' initiatives that emphasize the need for close connection to the Greenlandic culture and the civilian parts of Joint Arctic Command's tasks. Lastly, with the quote of Sofia Geisler, the tasks are further expanded to the environmental sector where, Geisler welcome the cooperation between civilians and Joint Arctic Command based on knowledge reflected in SAR and environmental clean-ups.

The Danish Defense in Greenland is in a crucial need of close connection to Greenlandic culture and the civilian tasks of the JAC. This means the two sectors: the military and the societal – that in traditional security studies often are far away from each other (Buzan &

⁸ "[...] så længe det ikke har noget med en militarisering af det arktiske område, men hvor vi har fokus på viden, der kommer til udtryk ved redningstjenester og [oprydning af] olieforurening, [...] så er det helt klart vores holdning, at det vil være en rigtig god ide at få etableret et samarbejde [mellem Arktisk Kommando og civilbefolkning]" – Translation by the author

Wæver, 2003, p. 87) – are in the case of Greenland interlinked and most importantly interdependent of each other to sustain. This interdependency is a result of the political sectors analysis and recommendations, that ‘merge’ the military and societal sectors on the arguments of the environmental issues – which therefore widen Joint Arctic Command’s tasks and contact surface to the environmental sector as well.

The US and spillover

The last area to examine in the analysis and mapping out on the multisectoral landscape is in the more international and geopolitical perspective. First the focus was on Greenlandic commercial interests and the relation to Denmark, secondly Joint Arctic Command as an actor balancing between sectors and now the focus will be on the relationship with the US and how this also mix in between the sectors.

Several of the interviews with officials from both Denmark and Greenland highlighted the agreement on improved cooperation between the US and Greenland (see Figure 2). This agreement has been spoken of positively in the interviews (appendix, p. 52); (TW, appendix, p. 50). Nevertheless, this agreement, with statements from the interviews, underlines how the US maintain a “security-role” on additional levels, and in additional sectors.

One argument delivered in the interviews was on how foreign and security policies in wide terms are closely connected to the US, and that the US is the closest ally, the guarantee for security (TW, appendix, p. 49). The security referred to is the military, traditional security, and the agreement with the US from 1951 about defending Greenland (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016); (retsinformation.dk, 2005).

This argument is verified in another interview, but nuanced, when it is stressed that the presences of the US via Pituffik in Greenland cover a further security definition: “*The Thule*

*Air base is still one of Greenland's biggest workplaces. So that is another kind of security, that is economic security*⁹ (Source in the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 31).

By pointing out, the security definition, that the US contribute to is influencing both the military and the economic sector based on the quote.

A third sector, that the US presences covers is the societal, which are underlined in the "October- agreement"¹⁰, the agreement on improved cooperation between US and Greenland. Several interesting initiatives are described in the following: *"Increasing the Greenlandic language skills of people at the U.S. base at Pituffik in order to interface more closely and effectively with the local community"* (Washington D.C., Copenhagen, & Nuuk, 2020, p. 5), the "Common plan" that aims to *"[...] expand the existing cooperation to unlock the great potential for partnerships and future initiative to deepen and strengthen the relationship between the United States and Greenland [...]"* (Washington D.C., Copenhagen, & Nuuk, 2020, p. 6) and further initiatives containing trade, investment and economic relation, the energy and mining sector, educational ties, the tourism sector and a single point on nature management (Washington D.C., Copenhagen, & Nuuk, 2020, pp. 6-7). The US presences, with the statements from the interviews and the "October-agreement"¹¹, are therefore in a multisectoral landscape, and operate in the military sector, the economic sector cf. the quote of the source from Danish MFA, but also the societal and to some extent the environmental sector cf. the initiative on nature management.

Lastly, unavoidable also the political sector, since the US has a consulate in Nuuk, has close diplomatic cooperation with both Nuuk and Copenhagen and by the "October-agreement"¹² emphasize the outcome of the cooperation and work in the political sector.

⁹ *"[...] Samtidig er Thulebasen en af Grønlands største arbejdspladser stadigvæk. Så det er en anden form for sikkerhed, det er en økonomisk sikkerhed."* – translation by the author

¹⁰ Named the "October-agreement" by the author and refers to "Statement on improved cooperation between US and Greenland" made on October 28, 2020

¹¹ See footnote 10

¹² See footnote 10

From the background interview with an anonymous source in the Government of Greenland, it was pointed out how Greenland and the Greenlandic (foreign and security) policy situation is affected by how things are connected, “communicating vessels”, and how situations or conflict from other places in the world will affect the Arctic and Greenland (appendix, p. 52). This spillover effects, are also well-known in academia and highlighted by scholars when analyzing the Russian military enforcement, connected to the West’s reaction (/EU sanctions) on the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Staun, 2020); (Reinke de Buitrago, 2020); (Rahbek-Clemmensen, The Arctic turn, 2017); (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017a).

The foreign and security policy reality of Greenland and Denmark is influenced by the spillover from a West - Russian conflict, the US presences at Pituffik and a Greenlandic wish to secure investments cf. (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020). It is also known as “Great Power competition” and is additional challenged by the suspension of the “military-to-military” consulting arrangements between the West and Russia due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Runge Olesen, et al., 2020, p. 23).

Firstly, this challenge is also emphasized by the source from the Danish MFA, which also connects to the before-mentioned point about the grey-zones between the Greenlandic commercial interests e.g., when it comes to fisheries policy: Greenland aims to keep good relations with as many as possible to secure investments (source from Danish MFA, appendix, p. 42).

Secondly, the spillover, also challenges the shared goal of Copenhagen and Nuuk about securing low tension in the Arctic: *“When there is low tension, there are better framework conditions to invest, develop and the possibility to plan on long terms.”*¹³ (source in the Danish MFA, appendix p. 41).

Thirdly, when the US presence in Greenland and the Arctic comes with the great power competition and thereby challenge the aim for low tension and framework conditions to plan long term for the development of Greenlandic economy, the US presences might appear as two-faced. On one hand, the US is guarantor for security in the military, economic, societal

¹³ *“Jo mere lavspænding, jo bedre rammebetingelser har man for at investere, udvikling og kunne planlægge langsigtet”*- Translation by the author.

(and some extent environmental) cf. the points about the “October-agreement¹⁴”. On the other hand, the US presences comes with great power competition, which is challenging the very essential element of Greenlandic development: low tension, better framework conditions, investments, and long-term planning.

As a fourth nuance to this, Justus Hansen asks in the interview, what the alternative would be:

“If Denmark and NATO were not there [...] Putin would stand in [Greenland’s] backyard in a moment. That is a reality. It is the foreign policy reality there actually is. If we did not have a military presence in Greenland, what would there be then?¹⁵” (JH, appendix, p. 8).

With this forth nuance, the perspective on governmental level and the “October-agreement¹⁶”, it also emphasize how the voice of Greenland is not univocal but should be in plural for underlining that the voices are different. The statement from Justus Hansen, with the values of the Demokraatit, the liberal party of Greenland would stand in contrast to the statement from Sofia Geisler, from Ataqatigiit (IA) a socialist party of Greenland that follows the anti-militarization line (cf. appendix, p. 7-8; 36).

