# Protecting Our European Way of Life

An analysis on how danger is constructed and maintained in the European Union

Development & International Relations
Global Refugee Studies
Master Thesis, 10th semester

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Abstract

In this project I investigate the relationship between the private security industry and the European Commission to reveal how the influence of commercial actors have taken part in shaping the Migration & Border Management and Security & Defence budgets within the next multi- annual financial framework (MFF) spanning the next seven years from 2021 to 2027, and currently being negotiated between the EU institutions. I have used this long-term budget as a case of analysis to show how immigration is administratively treated as a security issue within the EU Commission. By applying the theoretical lens of the Paris School of security, as presented by the scholars Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, I argue that the EU Commission as well as the private security industry frame immigration as an existential threat through discursive and institutional practices and therefore neglect a refugee perspective, which impairs a humanitarian response. Critically questioning the securitization perspective, I further argue that the securitization of immigration is not a process where the end goal is to exclude and criminalize immigrants and militarize borders alone, it is more so part of a broader economic scheme to create and sustain a lucrative and competitive single market within the European Union, which further investment in the private security industry can provide. The project is inspired and motivated by having spent five months in Brussels interning in the European Parliament, where I was both an observer and participant of lobbyism: an ever-present practice, which happens both publicly and behind the scenes. To frame my ethnographic findings, concepts from Irving Goffman's performance theory is used. This inside experience has given me access and insight to how the lines between public institutions and private interests are blurred and ultimately how policy is in influenced within the EU. I will use these observations in parallel with an investigation of how the private security companies lobby and form relationships with policy makers, in order to maintain their influential positions. This I argue is the result of a process of neoliberalization and market logic, which allows private actors to both be advisors and merchants to the EU.

Key words: EU Commission, EU institutions, private security industry, MFF, securitization, lobbyism, neoliberalization, Paris School, performance theory.

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Abbreviations

AMIF	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
AMF	Asylum and Migration Fund
ASD	Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CEO	Corporate Europe Observatory
ECRE	European Council of Refugees and Exiles
EOS	European Organization for Security
EP	European Parliament
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
IBMF	Integrated Border Management Fund
MEP	Member of Parliament
MFF	Multi-annual Financial Framework

Introduction

After the third hour, I wondered how long a group meeting could possibly last. I was sitting on the floor with many other advisors and interns because there was no more room left at the tables. The party the Greens/EFA had a successful election in May of 2019, and had grown from holding 50 seats to 74, becoming the fourth largest European Parliament Party. The group room they had used last term was now too small. I did not have access to the headphones attached to the tables, which provided translations, but I could tell by the French member who was speaking, that he was furious. He was standing, his face almost blue, and was yelling while spit flew from his mouth. He was not the first at the meeting to appear angry, and as most of the other members spoke in English, I understood the context clearly. Previously that day, the new President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen had nominated the new cabinet of Commissioners. She had given the Commissioner overlooking migration and internal security the portfolio title "Protecting our European Way of Life." This title and the combination of responsibilities seemed to the Greens/EFA to be catering to an extreme, right winged, and populist discourse, which they found to be grossly inappropriate and xenophobic. One member pressed, "We are a union of 28 nationalities with completely diverse cultures and traditions. What does the European way of life even mean?" While another sarcastically questioned, "Protect!? Protect ourselves from who!? All the dangerous brown Muslims we don't want to enter our precious white Europe?"

After the meeting, I rushed with Margrete Auken to the first social event of the term. Hosted by a Danish advocacy group, it was important to be there, as all the newly elected Danish members were presenting their political goals for the new term. It was held on the patio of a five-star hotel ten minutes away from the Parliament. There were waiters in shiny black vests walking around with Champagne flutes and caviar on their trays. Inside, there was a bar with several wine and cocktail options and a buffet with beautiful looking hors d'oeuvres. As Margrete made her way to the stage, I stood to the side holding her handbag. Almost immediately, a woman approached me to ask if I worked for Margrete. She explained that she had once been Margrete's advisor and had gifted her that very handbag. She was now

working as a lobbyist for McDonald's. Soon after, another young man approached me and also commented on the handbag. He is employed by the advocacy group that hosted the event and told me that he could always tell who Margrete's interns were, as they would usually hold her bag for her. I awkwardly laughed and joked that it was too heavy for her, since she had filled it with all the half-emptied wine bottles around the room. I may have overstepped, but returning his playful banter led to small talk, which ended with him slipping me his card and hinting that he would like a meeting with Margrete. I soon realized that this event was less about listening to the elected politicians and more about underhanded networking.

Caught off guard, I quickly found a table and sat with the other interns. Soon after, we got into a discussion on Ursula von der Leyen's nominated cabinet. I told them about the heated group meeting regarding 'Protecting our European way of Life' and how I fully agreed with the Greens/EFA's indignation. One intern laughed and called me a 'champagne socialist' - apparently, a common name to call people from Margrete's political party. Believing me to be a privileged humanitarian, he continued to explain that the Cabinet needs to reflect all member states, and in this recent election, the statistics showed that immigration had been a top concern for voters around the Union (Heath and Pawelec 2019).

Luckily, to my champagne socialist satisfaction, there was so much uproar in the Parliament regarding the title, that it was eventually changed to 'Promoting our European way of Life.' Although the title changed, the responsibilities of the Commissioner remain the same, leaving me to question: How can the Commission justify the connection between immigration and insecurity, and is it indeed solely based on EU citizens' rising concern over immigration?

The two events described, which took place on the same day during my first week in Brussels, have since motivated me to write this paper. One of them being the Commission's coupling of migration as a security issue, and the other being the social gathering, which I only found out later was in fact a lobby event.

I was, therefore, determined to find out what role commercial and private actors play in EU migration and security policy. Fortunately, I was in Brussels while the next long term budget (MFF) for 2021-2027 was being negotiated, and I have, therefore, used the Commission's proposal for this budget as a case to expose not only how the securitization of immigration is

manifested, but also how the influence of the private security industry has contributed to the prioritization of this within the budget. Based on my fieldwork on lobbyism, I assume a Paris school of securitization perspective complemented with the theoretical outlook on the process of neoliberalization, to ask the following research question:

1.1 Research question

How is immigration framed as a threat to EU security within the currently negotiated MFF, and what role does the private security industry play in contributing to this construction? Moreover, what do the EU and these private actors gain by securitizing immigration?

1.2 Case: The Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

In this section I will briefly explain the MFF and its overall components. The multi-annual framework (MFF) usually spans from 5-7 years, as opposed to the EU's annual budgets. It determines the amounts of euros that match the EU's priorities as well as sets limits on how much money the EU will spend on different areas. All three institutions, The Commission, the Council and the Parliament play a role in its adoption.

The Commission initially proposes the draft, then the Council creates a 'negotiating box' and ensures that all member-states come to an agreement. Finally, the Parliament votes to either accept or reject the budget, however, do not have the option of adding or editing any amendments (EU Council, n.d.). The current long-term budget expires by 2021, thus the institutions foresee to come to an agreement on the next MFF latest in November 2020. The Parliament already drew up their first proposal in 2018, however it adopted a revamped version on May 27th, 2020, after the Covid-19 crisis, to include an emergency recovery instrument to repair economic damages spurred by the pandemic.

The Commission proposes a budget of €1.850 trillion from year 2021 to year 2027 (EU Comission 2020b) In their proposal from 2018, which is still valid after the Covid-19 changes, the Commission breaks down the priorities into seven headlines which capture the EU's top priorities:

1. Single Market, Innovation and Digital

2. Cohesion and Values

3. Natural resources and Environment

4. Immigration and Border Management

5. Security and Defence

6. Neighborhood and the World

7. EU Administrative spending (EU Comission 2018a)

Although the influence of the private security industry can be connected to several of the headlines, I will this project focus on headline 4 and 5.

1.3 Delimitations

This project's focus centers on how private security companies have influence on EU border control and migration policy. Since I interned in the Parliament, I have mostly gathered observations on how some forms of lobbying take place there. The EU institutions all work and are structured differently as they have different functions and are therefore also lobbied differently. My fieldwork is therefore merely an indication of certain lobby dynamics and should be considered to be a small piece of a much bigger and more complex puzzle. On the basis of my fieldwork, I can therefore (to a certain extent) only speculate how these companies use their extensive lobby budgets in which the amounts are publicly registered. I have tried to obtain meetings with the private security companies I mention in the paper, however none of them have responded to any of my (several) e-mails or calls. This of course, limits my opportunity to unfold questions and issues seen from their perspective. If I had more time in Brussels, I probably could have spoken to more people who could have informed me on lobbyism specifically regarding border-control and security.

1.4 Terminology

The use of 'Private Security Company' is a broad term which covers many areas. In in this project it includes all companies which act as commercial actors and who profit from

providing equipment towards EUs internal and external borders. Some of these companies are in other articles and reports referred to as private military/ defence/surveillance, or technological companies.

As there is no universally accepted definition the use of the word 'migrant' when used, throughout this paper it is inspired by United Nations Human Rights High Commissioner working groups definition. Their use of the word refers to:

> (...) any person who is outside a State of which he or she is a citizen or national, or, in the case of a stateless person, his or her State of birth or habitual residence. This term includes a wide range of categories, including migrant workers, refugees, victims of trafficking, women, children, or any other category who may be at risk of human rights violations and abuses (OHCHR n.d.).

This is, however, not to be confused with the EU Commissions use and definition of 'migrant' which excludes the rights of the refugee defined by the Refugee Convention until they are proven to be under that category. Therefore, you will notice that the word 'refugee' is not included in the MFF.

2. Methodology

This project spawned from a conglomerate of information deriving from fieldwork within the EU, seminars, legal texts and proposals, newspaper articles, reports, studies, statistics and online registries. While there has not been a definite order and strategy in the 'collection' of data, one set of information has led to another. In the following section I will account for and reflect upon the methodology by firstly explaining how my fieldwork and participant observation has contributed to the research, subsequently I will account for some of the local Brussels research groups, search engines, EU tools and registries for which my research has substantially benefitted from, and finally I will position myself within the research.

2.1 The EU- Bubble: Fieldwork and Access

From September 2019 to February 2020, I interned and conducted fieldwork in the EU Parliament for Danish politician Margrete Auken, who holds a seat in the party Greens/EFA. I was selected by Margrete due to my interest and knowledge in refugee studies and migration, a topic she wanted to focus more on within her work in the Parliament. My job was to inform her of on-going EU discussions and decisions as well as advise her on debates and political activity regarding this area. The fact that I was working for a politician and owned a badge to the Parliament, gave me access to people and information I would have never gained otherwise. Without having a clear-cut plan regarding what I wanted to explore, I utilized that access and began attending and participating in as many activities as possible- particularly regarding my interest on migration and border control, a topic that I wished to write my thesis on and which I luckily also had to inform Margrete about. I was privileged to obtain an inside perspective on EU politics, and it has inspired and motivated this project.

I also had many other responsibilities, which included attending meetings alongside Margrete, and managing her busy schedule. Mostly I had to be with her at all times making sure to inform her of upcoming events and briefing her on whatever was happening during the day. A typical day for Margrete in the Parliament is a combination of group meetings[1], Committee meetings[2], lobby meetings, lobby events and general office work. Usually all the members of Parliament (MEPs) are in Brussels from Tuesday morning to Thursday afternoon. This gave me the opportunity to focus on the project the days Margrete was not there.

After being thrown into the daily hustle of political life, I quickly realized an on-going dynamic I was consistently faced with, namely lobbyism. This practice is an ordinary part of EU culture and it happens on several levels between various actors. After realizing what an immense part of our day-to-day this was, I began focusing my observations and fieldwork more towards it. The fieldwork I conducted in the five months I was in Brussels has not only broadened my knowledge on lobbyism dynamics, but it has also given me great insight to how the EU institutions work and in general, what the political culture at the EU level looks like,

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[1] Greens/EFA meetings would take place every two weeks, and last about 3 hours. Here all members of the party and their advisors would be present to discuss on-going issues and votes.
[2] Margrete is a member of PETI (citizens petitions regarding member-state breech of EU law), ENVI (environment), and the Delegation for Israel Palestine relations.

something both the media and EU personnel refer to as the 'EU-bubble'- a bubble you have to be part of to fully comprehend (EU Comission 2017)(Baume 2019). Many of these insights have inspired this research project and will be present throughout the paper.

2.2 Participant Observation

When I first came to Brussels, I did not know what to expect. I was thrown into what seemed like a chaotic but exciting and intense environment. There were no clear-cut guidelines for my tasks and I just had to sort of learn my way around. My ignorance regarding what to do, which at first was quite uncomfortable, however allowed me to "fall naturally into the role of participant observer" (Spradley 1980, 53), slowly learning the tacit rules and norms of this new place. It was easy to observe everything in the beginning, as I knew nothing and wanted to know something. As I learned more, I could better 'completely participate' in the field (ibid, 61), however that also made it more difficult to be 'explicitly aware' of the situations I found myself in. Occasionally using Spradley's method of introspection and "reflected on experiences after events have[ing] taken place"(Spradley 1980, 59) I realized that, I myself had participated in the practice of lobbying, the very phenomenon I was trying to study.

My fieldnotes were quite full the first three months of my internship, as I had more opportunity to detach myself from the situations and merely take notes and listen. The last two months of fieldnotes look more like quick reminders in the form of 'scratch notes' as Madden defines as: "(…) those taken in the hurly burly of active fieldwork and participant observation (or very soon after) which concentrate on jotting down as much information as possible in as brief a form as possible"(Madden 2017, 7). I also took reflective notes or 'full notes' after I got home, where I could "expand the description" and be more analytical (ibid). Spradley (1980) explains that the role of the participant observer is to simultaneously work between being an insider and an outsider (p.56-57), something I strived to do as I had to perform my tasks for Margrete but also had to find material for my thesis. Luckily many of these tasks overlapped.

2.2.1 Lobby Meetings

Margrete often met with representatives from different interest organizations, mostly environmental or humanitarian NGOs but also medical firms, as these were within her main policy areas. I was present for most of these meetings, as Margrete prefers to have at least one staff member there with her at all times, and often it was me as her two other assistants were occupied with other pressing work. Sometimes when Margrete was not there, the advisors would take the meeting on her behalf. At the end of my stay, I even got to take some of these meetings alone. During the meetings which took place in Margrete's office, I shifted between two types of participant observer: passive participation and moderate participation. When I took on the passive role, I would just take notes. I would be present in the situation, but not participating (Spradley 1980, 59). This allowed me to fully use a 'wide observational lens" (ibid, 56) and take detailed notes on lobby techniques. As I became more involved in Margrete's work, I would use moderate participation in trying to juggle both asking relevant questions on Margrete's behalf but also taking field notes and staying aware of my role as an ethnographer. Often this observer position would be most exciting as I could use my participation, as Margrete's intern and at the same time get closer to finding out how lobbying works. For example, I could ask about the lobbyists' research, how they knew Margrete and who else they were speaking to that day. This may have come across as pure interest or merely small talk, however this overlapping of using my role (of course always ethically) as both intern and researcher has provided me with some of the most important findings. After each meeting, I had to register it in the official online lobby register. During the time I was there I registered over 30 meetings[3], not including the many events we also participated in.

