

Authority and Legitimacy in the Pikialasorsuaq: Implications for the Global Governance System

Global Refugee Studies
10th semester - Master's Thesis
Supervisor: Margrethe Holm Andersen
Spring 2020
Character count (without spaces): 212.267

Dalton Gaume-Wakefield	20180704
Gabriela Kaplan	20181566

Abstract

The changing climate has already had a profound impact on the Arctic region. Among those impacts is an increase of foreign attention to the region. As the ice melts, subsurface resources, shipping routes, tourism and commercial fishing becomes more accessible and commercially viable. This has already begun to change the geopolitical dynamics of the region -- a region which has been characterised by an ethos of international cooperation. However, this ethos is facing challenges as more and more countries have begun taking interest in the region, increasing geopolitical tensions and triggering a wave of militarisation that harkens back to the Cold War era. This has prompted observers to question -- who owns the Arctic, why? This research takes as a point of departure the idea that this question does not only apply to states, but also to non-state actors, such as Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples make up a quarter of the global Arctic population and are important actors within international regional governance. However, the role of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic governance is often left out of geopolitical questions. This research will show why Indigenous Peoples and their politics cannot be excluded from such discussions. In this pursuit, this research will undertake a case study approach to better understand how Indigenous Peoples influence governance in the region. More specifically, this research will look at the Pikialasorsuaq, a small but biologically critical marine area located between Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland) and Nunavut, Canada, and examine how Inuit on both sides of the Denmark/Canada border work towards gaining authority over the region. In approaching this case, this research will conceptualize the complex dynamics between authority, legitimacy, sovereignty, territoriality, indigeneity and statehood. In doing so, the conventional categorizations of state versus non-state actors will be deconstructed and reimaged. The primary theoretical approach will be Global Governance Theory, which this research locates within the field of international relations. Specifically, concepts from Michael Zürn's *Theory of Global Governance* (2018) will be applied to the case study. This application will allow this research to demonstrate, analyse and explain how localised contestation of international authority can ultimately strengthen or weaken the global governance system.

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction and Problem Formulation	5
2.0 Methodology	9
2.1 Methodological Approach.....	9
2.2 Ethical Considerations, Research Motivations, and Biases.....	9
2.3 Data Collection.....	11
2.4 Analytical Methods.....	12
3.0 Context.....	14
3.1 Pikialasorsuaq.....	14
3.2 Pikialasorsuaq Commission.....	18
3.3 Who are Inuit?.....	20
3.4 The Inuit Polity.....	23
3.5 Inuit and The State.....	26
4.0 Theoretical Framework	29
4.1 Global Governance.....	29
4.2 Relevance for This Research.....	32
4.3 Literature Review on Arctic Governance.....	34
4.4 Research's Approach.....	38
5.0 Analysis.....	43
5.1 Global Governance and the Pikialasorsuaq.....	44
5.2 Response.....	58
5.3 Deepening or Decline.....	71
6.0 Discussion & Contributions.....	76
7.0 Conclusion.....	80
8.0 References.....	85

List of Acronyms

ARAF - Arctic Resilience Action Framework

DFO - Fisheries & Oceans Canada

EU - European Union

GAC - Global Affairs Canada

GGT - Global Governance Theory

GGS - Global Governance System

ICC - Inuit Circumpolar Council

IMF - International Monetary Fund

IMA - Inuit Management Authority

IR - International Relations

ITK - Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami

KNAPK - Organisation of Fishermen & Hunters in Kalaallit Nunaat

NOW - North Water Polynya

NLCA - Nunavut Lands Claim Agreement

NRI - Nunavut Research Institute

NSA(s) - Non-State Actor(s)

NWP - Northwest Passage

PAME - Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment

POPs - Persistent Organic Pollutants

PC - Pikialasorsuaq Commission

TIK - Traditional Indigenous Knowledge

UN - United Nations

UNDRIP- UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNFCCC - UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

WWF - World Wildlife Fund

1.0 Introduction and Problem Formulation

At the edge of the Earth's habitable regions, the Arctic of our modern times is portrayed by dominating images of a region on the brink of collapse and the epicentre of our oncoming climate catastrophe, to serve as a signal to the rest of the world of what's to come. The phenomenon of melting ice sheets in the Arctic dominates media attention often with a focus on what this glacial melting means for those of us living in the non-polar regions of the world, namely rising global sea levels. However, within the region itself, the climatic and environmental changes have not only a destructive potential, but also an opportunistic one. As the ice and permafrost melts, access to subsoil resources becomes more available, and water routes become more navigable and thus commercially viable for trade. These changes have already brought on a new wave of development and global attention to the region. Foreign investment has boomed, and Arctic and non-Arctic states alike have strengthened their Arctic policies, in some cases even building them for the first time. China, for example, published its first-ever Arctic policy, stating in its foreword that “The Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development, and the shared future for mankind” (State Council Information Office 2018). This year, after a failed attempt to purchase Greenland from Denmark in 2019, the United States negotiated a 12-million-dollar aid deal for Greenland, and has announced it will open a consulate on the Arctic island (Selsoe Sorensen, 2020). In Russia, Arctic development has become a key national strategy under President Putin, who has moved the Ministry for Development of the Arctic and the Far East, established in 2012, from the Arctic city of Murmansk to Moscow (Medvedev, 2018).

The increased attention of global superpowers has brought the buzz of rising geopolitical tensions, prompting observers to ask the following questions: Who owns the Arctic? In other words, who has the right to exercise authority over the region, and to what extent? This question,

and the way it is answered through action, has important consequences for global geopolitics, trade, and climate change. It also has deep implications for those who live in the Arctic. While the Arctic has long been portrayed in popular imagination as an empty, unclaimed, abstract space of exploration (Shadian, 2015), the reality is that the circumpolar Arctic is home to a population of approximately four million people, about a quarter of which are Indigenous Peoples (Heleniak, Turunen, & Wang, 2019). Indigenous and non-indigenous alike, the inhabitants of the Arctic are modern people, living in a modern Arctic -- an Arctic which is far from the untamed wild frontier of the popular imagination. Since time immemorial, Indigenous Peoples have lived in the Arctic, creating and sustaining their own various societies and systems of governance that include well-developed political, cultural, economic, and legal institutions (Shadian, 2010). However, these systems have not developed in a vacuum, but rather have experienced a long history of complex interactions with the non-Arctic world by way of trade, colonialism, and scientific exploration (ibid).

Over time, Indigenous and colonial systems and institutions have impacted and shaped one another, creating a governance architecture in the region that challenges conventional ideas of statehood, nationality, territoriality, and sovereignty, further complicating the question of who owns the Arctic. Today, and through a long history of struggle, Arctic Indigenous Peoples have rendered enough political capital to have a seat at the negotiating table with nation-states in international fora, such as the Arctic Council, where six Indigenous Peoples organisations have the status of Permanent Participant. Some of these organisations, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Gwich'in Council International, and the Arctic Athabaskan Council, are unique in that they represent Indigenous nations that cross state borders at the international level, despite the fact that those nations have no formal state¹. Inuit, for example, live in parts of Russia, the United States, Canada, and Denmark, but through the ICC, they are represented as a single national and political unit on the international stage. Organisations like the ICC thus fulfill a

¹ Not all Arctic Indigenous Peoples cross state boundaries, and thus this statement applies only to some of the organisations that hold the status of Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council.

certain state-like function for their respective transborder peoples, despite the fact that structurally they are more akin to international NGOs. International legal frameworks, namely the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), enshrine the rights of all Indigenous Peoples to self-determination on their lands, providing these organisations with a greater legal basis. Land claims agreements and other instruments at the domestic level have granted some Arctic Indigenous Peoples high levels of autonomy over certain territories within national borders, creating space for these organisations to work at the domestic level as well. The presence and authority of these organisations on the international, territorial, and domestic levels, and the rights of the peoples they represent, suggest a regional governance architecture that cannot be fully understood through looking at state interaction alone. However, because some of these organisations fulfill state-like functions for transborder peoples with rights, simply adding the category of non-state actors into the mix does not suffice, either. In order to understand who has the right to exercise authority in the Arctic, an approach is needed that looks beyond the categorical boundaries of states versus non-state actors.

It is the problem outlined above that this research will take on in the ensuing chapters. In approaching the broad question of who owns the Arctic, this research will examine new ways of thinking about actors that could better explain the dynamics of governance in the Arctic. In this pursuit, we will zoom in on a particular point of interaction between actors to illustrate how authority can be negotiated in the region. Specifically, this research will look into governance of the *Pikialasorsuaq*, an important geographical marine area in the Arctic that sits on the border of two semi-autonomous Inuit territories. To the east lies Nunavut, a territory of Canada, and on the west is *Kalaallit Nunaat* (Greenland), a territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. From 2016-2018, a Commission, known as the *Pikialasorsuaq Commission* (PC), was set up by the ICC to research Inuit needs across the border region and craft suggestions for future protection of the region. An examination of the content of these suggestions and how they have been handled by states, territorial governments, and international organisations will be used to anchor discussions of broad concepts such as authority, statehood, nationalism, territoriality, power, and sovereignty in

real time. This research will take global governance theory as a theoretical point of departure for such an approach -- in particular, Michael Zürn's theory of global governance (2018), which will be detailed in section 4. By analysing governance of the Pikialasorsuaq using Zürn's theoretical concepts, an attempt will be made to provide a framework for understanding how the immense climatic, economic and geopolitical changes taking place in the Arctic may be governed. This process will illuminate how localised, small-scale instances of global governance can serve to impact the stability, efficiency, and capacity of the global governance system. To this extent, this research is interested in understanding how the agency of Indigenous groups and other sociopolitical actors shape systems, rather than how those actors are shaped by systems.

In Zürn's terms, the impact of interactions within the global governance system can serve to either "deepen" or "decline" the system, meaning to reinforce or fragment it, respectively. Using these terms, the primary question that guides this research is: To what extent do the interactions and processes surrounding the Pikialasorsuaq Commission's work contribute to a deepening or decline of the global governance system? This will be answered by looking in depth at the suggestions of the Commission and analysing the responses of the relevant federal and territorial state governments using concepts from Zürn's theory. In this pursuit, this research will also address the following sub-questions: (1) How can state and non-state actors be reimagined as actors in the global governance system? (2) To what extent does the interplay of the norms of the constitutional state and those of the global governance system impact state responses to suggestions by Indigenous Peoples? (3) How are processes of legitimation complicated by transborder indigeneity, and what does this mean for the exercise of authority by various actors?

2.0 Methodology

2.1 Methodological Approach

The authors of this research undertook a case study as the main method of research. In order to answer the questions at hand, this research decided to apply a conceptual analysis using Zürn's theory of global governance to the case study. The work was a form of explanatory, deductive research, meaning that the research was attempting to gain a better understanding of a well-defined problem through applying concepts from an already-established theory. The well-defined problem in this research could be explained as relating to the connection between global governance dynamics and non-state actors. Moreover, governance in the Arctic and Indigenous governance, specifically Inuit governance, are also well-studied topics. At the same time, the research has an exploratory element because the case itself is relatively new and has not been the subject of much specific research. There has also been a bit of a reversal of the approach, in that, instead of looking at the effects of the system on non-state actors, this research looked at the effects of the non-state actors upon the system. Through examining how the system responds to contestation by non-state actors, the authors of this research sought to gain a better understanding of the patterns and characteristics of the global governance system as it functions at the local level. The research then strived to explain these patterns through identifying the causal connections between contestation and response using Zürn's conceptual metrics of the global governance system.

2.2 Ethical Considerations, Research Motivations, and Biases

The ethical considerations that the authors of this research needed to address was how to conduct research that was respectful toward and acknowledged the rights and unique positions of the Inuit. Like many other Indigenous Peoples, Inuit have had research conducted on them

without their consent or input as part of their experience of being colonised. In order to avoid repeating historical forms of exploitation, the authors of this research consulted the text *Negotiating Research Relationships with Inuit Communities: A Guide for Researchers*, written by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) and the Nunavut Research Institute (NRI). It is important to note that this research is a Master's thesis where the authors have tried to demonstrate knowledge gained throughout their graduate programme and are not trying to create something completely new, as in a dissertation for a Ph.D. This is significant because the knowledge this research is presenting is part of the "extensive background research" that would be used for a large scale research project (ITK and NRI, 2006). Whilst some aspects of these guidelines are not applicable to this research and relate specifically to hard sciences or anthropological research, it is important that this research tries to follow these requirements as much as possible.

The guide highlighted previously requests for Inuit self-determination; at the very least, inclusion of research done in Inuit Nunangat, Inuit knowledge, and expertise is acknowledged, use of Inuit language where possible, consent is gained before conducting research, and that the results from research are shared and communicated to the Inuit (ITK and NRI, 2006). Whilst this research is not conducted in Inuit Nunangat, this research attempted to include Inuit perspectives in the process by including direct quotes from Inuit who have participated in the Pikialasorsuaq Commission and consented to have their perspectives shared, as well as using reports from the ICC. In order to respect the Inuit language, this research will use Inuit names, such as Kalaallit Nunaat for Greenland, Pikialasorsuaq for the Northern Water Polynya, and Inuit names for Inuit communities that are mentioned in this research. All of the data this research collected on Inuit perspectives and knowledge were either in the public domain or published by Inuit organisations and government bodies, such as policy papers, declarations, or documents for general education, and are accessible online. The authors of this research have ensured that, if this research is to be published or made into an article, they will seek Inuit input before being published.

2.3 Data Collection

The materials used for this research are all secondary sources, such as press releases, newspaper articles, legal documents, presentations, international declarations, reports from transnational organisations and governments, commission reports, academic articles and journals, governmental legislation, testimony from parliamentary committees, and a court case from Canada. The academic articles and journals were found by using Google Scholar and AAU's library database. Academic articles and journals enabled this research to build a theoretical framework and help apply the conceptual analysis. By using press releases, legal documents, reports, legislation, and testimony, this research was able to examine the official responses, laws, and policy agendas from various actors within the global governance system. These official responses and policy agendas allowed this research to see how different actors within the Pikialasorsuaq region may perceive and react to other actors and their interests. These materials were found through online searches and official websites of various states, Inuit organisations, and other transnational organisations, such as the United Nations (UN).

Secondary sources allowed the authors of this research to conduct data collection in a safer way, as trying to collect primary data has been made more complicated due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Pandemics aside, the use of secondary sources was necessary, as this research wanted to see how various actors, such as states and transnational organisations, were interacting with each other, and if anything could have been gained from these interactions. Secondary sources give this research reliability, as anyone could access the material used and repeat a similar analysis. The authors of this research attempted to contact ICC Canada for an interview, but they were not available due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Primary sources would have given more information regarding how the suggestions of the PC were being implemented, and how states and NSAs were interacting with each other in a less-publicised way.

2.4 Analytical Methods

By using a case study method, the authors of this research were able to explore and analyse specific dynamics between non-state actors and states. The authors of this research recognise that a case study is often a concept that is commonly used, but not usually defined. To help clarify, the authors of this research decided to use the University of Southern California Libraries' definition of a case study (2020), which stated the following:

“A case study research paper examines a person, place, event, phenomenon, or other type of subject of analysis in order to extrapolate key themes and results that help predict future trends, illuminate previously hidden issues that can be applied to practice, and/or provide a means for understanding an important research problem with greater clarity. A case study research paper usually examines a single subject of analysis, but case study papers can also be designed as a comparative investigation that shows relationships between two or more subjects. The methods used to study a case can rest within a quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-method investigative paradigm” (USC Libraries, 2020).

The case study helped this research by providing a geographical and temporal place to focus on and analyse. Selecting a case study made this research both descriptive and innovative, as this research had to first describe the situation with the Pikialasorsuaq region by pointing out patterns of requests and the interests of various actors. Using a case study also required the authors of this research to use both quantitative and qualitative approaches, with the majority of the research being qualitative. After describing the situation, this research became innovative, as it looked at specific responses from states to see if there was a causation of deepening or decline in the global governance system and expanded Zürn's conceptual ideas into more localised and regionalised levels, which is a new approach. A case study was also beneficial as there were limited resources and time pressures preventing larger-scale research. The authors of this research selected the Pikialasorsuaq Commission as the case study because it has active non-state actors in the form of Inuit organisations who engage with states on a regular basis and make requests for specific policies. Pikialasorsuaq is also in an Arctic region that has a high level of international interaction where global governance is active. This region is also experiencing the

impacts of climate change, which has created a changing environment that requires action from local, regional, and international levels. The limitation of using a case study is that many of the findings of this research can only be applied specifically to the Inuit and states regarding the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, and cannot be applied to other groups. This is not to say that some of the dynamics or issues mentioned in this research's findings cannot be applicable to other cases or dynamics in the global governance system; however, it does mean that this research alone cannot definitively apply to other cases.

A conceptual analysis was chosen to help guide this research's analysis. By choosing a conceptual framework, this research could apply theoretical concepts to a real world example through the case study and see how theoretical concepts interact on a material level. Selecting a conceptual analysis has made this research both deductive and explanatory; this research took Zürn's theoretical concepts and attempted to see if they were applicable, and it attempts to use Zürn's concepts to answer whether or not Inuit organisations specifically deepen the global governance system. The authors of this research chose Zürn's theory of global governance for its conceptual tools. His theory challenges the notion of the "black box" of the state and acknowledges that not only does global governance influence domestic politics of states, transnational organisations, and individuals, but that global governance is also influenced by, and forced to react to, the domestic politics of states, transnational organisations, and individuals as well. Moreover, Zürn's theory sees the global governance system as something that exists in real life, despite there being many intangibles. This perspective allows the dynamics of that system to be seen as distinct from dynamics in other systems of governance. A limitation of having chosen Zürn's concepts is that his concepts are clearly defined for the international level and have not been fleshed out for more localised and regionalised forms of governance. Due to the lack of conceptualisation, the authors of this research had to expand from Zürn's conceptual framework and conceptualised this application by showing how multinational states can often parallel international organisations. This does not mean that his concepts are not applicable for this research's case; the aims of this research sought to expand on his concepts and use some if/then

hypotheticals to answer the research question.

One of the limitations of this research was the newness of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, which meant that some of the responses, especially from Kalaallit Nunaat, were difficult to find. Due to a lack of responses, this research used whatever data was available to deduce possible responses, which were broken down into if/then hypotheticals. Many of the if/then hypotheticals came from government white papers, parliamentary documents, and reports. Because this is an ongoing case and the responses from all actors are still in progress, the use of hypotheticals was needed to sort out different possible outcomes for the global governance system.

3.0 Context

In the following sections, some general information will be provided regarding the Pikialasorsuaq region, the states that govern it, the people who live there, and the institutions which represent the people of Pikialasorsuaq. This will set a solid contextual foundation for the case study in question before elaborating further on the theoretical and conceptual framework that will be used to analyse the case study.

3.1 Pikialasorsuaq


Pikialasorsuaq is the largest and most biologically-productive polynya north of the Arctic circle (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017). A polynya is a large area of open water, or very thin ice, in the midst of the thick ice that covers much of the Arctic Ocean throughout the year. Polynyas remain free of ice during the winter -- or what little ice exists thaws in early spring -- creating an oasis for feeding, mating, spawning, and waiting out the winter for a variety of Arctic sea mammals, fish, and birds (Barber et al., 2010). The lack of ice allows the sun to reach the surface of the sea while warm currents bring up nutrient-rich sediments from the ocean floor, creating the perfect environment for the proliferation of phytoplankton, which is the base of the

Arctic food chain (ibid). In one of the harshest environments on earth, polynyas are teeming with life year round, making them essential hunting grounds for the Arctic peoples, such as Inuit, who depend on sealife for a majority of their dietary needs. At the same time, polynyas are highly sensitive regions, where the effects of oceanic pollution and climate change are becoming more evident.

