

The Role of NGOs in the Aid Effectiveness Partnership

-A Case Study of Developmental NGOs in Ghana

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List of Acronyms

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AEF	Aid Effectiveness Forum
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDD	Center for Democratic Development
CPP	Conventional Peoples Party
CSO	Civil society organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DNGO	Developmental Non Governmental Organisations
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
GAPVOD	Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations
G-JAS	Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
G-RAP	Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisations
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IMF	International Monetary Foundation
ISG	International Steering Group
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
RAO	Research and Advocacy Organisations

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Jeanette Bak Christensen

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Section I – Introduction

“The Paris Declaration is a step in the right direction but is insufficient in getting real political change as it only touches some issues but does not address the inherent power imbalances in development cooperation.” (Singh 2008:1)

The power imbalance in the development cooperation is an important issue that needs to be dealt with. This issue is particularly problematic in the current development approach of aid effectiveness. The commitments in the Paris Declaration advocate for partners in development to cooperate in a mutual partnership, meaning recipients is encouraged to take more responsibility of this development strategy. This partnership approach, however, is criticised for having a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice, as the Paris Declaration makes an unrealistic assumption of donors and recipient governments sharing objectives and interests (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007). Furthermore the consequences of the partnership commitments have meant that the recipient government seem to be favoured over civil society in the donor strategy, the partnership approach (Hyden 2008). This meaning that partnership initiatives, primarily has been seen in the form of contracts between the recipient government and the donors. In this light, this thesis considers what impact the partnership approach has on the role of civil society organisations in a recipient country, or more precisely in Ghana. The focus will particularly be on the power imbalance between the partners in the development partnership, to consider whether the partnership is realistic to implement, and what role civil society organisation have in the power play.

This thesis will examine the above, using civil society organisation in Ghana as case. Ghana has an active civil society community, which also has been an active development actor since the 1990s. The civil society organisations working in development are, however, highly dependent on donors, which perpetuate the power imbalance. The aid effectiveness agenda have particularly become recognised after the High Level Forum in 2008, the follow-up to the Paris Declaration, which was hosted by Ghana. During this event several local civil society organisations participated to advocate for the inclusion of civil society organisations in the development partnership, since this was felt disregarded in the Paris Declaration. Because the awareness of the aid effectiveness agenda is high among civil society actors in Ghana, and because several organisations even have tried to take advantage of the partnership policies, it is interesting to consider their experience of the impact of the effectiveness agenda.

Chapter 1 - The Aid Effectiveness Agenda

For more than ten years, the aid effectiveness debate has been raging. The discussion culminated at the High Level Forum 2 in 2005 with the Paris Declaration (Whitfield & Fraser 2009) & (ISG 2008). The era of aid effectiveness started, however, with the Rome Declaration in 2003, where development partners committed to harmonise and align aid. At the High Level Forum 2 the commitments of the Rome Declaration were reaffirmed, and the following five partnership commitments were agreed upon:

- OWNERSHIP- Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions
- ALIGNMENT - Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures
- HARMONISATION - Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively effective
- MANAGING FOR RESULTS - Managing resources and improving decision-making for results
- MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY - Donors and partners are accountable for development results

(High Level Forum2 2005)

In 2008, the Paris Declaration was followed up by a new declaration being signed; the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).¹ This declaration, did not add more commitments to the aid partnership, but expanded the five commitments of the Paris Declaration. The Paris Declaration had been criticised for its narrow focus of recipient countries by accounting only for the governments. Therefore, it emphasised the importance of strengthening the capacity of development countries' institutions, and encouraged donors to align their support in a demand driven strategy. This should not only include demands from the government, but from institutions and nongovernmental organisation (NGO), who also contribute to increase the capacity of the country (High Level Forum3 2008).

Prior to the High Level Forum 3, NGOs organised themselves in an international steering group (ISG)² that organised research on the outcome of the aid effectiveness agenda in relation to civil society (ISG 2008). This research was presented at a civil society parallel forum, organised by the

¹ On the Accra High Level Forum 3 there were more focus on aid effectiveness, High Level Forum, refers to the conferences convened by OECD, to make donors commit to organized and streamlined aid activities. The fourth High Level Forum will be in 2011 in Busan.

² The theory defining civil society have many faces; it being civil society as either the (liberalistic) opposing the government, or the (democratic) complementation of the government. These theories will be elaborated upon in the section of theory.

ISG in the days prior to the HLF 3. The research created the basis of a position paper of recommendations from a civil society perspective, which was presented at the HLF 3 (Alliance2015, 2008). Furthermore, a large platform of NGOs was mobilized through the network BetterAid. The aim of the network was to mobilize NGOs from all over the world to participate in the parallel forum, and more than 800 people working in NGOs did so. The BetterAID network still exists as a platform for more than 700 NGOs, who challenge the aid effectiveness agenda (BetterAid 2010). These events have had a large impact of awareness on the aid effectiveness agenda among developmental NGOs (DNGOs) in Ghana, because several of them were involved with or participated in the parallel forum. Because of this event, Ghana is an interesting case to examine in terms of the role DNGOs have after it has been explicitly included in the partnership approach, and because the DNGOs in Ghana are committed to the aid effectiveness agenda. Civil society in Ghana is a large and diverse group, see chapter 4; therefore this project has narrowed its focus to NGOs working with development, which is why the term DNGOs is used.

Chapter 2 - The partnership approach

Aid effectiveness has become a significant buzz word in development rhetoric. In this connection, the concept of 'Partnership Approach' has emerged, as a strategy of how manage development assistance. In academia the term Partnership is often used, but rarely defined (Andersen &Therkildsen 2007). It has however been defined by Ole Winckler Andersen and Ole Therkildsen (2007) and Goran Hyden (2008), which the definition of the partnership approach in this thesis, has its inspiration from. Andersen and Therkildsen define the partnership approach as a naive concept. It is to be initiated by the donors' through their commitment to 'harmonisation' and 'alignment'. The underlying assumption of the Paris Declaration is that all donors have the objective of reducing transaction costs, and enhance local ownership. As donors all base their development assistance on different interests, the assumption behind the partnership approach is considered utopian, since it is almost impossible to harmonise and align their own different donor countries interests (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007). Hyden (2008) considers the partnership approach, more as a mutual partnership, with focus on both donors and recipient countries commitment to 'ownership' and 'alignment'. The partnership approach presupposes a high level of trust between partners, in the sense that there is a social contract rather than a business contract, where partners have more at stake. The recipient countries strategy has to trust that donors are willing to align to their development strategy. While donors have to trust the recipients ability to manage the funds, sine the donors will lose its credibil-

ity if the recipient country mismanages funds. The partnership approach is therefore a political arrangement built on trust (Hyden 2008). This requirement of trust between partners is particularly relevant to consider, since the partners working in development are known for their asymmetrical power relations.


The Paris Declaration does not constitute in itself a partnership, as it brings together national and international actors in the aid cycle with extremely asymmetrical conditions and does not spell out corresponding rights and obligations. As a framework for bilateral partnerships between donors and creditors on the one hand and individual aid recipient countries on the other, the Paris Declaration fails to provide institutional mechanisms to address the asymmetries in power. (ISG 2008:2)

These asymmetrical power relations within aid negotiations are highly relevant to consider, as it questions the accountability of a social contract, and whether it is possible to build a partnership of trust.

In this thesis, the partnership approach is here defined, as the partnership between government, donors, and DNGOs when committing to ownership, alignment and harmonisation. The three commitments are imperative to the definition because one presupposes the other and are mutually connected. The recipient country can only make an effective development strategy, if donors harmonize and align to the strategy.

Chapter 3 - DNGOs in the Aid effectiveness agenda

The partnership approach has particularly had a high impact on several International NGOs (INGOs) working with development. Many are actively implementing the commitments from the aid effectiveness policies: “We believe that the success of a partnership depends on the extent to which ownership, commitment and power are shared with the partners” (IBIS 2010a) Similarly, the Danish branch of Action Aid (Mellemfolkelig Samvirke) express their partnership approach to evolve



around local ownership. Recently, they have even begun to establish independent branches of Action Aid in developing Countries, to encourage local ownership (Mellemfolkelig Samvirke 2010). The partnership approach therefore has a large impact on the local DNGO partners,

through the INGOs implementing local ownership.

This thesis is focused on the three development partners sketched in figure 1, while also including the influence of the INGOs. The term ‘development partner’, defines donors in the new terminology of aid effectiveness. In this project I will however use the term donors, to use a concept familiar to everybody. Furthermore the partnership approach requires there to be several partners to determine the development strategy. The Partnership approach is a focal concept in this thesis, and the term development partners is here used to define the partners which combined comprise the partnership, as defined in figure 1. This triangle of partners is inspired by Lindsay Whitfield & Alastair Fraser (2009), who considers aid relations in Africa to involve at least three actors; the aid agencies, government and citizenry. Their research focuses on the relationship between aid agencies and governments when negotiating development strategies, as the partnership approach has made aid assistance negotiable, because the recipient countries’ now are encouraged to take ownership of their development strategy.

As sketched in the figure above, the aid architecture affects development actors reciprocally. DNGOs have been important actors in the development practice of Ghana (Whitfield 2003), which is why the new partnership between government and donor also affects DNGOs. In this light, this thesis focuses on the new development agenda and its influence on DNGOs in Ghana. In particular it focuses the negotiation power of the DNGOs in between the government and the donors. When focusing on DNGOs, it must be recognised that several important partners such as the business community are being neglected in the analysis of the partnership approach’s effect on the aid architecture. This creates a bias, however, as this thesis’ focus is on the DNGOs, which has little active engagement with the private sector, this actor has been delineated (IDEG 2010).

Chapter 4 - Civil Society in Ghana

Ghana, compared to most other countries in sub Saharan Africa, is considered to be a stable democracy. Ghana has had five democratic elections, which have resulted in two government turnovers, both happening peacefully. In 1957, Ghana became the first African Sub Saharan country to gain independence. However, it was not until 1992 that power was returned to civilian rule. This hap-

pened under the rule of Rawlings who also won the first two elections in 1992 and 1996. (Opoku-Mensah 2007)

Civil society in Ghana has its roots in the colonial role's charity and welfare activities, which have made civic engagement well rooted. Today, civil society is a diverse entity, which might be engaged, but not all have influence:


Civil society in Ghana can be grouped into three main groups, based on their influence. The most powerful civil society organisations are the trade union congresses, which include all the specific trade unions, international non-governmental organisations, the political parties, particularly the two major parties (New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress), the media and think-tanks. The next tier of civil society organisations includes faith-based organisations (predominantly the Christian and Muslim faiths), professional bodies such as the Ghana Bar Association and the Ghana National Association of Teachers, local NGOs and community-based organisations. Women's groups and consumer groups exerted the least influence. Active collaboration only existed between the think-tanks, NGOs, women's groups and community-based groups. (GAPVOD 2006:27)

Of the three groups, which civil society is divided into, the local NGOs are positioned in the second. This indicates that DNGOs have a rather low influential position in Ghana, whereas the INGOs

are considered among the most powerful civil society actors in Ghana.

The following will shortly describe the current situation of civil society in Ghana. An assessment report of civil society in Ghana has rated the country at an average level, taking into consideration the four dimensions seen in figure 2³. However, the report identified several challenges. The dimension; 'Structure' characterizes the level of

Figure 2: Civil Society Diamond for Ghana



(Scores range from a low of 0 through a high of 3)

Source: GAPVOD 2006

³ As part of an initiative by CIVICUS Civil society Index (CSI) to assess and compare a broad range of countries' state of civil society, an assessment report of the current state of civil society in Ghana was published in 2006. In Ghana the assessment was conducted by the civil society organisation GAPVOD, which used population surveys, case studies, interviews etc. to cover the framework of 74 indicators behind the four dimensions used to assess the countries in figure 2 (GAPVOD 2006).

citizen participation and organisational ability of NGOs. Despite a high level of participation, especially among faith based groups, the score is low, as only a small number of NGOs are considered active members of umbrella organisations. Furthermore, the level of participation in political organisations is low. Most NGOs are based in urban areas, where they have easier access to technological and financial resources in the cities. Resources are, however, still inadequate for most NGOs operating in the country. In terms of the dimension 'external environment', the score is also rather low, which is due to illiteracy, poverty and corruption in Ghana. This external environment makes it difficult for civil society to operate. Furthermore NGOs have limited resources available from state institutions and the private sector to support them. The last two dimensions, 'impact' and 'values', on the other hand, show better results. The 'values' show good results because of the fine practice of internal democracy within civil society organisations, and a broad commitment to eradicate poverty. The 'impact' of civil society work is successful because of the large contribution civil society has had on women's empowerment, and its high involvement of providing basic services to local communities. (GAPVOD 2006)

Chapter 5 - The Partnership Approach in Ghana

The partnership approach in Ghana was initiated with the government in Ghana making a poverty reduction strategy, see chapter 20. This strategy creates the platform from where donors and the government decide how funding in Ghana is to be managed. Funds are provided as direct budget support to the government, whom then become responsible for reaching the goal set in the strategy. If it does not achieve those goals, donors can decide to decrease their next disbursement. The government is now provided with more responsibility, also in terms of service delivery, which previously has been conducted by civil society (Whitfield and Jones 2009). Therefore, donors request DNGOs to be government watchdogs instead, and to commence research and advocacy, since accountability has become a focus area to monitor the government and make sure funds are managed properly. (Whitfield 2009) Monitoring of government's budget management has also become more important after oil was discovered. The oil recovery is expected to initiate in 2010, with high revenues expected for the national budget. Also, the World Bank (2009) has emphasized the importance

of mobilising civil society, as a strong watchdog is needed, to avoid the Dutch disease⁴ and to promote transparency of oil revenues.

In Ghana, the partnership approach emerged as a response to the critique of the Structural Adjustment Programmes⁵ introduced by the IMF and the World Bank. With the structural adjustment loans, public spending had to be lowered, which made civil society forced to take over the role of the service provider in Ghana, as the government was incapable of it. This, combined with the expansion of development assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors available to NGOs, made the number of NGOs grow from only 80 registered in the early 1980s to 900 NGOs registered in 1996. In this context, the DNGOs emerged, as there was a high donor demand for DNGOs in field of development. (Opoku-Mensah 2007) The favouring of DNGOs made relations with the government tense, as the government felt it had to compete with DNGOs over donor funding (GAPVOD 2006). This tension is recognised even today, where government only to a small extent allow civil society influence in policy debates. (Opoku-Mensah 2007) (World Bank 2009) The tense relationship between government and DNGOs complicates the partnership approach, as it is difficult to see how DNGOs are to be the government watchdogs, if they are excluded from policy debates. What complicates matters further, are the aforementioned rather naive assumptions implicit in the partnership approach of donors harmonising despite their differing interests, and development partners coordinating despite the asymmetrical power relations. This complex relationship between development partners leaves the role of DNGOs undefined. Therefore, it is important to examine these asymmetrical power relations between development partners, in order to explain what impact the partnership approach has on the role of the DNGOs in Ghana, which is what this project will pursue.

⁴ The Dutch Disease is the effect of an oil boom crowding out other productive sector of the economy, making the economy less diversified. (Isodec & Oxfam America 2008)

⁵ The structural adjustment programs, was initiated by the IMF and the World Bank, being conditional lending, requiring recipient governments to undertake liberalistic policy reforms to stimulate the supply side and improve the national and public finances (Oxford 2003).

Chapter 6 Problem Formulation:

To what extent do policies of Partnership in the development process have implications on the role of developmental NGOs in Ghana?

The problem formulation of the thesis will be conceptualized via the following sub-questions:

- In a historical context, how have DNGOs in Ghana emerged?
- What impact has the partnership approach had in Ghana?
- What role do DNGOs have in the development partnership between government and donors?

