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“Europeanization of the national public sphere”  
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# Table of Contents

Introduction:.....	3
Method and methodology:.....	4
Political claims making analysis as methodology. ....	5
Frames of Europeanization:.....	7
Choice of media outlet and of empirical material. ....	8
Literature review: .....	10
The origins of the Habermasian public sphere: .....	10
A transnational Public Sphere. ....	12
The European Public Sphere, and the question of a 'common identity'. ....	15
The Public Sphere in the European Union.....	17
Analysis: .....	19
Frame analysis: .....	21
The Comprehensive European Frame:.....	21
The Horizontal European frame: .....	29
The Vertical Europeanization frame: .....	36
No Europeanization: .....	41
Discussion:.....	47
Conclusion.....	49
References:.....	51

## **Introduction:**

During the latest decade, the European Union have been hit by an amount of crises. The financial breakdown that started in the housing market of the US in 2008, spread to cause the Eurozone crisis in Europe. Subsequently, due to instability in Syria the Union was hit by waves of migrations, and refugees, fleeing the destruction of their home country. This was followed by waves of austerity measures and political populism in almost all of the member states, both left, and right-wing. Most recently the vote to leave the European Union in Great Britain, and a global pandemic threatening a new economic depression, the legitimacy of the European Union have been called into question in the eyes of the European publics. While the union enjoyed a certain amount of permissive consensus from the European populations, being allowed to make policies largely out of the public eye this permissive consensus have shifted towards a more skeptic attitude. The need for a unified Europe has never been greater. Yet, in order to institute broad policies, and get the European populations behind these, the Union needs an efficient public sphere in which problems, and solutions can be discussed. Either across national lines, or concurrently inside the national public spheres.

This question of a European Public Sphere, have puzzled researchers in the field for some time. Even though the European project have been a process of development and integration, the robust public discussion that regularly takes place inside national public spheres have not emerged on the European level. So far no real trans-European news sources have successful in bringing together European populations, in order to discuss the future of the Union on a common basis. The lack of such a public sphere, have also meant that holding power accountable inside of the European system is increasingly difficult. Without any real means of deliberating between appropriate responses, the European citizens are left with very little choice in the case they disagree with the decisions of the Union. Furthermore, the idea of solidarity between European nations, also seem a far-fetched ideal without a platform for common deliberation and to express needs and wants horizontally between nations.

Thus this thesis seeks to investigate the composition of the current level of Europeanization in the public sphere, which actors drive further Europeanization, and which frames of Europeanization is most conducive in order to drive the formation of such a common conversation. This is done in order to examine why a strong collective identity, and why a European public sphere have not emerged.

## Method and methodology:

The main research question addressed in this thesis is:

“Why have a European public sphere not emerged?”

In order to guide the exploration two sub question have been formulated:

- To what extend do different actors drive Europeanization of the public sphere?
- To what extend do different actors drive the formation of a strong European collective identity?

In order to investigate the research question, the method of this thesis will be a case study of the Europeanization of the public sphere as it appears in two Danish, quality newspapers. The chosen methodology will be political claims-making analysis as it appears in Koopman's and Statham's "The Making of a European Public Sphere. The analysis will consist of the following steps, 1) selection of empirical material 2) first reading 3) second reading. The first reading will focus on quantitatively categorizing claims made, while the second reading will be a qualitative analysis of the most prominent frames of Europeanization. The chosen empirical material, along with the reasons for the choices will appear in the section titled 'Choice of media outlet and of empirical material.

Specifically this thesis will investigate claims as they appear in the climate-change discourse in the Public-Sphere for the year of 2019.

Using the case study as a research method provides certain advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of this method, is that it allows the researcher to focus on a given situation in its full context. Furthermore, since the Europeanization of national public spheres can vary considerably the case study method allows for detailed look at a specific example of Europeanization. This also means that there are certain disadvantages that should be taken into consideration. It can be quite difficult to justify any generalization from singular case studies, since the representativeness is relatively low. Further, drawing specific link between cause and effect is also problematic, considering the single case is only a small part of the larger potential sample. The reason for choosing the case study method in this thesis, is partly the segmented nature of the dispersion of

political communication in the European Union.

The structure of the thesis will be as follow: A presentation of the methodology, and method chosen for the analysis along with an a presentation of the empirical material to be examined, a literature review on the concept of a public sphere, followed by the current conception of collective identities, and how the current research view the Public sphere in a post-Westphalian world, and specifically how the concept relates to the European Union. Following these sections comes the analysis, and finally a discussion and conclusion.

### ***Political claims making analysis as methodology.***

The methodology used in this thesis will be 'Political Claims Making Analysis', as it appears in 'The Making of a European Public Sphere'<sup>1</sup>. This approach combines insights from the areas of political mobilization and protest movements, with those from the field of media, and political communications<sup>2</sup>. From the field of political mobilization and protest movements the approach draws on the concept of political opportunities defined as “*consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure.*”<sup>3</sup>. As such the purpose is to examine political communication by a full range of political actors, ranging a spectrum from official European institutions to interest groups and protest movements. From the political communications literature, the approach draws on the notion that political opportunities does not simply present themselves. Rather than just appearing as accessible, such opportunities must be made available in the public sphere<sup>4</sup>.

In terms of categorizing actors and claims, Koopmans and Statham's framework takes the approach of perceiving the Europeanization of public media in terms of networked relations of communication. Accordingly they gage Europeanization along horizontal and vertical lines. This approach is coherent with previous literature in the field as presented in the literature review of this thesis, the following specifies how the concepts will be understood within the framework, of analysis. In the framework of the analysis, Europeanization will be understood in terms of the

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1 Koopmans, Ruud; Statham, Paul: “*The Making of a European Public Sphere*”, Cambridge University Press, 2020.

2 Ibid. p. 43

3 Ibid. p. 43

4 Ibid. p. 44

following three categories<sup>5</sup>:

The emergence of a *Supranational European Political Sphere*. This type of Europeanization is characterized by increased interaction among European level institutions, and collective actors around European themes.

*Vertical Europeanization*. This type of Europeanization is characterized by communicative linkages between national, and European level actors. This type is further subdivided into *bottom up* and *top down*. In the *bottom up* variant, national actors address European level actors, or make claims on European level issues. In the *top down* variant, European level actors intervene in national debates.

*Horizontal Europeanization*. This type of Europeanization is characterized by communicative linkages between different European countries. This is further broken down into a *weak* and a *strong* variant. In the *weak* variant the media covers debates in another country, but no communicative link is established. In the *strong* variant actors from one country explicitly address or refer to actors of policies in another European country.

As such they would stereotype an 'ideal national sphere' as a network of communicative linkages remaining completely confined within national borders. This would signify a density of 100%. on the complete opposite end of the spectrum a completely denationalized sphere with a density of 0%, would not imply that national actors or issues do not play a role, but that these are always discussed in combination with a reference to the political space outside of the national sphere<sup>6</sup>. As it pertains to the emergence of a *supranational European Political Sphere*, in this case the discussion would be centered around European actors in the name of European interests with no specific reference to national politics. Thus a Europeanized public sphere is one in which an increasing number of communicative links between actors goes beyond the sphere of national politics, without bypassing the European level in reference to international actors<sup>7</sup>. While the approach does content that political claims extend beyond the realm of mediated communication, mass mediated communication still constitute a central role in making these claims available to a wider audience. Thus in an increasingly Europeanized public sphere would be one in which public discussion goes beyond a particular national political space.

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5 Ibid. p. 38

6 Ibid. p. 40

7 Ibid. p. 42-43

In contrast to other approaches focusing on political discourse, this approach does not take the article as the central unit of analysis, rather the focus is shifted rendering the claims made by political actors the relevant unit of analysis. Koopman and Statham define claim-making acts as: *”consist[ing] of public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors”*<sup>8</sup>. Claims are further broken down into seven code able elements:

1) Location of the claim in time and space, 2) claimant, the actor making the claim, 3) form of the claim (how is it inserted into the public sphere), 4) addressee of the claim, 5) substantive issue of the claim, 6) the object (beneficiary or maleficiary) of the claim, and 7) Justification for the claim (why should action be taken). In the ideal a claim would contain each element, although it is not a necessity that each element is present for a speech act to qualify as a claim<sup>9</sup>. The analysis will consist of two steps. The first step will include the identification of actors making claims and their geographical location. Secondly the analysis will look at the frames of Europeanization in which each actor present their claim.

### ***Frames of Europeanization:***

In investigating political claims, the questions of frames have become more and more prominent in research on the European Public Sphere. Frames are representations of reality, that structure how we talk about subjects based on a common understanding of the world. Thus this second part of our analysis will focus on the different frames of Europeanization at play in European climate-change discourse. As such all actors make use of a certain frame, when talking about subjects in the media. In order to guide our investigation of these this thesis will make use of the framework appearing in Koopmans', and Stathams *”The Making of a European Public Sphere”*<sup>10</sup>. The articles will be coded according to the follow four criteria as follows:

- *Identity*: On this criterion the thesis will stray a bit from the definition specified in Koopmans', and Statham's<sup>11</sup>. Rather, identity will be examined in terms of the three 'we'

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8 Ibid. p. 55

9 Ibid. p. 55

10 Koopmans, Ruud; Statham, Paul: *”The Making of a European Public Sphere”*, Cambridge University Press, 2020. p. 195

11 Ibid. p. 199

communities referred to in Cathleen Kantner's "*Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-understanding*"<sup>12</sup>. Thus identity will be analyzed in terms of 1) the universal "we", signifying the community of all beings capable of talk and action 2) We (*commercium*) signifying groups smaller than mankind whose members interact or cooperate with each other forced by the situation or for the purpose of common interest without sharing an ethical self-understanding, and 3) We (*communio*) Groups smaller than mankind whose members pursue collective projects based on a commonly shared ethical self-understanding<sup>13</sup>.

- *Instrumental understanding of the EU*: This part of the analysis concerns how the EU is presented in instrumental terms. Specifically to this thesis being the way in which frames activate either the national state, or the EU when discussing solutions to the climate crisis.
- *Historical understanding of the EU*: This part concerns the way in which historical periods are perceived, in other word, when talking about historical periods or events, are these framed in national or European terms?
- *Inter-European discourses*: The last part of the analysis concerns the way in which the discourse surrounding the climate crisis draws inter-discursive connections to other policy areas of the European union, or whether references to other discourses are made on primarily national terms.

The last part of the qualitative analysis regards the actors presenting frames in media. Since frames and identities are intimately connected, the position specific actors occupy may yield more information on which classes of actors tends to push narratives positive towards European integration, and which actors tend to push more nationally focused narratives. Actors will be analyzed according to the *dialogic context*<sup>14</sup>: How does the actor engage in dialog with other actors in European society, both in terms of opponents, and sympathizers.

### ***Choice of media outlet and of empirical material.***

When choosing the specific news media that serves as a representation of the public sphere in this study, several important factors, along with certain limitations come into play. While in the ideal

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12 Kantner, Cathleen: "*Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding*" in *European Journal of Social Theory*, p. 501-523, Sage Publications, 2006.

13 *Ibid.* p. 510

14 Koopmans, Ruud; Statham, Paul: "*The Making of a European Public Sphere*", Cambridge University Press, 2020. p. 197



scenario a comprehensive study of the European public sphere would include several media types, and outlets across the entire EU such an endeavor is out of the scope of the current thesis. Instead this study will focus on one member state of the Union, and as such present an example that could be part of a wider framework of investigations across the Union. In choosing the specific member state, several practical concerns present themselves. First and foremost concerning the researchers linguistic competences. Since the dispersion of political news in the Union largely happens via national languages, this naturally limits viable states. Furthermore, a nation with a politically independent press and a stable democratic regime would provide an ample basis for analysis. Given these considerations the public sphere of Denmark will be considered as the main focus for the analysis.