The Pikialasorsuaq region spans 80,000 km² in northern Baffin Bay, nestled between Nunavut, Canada, and Kalaallit Nunaat. Pikialasorsuaq provides a feeding and mating ground for narwhal, beluga, seal, walrus, bow-headed whales, polar bears, Arctic cod, halibut, turbot, shrimp and char, and an overwintering spot for millions of birds. According to the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report, *People of the Ice Bridge: The Future of Pikialasorsuaq*, Inuit depend on these animals for clothing, livelihoods, culture, and most importantly, food. Hunting, also known as harvesting, is a critical aspect of Inuit life. The extreme conditions of living in the Arctic prohibit any kind of agriculture, and imported food is unaffordable for most (Angry Inuk, 2016). For this reason, the health of Inuit communities is directly dependent on the health and availability of wildlife. Pikialasorsuaq provides a critical harvesting ground for communities in the region, such as the Canadian Inuit communities at Ajuittuq (Grise Fiord), Qausuittuq (Resolute Bay), Ikpiarjuk (Arctic Bay), Mittimatalik (Pond Inlet), and Kangiqtugaapik (Clyde River), and the Kalaallit Nunaat communities at Siorapaluk, Qaanaaq, Savissivik, Kullorsuaq, Nuussuaq, and Upernavik. The Pikialasorsuaq region has also been an important source of connection for these communities. Up until recently, a naturally-forming ice bridge has connected Umimmaat Nunaat (Ellesmere Island, Canada) and Avanersuaq (NW Kalaallit Nunaat) at the Northern boundary of the polynya year round. Historically, the ice bridge has facilitated human migration across the Arctic, from the Thule and Dorset migrations nearly 5,000 years ago, of whom modern-day Inuit are descendants. While Pikialasorsuaq is internationally recognised as an important and unique ecological system, and some of the surrounding land area is protected by state governments, the marine environment has no formal legal protections

(Pikiasorsuaq Commission, 2017). A map of the region has been inserted below for the reader's reference.

Figure1: Map of the Pikialasoruaq and surrounding area (Oceans North Canada, 2016).



Today, the region faces many changes and challenges that mirror those felt across the entire Arctic region and are detailed in the Pikialasorsuaq Commission's report. According to the report, while research is still needed to fully understand the impacts of climate change on biological processes in the polynya, Inuit who live there are already observing changes in numbers and migratory patterns of different animals. While animals like fish are becoming more abundant, giving rise to increased commercial fishing activities, others like polar bears and seals are facing habitat loss. Moreover, the warming weather creates unstable and risky ice conditions for transportation and harvesting. This especially impacts Inuit who live at greater distances from

the polynya and must travel far to harvest. The ice bridge, which used to stay solid year round, has begun to melt during the summer months, severing the direct connection between Inuit communities and families across the state border. At the same time, increased securitisation of border regions in the 21st century has impacted Inuits' freedom of movement within their homeland, Inuit Nunangat.

Melting sea ice has brought with it the promise of increased commercial fishing, shipping, oil development, and tourism. At the northern tip of Baffin Bay, Pikialasorsuaq lies just off the route of the Northwest Passage (NWP) but remains close enough to feel the impact of increased activity in the Bay. As sea ice melts, the NWP is becoming more viable as a commercial trade route, leading to increased maritime traffic. The increased potential for oil spills and marine pollution can greatly harm wildlife in the polynya, threatening food security for the entire region. Oil and mineral development in Baffin Bay, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and on Kalaallit Nunaat's northern coast likewise threaten marine life in the polynya. From testing to drilling to clean up, all stages of the resource extraction process have been shown to harm marine wildlife. Meanwhile, the global buildup of persistent organic pollutants² (POPs) -- such as pesticides, solvents, pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals -- in the world's oceans have profound effects on the Arctic, including Pikialasorsuaq. POPs contaminate many types of wildlife via bioaccumulation, sickening them with harmful toxins. The Inuit who hunt and eat contaminated wildlife, such as whales, seals, and polar bears, face severe health issues, such as high rates of cancer and diabetes, as a consequence (Singh & Chan, 2019).

² POPs are organic compounds found in a multitude of human-made chemicals and products that are resistant to biodegradation by biological, chemical, or photolytic processes. POPs can travel long distances by water or air, thus contaminating areas of the world far from their point of production. POPs can undergo a process called bioaccumulation, which refers to when they are stored in the lipid tissues of animals in highly toxic concentrations (Litter et al., 2007)

3.2 Pikialasorsuaq Commission

In 2016, the Kalaallit Nunaat and Canadian branches of the ICC established the Pikialasorsuaq Commission (PC) as a three-year project. The mandate of the commission was to recommend “an Inuit strategy for safeguarding and monitoring the health of Pikialasorsuaq [...] for future generations - and explore avenues for establishing an Inuit lead management regime for Pikialasorsuaq” (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017). The commission created these recommendations based on interviews and consultations with Inuit communities on both sides of the polynya who depend on the polynya for food and culture. The mandate and workplan were based on the vision that “Inuit will continue to use and occupy Pikialasorsuaq region in perpetuity” (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017). The commission was composed of three members: Former Nunavut Premier, Eva Aariak, served from the Canadian side; Former Kalaallit Nunaat Premier, Kuupik Kleist, served from the Kalaallit Nunaat side; and ICC Chair, Okalik Eegeesiak. Six staff members worked to coordinate, fundraise, and administrate for the project. Finally, PC had four partners including the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Organisation of Fishermen and Hunters in Kalaallit Nunaat (KNAPK), Oceans North Canada, and Nunavut Economic Developers Association.

The commission published the results of the consultations in the *People of the Ice Bridge: The Future of Pikialasorsuaq* report. The PC found that local Inuit concerns centred around the relationship between climate change, development, and individual and communal rights, such as hunting rights, the right to benefit from development on Indigenous lands, and the right to free, prior, and informed consent. That is not to say that Inuit responded negatively to development. Generally speaking, the consultations found that Inuit, while positive about the economic potential of development, are concerned about the impacts development could have on food security and cultural integrity. If the environment and wildlife are harmed, interviewees fear they may go hungry. If development means increased migration into the region, they perceive a potential threat to their cultural survival. Further, the report found that “most emphatically, Inuit

want to rebuild a collective Inuit caretaking regime for the polynya, between Inuit communities in Canada and Kalaallit Nunaat” (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017: p. 14). Inuit on both sides of the polynya repeatedly cited climatic and development stressors, such as seismic testing, shipping, and tourism, as the main threats to the biodiversity of the region, and thus to their food security and culture. All communities that were consulted in the process were of the opinion that Inuit who live in the region should be the ones monitoring and managing it. Finally, many communities expressed a desire for freedom of movement across the border region. As such, the report produced three concrete recommendations.

First, the report recommended the establishment of an Inuit Management Authority (IMA) composed of representatives from regional communities. This IMA should be able to regulate activities, including transportation, shipping, and off-shore industrial development, in order to promote conservation of the wildlife in and around the polynya that supports life for Inuit communities. Second, a protected area should be identified encompassing the polynya and its surroundings, decided on by communities who live there. The protected area management zone should “reflect the connection between communities, their natural resources, and the polynya” (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017). It should be recognised formally by governments, but managed fully by Inuit. Third, the report recommended the establishment of a free travel zone for Inuit across the Pikialasorsuaq region. As will be elaborated in Section 5.3, these recommendations represent a contestation to the global governance system. How the federal and territorial state governments respond to this contestation can either contribute to the deepening of the global governance system, or to its decline.

In 2018, the Pikialasorsuaq Commission completed its mandate of conducting the community consultations and crafting the recommendations. From there, the Pikialasorsuaq Implementation Committee (PIC) was created to work on turning the suggestions into reality. However, progress has been slow and information is limited. In any case, this research focuses on general responses to the suggestions made by the Commission, including responses by each of the relevant actors (of which the Implementation Committee is just one response). In the

Inuit are not a monolith, yet there is a social, linguistic, political, historic, and economic fabric that binds Inuit communities and individuals into a society. The term society has many meanings, but this research will use Berger's sociological definition of society as “a human product...that continuously acts upon its producers” (Berger, 2011). In other words, societies are human creations that in turn shape the humans who made them. When “Inuit interests” are discussed in this research, it does not refer to the interests of all individual Inuit or Inuit communities; however, the term is used in reference to official statements and policies given by legitimate representatives of Inuit society.

As an Indigenous People, Inuit are “inheritors and practitioners of unique cultures and ways of relating to people and the environment. They have retained social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live” (World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, 2014). According to the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (the Permanent Forum), Indigenous People are descendants “of those who inhabited a country or a geographical region at the time when people of different cultures or ethnic origins arrived. The new arrivals later became dominant through conquest, occupation, settlement, or other means” (Who are Indigenous Peoples, n.d.). However, the UN has not adopted a complete definition of Indigenous Peoples, but rather understands the term through the following factors:

- “Self- identification as Indigenous Peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member
- Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies
- Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources
- Distinct social, economic, or political systems
- Distinct language, culture, and beliefs
- Form non-dominant groups of society

- Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities” (Who are Indigenous Peoples, n.d.)

Being Indigenous is more than just a consequence of historical events; it is also an identity with social and political dimensions. Indigenous Peoples are self-defining as Indigenous. Indigenous Peoples are diverse, and in some countries prefer different terms such as First Nations, Aboriginal, peasants, tribes, ethnic groups, nomads, hunter-gatherers, adivasi, janajati (ibid). In this research, we will use the term Indigenous. There are no specific customs, beliefs, or values that tie all the Indigenous people of the world together; however, as a politically-manifested social group, Indigenous Peoples have come together at the global level through international institutions to promote common interests. At the UN, this is best represented by the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), which enshines the rights of self-identified Indigenous Peoples to political, economic, and cultural self-determination. It declares that Indigenous Peoples have the right to control the natural resources and development of their ancestral lands. Indigenous Peoples also share common problems -- namely marginalisation, exploitation, and denial of their rights at the national level -- which they seek to address through these institutions (UNDRIP, 2007).

At the global level, Inuit are represented by the ICC. The ICC is a member of the UN, the Permanent Forum, the Arctic Council, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and has had active involvement as one of the first non-governmental observers at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the ICC has NGO status within some of these institutions, it is also considered to act as a quasi-state for Inuit. Structurally, it is broken down into four regional organisations that are composed of local civil society actors, called “member parties.” Member parties elect a regional president and vice president who go to represent their region at the Executive Council, which meets twice a year. Every four years, a new Executive Council Chair is elected at a General Assembly, where member parties vote on all important

issues related to Inuit politics through delegates. Due to this institutional structure, which is built on representative democracy, this research views the ICC as a legitimate political voice of Inuit.

3.4 The Inuit Polity

As an Indigenous People with transnational cultural ties, political representation at the state and global level, and substantial levels of self-determination across the north, Inuit and their institutions defy the conventional categorisations of actors. Inuit are both a minority group with states and a transnational people. The ICC works simultaneously as an NGO and as a quasi-state, responsible for the political representation of Inuit on a global level. In this sense, Inuit “traverse both inside and outside” the conventional boundaries of what constitutes the nation-state (Shadian, 2010: p. 494).

Shadian argues that the concept of the polity is useful for explaining this situation (2010). Simply put, a polity can be any identifiable political entity with institutionalised social relations and the capacity to mobilise resources toward their interests. The Inuit polity is “based on a contemporary political myth of a people that have existed as part of the Arctic since time immemorial” combined with the institutional structure of the ICC and more localised Inuit organisations (Shadian, 2010: p. 503). The Inuit polity in this research refers not only to institutions such as the ICC, but also to the territorial governments of Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat. Importantly, being included as part of the Inuit polity does not exclude the governments of Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat from also being part of the state apparatus.

The ICC, Inuit as a people, and the territorial governments defy easy categorisation as either/or and are best understood as yes/and. Inuit are lacking neither state nor nation; rather, the situation is one of overlapping and hybridisation between different nationalities and statehoods. The concept of the polity represents a meeting point of different institutional structures with the collective political identity of Inuit. The concept therefore provides a tool for understanding Inuit nationalism that is abstracted from territoriality. This disrupts the conventional connection between state, nation and territory. In this view, the physical location of the Arctic is an

important constitutive factor of the Inuit polity, not because it is connected to sovereignty, but because of its role in constituting the collective identity of the people as a nation. At a definitional level, Inuit can be considered a nation, defined as “a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular country or territory” (Oxford University Press, 2019a). Inuit are also a people, defined loosely as “the members of a particular society” (Oxford University Press, 2019b). On both these accounts, Inuit occupy multiple nationalities and constitute various peoples, given that they are also citizens of states, such as Canada and Denmark. As a people and a nation, Inuit have the right to self-determination under UNDRIP and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. However, the concept of the polity pushes further by accounting for the political dimension. It is with this dimension that the concept of the polity can be distinguished from the concepts of “nations” and “peoples.” This concept is therefore useful in understanding the overlap of representation at multiple levels of governance, despite having no single state apparatus. With these distinctions in mind, this research will use the terms people, nation, and polity respectively.

3.5 Inuit and the State

In the following sections, the relationship between Inuit and their respective states will be discussed, focusing only on Canadian Inuit and Inuit in Kalaallit Nunaat due to the scope of this research. This discussion will be mostly historical in nature, attempting only to point out some important turning points in each respective relationship. This is done in order to further establish clear terminology and to identify key laws, policies, and actors that provide relevant context for the case study.

Canada-Inuit Relations

The relationship between the State of Canada and the Indigenous Peoples who live in the territory is complex. Canada is home to many Indigenous Peoples who are broadly categorised into Inuit, Métis, and First Nations Peoples, making up 5% of the Canadian population according

to the 2016 census (Statistics Canada, 2018). There is vast diversity within each group of peoples. As of the 2016 Canadian census, there are over 600 First Nations distinctive band governments alone (Statistics Canada, 2018). Each of these distinctive peoples have a unique history and relationship regarding the State of Canada. The historical and contemporary relationship between Inuit and the State of Canada must therefore be seen as unique, and does not necessarily say anything about the relationship between Canada and Indigenous Peoples generally. Inuit-Canadian relations are distinct from the relationship between the state and hundreds of other Indigenous Peoples in Canada. Assumptions should not be made about the nature of those relationships based on this research.

Historically, the relationship between Inuit and the state is characterised by Inuit struggle, negotiation, and resistance to the Government of Canada (Bonesteel, 2008; Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs). Over time, Inuit have been successful in their struggle and have gained the recognition of their rights as a people by the state, including their right to self-govern. The struggle for the recognition of Inuit rights has been comparatively smooth relative to First Nations and Métis Peoples, due in part to the fact that Inuit, unlike other Indigenous Peoples in Canada, have been considered Canadian citizens since the country gained independence in 1867 (ibid). As major actors within the whaling and fur trade industries, Inuit played an important economic role in colonial Canada even prior to the country's independence. In the 1930's, when the fur trade collapsed, provincial governments were tasked with providing economic support to affected Inuit communities (ibid). The challenge was substantial as fur trading was at the time the economic backbone of Canadian Inuit communities, especially in the east. People were starving (ibid). The province of Quebec, unwilling or unable to meet the needs of Inuit, brought suit against the federal government in a historic case known as *Re Eskimo* (Reference as to whether "Indians" includes Eskimo, 1939). As a result of the case, Inuit became the legal responsibility of the federal state rather than of the provinces, as they had been previously (Bonesteel, 2008; Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs). This change put Inuit in political and legal limbo in Canada. No policies or institutions were created by the federal government to

manage Inuit affairs or engage Inuit people; rather, responsibility for Inuit policy was tossed around between various Canadian ministries over the decades (ibid). However, Inuit have claimed for many decades that they are entitled to specific federal programming based on the *Re Eskimo* decision. In 1966, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was created, which became the department that managed Inuit affairs among other things (ibid). Throughout this long period, Canada expanded housing, education, and healthcare funding packages that were largely embedded in policies of forced assimilation. World War II in particular brought massive development and changes to Inuit communities as the Canadian Arctic became a major site of militarisation. The result is a history in which development and cultural oppression are intimately linked and interwoven (ibid).

Despite the complex and difficult history, Inuit today have attained substantial influence within the Canadian government through a variety of institutional channels. This is particularly true of the Inuit living in Nunavut, Canada's most recently established territory which came to be legally recognised as such in 1999 (*Encyclopædia Britannica* 2008, Nunavut entry). Pikialasorsuaq is located in Nunavut. The territory of Nunavut is massive, about the same size as Mexico. It is populated by just 35,000 people, 85% of whom are Inuit, and composes most of Canada's Arctic territory (ibid). Nunavut is the product of the 1993 Nunavut Lands Claim Agreement (NLCA) and 1993 Nunavut Act, which were negotiated between Inuit and the Crown in the right of Canada and effectively separated Nunavut from the Northwest Territories with the aim of establishing an ethnically-Inuit territory (Bonesteel, 2008; Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs). Importantly, as a territory rather than a province, Nunavut's power is delegated directly from the Canadian parliament, whereas provinces derive their power through the Canadian constitution. This means that territories experience a higher degree of federal control than provinces (ibid). The NLCA established 350,000 km² of land within the territory that remains to this day under the exclusive jurisdiction of Inuit (NLCA, 1993). The remaining 1.5 million km² of land territory is federal Crown Land, which is public land (ibid). Among other things, the NLCA granted Inuit harvesting rights throughout the territory, equal representation

between Inuit and Canadian government officials on a number of boards related to resource management, a share of royalties from resource development on Crown Lands, the right to negotiate with industry on Inuit-owned lands, and capital transfer payments of \$1.9 billion CAD over 15 years to Inuit (ibid). Moreover, in 2005, the Inuit Relations Secretariat was established within the Department of Indian Affairs and Resource Development. After many years of advocacy, the secretariat finally provided a channel for Inuit from Nunavut and beyond to “advocate for Inuit concerns within the federal system, support the development of federal Inuit policy, and work to improve the relevance and effectiveness of existing federal programs and policies that affect Inuit” (Bonesteel, 2008; Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs).

With the Trudeau government's “era of reconciliation,” political gains for Inuit have increased. While there is much debate on what the “era of reconciliation” means exactly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Final Report in 2015 is an accepted beginning for the Canadian federal government's attempts to repair and acknowledge its role in the colonisation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada (Hunter, 2016). In the past five years, this has been done through issuing formal apologies, signing UNDRIP, and establishing some governmental bodies that seek to increase Aboriginal participation in government processes (ibid). For example, the 2017 establishment of the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee (ICPC) is a permanent government body formed through a bilateral agreement between Inuit and Canada to work together on issues that affect Inuit and Canadians (ICPC Declaration, 2017) that can be considered as connected to the broad reconciliation policy. In this bilateral relationship, Inuit are represented by IITK, of which the ICC is a board member. The committee has so far created several policy frameworks in cooperation with Inuit, such as the Tuberculosis Elimination Framework, and the Inuit Nunangat Housing Strategy, and has been influential in composing the 2030 Canadian Arctic policy framework, with participation from Inuit (Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee, 2019).

Denmark-Kalaallit Nunaat Relations

Kalaallit Nunaat has been a territory of the Kingdom of Denmark since 1721. The island was under colonial rule until 1953, when it was integrated as a district of the Kingdom (Grant, 2011). This change closely followed a five-year period of American occupation of the island, between 1940-1945, when Denmark was occupied by Nazi Germany (ibid). Once the island shed its colonial status, it gained representation in the Folketing and voting rights for residents of the district. This made it possible for Kalaallit Nunaat to push for greater autonomy in 1979, which resulted in the passing of the Home Rule Act. This Act established the Parliament of Kalaallit Nunaat, known in the Kalaallisut language as Inatsisartut, marked the adoption of the island's flag, and transferred control over health, education, environment, and fisheries to the island's authorities (Statsministeriet, n.d). The Home Rule system operated until 2009, when the Act on Greenland Self-Government was passed, granting even further autonomy to the Kalaallit Nunaat (Statsministeriet, n.d). This Act established the Naalakkersuisut, the government of Kalaallit Nunaat, and transferred control over legislative, executive, judicial, and policing functions to that authority. Kalaallisut was adopted as the national language of the island, alongside Danish, and it began to be taught in schools and used in the government. Naalakkersuisut today therefore has authority over almost all areas of government, including control over natural resources. Moreover, the Self-Government Act recognised Greenlandic Inuit as a people, as stated in the preamble to the Act (Act on Greenland Self-Government, 2009). Finally, the Act recognised the right of Kalaallit Nunaat to independence upon local referendum and approval from the Folketing. What is left today in Denmark's control is the foreign policy and security of the island, as decisions about these are decided in the Danish Folketing (ibid). Despite the lack of authority over Kalaallit Nunaat directly, laws passed in the Folketing do apply to the island under Self-Government. In addition, Denmark finances Kalaallit Nunaat through a block grant of 3.2 billion kroner annually, accounting for around 65% of the island's GDP (ibid). Under this context, the prospect of economic growth based on increased resource access under global

climate change represents an opportunity for Kalaallit Nunaat to free itself of its financial dependence on the Kingdom, pushing it even closer to independence.