Section II - Methodology

Chapter 7 Research Design

It is the aim of this project to explain what impact the partnership approach has had in Ghana, and on the DNGOs. The research design of this project is built on the three sub-questions which will form the analysis.

As the DNGOs are a part of civil society, the concept of civil society is very important. It has been discussed by many scholars how to define civil society, and a further elaboration of this discussion will be given in the theory chapter. Two theoretical directions are chosen to provide an analytical framework of the first two sub-questions. This theory is the classical Neo-Marxist theory provided by Antonio Gramsci, complimented with the theory of Alternative Development, which is a bottom-up development theory, meaning it emphasises the importance of civil society in development.

The first sub-question is posed to give a historical overview of the political economy of Ghana. This will help to understand the context of which the DNGOs have emerged, and what role they played as civil society actors. The key assumption of this thesis is that the partnership approach is more of a rhetorical change of the development architecture, which only contributes with minor changes in the development process. To verify this, it is necessary to identify the historical role DNGOs have had, to determine to what extent it has changed as an outcome of the partnership approach. The initiatives implemented as a result of the partnership approach will be elaborated in the second part of the analysis. The partnership initiatives, which have had specific impact, on the DNGOs will be discussed through three cases, see chapter 10.

The final part of the thesis will consider the role DNGOs in Ghana have in between government and donors. To analyse this, the asymmetrical power relations will be considered through the theory of Michel Foucault and Joel S. Migdal, who both provide analytical concepts to consider power relations. In the light of the historical as well as the current context, this part of the thesis will consider the different roles of development actors, in order to determine how the triangle of development partners influence each other, and how they determine the role of DNGOs. Furthermore, it will be

discussed to what extent these asymmetrical power relations can become a successful partnerships including the DNGOs as equal partners.

Chapter 8 - Epistemology

“Social science is principally concerned with interpreting the process by which social reality is constructed by social actors” (Delanty 2005:140) In the philosophy of constructivism, the social world is believed to be socially constructed. The epistemology of this project is to be found in a weak form of constructivism; “social constructionism”, meaning that the social reality is ‘principally’ social constructed as the quote above indicates. In the weak form it is, however, the reality is recognised in the social process created over time. This process is determined by the historical context it goes through, making ‘social constructionism’ historically constituted. In opposition to that, social constructivism only recognises the social world as socially constructed (Delanty 2005).

The epistemology of this project has its backbone in the theory of Migdals, and Foucault who both see society as a result of a historical process (Migdal 2001)(Lindgren 2005). This theory is included to complement the analytic framework, which is, however, primarily inductive. The reason for this thesis to be inductive is that the problem formulation and the analytical framework are defined on behalf of the issues defined through empirical data. Data was gathered during my internship at the Danish Embassy in Ghana (2009-2010), where I was working with the Good Governance and Human Rights Programme. From this work, my interest in the partnership approach’s influence on DNGOs emerged. This made me conduct interviews with organisations I knew had a deeper knowledge in this field. These expert interviews have been used to define the problem formulation. Subsequent to this, theory is chosen to support the analytical framework. The objective of the analysis is not to falsify nor is it to build theory, but to conduct an explanatory analysis. With the epistemology of this thesis is the intention to get beyond current events, to explain how the historical social process has influenced the current role of the DNGOs in Ghana.

Chapter 9 - Data Triangulation

This thesis is based on a combination of qualitative primary and secondary data, since explanatory data was considered more significant to explain social relations, than quantitative data. The data

approach of this research is data triangulating, which means that the researcher includes as many data sources possible to enlighten the area under research. The selection of data does not require data to be extracted through one method, and the secondary data can have different research areas (Denzin 1970). The main aspect, they have in common, is the historical development process of Ghana, or the role of civil society in Ghana. Furthermore, theory is included in the triangulation of data, since the role of DNGOs also is interpreted through the use of theoretical data. The three sources of data: primary data, secondary data and theory will through their different perspectives enhance the validity of this thesis.

The primary data comes from six expert interviews, exploring the effects the aid effectiveness paradigm among different partners working in or with DNGOs in Ghana. As this is only a small sample, thus limiting the reliability of the study, secondary data is included to validate the results and discuss whether the results may be generalised. To a small extent, personal observations are included, since I had the privilege of participating during an evaluation workshop for Community Based Organisations (CBO) supported by IBIS during my internship. This provided interesting insight to the process of funding CBOs under the partnership approach. Since the primary data is explorative and were conducted in the beginning of the process of this thesis, the secondary data has also been used to fill the gaps, of e.g. historical insight. Several researchers have already conducted research on civil society in Ghana, and the history of political economy in Ghana; Lindsay Whitfield (2003,2005,2009), Poul Opoku-Mensah (2007) and Kwame A. Ninsin (1998) may be mentioned as examples. The secondary data is collected mainly from books, reports and scientific articles. This data has already been interpreted by researchers, which is why this data will have been treated tentatively, and combined with other data sources, for me to reproduce it. I have though been able to find two interviews, conducted for an evaluation of one the organisations interviewed, which has included in the analysis.

Chapter 10 - The Cases

“What is a case?” The less sure that researchers are of their answers, the better their research may be.” (Ragin 1992:6)

A case can have many definitions, and Charles C. Ragin believes most researchers will not know what their case is, until the research is completed. To define the DNGOs as a case also turned out to

be a great challenge, as this group is highly diverse in terms of being either a CBO providing service delivery in rural communities, or being an established research DNGO in Accra. Accordingly, the case has been identified as several ‘objects’ of cases instead. Ragin (1992) describes this type of cases as empirically real and bounded (instead of theoretically), without setting boundaries to the case in the research process. Instead, it is identified as an object through existing definitions in research literature. These definitions are conventionally used to describe appropriate cases for the research, such as organisations or families (Ragin 1992). The cases in this thesis are bounded by the primary data collected, and have been defined as objectives through the existing vocabulary in the partnership approach, these being ownership, alignment and harmonisation. The first case is donor alignment to DNGOs, considered through an organisation managing a pooled funding mechanism on behalf of bilateral donors, called G-RAP (the organisations will be introduced in the following chapter). The second case is considering the possibilities of DNGO having ownership, which focuses on ARK Foundation, as an example of an organisation which is doing both service delivery and advocacy. The third case is DNGO harmonisation, which the organisation SEND West Africa is an example of, as it is trying to administrate a comprehensive network, which is organising DNGOs in Ghana within 10 sector platforms.

The case strategy has continued in line with the strategy used to identify informants. Informants were chosen on the basis of their roles as representatives of various organisations in the development partnership. This strategy has been transferred to the definition of cases, where three organisations in particular have been interesting in terms of their work, and have been used as examples to identify the cases. This case strategy can also be referred to as the “maximum variation of cases”. The strategy is used to maximise the utility of the information provided from a small sample, to obtain significant information about various situations determining the case process and outcome (Flyvbjerg 2006). To obtain this information, examples from the initiatives implemented by the interviewed organization will be described, to determine the process DNGOs are going through, and what impact this has on them. The cases are not meant to provide a holistic and general picture of the impact the partnership approach has on DNGOs, but to provide a nuanced picture of what impact the policies have on DNGOs when implemented.

Chapter 11 - The Interviews

It was the objective of the interviews to have expert opinions from partners working in development to shed light on the role of DNGOs in the partnership. This area has only been explored by some INGOs, in terms of the impact of certain partnership initiatives, but not in terms of exploring the impact of the partnership of asymmetrical power relations. The interviews were thus conducted to explore the relations between development partners, and to discover how DNGOs in Ghana see their own role in the partnership.

Interviews have been conducted with the following:

- SEND-West Africa was interviewed, because they run the secretariat of Civil Society Aid Effectiveness Forum (a network mobilizing DNGOs). As organisations they have changed from community service delivery to becoming a research and advocacy organisation, monitoring local authorities
- The ARK foundation was interviewed as a women's right organisation involved in service delivery (shelters for abused women) as well as running a research and advocacy unit.
- Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) was interviewed, as it is a think tank with knowledge of the current political condition of Ghana, and because it has conducted research on the aid effectiveness initiatives in Ghana
- IBIS West Africa was interviewed because of their role as an INGO, which includes facilitating funds to Civil Society on behalf of Danida-Furthermore, they were an active contributor to the parallel forum, trying to organise DNGOs in Ghana through support to the AIF.
- Danida was interviewed because of its role as a donor supporting DNGOs through pooled funds (e.g. G-RAP).
- Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP) was interviewed because they are managed by the INGO, CARE, with only one purpose; to manage a basket of funding from four bilateral donors.

To develop an interview guide, inspiration was found from Peter Dahler Larsen (2008), who gives *“three reasons for not determining categories of an inquiry in advance”*:

- “The field of study is yet relatively unexplored
- The field of study is multiple and complex, consisting of disorganised structures of information etc.
- The field of study is made up of cultural constructions, created by the field itself. These can by definition not be understood by the researcher before the research has been undertaken”
(Larsen 2008:25)

These reasons are all identified in this research area as there has not been focus on the dynamics and relations both between DNGOs and the development partners. This study is furthermore considered complex in terms of exploring power relations, as these are made up of cultural, social and historical structures. Therefore, the interviews have been of an explorative character, and the questions were moderated according to the position of the informant, whether being from a local DNGO, a donor or an INGO. To guide me through the interview, and for me to remember the areas that were to be enlightened upon, a semi-structured guide was however developed. A semi-structured guide contains an outline of topics to be covered, with suggested questions (Kvale 1996). These topics secure that all interviews are possible to compare afterwards. The interview guide was developed around the following four topics:

- Aid effectiveness and the new role of CSOs in relation to government
- Relations between CSOs in Ghana
- Challenges of being the middleman (e.g. G-RAP)
- Effectiveness of the aid effectiveness agenda

It is important to note that said topics and the correlating interview questions were not necessarily relevant for all informants, since the informants represented different organisation, and did not have the same knowledge. The themes were developed under the assumption that they would cover the main challenges which the DNGOs experience in relation to the partnership approach. The full interview guide is enclosed in the appendix.

The interviews were transcribed and coded in three new themes, which also define the cases. To analyse and code the interviews, the concept of “meaning condensation” was utilised. Steinar Kvale

(1996) defined this approach as a discipline, which does not transform data into quantitative units, but instead presents condensations of the meaning and deals with the expressed information in a systematic way. This approach was applied by first coding the interviews into the following three themes: 1) Donor alignment to DNGOs; 2) DNGO ownership of projects – is it possible; 3) Harmonisation of DNGOs. These themes also define the cases, and the condensation of information is therefore presented in matrixes with each case.

Chapter 12 - The Unperceived Biases

The relatively small research sample collected, and my role as an intern at the Danish Embassy caused certain limitations and biases. The following will explain how I dealt with these biases. This is inspired by Robert Chambers (2008) who identifies six biases, which he calls the “Rural poverty unperceived”. First, there is the ‘*spatial bias*’, or urban bias. This is the result of research mediated through impressions given from a vehicle, when driving from the urban area to the rural communities, on a short ‘touristy’ visit. These short visits do not provide enough insight into the conditions in the rural community. The second bias, ‘*project bias*’, is also a result of these tourist visits, since researchers often are sent to successful places aid workers are familiar with, because projects are implemented there. These places do not show a representative picture of the rural areas in developing countries. This thesis can be claimed biased in terms of the informants all represent established organisations in or near Accra. However, what may seem a limitation, can also be seen as an advantage in this thesis, since the informants have been chosen because of their active role and commitment of the partnership approach. Furthermore, the role of rural CBOs in the development partnership is given critical attention in the analysis, since there is a tendency that donors neglect these organisations in their current civil society strategy. As there has not been conducted any interviews with CBOs, this might have caused bias in term of the third ‘*the unseen and the unknown*’. It was however considered necessary to narrow down the area of research. The fourth and fifth biases; ‘*personal bias*’ and ‘*professional bias*’ does in this project overlap. The ‘*personal bias*’ occurs when informants are not representative, of the group studied, whereas the latter refers to the interviewer’s professional training and personal values. In this thesis, it might appear limiting that informants represent the elite among DNGOs, or the professionals working with or in a DNGO. To conduct expert interviews, however, this was considered necessary, to chose informants working in or with DNGOs, in positions where they would have a comprehensive overview.

Finally, the '*diplomatic bias*' occurs when an interviewer is too polite to confront sensitive issues. This bias is important to consider, as the interviews were conducted at a time where I was an intern at the Danish Embassy, which did force me to pose critical questions with care. Furthermore this might also have made informants reluctant to be too critical of Danida. I used a strategy of full disclosure in regards to my work at the Embassy. My association with the Embassy was used as a gateway to get in contact with informants. Moreover, this bias was addressed by making clear both prior and during the interview that the research was to be used for this thesis only. Informants were not shy to make critical comments about donors in general, thus making their general comments of donors valid. Comments about the work of Danida, however, have been excluded to avoid bias. In spite of my position at the Embassy, I did pose donor critical questions, and I have used critical theory to explain the consequences of the partnership approach in the analysis section. I was therefore able to overcome my supposed bias in regards to my 'profession' of being an intern at the Danish embassy.

Section III - Theory

Chapter 13 – Introduction to Theory

The concept of civil society is used as a theoretical concept in the social sciences, and has its roots in different philosophical directions, e.g. Alexis de Tocqueville representing a liberal view with his analysis of civil society being the counterbalance to individualism and the central state; or Gramsci representing the Marxist view, considering civil society to be an integrated part, thus a separate entity, within the capitalist state (Hardt 1995). The two directions to be included here are those outlined by Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. *“While Gramsci highlights the democratic potentials of the institutions of civil society, Foucault makes clear that civil society is a society founded on discipline and that the education it offers is a diffuse network of normalization.”* (Hardt 1995:33). In spite of them being critical towards capitalism, Foucault is also critical in terms of defining civil society as a separate entity. Foucault considers society to be constructed on disciplinary mechanisms, making civil society a dependent entity. Gramsci provides the more classical notion of civil society, as it being a democratic necessity. The two interpretations will be used separately in the analysis.

In the analysis, Gramsci will be used to explain how civil society has developed in Ghana, and how DNGOs became an important factor in development, because of the notion of civil society being a democratic necessity. This idea is also associated with Alternative Development theory, which extended the concept of civil society from being an analytical concept to a practical concept. Implementing a theoretical concept into practice has not been without challenges, as we will see in the analysis. The theory of Alternative Development is therefore described in addition to the classical Gramscian version of civil society.

The second part of the theory section focuses on power relations. Foucault, with his constructivist definition of power mechanisms, is in this context relevant to include, as these mechanisms are said to determine the social processes in society. The aspect of power relations is included to consider the implications of the partnership approach, as it implicates partners having asymmetrical power relations. As the theories of Gramsci and Foucault both were developed in a western context, a third theory, which has more a dynamic approach to the analysis of society and power relations, is included by Joel S. Migdal. Migdal analyses society with a process oriented approach, meaning the

relationship between actors contributes to the development and change in society. Migdal has created his theory with elements from a variety of different theories, from Weber to System Theory. Migdal's theory will be used to consider how the process of development has occurred through time in Ghana, by defragmenting each actor in a case. In the context of a developing country, there are several actors involved in decision-making, which make this approach of defragmentation relevant.

Chapter 14 - Civil Society

As civil society is an important concept in this thesis, this chapter will clarify the origin and diversity of concept.

In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

(Centre for Civil Society)

This quote is one among many definitions of civil society. This quote shows the diversity inherent in the concept. Because of this diversity, civil society has been defined numerous times and has been interpreted through several theoretical orientations. The concept is essentially considered to be linked to the modern idea of labour defined by Hegel, who was the first to differentiate between civil society and political society (the state).

*...the standard German translation of the English "civil society," which Hegel used, was *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, or "bourgeois society." This fact alone should lead us to focus on the relationship between Hegel's conception of civil society and the conceptions, widespread at the time, of the civilizing process contained in market exchange and capitalist relations of production.*

(Hardt 1995:28).

