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A study on the Minority Adviser Scheme in Norway

Master of Science (MSc) in Development and International Relations with a specialization in
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Abstract

This study is set to explore the policies and the minority adviser scheme put in place by the Norwegian government to combat forced marriage, female genital mutilation (FGM), honour-related violence (HRV) and negative social control. The Norwegian government has developed preventive measures to tackle the issues stated above by implementing the minority advisor scheme in schools. The empirical material is based on three action plans, relevant laws, and data gathered through interviews with four minority advisers in Oslo. The research study has three sections of analysis; the first part addresses the policies and laws put in place to combat forced marriage, FGM, HRV and negative social control. The findings show that the policies create categorisation of people based on their ethnicity, culture, tradition and religion, which justifies separate actions plans, specific laws and regulations that apply to particular groups of the Norwegian population. Ultimately, it justifies stricter immigration control. The second part addresses how the advisers practise the minority advisor scheme. The findings show that the advisers are influenced by the action plans, hence reinforce the stigmatising effects. Moreover, the advisers can potentially do harm by being present at schools. Lastly, the third part of the analysis specifically looks at two cases of the minority advisers who subvert the scheme from the inside by the way they carry out their work. This thesis can be seen as a stepping-stone for further research on the topic of forced marriage and, in particular, the impacts on how advisers carry out their jobs.

Keywords:

minority adviser scheme, policy analysis, integration, forced marriage, bureaucracy, ethnic minority families, biopolitics

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List of abbreviations

Female genital mutilation	FGM
Honour-related violence	HRV
“What is the problem represented to be”-	WPR-approach
Directorate for Diversity and Inclusion	IMDi
Lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender and intersex persons	LGBTI

Introduction

As of 2021, Norway's population consists of 18.5 % of immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents with a wide diversity of nationalities (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2021). Throughout many decades with immigration to the country, Norway has had an increased demographic diversity and brought about cultural customs that differ from the Norwegian ones. Norway has positioned itself as a global leader in gender equality, making this central values and principles to Norwegian self-understanding (Bredal, 2014, s. 136). Migration from non-western countries has seen a rise in non-traditional Norwegian marriages, such as arranged and forced marriages. The rise of forced marriages in Norwegian has led to media and political attention (Bredal, 2011, p. 97). Forced marriage was seen as the opposite of equality, hence challenging Norway's national identity (Svendsen & Røthing, 2011 p. 1955). As a response, Norway has committed to combat forced marriage since the first national action plan in 1998. Since then, five action plans have been implemented, meaning that this has been a political interest for 23 years. Along the way, other matters of concern have been added on, such as female genital mutilation (FGM), negative social control and honour-related violence (HRV) (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 14).

In 2008, the minority scheme was put in place at various schools across Norway. Minority advisers are currently stationed at schools to engage directly with youths to identify students that might be subjected to forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and HRV (IMDi, 2020, p. 1). Moreover, they will function as experts on these issues and provide knowledge and assistance to teachers, parents and other relevant actors. Each year, the Norwegian government provides financial support, and the numbers of minority advisers are currently growing (Regjeringen, 2020). As of 2020, there are 49 minority advisers placed in high school and junior high school (IMDi, 2020, p. 1). Argumentatively, the minority adviser scheme is, in one way, an example of how the government has recognised a problem area and created a "solution" to the problem.

It is within this comprehensive field I found it interesting to look at how the Norwegian government identifies particular marriages, which are conceptualised as forced marriage, and provides a concrete solution to the "problem". In this case, the solution is reflected in the implementation of the minority scheme. This study will, therefore, firstly focus on a policy

analysis of three action plans and specific national laws. Secondly, I will explore how the minority advisers carry out their jobs in the field through the interviews I have conducted. Lastly, I will present two cases of two minority advisers who subvert the scheme from inside in their everyday practice.

Research question

The study will explore the following questions:

- *How do the public policies construct the problems that are identified in the Minority Adviser Scheme in Norway?*
- *And how is the Minority Scheme practised by the advisers in the Norwegian context?*

State of the art

Topics such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation, negative social control, and honour-related violence have been researched to a great extent internationally and nationally which means that I enrol in the extensive literature on these topics. Moreover, these topics are comprehensive and touch upon many different research fields. In Norway, debates about the above-mentioned topics have led to heated debates between politicians, scholars and have gotten massive media coverage. More than often, the debates are located amid gender equality and immigration. More specifically, in the recent decade, research and political interest have associated the topics with ethnicity and culture, including gender (Bredal, Eggebø, & Eriksen, 2020, p. 11). The media coverage of individual cases of honour killings started in the 90s. The case of Fadime Sahindal, who was murdered by her father in 2002, received especially much public and political attention throughout Scandinavia (Bredal, 2011, p. 95)

Notably, the right-wing populist party, The Progress Party, along with Human Rights Service, has for some time managed to polarise debates about immigrants and integration by framing forced marriage, female genital mutilation as a threat to Norway's gender-equality position and hindering integration (Teigen, 2009, p. 333). Within this framing, Islam and Muslims are primarily targeted and linked to debates about forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence (Bangstad & Helland, 2019, p. 5). Another central actor within this debate is anthropologist Unni Wikan who has done extensive research on Muslim communities and honour-related violence (Gullestad, 2002, p. 51). She has publicly claimed that previous researcher and the Norwegian government has been too generous in their attempts to be "anti-racists" (Gullestad, 2002, p. 51). Marianne Gullestad (2002, 2004) and Sindre Bangstad (2014,

2015) have provided anthropological studies on the discourses of national identity of Norway, racism, islamophobia, culture egalitarianism, Norwegianness and the “imagines sameness” that exist amongst Norwegians.

Helga Eggebø (2013) and Anja Bredal (2011, 2014, 2018, 2020) are two scholars who have written extensively on migration marriage in Norway and empirically explore how migration marriage has been intertwined with immigration control. Eggebø (2013) has explored how the Norwegian regulations only apply to notions of “real” or “genuine” marriage; thus, transnational marriages are criticised (Eggebø, 2013 p. 1). Anja Bredal (2018) research on forced marriage as well as other marriage customs is well recognised in Norway. One of her studies challenges the established distinction between «ordinary violence» (violence in majority Norwegian families) and «special violence» (violence in minority Norwegian families). She illustrates how the differences are not only a matter of honour, but also linked to different ways of forming and organising a family (Bredal, 2014, p. 144-145). Furthermore, Bredal has written extensively on how the Norwegian public debate tends to lump forced marriage, plural marriages and ineffective divorces with Muslim marriages. She argues that this is due to the growing hostility towards Muslims and Islam in Norway and the general suspicion of Islamic marriages (Bredal, 2018, p. 298).

My motivation for reaching this field is due to the heated public debates, policies set up by the Norwegian government and the implementation of the minority adviser scheme. The studies mentioned above serve as the basis of my research. In addition, they will also be referenced to several times throughout this thesis. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate how three action plans (policies) and laws construct problems and link these to specific groups based on their ethnicity, culture and religion – hence highlighting the underlying rationalities and assumptions. Further, I aim to give an insight into how minority advisers might be influenced by the policies and to provide several findings on how they carry out their job and the implications of their presence at schools. My contribution to the existing literature is to bring more research on the policies regarding the mentioned issues, and especially how this might impact the way the advisers that work within this field carry out their jobs. Moreover, I present new empirical data that highlight interesting and alternative ways some minority advisers carry out their jobs, which hopefully can be of use for further research.

Structure of study

This study is divided into five chapters, and in this section, I will provide a paper outline of this thesis. In the first chapter, I will present a historical context of how forced marriage became of political interest and connected to immigration and integration concerns in Norway. Further, I present the position of the welfare state in regard to family intervention. In addition, I will describe the political discourse on Muslims in Norway and particularly in the media, which has given rise to the political interest of forced marriage. Moreover, I will give an outline of the Norwegian public debate and how women's rights have been delineated. Lastly, information on the minority scheme is provided.

The second chapter describes the methodological approaches used to build up the core section of this thesis. It presents the analytical approaches used to examine the data gathered. Also, within this chapter, I will present the theoretical approach to give a roadmap of theories and concepts used to explain the data. Further, my positionality, as well as the limitations of this research, are described.

The third chapter revolves around a policy analysis where I will draw on Carol Bacchi's (2009) WPR-approach: "what is the problem represented to be?". I have investigated three action plans and two specific laws, Section 1a of the Marriage Act and The Act of 17 June 2016 No. 58 of the Immigration Act regarding forced marriage. By studying three action plans, I have identified recurrent statements that underpin a problem representation (problematizations). Which I will, throughout the thesis, refer to as frames. The identified frames are: *immigration frame*, *cultural, traditional and religious frame*, *legal (criminalisation) frame*, and *violence frame*. These frames will help me to answer what kind of assumptions are inherent in the actions plans.

The fourth chapter is the second part of the analysis, where I explain what happens in practice. In other words, I will examine how the minority advisers perform their role and carry out their job. I have conducted online interviews based on James P. Spradley work, "*The Ethnographic Interview*" (1979). I will discuss the implications of placing the minority advisers in schools to combat forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and HRV.

In the fifth and last part of the analysis, I will go into details of two individual cases of two informants who have shown different ways to carry out their jobs within the minority adviser scheme. I will draw on Michel de Certeau's work "*The Practice of Everyday Life*" (1984), and

I will particularly draw on his concepts of *tactics* (1984) to investigate the two minority advisers' different ways to exert everyday practices and actions in the policy field of forced marriage, negative social control etc. In the final chapter, I provide an overview of the findings with the aim of answering my research questions.

Chapter 1: Background context

This chapter introduces the background information and selected concepts to understand the historical, political and discursive landscape this thesis is situated in. This chapter aims to contextualise the policy field in which the minority adviser scheme is situated in. Firstly, I will present integration as a political discourse to show how policies regarding forced marriage, negative social control, FGM and HRV are positioned in relation to integration. Secondly, I will present how forced marriage can be understood within Norwegian society as it has been the leading cause for the action plans and laws (Keskinen, 2017, p.154). Thirdly, I will give a brief outline of the role of the welfare system as it has a significant meaning and position in Norwegian society. Fourthly, I will describe the discourse of Muslims in Norway and especially in the media, which has influenced the political agenda of forced marriage (Bredal, 2018, p. 307). Fifthly, because Norway is viewed as a country that firmly advocates for gender equality, it is essential to give background information on how debates about women's rights and forced marriage are intertwined (Bredal, 2014, p. 136). Lastly, the minority scheme will be presented to give a brief overview of what the scheme is and its purpose.

Integration as a political discourse in Norway

From a global perspective, the numbers of immigrants entering Scandinavia have been comparably limited to other countries. Norway's population has been relatively homogeneous, with low numbers of immigration (Eggebo, 2013, p. 15). However, indigenous populations and national minorities such as the Sami, the Roma, Tatars, the Kven and the Jews have long histories in Norway (Eriksen, 2013 p. 3). The largest groups of immigrants are Swedes and Poles; however, according to the Norwegian. Most Norwegians would define an immigrant as non-Western and usually Muslim (Eriksen, 2013 p.4). Therefore, integration became a highly political topic when non-Western immigrants and refugees began to immigrate to Norway (Olwig, 2014 p. 4).

Historically considered, *integration policy* is a relatively new field within the framework of the welfare state. From the beginning of the 1960s, the first non-western immigrants, also known as *guest workers*, arrived in Norway from Pakistan, India, Turkey and Morocco (Bredal, Bråten, Jensen & Strand, 2015, p. 13). During this period, migration was not subjected to strict regulations, nor was it a highly political topic. However, this changed when the number of labour migrants increased from outside of Europe (Eggebo, 2013, p. 15). These male workers began to establish families, apply for family reunifications and marry spouses from their country of origin. In 1975, the government formally introduced an immigration ban to stop immigration into the country (Eggebo, 2013, p. 15). However, this ban did not include immigration from neighbouring countries (Eriksen, 2013 p. 4). With this ban, a shift in the immigration policy followed. Meaning that the immigration ban of 1975 mainly revolved around restricting unskilled workers rather than a complete immigration ban (Eggebo, 2013, p. 15). Moreover, throughout the 1970s and 80s, Norway received refugees and asylum seekers worldwide who sought refugee status or residency through family reunification. Due to the increasing number of immigrants, integration gradually became of political interest and public debates. In the 20th century, integration became a political term (Bredal, Bråten, Jensen & Strand, 2015 p.13).

The welfare state

The Norwegian welfare model has a solid and dominant position in the country. Funded by taxpayers, welfare services such as free education, free healthcare, and financial support for the unemployed are just some of the welfare services provided to the population (Olwig, 2014 p. 2). Furthermore, many responsibilities which in other countries and previously was undertaken by the family or other organisations are now in the hands of the state of the welfare state, such as education and social services (Olwig, 2014 p. 2). However, the right to these services is based on citizenship or residency (Olwig, 2014 p. 2). There is general acceptance in the Norwegian population that the welfare state can monitor and intervene in the private sphere of the family when considered necessary; for example, the children protection service can assist families or interfere if there is a severe worry for the child's wellbeing. Another example of welfare responsibility is the integration scheme of immigrants and refugees (Olwig, 2014 p. 2).

Friberg and Bjørnset (2019) point to the growing tendency of family structures and upbringing practices in the immigrant population having become a political interest and a central part of

the integration policy (p. 38). This especially relates to family customs that do not conform with Norway's social laws, norms, practices, and values (Olwig, 2014 p. 12). For example, transnational marriages, arranged marriages and plural marriages have been subjected to political debate and seen as one core reason for the rise of immigrants and hindering social integration (Bredal, 2011, p. 97). Some of these marriages have been questioned and, to some extent, considered as *forced marriages* where women are victims with no say in the matter of matrimony. Therefore, the political response has had increasingly strict regulations on family reunifications (Bredal, 2011, p. 98).

Understanding forced marriage

Forced marriage is often discussed within the discourse of human rights, women's rights, social justice and multiculturalism (Gill & Anitha, 2011 p. 1). Depending on which lens one uses, the definition varies. Multiple disciplines employ different definitions of the term, and there is no official internationally agreed definition of the term (Psaila, Leigh, Verbari, Pozza, & Gomez, 2016 p. 15). From a legal point of view, the right to freely consent to marriage is enshrined in numerous international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1981) (Gill & Anitha, 2011 p. 6). Therefore, from a human rights perspective, "*marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses*" (Gangoli, Chantler, Hester, & Singleton, 2011, p. 26).

In Norway, forced marriage is an illegal act. Norwegian Criminal Code § 253 states that forced marriage is "*Any person who by force, deprivation of liberty, other criminal or improper conduct or undue pressure forces another person to marry shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years.* " (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020 p. 17).

For the purpose of this research, I want to make it clear that this thesis uses Norway's definition of forced marriage since the research is based on Norwegian action plans and laws. Moreover, I will not discuss further the concept of forced marriage or its definition. Nevertheless, I

recognise the importance of these debates as forced marriage was the leading cause for creating the first action plan and the minority adviser scheme.