2.2.2 Public Lobby events

These events included everything from five course dinners, to cocktail parties to, exhibitions in the Parliament, to breakfast buffets and after hour drinks. They were organized by unions,

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[3] All of Margrete's lobby meetings are public here:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/28161/MARGRETE_AUKEN/meetings/past#detailedcardmep
The Greens/EFA encourage all their members to register their meetings, however there are no sanctions if they do not. In general, it is only required to register the meetings if the member is a rapporteur or shadow on a proposal or resolution.

private companies, non-profit, for-profit organizations and everything in between. Besides the positive aspects of the free drinks, meals and merchandise, these were a great opportunity for my research. I could to a certain extent detach myself in these social situations and focus on observing. Sometimes mingling was expected, and I tried to always speak with someone hosting the event in order to find out what they would say regarding their organization and usually, they had an elevator speech prepared. Many times, representatives wanted to speak with Margrete and when this happened, I would also moderately participate to see how they would go about speaking with a politician. I would go to about three to four lobby events a week, mostly with Margrete but also sometimes just with her advisors, who often acts as an extension of their MEP's.

2.2.3 Informal Interviews

During my internship I wrote to various people whose knowledge lies within border control, lobbyism and migration, to see if I could meet with them and gain better knowledge in this area. Due to people commonly being busy I only managed to meet with three people. They provided me with great insight, however which has led me to investigate other channels. This interaction is described in anthropologist Shore's article (2007) as the 'snowball technique'. In his fieldwork conducted in the EU, he explains that "if the interview had gone well, I would ask informants who they would recommend I talk to for alternative perspectives on the issues discussed" (Shore 2007, 13), and this I indeed benefitted from.

I did not make an interview guide as I did not intend to use my meetings with them for pure data. I also was unsure of what I was looking for, I just knew what sort of direction I wanted to go in and knew that these people could help get closer to my interest. I did however have some background knowledge on my interests and had also researched the informants and their work, which allowed for more fruitful conversations. I approached each meeting prepared but also with open mind remembering that "an open mind is not the same as an empty head" (own translation) (Brinkmann, Tanggaard, and Czarniawska 2010, 37).

The first person I met with is a Greens/EFA advisor who has worked mostly on transparency: an important topic, as the party fights for a more transparent EU in terms of lobbyism, access to EU documents and EU spending. I was recommended to reach out to her from one of

Margrete's advisors. We met in a café within the Parliament, generally called the Mickey Mouse Café due to its funny shaped mouse chairs. Many go there for quick meetings over coffee. I had reached out to her using my European Parliament (EP) e-mail and told her that I was interning for Margrete and that was looking to speak with someone knowledgeable in my area of interest, as I was searching for material for my thesis. I had not prepared any questions for her, just a few speaking points on my interest in private security companies' influence on border control, migration and lobbyism. We spoke for about an hour, and I took notes in hand. She told me about general transparency issues within the EU, about the freedom of information act, the transparency register and then she gave me the e-mail of her former colleague who now worked in Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), who she proudly said had taken Frontex to court due to a transparency case. I asked some follow-up questions; the setting was very informal and felt more like getting coffee with a friend. I asked her if it came to it, if I could quote her in my thesis and she agreed. I have chosen not to use the names of who I met with however, as this is not essential to the project.

After a week I met up with the Greens/EFA advisor's former colleague, in the canteen of her workplace at Corporate Europe Observatory[4] which was located only a few blocks away from Parliament. I had e-mailed her, letting her know of my thesis interests and that I had been recommended to reach out to her by her former colleague. She agreed to meet immediately. I am convinced that me having written from an EU mail and that I was recommended by a reliable source, helped me get the meeting fast. A reacquiring theme I encountered, and also was affected by myself, was the fact that everyone was very busy all the time, therefore, when I got a meeting, I was very grateful. I told her a bit about my thesis interests, and she told me about her work. She had printed out a report just published that week, from Transnational Institute who share the workspace with CEO. It was about private security companies and their lobby efforts in the EU, exactly what I was interested in. This report and other information she told me about Frontex, has paved the way for this thesis. We spoke for an hour and she also told me I was welcome to quote her if necessary. We agreed to meet soon again, but due to business, it never happened.

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[4] An NGO and research group whose main mission is to reveal lobby dynamics between the EU and the private sector.

The third person I met with was another Greens/EFA advisor on telecom and space issues. I was interested in meeting with him because many of the private security companies provide space equipment, which is, among other things, also used for surveillance through satellites. I wanted to know if he had any information on the space intergroup[5] and their affiliation with these private companies. We met in a coffee spot in the Parliament, but this time in Strasbourg[6], where the usually busy working day is multiplied by a hounded. I was therefore especially happy that he had time to meet. During this meeting I also took notes. I had, like the other meetings let him know what my interest were and that I was curious in finding material for my thesis. We spoke for only twenty minutes, but he gave me useful insight to how private security companies lobby the Council and Commission differently than the Parliament and their reasons for going specifically after certain members. He also told me a bit about how intergroups work and how they are not sanctioned for their lack of transparency regarding the funds they receive from commercial actors. Due to the time restrain, my notes were unfortunately quite messy. He was also fine with me quoting him and told me to reach out again if I needed more time back in Brussels.

2.3 Ethical considerations

Since I had conducted fieldwork previously during my studies, I knew I had to make ethical considerations from the outset. However, I also knew that, as paraphrased from Qualitative Methods (2010); when using qualitative methods, it is more important to stay open towards the ethical questions which inevitably occur along the way, than to preestablish ones ethical principles and then blindly proceeding in conducting ones research (own translation) (Brinkmann, Tanggaard, and Czarniawska 2010, 444). During my internship, I have therefore made daily reflections on what information I could use and what was best to leave out.

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[5] Intergroups are set up by members of parliament "with a view to holding informal exchanges of views on particular subjects and promoting contact between Members and civil society" (EU Parliament, n.d.)

[6] The entire Parliament (all staff and members) move every 4 weeks to Strasbourg where votes in the Plenary take place. I was in Strasbourg twice during my internship. This week is extra intense as people prepare votes, meet with their groups and have hour long discussions in the Plenary. This week is also known to be the week where the staff work extra-long hours as well as go out after work almost every night.

During my interview for the internship with Margrete, I made clear that part of the reason I wanted to go to Brussels was also to gather material and insight for my thesis. I reminded the office[7] once again when we got Brussels that I would be conducting fieldwork and writing down experiences along the way. I assured them that my project would not focus on office culture and that I would not use any private or personal information about them or Margrete. Margrete is the only person within my fieldwork whose name I use in the paper. I have chosen to do this because her identity would be difficult to anonymize in describing my work tasks and experiences within the Greens/EFA and the Parliament. Since she is a public figure and well-known politician in Denmark, I have chosen to be selective in what I share about her. I have therefore only written about experiences, which generally support my research area and other non-controversial observations. Of course, working with within qualitative research there is fine subjective ethical line, which is difficult to clearly distinguish and will always be based on what I deem ethical (Brinkmann, Tanggaard, and Czarniawska 2010, 430). I have however, offered to send Margrete the project before hand-in, so she can check to see if she thinks I use her name in any way she feels uncomfortable with. Occasionally during meetings or in private, Margrete or her advisors have explicitly asked me not to share certain information and this I have naturally respected.

Due to my privileged position being inside the Parliament, I had access to a lot of information which would not be ethical to share, such as e-mail exchanges, personal conversations, closed meetings and unpublished material. The things I came across which might have been on the verge of being confidential, however is not featured in this paper. Working within the Parliament I learned where to look for material, and I have, as mentioned, had access to variety of things which would have been difficult to find otherwise. Most of the material and tools used within the project are actually public however, the tricky part is knowing where to look and knowing how to use the mechanisms properly.

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[7] The office consists of Margrete, her two advisors and me (the intern). On a daily basis her office touches base with the other Danish delegate from SF, Kira and her office. These two offices then touch base together with an EU advisor, and a press person working for SF in Denmark.

During my observations in lobby meetings and during events, I did not tell people that I was observing them for my thesis. I did not find this necessary as my observations were used merely as an indication of how lobbying could take place. I do not refer to the lobbyists I met with by name, nor do I use any tracible information. When I refer to any lobby observations outside Parliament, I thus also restrain from using names or tracible references.

In the meetings I had with my three informants, I used a few 'rule of thumbs' explained in Qualitative Methods (2010) to guide me in conducting the meetings ethically. Firstly, as mentioned, I informed the involved parties why I wished to meet, and that it was for my research and not for my work with Margrete. This is also known an 'informed consent' and can, in explorative projects such as mine (which did not have a clear goal to begin with) change its from over time (Brinkmann, Tanggaard, and Czarniawska 2010, 443). Another consideration was whether to keep the informants anonymous or not, which I chose to do just because the meetings with them take up very little space as data in the project.

Finally, as I reflected on the research and the people involved, I had to continuously ask myself what the consequences would be by for example using Margrete's name and my other lobby observations. I am convinced that no major negative consequences could arise from the data I use.

2.4 Life as a Stage

To frame the empirical findings on lobbyism from my time in Brussels, I will draw on concepts from sociologist Irving Goffman's performance theory. In The Presentation of Everyday life (1959/1990) Goffman uses the metaphor of the theater to describe social life. He considers "(…) the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to others" (Goffman 1990, 10) through the sustaining of an impression, a performance "which it is in his interest to convey"(ibid, 16). Thus, if the stage is the EU district in Brussels, the performer is the lobbyist, and the audience are the politicians the lobbyists are trying to influence. The lobbyist "convey a particular impression" (ibid, 18) in order to effectively define the situation. However, audiences and in this case Margrete (politicians)

although passive in their role, also contribute to the definition of the situation by virtue of their response. Therefore:

> Together the participants contribute to a single over-all definition of the situation which involves not so much a real agreement as to what exists but rather a real agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues will be temporality honoured (ibid, 21).

Therefore, a constant negotiation and aim to sustain a harmony in the situation is observed, as it is in the lobbyists interest to perform convincingly. A performance is given in what Goffman refers to as the front stage. In Brussels, the front stage for lobbyists are scheduled meetings between representatives and politicians. In the front stage certain standards in the form of manner and appearance are maintained (ibid, 110-111). Tacit rules and norms in the form of the order of who gets to speak when, how a lobbyist presents their arguments and how they often, together with fellow lobbyists, compliment one another's arguments. As Goffman maintains, "some aspects of the activity are expressively accentuated and other aspects, which might discredit the fostered impression, are suppressed" (ibid, 114). These 'hidden' aspects could for example be the lobbyists temper, informal speech or crude humor which could throw off the politician and result in a rejection of the performance. These aspects are what appear more so in what Goffman calls 'the backstage'. In this region "the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character" (ibid, 115). In Brussels, the backstage is Thursday bar at Place Luxemburg, it is organized dinner parties and cocktail hours. The backstage is where events and gatherings happen, where lobbyists try to establish relations with advisors, interns or the politicians in order to find out how they should practice their performance for them. It is in this region they also attempt to set up formal meetings in the offices of the politicians.

However as further pointed out in the context chapter, I will argue that front stage and back regions in Brussels are not always as distinct as in the theater. Rather there is a duality between the two, as a seeming desire for the informal tends to reoccur in the frontstage.

2.5 EU tools used to gather data

During my internship I made acquaintances with an enthusiastic man who worked in the EP library. He gave me a one-on-one lesson on how to navigate the EU web portals to find the information I needed. This was useful as an intern, in order to find resolutions and briefings but it has also been advantageous for the research of this paper. I list some of the portals below:

- Transparency register

As mentioned before, one of my tasks as an intern was to register all of Margrete's lobby meetings in the transparency register. However, I also found out after having spoken to the Greens/EFA advisor that this register was for the lobbyists. They are required to register, if they want a badge to access the Parliament. Through a seminar specifically on this register, which I attended in the Parliament, I learned how to navigate it and it has been very useful in terms of drawing connections between the private security companies I analyze and the Commission. However, important to note is that all the information on the site, is provided by the organizations themselves and may at times be fairly limited or even outdated.

- Cordis

Cordis is an online archive of all EU conducted research since 1990. I have used this site to trace EU research projects in collaboration with private security companies

- Legislative Train

Is an online tool to follow EU Parliament and European Council legislation. If you search for example "MFF 2021-2020" the site will give you a timeline on all votes and negotiations. I have used this for many things such as the MFF, the European Defence Fund, the migration pact etc. to find out when they were established and what their status is now.

- EPRS

The European Parliament Research Service has all briefings, resolutions and statistics needed. If you work within the Parliament and need specialized knowledge on a topic, you can request it and after a day or two, EPRS will send you a package of information. I used this to find information on border control and past long-term budgets. Now that I am not

in the Parliament, I have gotten my friends on the inside to request information on my behalf. This is a very good tool, however not open to all.

- Register for Commission Expert Groups

This public registry on the Commission website can provide information regarding the different expert groups which advise the Commission. This has given me information about which people from the private security industry directly advises the Commission on security issues.

2.5.1 EU Corporate Observatory

- Lobby tour

During my first week in Brussels, one of Margrete's advisors took me on a lobby tour hosted by Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO). They took us around the EU quarter and showed us where some of the biggest lobby firms were located, as well as gave us general information on the lobby culture in Brussels. My fieldnotes and the material they handed us at the tour is used extensively throughout the project.

- Lobby Facts

Is a website created by CEO, where one can find information on all lobby groups in Brussels. It is similar to the transparency register, however, often it has much more information available and is also put in simpler terms.

Studies made in collaboration with TNI

The Transnational Institute which shares office space with CEO has provided a lot of research on lobbyism in Brussels, especially focused on the border control industry. All of their work is free and open to the public on their website. I have especially utilized the reports conducted by Akkerman in his series 'Border Wars.'

2.6 Document Analysis

The Commissions' proposed MFF published in 2018 is used as a case in this project. It is approximately 140 pages, outlining the separate budgets for each of the seven headlines I have introduced previously. For each headline there is a separate volume, with more detailed information on percentages and financials. I have studied the entire MFF however only specifically analyzed headline 4 'Migration & Border Management' and headline 5 'Security and Defence' as well as these separate volumes. Moreover, I have collected and studied the position papers published by lobby groups, which also are included in my analysis.
I have therefore applied document analysis as a qualitative research method as the documents utilized are not merely words and statistics on paper but more so "(...) 'social facts', which are produced, shared, and used in socially organised ways" (Atkinson and Coffey (1997) in Bowen 2009, 27). The documents have helped me in uncovering meaning and in discovering new insights relevant to my research question (ibid, 29).

The information contained in the MFF has provided me with a timely perspective on how immigration is perceived in EU today, and how it should be tackled in the next seven years. The position papers reveal how the market for private actors within defence is on the rise and how they believe the EU needs to better promote and assist the industry in its growth. The analysis of these documents has ultimately allowed me to discover the connection between the public and private and how they work together to create policy. Most importantly however, document analysis has led to evidence how the EU commission and Private Security Industry presents issues on security, how they define threat and risk and how they define the solutions for them.