The differentiation, Hegel made, was not to distinguish citizens from the political society, which the civil society later has become to known as. Instead, Hegel considers the 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft' or the 'bourgeois society' to initiate the civilising process of the capitalist system. Through this process it organise the civil society, which then becomes a contrast to the political realm. Hegel's original concept of civil society has been modified many times, but there are traces of his definition to be found in the theoretical works of both Gramsci and Foucault.

14.2 Antonio Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci, (1891-1937)⁶, has through his writing contributed with a description of two organic opposing forces in society, one being civil society, which is either against or with the second force being the state. Gramsci definition of these two forces has been of great importance to the western understanding of civil society. (Katz 2006)

Gramsci advocates that change emerges through an organic dialectical relationship between a hegemonic and a counter-hegemonic force. The hegemonic dominant force in society inform about norms, values and tastes, whereas the counter-hegemonic force either promotes or resists this information given by the dominant force (Katz 2006). The counter-hegemonic force can be considered as what Gramsci refers to as the subaltern classes. These are groups, who are not unified and have a history that is intertwined with that of civil society. In each group, one will tend to exercise hegemony of the group by including elements from the hegemonic group or other similar subaltern groups. The hegemonic force is often a reference to the state in Gramsci writings, but it can also refer to other dominant forces e.g. educated people. (Gramsci, Smith & Nowell 2001)

The two forces can be discussed in terms of their definition. Gramsci describes the role of the state and civil society differently, according to the situation, which makes the concepts difficult to operationalise.

Gramsci describes the State in the West as “an outer ditch, behind which there stand a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks”.... The State is elsewhere defined as “political society + civil society”, and elsewhere again as a balance between political society and civil society. In yet another passage, Gramsci stresses that “in concrete reality, civil society and State are one and the same.

(Gramsci, Smith & Nowell 2001:447)

The state can be considered a dominant force, which utilises groups from the civil society to secure the dominant class. Civil society can in this context be considered an extended version of the state, or a revisionist serving the state. The state can contain elements of political society and civil soci-

⁶ Gramsci did most of his writings while being imprisoned in Italy from 1929 to 1935, as a political prisoner under the fascist regime. This section is based upon a compilation of Gramsci's prison writings, made by Quentin Smith and Geoffrey Nowell as editors (1971), complimented with secondary writings from (Katz 2006).

ety, or it can be the instrument conforming civil society into the economical structure. All examples do, however, have their dialectical relationship in common. Since Gramsci was a revolutionist Marxist, the dominant and counter-dominant forces are not to be neglected, as these two movements reciprocally shape one another. (Gramsci, Smith & Nowell 2001) (Katz, 2006) The different descriptions have, however, opened up for different interpretations of how autonomous civil society can be.

The reason for the different definitions may be found in the different contexts the two movements are situated in, which can either be organic or of crises. *“The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the state, and their history is essentially the history of state and of groups of state. ... the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and civil society”* (Gramsci in Gramsci, Smith and Nowell 2001:202) Gramsci believed that this organic relationship could not continue, which is why the counter-hegemonic force has to release itself from the string tying it to the state, and organise in movements, for a strong leadership from below to emerge. The counter-movement needs to mobilise through consciousness and education. To challenge the hegemonic force, the counter-hegemonic force must organise into one group with a common ideology and objective, before a revolution can be attempted. (Katz 2006)

14.3 The Idea of Civil Society as a Tool for Democracy

Gramsci offers an ‘idea’ of civil society being the counterforce necessary in a democratic society, as either the counter-force to challenge the state when it is needed, or to promote the ideas of the state. Whitfield (2003) believes that through time, this idea has been turned into a ‘conventional idea’ of civil society being an agent of democratisation. Civil society is an entity embracing many parts of society, which makes it naive to consider it as a collective agent of democratisation. Donors have though been inspired by this conventional idea, and implemented it in their development strategies. (Whitfield 2003) The reason for this is found in the promoting of the conventional idea by several academics, who, during the 1980s and 1990s, wrote about what ‘Alternative Development’ (Piet-erse 2000). Alternative Development is a reaction to the neoliberal development agenda promoted by the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, often referred to as the “Washington Consen-

sus”⁷. The idea behind alternative development is to use resources at grass root level, such as knowledge and capacity from local communities to evoke social change. Alternative development has a bottom-up perspective, and it is more practice oriented than it is theoretical by nature. (Piet-erse 2000) Representatives of this approach are among others David Korten, Robert Chambers and John Friedmann. Here, particular attention is paid to Korten (1990), who in his book ”Getting to the 21st century” recognises a growing consensus of what he calls a ‘people-centred’ development vision. This vision is driven by the well-being of people and the environment in an equity-led sustainable growth strategy, opposed to the conventional growth-centred strategy, which expects a trickle-down effect when helping the rich to become richer. The people-centred approach is defined by Korten as follows: *“Development is a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations”* (Korten 1990:67) Thus, the capacity building on people's own aspirations is an important focus in the people-centred approach. Korten (1990) acknowledges that one good initiative has led from the 1980s developing policies, the focus on civil society. This has though brought along with it a certain degree of confusion as to what civil society should be defined as. Therefore, Korten differentiates NGOs into categories to illustrate that civil society cannot be considered a unified entity. The categories are as follows:

- Voluntary Organisations that pursue a social mission driven by a commitment to shared values.
- Public Service Contractors that function as market oriented non-profit business serving public purposes.
- People’s Organizations that represent their members’ interests, have member accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant.
- Governmental Nongovernmental Organizations that are creations of government and serve as instruments of government policy.

(Korten 1990:2)

Voluntary organisations are defined as having an important position, as it is considered an independent entity in a dynamic self-sustaining development process. The society has three primary types of third-party organisations – government, business and voluntary organisations – from where each is based on the belief of it serving an essential function in a relationship of need between the

⁷ The Washington Consensus was a neoliberal development approach which emerged in the 1980s. It implements privatization and deregulation, with the idea to shrink the role of the state and to encourage foreign direct investment (McLean & McMillian 2003).

three of them. The three parties are furthermore distinguished by their level of resources and power. Government has a predominant role, because it enforces rules limiting behaviour of citizens to preserve social order, and it can stimulate the environment for entrepreneurship and wealth creation. The comparative advantage of actual wealth creation does, however, belong to business, while the voluntary organisations have the capability of stimulating social innovation. Voluntary organisations are built upon values and are able to define their positions more clearly, in order to press for innovative solutions. Korten (1990) describes voluntary organisations in line with Gramsci's counter-hegemonic force to be the catalyst of change, implementing the theoretical idea of a counter-hegemonic force in development theory.

Other important concepts in Alternative Development have been emphasized by Chambers (1997). These are 'participation' and 'empowerment'. Participation entered the development vocabulary in the 1980s and has been used repeatedly since. Chambers focused on rural participation through facilitation of locals, to use their own capacity. The capacity building would then have the effect of empowering people, as they would be able to provide for themselves (Chambers 1997). The approach of participation, has in term of ownership, been evolved to include 'participation' at governmental level.

The theoretical aspects of civil society introduced here; the classical Gramscian version and the practical people centred approach will be used both to describe whether DNGOs in Ghana have become a conventional idea, and to explain the role of DNGOs. These theories are also used to enlighten on Whitfield's (2003) critique of civil society becoming a 'conventional idea'. The people-centred idea behind alternative development, she believes, has made civil society a constructive tool and a key to constructive change. Because civil society is a diverse force, it is limited, when understood as a constructive tool. The analytical category of civil society should go beyond the 'idea', and instead consider civil society as the dynamic entity it is, and as an analytical tool for understanding historical processes. To do this, it is necessary to include theory considering the process DNGOs have been through to get beyond the idea. Therefore, the following part focuses on power relations in a historical context, to explain how the development partnership influences the DNGOs in Ghana.

Chapter 15 – Power Relations

15.1 Foucault's Mechanisms of Power

Michel Foucault⁸ (1926-1984) is the author of an extensive theoretical approach. The main focus is here on Foucault's power mechanisms, and his theory of power. This theory introduces mechanisms, which has been determined through social processes, in a historical context, and today is recognised in the composition of society and how we interact.

Foucault explains power to be inclusive in all relationships, and his studies focus on how mechanisms maintain and secure power in society (Foucault 2007). Foucault believes it possible to discover power in its multiplicity of bodies, forces and energies, which gradually can shape multiple individuals into a single will. Power is something that circulates, and cannot be restricted on one individual, as it passes through individuals making them a power-effect. This does, however, not mean that power is equally distributed. Power can be recognised in mechanisms, which each have their own history and have become colonised, transformed and used as general forms of domination throughout time. (Foucault 2003) The following will introduce three types of these mechanisms: the sovereign power, the disciplinary power, and governmentality.

Sovereign power is exercised over land, and the wealth of the land (e.g. taxes) is exercised through juridical instruments. It has its origin in the Feudal monarchy, where it was an instrument to justify the monarchical administration. This power has later been used by different groups such as the protestant anti-monarchists, and the catholic monarchists. The sovereign/subject relationship is even recognised in the parliamentary democracies emerging in the 18th century, where the feudal-type of society has survived behind juridical codes. (Foucault 2003)

The disciplinary mechanisms of power are the surveillance and regulation of peoples' behaviour through time and space, for instance through disciplinary institutions such as schools, prisons and hospitals. Discipline is not defined by law, but by normalisation (Foucault 2003). *"Disciplinary normalization consists first of all in positing a model, [...] and the operation of disciplinary normalization consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions to conform to this model..."*

⁸ The following section is based on the dictation of Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) two courses "Society must be defended" from 1975-1976 (2003) and "security, territory and population" from 1977-1978 (2007).

(Foucault 2007:57). By imposing an idea of what is normal, and an optimal model; movements can be used to conform society into this model (Foucault 2007). This mechanism first appeared in the 17th and 18th century with the bourgeoisie's introduction of capitalism. Discipline was then implemented through the extraction of labour and time (Foucault 2003).

The two mechanisms introduced first are incompatible, and it is between these two limits that power is exercised and constitutes the mechanisms of power in the western society. The sovereign power has built a juridical system throughout time, which allowed the democratisation of sovereignty. This, however, occurred alongside with the disciplinarian constraints being imposed through capitalism. (Foucault 2003) The gap between these two mechanisms has opened up for a third mechanism, which is used to regulate the population, this being 'governmentality'.

When using the term governmentality, Foucault does not refer to the government of a state, as the concept of government is distinct from sovereignty; instead it refers to the governing of a state. The art of governmentality can also recall to the governing of other things; a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, a family etc. Governmentality "*has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument*" (Foucault 2007:108). Governmentality, Foucault believes, is exercised through knowledge of political economy, which can be used to regulate people, using security as an instrument of implementation, e.g. campaigning on how to live, for example on subjects like health, child birth recommendation, number of working hours and so on. Governmentality only acquired its full scope in the 18th century. It was initially caught between the rigid framework of sovereignty and the model of family (Foucault 2007). Governmentality was released, when the model of government and economy managed by families turned into an element within the population. The family turns into a segment of the population, and it is the government's responsibility to govern the population, and improve the conditions. In the end, the population will be an instrument of government - regulated through campaigns or other techniques to e.g. stipulate the birth rate. Foucault describes the techniques and tactics of governmentality to be the reason why states have survived, and has supported the continued existence of sovereign power, and the need for discipline more acute than ever. (Foucault 2007)

These three mechanisms combined are seen as “*the triangle of sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatus of security as its essential mechanism*” (Foucault 2007:107). Accordingly, security can justify new initiatives to manage a population.

Despite the fact that Foucault is not using the term civil society, he does presuppose a differentiation of the sovereign state and society (Cohen & Arato 1992). This differentiation is used to describe how mechanisms of power are manifested in this differentiation, where individuals are being subjugated by disciplinary and juridical forces into a subject (Foucault 2007). In this context, civil society can at most be considered a disciplinary force, or similar to Gramsci, an extended version of the state, not an independent social force. In the context of DNGOs in Ghana, working in a partnership with donors and the Government, this theory will explain why it is difficult to perform ownership, and question to what extent the DNGOs are capable of being independent actors.

15.2 The Process of Development

Following Foucault’s theory of power, this section will continue describing theory of power being inclusive in all relationships. Contrary to previous theory, this one uses a process oriented approach instead of describing an ideal idea or norm from where the social deviant can be explained. In “State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute one Another”, Joel S. Migdal⁹, has described how to study domination and change with what he calls a state-in-society approach. Migdal’s theory will be used to operationalise the ‘Western’ concepts of civil society and power mechanisms into a process oriented approach to analysis.

Migdal defines his theory of the state in opposition to the Weberian ideal type state, which is mainly utilized as a comparative analytical approach. Migdal believes this to result in a limited analysis, because only the deviation from a standard, uniform and constant ‘state’ can be recognised

⁹ Joel S. Migdal is the Robert F. Philip Professor of International Studies in the University of Washington's Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. The inspiration for his theory, he found, while teaching at the Tel Aviv University in Israel in 1972, when he was researching on the conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians. He concluded that turmoil and conflicts prior to the two wars of 1967 and 1973 explained more about the “*patterns of domination and change*” (Migdal 2001:11) than the acts of single powerful actors during the wars. (Migdal 2001) This experience laid the seeds to his theoretical “state in society approach”, and made him confront the conform definition of the State.

(Migdal 2001). Despite confronting the theoretical notions of an ideal state, Migdal is also inspired by the theories he confronts and is using elements from Weber, system theory¹⁰, Foucault and Bourdieu. Opposed to the previous theories, Migdal's theory is not created in the perspectives of Western society. Instead, it is more extensive, as it recognises the multiple levels in the systems of rules, which is important to recognise in the context of power relations in a developing country. (Migdal 2001)

The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts. Actual states are shaped by two elements, image and practices. These can be overlapping and reinforcing, or contradictory and mutually destructive.

(Migdal 2001:16)

In Migdal's opinion, the concept 'state', is divided into the two concepts of 'image' and 'practise'. 'Image' is adapted from Edward Shils (system theory), and describes a homolog centre, emerging from numerous institutions. The performers in these institutions are recognised as members who exercise authority into a dominant single entity of society. 'Practices', on the other hand, are more diverse and serve to recognise and reinforce the territory of the centre, but they also separate the state and other social forces. The 'image' should not be considered an ideal type, as Migdal also describes the centre to be a complex, and defined through multiple parts not always working in harmony. Governmental and nongovernmental organisations can be defined as these parts (or practices) which shape the image of the state. The importance of the state is that those inside and outside of it have a perception (or image) of its claimed territory. (Migdal 2001)

To describe Migdal's analytical approach, the term 'process orientation' is important, as this is the basis of his state-in-society theory. "*The dynamic process changes the groupings themselves, their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting[....] Like any other group or organization, the state is constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with others.*" (Migdal 2001:23) In the process oriented approach, it is important to dissect the different groups in society, as their continuing interactions (practices) constitute the state, as well as each group. It is often neglected in the analysis of the state, that the authority has a

¹⁰ From System theory he is particularly inspired by Edward Shils, an important collaborator of Talcott Parsons (Migdal 2001)

limited space to manoeuvre in, because of the many contradictory entities which shape the state there is not room for one to dominate. To recognise domination in a state therefore requires two levels of analysis. One needs first to understand the unified dimension of the state, expressed in its image; second to dismantle this to “*examine the reinforcing and contradictory practices and alliances of its disparate parts.*” (Migdal 2001:22).

