Turkey as a Candidate Country on the Way to Join the European Union

By:

Klára Šafářová

Supervisor: Søren Dosenrode, Dr. Phil.
Programme: European Studies
Type of Paper: Master Thesis
Date: 30 June 2010
Key Strokes: 126,151
# Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4  

Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5  
1.1 Research Question............................................................................................................ 6  
1.2 Reasons for Choosing the Topic ...................................................................................... 7  
1.3 Brief Outline of Each Chapter.......................................................................................... 9  

Chapter 2: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 10  
2.1 Epistemological Considerations, Research Philosophy and Approach........................ 10  
2.2 Theoretical Considerations............................................................................................. 12  
2.3 Empirical Considerations and Data Collection Method................................................. 13  
2.5 Time Frame-Outline and Delimitation........................................................................... 13  

Chapter 3: Historical Background ............................................................................................ 14  
3.1 Ottoman Modernization ................................................................................................. 14  
3.2 The Emergence of the Republic of Turkey .................................................................... 16  
3.3 A Brief Chronology of EU-Turkey Relations ................................................................ 20  

Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspective .......................................................................................... 22  
4.1 Basic Characteristics of Classical Modernization Theory ............................................. 22  
4.2 Rising Role of Cultural Factors...................................................................................... 24  
4.3 Inglehart’s Unified Version of Modernization Theory .................................................. 28  
4.3.1 Data and Measures .................................................................................................. 28  
4.3.2 Global Cultural Map................................................................................................ 31  
4.3.3 Socioeconomic Development and Cultural Change................................................ 32  
4.3.4 Summary of Findings .............................................................................................. 33  
4.4 Criticism of Modernization Theory................................................................................ 37  

Chapter 5: Analysis .................................................................................................................. 41  
5.1 Turkish Economy and Society until 1980 ...................................................................... 41  
5.2 Transformation of the Turkish Economy and Its Impact on Society since the 1980s ... 46
Abstract

This paper sets out to provide fresh insights in the controversial case of Turkey as an EU candidate country and its progress in the accession negotiations with special focus on the course of achievements of political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular democratic standards and human rights. It also seeks to identify and analyze the main obstacles to progress in the Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and assess the current weaknesses of the country’s candidature. By analyzing the hindrances in front of Turkish negotiations, it aims to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership.

Firstly, this paper borrows theoretical framework of Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory to examine the relationship between economic development of the country and its impact on social, cultural and political changes conductive to democracy. It analyzes economic development of the country from the emergence of the Republic of Turkey and its positive influence on social transformations. Secondly, except other secondary sources, this paper examines most recent European Commission’s Annual Progress Reports which contain official up to date information not only about the current relations between Turkey and the EU but also valuable data on the situation in Turkey in terms of fulfillment of the political element of the Copenhagen Criteria. Thirdly, this paper takes use of original primary data collected in form of two semi-structured interviews, namely from European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt.

Findings of this study suggest that Turkey has entered the right road in order to approach democratic standards within the EU. However, a long road ahead Turkey still remains if it aims to fully embrace the values that make a country truly modern, human rights and democracy. In addition, the process of gradual liberalization of the country’s political culture remains hindered by Turkey’s remarkably tenacious cultural heritage.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The European Union (EU) is currently dealing with the significant challenges of managing the enlargement which already took place as well as the on-coming ones which present a daunting test for the EU. The ongoing process of bringing together the old and new Member States and candidate countries and the economic dimensions which differentiate them seem to constitute an uneasy task to the EU. It appears to be rather obvious that concepts such as enlargement and integration are in an inconsistent relationship with each other. The possibility of onward enlargement and accompanying border shift has significant consequences.

The gradual course of EU enlargement has had a substantial influence on the internal structure of the EU as a whole in terms of increased diversity and it has stirred up a large number of divergent reactions within individual EU Member States. With regard to EU widening, the case of Turkey’s prospective membership of the EU is undoubtedly the most contentious, facing long-standing and deeply divided opinions.

Turkey and the EU have a long history stretching back to the 1963 Ancara Agreement. A central question of Turkey’s membership has been on the agenda for over 40 years. In 1999, Turkey has become an EU candidate country at the EU summit in Helsinki and after intense bargaining EU accession negotiations were launched in October 2005. Nevertheless, so far the going has not been easy.

Despite the ongoing accession process and official EU policy, a number of stumbling blocks remain on Turkey’s road to EU accession. Firstly, while the Commission is increasing its efforts to strengthen the EU-Turkey relations, negative statements by a number of MEPs is having a contrary effect. Several prominent politicians as well as many EU citizens would rather not see Turkey join the EU (Parker, 2009). For instance, great reluctance to Turkey’s prospective membership of the EU comes from current and also former French Presidents. The current French President Nicolas Sarkozy has repeatedly suggested that there is no space for Turkey in the EU (EurActiv1, 2007; Yinanc, 2007; Parker, 2009). Moreover, achievement of all the necessary accession criteria (the Copenhagen Criteria) determined to the states desiring accession to the EU seems to still present a considerable hindrance to Turkey on the way to being permitted to join the EU. Even though, substantial reforms in line with EU
requirements were introduced in the areas of human rights, freedom of expression, upholding the rule of law, military, broadcasting, the rights of the Kurdish minority or the country’s economy, not all of them have been fully implemented so far (Müftüler-Bac and Stivachtis, 2008; Parker, 2009).

It appears to be difficult to imagine that further accession negotiations with the EU and Turkey’s prospective accession will be smooth and will not pose difficulties for the EU when taking into account the size of Turkish population, the majority of Muslim population, cultural prejudices, the level of GDP per capita and also the share of agriculture in the economy (Nello, 2009). At the same time, Turkey is a country of a great geopolitical importance (MacLennam, 2009). It can contribute towards strengthening of the EU as an economic superpower and boost its global role. Turkey’s entry to the EU might also contribute towards enhancing security in such an unstable corner of the globe and bridge the gap between Europe and the Islamic world.

1.1 Research Question

This paper aims to examine Turkey as an EU candidate country and its progress in the accession negotiations with special focus on the course of achievement of political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular democratic standards and human rights. It also seeks to identify and analyze the main obstacles to progress in the Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and assess the current weaknesses of the country’s candidature. By analyzing the hindrances in front of Turkish negotiations, it aims to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership. One main research question of this study has been formulated as follows.

This paper sets out to think through the following question:

To what extent has Turkey proceeded on the way to join the EU and being permitted to do so with a special focus on the course of achievement of political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular democratic standards and human rights, necessary conditions which any country seeking membership of the EU must conform to?
1.2 Reasons for Choosing the Topic

The topic selection - Turkey as an EU candidate country on the way to join the EU - was influenced by a number of reasons. Firstly, it should be emphasized that in the current accession negotiations with Turkey, there is something more at stake than the ‘mere’ entry of the country to the EU. Turkey’s membership of the EU would to a large extent affect the concept of Europe which marks out the future of the EU.

Turkey’s admission to the EU would significantly change the nature of the EU and most likely undermine the momentum of the integration process. The case of Turkey constitutes an unprecedented challenge for the EU because entry of the country comprises multi-faceted issues such as political system which is still relatively far from meeting European standards, a relatively backward economy, cultural differences, the impact of religion on politics and the society, the size of Turkish population or the Cyprus issue (Nas, 2005; MacLennam, 2009; Nello, 2009).

Moreover, there appear to be ongoing serious concerns over the situation of the Kurdish people (the largest minority group in the country) and human rights standards in Turkey. These ongoing issues evoke anxiety over the decision of 17 December 2004 when the European Council decided to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October 2005, based on the country’s sufficient fulfillment of the political element of the Copenhagen Criteria (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Nello, 2009). The political elements of the Copenhagen Criteria entail that candidate countries must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Nello, 2009: 471).

Even though, Turkey has introduced remarkable series of pro-EU reforms over a relatively short period of time and has moved towards closer compliance with democracy, international standards of human rights and the rule of law, there still remain substantial problems related among others to the human rights situation or the Kurdish issue in Turkey (Richardson, 2005; Yildiz and Muller, 2008). This has inspired substantial concerns for Turkey’s full commitment to the reform process and appears to hinder already complicated political dialogue between Turkey and the EU which plays a crucial role if Turkey is truly to democratize itself.
One could argue that the EU is seen as an effective channel to democratization. It that case, Turkey’s current accession process seems to endow the EU with a historical opportunity to take a role as an influential international player intervening in European affairs. The EU might constitute a firm anchor on the Turkey’s way to fully establish the values which make a country truly modern, which is human rights and democracy.

Another important element of Turkey’s possible EU membership is that it would alter the geopolitical environment of the EU. The country’s accession would carry the EU borders as far as the Middle East and find the EU neighbouring with unstable and problematic countries such as Iraq, Iran or Syria. Thereby, conflicts of the Middle East and Transcaucasia would fall within the group of issues of direct concern for the EU.

It should be also noted that result of the current EU accession negotiations with Turkey is also vital regarding the question of where Europe ends and the determination of the borders of the EU. There is no reference to the eastern border of Europe or geographical definition of Europe in the EU treaties. The union constitutes an open, not geographically bordered entity which allows permanent enlargement and the Copenhagen Criteria (the political and economic accession criteria) have meanwhile become explicit conditions for eligibility (European Council in Copenhagen, 1993; Pelkmans, 2006). Thus, if Turkey becomes an EU member state, there are no good arguments for denying applications for membership to countries on Turkey’s borderline if they wish to do so.

As already mentioned above, the case of Turkey on the way to join the EU presents a formidable challenge for the EU and the country’s eventual entry would affect the concept of Europe which would in turn shape the future of the EU and touch upon the question of where the eastern border of the EU lies.

This paper aims to follow and examine the development of the current EU accession negotiations with Turkey with special focus on fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria, necessary conditions which any country seeking membership of the EU must conform to. This study does not set out to weigh up the pros and cons for each party. It rather seeks to identify and analyze the main obstacles to progress in the Turkey’s negotiations with the EU. By
analyzing the hindrances in front of Turkish negotiations, it aims to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership.

1.3 Brief Outline of Each Chapter

This paper is divided into six main chapters. In the next chapter, rationale for choosing methods and approaches used in the study is explained and justified. It deals with methodological considerations and delimitation of the study. Chapter 3 outlines a historical background of Turkey to the debate on political culture, the societal situation of the country and EU-Turkey relations starting from Ottoman Empire. Chapter 4 provides the main characteristics of classical version of Modernization Theory. It continues with theoretical tradition of a number of theorists who altered view on modernization. Further, it presents Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory. At the end of this chapter, criticism of Modernization Theory is outlined. Chapter 5 sets out to firstly, examine the nature of relationship between economic development and emergence of democracy in the case of Turkey through matching empirical data with what the theory proposes. In the second part, this chapter analyzes primary data collected via semi-structured interviews with Czech European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and German Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt. And the last chapter answers the main research question of the study and briefly summarises the main points and findings of the paper.
Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter sets out to explain and justify the rationale for choosing methods and approaches used in the study. The chosen approach which is described further in this chapter will help the reader to understand not only the working paradigm but also to clarify the structure of this paper. Theoretical and empirical considerations aim to explain and justify the use of theory and both primary and secondary data. Finally, delimitation of the study is also included in this chapter in order to emphasize what this paper is primarily focused on and what aspects are set on aside.

In order to research the key research question, this study combines three research methods. Firstly, it borrows an existing theory – Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory – and tests a hypothesis deduced from the theory by matching them with available data. Secondly, it closely examines the official Turkey’s Progress Reports which are issued annually by the European Commission. This kind of empirical data seems to be highly suitable for this study because it contains up to date information not only about the current relations between Turkey and the EU but also valuable data on the situation in Turkey in terms of fulfillment of the political and economic element of the Copenhagen Criteria (EU Membership Criteria). Thirdly, this paper takes use of original primary data collected in form semi-structured interviews, namely from European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt. The research methods and approaches used in this study will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapters.