In the last theme of the multisectoral landscape and the mapping out of the interactions that were emphasized in the interviews, the focus has been on the US and spillover. With the four nuances the aim has been to make the dynamics come to light and map out the patterns the actors move in or are interacting with.

Next is the second operationalized area, that will concentrate on the dualisms emphasized in the literature review and whether it is a question of security as failed politics (cf. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 4)).

¹⁴ See footnote 10

¹⁵ ” At hvis Danmark og NATO ikke var der, så ville [...] Putin stå i [Grønlands] baghave lige om lidt. Det er jo en realitet. Det er den udenrigspolitiske realitet der egentlig er. Men hvis man ikke havde militær tilstedeværelse på Grønland, hvad ville der så være?” – translation by the author.

¹⁶ See footnote 10

Security as failed politics

In the second part of the analysis, where the focus is the second operationalized part about “Security as failed politics”, the dualisms from the literature review will be based the question about whether there are failed politics, or it stands on the regular politics. To structure this part of the analysis even sharper, the dualisms have been reduced to three categories rather than the seven dualisms, that were presented in figure 5. The three categories are as following:

- (1) The first category has starting point in the way of organizing decisions. Is it by the means of an Inuit and vertical level or the state-centered, “the system” and horizontal level?
- (2) Is it dealing with “us”-being Greenlandic as a contrast to “them”- begin Danish?
- (3) The third category focus on the perspectives of the to-be Greenland, is the aim to sustain the original and traditional oriented or the modern and future oriented?

If one were to sharpen the three categories further with the units of the theory, the first category focus on the political sector, the second at the societal and the last category as the economic sector (cf. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 7)).

The dualisms

“I have this motto: “Nothing about us, without us” [...]: When Greenland is discussed, which it is in several fora, it is important that Greenland is represented¹⁷” (ACL, appendix, p. 17). This quote by Aaja Chemnitz Larsen represents what several other informants also highlighted: the importance of having a Greenlandic representative. Liv Inuk also emphasizes this but in relation to the academic discussion, where she agreed with the American and Danish analysis, but was missing the Greenlandic perspective: *“[...] it would be nice if there was a Greenlander with. Regarding representatives.¹⁸”* (LI, appendix, p. 32). This wish for a Greenlandic representative is additionally stressed by Justus Hansen in relation to the political forum of

¹⁷ “Jeg har sådan et motto: “Intet om os, uden os” [...]. At når Grønland bliver drøftet, hvilket det jo gør i flere og flere fora, så er det også vigtigt at Grønland sidder med en repræsentant” – Translation by the author

¹⁸ “[...]det ville være rart at have en grønlander med også. Rent repræsentationsmæssigt” – Translation by the author

Arctic Council, where Hansen, not only emphasizes the wish for being represented, but be *the* representative. He pointed out in the interview:

[...] we are in the middle of it all and [...] we are living in the Arctic – why is it not us that say a slightly more? So, I said loud and clearly, that at the meetings of Arctic Council, Denmark and Greenland sit at the table, but we do not have much parlour [taleret]. So, I suggested, that we should have 50% of the right to speak [...]. That provoked some controversy [...]. But that is how it should be. Because we are having our daily life in the Arctic¹⁹ (JH, appendix, p. 8-9).

On both the political and some extent the academics stage, based on the quotes, there is a need and request on having a Greenlandic representative and even have more right to influence at the international forums. These examples could be where the state-centered and horizontal level- thinking of Denmark clash with the vertical level, referring to the Greenlandic perspectives. Another nuance to this clash is delivered by a source from the Government of Greenland, that point out that the political Greenlandic and Danish levels have clashed:

[...]I spoke with Kuupik Kleist at a point about being respected from the Danish side. There has been a high-level meeting, when he was the Premier of Naalakkersuisut and they have had a meeting with the Danish government, the Prime Minister and it was a very fine meeting. When the meeting ends, they rise and Helle (Thorning red.) feels like saying something kind, as a closing, and lean over the table to Kuupik and says motherly: “Kuupik, you should know, that if there is something we can do, we always want to help you.” That made him fume. That Denmark is the ones helping Greenland²⁰ (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 12-13).

¹⁹ ” [...] vi jo står midt i det hele og [...] vi lever i Arktis – hvorfor er det ikke os der skal sige noget mere? Så jeg sagde højt og tydeligt, at til møderne i Arktis Råd, der sidder Danmark og vi sidder med ved bordet, men det er ikke meget taleret. Så derfor foreslog jeg faktisk, at vi skulle have 50 % af taleretten[...]. Det skabte en hel del polemik [...]. Men sådan skal det jo være. Fordi vi lever jo i Arktis til dagligt.” – Translation by the author

²⁰ ” [...]jeg snakkede med Kuupik Kleist på et tidspunkt og det her med at været respekteret fra dansk side. Man havde haft et møde på højt plan, da han var formand for Naalakkersuisut og de havde haft møde med den danske regering, statsministeren i hvert fald og de havde haft et vældigt fint møde. Så slutter mødet og de rejser sig fra bordet og Helle (Thorning red.) synes ligesom hun skal sige et eller andet venligt, som afslutning, så hun læner sig ind over bordet til Kuupik, og siger moderligt: “Kuupik, du skal jo bare vide at hvis der er et eller andet vi kan gøre, så vil vi jo altid hjælpe jer”. Det blev han faktisk så rasende over. At Danmark er dem der hjælper Grønland.” – Translation by the author

By this example: the (former) Danish Prime Minister speaking “motherly” to the Greenlandic (former) Premier of the Government of Greenland, illustrated Denmark as the state-centered actor, “the system” speaking to the Inuit. Gad (2017) refers to this, with family metaphors of “mother-child” relationship and emphasizes that it is one of the most used metaphors in the Danish political discourse. The use of this discourse puts Greenland in the position of needing help, by doing so, emerges a hierarchy (Gad U. P., 2017b, p. 30;36;42). On the other hand, the source from the Government of Greenland is pointing out that one can observe a shift in this relation with the current Danish administration, that to a greater extent cooperation with Greenland rather than focusing on helping as a benevolent mother (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 12-13).

With the beforementioned examples by ACL, LI and JH about Greenland and having representatives one can also notice a development on both sides. In the political landscape and based on the examples by ACL, LI and JH, Greenland is possibly not standing clearly in the categorizations as the opposite to “the system” and as opposite to the horizontal level, since stakeholders of Greenland seeks to influence on the state-centered and the horizontal level. If going back to terminology of narrating and the actant model, one can say that the quote from Justus Hansen, and his accentuation of being *the* representative, expresses: *Status is not something you necessarily get, it something you take*, but where it in this case is about *influence* – so it is: *Influence is not something you necessarily get, it is something you take*. Since status is the degree of power or influence an actor can have (cf. (Johnstone, 1981)).

The second category which focus on the contrast between “us” and “them” and the cultural differences: The examples used in this part are mainly referring to Arctic Command and how it by the extreme political wing in Greenland based on the interviews is articulated as “[...] *a sort of Danish indoctrination*”²¹ (ACL, appendix, p.22) and “[...] *there are some parties that label it as an occupying power [...]*”²² (JH, appendix, p. 4). By these examples the outer wing of the Greenlandic political landscape stands critical on the Danish presence and influence in Greenland, but also emphasize the existence of the “us” against “them”.