Another important concept in Migdal’s theory is that of ‘social forces’. These encompass informal and formal organisations, as well as social movements. For social forces to exercise power, they need to be internally efficient in terms of their ability to take advantage of resources at hand and to generate symbols towards which people develop strong attachments. These symbols can result in the social forces being capable of influencing behaviour and beliefs. The process oriented approach focuses on the arenas, where the social forces, including the state, meet one another in either clashes or coalitions, as this result in change and development. (Migdal 2001)

To sum up the theory section, it can be said that all theory described here recognises civil society as an inherent actor in society. However, there are differences regarding to what extent civil society can be independent, and what role it has in relation to dominating forces. In relation to Foucault, Migdal can be seen as the ‘alternative’ approach to analysing power relations. They both consider power inherent in relations, but Migdal provides a theoretical framework which makes it possible to consider how each entity, e.g. DNGOs, also can be influential when interacting with other social forces such as the state or donors, if being efficient. Regarding the theory of Alternative Development, this may be considered the ‘alternative’ version of Gramsci’s theory. Both recognises civil society as autonomous actors, but contrary to Gramsci, Alternative Development defines it as a conform entity, which is to balance the power of the state.

Chapter 16 - Analytical Framework

The following section will define the analytical parameters extracted from the theory. The analytical framework is built on the three sub-questions. In line with Migdal’s thinking, the framework does not have a comparative nature in terms of combining empirical data to theoretical ideal concepts. Instead, the theory provides explanatory concepts, supporting the interpretation of the empirical

data. The backbone of the analytical framework consists of the two concepts ‘process orientation’, and ‘social forces’, as outlined by Migdal. The analytical approach extracted from these concepts, is to consider and explain the process determined by the social forces, here being the development partners. To answer the problem formulation it requires an analysis of the social process determined by the partnership of the development partners, to be able to define the role the DNGOs have.

In a historical context, how have DNGOs in Ghana emerged?

The first part of the analysis will look into the history of political economy in Ghana and explain how this has influenced and determined the role of DNGOs during the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis of this will be conducted with Gramscian theory, to explain what role civil society had in relation to the government. Because Gramsci define civil society in terms of different role, his theory is relevant to describe the nuanced picture of the development process in Ghana. To operationalise his different descriptions of the dualistic approach between civil society and the state, the concepts hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces are mainly used, to have a perceptible reference to his theory. Furthermore, it will be considered how theory of Alternative Development had impact on the role and self-perception of DNGOs, when implemented by donors as a conventional idea of civil society.

What impact has the partnership approach had in Ghana?

The second part of the analysis will look into the challenges that followed the aid effectiveness policies. First, by discussing how the partnership approach has been initiated between government and donor, second it will be discussed how this has affected the DNGOs. To do the latter, the three presented cases will be described, followed by a discussion using Gramsci’s theory to consider what role the DNGOs take in the development partnership. This discussion will be a continuation of the first part of the analysis. Furthermore, Kortom’s description of the different categories of organisations will be used to demonstrate how DNGOs have evolved, to become the social actor it is today.

What role do DNGOs have in the development partnership between government and donors?

The final part of the analysis is a discussion based on the empirical data presented in the first two parts of the analysis. The discussion will consider how the social forces in Ghana impact each other, with the DNGOs as the focal point. Foucault’s power mechanisms will be used to define the conse-

quence of the asymmetrical power relations between development partners. The mechanism ‘sovereign’ will be used to analyse the strength of government in Ghana, opposite the DNGOs, while discipline will define the extent of influence donors have. The power mechanisms are used in a moderated version to analyse the situation in Ghana because it, compared to western societies, have donors included as an additional active actors in the power analysis. Foucault himself considered these mechanisms to have a problematic influence in terms of limiting society into a constructed process. This problematic will not be discussed in the analysis, as the mechanisms mainly is used to define the power relations between development partners, and how these determine the role of the DNGOs.

Section IV – The Emerging DNGOs

Chapter 17 - A Glance at the History of an Independent Ghana

As described in the introduction, civil society in Ghana has to a large extent been driven by the donors' development policies. Like the Government, DNGOs are donor dependent and therefore adapt their work to donor policies (IDEG 2010). Historically, this has not always been the reality for civil society organisations (CSO) in Ghana. This part will describe the economical and political history of Ghana, since its independence, and discuss the different role civil society's roles has possessed during this period. Furthermore it will explain how the DNGOs emerged as a civil society actor.

After independence in 1957 and until 1992, Ghana was predominantly ruled by single party systems or military dictatorships, while also undergoing several failed coup d'état attempts (Whitfield 2003). Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the independent Ghana (from 1957-66), led the Conventional Peoples Party (CPP). During his rule, democracy was turned into a single party system of state socialism and protectionism (Bluway 1998). To increase state control, independent associations were made illegal. The CPP gained control of associations of farmers, trade unions, women, students and youth. Furthermore, it took control of appointment and dismissal the tribal chiefs, which left very little opportunity for the public opinion to influence the government (Whitfield 2003). Internally, the CCP operated as a loose network of personal alliances, which has been characteristic of most ruling parties in Ghana. With the military coup in 1966, the National Liberation Council came to power, being a military junta preparing for the return to constitutional power. However, the period was initiated by abandoning all nominal democratic machinery, and suspending the republic constitution made by the CPP. (Bluway 1998)(Whitfield 2003). The National Liberation Council used an informal and ad hoc form of communication with society, a governmental structure, which was kept largely intact until Rawlings reconfigured the political terrain (Whitfield 2003). In 1969, the National Liberation Council allowed existence of other political parties, though with exception of the former CPP, which gave the opposition little significance. The multiparty system only lasted till 1972, where a new military junta seized power (Pellow & Chazan 1986). During the period 1957 to 1981, Ghana can in short be described as a country alternating and experimenting between different party systems and military control. Despite different ruling systems, they all had two issues in common; *first* they could not mobilize the public to support them, which *second*

made them unable to create a stable political base. Opposing social movements organised against the poor performance of governments, in student groups and unions, this made armed forces detain opponents. When dissatisfaction was high, the military would organise in a military coup, and create a new ruling system that neither gained public support, and the circle would start again. (Pellow & Chazan 1986)

The final military coup, in 1981, was a turning point in Ghanaian history. Power was given to Jerry Rawlings. New initiatives were generated, such as the Provisional National Defence Council, the highest policy making body. However, the laws in reality came from Rawlings (Whitfield 2003). Ghana had experienced economic decline since the 1970s, which made Rawlings, in close consultation with the IMF and the World Bank, introduce the Economic Recovery Program (ERP¹¹) in 1983 (Jebuni & Oduro 1998). The first period from 1982-1984 was characterised by internal ideological conflicts in Rawlings' coalition regime. The left oriented part of the coalition failed to obtain external funding, since donors only funded neoliberal economical proposals that were compatible with the Washington Consensus. The ability to attract financial assistance now became the main parameter to obtain power (Whitfield 2003). By 1984, power was centred on Rawlings, resembling former ruling powers in terms of consulting only a few selected people prior to policy making. The Provisional National Defence Council also dispersed the opposition through de-politicising popular organs, terminating autonomous organisations, and general repression. This however changed by the end of the 1980s, as Rawlings needed NGOs to provide service deliveries in the form of infrastructure, education and private community cooperatives. This was a result of the ERP demands of cutting government expenditure, which made the Government unable to provide for national needs. Furthermore donors impede this tendency with aid assistance to NGOs, this resulted in NGOs flourishing in a great number, as described in the introduction. (Opoku-Mensah 2007) The changing environment of the late 1980s culminated in protests against Rawlings regime in 1991, partly due to the high social costs of the ERP. This resulted in Ghana's formal return to a constitutional, presidential republic, thus becoming the fourth republic in Ghanaian history (Jebuni & Oduro 1998). The first election was held in 1992, where Rawlings himself won the election, after having renamed his party to National Democratic Congress (Jonah 1998).

¹¹ The ERP is an example of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, and was also implemented by the World Bank and IMF, as a part of the Washington consensus.

The return to democracy was not only the result resistance to the ERPs. The period of transition to democracy is also characterised by Kwame A. Ninsin (1998), to be the result of the struggle between ‘pro-democracy civil society’ and ‘alternative civil society’. The ‘alternative civil society’ supported the existing power structures with Rawlings in front. Ironically, the ‘alternative civil society’ was organized by the public which was weakest economically and most dependent on the state. The ‘alternative civil society’ organised in committees and women’s movements. The ‘pro-democratic civil society’ was organised by a large variety of groups; including churches, the bar association, trade unions and students. In the early 1980s, the pro-democratic movement had struggled to overthrow the military regime, but changed their struggle to be for democratic reforms. These struggles divided the society prior to the democratic transition. When the multiparty system finally was in place, these two movements disappeared from the political scene, as the election for power became more significant. (Ninsin 1998)

Chapter 18 - How DNGOs Emerged

To describe how the DNGOs emerged, an example is provided to help illustrate how donors have promoted the DNGOs in Ghana.

The increased attention NGOs obtained from donors, gave rise to the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organisations (GAPVOD) in the 1990s. The organisation was originally founded in 1980 as a forum for information sharing. Through its links to external donors, it rose from a 14 member organisation to become the largest coalition in Ghana, and has become the officially recognised coordination body for NGOs (Opoku-Mensah 2007). GAPVOD’s first official policy role, which had great influence on it becoming the ‘voice’ of NGOs, was its participation in the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment. The United Nations and the Government decided to use GAPVOD as a vehicle to enlist DNGOs into the aforementioned programme, which made a membership of GAPVOD a criterion for local DNGOs to receive external funding (GAPVOD 2006). The programme did, however, never become as successful as intended, as the target group was people who had slid into poverty as a result of the structural adjustment measures. This group turned out to be difficult to identify, because large amounts of people were already poor prior to the structural policies (Amoako-Tuffour 2008). GAPVOD was not successful as a tool to organise NGOs, due to the following reasons: 1) It was supported by donors, instead of its members. 2) It

was included in policy debates as a result of donors' insistence, not as a result of its own insistence. 3) It lacked capacity, in the form of educated staff, which meant that it was unable to comment on policies or the annual national budget, despite being the organisation invited by the Government to participate. The latter was a general problem during the 1990s, where hardly any NGOs participated in policy debates. Even in 2001, when NGOs (except for the NGOs working within Health and Education) were included in the budget to pay tax on all their imports, no NGO complained. Only the Deputy British High Commissioner did. (Opoku-Mensah 2007)

Chapter 19 - Civil Society – the Idea of a Counter-Hegemonic Force

Looking at the historical context, civil society has taken different roles in society. The concepts of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces used as an analytical framework will here explain the development of a democratic Ghana; democratic as in referring to the return to a constitutional multiparty system in 1992.

During the years of creating an independent Ghana, different ruling powers have tried to mobilise people under a one party system, i.e. a dictatorship. Prior to the 1980s, civil society can, to use Gramscian vocabulary, be considered primarily an extended actor of the government, because it was not allowed to mobilize in social movements. This made civil society incapable of organising into a counter-hegemonic force, and when it did try, demonstrations were stopped by the military. Only the military had the capacity and power to overthrow the government, and therefore became the hegemonic political player. Not until the 1980s were the social movements able to organise themselves as a single unified force, under the 'pro-democratic civil society'. Despite, the differences in this group, it had a common goal; democracy. The two social forces described by Ninsin (1998) explain, in line with Gramscian theory, how a counterforce organises with a common goal of creating a just social system, because the hegemony is unable to provide this. At the same time, the hegemony also utilises part of civil society to create its own crucial basis of support. The counter-hegemonic force was in the case of the pro-democratic civil society, though lacking the necessary strength and unity to actually attempt to gain power. After the democratic system was being implemented, it had achieved their common goal, and the election seemed to divide the group back into its original affiliations. In the light of Gramsci's theory it is explained why the alternative/counter force organised against the unjustified power structures. The result was not a revolution against the

ruling power, neither for history to repeat itself, with the military regaining power. Instead, the ruling power implemented the critique of the civil society, and avoided history to repeat itself.

That civil society suddenly became scattered after the democratic system was implemented, can also be explained by donors emerging inclusion of civil society in their development strategy, which started during this period, as described with the example of GAPVOD. After the government became a multiparty system, civil society needed more capacity to respond to policy issues, since their objective was no longer concentrated on the single objective of constitutional rule. Donors promoted this capacity building in GAPVOD, but this did not seem to be a wholehearted civil society strategy. The donors' interest in the economical policies was during this period, to a large extent dictated through the ERP support. Therefore the main idea was to use DNGOs to implement service delivery projects (Whitfield 2005). In this context GAPVOD partly lost its credibility as an umbrella organisation, because it was unable to involve itself in the policy debates.

The reason for donors emphasising civil society in its development strategy can be attributed to Alternative Development, which was introduced at that time. The analytical concept of civil society being an organic actor in society did through Alternative Development become a conventional idea of an independent actor in society. This conventional idea had its good intentions with Korten and Chambers promoting an alternative strategy, using local resources to empower the rural poor communities. When the academic idea of civil society was implemented into development practice, the idea seemingly turned into a donor driven use of local DNGOs to provide the needed service delivery. Even the Government had to encourage the DNGO to provide service delivery, because the ERP impeded government from doing it. Because of this, numerous DNGOs emerged during the 1990s. This donor driven exposure of DNGOs, as Lindsay Whitfield (2003) discovered, gave the DNGOs an image of being the ones to complement the efforts of government. With this reference, civil society in Ghana can be classified as 'Public Service Contractors', in Korten's NGO categorisation, see chapter 14.3. This is not to be considered a negative outcome, because the service was needed. However, it seems to have pushed the value-laden voluntary organisations away from having the capability to react against unjust government policies, or to comment on annual budgets. In the hands of donors, the DNGOs was supported as independent actors, as was promoted by alternative development theory. This 'idea' of civil society has therefore locked DNGOs to a complementary role. However, not in the Gramscian sense of an 'organic' complement to the government,

which would mean that the Government would include the DNGOs to complement their needs. Instead the DNGOs were supported by donors, as an independent entity taking over government responsibilities.

When considering civil society prior to 1992, it was then capable of participating in debates, when it felt needed. After this the DNGOs only had capacity for delivering services, which was donor supported. The conventional idea of an 'independent' civil society, seem to be a problem with alternative development. In the 'organic' approach, civil society is recognised as being an inherent part of the state. The DNGOs have in this sense neither become independent, but dependent on donors, and thereby an extended version or arm of donors. In this context the DNGOs can be claimed to have lost the attachment to the Government, and its 'organic' capacity. This is also recognised in the tense relationship existing between the Government and the DNGOs, as they felt they were competing over donor funds (Opoku-Mensah 2007).

When concluding that the donors have created the DNGOs as an image of themselves, because of their inspiration of Alternative Development, this is not to claim that the theory is problematic. The outcome of the strong donor influence in Ghana during 1990s can hardly be recognised as being the result of the theory defined by Korten. Contrary the development strategies were donor driven instead of grass-root driven. Despite the Alternative Development approach being practical oriented, it still seems to be too theoretical to implement.

To sum up, and answer the second sub-question, it can be said that civil society has emerged from divided social forces either promoting government or organising against it. Since Ghana became democratic, donors have imposed it with different development strategies; this has resulted in a high level of donor dependency. The DNGOs have emerged through the idea of civil society as an independent development actor that can create participation and empowerment in rural local areas, by implementing projects of service deliveries. The idea is appealing in theory, but in practice the DNGOs, through donor support, have become an extended arm of donors, instead of the government.

Section V – The Partnership Approach in Ghana

What impact has the partnership approach had in Ghana? To answer this question, it is necessary to get an overall understanding of the partnership approach, and what impacts it has on Ghana. The following will describe the relationship between government and donors as a consequence of the partnership approach. This part will be used to consider how their relationship is reflected on DNGOs. Secondly, this section will discuss how the current development policies are affecting DNGOs, using the first three commitments of the Paris Declaration to define the three cases, which will be described here. Each case describes different consequences of the aid effectiveness agenda on DNGOs. The final chapter will discuss and clarify, in a theoretical perspective, how the partnership approach is visible in Ghana, and how it affects the DNGOs.