Today, Kalaallit Nunaat appears to be approaching an important historical moment. It has become the interest of the United States, which has in the past two years offered to buy the island, and then when rejected, offered \$12 million USD in development aid (Selsoe Sorenson, 2020). The United States is currently in the process of establishing a Consulate on the island (ibid). The presence of rare earth minerals and uranium has spurred increased Chinese interests (Treadgold, 2019). The combination of rising foreign interest and the possibility of independence has generated substantial political tension on Kalaallit Nunaat, with some in favour of a gradual move toward independence that involves less drastic resource extraction, while others lean toward immediate independence and opening up to foreign business rapidly to support their independence (Sorento, 2020).

4.0 Theoretical Framework

This section will attempt to locate this research within the existing, relevant global governance literature. First, the concept of global governance will be explained and defined, and its application to this research will be outlined. This will include a discussion of Arctic governance research, or research on global governance that has focused on the Arctic. Following that will be a brief literature review covering the main lines of argument or perspectives that have defined the research area from the authors' perspectives. Finally, this research will outline its own approach, clarifying its theoretical underpinnings and defining key terms and concepts as they will be used through the paper.

4.1 Global Governance

Global governance is a term which pervades academia and politics alike. Used broadly by states, supranational institutions, transnational NGOs, and corporations, the concept appears at

first glance to cover everything and anything that is global in nature and related to decision-making. Like its sister term globalisation, global governance has become commonplace though politicised buzzwords. Therefore, it is important to clarify what this research refers to when using the term and to make a clear distinction between different understandings that will be relevant to the research. In order to ensure minimal confusion about terms, this research will refer to the political manifestations of global governance as the global governance system (GGS). When discussing the global governance system as it exists within the Arctic region, this research will use the term Arctic governance. Finally, the theoretical usage will be referred to as global governance theory (GGT). The function of GGT is to theorise and understand global governance as a political reality within the international system. Importantly, GGT encompasses many different theories, which will be delved into later. However, in using GGT, this research refers to the *group(s) of theories* that are related to analysing and making sense of the global governance system. The GGS is therefore understood as the manifestation of the system, whereas GGT refers to a set of ideas about the system.

In the most concrete terms, the GGS can be understood as a loosely connected network of international and supranational organisations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and the Arctic Council, just to name a few (Bevir, 2011; Zürn, 2018). These organisations are similar in that they deal with problems that are international in nature, such as climate change, human rights, pandemics, or market regulation. More specifically, they set and maintain the rules over procedures, regulations, monitoring, and evaluation of the complex interactions between governments, markets, and civil society related to international problems (Bevir, 2011). In these ways, such organisations exercise authority in the international arena. While there is no single body that coordinates interactions between these organisations, they are nonetheless connected through a system of “shared goals and elements of rule” (Zürn, 2018: p. 4). In other words, a set of institutionalised norms shapes how organisations interact both internally and externally, and give character to the set of organisations as a systematic whole.

The emergence of this system can be roughly traced back to a 1995 report made by the UN-supported Commission on Global Governance (Bevir, 2011)³. The report advocated for increased supranational power and coordination between state and non-state actors, such as corporations and NGOs, across all levels of government. The report was outspoken in its cooperative vision for global politics, stating clearly that “there is no alternative to working together and using collective power to create a better world” (Our Global Neighborhood, 1995: p. 1). The report further suggests that “in some cases, governance may rely primarily on markets and market instruments, perhaps with some institutional oversight” (Our Global Neighborhood, 1995: p. 3). These quotes reveal clearly the neoliberal⁴ underpinnings that have shaped and formed the system as it exists today. While it is not within the scope of this research to go deeper into an examination of the ideological basis of the GGS, it is nonetheless important to contextualise the system in this manner. As will be demonstrated in Section 4.4, the norms that bind the system together are highly connected to some of the basic tenets of neoliberalism, such as the social value of negative freedom via the minimisation of state control and regulation and the importance of the individual as a social actor (Springer, Birch & McLeavy, 2016).

Global governance theory, on the other hand, is related to understanding the exercise of authority across transnational borders. It is concerned with the process of governing and the process of exercising authority, which is often referred to as “patterns of rule” (Bevir, 2011: p.1). These patterns and processes -- whether they be driven by supranational institutions, states, markets, or networks of non-state actors such as NGOs -- give rise to particular norms, power dynamics and dilemmas within organised societies (Bevir, 2011). Put another way, GGT looks at

³ It is important to note that many of the organisations that compose the GGS existed and operated prior to the publishing of the 1995 report. While scholars such as Bevir (2011) and Rowe (2018) cite the 1990’s as the historical moment where GGS emerged in conjunction with the neoliberal world order, other scholars such as Shadian (2015), Pelaudeix (2014) present different chronologies. It is outside the scope of this research to engage in this debate, but it uses the 1995 report as point of departure due to the fact that this report marked the moment when the term itself came to be widely used.

⁴ This research uses the term neoliberalism in a generalised, colloquial way to refer to the set of ideas, policies, and norms surrounding the revival of *laissez faire*, free market economics that emerged in the 1980s, generally associated with privatisation, deregulation, and globalisation.

the processes by which norms, rules, and power dynamics related to perceived global issues or global commons are structured, sustained, and regulated at the international level of government (Zürn, 2018). The task of GGT is to understand that process and its consequences, as well as analyse how our current structures “arise and develop, and subsequently permeate and modify the international system” (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014: p. 8) and realities on the ground. Indeed, the GGS is constantly shifting and modifying, reacting to challenges and global changes. In other words, GGT can connect the “form and function of global governance,” its institutional structure and normative principles, to external global dynamics such as climate change, geopolitics, and transnationalism by analysing the processes of the system (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014: p. 11).

4.2 Relevance for this Research

Global governance theory is relevant to this research first and foremost because it is a set of theories which acknowledge the GGS, including tangibles such as organisations, and intangibles such as norms, as an object of study. In other words, it is within GGT that the GGS is seen to exist as a distinct political system that causes real effects on the behaviour of actors. In regards to the field of international relations (IR), this fact places GGT firmly within the broad domain of liberalism rather than realism. Here, realism refers to the “spectrum of ideas” in IR that operate under the assumptions that states are the central actors in international politics, that the international realm is anarchic in nature, and that rational self-interest and the pursuit of power define state behaviour (Haslam, 2002). GGT rejects these assumptions by acknowledging the role of international organisations and norms in influencing state behaviour and by seeking to explain instances in which states *do not* act strictly in accordance with their own self-interest and the pursuit of power. The case of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, as will be shown in Section 5, is one such instance. In that case, states are being asked to devolve power over part of their territory to a different set of actors and to compromise their borders. In other words, they are being asked to negotiate their territorial sovereignty. The realist perspective, with little capacity for conceptualising the actions of actors other than states, would have a hard time making sense

of such a request in the first place, not to mention the response of states. The very existence of the Inuit polity, as a transborder nation without a state, but with political representation at the international level, defies the assumption of the necessity of a state to participate in international politics. Moreover, given that the Pikialasorsuaq Commission itself was established propped up by the rules and norms of international agreements (re: UNDRIP) and institutions (re: ICC), it is necessary to approach the topic from a perspective that acknowledges the existence and importance of such norms and institutions in the first place.

Therefore, this research needed to approach the case in question from a liberalist perspective. Here, liberalism is used in the IR sense to refer to the school of thought that holds international cooperation to be possible and mutually beneficial, rejects power politics as the only outcome of international relations, and acknowledges the role of non-state actors in influencing state behaviour (Shirayev & Zubok, 2016). In this way, the liberal approach can “open up the black box of the state,” viewing the state as an actor among actors on the international scene, rather than as a closed unit of absolute and sovereign authority (Bevir, 2011: p.2). Liberalism, like realism, has given rise to a multitude of different ideas and theories, such as GGT. What distinguishes GGT from other liberalist approaches, such as democratic or commercial peace theory or deliberative democracy, *inter alia* (Gaus, 2003), is that GGT is specifically concerned with the systematic “patterns of rule” that are produced internally by the GGS (Bevir, 2011: p.2). GGT deals not with values, interests, or politics per se, but rather with the processes that constitute international authority. In other words, GGT assumes the existence of a real system that has set characteristics (rules and norms), and tries to understand how those systematic factors produce outcomes (i.e. laws, social values, policies, or new organisations) that can be understood as “patterns of rule.” The specific focus on processes makes the GGT perspective uniquely useful in examining situations where actors defy conventional categorisations, such as state vs. non-state actors, by allowing *functions* to come before *structures*. In other words, by focusing on processes within an existing system, the question of how things are is held constant, allowing deeper examination of how things work. This creates

flexibility in conceptualising actors based on what actions are produced by their outcomes, rather than strictly on their organisational makeup. For this reason, GGT is well suited to understand bodies such as the ICC, semi-autonomous territorial governments, and transborder nations.

Importantly for this research, it should be noted that GGT need not necessarily refer to issues that are strictly global in scale, but can also refer to those that are regional, or even domestic. This holds true so long as the issues in question deal with situations in which two or more nations interact with each other in order to solve common problems and in which the norms and rules of the GGS can be evidenced (i.e via the existence of international legislation, participation in and compliance with international organisations, etc.) (Zürn, 2018). As has been noted in the context, this research includes Indigenous Peoples within the definition of “nations.” For this reason, GGT can apply to the Arctic as a region, or to states where multiple nations reside, such as Canada and Denmark. GGT can also apply to issue areas that meet this criteria, such as climate change, biodiversity and wildlife, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, migration, and markets, all of which are relevant to this research. In Zürn’s terms (2018), regions and issue areas that meet the criteria above can be understood as “spheres of authority” (p.10). These spheres deal with common problems, are socially constructed, and are governed by organisations within the GGS that share common goals. Within any given sphere of authority, organisations may work together and share institutional links, but it is not necessary. Spheres of authority function independently of one another due to the fact that there is no meta-authority coordinating the actions of international organisations. The variety, number, and lack of coordination between organisations and spheres of authority creates both overlap and gaps in governance and generates complexity within the GGS (ibid). As will be seen in Section 5.1, this phenomenon is critical for understanding governance of *Pikialasorsuaq*.

4.3 Literature Review on Arctic Governance

In 1989, in the last years of the Cold War, Soviet Union president Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech at Murmansk calling for demilitarisation and international cooperation in the

Arctic region (Åtland, 2008). During the Cold War years, the Arctic had been a site of intense military standoff between the United States and USSR (ibid). Gorbachev's speech kicked off a new era in the region, sparking action across the Arctic that ultimately led to the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Rowe, 2018). While the Arctic states initially ignored or rejected Gorbachev's ideas of cooperation and peacebuilding, Inuit activists, such as Mary Simon⁵ from Canada, took up the call. While it is outside the scope of this research to recount the history, Axworthy and Dean (2013) provide a thorough and interesting chronology of the critical role such activists played in bringing the Arctic Council into existence, taking on the diplomatic footwork and working strategically to bring states and other Indigenous groups on board.

The Arctic Council, though by no means the only international organisation that influences the Arctic, is regarded in much of the recent scholarship as a defining organisation of it (Axworthy & Dean, 2013; Pelaudix, 2014; Johansson & Donner, 2015; Shadian, 2010; Rowe, 2018). Put simply, the Council sets a certain ethos for the region. Upon quick review, this ethos can be seen as a reflection of the norms of the GGS. Briefly put, these norms are: a belief in the idea of the common good(s), in the existence of individuals' and non-state actors' rights, and a recognition of the possibility of international authority (Zürn, 2018). The Arctic Council reflects the first norm in that it explicitly works on problems, such wildlife protection, marine pollution control, climate change mitigation, regional maritime regulation, and more, that are common in

⁵ Mary Simon led a generation of Inuit, First Nations, and Métis Canadians in winning the constitutional Section 35 Amendment in 1982. She served as chairwoman of the Inuit Circumpolar Council from 1986-1992. Axworthy and Dean (2013) note that "Simon was one of the first notables to be invited to join the Gordon Foundation's Arctic Project Steering Committee, and formal recognition of indigenous participation became a core principle of the Arctic Council work funded by the Foundation" (p. 40). Simon was also a member of the Arctic Arms Control Panel in 1989, among numerous other accolades. Her influence on Arctic governance has shaped the norms and institutions for decades, and her legacy is widely recognised within the field (ibid).

nature. On the second account, the Arctic Council is an innovator on the international scene in terms of creating the position of Permanent Participant for Indigenous groups, which gives these groups a seat at the negotiating table equal to states. Finally, the Council reflects the third norm by its very existence as an international authority. It can be considered an authority by Zürn's definition in particular, which describes authority as based on the capacity to make and evaluate suggestions, and to have those suggestions considered, without the use of force (2018). That the Arctic Council, as an important authority within the Arctic, reflects the norms of the GGS is relevant to understanding the general characteristics of Arctic governance as a sphere of authority within the GGS. The Council has played a major role in anchoring the GGS in the region by promoting the norms through their work. However, it is important to note that the norms of the GGS are not the only norms the Council promotes. The Council also has a strong normative focus on international scientific cooperation, which has also impacted the ethos of the region. This also helps understand how governance became an important topic in Arctic regional studies to the point that "Arctic governance" is now commonly used within the discipline.

Pelaudiex provides a thorough outline of how the term has been variously used in the literature in her article, "*A Critical Assessment of the Diverse Meanings of 'Arctic Governance'*" (2014). She frames the common approaches that shape discourse about Arctic governance. These approaches differ epistemologically, diverging on foundational questions such as what governance *should* do and *who* has the right to participate in it. The common approaches are institutionalism, multi-level governance, good governance, and theories related to power and hierarchy in governance structures. Each holds a different understanding of both the normative basis of the GGS and the roots of its legitimacy; however, the latter appears to be less developed conceptually within the literature. While much scholarship has been done around the normative question of how Arctic governance could be improved (Senarclens, 1998; Koivurova, Duyck, & Heinämäki, 2012; Kankaanpää & Young, 2012), less work has been done to understand the roots of the legitimacy of GGS in the Arctic region in the first place. This research is concerned not only with the roots of the system's legitimacy, but also the patterns of rule that it produces, and

seeks to implement concepts from Zürn's theory to the case of Pikialasorsuaq. Zürn's theory is rooted heavily in institutionalism.

To define institutionalism, it is helpful to locate it within Pelaudix's assessment of the meanings of Arctic governance in order to draw out both what it is and what it is not. Institutionalism asserts the claim that "the nature of institutions will influence the capacity of the political system to govern effectively" (Peters, 2011: p. 79). The theory emphasises the importance of institutions as what connects social actors, such as a state, and NSAs. The term institution in this context refers to established laws, practices, and customs (re: "the institution of marriage") rather than a type of organisation (re: "an academic institution") (ibid). It is in this manner that it will be used throughout this research. Institutions are closely related to norms, which can be understood as values that have become regulated and part of the cultural common sense (Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). With these definitions in mind, institutionalism holds that the norms and institutions of an organisation, sphere of influence, or other social unit influences the processes and outcomes of decisions (Peters, 2011). This is because norms and institutions shape how actors engage with one another. In Arctic governance scholarship, institutionalism has been often used to "depart from the postulates of realism and the central role of states and show the importance of other institutions in international politics" (Pelaudix, 2014: p. 412). Institutionalism allows this departure because it focuses on the social element of interaction, inviting the flexibility that is part and parcel of human sociality (Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). Evidently, the approach of this research fits this mold. One normative conclusion that has been drawn from this line of research in the Arctic is that governance should "bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually" (Weiss & Gordenker, 1997).

For reference, multilevel governance, good governance, and approaches to power and hierarchy within governance have also contributed to the field and point to different elements of the GGS that are not explicitly covered within institutionalism, but are nonetheless important for this research in a supplementary way. "Good governance" seeks to analyse the success of

governance systems based on predefined principles of high transparency, accountability, democratic participation, and strong rule of law (Pelaudiex, 2014). This approach has been used in the Arctic context to call for strengthening supranational organisations' power over domestic policy, which is seen as necessary for the realisation of human rights (ibid). The power dynamics approach looks at how existing hegemonic orders and hierarchies influence the GGS in practice (Rowe, 2018). This kind of approach has been applied to the Arctic to analyse and show how global power dynamics influence but do not determine hierarchies in the region (ibid). Finally, multi-level governance organises the GGS along vertical, jurisdictional lines and examines the interactions between them in order to discern the effectiveness or functionality of governance systems (Pelaudiex, 2014). In the Arctic, multi-level governance theory has been used to work on issues concerning policy coherence at different levels of government; for example, between decisions taken within international institutions, the behaviour of implementing actors, and the impact on policy objectives on the ground (Stokke, 2010; Bai, 2015; Rodon, 2017). In contrast, institutionalism is concerned with what social conditions produce decisions in the first place. It makes little claim on what should be done, but rather focuses on processes within and between actors. Finally, it seeks to explain things that cannot be explained by analysing power dynamics or rational self-interest alone by uncovering the social nature of authority relationships.

4.4 Research's Approach

This research will take an institutionalist approach, relying heavily on Michael Zürn's Theory of Global Governance (2018). A strength of Zürn's theory for this research is that it is specific in describing the characteristics of the GGS, setting up a clear picture of what the system is and how its various parts function together. These include tangible groups like organisations (i.e. the UN and others consistent with what has already been mentioned in this research) but also intangibles like norms. He argues that the GGS is based on three main normative ideas. These are: the idea of the common good(s), the existence of rights of individuals and non-state actors, and a recognition of the possibility of international authority. An actor does not necessarily need

to be kind or selfless; they only have to justify their agenda with these norms in perspective.

Zürn claims that these norms, which constitute the GGS, function through authority rather than power. In particular, he proposes the idea of “reflexive authority” to explain Max Weber’s paradox of “voluntary subordination” (Zürn, 2018). In other words, he uses reflexive authority to explain why actors might act subordinately, and even in contrast to their interests, in the absence of force or coercion. Reflexive authority is twofold: “it speaks to an element of enduring reflection about the worthiness of the authority.... [and] the recognition of external authorities is based on the knowledge about the limitations of one’s own rationality and information base” (ibid). Reflexive authority is therefore based on the belief that the authority *knows better* and is worth listening to. This belief needs constant legitimization in order for exercises of authority to be successful, requiring authorities to actively justify their worthiness through various methods. Reflexive authority is not expressed in commands, but in requests. This is important because it allows a subordinate to reject the request, but still acknowledge the norms and authority of an international or transnational authority. Zürn provides the example of the European Union rejecting the World Trade Organization's request to accept genetically modified crops, but paying annual fines as a recognition of its authority (2018). Reflexive authority is pooled into spheres of authority, such as the Arctic region, or certain issue areas, which may compete or cooperate internally (between organisations) or externally (between spheres) since there is no meta-authority on the international stage.

The GGS as an authority struggles with legitimacy because it is limited in the type of legitimization it can use. Legitimation refers to the process by which an authority encourages belief in its legitimacy. Actors in the GGS can use policies, organisational structures, statements, campaigns, or other actions to create what Zürn (2018) refers to as “legitimation narratives” (p.70). Narratives can be understood as “stories that mix reasons and deceptions in order to explain and justify a normative order” (ibid). Zürn sets out a typology of common legitimization narratives that public authorities use to justify their exercise of authority. He claims that international organisations have two main problems with legitimization. The first is a technocratic

bias in justification of authority which stems from the inability of the GGS to use any of the common legitimization narratives besides the technocratic narrative. This narrative by Zürn (2018) is based on “non-prejudiced expertise and knowledge of the facts” where “[e]xpertise is normally derived from the concept of science as an independent search for knowledge with no regard for particular interests, and based on a systematic methodology” (p.74). It would be imprudent for this research not to explain why the other six narratives Zürn notes do not function for the GGS. However, for the sake of space, such an explanation can be found in Section 3.3 of his book (2018). While it would surely be possible to argue that some of these narratives are at least somewhat available to some organisations that compose the GGS, the dominance of the technocratic narrative in the context of Arctic governance is evidenced by organisations like the Arctic Council, in which the scientific approach is heavily integrated. The second legitimization problem the GGS faces is a lack of impartiality in exercising authority (Zürn, 2018). Using the technocratic legitimization narrative often requires at the very least an appearance of impartiality; however, due to a lack of separation of powers on the global stage, international organisations must rely heavily on powerful or wealthy states such as the United States and China for funding and relevance. This means that the hierarchies of global geopolitics influence how GGS organisations are structured, making it difficult to claim impartiality.