2.1 Epistemological Considerations, Research Philosophy and Approach

Research philosophy describes the process of thinking about development of knowledge and the way of thinking consequently influences the conduct of research. Bryman (2004) outlines two main epistemological positions, namely positivism and interpretivism. It should be mentioned that research rarely falls into one of the camps. According to Saunders et al. (2000) mixture between positivism and interpretivism can be often observed in the practice. However, considering the nature of positivism, this epistemological position is preferred in
this study. Positivism supports working with observable social reality and also entails elements of deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2000; Bryman, 2004) which was considered as the more suitable research approach for this study. According to Denscombe (2003) positivism assumes that there are “patterns and regularities, cause and consequences in the social world, just as there are in the natural world”. Positivists aim to discover the patterns and regularities of the social world in social research.

As already mentioned above, deductive approach was chosen in this study. It begins with an observed regularity that needs to be explained. Then theory, in this case Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory, is borrowed and on the basis of theoretical considerations in relation to the observed regularity and of what is known about the particular domain, a hypothesis is deduced and subjected to empirical scrutiny. A hypothesis together with explanation of its formulation is stated at the end of Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspective from which the hypothesis is deduced. The use of deductive approach aims to establish whether or not what the theory proposes matches the data (Blaikie, 2000). A match lends some support to the theory; nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that it cannot conclusively establish the only or the true explanation for the observed regularity.

![Scheme I. Process of Deductive Approach](image)

In this study, two subsidiary questions next to the major research question, which forms the core of this research, were formulated. These subsidiary questions are not absolutely central to the study; nevertheless, they deal with background information and context of the study which is conductive to answering the key research question of this paper. In particular, the testing theory chapters aim to think through the two subsidiary research questions.

Subsidiary research question:
- To what extent is gradual economic development and democratization process correlated in the case of Turkey?
- Why does or does not this relationship exist?
Focusing on the subsidiary questions helps to establish and explain the nature of the relationship between the level of economic development and democratization in Turkey through historical analysis of social change and economic growth in Turkey. It sets out to assist in specifying persisting hindrances to the current EU accession negotiations with the country which in turn helps to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership.

2.2 Theoretical Considerations

As already mentioned above, one of the three research methods used in this paper presents subjection of propositions emerging from Modernization Theory, namely Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory, to empirical test. One of the main assumptions of the unified version of Modernization Theory is that economic development tends to bring coherent, and to some extent, predictable social, cultural and political changes which are over time conductive to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). It sets out to examine the nature of relationship between economic development and emergence of democracy in the case of Turkey through matching empirical data with what the theory proposes. Thus, the testing theory chapters aim to think through the two subsidiary research questions stated above. The empirical data in the section presents mainly academic articles and books shedding light on historical development of Turkey with special focus on transformation of Turkey’s society structures, respect for human rights, political reform process and economic development.

Selection of a suitable theory constitutes a difficult task for a researcher. Different theoretical concepts such as ‘clash of civilization’ theory (Huntington, 1993) or theoretical approach of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (Keohane and Nye, 1989) were considered, nevertheless Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory was chosen for a number of reasons.

Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory helps to explain and clarify Turkey’s gradual progress towards modernity and also enables to more closely specify prospects of Turkey’s democratic qualities in the future while shedding light on correlation between economic development of the country and transformation of its society’s social structures leading towards democratization process. Moreover, analysis of historical development of Turkey along with the gradual process of modernization will help to uncover hindrances to
further economic and political development of the country and impediments to progress in fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Moreover, by analyzing the hindrances in front of Turkish accession negotiations with the EU, it aims to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership.

2.3 Empirical Considerations and Data Collection Method

Empirical basis of this paper consists mainly of qualitative and some quantitative data about historical, economic and social development of Turkey in form of books and academic articles. This paper also examines official Turkey’s Progress Reports which are issued annually by the European Commission. In addition, it takes use of original primary data collected in form semi-structured interviews, namely from European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt. If the time allowed, it would be preferable to conduct a larger number of interviews which would enable wider and more profound analysis and comparison.

2.5 Time Frame-Outline and Delimitation

This paper has been delimited to focus mainly on economic and social development and its influence on social, cultural and political changes from the emergence of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Nevertheless, due to the country’s remarkably durable cultural heritage, the period of Ottoman Empire is also taken into account. Official Turkey’s Progress Reports from 1999 until the most recent report from 2009 have been reviewed which allows examining the progress in Turkey’s pro-EU reform process from the time when Turkey received official candidate status until 2009.

It should be mentioned that numerous studies set out to objectively weight up the pros and cons of Turkey’s membership of the EU. Nevertheless, even though, it is a relevant topic, this paper is, rather, interested primarily in examining Turkey as an EU candidate country and its progress in the accession negotiations with special focus on the course of achievement of political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular democratic standards and human rights.
Chapter 3: Historical Background

This chapter aims to outline a historical background to the debate on political culture of Turkey, the societal situation of the country and EU-Turkey relations. It sets out to explain why Turkey has become the most advanced democracy in the Islamic world, different from other Muslim nations, especially from its neighbouring countries in the Middle East (Akyol, 2009). Firstly, it emphasizes a rich heritage of the Ottoman Empire and its linkage to the country’s gradual modernization. Further, it continues with an establishment of the modern secular Turkish Republic by nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. It also highlights a long history between Turkey and the EU stretching back to the Ankara Agreement in 1963 and simply outlines the subsequent development of EU-Turkey relations.

At first glance Turkey might represent the shining star of the Muslim world for many Westerners. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that even though the main religion in the country presents Islam (99% of the country’s population is registered as Muslims) it has been a secular state as the ‘Western’ political and civilizational model has been introduced since the establishment of modern Turkey in the 1923 (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2010). Thereby, Turkey has become gradually integrated in the West. It has become a member of organizations such as Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952) or OECD (1961) and it has built close ties with the USA as its ally during World War II (Richardson, 2005; Akyol, 2009). It should be noted that a number of historians who deal with the origins of modern Turkey argue that it was a rich legacy of Ottoman modernization that gave rise to modern Turkey (Karpat, 2001).

3.1 Ottoman Modernization

The Ottoman (Osmanic) Empire also known as the Turkish Empire lasted from 1299 to 1922 was centered in present day Republic of Turkey and it was governed by the Muslim Turks. During the 16th and the 17th century when the Ottoman Empire acted as the world’s leading superpower, it extended its borders to three continents gaining authority over much of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia and North Africa (Akyol, 2009; Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2010). Long-term interaction of the Turks with the West resulted in a significant
insight. The Turks started to discover and follow the Western ‘ways’ (Mardin, 2005) which in turn let towards gradual rise of the state’s modernity.

One could mention the advanced role of Ottoman bureaucrats who were sent to different European states to identify and learn the Western ‘ways’ and methods already in the 1730s (Mardin, 2005). Those delegates were in charge of writing reports about their mission observations and as Mardin highlights, the interesting point was that the reports focused mainly on material aspects of life discovered in the West such as technological advances, e.g. construction of military and civilian buildings or astronomical observatories, modernization of army or banking system or replacement of guilds with factories. Thereby, the Ottoman intellectual elite could introduce a number of practical Westernization changes and implement advanced European technologies which firstly enabled to understand and promote the secular elements of the discourse of Ottoman bureaucracy and which were secondly conductive to the creation of Turkish-Islamic exceptionality.

Despite of the general favourable historical legacy of the Ottoman modernization project, it should be noticed that the Ottoman officers or the intellectual elite had the greatest impact on determination of policy and wealth and status were anchored to them (Grigoriadis, 2009). Moreover, political tradition of Sunni Islam (most of Turks professes Sunni Islam) emphasized the importance of strong central state power (Rahman, 1979; Khaled, 2001). This kind of state-centric ideology of the Ottoman bureaucrats could have contributed to the lack of a vibrant civil society in Turkey. According to Grigoriadis (2009:42) “a high degree of citizen participation in civil society associations is positively correlated with a flourishing liberal democratic system”. Thus, the absence of civil society in Turkey before the 1990s could be viewed as one of the reasons for the country’s subsequent difficult consolidation of democratic system and liberal political culture.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire started to introduce the principle of religious freedom. In 1856, the Ottoman sultan pronounced that “all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions” (Deringil, 2000). It should be noted that the Ottoman State - an Islamic state - endowed Jews and Christians with full citizen rights in the 19th century while not waiving Islam but rather modernize it from within according to the requirements of the time. The Ottoman project of modernization of Islam came to an end with the empire’s fragmentation as a result of its defeat in World War I. In the meantime, rise of national
consciousness fostered a number of national groups within the disintegrating Empire to struggle for independence as nation-states.

### 3.2 The Emergence of the Republic of Turkey

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalists expelled invading victorious forces from Anatolia (a geographic region of Western Asia) and subsequently formed Republic of Turkey as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 (Akyol, 2009). Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) became the founder and the first President of the young Republic and the Turkish parliament endowed him with an honorific surname ‘Atatürk’ - Father Turk (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2010).

Kemal set out to establish a Turkish-nation state based on strong mono-ethnic nationalism, secularism (separation of church and state) and western orientation. In line with the Kemal’s new reform program, the religious and multiethnic base of the Ottoman population was removed; instead the official Turkish national identity was imposed (Grigoriadis, 2009). Thus, Islamists, minorities (such as Kurds – the largest group of non-Turkish people in Turkey) and liberals presented the main enemies of the Kemalist Westernization project and were systematically suppressed. There was a ‘single party regime’ in Turkey from 1925 to 1946; other parties were destroyed and their leaders were removed from the country’s political scene (Akyol, 2009). The only political party – the People’s Party (CHP) – which was directed by Mustafa Kemal believed in so called ‘Turkification’ of minorities with the aid of authoritarian methods such as prohibiting Kurdish language and destroying their culture (Akyol, 2009). This in turn led towards severe human rights violations in the Turkish Republic. The authoritarian structure of the young Republic seems to be perceived by Kemal and his staff as instrumental in pursuit of achievement of strong Turkish national identity.

It should be also mentioned that the role of military in Turkish politics notably strengthened during the period of Kemalist modernization. The military was placed at the core of the state and was perceived as the guardian of the official Kemalist state ideology (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Grigoriadis, 2009). It executed a number of coups; in 1960, 1971 and 1980 (Akyol, 2009). Thereby, the military has intervened in politics and assumed power several times in the second half of the 20th century. It should be also noted that even though the Turkish military
has been viewed as an important instrument conductive to the country’s modernization - Turkey was favoring the Western allies during World war II which entered rather symbolically during the last few official days on February 23, 1945 so it became identified with the winning side; this in turn allowed the country to benefit from the Marshall Plan and join NATO in 1952; the country’s entry to NATO was also supported by its participation in the Korean War as a member state of the United Nations (UN) whereby it earned respect of the West - the role of military in Turkish politics seems to present one of the main hindrances to Turkey’s desire to join the EU.

Things started to gradually change after Kemal’s death in 1938. A substantial step forward concerning the process of Turkey’s political liberalization and democratization presented the introduction of a multi-party system in 1946 (Grigoriadis, 2009). The second President of Turkey, Mustafa İsmet İnönü, declared in his speech in 1945 that the absence of an opposition party constitutes the main failure of Turkish democracy (Zürcher, 2004). Soon afterwards, in January 1946, a new opposition party called the Democratic Party (DP) was registered next to the already existing Republican People's Party (CHP) which was created by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 (Grigoriadis, 2009). The İnönü’s decision to allow for the establishment of opposition parties seemed to be influenced by domestic discontent and also external pressure. Firstly, Islamists and minorities had a hard time putting up with the undemocratic Turkish state. Muslims had their religious institution ruined and Kurds were dissatisfied with prohibition of their language and identity (Akyol, 2009). Instead, these groups hoped for democratic principles which would enable them to realize their desire for freedom. Moreover, the ruling party, the CHP, became increasingly unpopular with the majority of the population (Grigoriadis, 2009). Secondly, territorial claims of the victorious Soviet Union against Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War also influenced the country’s - even partial - convergence towards the Western political and economic paradigm and strengthening of its political ties with the USA (Grigoriadis, 2009).