Chapter 20 – Partnership Initiatives in Ghana

Just as Ghana was a front runner when implementing structural adjustment policies, the same can be said about the aid effectiveness policies. Against the backdrop of an economical crisis by the end of the 1990s, the Parliament approved the “Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy” (GPRS)¹² alongside with a new set of arrangements with the IMF: “The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility” in 2003. (Armah 2008) (CDD 2007) The economical crises in Ghana were due to external shocks, mainly the declining world prices of cocoa and gold, while oil prices increased. This was consolidated by the substantial debt increase due to the structural adjustment loans, and mismanagement of funds to gain political support (Whitfield and Jones 2009). These difficulties led to discontent among the people, and at the election in year 2000 the opposition won, giving power to the New Patriotic Party led by John Agyekum Kufuor. To negotiate new initiatives with the IMF and the World Bank, it had to create the GPRS. The first GPRS, covering 2003-2005, was negotiated under both ruling parties, and ended up having a weak framework (Whitfield 2005). The framework was built on three pillars: Private Sector Competitiveness, Human Development and Basic Services and Good Governance and Civic Responsibility (GPRS II 2005). The paper was not given much attention, as the ministries thought it was just another World Bank and IMF process. Furthermore the

¹² As a response to the criticism of the SAPs, the IMF implemented the Poverty Reduction Strategies. This strategy has to be produced by each developing country, as it creates the base from where development initiatives are negotiated from. The Poverty Reduction Strategy became a condition in order to obtain support from the IMF, and to become entitled to the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) support. Through this initiative, developing countries may receive debt releasing funds every year. (GPRS II:2005).

seminars conducted to include the civil society in the process ended up as mere hearings, giving civil society a cursory role in the formulation process. The seriousness of the GPRS was only realised late in the process, which made the framework a result of last minute efforts to ensure the programme. (Whitfield 2005) The framework is considered to be the first step towards ownership, and has later been followed by GPRS II 2006-2009 (CDD 2007). The extent of ownership has though been described by Whitfield as follows: “*While the donors did not take over the process, government–donor relations could be described as government in the driver’s seat but donors trying to steer the car.*” (Whitfield 2005:652). The GPRS II is built on the framework of the GPRS I, only with some alterations, in order to meet the critique of the first. The GPRS II was renamed to Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy to reflect the new direction. With the GPRS II, Ghana set the goal of becoming an ‘emerging middle income countries’ by 2015, and therefore, the document presents what it claims to be a coordinated national programme of how to eliminate manifestations of poverty in Ghana (GPRS II 2005). The third GPRS, which again was renamed, is called the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy 2011-2015. This strategy was created after the last election in 2008, which gave power back to the National Democratic Congress, now led by John Atta Mills. The document has been given a new framework, which only focuses on the strategy of Development aid, instead of the country. The document is to a large extent build on the aid effectiveness vocabulary, instead of the three pillars. Since this document is still new, it is too early to conclude whether it is actually an improvement (MoFEP 2010).

An initiative which has been negotiated on the GPRS, is the Multi Donor Budget Support (MDBS). This initiative provides un-earmarked support to the national treasury, to support the national budget. It has the objective to create a harmonised mechanism for donors to assist in the implementation of the GPRS. Furthermore it is intended to create dialogue between donors and Government by meeting twice a year to discuss and evaluate the implementation of the GPRS (CDD 2007). The condition of the MDBS is partly based on the GPRS, but it also focused on improving public finance management. A common set of benchmarks has been agreed upon, and a set of 10-14 performance triggers have been created for the government to be evaluated upon every year. These triggers partly determine how much is being disbursed (CDD 2007). The MDBS is considered important, since it has provided just below 10 % of the total government spending from 2003 to 2006. Thus, it became possible to reduce domestic debt and to raise the level of allocations to poverty-reducing expenditures (CDD 2007). An evaluation on the MBDS made by the Center for Democ-

ratic Development (2007), pointed to the following positive outcomes: strengthened dialogue between government and donors, strengthened macroeconomic picture and improved environment in the private sector. The report concludes that “*Ghana MDBS has represented an efficient and effective use of aid resources.*” (CDD 2007:129) And “*The overall role of the MDBS has been more one of facilitation of a number of positive effects rather than clear-cut causation of any single major output or outcome.*” (CDD 2007:128) Despite the positive effects, the last quote indicates a criticism, which is often mentioned in relation to general budget support (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007), that evidence of clear-cut causation showing a positive and measurable outcome is not possible to define. The effectiveness of the MDBS has also been questioned in other terms. It requires an extensive system of sector working groups, which has been time consuming for government officials. There is a general understanding among Ghanaian official and academics, that the MDBS is only a mild improvement of the structural adjustment loans, due to more flexibility and more time to carry out reforms. The main issue is still that donors try to insert their own interests, and increase their leverage over implemented policies, which have resulted in confrontational discussions between donors and government (Whitfield and Jones 2009).

In addition to the MDBS, donors have created an initiative for donors to harmonise through the Ghana’s Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS), with 16 donors signing in 2007. The G-JAS is designed to take the alignment of the GPRS a step further. Its members commit to: aligning to Ghana’s country systems to lower transactions costs, using programme based frameworks, and a standard tool of monitoring, etc. The G-JAS signatories represent 95 percent of the Official Development Assistance in Ghana. (G-JAS 2007) This does however not include gifts and loans from countries such as India and China that do not align to the GPRS.

The donors supporting these two initiatives of alignment to the GPRS does to a large overlap. The members of the MDBS are The African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World Bank (MDBS 2009). The G-JAS was additionally signed by Italy, Spain, the USA, IFAD and the UN delegation (G-JAS 2007). It therefore seems to be an exclusive group trying to implement the Paris Declaration, while important partners position themselves outside with their own set of conditions.

The problem of donor harmonisation is not only recognised, in terms of it being an exclusive group that only some donors commit to. Despite the official strategy of donors collaborating, there are several indications of a power play within the MDBS group. The World Bank has several times taken their own path, not before 2004 did they agree to the shared performance triggers, and prior to this it had its own set of triggers (CDD 2007). In 2009, they pulled out of the MDBS for a year, to provide an emergency loan of 300 mill dollars to the government of Ghana. The emergency loan was a result of the global financial crisis, which also took its entrance in Ghana. This loan was attached to a new set of conditions, which made the public question, whether the World Bank President in Ghana has more power than the president. Furthermore it did not impress the MDBS partner group, since it questioned the credibility of their harmonisation initiative. In addition to this, it created diplomatic confusion, since the MDBS partners also are members of the World Bank. The result was that countries in the MDBS group now promote different strategies in their bilateral and multilateral approach (Pedersen 2009). It can in this context be concluded that harmonisation is a difficult and maybe even unrealistic path for donors, since it is recognised that donors have different interests for giving development assistance (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007)

Whitfield and Jones (2009) have through their research considered whether the partnership approach helps Ghana break out of aid dependence. They conclude that Ghana is gaining more ownership, but not the because of the partnership approach, since donors still are influential in the aid negotiations. Experience has revealed it to be impossible to leave out donors when designing development policies.

It is apparent from discussions with donors that they will only fund strategies that they 'trust'. This invariably means strategies that they have had a hand in designing, not just to ensure that their interests and views are incorporated, but also because using 'experts' reassures them of quality and soundness (Whitfield and Jones 2009:202)

This conduct is limiting the work of the government, since it requires over-planning and makes changes in strategies and plans difficult, once they are signed. Aid from official donors is therefore disposed on terms required by donors. The reason why the Government is less dependent on donors today is because the former governments focused its remaining resources on their own priorities, which turned out to be rather successful. This was combined with good macroeconomic management, increased exports and rising prices of gold and cocoa. Finally the prospects of oil increased

the self-confidence of the Government. The debt relief gave Ghana a marketable credit ranking and access to the international market, with condition-less capital, as grant loans from China. Receiving condition-less loans was a welcomed change for the government of Ghana, compared to extensive set of conditionalities, now called triggers, attached to the MDBS. (Whitfield and Jones 2009) The GPRS strategy has been criticised by several for not providing the government with the promised ownership. Instead, the limitations of the structural adjustment loans seem to have continued with it, controlling the macro-economic framework of Ghana. The GPRS framework does however cover this issue, under its complex set of procedures. (Armah 2008) (Whitfield & Jones 2009)

To sum up, this section has questioned the actual effectiveness of the initiatives implemented under the partnership approach. It has not been possible to find measurable positive results of donors' harmonisation and alignment initiatives. Furthermore, it is not known to what extent the new initiatives such as the MDBS, actually lead to harmonisation and alignment. The partnership approach does not seem to have supported a donor independent government in Ghana; instead, the initiatives seem to have been nothing more than a mild improvement of the structural adjustment programme. In line with the new initiative between government and donors under the headline of aid effectiveness, the donors' approach to DNGOs has also changed. In the following chapters, three cases will demonstrate what influence the aid effectiveness policies have had on the DNGOs in Ghana.

Chapter 21 - Case 1: Donor Alignment - Multi Donor Funding for Civil Society

In line with the aid effectiveness strategy donors have, like the MDBS initiative, implemented multi donor funding, or what is called a pooled funding mechanisms, for DNGOs to apply for grants from. These mechanisms are developed in line with the strategy to align to the recipients' development strategy, in this case being the DNGOs, while also being cost efficient. This case will consider whether these initiatives actually promote recipient ownership, one of these mechanisms will be used as an example. First it will however be described how these mechanisms function.

Danida explains the reason of creating these baskets to be “*chasing efficiency and effectiveness*” (Danida 2010:40). Prior, donors would individually fund an NGO, risking that several other donors might be funding the same project without their knowing. The intention of pooled funding, like the MDBS, is to lower transaction costs, especially for the recipient, who would have less donors to

report to. Therefore, better service may be expected from donors as well as recipients. (Danida 2010). The pooled mechanisms are tendered to either an INGO or a consultancy firm. It is then their job to manage the disbursement of grants to the DNGOs, or setup an organisation to do it. These mechanisms have, however, not been implemented as a coordinated and harmonised donor approach. It started with donors making several pooled mechanisms, and some only having one donor, for instance the ‘Good Governance and Human Rights Fund’ which is a Danida funded mechanism, managed by IBIS. Other civil society funds are the ‘Rights and Voice Initiative’, funded by the UK; the “Business Sector Advocacy Challenge”, pooled funded; and finally the Ghana Research and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP) also pooled funded.

To describe the results and the agenda behind pooled funding mechanism, G-RAP will be used as an example in the following. G-RAP was founded in 2004 with CARE UK as the contract holder and CARE Ghana as the office having the oversight responsibility, of the G-RAP office. The donors funding G-RAP are the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands. G-RAP is a front-runner of its kinds and was initiated when realising that civil society was not able to respond to national budgets, as described in chapter 18. When the MDBS was initiated, some donors considered it important to strengthen civic engagement in the GPRS process (Kuijper 2006).

The organisations likely to be grantees of G-RAP are the Research and Advocacy Organisations (RAOs). The objectives of G-RAP are:

- Expanded knowledge base on public policy priorities
- Progress in gender and equity inclusive policy processes
- Institutional development of established RAOs
- Increased autonomy of RAOs
- An active and inter-active community of RAOs
- Local networks and constituencies set up and animated by RAOs
- Assistance to emerging RAOs

(G-RAP 2010b)

The idea of G-RAP was inspired by a human rights pooled fund in Kenya. Therefore, the framework of G-RAP was based partly on framework of that Kenyan fund and partly on the MDBS structure (Kuijper 2006). The first draft of the framework was then consulted with local CSOs and reformulated in order to support their demands. Like the MDBS, it provides core funding and capacity building, meaning that grants are not tied to one project (G-RAP 2010a). The goal is to improve

the capacity and quality of the RAOs work. To make decision-making diverse, the programme board, being the primary organ to select grantees and to do the strategic planning, is made up of a variety of donors, CSOs, parliament members, and eminent Ghanaians (G-RAP 2010c). G-RAP does not, as a donor intermediary, dictate what RAOs should be doing, and neither can donors dictate how G-RAP delegates grants (G-RAP 2010a). In 2009, 20 RAOs received core grants, adding to the amount of \$2.3 mill., while G-RAP also disbursed \$0.9 mill. to 11 special project funds. Project funding is therefore also a part of G-RAP (G-RAP 2010d). Due to this structure, G-RAP is considered progressive and an achievement in terms of donor harmonising (G-RAP 2010a).

Nevertheless, this new structure has created some difficulties. The new procedures of applying for grants and evaluating work have been complicated for some RAOs to obtain, since they were used to applying for project grants. To apply for capacity funding at G-RAP, a RAO has to explain what projects they are working on, how research is included in their projects, and how their research can be used as evidence to influence the policy arena (G-RAP 2010a). This issue is explained by IBIS, to be because the funding mechanisms, as G-RAP, have been inadequate to communicate their purpose and procedures, with the result that several DNGOs were alienated from replying for grants from the pooled mechanisms (IBIS 2010). Furthermore, core support is only provided to RAOs with a track record of active public engagement (G-RAP 2010e). Since G-RAP provides rather large grants to a selected number of established RAOs, this will inevitably make the strong DNGOs even stronger, and make it more difficult for rural DNGOs. IBIS is particularly concerned about this because the mechanism they are managing is closing by 2010, and Danida will join a new pooled mechanism to follow up on UK funded mechanisms, which has also reached the end of its contract. The mechanism managed by IBIS had community based organisations (CBOs) as their target group for core funding, and contrary to G-RAP's more focused approach, it supported 50 CBOs, with a smaller budget. The two mechanisms have different strategies for supporting civil society, and it is rather complex to attempt to answer which strategy is most successful. The strategy of supporting few established RAOs, opposed to 50 CBOs, is more likely to show positive results in a short term. The long term implications might be that only the stronger organisations survive. Bernice Sam from the organisation 'Women in Law and Development in Africa' explains the problem as follows:

...with the new aid effectiveness going on in Ghana, pooling of funds for the MDDBS and a number donors pooling funds for G-RAP also means that a number of small RAOs

fall through the holes in the basket. This is the down side of G-RAP, in as much as it had helped the well established RAOs... (Sam 2008:9)

With the DNGOs being donor dependent, it is the donors' strategy which decides the future variety and number of organisations in Ghana, just as it was their support which increased the numbers of NGOs in Ghana during the 1990s. Currently, G-RAP and the other funding mechanisms are far from providing the majority of grants to DNGOs. Many donors still support service delivery projects (SEND 2010).

G-RAP is not issue based, but does have certain target areas that RAOs are preferred to be occupied with, such as 'women's rights' or 'oil and gas regulations'. (G-RAP 2010) In terms of the latter, G-RAP held a conference in 2009 for organisations to mobilize DNGOs and educate the public on the serious situation of the Government's slow progress in making oil and gas regulations. In this context G-RAP come to have two faces, as being both a donor in terms of delegating grants, while also taking active partner when promoting the work of RAOs. IBIS has also experienced how this can cause confusion (IBIS 2010). IBIS is first and foremost an activist INGO working with DNGOs. But, since they also manage funding from Danida, this sometimes complicates things. This is particularly recognised among the local staff, having working roots in the local NGO community, which suddenly see themselves on the other side of the table as a donor (IBIS 2010). This is challenging for employees, but on the other hand, IBIS also believe that this is what makes the mechanisms unique. These new funding mechanisms are better at building CSO capacity than donors were, as the institutions used to be within the CSO world before becoming 'donors'. (IBIS 2010)

21.2 - G-RAP in a recipient perspective

All organisations interviewed praised G-RAP to be an improvement, in terms of DNGOs have more flexibility through the grants they receive from G-RAP. This provides a feeling of independency when deciding how their grants are disbursed. There are, however, some issues, which will be discussed in the following section. Figure 3 "Donors alignment through G-RAP" provides an overview of how G-RAP is perceived among the interviewed recipients of G-RAP.