Zürn (2018) bases his global governance theory on historical institutionalism because it offers “pertinent concepts such as critical junctures, different types of path dependence, and external shocks for conceptualizing these institutional dynamics in International Relations” (p. 91). External Shocks are situations which challenge the institutional status quo and are not created by the institution in question. Such shocks can create a new critical juncture, or decision-making point, and allow for opportunities of agency within organisations or systems (ibid: p. 92). These terms are related to the concept of path dependence, which holds that previous decisions taken by an actor limit the options for present decisions. In this way, decisions, regardless of the value of their content, can be self-reinforcing. This occurs through a process of investment of political, social, or financial capital, in which investment in each

decision makes it more costly to change course. Focusing on path dependence, especially self-reinforcement, allows for stability that other IR theories cannot explain -- for example, in a situation when a state continues along a certain policy path despite evidence of its failure. An effect of path dependence is that institutions can internally generate their own external feedback which may support or frustrate said institutions' reproduction (Greif & Laitin, 2004). In other words, pathways can lead to reactive sequences that enclose change in "opportunities, beliefs, or desires" that may erode support for the organisation. This means the actor itself can endogenously create challenges and challengers that could upend the actor's integrity, leading to a loss in legitimacy (Zürn, 2018: p 94). However, these challenges may also serve as an opportunity for the institution to adapt and respond in an effective way which could lead to a strengthening of the institution.

Zürn presents that there are two types of reactive sequences that result from legitimization problems in the GGS: state contestation and societal contestation. State contestation occurs when states challenge an international organisation due to how power is distributed between states within the organisation. If the organisation has "institutionalised inequality," meaning more historically powerful states have stratified power structurally within the organisation, by way of rules and procedures, then new rising, weaker states may challenge the organisation to have more say (Zürn, 2018: p. 96). If the request by the rising powers is accommodated, it may lead to a "deepening" of the international organisation's legitimacy. "Deepening" here refers to an increase in the legitimacy of an actor, leading to a greater capacity to justify the exercise of authority. If the request is rejected or avoided, it may lead to the weaker states stalling the institution's agenda or looking to create alternative institutions that will better serve their needs, causing a decline of the institution's legitimacy and authority (ibid). Zürn uses the term "decline" to refer to when legitimacy is damaged and the scope for the exercise of authority is limited, which leads to fragmentation or ruptures in the system. On the flipside, if there is "sovereign equality" in an international organisation (i.e. a system of one state, one vote), powerful states have less ability to influence the organisation relative to their power. Weaker states tend to

favour the current status quo in such organisations and may use it to punch above their weight. The more powerful states may then stop supporting the organisation financially or in terms of participation, and may look for or create alternative institutions that can advance their agenda (Zürn, 2018, p. 98). This would be an example of fragmentation.

Societal contestation, on the other hand, involves non-state actors challenging organisations. The more authority an international organisation is able to exercise over societies and states, the higher the need for legitimation (Zürn, 2018). This demand for legitimacy may lead to “politicisation” within societies. Politicisation, as Zürn (2018) defines it, is “moving something into the realm of public choice, thus presupposing the possibility of making collectively binding decisions on that matter” (p. 140). This creates a scenario in which the authority in question must respond to the perceptions of the public, particularly in cases where the public makes a strong case against the legitimacy of the authority. Public protests accusing international organisations, such as the World Bank, for facilitating the exploitation of child labour by multinational cooperations would be one example of this type of situation. As in the case of state contestation, the response of authorities determines the extent to which the authority experiences a deepening or declining of legitimacy. If the authority takes a superficial response, then it becomes vulnerable to fragmentation because member states may need to appear to reject the authority in order to maintain domestic legitimacy. This plays on the fact that, within the GGS, authorities have multiple constituencies from which they must gain justification, meaning that they must be legitimate in the eyes of states, but also of the general global public. On the other hand, if the authority takes substantial measures, such as major reform, in addressing societal concerns, their legitimacy can be deepened, leading to greater breadth in the exercise of authority (Zürn, 2018: p. 99).

Zürn’s theory of global governance is highly useful for this research because it provides a strong framework for understanding what the GGS is. The theory develops several concepts that are especially useful for understanding the case of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, such as reflexive authority, legitimation narratives, state versus societal contestation, and deepening

versus decline. These concepts make it possible to break down how the structure of international authorities, such as the UN, the ICC, or the Arctic Council, internally produce a need for legitimization in order to exercise authority. Zürn refers to this connection as the “authority-legitimation link.” The way this connection is navigated by authorities in the face of either state or societal contestation determines the extent to which deepening or decline will occur. Through examining these dynamics in the case of the PC, this research will be able to approach the following question: To what extent do the interactions and processes surrounding the Pikialasorsuaq Commission’s work contribute to a deepening or decline of the global governance system? Importantly, applying these concepts to the case will require some departure from Zürn’s theory, due to the fact that this case relates not only to international authorities, but also to state and territorial authorities (namely, the governments of Canada, Denmark, Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut). This requires both a reimagining of these authorities in order to fit the theory and also a bending of the concept to fit the realities of the case, with the hopes of arriving at a less categorically-bound reading of these actors. To this extent, the coming analysis will need to take into account how the difference in norms between the constitutional, sovereign state, and the GGS connect and diverge, thus affecting the dynamics of the authority-legitimation link.

5.0 Analysis

This analysis will seek to apply Zürn’s concepts to the case of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission in order to examine the extent to which the activities of the Commission contribute to the deepening or decline of the global governance system. In order to reach this point, this research will first take a moment to conceptualise the PC as an actor and present the suggestions it has made. Then, returning to the sub-questions that guide this research in pursuit of the above, this analysis will reimagine state and non-state actors within the framework of the GGS, with a focus on the specific actors in question. This will help clarify how the norms of the multinational, constitutional state and those of the GGS differ and overlap. This research will

then attempt to examine how transborder indigeneity and Indigenous-defined space can be positioned and understood within the context of interacting norms and systems, with a focus on how indigeneity complicates the legitimization processes in the context of this dualism. Finally, this analysis will describe and analyse the responses to the PC's suggestions by Canada, Nunavut, Kalaallit Nunaat, and Denmark, using a comparison to uncover the processes of the authority-legitimation link, which will then be connected to the idea of deepening versus decline.

5.1 Global Governance and the Pikialasorsuaq

Suggestions as Contestation

As an actor established by the ICC, working on issues that are international in nature, and normatively rooted in the GGS, the PC can be seen as an actor within the GGS. The Pikialasorsuaq Commission represents an Inuit approach to policy making which seeks to localise the GGS in order to meet regional Inuit needs and interests. The Commission seeks to create a coherent, Inuit-led institutional framework that will facilitate the procural of the goods of the GGS for the region. Specifically, the PC seeks to gain the capacity to exercise authority over common goods, such as the polynya and travel, and strengthen the implementation of norms that are an integral part of the GGS, such as recognition of rights. The PC's suggestions are in part justified by the Commission through international legislation such as UNDRIP, *inter alia*. This can be seen in the *People of the Ice Bridge* (2017) report, where the Commission outlines all of the international legal tools that are relevant to supporting the suggestions. In particular, there is much emphasis given to the rights of individuals and the desirability of international authority over the Pikialasorsuaq region, which is seen as a shared good. Moreover, the three suggestions made by the Commission -- to create a transborder Inuit management regime with an institutionalised IMA; to create a protected area in the North Water Polynya defined by local Inuit; and to establish freedom of movement between Inuit communities on each side of the border -- are deeply connected to the concept of rights, specifically the rights of Indigenous

Peoples, such as the right to self-determination and cultural integrity. All of the suggestions relate to the common good as conceived by Inuit who were interviewed during the PC's consultation process. In these ways, the Pikialasorsuaq Commission itself, as well as its specific suggestions, can be seen as an attempt to localise the GGS in the Pikialasorsuaq region.

In this pursuit, the Pikialasorsuaq Commission can be understood as a form of societal contestation within the GGS. According to Zürn (2018), societal contestation occurs when international authorities exercise “intrusive authority” over societies and non-state actors, creating an intensified demand for legitimization of the international authority (p. 99). As has been elaborated throughout this research, climate change has led to increased global attention and activity in the Pikialasorsuaq region and throughout the Arctic, related in particular to resource development, international shipping, fisheries, and tourism. Arctic and non-Arctic states alike have taken note of the economic and geopolitical potential of the region. Many have moved in to stake their claim to various degrees: China has pursued observer status at the Arctic Council (Willis & Depledge, 2014); the US has attempted to purchase Kalaallit Nunaat (Selsoe Sorensen, 2020); the presence of resource development projects, military exercises, and traffic along the NWP have increased (Humpert, 2018; Xu *et al.*, 2019; Staalesen, 2020; Nielsen, 2020); and legally binding legislation such as the Search and Rescue Agreement (Arctic Council, 2011) and the Polar Code (IMO, 2017) have passed through international organisations in recent years. These are a few examples of activities that constitute a sense of “intrusive authority,” impacting the lives of Inuit communities without their participation. Even though only some of this activity is focused in Pikialasorsuaq specifically, they all combine to create a sense of change and urgency that permeates the region as a whole, including Pikialasorsuaq. These activities thus warrant justification to society, to the people whose lives are impacted or may become impacted. The findings of the Commission's report support the notion that this demand is grounded in the individual opinions of Inuit who live in Pikialasorsuaq, all of whom voice concern over the previously-stated issues in the region generally and in Pikialasorsuaq specifically. The PC's work can be seen in this context as a manifestation of the societal demand for justification of

these activities, and thus constitutes societal contestation of the GGS.

At the same time, the suggestions can be understood as a form of state contestation. Due to the fact that the Inuit polity, manifested in the ICC and in the territorial governments of Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut, has elements of being both a state and non-state actor simultaneously, the Inuit polity has the capacity to bring “state contestation” without actually being a state. In other words, the quasi-state status of Inuit allows the polity and its political representatives to contest as a state in certain cases. State contestation looks different depending on the organisational arrangements of the given organisations. For this reason, the dynamics surrounding contestation by the ICC acting as a state in the Arctic Council differs from the contestation of the territorial governments within the states of Denmark and Canada.

State contestation can happen in a context of institutionalised inequality, where the weaker states in an organisation gain power, thus shifting underlying power dynamics within the organisation. This can lead to contestation in the form of demands or suggestions from weaker states to change the rules, procedures, and structure of the organisation. This situation applies to the relationship between the state and territorial governments of Canada/Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat/Denmark. These are contexts of institutional inequality, where Inuit have gradually been included in governmental organisations which were built up without Inuit input, often to the detriment of Inuit interests. Procedures in these contexts tend to favour powerful actors, which in this case are the states of Canada and Denmark, respectively. However, over time, both Canada and Denmark have appeared to use their institutionalised powers benevolently, which has led to increased power for Inuit at the territorial level. At the same time, increased influence at the international level (re: UNDRIP) has increased Inuit bargaining power, making it easier for Inuit to make gains (re: the work of ICPC in Canada and Self-Government in Denmark) in the domestic context, despite the *de facto* power differential between the state and Inuit remaining the same. Today, the public governments of the Inuit-majority territories of Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut are fully-fledged state institutions. Importantly, despite the gains both territorial governments have made, they are still fully dependent on the federal/unitary states of Canada

and Denmark for political and economic capital that are vital for the safety and well-being of the people who live there. Through the PC, the Inuit polity is utilising that increase in power to ask for what is essentially a change in the rules and procedures of governance over the Pikialasorsuaq region, which could serve to further balance out the power dynamics between the actors. To this extent, the suggestions can be seen as a form of state contestation within the context of institutionalised inequality, where a shift in the balance of powers is gradually being negotiated.

Another form of state contestation can occur where there is a context of sovereign equality, meaning a situation where the rules and procedures do not favour any particular actor. In those contexts, powerful states may be frustrated by their inability to push through their agendas. This can drive powerful states to withdraw participation and funding from the organisation, perhaps opting to start an alternative organisation with the same purpose. Zürn categorises this dynamic as one that leads to fragmentation of the GGS. The Arctic Council is one such organisation where conditions of sovereign equality apply at the organisational level. In the Council, leadership positions rotate regularly, all actors share responsibilities and obligations, and there is no veto power for any state. Given that the PC was established by the ICC, which is a Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council where it sits in a position of equality with Canada and Denmark, the suggestions could potentially trigger the dynamic described above. The Arctic Council also interacts directly with territorial governments, creating potential for the fragmentation dynamic to occur at the territorial level as Nunavut and especially Kalaallit Nunaat approach independence. At the Arctic Council level, the work of the PC has been integrated into the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group and the Arctic Resilience Action Framework (ARAF), demonstrating Council support for the Commission (Arctic Council, 2018; Compilation of Examples ARAF, 2019).

Therefore, the suggestions by the PC can be conceptualised as a manifestation of contestation within the GGS, corresponding to multiple types of dynamics due to the quasi-state nature of the Inuit polity. Through the territorial governments of Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat,

the dynamics of institutional inequality apply; meanwhile, in the context of the ICC as an actor within the Arctic Council, sovereign equality dynamics apply. At the same time, due to the fact that the PC is established by a legitimate representative of the Inuit polity, and that it has taken an approach of consultative interviews to determine its suggestions, those suggestions can also be understood as societal contestation in response to changes and increased activity in the region. Importantly, the subject of contestation in this case is not the extent to which standards are fulfilled by the authorities, but rather the standards themselves. The PC is not necessarily contesting the *content* of Danish, Canadian, or other authoritative decisions regarding the Pikialasorsuaq region. It is not contesting any particular activity, development, or commercial project. Rather, the PC is contesting the legitimacy of those actors to make the decision in the first place. It is a contestation along the lines of “who” and “how” decisions are made, rather than what the decisions are. As Zürn (2018) points out, the process of contestation is decisive for the development of legitimacy beliefs in the GGS. It is through contestation that legitimacy is built or broken, leading to the deepening or decline of the system.

The Multinational State as Quasi-International Organisation

Contestation must have an audience. In this case, the audiences of contestation are the states of Denmark and Canada. As has been explained at length in this research, the Inuit polity defies easy categorisation as either state or non-state actor. However, because of the conditions of this case, the state itself cannot be so easily categorised, either. The states of Denmark and Canada in this case function simultaneously as states proper and, to a certain extent, as international organisations. This impacts how both Denmark and Canada are able to gain legitimacy from their constituencies and impacts their options to respond to the suggestions of the Commission. In short, duplicity of roles played by Denmark and Canada determine the possible legitimisation narratives available to each state; because the states require legitimacy to exercise authority, this impacts how they will respond to the contestation by the Pikialasorsuaq Commission.

First, however, it is necessary to justify the claim that Canada and Denmark function as quasi-international organisations in this case. This claim is true insofar as both Denmark and Canada are multinational states. Both states exercise authority over different nations of people within their borders, of which Inuit are at least one. Here, the terms international and multinational begin to blur, with the primary difference being that the former refers to interactions between nations that have sovereign states, whereas the latter refers to sovereign states with distinct, non-sovereign peoples living within their borders. However, Canada and Denmark are highly aligned with the GGS, meaning that they have signed relevant legislation such as UNDRIP and are active members in international organisations. Thus, both states have recognised the right to self-determination of the non-sovereign nations within their borders, such as the Inuit. Self-determination brings key aspects of the GGS, such as reflexive authority, the authority-legitimation link, and the norms of the system, into play in the case of the Pitkialasorsuaq region because it places the task and authority of governance in the hands of the Inuit polity, not only the central state. In both multinational states, increased Inuit authority has manifested in greater autonomy at the territorial level. This creates dynamics between territorial, Inuit governments and central governments that are characteristic of the GGS.

This rebalancing of authority changes the dynamics and requirements of legitimacy for Canada and Denmark, which can no longer be understood as “final and absolute authorities that compete with one another” (Zürn, 2018: p. 14). Rather, because Inuit authority has manifested in the build up of the territorial government, Denmark and Canada must legitimise themselves to the Inuit polity as both part of the multinational state and society. The territorial governments of Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut can be understood in this context as analogous to member states at the UN level, with the ability to make requests and suggestions, evaluate activities of the organisation, and choose to reject or accept policies, at least to some extent. For example, shortly following the passage of Home Rule, the Inatsisartut voted to withdraw from the European Communities, despite Denmark remaining part of them (European Union, 2016). Moreover, both Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat must be consulted before statewide legislation passes, if it is

deemed that the legislation may affect the territories in particular (Act on Greenland Self-Government, 2009; Nunavut Act, 1993). In Canada, these processes are today mediated through the Inuit-Crown Joint Committee, whereas in Denmark the Self-Government Act lays out the procedures of reflexive authority between itself and Kalaallit Nunaat. Through these institutions, Denmark and Canada create processes that mimic those of an international organisation with respect to the non-sovereign nations within their borders.

That Canada and Denmark must legitimise their authority to the respective territorial governments does not detract from the need to legitimise their authority to the Inuit polity as a societal actor. Here, another parallel is drawn between international organisations and the functioning of the state in this context. According to Zürn (2018), international organisations have two constituencies: the state and the society. The Inuit polity, composed of citizens, international organizations (re: ICC) and territorial governments, creates this dual constituency for Denmark and Canada to respond to. Moreover, because Inuit are a transnational people, with representation as such through the ICC, Denmark and Canada must consider the interests of Inuit that live outside their borders, as is the case with *Pikialasorsuaq*. The ICC has offices across Inuit Nunangat and is regularly involved with the state at the territorial level in both Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat. In reverse, territorial states are highly connected to the ICC. This is clearly illustrated by the *Pikialasorsuaq* Commission itself, which was composed by the former premiers of Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut, alongside the ICC chairperson. There is substantial crossover of personnel between the ICC and positions within the territorial and even central states in question (Shadian, 2015), implying the presence of transnational Inuit influence within the domestic sphere(s). This aspect augments the sense in which Canada and Denmark can be understood as quasi-international organisations.

The state's of Canada and Denmark rendered in this way can be seen as resembling international organisations within the GGS, though both states nonetheless maintain the norms, structures, and procedures of a constitutional nation-state. Again, what is seen here is not a situation of either/or, but of yes/and. While the norms of the GGS have been clarified up until

this point, those of the constitutional state have yet to be elaborated. This is important to understanding Canada and Denmark's positions because the nature of the quasi-international state can be seen as a hybrid with overlapping elements of both systems. However, Zürn (2018) does not account for the norms of the constitutional nation-state because his theory is intended for analysing international organisations proper, such as the UN. As far as this research has found, this is the first attempt to utilise some of his concepts in a case that deals with states in this way. Therefore, this research uses other sources here to clarify this point and expand on Zürn's theory.

The phrase "constitutional nation-state" is used to refer to societies that are constructed by the rule of law, in which state power is legally bound (Gosewinkel, 2018), and where the imagined identity of the people is connected to the territorially-bound state. Denmark and Canada fall into this category of "constitutional nation-state," as do the majority of present western countries (Zürn, 2018). The norms and institutions of the constitutional nation-state, insofar as they relate to the international sphere, can be understood through the concept of Westphalian sovereignty (Shadian, 2010). In short, Westphalian sovereignty is based on three norms: that states have exclusive sovereignty over their territory; that all sovereign states are legal equals on the international scene, no matter their size or power; and that other states have no right to intervene in domestic affairs (Croxtton, 1999). This perspective is related to the international realism described in section 4.2. Respect for these norms is often the premise upon which states agree to join international organisations like the UN (Zürn, 2018), which is a factor in explaining why the GGS must function on reflexive authority in the first place.