The newly formed DP won the first Turkey’s free and fair elections in 1950 (Akyol, 2009). The DP introduced a number of liberal reforms such as legalization of the Islamic call to prayer; restrictions on freedom of expression and prohibitions in Kurdish areas were theoretically lifted (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Akyol, 2009). Nevertheless, the period of democratization did not last long. In 1960, the military coup disbanded the DP, executed the DP’s Prime Minister and re-introduced authoritarian policies (Grigoriadis, 2009). Thereby,
the Turkish military demonstrated its power and dominant position in the state. The 1960 military coup seems to present the first blow against democracy and liberalizing policies in Turkey.

It should be mentioned that the basic human rights remained to be violated and treatment of minorities such as the Kurds did not significantly improve (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Grigoriadis, 2009). Moreover, Turkey’s pursuit of democracy was repeatedly hit by military coups as mentioned above (in 1960, 1971 and 1980) which allegedly sought to thwart anti-Kemalist revisionism (Grigoriadis, 2009).

Moreover, it should be noted that Turkish constitutions since 1961, that is the 1961 and 1982 constitutions, were drawn up in the wake of military coups, including the current version which was introduced after the 1980 coup (Rainsford, 2008). Not surprisingly, the current Turkish constitution has been a target of sustained criticism from lawyers, the Council of Europe and the EU for protecting the state over the individual and its military framework - the great influence of military on the Turkish politics such as the army's right to dismiss officers at will or protection of leaders of the 1980 military coup from prosecution (Rainsford, 2008; Champion, 2010). Moreover, Grigoriadis (2009) argues that the constitutional protection of fundamental rights was created as conditional and can be limited or annulled by virtue of national interest, national security or threat to the republican order.

A new, more liberal proposal of Turkish constitution has been drawn up recently. It was signed by the President, Abdullah Gül, in May 2010 (Czech News Agency, 2010). But due to the fact that the new controversial proposal was not approved by at least two-third majority in the parliament, it will be submitted to a plebiscite in the near future (Czech News Agency, 2010). The new constitution is aimed to replace the current military framework with a civilian one; it would among others increase civilian control of the armed forces, address the thorny issue of ethnic identity, increase labour-union rights and it would also improve protection of fundamental human, social and political rights in order to make the constitution more liberal (Rainsford, 2008; Champion, 2010).

It should be emphasized that the constitutional reform and subordination of military to civilian control has become one of the main requirements for successful Turkey-EU accession talks (Champion, 2010). Nevertheless, one could argue that full curbing of military influence on
Turkish politics could be rather time consuming due to the military heritage of the country. However, if the proposal becomes law, it will become a significant indicator of Turkey’s democratic development; if it does not, it will most likely remain one of the major concerns of the EU which will subsequently deteriorate progress in Turkey-EU accession negotiations.

Since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been the governing party in Turkey; the main opposition party has remained the People’s Republican Party (CHP) since 2002 (BBC News, 2007). The AKP won the last general elections with 47% of the total votes in 2007. Even though, the AKP has its roots in political Islam, it positions itself as a liberal, pro-Western party with a firm commitment to liberal market economy aiming to move Turkey closer to the EU (Turkish Daily News, 2007). This new stance of the currently governing party has brought many reforms to the country which helped to boost the economy and it has also introduced a number of freedoms (Akyol, 2009). Even though, the AKP seems to be publicly committed to push for the EU membership and emphasize its pro-Western stance, the very recent AKP administration appears to pull Turkey rather towards the Islamic Middle East. One could mention the recent nuclear fuel swap deal for Iran (currently on the table), numerous meetings with the Iranian President or impaired relations with Israel after the May 30, 2010, incident (Gurdogan, 2010; Christian Science Monitor, 2010).

Turkey’s political structure seems to be rather fragile and prone to significant changes in a relatively short period of time. However, one could argue that the currently ruling ‘pro-EU’ AKP will have a hard time in the 2011 elections due to the recent developments in Turkey, such as TEKEL workers’ resistance¹ or the recent development of foreign policy, and gradual increasing popularity of the opposition parties.

It should be also noted that the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU appears to have significantly influenced the country’s political transformation. That is why a brief chronology of EU-Turkey relations is outlined in the section below.

¹ TEKEL was a state monopoly company of tobacco and alcohol producing factories in Turkey which was closed by the government at the end of January 2010. About 10 000 affected workers have staged the biggest protest in Turkey in 30 years and they have been fighting for labour rights protections, the Turkish government offers to change the workers’ status to ‘casual worker’ – a contract with pay cut and reduced labour rights (Akca, 2010; Gurdogan, 2010).
3.3 A Brief Chronology of EU-Turkey Relations

EU-Turkey relations stretch back to the late 1950s. Since that time, Turkey has begun cooperating with the European Economic Community (EEC) (EurActiv2, 2010). Turkey’s prospective membership of the EU, the EEC’s successor, has evoked a rich source of debate ever since. Turkey’s relationship with the EEC was legally established in 1963 when Ankara Agreement was signed which presents the first step on the way to the country’s full membership (Evin and Denton, 1990). However, during the early years that followed the Ankara Agreement, EU-Turkey relations rather worsened; particularly after Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the 1980 military coup which in turn put on hold Turkish hopes for the country’s full accession to the EU (EurActiv2, 2010). In a reaction to the course of events, the EEC suspended its relations with Turkey primarily in protest of the military intervention. The suspension came into force in January 1982 and was lifted in September 1986 (Yilmaz, 2009) which put Turkey back on the EEC’s agenda.

A significant turning point for the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU seems to present the decision reached at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 which gives official candidate status to Turkey (EurActiv2, 2010). In the period between 1999 and 2004, Turkey seems to enact a noteworthy series of pro-EU reforms in order to meet particularly the political elements of the Copenhagen Criteria (Accession Criteria). It should be emphasized that satisfaction of the political aspect of the Accession Criteria is decisive for the commencement of official accession negotiations (Europa, 2010).

The Turkish Constitution was amended several times between 1995 and 2004 in order to alter the illiberal nature of the 1982 Constitution (Grigoriadis, 2009). These amendments positively altered the general approach to the restriction on fundamental rights and liberties and also introduced a number of improvements concerning individual rights (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004). Turkey agreed to abolish the death penalty in all circumstances, including during wars (BBC News1, 2004). The European Commission warmly welcomed the Turkey’s move as it presented one of the basic conditions for Turkey to open accession negotiations on EU membership (EurActiv2, 2010). According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000), Article 2, “no one shall be condemned to the death penalty or executed”. Also the prohibition on education and broadcasting in Kurdish has been, at least formally, lifted and the traditional influence of the military on government has been reduced (Yildiz and Muller,
Turkey appears to move closer to compliance with international standards on human rights, democracy and rule of law. The motivation goal of EU membership seems to provide the stimulus for Turkish reform process.

In December 2004, the European Council decided to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, based on the Council’s conclusion that Turkey has fulfilled the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria (Nello, 2009). However, it should be mentioned that the Council’s decision has generated criticism in some quarters. Yildiz and Muller (2008) argue that the Council’s decision to start official accession talks with Turkey was reached prematurely and is highly questionable.

It should be mentioned that the Copenhagen Criteria seem to have been rather broad and vague which can in turn lead to wards considerable openness to interpretation. For instance, the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria entails that the candidate country must achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Europa, 2010). Nello (2009) points out the imprecise nature of the concepts involved in the number of criteria and argues that the simple rule ‘when a country fulfills political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU will open the official accession negotiations with the country’ seems to be misleading when taking into account the discretion in deciding whether the conditions have been achieved. Arikan (2006) also supports the notion that the EU Accession Criteria appear to be vague and not defined in a clear manner. The extent to which the applicant countries have to make progress in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities seems to be not clear. In the end, the choice of who and when can proceed to official accession negotiations or join the EU appears to be also a political issue due to a relatively large flexibility and political leeway in deciding whether the Copenhagen Criteria have been met.

Even though, the EU symbolically opened accession talks in October 2005, Turkey-EU relations seem to entered a ‘vicious’ circle in the post-2005 period and a number of stumbling blocks remains on the Turkey’s road to EU membership as discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 4: Theoretical Perspective

This chapter presents a revised version of classical Modernization Theory. Even though, early versions of Modernization Theory were criticized for its simplicity and deficiency in a number of important respects (Preston, 1996; Martinussen, 1997; Joas and Knöbl, 2009), a massive body of evidence seems to indicate that the most central premise of Modernization Theory - that socioeconomic development brings significant changes in society, culture and politics - was plausible (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The theoretical basis of this study follows and relies on extensive work by Ronald Inglehart\(^2\) whose research focuses particularly on cultural changes (values and beliefs of mass publics) and their impact on social and political change. He outlines a new and unified version of Modernization Theory. He combines the central insights of modernization theory with theory of cultural change and democratization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

In the following sections, the main characteristics of classical version of Modernization Theory are outlined. Further, it simply presents theoretical traditions of political economists and scientists such as Max Weber (1958 [1914]), Samuel P. Huntington (1993), Robert D. Putnam (1993) or Francis Fukuyama (1995) who altered view on modernization by taking into account situation specific factors such as cultural heritage when making analyses of socioeconomic development and its consequences. Instead of omitting cultural factors, they started to play an important role in empirical analyses (Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This chapter continues with presentation of the Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory and at the end, criticism of Modernization Theory is outlined.

4.1 Basic Characteristics of Classical Modernization Theory

\(^2\) Ronald Inglehart (1934) is a political scientist and author of more than 120 publications. He currently works as Professor of Political Science and Program Director in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He is a Chairman of the executive committee of the World Values Survey. He also served as a consultant to the U.S. State Department and the EU. His research deals with changing values and beliefs of mass publics and their influence on social and political change.
Modernization Theory has been developed and popularized in the 1950s and since that time a number of important studies among the magna opera of Modernization Theory was produced such as Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* from 1985 or Walt Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth* from 1960 (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Even though, these studies, written mainly by political scientists, sociologists and economists, were often diverging in details, key characteristics of classical Modernization Theory can be identified (Joas and Knöbl, 2009).

Firstly, one of the basic assumptions of classical Modernization Theory seems to present a distinction between tradition and modernity. This basic dualism contrasts the traditional and underdeveloped with the modern and developed (Martinussen, 1997; Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Western or American societies and their system of institutions and values was perceived as modern and desirable at that time and it was believed to serve as an ideal model for various underdeveloped or developing countries whose societies were perceived as traditional (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Moreover, underdevelopment tended to be viewed as a direct consequence of countries’ internal characteristics such as distinctive cultural traits or traditional value systems which should be replaced by modern Western value system (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Thus, classical versions of modernization theory seem to assume antithesis between traditional and modern structures.

Secondly, historical development appears to be viewed as the process of modernization which proceeds from traditional to modern societies (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). The idea that societies tend to develop over time from traditional to modern appears to be present in a large number of classical theorists of modernization. Joas and Knöbl (2009) suggest that one of the reasons for popularity of this theoretical construction in the 1950s and early 1960s consists in the theory’s ‘promise’ to be highly relevant to practice; the basic idea relies on the presumption that one could steer process of development in the non-Western world with the aid of its insights. At that time, modernization theorists assumed that backward countries and their societies needed to adopt modern (Western) values and institutions in order to develop (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Thus, modernization of the non-Western world appears to be viewed as a process of approximation towards the ‘modern’ system of institutions and values developed in the Euro-American world which was at that time perceived as desirable and appropriate for various developing countries regardless of the countries’ cultural heritage.
Thirdly, according to the classical theory’s conception, modernization constitutes global forces which started in Europe with industrial revolution and moved further to North America but this process increasingly influences all societies and is irreversible (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). In line with this notion, it was believed that developing countries will over time follow Western-style modernization.

Further, classical versions of Modernization Theory assumed that social change which is conducive to and leads to modernity will proceed in relatively uniform and linear nature in the different countries (Martinussen, 1997; Joas and Knöbl, 2009). The idea that Western modernity could be developed on the basis of specific traditions and circumstances in which European or American actors found themselves seems to be not considered by classical modernization theorists.