More concretely, I have analyzed the documents by both skimming, thoroughly reading and re-reading as well as interpreting, which has allowed me to code specific discourse into categories (Bowen 2009, 32). For example one category I made was ' immigration linked to crime' and under this headline, I would copy/paste sentences within the MFF or position papers which included wording such as " combating illegal migration" (EU Comission 2018a, 64) or "manage cross border crime"(ibid, 65). Another category I made was 'EU at risk' where I would also add position paper discourse such as

A wounded Europe is a Union that risks being unable to protect itself from current and future threats to its security (...)The EU will need to manage its external borders to prevent the uncontrolled entry of people infected by transmissible pathogens and to protect European citizens from terrorism and crime (EOS position paper 2020).

Having these categories set up, were extremely helpful once I began the writing process as I could continuously draw from them.

2.7 Positionality

By virtue of being a student of Global Refugee Studies, a program where a humanitarian and critical perspectives are central, my motivation for this project stems from a sharp critique and concern of the hostile political climate regarding immigration in the EU. As "[r]recent literature acknowledges the increasingly mediated character of global migration, with actors other than states and migrants- from NGO's to private security companies [...]playing a more central role" (Pascucci 2009, 250) I have intentionally chosen not to conduct fieldwork on the experience of migrants and refugees. Rather I have sought to 'study up' and look at the some of the overarching apparatuses which have the power to exclude and include these populations, " (...) for such institutions and their network systems affect our lives and also affect the lives of people that anthropologists have traditionally studied" (Nader 1972, 9). It is therefore my intention, not to contribute to the notion of 'over-research' in focusing on the people affected by the policy as it might not actually be "contributing to meaningful social change" (Pascucci 2009, 250). More importantly I aim to research central political and private actors, who I believe to be just as essential within this field.

In the production of qualitative and quantitative data, the researcher will always be the primary tool to gain knowledge (Brinkmann, Tanggaard, and Czarniawska 2010, 444). It is through my personal experience and perspectives I have conducted the research and as such, I believe have an obligation to be aware of the innate values, opinions and judgments which have ultimately affected the data produced (ibid). I therefore do not aim to be 'neutrally objective'(Haraway 1991). In other words, I do not try to detach myself from my own biases in

the process of my research since the knowledge produced, cannot exist without context (ibid). However, admittedly, being in Brussels has also punctured some of my preexisting one-dimensional expectations of the EU and the private security industry being the 'big bad guys' as I gained deeper understanding of the complexities of politics and lobbyism. I therefore strive to also be critical of my own criticisms to further nuance the project.

3. Literature review

The research takes point of departure in the Paris School's theoretical perspective on 'securitization' originally developed by Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School, however further expanded by scholars Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans. I use the securitization lens to analyze how immigration in the EU is posed as a security threat, which in turn justifies the major spending on border control seen in the MFF. I aim to elucidate how the private security industry plays a role in influencing policy, as the biggest companies position themselves as 'experts' within the field of security and thus contribute to the daily practice of securitization of immigration taking place particularly within the Commission but also in the other institutions.

Huysmans and Bigo's contribution to the securitization perspective, although useful and more nuanced than the Copenhagen School, leaves out a concrete analysis of the actual securitization practices and experts they present. Although they focus on immigration and the EU, relevant to this project's research, they do not offer cases or examples of the blurred lines between public and private interests and of the security companies lobby efforts, which I argue also constitutes as a practice of securitization. For this perspective, I turn to the research conducted on private security companies and the process of the neoliberalization of borders in the EU. This research, still within the field of security studies offers a more detailed analysis of how the dynamics between private security companies and the public institutions of the EU are related. Although these perspectives offer more detailed analysis of concrete security practices within the security industry and lobbyism as examples, their analysis is maintained at a macro level and do not consider how these dynamics of policy making takes place in the everyday social life of the decisions makers and the lobbyists. As anthropologist

Chris Shore elucidates: "Outsider perspectives are remote from the actors involved and do little to help us understand the worlds of public officials as meaningful domains of social action" (Shore 2007, 3). Taking Shore's perspective into account, I aim to use the fieldwork and access I have gained in order to contribute to the securitization research and fill some of the gaps when using an ethnographic perspective on how policy is formed with the influence of lobbyists in Brussels today. In the following review I will critically summarize the theoretical lenses used in the project as well as discuss the current and former research conducted in this area.

3.1 Securitization of immigration

Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans has taken the Copenhagen School's concept of 'securitization' and further expanded on the definition. The theory ultimately seeks to look at how 'threats' are constructed. Taking roots in John Austin's linguistic speech act theory, the Copenhagen School defines securitization as: " (…) a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue- not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" to an audience who listens (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 25). Furthermore,

> The process of security is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship (ibid, 26).

Therefore, according to the Copenhagen School, the threats "have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 5). As a current example, the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán claimed in 2018 in his State of the Union speech that Europe was under invasion and existential threat due to the increase in migration in 2015. He proclaimed that:

> I am convinced that migration eventually leads to the disintegration of nations and states: national languages weaken, borders become blurred, national cultures dissolve; and what remains is a single "open society" (Orbán 2018).

This speech act has thus legitimatized a stigmatization and fear of immigrants and a closing down and militarization of borders in Hungary- even though there is no empirical evidence to the words claimed by Orbán. Thus, in securitization theory, "the central question is not if threats are real or not, but rather how a certain problem is constructed as a threat" (Van Muster 2012, 140). Speech acts are treated as discursive processes which as mentioned above, constructs a truth about certain issue (as a threat) which then leads to action, or rather the discursive process is in fact an act (ibid). Therefore, most research which uses a Copenhagen School perspective looks at national politics, as pointed out by Neal (2009):

> Because of the focus on discourse and audience, the statements of national political leaders and government ministers are an obvious focus of securitization studies. These are widely reported and discussed in national media and are presumed to bear a strong relationship to policy outcomes (Neal 2009, 336).

Huysmans and Bigo however, have further developed the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization to go beyond national politics and speech acts. They find it more useful and accurate to view securitization as an everyday routine and practice, which is much more complex and intimated than the concept of speech acts which is mainly used in analysis of national crisis and exception (Huysmans 2006, 13).

Huysmans and Bigo have been labeled as scholars within the Paris School of security studies due to their work being influenced by the French philosopher Foucault and anthropologist Bourdieu. They take point of departure in sociological, post-structural and critical perspectives as well as focus on the securitization of immigration within the EU, which is central to this project's context. My analysis will thus take point of departure in their broadened securitization perspective.

To understand why these scholars have expanded the definition and why their definition is more applicable to my research on the private security industry and the MFF a few comments on their critique of the Copenhagen school is necessary. Huysmans explains that:

> (…) discursive approaches tend to focus on political speeches and writings which are often highly visible in the public domain, such as parliamentary debates, governmental speeches. They thus have an implicit bias towards focusing on professional politicians and opinion makers. As a result they tend to undervalue the importance of security experts (…) Their discourse, routines and more generally their political role is often much less visible in the public and mediatized domain (Huysmans 2006, 8).

Moreover, Bigo explains that the Copenhagen School definition has:

> (…) little sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice. Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake (Bigo 2002, 72).

To further explain, Huysmans and Bigo believe it to be necessary to look beyond exceptional situations spoken of by political leaders, and into the other more routine based securitization moves. These moves do not always happen publicly and are conducted not only by political leaders but also by what they call security experts, or 'professionals in the management of unease'. These experts play a part in defining danger. In the case analyzed in this project, the experts constitute not only the private security industry but also political leaders within the Commission. Therefore, the securitization of immigration in the EU consists of complex diverse governance linkages such as:

(…) border control, citizenship, population management, the single market, terrorism and crime (…) this means not only that the process of securitization penetrates deeply into society and government, but also that it engages a very wide range of agencies and bureaucracies not normally associated with international security (Huysmans 2006, preface 10-11).

These different actors create what Bigo calls a 'regime of truth' by positioning themselves as experts and "through the "authority of the statistics", they have the capacity to class and prioritize the threats, to determine what exactly constitutes security" (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 8). Further, although Bigo admits that the securitization of immigration can come from successful speech acts made by political leaders, more important is the fact that:

It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific habitus[8] of the "security professional" with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease (Bigo 2002, 65–66).

The essentiality in using the Paris School perspective is to move away from a crisis/exceptionality analysis and look at some of the more complex and mundane dynamics where securitization happens on a day-to-day basis as in the case of the currently negotiated MFF and lobby culture in Brussels, which has influenced it. Huysmans and Bigo look at securitization as a 'technique of governing danger,' a process where the construction of

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[8] From Bourdieu:" habitus can be understood as the values and dispositions gained from our cultural history that generally stay with us across contexts (they are durable and transposable). These values and dispositions allow us to respond to cultural rules and contexts in a variety of ways (because they allow for improvisations), but the responses are always largely determined—regulated—by where (and who) we have been in a culture" (Webb et al. 2002, 37)

danger and threat happens both secretly and competitively and is embedded in institutional history, training, routine and technical knowledge and skills which all contribute to a formation of a continuous ordinary practice (Huysmans 2006, 5-9). Although this expanded securitization lens is useful to this project's focus, the scholars however, tend to focus mainly on analysis of EU regulations and laws such as the Dublin Agreement, Schengen and other EU migration policy, while leaving out concrete cases of who the security experts are or could be and more specifically how they play a role in these policies and practices.

Neal (2009) and Léonard (2010) draw on a Paris School of securitization approach when researching the role and establishment of Frontex. They write about how the agency came about through securitization practices at the EU level, however they also do not look beyond the EU perspective to consider the commercial securitizing actors which Frontex works with and whom has a stake in how the agency operates.

Therefore, to gain a better perspective on commercial and private interests as security experts, I have turned to research which looks at EU securitization of immigration but with a focus on how corporations and lobbying are key players in this practice.

3.2 The Neoliberalization of Borders

In this paper the concept of 'neoliberalization' will be used to understand and delineate how private security companies gain influence in EU migration policy and more specifically, how they have influenced the MFF. I will use this lens as context to look at how the EU border control policy is part of a neoliberal transformation from formal to informal techniques of government, where private and public actors work closely together (Bigo 2002b, 65–66).

The process of neoliberalization comes from Peck and Tickell (2002) who describe it in their article 'Neoliberalizing Space' as a process of transformation, of "shifts in systems." They explain that the process of neoliberalization is:

> (…) the ways in which ideologies of neoliberalism are themselves produced and
> reproduced through institutional forms and political action, since "actually

existing" neoliberalisms are always (in some way or another) hybrid or composite structures (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383).

Neoliberalization thus refers to the transformation of for example EU borders, and the shift from formal to informal ways to govern them. It is a reconfiguration of private and public actors within that space. Lemke calls it "the withdrawal of the state" (Lemke 2005, 11), but, as Lemberg-Pedersen points out: "This, however, does not mean less governance, or in the case of borders, less border control" (Lemberg-Pedersen in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013, 161). Lemke further explains:

> (...) that we are witnessing an important transformation of the state under the sign of deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation. It is more and more the scientific consultants, economic interest groups and civil societal mediators that define, the beginning, the end, and the value of life in consensus conferences, expert commissions, and ethical counsels (Lemke 2005, 11–12).

Furthermore, when it comes to EU border control, this signature indication of neoliberalization- the blurring of lines between private and public spheres- is discussed by Prokkola (2012) who highlights this in her analysis on the Finish Border Guard Agency and their collaboration with enterprise units such as private security firms. She explains that: "they [neoliberal processes] compromise linkages between various governmental and non-governmental actors and authorities, relations of liability between public and private organizations, as well as global–local interconnectedness and networking (Jessop 2000 in Prokkola 2012). Lemberg-Pedersen has also contributed to the research on the neoliberalization of borders. In his article 'Private Security Companies and the European Bordercapes'(2013), he argues through an analysis of contracts won by private security firms in the development of EU border control initiatives, that borders are "dynamic and multifaceted sites of interventions for public and private actors " and that the private security companies' "development of new, advanced technologies securitizes and thus transforms the day-to-day governance of the European Borders" (in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013, 152). Furthermore, both Lemberg-Pedersen and researcher Anna Leander, point towards how lobbyism plays an important role in the neoliberalization process (Lemberg-Pedersen,

Hansen, and Halpern 2020)(Leander 2009). Leander argues in her research on private military companies (PMCs) and their influence on the construction of threats, that:

> PMCs can no longer content themselves with being mere technical experts. They become security experts shaping understandings of and decisions about security. The competition for market shares pushes PMCs to become lobbyists, security advisors and public opinion makers (Leander 2009, 612).

This perspective compliments Bigo's argument that these private actors are positioned as experts. Furthermore, in Akkerman's recent report 'The Business of Building Walls' (2019), he delves into the biggest security lobby groups in Brussels. He examines how much the groups spend on lobby activities and how often they meet with commissioners, to draw attention towards how border control policy is influenced by the industry. The research within EU border control and the focus on neoliberalization and in turn lobbyism, is not scarce, however much of it, especially when it comes to the private security industry and lobbyism, is associated with "ominous deals and unfair play"(Nothhaft 2017, 24) and the "profiting from the plight of refugees" with the goal of creating a Fortress Europe (Akkerman 2019, 30). Not many provide perspectives on how politics actually come to life through for example the everyday mundane routine and practice the Paris school addresses, which takes place in the 'EU machine' and further questions why, the securitization of immigration continues despite years of research and attention towards the humanitarian consequences it creates. For this perspective, I turn to some of the ethnographic work conducted on policy making.

3.3 The Everyday Life of Policy Making

Although there is much research conducted in the area of EU politics, there seems to be a lack of ethnographic research on how policy is actually formed in Brussels. Few scholars address the social life around policy making especially in regard to lobbyism, perhaps because it becomes an impossible task to study it and at the same time not also become a part of the process. In his book Lobbying in Washington, London and Brussels (2005) McGrath addresses this issue when maintaining that (...) [a]nyone who has any relevant current information is likely not to be writing about it but practicing it, yet will not tell you how, or with what

success." Therefore, much of the literature that exists on lobbying stems from surveys, interviews and macro-meso analysis on how lobbyism influences policy (Jaatinen 1999, Moloney 2009, in Nothhaft 2017) thus, there seems to be a definite gap when it comes to how lobbying actually happens as an interaction and practice.

In Milbrath (1960), Lobbying as a Communication Process he boils down the phenomenon of lobbying to the individual by conducting interviews in Washington on how lobbyists most successfully communicate "(…) so that the decision maker will be perceptive" (Milbrath 1960, 35). He maintains that lobbyists are 'merchants of information,' that their communication falls into three categories: facts, arguments and power. Accurate and up-to-date facts are complimented with arguments to support the lobbyist' claims. These arguments, Milbrath have found, most lobbyists admit to being one sided- benefitting the raison d'être of the interest group. Power is observed through what the lobbyists can provide the decision maker, in terms of electoral support (Milbrath 1960, 36). These insights are valuable when studying interactions between lobbyists and politicians, however although Milbrath uses both quantitative and qualitative methods, his work does not include on sight observations of how these communicative processes take place in the moment, nor how policy making is a social practice. Nylander (2000) elucidates that:

> Politics is about choices, voting procedures and rules, strategic action, resources, influence, and pressure. However, it is also a social sphere- a social field in which culture, traditions, cognitive frameworks, norms and ideas play an important role (Nylander 2000, 86).