Organisation	Figure 3: Donors alignment through G-RAP
The ARK Foundation	-The Basket funding mechanism has not made any difference in reporting procedures and the number of donors they are receiving funds from has not decreased
IDEG	-There might be a slight change in admin costs. -G-Rap has provided more ownership, because recipients have been involved in the creation of it. -It still leaves donors powerful. -There is a tendency towards reaching too many organisations, making funds limited to each.
SEND	-There are not enough funds available for core funding, more donors should support the mechanisms and stop project funding. - Accounting to G-RAP is about the organisations progress, instead of actual results.

The initiative of funding mechanisms is developed in line with the MDBS, to create cost reducing and effective disbursement system. This idea copied into the grant administration of DNGOs, results with similar problems as was recognised with the MDBS. This effectiveness rationale is used as a strategy to decentralise the delegation of grants. As in the case of the MDBS, donors require more monitoring and information sharing when decentralising the management of grants. This issue was also be recognised in the early days of G-RAP, by a representative of G-RAP: *“in spite of the pooling of donor funds, we deal with six currencies to date and work within four different financial years. We have also seen continuous changes in staff on the donor side. At the moment almost all donor staff in office from the beginning has changed.”* (Determeyer 2008:13) These challenges were combined with the issue of donors not having agreed on how to run the programme, thus being unwilling to give up power to G-RAP. These initial challenges have though been recognised and worked upon, and after its midterm review in 2006, G-RAP does seem to have improved in terms of handing over power to the G-RAP Programme Board (G-RAP 2007).

Similar to the MDBS, it has not been clarified whether the funding mechanisms actually are more cost efficient. IDEG believes there is a slight decrease in administrative costs, which can insinuate that the established RAOs have gained from G-RAP (IDEG 2010). On the other hand, the ARK Foundation has not experienced any change in terms of decreased administrative costs, and claims to report to a large amount of different donors (ARK 2010). It is furthermore a problem when only a minority of donors fund in this manor, as it then has to fund more organisations, making funds limited to each. (IDEG 2010) Despite G-RAP actually fund with rather large grants for core funding, it is still considered a limited amount available in the form of core funding. The DNGOs would there-

fore prefer more donors to participate in the pooled funding strategy. There is still a large share of donor grants being channelled to projects, thus making it relatively easy to get support for service delivery. (SEND 2010) The reason for the limited amount of donors supporting these mechanisms may, from a donor perspective, be reasoned by the difficulty of flagging tangible results (Danida 2010). Donor funding is often about showing national results to tax payers at home, which is difficult when disbursements are made collectively.

The overall conclusion of G-Rap is that DNGOs receiving grants from it, do consider themselves to gain ownership. The donors however maintain a powerful role as it decides the framework of the mechanism, and the target group of DNGOs. As it has decided the RAOs to be the target group G-RAP. The mechanisms is a step towards donor harmonization and alignment, but as the results of the MDBS it has shown that it is more time consuming when more donors need to agree on something. Furthermore it is only a limited part of donors which actually commit to these mechanisms.

Chapter 22 - Case 2: Service Delivery or Advocacy / ownership or donor demands

G-RAP's strategy to support RAOs in order to advance the DNGOs' ability to advocate in policy debates, is currently a recognised civil society strategy among donors, now that government is expecting to take ownership of service delivery. To illustrate this tendency, the following quote from the Strategy of Danish Support to Civil society in Developing Countries (2008) is included:

... there is concern among some civil society organisations that civil society is viewed by donors as sub-suppliers to the government rather than constituting an independent space for the ability of people to organise themselves. It is important to maintain that national ownership in developing countries is a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development. Ownership must be ensured through a sustained focus on ensuring that national development plans emerge from democratic practice, where citizens through an open political process have not just been informed, but also through their organisations have been genuinely involved in the preceding political processes.

(Danida 2008:21)

This quote expresses Danida's effort to promote the involvement of civil society in the political process, while national ownership, referring to the government, is the prerequisite of sustainable development. In other words, the government should be responsible, and have ownership for the implementation of sustainable development and service deliveries; whereas the DNGOs should be involved in the political processes, to ensure the democratic practices. In line with this, there is a

tendency among DNGOs to change their activities from service delivery to advocacy, as it is concerned about becoming merely a sub-supplier to the Government. This case will discuss to what extent this tendency, of DNGOs moving towards advocacy, is a result of their desire (and ownership) or a result of donor demands. To consider this the ARK Foundation is included as an example, because it conducts projects of service delivery as well as advocacy. Furthermore, it will be discussed to what extent this new donor strategy of civil society engagement in policy debates can be successful in Ghana, considering the historical relationship between government and civil society.

The ARK foundation is a Women's rights organization, specialised in combating domestic violence. It assists abused women in their crises response centre and shelters, and through its monitoring and advocacy unit it observe and comment on the progress of the national Domestic Violence bill, passed in 2007. The ARK was established in 1995, but did not become active before 1999. (ARK 2010) The main concern for the ARK Foundation at the time of the interview was their main donor, CORDAID, pulling out of Ghana. A foundation such as the ARK is at the mercy of donors' assistance, because the Ministry of Women and Children's affairs (MOWAC) is unable to provide assistance for shelters, thus making civil society the main provider of this kind of services. It is not easy to be dependent on donor assistance, because there is little coherence in terms of which projects donors support, thus making planning impossible. In 2006, the ARK Foundation received GHC 437,932.70, which in 2009 had increased to GHC 659,138.30. In 2006, their main donor was UNFPA, providing 40.27% of the budget. However, they had pulled out their support by 2009, whereas CORDAID provided 39.58% of the budget in 2009, compared to only 10.52 in 2006 (Ark 2010b) (See appendix H). These changing conditions seem to make it difficult to get an overview of grants, and make long term planning complicated. Despite The ARK Foundation not feeling a change in the number of donors to report to, as was described in the previous case, it is however interesting to notice that in 2006, it had 15 donors, whereas it only had 8 donors in 2009, while still increasing their overall income.

The ARK Foundation has recognised the tendency of donors promoting policy participation. This is positive, because "*policies run a nation... [but]...here in Ghana we are good policy makers, we have lots of policies, but they are not being implemented*" (ARK 2010:5). The changing donor policies have opened a new gap. This can be illustrated, with the case of Ministry of Women And Children's Affairs. The Ministry was established in 2001, with personnel having little experience and

limited capacity to implement the activities which civil society have been doing for the last 10-20 years (ARK 2010). Therefore, the ARK Foundation struggles to maintain their crisis centres, because they and other DNGOs are the only actors in society who currently have the capacity to assist abused women. With the new donor strategy, however, they might not continue to receive funds for the implementation of these activities. The Ark Foundation is not the only organisation experiencing the lack of ministry capacity. In an aid effectiveness research in Ghana conducted by SEND, similar results were recognised within the education sector. DNGOs working in this sector are also struggling with the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports of Ghana, which have limited capacity to maintain schools. As a result, the report recommends DNGOs to continue providing service delivery in the education sector, as long as the ministry is unable to (SEND 2007). The following will discuss whether this context makes civil society gain ownership. Figure 4 “Civil Society Ownership” provides an overview of what the informants' answered on this topic.

Organisation	Figure 4: Civil society ownership
The ARK Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -ARK has been in the field for long time, and is disappointed of not being included in the implementation of the service delivery, since the ministry lacks experience. -Is repellent to the idea of receiving funds through government one day, since it is not considered realistic that government will support critical DNGOs.
IDEG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Civil society is better informed, as government people are changing, and therefore are not well-informed.
SEND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Civil Society should move away from service delivery, and start monitoring the work that the government is doing. -Civil society has been recognized in the AAA, but now relations between donors and civil society are more complex. -Easier to be in service delivery, as it is easier to get support.
IBIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Service delivery by NGOs should be followed by advocacy for the government to see the importance, and take over the maintenance of e.g. schools setup by NGOs.
G-RAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Civil society should have influence, but not necessarily at the table, because it is not about policy makers favouring one side over another. It should articulate poverty alternatives. -Civil society has to respond to issues, and donors should not pressure the government. -Change mentality to advocacy is difficult, it cannot be eaten. -Difficult for NGOs used to donor funds and project applications to be sustainable.
DANIDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Civil Society has to realize that they have better opportunities with government today. -Government and civil society have a historical bad relationship, which is why civil society does not want money from the government to compromise their legitimacy, and the government needs to realise that a watchdog is needed.

All interviewees agree that the government should be overall responsible of the implementation of service delivery. There is however a dilemma in this approach, as this would mean more coopera-

tion between government and the DNGOs. The historical tense relationship between the government and DNGs over donors' seems to make it difficult for both to cooperate. The result of this is that the Government does not take advantage of the experience DNGOs have gained through their work. Concerns are expressed by the ARK Foundation:

"So one would expect with CSOs having been in the field, they will bring us together, they will support and they will coordinate the work that we do But instead of that, they are trying to be implementers, where they do not have the expertise, so what they do is, they gather us, to get information from us, and then they try and implement, but while they are doing that, we can't wait." (ARK 2010:4)

The ARK Foundation expresses concern about the few results visible, as a result of the budget funding. SEND also point out that the ministry of education has a complicated process of bureaucracy for funds to pass through (SEND 2007). This results in funds taking a long time to reach their destination, thus making the relationship between DNGOs and the ministries even more tense. The results of these new aid policies have, in an overall perspective, given much concern to DNGOs working with service delivery. It is however not only the Government Ministries creating the problem. The DNGOs also find it difficult to start cooperating with the Government, which is also expressed by The ARK Foundation: *"... we are independent we can easily confront and stand up to government, and make sure that the right things are done. But as soon as we start eating from the government pockets, then our hands are tight"* (ARK 2010:5) Considering the history of Ghana, it is understandable that DNGOs are concerned about cooperating and receiving funds from government while still maintaining their independence and credibility. Particularly, now that donors promote DNGOs to be independent actors advocating to the Government. The ARK Foundation also questions whether the government is ready to support critical voices from civil society, which there has not been tradition for in Ghana. Among the interviewed DANIDA, G-RAP and IBIS are however not concerned about this. They are confident in the government's will to cooperate with civil society, and use their experience within service, it is however difficult to adjust to new procedures. There have also been a few good results in cases where DNGOs and district assemblies¹³ have been cooperating on education programmes (SEND 2007).

¹³ There are 103 District Assemblies in Ghana, which functions as planning authorities of the districts, and is assigned with the responsibility, by the government, to integrate political, administrative and developmental support (Ghanaweb 2010).

Despite of the agreement of advocacy being important, the challenge is, according to G-RAP, to provide results for the poor needing help now: *“It is a challenge to convince some in the area that, do advocacy, and they say I can’t eat advocacy.”* (G-RAP 2010:31) This leads us back to SEND's recommendation of DNGOs should continue providing services. The solution, according to IBIS, is to not abandon service delivery, but it should at all times be followed by advocacy for the government to see the importance of the work, and to take over the maintenance of e.g. school setups by DNGOs. (IBIS 2010) The donors believe the strategy of DNGO should be, to advocate for government to take responsibility. This strategy will have a negative impact, if donors do not take into account the inadequate capacity of governments and their inability to cooperate with a civil society, which has already been experienced in terms of service delivery implementation. The DNGOs are however starting to implement this strategy, whether this is actually DNGO ownership is difficult define. For DNGOs to move away from service delivery is to lose a great capacity of service delivery. It is therefore unfortunate when the Government and the DNGOs is not able to cooperate, the feeling is, however, that DNGOs would lose their independency (and ownership) if they were to work for the Government.

Chapter 23 - Case 3: Harmonization – The Aid Effectiveness Forum

The partnership approach has broad with it other ideas. Along with donors trying to harmonize their efforts, DNGOs try to do the same. This is not a new phenomenon, GAPVOD also tried to ‘harmonize’ DNGOs in their network. However, the efforts of harmonizing today seem to have more support internally among DNGOs. This case will consider the strength and weaknesses of the current trend of DNGO harmonization, using the network The Aid Effectiveness Forum, and its host organisation, SEND, as example.

An organisation which has implemented these new donor policies and managed to make the best of it, so to speak, is SEND-West Africa. They have themselves changed from being within service delivery to do advocacy (SEND 2010b). SEND is a consolidation of three autonomous organisations in Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Here the focus is only on SEND Ghana, which was established in 1998. In its first years it carried out food security programmes, and farm cooperatives. In 2002 it distinguished itself by starting its first policy advocacy project, which has later become a comprehensive programme, covering participatory monitoring and evaluation of public spending, in

170 districts (SEND 2010b). SEND (2010) still believe that service delivery is important to implement by DNGOs, however, believe it is necessary to begin to move away from service delivery, or at least not duplicate government initiatives. SEND has, as organisation effectively used the new policies to its advantage, and has also been a strong actor in advocating civil society to be more involved in the Aid effectiveness policies at the AAA conference. To promote this, SEND have been an active actor in the Ghana Aid Effectiveness Forum (AEF), a network of more than 60 CSOs in Ghana, and has been elected to host the secretariat of the Forum. The AEF was established just before the AAA, in respect of the need, to broaden the understanding of Aid Effectiveness in Ghana. Furthermore, AEF together with IBIS collected information on what impact the partnership approach has among DNGOs. This information was presented at the civil society parallel forum, along with other countries results. The result of the AEF network was better than expected in terms of coordination among DNGOs. Therefore the AEF has extended its work in order to organise a comprehensive network of DNGOs in Ghana, with the objective to improve dialogue with government and donors (SEND 2010).

“after that [the AAA] we realized that there were opportunities, that we civil society could actually engage and make aid better or make aid effective, so what happened is that civil society needed to actually look at itself, ... to see where we can effectively and proactively engage.... So I want to say that it is actually, in terms of added advantages I think it has got more positive effects in terms of civil societies’ engagement with government, as regards policies and even to an extent of how we relate with development partners.”

(SEND 2010:33)

The added advantage and opportunity of more engagement with government, which the partnership approach opens up for, has inspired some DNGOs to organise and harmonize. The AEF will be organised into ten platforms, with each platform being led by an existing strong network. An example of this is the gender platform led by The Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana NETRIGHT, which is an established women rights network. The AEF believes the implementation of existing established networks will create a unified voice for civil society. The secretariat can as an administrative centre help different actors to get in contact with the right Network (SEND 2010). According to SEND, IBIS and Danida, AEF is believed to be better organised compared to previous attempts of creating a strong network for civil society. The following will discuss if this aspect is sufficient in characterising AEF as a success. Figure 5 “Harmonisation – The Aid Effectiveness Forum” provides an overview of how informants perceive networks in Ghana in general, and to what extent they have confidence in the AEF initiative.

Organisation	Figure 5: Harmonisation – The Aid Effectiveness Forum
The ARK Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -There is good cooperation between DNGOs in the women's networking. -DNGOs apply for grants to the same donors, which does create competitiveness. -A good reputation and image is important, because civil society is an environment where you do not work alone. You need references from another organization before you can start a project and propose for funding.
IDEG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The AEF might be successful, if donors will support it, and if civil society is able to advocate and engage for support. -The many evolving networks can be good, to avoid civil society monopolized in one center. -Civil society should not be organized as streets; it is in its essence diverse. -The small NGOs future, seen in the light of private sector theory, will probably not survive. There has to be a regulating framework, for it not to end in monopoly.
SEND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The AEF will provide civil society with a stronger voice, and it will help different actors find the right NGO in Ghana.
IBIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -IBIS should not manage the Aid effectiveness Forum, but fear that SEND does not have the capacity to do it.
G-RAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Issues are becoming more sophisticated, and require DNGOs to be confident and to align with peers. -Networking is a challenge, as long as there is competition between DNGOs for funding.
Danida	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The AEF is progress, and can close the gap between the small and big NGOs. -There are too many networks in Ghana, which the AEF can help organizing. -If the AEF have enough time, it can be effective. -The platforms are make the AEF better organized and more practical than GAPVOD. -Competition is there between NGOs, but it's because they want to preserve their identity, and specialize, but when needed, they come together against government. -Some competition can also be good for the product.