However, the paradigm of classical Modernization Theory as presented above seems not to survive very long. Its heyday lasted only about fifteen years and in the late 1960s, Modernization Theory became a target of criticism (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). In general, it was criticized for its simplicity (Martinussen, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Section 4.4 outlines in more detail a number of interpretations of why classical version of Modernization Theory was criticized and thus became marginalized. Due to the fact, that classical view of Modernization Theory was considered as deficient in several aspects, new versions of Modernization Theory began to emerge. However, it should be mentioned that the central concept of Modernization Theory - “the rise of industrial society is linked with coherent cultural shifts away from traditional value system” - remained central in a majority of newly emerged views of modernization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

4.2 Rising Role of Cultural Factors

From the late 1950s or early 1960s, modernization was widely considered as a unique process of Westernization that non-Western societies could follow if they abandoned their traditional cultures and adopted ‘superior’ Western model of values and institutions (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). However, over time ‘superiority’ of the American or Western value system tended to lose its appeal and no longer seemed to be opportune to serve as a normative model for the world due to massive protests and demonstrations against the Vietnam War (1964-
1975) and American imperialism, growing domestic and international reaction in opposition to US policy during the war, protests against oppression of the blacks in America, etc. (Young, 1991; Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Moreover, cultural factors started to play an important role in theory and research on socioeconomic development and its social and political consequences.

Instead of omitting cultural factors from most empirical analyses, they rather started to gain importance in the process of modernization. By the 1990s, observers from various continents seem to widely came to a conclusion that cultural factors played a significant role in the problems they were facing with the process of modernization (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Cultural traits and cultural changes and their consequences in relation to economic development began to be more widely theorized and also data on cultural factors and their changes following economic development were submitted to empirical analyses such as Inglehart (1990, 1997) or Putnam (1993).

However, it should be mentioned that the idea of relationship between economic development and cultural change seems to have long history. Jean Antoine de Condorcet\(^3\) (1979 [1795]) belongs among the first theorists who explicitly linked together economic development and cultural change (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). He argued that technical progress and economic development have an impact on changes in people’s value system. Even though, the idea had an influence on social philosophers, from its origin it tended to be opposed by notions of social decay such as Edmund Burke (1999 [1790]) which did not support development of the idea (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Further, Max Weber\(^4\) (1958 [1914]) also emphasized the role of cultural heritage in development of societies. He argued that society’s cultural heritage tends to shape its value system, beliefs and motivations, and that traditional (religious) values have a significant

---

\(^3\) Jean Antoine de Condorcet (1743-1794) was a French philosopher, mathematician, and early political scientist. In contrast to his contemporaries, he advocated a liberal economy, free and equal public education, constitutionalism, and equal rights for women and people of all races. A number of his ideas and writings seem to remain influential to this day such as the idea that economic development is linked with changes in people’s value system from his work *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of Human Mind* (1979 [1795]).

\(^4\) Max Weber (1864-1920) was a German political economist and sociologist. He is widely regarded as the foremost social theorist of the twentieth century. Max Weber is also known as a principal architect of modern social science along with Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. Among his famous writings belongs *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958 [1904]).
impact on the system of institutions of a society (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Scholars from various disciplines seem to follow Weber’s tradition and they argue that cultural traditions tend to endure over long period of time and have an impact on political and economic behaviour of their societies (e.g. Huntington, 1996; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995).

Samuel P. Huntington⁵ (1993, 1996) suggests that the world is divided into eight main civilizations which are characterized by various enduring cultural traits which have persisted for centuries. Moreover, he argues that in the future the main conflicts will be situated primarily along the cultural lines which separate these civilizations (1993, 1996). Huntington emphasizes that these civilizations were to a large extent influenced by religious traditions which survive today (Huntington, 1996). Thus, Huntington’s assumption outlines that the major conflicts of global politics will primarily occur along these cultural divisions, between groups of different civilizations, not along ideological or economic lines.

However, it should me mentioned that Huntington’s theory has been criticized for failing to analyze the nature of the relationship between religion and politics in the various cultural divisions (Senghaas, 2002; Booney, 2008). Moreover, Fox (2004) argues that religion conflicts (between groups within the same religion) seem to be more common than civilizational conflicts. He concludes that evidence appears to demonstrate that the influence of religion has increased and he points out that religion presents only one factor among many in conflicts (2004).

Robert D. Putnam⁶ (1993) examined performance of various regional governments in Italy in relation to differences in cultural traits of the Italian regions which contained these

---

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008) was an American political scientist and author of many books. He was Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor and Chairman of the Harvard Academy of International and Area Studies at Harvard University. He also served as President of the American Political Science Association and as Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council. Among his famous writings belongs The Clash of Civilizations? (1993). He later expanded his thesis of a post-Cold War new world order in a book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

⁶ Robert D. Putnam (1941) is an American political scientist and professor of public policy at Harvard Kennedy School. He belongs to influential contributors to thinking about the nature of civic society and its linkage to political life. His first work in the area of civic virtue in politics was Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993).
governments, in particular differences in the history of the people residing in these regions. Putnam (1993) seems to come to a conclusion that the successful governments were situated in the regions where a high degree of civic tradition was present. He argues that democratic institutions appear to work the most successfully today in Italian areas in which civil society was relatively well developed already centuries before (Putnam, 1993). In other words, Putnam suggests that there seems to be a strong link between the performance of political institutions and the character of civic life.

Moreover, Putnam (1993: 87-91) provides introductions to basic conditions for successful democracy. He outlines four main themes in civic community, that is: (1) civic engagement, (2) political equity, (3) solidarity trust and tolerance and (4) associations - social structures of cooperation. Putnam (1993) suggests that firstly, citizens in civic community tend to be interested in and actively participate in public affairs; secondly, citizens interact as equals, such a community can be characterized by horizontal relations which strengthen ties within the community; thirdly, they tend to trust and help each other regardless of differences in matters of substance and finally, value system in the civic community is strengthen by social structures of cooperation, that is a network of associations which fosters effective social collaboration.

These themes with different emphases seem to have been subsequently addressed by a number of writers. For instance, Francis Fukuyama7 (1995) examines the role of trust (or cooperative behavior based upon shared norms) as a source of social cohesion and its impact on a nation’s prosperity. He was investigating the development and expression of trust in different countries. Fukuyama (1995) divided the countries into two categories, low trust (e.g. China and Italy) and high trust (e.g. Japan and Germany) and he argues that societies with high level of trust seem to be at an advantage because they are more effective in developing large and efficient social institutions. He also emphasizes that trust and other cultural factors can be impaired more easily than created.

To summarize, all the writers mentioned in the section above seem to emphasize the role of specific factors, such as cultural heritage. They appear to reflect the assumption that present

---

7 Francis Fukuyama (1952) is an American philosopher, political economist and author of many publications. He currently works as a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, deputy director of the State Department’s policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation.
societies can be characterized by different cultural traits which have survived for centuries and they draw a conclusion that these cultural factors have a significant influence on a society’s political and economic performance. In other words, different societies tend to follow different trails even when they are subjected to the same forces of modernization, in part because endurance of specific factors, such as cultural traits. Ronald Inglehart (1990, 1997, 2005), whose extensive work presents the main theoretical basis of this study, also supports the notion above and his unified version of Modernization Theory is presented in more detail in the following sections.

4.3 Inglehart’s Unified Version of Modernization Theory

Inglehart’s studies (1990, 1997, 2000 and 2005) seem to present a significant contribution to the understanding of social and political change. His work appears to outline new and rich insights into the linkages between economic development and social and political change. It examines the influence of societies’ cultural traits on political and social life by analyzing the most extensive set of empirical data ever collected for this purpose (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Moreover, it integrates the empirical evidence into a new theoretical framework which unites theories of modernization, cultural change and democratization.

The evidence seems to demonstrate that considerable changes are occurring in value and belief systems of societies over the world over time (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The data appear to indicate that these changes are influenced by an interaction between the forces of socioeconomic development and lasting imprints of societies’ cultural heritage. And with the support of data drawn on extensive national surveys (the World Value Surveys) made in more than eighty societies, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that changes in mass values tend to create increasing pressures for the establishment and strengthening of democracy as explained in the following sections.

4.3.1 Data and Measures

The study of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) draws on a unique database, the World Values Survey (WVS), which is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change, in
particular attitudes, values and beliefs (World Values Survey, 2010). It should be mentioned that Inglehart works as a Chairman of the WVS Executive Committee (World Values Survey, 2010). The study of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) analyses extensive empirical material collected from four waves of worldwide national surveys starting in 1981, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Eighty societies containing about 85% of the world’s population were involved in the survey from 1981 to 2001 (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey, 2010).

In order to examine the central thesis of their study, that is that “socioeconomic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture as well as political life”; two central dimensions, which demonstrate systematic differences in worldviews of rich and low-income societies across various political, social, and religious norms and beliefs, were established (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:19). These two dimensions which dominate the study reflect cross-national polarization between: (1) Traditional/Secular-Rational and (2) Survival/Self-Expression values. According to Inglehart (1990, 1997), Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) even though, there is enormous variation in people’s prevailing value orientation, the evidence demonstrates that a number of aspects can be summarized just in two dimensions of cross cultural variation.

According to the study of Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the first dimension - traditional/secular-rational values dimension - is linked with the process of industrialization that is transition from agrarian society to industrial society. The evidence indicates that societies with prevalence of traditional values tend to emphasize the importance of religion and family which is crucial to survival. Accordingly, they appear to favour having a larger number of children and reject abortion. Traditional societies also seem to have more respect for authority, support deference for authority, rarely or never discuss politics and to learn obedience appears to be more important than independence and determination. Societies high on secular-rational values tend to emphasize the opposite preferences on these topics.

Figure I. presents a summary of main indicators of weak and strong aspects of secular-rational values. With secular-rational values getting weaker, one seems to get closer to the ideal of a sacred community and with these values getting stronger; one approaches the rational ideal of a secular community (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the second main dimension - survival/self-expression values - is related to the transition from industrial society to post-industrial society that is rise of service economy. The evidence demonstrates that societies with prevalence of survival values tend to report relatively low levels of subjective well-being, be rather distrustful, intolerant of homosexuals and other ‘out-groups’, emphasize traditional gender roles and sexual norms and give priority to economic and physical security over self-expression. Moreover, the evidence shows low demands for participation in decision-making in political life. In line with this, the respondents seem to relatively positively accept authoritarian government and they emphasize that democracy does not necessarily present the best form of government. Societies with prevalence of self-expression values tend to highlight the opposite preferences on these topics.

Figure II. summarizes the main indicators of weak and strong aspects of self-expression values. With self-expression values getting weaker, one seems to approach the conformist ideal of a restrained individual and with these values getting stronger, one gets closer to the ideal of an expressive individual (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Moreover, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the wealth which has accumulated in the advanced societies during the past generations tends to push for a shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security towards an increasing emphasis on self-expression, in
particular higher levels of subjective well-being and concerns about quality of life; this kind of shift in value priorities seems to be supported by an increasing percentage of the population which has grown up taking survival as granted. This value shift from survival to self-expression values appears to be connected with an increasing sense of existential security and human autonomy which in turn gives rise to a culture of tolerance and mutual trust where people tend to emphasize freedom, self-expression and have active orientation towards politics.

Figure II. Weak vs. Strong Self-Expression Values

4.3.2 Global Cultural Map

Inglegart-Welzel’s (2005) Global Cultural Map (see Appendix 1) displays location of eighty societies which were surveyed on the two main dimensions of cross-cultural variations - (1) Traditional/Secular-Rational and (2) Survival/Self-Expression values. The position of each society on the global cultural map is determined by results of survey data analysis from each country, thereby the location of societies on the cultural map is objective. It should be mentioned that previous Inglehart’s versions of cultural map and the most recent and more complete Inglegart-Welzel’s version of cultural map use the Huntington’s (1993, 1996) theoretical classification of cultural zones as a guide when drawing the boundaries around
groups of countries and then test for their explanatory power. Thus, the boundaries around the societies seem to be drawn in a subjective way and could have been made in different ways.