Anthropologist Chris Shore conquers with Nylander as he addresses the EU institutions more so as a social field to be studied within, through a 'native point of view' by maintaining that doing so " (…) is as pertinent for the study of policy professionals in complex European bureaucracies as it is for villagers in the remote islands of Melanesia" (Shore 2007, 4). Much like Jack Weatherford who in his fieldwork in Washington working in the Senate found more parallels between life in Congress and the practices of tribes in South America than to other legislative bodies (Tribes on the Hill 1985). Shore studied the everyday life and culture in the EU institutions from 1995-97 by firstly working as an intern within the Parliament and then

the Commission. Although his fieldwork does not specifically focus on lobbyism alone, his insights are valuable in understanding how life within especially the Commission (which I did not have access to) functions through their traditions, rituals, "administrative norms and organized culture" (Shore 2007, 28).

More recently, Nothhaft's dissertation Moments of Lobbying (2017) addresses the lack of ethnographic research on lobby interactions. She aims to step "away from focusing on influence and the effects of lobbying to a perspective that stresses personal relationships and asks how these are established an maintained" (Nothhaft 2017, 39). In her work she interviewed 27 partitioners with lobby experience, shadowed meetings between three members of Parliament (MEPs) and four lobbyists as well as conducted participants observation in the EU Parliament by following the work of the MEPs assistants. Her micro-approach to studying lobby interactions has greatly inspired my fieldwork. However, while Nothhaft's main concern are the interactions themselves, she does not look at how these interactions influence any specific policy. Therefore, in my research I aim to combine the theoretical elements of securitization and neoliberalization accompanied by an inside ethnographic perspective to further expand the discussion on how the private security industry lobby to influence on the currently negotiated MFF.

4.Setting the Scene

In the following chapter, I will engage the reader in the context in which the case of MFF takes by explaining how the 'EU-Bubble' works in relation to private and public actors. I will first explain a bit about lobbyism in Brussels in general, then provide the insights I have gained through my fieldwork using Goffman's performance theory, and finally I will account for the private security companies used in the analysis and how the process of neoliberalization allows for their influence.

4.1 Lobbyism in Brussels

The first week of my internship I was encouraged to go on an EU quarter lobby tour hosted by the NGO Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO). Margrete's advisors had told me that one of her and the Greens/EFA's main political focus areas was transparency, and therefore this tour

could be insightful. Perplexed about what lobbyism and transparency actually meant at this point, I joined the tour. We met up in a small park near the Parliament, and for the next two hours we walked around the EU quarter, a four-square kilometer area the hosts called a "soulless administrative district." Here we visited some of the major lobby offices located only minutes away from the Parliament and the Commission.

There are according to the EU Lobby Transparency and CEO, an estimated 25,000 lobbyists within the EU quarter. More than €1.5 billion is spent on lobbying annually which mostly comes from the big corporations such as Google, Microsoft, Shell etc. (Lundy 2017, 4) (Lobbyfacts n.d.). However, the practice of lobbying is not only conducted by the large corporations, they can also be smaller organizations, NGO's and national organizations such as trade unions, which I mostly encountered in Margrete's office. An important factor, however, is that money matters and the bigger the company, the more influence can be gained by their "ability to lobby steadily over time, at all stages of the decision making process" also evidenced by the fact that 60% of the lobbyists with badges to the EU institutions are from affluent corporations (Lundy 2017, 4–10). According to the host of a seminar on transparency I attended with the Parliament, a lobbyist is anyone who tries to influence policy; however, CEO argues for a vital distinction between activists and engaged citizens and those firms which have employed lobbyists (ibid, 4).

The actual word lobbying " (…) arose from the habit of interest representatives waiting outside the plenum, in the lobby, to catch politicians walking by for a chat and possibly deliver some documents (Nothhaft 2017, 15). Today it is common however, that "[l]obbyists are associated with ominous deals, unfair play and even illegal activities, such as bribing and black mailing to achieve the desired outcome (i.e. legislation favorable to their special interests)" (ibid, 24). That may be true to some extent, however, the EU institutions have since the beginning relied on outside expertise. The EU officially calls lobbyists interest groups (IGs) used as an: "an overarching definition covering the whole range of actors who carry out activities to influence policy-making" (EU Council 2013). It is written on the EU website that the IGs integral part of the EU is to ensure regulation:

EU integration focused from the very beginning on detailed regulation of specialized policy areas (coal and steel, customs). Its institutions and its relatively small civil service are by definition heavily reliant on technical expertise for policy definition. This has always been the case for the European Commission, as the sole initiator of legislation, but has increasingly become the case for the European Parliament too, as it has gained substantial co-legislating powers (ibid).

Although the practice of lobbying has always been a part of the EU "the last decades have seen a tenfold increase in lobbying practitioners: from 1990 to 2016, the number of lobbyists grew from 3000 to 30,000" (Nothhaft 2017, 15), which has sparked the debate on transparency and accountability. The influence of lobbyists today affects 27 member-states and around 446 million people (European Union 2020), however not many have insights to who lobbies and how their influence affects policy. In 2017 the Juncker Commission, with the intent to enhance transparency, set up the transparency register; a soft power instrument where lobby organizations can register basic information such as lobby spending, lobbyists with badges and who they represent, income and meetings with Commissioners. The latest numbers from the registry lists 11, 936 organizations (Transparency Register, n.d.).

The registry was a theme which took much presence when I was in Brussels, especially debates on how to improve the registry and also discussions regarding the forms of lobbying which take place were abundant. Today the Commission and the Parliament are required to register their meetings and the lobbyists as well. If a lobby organization sign up for the registry they receive 'the brown badge'- an access pass to the Parliament. Even though there is a push for transparency, there are still few guidelines and no sanctions if the registry is misused. All the information is provided by the organizations and therefore as an outsider it is difficult to know if all lobby activities are indeed registered, and most of the time the information regarding a meeting is rather vaguely summarized. So far, there are no transparency requirements for the EU Council, which many politicians and NGO's as well as the European Ombudsman believes to be an issue. In the next sections I will broaden the

discussion on lobbyism to include my observations in order for the reader to understand how some of these dynamics actually takes place within the EU

4.2 Lobbying: A Performance

The practice of lobbying is often perceived and discussed as the part of the EU policy-making which is hidden from the public (Mulcahy and Transparency International 2015). We know it happens but we do not know how and to what extent, really. It is no secret however, that lobbyism and IGs play a major part in how policy is formed. Lobbyism can in other words be described through Goffman's performance theory concept of 'backstage.' The area in which the policy the public can see unfold before them, can be described as the frontstage region, whereas the backstage is where the influence of lobbyists shape policy before it becomes official. It is the backstage which "conceals the amount and kind work of that had to be done (…)"in order for a piece of legislation to look the way it does (Goffman 1990, 117). As mentioned in the previous section, more effort is being made to push lobbyism to the frontstage through the transparency registry for example[9]. I will therefore in this section not discuss the outcome of policy as the front stage, but rather how lobbying happens as both a front stage and backstage activity. I have found through my fieldwork, that both lobbyists and politicians prefer the backstage when it comes to discussing political matters. Therefore, one might ask even with initiatives such as the transparency registry, if the practice of lobbying can ever truly be a front stage activity? I argue both yes and no as I have found that there is a duality between frontstage/backstage lobbying.

4.2.1 Lobbying in the EP Act

Lobbying literally refers to the place backstage (the lobby) of the Plenum where politicians vote (Nothhaft 2017, 119). Here it is still to this day common to see lobbyists discuss matters with politicians. When MEPs vote in the Plenum, no one else is allowed on the floor. There are however audience seats above them in which one may access from a different floor and

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[9] The Greens/EFA require all of its members to only meet with lobbyists who are registered in the transparency registry. If an organization asks for a meeting and they are not registered, the MEPs office has to ask them to first sign up. This requirement, however, seems to be taken quite lightly by some of the MEPs. I was also under the impression that not all of them were aware of this rule.

usually the votes are also broadcast live on the EU website. But one cannot directly communicate with the MEP once they are inside the plenum. When we were in Strasbourg, I have observed lobbyists hand Margrete material or stop her for a quick chat before she entered the Plenum. These lobbyists are however commonly someone she knows already or have discussed the topics on the agenda with beforehand either over the phone or via e-mail[10]. In Brussels before voting on citizens' petitions, Margrete often meets with the citizens proposing the petition or lobbyists who have an opinion on the petition, even during the meetings, which could sometimes last hours. They would meet in the sofa areas which are directly outside of every meeting room in the Parliament. This sort of lobby strategy is from what I analyze a frontstage activity as it is done in the open in front of all other politicians who may walk by and where a a clear 'performance' takes place.

According to Goffman "[a] performance may be defined as all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in anyway the other participant" (Goffman 1990, 27). These types of frontstage performances also take place in Margrete's office, where most lobby meetings were held while I was there (that I knew of at least). During these meetings I observes a "pre-established pattern of action which is unfolded during a performance, and which may be called a 'part' or 'routine'" (ibid, 27). The lobbyist(s) enter the office, sits on the couch Infront of Margrete's desk and perhaps after some small talk they present their 'routine' or in other words, what they want to discuss. As Goffman explains, "the object of a performer is to sustain a particular definition of the situation" (ibid, 90) depending on who the lobbyists are and who they represent they will try to come off as if they have important knowledge and information which Margrete does not. This aligns with Milbrath's (1960) finding, that lobbyists prioritize presenting accurate facts which are "accompanied by a set of arguments concerning the wisdom, or justice of the proposed action" (Milbrath 1960, 35),

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[10] In Strasbourg, there is a desk in front of the Plenum, in which an EU employee sits. Here you can hand this person papers or anything a MEP might need inside the Plenum. Sometimes Margrete would forget her voting card and I would have to rush down to the desk and hand it to the employee so they could hand it to her in the Plenum. You would have to know which seat number she is sitting in in order for them to hand it on. If a certain lobbyist has agreed with a MEP to hand him/her papers regarding a discussed issue they could get it to them via this desk, however it seems to be the norm to hand it directly face-to-face.

as the goal is to get the decision maker to consider doing something about the information presented: for example vote a certain way, or raise an issue in the Plenum to a Commissioner or suggest an amendment to a resolution or proposal from the Commission. While presenting the information and arguments, the lobbyists try to balance between a humble and knowledgably manner in order to 'maintain harmony' with the goal of the interaction to be sustained (ibid, 15). If the lobbyists are too aggressive or insisting and Margrete protests or disagrees on something, they will try to 'save the definition of the situation' (Goffman 1990, 15) by either daring to challenge her even further and convince her on a certain issue (these are usually people she knows) or as I found, they will try to agree with her on somethings, speak in a lower voice and be more submissive till she gets her points across and then they will get back to their routine. During these frontstage performances, I noticed however that both Margrete and often the lobbyists would try to create a backstage atmosphere.

The back region is described by Goffman as the place where the 'performer can relax: he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character" (ibid, 115) whereas the front region "may be seen as an effort to give the appearance that his [the performer] activity in the region maintains and embodies certain standards (ibid, 110). Margrete would never book a meeting room for her lobby guests to sit in, it would always be in her office. Sometimes it could get quite crowded as I and other assistants and multiple lobbyists were present, there would not be enough chairs and some of us would sit on these little Ikea stools which we had in the advisor's office. There would usually be press coffee I had made, which were poured in different looking cups and if someone preferred milk I would get the carton in the mini fridge. In other words, there was nothing which seemed formal or 'staged' about these interactions. When lobbyists asked to come by either in person or over e-mail they would often use the terms 'swing by' or 'come by for a quick chat,' a type of relaxed informal wording, even though the subject matter could be quite serious. I found that there is a prominent gravitation towards making these meetings informal, perhaps because in this way it is less obvious that the practice of lobbying takes place but also because the parties prefer a setting where "the guards are down" although this paradoxically also becomes part of the performance. This is a strategy, as Nothhaft argues that lobbyists use to "downplay their role

as straightforward interest representatives with the aim of influencing politics"(Nothhaft 2017, 126)

I also found that there were a quite a difference between the lobby meetings where the relationship between Margrete and the lobbyist was already established. The known EU concept of 'revolving doors' which I will also delve deeper into later in this paper, is a constant in my fieldwork. Revolving doors refers to the practice of lobby firms or organizations hiring ex. EU politicians or advisors and also the other way around, "[l]ikewise it is not uncommon for EU institutions to hire 'policy' experts who have had careers in the same corporate sectors they are then supposed to help regulate" (Lundy 2017, 142). Thus, some of the lobbyists Margrete met with had been in the Parliament previously and knew her from when they sat in office together. These meetings it seemed like were often more successful than the ones where Margrete did not know the lobbyists. Goffman explains that "[in]formation about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may expect of him" (Goffman 1990, 13). This gives certain lobbyists an advantage and they can play on the knowledge they have on the politician they are trying to lobby.

Pre-established relationships mean a lot, as trust and openness allow for a more backstage atmosphere. The fact that there is a desire for the informal backstage sort of interaction should not be confused with the fact that most lobbyists strive to get a formal meeting with a MEP. It is in these office meetings, that they get the chance to perform and if that performance is successful, they get to have influence. Thus, I found that there is an on-going duality between the frontstage and backstage and they are in the case of lobbying, difficult to separate. In the next section I will therefore describe how I observed lobbyists use the backstage to establish these relationships in order to get MEP meetings which, as I have argued, are a frontstage performance where the lobbyists truly get to shine.

4.2.2 Lobbying the EP, outside the EP Act II

A general critique of the backstage approach to lobbyism in the EU is well recognized, as it makes accountability nearly impossible and as previously mentioned, is a theme which is

often discussed both in the different parties in the Parliament, but also in the other institutions and especially by the by the European Ombudsman Emily O'Reilly (Dartford 2019). Dinner and cocktails are, however, a natural part of Brussels culture, and here I have found that lobbyists use this backstage region as a strategy to get meetings with MEPS. The big affluent companies will often throw cocktail events with lavish hours d'oeurves being served by waiters in white shirts and black vests. There will often be a bar section as well as glasses of champagne being handed out. There will be a presentation regarding new findings or other news and then the participants will mingle. These events take place outside the Parliament and are also usually described as informal events where a 'light dinner' will be served. Usually the company hosting the event will call to confirm if Margrete is coming, and if it was something relevant to her work she would accept. During these events the people who have arranged it knows who the MEP's are and they will try to connect with them through small talk. Even though this may appear as a very clear performance, where the company attempts to act in a way "in order to give a particular impression" (Goffman 1990, 17), this is also a way to create a laid back party-like atmosphere, a back region where one can 'put down their guard' (ibid, 115). Here the lobbyists will try to establish a relationship with the MEP in order to eventually get to have a meeting with them. I have observed how people Margrete did not know, would complement her and ask her about recent developments within her work. If they had good conversations, they would ask to 'swing by' her office and then formally call her office the day after. These sorts of situations where very common. More so, are the lobbyists attempts to establish relations with the advisors and even interns. Every Thursday when all the MEPs have left Brussels, there is rather impressive Thursday bar which takes place in Place Luxemburg: a big square filled with bars just outside the Parliament. Here advisors and lobbyists (and all in between) gather for happy hour. There is a certain bar all the Danes go to and here I often got approached by danish lobby groups who were interested in speaking with me once they found out I worked for Margrete. Similarly, Nothhaft also found in her study that:

> [t]o enhances the chance of success in setting up an office meeting, lobbyists attempt to find a backstage surface between the politician and the lobbyists. In other words, lobbyists who want an office meeting with the politician use

backstage strategies to cut through the large number of contact attempts the politicians face every day. Backstage is the normative organizing principle by which lobbyists get close to politicians to book these meetings,

Without actually having direct contact to the MEPs. 'Plux' as is the common term for this Thursday bar (a combination of place and Luxemburg) was an interesting place to observe, as this is by all means a backstage region where it is expected that the hard working EU employees and lobbyists all loosen their ties and often get quite tipsy, however at the same time also discuss relevant policy, negotiate deals and attempt to get meetings.

