The Roles of EU and ASEAN in Security Crises:
A Study of Regional Cooperation and Securitisation Approaches

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Abstract

As climate change has become an increasing concern in terms of security risks, it has also become increasingly relevant to examine the patterns of securitisation and adaptation capacities of the world, in order to understand likely reactions to climate-security issues, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation strategies. Two interesting regions to examine, in the case of response to climate change, are Europe, with a response shaped by the EU goal for Europe to become the first climate neutral continent, and Southeast Asia, which according to the International Panel on Climate Change is expected to be the region most affected by climate change. According to theory on the security risks of climate change, the expected response to future climate change issues is best understood through responses to previous trigger events for security response.

As a comparative case study based on document analysis, this thesis examines previous, recent trigger events of migration crises and natural disasters in Europe (the Syrian civil war refugee crisis and the 2003 European heatwave) and Southeast Asia (Rohingya refugee crisis and the 2011 Southeast Asian floods) in order to discuss whether the security approaches of these specific events would also be suitable to mitigate and limit the security risks of climate change. The analysed datasets consist of documents, strategies and press releases from official sources such as the EU, ASEAN, IPCC and UN organisations, as well as news articles from renowned media in order to provide multiple angles on the cases. The theoretical angle of the analysis is based on Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's theory on Regional Security Complexes, and Robert O. Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism.

The analysis unveils that regional cooperation and the Regional Security Complexes in Europe and Southeast Asia have a great impact on how security issues are tackled, due to which the same factors also cause significant differences in approaches between the two regions. In Europe, security approaches, as well as other points of cooperation, are mainly focused on coordinated efforts, common laws, strategies, and initiatives by the EU. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, is more focused on national autonomy with individual approaches, based on the agenda set by the regional powers; Indonesia, Singapore, and Viet Nam. The regional intergovernmental organisation ASEAN has the main task of coordination and facilitation of cooperation. The difference in approaches to migration crises and natural disasters is caused by the level of agreement on what the actual security threat entails, who should be protected, who should be the securitising actor, and of course the willingness to cooperate regionally. Concludingly, it is argued that in the situation of climate change, beliefs in an actual security risk are challenged, as the security risks are rather abstract and uncertain, and thus also the willingness to spend resources on limiting climate change. What could possibly strengthen understandings and efforts on the matter is an inter-regional cooperation between the European and the Southeast Asian regional security complexes with shared expectations, understandings of the threat and best practises, joint technological development, and financial support systems.

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1. Introduction

Climate change has in recent decades become a global issue of increasing importance for the interdependent, globalised world. By some, it has even been deemed as the "*number one threat to mankind*"[1], which will lead to famine, flooding, and disease, without the early action,[2] which United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned may already be too late.[3] With initiatives and agreements based on data from the entire world, regular assessments of climate change by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),[4] and meetings like the Conference of the Parties (COP), arranged by members of the UN through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),[5] a majority of the world play an active role in minimising the risks of climate change.

Two regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), which are interesting cases to investigate when assessing the minimisation of risks induced by climate change, are the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The EU has signed both the UNFCCC[6] and the Paris Agreement,[7] and set a strategy to make Europe the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050.[8] Southeast Asia is one of the regions in the world expected to experience the greatest consequences of climate change, and the member states of ASEAN are said to bear minimal responsibility for CO_2 emissions historically.[9] In ASEAN, individual national goals for emission reduction spans from no explicit goals to a goal of 63% reduction.[10] However, emission levels, in the region, are still rising.[11]

[1] Parry, Emyr Jones (N.D.). The Greatest Threat to Global Security: Climate Change is Not Merely An Environmental Problem. In: *UN Chronicle*. N.D. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/greatest-threat-global-security-climate-change-not-merely-environmental-problem (25.05.2020).

[2] Parry. Ibid

[3] Verbeek, Alexander (2019). Planetary Security: the security implications of climate change. In: *NATO REVIEW*. 10.12.2019. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/12/10/planetary-security-the-security-implications-of-climate-change/index.html (25.05.2020).

[4] IPCC (N.D.). About the IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/about/ (25.05.2020).

[5] UNFCCC (2020). Conference of the Parties (COP). https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop (25.05.2020).

[6] UNTC (1992). CHAPTER XXVII: ENVIRONMENT: 7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: New York, 9. May 1992. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (25.05.2020).