When considering which media publications to include two approaches have been under consideration. One has concerned the inclusion of a large sample of different kinds of media (i.e. Television, written press, social media, radio etc.), while this could have generate a large amount of data lending some degree of generalization to the results such an investigation is likewise out of the scope of the current thesis. Instead, the media was chosen based on a reflection of the current media usage of the Danish population. In order to limit the material for this thesis, focus will be on the coverage of national omnibus newspapers. The rationale for this choice is to capture the most popular quality newspapers responsible for the distribution of political news coverage. In choosing which specific newspapers to cover, Politiken and Jyllands-Posten have been chosen since they are both national newspapers, they represent the two most read newspapers according to Kantar Gallup<sup>15</sup>. Furthermore Politiken and Jyllands-Posten are respectively ideologically centre-left, and centre-right thus encapsulating a significant portion of the political views of the population.

Since 2014 the Danish government has published a yearly report on the media usage of the danish population<sup>16</sup>. While this study presents a broader picture of media use that includes recreational usage, it presents a clear picture of waning support for print media, flow-tv, and traditional AM/FM radio. These media forms lose ground to media facilitated by the internet, while 61% watch tv, 71% listen to the radio, and 33% read print newspapers a staggering 89% use the internet every day. While the usage of the internet is not broken down further, this includes everything from surfing to accessing the digital websites of print-newspapers. Considering this the chosen sample of empirical

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15 Kantar-Gallup: "*Læsertal fra Index Danmark /Gallup 4. kvartal 2018 + 1. kvartal 2019*" 2019.  
<https://webtest.kantargallup.dk/storage/reports/October2019/4QCx7rk5F6v71II0EBJw.pdf>

16 The Danish Government: "*Overblik og Perspektivering 2019*", 2019.  
<https://mediernesudvikling.slks.dk/2019/overblik-og-perspektivering/>

material will include articles from both the print, and digital outlets of Politiken and Jyllandsposten.

In total 48 articles will be chosen, the entire sample will be included in the quantitative analysis, although because of the limited scope of this these, only 12 of these will be subject to a deeper qualitative analysis. Two articles will be chosen for each month, for each of the two newspapers throughout the year of 2019.

## **Literature review:**

This section of the thesis will focus on a literature review of the public sphere in general, and how the current scholarship conceptualizes the European public sphere.

### ***The origins of the Habermasian public sphere:***

*"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity [...] Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding"*<sup>17</sup>

While the idea of public deliberation did not originate with Jürgen Habermas, he was one of the first authors to properly conceptualize it. In his work "Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere" first published in 1962, Habermas tracks the development of deliberation in bourgeois society in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century<sup>18</sup>. In Habermas' original conceptualization, the public sphere figures as an arena between the public and authority, in which matters of common societal concern is discussed in a rational-reasoned manner. In the ideal, social status was put aside in order to let the force of rational argumentation come to the forefront. According to Habermas, in early capitalist society the idea of the 'public' was formed in opposition to state authority. That is, in the western merchant societies of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, a dichotomy began to emerge between the private sphere in which reproduction of social life took place, and a depersonalized state authority ruling over this private sphere. As Calhoun put it, Habermas refers to a period in which, on the one hand private domestic authority became the subject of state authority, while on the other the administrative matters ruling over private authority became subject to a critical discussion allowing a public "general interest" to emerge<sup>19</sup>:

*"The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the*

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17 Kant, Immanuel: "Besvarelsen af spørgsmålet: Hvad er oplysning?". In "Oplysning, Historie, Fremskridt, Slagmark 1993. (My translation). p. 71

18 Calhoun, Craig j: "Habermas and the Public Sphere". Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992. p. 2

19 Ibid. p. 9

*basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason*"<sup>20</sup>

In the most general sense, as the quote above mentions, the public sphere emerged as a space in which 'people' met to discuss matters of common concern. More specifically this space emerged on the background of coffee houses. In the first decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, cities such as London (with its around 3000 coffee houses) became the nexus of discussion between members of the literary public. In these coffee houses businessmen met in order to discuss affairs of state administration and politics. These discussion rested, according to Habermas, on two crucial points a) the suspension of status, and b) the force of the rational argument as the sole arbiter of issues<sup>21</sup>.

Serving as a link between these different particularized coffee houses, emerged a wide array of opinion journals thus ensuring that anyone (who was propertied, and educated enough to read the journals) could in principle take part in the discussion. This development of a deliberative civil society coincided with the codification of a society based on depersonalized laws, in which every person as the inhabitant of certain rights to property was equal first in Britain, then in France and Germany throughout the period of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

This early configuration of the public sphere then began to transform as the acceleration of capitalist society underscored the fundamental differences between the property owning class, and the emerging proletariat. As such the fundamental class differences in society seemed to undermine the 'general will' of the people, and the idea of a 'general interest' became replaced with the negotiation of compromise among differentiated interests<sup>22</sup>. While these differences between classes may always have been present in society, the increased access provided a higher literacy among the general citizenry undermined the previously bracketing of social classes. At the same time Habermas notes a general transformation of the activities in the public sphere coinciding with the increased access, in which the previous rational-critical discussion became replaced by the individual consumption of mass-culture. Calhoun sums Habermas' argument by noting that the structural changes i.e. the loss of a notion of a general interest, and the appearance of consumption oriented mass media as such facilitated the transformation of the public sphere from one of rational discussion, to an arena for advertising<sup>23</sup>. It is in this sense important to note that advertising does not

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20 Habermas, Jürgen: *"Structural Transformations of the Public sphere"* Cambridge 1989 p. 27

21 Calhoun, Craig J: *"Habermas and the Public Sphere"*. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992. p. 13

22 Ibid. p. 22

23 Ibid. p. 25-26

necessarily imply a connection to the commercial realm of product-consumption but rather a mode of passive engagement or as explained by Calhoun

*"The media are used to create occasions for consumers to identify with the public positions or persona of others. All this amounts to the return of a version of representative publicity, to which the public responds by acclamation, or the withholding of acclamation, rather than critical discourse."*<sup>24</sup>

Thus, Habermas' initial analysis implied a degeneration of such an ideal public sphere of rational-critical discussion, into one of passive mass-mediated advertisement. While Habermas' original conception have been challenged on several point, these include the extend to which participation in such a public space have ever really been as 'equal' both in racial, and gendered terms, whether the early development of print press in which Habermas' situates the early printed media market as based on a free rational discussion, among others<sup>25</sup>. While these criticisms certainly hold water, the Habermasian ideal should be taken as just that, an ideal in the Kantian regulative sense as a mode of societal discursive interaction to strive for. As such, three central points of the public sphere as a regulative ideal can be outlined 1) Openness to participation; 2) Challenges to public authority to legitimize decisions and; 3) Ideal of rational critical discourse<sup>26</sup>.

### ***A transnational Public Sphere.***

Following the Habermasian ideal, one of the functions of the public sphere is to legitimize the decisions of the state vis á vis the public it governs, while also serving as a space for the generation of public opinion<sup>27</sup>. In this sense the ideal public sphere is intimately tied to the idea of popular sovereignty, and the nation state, at least in the normative literature. This idea of the public sphere contained within the boundaries of national states is challenged by Fraser, who questions both the current conception of the national public sphere while also questioning the ability of such public spheres (whether they really are national or increasingly trans-nationalized) to hold state power to account in a world where both politics and the economy transgress national boundaries.

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24 Ibid. p. 26

25 Garnham, Nicholas: *"The Media and the Public Sphere"* in *"Habermas and the Public sphere"* Cambridge MIT press, 1992, p. 359-360

26 Van de Steeg, Marianne: *"Theoretical Reflections on the Public Sphere in the European Union"* In *"Mapping the European Public Sphere"*, Routhledge 2010, p. 35

27 Frazer, Nancy: *"Transnationalizing the Public Sphere, On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World"* in *"Theory, Culture & Society"*, Vol. 24(4), SAGE 2007, p. 7

As such Fraser postulates six presuppositions that underlie Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere 1) the correlation of the public sphere with a sovereign state exercising power over a bounded territory, 2) Participants in the public sphere are fellow members of a bounded political community, 3) the primary focus of the public's concern as the national economy contained by a Westphalian state, 4) That the media infrastructure in which discussion takes place is focused on a national media space, 5) Linguistic transparency of the public space, that is, all members of the political community share a common language, and 6) while conceptualizing the public sphere, Habermas traces the cultural origins to a literary bourgeois genre which also gave rise to the imagined community of the nation<sup>28</sup>. Fraser problematizes this conception of the public sphere, by drawing on two main strands of critique. Fraser argues that, since the world has rapidly globalized, in so far as states share decision making power with various international institutions, and intergovernmental networks, we cannot solely take the position that the addressee of the public is the government of any given national state. Since one of the principal functions of the public sphere is to make power accountable, a world in which the states share a variety of powers would seem to complicate the first presupposition. Furthermore, the members of the public sharing equal access to the public sphere is likewise assumed to be the citizens of the state. To Fraser this contradicts the view that all affected by political decisions must have a voice. That is, in order to be fully legitimate, the public sphere must transgress the notion of citizenship to incorporate a wider notion of the proper public. The same goes when it comes to the 3<sup>rd</sup> presupposition, since every national economy is entangled in the global web of the financial market, and partly governed by intergovernmental arrangements such as the WTO, and the IMF the concern for the national economy seem to transgress the boundaries of the state as well. In terms of the communicative infrastructure, the world media does not seem contained within the national framework either. News organizations are privatized in global conglomerates, niche magazines, and the communicative power of the Internet, this also poses the question if the participants of communication in the public sphere are becoming increasingly fragmented then it would be difficult to imagine a coherent 'will' of the people emerging. In terms of linguistic capacity, the free flow of communication between different national publics affected by the same problems would also be in jeopardy. While English is slowly emerging as the global lingua franca, many people still communicate politically in their own language. Finally in global culture it seems to be more difficult to talk about truly 'national' imaginaries, that a shared public sphere would build upon.

According to Fraser, all these elements call on us to rethink our conceptual notions of a legitimate

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p. 9-10

public sphere<sup>29</sup>. In an attempt to sketch out key-concepts of a new trans-nationalized public sphere, Frazer centralizes the notions of *legitimacy*, and *efficacy*. Legitimacy concerns the criteria of participation, both in terms of *inclusiveness*, and *participatory parity*. Inclusiveness concerns the question of who participates in public discussions, while the participatory parity address the question of *how*, or on which terms the interlocutors are engaged<sup>30</sup>. Concerning the inclusive character, Frazer proposes to take seriously the criteria of 'all affected'. While the notion of the proper participants so far have been the citizen of the state, Frazer suggest that in a proper transnational public sphere all, in practice, affected by a political decision must be included. Concerning the other criteria, a public sphere must further contain the ability of translating the distinct elements of public opinion from the weak public, to the strong public. i.e. From the general public sphere to the legislative body<sup>31</sup>.