²¹ “[...] *en form for dansk indoktrinering [...]*” – Translation by the author

²² “[...] *der er visse partier der betegner det som en besættelsesmagt [...]*” – Translation by the author

Aaja Chemnitz Larsen points out in the interview, that a nuance to the harsh perspective on the Danish military possibly is connected to how people in Greenland see “[...] *they fly people in and out from Denmark to solve the tasks in Greenland*²³.” (ACL, appendix, p. 22). This aspect is clearly being focused on and attempting on changing cf. earlier described and analyzed under the part about Joint Arctic Command as an actor balancing between sectors. Another essential part of the issue is according to Chemnitz Larsen, that it is important to get things on a more “everyday-life”-level, so it will make more sense either by being a part of solving the issues or by getting the right information and foundation on why somebody is flied to Greenland for an exercise or a specific challenge (ACL, appendix, p. 22).

Focusing on more general terms, another schism in the category about “us” against “them” is accentuated in relation to the relationship between Denmark and Greenland. Here an informant portrays how Denmark focus on *statics* which might relates to the source from the Danish MFA, that accentuates that some sort of stability is needed to secure a better foundation for investments and being able to long term planning (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 41). Where Greenland is related to *dynamic* (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 10), that also can be seen in how the case about Kvanefjeldet played out – a case that have been public and investigated for more than ten years (cf. (Persson & Ringgaard, 2016), but changed in at the eleventh hour, which then challenged the stability for investments that Denmark is advocate of (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 47).

By these two examples, about Joint Arctic Command and the approach to be static or dynamic, are ostensibly an expression of how the contrast between Denmark and Greenland exist on several levels. The last dualism category to examine is about whether it is a question about original oriented or modern, future oriented when it comes to economy. After this last dualism, the focus will be on whether, these dualisms generate controversy enough, that make the regular politics fail and turn into a security issue.

²³ “[...] *at de flyver folk ind og ud fra Danmark for at kunne løse de opgaver, som der er i Grønland*” – Translation by the author

As highlighted in the first category of dualisms, the family metaphors, are often used in describing the relationships in the Kingdom of Denmark. When it comes to the economic development, that for many is a focus on a sustainable economic development that can secure Greenland's economic foundation, and thereby a future independent Greenland, Liv Inuk underlines how Greenland to a great extent to look to the "big brother". The big brother in this family metaphor is Iceland and is, according to Liv Inuk, an example on how to become sovereign (LI, appendix, p. 27-28).

The metaphor about "the big brother" is also used by Aaja Chemnitz Larsen, but in relation to Denmark and Greenland:

*[...]because, right now we are having this "big brother- little brother" relationship, where Denmark is the big brother and Greenland is the little brother. If one wants a more equal relationship to each other, then one must secure that Greenland stands stronger economically [...]*²⁴(ACL, appendix, p. 16-17).

Thirdly, Justus Hansen is emphasizing how Greenland should aim to speak out more and manifest the Greenlandic voice in the foreign policy, through cooperation with Denmark (JH, appendix, p. 2).

Both in the family metaphors and Justus Hansen's example there is a close relation to Nordic states which indicate that the stress is on a modern and future oriented approach to the economy. Based on the interviews, the focus on economic development weaves into the independence process and how Iceland is a role model and there is a wish for close cooperation with Denmark which is an outcome that fits well with the "The First Foreign – and Security Policy Opinion poll in Greenland" (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021, p. 3).

²⁴ "[...] fordi lige nu har vi det her "storebror-lillebror" forhold, hvor Danmark er storebroren og Grønland er lillebroren. Hvis man gerne vil have et mere ligeværdigt forhold til hinanden, så er man også nødt til at sikre at Grønland står stærkere økonomisk". - Translation by the author

Security

Both the literature review's results and examples from the conducted interviews illustrate how Denmark and Greenland have differences and might not always stand on the same course. As highlighted in the theory chapter, Wæver (2017) points out that sensitive political cases often carry some sort of latent securitization (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126). When examining further into the security aspects on these dualisms or differences, is it a question of failed regular politics which then become a security issue? (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 29). This is the focus of the following section.

The source from the Danish MFA points out two areas where Greenland and Denmark are not aligned namely when it comes to the Paris-agreement²⁵ which Greenland have chosen not to be a part of. Further the politics about Russia, where Denmark are attentive to the geopolitical competition between the US and Russia, and Greenland more indirectly is attentive to the issue, since Greenland wants to keep relations with as many as possible due to future investments (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 42). Denmark and Greenland politically appear thereby different on the question of essential areas such as the international agreement on handling the climate crisis and the attitude towards the actions of Russia, which are some of Denmark's crucial foreign and security policy priorities (Udenrigsministeriet, um.dk); (FE, 2020). Nevertheless, inside a security issue dynamics or dualisms such as amity and enmity exist, but a real security issue has "the threat" as center (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 12-13; 21; 27), which does not really show in this case. Based on the interviews and the policy papers (see Figure 2) it does not show a Danish attempt on framing and articulating the Greenlandic approach to the Paris agreement and Russia as the absolute threat. Since there are not being pushed other issue away, which Buzan et al. (1998) stressed is essential to determine whether there is a securitization (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 176-177).

On the other hand, it is rather the opposite: Where the source from the Danish MFA argues that "[...] *we must fight to keep the constructive agenda of cooperation in the Arctic.*"²⁶ (source

²⁵ The Paris agreement: "[...] is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted by 196 Parties at COP 21 in Paris, on 12 December 2015 and entered into force on 4 November 2016." (United Nation Climate Change, 2021)

²⁶ "[...] *vi skal kæmpe for at holde fast i den konstruktive dagsorden der handler om samarbejde i Arktis*" – Translation by the author

from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 44-45). At the same time, it is accentuated how the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' tasks are broader, but still focused on keeping the issues separate, so the cooperation and security policy do not get mixed up. However, there is more cooperation with the security policy colleagues than the MFA did ten years ago (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 45).

Whether it is a question on failed politics and therefore a security issue would not be the case here, since, according to the source from the Danish MFA, it is the aim to keep the issues separate and by that maintaining the politics as regular – ostensibly with some cases with the shadows of a security issue, such as the beforementioned of Paris agreement and attitudes towards Russia.

The source from the Government of Greenland described the time around the former President of the United States, Donald Trump's offer on buying Greenland. Here the source from the Government of Greenland underlined how they, from Greenlandic official side, could observe a different attitude from the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, compared to previous Danish Prime Ministers. The source from the Government of Greenland stated how Frederiksen demonstrated *"[...]a different genuine respect for the fact that Greenland is an equal partner, as equal as you can be, in the context there is ²⁷"* (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 11-12). This genuine respect, that is hinted to refer to how:

[...]there has been a dialogue behind – internally, before going out [with a statement]. Greenland got full 'carte blanche' to announce its own statement before the Danish Prime Minister announced anything. I see that, as a new way of thinking from Denmark, which really helps to pave the way for a genuine consensus²⁸ (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 11-12).