[7] UNTC (2015). CHAPTER XXVII: ENVIRONMENT: 7. d Paris Agreement: Paris, 12 December 2015. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en (25.05.2020).

[8] Astuccia, Evelyn (2019). Can the EU lead the way in the fight against climate change?. In: *Eyes on Europe*. 03.12.2019. https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/can-the-eu-lead-the-way-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/ (25.05.2020).

[9] The ASEAN Post Team (2019:A). ASEAN's role in realising the Paris Agreement. In: *The ASEAN Post*. 12.01.2019. https://theaseanpost.com/article/aseans-role-realising-paris-agreement (25.05.2020).

[10] The ASEAN Post Team. Ibid.

[11] World Carbon Atlas (2018). CO_2 Emissions: Focus: World Consumption Emissions. http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions (25.05.2020).

According to a theory on the security risks of climate change by head of the Climate Change and Security Research Group under the Integrated Climate Systems Analysis and Prediction Initiative at KlimaCampus Hamburg, Jürgen Scheffran,[12] it is important to understand how nations have responded to previous trigger events, jeopardising the nations liveability, in order to understand the nations' mitigation strategies and adaptation capacities in a climate-security crisis.[13]

Two of the most expected types of crisis, to arise from climate change, are migration and various types of natural disasters.[14] These types of crises have already been experienced as trigger events in Europe and Southeast Asia,

despite not necessarily being results of climate change. Some of the most significant cases of this is the Syrian migration crisis in Europe[15] and the 2003 European Heat Wave for EU,[16] and the Rohingya refugee crisis[17] and the 2011 Southeast Asian Floods for ASEAN.[18]

What is significant, is the difference in how these migration crises and natural disasters are securitised in the two regions, and the difference in the roles of EU and ASEAN as IGOs in solving and preventing security crises, as well as the effect these differences have on the security of each region now and in a potential climate-security crises. This wondering has led to the following problem statement:

1.1. Problem statement

Why is there a difference in strategies against migration crises and nature crises in both EU and ASEAN, and how does this affect regional climate-security?

1.2. Objective

Under the circumstances stated in the introduction, answers to other questions are also required in the comparative analysis to provide a conclusion to the question presented in the problem statement above:

- How can cooperation be part of maximising security?
- What is the role of regional institutions in solving security crisis?
- How do the two IGOs, EU and ASEAN, respond to different types of security crises, and how effective are their approaches?

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[12] Universität Hamburg (2020). PROF. DR. JÜRGEN SCHEFFRAN. https://www.clisec.uni-hamburg.de/en/staff/current-members-of-clisec/scheffran.html (25.05.2020).

[13] Scheffran, Jürgen (2011). Security Risks of Climate Change: Vulnerabilities, Threats, Conflicts and Strategies. In: Brauch, Hans Günter; Spring, Úrsula Oswald; Mesjasz, Czeslaw; Grin, John; Kameri-Mbote; Patricia, Chorou, Béchir; Dunay, Pál; Birkmann Jörn (eds.). *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security*. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. p. 739.

[14] UNHCR (2020:A). Climate change and disaster displacement. https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html (25.05.2020).

[15] BBC News (2016: A). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. 04.03.2016. In: *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (25.05.2020).

[16] Jha, Alok (2006). Boiled alive. 26.07.2006. In: *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/jul/26/science.g2 (25.05.2020).

[17] The ASEAN Post team (2020). No rights for the Rohingya?. 12.02.2020. In: *The ASEAN Post*. https://theaseanpost.com/article/no-rights-rohingya (25.05.2020).

[18] Al Jazeera and Agencies (2011). Hundreds killed in Southeast Asia floods. 05.10.2011. In: *Al Jazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2011/10/20111058822468175.html (25.05.2020).

- What would need to be included, for the cooperation on climate change to be attractive and effective enough to induce long-term changes?

This thesis seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the security risks of climate change and how to ensure adjustment to new conditions, by critically assessing strategies from EU and ASEAN on previous security crises of migration and natural disasters, which will also arise under a climate-change situation, and discussing the role of regional institutions in dealing with different types of security risks. The thesis will provide an understanding of why different types of regional security crises are securitised differently, and how regional cooperation can contribute to an overall enhanced stability by benefitting the combat of a global climate challenge broadly. The theoretic perspective of the analysis will be found in the application of Regional Security Complex theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism.