The two-dimensional cultural map seems to be constructed on the basis of similarities of basic values between the surveyed societies. However, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the cultural map also reflects the location of these societies on other dimensions, such as religion, the structure of the workforce or level of economic development (see section 4.3.3). Previous versions and the current version of cultural map seem to demonstrate relatively consistent cultural clusters (Iglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Even though, these clusters present historical heritage of various surveyed societies, taking into account factors which are specific only to certain countries, the clusters appear to exhibit remarkable coherence (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). They seem to demonstrate existence of a systematic pattern despite each society’s singularities.

### 4.3.3 Socioeconomic Development and Cultural Change

The two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation are identified in the sections above. However, the question is whether they are linked with socioeconomic development, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) hypothesized. The study takes use of basic indicators of a society’s level of economic development, namely GDP per capita, the changing nature of the labour force (division of workforce in agrarian, industrial and service sector), fertility rates or changing educational levels.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the evidence indicates that socioeconomic development appears to be strongly connected with a society’s basic cultural values. The study seems to demonstrate that there is a significant difference between the value systems of rich and poor countries. Moreover, the first dimension - traditional/secular-rational dimension - tends to be linked with shift from agrarian to industrial society and the second dimension - survival/self-expression dimension - with the rise of service economy.

Thus, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) come to a conclusion that socioeconomic development (such as changes in GDP per capita, occupational structure or fertility rates) appears to systematically influence society’s value systems but they highlight that counties’ cultural
heritage has proved to be surprisingly resilient and the influence of cultural traditions does not simply disappear with the process of modernization.

4.3.4 Summary of Findings

Findings of the study of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) seem to demonstrate that socioeconomic development tends to bring roughly predictable cultural changes (such as changes in value systems) and beyond a certain point, these changes appear to be conductive to emergence and strengthening of democracy. In the long run, socioeconomic development seems to bring cultural changes such as changes in gender roles, sexual norms or attitudes towards authority, decreasing fertility rates, development of interpersonal trust, high priority on self-expression or rising demands for participation in decision-making in political life which in turn gives rise to growing mass demands for democratic institutions. Thus, changing values, which occur when the people of a given society have experienced higher levels of economic prosperity, seem to have important effects for the nature of societies’ governance, gender equality or democratic freedom.

However, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize that even though, socioeconomic development tends to propel systematic changes in people’s value and belief systems, the impact of cultural traditions does not simply disappear. According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) postindustrial societies tend to rapidly change and move in a common trend but cultural differences between them remains rather great. Empirical evidence demonstrates that belief systems have proved to be remarkably durable and while values tend to change with modernization process, beliefs continue to reflect societies’ cultural heritage despite overwhelming forces of socioeconomic development; thus, cultural change seems to be path-dependent (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

The main points of the study of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and revision of main assumptions of classical version of Modernization Theory (for comparison see section 4.1 Basic Characteristics of Classical Modernization Theory) is outlined in the following section.
Firstly, even though, socioeconomic development tends to change societies in a direction which can be to a large extent predicted, the process of societies’ transformation is not deterministic (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). There are other factors next to socioeconomic development which are involved and can exert influence, such as wars, world events, elite decisions or specific leaders. Thus, predictions of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) seem to be rather probabilistic. Nevertheless, Inglehart and Welzel (2005:46) conclude that socioeconomic development tends change people’s behaviour and value and belief systems and thus make people more “secular, tolerant, and trusting and to place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and the quality of life”. However, it should be kept in mind that socioeconomic forces which drive cultural change are not the only important influences.

Secondly, various elements of a society’s cultural heritage such as religion do not seem to simply die out as classical modernization theorists presumed or fade away with modernization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Even though, the societies tend to get richer and more educated during the phase of industrialization and post-industrialization, worldwide shift towards a uniform culture on the whole world does not seem to occur. In other words, cultural heritage of single societies appears to be remarkably enduring.

Thirdly, in contrast with the assumptions of classical version of Modernization Theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that modernization is not irreversible. Predictable cultural changes stem from socioeconomic development over longer periods of time. Thus, economic collapse tends to produce changes in the opposite direction.

Fourthly, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize that the process of cultural change leading towards modernity does not occur in linear fashion which also contradicts the basic assumptions of classical Modernization Theory. They suggest that industrialization is linked with one main process of cultural change (rise of secularization and bureaucratization) and growing of postindustrial societies gives rise to another main process of cultural change which proceeds in a different direction (growing emphasis on self-expression values such as civil and political freedom or individual autonony). Thus, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) socioeconomic development seems to bring two main dimensions of cross-cultural variations.
However, it should be mentioned that even though, the two value dimensions are partially distinct as they have different reference points (the community and the individual); they also seem to partially overlap. The weak poles of the two dimensions seem to overlap on a common emphasis on human constraint; on the other hand, the two strong poles seem to overlap on a common emphasis on human choice (Appendix 2: Two-Dimensional Value Space in Theory presents explanatory illustration) (World Values Survey, 2000). Combination of weak secular-rational values and weak self-expression values seems to pursue an ideal in which individuals are restrained by chaining them to survival communities. The commonality of this ideal appears to emphasize human constraints. On the other hand, combination of strong secular-rational values and strong self-expression values pursue an ideal in which individuals tend to be increasingly free to express themselves by unchaining them from survival communities. The commonality of this ideal seems to emphasize human choice.

Further, even though, American or Western system was presented as the ideal model for the system of values and institutions and the process of modernization was interpreted as Westernization in the early version of Modernization Theory (Joas and Knöbl, 2009), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) oppose this notion and argue that the United States does not present the leader of cultural change; they regard it as a “deviant case” which rather shows persistence of more traditional and religious values than other rich countries. And Inglehart and Welzel (2005) conclude that industrializing countries in general do not tend to approximate the American model.

Finally, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) suggest that emergence of self-expression values seems to transform the process of modernization into a process of human development which brings a new sort of society which emphasizes and promotes human emancipation (from equal rights to homosexuals to the rights of people in general). Moreover, emerging self-expression values and in link with that growing emphasis on human choice and individual autonomy together with increasing activist political orientations of individuals tend to create pressures for civil and political freedom and democratic institutions.
On the basis of theoretical considerations, in particular, Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory, in relation to the observed regularity and of what is known about the particular domain, a hypothesis is deduced and subjected to empirical scrutiny in the following chapter

**Hypothesis:**

Economic development of Turkey tends to bring social, cultural and political changes which are over time conductive to emergence and strengthening of democracy.

It sets out to examine the nature of relationship between economic development and emergence of democracy in the case of Turkey through matching empirical data with what the theory proposes (Chapter 5).
4.4 Criticism of Modernization Theory

Even though, the core concepts of Modernization theory (which are present in the main theoretical field of this paper, in particular Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory) were chosen as the main theoretical basis in this study, it should be kept in mind that Modernization Theory is not uncontested. Classical version of Modernization Theory originates in the late 1950s and its prominence lasted only around fifteen years (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). In the late 1960s, classical Modernization Theory became a target of criticism, ending its preeminence in describing and explaining developmental processes of societies; processes of social change. There appear to be various explanations concerning its criticism and its further marginalization.

One of the most common interpretations comes from Jeffrey C. Alexander. He argued that classical Modernization Theory became a victim of the ‘zeitgeist’ (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). He claimed that it was in good working order, however, the leftist student movement and student rebellions in the late 1960s together with the spreading climate of politicization of social science faculties of (American) universities resulted in loss of its appeal to the younger generation. Modernization Theory does entail a vision of ‘modernity’ and it represents the system of institutions and values which were developed in different variations in the European and American world as desirable. In accordance with this, the modernization process of the Third World was seen as a process of approximation to this Euro-American institutional and value complex. Nevertheless, following this notion in the political climate spreading through the social science faculties appeared to be no longer possible (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Numerous protests and demonstrations against the war in Vietnam and American imperialism or the oppression of the blacks in America seem to demonstrate that this American or European system could not serve as a desired model for the Third World (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). This in turn negatively influenced credibility and applicability of Modernization Theory. It should be mentioned that according to Alexander, Modernization Theory became a victim to the leftist ‘zeitgeist’ and its weak points did not have to necessarily lead towards such renunciation (Joas and Knöbl, 2009).

Jeffrey C. Alexander (1947) is an American sociologist, and one of the main proponents of Neofunctionalism. He currently works as the Lillian Chavenson Saden Professor of Sociology at Yale University and Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Sociology (CCS). He is also a writer and one of the editors of the journal Sociological Theory.
An alternative interpretation of why classical Modernization Theory became a target of criticism and was thus marginalized suggests that it was due to its disintegration from within. One could argue that Modernization Theory was built on rather not very stable foundations and certain points or causal questions seem to remain unresolved.

Firstly, one of the core assumptions of classical Modernization Theory seems to appear dubious. One of the main characteristics of Modernization Theory presents a very clear distinction between traditional and modern structures (Martinussen, 1997; Joas and Knöbl, 2009). However, a closer scrutiny appears to demonstrate that traditional signs did not fade away completely from Western societies. One could, for instance, highlight the case of the USA - presented as an exemplary modern society - and its persistence of religious tradition and 200 year old political and legal tradition (Joas and Knöbl, 2009) or preservation of monarchical structures in European countries such as Great Britain or Denmark.

Characterization of the models of traditional and modern within classical version of Modernization Theory seems to offer rather simplistic picture. The notion of the modern society appears to be taken as given self-evidently and the notion of the traditional one seems to be described as a collection of dissimilarities from the model of the modern (Preston, 1996). Classical modernization theorists seem to define first the model of the modern and the category of traditional presents a residual category (Preston, 1996; Martinussen, 1997). This kind of dichotomous typification in turn allows constitution of many deviations from the notion of the modern. Moreover, if distinction between the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ appears to be rather unclear, Modernization Theory’s assumptions concerning shift from the ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’ societies becomes problematic as well.

It should be also mentioned that classical Modernization Theory does not seem to pay much attention to the historical roots of contemporary phenomena. Jean- François Bayart\(^9\) and Andre Gunder Frank\(^10\) have both criticized classical Modernization Theory because it neglects

---

\(^9\) Jean- François Bayart is a French political scientist, book writer, senior research fellow at CERI (Centre for International Studies and Research) and former director of CERI (1994-2000). He was also a consultant for the Policy Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France (1990-2005) and member of the Board of the European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam (2002-2006).

\(^10\) Andre Gunder Frank (1929-2005) was a German-American economic historian, sociologist and theorist. He presents one of the founders of the Dependency Theory and the World Systems Theory from the 1960s. He was
history of underdeveloped or developing countries; counties desiring of development (Preston, 1996; Martinussen, 1997).

Frank focuses his criticism on Walt Whitman Rostow’s\textsuperscript{11} stage theory – *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960) – which became one of significant concepts in Modernization Theory. He argues that the Rostow’s scheme looks upon developing countries at their starting point as primitive and without any historical roots (Preston, 1996). Rostow’s model seems to grant history of emergence to the presently developed countries, however, all history appears to be denied to the presently developing ones. Frank emphasizes the importance of countries’ histories because it can to a large extent serve as an explanation to their current position and circumstances (Preston, 1996).

Bayart supports the notion that historical reducibility of classical Modernization Theory presents a skewed classification of developing or underdeveloped countries. He argues that distinctive histories of individual states should be considered and understood as a complex product of societal development over longer periods of time because they shape the nature of modern states (Martinussen, 1997). Bayart proposes an approach which highlights and acknowledges significance of historical roots and diversity of political systems of developing counties (Martinussen, 1997). Moreover, he outlines a method of developmental analysis of states where religion, especially Islam or Hinduism, plays an important role which pays attention to the cultural construction of politics with special focus on religion and the way it shapes politics in the country (Martinussen, 1997). Countries’ cultural heritage and former or surviving political systems might have a considerable influence on the current situation of developing countries and that is why it seems to be beneficial to consider the historical trajectories of individual states when analyzing their development. Even though, the approach of acknowledgement of the long-term historical perspective appears to be commendable adjustment of mainstream approaches, it should be mentioned that comparison and construction of general theory become rather difficult.