By this quote about having a dialogue internally, that secured the Premier of Greenland to announce the Greenlandic statement first could be an example of a desecuritization. With starting point in the Ilulissat agreement and Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg's (2017) argument on

²⁷ "[...] en anderledes ægte respekt for at Grønland er en så ligeværdige partner man nu kan blive i den sammenhæng som det er." – Translation by the author

²⁸ "[...] der har været en dialog inden bagved, internt, før man gik ud. Grønland fik fuld carte blanche til at melde sit eget ud før statsministeren meldte noget ud. Det ser jeg som en nytænkning fra Danmarks side, der virkelig er med til at bane vejen for at der kan komme noget meget ægte konsensus" – Translation by the author

that it was a desecuritization which might solve a security issue on the horizontal level, but on the other hand generated controversy on the vertical level (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017). Here it is rather the opposite, where Mette Frederiksen secured the good relation to Greenland and then offended Trump, that led to cancellation of his coming trip to Denmark, when Frederiksen called Trump's offer "an absurd discussion" (Sørensen & Pérez-Peña, 2019). So as argued before, there might be some shadows of security issues – dualisms – in the relation between Greenland and Denmark, but the case of Trump's bid is rather an illustration of how politics, at least between Denmark and Greenland, stay as politics.

Securitization as a speech act and an acceptance of it by a relevant audience

After being through two of the operationalized points about the *multisectoral landscape* and the *dualisms and security*, the third and last point of analysis is focusing on the key units of securitization. Some of the often-mentioned areas, that is focused on in relation to Greenland and Arctic with starting point in securitization have been accentuated in the operationalization and analyzed in the section on dualisms and security. Additional places in the interviews, these analyses came to light.

A current example is on the discussion about a stronger Greenland society, which refers to the dualisms of traditional, original oriented versus future, modern oriented. This has also been emphasized by the source from the Danish MFA, that securitizes better framework condition to secure a more sustainable economic development. If using the key units of securitization, the source from the Danish MFA would be the securitizing actor, trying to secure the referent object which in this case is the better framework conditions that is threaten by the changing opinion upon the Greenlandic election (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 51; 56). According to the source from the Danish MFA, a solution to meet the dynamics of Greenland, is diversifying the Greenland economy.

This is an interesting analysis and could be tempting to follow further, but as underlined in the delimitations in the introduction, the focus will not be on the independency debate – which is almost unavoidable. Nevertheless, as emphasized in the literature review the topic of the independence debate is the center of the narrative of Greenland cf. "the process", where only the route and the speed are not settled (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126). Further

Kristensen and Rahbek-Clemmensen (2017b) argue how in the case of Greenland, securitization of economy is a precondition for independence (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017b, p. 45). However, according to Buzan et al. (1998) economy cannot be securitized per se since it is often connected to other referent objects (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 100) highlighted in (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017b, p. 45)).

Therefore, this securitization of the stable framework conditions is well matched with the existing knowledge cf. literature review and some of the challenges described there.

The last part of the analysis is therefore on another perspective, namely the following:

A need for a knowledge build-up on the foreign policy area to make the right decisions

A significant perspective found in the interviews is the need for information and knowledge build-up on the foreign and security policy area on both the academic and political front in Greenland. The next section will elaborate on how the specific arguments can be seen as a speech act of securitizing the knowledge build-up. Whether it fully can be seen as an accomplished securitization depends on who the audience is, and if they will accept the securitization of reaching a stronger foreign and security policy knowledge.

The analysis of the multisectoral landscape sat light on:

- (1) the grey zones of Greenlandic commercial interests and Denmark's competences on foreign and security policy e.g., when it came to fisheries policy
- (2) the Joint Arctic Command as an actor where the military and societal sector 'merged' to secure a trust relation to the Greenlandic community
- (3) how the relationship to the US is dynamic, has multisectoral interactions and because of spillover also appeared as two-faced (cf. the analysis on Multisectoral landscape).

In the analysis of dualisms and security it became clear that:

- (1) several of the informants requested Greenland represented more often
- (2) Greenland is dynamic compared to Denmark, according to the interviews, focus on static and these dualisms could in a security perspective be an expression on shadows of security.

(3) based on the source from the Danish MFA and from the Government of Greenland, the joint effort around Trump's offer was a good example on how the Danish and Greenlandic administrations of 2019 had a considerable better relation than seen before. Therefore, it had resembled tendencies as Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg's (2017) analysis about the Ilulissat-agreement as a desecuritization (Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017, p. 24; 26).

'Knowledge armament'

The results based on the two first operationalized areas are by, the informants, explained with that the Greenlandic foreign policy and domestic policy are very close in general:

*[...] foreign policy [is] in fact domestic policy, and it may sound a bit simplistic [...], but it is about pursuing own interests in cooperation with other countries. To be able to do that, you must know what our interests really are in foreign policy. That is perhaps my biggest call for the new government of Greenland – it is to have a clear foreign policy direction and strategy for ourselves.*²⁹ (ACL, appendix, p. 19).

Further ACL articulated:

[...]we have secured a foreign policy center at Ilisimatusarfik in Greenland, because we need to have much more research, much more knowledge about foreign policy if we want to play a bigger role. Then it is important to make a link between research and the political world if the knowledge is to strengthen the political decision-making processes as well. We have, also in Greenland, fact-resistant politicians and this of course makes it difficult when there is no reception of the good news from the research and science sector. I think it is extremely important that Greenland builds knowledge, for example, "how does China act around the world?", "is there anything we need to be aware of in relation to the Americans?". Therefore, we have to build-up knowledge in real life and develop the competences to play a greater role in foreign policy, and then with a link to the political [sector], where there actually

²⁹ "[...] udenrigspolitik [er] i virkeligheden indenrigspolitik, og det kan måske lyde lidt forsimplet [...], men det handler om at varetage sine egne interesser i samarbejde med andre lande. For at kunne gøre det, så er man nødt til at vide, hvad er det egentlig vores interesser er på det udenrigspolitiske. Så det er måske min største opfordring til en kommende regering i Grønland – det er at have en klar udenrigspolitisk retning og strategi for os selv." – Translation by the author.

*is a reception of the good messages and recommendations that the researchers come up with*³⁰. (ACL, appendix, p. 23-24).

By this quote, ACL makes a securitizing move. ACL gives high priority to attaining a stronger basis of foreign and security policy knowledge rooted in Greenland. That is given high priority on the foundation of the Greenlandic voices about having a bigger part in the sayings about Greenlandic relation to foreign and security policy issues. Additionally, the stronger knowledge on foreign and security policy will strengthen the decision-making process and reduce the threat of decision-making made of “fact-resistant” politics (cf. ACL, appendix, p. 23-24).

The foreign policy center at Ilisimatusarfik in Greenland, that ACL refers to is a part of the agreement by the Danish Government and additional Danish parties, where DKK 2 million were allocated to research about climate, geopolitics and foreign and security policy in Arctic, where the University of Greenland are to coordinate and cooperate with the Arctic Hub and the other Arctic research centers in the Kingdom of Denmark (ufm.dk, 2020). Not only is the request for ‘knowledge-armament’ articulated politically by ACL, also the anonymous source from the Government of Greenland highlighted in the background interview how the worst case would be if Greenland does not understand what is happening around the Island and the Arctic. Therefore, the informant pointed at strengthening the foreign and security policy understanding, by buildup academic capacity in Greenlandic and among Greenlanders (background interview with source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 53).