2. Methodology

In order to investigate and provide a qualified answer to the problem statement, presented in section 1.1, a variety of methodological considerations, such as choice of theory and data, the analytical approach, the limitations of the project, and its methodological approaches, must be taken into account. These considerations will be presented in the following sub-sections, along with a review of existing data, transcending the topic of regional climate-security, which will provide a basic knowledge of what has already been written on the matter in social sciences.

Due to the interest in comparing regional approaches, it would be relevant to look at the current SARS-CoV-2 crisis, as it is a global situation that different regions are struggling with in the same way, and where the outcome seems to be highly reliant on the approaches taken to securitise the issue. However, as this crisis is still ongoing and very recent, it is not possible to draw adequate conclusions to the responses from various nations and the consequences of the crisis, which is why it has been left out as an example in this thesis, despite the fact that it would provide a common ground for understandings of different responses to a common issue and the way it affects a nation or a region.

2.1. Choice of theory

To assess the question of why the cases of migration crises and natural disasters in the EU and ASEAN are treated differently in the two regions, and what this means in a situation of climate-security, it is important to understand both the regional dynamics of security politics, as well as the effects of cooperation between states in regional security crises. Therefore, two theories have been chosen for the analysis of this thesis: Barry Buzan and Ole Wævers theory on Regional Security Complexes[19] and Robert O. Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism.[20]

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[19] Buzan, Barry; Wæver, Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers: The structure of international security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[20] Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

The theory on Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), presented in Berry Buzan and Ole Wævers' 2003 book *Regions and Powers: The structure of international security*, has been chosen for this thesis, as it provides a framework for analysing the link between nations in a region in the case of security matters and the effect it has on how security crises are solved. Further, Buzan and Wæver presents a framework for understanding the dynamics in and between RSCs and super- and great powers.[21] For the analysis and comparison of strategies and actions in two different types of crises in two types of regions, which have clear differences in their stages of development and regional integration, this theory offers an important insight to how regional integration of security politics may give reason for the importance, assigned to different types of crises.

The theory offers means to analyse the complicated dynamics between nations in a region, as well as between RSCs and super- and great powers. It is mentioned that the super- and great powers of the current global system should be identified, as well as the type of RSC for the regions under analysis, in order to understand the geographic, cultural, historic and security factors, which affect the region.[22] The theory is highly advantageous to this thesis, as it is sensible to thoroughly analyse the regional level of security, in the comparative analysis with EU and ASEAN as cases.

With the use of this theory, the roles of regions in crisis situations will be analysed. The theory will further contribute to the analysis of the regional response to migration and climate crises, as well as the expected effects of regionalism in the process of minimising climate change. As the theory is still relatively new, it provides modern perspectives, making it possible to focus on the relevant, current structures of the globalised world.

Additionally, this thesis will make use of Robert O. Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism and state cooperation after hegemony as presented in his 1984 book *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. This theory has been chosen due to the establishment of possible reasons behind and outcomes of cooperation, which in this thesis will be in the cases of EU and ASEAN.

In the theory, states are considered rational actors in pursuit of self-interest, thus acting according to incentives, which can often be provided by international cooperation.[23] Further, it is argued that the relation between nations can be either harmonic, cooperative, or discordant.[24] The theory provides an opportunity to make a qualified assessment of the incentives provided to the member states of EU and ASEAN by security cooperation, and how to strengthen security cooperation in a climate-change situation. Despite being built on a study of advanced capitalist countries,[25] the theory also offers perspectives on how cooperation can be organised based on common interests in general, which makes it applicable to the case of developing nations as well.[26]

With the use of this theory, the project takes an angle of analysing not only the incentives or gain for nations to work in RSCs but also the incentives that could lead to an inter-regional security regime in the future.

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[21] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 43-46.
[22] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 43-48.
[23] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 26-27.
[24] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 51-53.
[25] Keohane. Ibid. p. 5.
[26] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 6-7.

Combining these theories will enable an in-depth analysis of how regional cooperation affect the security of the member states, and why security crises are handled differently in the two regions. First, the two theories will be combined in an analysis of how cooperation is structured in the two regions as security complexes, and the role regional IGOs play in security crises. Hereafter, the theories will be applied in an analysis of recent security crises of two different types in EU and ASEAN in order to understand the effects cooperation has had on securitisation in the two regions. The two theories will the thoroughly elaborated in section 3.