Muslim in Norwegian discourse

The world changed after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, especially for Muslims worldwide. Enormous security measures took place after the attacks, and as George W. Bush stated, there was now a "war on terror". For Muslims, this meant *a war on Muslims* (Khalid, 2011, p.16). There is extensive literature that has established the rise of Islamophobia globally, especially in the West (Fekete 2006, Bangstad, 2015, Khalid 2001), and this is also the case in Norway.

Several examples of political and public discourse explicitly speak out on the problems and threats with Islam and Muslims in Norway. Hence, there is tangible evidence of the rise of Islamophobia in Norway (Bangstad, 2015 p. 53). In 2007, a previous political leader of the Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, said, "*not all Muslims are terrorist, but all terrorists are Muslim*" (Eriksen, 2012 p. 11). Furthermore, Hege Storhaug, director of Human Rights Services, has promoted Islamophobic rhetoric in the public sphere for several years. In 2015, Storhaug self-published her book "Islam – the 11th Plague", which became the best-selling book on Islam and Muslims in Norway (Bangstad & Helleland, 2019 p. 2). Hege Storhaug and Human Rights Services are known for being the most influential in framing Muslims in Norway, especially in regards to forced marriage (Bangstad & Helleland, 2019, p.1).

Lastly, Norway's largest anti-Islamic organisation SIAN has made its mark in the public debate regarding Muslims. In 2020, SIAN held several demonstrations throughout the largest cities in Norway and in (Taherdoost, 2016)the areas with high numbers of immigrants. At the same time, SIAN demonstrations were met with counter-demonstrations. SIAN members were tearing up pages of the Quran, burning them and shouting hateful slurs about Islam, resulting in the counter-demonstrators reacting with anger and violence. According to the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, the police used teargas against the counter-demonstrators, and 29 youngsters were arrested that day (NRK, 2020).

Bredal's (2011) research shows how unregistered Islamic marriages (nikah) has drawn negative attention in Norwegian public and political debate and how they are often associated with forced marriage. Moreover, she argues that this discourse is linked to the growing hostility

against Islam and Muslims in general (p. 298). Eriksen (2012) highlights the different ideas about Norwegian marriages that emphasise individual choices in contrast to marriages within immigrant communities where kinship and families are valued (p. 9). Nevertheless, debates on marriages amongst minorities in Norway often put Muslims in the centre of those discussions, no matter their origins (Eriksen, 2012 p. 10). Eriksen (2012) provides an example of how religious marriages amongst Tamils are not put under the same scrutiny as Muslim marriages (p. 12).

In reference to my research topic, forced marriage is often associated with Islam, although it might occur amongst several different immigrant groups (Eriksen, 2012, p. 9). I argue that to understand how forced marriage, FGM and negative social control is conceptualised in Norway; it needs to be seen in the context of the growing public debate that represents Islam and Muslims in negative and problematic ways (Olwig, 2012 p.11)

The Norwegian public debate on women's right and forced marriage

Norway has positioned itself as a global leader in gender equality and human rights, making these central values to Norwegian self-understanding. Studies show the tendency to portray *gender equality* as a national characteristic and how this has been documented in Norwegian gender studies (Svendsen & Røthing, 2011 p. 1955). The Scandinavian countries are also known as "women-friendly" welfare states. Norway is one of the countries with relatively high numbers of national projects with a significant focus on gender and sexual equality (Svendsen & Røthing, 2011, p. 1956).

While the process of integration policy took place in Norway in the 1990s and early 2000s, another political movement was taking place simultaneously, *the women's movement* (Bredal, Bråten, Jensen & Strand, 2015, p. 14). Central to the women's movement in the 1970s that pushed for governmental interference to combat domestic violence and create public services to assist women subjected to violence (Bredal et al., 2015, p.14). Further, public debates covered topics of domestic violence and the demand for the state to interfere in what was previously considered a private family matter. The welfare state was now expected to take care of the individuals' safety, security and freedom, and also within the private sphere of families (Bredal et al., 2015, p.14). The term *violence in close relationships* emerged from the women's

right movement and is an entrenched policy field where the government offers services, measures and arenas for assistance (Bredal et al., 2015, p. 15).

However, with the increase of minority groups in Norway in the 1990s, the principle of cultural pluralism and acceptance for diversity was on the rise in Norway (Bredal et al., 2015, p.14-15). In practice, this meant that it became a matter of choosing family politics or women's rights (Teigen, 2009, p. 2). This prioritisation somewhat challenged the political movement about the welfare state interfering in the private sphere regarding women's rights to freedom from violence. Within law-making and the government's policies, these two parallel processes created a political dilemma and tension (Bredal et al., 2015, p. 15). The political dilemma raises two main concerns. Firstly, how can the government go about protecting women against patriarchal practices? Secondly, how can gender equality bring about problematic aspects by contributing to the stigma and demonisation of minority groups? Politics on forced marriage and female genital mutilations are two relevant examples of this political dilemma (Teigen, 2009, p.2).

However, with time, the media coverage presented several cases of immigrant girls being subjected to severe domestic violence, forced marriages, and extreme restriction of freedom and social control from close families and relatives (Bredal et al., 2015, p. 15). Slowly but surely, these examples pushed for change in governmental strategy, legislation, and policy-making against violence in close relationships, whether domestic and family violence. Hence, the first-ever action plan against forced marriage came in 1998 (Bredal et al., 2015, p. 15).

The Minority Adviser Scheme

The minority adviser scheme is an initiative that emerged from a highly political agenda regarding forced marriage in the Norwegian political and public landscape (Friberg & Bjørnset 2019, p. 39). The minority adviser scheme was first put in place in 2008 by the government. Their mandate is to strengthen schools' knowledge and establish accessible assistance at schools for students who might be subjected to forced marriages, negative social control, or other forms of honour-related violence (Action Plan against Forced Marriage 2008-2011, p 13).

The minority advisers are stationed at schools. They are employed by The Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi, 2020). The division of responsibilities between IMDi, school

principals and school owners are defined in a cooperation agreement between IMDi and the municipality (IMDi, p. 1). The minority adviser's mandate is two-folded. Firstly, they work to determine which students are at risk of being exposed to forced marriage, genital mutilation, honour-related violence, and negative social control and assist with advice, guidance, and follow-up in line with their needs and rights. Secondly, they aim to strengthen competence on the mentioned topics for school staff and public assistance services. The latter applies to employees at the school where the minority adviser is stationed and employees in the adult education service and introductory program for newly arrived refugees (IMDi, 2020 p. 1-2). Since the first pilot project in 2008, the efforts and the number of minority advisers is growing. Today, 49 minority advisers operate at 44 schools throughout various municipalities in Norway (IMDi, 2020 p. 1).

Chapter 2: Methodological approach

In this chapter, I will describe the methodological approach that I used for this thesis to answer the research question: *How do the public policies construct the problems that are identified in the Minority Adviser Scheme in Norway? And how is the Minority Scheme practised by the advisers in the Norwegian context?* My study is based on a qualitative research approach. I will outline the data collection, which is based on textual empirical material and interviews with minority advisers. Further, I will explain the analytical and theoretical approach used to analyse my data. Lastly, I will present my positionality and limitations in this research study.

Date collection

In the next section, I will present how I collected the empirical data. The data collection includes two parts. The first part of the data has been gathered from three selected action plans regarding forced marriage in Norway, along with laws relevant to the research topic. The second part of data was collected through online interviews with four minority advisers.

Textual empirical material: action plan and laws

As the first part of my analysis, I will carry out a policy analysis based on three action plans. By studying these plans, I will investigate how the public policies regarding the minority adviser scheme construct the problems that are within the scheme. The minority adviser scheme is positioned in a complex and broad field of several policies and laws. Due to the large

landscape of policies and the limited time for the research, I have chosen to focus on the textual empirical material from three action plans in particular:

- The first "Action plan against forced marriage (1998)".
- The second "Action Plan against Forced Marriage" (2008-2011)".
- The latest "Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation 2017-2020".

I have decided to look at the first action plan as it will provide background information to understand the rhetoric behind the politics and how it laid out the foundation for the following action plans. The second action plan is relevant for this study as it was with this the minority adviser scheme was first put in place as a measure to tackle forced marriage and negative social control. I found the last action plan relevant as it presents the current-day policies and representation of the forced marriage and the minority adviser scheme. I will not compare the action plans with each other or draw out a timeline of changes from 1998 to 2020. My aim for using the action plan is to get an overview of how the “problems” are constructed, represented and discussed. Further, I will include two specific national laws, Section 1a of the Marriage Act and The Act of 17 June 2016 No. 58 of the Immigration Act regarding forced marriage, to examine how they reinforce the stigmatisation of minority groups.

Interview with minority advisers

In order to investigate how the policies and the mandate of the minority adviser scheme are influencing how the minority advisers carry out their role, I conducted five virtual interviews with four informants. One informant was interviewed twice, to further discuss his individual projects I found interesting. The informants were three women and one man, and they all have work experience as minority advisers. One informant is currently working as a minority adviser located at a school in Oslo. Two of the informants recently (in January 2021) started a new position at IMDi in the Analysis and Diversity Division. The last informant is the coordinator for the minority advisers in Oslo.

My access to the informants was through snowball sampling. This method refers to a non-random sampling method where the researcher finds informants relevant to the research topic. From there, the informants encourage or suggest other informants to participate, hence increasing the sample size (Taherdoost, 2016 p. 22). I gained access to the coordinator, Nayla, through a friend who works as a minority adviser. He put me in contact with the coordinator,

and we arranged an interview. After interviewing her, she offered to assist me in getting in touch with minority advisers that were willing to participate in an interview. From there, I conducted virtual interviews with the others on Microsoft Teams where all of them were recorded on tape, with their permission. Since I had no previous contact with the informants who participated in this study or knew them personally, my positionality towards the interviews could be characterised as primarily objective.

Prior to conducting interviews, the coordinator asked for a document with information on the purpose of the interview. In this document (appendix 6), I provided information about the purpose of the interview, how the interview would be conducted and how the data and personal information would be treated anonymously and deleted after my thesis is handed in. Furthermore, the participants were given the opportunity to withdraw their participation in the research at any time. To ensure that the participants were fully informed, I repeated the information from the document to each participant before starting the interview. To ensure their anonymity, I have given the informants fictional names. From the interviews, I got access to the adviser's understanding of their work and their role. I want to stress that I am referring to what the advisers say they do in practice and acknowledge that this might differ from what might happen in their everyday jobs. Therefore, the data from the interviews provide insight into how advisers perceive their jobs and carry out their tasks, which is valuable for this thesis

I decided to carry out virtual interviews as all participants worked from home due to the national Covid-19 lockdown. Online interviews are naturally different from in-person interviews. However, after a year with on and off lockdowns, people are adapting to the situations, online work, school and socialising is becoming the new "normal". There are some advantages to interviewing the informants away from their workplace and as well as virtually. One avoids possible interruptions, the fixed atmosphere, unexpected tasks that might come along and most importantly, the influence from their surroundings, such as co-workers, students and their boss (MuCurdy, Spradley & Shandy, 2005).

Analytical approach

This section describes the manner in which both of the datasets are analysed. In this research project, I have used two qualitative approaches to analyse the data. In regard to the first part of my data analysis, I will present Carol Lee Bacchi's "What is the problem represented to be?"

approach (2009). Secondly, I will describe the interview approach based on James Spradley's "The Ethnographic Interview" (1979), where I will present how I have applied the reflexive thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke (2019, 2020), in which I coded the interviews.

Policy analysis – "what is the problem represented to be?" by Carol L. Bacchi

This section will briefly introduce policy analysis as a methodological framework for the first part of the analysis. I will draw on Carol L. Bacchi's "what is the problem represented to be?" approach (2009) to analyse the policies. This approach allows me to look into how the Norwegian government has created policies concerning forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence to solve the problem. In this case, the minority adviser scheme is one solution amongst others. Furthermore, the approach allows me to explore how this problematisation is represented through the chosen action plans.

In conventional terms, policies are put in place by the policymakers (government), which suggest that there is a current "problem" that requires solving (Bacchi, 2009 p.1). The term "policy" is generally related to programmes and courses of actions, such as action plans. The government creates action plans regarding the identified social, political, economic issues that require extensive measures to be *dealt with, changed* and *solved* (Bacchi, 2009, p.1). Within policies, the problems are seen as fixed. They are "*endogenous - created within - rather than exogenous - existing outside - the policy-making process. In effect, policies give shape to the problem; they do not address them*" (Bacchi, 2009, p.x).

Interestingly, Bacchi's approach of "what is the problem represented to be?" allows us to be critical towards policies that aim to deal with issues that are constructed by the policy itself. According to her, policies are not simply reacting to "problems", but "*governments are active in the creation (or production) of policy problems*" (Bacchi, 2009, p.1). Therefore, her approach brings attention to how specific "problems" are represented and how this plays a central role in how we are governed, in other words. Hence, people are governed through *problematisation* rather than through policies (Bacchi, 2009, p. 9). By its very nature, any policy is a problematisation. The approach does not deny the existence of troubling conditions that must be discussed; however, it is the shape of the implied "problems" in specific proposals that is important (Bacchi, 2009, p. 34). An important note about problematisation is that it reduces complexity. More than often, only one part of the story is told, meaning that other factors and issues are simplified or even left out of the problem (Bacchi, 2009, p. 20).

When looking at policies, such as action plans, it matters how the "problem" is constructed because it naturally carries implications. This can consider how the issue is understood and how the people involved can be treated. Therefore, it can influence how people perceive themselves (Bacchi, 2009 p.1). Furthermore, the approach allows us to problematise not only the government's attempt to create policies but also the actors and institutions that carry out their role in society and influence the shape of governing, such as politicians, doctors, health workers, police and social workers (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26).

Methodological approach to policy analysis

In my research of the minority adviser scheme, I find the WPR-approach beneficial for analysing policy documents. The approach permits me to shift the focus from how the action plans solve problems to how the problems are shaped and framed (Bacchi, 2009, p.x). I will explore the represented problematisation in the policies regarding forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and HRV. By studying the problematisation in the policies, I will discuss how the identified problems are constructed. The WPR-approach asks six main questions, which will help the researcher analyse the problem representation:

1. What's the "problem" represented to be in a specific policy?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? What are the silences?
Can the problem be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended?

(Bacchi, 2009 p. 2)

One might systematically address these six questions; however, I have chosen to focus on questions 1 and 2 in the WPR-approach. I have chosen Q1 and Q2 as they allow me to analyse the action plans and answer the first part of my research question. The aim of looking at Q1 is to examine the aim of the action plans and then flip it around to see how the government has constructed the problem (Bacchi, 2009 p. 55). In this way, I will look into how forced marriage,

FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence is constructed in the action plans. Q2 aims to look into presuppositions or assumptions of the problem representation. In other words, it looks at the background knowledge, which is often taken for granted and the “*conceptual logics that underpin specific problem representation*” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 5). Q1 and Q2 will be central to the first part of the analysis. I acknowledge the limitation of not applying all the six questions; however, I believe that the two first questions will serve as a good basis to answer the first part of my research question. Moreover, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I recognised that I had to focus on the two questions to unfold them fully.