Aaja Chemnitz Larsen also stated, in the Danish Parliament in connection with the yearly arctic review from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2019, that it is essential to be able to navigate in the grey zones of foreign policy area and home taken areas (Folketinget, 2019). Moreover, she argued how it is a precondition that the Greenlandic politicians, officials, and public can

³⁰ “[...] vi har være med til at sikre et udenrigspolitisk center på Ilisimatusarfik i Grønland, fordi vi er nødt til at have meget mere forskning og meget mere viden om udenrigspolitikken, hvis det er at vi gerne vil spille en større rolle. Så er det vigtigt, at der bliver skabt en kobling mellem forskning og den politiske verden, hvis det er at den viden reelt også skal styrke de politiske beslutningsprocesser. Vi har, også i Grønland, fakta-resistente politikere og det gør det selvfølgelig svært, at der ikke er en modtagelse af de gode budskaber fra forskning og uddannelsessektoren. Jeg tror, det er enormt vigtigt, at Grønland opbygger viden, om for eksempel, ”hvordan agerer Kina rundtomkring i verden?”, ”er der noget vi skal være opmærksomme på i forhold til amerikanerne?”. Så vi er nødt til at videns-opruste i virkeligheden og kompetenceudvikle for at kunne spille en større udenrigspolitisk rolle, og så med kobling til det politiske, hvor der reelt er en modtagelse af de gode budskaber og anbefalinger, som forskerne kommer med.” – Translation by the author.

base the decisions on facts and foreign and security policy knowledge rooted in Greenland (Folketinget, 2019).

The accentuation on the knowledge buildup was thirdly also an argument the source from the Danish MFA followed and highlighted in the interview: “[...] *the more understanding and the more ownerships you have, the more responsibility you will take* ³¹” (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 48).

If connecting that quote to the request on more Greenlandic representatives in political and academic relations and the still existence of dualisms could point to a need for expand information sharing and knowledge of why and how to understand a certain complexity of a foreign and security policy issue.

By the securitizing move by ACL and her speech act from both the quote taken from the interview and Danish Parliament (Folketinget), the essential step is to find a relevant audience. The two potential audiences border between two schisms based on the interviews: (1) Regular citizens versus political/academic elite and (2) Greenlandic administration versus Danish administration.

Schism: The regular citizens – political/academic elite of Greenland

This schism concerning the general citizen opposite the political/academic elite has been discussed by all the informants in the conducted interviews (see appendix). The distinction, with starting point in the opinion poll from Ilisimatusarfik (2021) and the results on “Perceived Security Threats” (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021), was made between the general citizen of Greenland, that possibly took part of the opinion poll versus how the academic and political elite perceived the security threat. Several nuances were made in that distinction.

The first to emphasize is Liv Inuk, that categorize into the ‘educated academic Greenlander’ that supposedly works in the Government of Greenland and has a foreign and security policy

³¹ “[...] *jo mere forståelse og jo mere ejerskab man har, jo mere ansvar tager man også.*” – Translation by the author

attention through education and work and thereby assigns a high priority to it. On the other hand, is the 'regular Greenlander' that does not have a university degree and to some point is aware of the great power state's interests in Greenland and Arctic, but it is not a high priority in the daily life. To this category, LI further nuances how educations within the field of tourism, some of the lessons teach in foreign and security policy areas, so the students will be prepared for some of the questions tourists might ask (LI, appendix, p. 25-26).

This differentiation is close to what Thomas Winkler and the source from the Danish MFA argued (TW, appendix, p.); (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 52-53). The source from the Danish MFA argues that the fundamental definition of 'security' also would be different depending on who is being asked: *"I think that there is big difference between what a Greenlander and a Dane, and a Greenlandic and Danish official put in the concepts"*³² (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 43).

A third informant highlights how the awareness and consciousness both exist in the general population and has always been in the informant's own mind:

*"I have always been, even before I entered politics, aware that there is not very far to Russia, nor very far to the US. You just have to follow the media's coverage of this relationship, then you quickly get a sense that Greenland's location is as it is, and will always be located between two large nations, geographically speaking"*³³ (SG, appendix, p. 37).

Not only the media's covering of the geopolitical situation, but also the Intelligence risk assessment by the Danish Defense Intelligence Service gives an indication of what is happening and SG states that the US interest in Greenland, is ostensible because of things taking place at other fronts (SG, appendix, p. 38). This statement enters the earlier described spillover effect that several scholars approve (cf. (Staun, 2020); (Reinke de Buitrago, 2020); (Rahbek-Clemmensen, The Arctic turn, 2017); (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017a)).

³² "Der tror jeg, at der er rigtig stor forskel mellem, hvad en grønlænder og en dansker, og en grønlandsk og dansk embedsmand ligger i de begreber" – Translation by the author

³³ "Jeg har altid været, også før jeg kom ind i politik, opmærksomhed på at det altså ikke er særlig langt til Rusland, ikke særlig langt til USA. Man skal bare følge med i mediernes dækning af den her relation før man hurtigt får en fornemmelse af at Grønlands placering er sådan som den er, og altid vil være placeret mellem to store nationer, geografisk set". -Translation by the author

The informant argues further that the population is aware of the geostrategic location of Greenland, but also that there right now, and the past year, has been the pandemic of covid-19 to take a position on (SG, appendix, p. 37). Thereby the argument follows what the opinion poll from Ilisimatusarfik (2021) and the result on “what are the largest challenges that the Greenlandic society faces” where ‘economic situation’, ‘unemployment’, ‘higher living costs’, ‘climate change’, [‘other’] and ‘pandemics’ are highest main challenges in Greenland” (Ackrén & Leander Nielsen, 2021).

Lastly, the informant emphasizes in relation to the relationship between the Greenlandic community and Joint Arctic Command, how a stronger Greenlandic awareness and way of thinking are essential to secure a better surveillance of the large island, otherwise it could appear as a weak link in the surveillance (SG, appendix, p. 40).

These examples were to illustrate how the interviews, when discussion the “perceived security threat” and which ‘group’ would be among a relevant audience. As LI, TW and the source from the Danish MFA argue, the political and academic elite might approach differently than the regular population, but on the other hand, SG highlights how it might not be that far away from the population’s awareness, because the medias, among others, write about the geopolitical location of Greenland. Still SG nuances that the domestic issue among the pandemic is on the most people’s minds now (SG, appendix, p. 37). Before discussion whether, there is a successful securitization with an acceptance by a relevant audience, the second and last schism will be presented in the following.

Schism: Greenlandic and Danish administrations

The second schism is differencing between the information sharing and knowledge buildup between Denmark and Greenland. The informant is JH, that argues the significance of spreading out knowledge from the Parliament and the Government of Greenland to the Greenlandic population about Greenlandic alliances: NATO, the cooperation in Arctic Council and other international forum and through that way promote the good alliances (JH, appendix, p. 5). Moreover, the dissemination of knowledge about negotiations and results of

negotiations with Denmark should be more public, where both Denmark and the Greenlandic Government ought to focus on that work, according to the informant (JH, appendix, p. 7):

“Then it could illuminate these mythical instances [...]. This is the way we have to go through, and I think you have to inform the population better about these initiatives, so you not only see whatever pops up on Sermitsiaq, the newspaper, that Denmark is doing something military [...].”³⁴ (JH, appendix, p. 7).