Organising civil society is highly challenging, which is also recognised by SEND. They are however optimistic. Contrary to the failure GAPVOD experienced in their attempt to organise CSOs, SEND feel the circumstances for the AEF has improved in terms of *first* the AEF is not a tool on behalf of donors and government to monitor civil society (SEND 2010). *Second* The AEF seem to have support from several of the established networks and DNGOs (SEND 2010), this was not the case with GAPVOD. Finally the AEF is different in terms of not being supported by multilateral or bilateral donors. This is a positive development in relation to GAPVOD.

However, other circumstances still impede the AEF in becoming a success. The AEF has in its initial phase been dependent on outside support, though not from a multilateral donor, but from an INGO, i.e. IBIS. IBIS was active prior to the parallel Forum, of promoting awareness of the aid effectiveness policies among DNGOs in Ghana. Therefore, IBIS also put a lot of effort into the work of the AEF, not only because of the parallel forum, but also because IBIS believed it to be important to organise the DNGOs (IBIS 2010). The support did not only take shape in the form of economical subsidies, since employees at IBIS also took part in organising the AEF. However,

IBIS' active engagement is dwindling, because it is believed to be better for the AEF to be run by local organisations and not by an external organisation. It is, however, feared by IBIS, that SEND does not have the organisational capacity to run the AEF secretariat (IBIS 2010). This was an issue that was also pointed out at the 'review of the AEF's work to mobilize the civil society organisations to participate in the parallel forum', conducted in 2009. The review pointed out issues of limited funding for activities; and the Aid Effectiveness Framework being new to the majority of the DNGOs. Therefore the debate was dominated by the few DNGOs, who had insight into the new donors' policies, which in turn also made it impossible to organise civil society representatively (SEND 2009). For the AEF to better organize themselves, with broader representation of those organisations that do not have much insight into donor policies, they need more capacity.

According to IBIS and DANIDA the new framework is believed to be a positive development compared to GAPVOD, and has the potential to become a framework, which can close the gap between the small and the established DNGOS. However, for it to be effective, the framework should be given long-term timeframe (DANIDA 2010). SEND will host the secretariat for two more years. Thereafter discussion will be held on whether or not the ten different platforms are ready to organise by themselves, or if a secretariat is still needed to coordinate the platforms (SEND 2010).

The challenges experienced by the AEF should be seen in the light of the complex DNGO environment. There are many existing DNGOs, and also many networks trying to organise DNGOs within each sector (Danida 2010). Within this scattered environment, communication between DNGOs is lacking. This was also a problem in regards to the AEF, since informants from both G-RAP and the ARK Foundation were unaware of the existence of the AEF. It was by G-RAP even explained that also the Ghana Anti Corruption Coalition's is initiating a similar network (G-RAP 2010). This lack of communication makes it particularly difficult for CBOs, to become aware of the initiatives and networks emerging in Accra. During my participation at an evaluation conference organised by IBIS, for the CBOs receiving support from the IBIS funded mechanism, in Kumasi in December 2009, I observed that many of these CBOs often were established because of the instant need of service provision in their community. Because of this need, they were obliged to spend much of their time, on administrative obligations, such as either applying for or renewing current grants. Therefore the CBOs did not have the capacity to actively participate in a network. Many of them did, however, appear to be members of different networks, but complained about the networks

either not providing sufficient support, or fellow network members did not contribute to the network. Since networks are reliant on the synergies created when members contribute, it is difficult to maintain a network in Ghana, when its members hardly have the capacity to implement their own projects. Furthermore it is also important to note that among the various DNGOs there is much competition for funding, and sometimes even a network compete against its own members, which does not encourage cooperation among DNGOs (IDEG 2010). In this light it is necessary for a network in Ghana to have a large capacity to compensate for its members scarce capacity. However, this can on the other hand jeopardize the credibility of a network, as it is not supposed to be centralised.

The challenges mentioned above do, however, not make it impossible for networks to exist in Ghana. There are success stories, of both networks within the education sector, the oil and gas sector and gender groups (G-RAP 2010). Furthermore, there is a strong tradition among civil society in Ghana of networking, and using their contacts. An example of this is given by the ARK foundation, whom when they are contacted by abused women in geographic areas where they are not able to help them, they will use their contacts in other DNGOs, to assume the role. Networking is very important. Having a large network can also boost an organisations image, which will have a bearing on the DNGOs ability to obtain support from other DNGOs and grants from donors. (ARK 2010) Networks are therefore also being used by the progressive and established organisations as a means to organise and gain a good reputation. This also explains why many organisations are members of several networks, and the existence of a great number of networks.

To what extent the AEF will succeed is difficult to predict. Two main challenges are mentioned *first*; the difficult task of organising a diverse and competitive civil society and *second*; capacity building. SEND believes it has capacity needed to manage the task, but when considering the slow progress of organising the network since the Parallel Forum. It is therefore not possible yet to determine whether this will be a success, or merely a new attempt to continue a network created in because of an event supported by outside actors.

Chapter 24 - The Idea of Democracy with a Partnership Approach

This chapter will continue the analysis of the role DNGOs play in Ghana, from where the historical analysis left off. DNGOs emerged in light of a conventional idea recognised in the theory of alternative development. The idea Korten had, of a people-centred development, did inspire development practice, but never became the main approach of donors. Through the three cases discussed above there are several indications of a changing environment between development partners, which have affected DNGOs. Despite this, DNGOs have continuously been struggling with the same challenges they did ten years ago, namely fighting for funds. The following will discuss to what extent the new partnership approach can be considered to encourage an 'organic' relation between the three development partners.

24.1 Alignment to an Alternative Development Vision

The partnership approach i.e. three commitments: ownership, alignment and harmonization, have created the framework of the three cases above. Via the cases it has been analysed how the aid effectiveness approach is visible and affecting DNGOs in Ghana. The cases show that donor alignment only has had little impact of actual ownership for DNGOs. The pooled funding mechanisms demonstrate similar results to that of the MDBS; only a few donors participate and fund the pooled mechanisms; donors are still powerful in terms of defining which DNGOs are the target group of the mechanisms; little identifiable evidence of decreasing administrative costs; new administrative procedures, which have been difficult to communicate to the public, making the mechanisms unavailable for less established DNGOs. Just as with the MDBS the pooled funding mechanisms have brought with it positive outcomes. These have taken form of a harmonized approach by some donors; improved availability for the established RAOs; it is possible to receive core grants for capacity building, making RAOs more sustainable and independent. Sustainability is however still a great challenge; an aspect that all the interviewed DNGOs are concerned with. The mechanisms do not provide enough in capacity building grants, and do only commit their grants for a year, which make long term planning impossible for DNGOs.

Through the support from donors, the established DNGOs have been able to take ownership of which research to conduct. This development from being a service provider to become a research and advocacy organisations, can be explained through ideas in alternative development theory. The

theory of Korten focuses on how NGOs should evolve as a development actor, through what he refers to as the; Strategies of Development-Oriented NGO's Four Generations. This is a set of ideal-type phases that DNGOs should go through, in conjunction with the development of a country (Korten 1990).

- 1) An NGO initiates with a short term strategy of emergency relief in the developing country;
- 2) Then it continues to service provision and small scale – local development;
- 3) Going to sustainable systems development;
- 4) Finally it turns into social movements working for global change.

(Korten 1990:117)

In this context, DNGOs in Ghana can be considered as both a service provider, while also advocating for a sustainable development system. A large group of DNGOs are still service providers, but several DNGOs are slowly trying to advocate for government to step up efforts to ensure sustainability. There are only a small group of DNGOs that are being heard in policy debates, that being the already established DNGOs. This indicates that these established DNGOs are moving to the third generation of Korten's Strategies of Development-Oriented NGO's Four Generations. Examples of this can be documented by the fact that DNGOs have advocated for management policies of the oil revenues; and advocating for women's rights, and education facilities; i.e. to make the Government take responsibility of these 'services'. These events can be recognised as a step toward a sustainable system. Established DNGOs have after the Parallel Forum become more aware of the negotiation¹⁴ power, ownership has given them, and therefore become more independent in that sense. This has particularly been recognised by SEND that has tried to mobilize DNGOs, to create a stronger unified DNGO voice. These examples indicate that the established DNGOs are ensuring a strong foundation to build their negotiation power upon. Whereas the DNGOs providing service provision are more dependent on funds for projects, which perpetuates them in a position, of being a generation behind, and having less negotiation power.

To define the established DNGOs Korten's two categories of NGOs, should be included; the 'Voluntary Organisation' and the 'Public Service Contractor.' The increased independency of estab-

¹⁴ When referring to negotiation power, it is, with inspiration from Whitfield (2009), used to operationalise the term ownership, and define a tangible outcome of this commitment, see chapter 3.

lished DNGOs can in Korten's terminology suggest that the group of established DNGOs in Ghana have become Voluntary Organisations i.e. having a social mission, based on shared values. This category is defined as having an important position, promoting for a self-sustaining development process. As also described by Korten, it is important to recognise the diversity in civil society. These categories can, however, not encompass the diversity of the individual organisation. The two of Korten's categories; Voluntary Organisations and Public Service Contractors are difficult to distinguish between in practice (Korten 1990). The established advocacy and value laden DNGOs are still donor dependent, which was emphasised by both The ARK Foundations, SEND and IDEG. When research and advocacy is demanded by donors, it becomes difficult to distinguish between the definitions of either independent driven RAO or a contract driven RAO. Even though the research is independently determined, donors still define the target groups of RAOs. It is in therefore challenge of characterising whether DNGOs are driven by donor demands or recipient needs.

When donors advocate for the role of DNGOs to be as a government watchdog, the civil society development strategy has in terms of its rhetoric become more similar to that of alternative development theory. The three primary actors in society, defined by Korten as: Voluntary Organisations, the government and business, introduced in section of theory, have essential functions. These actors are each supported in different terms by donors. John Friedmann (1992) has also defined the necessity of not just focusing on civil society. Friedman belongs to the Alternative Development paradigm. Despite this, he criticises the doctrinal belief in alternative development as:

(a) the belief that the state is part of the problem, and that alternative development must as much as possible, proceed outside and perhaps even against the state; (b) the belief that "the people" can do no wrong and that communities are inherently gemeinschaftlich; and (c) the belief that community action (i.e. action on the social terrain) is sufficient for the practice of an alternative development, and that political action is to be avoided." (Friedmann 1992:6)

Friedmann rejects the approach of Alternative Development which defines the state as the enemy, and the voice of the public never to be in conflict with itself. Alternative development should begin locally, but cannot end there, since the voice of the people will never be uniform. The state will always maintain an important role, and without collaborating with it, poverty reduction is not possible. (Friedmann 1992) It is not the intention to insinuate that donors are actually implementing alternative development per se. As previously demonstrated the partnership approach has a top-down structure, beginning in a partnership between government and donors. Following this, the DNGOs had to advocate for their role in their partnership, which was seen at the Parallel Forum. Further-

more, donors in Ghana also realised a government watchdog was needed. The DNGOs have therefore been less prioritised by donors, then what is advocated for in Alternative Development. However, if focusing on donors' civil society approach, it has rhetorically similarities as both encourage DNGOs to be independent actors opposite the Government. Despite Alternative Development being developed as a critical reaction to the neoliberal development policies of the 1980s and the 1990s, it can in the encouragement of an independent civil society, be termed as having a liberalistic approach itself. Particularly, compared to Gramsci's 'organic' definition of a civil society that is the extended version of the state, the idea of an independent civil society. This liberal approach has been compatible with donors' development approach, and therefore ideal to include in their development strategy. The result of this has been that DNGOs are supported as a 'conventional idea' of a democratic necessity, as Whitfield (2003) has described it. This approach limits DNGOs to act as an entity of the image encouraged by donors. Donors now encourage DNGOs to be independent, but as they are dependent on donors' funds, this is difficult to become in practice. In this context the preliminary findings from Section IV, can be regurgitated: DNGOs have maintained the role of being an extended arm of donors. It seem somewhat ironic that donors advocate DNGOs to be the actor creating a democratic balance of the state but does at the same time interfere in the balance, and work against their own strategy, when making civil society an image of themselves, instead of the state.

24.2 Mobilizing Civil Society

To support DNGOs in order for them to increase capacity via education, which is the objective with pool funding mechanisms, is in a theoretical context considered positive. In Gramscian theory, consciousness and education is considered the tools to mobilize voices from below. However, in the context of this thesis with its focus on DNGOs in Ghana education is considered as a catalyst to mobilize DNGOs to be a strong government watchdog, and thus not to necessarily start a revolution.

The idea of mobilizing DNGOs to have a stronger voice has created similar conditions to that of the market economy (IDEG 2010). Since only the strongest and most effective DNGO, which is able to participate in the networks, is likely to gain funds. In this context a competitive environment has come to define the relations between DNGOs in Ghana (ARK 2010) (G-RAP 2010). It is also ex-

pressed by Danida that “*the competition in itself is good*” (Danida 2010:41), as it creates a better product. In the context of effectiveness, the practices from the market economy must be recognised to have come to define the relationship between the DNGOs. This is also recognised in the grants system produced through the funding mechanisms, which is more likely to secure effectiveness, as it selects the already established DNGOs. The result of this may also be that some DNGOs generate a strong voice, in terms of advocacy, while the less established DNGOs doing service provision, find it more difficult to generate funding, which reinforce the gap between these two groups.

To sum up and answer the second sub question, the partnership approach has in Ghana been visible in several ways. It has both been seen through new initiatives between the Government and donors, where the donors with little success have tried to align to the development strategy created by the Government of Ghana. The partnership approach has also changed donors’ civil society strategy, which is now focused on research advocacy, thus moving away from service delivery. Through the-ory of Gramsci and Alternative Development the new initiatives has been identified as having a liberal approach, which indicate that donors’ development approach has not changed its ideological foundation, since the 1990s. The partnership approach has meant that donors strive to support the more established DNGOs, since these are more qualified for advocacy work. The result of this strategy has been that the ‘organic’ relationship between the Government and DNGOs is barely created, when promoting the DNGOs to be independent government watchdogs. DNGOs are in this context recognised as having continued their dependency to donors.

Section VI – Asymmetrical Power Relations

“Struggles for domination take place in multiple arenas in which the parts of the state are related not only to one another but each is a single social force in a field of interacting, at times conflicting, social forces. The individual parts of the state may respond as much (or more) to the social field in which they operate ... as they do to the rest of the state organization”

(Migdal 2001:100)

The struggles between social forces, which Migdal refers to, can take place in several arenas, either in a limited slum area or a countrywide struggle extending to the seat of power, but even the limited arenas can influence the rest of the state. The social forces’ struggle for domination is what the following section will analyze, i.e. explaining what role the DNGOs have in the power play taking place in the partnership between development partners. The assumption defining this part of the analysis is according to Migdal’s (2001) critics of the bipolar perception, which civil society has become defined by, because it leaves little room to explain societies multiple arenas of struggle. Civil society has because of this become a normative concept. Instead civil society should be understood in its partial nature, as both being separate from the state, while also addressing the state. (Migdal 2001) In line with this premise of civil society the following will consider the power play between the three development partners, which seems to determine the result of the development strategy of Ghana. Another premise is included from the theory of Foucault, namely the unequal distribution of power. Foucault’s power mechanisms are included, to sustain the interpretations of the role civil society play between government and donors in Ghana. Furthermore it has given a framework to describe the consequence of donors having an overweight of power, in the development partnership. Compared to a Gramscian and alternative development perspective, which is focused on the relationship between government and DNGOs, the power mechanisms make it possible to explain the consequence of donors’ domination in the partnership, in relation to the role of the DNGOs.