4.3 The Companies

The three biggest private security companies in Brussels I will mainly focus on in this project are Airbus, Leonardo and Thales (Akkerman 2019, 30). I have chosen these as they have been directly involved in the development of EU border control technology and research prioritized in MFF. They all are members to the two main security lobby groups European Organization for Security (EOS) and Aerospace and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD). In the analysis I will account for these groups' lobby efforts as well as to reveal their close relationship with the EU Commission. However firstly, I will draw attention to the process of neoliberalization, the lens that will be used to analyze these companies involvement in border control, to include the reader in the market logic which ultimately makes it possible for commercial actors to have a say in the EU decision making process.

4.4 Market Logic

In this project I aim to investigate how and why private security companies are effectively positioned to influence and define EU security and migration policy. More specifically, I question how these companies get to have a say in deciding on the proper security solutions which consequently contributes to framing immigration as a 'threat', as seen in the currently negotiated MFF. One explanation for this inquiry is to look at the process of neoliberalization. This view is applicable as Peck and Tickell maintain that neoliberalism is a still evolving process

which can be found in various neoliberalized spaces "through institutional forms and political action" (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383). It is therefore not valuable to look at neoliberalism solely as an "all-encompassing private force "out there" intruding on a public body" (Lemberg-Pedersen in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013), but more useful to view how it actually co-exists within specific contexts such as in the governance of EU border control.

Therefore, I will in the analysis look at the interactions between the public EU Commission and the private actors in the security industry, to show how the lines between public and private interest are blurred when it comes to EU policy making. Prokkola explains this neoliberal market logic, maintaining that "(…) only competition can assure economic rationality and thus should be produced by active governmentality. In this approach the distinction between public and private spheres is not approached as the limit of governmental practice but as its effect and instrument" (Prokkola 2012, 1320). Furthermore Leander explains that "when privatization increases, the competition for market shares expands the market for force" (Leander 2009, 612) in this project's case that translates to the market for the private security industry. This means that these private actors now have to act not only as technical experts, but also as security experts as the neoliberalized space within the EU. The neoliberalization of border control thus "(…) pushes the private security companies to become lobbyist, security advisors and public-opinion makers" (ibid). The companies therefore have to create demand for their own services by securitizing immigration, in promoting the best border control solution as their products "relies on the inscription of existential insecurities"(Lemberg-Pedersen in Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013, 161).

 The point is thus that the process of neoliberalization, where a market logic dominates and where privatization becomes part of the governing process, allows private security companies to position themselves "not only as providers of security services but as security experts, defining which services are needed" (Leander 2009, 612) which results in a reconfiguration of the relation between the public and private. I will show examples of how the private security industry has established themselves as security experts as they provide EU funded research

and sit on advisory boards, but also how it attempts to maintain this position through lobbying and building relations with EU decision makers.

4.5 Part conclusion

In this chapter I have shown that although there is a political push for lobbying to be more of a frontstage activity there is a desire for the practice to be backstage. Lobbyists uses the backstage as a strategy to get meetings with MEPs and once they are at the meetings, both the politicians and the lobbyists strive for a backstage atmosphere. Lobbyist try to appear as casual encounters, and often do this with success as they have preestablished relationships. However, they also try to balance this backstage atmosphere with their performance and objective of giving off a certain impression of legitimate actors within EU policy making. Therefore, I argue that there is a duality between frontstage and backstage lobbying. I have found that the desire for backstage interactions which exists within Brussels culture is not an attempt to be secretive or murky about the policy being disused, it is however an innate practice, or rather a ritual which I think is not even always recognized as lobbyism. Throughout my analysis of the private security companies' influence on the MFF, I will draw connections to my observations and findings on lobbyism in the Parliament encouraged in the neoliberalized space of the EU. Aspects such as revolving doors and the maintaining of relationships will come up as I look at the way these commercial actors influence policy. However, in the next analysis chapter, I will first draw the reader to the case: namely the MFF, and more specifically how the headline on Migration and Border Management frames immigration as a security issue.

5. The MFF: A Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends

In these analysis chapters, headline IV Migration & Border Management will be zoomed in on in order to unravel how immigration is securitized within the budget and what role the private security industry has played in influencing the Commission's proposal. An essential and continuous theme throughout this paper is the overlapping of 'security/defence' and 'border management/migration' as they often fuse together however not invariably. When 'security'

is discussed within the MFF and at lobby meetings, it may serve a broader military purpose, however it is also often related to border management and ultimately immigration. As Lemberg-Pedersen et al. points out "many of the products and technologies have dual or, or multiple uses (…) Border control technologies therefore elude clear-cut dichotomies like security/defence or civil/military(…)" (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 27). Therefore, headline V on Security & Defence will also be discussed in attempt to show the complexities of the private security industry's relation to the EU and to paint a nuanced picture of how these fields overlap.

To begin with, I will introduce the headline Migration & Border Management, then provide some thoughts on how the political reception crisis in 2015 already began shaping the future budget in this area. Furthermore, I will break down the Migration and Border Management headline into two parts: The Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) on one hand, and Frontex, eu-LISA and the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) on the other. This is done to show the imbalance of the budget in its limited efforts to protect immigrants and refugees over the protection of the EU borders. Then, I will look at the private security companies' relation to the EU and how they are positioned within the (in)security field to prove how they are able to influence policy. Finally, I will hone in on the Security & Defence budget and discuss how it has become a priority in the MFF. I will look at how the EU Defence Fund relates to the securitization of immigration and further how the private security industry has fought to make this a priority for years.

5.1 The Migration & Border Management Budget IV- A Union that Protects

"The Commission proposes to increase support to strengthen our external borders, to improve the asylum system within the Union, and to step up the management and long-term integration of migrants "(EU Comission 2018a, 14)

Headline IV of the MFF is broken down into two parts:
1. Migration – Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF)
2. Border Management - Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), Frontex and eu-LISA.

In the following section I examine each part to show how the Commission frames migration as a security issue. Furthermore, connections to the private security companies and industry will be made in their involvement within EU border management agencies as well as their lobby efforts which has resulted in the tripling of the budget for this headline since the last MFF. Before delving into the different parts, I will briefly introduce Headline IV, in order for the reader to gain a better understanding of how the budget is structured.

The Commission proposes to set aside an estimate of €33 billion under headline IV Migration & Border Management. This will go towards Frontex (the border and coast guard agency), eu-LISA and the two funds: The Integrated Border Management fund (IBMF), which will cover border management, visas and customs control equipment at the Unions external and internal borders, and the Asylum and Migration Fund which the Commission writes, will support member states' reception of asylum seekers and migrants, the development of a common migration and asylum policy (CEAS) and ensuring effective returns/combatting illegal migration (EU Comission 2018a, 14)(EU Comission 2018c). The budget for the area of Migration & Border Management has severely increased from that of the current MFF, which covers less than 1% of the total budget, to in the 2021-2027 budget take up 2.7 %. However, as shown below the majority of the €33 billion will go towards border management, while most of the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) will be spent on short-term integration and effective returns.

A strong focus on migration and protecting our external border

In billion euro, current prices

Note: Compared to the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at EU-27 (estimate)

Source: European Commission

(Figure 1: EU Comission 2018a, 15)

The figure above gives a clear picture of how the Commission wishes to prioritize the handsome sum of €33 billion which, as mentioned will go mostly towards the already established border management agencies such as Frontex, eu-LISA and the integrated border management fund (IBMF). In the following figure published by the EU Parliament one can in more detail see how the budget will be divided:

(Figure 2: Guilio 2020, 3)

More specifically, as mentioned in a Commission press release on the Migration & Border Management budget, €21.3 billion will go towards border management in total: The new integrated border management fund will have approximated a value of €9.3 billion, and more than €12 billion will go towards Frontex and eu-LISA. The Asylum & Migration Fund (AMF) is left with €10.4 billion, which is meant to support member states in, as mentioned before, areas such as asylum (30% of the fund), legal migration and short term integration (30 %) and countering illegal immigration and ensuring faster returns (40%) (European Comission 2018). Even though the overall budget has gotten a severe economic boost from €12.4 billion in the current MFF to €33 billion in the next MFF (Guilio 2020, 3), 66% of it will be going towards border management (eu-LISA, FRONTEX and IBMF). Further, although the increase in funds for this headline seems significantly higher, the actual budget for asylum and migration only increased by 1.5% from the current MFF, despite the much discussed need for resources in this area (Rasche 2018, 12).

It is clear that the budgets' imbalance serves as an administrative and institutional process of framing immigration as a security issue. Although a reform of the Dublin agreement, search and rescue operations, a relocation scheme between member states for asylum seekers, as well as safer migration routes are all topics which have been discussed and debated (Radjenovic 2019) (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2019) (European Comission 2015), they do not come to light in this budget. More so, it is clear that the Migration & Border Management budget is not intended to better protect migrants, but rather to prevent them from coming and more importantly, intended to protect the EU borders. My findings hence align with Huysmans argument that migrants are represented as a "collective dangerous force" in the MFF, posing an existential threat to the union (Huysmans 2006, 56). In the following sections I will explore this process of securitization and how it on one hand creates fear of migrants in the construction of the 'the dangerous other', and on the other hand creates a sense of community within the EU: a process of securitization necessary in the creation of politics of fear and in the governance of exclusion (Huysmans 2006, 57).

5.1.1 The Migration Crisis

"The migration crisis of 2015 showed that Member States cannot address the migration related challenge alone"

(EU Comission 2018a, 64)

In order to understand the structure and the imbalance of funds in the Migration & Border Management budget, it is essential to draw connections to the events in 2015 under the former Juncker Commission. The years 2015 and 2016 marks the time which is commonly known in the EU as the 'migration crisis,' as a large increase in asylum applications within the EU rose from around 620,000 in 2014 to 1.3 million in 2015 (Rasche 2018, 3). The relatively small number of migrants and refugees crossing to the EU, compared to other neighboring countries (UNHCR 2016) was not what sparked the crisis however, but more so the chaotic and hostile reception of them within the European Union (Ambrosini et al. 2019).
Not reserved to, but especially since 2015, the increasing use of metaphors such as "refugee flows", "floods", "invasion", and "an opening of the faucet" have become common in

describing migrants and refugees both politically and in the media (Arcimaviciene and Baglama 2018). This type of discourse is a powerful way to securitize an increase in migration and has an "an existential connotation" which frames migrants as the "dangerous others" or a force or mass, which increasingly alienates "them" from "us"(Huysmans 2006, 48–50). The construction of the 'dangerous others', however, is at the same time also asserting a more concrete unity. Huysmans highlights the importance of "(…) the specific method through which this carving out of an 'own' place is done" and explains that "[s]ecuritization constitutes political unity by means of placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat" (Huysmans 2006, 50). In this analysis I thus aim to show the securitization strategy of how the EU 'carves out a place of unity' by framing immigration as a threat. For example, in 2016 president Juncker addressed border management in his State of the Union speech and links it with terrorism. Under the headline "A union that defends" he points out that:

> Since the Madrid bombing of 2004, there have been more than 30 terrorist
> attacks in Europe – 14 in the last year alone. More than 600 innocent people
> died in cities like Paris, Brussels, Nice, or Ansbach. (...) (Juncker 2016),

And ends with "we need to know who is crossing our borders" (ibid), insinuating that those who conducted the violent attacks were not people living within the EU, but migrants. This is a clear example of securitizing immigrants, especially since there is no clear empirical evidence for that connection. In fact there is more evidence that the terrorists attacks were perpetrated by actual EU citizens (Crone et al. 2017). Juncker proceeds to present the new European Border and Coast Guard, (also known as Frontex) and the European Travel Information and Authorization System[11]. Juncker adds:

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[11] A system which" keeps track of visitors from countries who do not need a visa to enter the Schengen Zone" because" recent security concerns with terrorism and the migrant crisis have called for a better management of who is entering EU borders. The EU has continuously declared its goal of making travelling within its borders a more secure experience" (Schengenvisainfro.com n.d.)

> We will defend our borders, as well, with strict controls, adopted by the end of
> the year, on everyone crossing them. Every time someone enters or exits the
> EU, there will be a record of when, where and why (Juncker 2016).

This impression of insecurity is a construction of exactly what Juncker mentions: "A union that defends is a union that protects" (ibid). It is the construction of a "political community" which ensures that it is 'the established' who are in danger and ultimately should be protected (Huysmans 2006, 2). As mentioned before, paradoxically this notion of making immigration seem dangerous, creates the feeling of a 'political unity' by means of placing the EU in an 'unsafe' environment. Further, in the same section of the speech, Juncker announces the proposal for the establishment of the European Defence Fund and underlines that "Europe needs to toughen up, nowhere is this truer than in our defence policy (…) For European defence to be strong, the European defence industry needs to innovate" (Juncker 2016). As will be shown in the analysis, the private security industry has had considerable influence on the establishment on the Defence Fund which plays a major role in the MFF. This attention towards defence and industry is therefore not solely due to the EU Commissions constructed image of unease but is also a part of a security framing which has been created a long time ago through administrative lobby practices. This has led to, for the first time ever, a headline solely dedicated towards 'Defence & Security' in the MFF. Juncker's speech thus exemplifies how these fields of defence, border management and immigration are not clearly distinct from one another but rather blurred. This overlapping of fields, is analyzed by Bigo, who argues it to be part of a 'governmentality of unease 'created by different security actors in charge of the management of risk (Bigo 2002, 63). As Neal further highlights:

> This stresses the institutionalization of links between different policy areas such
> as external border control, asylum and anti-terrorism policy that have formed
> not simply in the statements of politicians, but in the complex technologies,
> knowledges and techniques of European governance themselves (Neal 2009,
> 352).

However, connecting immigration with the notion that Europe needs to protect its borders justifies methods of exclusion institutionally and administratively in the EU through for

example, extensive control and management of migrants as seen in the budget for Migration & Border Management. This 'governance of exclusion by security framing'(Huysmans 2006, 57) is thus not limited to speech-acts performed by people with political power such as Juncker, but is more essentially part of a process and routine which takes place through "administrative instruments and procedures"(Huysmans 2006, 57) within the EU. Therefore, I will in the following sections, take a closer look at the different components of the budget for Migration & Border Management beginning with the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) to reveal how the 'migration crisis' is used to justify the extensive amounts allocated towards border control as well as show how the influence of the private security industry has shaped headline IV to fit a security framing.

5.1.2 Discourse Criminalizing Immigration

Standard discourse within the EU as I have observed, and which is also manifested throughout the MFF is the use of 'illegal immigration', 'irregular migration' as well as 'human smuggling'. One will notice in the MFF that it is often framed as 'combatting illegal migration' or 'the fight to end cross border criminality.' I want to briefly point out how this choice of terminology is a discursively efficient way to frame immigration as a security issue.