From the perspective of Frazer, it seems that increased attention on the trans-nationalization of the public sphere would be required to sufficiently address issues of modern citizens. If we evaluate the presuppositions of classical public sphere theory, it suggests that the arrangement of the European Union would require the presence of a proper transnational public sphere. Since member states share a wide variety of competences with the Union, the exercise of power as such is also shared. The citizens of each member state are de-facto fellow members of a bounded community enveloping their national states. Ever since the institution of the single market, and the ability of the EU to negotiate trade deals with outside communities, it would be impossible to ground the economy in a Westphalian framework. Concerning the media landscape, it still seems to be rooted in the imaginary of the nation state. As noted by Fishkin, et. al. the publics of the European Union first and foremost discuss politics in their national language, and the media tends to focus on national affairs<sup>32</sup>. While it seems that the European Union calls for a concept of the public sphere extending further than a nationalized Westphalian version in terms of participation, there is a corresponding sense that it needs the public legitimacy. According to Hans-Jörg Trenz, and Asimina Michailidou, the Union is suffering from constraints of legitimacy<sup>33</sup>. They note that while the Union initially enjoyed a permissive consensus in which publics did not pay much attention to the developments, this has now shifted to a constraining dissensus. This constraining dissensus serves

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29 Ibid. p. 17-19

30 Ibid. p. 20

31 Ibid. p. 22

32 Fishkin, James. S; Lushkin, Robert. C. And; Siu, Alice. *"Europolist and the European Public sphere: Empirical explorations of a counterfactual ideal"*. Sage, 2014. p. 329

33 Trenz, Hans-Jörg; and Michailidou, Asimina: *"The mediatization of Politics – From the National To the Transnational"*. In *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*, the University of Solento, 2015.

to pressure the European decision makers to increasingly legitimize their decisions publicly. While Frazer did not further specify exactly how a transnational public sphere might fulfill the criteria to serve its purpose, Fishkin et. Al.'s version of such a public sphere presents an interesting model. This model is based on six basic criteria for the ideal unitary European Public Sphere. It should be *inclusive*, i.e. Representative of citizens throughout the EU. This maxim essentially mirrors Frazer's ideal version, with the single difference that instead of presuming a bounded nation it takes as the basic participant the European citizens. Recalling Frazer's second point concerning participatory parity or "how" the participation is structured. The following four ideals constitute good participation It should be *Dialogic* in allowing for an active discussion of ideas against each other. It should be *Informative* i.e. Allowing participants to become more knowledgeable. It should be *Deliberative* in the sense that participants should be allowed to reach their own conclusions. It should be *Undistorted* i.e. Inequalities among participants should not affect the outcome<sup>34</sup>. Lastly, like Frazer, Fishkin et. al. Point to the *Consequentialism* of, i.e. Conclusions reached can be connected to political actors<sup>35</sup>. It is clear that the accepted notion of the public sphere as grounded in a nationally bounded political community is problematic when attempting to analyze a media environment transcending said national borders, thus in order to investigate to which degree discussions about EU matters have been 'Europeanized' it is necessary to develop a broader concept of the public sphere.

### ***The European Public Sphere, and the question of a 'common identity'.***

When we think about the public sphere as a concept, the question of a 'common identity' is unavoidable. Through the discussion of the development of the Public Sphere as a concept, this thesis specified the way in which the nation state was perceived as the basis upon which a public sphere could be build. This is in terms of a shared cultural understanding, a shared language, and shared political authority. This understanding of the Public Sphere as nationally grounded present certain problem, when talking about the national sphere in a transnational context, specifically, the question of the importance of a shared identity. While some scholars take the existence of a shared identity as a prerequisite of the emergence of a public sphere, this thesis approach the question differently. Rather than regarding the public sphere as building upon the basis a singular collective identity, this thesis regards the emergence of a collective identity and a public sphere as dynamic

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34 Fishkin, James. S; Lushkin, Robert. C. And; Siu, Alice. "*Europolist and the European Public sphere: Empirical explorations of a counterfactual ideal*". Sage, 2014. p. 332

35 Ibid. p. 333

processes, evolving side-by-side over time. This is also expressed by Trenz "Nation-building and public sphere building are seen as co-evolutionary through the differentiation of a well functioning system of mass communication"<sup>36</sup>. In other words the understanding of a common 'European' identity in this thesis can be likened to Kierkegaard's understanding of the human self in the work "Sickness unto Death", "[...] *But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis [...]*"<sup>37</sup>. In this respect, the collective identity does not emerge before, or after the establishment of a Public Sphere, rather it appears in the relations between actors, which themselves represent relations. Another point of contention between scholars of public sphere, is the ability of collective identities to exist side by side. Are we to assume that the emergence of a European identity will display national identities, or can collective identities coexist to a certain extent? Kathleen Kantner attempts to illuminate this question in the text "Collective Identity as Shared Ethical self-understanding"<sup>38</sup>. Kathleen presents the predominant view of the current conception of European identity: "[...] *many argue that the EU citizens, apparently, first need a common identity in order to accept common rules and institutions and especially in order to accept common rules and institutions*"<sup>39</sup>. Here, representative such as Habermas would argue that the need for a common material understanding of a European life form, as well as a common interpretation of European history<sup>40</sup>. A common understanding of collective identity, is supposed to make the institutionalization of common political solutions easier, since all members of the community share certain ethical, and moral values. The conception of collective identities has rested on the categorization of its members along the line of commonality, such as living in a certain territory, ethnic origin, culture, religion, language, history, and lifestyle<sup>41</sup>. In this respect, Kathleen objects, pointing out that observing such categorizations merely represents a *numerical identification*, or the aggregation of individuals with certain characteristics into groups, it does not tell us anything about the qualitative meaningfulness of these characteristics in their individual or collective lives, or whether or not the presence of these variables would imply a sense of belonging. Kathleen initially distinguish between two types of identification; *numerical, and*

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36 Trenz, Hans-Jörg: "The Europeanization of Political Communication: Conceptual Clarifications and Empirical Measurements", in Bozzini, Emanuela et. al. "Mapping the European Public Sphere" Routledge, 2010. p. 15

37 Kierkegaard, Søren: "The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening" Princeton University Press. 1983 (First published 1849).

38 Kantner, Kathleen: "Collective Identity as Shared Ethical self-understanding", In European Journal of Social Theory nr. 9 vol 4, 2006, Sage Publications.

39 Ibid. p. 502

40 Ibid. p. 502

41 Ibid. p. 503



*qualitative*. In the first category lies the characteristics we have just discussed, that is all of the characteristics that a neutral observer would be able to group people by, although in order to base the public sphere on a collective identity other types of categorization would be needed. These categorizations need to be on qualitative terms, after all if a collective identity is supposed to make the institutionalization of policy easier, it must have some effect on the internal life of individuals' subjectivity. In order to investigate what this effect might be, the standpoint of a neutral observer is insufficient<sup>42</sup>. Kathleen derives three communities of identity, from the way in which the collective pronoun 'we' is used. The first community being 'The universal we' which includes all being capable of talk and action, from here Kathleen further derives two types of smaller communities, the 'we (commercium)', and the 'we (communio)'. The 'we(commercium)' consist of groups smaller than mankind, in which their members co-operate with each other forced by the situation or for the purpose of common interests without sharing an ethical self-understanding. The 'we (communio)' consist of groups smaller than mankind in which their members pursue collective project based on a commonly shared ethical self-understanding<sup>43</sup>. Thus while Kathleen agrees that a shared identity of some form is a precondition for a functional political community, this identity does not need to take the shape of a strong 'we (communio)' as we often envision national identities, but can be based on the weaker 'we(commercium)'.

### ***The Public Sphere in the European Union.***

Turning from the ideal criteria for a public sphere, to the literature on the European Public Sphere specifically. In order to better understand the current composition of the European Public Sphere, however far from the ideal it may be, we turn to Hans-Jörg Trenz<sup>44</sup>.

In Bozzini, et. al. Hans-Jörg Trenz problematizes the idea of conceiving of the European Public Sphere, as a model of our current nationally grounded public spheres<sup>45</sup>. This is in a sense what Frazer takes for granted, when she calls for a larger, more cosmopolitan grounded idea of a public sphere. This is grounded in the notion that a European Public Sphere would not only be quantitatively better in the sense that its participants would be all Europeans, it might also be qualitatively different<sup>46</sup>. In order to move forward from this point, Trenz dis-aggregates the concept

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42 Ibid. p. 509

43 Ibid, p. 510

44 Trenz, Hans-Jörg: "The Europeanisation of Political Communication: Conceptual Clarifications and Empirical Measurements", In Bozzini, et. al. "Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society" Routledge, 2010.

45 Ibid. p. 17-18

46 Ibid. p. 19

of the Public Sphere. Instead of speaking of a unitary public sphere as a phenomenon in an of itself focus should be put on its constituent parts, which is "[...] *loose relations of communication that refer to variable carriers and reference groups*"<sup>47</sup>, along with the functions it [the public sphere] serves. Trenz thus situates the process of the Europeanization of the national public sphere along lines of *operational*, and *relational components*. That is, on the one hand the process of Europeanization concerns a specific mode of social change, a trans-formative process expanding within a particular economic, political and societal space. On the other hand Europeanization also implies the forging of new horizontal and vertical links between institutional environments<sup>48</sup>. In this context vertical links refer to links of communication forged between national communities, while horizontal refers to the introduction of European political actors in national public discourse. By disaggregating the concept of the public sphere in this manner, Trenz allows for a frame of analysis transcending the grounding of a public sphere in the national-state, shifting the focus from the construction of a "new" public sphere to the Europeanization of already existing public spheres.

Trenz specifies two approaches commonly used by researchers when investigating the Europeanization of national public sphere. Researchers have on the one hand attempted to analyze Europeanization based on the notion of a public sphere as a mediating arena between political contenders and their publics. That is, as a space for examining the rational-critical discussion, and as a process by which political inputs, throughputs and outputs are actualized and mediated. The second group of researchers have mainly been focusing on the content of European news coverage in terms of the public sphere as a space for framing discourses and identities<sup>49</sup>. In terms of forming an area of a shared political understanding, Trenz remarks on the specific mechanisms posited in the literature as drivers, and signs of Europeanization. Viewed through the lens of of the public sphere as relations of communication, a Europeanization of such a space could be expressed in terms of *discursive interaction*<sup>50</sup>. Trenz describes such a process as "*The development of a multi-level public sphere [...] through enhanced interchange between different levels of jurisdiction represented by cooperating actors and institutions*"<sup>51</sup>. As mentioned earlier these types of interaction have also been categorized in terms of vertical and horizontal Europeanization. Michael Brüggemann and Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw have categorized different patterns of Europeanization based on an analysis of the discursive interaction in five European member states. The analysis describes Europeanization along the aforementioned vertical and horizontal axes, with increased discursive

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47 Ibid. p. 19

48 Ibid. p. 19

49 Ibid. p. 20

50 Ibid. p. 23

51 Ibid. p. 23

exchange between units in member states as vertical Europeanization, and increased exchange and attention paid to European institutions as horizontal Europeanization<sup>52</sup>. While Trenz outlines the shared observation of political life as an element of Europeanization, as such the diffusion of political knowledge through societies constitute another way of looking at Europeanization than patterns of discursive communication. Accordingly Trenz points towards the *transnational resonance* of political communication spread throughout national media environments. While Trenz does explicitly mention the differences in the way national media systems Europeanize, it is uncertain whether different media systems will be capable of forming such an area of resonance.

For the purpose of this thesis, the following conception of a public sphere will be used. A public sphere is an area of discursive interaction between different actors, both in civil society and in government. The concept of a 'unitary' public sphere in terms of the dispersion of opinions through a single lingua franca is rejected. Granted, this view of the public sphere somewhat weakens conceptual coherence, it could be argued that this is simply necessary in order to decouple the national sphere from the conception of the Westphalia nation-state. In this sense, what sets apart a public sphere from other areas of communication? After all, with the invention of the Internet and various types of social forums, discursive connection are formed across national lines in a number of different arenas. In order to bring conceptual coherence back into the concept, the public sphere needs to rest on some conception of a common identity. At this point it is important to clarify that 'rest on' does not imply any sort of chronology. As mentioned in the section on identity, the presence of an identity, before the emergence of a public-sphere is not taken as a given. Rather, at some undecided point linkages of communication transform themselves into a 'public-sphere' concurrently with the emergence of an identity. In other words, at some point communicative linkages becomes strong enough to constitute a synthesis between relations.

## **Analysis:**

The analysis will be comprised of two sections, the first attempts to aggregate the collected empirical material to categorize the claims made in terms of *Vertical-*, *Horizontal-*, *Comprehensive-*, and, *no-Europeanization*.

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52 Brüggemann, Michael; Königslöw, Katharina Kleinen-von: "Let's Talk about Europe' – Why Europeanization Shows a Different Face in Different Newspapers" European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications, 2009. p. 29

This section of the analysis will deal with the empirical data in an quantitative aggregative way, while the next sections dives deeper into a qualitative reading of the frames presented.