The norms of Westphalian sovereignty and the GGS interplay within the quasi-international states of Denmark and Canada, creating areas of both difference and overlap. The two sets of norms differ most starkly in their conception of sovereignty and territoriality. While the Westphalian perspective holds state sovereignty to be both absolute and directly linked to territory, the GGS sees sovereignty as conditional upon adherence to its own normative foundations and sees territoriality as linked to rights (as in UNDRIP) (Zürn, 2018). There is also

a difference in scope. The GGS is focused on the rights of individuals and conceives of states as actors which have the obligation to provide and uphold those rights. Meanwhile, the Westphalian system is focused on the rights of states as concerned with other states. Finally, the systems differ in the idea and value of sovereign equality between states, with the Westphalian perspective asserting clearly that states should be legally considered as sovereign equals while the GGS is open to negotiation on this point (creating a legitimacy problem for itself, as explained in 4.4). These differences in norms create complicated dynamics regarding the exercise of authority and how it is justified and legitimised, which becomes particularly evident when considering indigeneity and Indigenous spaces.

An Inuit-Defined Space

The concept of indigeneity is deeply related to a history of conflict with Westphalian sovereignty. As has been explained in the Context section, resistance to external power, such as that of the state, is a defining factor of indigeneity. By definition, Indigenous Peoples have their own systems of governance that they seek to maintain and reproduce, creating tension with state power. As constitutional nation-states, Denmark and Canada build their obligations and expectations with citizens through the constitution and the rule of law. These are critical tools in creating state legitimacy for constitutional nation-states (Zürn, 2018). However, in the case of Inuit on both sides of the border, citizenship is complicated by the historical use of force in bringing them under state power (Valadez, 2019). This history renders those obligations negotiable on both sides because it compromises the legitimacy of the constitutional law (ibid). To use Zürn's terms (2018), the legal legitimization narrative, which is based on the concepts of legal equality and impartiality (p.73), is undermined by the fact that Indigenous Peoples have historically not experienced those features. In the long run, this has created a lack of trust in the legitimacy of the state, and particularly in state law (Angry Inuk, 2016).

This legitimacy problem between states and Inuit corresponds to one of the key legitimization problems with the GGS. This problem is that of the biased exercise of authority.

Danish and Canadian state institutions, (re: parliaments, court systems, ministries) do not necessarily exercise authority with impartiality. Like international organisations, they are “created and shaped by powerful actors with a certain social purpose that also pre-determines distributional questions” (Zürn, 2018: p. 95). For both of these states, the “powerful actor” is the state itself, which has built up the procedures, rules and structures of institutions in a way that works to maintain power dynamics. As has been noted, a fundamental aspect of Westphalian sovereignty is the monopoly on power with territorial bounds. State institutions and organisations are structured to uphold that power and can be considered hierarchical in nature, with specific rules and structures built in to maintain status-quo power dynamics (Zürn, 2018). State organisations, such as the government and the police, are entirely dependent on government funding for all procedures, including implementation of decisions. In the case of Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat, this fact holds true, meaning that many decisions made at the territorial level are subject to the approval and support of Canada and Denmark, at the very least in terms of financing. This is also evidenced by the fact that Canada has yet to ratify UNDRIP, despite significant lobbying efforts from Inuit actors since its establishment in 2007. While Inuit may have become better included in Danish and Canadian state institutions, for example via the Inuit-Crown Joint Committee on the Canadian side, state organisations are still built by and for the state. This dynamic of institutional inequality parallels the relationship between weak and powerful states within some international organisations, where powerful states have the ultimate say through veto powers, among other things. As Zürn (2018) points out, “given that any attempt to abolish the special position of the veto powers can be thwarted by this very same veto, we have institutionalized inequality” (p. 86). The state retains this same kind of power within regards to its relationship with non-sovereign nations, such as Inuit, despite the fact that they have become more inclusive of such peoples. On this note, it is worth noting that both the Act on Greenland Self-Government and the Nunavut Act are parliamentary acts which can technically be revoked at any time.

Indigenous Peoples such as Inuit also make a territorial claim to their traditional lands,

playing at a legitimization narrative based on tradition, which conflicts with the Westphalian norm that states have exclusive dominion over their territory. This claim on territory, and the right to govern it, is particularly significant. In claiming a right to govern territory, indigeneity conflicts deeply with the connection between state, nation, and territory that composes the core of the constitutional nation-state. In the case at hand, the Commission's suggestions can be read as a redefining of space on Inuit terms. It is one of colonialism's many legacies that the designation of places was often determined by settlers, redefining regions of importance to Indigenous Peoples on the settlers' terms (Kouri & Skott-Myhre, 2015). This settler subjectivity upon the land defined how modern multinational states perceive and govern their territory (ibid). Pikialasorsuaq is one such region.

For Canada and Denmark, Pikialasorsuaq primarily exists as a border region and a site of scientific research due to its importance for Arctic marine wildlife and part of a potentially profitable shipping route. For Inuit, Pikialasorsuaq is “an enduring cultural and spiritual cornerstone linking Inuit across borders to each other and to their shared history” (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017: p. 27). One resident put it simply: “It’s our life” (ibid). While the practical and substantive importance of the polynya to Inuit cannot be understated, the meaning of the region goes beyond that, playing an existential role in the cultural integrity of Inuit as a people connected to a land. Thus, while the Great North Upwelling can be seen as a border territory between Denmark and Canada, the Pikialasorsuaq region is better understood as an integral part of Inuit Nunangat, the Inuit homeland that constitutes shared Inuit identity. To this extent, the PC’s suggestions can be read as at least an indirect challenge to the territoriality of Denmark and Canada. What the PC is asking for is to redefine how governance and authority are administered based on Inuit understandings of the land, its meaning, and its borders.

Redefining the land effectively produces a reshaping of the problem field of the region, which in turn defines the sphere of authority. Zürn (2018) notes, “spheres of authority can be defined as problem fields that are governed by one or more authorities” (p. 9). The boundaries of these spheres are socially constructed and the spheres are organised by institutions with similar

social purposes. As explained above, states and Inuit have different perceptions of the meaning of land in the region, and thus different definitions of the problems that governance could address. This definitional disconnect between Inuit and states has resulted in a situation where authority exercised over the region -- via the multitude of national, regional, and international legal frameworks, bilateral and land claims agreements, and development initiatives that apply to the region -- has never been applied to it coherently, as a distinct region. By redefining the land, its meaning, and its borders, the PC is suggesting a deep reimagining of what governance should do and by whom it should be done. As the report explains, the primary problems Inuit around Pikialasorsuaq face are food security, climate change, cultural integrity, and development. Meanwhile, for Canada and Denmark, the main problems are national security, geopolitical tensions, and territorial sovereignty. Climate change and development are acknowledged as problems as well, but only insofar as they are linked to national security and sovereignty issues. The Danish Arctic Policy for 2011-2020 states that “increased economic activity and renewed geopolitical interest in the Arctic results in a number of key challenges to ensuring a stable, peaceful and secure region” and claims that “a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic” is the primary strategic target of the policy (p. 10). Similarly, the 2030 Canadian Northern Policy Framework frames the North as a region that “has become an important crossroad where issues of climate change, international trade and global security meet” (p. 1). A climate-security-development nexus is established in both policies, with the territorial, sovereign state as the central subject of protection and services. Meanwhile the PC problematises the region in an entirely different manner, emphasising the health of the people, wildlife, and climate of the region “for future generations,” wherein Inuit are the central subjects of protection and services. These two problem definitions would necessitate different approaches to governance altogether because they define the goals of that governance differently.

Moreover, the fact that it is Inuit who live on Kalaallit Nunaat and in Nunavut is critical in understanding how such a contestation could arise. It is Inuit who are the stewards of the territory, and it is their presence as citizens of the state which justifies Danish and Canadian

sovereignty over the land in the first place (Shadian, 2015). The legitimacy of the constitutional nation-state is derived from the sovereign relationship between territory, state, and nation. However, if there are no people present to justify the sovereignty claim and carry out the exercise of authority, the claim itself becomes highly vulnerable. This has been a particular problem for Canada, which has faced repeated challenges to its sovereignty in the Arctic from the United States, based on the fact that the territory is largely unpopulated. During the Cold War era, these challenges provoked Canada to initiate a forced relocation of 92 Inuit to the high north as a way to reinforce their sovereignty in the region (Bonesteel, 2008). The Canadian government issued a formal apology for this as part of Trudeau's reconciliation policy (Duncan, 2010). Then, in recent years, the United States has challenged Canada's claim to govern the NWP on the same terms, sending ships through the passage without permission (Huebert, 2011). Meanwhile, Kalaallit Nunaat has just accepted 12 million dollars in US foreign development aid, to the chagrin of the Folketing (Selseo Sorensen, 2020). Therefore, the sovereignty of states in the Arctic is dependent upon Arctic peoples living there as citizens of the respective states. This creates a dependency between states and Inuit, in which sovereignty becomes detached from territoriality and finds its locus instead in the process of interaction between Inuit, the land, and the state (Shadian, 2010). In other words, because state sovereignty is embodied by citizens, in this case the Inuit polity, both Canada and Denmark are incentivised, if not bound by necessity, to negotiate authority and power with Inuit. This is especially true because of the extreme conditions that characterise the Arctic. The Arctic environment is hostile to human life and human technology. Survival and safety in such a climate requires knowledge that Inuit have gained over millennia of living there (Pikialasorsuaq Commission, 2017). This Traditional Indigenous Knowledge (TIK) is a valuable asset for Inuit which increases their authority in the region (Shadian, 2010). This dynamic is reinforced by the norms of the GGS, which both states have signed onto.

In sum, the Pikialasorsuaq Commission suggests a new sphere of authority that would be based on Inuit-defined problems and grounded in TIK as the knowledge order (Pikialasorsuaq

Commission, 2017). This has the potential to change the normative purpose of governance in the region, which can be understood as a challenge to state sovereignty in the Westphalian sense. The factor of indigeneity already limits and weakens the state's capacity to utilise some legitimisation narratives, making it more susceptible to such contestation. Indigeneity also comes with its own legitimisation narratives which conflict with the constitutional nation-state, increasing its vulnerability further in terms of legitimacy. This creates a legitimacy problem for the state, especially in the context of increasing activity in the region which itself triggers an increased need for legitimisation. The Inuit polity is in a unique position to have its suggestions heard because the polity acts simultaneously as state and society, allowing contestation from different angles and requiring legitimisation to different actors that compose the polity. At the same time, in the context of this case, the state itself functions simultaneously as a state proper and as a quasi-international organisation, forcing Canada and Denmark to balance the norms of Westphalian sovereignty with those of the GGS. Due to Denmark and Canada being states which are adherent members of the GGS, the PC's attempt to link its suggestions to UNDRIP and other international legislation increases the need for the states to react. Channeling the authority of the GGS, the PC's suggestions attempt to redefine the meaning of the land based on Inuit understandings, thus redefining the sphere of authority. Importantly, this sphere of authority would not exclude other actors, such as the state or international organisations, from engaging. The fact that Pikialasorsuaq lies on a state border, situated near a potential trade route, and is surrounded by mineral resources, ensures that multiple actors will at least attempt to exercise authority in the region, regardless of the ultimate outcome of this Commission's work. However, the new sphere would reimagine the purpose and criteria of that engagement. In this way, without outright rejecting the sovereignty of states, the PC creates a contestation of state sovereignty on Westphalian terms. At the same time, the fact that Inuit are the people that live in the Arctic already requires that states are dependent upon Inuit presence and citizenship to maintain their sovereignty in the Arctic. This is especially true given that the Arctic is an extreme climate, where knowledge of the environment is critical for activities such as

infrastructure development (Shadian, 2010). This creates a situation where sovereignty lies in the interaction between Inuit and state, raising the stakes of legitimation for states. Ultimately, the competing normative systems, the flexible nature of both the Inuit polity and states, the climatic extremity and remoteness of the Arctic, and the context of indigeneity supported by the GGS generate a strong need for the state to legitimate its activities to the Inuit polity. This can be done by responding to the suggestions in a substantive manner (Zürn, 2018). However, as the next section will show, the same factors that make a positive, substantive response from states likely do not exclusively or necessarily translate into a deepening of the GGS. Rather, localisation of the GGS through the PC's suggestions could intersect with internal dynamics at the territorial level to create the potential for simultaneous deepening and decline.

5.2 Response

In the following section, the Danish, Kalaallit Nunaat, and Canadian/Nunavut response to the contestation will be described and explained. The Nunavut/Canadian response is defined by strengthening ties, co-optation, and joint action between Canada and Nunavut and therefore will be explained together. On the other hand, Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat have had separate, though similar, responses, which will be explained in turn. As will be shown shortly, it is due to different constitutional arrangements within Canada and Denmark, historical relationships with Inuit, levels of commitment to international treaties, and relationships to sovereignty that can explain the differing dynamics on each side of the Pikialasorsuaq region. While these aspects may be a source of difference, they are at the same time able to explain why both Canada and Denmark have responded, on the whole, in support of the project. Then, the differences between the Danish and Canadian state responses, and between the Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat territorial responses, will be elaborated and explained. Finally, these responses will be linked to Zürn's concepts of "deepening" and "declining" in order to gain a better understanding of how the Pikialasorsuaq Commission's suggestions could affect the GGS, and more broadly, what this

says about how the Pikialasorsuaq Commission and the Inuit polity in general impacts the system.

Canada and Nunavut

On the Canadian/Nunavut side, the federal and territorial states responded jointly, through mostly joint institutions, by issuing statements and assigning tasks to specific ministries and personnel. In 2019, through the Inuit Crown Partnership Committee, Inuit leaders and the Prime Minister agreed to “working in partnership together, and with the Governments of Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat, to develop a path forward for advancing the sustainable marine management and environmental protection of the Pikialasorsuaq region, and to facilitate mobility for Inuit of the region” (Pikialasorsuaq Leaders Statement, 2019). Following that agreement, the Canadian government has tasked Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) with the responsibilities of finding ways of facilitating free movement for the Inuit across the border and of advancing negotiations with the governments of Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat to agree on a framework for the implementation of Inuit-led management and conservation of the Pikialasorsuaq region (Meakin, 2019). The government of Nunavut is not included in these negotiations; however, it works with these agencies on a variety of other projects. These agencies often rely on Inuit expertise (TIK) for negotiations and implementation (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2019). Moreover, the Pikialasorsuaq Implementation Committee, which was established in 2019 to continue the work of the Commission, is composed entirely of Canadians, including a representative from DFO (Partnership Across the Pikialasorsuaq, 2019).

This reaction can be in part explained by the fact that the Canadian constitutional system is federalised, which means that powers are shared and divided between the federal, provincial, and territorial units with each unit having its own constitution under the Canadian constitution. This can often lead to various conflicts between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. Since territories are directly under the federal government, Nunavut works with the

federal government on a variety of issues dealing with budgets, infrastructure, healthcare, and climate change. As a territory, rather than a province, Nunavut is subject to more control by the federal government and has to depend on the federal government to negotiate with other states and international actors regarding any issue outside of its territorial borders, as well as depending on the Canadian government for money (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2017: p. 9). Nunavut as a territory has little legal control over how international negotiations are conducted besides what pressure it can exert on Canada. In order for Nunavut to be able to fully implement the PC's recommendations, it has to get the Canadian federal government to be willing to engage in an international negotiation with Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat and to also provide funding for establishing new mechanisms of authority, such as the Inuit Monitoring Authority (IMA) or a free mobility zone. This is not to say Nunavut does not have influence over how the Canadian federal government will negotiate, or that the Canadian government does not want Nunavut at the negotiation table, but rather it is meant to point out how reliant the Inuit in Nunavut are on the goodwill of the federal government of Canada.

This reliance on the goodwill of the Canadian federal government emphasises Zürn's idea (2018) of institutionalised inequality, where the Canadian federal government "stratif[ies] chances for influence through the allocation of governance positions... the dependence on state resources in the implementation of these decisions again favors powerful states" (p. 96). Inuit are contesting this institutional inequality especially regarding resources by asking for the creation of the IMA. Creating the IMA would essentially institutionalise a rule change regarding the question of who has the authority to govern in the Arctic, and how. These suggestions come packaged in a narrative of delegitimation towards the state to the extent that the PC report cites numerous national and international agreements that are built on longstanding narratives of decolonisation and resistance to state authority (see Context).

Zürn (2018) points out that "authority holders may respond to these delegitimation practices by either incorporating the new actors and their demands or by ignoring and resisting them" (p. 96). Canada, under the leadership of its current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has

adopted a narrative of reconciliation, in which Trudeau emphasises his aspirations for a new relationship with Indigenous Peoples, stating “...we are committed to building a renewed relationship based on recognition of rights, respect, cooperation, and partnership” (Trudeau, 2019). This “renewed” relationship has also led to Canada dropping its opposition to and signature of UNDRIP in 2016; however, as of 2020, it has yet to legislate it into Canadian law. This is important because Canada, through its own volition, has obligated itself on an international level to include Indigenous Peoples in decision-making processes that affect them, even if there is little legal enforcement.

Canada does not only face pressure from the GGS, but also internally. Section 35 of the Canadian constitution states that “The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” (Constitution Act, 1982). The constitution goes further to define Aboriginal Peoples as Inuit, Métis, and First Nation Peoples, and that any land agreements are considered treaty rights (ibid). This is important, as Aboriginal Peoples fought for this amendment's inclusion in the 1982 Constitution Act, which gave Canada full sovereignty from the United Kingdom. Other societal pressures pushing for greater Inuit authority in governance also come from the scientific community. Dr. David Barber, a professor from the University of Manitoba who has done extensive research in the Canadian Arctic states, stated in a senate Special Committee on the Arctic regarding Inuit management over Pikialasorsuaq, that: “The way I see it is we’re not going to get very far in the Arctic until we have the ability and capacity of the Inuit to lead and manage a lot of these things on their own. As a scientist in the Canadian system, I believe it’s my role to assist them in doing that” (Senate Special Committee on the Arctic, 2018). This societal pressure shows that Indigenous Rights are politicised in Canada. As mentioned earlier, Canada is an international actor; however, there are parallels between international organisations and the role in which Canadian institutions find themselves regarding authority and legitimation in the GGS. Zürn (2018) points out that politicisation is expressed by “[p]ublic resistance to international institutions and their more intensive utilization...” (p. 138).

This politicisation has resulted in various legal Supreme Court cases and land claims agreements, such as the one that created Nunavut, requiring the federal and provincial governments of Canada to include Indigenous Peoples in decision-making processes in Canada. The parallel continues as Canada's legitimacy as a sovereign multinational state is strengthened or diminished by its own response to the politicisation of Indigenous Rights. Many Inuit Canadians have worked in both Inuit and Canadian forms of governance, such as Mary Simon, who has held the positions of Canadian ambassador to Denmark, Canadian ambassador on Circumpolar Affairs, and president of ITK, as well as the person who led Canada's negotiation in the creation of the Arctic Council (Biography - Mary J. Simon, 2016). Mary Simon, among others, has exerted pressure on the Canadian government by pointing out that "[t]he bedrock of Canada's status as an Arctic nation is the history of use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters by Inuit for thousands of years" (Fraser, 2012). Mary Simon's point is critical in understanding the nature of the response. Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is justified on the basis that there are Canadian citizens living in the Arctic. Those citizens are Inuit, and therefore, Canada needs to at least *appear* to be working with them in a way that respects their self-determination. Emphasis is placed on the word "appear" here, not to say that Canada is necessarily *only* responding positively for appearances, but to point out that politicisation can often temporarily be balanced by the appearance of change. Though, as Zürn points out, this ultimately leads to decline and fragmentation in the medium-to-long term (2018). However, given the recentness of this case, it is too early to determine how well Canada will substantiate its claims of reconciliation and a new era of Inuit-Canadian relations.

Denmark

On the other hand, the Danish response has been characterised by quiet support and deference from Denmark toward Kalaallit Nunaat by proxy of the scientific community. Denmark has essentially not responded in any perceivable way from the perspective of this research, aside from supporting research in the region. However, silence can also speak volumes.