One cannot cross over to the EU legally from a third country unless they have a visa (EU Commission, n.d.). Most refugees fleeing from war and conflict who get on a boat and cross the Mediterranean do not have visas. They are most likely coming to apply for asylum, which they have the right according to The Refugee Convention (UNHCR 1967). The issue is however, until they apply for asylum they end up in a category of criminals as they are entering a territory illegally. Therefore, one might argue that all migrants who do not have visas are in fact criminals, until they are not (if they are granted refugee status). Another fallout is the term 'human smugglers', who may be any person or NGO ship, who has helped a refugee cross a border. Human smugglers are often portrayed as being part of an organized criminal network, even though most academic research on the matter proves the opposite (Van Liempt, 2006, 6). Research also shows that due to the increase in border control: the closing down of borders and legal migration routes leaves immigrants with no other option than to rely on alternative and often precarious options (Crawley 2016).

I therefore question, where that leaves us in terms of the EU discourse on 'cross border criminality'? I do not point to this to undermine the fact that crime actually exists in terms of drug and sex trafficking and probably many other forms, but the broad category of 'illegal immigration' and 'crime' needs to be critically questioned when used administratively and politically in EU policy and research on security and migration. The word 'refugee' is not mentioned once in the MFF. This, I argue is a way for the Commission to distance itself from the humanitarian perspective which does align with the how the budget has been prioritized, as I will show below.

5.2 Asylum and Migration Fund

"EU Migration Policy that is robust, realistic and fair" (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:1)

The current Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2014-2021 was proven ill-equipped to handle the increase in asylum applications in 2015 and 2016 (EU Parliament 2017). It essentially fails to provide the proper assistance to the southern members-states put under severe pressure as they are the first EU countries many migrants reach and therefore have to apply for asylum in due to the Dublin Regulation. EU member-states are thus still failing to cooperate under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (EASO n.d.), which has had detrimental effects for both migrants at sea and those stuck in overcrowded camps around the EU as well as to the receiving countries' capacity and economies. Due to the inflexibility and limited reach of the AMIF to handle the 'migration crisis' I argue in this section that that has allowed for the possibility of the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) to be reshaped to fit a 'crisis driven approach' (Rasche 2018, 12) which ultimately favors the private security industry. Although numbers in asylum applications has severely dropped since 2015 (EU Parliament 2017), the primary focus of the fund is now to provide an immediate response to migration by "patching up the rupture in addressing the abnormal and restoring the status quo " (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 318). The focus is thus not centered on sustainable solutions and member state cooperation which would provide protection and benefit the migrants trying to make a life in Europe but rather it takes up emergency measures which deals with the issue on the spot. This form of crisis approach plays into the institutionalized practice and routine of securitization as the Commission proposes to spend

billions of euros on excluding the people fleeing from conflict and poverty from reaching the EU not only within the Border Management budget but even within the area of Asylum. In the following section I will give three examples of how the AMF is used as a tool in the governance of exclusion which securitizes immigration. Furthermore, I will argue how a crisis narrative allows for the prioritization of these securitizing interests.

Example 1: Asylum

As previously mentioned, the AMF is approximately worth €10.4 billion proposed to cover the areas of asylum (30%), legal migration and early integration (30%), and finally returns and countering illegal migration (40%) (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:2). Even though the budget for Border Management and Migration under headline IV, has been tripled in the new MFF, the asylum and migration funding only increased by 1.5%, a tiny jump considering the rest of the increase proposed for border management. This shows how "this imbalance relates to the maintenance of a crisis narrative in the Commission proposal on migration, which rests on the premise of preventing a repeat of 2015 as the benchmark for future policies" (Rasche 2018, 12). This sort of security framing is discussed by Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins (2016) as they argue that 'crisis' and 'routine' are relational and the construction of a crisis narrative is beneficial to the EU (and the private security industry) as it is "used to further pre-existing migration control practices and techniques of government" (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 316).

Continued disagreements from member-states regarding a reform of CEAS thus opens the window for the Commission to focus on migration in terms of border control as this is something most member states can agree to collaborate on. Therefore, when it is proposed that 30% of the AMF will go towards 'asylum' what is actually meant is that the Commission has -from that 30% - "proposed that 60% will go to the number of first time asylum applications, 30% weighing to the number of persons with international protection status (immigrants who have been granted asylum) in a Member State and a 10% weighting to the number of people resettled" (EU Comission 2018, Volume 13:3)

OF THE 30% GOING TOWARDS ASYLUM IN AMF

(Figure 3)

It is difficult to dissect exactly what these categories mean, as it is presented rather vaguely in the MFF however, as mentioned before the funds allocated seems to cover just the bare minimum of the 'asylum' procedure costs and should, according some reports on the MFF be more oriented towards aspects such as the insufficient support for reception, the process and relocation of asylum applicants, as well as a more effective and fair sharing of responsibility of taking in asylum applicants (Rasche 2018, 12) (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2018, 4), which remains the issue today, and if solved would provide a more sustainable plan, also in the case of a sudden increase in immigration were to happen again.

In the MFF it is stated that the Commission proposes to "improve the asylum system within the Union" (EU Comission 2018a, 14) however when zooming in on the actual numbers, they propose to grant only a small sum to the already established procedures. A clear indicator that a reform of the asylum system as we know it or even additional attention towards the area of asylum is not an essential priority, ironically even within the Asylum and Migration Fund. More importantly, as indicated by the percentages allocated towards short-term integration and returns, the AMF's role is now more oriented towards preventing immigrants from staying than to provide them with protection and give them a chance to make a life within the EU. These sort of "new approaches and responses are made possible by the disruptive quality of crisis" (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 318) and thus justifies the governance of exclusion, which comes to light not only in the performative forms of

securitization such as large border control operations, but also as shown here, on a routine administrative basis within the proposals of the MFF.

Example 2: Integration reduced

Another example of how the AMF is driven by a crisis approach and ultimately administratively securitizes immigration, is its focus on 'early integration.' More specifically, this means that the fund is now reduced to the immediate reception of asylum seekers and legal immigrants "via activities such as language training, information and orientation after arrival, as well as assistance to victims of human trafficking" (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:2). This may be the reason for why the 'integration' part in the title of the fund has been taken out to go from AMIF to AMF.

In the MFF it is stated that the Cohesion and Values budget under headline II will now provide support for long-term integration under the European Social Fund (ESF+) which promotes social inclusion, employment, education and health (EU Comission 2018b, Volume 10:2) as well as the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which provides funding to EU regions which have accepted refugees. Besides the mentioning of the fact that this will be removed from the current AMIF, a more detailed description of how long-term integration is envisaged is not provided anywhere in the MFF.

The report More Money, Fewer Problems? (2018) points out that because there are so many different programs which will compete for ESF+ and ERDF funding, both of these instruments will need an adequate amount of financing, which does not seem to be case in terms of increased funds for this headline. The author notes that"[a]part from this lack of additional funding, making (…) different funding instruments responsible for integration risks fragmentation as well as a lack of prioritisation and monitoring" (Rasche 2018, 13). This move to casually transfer the long-term asylum integration budget to that of the social and employment programs seems like a way to undermine the importance of investing in the proper protection and inclusion of recognized refugees. This, I argue to be a bureaucratic move which speaks into a securitization process in excluding even the immigrants who have the right to stay in the Union- a direct opposition of what is stated in the MFF namely to "step up the management and long-term integration of migrants "(EU Comission 2018a, 14).

Another point which is not mentioned in the MFF are the many rejected asylum seekers who cannot be sent back to their countries due to the principal of non-refoulement or other legal reasons[12]. The European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) express their concern with the lack of attention towards the integration of these people, who are often detained in remote centers around the EU sometimes for many years. They elucidate that "there is a risk that the suggested division of responsibilities between the funds is used as a justification by Member States to exclude asylum seekers and people with precarious status from broader integration programmes" (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2018, 8).

This indicates that investing in the integration of immigrants, rejected or accepted, is not of high priority to the Commission, more so is the ability to return them as fast as possible: A securitization strategy which creates and sustains distance between the 'established' and 'the other.' Huysmans adds that:

> Administering distance towards immigrants and refugees produces a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. This dynamic does not necessarily work in a spectacular, highly politicized way, such as highly mediatized identifications of enemies of a society followed by a witch-hunt, or spectacular forms of border control like Italian police chasing Albanian smugglers with high-speed boats. Equally important are how administrative instruments and everyday interaction shape ordinary social relations (Huysmans 2006, 55-56)

Thus, a clear example of creating administrative distance is by removing long-term integration from the AMF and mixing it into a pool with other social funding where it may very well get underprioritized depending on the member-state. This I argue to be an administrative securitizing practice, which ultimately produces an exclusionary dynamic, and ultimately affects how the social relation is produced between 'us' and 'them.'

Therefore, investing in the bare minimum of immediate integration does not only expose a crisis-oriented approach in the sense of short-term emergency solutions but also speaks into

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[12] Some countries, like Iran for example, will not take back rejected Iranian asylum seekers if they deny voluntary return.

a security framing of immigration and refugees in signaling that they should not be invested in long-term, rather they should be excluded and/or sent back.

Example 3: Efficient returns

The final example of how the AMF is part of a broader security framing is brought out in the last and the majority of the AMF's 40% which will cover 'effective returns and countering illegal immigration.' This means that the fund will cover the cost of coordination between the EU and third countries who are willing to take (back) immigrants, it will go towards awareness campaigns within the countries of origin and transit, and finally it will cover reintegration measures once the migrants are returned (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2018, 8). This is all part of what the former Commission calls an "important tool in the fight against irregular migration" (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:2). This once again speaks into a security framing of immigrants and refugees as a rather one-dimensional 'dangerous force' which needs to managed, without having regard to EU's external borders and its "increasingly restrictive visa regime and strict carriers liability [which] has a direct consequence on people's ability to seek safe and legal routes into the EU (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 318).

Because the majority of AMF is allocated towards this 'fight to combat irregular migration' it incentivizes member-states to focus on returns, as well as third countries to hinder emigration. There is a series of issues with the fact that the majority of the AMF will go towards these efforts. Firstly, this is a clear way to, as my former boss Margrete Auken would say: "brush the issue under the rug," and leave it to regions outside the EU to deal with migrants and for the EU to neglect its responsibility towards international law which states that all persons has the right to seek asylum (United Nations 1948). Secondly, the AMF should be a funding tool which is focused on internal affairs. If the fund is used outside the Union it should be, as ECRE suggests more clearly articulated and limited to:

> (…) include instances where the cooperation with third countries is within the domain of internal affairs, i.e. it requires the necessary level of expertise, such as for the development of legal migration channels or cooperation on return and readmission (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 318).

As previously explained the majority of the Migration and Border Management budget is already dedicated towards border management which includes cooperation between third countries, thus it seems inappropriate to have the AMF also be centered on that. Finally, according to ECRE there is also an issue with the fact that the Commission lavishly mentions cooperation with third countries without any mentioning of diplomatic relations and human rights standards. They argue that:

> Using the AMF to implement the EU's narrowly defined migration management interests in third countries does not only risk undermining a more comprehensive EU approach but also exposes the EU to a greater risk to contribute to direct or indirect complicity in human rights violations in third countries (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2018, 10).

This clearly shows that the focus of the AMF is primarily to exclude and distance the EU from the intake of immigrants trying to gain asylum which plays into the broader goals of the crisis-oriented Migration and Border Management budget whose main interest is to strengthen borders and reduce arrivals. So when the majority of the asylum budget is actually dedicated towards keeping people from getting asylum it goes in line with Huysmans statement that "[i]t is often argued that one of the purposes of increasing the number of deportations is to deter future immigrants and refugees from coming to a country in the first place (Huysmans 2006, 55). In the next section, I will hone in on border management, which takes precedence in headline IV of the MFF, the Migration and Border Management budget

5.3 The Integrated Border Management Fund, Frontex and EU-Lisa

"The effective protection of our external borders is a prerequisite for ensuring a safe area for the free movement of persons and goods within the Union."(EU Comission 2018a, 14)

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, an estimate of 66% of the budget under Migration and Border Management headline IV, will be going towards border management. Here the Integrated Border Management fund (IBMF), eu-LISA and Frontex all receive a fair share of the €33 billion proposed by the Commission. In the following section, I will zoom in on each of these instruments to not only prove how they contribute to the securitization of

immigration but also how the private security industry has influenced their dominant presence within this budget as will be discussed at the end.

I will begin with FRONTEX and eu-LISA as the Commission writes that the migration efforts under the proposed AMF" (...) need to be complemented by a strong and fully operational European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) at the core of a fully integrated EU border management system" (EU Comission 2018a, 14). Once again, I invite the reader to look at how the budget is divided in order to see how much of the budget is dedicated towards Frontex. With a standing corps of 10.000 by the end of the financial year, and with eu-LISA they will receive €12 billion, about a third of the overall budget.

A strong focus on migration and protecting our external border

In billion euro, current prices

Note: Compared to the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at EU-27 (estimate)

Source: European Commission

5.3.1 Frontex

While I was interning in the European Parliament, many discussions regarding Frontex came up. I was surprised to observe that there was a general confusion from many of the members of Parliament and their advisors about what Frontex actually is. Some believed them to be a search and rescue coast guard, others thought of them as being the EU police in the

Mediterranean and some advisors in the Greens/EFA knew them to be shady and less cooperative when it came to transparency in terms of past cases of pushbacks of migrants orchestrated by Frontex (borderviolence.eu 2019).

To clarify, Frontex is an agency within the EU established in 2004 which monitors migration patterns and trends and criminal activity across borders. They work as a link between the EU and member-states as the agency shares the information it finds and also assists national authorities in border control operations. The agency deploys staff to member-states as well as equipment such as vessels, helicopters, drones, and other technical and surveillance instruments. Right now, they have corps of 1.500 (which will be increased to 10.000 by 2021). Moreover, Frontex "supports Member States with screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting of migrants (…) assists EU Member States in forced returns of people who have exhausted all legal avenues to legitimize their stay within the EU." Frontex is a good example of how public and private interests are blurred within the neoliberlized space of EU border control governance. In 2011 its mandate was extended to, as described in regulation 1168/2011, "proactively monitor and contribute to the developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders" (EU Council and EU Parliament 2011) whereas it had previously been described as merely "following up" on research on border control (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 17). Furthermore, in 2015 Frontex's powers were expanded to (among other things), buy and lease security equipment rather than merely borrowing it from member-states, as it had done before (Akkerman 2019, 20). This, as Lemberg-Pedersen et al. (2020) argues positioned the agency in a 'double role' as it now both has to oversee and monitor research and development coming from the private security industry but also becomes the industry's "direct end user" (p.17), as will brought fourth further down when delving into the companies relation to the EU. Not only is this a prime example of how public agencies are configured within a market logic, however the immense spending on Frontex within the border management budget also represents an institutionalized securitizing practice as this agency's main purpose is to surveil and detect cross border crime, which as discussed also includes migrants attempting to seek asylum.