2.2. Choice of data

The data, to be analysed in this thesis, is gathered from various official sources such as the EU, ASEAN, UN, and IPCC, as well as variety of news articles. In the chosen theories, certain aspects, which must be investigated and understood, are already pinpointed, thus providing a good starting point for the choice of data.

In the theory on Regional Security Complexes, Buzan and Wæver points out that in order to assess and understand security, it should be analysed from the regional level but also take the analysed region's interactions with the global security system into account.[27] This means that the hierarchical structure of the regional IGOs under analysis should be understood before assessing their strategies. Further, one should understand the geographic and historic boundaries, cultural context, fears, and aspirations, which ties the regions together.[28] It is recommended to analyse this through the use of historic accounts and regional strategies in a comparative method.

Looking to Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism, it is mentioned that important aspects to investigate are the nature of[29] and incentives for[30] the cooperation between parties, in this case the member states of EU and ASEAN, as well as the rules and norms of the cooperation,[31] and whether or not they are actually followed by the involved parties.[32] It is recommended to investigate these aspects through the use of strategies, state declarations, cooperation statements and action plans.

In the analysis of regional cooperation and types of RSCs found in Europe and Southeast Asia, and the roles of EU and ASEAN as regional IGOs, the applied data will mainly consist of overviews on the regional situation, background for cooperation, and common regional principles from EU and ASEAN.

The chosen cases of security crises, the Syrian civil war refugee crisis and the Rohingya refugee crisis, and the 2003 European heatwave and the 2011 Southeast Asian floods will be assessed on the basis of a combination of strategies on migration crisis and natural disaster from EU and ASEAN, as well as statements from relevant organisations under the UN, alongside news articles to provide a picture exceeding political understandings. News articles will be from various well renowned sources including Al Jazeera, The Straits times, The Guardian, BBC, Financial Times, and Channel

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[27] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 55-63.
[28] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 43-48.
[29] Keohane (1984). Op. Cit. pp. 31-35 + 78-79.
[30] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 18-21.
[31] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 61-63.
[32] Keohane. Ibid. p. 96.

News Asia.

The discussion of consequences of approaches to security risks in terms of regional security and how it will affect the climate change situation will be supported by data from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report on Regional Aspects of Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,[33] the most recent assessment report published by IPCC. Further, this will be supported by strategies on climate change and security from EU and ASEAN, which both offers insights to strategies, policies, agreements, cooperation statements, etc on their websites.

The variety in sources of data will provide a differentiated picture of the security situation Europe and Southeast Asia. This will enable the analysis to be strongly built on the IGOs' and the member states' own perception of what is important and desirable in security cooperation, while it will also include perspective on the situations from more independent sources that are not directly linked to neither the EU nor ASEAN.

2.3. Literature review

Climate change, and related security issues and adaptation strategies has become an important subject not only politically or economically, but to various strands of academia. However, in academia, there is a general consensus that research on the topic is lacking as the situation is constantly developing, and analysis involve both global politics and the mind-sets of people from all over the world. Further, research is made increasingly difficult by the fact that the academic community is still discussing whether or not the climate-security link is even relevant, despite a majority believing climate change to at least be a risk multiplier.

Rita Floyd's article *Global climate security governance: a case of institutional and ideational fragmentation* was published in 2015. With the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), EU, and the US/Pentagon as examples, Floyd criticises securitisation of climate change, as she argues that on a global scale there are two types of fragmentation when speaking of climate-security; institutional and ideational, and that not all parts of these fragmentations will lead to a safer climate for people. She argues that institutional fragmentation, with the question of who is in charge of climate-security, in its own may not necessarily be problematic, as all actors within the area could potentially want to implement UN's morally appropriate preference for climate security. Ideational fragmentation on the other hand is argued to be problematic, as it means that different actors will have different ideas of what the threat from climate change entails and how it is solved. This could cause a situation, where actors end up working against one another, thereby creating a new threat.[34] Even with useful points on the downsides of climate-security, the article is inapplicable to this thesis, as it focuses solely on

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[33] IPCC (2014). *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[34] Floyd, Rita (2015). Global climate security governance: a case of institutional and ideational fragmentation. In: *Conflict, Security and Development*. Vol. 15. Iss. 2. pp. 119-146.

Western and Global perspectives, and Floyd mentions that she deliberately leaving out the Global South, including Southeast Asia.