In this case, the near total silence can be read as a result of the gains made under the Self-Government arrangement, which has done significant work towards institutionalising a relationship of sovereign equality between the Kingdom and Kalaallit Nunaat, though that transformation is still not complete. This, combined with the support of the scientific community who supports Inuit, can help clarify and explain the seemingly-absent Danish response.

Under the 2009 Act on Greenland Self Government, Kalaallit Nunaat's institutions are responsible for legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government in Kalaallit Nunaat. The government of Kalaallit Nunaat also has the legal authority to interact on the international scene independently of Denmark, so long as those actions have no effect on Danish interests. Importantly, this is not strictly the case with *Pikialasorsuaq*. The polynya, rich in biological and mineral resources, critically located along the Northwest Passage, is potentially a huge source of revenue for governments and corporations. The suggestion to create an IMA, inclusive of protected areas that fall in international waters, may easily interfere with Danish economic interests in the region. The suggestion to create a free mobility zone in a border region, with a non-EU country, could be easily seen by the Kingdom as a concern of national security for Denmark. At the very least, it could be expected that Denmark would take interest in setting the terms of an agreement that so directly concerns the territorial and demographic boundaries of the Kingdom. Moreover, the *Pikialasorsuaq* region includes the disputed territory of Hans Island, which is claimed by both Denmark and Canada, a dispute which falls clearly under the jurisdiction of Danish government under the Self Government Act. However, Denmark has remained silent on the matter. In contrast to Canada, no public statements have been made, no officials have been appointed, and no institution has taken up the issue in any direct way. This is despite the fact that Denmark has a legal right under the Self-Government Act to exercise authority on this matter. That right has effectively been deferred, amounting to tacit consent for the PC and showcasing the high level of reflexive authority that exists between Kalaallit Nunaat and Denmark, marked by an attitude of deference to Kalaallit Nunaat on this issue.

Importantly, it is not the case that Denmark is simply ignoring the Commission or is

somehow unaware of the suggestions. In 2018, the Commission presented their findings and suggestions to the Arctic Council's Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group. In attendance were representatives from the Danish Ministry of Environment and Food, the Danish Maritime Authority, and senior researchers from Aarhus University (Arctic Council, 2018). In 2019, the PC was discussed again at a PAME workshop, with Danish representatives in attendance, particularly researchers from Aarhus University. In 2017, the Ministry of Environment and Food helped fund the North Water Polynya Conference (NOW Conference), which produced a White Paper that serves as the only policy-type document that mentions *Pikialasorsuaq* on the Danish side. Kuupik Kleist, listed as *Pikialasorsuaq* Commissioner, attended, participated in roundtable discussions, and presented the findings of the PC at the conference. Thus, it is evident that Danish authorities have been informed about the Commission's recommendations and have *willingly decided* to not interfere despite their legal right to do so.

Denmark's only visible position indicating a response to the Commission can be discerned through the NOW Conference White Paper, which, despite being primarily scientific in nature, appears to be highly in sync with the suggestions of the PC. The paper concludes that there is "a need for establishing a process for Greenland, Denmark and Canada to involve locals and collaborate on identifying and addressing a) management objectives, b) an integrated monitoring program for the socio-ecological system and c) the most urgent research questions for the NOW polynya" (NOW Conference White Paper, 2019: p. 145). The question "What information is needed to support the management in achieving the objectives, and what adaptation tools may be required for adaptation and sustainable management?" was asked, specifically in reference to local Inuit involvement. Again, this signals an acceptance and deference to Inuit on both sides of the border as the agenda setters in the *Pikialasorsuaq* context. This deference is based on the belief that Inuit knowledge is "seen as crucial among a number of scientific disciplines" (ibid, p. 54). To this extent, Denmark, through funding this knowledge, appears to acknowledge the Inuit polity as an epistemic authority on *Pikialasorsuaq* by proxy of

the scientific community. This means that the Kingdom, at least to some extent, believes that the polity *knows better* and is best suited to interpret facts (Zürn, 2018), such as the meaning of climatic changes for management objectives. The role of the scientific community is key here, as they serve as an important link in the deference of authority. Denmark defers authority to the scientific community by funding research, and the scientific community then defers this authority to Inuit because they rely on Inuit in order to effectively work in the region. This could explain why, in terms of wording, the need to “involve locals” and “collaborate” does imply something less than a full recognition of self-determination. It is not so much that Denmark has deferred authority to Inuit, but to the scientific community, which Inuit are an integral part of through TIK.

Kalaallit Nunaat

Under these circumstances, Denmark appears to have deferred authority in this case, leaving the Naalakkersuisut to respond as it sees fit. Interestingly, the Naalakkersuisut has been just as silent as Denmark on these matters, though for different reasons. While Denmark’s silence can be read as a sign of deference and the slow institutionalisation of sovereign equality, Kalaallit Nunaat’s silence must be seen in light of the domestic politics of independence in Kalaallit Nunaat. As Kalaallit Nunaat’s Commissioner Kuupik Kleist explained in an 2020 interview on the PC’s work, “In Kalaallit Nunaat, there are many conflicting interests regarding this project; for instance, there could be interest in allowing ships with cargo and tourists in the future, while interests in fisheries and perhaps oil exploitation may also emerge at some point” (Jacobsen, 2020). Kalaallit Nunaat is in the unique position of having the *de jure* possibility of independence, but not the *de facto* possibility, due to the fact that the island is still deeply dependent on Denmark for financial solvency and for security. In terms of nearly every measure, from public health to infrastructure to food security, Kalaallit Nunaat struggles to meet the needs of its society, even with the Danish grant. Without it, the economy would be devastated, and everyday Inuit would see a significant drop in their standard of living. In addition to the real life

consequences that a too-quick independence could have in Kalaallit Nunaat, it would also potentially damage the legitimacy of the emerging state. At the same time, in the parliament of Kalaallit Nunaat, known as the Inatsisartut, 24 out of 31 seats are filled by parties that have independence as a major component of their platform (Inatsisartunut Ilaasortat | Inatsisartut, 2019), showing a generalised support for independence on the island. This renders pursuing independence not only a political imperative, but also a legitimacy issue at the domestic level. As an emerging entity pursuing a model of liberal, democratic statehood, Kalaallit Nunaat must at least appear to be pursuing the interests of its citizens. On an international level as well, in order to exercise authority in the international sphere, Kalaallit Nunaat must be legitimised as a proper state which is able to meet the needs and uphold the rights of its citizens. In this context, Kalaallit Nunaat has a legitimacy paradox in the sense that gaining independence could lead to a crash in legitimacy due to loss in standard of living, while *not* gaining independence keeps the emerging state's legitimacy from being fully justified internally and internationally.

In this context, the question is not if, but when and how independence should happen. Kalaallit Nunaat needs to balance its conflicting interests. Siumut, the leading party in Kalaallit Nunaat, advocates for a strategy of gradual independence, using mineral resource development to generate revenue and wean the island off the Danish grant (Siumuts Grundholdninger, n.d.). This strategy has been broadly pursued since Self-Government in 2009. Through the 2009 Mineral Resource Act and ensuing amendments, Kalaallit Nunaat has opened up new areas to mineral resource exploration, streamlined a licensing process, increased the number of available licences per year, done extensive work in resource exploration and mapping, and implemented a favourable taxation and regulation regime for the sector (Mineral Resources Authority - Naalakkersuisut, n.d.). The 2009 Mineral Resource Act transferred full authority over resource development to Kalaallit Nunaat, including the right to revenues. Northwestern Kalaallit Nunaat and the Píkiálasorsuaq region itself, though not the most resource-rich region of the island, have been found to have substantial deposits of iron, gold, copper, zinc, lead, silver, barite, and titanium (Mineral Resources Authority - Naalakkersuisut, n.d.). In particular, the titanium

deposits are of a high grade ore known as ilmenite; this is already being mined at Moriusaq, directly on the coast of Pikialasorsuaq. The project is valued at \$83 million and is undertaken by Bluejay Mining plc., which has three other active mines on the island (Dundas Ilmenite Project - Bluejay Mining, n.d.). The Commission is listed as a stakeholder in the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and has played a consultative role in the development of the mine (Terms of Reference for Social Impact Assessment Pituffik Titanium Project, 2017). Moreover, the Pikialasorsuaq region is close to multiple suspected marine oil reserves and to the Northwest Passage. With resource development so closely linked to the long-term independence plan in Kalaallit Nunaat, suggestions such as the PC's to create an environmental protection zone (potentially including the surrounding land area) could be seen as out of touch with Kalaallit Nunaat's political interests, thus possibly explaining the lack of action on the suggestions.

Another relevant element in explaining the response is the standing of the ICC itself in Kalaallit Nunaat. A main pillar of ICC's work is about uniting transnational Inuit across borders, working towards a vision of a unified people (Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, n.d.). However, not all Inuit across the Arctic are equally enthusiastic about this prospect. Unfortunately, this research was unable to locate data regarding public opinion on the ICC or to transnational Inuit vision in Kalaallit Nunaat. However, the ICC has faced cuts in 2013 and 2019 from the Naalakkersuisut, who provide a subsidy to the organisation, according to news outlets. Moreover, the Kalaallit Nunaat Foreign Policy reports in 2018 and 2019 appear to take a more practical approach to engagement with the transnational Inuit polity. The 2018 report refers to the "Inuit society" only in reference to common interests in seal hunting rights and fighting restrictions on the seal skin industry (Dept. for Udenrigsanliggender, p. 33). At the international level, it appears that Kalaallit Nunaat's priorities are about visibility and partnership with states and supranational institutions, such as the United States, China, and Arctic Council, rather than in strengthening the Inuit polity per say. That said, the 2018 report gives several pages to discussing support for joint marine biological protection with Nunavut in shared waters, including Pikialasorsuaq. The report refers to the area as "an important biodiversity field that

Greenland has a specific focus on. Mr. LeBlanc, minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, confirmed that the interest in *Pikialasorsuaq* is shared by Canada”⁶ (Dept. for Udenrigsanliggender, p. 68), though clearly making no reference to any specific commitments.

Differences and Similarities in State Responses

Canada and Denmark have responded differently from one another to the suggestions of the Commission, which represents a contestation of both states’ legitimacy, and therefore of their right to exercise authority. This has much to do with the spatial, demographic, and historical realities of the Arctic Inuit populations of each state. A key difference between Canada and Denmark in this regard is that Canada has more Indigenous Peoples than Denmark. This means that Canada is more dependent on societal approval of Inuit, other Indigenous groups, and their supporters to legitimise the state's sovereignty in the Arctic, compared to Denmark. In other words, sovereignty over a territory is tied to having citizens in that territory, and those citizens must view the state as legitimate for its authority to hold. This is because the citizens are the actual people who carry out the exercise of authority on the ground. Especially in the case of the Arctic, where there are very few who know how to survive in the harsh climate, it is critical that those few view the state as legitimate enough to at least carry out its authority. This dependency makes the state more susceptible to societal contestation, and thus creates space for either compromise or force.

The fact that Canada also needs to appear to act in accordance with global governance norms tilts the balance in favour of compromise, or at least the appearance of it. The fact that Canada has more Indigenous Peoples can thus explain why Canada has been more reluctant than Denmark to sign international agreements, such as UNDRIP, and also explain why Canada has taken a stronger, more outwardly supportive response. With more Indigenous Peoples across a greater amount of their territory, Canada has more at stake in acknowledging the rights of Indigenous Peoples, particularly the right to self-determination. Indigenous Peoples in Canada

⁶ Translated by Louise Kongsted, 3 May 2020

have legal claim to about 50% of Canada's landmass; Inuit territories of Nunavut, Nunavik, Nunatsiavut, and NunatuKavut alone account for 35% of Canadian territory. If Canada wishes to maintain its legitimacy in the GGS, it must at least appear to respect the exercise of authority, including control of resources and revenues from resources, over half of its territory (Inuit Nunangat, 2020). In this case, taking up the suggestions of the Commission and paying verbiage to the right to self-determination allows Canada to fulfill both its interests: appearing to meet the norms of global governance, while also maintaining ultimate authority over the process of implementing the suggestions.

The Kingdom of Denmark had much less at stake in signing and implementing UNDRIP. Denmark is the political, economic, and demographic hub of the Kingdom, while Kalaallit Nunaat is sparsely populated, and, recently realised economic potential notwithstanding, an economically-underdeveloped region. Moreover, Denmark remains an important supporter of the Kalaallit Nunaat's mineral resource industry, with the two governments, and many scientists from Danish universities, working jointly to develop resource maps and licensing plans under the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (Greenland Geology And Selected Mineral Occurrences, n.d.). In the Standard Terms, Danish as well as Kalaallit Nunaat's labourers get priority for employment in resource development projects; both Danish and Kalaallit Nunaat's laws apply to all licences at any given time; and Denmark's Supreme Court maintains the power of arbitration. Furthermore, the Government of Kalaallit Nunaat and the Danish Minister for Environment and Energy jointly make the final decision on all licencing agreements (Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 2013). Once an application is accepted and a licence provided, Kalaallit Nunaat is required to compensate Denmark for "the provision of consultancy and other attendance to tasks" (Act on Greenland Self-Government, 2009; s. 9.1). Through these capacity-building activities, Denmark is ensured a role in building up the market in which it will eventually participate when Kalaallit Nunaat reaches independence. With this institutionalised connection to the potential market, and with no other Danish territories populated by Indigenous

Peoples, the legitimacy benefits of signing UNDRIP potentially may have thus outweighed the potential losses and made it less imperative for Denmark to maintain sovereignty over the island.

Differences and Similarities in Territorial Responses

At the territorial level, Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut have responded differently as well. These actors are simultaneously representatives of the Inuit polity and part of the Danish and Canadian states, respectively. As part of Canada, a highly-multinational state where Inuit are a minority, Inuit in Nunavut have had to either fight for Inuit-led forms of governance or share authority with non-Inuit actors, such as the federal or provincial state. Nunavut was established as recently as 1999. In contrast, the Inuit in Kalaallit Nunaat have been gaining authority over Kalaallit Nunaat and its resources since Home Rule in 1974. This difference may lead to the Inuit in Nunavut and in Kalaallit Nunaat to view or prioritise the PC in slightly different ways. With the PC suggestions meaning an increase of authority and self-determination for the government of Nunavut, the government of Kalaallit Nunaat may have more of a question of how much of the Pikialasorsuaq region needs protection versus development. For Kalaallit Nunaat, an emerging state still in the process of statebuilding and establishing its authority-legitimation link, the suggestion of the PC to share authority with Canada and Nunavut over an area with key resources may not match well with Kalaallit Nunaat's interests.

The relationship between Kalaallit Nunaat and its resources is different from the relationship between Nunavut and its resources. While Kalaallit Nunaat has attached its hopes for independence on resource development, Nunavut's resource development brings nearly the opposite benefit: the economic support and power of the state of Canada. This is not to say that Inuit in both Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat do not share the same goals of protecting the Pikialasorsuaq region or having free movement, but that the issue of control over the decision-making about resources may be more of a factor for Kalaallit Nunaat than Nunavut due to the different constitutional arrangements and interests of Inuit in their respective states.

5.3 Deepening or Decline

The responses outlined above create a possibility of both deepening and decline of the GGS. As Zürn (2018) notes, these processes often go hand-in-hand due to the complexity of the system and the ripple effects that are created by decisions. Importantly, the processes of deepening and decline are medium-term in scope. An instance of decline or fragmentation is not a signal of a failing or collapsing system; rather, it is a type of change within the system that signals a decrease in its capacity to legitimately exercise authority, often within a specific sphere of authority. This change can be reversed through dynamics of deepening at a later point in time. For this reason, this research cannot say whether the system as a whole will ultimately deepen or decline in the long term, but it can chart out some possibilities in terms of changing dynamics of legitimacy and authority. In addition, this research comes up on one of its main limitations here: the fact that this is an ongoing case. As has become evident by now, the responses of Denmark, Kalaallit Nunaat, and Canada/Nunavut are incomplete. What the end result of the PC's suggestions will be remains to be seen, as the relevant actors have really only begun the process of responding to the suggestions. While the responses thus far hint that the suggestions will be implemented in some form or another, this cannot be said for certain, and even if it could, the details cannot be determined. Therefore, this section will take on a hypothetical perspective, looking specifically at how the responses thus far could impact legitimacy and the exercise of authority by the actors in question, and how this could affect the system at large.

Starting with Canada, the possibility of a deepening versus decline of state legitimacy depends highly on how well the state is able to substantiate its response. This must be seen in the context of the politics of the era of reconciliation. In many ways, the state's supportive response to the PC's suggestions fall well in line with the policy of reconciliation and improving state-Aboriginal relations overall. The Canadian response to the Pikialasorsuaq Commission is tightly connected to this policy. In a Joint Leaders Statement, Trudeau stated that "reconciliation and self-determination are key to this government's commitment to Inuit and establishing Inuit

leadership in the Pikialasorsuaq [which] supports this goal,” clarifying the direct link between reconciliation and the Canadian response (2019). Reconciliation can be seen as a legitimization narrative, insofar as it attempts to justify the continued exercise of authority over Aboriginal lands. Trudeau (2019) stated, “We believe that this initiative provides a unique opportunity for us to *come together* to strengthen ocean conservation, and build a strong, sustainable Arctic region where Inuit *share in its responsible management and future opportunities*” (authors emphasis added).

Ultimately, if the Canadian state substantiates its support of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, and takes real action to implement the suggestions, this would deepen the legitimacy of the reconciliation narrative, and thus deepen the state’s ability to exercise authority over Inuit and other Aboriginal lands, while still falling in line with the norms of the GGS. In a concrete sense, this deepening would imply an investment of resources from the Canadian state in terms of financing, human capacity, and political will that would go into creating an IMA, or a conservation area and a free travel zone. This would create dynamics of reinforcement in which these investments in a decision make it more costly to change that decision in an organisational sense (Zürn, 2018). Such a sequence could imply a deepening of the GGS at large (re: at the UN level) because it would legitimise UNDRIP as an effective tool for negotiating authority between multinational states and Indigenous Peoples. The epistemic authority of the declaration, and thus by proxy the UN, would be increased. Moreover, if events occur in this direction, Canada stands to gain a measure of sovereignty precisely through the devolution of authority. This would create legitimacy for the norms of the GGS as opposed to the Westphalian perspective, serving as an example in which international authority, common goods, and respect for the rights of individuals strengthen sovereignty of the state.

For Canada, which is conceived as a quasi-international institution, this sequence could remedy some legitimacy problems faced by the GGS, such as technocratic bias and impartial exercise of authority -- but not for the UN. As a constitutional nation-state, Canada does not suffer from legitimacy problems relating to technocratic bias because it can use many other

narratives, such as participatory, legal, and fairness, to justify its authority. However, in the context of indigeneity, some of those narratives are weakened due to historical facts. The sequence described above could strengthen the legitimacy of those narratives in the Indigenous context because it could improve societal trust in the law and state. At the same time, it would improve the problem of partiality in the exercise of authority by changing the rules and procedures of governance in Pikialasorsuaq to more closely resemble a situation of sovereign equality, though admittedly to a limited extent. Meanwhile, for the UN, this sequence would not remedy the legitimacy problems because the legitimacy generated for the UN would be along technocratic lines in terms of effectiveness. No other legitimization narratives become open to the UN by proving UNDRIP to be useful -- it is ultimately another example of expertise. It also does not touch on partiality of authority at the UN level.

On the other hand, if Canada does not uphold the commitments it has made through the reconciliation policy by responding supportively to the PC's suggestions, a sequence of decline and fragmentation could follow. Zürn (2018) notes that when authorities make empty promises, politicisation increases in society, leading to further contestation, delegitimation, and ultimately decline and fragmentation. It is difficult to say where this fragmentation could occur in such a scenario. An absence of action and change could cause societal contestation directed towards the federal and/or territorial state, or the ICPC, depending on public opinion. In an extreme scenario, this could lead to greater societal contestation (from Canadian Inuit citizens) and state contestation (from Nunavut) in the form of greater calls for independence. This contestation could lead Canada to backtrack on its reconciliation narrative, which is built on the premise of enhancing partnership and advancing Canadian interests together, signaling fragmentation and decline. Even a less extreme scenario, such as intensive protesting, could create similar dynamics. UNDRIP itself would be seen as ineffective, causing decline in the technocratic legitimacy of the UN as an epistemic authority.