However in the MFF, the Commission tries to frame Frontex as a search and rescue agency claiming that "The role of the Union budget is therefore pivotal in supporting the

management of asylum seekers and migrants, in developing search and rescue capacities to save the lives of those attempting to reach Europe (…)"(EU Comission 2018a, 14). However due to international maritime law, a vessel passing a ship or person in distress at sea is legally obligated to help them (United Nations 1982). In other words, if a Frontex ship passes a rubber boat filled with refugees about to sink, they are legally bound to assist them. However, Frontex do not have plans to have specific operations which are solely aimed at search and rescue. It is therefore important to distinguish this difference. As the chief of Frontex Fabrice Leggi confirmed to the Guardian:

> I mean, in our operational plan, we cannot have provisions for proactive search-and-rescue action. This is not in Frontex's mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union" (Kingsley and Traynor 2015).

5.3.2 Eu-LISA

Eu-LISA stands for The European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The agency was established in 2011 "to provide a long-term solution for the operational management of large-scale IT systems, which are essential instruments in the implementation of the asylum, border management and migration policies of the EU" (EU-Lisa n.d.). These IT systems include Eurodac [13] The Schengen Information System (SIS II)[14] and the Visa Information System (VIS)[15]. This allows for data exchange between member states, for example regarding information on registered asylum seekers. Eu-LISA'a connection with the private industry can be found under their procurement team (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 18), where they express that:

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[13] database for identification of asylum applicants mainly through biometric systems (EU Comission 2020a)

[14] "largest information system for public security in Europe; allows information exchanges between national border control; customs and police authorities ensuring that the free movement of people within the EU can take place in a safe environment" (Schengenvisainfro.com n.d.)

[15] "Allows Schengen states to exchange visa data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to national systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of Schengen States" (Schengenvisainfro.com n.d.)

> EU public procurement plays an important part in the single market and is
> governed by rules intended to remove barriers (…). The objective of public
> procurement is to increase the choice of potential suppliers to public bodies,
> thereby allowing the Agency to achieve better value for money results, whilst
> developing market opportunities for companies (EU-Lisa n.d.)

This shows that the EU agency's connection to the private industry is essential to its technological development, but it is also important in regard to strengthening the EU-single market and developing opportunities for companies.

5.3.3 Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF)

Last but not least, approximately 9.3 million is allocated towards the IBMF, where the majority will go towards border management and visa, and 1.3 billion towards customs equipment (EU Comission 2018a, 104). Breaking it down even further, I want to explain what 'border management' and 'visa' mean in the MFF, especially because funds have already been allocated towards Frontex and eu-LISA which as explained are the EU agencies which take care of border management and visa systems. The IBMF's main purpose is to provide support to member-states in their customs unions "as the customs authorities have been taking on an increasing number of responsibilities which go far beyond the supervision and facilitation of EU trade and which extend to the field of safety and security" (ibid, 64). Therefor 'border management' and 'visa' essentially means an improvement of the customs Union. The Commission connects here again migration and terrorism as an EU threat in explaining that:

> A threat posed to one Member State affects the EU as a whole, thereby
> confirming the need for action at EU level. The migration and terrorism
> challenges of the past years could not have been managed by individual
> Member States acting alone and without the financial and technical support of
> the EU (EU Comission 2018a, 64).

Like in Juncker's state of the Union migration is constructed as something dangerous related to terrorism. The reason for this coupling of terrorist and migrant relates to Bigo's argument that:

The professionals in charge of the management of risk and fear especially transfer the legitimacy they gain from struggles against terrorists, criminals (…) people crossing borders, or people born in the country but with foreign parents" (Bigo 2002, 63).

It however also relates to the placement of the EU in a precarious and dangerous position which ultimately justifies the attention towards increased border control and the framing of immigration as a threat. Therefore, the main objective of this fund is to help member-states enhance border control in the detecting cross-border crime by supporting the development of information systems, risk assessments, inter-agency cooperation and furthermore in promoting co-sharing of control equipment (ibid, 64-64).

5.4 Part conclusion

In this chapter on the Migration & Border Management budget in the MFF, I have attempted to break down each component and through a securitization lens, expose how immigration to the EU is institutionally and administratively framed as a security issue.

What is striking about the AMF is that even though discussions on a reform of CEAS and negotiations on the Dublin agreement, the Union Resettlement Framework and safer migration routes are all mentioned as something the AMF should support and have been hot topics of discussion for years (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:1–2) these initiatives which work to the favor and the protection of the migrants seem inconspicuous within this fund. This, in addition to the overall imbalance to the favor of border control within the total budget for headline IV is part of a security practice which is justified by the crisis narrative of the 2015 'migration crisis'. It is part of the construction of the politics of fear as the EU commission "administers trust by (…) , controlling immigrants, deterring immigrants from entering and expulsing immigrants, etc. rather than intervening in the restructuring of the labour market and/or the national economy" (Huysmans 2006, 52). The budget for this headline has become 2,6 times as large as the current MFF, and the fact that the Commission proposes to spend excessive amounts on border control while arrivals are going down, only insinuates to the public and the member-states that there is not enough control as it is now.

As written in the MFF: "The Fund will (…) support solutions that replace irregular and uncontrolled flows (…)" (EU Comission 2018c, Volume 13:1).

Through the creation of this image of unease, the EU in turn gains trust from the citizens within it and they come to believe that 'we' are protected. The more the people within the union believe that they are protected by the Union, the more they will support it. As argued by Huysmans: "Securitization constitutes political unity by means of placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat" (Huysmans 2006, 50) and that is what can be observed to happen within headline IV, Migration & Border Management. This process of the securitization of immigration is not a new practice but has in collaboration with the private security industry been administratively and institutionally occurring for years. However, the 'migration crisis' in 2015 and the perception of the EU not being in control of its borders has allowed for these pre-existing securitization practices and interests to take the center stage in the next MFF. In the next section, I will account for the private security industry 's relation to EU, as well as the lobby efforts they perform in order to maintain their powerful influential positions.

6. The Managers of Unease: The Influence of the Private Security Companies

A reason for the extensive imbalance of the budget for Migration & Border Management to the favor of border control and the focus on the securitization of immigration in the proposed MFF, is in large due to the involvement of private security industry. Their influence on the Commission and collaboration with EU agencies has given them a powerful 'expert' position within the field of border control and migration which not only benefits them financially but also strengthens the EU-single market which creates competition and boosts the union's economy. According to a study conducted by the company ENCOYS as referenced in Lemberg-Pedersen et al (2020), "The EU security industry is combined to generate an annual turnover of close to €200 billion and employing nearly 4.7 million people" (p.27). A sound reason for the EU to want to strengthen the industry. Their influence however leaves out a refugee and humanitarian perspective which I argue creates a more militarized approach to migration.

Before delving into each company and their influence and relation to the EU I want to consider Bigo's perspective on 'transnational field of the management of unease,' (2002) which is useful in the analysis on the role these private security actors play along with the EU Commission in contributing to the securitizing immigration. The field is transnational because it goes beyond national borders, and it is managed by 'professionals of unease' which in regards to this analysis are the public EU agencies such as Frontex, eu-LISA as discussed in the previous chapter, however they are also the private companies and lobby organizations within the security and defence industry which I will now turn to. They are ultimately all the organizations "dealing with the control of access"(Bigo 2002, 64) of persons wishing to enter the EU. However, they also constitute as 'professionals of unease' because they are structurally positioned with authority within the field of (in)security and thus get to determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk. As Bigo explains:

> They are invested with the institutional knowledge about threats and with a range of technologies suitable for responding to these threats. They benefit from the belief that they know what "we" (nonprofessionals, amateurs) to not know and that they have specific modes of action of a technical nature that we are supposed to know about (ibid, 74).

In the following section I will therefore demonstrate how these non-state actors influence EU policy " (...) through strategies of public-private partnerships, lobbying, private-rule and standard setting and of framing their input as expert knowledge" (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 16).

Airbus

Airbus is a pan European aerospace company among the top ten defence companies worldwide. The company produces everything from military combat aircrafts to helicopters, to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) such as drones, to surveillance to data technology. Their Brussels office is located in the European Quarter just between the EU Parliament and the Commission. According to the transparency register, the company has three accredited lobbyists with brown badges to the Parliament. The company has had 193 registered meetings with Commissioners since the transparency register opened in 2014 (and the

negotiations for the new MFF began). Moreover, it is registered that company spent between 1,750,000€- 1, 999,999 on lobbying in 2018 (ec.europa.eu).

Airbus Research

Airbus has been involved in several EU funded research projects. This is a prime example of how processes of neoliberalization and securitization occurs, as "commercial actors frame their input as expert knowledge" (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 16) supported by EU public budgets. Among them are OCEAN2020[16], the first project financed under the European Defence Fund in 2018 where the Commission launched a Preparatory Action on Defence research (European Defence Agency 2018). The main objective of this project is to "(…) support maritime surveillance and interdiction missions at sea" (ibid). This is done mainly by using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Airbus (and its subsidiaries) have also been involved in the development of Eurosur (European border and surveillance system), a system which shares information between member states and Frontex regarding activity and crime at external borders (EU Comission n.d.) through the projects PERSEUS where according to Akkerman, Airbus received €5 million "to provide recommendations for the European wide integrated maritime border control system" (Akkerman 2019, 31) and LOBOS, where satellites are used for border surveillance (Cordis n.d.). Moreover in 2017 Airbus led a collaboration for Copernicus (EU's Earth Observation Program) to make its data used for migration and border security available to agencies such as Frontex (Akkerman 2019, 31).

EU Missions using Airbus Helicopters

Operation Sophia: Was an EU military operation which began in 2015 to "better manage irregular migration" (Council of the EU 2017) and to combat human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. Its mandate was extended several years till March 2020 to include the training of the Libyan coastguard, and "conduct new surveillance activities" (ibid) among other activities. The operation set up by the Council was not funded by the official EU budget, because "official EU money can't be used for military operational costs"(Akkerman 2019, 19). This however goes to show how immigration is clearly linked with increased securitization

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[16] Airbus subsidiary Hensholt is the involved actor in this research

measures, where companies such as Airbus contribute to the definition of immigration as a threat, in providing military equipment for border management.

Frontex's Operation Poseidon: Is an ongoing operation since 2006 which supports the Greek Borders with surveillance, registration and combatting criminal activity in the eastern Mediterranean sea (Frontex, n.d.)

Frontex Operation Triton, now operation Themis: Began in 2014, supports the Italian in border control and surveillance (ibid).

Leonardo

The company Leonardo, formerly known as Finmeccanica, is an Italian arms and security company. According to Akkerman (2019), they are the leading suppliers of helicopters, airplanes and UAS for Europe's borders (ibid, 32). Leonardo also has an office in the EU quarter with three lobbyists accredited to the EU Parliament. It is registered that they spent between 300.000€-399.999€ on lobbying in 2018 and that they have had 38 meetings with Commissioners since 2015 (Transparency Register, n.d.).

Leonardo involvement with EU

In 2017 Leonardo was awarded a €67.1 million contract by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) for remotely piloted aircraft services (Akkerman 2019, 32) which assist maritime surveillance operations in for example combatting illegal immigration (EMSA n.d.). The information gathered by EMSA is shared with other EU border control agencies such as Frontex. In 2018 Frontex used Leonardo's Falco EVO (drone) for maritime surveillance in order to "test its ability to monitor the European Unions' external borders" (Leonardo press release 2018). In 2019 the EU IT security agency, eu-LISA awarded Leonardo a four year contract to implement its Entry/Exit system in collaboration with two other firms (eu-lisa press release 2019). According to Akkerman, this contract is worth €142.1 million (2019, 32). Funds to eu-LISA has been severely boosted under the proposed MFF, as discussed in the previous chapter. Leonardo and Thales co-own a space technology company names Telespazio, which is also involved with different EU agencies, such as the European Defence Agency, Copernicus and Frontex (European Defence Agency 2017). Telespazio was thus involved in a space project "that sought to approve geo-information and satellite imagery"

(Akkerman 2019, 32) which is used to surveil and track migration patterns outside the EU. Moreover Leonardo has also provided helicopters and airplanes in Operation Sophia (Akkerman 2019, 32), and Frontex led operation Hera, a border control operation which identifies and returns illegal immigrants along the sea route from west Africa to the Canary Islands (Frontex, n.d.), and operation Triton/Themis.

Leonardo Research

According to Akkerman, Leonardo has been involved in up 24 research projects in which it has led at least three, some of them for the development of Eurosur (2019, 33). The first research collaboration project funded by the European Defence Fund, OCEAN2020 described above is also led by Leonardo.

Thales

Thales is a Defence and Security company from France, whose main production lies in biometrics systems, radar and sensor systems for space and oceans. However, they also provide technology and equipment for digital identity, aerospace and ground transportation (thalesgroup.com). They, like the other two companies, also have a presence in Brussels, ten minutes walking distance from the EU institutions. Thales do not have any accredited lobbyists with access to the Parliament, however they do have 24 registered meetings with commissioners and have spent between 300.000€ and 399.999€ in 2019 on lobbying (Transparency Register, n.d.).

Thales involvement with the EU

Thales has been involved with Frontex by providing radar systems for boats, and by providing surveillance systems for UAVs used in Greece for border control (Atlantic organization for Security 2012). According to an article in the Guardian, Thales among other security companies was invited by Frontex to a meeting in Lesbos, to pitch ideas on how to make smartphone apps and identity cards that could track migrants before and after they would come to Europe (Taylor and Graham-Harrison 2016). Besides that, Thales was also involved in a study for Frontex and the European Space Agency which looked at the use of high altitude Pseudo satellites (HAPS) which are among other things, used for border control and surveillance (esa space solutions 2019). According Lemberg-Pedersen et al. Thales was the

biggest beneficiary of the EU research and innovation funding program between 2007 and 2013 " participating in 97 projects totaling €253,8 million"(Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 21). In 2008 Thales led the collaboration on the research project OPERMAR "meant to provide the foundations for pan-European Maritime Security awareness by addressing the insufficient interoperability of European and national assets with a view to generating unified data models for seamless exchange" (Cordis 2008).

Even though the companies have publicly registered the amounts they spend on lobbying, they have not declared what they have used them for. Based on my fieldwork and the many events I attended, I can only speculate that these companies also spend a great sum on similar events, which as pointed out, are often presented as something else. For example, they could be presentations on new research, debates, or panel discussions. I also attended conferences with prominent speakers, which sometimes could last for more than one day. These events as I have described, were also usually quite lavish including dinner and drinks, sometimes even live music. Besides the events, the CEO lobby tour informed me of two other important lobby strategies the big firms use. One is paying lobby consultancies who offer services on influencing different policy areas. They basically sell "strategic lobby advice" and are very popular in Brussels (Lundy 2017, 11). One of the biggest consultancies, which we visited in the EU quarter is Fleishman-Hillard, they have according to Lemberg-Pedersen et al. had Airbus as a client (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 38). Another important investment for companies is linking up with law firms. They provide legal advice, and for example help draw up legislation. Many companies pay for this service, in order to have concrete policy inputs they can present to the decision makers, which the politicians then can credit as their own(Lundy 2017, 16). Moreover, memberships to different lobby groups as exposed below, is also a way to spend their lobby budgets.