Interview guide approach by James P. Spradley

My second source of data collection are interviews conducted virtually with four minority advisers. The design of the interviews was based on the ethnographic interview as explained in James P. Spradley work, “*The Ethnographic Interview*” (1979). According to Spradley (1979), ethnographic interviews share many of the features similar to a friendly and casual conversation (Spradley, 1979 p. 55). Within ethnographic interviews, three ethnographic elements are essential to keep in mind: *explicit purpose*, *ethnographic explanation* and *ethnographic questions* (Spradley, 1979, p. 59). The explicit purpose is about the ethnographer making clear the purpose of the interview, which makes an interview less of a friendly and casual one. However, the goal is to do this with as little authority as possible. The ethnographic explanation is about repeatedly offering explanations to the informants. The aim is to learn about the informant's culture and learn to become an ethnographer (Spradley 1979, p. 59). Spradley (1979) has identified more than thirty ethnographic questions; however, I have chosen to focus on descriptive questions as my primary tool in the interviews (p. 60), which I will elaborate on in the following section.

Asking Descriptive questions

According to Spradley, there are four stages of interactions that occur during an interview: *apprehension*, *exploration*, *cooperation* and lastly, *participation* (Spradley, 1979 p. 79). These four stages aim to build rapport between the researcher and the informant and achieve meaningful information. Spradley points out that one of the most important things is getting the informants to talk, keep them talking, and do most of the talking (Spradley, 1979, p. 80).

The purpose of asking descriptive questions is to get a large sample of statements and speech from the informants in their native language. Native language is referred to as their cultural setting (Spradley, 1979 p. 17), which in my study is their work at schools. Moreover, by asking descriptive questions in the interviews, I experienced that the informant had the freedom to decide sequences, wordings and the flexibility to talk freely. Therefore, by using this method of interviewing, the informant did most of the talking. I prepared 5-6 descriptive, open-ended questions. However, I experienced some differences in each interview as the informant was allowed to speak freely and decide where the interview would go.

The interviews were conducted in Norwegian as this is the "native" language of the minority adviser in their field of work. I found it more interesting and relevant to allow the informants to speak in their "native" language as it allows them to speak in a more natural manner. Furthermore, when asking descriptive questions about their everyday practices at work, their native language will allow for descriptive answers (Spradley, 1979 p. 17). It will most likely be easier for the informants to express their work and activities as it is, rather than translating their meaning to English in an interview with limited time. According to Spradley (1979), informants are native speakers who should be encouraged to speak in their own language better to understand their cultural reality (p. 17).

Reflexive thematic analysis by Braun & Clarke

In 2006, Braun and Clarke developed a thematic analysis as a guideline to analyse qualitative data. The guideline offered a six-phase process which is: “1. *data familiarisation*, 2. *systematic data coding*, 3. *generating initial themes from coded and collated data*, 4. *developing and reviewing themes*, 5. *refining, defining and naming themes* and 6. *writing the report*” (Braun & Clarke, 2019 p. 4). According to Braun and Clarke (2019), this guideline as often been misinterpreted. They make it clear that the guideline does not need to be followed as a hardliner and it allows for more flexibility (p. 592). In later publications, Braun and Clarke (2020) further develop this approach to stress “*the importance of the researcher’s subjectivity as analytic resource, and their reflexive engagement with theory, data and interpretation*” (p. 3), which they called reflexive thematic analysis. This approach allows for both experimental and critical framing of data, language and meaning, allowing for both inductive and deductive analytical processes (Braun & Clarke, 2020 p. 5).

An interesting take on the reflexive thematic approach is that it rejects the idea that themes simply “emerge” from the data (Braun and Clarke, 2019, p. 594). According to them, this idea suggests that themes already “exist” in the data and are waiting to be discovered (Braun and Clarke, 2019, p. 594). However, they understand coding as an active and reflexive process. The reflexive thematic approach allows the researcher to take a more active position in the research process, which means that the researcher is never entirely objective and does have an interpretative role in the result of developing themes. In their own words, “*themes are creative and interpretive stories about the data, produced at the intersection of the researcher’s theoretical assumptions, their analytic resources and skill, and the data themselves.*” (Braun and Clarke, 2019, p. 594).

I have, therefore, chosen to use a reflexive thematic approach in which I coded the interviews. I acknowledge my subjectivity and theoretical assumptions while coding the data. However, I argue that the largely inductive process enabled me to categorise empirical themes and concepts that identify patterns, wordings, statements, tensions and contradictions produced in the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2019 p. 592)

After each interview, I transcribed each interview to be able to fully engage with the data. Later on, I read through each interview and highlighted fascinating sequences. During the second reading, I coded what was highlighted into themes and concepts in separate tables to have a clearer and systematic overview. I compared the interviews to explore similarities and deviations between them. From there, I ended up with a collection of material for each theme, which served as the basis for the second and third part of the analysis. Direct quotes from the informants will be presented, which I translated to English. It is vital not to read interview material as an authentic truth, as within reflexive thematic analysis, the researcher’s subjectivity and theoretical assumptions partake in the construction of data (Braun & Clarke, 2019 p. 592).

I consider the advantage of the reflexive thematic approach that it is theoretically flexible, meaning that it will allow me to build on multiple theories to explore the themes and to answer my research question (Braun & Clarke, 2020 p. 4-5). I will elaborate on this in the next section.

Theoretical approach

In this section, I will present a theoretical roadmap to clarify the overall framework of this thesis. I electively build my analysis on different theoretical concepts. By carrying out a reflexive thematic analysis, I will first look for which themes I discover in the interview. From there, I look for theoretical concepts that help shed light upon those themes and how they relate to the research topic. In this way, the empirical data is at the forefront and guides the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2020 p. 5). In the following, I will introduce my theoretical approach. However, a further and more in-depth elaboration of the theories will be outlined simultaneously with the analysis in each chapter.

WPR-approach focuses on how the government provides policies based on “problems” they have identified, making this approach post-structuralist. Hence, the WPR-approach offers insight into how we are governed through problematisation (Bacchi, 2009, p. 34). Studying how a problem is constructed allows us to examine how rule takes place and helps us to understand governing processes (Bacchi, 2009, p. xii). Therefore, the thesis’ overall theoretical framework is aligned with Michel Foucault’s work on governance (Bacchi, 2009 p. 34). The analysis will mainly draw on two theoretical concepts developed by Foucault: governmentality and biopolitics. In the following paragraph, the concepts and the usage of them will be explained.

For Foucault, the concept of governmentality is concerned with the forms of rule that can be found in modern forms of political thought and action (Miller & Rose, 1990 p. 2). He spoke of governmentality on two levels: one to “*identify different rationalities or mentalities of rule (govern-mentalities), the different kinds of thinking associated with particular approaches to government*” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26) and one to “*refer to the form of rule that emerged in the late eighteenth century, which focuses on the population*” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 26). Moreover, experts (such as doctors, psychologists and social scientists) play an essential role in governmentality as they influence and produce knowledge (Bacchi, 2009, p. 25-26).

However, I do not wish to only draw on a Foucauldian governmentality analysis. Instead, I want to look at the specific ways people are governed in this particular scheme by drawing on biopolitics and study the scheme as a concrete technique of state power, which originated within the broader conceptual framework of governmentality (Bacchi, 2009, p. 29). Therefore, I have

decided to mainly draw on the concepts of biopower and biopolitics in the first chapter of the analysis.

According to Foucault, the concepts of biopower and biopolitics refers to the management of populations and the administration of the bodies as its subject (Foucault, 1998 p. 140). The population becomes a political issue and a matter for governing to “*ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order*” (Foucault, 1998 p. 138). Hence, the concept of biopolitics offers an explanation for the categorisation of people and is understood as political rationality (Bacchi, 2009 p. 9). Furthermore, within policy analysis, categories and especially people categories, are essential to study as they play a central role as governing tools (Bacchi, 2009 p. 9).

I have identified four different ways that the policies have categorised minorities as “problems” linked with forced marriage. I have named these frames: *immigration frame, cultural, traditional and religious frame, “Other” violence frame and legal (criminalisation) frame*. In the first chapter of the analysis, I draw on several concepts to discuss my findings. Lastly, I will turn to the concept of biopower and biopolitics to further explore how and if the policies, laws and action plans regarding forced marriage can be understood as a way of governing the population, and particularly immigrant populations. In the first chapter of the analysis, I will elaborate on these two concepts and demonstrate how I have applied them to analysis my findings.

In the second chapter of the analysis, I have analysed the role of the minority advisers and how they carry out the scheme in the Norwegian context. According to Bacchi, what is essential in the WPR-approach is the role of experts “*that link the conduct of individuals and organizations to the objects of politics*” (Miller & Rose in Bacchi, 2009 p. 26). Based on the data, I have identified two main themes: *reinforcing the stigma associated with the minority scheme and bureaucracy and doing good*. Within the second chapter of the analysis, I draw inductively on several concepts to answer the second part of my research question - to uncover what happens in everyday practice. Again, these concepts will be elaborated throughout the analysis.

In the last chapter of the analysis, I turn back to the overall framework of governmentality by looking at how two minority advisers are able to *subvert the scheme from inside* by drawing on Michel de Certeau's notion of tactics. As de Certeau is building on Foucault in his book “*The*

Practice of Everyday Life” (1984), I find it applicable to use de Certeau work to demonstrate how two advisers practise their role - which is seen as *tactics*. An elaboration of these concepts will be provided in the last chapter of the analysis.

Positionality

In this section, I will give an overview of my reflections regarding my positionality. Before starting my master education, I worked as a social worker for the Norwegian government for five years. For two of those years, I worked as an adviser within the field of immigrants. As a person who has worked in a public bureaucracy, I acknowledge that I have been shaped and influenced by public discourse and work experience. As a civil servant, I am shaped by my role, tasks and the bureaucracy in which I worked for. I have to state how my familiarity might have impacted my perspective within my research, even subconsciously. It adds another layer of challenges when working with the data and identifying peculiar practices within the public sphere.

Having personal proximity to the object of the study can manifest in both beneficial and disadvantaged ways. As a result, I have to constantly take a step back and ask questions regarding the whole study. On the other hand, having work experience could give me an insider perspective that might allow me to understand practices in greater depth than otherwise. I first heard about the minority adviser scheme in 2017 from a previous classmate who is employed as a minority adviser. We talked about the scheme on some occasions, raising thoughts and critical questions regarding some parts of the scheme, which also led me to examine the particular subject.

To further clarify my position, I want to stress the importance of needing to combat forced marriage, female genital mutilation, negative social control and honour-related violence. These are violations of international human rights and need to be tackled. I am not questioning the importance of working with these issues that affect young people's lives in Norway and generally in the world. However, I want to showcase how the scheme is practised in the Norwegian context and how it is carried out by minority advisers. I want to examine how the scheme is talked about, framed and what happens in practice. How are they approaching their tasks? Furthermore, I am not undermining the importance of having minority advisers as they

are put in place for the youth that rely on them. Lastly, I acknowledge the crucial work the minority advisers do in their day-to day jobs which is impactful for the young people in Norway.

Limitations

This section will elaborate on the limitations of this study by acknowledging the disadvantage of not carrying out participant observation and the relevant small scale of data sampling. Ideally, it would have been more interesting to interview the informants at their workplace. It would have given me, as a researcher, the possibility to observe them in their field, their day-to-day tasks, methods and the informal settings and conversations that often can give greater in-depth meaning to the research. Initially, I was eager to conduct participant observations on several schools. However, this was not possible as most schools were closed due to the COVID-19 restrictions and because many minority advisers are working from home. By doing participant observations, it would have provided me with supplementary information to cross-check my data. I would have been able to see if there was a correlation between what the minority advisers say and what they do in practice. Therefore, the data from the interviews do not provide insights into *how* the informants practice their role in everyday reality, rather it gives insight into how the advisers think and explains their role and their job. Further, it helps to understand how the scheme is perceived, practised and unfolded by four informants. It allows me to examine how specific individuals engage with the policies and the mandate. I also wish to acknowledge that interviewing four minority advisers does not necessarily give an overall representation of the research subject.

Another limitation within this thesis is that I present the perspective of the advisers and look into the policies. Therefore, I have only shed light upon one side of a broader topic. Hence, the limitation is that I have not had the opportunity to engage the youth and the families who are affected by the policies and the minority scheme. An approach like this would have provided a more nuanced and holistic picture of the scheme. Consequently, the thesis provides a one-sided picture - as told by the advisers, and not how this scheme affects the actual minority group - as told by the youths or families. Therefore, I acknowledge the chance of reproducing knowledge that does not include the voices of the “targeted” people and the risks of exercising “the power” this thesis would like to investigate, as it may contribute to further positioning of population groups.

Chapter 3: A policy analysis

In this chapter, I will present a policy analysis based on Carol Lee Bacchi's (2009) WPR-approach: "What is the problem represented to be?". By applying the WPR- approach, I will explore how the Norwegian government problematises forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM), negative social control and honour-related violence in Norway and how these topics are represented in the action plans. In this case, the action plans created by the Norwegian government identify particular marriages that are conceptualised as forced marriage and provide solutions to the "problem". The analysis will focus on the textual aspects of the first "Action Plan Against Forced Marriage 1998, the second "Action Plan against Forced Marriage (2008-2011)", and the latest action plan of 2017-2020. Further, I will look into how The Act of June 17th 2016 No. 58 of the Immigration Act and Section 1a of the Marriage Act regarding forced marriage affect the reinforcement of stigmatisation of minority groups.

Situating forced marriage – a social problem

"Forced marriage is a serious social problem."

(Action Plan against Forced Marriage" 2008-2011 p. 14)

For the last 23 years, forced marriage has been on the political agenda in Norway, resulting in media attention, public debates, policy measures and action plans. (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000). Forced marriage has been the leading cause of the five action plans stemming from 1998 until today, where the sixth is currently being developed (Regjeringen, 2020). The minority adviser scheme is one of the efforts put in place by the government to combat forced marriages, FGM, negative social control and HRV.

In 1998, the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs published the first-ever action plan against forced marriage. The plan is 25 pages long with 40 policy measures to tackle forced marriages (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000 p. 1). The plan's objective is that children and youths should have safety, care and legal right to develop themselves emotionally, culturally, intellectually and socially (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 1). Further, it states that the aims of the action plan are :

- To prevent youths from being subjected to forced marriage.
- To provide better help and support to the youths subjected, or have been subjected, to forced marriage (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 1)

The two other action plans revolve around the same aims; however, the titles have been reformulated with each action plan, and "issues" have been added. The second was titled "Action Plan against Forced Marriage", whereas the latest in 2017-2020 was titled "*Action plan against negative social control, forced marriage and genital mutilation*". All the action plans will be analysed in this chapter.