\textsuperscript{11}Walt Whitman Rostow (1916-2003) was an American economist, political theorist, book writer and National Security Adviser for President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He was regarded as one of the most prominent theorists in development and modernization studies (Solivetti, 2005). The book *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) belongs among his most famous writings. He had a significant role in the shaping of American policy in Southeast Asia during the 1960s.
In line with the notions mentioned above, historical roots of Turkey are not be overlooked in this paper because it is believed that the country’s history can be conducive to clarification of the current societal and economic situation in Turkey.
Chapter 5: Analysis

This chapter sets out to firstly, examine the nature of relationship between economic development and emergence of democracy in the case of Turkey through matching empirical data with what the theory proposes. In the second part, this chapter analyzes primary data collected via semi-structured interviews with Czech politician, Štefan Füle, who has been working as European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy since February 2010 and German politician, Bernd Posselt, who has been a Member of the European Parliament since 1994.

5.1 Turkish Economy and Society until 1980

During the last centuries, Turkey has been to a large extent shaped by its rulers’ attempts to transform the country into a modern Western industrial nation, such as Ottoman modernization and Kemalist Westernization project (for more details see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that Turkey’s full convergence with the Western paradigm remained rather unfinished. The Ottoman Empire was hit by a number of serious economic problems beginning in the eighteenth century which gradually led towards increasing indebtedness to Western imperial powers (Metz, 1995). This dependence on the West together with the establishment of centrally planned economy in the Soviet Union seem to have an influence on the direction of economic policy of the newly established Republic of Turkey in 1923. Thus, in accordance with these factors, the new leaders of the young republic chose state planning in pursuit of Turkey’s modernization (Metz, 1995; Grigoriadis, 2009).

From the mergence of the Republic of Turkey until the early 1980s, the state pursued economic policy of import substitution industrialization in order to reduce its foreign economic dependency and vulnerability to the First World economies through protection and promotion of the emergence and expansion of domestic industries (Metz, 1995; Grigoriadis, 2009). It was realized by allocation of preferential subsidized loans to domestic industries and imposition of protective import tariffs and quotas to protect local manufacturing (Todaro, 1994). This kind of policy gave a rise to a mixed economy in which industrial development started to flourish. However, during the period after the World War II, the shortcomings of
excessive state intervention became increasingly evident not only to policy makers but also to the public. State owned businesses, which presented about 40% of total industrial production by 1980, were facing serious problems with excessive number of employees and overall inefficiency (Metz, 1995). Not surprisingly, their losses presented significant burden on the government budget. According to Metz (1995) Turkish leaders excessively focused on and strived for promotion of the country’s industrial sector which led towards setting of too ambitious state planning targets and marginalization of such an essential sector as agriculture. Moreover, overriding insistence on import substitution model was not conductive to promotion of exports which in turn resulted in the country’s trade deficits (see Appendix 3: Export/Import of Goods and Services in Turkey from 1975 to 2008). Trade balance deficits and foreign borrowing which financed periods of Turkey’s rapid growth to a large extent contributed to balance of payment crises which led towards austerity programs (Metz, 1995).

The rapid shift from an agricultural to an industrial society caused also problems in Turkey’s labour market. The rapid transition resulted in distortions in labour market and unequal income distribution (Metz, 1995). Moreover, there was a relatively high fertility rate in Turkey at that time which implied a rapid growth of labour force (see Appendix 4: Comparison of Fertility Rates in Turkey and the UK from 1980 to 2008). Over time, this led towards increase of unemployment, especially during the post-World War II period (Metz, 1995). In addition, gradual process of modernization of agriculture tended to make numerous small farms economically inefficient and non-viable; thereby, many farmers decided to move to urban areas (Metz, 1995; Grigoriadis, 2009). However, rural people were often unsuccessful with finding a job in ‘modern’ industry due to lack of skills (Metz, 1995). It should be mentioned that even though, a large proportion of rural population left farming and decided to migrate to urban areas, large percentage of the labour force remained at that time and still remains employed in agricultural sector. In 1985, 45% of Turkey’s workforce was engaged in agriculture and in 2008 it was 26%; compared with 3% in 1985 and 1% in 2008 in the United Kingdom (for more details see Appendix 5: Comparison of Employment in Agriculture/Industry/Services in Turkey and the UK from 1985 to 2008).

As the sections above indicate, adoption of import substitution model in Turkey turned out to be rather unsuccessful over time. Turkey was left with a large number of inefficient state protected industries, increasing unemployment and chronic trade deficits and large external debt. Moreover, long history of strong state politics aimed at forging unity of a Turkish
(mono-ethnic) nation-state and building a modern secular identity involved illiberal policies which violated fundamental human rights such as brutal suppression of Turkish dissident voices or the Kurdish minority. Any kind of dissent or opposition to the state’s course of action was suppressed in order to protect and pursue the modernization project of the Turkish Republic (Akyol, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). Thus, mounting role of the Turkish state does not seem to promoted human emancipation and individual autonomy as discussed in the following sections. Necessary transformation of the Turkish economy not only reduced the role of state and opened the economy to international markets but also positively affected development of Turkish society as discussed in section 5.2 Transformation of the Turkish Economy and Its Impact on Society since the 1980s.

As already mentioned above, Turkish society’s human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of association or freedom of press, and minority rights were significantly limited by Turkish state. Public opinion was unfavorable and any kind of dissent with the state ideology resulted in fierce state persecution and suppression (Akyol, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). Turkish security forces demonstrated its power and atrocious practices a number of times, such as the Manisa Affair or persisting repression of Turkey’s Kurdish minority (Grigoriadis, 2009; MacLenam, 2009). Thereby, state power and its often frightening practices served as a threat and means of repression of any ‘unfitting’ pursuit of liberty aspirations or individual autonomy such as active orientation towards politics.

Moreover, a Turkish business class was from its emergence to a large extent linked with state and its active support. Historically, Turkish businesses capital was strongly dependent on the state (Grigiriadis, 2009). The emergence and expansion of domestic industries was being protected and promoted by the state via the economic policy of import substitution industrialization as already mentioned above. The import substitution model created promising conditions for the emergence and prosperity of local business elite, whose manufacturing could benefit from imposition of protective import tariffs and quotas, allocation of subsidized loans and privileged access to the Turkish market (Grigoriadis and Kamaras, 2008). Over time, Turkish business started to flourish and grow in size and especially large business conglomerates dominated the country’s economy (Grigoriadis, 2009).
However, it should be emphasized that during this time, Turkish business class largely identified with the state and its interests. Thus, they tended to avoid any possible confrontation with the state such as involvement in political activities of associations or taking any political positions in order not to damage or break crucial ties with the state (Grigoriadis, 2009; MacLenam, 2009). The Turkish bureaucrats together with the powerful military presented indispensable allies of businesspersons who were well aware of the fact that their ‘imprudent’ behaviour could simply result in alienation of their vitally important allies.

It should be also mentioned that the relationship between economic and political power in Turkey seemed to have a diverse character in comparison with Western Europe at that time. According to Ozbudun (1996:135) “instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading to political power, political power (high position in the state bureaucracy) gave access to material wealth”.

As already mentioned above, state interests tended to prevail over individual interest. According to the state leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Father Turk), sovereignty was directly linked with people without any knowledge and qualifications (Grigoriadis, 2009). Thus, it was rather state elite who practiced sovereignty in the name of Turkish public because the state elite was allegedly well acquaint with the interests of the people (Parker, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). In practice, the citizen interests tended to be broadly perceived as identical with the ‘common’ state interests. Moreover, during the early phases of the young republic, Atatürk was often considered as a hero and saviour of Turks (Akyol, 2009) which was conductive to implementation of the state ideology and the authoritarian and secularist modernization project of the Kemalist regime. One of the reasons for this kind of regime perception seems to present the official Turkish history to which majority of Turks has been educated (Akyol, 2009). Thus, one could argue that reverence towards the state, which dates back to the Ottoman Empire, persisted during the early years of the Turkish Republic.

Moreover, state interests were protected by the Turkish military. The military was placed at the core of the state and was perceived as the guardian of the official Kemalist state ideology (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Grigoriadis, 2009). Thus, the military had a unique position in Turkish political life. It should be mentioned that the military’s direct involvement in politics has a relatively long history which stretches back to the late years of the Ottoman Empire which helps to explains its tenacity and long-term preservation of its status and political
influence despite political leaders’ efforts to widen the gap between the military and politicians since the end of 1940s (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Akyol, 2009; Nello, 2009).

As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the Turkish military had three times assumed power and stalled endeavour of political leaders to move the balance of power towards their side. Moreover, the three military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 meant blows against the young Turkish democracy and its liberalizing policies.

The 1960 military coup was staged after a ten year period of ‘democratic honeymoon’ (the Democratic Party (DP) won the first fair elections in 1950) in Turkey. The military disbanded the DP, relapsed to authoritarian policies and the important role of the military was for the first time formally recognized in the Constitution and institutionalized via foundation of the National Security Council (Akyol, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). Not long after the handover of political power to civilians, the 1971 coup was staged which stalled again increasing influence of liberalism and popular participation in Turkish politics of the 1960s. The 1971 amendment of Constitution was not conductive to promotion of human emancipation and fundamental freedoms. The 1971 amendment to a large extent limited the scope of civil and political rights – freedom of press and media and university autonomy were significantly curbed (Grigoriadis, 2009). Worse was to come with the last military coup of 1980. During the military regime which lasted from 1980 to 1983, the parliament and the cabinet was dissolved, all political activities were banned and trade unions and newspapers were suspended (Akyol, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). In addition, the new Constitution of 1982 brought about even further restrictions on basic freedoms and liberties by making them conditional (Grigoriadis, 2009).

To summarize the sections above, authoritarian policies and a series of military coups together with serious restrictions on human rights and liberties did not enable full promotion of human emancipation of Turkish society, in particular until 1980s. Individual interests, free expression or active orientation towards politics were perceived by the state as unfavorable and tended to be suppressed on alleged grounds of national interest, especially during the periods of military regimes. Moreover, business class was actively supported and to a large extent dependent on the state which entailed business persons’ identification with the state and its interests, and any possible dissent with the state interests and priorities could simply result in damage of crucial ties with the state.
However, the end of military rule in 1983 and the victory of the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1983 elections led towards necessary transformation of the Turkish economy which not only reduced the role of state and opened the economy to international markets but also brought about positive effects on development of Turkish society as discussed in the following section.

5.2 Transformation of the Turkish Economy and Its Impact on Society since the 1980s

In the early 1980s, the Turkish government undertook a series of crucial reforms in order to open the protectionist state-dominated economy to international markets. The main political leader in charge of the necessary reform program was Turgut Özal. He was a founder of the Motherland Party (ANAP) which won the 1983 elections and maintained a majority in the Turkish Parliament until 1993. Özal became Prime Ministr in 1983 (after a three year military regime) and he served as a President from 1989 until his death in 1993 (Metz, 1995). Özal’s reform program led to an unprecedented shift towards economic liberalization. The liberalization program included adoption of export-oriented model, reduction of the role of state in the economy, elimination of most subsidies, cutting down public area and moving towards privately owned businesses (Metz, 1995; Grigoriadis, 2009).

During the early years, the Özal’s reform program attained significant success in reducing external deficits, restoring economic growth and it also helped to overcome the balance of payment crisis (Metz, 1995). Turkey’s increasingly liberal policies and great economic potential of the country led towards noticeable increase of foreign direct investment, especially during the 1980s and early 1990s (see Appendix 6). However, it should be mentioned that the country’s history of political instability and persisting high inflation tended to make foreign investors hesitate (Metz, 1995). The economic reforms also resulted in considerable increases in exports (see Appendix 3) and developing trade relationships with particularly European and Middle Eastern countries.