6.1 Groups the Companies are involved in

As shown above, the companies have close ties with the EU in collaboration on security research, development of border control systems and in selling their military and technological products for missions and operations. This is a solid strategy for private actors to influence EU policy, as trusted relationships have already been established and as pointed

out previously makes an important difference in terms of lobby efforts. Still, in a market where competition is essential, private security companies "have to convince clients that the threats they are specialized in dealing with are the most imminent and the most real and the most important threats"(Leander 2009, 612). A way to maintain their positions within the field of unease is therefore to continue their lobby efforts. One common strategy is to promote and market their product by spreading it to as many channels as possible to "build credibility and create the illusion of general consensus on an issue" (Lundy 2017, 15). Therefore, the companies join forces with others in the industry in lobby associations which have the ability to boost their influencing power (ibid). Another channel is direct contact with members of Parliament and the Commission via intergroups and advisory boards as exemplified below.

EOS and ASD

All three companies described above are members of the two prominent security lobby groups EOS and ASD, with main offices located in the EU quarter. EOS' main objective is "the development of a harmonized European Security Market in close cooperation with the public and private sector, while satisfying political, social and economic needs" (EOS on transparency register) and "to ensure a more secure environment for Europe's citizens" (eos.com n.d.). EOS has no accredited lobbyist with access to the Parliament, however, have had 18 registered meetings with Commissioners since 2014 and spent between 100.000€ and € 199.999€ in 2018 in lobbying efforts (Transparency Register, n.d.). Currently EOS sits on the Commission advisory board on Maritime Security, whose task it is to "[a]ssist the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives"(EU Comission 2005). Currently the chair of EOS is Giorgio Mosca from the firm Leonardo (eos.com n.d.). Members of its board include CEOs from Airbus and Leonardo (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 42). The lobby association ASD, writes that their main purpose is to:

> Act as a single voice to promote the best interests of the Industry in dialogue with the EU Institutions and other stakeholders and contribute to shape effective policy and legislation at European and global level by advocating common positions (asd-europe.org n.d.).

It is registered that they have had 45 meetings with Commissioners since 2015, five accredited lobbyists with access to the EP and spent between €200.000 and €299.999 on lobbying in 2019. ASD sits on the Commission expert group on Drones. One of the directors of ASD Dr. Burkard Schmitt has previously worked for the Commission as defence expert (ASD 2014) which constitutes the common revolving door dynamic present throughout the Brussels policy-making and lobby scene (Lundy 2017, 16). This of course, gives the lobbyist a great advantage in terms of know-how and connections with other decision makers. Other members of the ASD board include CEOs from Airbus, Thales and Leonardo (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 41).

The Sky and Space Intergroup

Airbus, Leonardo and Thales have registered that they are members of the Sky and Space intergroup on the Transparency register. An intergroup is an unofficial grouping of members in the Parliament regarding a certain topic of interest (EU Parliament n.d.). As explained by one advisor on space in the Greens/EFA, "it is a way for the institution to connect with civil society and industry on political issues. However, because they are unofficial bodies, transparency regarding meetings, events and financials are difficult to obtain." As of now 45 members are listed in the Sky and Space intergroup group, however the outside members or affiliates are not listed. On Twitter however, I have found that the intergroup in 2018 hosted its fourth Aeronautics Conference in Brussels bringing together public officials and private interest groups. Prominent speakers attended such as the former president of the European Parliament, Vice President of the former Commission, president of ASD and CEO of Airbus. The conference was financially supported by ASD and gathered over 300 participants. It is written on their website that

> (...)this conference provides a platform for an interdisciplinary debate, by engaging policymakers, the industry and the scientific community, and aims at leading to tangible conclusions that will inspire future political initiatives (EU Aeronautics Conference 2018).

Intergroups thus represent a way in which these private companies and lobby groups in the market for border control, can influence decision makers both within the Parliament and the Commission, without being overtly transparent about it (Lemberg-Pedersen, Hansen, and Halpern 2020, 39).

Kangaroo Group

Moreover, the three companies are also registered to being members of the Kangaroo Group, registered under the transparency register as a Think Tank. This group is formed by representatives of all three EU institutions as well as the business, academia and media community. The motto of the group is "free movement and security" thus their main goal is the removal "(…)of the remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between the Member States of the European Union" However, "At the same time, we propose effective measures to secure the external borders of the European Union. We consider external security as a necessary basis for economic progress"(Kangaroo Group n.d.).

The group has 18 members from the EU Parliament who sit in relevant committees such as Security and Defence, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. It has 37 members listed as experts, who are mainly former members of EP or the Commission. Finally, they have 38 members from the industry, such as the Airbus, Leonardo and Thales (ibid). This is by all means a large conglomerate of public and private interest, which host events in the form of lunch debates and workshops both in Brussels and Strasbourg on a monthly basis, if not more than once a month (ibid). Although the group's website seems quite open in regard to their activities, they have very limited information on the transparency register, perhaps because so many of them are already members within the institutions and do not need access. It is listed however that the group spent between €100.000 and €199.999 on lobbying in 2019.

6.2 Part Conclusion

In this section on the influence of the private security industry, I have exemplified how the specific security companies have established themselves and try to maintain their positions as security experts within the neoliberalized EU border control field of unease. Due to the fact

that the governance of border control is dominated by a market logic where competition is fundamental, the actors within the private security industry are pushed to create the demand for their own product. As Leander explains " In the market for force, supply creates its own demand"(Leander 2009, 612). This thus leads to extensive lobbying efforts as highlighted above, but also blurred the lines between private interests and public policy. EU migration and border control agencies and developments such as Frontex and eu-LISA, which take a dominant role under the Migration & Border Management headline in the MFF, have been created and are maintained through an interdependent relationship between the private security industry and the EU. Together, as established professionals in the management of unease these actors thus rely on the fact that immigration remains a security issue. At the same time, they also encourage it through lobbying and partnerships with the EU as the securitization is of immigration is "a useful target for the use and experimentation of their technologies" (Bigo 2002, 77). In the next part of the project, I will move on to headline V Defence and Security, to further show how the private security industry has lobbied to effectively make defence its own EU priority.

7. The Security and Defence budget V - A Union that defends

"In the area of defence, the Union will need to take greater responsibility for protecting its interests, values and the European way of life"(EU Comission 2018a, 16)

As I have previously attempted to explain, the border control technologies provided by the private security industry are used for many purposes and its dichotomies are not always very distinct. Border control technologies can include everything from security, defence or civil, military equipment. However, the connection between these different fields and immigration has been made continuously throughout EU discourse, as I have shown both in the Juncker state of the Union but also throughout the MFF. Therefore, I find it necessary to also look at other headlines when discussing the securitization of immigration. In the above cursive statement regarding headline V in the MFF, the Commission states that the EU needs to better protect the European way of life. This formulation, as explained in the introduction, was also used as the title for the new Commissioner of Migration in 2019. This is just another clear example of how immigration is viewed as a threat to the European values, and

something in which 'we' should defend ourselves against, moreover it proves that a humanitarian perspective is left out of this policy area. In the following and final analytical chapter, I will thus zoom in on headline V Security & Defence, to expose how it has been influenced by the private security industry and how the Defense Fund is yet another administrative tool securitization.

The proposed budget for Security & Defence under headline V is approximately worth €24.3 billion and takes up 2.1% of the overall MFF. This may seem small compared to some of the other headlines however as an EU Commission briefing underlines "[a]lthough the European Union (EU) has already financed action linked to security and defence, this is the first time that this policy area has been so visibly underlined in the EU budget structure" (Jędrzejewska 2020). The budget is divided into three clusters: Security, Defence and Crisis responds which consists of both new and old initiatives. The old ones are for example the Internal Security Fund, funding for nuclear decommission and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. The new initiatives are the military mobility program and the European Defence Fund (ibid). I will in this chapter, focus on the latter as the European Defence Fund not only is visibly connected to the lobby efforts of the private security industry but also because this fund is by far the largest item in the headline, taking up 47.1% of the overall budget of €24.3 billion as seen in the figure below:

Heading 5 - Security and defence - € 24.3 billion (2018 prices)

Margin 6.6%
rescEU 5.1%
Military Mobility 23.7%
European Defence Fund 47.1%
Nuclear safety and decommissioning (BG, SK) 2.3%
Nuclear decommissioning (LT) 2.0%
Decentralised agencies 4.1%
Internal Security Fund 9.1%

(Figure 4: Guilio 2020)

The Commission thus proposes that €13 billion be allocated towards the Defence Fund, where €4.1 billion will go towards research and €8.9 billion will go towards capability development (EU Comission 2018a, 76). This is almost a twenty-fold increase from last terms MFF spending one the Preparatory action on defence and research and the European Defence Industrial program, which the Defence Fund is built on (Jędrzejewska 2020).

A step change for security and defence

In billion euro, current prices

Note: Compared to the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at EU-27 (estimate)

Source: European Commission

(Figure 5: EU Comission 2018a, 17)

7.1 The birth of Defence Fund

In 2015 the former commissioner of Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Elżbieta Bieńkowska set up the Group of Personalities on defence research (EU Comission 2015), a pre-stage to the European Defence Action Plan which was presented a year later by the Commission. The Defence Action Plan proposed the Defence Fund and "other actions to support member states in more efficient spending in joint defence" (EU Parliament 2016). Elżbieta Bieńkowska's 'Group of Personalities' involved several members from the private security industry: for example the CEO of Airbus, the CEO of Finmeccanica now called Leonardo, and the managing director of ASD (EU Comission 2015). According to the Corporate Europe Observatory, Elżbieta Bieńkowska, was the Commissioner who had the highest percentage of meetings with corporate lobby groups under the Juncker Commission (86.9%). She has met with the arms industry 37 times between 2013-2015, before setting up

the advisory group which indicates a clear connection to their influence (Corporate Europe Observatory 2017).

Furthermore, In November 2016 the Defence action plan was announced. Here the Commission for the first time proposes the European Defence Fund and its two components as proposed in the MFF: the research window and the capability window (EU Comission press release 2016). A few months prior, The Aerospace and Defence group (ASD) published a position paper on what they believed to be the most important aspects of the Action Plan. The similarities between the two are surprisingly apparent. The main points ASD wants the Commission to prioritize are: research and the " (…) development of European solutions for those capabilities which underpin Europe's strategic autonomy (ASD position paper 2016, 3).

Under the headline 'research' ASD suggests that the Commission allocates approximately €500 million a year in the next MFF (2021-2027) (ibid). In the Commissions press release on the Defence Fund they write that " The Commission intends to propose a dedicated defence research programme with an estimated amount of EUR 500 million per year" (EU Comission press release 2016). In the MFF which spans seven years, €4.1 billion as mentioned, is set aside for research, which ends up being approximately €5.8 billion a year, which is actually 13% more than asked for by the industry. Besides the general agreement between ASD and the Commission on closer cooperation between member-states' incentive to buy and invest in equipment together to reduce costs and strengthen the single market (capability window), there are also other similarities. For example ASD wants the commission to lift the ban on defence funding (ASD position paper 2016, 9), and the Commission thus states in a press release that they will "support the European Investment bank efforts to improve access to funding by defence supply chains" (EU Comission press release 2016). Under ASD's headline on 'The Internal Market', the company suggests that the Commission will give an orientation in the action plan on how to improve the effectiveness of the two directives the company has been part of reviewing. The directive on defence and security procurement and the directive on Intra-EU transfers of defence-related products (ASD position paper 2016, 5). These directives are both mentioned in the action plan and the Commission states that they will push for these directives as well as "strengthen the conditions for an open and competitive

defense market in Europe to help companies operate across borders"(EU Comission press release 2016). The Commission even mentions that they will "promote the contribution of sectoral policies such as EU space programmes" (ibid), which if you read these two documents back to back seems like an obvious salute to ASD.

When the Defence Fund was officially announced, Bieńkowska appropriately tweeted: "Good news for the defence industry: new European Defence Fund before the end of the year"(Bieńkowska 2016). And this was indeed good news for the industry as they had obviously been an essential player in formulating this policy. A very clear example of the powerful expert position the industry holds within the field of (in)security (Bigo 2002).

7.2 Part conclusion: A More Innovative and Competitive EU Defence Industry

The successful lobby efforts of the private security industry, and their relation to the EU has severely increased the prioritization of security and defence with in the MFF. This affects how immigration is perceived and how policy will be dealt with in the future. What seems most vital to the EU and to the industry, however, is in fact not so much the 'threat' of immigration and the protection of the European values, but more so the protection of the industry and its ability to boost the EU-single market. Bieńkowska demonstrates that in saying:

> The European Defence Fund is essential to bring more cooperation between defence companies and the military in the European Union and to ensure Europe's strategic autonomy (...) lay the foundations for future defence capabilities and support a more innovative and competitive European defence industry (EU Commission press release 2018).

However, the incentive to strengthen the EU economy and single market is framed, as I have proven throughout the analysis, to be part of the construction of unease and the need for the EU to defend itself and thereby protect its citizens. In order to justify the extensive spending on defence within the budget this construction of danger remains indispensable.

These practices of securitization such as the prevalent role of the Defence Fund in the MFF, I argue tie into how immigration and asylum are ultimately viewed. As Huysmans maintains: "[even when not directly spoken off as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that emphasizes policing and defense (Huysmans 2006, 4). The budget for Security & Defense ultimately demonstrates how the industry's increasing involvement with the EU is part of shaping EU immigration policy.

Conclusion

In this project I have examined how immigration is framed as a threat to EU security and how the private security industry has contributed to this securitization through their involvement with the EU, as manifested in the currently negotiated MFF.

By conducting fieldwork in EU Brussels, I have gained access to the social life of lobby culture and seen first-hand how companies try to establish relationships with decision makers with the wish to influence policy. I have found that in the context of a neoliberalized market logic governing the EU, lobbyists and politicians rely on one another in the production of policy making. These two entities cannot be seen as purely separate but rather interdependent bodies who are on a daily basis intermingled in various ways. This relationship, where commercial interest is increasingly a part of the governing process leads to blurred lines between the public institutions' work and the interests of the private companies.

By focusing on the case of the MFF, I have revealed how the EU Commission intends to deal with immigration the next seven years. They have proved that there is minimal room for a humanitarian response as the budget within the Migration & Border Management not only criminalizes immigration but also tremendously prioritizes border control initiatives and the return of immigrants. I argue that the reason for this imbalance is due to the EU's attempt to frame immigration as an existential threat, which the Juncker Commissions response to the 2015 'migration crisis' gave them the opportunity to do. The budget has been reshaped to fit a crisis narrative, which justifies the heavy emphasis on the protection of EU borders as well as EU values being under threat. The construction of danger is necessary as it carves out a place of unity: It makes the EU seem like it can and will provide protecting to its citizens. The construction of immigrants as a collective dangerous force, I believe will have detrimental effects on many lives over the next seven years. It creates an exclusionary dynamic between 'us' and 'them.' However, more interestingly I have found that the exclusion and securitization of immigrants is not necessarily the end goal of the European Union, rather it is the result stemming from the strive for a better and stronger economy. The EU wants to strengthen the single market, and the private security industry can contribute to that as the market for security and defence is competitive lucrative. However, the reason is it so, is in part due to the fact that the companies create their own demand, and the way to do this is

through the securitization of immigration. The private security industry is positioned within the field of (in)security as powerful actors, which allows them to contribute to definition of threat and danger. I argue that the EU and the industry are ultimately reliant on the construction of immigration as a threat as long as it keeps essentially boosting the industry and the economy. The EU and the industry will therefore continue to invest in and create new innovative ways to control and manage immigration.

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