Especially this: that initiatives or negotiations with Denmark pop up on Sermitsiaq, the newspaper, is criticized by another informant. Here the criticism takes starting point in the process about the new political agreement on Arctic Capabilities (The Danish Government, et al., 2021), where according to the informant:

“ There were some admirals from the USA who were visiting or had planned to come to Greenland to look at some port facilities [...] to be able to ensure an increased capacity [...]. So, when we get knowledge through the media, it obviously raises some question, whether the Danish administration is open enough in relation to include Greenland [...]”³⁵. (SG, appendix, p. 38-39).

By this example, confirmed by two articles from KNR (Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa)³⁶, the question about being represented, or the question about being included enough is raised again. As the articles from KNR describe, the American admiral met with *both* Greenlandic and Danish officials, nevertheless the articles refer to a press release from the American Embassy in Denmark (Veirum, knr.gl, 2019a) and not from Danish and Greenlandic administrations. In relation to this, another informant emphasized that the worst-case scenario is that Danish, American or a small group of academic Greenlanders in high positions take the decisions without listening to the Greenlandic population (LI, appendix, p. 33).

³⁴ ” Så kunne det også illuminere de her myteforekomster [...]. Det er den vej vi skal igennem og jeg synes man skal informere befolkningen bedre om de her tiltag, og ikke kun ser det der popper op på forsiden af Sermitsiaq, avisen, med at Danmark gør et eller andet militært [...]”. – Translation by the author

³⁵ ” Der var nogle admiraler fra USA, som var på besøg eller havde planlagt at komme til Grønland for at kigge på nogle havnefaciliteter for [...] at kunne sikre en øget kapacitet [...]. Så når vi får en viden via medierne, så rejser det selvfølgelig nogle spørgsmål, om man fra den danske side er åben nok ift. at kunne inddrage Grønland”. – Translation by the author.

³⁶ (Veirum, knr.gl, 2019b); (Veirum, knr.gl, 2019a)

The source from Danish MFA states that the information often stops at the Greenlandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, the informant adds that:

*[...]we have an interest in [Greenland] gaining knowledge and insight, also in what is the expensive, the challenging, that is, what kind of information we have and on which we built our concerns [...]. So, we get a better "level-playing-field" of what is good for Greenland and for the whole Kingdom.*³⁷ (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 48).

Still the informant from the Danish MFA accentuated how it is doubtful whether the 'knowledge armament' is relevant for the regular Danish or regular Greenlander, however the informant follows the fact that news about geopolitics come closer. Thereby the source from the Danish MFA underlines that the authorities have a role to secure these framework conditions (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 48).

Acceptance from a relevant audience

When discussion whether it is relevant to look at the regular citizen of Greenland as potential audience, there might appear the argument on: should the basic education level among the Greenlandic population be strengthened first, before speaking about 'knowledge armament' on the foreign and security policy area? This is also something several of the informant addressed "the lack of education" (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 15); (ACL, appendix, p. 18;22); (LI, appendix, p. 26;32). If looking at the numbers of how the status of the educational level is, the numbers are positive: During the last ten years, there has been an educational rise on 7,8 % regarding the part of the Greenlandic population between 16-74 years. This means that almost 40 % has an education on higher level than elementary school (Folkeskolen) (naalakkersuisut.gl, 2020). As accentuated in the relation on the publishing numbers, there still lies a long road before getting to the bottom of the problem.

Nevertheless, as LI states inside the field of tourism, the students have lessons about foreign and security policy (LI, appendix, p. 25-26). Furthermore, as the source from the Danish MFA

³⁷ "[...] vi har en interesse i, at de får viden og indsigt, også i det som er det dyre, det udfordrende, altså hvad er det for nogle informationer vi har og som vi bygger vores bekymringer [...]. Så vi får en bedre "level-playing-field" af, hvad er godt for Grønland og for hele Kongeriget." – Translation by the author

have argued on the area of fisheries policy – it might appear as domestic policy, a home taken area, but has the likelihood for becoming foreign and security policy in some cases. ACL has stressed how foreign policy is domestic policy (ACL, appendix, p. 19) because these interests are closely connected.

By those examples, the regular Greenlandic citizen or population could be a relevant audience, accepting the securitization on the requirement for more knowledge and information sharing on foreign and security policy by a ‘knowledge armament’ – the knowledge build-up on the foreign and security policy area. Like a Danish farmer who knows the European support, where 30 % of the support is conditional on three green demands (demands applied from 2015-2020) (Landbrug & Fødevarer, 2015), likewise, could it be relevant for the Greenlandic fishermen to have a good knowledge basis of the foreign policy angle of their profession.

As one of the informant states: the foreign and security policy is not that far away from the population’s awareness (SG, appendix, p. 37).

When it comes to the focus on the Greenlandic political and academic elite, the interviews give the impression of how this group already is on the route of developing a stronger knowledge about foreign and security policy. ACL emphasized the foreign policy center at Ilisimatusarfik and the DKK 2 million in the restart of Danish economy and special challenges caused by covid-19 as steps in that direction (ACL, appendix, p. 23-24); (ufm.dk, 2020).

Moreover, as the statements from Greenlandic politicians (and informants), Justus Hansen and Sofia Geisler expressed how the medias as the bearer of messages send unfortunate signals. Hansen emphasized how it in the bad cases caused the existences of myths about Denmark and the Defense (JH, appendix, p. 7) and Geisler stressed how it raised the question on how much Denmark really is sharing and whether Greenland is included well enough (SG, appendix, p. 39).

In the second schism between Greenlandic and Danish administration there are, by the informants, bought some examples to the table, nonetheless under the analysis section “Security” the time around Trump’s offer and the joint effort on both Danish and Greenlandic

administrations' sides illustrated how the information sharing and trust worked. It is supposedly a nuanced story; however, the situation made a foundation of letting Greenland represent Greenland and have influence.

Another example is the effort on constitute trust between Joint Arctic Command and the civil society of Greenland, as analyzed under the section "Multisectoral landscape".

Those two examples could indicate that the Greenlandic and Danish administrations have found a good communication line, due to the Mette Frederiksen's administration.

There is presumably still some way to go. The source from the Danish MFA used the formulation "getting a better 'level-playing-field'" about what is good for Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark" (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 48). With such a formulation it gives the impression of, that there is room for improvement both in knowledge sharing between the administrations but also regarding a general knowledge buildup inside the field of foreign and security policy area for the Greenlandic decisionmakers.

If bringing out Trump's offer again and making a parallel with a similar Danish case, the Muhammed-crisis of Denmark was, arguably a "wake-up-call", where Denmark did not go without being noticed and where, assumably, many Danes wish that the Muhammed-crisis just was a flash in the pan and would be forgotten at some point. However, it was only a put to rest for a while, since there last year came up new sensitive situations in France and Denmark (AFP, 2020); (ritzau, 2020); (Holm, Rysgaard, & Kielgast, 2020); (Fuglsang & Davidsen-Nielsen, 2020).