During the first reading of the empirical material, claims were ordered, and organized according to the claims-making framework. Fig. 1 of the appendix provides an overview of the identified claims. Additionally each article will be assigned a number, according to the order of their publication. The first part of the analysis will categorize actors appearing in the selected empirical material, in order to determine the level of horizontal, vertical, or comprehensive Europeanization. This will be done by categorizing each article according to actors mentioned, on the vertical / horizontal Europeanization spectrum. Thus, the categories used will be: "Domestic", "European", "supranational", and "International". Fig. 2 of the appendix shows a table indicating the actors represented in each respective article, while fig. 3 consist of a bar chart aggregating the results in terms of all of the articles in total, and for Jyllands-Posten and Politiken respectively. The total chart breaks down like this:

Total:

Domestic: 101

European: 37

Supranational: 17

International: 26

Politiken:

Domestic 54

European: 26

Supranational: 9

International: 11

Jyllands-Posten:

Domestic: 47

European: 11

Supranational: 8

International: 15

No significant differences is seen throughout the categories, with the exception of European actors, gaining almost double the representation in the center-left Politiken, compared to the center-right

Jyllands-Posten. According to the data we can see that domestic actors, unsurprisingly, dominates the the narratives with 56% of actors represented being domestic, 21% European, 9% supranational, and 14% international. While it is certainly significant that Politiken, almost double s the European representation compared to Jyllands-Posten, it should be kept in mind that this is merely across one discourse, namely climate change. From the aggregated data it further seems that actors from other European countries gain more representation than supranational institutions, pointing towards the fact that the Europeanization of the climate change discourse is more driven by horizontal actors, rather than vertical actors. The next step will be to categorize each article according to the Europeanization classification. 14 articles show horizontal integration, 3 vertical, 22 shows no Europeanization, while 3 show some degree of internationalization. In this case the density of Europeanization of the Danish public sphere is 29,83%.

### ***Frame analysis:***

This section analyses the frames presented in each category of Europeanization, because of restraints in time and space for this thesis, only a number of claims will be analyzed for each category, the chosen material under each category will be chosen on the background that they. As mentioned during the explanation of the analytical framework, each article will be analyzed in terms of the aforementioned factors: Understanding of self-identity, instrumental understanding of the EU, Historical understanding of the EU, Inter-European Discourses, and in terms of how each actor relates to one another. While each article does not necessarily contain all of the aforementioned factors, only the relevant ones will be taken into consideration. The sections will be structured as follow, each frame presented will contain an analysis of three articles, each section will contain the date, and headline of the article in question, along with a small piece of text summarizing the findings from the initial reading (as found in fig. 1).

### ***The Comprehensive European Frame:***

Politiken, March 29<sup>th</sup>: "We are the new and green Europe"<sup>53</sup>.

Claimants Rasmus Nordqvist & Yanis Varoufakis, respectively politicians for the Danish party "Alternativet", and the transnational European movement DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe

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53 Varoufakis, Yanis; Nordqvist, Rasmus "Vi er det nye og grønne Europa" Politiken, 2019  
<https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediemarkiv/link?articles=e772a995>

Movement 2025) calls on the European public to band together in a truly united Europe in order to solve our common environmental issues. On behalf of the European populations. This is necessary because without concerted effort from Europe, a proper solution to the climate crisis will not be reached.

#### Identity:

When speaking about collective identities the collective pronoun "we" appear several times throughout the article; *"We are the new and green Europe"*, *"[...] we need spring, we need a new beginning for the EU we are all a part of, "We have banded together in order to create a new political direction for Europe"*<sup>54</sup>. It is clear that when the authors speak about the European Union, the collective identity described is of the "We (communio)" variant. The collective pronoun 'we' is used in two ways, first as an all inclusive 'we' referring to all members of the European community, and secondly as a particularized 'we' referring to the particular political movement that the authors represent. In both instances it is clear that the 'we' is a part of a voluntary community of people pursuing collective project. In this case projects are presented in two ways 1) as a general 'European' project for European democracy, and 2) as a particular project to alleviate the climate crisis. Further, when discussing the future of the 'we', it is quite clear that shared values and ethical considerations come into play. References to 'future generations of Europeans' are clearly based on more than simply practical considerations but also on a fundamental ethical value-based leveling statements such as; *"[...] in order to answer the great youth-unemployment, we observe in several member-states, that can potentially leave future generations behind"*, and *"The EU is in crisis, because more and more are questioning the unions institutional legitimacy – and this threatens the idea of the EU as a community of solidarity, as it should be"*<sup>55</sup>. Thus, in terms of this frame the EU is viewed as a strong collective identity, not just bound by political obligations, bus as a voluntary association of peoples sharing a normative values and ethics.

#### Instrumental understanding of the EU:

While the EU is presented as a strong community in terms of identity, in instrumental terms the Union is presented as indispensable. A clear dichotomy is established within witch the logic of the national-state as the primary instrument of action is opposed to the EU. This shines through when talking about the current political order *"Time has run it's course for national-parties to run for the European parliament, only to be a part of vague political coalitions [...]* *With the European spring*

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54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

*a transnational European list is presented*", and *"It's a deal with the European people to correct the failed neo-liberal approach [...] A collective European plan to invest in a sustainable society can change this radically"*<sup>56</sup>. Thus solutions and problems are presented in common terms throughout the article, likewise when speaking about different member states of the union, these are usually presented as one collective entity e.g. Instead of saying *"This is a deal with the European peoples"* (plural), the articles refers to *"This is a deal with the European people"*<sup>57</sup> (singular). Furthermore, when discussing specific solutions to the climate crisis, the key actors mentioned are specifically European. This comes to light when the authors discuss their plan for a new investment strategy *"The European Investment bank will issue green bonds [...] the European Central bank will be ready to buy, if the value of bonds fall"*<sup>58</sup>. Furthermore the authors propose to create a new European agency called 'the European Agency for a Green Transition'. Their plan is to make the new agency responsible for the distribution of the funds from the Green bonds all over Europe, with an emphasis on the most efficient projects.

Historical understanding of the EU:

Throughout the article, there are several references to historical periods. The first concrete historical reference bring attention to the post depression America of the 1930's, this reference brings attention to president Roosevelt's 'New Deal'<sup>59</sup>. This historical reference mirrors the current political developments the authors wants to bring attention to. As such the post-depression period of the United States, and to an extend Western Europe became marked by a radical rethinking of the way in which capitalist practices are perceived in modern economies. During Roosevelt's terms as president a new understanding of capitalist ventures turned away from the *laissez-faire* approach of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, towards a more progressive 'embedded liberalism', i.e. A version of liberal capitalism constrained, and guided towards the betterment of society by institutional setups, such as the separation of investment and commercial banking in the United states<sup>60</sup>. This period is directly mentioned in connection to the EU *"We need to find the same courage and ambition, as when the EU was formed after the second world war"*<sup>61</sup>. This signifies a move towards societal solidarity, one that stands in sharp contrast to the more recent past, which is described as *"The neo-liberal thought process had grown before the crisis [crash of 2008] and economists preached the neo-liberal free*

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56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Blyth, Mark: *"Great Transformations – Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century"* Cambridge University Press 2002, part two.

61 Varoufakis, Yanis; Nordqvist, Rasmus *"Vi er det nye og grønne Europa"* Politiken, 2019 <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediemarkiv/link?articles=e772a995>

*market forces*”<sup>62</sup>.

Inter-European discourses:

Several parallels are drawn to inter-European discourses, while discussing the climate crisis. The primary discourse referred to is the problem of the democratic deficit of the European Union. While the authors throughout the article refer to a 'strengthening of the European democracy', the deficit is explicitly mentioned in connection to the French president Emmanuel Macron *”Maybe worst of all, a top-down approach as Macron's will strengthen the democratic deficit”*<sup>63</sup>. Further, the Euro-zone crisis starting with the crash of 2008, is also explicitly mentioned. This is in connection with the historical perspective, in which clear parallels are drawn between the Great Depression of 1930's, and the Crash of 2008. In the context of the text, such parallels specifically focus on the youth-unemployment, and unemployment in general of the South-, and Eastern European member states. The last inter-discursive connection is drawn to the recent migrant and refugee crisis. When discussing these discourses, they are all framed as common European problems, with common European solutions.

Dialogic context:

In terms of the dynamic between the actors, once more we are presented with a comprehensive perspective on the Union., both in terms of vertical and horizontal integration. The authors either mention, or engage in dialog with a row of European institutions, and actors from other member states. First and foremost is the mention of the DiEM25 movement, and the countries from which the movement draw support *”Here is the trans-european DiEM25-movement (Democracy in Europe Movement 2025) banding together with, among others, Génération. S from France, the green Livre from Portugal, and several other good parties from Poland, Belgium, Italy, Greece, and Spain”*<sup>64</sup>. As mentioned earlier, several references are made to the European institutions, mainly as parts of the solution to the climate problem. These are the European Investment Bank, and the European Central Bank, along with the fictitious future agency *”The European Agency for a Green Transition”*. Reference is made to 'the British politicians', postulating that they have been caught in *”[...] a political mess of dimensions after the decision to leave the EU”*<sup>65</sup>. Reference to the French president Macron also appear, although the authors are somewhat ambivalent on their stance. On the one hand, the pro-European approach of Macron, and Angela Merkel is presented as a positive,

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62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.



while the adherence to the neo-liberal approach is presented as insufficient to solve the problems of Europe. In stark contrast to Macron and Angela, the authors paint a picture of their political opponents as nationalistic and xenophobic *"On the other side we see xenophobic and nationalistic, anti-EU self described 'strong men' such as Italy's Matteo Salvini, and Hungary's victor Orbán"*<sup>66</sup>. Thus, on the vertical axis actors from other member-states are generally presented in a positive light, as sympathizers with the frame of the authors in so far as they themselves present pro-European narratives, the expectation is the 'British politicians', and the 'self-described strong men'. This is quite fitting with the identity of the European Union as a *We (communio)*, since these actors are described as opponents on ethical, and value-based grounds. On the horizontal axis mentions of the institutions as instrumental to the success of the European project, and as the solution to the climate change crisis further present an aspect of Europeanization on the Horizontal axis. Thus the frame in which their claim is presented is comprehensively European throughout.

Politiken, April 5<sup>th</sup>: "Debate: The necessary climate-transition needs to start now"<sup>67</sup>

Claimants, the Climate Council of Denmark calls on the Danish public, to express more urgency in the climate fight. This is done on behalf of the Danish people, and the universal 'we', and is justified by the fact that a Danish effort alone will not make any difference. Instead, we have to find common European solutions.

Identity:

The collective pronoun "we" appears several places in the text, both in relation to the EU and in relation to Denmark. While it is clear that the authors consider "European" a part of their identity, it is mainly in terms of the "*We (commercium)*". While the national Danish identity if referred to in terms of the "*We (communio)*". An example of the latter can be seen when the authors write; *"Our Earth only have a limited budget for greenhouse gases [...] and here Denmark should do our part"*<sup>68</sup>. In terms of a European identity, this is discussed both as a product of necessity, and of mutual interest, thus; *"It is important to remember, that Denmark's reduction cannot be seen isolated, and that the reductions we manage in Denmark, Risk appearing in other [European] countries, with a less ambitious climate policy [...]"*<sup>69</sup>. Thus it is clear to the authors that cooperation

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66 Ibid

67Climate Council of Denmark: "*Debat: Den nødvendige klimaomstilling skal i gang nu*", Politiken, April 5<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e724fe6f>

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

within Europe is a necessity in order to combat climate change. Another sign that the authors

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

It is quite clear that the authors view the EU as an indispensable area of politics, when considering climate changes. The question of a green transition is immediately connected to the European policy-making machine, by remarking on the (at the time) coming European elections; *“In Denmark there's elections for both the national parliament, and the European parliament, and polls show, that the climate is at the top of the voters priorities [...] we need to actively make an effort if we are to control man-made climate changes”*<sup>70</sup>. The importance of the EU is further underscored by the understanding that any progress made in Denmark, will inevitably depend on the larger progress made in the EU as a whole. Furthermore it is remarked that; *“It is demanded, that the national politics takes the European perspective into consideration”*<sup>71</sup>.