The action plans state that forced marriage touches upon several policy areas, such as gender equality policy, integration policy and immigration policy (Bredal & Lidén, 2015 p. 106). The underlying message is that the "problem", that being forced into marriage, is a considerable and imperative matter to tackle as it stretches over several policy areas. On the one hand, forced marriage is intertwined with migration and integration, and on the other, with domestic violence (Bredal & Lidén, 2015 p. 106). Thus, it simultaneously makes forced marriage both a general and a particular problem that needs specific attention.

By studying the above-mentioned action plans through the WPR-approach, I have identified recurrent problematisations that I have placed under various frames. I have named these frames; *immigration frame, cultural, traditional and religious frame, "Other" violence frame and legal (criminalisation) frame*. These frames will help me answer what kind of assumptions are inherent in the actions plans and will be decided below.

Immigration frame

In the first action plan of 1998, forced marriage was identified as a particular marriage, seen as a problem that occurred amongst minority groups. Furthermore, practices of forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and HRV was discussed in relation to minorities (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 1). In the following, quotes from each of the three action plans are presented and my emphasis are added.

*"Throughout the 90s, several cases came out in the media where young girls with a **minority background** were taken to their parent's country of origin and forcefully married against their will." (...) A majority of the cases concerning forced marriage has connections to **foreign countries** (...)." (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 4). [emphasis added].*

*“One means of combating forced marriage is to disseminate information in relevant **minority groups** on the legal and social premises for family life and parenthood in Norway.” (Action Plan against Forced Marriage” 2008-2011 p. 17) [emphasis added].*

*“Girls from **immigrant** backgrounds are generally known to be subjected to negative social control, but boys or girls and men or women may be affected” (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 14) [emphasis added].*

The above-mentioned quotes show how the three action plans associate forced marriage and negative social control with minority and immigrant groups. The quotes problematised the issues as a foreign and immigrant problem that needs solving. I argue that the action plans are creating *categories* such as "minority background", "minority groups", “immigrants”, and "foreign countries", which are being connected to the "problem" and needs to be solved with different measures. Looking closely at the quotes, I argue that these terms refer to people either not born in Norway or having parents from another country. Which, I argue, gives the term "minority" a meaning of ethnicity and race.

Interestingly, with the most recent action plan, it seems to be taking a more comprehensive approach to include youths growing up in strict households or communities. The quote reads, "Young people born or raised in faith-based communities or sects may also be victims of negative social control (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020 p. 11). Furthermore, it also includes LGBT groups: “LGBTI people may experience pressure to enter into heterosexual marriages.” (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 15).

Although the current action plan of 2017-2020 includes several categories such as “faith-based communities”, “sects” and “LGBT”, these categories are not referred to by ethnicity, such as minority groups. The quotes do not explicitly refer to Norwegian ethnicity or population as partaking in negative social control; rather, these categories can be interpreted as including the

whole population. My argument here is that Norwegian ethnicity is not a reference point when attempting to include a broader approach to negative social control.

Further, I want to point out that *immigrant* as a term or a category is not a neutral one (Gullestad, 2002 p. 50). Considering the Norwegian context, “immigrant” can be perceived as a loaded term because the term often appears in negative contexts. Gullestad problematises how the use of the term “immigrant” cannot be understood without constituting “Norwegianness” at the centre. Consequently, the term ‘immigrant’ is understood as the opposite of “Norwegianness” (Gullestad, 2002 p. 50). Moreover, terms such as “ethnicity” and “ethnic minorities” are often used as they are perceived as more neutral term in the Norwegian society, instead of race (Thun, 2012, p. 46). Taking into account Gullestad (2002) and Thun (2012) studies on the terms immigrant and ethnicity in Norwegian society, I argue that the representation of immigrant/minority groups creates a division between Norwegians and immigrants and ultimately serves to define who is not “native” Norwegian (Thun, 2012 p. 52).

Another aspect of targeting the above-mentioned groups is by inviting minority organisations to develop the action plan due to their "*different opportunity to influence and contribute to change attitudes amongst their own, rather than the large society has*" (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 3) Minority organisations are not only invited but also expected to participate in combating forced marriage:

*“At the same time, it is important to have a dialogue with the communities where forced marriage occurs, in order to bring about a change of attitudes. In this dialogue, it must be made clear that there is both a need - and an **expectation** - for the minority organisations to take an active part in the work against forced marriage.” (Action plan 1998, p. 6). [emphasis added]*

The quote shows how minority organisations are expected to distance themselves from the practice by actively working against forced marriage and that dialogues take place in communities where forced marriage occurs. The action plan states that:

*"A vital prerequisite for dialogue and interaction to take place is that there are arenas where people with Norwegian backgrounds and minority backgrounds meet. These arenas must also create conditions so that the participants feel safe, and the dialogue has **growth opportunities** [vekstmuligheter - Ed]." (Action plan 1998, p. 8). [emphasis added]*

As the quote above shows, Norwegians are positioned as superior, educated, and enlightened compared to those with a minority background. When minority organisations are invited to participate, they are expected to change the attitudes within their own immigrant groups. In contrast, Norwegians are given the opportunity to help minorities to "grow", therefore, assuming that immigrants are unknowledgeable and, in a position, where growth is needed. *Vekstmuligheter*, translated into *growth opportunities*, is a particularly interesting wording. My understanding of it is that it has an underlying assumption that implies that this is a quality that certain groups lack, in contrast to ethnic Norwegians who seem to have this inherently.

I will draw upon the Anja Kublitz' article "*The Cartoon Controversy: Creating Muslims in a Danish Setting*" (2010) to further examine the assumption of *growth opportunities* mentioned in the quote above. Kublitz (2010) writes about an Enlightenment project taking place in Denmark where Danes are considered inherently Enlightened, and immigrants should strive to achieve a similar Enlightened position (p. 116). She states that the idea of Enlightenment refers to human beings as inherently rational and capable of independent thinking (Kublitz, 2010, p. 116). Modern-day examples of these qualities are freedom of speech, secularisation, human rights, as opposed to silent, suppressed and religious groups (Kublitz, 2010, p. 116). The Enlightenment discourse helps understand how "people with Norwegian background" are situated as inherently educational and superior in opposition to those uneducated people with minority backgrounds where growth opportunities can happen. I argue that this positioning creates a hierarchical relationship. By asking question two in the WPR-approach, "*what assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?*" (Bacchi, 2009, p. 2), I argue that underlying assumptions of Enlightenment ideas can be found in the action plan.

The notion can be further understood through Edward Said's work on *Orientalism* (1977, 2004). Said's work is a criticism of Orientalism that reveals the power dynamics that underpin Western representations of the "Other" in relation to the West and non-Western

topics (Khalid, 2011 p. 15), which in this case are the topics covered by the action plans. However, keeping in mind the Enlightenment perception of Norwegians (and self-perception), I argue that the West is constructing themselves as enlightened by depicting the East – as different from the West – as uneducated and uncivilised (Khalid, 2011, p. 15). According to Said, Orientalism is:

“the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, orientalism as a Western style for dominating restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (as cited in Khalid, 2011, p. 17).

Central in Orientalism is the process of "othering", and in this study, "forced marriage" has become the subject of concern that belongs in ethnic minority families. Said argued that this representation of the Orient might not resemble the reality of the East, but it was created with Western knowledge to ultimately control the East (Khalid, 2011 p. 17). In the context of forced marriage, the action plans and their measures, such as the arena for dialogue, can be viewed as the corporate institute making statements, teaching and describing a non-Western practice. I argue that the action plans can be explained as a product of the Western point of view of the East. In other words, forced marriage has come to symbolise the non-European practice of the “Other”, which must be tackled, solved and combated. Further, it turns into a style of reconstructing and dominating the “Other” (Khalid, 2011, p. 17).

By applying the WPR-approach (Bacchi, 2009), I find that the problem representation is that youth with a minority background and a different culture than the Norwegian might automatically be subjected to forced marriage. I claim that this framing of the "problem" creates the notion that forced marriage and FGM is a cultural problem belonging to ethnic minority families.

Cultural, traditional and religious frame

In Norway, much like the rest of Europe, there seems to be a move away from a positive view of multiculturalism towards scepticism about its function in practice (Bredal, 2011, p. 1). The belief in multicultural societies is being challenged with public chants to fight against certain cultural, traditional and religious practices that violate international human rights (Fekete, 2006

p. 12). Liz Fekete (2006) claims that the idea of Enlightenment has given rise to cultural fundamentalism. She writes: “*the specific problems that Europe’s Muslim citizens face – unemployment, discrimination, poverty, marginalisation – are now viewed through a cultural lens*” (p. 7). This underlines the belief that Western societies have roots in Enlightenment tradition, whereas other non-Western cultures are seen as a threat to democracy, social justice and human rights (Fekete, 2006, p. 7). One example, as put forward by Liz Fekete (2006), is that family reunification is being placed under immigration laws as a way to “*(..) protect Nordic values and human rights*” (p. 6). Furthermore, she points to how particular family reunification laws discriminate against ethnic minorities, especially Muslims (Fekete, 2006, p. 7).

The tendency to view forced marriage through a cultural, religious and traditional lens can be found in all three action plans:

*"Forced marriage is, in some cases, explained by **culture, tradition and/or religion**. In these cases, it is reasonable to point out that Norwegian laws and regulations apply here." (Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2000, p. 6)[emphasis added]*

The quote above show that forced marriage can be explained by culture, tradition, and religion – hence *the cultural, traditional and religious frame*. It shows how cultures, traditions and religion that practice forced marriage and FGM are represented as problematic.

To understand why immigrant culture, tradition and religion is represented as a “threat” to Norwegian society, I will expand on the principle of equality (likhet), which is seen as a strong, almost inherent, norm in Norwegian society (Chinga-Ramirez, 2017 p. 152). Norwegian society is perceived as egalitarian, which is based on "sameness". Gullestad (2002) has named this equality *imagined sameness* when describing the need for the population to be the same in order to be equal (p. 46). She writes:

"The central value concept is likhet, meaning, 'likeness', 'similarity', 'identity', or 'sameness'. Likhet is the most common translation of 'equality', implying that social actors must consider themselves as more or less the same in order to feel of equal value." (Gullestad, 2002, p. 46).

Consequently, when defining equality, one simultaneously defines what is not the same, which in this case is Norwegian. Thus, if someone is too different from this sameness, they are often perceived as problematic (Thun, 2012, p. 47).

Furthermore, Gullestad (2004) has studied the Norwegian public debates on immigration and how immigrants are depicted by Norwegian people (p.192). According to Gullestad, there exists a discourse on majority and minority populations in Norway, consequently creating a notion of "us" and "them" (aligned with *Orientalism* by Said, 1977), where the "us" and "them" are seen to be dissimilar (Gullestad, 2004, p. 193). According to Gullestad (2004), the most visible difference of "them" is based on skin colour, which in Norway is used more often than the notion of race (p. 193). Now more than ever, skin colour is a synonym for culture, hence, the "new racism" in Norway is referred to as "cultural racism", which especially targets Islam and Muslim culture (Gullestad, 2006 p. 193). The two following quotes highlight the tendency to portray what is different from the Norwegian idea of equality:

*"Immigration to Norway has brought **different** religious and cultural customs from those we have been accustomed to (...) Girls and boys who are deprived of their freedom or who are **victims** of forced marriage or genital mutilation must be helped."* (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 6) [emphasis added].

*"**Certain minority** groups have continued their **tradition** of arranging marriages for their children or other family members after they come to Norway"* (Action Plan against Forced Marriage" 2008-2011 p. 7) [emphasis added]

Based on the quotes above, these customs are viewed as something "brought" to Norway by immigration, where individual boys and girls who are subjected to these customs are viewed as victims. Regarding religion, I argue that Islam is especially targeted, even though it is not explicitly stated in the action plans. Several scholars (Bredal 2005, Fekete 2006, Gullestad 2001, 2002, Jacobsen 2005) point to a growing tendency where the terms "immigrant" and

“Muslim” have become more unified into one common understanding. Christine Jacobsen, a Norwegian anthropologist, notes that:

“[i]n Norway, Muslims are often cast as representing a unitary "Islamic Culture", assuming a religious homogeneity that overrides cultural and social differences, including those between different ethnic groups, people of rural and urban origin, rich and poor, educated and illiterate, genders and generations” (as cited in Røthing & Svendsen, 2011 p. 10-11).

Moreover, this highlights the differences between Norwegian culture and Islamic culture, where most immigrants from the Global South are associated with Islam (Røthing & Svendsen, 2011, p. 1962). I argue that the understanding of forced marriage is that the practice seems to take place in Norway due to the presence of some Muslim families.

Going back to the action plan and the presented quotes, I claim that this framing of the "problem" creates the notion that forced marriage and FGM is a cultural, traditional and religious problem belonging to ethnic minority families and not normative (white) Norwegian families (Keskinen, 2017, p. 167). Hence, immigrants are minimised and racialised in the sense that they are assumed to be a homogeneous category and excluded from the category “Norwegians” because of their assumed “otherness” in a Norwegian context (A. Van Es, 2016, p. 119). Moreover, this contributes to the division between "us" and “them”, where immigrants are constantly excluded from being considered "Norwegian", or as Gullestad (2002) refers to as *imagined sameness* (Thun, 2012, p. 46-47).

By asking question two in the WPR-approach “*what assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?*” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 2), I argue that the underlying assumption in the action plans poses the "other" (Said, 1977), and their culture, tradition and religion as a threat to the enlightened, liberal democratic notions of Norwegian society, where freedom and gender equality are valued (Fekete, 2006, p. 6). Moreover, this notion foregrounds the idea that some cultures are better than others. By creating categories, it legitimises state intervention, such as the minority adviser scheme, on the basis that those that fall under the category share the same characteristics (Keskinen, 2017, p. 156). Thus, I claim that the action plans echo this very notion

by identifying these problematic practises as explained by “other” (Said, 1977) culture, tradition and religion (A. Van Es, 2016, p. 119).

I view the two frames above as essential to how the two subsequent frames have been created. I argue that the problematisations have led to categorising the “problems” as belonging to immigrants due to their culture, tradition and religion. Hence, the creation of separate action plans for forced marriage and violence in close relationships, as well as specific laws and regulations, have been justified.

“Other” violence frame

In the next section, I will analyse how the problematisation of forced marriage, FGM, HRV and negative social control is viewed as “other” violence, which is characterised as different from “ordinary violence” (Bredal, 2014). This problematisation of the issue has resulted in separate actions plans to tackle the problem of domestic violence. Therefore, I have named this frame the “*Other*” violence frame.