In relation to Greenland and Trump's offer this – as happened for Denmark – got Greenland manifested in the world press and diplomatic corridors (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 11-12), and could be Greenland's "wake-up-call". With increased attention, the securitization, therefore, call for the 'knowledge armament' so Greenland, the population as well as academia and decision-makers, have the best basis for meeting this.

Summarizing tool

Which narrative can be found in the Kingdom of Denmark: In Copenhagen and Nuuk? And how are the different Greenlandic voices narrating the relation to foreign and security policy? Both Denmark and Greenland have close relations to narratives whether it is Greenlandic myths or the Danish, H.C Andersen's fairy tales. It is also, as emphasized by Auerswald (2020), an important tool for small states since it strengthens the foundation of being moral correct rather than showing of with hard power (Auerswald, 2020, p. 253). Which narratives are connected to the Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy as the experts have stated and what essential arguments can be deduced from the analysis?

In the summarizing section of the analysis three illustrations will be brought out in the actant model. All three are potential securitizations, that are revealed from the analysis. Yet, the last and third illustration sum up the essential result of the analysis and is thereby the analytical answer to the research question: *How are the Greenlandic voices articulated in foreign and security policy by Danish and Greenlandic experts?*

The first to be emphasized as a potential securitization is what the section about Arctic Command as an actor balancing between sectors. Here the overall analysis found that the Danish Defense in Greenland needs establishing a closer relationship to the civil society of Greenland. That both has an operational purpose and a confidence-building purpose. In relation to the multisectoral analysis perspective, the argument highlighted how Joint Arctic Command balances between the military sector, which is their traditional sector, but likewise to a great extent the societal sector. This analytical result is elaborated in the follow illustration:

Figure 6: Potential securitization based to the analysis of Joint Arctic Command as an actor balancing between sectors. Illustrated by the author.


Sender/securitizing actor: Kingdom of Denmark	Object/referent object: Relation to the Greenlandic society	Receiver/functional actor: Danish Defense
Helper/extraordinary means: 'Merging' the military and societal sector	Subject: The Kingdom of Denmark (Danish Defense)	Opponent/threat: anti-militarization

Based on the analysis, the political sector of the Kingdom of Denmark, represented in the report, “Arctic- Analysis” and the new political agreement on Arctic Capabilities, is the securitizing actor. The securitizing actor both saw an internal problematic based on Greenlandic objection about the Danish Defense in the Arctic and an external pressure from the US. The US demanded more and better surveillance of Arctic territories, something the Kingdom of Denmark has met with the new political agreement on Arctic Capabilities. This is also an argument delivered by Rahbek-Clemmensen (2017), that describes how the *“The Danish Armed Forces became a tool in that strategy, as it could improve Denmark’s relationship to other states and the government of Greenland through practical initiatives and cooperation.”* (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017, p. 55). The referent object in this analysis case is the trust to the Greenlandic society, but the analysis (if other data) could supposedly also have had the ‘surveillance of own Arctic territories’ as referent object.

However, the data, interviews and reports, have highlighted how internal attitudes towards the Danish Defense has a significant influence that required the extraordinary means. The analysis found that if ‘merging’ the military sector and the societal sector, this would strengthen the relationship and the likelihood of being able to involve the civil society and thereby strengthen the relation and trust between the Danish Defense and the Greenlandic society and thereby function as helper – the extraordinary means. However, the relationship between the Joint Arctic Command and the Greenlandic society is challenged by the anti-militarization attitudes that exist in the Greenlandic political landscape. Whether this could be a successful securitization, would depend on an audience accepting it, but based on the data, this dynamic between the military sector and civil society appears to be on a regular political level, and never fully securitized.

The second potential securitization is the one extracted from the analysis about dualisms and security and illustrated in figure 7. The referent object is ‘stable framework conditions to secure Greenlandic economy’, and thereby a better foundation for future independency.

Figure 7: Example of a securitization based on existing analyses: Focus on the framework conditions to secure a better foundation for sustainable economic development of Greenland. Illustrated by the author.



As the figure illustrate it is the Kingdom of Denmark, mainly Denmark, that is the securitizing actor advocating and stressing the referent object which are the stable framework conditions. This can be found in the statement by the source from the Danish MFA and the relevant policy papers cf. figure 2. As earlier mentioned, Greenland deals with dynamics and Denmark with static (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p. 10) and if the Kingdom of Denmark success with stabilizing the dynamics in Greenland, by diversifying the Greenlandic economy, as the extraordinary means, Greenland but also the Kingdom of Denmark- would be the receiver and a functional actor and the subject desiring the conditions for economic development.

This potential securitization has not been followed further, because of the two arguments mentioned earlier. (1) It is a part of Greenlandic narrative to be in the “process” (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126) and thereby a significant argument related to the discussion about Greenlandic independence, and (2) securitizing economy is often connected to other referent objects and therefore cannot be securitized per se (cf. (Kristensen & Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017b, p. 45); (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 100)).

Nonetheless, the last and third securitization found in the analysis, elaborated in figure 8, is the main securitization to be follow in this thesis. Not only because it has the potential of being accepted by a relevant audience but moreover, because it is the general concluding analysis of the thesis.

Figure 8: The main securitization articulated in the analysis. Illustrated by the author.

Sender/securitizing actor: Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland)	Object/referent object: Knowledge foundation in relation to decision-making.	Receiver/functional actor: The Kingdom of Denmark
Helper/extraordinary means: 'Knowledge armament' rooted in Greenland	Subject: The Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland)	Opponent/threat: If Greenland does not understand what is going on

As analyzed in the section about 'knowledge armament', both the political sector in Greenlandic and Danish administrations emphasized the high priority there should be given to a stronger knowledge basis when it comes to making decisions on foreign and security policy. The data especially made it clear how the speech act of ACL both in the interview, by establishing the foreign policy center at Ilisimatusarfik and the statement from 2019 from the Danish Parliament manifested the high priority of the strengthen knowledge foundation for Greenlandic decision-makers. Moreover, from the background interview with a source from the Government of Greenland underlined how it is essential that the Greenlandic administration has the best foundation on making decisions. As figure 8 shows, the Kingdom of Denmark is placed as the securitizing actor yet with an emphasis on Greenland, due to the interviews and ACL speech act. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Denmark as whole does appear as the securitizing actor, because the source from the Danish MFA pointed out how the extraordinary means – the 'knowledge armament' – would give a better level-playing-field plus a better understanding of foreign and security policy would be a basis for taking more responsibility (cf. (source from the Danish MFA, appendix, p. 48).

The Kingdom of Denmark is (also) the receiver – a functional actor. This argument is based on how the extraordinary means of knowledge armament rooted in Greenland can support the Greenlandic voices' request on being own representative in the political and academic discussions. Thereby the Greenlandic academia and Greenlandic administration would be a basis for taking the (natural) more responsibility and get a healthier level-playing-field with the Danish MFA. The healthier level-playing field is profitable for both the Greenlandic and Danish administration, which could be exemplified with the times around Trump's offer,

where the Greenland administration (2019) and the Frederiksen administration, according to the informants, had a good communication.