It should be mentioned that despite the success of liberalization program, Turkey has suffered several setbacks on a number of fronts. Free market reforms helped to make the Turkish
economy more competitive in global markets, the country has made great steps towards building close economic ties with Europe and it has been also promoted as a mediated between European industrial economies and Middle Eastern underdeveloped economies but firstly, Turkey’s balance of payment remained encumbered with large external debt and secondly, the country’s reputation and political relations with Europe tended to deteriorate due to persisting severe violations of basic human rights and freedoms closely scrutinized by EU officials, especially repression of Turkey’s Kurdish minority, the conflict with Cyprus and also increasing discontent in Europe with mounting number of Turkish immigrants (Metz, 1995).

Nevertheless, substantial reshaping of the Turkish economy beginning in the 1980s seems to have had a positive impact on transformation of country’s society and also gradual development of civil society in Turkey. Adoption of new economic policy of export oriented economic model and with it accompanying de-emphasizing role of state in the Turkish economy signaled a series of social transformations. The move from import to export oriented model did not bring about only competing of Turkish businesses with their foreign competition for a share of the country’s market on more and more equal conditions and expansion of their economic operations beyond the borders of Turkey; more importantly, Turkish business class became relieved of the state ‘grip’. The business class was no longer dependent on state and its protectionist practices. Thus, businesspersons gradually ceased to be identified with the state and its interests, and they did not have fear losing their vitally important economic ally when taking political positions (Grigoriadis, 2009). This in turn led towards progressing flourishing of interest in politics and rising demands for active participation in political life.

Widespread discussions on political liberalism and the social role of capital tended to increasingly influence Turkish businesspersons (Metz, 1995). Over time, businesspeople started establishing new associations and reestablishing preexisting ones (banned during the military regime from 1980 to 1983), giving them wide range of activities, and they also started allocating financial support to independent associations (Grigoriadis, 2009). Associations like TUSAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), which was founded as a reaction of the business to the non-functioning closed and public driven economy system in 1970s, became concerned and developed an interest in Turkey’s fundamental shortcoming such as curtailment of human rights and basic freedoms and started
to push for democratic reforms in order to bring Turkey’s democratic standards closer to the level of the EU (Grigoriadis, 2009; TUSIAD, 2010). Moreover, TUSIAD is a member of BusinessEurope (former UNICE - Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe) and it has actively lobbied via its membership in favour of Turkey’s membership of the EU and domestic liberalization program within the framework of the EU accession process (Grigoriadis, 2009). It should be mentioned that TUSIAD currently presents the largest non-governmental voluntary association in Turkey composed by CEOs and executives of the major companies in the country (TUSIAD, 2010). In addition, Turkish businessmen started to financially support independent NGOs whose activities were consistent with their political agenda (Grigoriadis, 2009).

To summarize, it seems that the profound transformation of the Turkish economy beginning in the 1980s was conductive to reshaping and development of Turkish society which over time led towards more open expression of public opinion, rising interest in demands for participation in political life and proliferation of horizontal citizen networks, and set one of the conditions for the growth of an organized and responsive civil society structure assisting Turkey’s democratic consolidation. It should be mentioned that Grigoriadis (2009) emphasizes positive effects of high degree of citizen participation in civil society associations on flourishing of liberal democratic system.

Even though, during the 1990s, participation in politics tended to grow, civil society groups widened spectrum of their activities and demands for recognition of citizens’ rights by the state increased (Toprak, 1995; Grigoriadis, 2009), there still remained a number of issues often anchored in the country’s unique cultural heritage which caused serious deficiencies in Turkish democracy or damaged its external image. In addition, these problems presented and some of them seem to still present obstacles to the progress in current EU accession negotiations with Turkey.

Thus, in order to address the hypothesis - Economic development of Turkey tends to bring social, cultural and political changes which are over time conductive to emergence and strengthening of democracy – deduced on the basis of theoretical considerations, in particular, Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory, this paper suggests that profound transformation of the Turkish economy beginning in the early 1980s had a positive influence on reshaping of the country’s society which triggered and enabled rising interest in demands
for citizen participation in political life, growing demands for recognition of their rights by the
state and increasing degree of citizen participation in civil society associations which led
towards gradual flourishing of liberal democratic system. However, remarkably durable
cultural heritage of Turkey tended and to some extent still tends to hinder the process of
liberalization of political culture in Turkey.

5.3 Turkey’s Progress in Meeting the Copenhagen Political Criteria

This chapter sets out to discuss the course of Turkey’s progress in meeting the Copenhagen
political criteria; that is achievement of “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Europa, 2010) with
special focus on human rights and the protection of minorities in Turkey. Even though, the
Turkish government put in place a large number of pro-EU reforms and the European Council
decided to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, based on the
Council’s conclusion that Turkey has fulfilled the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria,
the Council’s decision has generated criticism.

Parker (2009), McLenam (2009) and Sarokhanian and Stivachtis (2008) argue that Turkey did
establish extensive legal framework in order to meet the minimum requirements of the
political element of the Copenhagen Criteria in order to start formal accession negotiations,
however, they stress the point that actual progress was in certain areas rather insufficient.
Yildiz and Muller (2008) concur with the notion above and add that the Council’s decision to
start official accession talks with Turkey was reached prematurely and is highly questionable.
Moreover, the European Commission still tends to express misgivings about Turkey on the
basis of certain points of political criteria which in turn tend to hamper the formal negotiations
(Nello, 2009; EurActiv2, 2010). Thus, in the following chapter, the course of Turkey’s
progress in meeting the Copenhagen political criteria with special focus on human rights
standards and the protection of minorities is discussed.

5.3.1 Freedom of Expression
Concerning the freedom of expression, on one hand, Turkey had made a progress since 1999 when it was granted official candidate status but on the other hand, Turkey seems to have slightly regressed with the passage of Article 301 in the new Penal Code from 2005 (Sarokhanian and Stivachtis, 2008). According to Article 301 of Turkish penal Code, it is considered as a crime to publicly insult Turkish identity. Moreover, this highly controversial article has been repeatedly used to suppress and punish non-violent expression of opinions of journalists, politicians or human rights activists (Sarokhanian and Stivachtis, 2008; MacLenam, 2009). One could give an example of Nobel-prize winner and famous novelist Orhan Pamuk who said during an interview in 2005 ‘that during the period of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey one million Armenians and 30 000 Kurds were killed but no one dared to speak it out’ was prosecuted under the Article 301 (Leicht, 2006). Not surprisingly, the trial against Orhan inflamed European public opinion against Turkey and put supporters of Turkey’s membership in the EU into a very difficult position. The Turkish government became well aware of the fact that continuing prosecution against Orhan would negatively influence the country’s prospects of joining the EU and the Istanbul court ended the trial (McLenam, 2009). However, it should be mentioned that in many similar but less well known cases, numerous intellectuals have been prosecuted and convicted to prison sentences or fines.

Paradoxically, the new paragraph was aimed at ensuring increased freedom of expression and was part of reform program adopted by the Turkish state as a condition for the country’s future admission into the European Union. In fact, it soon became clear that previous repressive practices were merely being continued under the new statute.

In addition, the most recent European Commission’s official Annual Progress Report of from 2009 states that Article 301 is “no longer used systematically to restrict freedom of expression”; however, it concludes that the Turkish legal framework still does not provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression and it tends to be interpreted in a rather restrictive way by Turkey’s prosecutors and judges (European Commission, 2009:17). Thus, further measures seem to be required in the area of freedom of expression in Turkey.

To summarize, the West tends to advocate pluralism and the capacity of modern, democratic societies to embrace the variety of opinions and ideas but Turkey appears to remain trapped in backward ideologies of mono-ethnic nationalism and the primacy of the unitary nation state which were anchored in the late era of Ottoman Empire and subsequent Atatürk’s...
modernization project from the emergence of the young republic in 1923. The lines above seem to evidence the remarkably persisting tenacity of Turkish cultural heritage.

5.3.2 Minority Rights and Protection of Minorities

Historically, Kemal set out to establish a Turkish-nation state based on strong mono-ethnic nationalism (for more details see Chapter 3). Thereby, the Kemalist project did not allow for ethnic or religious diversity which led towards severe human rights violations. Among many minorities in Turkey, the Kurds represent the largest and the most significant group (Engert, 2010). Turkish leaders in the young republic believed in ‘Turkification’ of the Kurds by using authoritarian practices such as banning Kurdish language broadcasting and teaching and destroying their culture (Yildiz and Muller, 2008; Akyol, 2009). The lines above seem to indicate that the Kurdish issue has deep roots.

The Kurdish issue escalated even more during the military regime from 1980 to 1983 when state policies aiming at the repression of the Kurdish minority intensified; not only the use of the Kurdish language was forbidden and even the existence of Kurdish minority was officially denied (Grigoriadis, 2009). Over years, atrocious practices of the Turkish security forces such as forced allocations or extrajudicial killing tended to attract the interest of international human rights organizations and EU officials, and evoked a series of international protests (Grigoriadis, 2009). Thus, external factors to a large extent influenced taking necessary steps towards liberalization in the early 1990s. In 1991, prohibition on education and broadcasting in Kurdish has been, at least formally, lifted (Yildiz and Muller, 2008).

However, even though, the prohibitions were officially lifted, a number of exceptions in this area and questions about efficiency of these reforms seem to still remain. Study of Grigoriadis (2009) emphasize that recurrent prosecutions of NGOs which focus on human rights violations tend to demonstrate that considerable problems still persist. Yildiz and Muller (2008) add that Turkey deserves some credit for what it has achieved so far, but they highlight that the reform process is in many ways in its formative phases, firstly, in terms of implementation of existing reforms and secondly, also in terms of the considerable ‘distance’ of the Turkish regulatory framework for human rights from democratic standards within the EU.
Even though, the issues of the Turkey’s largest minority group, the Kurds, tend to attract the most of international attention, Roma population in Turkey appears to frequently face discriminatory treatment. Roma currently face limited access to education, discrimination in health services or exclusion from job opportunities, and Roma districts continue to be destroyed without provision of alternative housing (Sarokhanian and Stivachis, 2008). Moreover, Roma are officially barred from immigrating to Turkey (Sarokhanian and Stivachis, 2008). Thus, the current Turkish Law on the Movement and Residence of Aliens need to be amended in order to stop promotion of discrimination against the Roma population and approach the EU standards.

The official 2009 Annual Progress Report views positively that the Turkish government has opened a wide-ranging debate on the Kurdish issue but it emphasizes the need for concrete measures. In addition, the European Commission expresses its concern with a number of exceptions which still remain in this area, such as restrictions on use of languages other than Turkish in private TV and radio programmes, education or political life (European Commission1, 2009). Moreover, the report points out that there has been no progress on the ground of persisting discriminatory treatment of Roma population which requires provision of adequate legal protection (European Commission1, 2009).

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that despite persisting shortcomings, Turkey’s prospect of accession seems to have so far proven to be driving force conducive to human rights reform in the country.

5.3.3 Position of Military in Political Life

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, military enjoyed privileged position in the country’s political life (for more details see Chapter 3). The military was seen as the protector of the traditional unity, sovereignty and secular structure of the republic and it did not hesitate to use its powers allegedly for the common good of Turkey. In addition, the strong military also provided smoother implementation of the Kemalist modernization project (Akyol, 2009; Grigoriadis, 2009). Moreover, the military has intervened directly three times in the country’s
politics, namely with a series of military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 (Grigoriadis, 2009), which caused serious blows against Turkish democracy.

It should be mentioned that even though, current Erdogan’s government has moved to limit the traditional influence of military in state affairs (as a part of an EU democratic reform package), Turkish armed forces seem to still exercise excessive political influence through both formal and informal mechanisms. It does not seem to be only the country’s turbulent past regarding military coups in the in the recent history what makes the EU concerned but particularly the last few years when the military has been active in pursuit of weakening the present government. The Turkish military has been criticizing the current government via issuing various memoranda (also on the Internet) in order to organize popular resistance to the government (Euronews, 2010). This indicates that the military does not seem to be in favour of the current AKP government and the EU reforms. The notion that the Turkish military remain opposed to the EU reforms has been confirmed in 2007 when Turkish Chief of Staff General during a visit to Washington emphasized the continuing firm stance of the military to protect the unity, sovereignty and secular structure of the Turkish state from those who intend to change the regime (Yildiz and Muller, 2008).