It is also possible that Canada will substantiate its narrative and response *somewhat*, making real changes in some areas, but not on all accounts. For example, Canada could support

the implementation of one of the suggestions, but not the others. What would matter in this case would be how Canada's dual constituencies (the state of Nunavut and Canadian Inuit citizens) perceive this partially-substantiated response. At the same time, external factors could affect the dynamics, because reconciliation is a broad narrative that extends to many policy areas, such as public health, education, and climate. For example, how well Canada responds to COVID-19 in Nunavut and other Inuit territories could outweigh any effects on legitimacy that the Pikialasorsuaq Commission might have.

In the case of Denmark, the state's response appears likely to lead to deepening and decline simultaneously, though at different levels. Mineral resource arrangements notwithstanding, Denmark accepted the inevitability of Kalaallit Nunaat's independence in 2009 with the signing of the Self-Government Act. The lack of Danish response shows that Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat are on the path away from a relationship of institutionalised inequality and towards one of sovereign equality within the multinational Kingdom. However, the prospect of independence complicates the matter. As soon as Kalaallit Nunaat gains independence, it will be more difficult to consider Denmark as a multinational state (Faroe Islands notwithstanding), and thus will make less sense to see the state as quasi-international in nature. In a certain sense here, the situation is such that Denmark's historic embrace of the norms of the GGS will ultimately make those norms more obsolete within the domestic context. Once Kalaallit Nunaat gains independence, Denmark will no longer govern over Indigenous Peoples, and thus the norms of the GGS, insofar as they relate to Indigenous Peoples, will no longer be applicable domestically. This situation would be one which the deepening/decline paradigm struggles to account for because Denmark would no longer fit the classification as quasi-international to the same extent. This change would, however, affect Denmark's legitimacy as a member state in other organisations within the GGS such as the Arctic Council. If Kalaallit Nunaat becomes independent, it may be difficult for Denmark to retain its legitimacy as an Arctic state since it will not have any Arctic territory left. This loss in status could cause Denmark to join a coalition of non-Arctic states which, in theory, could seek to form an alternative organisation for influence

in the region, reflecting the dynamics of counter-institutionalisation. However, this possibility can only be seen as speculation given the myriad of other factors at play that would need to coalesce to create such a scenario.

That said, signs show that Denmark is beginning to disengage with the Arctic. For example, the number of Danish attendees at Arctic Council meetings has decreased in recent years, and out of all the Arctic states, Denmark is the only one who has yet to publish an Arctic policy past 2020. What is clear, however, is that the situation Denmark finds itself in regarding Kalaallit Nunaat is a consequence of a history of deepening of the GGS within the state. On the social, political, institutional, and economic levels, Denmark has invested heavily in Kalaallit Nunaat's self-determination and ultimately independence. Changing this dynamic would likely prove to be costly across all those dimensions. In other words, it has become "more and more costly to change the institutional design" (Zürn, 2018: p. 92). of Kalaallit Nunaat-Denmark relations up to this point than to simply let it happen, despite the fact that Denmark stands to lose status in some international organisations and some measure of access to resources.

Finally, the response from Kalaallit Nunaat may lead to politicisation, fragmentation, and ultimately the decline of the GGS. Kalaallit Nunaat's aspirations for independence, combined with the lack of capacity of the emerging state to meet the needs of its population, puts the territorial government in a legitimacy paradox, wherein it risks a loss of legitimacy whether or not it pursues independence. The Naalakkersuisut may be able to find a way out of this paradox through resource development, particularly in the context of recent interest from the United States in purchasing the island. The need for resource development to cure the legitimacy paradox has the potential to conflict with the requests of the PC, which seeks in part to create a conservation area around Pikialasorsuaq. In this case, it is the legitimacy of the ICC which may face decline. The fact that ICC and the Canadian state have moved forward with the suggestions without much input from Kalaallit Nunaat may create a sense of intrusive authority in the perspective of the Naalakkersuisut, which would lead to contestation or possible counter-institutionalisation. Counter-institutionalisation refers to when powerful actors within an

organization are unable to exert their power due to a structure of sovereign equality with less powerful actors. In response, the powerful actors may choose to join a different organization that works in the same sphere of authority, or start a new one (Zürn, 2018: p. 7). The Naalakkersuisut, should it become the government of an independent state, would then have the option to join other international organisations, such as the Arctic Council, which it may see as better suited to its interests. Alternatively, the ICC and Canada could adjust their stance on the requests in order to include Kalaallit Nunaat interests, which would lead to a deepening of legitimacy.

These hypothetical processes of deepening and decline within each context would inevitably interact with one another. While Denmark, Nunavut, Kalaallit Nunaat, and Canada have all responded individually as distinct actors, those individual responses have already begun to intersect in interesting ways that affect the relationships between different actors. Ultimately, due to the complexity of the situation and the fact that it remains in its early stages, with responses only just having begun to manifest, it is difficult to predict or even speculate on what outcomes could be produced by this situation in the end. However, what can be said is that dynamics of deepening and decline will likely occur simultaneously, effecting actors differently.

6.0 Discussion and Contributions

Circling back to the research question, “To what extent does the Pikialasorsuaq Commission lead to a deepening or decline of the global governance system?” the answer, according to this research’s analysis, is deepening and decline of the global governance system are likely to occur simultaneously at different levels of governance, spheres of authority, and among different actors. This all depends on how states respond to the PC’s suggestions. To further clarify, Inuit polity operates at all levels of the GGS through their participation in international fora such as the UN, the ICC, and the Arctic Council, and through territorial governments such as Kalaallit Nunaat and Nunavut in pursuit of integrating their interests into

the system, such as food security. This blurs the line between state and non-state actors. Their involvement in governance, recognition on the international and state level as an Indigenous People, and status as citizens give Inuit the ability to both challenge and exercise authority. The Pikialasorsuaq Commission, as a manifestation of the polity, works both inside and outside state structures and contests the GGS by trying to gain *de facto* authority over the entirety of the Pikialasorsuaq region for the protection of their people and environment. Due to the different constitutional arrangements between Canada and Nunavut, and Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat, responses from the different state and territorial governments manifested differently. Nunavut has limited power, but is able to exert pressure on the Canadian federal government through societal pressure, bilateral mechanisms (re: ICPC), and TIK. Canada has responded by starting negotiations with Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat to establish a framework for future negotiations on the Pikialasorsuaq region. Denmark's response has been to defer its authority to Kalaallit Nunaat, which can be understood as an effect of long-term deepening of the GGS at the state level via the Self-Government Act, *inter alia*. Kalaallit Nunaat's response has yet to be well-ascertained, but depends greatly on how Canada and the ICC approaches negotiations with Kalaallit Nunaat.

While this research has not been fully able to answer the research question by saying whether the PC leads to deepening or decline of the GGS, through the process of analysis, other contributions to the field have been made. It has shown that, contrary to the assumption that state sovereignty and authority necessarily go hand-in-hand, this research outlined how state sovereignty has the potential to increase through the devolution or sharing of authority with other actors. Applying Zürn's concepts of reflexive authority (2018) revealed that actors that have territorial sovereignty may recognise that they are not in the best position to exercise authority and may have to defer to other actors to exercise authority due to legitimisation issues characteristic of the GGS. This concept is used by Inuit polity as they are the holders of TIK and have been the continual inhabitants of Inuit Nunangat for millenia. The legitimisation narratives

Inuit use have appeared to be effective in negotiating authority from the respective colonial states.

If the PC's suggestions are implemented, this could strengthen other Indigenous Peoples' arguments who live in states that have invested in the GGS. Conceptualising the state as a quasi-international organisation allowed this research to apply Zürn's concepts to the state, such as reflexive authority and the authority-legitimation link (2018). This showed that in certain contexts, such as the context of Indigenous lands and Peoples, the state may take on a mode of operation that is more akin to that of an international organisation. Both Canada and Denmark in this case utilise reflexive authority as opposed to direct power in the way they interact with the Inuit polity manifested in the territorial states of Nunavut and Kalaallit Nunaat. Moreover, Denmark and Canada face similar legitimation problems to the GGS because of the context of indigeneity. At the same time, this research contributes to understanding decision-making at various levels with attempts to blend thinking from GGT, rooted in liberalism, with the perspective of Westphalian state sovereignty, rooted in realism. In doing so, it was found that the context of indigeneity creates a space where Westphalian sovereignty is already vulnerable, and the GGS has greater potential to take hold. Interestingly, this can lead to stronger sovereignty claims for states like Canada on the conventional, international scene. This has implications for ideas about how change happens on the international level because it demonstrates that relatively small, localised instances of contestation can create ripple effects that ultimately have the potential to shift geopolitics, despite admittedly being just a drop in the ocean of global international relations.

Another finding from the research was that the relationship between central and territorial states can be an important factor in understanding how responses and decision-making processes play out. In Kalaallit Nunaat, the Inuit have *de facto* authority and have the ability to gain *de jure* authority which puts Kalaallit Nunaat on track for independence. Meanwhile in Canada, due to its multinational nature, Nunavut can only have *de facto* authority, which was gained by arguing that Inuit existence in Inuit Nunangat strengthens Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. This

co-optation of sovereignty has given Nunavut leverage to gain greater authority over their land as well as financial support via the ICPC.

Two trends could be found. In Kalaallit Nunaat, the trend is of relinquishing authority and sovereignty to the Naalakkersuisut, which actually started with the advent of Home Rule in 1979. In Nunavut, co-opting or co-development of authority and sovereignty between Nunavut and Canada has been the trend and is related to the policy of reconciliation, which is much more recent. The significance is that Inuit react differently depending on which nation-state they are located in and what the relationship is like with that state. Timing is also of the essence because of the patterns of reinforcement that go alongside deepening. When Denmark began its gradual relinquishing of authority in 1979, it did not necessarily know that climate change would occur, causing the melting of ice sheets and revealing economically-valuable resources. However, because it has invested politically and materially in this path, it has come to the point now where, if Denmark were to change course, it would come at a great cost of legitimacy and wasted investments of time, money, human resources, and political will. Meanwhile, Canada has built its reconciliation policy in a time when more knowledge is readily available.

Future research will be needed to see how the Pikialasorsuaq Commission's suggestions are implemented with a specific focus on how Canada and Kalaallit Nunaat negotiate an agreement for implementing an IMA, creating a free-travel zone, and establishing a conservation area in the Pikialasorsuaq region. Future research can use the processes established in this research in terms of looking into the dynamics of authority and legitimacy between states and Inuit, or other Indigenous Peoples. This process could also be used to look at non-indigenous transnational peoples. It could be interesting to use a state's dynamics, authority, and legitimacy to further understand the great differences in how transnational peoples pursue authority, power, and independence. In terms of social science research in the Arctic, this research could be built upon for an in-depth examination of the Arctic Council or the ICC. On a practical note, this research would recommend that the suggestions of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission be implemented because it would help address some of the problems arising from colonialism by

ensuring that Inuit can control their own food security, create a platform for addressing climate change, and fight environmental threats on an important biological region. Implementation of these suggestions would put Inuit in a better position to create their own scientific research that would have TIK and Inuit interests included.

7.0 Conclusion

This research has shown that Inuit polity through the Pikialasorsuaq Commission is able to influence the GGS through the mechanism of contestation. In this case, that contestation came in the form of three suggestions, and thus played into the system of reflexive authority that is characteristic of the GGS. Through their suggestions, the Pikialasorsuaq Commission challenged the legitimacy of Canada's and Denmark's authority in the polynya region, suggesting instead that the authority lies with Inuit. However, by using the medium of a request, the challenge was able to also acknowledge the sovereignty of the states.

As a result, the states responded differently, with Canada seeming to co-opt and incorporate the suggestions into its wide narrative of reconciliation that it has been pursuing. This can be seen as a strategic move on Canada's part, due to the fact that Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is dependent upon the state maintaining a functional relationship with Inuit who live there. Moreover, as an intensely multinational, highly-federalised state, Canada has a high stake in balancing its legal obligation to respect the right to self-determination of recognised peoples, such as Inuit, and maintaining state authority over half of its territory, which is populated by Indigenous Peoples. This creates a high incentive for Canada to accept and act on Inuit suggestions, but ensure that this is being done on Canada's terms and within its institutions.

While Denmark is also dependent on Inuit citizens to maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic, the state has already agreed to eventually defer that sovereignty to Kalaallit Nunaat through the Self-Government Act. Given the financial cost of maintaining Kalaallit Nunaat within the realm, and the mechanisms that have been put into place to facilitate Danish

engagement in the mineral resources market, Denmark's incentives point in the direction of encouraging independence for Kalaallit Nunaat. This is at least one factor in explaining why Denmark has seemed to completely defer to Kalaallit Nunaat authority on the PC's suggestions, despite some of the suggestions falling within the legal jurisdiction of Denmark. Another factor is that Denmark has invested so heavily in the path that it is on that change would be too politically, socially, and economically costly.

At the territorial level, Kalaallit Nunaat's response, or lack-there-of, can be seen in relation to the legitimacy paradox that the emerging state faces on the independence question. On one hand, Naalakkersuisut faces popular, internal pressure to gain independence rapidly. On the other hand, pursuing independence too rapidly could lead to a crash in standard of living. In order to escape this paradox, Kalaallit Nunaat has placed its bets on resource development, a pursuit which could be compromised by some of the suggestions of the Commission. Meanwhile, for Nunavut, the prospect of an Inuit-managed region could be seen as substantially strengthening Inuit and territorial *de facto* authority within the multinational state, where Inuit are a significant minority. Moreover, given the Canadian support for the project, implementing the PC's suggestions could serve as a way to bring the financial power of the state into the territory, which is underdeveloped. This can help explain why Nunavut seems to have accepted the Canadian move to co-opt the PC's suggestions and is willing to pursue co-development even though it falls short of full self-determination.

These dynamics lead simultaneously to trends of deepening and decline of the GGS. This research is unable to conclusively say how those dynamics will ultimately play out due to the fact that the project is still in progress and responses are still developing. However, in analysing the dynamics so far, this research gained insight into how the interactions between contestation, authority, and legitimacy play out at the localised level of the GGS. By taking Zürn's definition (2018) of the GGS, including his understanding of the norms and his concepts of reflexive authority, legitimization narratives, and the authority-legitimation link, and applying it to a localised sphere of authority within the system, this research showed how those norms and

concepts influence different levels and types of government. In this regard, it appears that the need to justify and legitimate based on the norms of the GGS do not stop at the international level, but are in fact brought to bear even in the domestic setting.

In particular for deeply multinational states like Canada, the normative claim that individuals and peoples have rights, including the right to self-determination, binds the state's claim to sovereignty to its ability to at least appear to respect and uphold those rights. This process has the potential to build up Canadian and Inuit sovereignty simultaneously, linking pursuits of power that are most frequently seen as opposition. This merging of sovereignties is highly connected to the demographic and territorial facts on the ground. In the case of the Arctic, it is Inuit who are the stewards of the territory, and it is their presence as citizens of Canada which justifies Canadian authority over the land. Thus, sovereignty becomes detached from territoriality and finds its locus instead in the process of interaction between Inuit, the land, the state, and the international community (Shadian, 2010). However, as this research shows, this trend towards a process of merging sovereignties is just one possibility. In the case of Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat, the influence of the very same norms has led to the opposite outcome: the slow dividing of sovereignties and the eventual emergence of a new independent state.

From the standpoint of this research, it seems that one factor that can explain these very different situations is the historical timeline of state engagement with the GGS. In the case of Denmark, it seems that the state embraced and implemented the norms of the GGS, at least regarding Kalaallit Nunaat, at a much earlier stage than Canada. Kalaallit Nunaat has been gaining significant measures of authority and self-determination since Home Rule in 1974; meanwhile, Nunavut only gained status in 1999. One aspect of the process of deepening is that, as a system deepens, it becomes more and more costly to change it (Zürn, 2018). Timing and the historical moment plays a role in this. The fact that Kalaallit Nunaat and Denmark have been investing political, social, and economic capital into independence for nearly fifty years can be said to increase cost along those same dimensions of switching course. This can help explain why, even as Kalaallit Nunaat becomes more and more attractive from a resource development

perspective, and even though the Folketing technically retains the right to revoke the Self-Government Act, these outcomes would be unlikely. Therefore, Denmark has pursued other means of maintaining its long-term economic interests in Kalaallit Nunaat while also tactfully encouraging independence through the deferral of authority, as in the case of the PC. Meanwhile, Canada acted later in implementing the GGS norms, and thus maintained flexibility in how it negotiated authority in light of the climatic changes that have exposed the vast economic potential of the entire region.

Thus, this research concludes that, in the face of the power of the state, Inuit have found ways to influence the GGS through contestation. This contestation, as in the case of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, has had the effect of localising the norms and structures of the GGS, and therefore has increased its influence on states that have already signed onto relevant documents. This process induces the need for states to legitimise themselves along the norms of the system, making room for Inuit and state authority to be renegotiated in the reflexive manner that defines the GGS. This can lead to various outcomes, which in turn require a response from other actors within the same or other spheres of authority, and so on. This becomes a ripple effect of contestation, responses, and outcomes within the system. The complexity here makes it very difficult to pinpoint exactly when an outcome has been reached, and thus makes it difficult to uncover a precise answer to the research question at hand. However, in pursuing the answer, much has been revealed about possibilities for Inuit influence on the GGS, on the quasi-international state, and has contributed to theoretical understandings of the GGS that can reach beyond the international level alone.

In this way, this research broadens the possible subjects of global governance studies vertically and outlines some possible pathways that non-state or quasi-state actors could gain influence and authority within the GGS. Through the Pikialasorsuaq Commission, Inuit polity appears likely to have at least some success in having its suggestions implemented. This could have concrete benefits for Inuit in the Pikialasorsuaq region by securing the protection of wildlife, increasing food security, allowing friends and family across the border to connect more

easily, helping to maintain Inuit culture, helping to ensure Inuit interests are met in upcoming development projects, and ultimately providing a venue for the exercise of Inuit authority in the region. Importantly, these expected gains would be due at least in part to the linking of sovereignties and interests through contestation. This finding paints an unusual yet useful picture of how a people's authority can be enhanced through spaces of co-dependence, negotiated knowledge orders, and reflexive authority, rather than through direct competition, opposition, or resistance. While this research does not pretend to make any normative claim about any of these strategies, it does suggest that these dynamics reveal potential pathways for how change might happen within the GGS specifically. What can be said is that Inuit have been and will very likely continue to be important actors in building, shaping, and reproducing the structures of Arctic governance. As the Arctic continues into the era of climate change, causing geopolitical tensions and economic potentials to rise, those structures are likely to become increasingly important for global politics and for the world.