Domestic violence has been an inclusive term in Norwegian public policies. It includes abuse against children, forced marriage, FGM and honour-based violence (Bredal & Lidén, 2015 p. 33). However, domestic violence is often understood as partner violence, which has led to the misuse of the term (Bredal & Lidén, 2015 p.12). Due to this, partner violence has become a broad term, where it today includes violence in close relationships, forced marriage and honour-related violence. Regardless of the inclusive term of domestic violence, the government has divided its approach to tackling domestic violence (Bredal & Lidén, 2015 p.12). There exist two separate action plans: one action plan against violence in close relationships under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and another action plan against forced marriage, FGM and severe restrictions on young people's freedom under the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion. The reason for separate plans has been explained by the need for particular focus and measures (Bredal & Lidén, 2015, p. 35). For example, it is stated in the action plan of 2008-2011:

*"Forced marriage is a form of domestic violence. The measures in this action plan must be seen in conjunction with the action plans to combat domestic violence. The government has decided to draw up a **special plan** to address*

the problem of forced marriage because combating forced marriage calls for special measures that target selected groups in society." (Action Plan against Forced Marriage 2008-2011 p. 7) [emphasis added]

As demonstrated in the quote, the Norwegian government recognises forced marriage as domestic violence; however, they have made specific policies (separate action plan) to tackle forced marriage as they recognise the need for special measures for selected groups. Examining what is meant by *targeted selected groups*, the action plans continuously refer to certain minority groups – as shown in the immigration frame. Special measures for a “targeted selected group” in society are justified because some groups in society need special measures due to their ethnicity. This tendency has also continued in the most recent action plan:

*“In recent years, the Government has implemented several initiatives to improve knowledge of **different types of violence** and the needs of particularly **vulnerable groups**, (...) In order to prevent and combat negative social control, forced marriage and female genital mutilation, the measures must be better targeted to allow the work to develop and meet new challenges.” (Action plan 2017-2020, p. 11) [emphasis added]*

The quote above highlights the categorisation of different types of violence that is negative social control, forced marriage and FGM. Further, the argument put forward is that the measures must be better targeted for the vulnerable group. In other words, for minority groups with another ethnic background.

In an open hearing held by the Justice Committee on the 22nd of April 2013, several participants pointed out the importance of viewing policy measures against forced marriage and FGM in connection with other forms of violence in close relationships. However, some Justice Committee members view the separate plans as a prioritisation because “*the knowledge in the public service apparatus is particularly deficient in this area, and a sharpened effort is needed.*” (Bredal & Liden, 2015 p. 31). Whereas others emphasise that separate actions plans lead to fragmentation and ineffective measurement because it is essential “*to ensure a comprehensive and interactive support system that takes care of all user groups*” (Bredal & Liden, 2015 p.

29). Nevertheless, the production of the sixth (separate) action plan against forced marriage is currently being written (Regjeringen, 2020).

Once again, Said's work on *Orientalism* (1977) helps to shed light upon the power relations between the East and the West. The category of "other" violence seems to resemble the concept of "us" vs "them", which is central to Orientalism (Khalid 2011, p. 20). Said criticised the West's depiction of the East and points out the power relations within this hierarchy of power between the two (Said, 1977, p. 171). According to Said, Orientalism "*can create not only knowledge but also the very reality that they appear to describe*" (as cited in Marandi & Ghasemi, 2012, p. 8). In this way, the Orient becomes the subject of study where knowledge is produced from the Western mindset (Marandi & Ghasemi, 2012, p. 7). Thus, this knowledge influences the construction of representation and is ultimately used to control the East (Khalid, 2011, p. 17).

The notion of Orientalism can be applied in this case to understand how the Norwegian government "the West" produces knowledge based on the Orientalist view of immigrants "the East", which then is used to create separate action plans to tackle what is considered as "Other" violence. This becomes especially evident as there is a separate action plan for partner violence in close relationships, which I argue reads as "Ordinary" violence. Thus, the knowledge production is created with a Eurocentric perspective that claims "other violence" to be set apart from "ordinary violence" (Bredal, 2014 p. 136). In Scandinavia, "ordinary" violence is viewed as structural and gender-based, whereas "other" violence is seen as cultural (Bredal, 2014, p. 148), hence creating a division between the two. Moreover, I argue that the Norwegian government attempts to distance itself from the traditions, culture and religions of the East by creating a separate action plan for "ordinary" violence. In this way, the Norwegian government strive to create a self-perception that is different from the "barbaric, uncivilised and backward East" (Khalid, 2011, p. 17)

I argue that the separate action plans for forced marriages, FGM, negative social control and HRV is framed within the rhetoric of "other violence" set apart from other types of violence. This is evident in all three action plans (1998, 2011-2016, 2017-2020), some members of the Justice Committee's evaluation and the continuous creation of separate action plans (Bredal & Liden, 2015 p. 31). Further, the underlying assumptions (Q2 of the WPR-approach) are that the violence in ethnic minority families is different from the one that happens in normative white-

majority families (Keskinen, 2017, p. 167), hence *sharpened effort is needed*. It creates a symbolic border between a Norwegian, Western "us" and an immigrant, Muslim "them". The "other" is constructed as something that goes against the norms and values of "us" (A. Van Es, 2016, p.119).

Furthermore, I argue that the above-mentioned shows how the action plans reveal and reproduce assumptions and biases that prevent forced marriage and other harmful practices from being addressed and challenged within a broader approach of domestic violence, where the victims can be more than the ethnic, passive girl/boy (Gangoli, Chantler, Hester, & Singleton, 2011 p. 39-40). The policies do not actively challenge the oppression of women and others subjected to forced marriage; instead, they reinforce existing stereotypes within certain ethnic groups. Furthermore, it disregards the importance of including structural factors such as socio-economic position, discrimination, legal and political framing (Gangoli et al., 2011, p. 33). Further, it overlooks that marriage customs can vary class, religions, economic position and social groups (Gangoli et al., 2011, p. 33).

Legal (criminalisation) frame

This section will demonstrate how the chosen action plans refer to forced marriage as a criminal act, which has pathed the way for instrumental use of the laws. I, therefore, refer to this section as the *legal (criminalisation) frame*.

Previous research (Keskine, 2017, Schmidt 2011, Bredal 2005, Sabbe et al., 2014) suggests that policies regarding forced marriage have become entangled with immigration control, especially in Denmark and Norway (Bredal, 2011 p. 92). In fact, Norway was the first country in Europe to introduce a particular section in the Criminal Act against forced marriage, making Norway one of the first countries to penalise anyone that force someone to enter a marriage against their will (Bredal, 2018 p. 304). The ban against forced marriage is enshrined in several national and international laws such as Section 1a of the Marriage Act, Section 222, Second paragraph of the General Civil Penal Code, Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 16 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 53). In all the action plans, it is clearly stated that forced marriage is recognised as a criminal offence:

*"(...) it is important to establish clearly that forced marriage is a **criminal offence** in Norway, and that legislation prohibiting forced marriage will be enforced effectively." (Action Plan against Forced Marriage" 2008-2011 p. 3). [emphasis added].*

There are several repercussions to the legal (criminalisation) frame of forced marriage. First, it puts the focus on the offender rather than the victim. It also casts a criminalising suspicion and stigmatising effect, which can lead to a higher risk of minorities wrongfully framed and criminalised (Sabbe, Temmerman, Brems, & Leye, 2014 p. 8). Secondly, it can create conflicting loyalties for the victim. Victims might feel conflicted about speaking up without their family members being persecuted. This fear might potentially lead to victims staying silent rather than seeking help. In worst cases, the victim might be taken out of the country (Sabbe et al., 2014, p. 9). According to a new study undertaken by Roehampton University in the United Kingdom, most respondents agree that criminalisation makes it more difficult for victims to come forward (Sabbe et al., 2014, p.11). Further, it underpins Norwegian authorities' definition of valid marriages in relation to other forms of marriages, which in this context is forced marriage (Sabbe et al., 2014, p.12).

Another example within the legal frame is The Act of 17 June 2016 No. 58 added a 24-year age limit to the Immigration Act for those who want to establish a family. Meaning that both spouses must be at least 24 years old to be given a residency permit in Norway to establish a family (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 18). The aim for this was:

*"to combat forced marriage. The idea is that older people, being more **mature** and having a more **independent** position in the family, are better able to withstand pressure" (Action Plan to Combat Negative Social Control, Forced Marriage and Female Genital Mutilation, 2017-2020, p. 18). [emphasis added].*

Once again, minority families are portrayed in the sense that they need stricter regulations to ensure that minority children get the time to become more mature and independent. I argue that the underlying assumption is that the family structures are so forceful that legislation is required. Furthermore, it implies that with time, these children will grow to withstand pressure. Ironically, the minimum age for marriage in Norway is 18 years old, as stated in the Marriage act Section 1a (Lovdata, 2020). In effect, transnational marriages are subjected to a different set of laws and regulations than marriages between Norwegian citizens. A study on the increased age limit for transnational marriages found several concerns; it could be discriminatory, may be harmful to human rights, will not prevent forced marriage as it affects people of all ages, and lastly, it would penalise those to genuinely wishes to get married (Gill & Anitha, 2011 p. 127). Moreover, I raise the question of whether forced marriage could also occur in Norway between Norwegian citizens.

Marriages amongst immigrants have become a matter of regulation and control, which is of considerable interest for policymakers and public debates. Therefore, I argue that the laws and the age limit for transnational marriages are other forms of immigration regulation and control from the Norwegian government (Sabbe et al., 2014 p. 8).

Categorisation as biopower and biopolitics

In this section, I draw on Michel Foucault's work on *biopower* and *biopolitics* (1978) to further explore how the policies (laws and action plans) regarding forced marriage can be understood as ways of governing the population, and mainly immigrant groups. As Bacchi (2009) states, we need to study problematisation rather than the "problem" to understand how we are governed by policies (p. 25). Out of the action plans, I have identified four frames: *immigration frame*, *cultural, traditional and religious frame*, *legal (criminalisation) frame*, and *violence frame*), where the government is justifying its policies to combat forced marriage. Thus, the government is able to manage, control and discipline certain groups of populations through governmental regulation. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, I will mainly draw on Foucault's concept of biopower and biopolitics as it is a concrete technique of state power within the framework of governmentality.

In the last chapter of *History of Sexuality* (1978), Foucault introduces the notion of biopower as concerned with power over the administration of life, rather than the sovereign juridical

power to decide over one's own right to live (Foucault, 1978 p. 136). In other words, biopower is the matter of how life and how the body is fostered, rather than the ancient right to take life or let live (Foucault, 1978, p. 136). According to Foucault, “*the notion of biopower is identified as two poles of power over life; one where biopower regulates the population, and one where it disciplines the body and life of the individual subject*” (as cited Bissenbakker & Myong, 2020 p. 4).

Biopower is the “new technology of power” that emerged in the 18th and 19th century to manage the population as populations become to be seen as a political problem (Rozakou, 2012, p. 564). Now, “*the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration*” (Foucault, 1998, p. 140) has become of political interest for the state and subjects to study by experts (Rozakou, 2012, p. 564). Biopolitics refers to a “*form of policies entailing the administration of the process of life of population*” (Dean 1999, p 98 in Bacchi, 2009, p 28). In sum, biopower then demonstrates how biopolitics is implemented in society through regulation, fostering and managing over life (Rozakou, 2012, p. 564). More importantly, the form of power seen in modern states is especially concerned with “*the control over life that can be exercised either individually through discipline or at a societal level through forms of regulation.*” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 28).

I find biopolitics relevant for my research as it allows me to examine the government's use of biopolitical technology to control, manage and regulate certain marriages, family formations and reproduction rights of ethnic groups through its policies. Central to my thesis is the categorising of people. Categories are created through measures, such as an action plan, where important techniques, such as specific laws and regulations are justified (Bacchi, 2009, p. 9). I go further to claim that it helps understand how the policies and their measures can be understood as biopolitical technology to control the human body in the sense of governing which population belongs to the nation-state (Bissenbakker & Myong, 2020 p. 4). As unfolded in the analysis above, the policies, laws and action plans on forced marriage, FGM and honour-related violence can be explained through the frames I have identified. In the following, I will elaborate on how the frames can be seen as governmental techniques targeting a particular group of the Norwegian population.

Within the *immigration frame* and also the *cultural, traditional and religious frame*, I argue that creating categories such as "minority background", "minority groups", “foreign” and

“cultural” suggests that the problem is primarily seen as an immigrant problem. By looking at the way the problems are represented, I claim that problematisation is linked with a particular “immigrant” body. Further, it poses these cultural, traditional and religious practices as a threat to the Norwegian society, democracy and strong national identity of gender equality. By singling out groups of people based on their ethnic background and cultural, traditional and religious belongings, I argue that the policies end up stigmatising these groups, regardless of whether these groups are subjected to the issues in the actions plans or not. Hence, it treats the ethnic population as a single entity with commonalities (Bacchi, 2009, p. 156). These categories justify political measures, such as the laws and regulations, to take place and are ultimately used as a governing tool to control and manage certain groups of people based on their ethnicity.

Within *the legal (criminalisation) frame*, I have shown how the government has imposed specific and stricter laws regarding transnational marriages, which can be seen in connection to the concept of biopolitics. An example is the 24-year age requirement which aims to combat forced marriage. I argue that the age requirement becomes another measure justified by problematising particular marriages associated with immigrant groups. This becomes especially evident when comparing it with the Marriage Act Section 1a that allows marriage amongst Norwegian citizens at the age of 18. I argue that the specific and stricter laws become an instrument (biopower) that mainly targets families seeking reunification. Hence it becomes a matter of citizenship and border control rather than a fundamental concern to combat forced marriage. My argument is that forced marriage might also occur in Norway between Norwegian citizens and happen after the age of 24.

“Other” Violence frame

Lastly, distinguishing domestic violence, such as partner violence from forced marriage, FGM, negative social control, and honour-related violence, becomes a tool to create a category of “other violence”. Further, it is understood as a type of "other violence" set apart from "ordinary violence" that happens amongst ethnic Norwegians. In effect, this contributes to reinforce already existing stereotypes within certain ethnic groups. Therefore, the category of “other violence” justifies separate policies, action plans and measures such as the minority adviser scheme.

Sub-conclusion

The problematisation in the action plans and laws about forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence play a central role in categorising populations based on notions of ethnicity, culture, religion and tradition. The government has identified particular marriage customs amongst immigrant groups such as transnational marriages, plural marriages and forced marriages, which is seen as a means of political matters that need to be combated. I argue that Foucault (1978) work on biopolitics allows me to understand how the government's conceptualisation of the "rightful", "safe" and "legal" marriage becomes a way of disciplining the immigrant body by deciding who is allowed to marry who and who is allowed to establish a family within the nation-state.

In sum, I argue that categorisation can be seen as biopolitical technology that governs the number of immigrants that enter the nation-state and manages the population already in the nation. Further, it contributes to shaping the meaning of who belongs in the nation and who does not belong (Bissenbakker & Myong, 2020 p. 4). In sum, categories have legitimised and pathed the way for stricter immigration regulations, and it closed the borders to Norway (Keskinen, 2017, p. 156).

Chapter 4: What happens in practice?