The statement seems to firstly, demonstrate the difficulty of reform process in Turkey due to constant attacks of armed forces which operate within the Turkish state apparatus and secondly, it highlights the significant role of EU accession process in facilitating the arrival of real democracy in Turkey.

Moreover, the course of action occurring during the election of the current Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, in 2007 seems to demonstrate the persistence of undue political influence which the military continues to exercise in the country (Yildiz and Muller, 2008). The 2007 president election crisis prompted the EU to a reminder that undue intervention of the country’s military in politics is unacceptable in any democracy and the Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn (2007), stressed the point that any attempt at military coup would result in immediate end of accession negotiations in Turkey. The relatively recent course of actions in Turkey as outlined above seems to demonstrate shortcomings in democratic standards of the country.
The most recent European Commission’s official Annual Progress Report also finds a number of deficiencies in this area. The European Commission states that Turkey has made some progress, especially on reducing the jurisdiction of military courts (European Commission1, 2009). However, it concludes that the Turkish armed forces have, despite reforms, continued to perform excessive political power and the presence of military staff in anti-government activities evokes serious concerns (European Commission1, 2009).

It should be mentioned that the persisting issues mentioned above, namely little actual progress on the grounds of human rights and basic freedoms (especially freedom of expression), undue influence of Turkish military on the country’s political life and protection of minority rights (in particular the Kurdish issue and the Roma population in Turkey) seem to present the most alarming cases which need to be addressed during the upcoming negotiations (European Commission1, 2009). However, it should be mentioned that there remains a series of other problems which require further action, such as corruption, women’s or children’s rights etc. Resolution of the persisting Cyprus dispute should be mentioned as well, even though this issue does not come directly under the political aspect of Copenhagen Criteria which presents the main focus of this study. Nevertheless, the Cyprus issue seems to significantly hinder the overall accession negotiations, thus it would deserve profound analysis on its own which is left for other researcher interested in this topic.
5.4 Analysis of Primary Data

This section aims to discuss primary data collected via two semi-structured interviews with Czech diplomat and politician, Štefan Füle, who has been working as European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy since February 2010 and German politician, Bernd Posselt, who has been a Member of the European Parliament since 1994.

Both Štefan Füle and Bernd Posselt agree that Turkey has made a remarkable progress since 1999 when it received official candidate status. They state that Turkey established a series of pro-EU reforms in various areas ranging from introduction of a number of freedoms, abolition of death penalty to opening of a debate to provide solutions of the Kurdish issue. Nevertheless, they both stress the point that there still remains relatively long road before Turkey to fully embrace the values that make a country truly modern that is human rights and democracy.

Thus, both Štefan Füle and Bernd Posselt concur that Turkey does not currently present a fully democratic country with respect for fundamental human rights and basic freedom. Thereby, the next question concerned their opinion on the European Council decision to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, based on the Council’s conclusion that Turkey has fulfilled the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria that is achievement of “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Europa, 2010).

Both Štefan Füle and Bernd Posselt agree that the Copenhagen Criteria are defined in a rather vague and imprecise way which in turn leaves space for interpretation. But the two interviewees have different opinion on the case of Turkey and the decision to open official accession negotiations. Štefan Füle states that Turkey entered and continued on the right path. He notes that Turkey established extensive legal framework in order to meet at least the minimum requirements for meeting the political aspect of Copenhagen Criteria. He adds analysis of the extensive official reports showed significant progress in almost all areas. In addition, he notes that not opening accession negotiations could have resulted in ‘alienation’ of the EU to Turkey and leaving the fragile Turkish reform process unprotected from domestic anti-democratic tendencies presented by the nationalist elite and military. Štefan
Füle states that Turkey’s prospect of membership of the EU seems to support the country’s gradual transformation into a modern country. Nevertheless, he admits that all aspects of Copenhagen Criteria leave some space for political leeway in deciding whether the criteria have been fulfilled.

Bernd Posselt views Copenhagen Criteria as an objective basis for selecting countries ready to either open official accession negotiations or join the EU in a more critical way. He does not agree with the current definition of accession criteria which on one hand do outline a rather wide path all candidate countries should take but on the other hand allow for interpretations depending on other factors. He points out that the end decision should not become a political issue and he calls for more precise formulation of the criteria which clearly define accession conditions. Moreover, he expresses doubts about the European Council’s decision to open formal accession negotiations with Turkey. Firstly, he states that there still persist shortcomings in areas of democratic qualities and protection of basic freedoms and secondly, he emphasize that he would prefer establishment of a close ties with Turkey in form of privileged partnership as discussed below.

The next question concerned their opinion on Turkey’s prospects of full membership of the EU. Štefan Füle highlights that if Turkey succeeds in meeting all conditions necessary for accession in the EU, he does not see a reason for denying its membership. In addition, he emphasizes that absorbing such a large country presents enormous challenge to the EU. He adds that there is still a long road ahead and Turkey needs to firstly, solve persisting issues, surely the Kurdish situation in the Southeast part of Turkey and the Cyprus dispute, secondly, it has to implement the existing extensive legal framework and finally, a series of new measures is required in a number of areas. Štefan Füle points out the need of a new revised Constitution which would allow for a number of key reforms. These reforms set out to improve democratic standards, protection of human rights and the rule of law and thereby positively contribute towards current situation of Turkish citizens, namely enhancing the rights and life standards for all country’s citizens. Moreover, he concludes that the Commission is ready to continue assisting the reform process and financially supporting the country’s efforts.

On the other hand, Bernd Posselt disagrees with Turkey’s full accession to the EU. As already mentioned above, he prefers building close ties with Turkey via form of privileged
partnership. He states that if the EU wants to have a significant role in this globalized world next to the USA, China and other countries, it has to act as an integrated unit not only in economic terms but also cultural and political. He emphasizes the importance of the EU political integrity so the citizens can identify with the EU. And he argues that Turkey’s membership would not lead towards strengthening of this factor. However, he is strongly in favour of regional and economic cooperation of the EU with Turkey, in particular in form of privileged partnership. Bernd Posselt views the EU as not only economic but also political and cultural unit. And he concludes that Turkey is not a European country and primarily from this perspective he denies Turkey’s membership of the EU.

To summarize, both Štefan Füle and Bernd Posselt agree that Turkey has achieved remarkable progress in a number of areas since 1999. Nevertheless, they stress the point that Turkey still needs to improve its external image, enhance democratic standards and improve protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, find solutions to persisting problems, namely the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus dispute and implement existing legal framework. Their opinion on Turkey’s membership of the EU, however, seems to be diametrically diverse. European Commissioner Štefan Füle is in favour of Turkey’s membership if all necessary conditions are met but Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt disagree with country’s integration to the EU mainly because of its geographical position and cultural divergence between the EU and Turkey. The lines above indicate that the Turkish membership presents a controversial topic and to make accession a reality constitutes significant challenge for both Turkey and the EU.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This paper sets out to provide fresh insights in the controversial case of Turkey as an EU candidate country and its progress in the accession negotiations with special focus on the course of achievements of political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular democratic standards and human rights. It also seeks to identify and analyze the main obstacles to progress in the Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and assess the current weaknesses of the country’s candidature. By analyzing the hindrances in front of Turkish negotiations, it aims to uncover the road in front of Turkey’s EU membership.

Firstly, this paper borrows theoretical framework of Inglehart’s unified version of Modernization Theory to examine the relationship between economic development of the country and its impact on social, cultural and political changes conducive to democracy. It analyzes economic development of the country from the emergence of the Republic of Turkey and its positive influence on social transformations. Secondly, except other secondary sources, this paper examines most recent European Commission’s Annual Progress Reports which contain official up to date information not only about the current relations between Turkey and the EU but also valuable data on the situation in Turkey in terms of fulfillment of the political element of the Copenhagen Criteria. Thirdly, this paper takes use of original primary data collected in form of two semi-structured interviews, namely from European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle and Member of the European Parliament Bernd Posselt.

Firstly, the main research question of this study will be addressed. Both analysis of secondary data and findings from primary data indicate that Turkey has made a remarkable progress in getting closer to European democratic standards since 1999 when it was granted official candidate status. However, a long road in front of Turkey still remains in order to fully embrace the values that make a country truly ‘modern’ – protection of human rights and democracy. Findings from both primary and secondary demonstrate that Turkey is currently facing serious shortcomings in areas of human rights and basic freedoms such as freedom of expression, minority rights and democracy remains relatively far from being perfect. Moreover, even though European Council decided to open formal accession negotiations with
Turkey in October 2005, based on the Council’s conclusion that Turkey has fulfilled the
political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria that is achievement of “stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities” (Europa, 2010), it is mainly on the basis of the political criteria, such as persisting
violations of human rights, undue influence of Turkish military or discrimination of
minorities, that the West continues to express misgivings about Turkey. In addition, these
persisting problems related to democratic standards and human rights hinder and even more
complicate this already peculiar case of Turkey.

Findings of analysis of secondary data indicate that the profound transformation of the
Turkish economy (unprecedented drive towards economic liberalization) beginning in the
early 1980s triggered and also enabled gradual reshaping and development of Turkish society
which over time led towards more open expression of public opinion, rising interest in
demands for participation in political life, increased demands for recognition of their rights by
the state and proliferation of horizontal citizen networks, and set one of the conditions for the
growth of an organized and responsive civil society structure assisting Turkey’s democratic
consolidation.

However, despite positive effects of economic transformation on gradual reshaping of the
Turkish society, the process of political liberalization was and to some extent still remains
hindered by a number of issues often anchored in the country’s unique cultural heritage which
caused serious deficiencies in Turkish democracy and damaged its external image. In
addition, these problems presented and some of them seem to still present obstacles to the
progress in current EU accession negotiations with Turkey. What political aspect of
Copenhagen Criteria concerns, the main hindrances present insufficient protection of human
and minority rights, in particular the issue of the largest Turkish minority – Kurds, persistence
of undue political influence of Turkish military and freedom of expression. In the case of
Turkey, the country’s cultural heritage, such as established role of military in politics or the
Kurdish conflict in Southeastern Turkey, has proven to be remarkably tenacious and it seems
to still present a significant obstacle to progress in liberalization process of political culture.

Thus, Turkey seems to have entered the right way to approach European democratic
standards; however, long road remains ahead Turkey before it can enter the EU - a
community of values related to liberty and freedom.
Reference List


Rehn, O. (2007) *A military coup has been avoided, but early election looms. Turkey’s problems are postponed not solved*. The Economist, 27 April-3 May

Richardson, J. (2005) “Games that nations play: will Turkey be part of Europe?” *Foresight*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 3-8


Appendices

Appendix 1: Inglehart-Welzel’s Cultural Map of the World

Appendix 2: The Two-Dimensional Value Space in Theory


Appendix 3: Export/Import of Goods and Services in Turkey (in billions USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>105.8</td>
<td>175.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>208.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 4: Comparison of Fertility Rates in Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK) (Birth per woman)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix 5: Comparison of Employment in Agriculture/Industry/Services in Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK)

Employment in Agriculture/Industry/Services in Turkey (% of total employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
<td>36 %</td>
<td>30 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Employment in Agriculture/Industry/Services in the United Kingdom (UK) (% of total employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>65 %</td>
<td>65 %</td>
<td>70 %</td>
<td>73 %</td>
<td>76 %</td>
<td>77 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 6: Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey and the United Kingdom

#### Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)</th>
<th>FDI, net inflows (in millions USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>10 031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>18 299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the United Kingdom (UK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FDI, net inflows (% of GDP)</th>
<th>FDI, net inflows (in millions USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>10 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>5 476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>33 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>21 731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>122 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>177 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>93 506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>