8.0 References

- A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat, (2016). Inuit Circumpolar Council. Retrieved from <https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Declaration-on-Resource-Development-A4-folder-FINAL.pdf> [3 May 2020]
- A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, (2016). Inuit Circumpolar Council. Retrieved from <https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration-11x17.pdf> [3 May 2020]
- Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada (1993). Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Tungavik.
- Anderson, Erik and Bonesteel, Sarah, "A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development: Lessons in Consultation and Cultural Competence" (2010). Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi). 70. <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/70>
- Arctic Council, 2011. AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON AERONAUTICAL AND MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE IN THE ARCTIC.. [online] Oaarchive.arctic-council.org. Available at: <<https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].
- Arctic Council *Working Group Meeting Report*. (2018). Quebec City. Retrieved from <https://www.pame.is/document-library/pame-reports-new/pame-working-group-meeting-reports/232-pame-i-2018-meeting-report/file>
- Åtland, K. (2008). Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43(3), 289–311. doi: 10.1177/0010836708092838

- Axworthy, T. S., & Dean, R. (2013). Changing the Arctic Paradigm from Cold War to Cooperation: How Canada's Indigenous Leaders Shaped the Arctic Council. *The Yearbook of Polar Law Online*, 5(1), 7–43. <http://doi.org/10.1163/22116427-91000117>
- Bai, J. (2015). The imo Polar Code: The Emerging Rules of Arctic Shipping Governance. *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 30(4), 674–699. <http://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-12341376>
- Barber, D., Marsden, R., Minnett, P., Ingram, G., & Fortier, L. (2010). Physical processes within the North Water (NOW) polynya. *Atmosphere-Ocean*, 39(3), 163–166. <http://doi.org/10.1080/07055900.2001.9649673>
- BBC News. 2020. US Announces Millions In Aid For Greenland. [online] Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52396715> [Accessed 14 May 2020]
- Bevir, M. (2011). Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma. *The Sage Handbook on Governance*, 1–16. <http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.4135/9781446200964>
- Berger, P., 2011. The Sacred Canopy. Open Road Media, p.11.
- Bluejay Mining. n.d. Dundas Ilmenite Project - Bluejay Mining. [online] Available at: <https://bluejaymining.com/projects/greenland/dundas-ilmenite-project/> [Accessed 1 May 2020].
- Bonesteel, S., & Anderson, E. Canada's Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development (2008). Government of Canada. Retrieved from <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016900/1100100016908>
- Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 2013. Application Procedures And Standard Terms For Mineral Exploration And Prospecting Licences In Greenland. [online] Govmin.gl. Available at: https://govmin.gl/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Application_Procedures_and_Standard_Terms.pdf [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Canada. Parliament. *Constitution Act*, 1982, being Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (UK), c 11, s 35 [online] Available at <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html> [30 April 2020]

Canada. Parliament. Senate. The Senate Special Committee on the Arctic, (2018). *Evidence*. 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. Retrieved from Canadian Senate website: https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/421/ARCT/53939-e?fbclid=IwAR3sNXB20ou_Qq7UgZyjN_a_Qj1Taus0U07upfnjR9DIJ6xaogKwL0PA-d4 [30 April 2020]

Canada. Parliament. *Nunavut Act*, 1993 S.C. c. 28 [1993] [online]. Ottawa. <<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/n-28.6/>>, retrieved on 28 May 2020

Canada. Supreme Court. *Reference as to whether "Indians" includes in s. 91 (24) of the B.N.A. Act includes Eskimo inhabitants of the Province of Quebec*, 1939 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1939] SCR 104, <<http://canlii.ca/t/fslhl>>, retrieved on 4 April 2020

China. The State Council,. (2018) *China's Arctic Policy* [online]. Beijing: The State Council Information Office.[Viewed on 12 March 2020] Retrieved from http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

Croxton, D., 1999. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty. The International History Review, 21(3), pp.569-591.

Denmark. Folketing. The Greenland Home Rule Act No. 577, The Greenland Home Rule Act No. 577 (1978) [online]. Copenhagen. [viewed on 15 March 2020] https://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html

Denmark. Folketing. Act on Greenland Self-Government Act No. 473, Act on Greenland Self-Government (2009) [online]. Copenhagen. [viewed on 27 May 2020] https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Engelske-tekster/Act%20on%20Greenland.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0CVSFBfrOGtRMLo2mnwVDjAW_jso3yps2dWhq12e3VFmUKaV7ZG3jETbk

- Duncan, J., 2010. Apology For The Inuit High Arctic Relocation. [online] Rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca. Available at: <<https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100016115/1534786491628>> [Accessed 24 May 2020].
- European Union. 2016. The History Of The European Union - 1982 | European Union. [online] Available at: <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1980-1989/1982_en> [Accessed 22 May 2020].
- Fraser, W., 2012. Inuit View on Canada's Arctic Sovereignty. Above & Beyond- Canada's Arctic Journal, [online] (May/June). Available at: <<http://arcticjournal.ca/featured/inuit-view-on-canadas-arctic-sovereignty/>> [Accessed 1 April 2020].
- Full text: China's Arctic Policy, Full text: China's Arctic Policy (2018). Retrieved from <http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm> [21 February 2020]
- Grant, S. D. (2011). *Polar imperative: a history of Arctic sovereignty in North America*. Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre.
- Gaus, G., 2003. Contemporary Theories Of Liberalism. London: SAGE.
- Gordenker, L., & Weiss, T. G. (1997). Devolving responsibilities: A framework for analysing NGOs and services. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(3), 443–456. doi: 10.1080/01436599714803
- Gosewinkel, D., 2018. The Constitutional State. Oxford Handbooks Online, [online] Available at: <<https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198785521.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198785521-e-42#oxfordhb-9780198785521-e-42-div1-226>> [Accessed 24 May 2020].
- Government of Canada. 2016. Biography - Mary J. Simon. [online] Available at: <<https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1469123230304/1537886915798>> [Accessed 1 May 2020].

Government of Greenland, n.d. Greenland Geology And Selected Mineral Occurrences. [image]
Available at: <http://www.eng.geus.dk/media/18831/postkort_2018.pdf> [Accessed 1 May 2020].

Greif, A., & Laitin, D. D. (2004). A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 633–651. Retrieved from
https://web.stanford.edu/~avner/Greif_Papers/2004%20A%20Theory%20of%20Endogenous%20Institutional%20Change.pdf [21 March 2020]

Haslam, J., 2002. No Virtue Like Necessity. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p.249.

Heleniak, T., Turunen, E., & Wang, S. (2019). Cities on Ice: Population change in the Arctic. *Nordreigo Magazine*. Retrieved from <<https://nordreigo.org/>> [10 February 2020]

Huebert, R., 2011. Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage. *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies*, [online] Occasional Paper(4), pp.383-399.
Available at: <<https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cpmss/issue/view/2442>> [Accessed 24 May 2020].

Humpert, M., 2018. Canadian Arctic Shipping Traffic Nearly Tripled Over 25 Years - Arctictoday. [online] ArcticToday. Available at:
<<https://www.arctictoday.com/canadian-arctic-shipping-traffic-nearly-tripled-25-years/>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

Hunter, T., 2016. Era Of Reconciliation: A Sacred Relationship - Lawnow Magazine. [online] LawNow Magazine. Available at:
<<https://www.lawnow.org/era-of-reconciliation-a-sacred-relationship/>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

Hurley, M. C., & Wherrett, J. Bill C-62: Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, Bill C-62: Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act (1999). Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch, Library of Parliament.

Ina.gl. 2019. Inatsisartunut Ilaasortat | Inatsisartut. [online] Available at:
<<https://ina.gl/organisation/sammensaetning-af-inatsisartut/>> [Accessed 3 May 2020].

Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. (2017). *Final Report Evaluation of 4.1.1 - Grants to the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of Nunavut for Health Care of Indians and Inuit No 1570-7/16123*. Available from https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-AEV/STAGING/texte-text/ev_ggnn_1521039222358_eng.pdf [30 April 2020]

Indigenouspeoplesatlasofcanada.ca. 2020. Inuit Nunangat. [online] Available at: <https://indigenouspeoplesatlasofcanada.ca/article/inuit-nunangat/> [Accessed 24 May 2020].

International Maritime Organization. *International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters* [online]. London: Maritime Safety Commission 94th session. [viewed 27 May 2020]. <http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf>

Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee, 2019. Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee Releases National Inuit Housing Strategy And Continues Progress On Shared Priorities. [online] Available at: <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2019/04/04/inuit-crown-partnership-committee-releases-national-inuit-housing> [Accessed 1 May 2020].

Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, n.d. ICC Canada | Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada. [online] Inuitcircumpolar.com. Available at: <https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/icc-canada/> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2017. Inuit Nunaat. [image] Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/inuitcircumpolarcouncilalaska/photos/a.10151194859207872/10155204110972872/?type=1&theater> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, 2019. *Submission Of The Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada To The Special Senate Committee On The Arctic Regarding The Arctic Policy Framework And International Priorities*. [online] ICC Canada, p.8. Available at: https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/ARCT/Briefs/InuitCircumpolarCouncilCanada_e.pdf [Accessed 19 April 2020].

- Inuit Crown Partnership Committee Declaration (2017). Government of Canada. Retrieved from
 <<https://www.nunatsiavut.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICPC-Declaration-English.pdf>
 > [15 March 2020]
- ITK and NRI. (2006). *Negotiating Research Relationships with Inuit Communities: A Guide for Researchers*. Scot Nickels, Jamal Shirley, and Gita Laidler (eds). Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Nunavut Research Institute: Ottawa and Iqaluit. 25 pp
- Jacobsen, M., 2020. The ICC's 40th anniversary: International, regional and local perspectives as seen from Nuuk. High North News, [online] Available at:
 <<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/iccs-40th-anniversary-international-regional-and-local-perspectives-seen-nuuk>> [Accessed 3 May 2020].
- Johansson, T., & Donner, P. (2015). *The shipping industry, ocean governance and environmental law in the paradigm shift: in search of a pragmatic balance for the Arctic*. Cham: Springer.
- Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. (2019, April 14). *Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada*. Government of Canada. Retrieved from
<https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2019/04/04/inuit-crown-partnership-committee-releases-national-inuit-housing>
- Kalaallit Nunaat. Naalakkersuisut. Departementet for Udenrigsanliggender. Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse (2018). Retrieved from
 <[https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/AttachedFiles/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske redegørelser/Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse 2018.pdf](https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/AttachedFiles/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske%20redegørelser/Udenrigspolitisk%20Redegørelse%202018.pdf)> May 28 2020
- Kalaallit Nunaat. Naalakkersuisut. Departementet for Udenrigsanliggender. Udenrigspolitisk Redegørelse (2019). Retrieved from
 <<https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Udenrigsdirektoratet/DK/Udenrigspolitiske%20redegørelser/UPR%202019%20da.pdf>> May 28 2020
- Kankaanpää, P., & Young, O. R. (2012). The effectiveness of the Arctic Council. *Polar Research*, 31(1), 17176. doi: 10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176

- Koivurova, T., Duyck, S., & Heinämäki, L. (2012). Climate Change and Human Rights. *Climate Change and the Law*, 287–325. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-5440-9_12
- Kouri, S., & Skott-Myhre, H. (2015). Catastrophe: a transversal mapping of colonialism and settler subjectivity. *Settler Colonial Studies*, 6(3), 279–294.
<http://doi.org/10.1080/2201473x.2015.1061967>
- Kyhn, L. A., & Kyhn, A. M. (Eds.). (2019). *North Water Polynya Conference White Paper*. Aarhus University. Retrieved from
https://conferences.au.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/NOW_Conference_book_White_paper.pdf [May 2 2020]
- USC Libraries. Libguides.usc.edu. 2020. Research Guides: Organizing Your Social Sciences Research Paper: Writing A Case Study. [online] Available at:
<https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/casestudy> [Accessed 18 May 2020].
- Litter, L. (2007) *PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS An Assessment Report on: DDT-Aldrin-Dieldrin-Endrin-Chlordane Heptachlor-Hexachlorobenzene Mirex-Toxaphene Polychlorinated Biphenyls Dioxins and Furans*. The International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS). Retrieved from
<https://web.archive.org/web/20070926101350/http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/ritter/en/tteren.pdf> [2 May 2020]
- Meakin, S., 2019. Findings, Recommendations, And Next Steps From The Pikialasorsuaq Commission. [online presentation] Available at
https://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/MPA/Workshop/Cambridge/Presentations/StephanieMeakin.pdf [30 April 2020]
- Medvedev, D. Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic 2020, Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic 2020 (2018). Moscow: Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
- Mineral Resources Authority - Naalakkersuisut. n.d. Tax And Royalties | Mineral Resources Authority - Naalakkersuisut. [online] Available at:
<https://govmin.gl/exploitation/start-mining/tax-and-royalties/> [Accessed 1 May 2020].

Nilsen, T., 2020. Northern Fleet makes major investments in nuclear submarine infrastructure. Will not repeat mistakes of the Cold War. *The Barents Observer*, [online] Available at: <<https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/6814>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].

Oceans North Canada, 2016. Map Of The Pikialasorsuaq. [image] Available at: <<http://pikialasorsuaq.org/en/>> [Accessed 21 May 2020].

Our Global Neighborhood The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. (1995). Retrieved from <<https://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/global-neighbourhood/>> [Accessed 30 April 2020]

Oxford University Press, 2019. Nation. In: Lexico. [online] Oxford University Press. Available at: <<https://www.lexico.com/definition/nation>> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Oxford University Press, 2019. People. In: Lexico. [online] Lexico.com. Available at: <<https://www.lexico.com/definition/people>> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Pelaudiex, C. (2014). What is “Arctic Governance”? A Critical Assessment of the Diverse Meanings of “Arctic Governance.” *The Yearbook of Polar Law Online*, 6(1), 398–426. doi: 10.1163/1876-8814_015

People of The Ice Bridge: The Future of The Pikialasorsuaq, People of The Ice Bridge: The Future of The Pikialasorsuaq (2017). Pikialasorsuaq Commission. Retrieved from <http://pikialasorsuaq.org/media/efa13559-9221-4407-8583-c47509b56e7b/6CkEoA/Reports/Report of the Pikialasorsuaq Commission Nov 2017_For e-distribution.pdf> [10 February 2020]

Perkins, H. and Berkowitz, A., 1986. Perceiving the Community Norms of Alcohol Use among Students: Some Research Implications for Campus Alcohol Education Programming*. *International Journal of the Addictions*, [online] 21(9-10), pp.961-976. Available at: <<https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1988-09099-001>> [Accessed 28 May 2020].

Peters, B. G. (2011). Institutional Theory. *The Sage Handbook of Governance* , 78–88. http://doi.org/http://sk.sagepub.com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/reference/hdbk_governance

- Pompeo, M. (2020, February). *Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting*. Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting. Rovaniemi. Retrieved from
<<https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2409>> [11 March 2020]
- Prime Minister of Canada. 2019. Pikialasorsuaq Leaders Statement. [online] Available at:
<<https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2019/04/04/pikialasorsuaq-leaders-statement>>
[Accessed 1 April 2020].
- Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment. (2018). *PAME 1-2018 Working Group Meeting Report* [online] Available at
<<https://www.pame.is/document-library/pame-reports-new/pame-working-group-meeting-reports/232-pame-i-2018-meeting-report/file>> [30 April 2020]
- Rea, K. J. (2019, September 13). Bonesteel, 2008; Office of Indigenous and Northern Affairs. In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. Retrieved from
<<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nunavut>> [10 March 2020]
- Rodon, T. (2017). Development in Nunavik: How Regional and Local Initiatives Redefine Sustainable Development in Nunavik. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 47(2), 176–188. doi: 10.1080/02722011.2017.1347993
- Rowe, E. W. (2018). Arctic governance: power in cross-border cooperation. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sakharov, A. (2018). Shift in the United States Climate Policy and the Arctic Council Agenda. *International Organisations Research Journal*, 13(1), 66–79. doi: 10.17323/1996-7845-2018-01-04
- Senarclens, P. D. (1998). Governance and the crisis in the international mechanisms of regulation. *International Social Science Journal*, 50(155), 91–104. doi: 10.1111/1468-2451.00112
- Selsoe Sorensen, M., 2020. U.S. Aid for Greenland Prompts Praise and Suspicion in Denmark. The New York Times, [online] Available at:
<<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/europe/us-greenland-denmark.html>>
[Accessed 20 May 2020].

- Shadian, J. (2010). From states to polities: Reconceptualizing sovereignty through Inuit governance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(3), 485–510.
<http://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109346887>
- Shadian, J. M. (2015). *The politics of Arctic sovereignty: oil, ice and Inuit governance*. London ; New York: Routledge Taylor et Francis group.
- Shiraev, E. and Zubok, V., 2016. *International Relations*. New York: Oxford.
- Singh, K., & Chan, H. M. (2019). Association of blood polychlorinated biphenyls and cholesterol levels among Canadian Inuit. *Environmental Research*, 160, 298–305.
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2017.10.010>
- Siumut. n.d. Siumuts Grundholdninger. [online] Available at:
<https://siumut.gl/da/home/parti/partiipsiunertaa/> [Accessed 29 April 2020].
- Sorento, Kenneth, director. *Fight for Greenland*. Copenhagen Film Company Short & Doc, 2020.
- Springer, S., Birch, K., & MacLeavy, J. (2016). *The handbook of neoliberalism*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Staalsen, A., 2020. Murmansk gains status as special economic zone. The Barents Observer, [online] Available at:
<https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2020/05/murmansk-gains-status-special-economic-zone> [Accessed 20 May 2020].
- Statsministeriet. n.d. The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement. [online] Available at:
http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html [Accessed 21 May 2020].
- Stokke, O. S. (2010). *International cooperation and arctic governance: regime effectiveness and northern region building*. Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274694823_International_Cooperation_and_Arctic_Governance_Regime_Effectiveness_and_Northern_Region_Building [12 February 2020]

Sdwg.org. 2019. Compilation Of Examples ARAF. [online] Available at:

<<https://www.sdwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Compilation-of-Examples-re-ARAF-Final-Report-2019.pdf>> [Accessed 25 May 2020].

Treadgold, T., 2019. Trump Might Want to Buy Greenland But His Nemesis, China, Is There Before Him. Forbes, [online] Available at:

<<https://www.forbes.com/sites/timtreadgold/2019/08/19/trump-might-want-to-buy-greenland-but-his-nemesis-china-is-there-before-him/#6c8ca4083f3c>> [Accessed 25 May 2020].

Trudeau J. (2019) *Statement by the Prime Minister on National Indigenous Peoples Day*.

[online] 20 June, Ottawa, Canada [accessed 30 April 2020]. Available at

<<https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2019/06/20/statement-prime-minister-national-indigenous-peoples-day>>

Trudeau, J. & Obed, N. Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee releases national Inuit housing strategy and continues progress on shared priorities (2020). Ottawa, Ontario.

Unikkaat Studios Inc. (2016). *Angry Inuk*. Retrieved from

<<http://www.unikkaat.com/projects/angry-inuk/>> [29 February 2020]

Un.org. n.d. Who Are Indigenous Peoples. [online] Available at:

<https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf> [Accessed 25 May 2020].

Un.org. 2014. World Conference On Indigenous Peoples. [online] Available at:

<<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/about-us/world-conference.htm>> [Accessed 25 May 2020].

UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

(UNDRIP): resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, available at: <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html>> [accessed 2 April 2020].

Valadez, J. (2019). *Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, And Self-Determination In Multi-Cultural Societies*. S.L.: Routledge.

- Writing.colostate.edu. 1993. Writing@CSU. [online] Available at:
 <<https://writing.colostate.edu/guides/page.cfm?pageid=1305&guideid=61>> [Accessed 18 May 2020].
- Weiss, T., & Wilkinson, R. (2014). Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, Change. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(1), 207–215. Retrieved from
<https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12082>
- Willis, M. and Depledge, D., 2014. How We Learned To Stop Worrying About China's Arctic Ambitions: Understanding China's Admission To The Arctic Council. [online] Thearcticinstitute.org. Available at:
 <<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-ambitions-arctic-council/>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].
- Xu, M., Aizhu, C. and Astakhova, O., 2019. Landmark Siberian gas to test CNPC's marketing mettle in China's backwaters. Reuters, [online] Available at:
 <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-russia-gas-pipeline/landmark-siberian-gas-to-test-cnpcs-marketing-mettle-in-chinas-backwaters-idUSKBN1Y30JH>> [Accessed 20 May 2020].
- Zürn, M. (2018). *A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2016) *Census return for Aboriginal Population Profile, Inuit Regions*. Statistics Canada. 29 June 2018, available at:
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/abpopprof/details/download-t-elecharger/comp/page_dl-tc.cfm?Lang=E [4 April 2020]
- (2017). *Terms Of Reference For Social Impact Assessment PITUFFIK TITANIUM PROJECT*. [pdf] Nuuk: Niras Greenland A/S. Available at:
 <<https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Hearings/2017/Forhoering%20for%20kommisiorier%20for%20VSB%20og%20VVM%20for%20Titaniumprojektet%20ved%20Pituffik/White%20Paper%20and%20Terms%20of%20Reference/5%20Terms%20of%20Reference%20for%20Social%20Impact%20Assessment%20PITUFFIK%20TITANIUM%20PROJECT%20October%202017.pdf>> [Accessed 1 May 2020].