In this chapter, I will present my analysis of the interviews to answer my second research question "*how is the Minority Scheme practised by the minority advisers in the Norwegian context?*". This analysis will demonstrate how the minority advisers engage with the policies and mandate and what happens in everyday practice. The analysis is divided into two main topics. The first topic revolves around how the advisers are *reinforcing the stigma associated with the minority scheme*. The second topic is named *bureaucracy and doing good*, where I discuss the implications of placing functionaries (the minority advisers) in schools to combat forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence. Within both topics, I draw inductively on several concepts to answer the second part of my research question - to uncover what happens when policies meet practice, as told by four informants.

Reinforcing the stigma associated with the Minority Adviser Scheme

The interviews started with the same question: *Can you describe a typical day at work from the morning till you leave the office?* All the informants responded by describing their tasks, such

as giving advice and information on forced marriage, FGM and honour-related violence to students and teachers, attending meetings, collaborating with other public partners and sectors. All the informants have more or less the same tasks during the day, with some differences based on the school they work in. Further on, I asked about the youths, who they are and how they get in contact with them. What I found interesting was how the advisers described who the youths were. Based on their answers, there seems to be a particular group of youths they consider as their “target” group, which is based on the youth’s ethnic background. There seems to be a difference between youths with a minority background and those with a majority background. Therefore, I have named this theme: *minority youths or just youths?* I will, in the next section, elaborate on this theme.

Minority youths or just youth?

The title of the scheme becomes crucial when understanding what this scheme is, who it is targeted towards, and the implications it has for the everyday life of youths and families. All of the advisers problematise how the title of the scheme and their role become segregating and polarising, and therefore challenging to use in their everyday work life. Mette identifies how the scheme is segregating as it targets youths that have multiple cultures:

*“It becomes **segregating** in the way that the offer [the scheme - Ed.] is aimed more towards youths that live with **multiple cultures** at the same time, they have a kind of home-culture with their parents and a kind of outside-culture at school” (Mette). [emphasis added]*

Culture is a complex concept with several meanings (Gullestad, 2004 p. 190), however within this scheme, the policies and the Norwegian society, I argue that multiple cultures equal youths with a non-Norwegian ethnic background, which will further be elaborated on below. Furthermore, when discussing how this scheme becomes segregating, Johanna gives an example of how the school sometimes refer students to the adviser because they are minorities, rather than referring them based on issues related to their mandate:

“(...) you have to make sure that you are not contributing to segregation or contributing to polarisation, and that minority advisers should help everyone who has a minority background because then minority students do not get access to the offers that should be for all students. Because it will not be right for me as a minority adviser to provide

career guidance as it is not my field because the student has a minority background (...)" (Johanna) [emphasis added]

Mette also gives a similar statement about this challenge:

"It is not my mandate to help an unaccompanied minor who is unable to learn Norwegian, who does not get a job, who feels alone or does not understand the educational fund."

Although it is not directly considered their task, all the informants talked about assisting minority students with practical matters, such as applying for student aid and loans, applying for citizenship, talking with other state departments, giving career guidance etc. In practice, the title highly affects who approaches the minority adviser, regardless of the reason. It influences the teachers' understanding of the advisers. Moreover, it influences how the youths understand themselves and whom they view as the "right" person to assist them. Another example that highlights this tendency is explained by Nayla:

*«(...) I always asked the youths, "why do you come to me?" (...) Then it was actually youths who said, "I am a **minority**, so then I will come to you since it says minority adviser on your door". It is just heart-breaking because then that tells a lot about how they understand themselves in the context of Norway because the minority adviser scheme always talks to people who are considering, «Am I Norwegian enough? When am I Norwegian?" (Nayla) [emphasis added]*

Nayla lays out her experience with students that approach her based on the idea that they are minorities and, therefore, the minority adviser is the right person to advise with. Mette shares a similar experience in her work which she finds difficult:

"What can be very difficult is that if we talk about it [the scheme - Ed.] in front of the entire class, for example, then there might be some individual students sitting in class who feel that "now everyone is looking at me", and it is not certain that this student, who seemingly can look to be in the target group, recognises oneself in that at all" (Mette)

As the quotes show, it appears to be a general assumption that the minority advisers are there to assist students based on their ethnicity rather than their problems related to the mandate, which is noteworthy, as the scheme has a specific mandate. This general assumption is exerted by teachers, other school employees and the youths themselves. Based on the interviews, the title seems to create blurred lines of what can be considered a minority problem and a common youth problem.

A note of caution is due here since the minority advisers express awareness of the challenges of the title and the mandate, which they discuss in great lengths. The advisers recognise that the scheme leads to segregation in practice, as well as politically. They raise questions on whether a separate scheme that targets minority youths leads to stigmatisation and express thoughts about the complexity of working with issues of forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence. However, some tendencies show that minority advisers are also influenced by the notion that the scheme is mainly put in place to help certain groups of people. Mette's statement highlights this point accurately:

*"But then we are called minority advisers, so it indicates that we are working in regard to minorities. Then there are **Christian minorities** who exercise negative social control. It is not just minorities, it can also be the majority that does it. So it is complicated then. But what is our area of expertise, which regular advisers do not have, is that we have a lot of knowledge about **migration, trauma, refugee situations, cultural sensitivity** and that type. And then migration issues become something extra we know, which others do not know. " (Mette) [emphasis added]*

As discussed in the quote above, Mette raises an interesting reflection on Christian minorities who also exercise negative social control. However, she states that their role involves *extra* knowledge on migration, trauma, refugees and cultural sensitivity, which interestingly is not written down in their mandate of 2021 (IMDi, 2021 p. 1-2). This example demonstrates how the title of the scheme influences and justifies the advisers to primarily focus on youths with a minority background, as they have *extra* knowledge on these matters and these "groups". I argue that this contributes to the notion that this is an immigrant problem rather than a broad one that can happen across several cultures, religions or ethnicities. The title contributes to making the issues hyper visible in immigrant groups and invisible in majority groups, even

though negative social control can happen amongst ethnic Norwegians. The following quote demonstrates my argument.

*“And then it is a little difficult to have that role at school, on the one hand, you have to be very honest about what you can help with, but on the other hand it can be a bit stigmatising (...), but then we [minority advisers - Ed.] work towards a **special group**, and it gets a little awkward in a way, “oh yes, you have questions about something, but you look very Norwegian. Are you still exposed to this?”. We do not practice forced marriage in Norway. But it is like a segregated service in a way, if you understand. We do not have everyone as a target group” (Mette) [emphasis added]*

The quote above shows how the advisers perceive the minority scheme as an effort for youth with a minority background. Further, they seem to view practices as forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence more as a minority issue rather than a broad, complex and intersected violence issue. As displayed in Mette’s statement, when you look like an ethnic Norwegian, there seems to be a doubt whether you can be subjected to the issues that lie in the mandate because “*we do not practice forced marriage in Norway*”. I argue that this finding supports the idea that the advisers are influenced by the stigmatisation of the scheme, even though they are aware that it is segregation and stigmatising.

I suggest that the title in itself creates specific “subjects” - the minority immigrant (Foucault, 1978), which I have presented through the data above. Consequently, the scheme is put in place by the Norwegian government to “save” these “subjects” from forced marriage, negative social control, FGM and HRV (Abu-Lughod, 2002). I will draw on Abu-Lughod’s article “*Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving*” (2002) to shed light on how the minority scheme enforces what I call *the saviour position*. Abu-Lughod (2002) addresses the recurrent Western discourse on “oppressed Muslim women” and the idea of rescuing these women from their home, culture and religion (p. 784). Further, she demonstrates how debates about the veil and honour-related crimes, such as forced marriage, FGM and honour killings, are used as 21st-century political projects (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 789). She challenges the idea of explaining and framing these issues with a cultural explanation, which feeds into a larger politics that makes this *saviour position* believable and morally right to compel with (Abu-Lughod, 2002 p. 784). It places the West and its idea of living in a superior position, where suppressed “others” - immigrants and

especially Muslims - need to be saved from themselves and their culture (Abu-Lughod, 2002 p. 789).

According to Abu-Lughod, the Western saviour position justifies mainstream political involvements that might have severe implications for the large population of immigrants, instead of solely on those who indeed are victims (Abu-Lughod, 2002 p. 789). Furthermore, she argues that sentiments on honour crimes have become matters of national and international administration and give legitimacy to regulations, surveillance and transnational governance (Abu-Lughod, 2013 p. 135-136). I argue that the scheme can be understood within this framework, where the Western saviour mentality is present and projects are taken up by the government to save young girls and boys with a minority background (Abu-Lughod, 2013, p. 789). Furthermore, I argue that the scheme mainly targets immigrants and views them as victims of their own culture and religion. In effect, I claim that the scheme produces and reinforces stigmatisation within Norwegian society.

Going back to the first quote in this chapter, Mette said that the scheme is segregating because it is profoundly aimed at students with a multicultural background. Marianne Gullestad (2004) has identified how the concept of culture has powerful political potential in Norway (p.191). She offers an interesting explanation of how the majority of Norwegians perceive themselves by securing their own culture. She states:

“That Norwegians use the notion of culture about themselves is also evident in the expansion of the neologism fremmedkulturell (‘of foreign or strange culture’) about ‘immigrants’ from ‘non-western countries’. The expression implies that the difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is not that ‘they’ have culture while ‘we’ do not, but that majority people regard ‘their’ culture as strange and alien, and ‘our’ culture as close and familiar.” (Gullestad, 2004 p. 191).

The above helps to locate the meaning of culture in the Norwegian context and how culture creates notions of who Norwegians are. Moreover, Norwegian culture is considered familiar and close, whereas other cultures are considered strange and alien. Hence, creating a hierarchy of cultures (Gullestad, 2004 p. 191).

Abu-Lughod (2002) and Gullestad (2004) works help to shed light upon how the justification of a scheme is based on the idea of a hierarchy of cultures where cultural practices and ideas that are not Norwegian need to be combated. The notion ultimately positions Norway as superior, and governmental interventions, such as the minority scheme, are seen as saviours of youths that are victims to their own cultures, tradition and religions. With Abu-Lughod (2002) and Gullestad (2004) work in mind, I argue that the minority advisers reinforce the stigmatisation and culturalization found in the action plans and the minority scheme in their everyday practice. Furthermore, I argue that the implications of the scheme lead to disregarding the diversity amongst immigrants and treating them as a homogenous entity. (Gangoli, Chantler, Hester, & Singleton, 2011 p. 33). Abu-Lughod (2013) highlights this point when she writes, “*The problem is that when violence occurs in some communities, culture is blamed; in others, only the individuals involved are accused or faulted*” (p. 127).

An extended scheme for integration?

As previously mentioned, the minority scheme is placed under The Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi, 2020). I suggest that politically placing such a scheme under IMDi not only signals that this is an immigration and integration issue, but it also makes it one. This is evident as *integration* was a central theme in all the interviews. I claim that the following quotes give evidence to understand the minority adviser scheme as an *extended scheme for integration* placed by the Norwegian government.

*“Yes, there is a big part of **integration** in this work because it is also about the human rights perspective in relation to **participation** in Norwegian society. So these youths are going to grow up, they are going to get married and they are going to become fathers and mothers and find their place. They are going to participate equally like everyone else. That is why there should not be anything that can hinder them from achieving these goals because of negative social control or forced marriage for example.” (Abdul) [emphasis added]*

Abdul perceives the scheme as a large part of the integration process because forced marriage and negative social control hinder participation in Norwegian society. Interestingly, Abdul also mentions that he has a human rights perspective when talking about participation in society. It seems like Abdul understands participation in Norwegian society as being a human right. Abdul has a particular position as a minority adviser, as he himself is a “minority” and has experience

with the integration process. He can use this to his advantage to connect with the students or for the students to connect with him. However, it becomes clear that his own (professional) position and experience is something that the youths understand as an example of “successful integration” or that they view Abdul as a “successful immigrant” rather than being an equal participant of the Norwegian society.

“And I, who also came to Norway when I was young, have a lot in common with youths that I can talk about. Maybe it is in relation to my background, what I have done in relation to my own integration process in Norway and why I have ended up where I am today. Because there are many who wonder about it; how have I done this? They also say, “My dad has not managed this, my dad washes or works in a factory or [pause - Ed.] how have you done this?” (Abdul)

The youths Abdul meets evaluate his “success” and compare this with their “less successful” fathers. The quote shows how youths with different ethnic backgrounds are constantly put under the scrutiny of proving or evaluating their worthiness to be considered Norwegian or belonging to the nation-state, based on their achievements or participation in society. In the interview with Nayla, she highlighted an interesting experience in regard to integration.

*“It was so sweet many times because there are some 12-year-olds who just “Huh, do you understand something about honour, or that religion is important? But you are Norwegian”. So, you work with **integration** in many different ways.” (Nayla) [emphasis added]*

Nayla’s experience of youths expressing admiration over the fact that she understands that honour and religion are important in families underlines the division between ethnic and Norwegian youths, as perceived by some youths. It raises further questions on why youths perceive themselves as different from other youths, especially for those born and raised in Norway. More importantly, the quote also emphasises how Nayla perceives topics of honour and religion as a part of integrational work within the minority scheme. However, she challenges her idea of integration by referring to Norwegian youths who grow up in closed religious communities:

“We also see this [negative social control - Ed.] happening with youths who are Norwegian in their own way, who grew up in Norway and live in parallel societies. It is a huge problem. But then the question becomes: what about ethnic Norwegians that grow up in closed religious communities? For example, those in the bible belt experience exactly the same control.” (Nayla) [emphasis added]

What is striking about her statement is that she recognised that negative social control might happen in closed religious communities by ethnic Norwegians. Furthermore, she refers to them as ethnic Norwegians, which I argue underlines the idea that ethnicity, or specifically which ethnicity, matters when thinking in terms of integration. According to Abdul, he measures integration based on participation in society. He states that forced marriage, for example, hinders integration as it might lead to students dropping out of school. If integration equals participation in Norwegian society, then negative social control that happens in closed religious communities might equally hinder ethnic Norwegians’ participation as well. Regarding the identified theme of integration, I argue that the youths are influenced by the adviser's understanding of the scheme as a part of the integration process in Norway.

In order to examine the above-mentioned empirical findings, I will draw on “*The Ongoing Catastrophe - Erosion of Life in the Danish Camps*” (2016) by Anja Kublitz. In this article, she presents the concept of double bind coined by Gregory Bateson (1956, 1963). Kublitz suggests that this concept can be used to explain the paradox of two opposing statements that lies within the concept of integration (Kublitz, 2016 p. 243). Meaning that immigrants are told that they need to become Norwegian, and at the same time, it is assumed that Norwegian is not something you become, rather it is something you are. Therefore, the result is that you will never achieve it. So, if you try to become Norwegian - try to integrate - it already means that you are not Norwegian (Kublitz, 2016 p. 243).