Inter-European discourses:

several inter-European discourses appear throughout the text, this is also signified by the holistic approach the authors take; *“[...] the green transition needs to include all sectors and all parts of society [...]”*<sup>72</sup>. The first discourse connected to climate change, is the socioeconomic status of European citizens. This is done as an example of the popular support, any initiative to combat climate change will need; *“This is one of the lessons of the Yellow Vests in France [...] the example illustrates nonetheless, that climate policies that affect people's economic position cannot be done without popular support”*<sup>73</sup>. Next up is the issue of energy security, in which the authors remark on the need to invent new ways of storing energy, such as the energy produced from wind-mills. A third inter-discursive remark is made towards European industry, especially concerned with industries that include CO<sub>2</sub> intensive steps of production, such as cement. A fourth discourse mentioned is transport, that is the reliance on especially air, and sea transport along with personal combustion engine vehicles; *“Especially for global sea- and air- fare, no meaningful technological solutions are in sight”*. Lastly the agricultural sector is a major point, especially since this is an area in which Denmark needs to improve; *“In The agricultural sector, which in Denmark is an object of debate in these days, critics have pointed out that improvements have been lacking”*<sup>74</sup>. Thus even though the perception of the community of the EU is the “we(communium)”, it is expressed that the effort must include wide sections of European society, including several important policy areas.

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70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

Dialogic context:

Other actors engaged in the text, display a significant level of comprehensive European integration. First and foremost, emphasis is put on the democratic institutions of the EU, that is the necessity to elect a European parliament, with the will to combat climate change. Secondly the yellow-vests are brought into the discussion as representatives of the European peoples, in the sense that an efficient climate policy, will rest on the support of the European population.

Politiken, May 7<sup>th</sup>: “210 cities calls for a climate-rebellion: EU-countries do not do enough for the climate”<sup>75</sup>.

Claimant Adam Hannested, writes as a proxy for '210' European cities, to call on national politicians and politicians in the European Parliament to institute a more ambitious climate policy, as well as a complete stop in subsidies for fossil fuels. This is on behalf of future Europeans and young people in general. The justification is the fact that rich Western-European economies contributed most, and thus must also have the courage to lead the way.

Identity:

While the collective pronoun “we” does not appear in the text, other signs are present, indicating the level of commitment to a European identity. First and foremost the fact that the claimant making the claim consists of '210 European cities; *“It's enough, the countries of the EU will have to pull themselves together and show leadership in the area of climate [...] that is the opinion of the mayors of 210 European cities”*<sup>76</sup>. Furthermore reference to future generations further underscore a sense of common ethical self-understanding, that is as European we need to act, in order to ensure that the earth will remain habitable for future Europeans. A clear signal that the articles express a sense of shared ethical self-understanding is shown through the way in which the 210 cities talk about young people, and vice versa. The letter states *“Vi are reminded of the insufficiency of our efforts [...] by the thousands of young people, who protest every week in the streets of European cities”*, and; *“they [young people of Europe] will not forgive us”*<sup>77</sup>. This signifies a significant ethical commitment to fight for the future of all European young people. The commitment to

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75Hannested, Adam: “210 byer kalder til klimaoprør: EU-lande gør ikke nok for klimaet”, Politiken, May 7<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediearkiv/link?articles=e72ff982>

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

identity expressed can thus be categorized as the “we (communio)”.

Instrumental understand of the EU:

As with the first article analyzed under the frame, the EU is once more presented as indispensable. The relationship between local government and the EU is describes as such; *“As mayers and leaders of local governments, we can play a significant role [...] But we need a supportive European framework and initiatives”*<sup>78</sup>. Furthermore, quoted in the article is Lars Chr. Lilleholt (politician for the center-right liberal party “Venstre”) remarking that no single European country can do it on their own, rather pressure must be put on countries lacking behind in order to strengthen ambitions within the EU as a whole.

Inter-European discourses:

While the climate discourse takes center stage, there are mentions of other discourses in the EU. This concerns mainly energy security, which is closely related to the problem of climate change; *“De also demand a total stop for state subsidies to oil, gas, and coal”*<sup>79</sup>. Furthermore the commitment to reduce the outlet of CO<sub>2</sub> is also connected to the transport sector, especially diesel-driven vehicles.

Dialogic context:

In terms of dialogic engagement between actors, several references are made throughout the article. First and foremost the button-up perspective, since the authors are comprised of leaders of local government, engaging the supranational institutions of the EU, showing vertical integration; *“This is the opinion of the mayers in 210 European cities, who are sending a common open letter til the leaders of the EU”*<sup>80</sup>. Furthermore references are made to a) governments of other European countries, mainly the ones lacking behind on the climate effort (such as Poland, and Romania), and b) young people in the European union. While communication between the authors and other European nations are one-way (the authors commenting on other European nations), communication between the authors and young people is on more dialogic terms, with quotes from young people present; *“We are happy, that our climate-strikes are listened to, but we will not applaud before word are put into action”*<sup>81</sup>. Thus while the vertical integration is comprised mainly of the authors commenting on European supranational leadership, horizontal integration is present

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78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

as a two-way communicative link between two actors.

General impression of the Comprehensive European frame:

The predominant conception of identity presented in the comprehensive European frame, is one of the “we(communio)”. Although one of the articles examined in the analysis did show an identity of the “we(commercium)”, this is an out-lier. The sense of belonging to the EU is not just one of necessity, or mutual interest, but rather as a community in which people cooperate on the basis of shared values, and ethical principles. This shines through in the fact that the fight against climate change is not just driven by a necessary sense of impending doom, but rather as a cooperative venture, that is both necessary, but also compelled by an ethical understanding that the EU needs to build a bright future for coming European generations. Furthermore the EU is presented as an indispensable element in the fight against climate change. Throughout the claims made it is made very clear that it will not matter if Denmark stands alone in this fight, larger systemic action on the European level is needed. Throughout claims, it is clear that claimants does not just seek to coordinate action from a European level, rather suggestions are made to deepen European cooperation by creating new institutions. This is seen especially in the first article analyzed, in which the 'green bonds' are proposed. In terms of the inter-European discourses, the comprehensive frame tends to be quite large in scope. Most claims include references to a wide variety of other European discourses, signaling that in order to reach the goal, we will need a comprehensive overhaul of many societal areas. As the comprehensive heading suggest, the actors engaged are many and varied. That is, both horizontally across European nations, but also in terms of vertically including supranational institutions. This is mainly done from a bottom up perspective, actors mostly refer to, and make demands of supranational institutions, while these institutions themselves do not gain any representation. Thus the comprehensive European frame displays a general will to hold supranational institutions to account, in line with the ideal purpose of the public sphere. Claims in this category is made mostly by Europeans from civil society, there is very little representation of claim from supranational institutions.

### ***The Horizontal European frame:***

Politiken, August 6<sup>th</sup>: “Trial, German innkeeper-family accuses the EU of climate-neglect”<sup>82</sup>

Claimants are 10 families from all around the EU, calling on the European Parliament to introduce a

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82Jensen, Erik: ”Retssag: Tysk krofamilie anklager EU for Klimasvigt”, Politiken, August 6<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediemarkiv/link?articles=e74aa781>

more comprehensive climate legislation. This is on behalf of European citizens, with the justification that climate change is already hurting Europeans, so we need to do something about it.

Identity:

Regarding the identity of claims-makers in this article, it is clear that these consider the EU to be a community of the “we(communio)” type, since it is clear that they feel the EU should do something about climate change on moral and ethical grounds; *“The reason was, that the 10 families have suffered damage, and loss of money on the grounds of climate, change, and that it will possibly be true, as they insinuate, that the changes in climate will destroy basic human rights. But the damages are hard to fix individually”*<sup>83</sup>. Thus not only does the claimant appeal to the EU on strictly economic grounds, but also for a fear that climate change will threaten human rights. Furthermore, the claimants state that while they haven't been especially hit by the climate crisis, that's only because everyone in the European Union is hit. This signals that not only are the families appealing to the EU because they themselves have lost something, but as representatives of the rest of the Union as well. This is further backed up by; *“it is important to understand, that people in Europe understand, that if climate change keeps happening, without any mitigation, it won't just hit our economy, but it will be a real threat to our democracy and our human rights”*<sup>84</sup>. The article furthermore states that the '10 families' included in the suit are from different parts of the EU, signaling solidarity between EU member states. One member of the lawsuit explicitly states that the reason is not monetary, but rather value based; *“What should politics be about right now?[...] 'To ask the right question: what hold value for us – more money now or our future, and the future of our children’”*<sup>85</sup>. While not explicitly stating it the transnational composition of the lawsuit, implies that the “us”, is the “us” of the EU, rather than any singular national identity.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

While the role of the EU in the climate crisis is not explicitly stated in the article, several signs point towards the the perception of the EU as the actor with the responsibility to act. First, since the lawsuits targets the EU, through the institutions of the EU it sends a clear signal that the responsibility should fall on all Europeans not singular national states. Furthermore since the lawsuit is brought through the European Court of Justice, signals that the participants of the lawsuit not only places responsibility with the EU but views EU as an actor capable of acting. This is also supported by the reflections of the European elections presented by the claimants; *“Now the*

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83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

politicians, from the other parties, can see that they have to follow The Greens on environment and climate, if they want a chance at reelection”<sup>86</sup>. Thus the clear narrative is of the EU as the unit responsible for acting, although the capability for it to do so is less clear; “Regular people are cognizant that something is wrong, but what are we to do? The political system reacts too slowly”<sup>87</sup>. The claimants thus create a tension between the European people, and 'the political system'. While they claim uncertainty whether or not the EU will act in time, it is clear that it is systemic action they seek; “But we humans are comfortable, and that's why the politicians have to set boundaries”<sup>88</sup>.

Inter-European discourse:

While the article does not touch on any of the larger European discussion, usually connected to the question of a green transition, such as energy security, or the preservation of natural habitats, it does connect the struggles of various Europeans under the heading of climate change. That is; “In the complaint at the European Court of Justice, is also agricultural families from France and Portugal, who sees their livelihoods threaten by heat-waves, droughts, and forest fires, A family from the Italian Alps, could lose their jobs in the tourist business [...]”<sup>89</sup>.

Dialogic context:

The dialog between actors in the article is mixed. While supranational institutions are mentioned, these are not addressed as such, rather their decisions are spoken about; “Since then nothing concrete have been done to stop climate-change on our island”<sup>90</sup>. When addressing someone directly the claims makers speaks to the European peoples; “Which values are supposed to count in our lives, and for the earth? Discuss it, and set some boundaries”<sup>91</sup>. This is clearly directed towards fellow European citizens, since the sentence is followed up with practical advice on how to live more sustainable. Further, there is clear divide in the minds of the claimants between young people, and older people, in so far as they perceive it as the responsibility of older generations to make sure there will be an earth for younger ones.

Politiken, October 30<sup>th</sup>: “Our generation decides the future of the Earth”<sup>92</sup>

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86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Andersen, Lene: “Kronik: Vores generation bestemmer klodens fremtid”, Politiken October 30<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e76abe80>

Claimant Lene Andersen calls on the current generation of Danish people, to lead a fight for a better climate. On behalf of the World society and future generations, since Danish philosophical traditions can provide young people of the world with the necessary systems-perspective.

#### Identity:

In terms of identity it is quite clear that the author considers themselves cosmopolitan, While the author does contend a 'Danish-ness', or a 'European-ness' she does not consider these wholly different identities; “[...] *all of a sudden I saw my 'Danish-ness' from the outside, and my relations to Denmark and everything Danish [...] Damn I've been an idiot! At the same time I saw my European-ness, and my Western-ness [...] inseparably connected*”<sup>93</sup>. The cosmopolitan identity is further underscored by the ethical value-based focus on improving the world for the “Universal We”, thus in this sense the “Universal We” assumes the same identity as the “We (communio)”; “*Can we use this systematic knowledge to nudge the development, our society, and the entire world I a democratic, economic, technological, and climate and environmentally sustainable direction*”<sup>94</sup>. Thus expanding the focus from the European continent, to the entire world. Further evidence of this perception of the world becomes apparent in the quote; “*In order to identify with each other around the earth, we have to perceive the world in a new way. We have to feel a one-ness, look at the world as one, and experience a both-and between us and everybody else*”<sup>95</sup>. This tip-toing between different axis of identity is made explicit in the text; “*Philosophically vi have in the west our Either / Or from Aristotle and his formal logic; what we need is, to supplement is with the “both, and” balance of the easterly concept of Yin / Yang*”<sup>96</sup>. While not only being a remnant of Aristotelian logic, the either / or dichotomy signifies a specific tie to Danish-ness. Thus, for the claimant as such, the “We (communio)” is the only relevant community of identity, as such enveloping the entirety of the “universal we”.