Chapter 25 - The Battle between Subject and Sovereign

The distinction between subject and sovereign in Foucault’s theory can in this context be used to consider the relationship between the government as having the sovereign power, and DNGOs representing the public of Ghana. In comparison to the western notion of a sovereign, the Ghanaian government can in terms of what has been described both in a historical and current context be con-

sidered weak. Ghana is a relatively new democracy which has been through several experiments of sovereign rule, but with none of them being capable of getting strong public support, and a strong judicial platform to maintain stability. According to Foucault the sovereign need public personnel to implement its policies, for their judicial system to function (Foucault 2003). The current democratic system that emerged in 1992 is however an improvement, but implementation of laws and policies is still a slow process, because of complicated bureaucratic procedures, and low capacity in ministries. The DNGOs therefore consider it necessary that they provide and implement services and research, since the Government is incapable of this. Often the importance of the people implementing policies is forgotten. The work, this personnel do defines the impact of the dominant power's policies, and if the work is done unsuccessfully it reflects negatively back on dominating power (Migdal 2001). This means that the inability of ministries to implement policies, reflect back on the government in Ghana, with the result of the DNGOs having little confidence in the government.

This issue is part of the reason why the DNGOs find it difficult to trust the Government and to cooperate with it. The DNGOs also fear that the government will compromise their legitimacy, and limit their ability to express critics against government (DANIDA 2010)(ARK 2010). This apprehension is expressed by IDEG as: *"who wants to pay ones critic, ..., to expose ones weaknesses"* (IDEG 2010:7). Government has in a historical context been reluctant to support CSOs which were in opposition to the government (DANIDA 2010). In a historical context civil society in Ghana was defined as either for or against the Government. Added to this is the competition over donor funds which started, when donors preferred to support DNGOs for service delivery, which undermines the legitimacy of the Government. The relationship and struggle between government and DNGOs is therefore described as competitive. As struggles between social forces define a society, it is a crucial aspect that civil society does not complement government in an 'organic' relationship, to use the Gramscian terminology. Their struggle has instead determined a complex relationship between them, which makes it difficult to create the 'image' of a coherent controlling organisation, as described necessary for a state to have, by Migdal. This 'image' is a result of the DNGOs not being included by Government to implement its development activities, despite their extensive experience of service provision. Instead the Government maintains an inadequate service provision strategy. Furthermore the Government does not include the public, in policy debates. On the other hand DNGOs are also reluctant to cooperate with their 'competitor', i.e. the Government, fearing they will lose their credibility and independency. For the two partners to meet in a partnership commit-

ment of trust, as Hyden (2008) describes as a necessity for the partnership approach, does currently seem impossible. The DNGOs interviewed are however all aware of positive synergy that could emerge between them if they cooperated, however, it seems like both partners are awaiting the other to initiate the partnership.

Chapter 26 – The Disciplinarian Player

The alienation between DNGOs and government has, as was described in the previous chapter, been an important aspect to maintain a relationship of donor dependency for both. The dependency provides the donors a powerful position. This position has given them the power to take a form of ‘disciplinarian’ role. This position is identified in their ability to regulate both the macro-economical framework of Ghana, and through their support of service deliveries. Through the latter donors can decide which type of institutions are being prioritised e.g. schools, the court system etc. These institutions are in Foucault’s theory important, as they define the disciplinarian mechanisms in a society. When donors in the 1990s supported the DNGOs on contract basis, they had a large impact on implementation of disciplinarian mechanisms. When projects are implemented on donor demands, it undermines the ownership of country development, which was initially the reason for the partnership approach.

The development strategies encouraged by donors have been difficult to reject or redefine, particularly because the Government of Ghana have little capacity to implement a comprehensive development strategy. The main problem with the donors’ strategy is that it is inconsistently implemented. Often individual donors have their own interests. Some donors give for humanitarian reasons, while others have political or economical interests, and finally some use aid to buy good-will in international fora. Often donors’ strategy combine different interests, making their objectives multiple and often conflicting, as a result of donors’ pursuit of assuring visibility, to attract political attention at home. (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007) These different interests have with the partnership approach been cover behind a strategy defined with the vocabulary of the aid effectiveness paradigm, making donor interests seem similar.

This has the outcome of a complex development environment, with each partner being unsure of the area of their responsibility, since donors claim to align to the ownership of recipient countries, but

do still want to steer the direction of the development strategy. This creates a paradox, since donors both have different interests with their development strategies, while also trying to decide the direction of the development strategy. In this sense the 'image' of the donors can also be identified as not being coherent. The disciplinarian mechanism, which implemented by donors can hardly be claimed an effective development approach, since the diverse strategies implemented by each donor, provide unintended results, and reinforce the non cohesive 'image' of Ghana, as was described above. This is not to suggest that donor should become effective disciplinarians of Ghana. Instead it is to signify the problems it creates in Ghana, when a donor, being an outside actor, imposes itself with a disciplinarian approach, which in practice is far from the partnership approach that defines donors' development strategy.

Chapter 27 - The Rules of the Game

The specific types of order and change in a society are the outcomes of the struggles over the rules of the game among social organisations, including the organisations that is usually the weightiest of all, although not always strong enough to end the struggle altogether – the state. (Migdal 2001:130)

In this quote Migdal defines the struggles between social forces as the struggle over 'the rules of the game', a struggle which is usually weighted by the state, but as described it is not always strong enough to end a struggle. In the case of Ghana, the 'image' of the controlling organisation, has above been identified as diverse and complex, contrary to the coherent, which is what Migdal (2001) argues, the 'image' of a state preferable should have. The 'image' of the state of Ghana does however still exist, which is necessary for a country to be identified. The reason for Ghana's non-coherent image is found in the 'practices', being the organisations defining the image of the state. The organisations, or social forces, which have been considered in this case, are the partners involved with the development practice of Ghana. These social forces are reinforcing, contradicting and mutually destructive towards each other, which the two previous chapters have indicated. The following will discuss the impact of this struggle 'over the rules of game', which define the development partnership in Ghana, and the role DNGOs have in the partnership.

The following quote from a brochure for G-RAP, describes how the organization considers the rules of game:

“Donors must dialogue. Donors need space and time of their own to work through issues and come to agreement – between and within themselves – about systems, roles and responsibilities (the “rules of the game”), before engaging with other stakeholders. The bigger the pot of money and the more donors involved, the longer this is likely to take.”

(G-RAP, appendix I)

The donors define the rules of the game; however, the bigger the pot of money the longer it takes for them to make decisions. To this can be added, that the bigger number of donors that are involved in the same ‘pot of money’ the longer the dialogue of systems, roles and responsibility are likely to take, which was recognised in the first case, describing donors ability to align with G-RAP as example of this. Donors all have different interests, which is why the idea of donor harmonization has resulted in long and time-consuming dialogues between donors in Ghana.

Among various recipient stakeholders, i.e. among different ministries, civil servants and government etc., there is also a tendency that there are different objectives (Andersen & Therkildsen 2007; Hyden 2008). One of the main problems in the partnership approach can therefore be determined as a challenge of coordination. As expressed by IDEG (2010), this is an issue in all organisations both national and international, because there is *“something human that occurs in organizations in their ability to stand together and act together, they can’t always act coherently or as a unity.”*(IDEG 2010) Coordinating peoples’ actions is a challenge, when the development policies then are based upon a partnership approach, where each partner: recipient stakeholder, donors and DNGOs have to coordinate (harmonize) as three coherent unities, the challenge of coordinating take an even higher level. Donors and DNGOs have both tried to mobilize, with unsuccessful results, as was described in the cases.

With the power mechanism ‘governmentality’, the following will determine how asymmetrical the power relations are between development partners. ‘Governmentality’, as explained by Foucault (2007) utilizes the population’s need for security as its essential technical instrument, while political economy is the knowledge used to define the security needed. It is, in the case of Ghana, neither possible to define the government or the capitalistic system to have the ‘governing power’ of the population. This is not to compare Ghana to the western notion of ‘governmentality’, but to show that despite the fact that capitalism has become an inherent factor of the Ghanaian system, there is little governing power manifested in the Government. Ghana has become an actor in the international economical system, by Ghana’s role as an exporter of natural resources, as described in chap-

ter 20, while being obliged to import all manufactured goods. The balance of payments is therefore highly sensitive to international economy, which is particularly a problem now because of the economical crises (Ghanaweb 2009). The Government is supposedly the authority which is to govern the macro economy. However, through the donor initiatives the MDBS and the IMF loans, donors have become highly influential in the management of macro level economy, as the triggers, which the Government is evaluated upon, define what an acceptable economical outcome is. The economy at national level is also yet to become managed by the Government, despite donors promote government to have ownership of this, DNGOs still manage much of the service deliveries, because the government does not have the capacity and experience to do this. Donors can be identified as the main actor to determine the strategy of the political economy in Ghana, and through this have large governing role in society. The political economy is, by Foucault, defined to be the main form of knowledge used to define the apparatus of security, to regulate people's behaviour. Donors therefore have a crucial role in state structure of Ghana.

The donor authority is, however, maintained since it is feared that the recipients will reinforce existing unsustainable country systems, which does not empower the poor, when deciding their own development strategy. This issue in the partnership approach is recognised by Hyden (2008). The partnership approach place donors in an ambivalent position, as it needs to assure the effectiveness of development aid disbursed, while on the other hand it has to align to the recipients' development strategy (Hyden 2008). The result of this has therefore been a complicated set of procedures attached to the development contracts, which has also been recognised in the initiatives implemented in Ghana. Behind these procedures, defined with vocabulary of the Paris Declaration, it is then possible to partly cover, how donors have maintained their powerful position.

In a historical context in Ghana, there has been precedence for external actors acting as disciplinarian forces. The partnership approach has meant more power to the government and the DNGOs in terms of ability and legitimacy to negotiate. However, how to manage this new form of power has not been defined. The government is said to have more power through the GPRS, but it is not determined to what extent this power is implemented. Contrary the donors have tried to 'steer the wheel' of how the GPRS was to be defined, as described in chapter 20 (Whitfield & Jones 2009). The negotiation power of the DNGOs is not identified, and being the extended version of the donors, it is difficult to negotiate for much. Furthermore their relationship being based on donors pro-

viding the money, the relationship will always maintain an asymmetrical relationship, meaning a partnership based on mutual terms is currently not a realistic outcome. Donors maintain a position of advantage by advocating knowledge of political economy in the conditionalities or triggers. On behalf of this the recipients implement the instruments of security to control the population, which is how donors maintain their governing position, despite it donors having contradicting interests in between.

27.1 “Civil society is being the society that we have, it’s slow” (G-RAP 2010)

The role of the DNGOs in the development partnership seems to be a reflection of the complex and bureaucratic development game. The rules of the development game is on behalf of the previous chapter difficult to define, since has the development process seems as a both a manipulative and complex struggle between the three development partners, being a reflection of how donors act. The rules decided by donors, appears on the surface to be in line with the partnership approach, but in practice it is covered under a diffuse bureaucratic development system. The bureaucracy defining the development game is therefore also reflected among DNGOs, as the quote above indicates; it is slow. The DNGOs interviewed all demonstrate an interest in becoming more involved in policy debates, which it is also encouraged by INGOs and donors participate in. Yet, the modality of how to actually involve them is lacking, and there has not been any incentive by donors to discuss this. DNGOs therefore approach this differently. Is it better to be at the table of the policy arena or is it better to be outside making noise? This question seems to have many answers, with only one common denominator; all find it important that DNGOs are to have a significant role in discussing policy. The local DNGOs seem to prefer to be at the table discussing. Whereas G-RAP, representing both an INGO and donors, thinks it should be outside making noise (G-RAP 2010) Because of this confusion of the role DNGOs play, the result is not, an independent unity of DNGOs acting with one voice. DNGOs are a diverse group, much like donors also are.

To sum up, and answer the last sub question; The DNGOs have in the partnership between the government and the donors, primarily taken the role of being the extended arm of donors. Which is reasoned by donors position, of both having disciplinarian and governing power in Ghana. Donors power is therefore not just reflected in the development partnership, but also in the structure and practices of Ghana. Their impact has meant that the DNGOs and the Government are reluctant to

cooperate on a development strategy, despite knowing it would be useful to combine their expertise. Government is now being prioritised financially, by donors, to implement service provision, which the DNGOs have the experience within, because it prior was prioritised by donors. The donors have because of their different and contradicting interests unintended provided a situation where the role of each partner is not defined. This has the result of DNGOs being insecure of their role in the game of development in Ghana.

Part VII – Conclusion

The partnership policies in Ghana can both be said to have had a large impact on the role of DNGOs, while at the same time maintaining the DNGOs in a position as the donors extended arm.

Considering the historical process of DNGOs, since they became included in the development process by donors in the late 1980s, their role has changed from being not just service providers, but also government watchdogs. They are now included in the research of effective development and donors encourage them to take part in the development debate to advocate the Government to implement development assistance from e.g. the MDDBS effectively. The idea behind this can be recognised in the democratic practice which we know in the western world. It is encouraged that the Government and the DNGOs cooperate on a development strategy, for Government to utilize the knowledge DNGOs have from their experience with service provision, and their research of how to implement effectively. This idea of the Government and the DNGOs to mobilize their forces is however difficult the two have a tense relationship, which is partly a result of competing over funds.

For DNGOs to take become government watchdogs, it has meant that core funding has become necessary to maintain educated staff with competences to monitor the Government. This type of funding requires certainty that the organisation is effective, which mean that donors now prioritise more established DNGOs. Competition over funds is not new between DNGOs, but in light of this change in donors' civil society approach the competition seems to be worsening. Market forces are determining the environment between DNGOs, which is creating a gap between the established DNGOs doing research and advocacy versus those providing services. This can be seen as a result of donors' emphasis on effectiveness and independency. In light of this approach, the partnership policies can be determined to have continued the neoliberal development approach from the Washington consensus.

The Government of Ghana has been recognised as becoming more independent of donors, this is however more a result of outside events then the partnership approach. Ghana has improved its economical position, adding to this is the oil discovery and finally because of unconditional loans provided by donors as China. The partnership approach has contrary to this, and despite promoting

independency and effectiveness, been recognised to bring the opposite, namely dependency. The MDBS has through triggers maintained a large set of conditions, and additionally to this some donors do still support the Government with separate conditions. This has meant that the even the public has questioned who has the most power; the World Bank President in Ghana or the Ghanaian President. This indicates that donors not only have more power in the development partnership, it can also be considered being part of the institutional structure of the state of Ghana. When donors promote the DNGOs to become independent state actors, opposite the Government, the result is instead that DNGOs maintain a position of being dependent to donors, as an extended arm of donors.

It should be emphasised that the partnership approach has had positive impacts, in terms of the established DNGOs within research have had felt more flexibility in their work after the new funding processes have been implemented. The problematic affect, being recognised as the result of the partnership approach, is that donors through their power seem to alienate and encourage competition between recipient stakeholders. This means that government and DNGOs both between and within have fragmented development strategies. The partnership approach seems to have brought with it more confusion, then a mutual partnership. The role of the DNGOs is hardly clear, it is encouraged to be independent, while it still is dependent on donor funding. Additionally it is encouraged to do research and advocacy, while there are still people suffering from the Government's inability yet to provide service provision, and it being unwilling to include the DNGOs in the policy debates. The partnership does not seem to be realistic to implement in the current context of Ghana, and when implemented in bit and peaces as it is now, it only has the result of confusion and uncertainty as to what roles each development actor have in the game of development.

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