Furthermore, I argue that the idea of integration in this context needs to be understood by the existing hierarchy of power (Gullestad, 2004, p. 51). According to Gullestad (2004), “*the very categories ‘host society’ and ‘guests’ thus construct a hierarchical relationship with the ‘immigrant’ at the receiving end.*” (p. 55). The context, in which the minority scheme is created, is uneven and there is an unequal power struggle between the guest (immigrants) and the host

(Norwegians) (Gullestad, 2004, p. 51). The question then becomes: when does an “immigrant” stop being a guest?

I claim that the consequence of the minority scheme being placed under IMDi influences and sets the tone for how minority advisers “do” integration work with youths born and raised in Norway. The quotes above are examples of youths that evaluate, perceive and differentiate themselves from the majority group. I am not suggesting that the minority scheme by *itself* is causing this notion amongst minority groups. However, I argue that the scheme and the fact that there are minority advisers at schools contribute to the double bind of integration. They are youths attending schools in Norway, however they become minorities that are associated with the issues that lie within the action plan and the minority scheme. This notion can lead to stigmatisation and segregation of a whole group of minorities. In sum, the minority scheme and advisers become a constant reminder that all what youths with a minority background can achieve in Norway, is to become a “successful immigrant”. Moreover, the hierarchy of power that already exists in the "host and guest" nexus further contributes to the saviour discourse embedded in the welfare state (Gullestad, 2004, p. 54).

Bureaucracy & *doing good*

Minority advisers are a part of the Norwegian bureaucracy, hence a part of the welfare state. The advisers are placed at schools for a purpose; to give children and youths who are at risk, or are exposed to, negative social control, honour-related violence, forced marriage and female genital mutilation advice, guidance and follow-up in line with their needs and rights (IMDi, 2020 p.1). In the following, I will present how bureaucracy translates into reality. I have identified how advisers build *trust, empathy and create safe spaces and visibility*. I will draw on Hannah Arendt work on “Banality of evil” (1963) to investigate the topic I have titled *doing harm while doing good*.

Trust & empathy

Building trust and exercising empathy towards the students is a reoccurring statement given by all the informants. Trust is seen as the essential tool to connect with the students and get them to open up and talk about their potential issues related to the mandate. For Johanna, much like the rest of the informants, *trust* is pivotal and needed to establish a relationship with the youths:

« (...) so it's about being able to build **trust** and build a relationship so that a youth can say “yes, but I talked to, or I know that you can talk to her. She is really good and she seems to understand” And that is kind of the agenda here when you go out and try to build good relationships” (Johanna) [emphasis added]

Nayla also talked about trust but brings in *empathy* as an essential tool for the advisers:

“Being a minority adviser, on one level, is about carry out **empathy** for others - put in system - in that what that minority advisers follow up on those youths that others do not understand and who for some reason is defined as demanding or as multicultural, or as whatever” (Nayla) [emphasis added]

Nayla understands empathy as something the minority advisers carry out on those youths that might be misunderstood as “demanding” or “multicultural” youths.

“ (...) it is a part of what I think of as the minority-adviser-method, that you think a hell of a lot about “how do I appear?”, “how can I build relationships with others?” So the goal is really to be so **trustworthy**, and I do not mean, like, to be a buddy to them, because as an adult in school, you should not do that. But you should be so trustworthy that it should be **attractive** to come talk to you and hang out with you. ” (Nayla) [emphasis added]

As Nayla states, she wants to be trustworthy to the extent where it becomes *attractive* to approach her. As part of her role, she reflects significantly on how she appears and how she can build a relationship with the students. In addition, she also states that there is a particular position they take as they are not friends, and the empathy they carry out is within a system.

Their work is highly sensitive and has been of political agenda for several decades. Their work is based on reaching a goal - to uncover who is subjected to forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and honour-related violence (IMDi, 2020 p.1). Through the interviews, the theme of trust and empathy is interesting as it is used as a “method” to connect with students and build relationships. The point made here is that trust and empathy should not be understood as methods without an agenda in this specific context. I argue that trust and empathy become

crucial tools for the advisers to connect with the students precisely because these issues are so complex and sensitive. An adviser will most likely not go up to a student and directly ask whether they are subjected to forced marriage or any other of the issues mentioned, as it will feel quite invasive.

Creating safe spaces and visibility:

According to all informants, creating *safe spaces* and *visibility* are crucial in their work, much like trust and empathy. When I refer to safe spaces, I mean the arenas the advisers create to connect with the students.

*“It is about being **visible** and be where these youths are, to try to establish contact with them and if you have established a contact with them then you build trust and then it is easier for them to come to you and tell you about things that bother them” (Abdul) [emphasis added]*

Abdul gives an example of visibility when he says: *“We stand in front of the entrance, me and the environmental group, to greet them when they come and again to establish trust, contact and build relationships” (Abdul) [emphasis added]*

For Johanna, being visible was also essential and meant that she physically was present wherever the students were: *“You can be out in the field, so out in the break time where the student is. So, in the canteen area and the other common areas.” (Johanna) [emphasis added]*

Considering that the minority advisers are not employed by the school, they function as an extra effort next to the school staff. In practice, this means that the advisers do not have arranged or structural contact with students, such as teachers have. Therefore, Abdul has to actively work to create visibility by approaching the students, greeting them by the gate every morning and being present around different parts of the school to engage with the youths. Nayla also spoke about being outside during all the recess hours to be visible for the students:

*“For example, when I was a minority adviser, they, of course, knew that I was a minority adviser, but I present myself first and foremost as Nayla. I was also **outside for all the recesses**, and I got to know them. And they think I'm cool because I was funny and I am curvy, and I stood there and could say, "Yeah girlfriend, work your booty." So, I did everything I could to build a*

relationship with them so that it became easier for them to be able to come to me the day they felt it became difficult” (Nayla) [emphasis added]

What is interesting with this quote is that Nayla speaks in specific terms to connect with the students. Further, she states that she did everything she could to connect with the students so that they could approach her when needed. Moreover, Nayla offered a safe space for the students if there was a need to be discreet:

“I also made many agreements to, for example, meet after school and meet somewhere else if there was a need to hide it” (Nayla)

The quotes show how advisers have to create safe spaces and be visible for the students in the most mundane way. By being present during the lunch break in the schoolyard, the canteen and speaking in “their language”, the advisers connect with the students to investigate whether they might be subjected to the issues known. Also, making arrangements to meet after school or in another place allows the students to feel a sense of safety (safe space) to reach out when needed. Therefore, safe spaces and visibility can also be understood as methods that allow students to ask for help when needed. Similar to my point above, when working with highly political and sensitive issues, the advisers use compassionate everyday methods to connect with the students.

Doing harm while doing good?

To elaborate on my argument, I draw on the concept of *banality of evil* coined by Hannah Arendt in “*Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963). Her work was based on Adolf Eichmann's trial, where she sought to understand the crimes of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust (Bernstein, 2009 p. 131). According to Arendt, she distinguishes between the *doer* and the *deeds*, and she challenges the idea of viewing Eichmann as simply being evil but as “terrifyingly normal” (as cited in Bernstein, 2009 p. 133). Further, the idea of *banality* brings attention to the failure to think and the frightening ability to “go along” with vicious crimes. Bernstein writes that Arendt “*describes a type of person and a type of behaviour that have become frightening and all too common in our time*” (Bernstein, 2009 p. 134).

Arendt's concept of the banality of evil has not been received without critique by several scholars, as it places evil acts into the normal ways of life and overestimates the power of thinking (Baheer, 2009, p. 142). Nevertheless, the banality of evil has been applied by many

researchers to reflect upon certain (extraordinary) events happening in our times (Bernstein, 2009, p. 135). Moreover, her concepts help us move beyond the simplistic ways of characterising people as either good or evil. Instead, it helps us to “*understand how ordinary “normal” people can - without thinking - be caught up in committing or supporting monstrous evil deeds.*” (Bernstein, 2009, p. 134)

Banality of evil is a concept that helps explore the idea of doing good in bureaucracy. Minority advisers can be understood as functionaries stationed at schools under the rule of the Norwegian welfare state. My argument is that while advisers undoubtedly have good intentions and a good will to combat practices that harm youths, it is not done without possible implications for those affected by the scheme. There are two points I want to bring attention to. Firstly, as previously stated, the advisers reinforce the stigma associated with the minority scheme due to its mandate and policies, whether it be consciously or subconsciously. What I find troubling is that advisers, with good intentions, can potentially harm the student’s self-perception simply by being at the schools. The adviser's very presence highlights the differences between minority and majority groups - based on ethnicity. As Nayla states, they work with students that constantly question, “*Am I Norwegian enough? When am I Norwegian?*”.

I argue that the empirical data proves how the very presence of minority advisers can be “harmful”, while they at the same time are *doing good*. It is not to state that there is no need to combat forced marriage, FGM, negative social control and HRV. However, my argument is that advisers can be understood as a symbol of governmental use of "social control". Moreover, they ultimately become functionaries that contribute to dividing the population based on who might be subjected to the issues in the mandate of the minority adviser scheme and who is not subjected to it. As I have unfolded in the previous chapter of policy analysis, the assumptions of the policies target minorities based on their ethnicity, culture, religion and tradition, which is seen as different from what belongs in the Norwegian society or the ethnic Norwegian population. Moreover, the presence of such a scheme might be harmful to a large group of diverse minorities, as it risks or perhaps ends up treating minorities as a homogeneous unity

In sum, I will refer to Gullstad’s excellent point, which I find relevant to my argument. She writes: “*small and trivial racialising incidents with no hateful intentions can still have a negative effect on the people who experience them over and over again*” (Gullestad, 2004 p. 185)

Sub-conclusion

In this chapter, I have aimed to explore how minority advisers carry out their jobs. Based on the empirical data from the interviews, I argue that *how* the scheme is practised in the Norwegian context leads to the reinforcement of the stigma associated with the minority scheme as carried out by the advisers. Findings show that the mandate and the title of the scheme influence the youths, the teachers and the advisers to mainly perceive the minority scheme for the youths based on their ethnic background, rather than their actual problems. Moreover, the scheme can be understood as an extension of integration because the advisers perceive it as such. In effect, this impacts how the minority youth perceive and differentiate themselves from the majority group.

Further, the adviser's very presence at school becomes a symbol of the minority/majority notion that can be detected overall in Norwegian society (Gullestad, 2004, p. 193). Within their attempts of helping youths that might be subjected to the issues in the mandate, they simultaneously do *harm* while doing *good* because their presence becomes a constant reminder of what they are not - a part of the majority.

Chapter 5: Subverting the scheme from inside

This chapter aims to answer my research question that explores how the minority scheme is practised by the minority adviser in a Norwegian context. As I have shown in the previous chapter, the advisers are highly influenced by the policies; however, in this chapter, I will examine the cases of two informants that take on a dual position regarding the policies. Meaning that while they are reinforcing assumptions from the action plans, however, they are also subverting its policies in particular ways. Firstly, I will present the case of Abdul, where I unfold his understanding of the scheme and his approach to his role. I will then present Mette's case, where I illustrate her approach to her role as a minority adviser. Both cases demonstrate different ways of practising the minority scheme, which I have named *subverting the scheme from the inside*.

Michel de Certeau's work "*The Practice of Everyday Life*" (1984) is a large and complex piece of work that I will not elaborate on in details. However, I will draw on his concept of *tactics* (1984) to investigate Abdul and Mette's different ways to exert everyday practices and actions in the policy field of forced marriage, negative social control, FGM and HRV. I will explore

how their everyday practice can be understood as tactics that subvert the scheme from inside. According to De Certeau, individual practices are not random actions; rather, they are logics to be understood (Yilmaz, 2013, p. 67). I will use the concept of tactics as an analytical tool to make sense of how Mette and Abdul *subvert the scheme from the inside*.

Concepts of strategies and tactics by Michel de Certeau

Michel de Certeau's work "*The Practice of Everyday Life*" (1984) focuses on individual life practices and actions, which he refers to as the ordinary, creative and mundane practices of people (Yilmaz, 2013 p. 66). De Certeau distinguished practice into two types: *strategies* and *tactics* (Yilmaz, 2013 p. 67). According to de Certeau, strategy is "*the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated*" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 35-36). Crucial to strategies is that it takes the place where "*competitors, adversaries, clientèles, targets or objects of research etc. can be managed.*" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 36). Therefore, strategies are considered to be the dominant institution that uses space to regulate disciplinary power (Yilmaz, 2013 p. 67). According to de Certeau (1984), a tactic is "*a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus*" (p. 37). In other words, tactics differ from strategies because it "*does not have a place, a tactic depends on time*" (as cited in Yilmaz, 2013 p. 67). According to de Certeau (1984), everyday practices such as talking, reading, walking and cooking are considered examples of tactics (p. xvii).

Moreover, de Certeau defines (1984) "*space is a practiced place*" (p. 117). He elaborates on this by demonstrating that a *place* can be defined as a geographical area, such as a street, which then turns into a *space* when people walk and move around (de Certeau, 1984 p. 117). Within my research, Norway can be considered the place, as it has an overview of what happens within this field. Therefore, they can plan strategies that have implications for a large group of the population. The policies, action plans and laws can then be considered a strategy put in place by the Norwegian government and the politicians.

Everyday life practices (tactics) are possible to be exercised in those spaces that belong to the other, hence tactics take place and manoeuvres on "enemy territory" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). Tactics are what the less powerful do (the weak) in the areas of the more powerful in order to achieve small victories (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). Abdul and Mette utilise time and take

advantage of opportunities through daily life practices, hence, it becomes *tactics* (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). In the following, I will elaborate on how their everyday practices can be understood as tactics that distort the strategies of the institutions, hence the minority scheme.

The case of Abdul

Abdul was an informant who stood out in some particular ways regarding how he talked about the minority adviser scheme, his role and how he went about his tasks. I interviewed Abdul twice. In the first interview, we casually talked about the minority adviser scheme and how he does his job. The second interview was more centred around his individual projects within his job as a minority adviser.

According to IMDi's job description of a minority adviser, one of their tasks is to "*implement preventive measures, such as discussion groups, presentations and teaching programs for students, staff and/or parents*" (IMDi, 2020, p. 2). I read *and/or parents* as not the main target group for the advisers. In fact, in the same document, parents are not explicitly mentioned as the target group (IMDi, 2020, p.1-2). Consequently, this shapes how and if minority advisers engage with parents in the everyday practice of their jobs.

Most informants mentioned how it was challenging to collaborate with parents as there is much tension connected with their role. For example, Johanna mentioned that she rarely has conversations with the parents, as most youths do not want this because "*that's exactly where the problem lies, so it is not what you want*". For Abdul, however, he engaged with parents in various ways. When he worked as an adviser, he created father groups, dialogue projects for women's empowerment in Mosques and participated in mentor projects for returned foreign fighters in prison. Abdul stated:

"For my part, what was actually important was that I had worked a lot with men and boys in relation to changing mindsets, which is very central in the job as a minority adviser".