#### Historical understanding of the EU:

While no explicit mention is made to the concrete history of the European Union, the claimant does present a historical view of Europe. The specific understanding of historical progress presented is as follow; “*That is how, we created our civilization, and achieved the results, we have. Patterns of development can be described by chaos-theory, and scale-free networks, that is newcomer in a*

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93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.



*network will always try to connect to those, with most connections*”<sup>97</sup>. In this sense, the claimant views not necessarily history as driven by 'nations', but by networks of connections between people. This is further underscored when the author claims; “[...] *a systemic perspective in which I could see both Denmark's, Europe's, the West's, and the entirety of the history of humanity as a whole, with repeating patterns*”<sup>98</sup>. In this historical understanding comes the perception, that the current malady of climate catastrophe likewise cannot be attributed to one actor alone, instead the author claims that we as European societies have all been doing our part.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

While the historical understanding of the claimant, did not rest on an institutionalized EU, neither does the instrumental understanding of the claimant. The main impression is that, it is Europeans, rather than institutionalized Europe, that makes 'Europe go around'. In this sense solutions aren't to be found within singular units, be they the U.S., The E.U, Or the CCP. Rather in order to properly utilize our understanding of the world, we must view it from a more holistic point of view; “*I could see in 2001, that a financial crack would come before 2010, and that the complexity imbalance between the West and the rest would lead to global unrest and terror, culminating around 2020*”<sup>99</sup>. This is further underscored in the next sentence, in which the claimant proclaims that the view of the world as a holistic system, would be necessary for 'us' to progress. Other European countries, are also presented as vital actors in driving the world forward. While the claimant contend that we all need to learn from each other, the Nordic countries gets explicit mention; “*enlightenment of the people [Bildung] vaccinated the North against communism, fascism, and Nazism [...] instead representatives could lead peasant, workers, and bourgeoisie to see their societies in a system-perspective*”<sup>100</sup>. This leads the author to to conclude that Denmark, and the North have a special opportunity to drive the world, and Europe forwards.

Dialogic context:

While only very few references is made to specific actors throughout the text, the only named actor being Swedish Gretha Thunberg; “*That is, those tipping points, as, among other, Gretha Thunberg understood: Controllable rises in our CO2-outlet [...]*”<sup>101</sup>. There is one specific dynamic recurrent throughout the text, namely a dichotomy between the old and the young. That is, older generations are perceived as being the enablers of younger generations, on good and evil; “*Our generation have*

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97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100Ibid.

101Ibid.

*given future generations the technological possibilities, raising that questions [Who do 'we' want to be?]*"<sup>102</sup>.

Politiken, November 23<sup>rd</sup>: "Debate: A sustainable lifestyle is filled with smelly socks, dirty jeans, and underwear turned inside out"<sup>103</sup>.

Claimant Asbjørn Søndergaard calls on Danish citizens, to make sacrifices in terms of lifestyle in order to live more sustainable. On behalf of the world society, This is justified because we have the means do to it, and we have benefited from the outlet of CO2.

Identity:

In terms of identity the collective pronoun "we" is used in two different ways, first in order to refer to a community of Western-European people in general; "*We have to get used to a lifestyle, that's more raw, unpredictable, and sometimes difficult. But also more fun, and meaningful*", The same sentiment is expressed when the claimant talks about the reality they [him, and his co-habitants] left behind; "*[...] we have used an entire century in order to create safety, comfort, and economic wealth, while we've consumed, the resources of the earth*". In this sense the claimant does connect a certain ethical value-based to the 'modern' lifestyle, namely that we are bound to repay what we've taken from the earth. While the author certainly makes these connections, there is no specific feeling of belonging to a 'European' community as such. Neither does the claimant express the same cosmopolitan identity as in the former article. On the other hand there is a clear sense of communal belonging when talking about Denmark; "*I feel, that I belong in Copenhagen right now, and it is here, I have to experiment with a sustainable lifestyle [...]*". While the author certainly feels an ethical connection to the 'Universal We', the center of identity, or the "We (Communio)", is squarely placed around Denmark.

Historical understanding of the EU:

As with other claimants in the horizontal frame, the author does not present as view of the EU from a historical angle. Yet, he does present a historical understanding of Europe. That is, of how the history of wealthy European societies have shaped the consciousness of modern Europeans; "*Nature is experienced mostly, as a sometimes brutal and unpredictable thing*", and; "*I understand*

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102 Ibid.

103 Søndergaard, Asbjørn Riss: "*Debat: En bæredygtig livsstil er fyldt med sure sokker, beskidte jeans og underbukser vendt på begge sider.*", Politiken, November 23<sup>rd</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e77515c8>

*people, who want a new set of designer clothes, smart luxury villas, watches, cars and technological gadgets [...] a race of consumption without end, peaking on Black Friday, which each year costs incredible amounts of CO2, as long as the world is run by fossil-fuels*". Thus, the clear impression is that 'we' as Western Europeans have created the situation we're in.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

No discernible instrumental understanding of the EU is presented, in fact no instrumental understanding of national, international, or transnational system of any kind is presented. Rather the claimant presents a radical individualism, that is, we are as individuals responsible for choosing a more sustainable lifestyle. Throughout the article, the claimant speak to his fellow Danes as individuals, who in turn needs to change their individual habits, rather than as a collective unit making political changes in a systemic fashion; *"It isn't a human right, for those, living down here, to fly to Thailand once a year, buy new dresses and sneakers every month, as well as spending money of resource heavy experiences"*. The claimant on the other hand, doesn't rely on systemic politics either, it is clear that he feel a moral imperative to act, but rather than seeking solution inside of the political system, it is made clear that the solution is through a radical individual transformation of lifestyle.

Dialogic context:

While the claimant does not rely on the instrumentality of the European political system in order to make changes, he does rely on individuals outside of Denmark. The article describes a sustainable stay at an olive farm in the Pyrenees, in which the claimant mingles with other European people, namely the owner of the farm; *"One morning the owner approached [...] Asbjørn, if you want to live a realistic sustainable lifestyle, you will have to get used to smelly socks"*<sup>104</sup>. In this respect the claimant learn from the lifestyle of his fellow European; *"They are neither blindly principled, climate-puritans, or backwards on Finca Sin Numeró. They simply try to live realistically, with respect for nature [...]*. Thus even though the claimant relies little on formal political decision-making, and in that respect is not concerned with the instrumentality of the EU as such, rather he is concerned with individual European, and the ability of individual Europeans to effect the needed change in lifestyle.

General impressions of the horizontal frame:

While the general impression from the Horizontal framework is, that it is mostly comprised of civil

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104 Ibid.

actors from European member countries. Very few politicians, or actors from supranational institutions are represented. As such the dominant narrative is one of solidarity between Europeans, and demands-making of supranational entities, In other words, the main claim seems to be one of accountability, of the supranational-Europe being accountable to civil society-Europe. There is no clear cut display of a specific historical understanding of the European Union in general, although the climate crisis is as a rule attributed to the consumption of rich western countries, and as such the imperative is on those countries to change. While few inter-European discourses appear, it is clear that each claimant have got an understanding, and solidarity with the struggles of Europeans on a horizontal level. The feeling of identity shifts somewhat between each claimant, never reaching a clear common position, rather some center the “we (communio)” nationally, and some have a more cosmopolitan scope blending the “Universal we”, and the “we (communio)”.

### ***The Vertical Europeanization frame:***

Jyllands-Posten, May 9<sup>th</sup>: “The green divides Europe”<sup>105</sup>.

Claimant Martin Kaae, calls on the European public to unite around climate issues, on behalf of the European public. This is justified because the EU is still divided on the climate question, but we will need to work together to fix it.

Identity:

While the collective pronoun we does not appear throughout the text, there are other indicators as to the question of identity. When talking about the climate crisis, emphasis is put on the necessity of the situation; “*These new, public protests force European leaders to acknowledge the immediate need to address the climate crisis*”<sup>106</sup>. In this way, the question is presented as one of necessity, in order to be able to better our world. While the question of 'what makes European proud' certainly does play a role, the driving forces behind 'why' we do the European community is put in terms of cooperative necessity, we simply cannot do it on our own. This places the claimant in the area of the “we (commercium)”, to further back this up by the perceived rift in the EU; “*besides Denmark, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Holland, Portugal, Sweden and Spain are signatories of the letter [...] and that the climate interest is largest on this part of the map, shows in a new study on the*

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105Kaae, Martin: “*Det grønne deler Europa*”, Jyllands-Posten, May 9<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e730c904>

106 Ibid.

wishes of the European citizenry, for the future of the EU”<sup>107</sup>.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

In terms of the instrumental understanding of the EU, the claimant perceives this as an extremely important venue for effecting change. Quite literally; *“Thursday the government leaders will be tasked with translating the dream into strategy”*<sup>108</sup>. It is not only an important venue, it is rather the main venue. Another argument of the instrumentality of the EU, is the way in which the claimant displays the relationship between the European Union, and the national states. As such national states appear as subunits within a larger system, communicating and coordinating their preferences, in order to finally transform them into policy at the center; *“Beforehand his government [the prime minister of Denmark], have in collaboration with seven other member-state governments [...] encouraged that the EU commit to CO2 neutrality in 2050”*. In other words, instead of writing that they encourage each individual nation to reach CO2 neutrality by 2050, they encourage the EU as a unit to do so. This further underscores the importance of the Union, in so far as a common goal would create an opportunity for richer European member states to help the smaller states, by creating a common commitment.

Dialogic context:

When engaging other actors, the text mainly concerns itself with two types. The first is actors in civil society. When these are engaged, it is to hold the vertical actors accountable. The first civil society actor engaged, is the American magazine Forbes; *“in order to create a positive momentum, the EU has to make ambitious announcements at the Sibiu-meeting’, Forbes say”*<sup>109</sup>. Likewise, when the organization Climate Action Network Europe is engaged, it is also to communicate the responsibility to the leader; *“At the meeting in Sibiu every European leader has to follow the encouragement of the most progressive among them, and publicly commit to letting climate-action take center stage in future EU policy”*<sup>110</sup>. The rest of the actors mentioned, are comprised of European actors on the vertical vector. Among them is Donald Tusk, and the Commission, these actors are engaged on the issue-areas they've laid out for the meeting. Here we once more see the instrumental view of the EU, namely the 'things' they need to get done, such as, fair competition, maintaining legal equality, ensuring fair competition, and so on. Thus engagement with these actors is presented in terms of the goals, that the EU as a common political entity must shape. The last

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107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

actor engaged is Jean-Claude Juncker, the then president of the European Commission. Here it is mainly to address the issue of Brexit, about which Juncker says; *“It was a political mistake to listen to much to the British government [...] it was wrong of me to keep silent at an important time”*<sup>111</sup>. Juncker's remark served two functions, first as an admission of inadequate political action, in other words a sign that Juncker feels responsible to the people of the European Union. Further it signals that the EU doesn't just gain the function as an instrument of external diplomacy, and cooperation around specific policy areas, but also in terms of balancing the intricate internal politics of the Union.

Politiken August 11<sup>th</sup>: “Debate: The government's 'Mission 70/30' demands broad popular support”.<sup>112</sup>

Claimant Erik Rasmussen, calls on the Danish public, to support broad initiative to combat climate change. This is justified because broad support will be needed to provide the political legitimacy it will take to make the 70/30 plan work.

Identity:

The collective pronoun 'we' does appear in the text, when it does it refers to Europe as a community; *“The conditions to keep the rise in temperature below 2 degree is, that vi from 2019 and towards 2050 reduce out consumption with 10-12% per year [...] In other words countries like Denmark with a lot of consumption will have to revamp their production-, and consumption-pattern”*<sup>113</sup>. Since the 'we' is followed up with 'that means that countries like Denmark', this implies that the greater 'we' community, the EU, will have to reduce consumption by 10-12%, and Denmark will have to be one of the main driver of this, relative to size. Further, it is states that; *“That is why we will not get around a drastic and quick restructuring of our way of living, and behavior”*. This is significant since it signal that the collaborative effort is not really one of ethical commitment, but rather of necessity, the necessity to act quickly. This means that the EU on these terms is an identity of the “We (commercium)” type.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

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111 Ibid.