The analysis found several threats, that could challenge the knowledge foundation in relation to making decisions in relation to foreign and security policy. Some of the threats count as the dominant American and Danish analyses (or influence), that in some of the dualism-angles could suppress the Greenlandic voices or the Greenlandic aim on have an increased Greenlandic representative. As the actant model as summarizing tool shows in figure 8, the threat and opponent are defined to 'if Greenland does not understand what is going on'. It may appear a bit clumsy formulated, but covers the argument delivered by ACL about "fact-resistant" politicians, as well as JH's argument about how lack of knowledge makes myths about e.g., the Danish Defense in Greenland. By that point, the threat is both an extern threat from states (Denmark and the US), but moreover an intern threat concerning the fact-resistant politicians – which could correspond with lack of familiarity or knowledge to a certain area.

The extraordinary means, that counts the knowledge armament rooted in Greenland have to some extent already been put to service by the earlier mentioned 2 DKK millions (ufm.dk, 2020). Yet, as discussed in the section about relevant audience there is some way to go if the receiver and functional actor is the Greenlandic population. The extraordinary means could therefore be an expression of how the means are matched to the audience of the administration at first.

This means by making the securitization, one is putting a strong political tool to service, however the alternative is the risk of Greenland not understanding what is going on around the island (cf. appendix, p. 53) or in that relation counteract Danish foreign and security policies as emphasized in the section about the grey zones of Greenlandic commercial interests.

Buzan et al. (1998) described³⁸ how a securitization can illuminate who securitizes and under what conditions (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 26-27; 32), here the outcome of the analysis has presented how the increased wish of being represented or being *the*

³⁸ As mentioned in the theory section

representative and the request on being able to influence when the issues concern Greenland also follow the securitization of a better foreign and security policy basis.

The analysis further shows how the political sector both is the securitizing actor, the sender, and the functional actor, the receiver. This is a nuance Buzan et al. (1998) also highlight³⁹; how a state often has articulated its own survival in traditional security studies (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 28-30). This might also be the case in this securitization, if the focus was on the political sector of Greenland securitizing own requirement for getting a better foreign and security policy basis. Nonetheless, the stronger argument in that relation points to that the *survival* in this securitization is connected to the internal complexes of the Kingdom of Denmark, also since Greenland is not a state. The survival would therefore to a greater extend be the cohesive energy inside the Kingdom of Denmark.

That further leads to the crucial question about who the relevant audience is and whether the securitization can be accepted by the audience. Here Buzan et al. (1998) emphasize how the relevant audience must share the same values and concern of the threat of the referent object, and thereby is ready to accept (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 31). During the discussion about the relevant audience, the differencing was between two schisms, and at this point the last schism counting the administrations appears as the most prospective audience. The Greenlandic population would thereby serve as an additional functional actor because the population is such a relevant part of the calculation.

Moreover, a further point by Buzan et al. (1998) to address is the part about how the speech act articulates the threat and when that expresses as ‘plot of no return’ (cf. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 31-33)). Due to the analysis, two factors can have worked as ‘plot of no return’. There is a general factor such as the Trump’s offer, as well-known, manifested Greenland in the international press for good, as one of the informants stressed: *“Suddenly it was discovered that there were living people in Greenland, and that had a huge effect. Then would people with pleasure talk with, and were requests for interviews from Japan, India and South Africa – from everywhere”*⁴⁰ (source from the Government of Greenland, appendix, p.

³⁹ As mentioned in the theory section

⁴⁰ ” Pludselig opdagede man, at der også boede mennesker i Grønland, og det havde jo en vældig effekt. Dem ville man gerne snakke med, og der var ønske om interview fra Japan, Indien og Sydafrika – overalt fra”. – Translation by the author

11). The second factor, closer related to the data, is based on Aaja Chemnitz Larsen's initiatives, and to some extent securitization of the foreign and security policy center, that was accepted by the Danish political sector that granted DKK 2 million and thereby count as a 'plot of no return'. Whereas the increasing of the 'knowledge armament' only goes one way: forward and up. Lastly, based on Wæver's (2017) emphasizing of the "process" as a part of the Greenlandic narrative, the securitization of a better foreign and security policy understanding could additionally be a part of the Greenlandic narrative of the "process". The route or speed might not be settled, but the process is (Wæver, 2017, pp. 125-126).

Conclusion

From an ontological phenomenological constructivistic philosophy of the research, using interviews as method and securitization as theoretical framework the thesis has focused on how the Greenlandic voices are articulated in foreign and security policy by Danish and Greenlandic experts.

Through three operationalized key units, the analysis went through the multisectoral landscape, security as failed politics- including the existing dualisms – and lastly with the use of traditional key units from securitization, whether it was a question of an accepted securitization of the better knowledge foundation in relation to decision-making. The analytical strategy has been used to map the diplomatic processes and to emphasize how complex the issues are concerning Denmark and Greenland and foreign and security policies. The complexity and existing connections have been illuminated from different angles as the interviews have given access to.

The analysis emphasized, how the Greenlandic voices to an increasing degree reach a larger audience and the relationship with Greenland is important. This was emphasized in the analysis about the multisectoral landscape, where the relational was emphasized between the Danish Defense and the Greenlandic civil society as well as in the relation to the US. The analysis did moreover explain how different dualisms or shadows of security issues exists in the relationship between Denmark and Greenland, and where the Greenlandic voices both welcome engagement from Danish and other's side but also question the Danish engagement.

The analytical conclusion is that there is a securitization of a better foreign and security policy knowledge basis. This gives a better foundation on decision-making and a better point of departure for cooperation bilateral with Denmark, inside the Kingdom of Denmark and with the US. Some informants pointed out at, that the creating of myths in relation to the attitude toward the Danish defense and Danish engagement in general, could be prevented by a 'knowledge armament'. Moreover, the knowledge build-up in the field of foreign and security policy would create the basis for taking more responsibility that corresponds well with the natural Greenlandic demand on be the representative of own interests, getting increased influence and over time: independency. By the example of ACL's speech act and the DKK 2 million as the 'point of no return' and the securitization, underline that there have been made political choices both from Danish and Greenlandic administrations about articulating the demand of the knowledge build up rooted in Greenland, and the accept of it by a relevant audience. This has come in the wake of Trump's offer, a pandemic, and a long-standing demand on being more involved and represent both Greenland and the Arctic Kingdom of Denmark to a larger extent.

The formulation of the research question, as discussed in the introduction, had a wide formulation but was delimited in the following section just after. The wide formulation made it possible, in the analysis to touch upon additional topics, which the analysis also contains. The choice of theory gave the basis for narrowing the topics further down and moreover to map the interactions and how the topic of Greenlandic voices in foreign and security policy is complex.

The securitization of the getting a stronger basis of foreign and security policy knowledge was to some extent surprising. Because the data as well as the relevant and used documents highlighted existing discussions about climate change, great power competition, intergovernmental cooperation, or the independence (process) of Greenland. These were also extracted from the two first parts of the analysis upon "multisectoral landscape" and "security and the dualisms". Upon that reflection, the choice of theory showed to be a good decision because it gave the tools, not only to find answers to the research question but moreover to locate an issue of high priority to additional informants and administrations as the audience accepting it.

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