Abdul was one of the first minority advisers when the scheme was first put in place in 2008. Back then, he observed that the number of cases involving boys was relatively low compared to cases with girls. Abdul questioned the low percentage of cases regarding boys and, therefore,

decided to establish boy groups. Furthermore, he wanted to involve parents and establish parent groups; however, only mothers would attend. He wondered why fathers were not involved and wanted to connect with them. Consequently, he created father groups where they discussed topics such as the man's role, gender roles in families, who makes the decision in the family and what raising children mean for them and in Norwegian society.

Furthermore, Abdul created a project named “Dialogue in Mosques - a platform for empowerment of women” in collaboration with the Nansen Center for Peace and Dialogue. According to Abdul, the project aimed to:

*«I go into the Mosque where I try to implement this [outreach work - Ed.], especially this with women's perspective in relation to Islam, religion and being able to promote the position of women in the board in the Mosque (...)
We go to the mosque and have a dialogue there with men and women to strengthen and empowerment them »*

Abdul's work in the Mosque has led to four women sitting on the board and the assistant manager role being taken up by a woman. Further, the project has led to strengthening women's position in the Mosque and empowering them. He has created a platform for dialogue where men and women meet to promote women's position. Moreover, within the project in Mosques, he created a platform where the women discuss what it means to raise children in Norway, the mother's role in child upbringing, women's rights and the Norwegian school system. Abdul mentions how the parent perspective is essential, especially in regard to integration and their rights:

“Many of these ladies have been very resourceful people, but when you come to Norway, it becomes like a new type of life. You have to learn the language, and you do not have a network. And that means that the integration process actually takes longer, and you actually do not know where to start. You do not have the network, and most people may not have a job and sit at home and raise children, and they do not have a contract with society. But the fact that you can strengthen and promote an arena where such things can be discussed and make them a little more independent. And being a woman

means a lot of things. It has something to do with dignity. So even if you are married, you cannot go to your husband all the time and ask for things. You want to be independent, you want to work for your own earning and be independent.”

The quote above demonstrates how Abdul perceives these women as resourceful, however, starting over in another country is challenging in numerous ways. He sees the need for women to be independent and partaking the Norwegian society. By creating arenas for these women, Abdul is providing women with an alternative way to integrate. Moreover, Abdul gives an alternative perspective to understand what can happen with the family dynamic if the man, who might have been the breadwinner, suddenly loses his job, as this might alter the gender roles within a family.

«We have to make these women aware of such things. It is not certain that they have thought about it, that there might be a correlation between this here and the socio-economic factors. Perhaps the men have “lost face” [tapt ansikt - Ed.] because they are the head of the family. They are the ones who go to work and bring home money. That is why we must strengthen those women so that they can also have a job where they can also be independent.”

In the quote above, Abdul understands that there are several factors that matter in relation to women’s participation in Norwegian society. More importantly, he considers the socio-economic factors that can affect the family dynamics and their position the Norwegian society.

Another project Abdul mentioned in the interview was that he was a mentor in a mentoring scheme for youth who had returned as foreign fighters from Syria. Abdul mentioned that this was not a part of his role as a minority adviser; however, he went to the prison once a week to talk to the youths during work hours.

«I am also a mentor for the Criminal Correctional Service where we also talk to these men who actually have been and fought in Syria, and in relation to radicalisation work.”

Based on Abdul's individual projects, I argue that he is approaching the real "problems". By creating father groups, dialogue groups in the Mosque to promote empowerment amongst Muslim women and mentoring returned foreign fighters in prison, he is not taking on the role of *saviour*, which the scheme positions him to become. Rather, he engages with the several people (the whole family) affected by the scheme and those not directly affected (returned foreign fighters). In addition, he does not view the parents as necessarily causing the problems identified within the minority scheme. Instead, he gives them a platform to discuss their lived experiences of being immigrants in Norway, what child upbringing means, how the Norwegian school system functions and what gender roles entail in Norway. I argue that he is showing them how to navigate Norwegian society.

As a result of Abdul's initiatives, such as the women's group at the mosque and the father group, mentoring returned foreign fighters, these practices can be interpreted as *tactics*. More clearly, when Abdul uses *time* out of his work hours to visit the prison to talk to returned foreign fighters, he uses tactics. In this case, Abdul's takes/uses *time* as his tactics. According to de Certeau, this taking of *time* is considered as resistance (as cited in Yilmaz, 2013 p. 67). With Abdul's initiatives, he is challenging the policies that are targeting the immigrant father, the "unempowered" Muslim women and the returned foreign fighter by giving them a platform and using time as his everyday practice.

The case of Mette

Mette was a particularly interesting informant, as she holds a dual position regarding her understanding of her role. As shown in the previous chapter, I argue that Mette reinforces the stigmatisation of youths and their families that the scheme is targeting. However, she also offers a different perspective and approach to her job, which is the parent and especially the mother perspective. Mette touches upon the benefits and importance of collaboration with parents:

"So I think you get a lot wiser if you can think aloud with parents about what is smart to do. I try to discuss such things with students no matter what they come for."

She goes on to say:

“It's about how I talk to them, I think. It sort of comes naturally and that I'm a little concerned with being on a team with them and seeing them, quite simply”

The quotes demonstrate Mette's view on what can be achieved by working together and including parents in her work. I argue that this highlights that Mette understands the “issues” as a broad and complex one that needs to be handled as a family issue. Similar to Abdul, she gives room for the parents' voices to be heard. Her approach is not fixated on “saving” the youths nor to suspect parents immediately.

Mette is able to have this perspective because she is a mother herself:

*«Yes, and that [parent perspective - Ed.] I think it is something I can use a bit more actively than my colleagues who are very young, for example. Because I can say, “But I also have children who are your child's age or older” I have also been a **scared** mother, and I have talked with mothers (...).”*

One practical example of involving parents is:

*“ (...) I have had ICDP-parent guidance courses, which is a program very aimed towards minority parents. So, I have had more groups with Somali mothers where I have discussed child upbringing in those courses (..) But, I have that [mother] perspective with me. That control may often also be about being **afraid**, “I don't know what my child is doing in a country that I do not understand, so I become scared, and therefore I tighten [the control - Ed.]” I try to explain this to the youths as well.”*

What stands out in the abovementioned quote is Mette's reference to *fear* as an explanatory factor for control. Her reflection opens up and allows us to view control exercised by parents as caused by fear instead of ethnicity, culture, tradition or religion, which I have shown is problematised in the policy analysis. Then it becomes a parent problem rather than an immigrant/minority problem. She recognises the fear a mother has when she feels like she is “losing” her child, especially in a country they did not grow up in. I argue that Mette has her narrative as a mother, which allows her to reflect on the possibility that parents exert control because they are afraid – hence seeing it from the parent's perspective. Further, I argue that this

perspective creates space for the parents to look at integration as a way to understand the country their child grows up in, rather than having to integrate because they need to “become” Norwegian.

I would argue that Mette uses everyday practices when she navigates between the mother and the child. She challenges the idea of integration by reflecting on the possibility that mothers might want to control their child due to *fear* because she identifies with motherhood and the complexities within this mother-child relationship. Hence, giving space for the mother to be understood in other ways.

Abdul and Mette are individuals that through their daily practices, use *tactics*. Michel de Certeau refers to daily practices of individual people as a form of resistance (Yilmaz, 2013 p. 68), which seems relatable in these cases as well. Mette and Abdul might not think of themselves as resisting (subverting) the scheme. They might not even reject the overall policies, action plans, or mandate put in place by Norway. Nonetheless, they contribute with different reflections and perspectives, which permits them to approach the policies in alternative and tactical ways (de Certeau, 1984, p. 32). They give parents and families, which are affected by the policies, a voice and a platform to “change” and adapt to the situation in which Norway has placed them under. Hence, they subvert the scheme from within.

In addition, both cases show the complexity of working with these issues. They show efforts of understanding and acknowledging the diversity and complexity of the issues in a broader landscape, in contrast to understanding it as primarily an immigrant and integration problem. They move away from the simplistic explanation of foreign, unknown, cultural practices and open up a broader understanding of fatherhood, motherhood and how to navigate Norwegian society. Their actions and choice of policy implementation are affected by identifying other ways to view the “problems”. I argue that because of their personal experiences, beliefs and views, both Abdul and Mette exert *tactics* through their everyday practices.

Sub-conclusion

In this chapter, I have aimed to showcase two particular cases of informants that work within the context of Norway that has put in place a minority scheme that has implications for a large part of the population. Their engagement with parents, such as creating father groups, mother groups, Abdul’s projects with women in Mosques and mentoring returned foreign fighters, can

be interpreted as *tactics*. They both view their work as relevant to the integration process of minority families. However, they redefine and remake how integration can take place in Norway with their everyday practices. I argue that they do this because of their own lived experiences and that they can identify with the parents. In this way, they are subverting the scheme from within.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to present and analyse the Norwegian public policies (three action plans and laws) regarding forced marriage, negative social control, female genital mutilation and honour-related violence. However, forced marriage has been the central topic as it has been the leading cause for developing these policies. I have conducted a policy analysis using Carol Bacchi's WPR- approach (2009), which has been the methodological framework for the first part of the analysis. By asking myself question one, “what is the problem presented to be?” and question two, “what assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?” (p. 2) I have identified four categories that I refer to as: *immigration frame, cultural, traditional and religious frame, “Other” violence frame and legal (criminalisation) frame.*

The analysis shows how categorisation of people based on their ethnicity, culture, tradition and religion problematises the issues mentioned. These issues are primarily seen within the minority family as they are seen as different from “native” Norwegians and what is accepted in Norwegian society. Further, I have demonstrated how the term *immigrant* is a negatively loaded term and viewed as the opposite of what “Norwegianness” entails (Gullestad, 2002 p. 50). Moreover, the action plans have traces of Enlightenment ideas where Norwegians are positioned as inherently superior, educated and enlightened as opposed to people with other cultural and ethnic backgrounds (Kublitz, 2010, p. 116). In addition, the identified problems are associated with minorities due to their culture, tradition, religion and can be perceived as a threat to Norwegian society and its national identity of gender equality. By drawing on Orientalism (Said, 1977), I have demonstrated that ethnic families are posed as “others”, hence framed as a homogenous group excluded from normative Norwegian families.

In the two last frames, I argue that categories of people based on notions of ethnicity, culture, religion and tradition have pathed the way for separate action plans, stricter laws and regulations. Consequently, this affects certain groups of the population. In sum, I argue that categorisation can be seen as biopolitical technology (Foucault, 1978) that governs the number

of immigrants that enter the nation-state, but also manages the population that are already in the nation. Further, it contributes to shaping the meaning of who belongs in the nation and who does not belong (Bissenbakker & Myong, 2020 p. 4). In sum, categories have legitimised and pathed the way for stricter immigration regulations (Keskinen, 2017, p. 156).

In the second part of the analysis, I have analysed how the minority advisers engage with the policies and mandate, and what happens in everyday practice. Based on five interviews with four minority advisers, I have identified two main findings that I have named: reinforce the stigma associated with the minority scheme *reinforcing the stigma associated with the minority scheme* and *bureaucracy and doing good*. Within the first topic, I argue that the title of the scheme and the mandate of the minority adviser scheme mainly targets youths with a minority background. This is evident through how the advisers explain their role and the tasks they do throughout their day-to-day work.

According to the findings, there seems to be a tendency that the youths and teachers approach the minority advisers with issues that are not related to their mandate; rather, it is based on the youth's ethnic background. The advisers are aware of the stigmatising effects of their title and their jobs. However, I have demonstrated that the minority advisers themselves also approach the students with another ethnic and cultural background than Norwegian and understand the scheme as primarily for those youths.

In addition, one of the findings is that the minority scheme is seen as a part of the overall integration of minorities in Norway. I argue that this is because the scheme is placed under IMDi, which influences the advisers to partake in integration work. Moreover, the advisers perceive forced marriage and negative social control as a hinder of participation in Norwegian society. The findings show that the implications of this are that youths with a minority background born and raised in Norway evaluate, perceive and differentiate themselves from the majority group. I am not suggesting that the minority scheme by itself is causing this notion amongst minority groups but can have an impact alongside other factors. However, I argue that the scheme and the presence of minority advisers at schools can contribute to segregation. Further they are a constant reminder that all what youths with a minority background can achieve in Norway, is to become a "successful immigrant", at best.

The second topic is centred around *bureaucracy and doing good*. I have discussed the implications of placing functionaries (the minority advisers) in schools to combat forced marriage, negative social control and honour-related violence. I identified how advisers build *trust, empathy and create safe spaces and visibility*. The findings prove how the presence of minority advisers can cause “harm”, while they at the same time, are *doing good*. Nevertheless, I want to state that there is a need to combat the issues identified in the scheme. However, their presence can become a constant reminder of what some youths are not. Which I argue, is a part of the majority population of Norway.

In the last chapter of the analysis, I presented the case of Abdul and Mette, where I have identified their distinct ways to practise the minority scheme, which I have named *subverting the scheme from the inside*. Central to this chapter is how they view integration and how they offer alternative ways to approach their role and tasks. By drawing on Michel de Certeau's concepts of *tactics* (1984), I have investigated Abdul and Mette's different ways to exert everyday practices and actions in the policy field of forced marriage, female genital mutilation, negative social control and honour-related violence. I have explored how their everyday practice can be understood as tactics that subvert the scheme from inside.

When Abdul aims to empower Muslim women in Mosques and created father groups where fathers got a platform to speak about their new identity in Norway, I argue that these practices can be understood as *tactics*. More clearly, when Abdul uses *time* out of his work hours to visit the prison to talk to returned foreign fighters, he applies tactics. In this case, Abdul's takes/uses “*time* as his tactics, which according to de Certeau (1984), this taking of *time* is considered as resistance (p. 37). Furthermore, I argue that Mette uses everyday practices when she navigates between a mother and a child. She challenges the idea of integration by reflecting on the possibility that mothers might control their child due to the feeling of *fear*. As a result of this, she can identify with motherhood, so she provides an understanding of the challenge in alternative and more complex ways.

Mette and Abdul might not think of themselves as resisting (subverting) the scheme. Nonetheless, they give parents and families a voice and a platform to “change” or adapt to the situation in which Norway has placed them under. Their actions and choice of policy implementation are affected by identifying other ways to view the “problems”. Because of their

personal experiences, beliefs and views, both Abdul and Mette exert *tactics*, which I argue can be understood as subverting the scheme from inside.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that problems stated in the thesis, such as forced marriage, FGM and negative social control, are highly complex issues and are deeply layered touching upon many aspects of the society. The experience and knowledge I have gained from my own research have demonstrated that there is no easy answer or one-size-fits approach to combat these issues. Analysing the policies and schemes set by the Norwegian government has proven that it can do more harm than what it is intended for. Therefore, it calls for much-needed research to increase the knowledge and understanding of why these issues happen in the first place and how to develop effective policies and schemes as a response to tackle issues such as forced marriage, FGM and negative social control in the society.

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