112 Rasmussen, Erik: *“Debat: Regeringens' Mission 70/30' kræver et bredt folkeligt forlig”*, Politiken, August 11<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e74c43c4>

113 Ibid.

The instrumental understanding of the EU, further underscores the identity of the “We (commercium)” type. While it is not understood as a primary driver of initiatives to combat climate change, it does appear as a guiding actor. That is, the scientific material relied upon to guide the green transition is supported from the EU; *“Behind the report is an international team of scientists, who, with support from, among other, the European Commission, and Danish KR foundation, which made the analysis for the European Environmental Bureau”*<sup>114</sup>. On these terms the collaborative element of the Union is not as much formulating, and putting into practice the way in which to facilitate a green transition, but rather one of supporting the underlying science.

Dialogic context:

The only actor besides the claimant allowed a voice, is the aforementioned collaboration of research institutions. Since the predominant identity is still tied to the national sphere in the eyes of the claimant, and the European Union does not play a large instrumental role in the green transition, it isn't afforded a lot of representation either. The only real exchange is in the form of a summary of the conclusions of European scientists; *“They [the scientists] build their conclusions on a mapping of 600 scientific articles, and the results is, according to the scientists very conclusive: There is no evidence that rich countries can keep economic growth going, while developing sustainable societies”*<sup>115</sup>. Thus European voices are large dismissed in the eyes of the claimant, in order to focus on a domestic angle.

Jyllands-Posten, December 12<sup>th</sup>: “The EU-Commission puts green pressure on Denmark”<sup>116</sup>.

Claimant Frans Timmermans (By proxy: Martin Kaae) calls on Danish politicians to be more receptive towards an increase in the budget of the EU, in order to combat climate change. By committing to a 1% of BNI budget, Denmark is standing in the way of the green transition.

Identity:

The collective pronoun “we” appears throughout the article, without fail as a referent to the European Union; *“I am going to ask those countries, who keep insisting on 1.00, to rethink, if it really is in their interest, if it means, that we will not be able to transition to green investment”*<sup>117</sup>.

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114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116Kaae, Martin: “EU-Kommissionen lægger grønt budgetpres på Danmark”, Jyllands-Posten, December 12<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e77d5ee1>

117 Ibid.

While that is the case, the impression of the Union, is one of the “We (commercium)”, the reason presented for getting the green transition going are those of necessity; *“But the cost will be enormous, if we don't act”*<sup>118</sup>. Thus the Union is not as such driven by an ethical commitment from the peoples themselves, but by necessity to survive. The article further states; *“[...] and it is the third time in 2019, that the chiefs of government will try to get along”*<sup>119</sup>. The difficulty in getting agreement on the best way to solve the problem, further highlights the necessary nature of the relationship.

Instrumental understanding of the EU:

the instrumental understanding of the EU is front and center of the claim, the leaders of government are gathering to discuss how the EU as a collective can start a green transition; *“The pact is going to ensure a green transition in the entire EU”*<sup>120</sup>. Furthermore, the claimant express that any solution for the European Union, will have to show itself in an increased budget. Another sign that the EU is viewed as the central instrument in this debate, is the way in which the richer parts of the Union, will have to help the poorer parts; *“We know that the transition will be more rough for some, than for others [...] the EU will have to correct this with more education, and the creation of more jobs”*<sup>121</sup>. Thus is the EU is to take care of the green transition in a sustainable way, the Union will need to act like a collective, supporting the weaker parts.

Inter-European discourses:

While no inter-European discourse is discussed in depth, certain areas which are intimately connected with the green transition is mentioned. These are areas like, building, cars, agriculture, energy, and industry, all of which are CO2 intensive arenas of production. Not only are these important because they are CO2 intensive, but also because they stand to suffer, if the current trajectory of climate change does not change; *“We are going to have losses of productivity, because the temperature is rising”*<sup>122</sup>.

Dialogic context:

There are two classes of actors mentioned in the article, those are other European member-states and their politicians, along with the institutions of the Union. The other European countries mentioned are furthermore grouped into two groups, that is, the countries committing to only 1% of GDP, and the countries who aren't even sure that a green transition would be necessary. In the first

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118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.



category are: Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Austria, and Germany, while the second is comprised of Poland, The Czech republic, and Hungary. In the context of the claim, the main purpose is to shame these countries, and bring attention to their hesitation in the public eye. Thus the claimant is here trying to make the governments of member state accountable, not from a bottom-up citizens perspective, but rather from a top-down supranational perspective. In the first line of the article it is made very clear, what the supranational institutions think of the Danish decision; *“Denmark's demand of a smaller EU-budget is going to weaken the green transition, according to the new EU-Commission”*<sup>123</sup>. This tone continues throughout the article, with the claimant addressing the countries standing in the way directly; *“Do you think, that Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Austria, and Germany's demand for 1,00. pct. Is going to hurt the green transition? 'It will seriously limit the possibilities to invest [...]”*<sup>124</sup>. Thus these actors are here presented as standing in the way for the necessary cause.

General impression of the vertical frame:

While claimants in this category are a mixed group, it is the only group containing any contributions of substance from the supranational European institutions. Interestingly, it is also the category of Europeanization in which the “We(communio)” is least present. When addressing supranational institutions from a bottom-up perspective it is with the view of holding power accountable, and while the institutions address the individual member states it is to hold them to the task, and to make demands. As with the previous frames, a historical understanding of the European Union is mostly lacking, although this is no different from the other frames presented. In terms of the instrumental understanding, the EU is presented as the central player. The member states communicate their preferences from the periphery to the center, while the political players in the center makes the final decisions. When inter-European discourses are mentioned, it is mostly when these can be directly coupled with the problems of the climate crisis, or the solutions to it. This is significantly different from, say, the horizontal frame in which inter-European discourses were presented mostly in terms of the issues for regular people, following changes in the climate.

### ***No Europeanization:***

While the purpose of this thesis, is to study the Europeanization of public-spheres, it may be just as important to take a look at the frame in which no Europeanization seem to be present. This will

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

require us to adjust certain categories, this means that the instrumental understanding will not be read in terms of the EU directly, but rather the issue at hand.

Politiken, February 21<sup>st</sup>: “How to we adapt to climate-change?”<sup>125</sup>

Architect Henrik Valeur calls on the 'wealthy' parts of the world, to adjust our way of living to become more sustainable, on behalf of the universal 'we'. This is justified since our current ways of living is not compatible with a sustainable lifestyle.

Identity:

The collective pronoun 'we' appear several times throughout the article, aimed at the Danish national community, since Denmark is a part of 'the richer countries'; *“It demands, that we want to, because there is no commercial or political interests in doing something, that the voters and the consumers doesn't want to”*<sup>126</sup>. Here it is clear that a change in lifestyle, due to ethical commitments, is needed if we are to drag commercial interests and politicians into the green transition. Later on in the article, an example is given of a community, that could be a model for the larger Danish community; *“It is a committing, self-autonomous collective, where you share stuff, happiness, and sadness. And learn to take responsibility for ones own life, and to help each other”*<sup>127</sup>. Thus the claimant clearly feels that the ethical, and value based commitment of the Danish community will be needed in order to drive a green transition. Later on the claimant makes a stark contrast between the ways of living of this model community, and the rest of the rich world; *“In this way, Fredens Have represents, both in it's messy physical apperance, and in the boatpeople's simple lifestyle, a direct anti-thesis to large parts of the rich population's self-understanding”*. Thus it is clear that the claimant think of Danish society as the 'we (communio)'.

Instrumental understanding of the issues:

It is clear that the author thinks the solutions to the issues will come in the form of individual adaption, and subsequent political change. This is shown in the fact that the commercial and political will, will not come before the population have made up their own minds. The claimant constantly moves between individual action, and systemic change, with individual action being coupled with our lifestyle; *“The impression that, the richer part of the world's population's way of*

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125 Valeur, Henrik: ”Kronik: Hvordan tilpasser vi os klimaforandringerne?”, Politiken, February 21<sup>st</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e716acf5>

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

*living in congruent with a climate-friendly order of the day, is based on false premises [...]*". The focus on lifestyle is starkly contrasted to structural factor of society, such as where we get our power from; *"PURELY VISUALLY Fredens Havn doesn't occupy much of the visual field of the neighbors. Actually, the [coal and oil fueled] power-plant behind occupies a lot more space"*<sup>128</sup>. Here the author contrasts the relatively small community of people living sustainable, with the structural issues of power generation, showing an acute awareness, that individuals do not do it alone. Thus in the end the claimant proposes individual changes in lifestyle, as the driver to start political change.

Dialogic context:

While no other actor is engaged in dialog, throughout the entire article the claimant builds up an understanding of two 'archetypal' Danes. That is, on the one hand there is the sustainable community of boat-people trying to live in harmony with nature in a sustainable way. On the other hand, you have the richer Danish people, whom in this example care more about the 'ugliness' of the boat-people makeshift harbor, than they do about the coal power-plant in the background.

Politiken, August 6<sup>th</sup>: "Let's have a CO2 label, please"<sup>129</sup>

Retired teacher Lis Mikkelsen calls on Danish politicians to provide labels for Danish foodstuff, signifying their impact on the environment. On behalf of developing countries, since ecologically produced goods are mistaken taken as being good for the climate.

Identity:

The collective pronoun we, appear throughout the article, referring to the Danish national collective, and the 'universal we'. In the cases where it refers to the 'universal we' it is in terms of necessity, and forced by the situation to cooperate; *"Any modern human can figure out, that the world is interconnected, and that we are dependent upon each other"*<sup>130</sup>. This is contrasted to the places in which it [the 'we'] appears relating to the Danish national community, which needs to take on the ethical commitment to better ourselves on behalf of the peoples around the world, who do not have the same opportunities; *"Maybe our efforts on the climate-issue would be greater, if we exported our knowledge in solar-cells, and windmills to India and China. If we hand over our technological*

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128 Ibid.

129 Mikkelsen, Lis: "Kronik: Lad os få et CO2-Mærke, tak!", Jyllands-Posten, July 18<sup>th</sup> 2019.

<https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aub.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e745dcbd>

130 Ibid.

*knowledge to then, in these areas, CO2 outlet could be reduced significantly*<sup>131</sup>. This ethical commitment is further underscored by the way in which the claimant talks about the governments approach to dividing agricultural areas in Denmark; *“If the entire world did as the new government, it would be bad for the population of the world”*<sup>132</sup>. Thus the identity of the claimant, is one in which the Danish 'We (communio)', should take an ethical approach to climate change, in order to benefit the bigger 'Universal we' community.

#### Instrumental understanding of the Issue:

As with the previous article, the claimant here moves between the perception of personal responsibility, and systemic change as drivers to combat climate-change. On the one hand, the claimant focuses on the structural changes of committing too much agricultural land to ecological agriculture; *“A government, wishing to reduce CO2-outlet by 70%, can't commit to doubling ecological production, [...] The weakness of ecology is, that production is too small for the area required”*<sup>133</sup>. It is clear that the the claimant views the issues as being rooted in the structure of our production, but like with the previous claimant, the solution to the issue is through drivers of individual consumption. Since the claimant's solution to the problem, is to apply a label to foodstuff in Danish supermarkets, it is clear that it is individual consumption which is perceived as driving change through increased information leading to better consumption habits. Thus the Danish populations themselves are perceived to be instrumentally important, as well as the Danish political structure.

#### Inter-European discourses:

While this section of the empirical material does not show any signs of Europeanization, the main area of focus, agricultural food production, is certainly an important discourse on the European level. Furthermore, another discourse appearing in the text, is the issue of energy security, mainly in connection to the technological advantages we enjoy in Denmark. Yet, when these issues are discusses, it isn't moved to the European level, but rather centered on Denmark.

#### Dialogic context:

Actors engaged in this article, is either Danish, or international. No mention is made to other European countries, or institutions. The main part of the article is entirely focused on Denmark, and civil society actors mentioned aren't engaged in dialog, but rather appears sparingly, such as; *“The*

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131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

chairman of 'Økologisk Landsforening' reject such as label. He already thinks, that there's enough label in circulation [...] In the article in Nature, it is shown that the climate-footprint of ecologically produced peas is 50% larger, than the footprint from conventionally farmed peas"<sup>134</sup>. Thus no actor are engaged in dialog, but rather as component to build up the argument of the author.

Politiken, October 17<sup>th</sup>: "Restructure Danish agriculture, the climate demands it."<sup>135</sup>

Claimant Jørgen Aagaard Axelsen, Søren Ilsøe, and Jens Toksvig Bjerre calls on Danish politicians to introduce conservation agriculture as a guiding principle in the Danish agricultural sector. On behalf of the biodiversity in Denmark, and Danish agricultural producers. This is justified because by converting our agriculture to conservation agriculture, we can draw CO<sub>2</sub> out of the atmosphere, increasing biodiversity and agricultural yields.

Identity:

The collective pronoun we appears throughout the article, in relation to the Danish national community. Although in relation to the question of climate change, it is purely in terms of necessity; "[...] The breakdown in fertility of our agricultural land will have to be stopped [...] or we will not reach the target of feeding even more people, and at the same time conserve the natural environment and planting more forest"<sup>136</sup>. There isn't any mention of an ethical, or value-based commitment to the effort to combat climate change, while this is true, the claimant might assume that the Danish identity is one of the 'We (communio)', but for all intents and purposes, as it is presented in this article, the Danish society is one of the 'We (commercium)'. The word 'Europe' appears a single time throughout the article, and this is likewise in terms of necessity; "THERE IS no reason to wait with the implementation of conservation agriculture in Denmark – or, in the entire Europe"<sup>137</sup>.

Instrumental understanding of the issue:

It is quite clear that the claimant views systemic political change in Denmark, as the instrument to drive the fight against climate change. When talking about the issue of agricultural production, emphasis is not put on the behavior of singular agricultural producers, but rather the political

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134 Ibid.

135 Axelsen, Jørgen Aagaard; Bjerre, Jens Toksvig; Ilsøe, Søren: "Kronik: Omlæg det danske landbrug. Klimaet kræver det.", Politiken October 17<sup>th</sup> 2019. <https://apps-infomedia-dk.zorac.aau.dk/mediarkiv/link?articles=e7669031>

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

approach to the entire agricultural sector; *“In order to institute conservation agriculture in Denmark, we need to have much more scientific research, on a theoretical level, and in relation to, how agricultural producers can restructure from a conventional farming system, to the new system”*<sup>138</sup>. The systemic view is justified since agricultural producers aren't spoken about as a group of people who, on their own, needs to restructure. Rather it is clear that the claimants think the entirety of society have got the responsibility to incentive, and help agricultural producers along; *“It is necessary to convince agricultural producers, that the system also contains bonuses for them. Particularly that they can reach a healthy, sustainable economy on their farms”*<sup>139</sup>. Thus the claimants view the Danish state, Danish consumers, and Danish agricultural producers as the main instrument for change in the climate-arena.

Inter-European discourses:

While the area of agricultural production, as previously mentioned, is a large part of the conversation in Denmark, it is also a point of importance for the EU as such. Despite this being the main focus of the article, it is interesting that Europe is only mentioned once, with no real instrumental impact.

Dialogic context:

Actors engaged in the text, are mostly Danish actors, and politicians related to agricultural activities, and civil society groups for the conservation of our natural environment; *“Our message and the underlying documentation where clear enough, that the nine representative politicians, as representatives for the Danish Union for the Conservation of Nature and the Ecological Council have admitted to the press, that conservation agriculture have got some interesting perspectives”*<sup>140</sup>. These actors are mostly mentioned in order to back up the need for structural changes in the agricultural sector. Agricultural producers themselves are not afforded any space, in order to express their perspective on the concept of conservation agriculture

General impressions of the no-Europeanization frame:

claimant within this frame, is almost exclusively civil society actors. In terms of identity Denmark is predominantly presented as a 'we (communio)', this also shows in the way in which claimants in this category view the solutions to the climate crisis. In this sense two narratives dominate a) individuals are responsible for the reduction of CO2 outlet, by transforming their own lifestyles,

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138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

into more sustainable ones, and b) the Danish agricultural sector is the main venue for the fight against climate-change in Denmark. It is quite peculiar that the agricultural sector gains this much attention outside any frame of Europeanization. Historically the Common Agricultural Policy have been a large part of EU-policy, so it would have been obvious to include perspectives from Europe when considering the direction of Danish agriculture. Actors mentioned are almost exclusively Danish, and in the rare cases any international actor gains representation, it is exclusive, either from outside of the EU, or in terms of larger communities of nations such as the UN.

## **Discussion:**

The key drivers of a Europeanization in the Danish public sphere, lay mainly with civil society actors as well as parliamentary politicians. During the investigation of the comprehensive European public sphere, no actors from any non-elected European institution were present. The main collective identity in this group were that of the 'we (communio)', signaling a strong ethical, and value based commitment to the European project. The same pattern of identity was discovered in the Horizontal frame, further backing up the statement that the main drivers of such an identity lies in the civil society, along with select politicians. While both frames drive Europeanization, we find the instrumentality of the European union to be of most importance in the Comprehensive frame, while a certain sense of solidarity and knowledge of the struggle of other Europeans appear in both. Likewise an understanding of the history of Europe is marginally present in other frames, yet, play a large part of the interpretation in the comprehensive frame. By the very nature of the analytical framework applied, it is quite logical that the deepest understanding of the Union is to be found in this frame. Further, the civil society actors in the comprehensive European frame mostly have some sort of connection horizontally in the EU. As an example, Rasmus Nordqvist and Yanis Varoufakis are both part of the trans-European political movement DiEM25 (Nordqvist as a Danish collaborator from a Danish national part, and Yanis as a part of DiEM25).

More surprising is the lack of supranational non-elected actors in the comprehensive frame, while they are mentioned and commented upon none of them appear as claimant themselves.

In the vertical frame, which is the only frame containing claimants of the non-elected supranational type, very few engage with civil society-Europe as opposed to engagement with governmental actors. Further, the lack of a presence of the 'we(communio)' send some clear signals. First it points towards the fact, that European officials tend to look at the EU in more instrumental terms. While they do acknowledge the Union as an important, if not indispensable instrument in the fight for a

better climate, none of them speak of Europe, or Europeans on ethical, and value-based terms. As presented in the literature review, the capacity to hold power accountable, is an important aspect of a public sphere. Thus, the fact that when non-elected officials appear, they mainly seek to hold national governments accountable rather than explaining that their own course of action is counterproductive to the emergence of a European public sphere.

In the frame free of any Europeanization, we find a mix of national politicians and civil society actors. These are typically actors emerged in the National environment, with no formal horizontal connections. A common discourse in this frame is the agricultural policy of Denmark, since this is also a large part of European policy. On the one hand, it is surprising that it does not include a European perspective, yet, on the other hand the area have also been a key part of Danish society making it more likely to be a key point in a national discourse as well.

Thus summing up. The actors most responsible for driving the formation of a European public sphere by increasing communicative linkages are horizontally connected civil society actors, and to a lesser degree politicians in the European parliament. Non-elected EU officials do not seem to drive a comprehensive public sphere, but rather a vertically focused one. Furthermore, these actors do not drive towards the formation of a strong identity in the form of the 'we (communio)', the main focus for these actors is the compliance of national states, with very little attention paid to human struggles across national lines. The inter-European discourses that drive European integration are not in and of themselves important, since many of these are perfectly capable of being discussed contained within the national public sphere. Connecting inter-European discourses to the struggles of other Europeans on ethical and value based grounds are further present in the comprehensive frame and absent in the vertical frame, confirming that the drive of a strong identity is driven by horizontal actors. The most comprehensive, unitary vision presented of the European Union is exemplified in the article written by Nordqvist and Varoufakis, an important point to notice is the focus on the 'future' of the union, namely that it is spoken about holistically, including ethical, and value based reason for all Europeans to support such a project. While it is not surprising that a comprehensive presentation would drive European integration it is noteworthy that there is a great appeal to the feelings of Europeans, an underscored common humanity of Europeans. The most important takeaway may be, that in order to drive the Europeanization of public spheres it is not enough to merely rationally explain reasons for action. Rather, the narratives must include a holistic vision of a Europe the citizenry would *want* to be a part of.



While it is extremely difficult to draw any final conclusion on the issue, since this thesis only investigated the Danish public sphere, and the relative limited scope of the empirical material (both in terms of issue area, and specific new-outlets), the absence of ethical, and value-based reasons to support initiative of the European union is very likely to have been a part of the puzzle in the missing strong identity of the European Union. Likewise, the vertical focus of unelected officials, and the little attention paid to justifying decision in the eyes of the public is likely to have played a part as well.

## **Conclusion.**

This part of the thesis will address weak points in the research design, discuss the findings of the thesis as it relates to the field of Europeanization research, and finally how the research design could be expanded. When investigating the European public sphere, it is important to remember that the European Union have expanded throughout its existence. This means that generalization across national borders can be difficult, for instance the German public sphere I likely to be Europeanized to a different degree than its Polish counterpart. Furthermore, the way in which a public sphere becomes Europeanized might also be qualitatively different. In other words, the driving actors, narratives, and frames might differ from one country to another. Neither does it follow that countries joining the Union at the same time, will develop the same level of Europeanization of their public sphere. Ruud Koopmans found in his investigation of several European countries in 2010, that the United Kingdom have significantly more European representation in the public sphere than Denmark, with 18,3% share of claims being European against the 2,2% of claims in the Danish public sphere<sup>141</sup>. Furthermore, in Koopmans investigation, he and his co researchers also investigated Europeanization over different issue areas. In this case, the level of Europeanization also tend to vary quite a lot, for instance on the issue area of monetary politics, supranational European actors represent 20% of the public sphere, while this is only 1% on the issue area of education<sup>142</sup>. This also means that the idea of a single unified European public sphere, may not be the best way to conceptualize Europeanization. Rather investigating Europeanization as a web of connected relations, as is done in this thesis, may be the most suitable approach. Thus any generalizations from research into one public sphere will be very difficult to obtain, and measuring 'Europeanization' by aggregating data from several countries may also create misleading results. This also means that the universality of the research presented in this thesis, will be rather low. This

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141Koopmans, Ruud; Statham, Paul: *"The Making of a European Public Sphere"*, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

142 Ibid. p. 65

is further increased, since only two quality newspapers were examined. Another problematic factor is the Invention of the Internet, with the Internet public communications becomes more dispersed, and, in theory, the bar to entry into the public sphere is also lowered since many online forums are not gate-kept by newspaper editors. Although generalize-ability may be low, if it is true that horizontal actors drive more Europeanization than supra-national European actors, the Internet might even increase Europeanization, since it makes it much easier to connect with other Europeans on the horizontal axis. In terms of the progress of Europeanization, it cannot be assumed that Europeanization simply progress forwards. In a paper from 2003 Ruud Koopmans, and Jessica Elbe argues that processes of re-nationalization can be seen in 'many' member states<sup>143</sup>. Koopmans and Elbe, further argues that Europeanization depend heavily on mass media. This is partly because if a Europeanization is to take place, communication must be made visible in the public sphere<sup>144</sup>. Here the Internet may also play a crucial role, as mentioned earlier it breaks down the barriers of editors in the entrance to the public sphere. With the internet the European citizenry can make blog post, videos, Facebook comments etc. without any particular cost besides access to the internet which is becoming increasingly cheaper for a large swath of the European population. This is also an area that have received very little attention from scholars of Europeanization, and European integration in general. This is partly because the conceptual-, and analytical frameworks suitable for communication on the Internet is still under development.

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143 Erbe, Jessica; Koopmans, Ruud: *“Towards a European Public Sphere – vertical and horizontal dimension of Europeanized political communication”*: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2003 p. 1

144 Ibid. p. 1

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