In the 2008 article *Climate Change and Regional Vulnerability to Transnational Security Threats in Southeast Asia*, authors Christopher Jasparro and Jonathan Taylor examine how climate change affects Southeast Asia's vulnerability to non-traditional transnational security threats from a geopolitical standpoint. They argue that the region as a transportation hub struggling with poverty, rapid economic growth, and a history of low intensity conflict will experience a rise in four different types of threats; Human trafficking, piracy, terrorism, and infectious diseases. The argued reasons for this are firstly that climate change will pressure livelihoods and social systems while straining the states capacities. Secondly, the impact of climate change could possible weaken states enough to let non-state actors, hereunder also illicit actors, gain influence and pressure states.[35] The analysis presented in this article offers useful ideas of how climate change could make Southeast Asia more vulnerable. Yet, it is inapplicable since there is no focus on regional efforts to securitise the situation and descale consequences.

Kamil Zwolski and Christian Kaunert wrote the 2011 article *The EU and climate security: a case of successful norm entrepreneurship* with the purpose of examining the development of EU as a global actor in climate security based on norm entrepreneurship from epistemic communities. In order to create norms in climate-security, EU has followed two processes: norm entrepreneurship downwards, developing research and capacities for climate change within the European region, and upwards, mainly by establishing a dialogue through the UN. By establishing epistemic communities consisting of both EU officials, member states, and think-tanks, it has not been a great challenge to create a norm within the EU, as most states agree that climate-security is a serious issue, and thus most states did not object. On a global level, however, some states are already battling issues such as poverty and hunger, making it difficult to find the right solution, which can be incorporated into programmes meant to solve the pre-existing issues, within the norms built in the EU. This means that, even by using the UN as a platform for discussion and norm diffusion, globalizing climate-security norms has proven to be a difficult task, as newly emerging norms will always need to battle pre-existing norms.[36] While the article offers thoughts on how the EU is challenged in spreading climate-security norms globally, it is not applicable to this thesis, as it only focus on shared global norms rather than cooperation in securitisation.

Following this review on previously written literature transcending the topic of climate-security, what this thesis is able to contribute to research on the climate-security is an analysis on how regional security is affected by assigning a different level of importance to issues that are expected to become part of larger security risk in a climate change situation, and how the structure of regions affects this.

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[35] Jasparro, Christopher; Taylor, Jonathan (2008). Climate Change and Regional Vulnerability to Transnational Security Threats in Southeast Asia. In: *Geopolitics*. Vol. 13. Iss. 2. pp. 232-256.

[36] Zwolski, Kamil; Kaunert, Christian (2011). The EU and climate Security: a case of successful norm entrepreneurship?. In: *European Security*. Vol. 20. Iss. 1. pp. 21-43.

2.4. Analytical approach

As previously mentioned, the analysis will be a comparative case study with the basis of qualitative document analysis with a thematic analysis approach, mainly using archival and historic research, and policy research. Using this method has the advantage of accessibility and scale, as existing sources can provide a broader, more representative and detailed dataset than one person can singlehandedly collect,[37] especially in light of the current crisis caused by SARS-CoV-2, making it difficult to collect data due to mobility restrictions. However, it is important to keep in mind that documents can never be seen as the complete truth, as they are all based on certain bias and agendas, which must be taken into account.[38]

In document analysis, a variety of between one and 1,000 pre-existing documents are usually included as sources of data, providing certain liberties in terms of choices.[39] As it has been presented in section 2.2, this project is no different and applies data both in the form of news articles, official data on security risks, and strategies, statements and policies on security. All data on the security situations and strategies of EU and ASEAN will be comparable in order to ensure equal grounds of analysis and to make it possible to take the sounding circumstances of the analysed crises into account, as recommended by Buzan and Wæver,[40] and Keohane,[41] and as an important analytical process in case studies.[42]

The analysis, as the majority of case studies, will make use of a deductive approach, where the important findings of the document analysis can be linked to a larger theoretical perspective. This will happen by deducting a hypothesis from already existing theory, which will be confirmed or invalidated by application to the specific case.[43] With a variety of documentary data, the qualitative approach will be applied as part of a thematic analysis, where data will be organised and summarised to draw key points from recurrent themes in the datasets on security in Europe and Southeast Asia. As previously mentioned, these themes and key points will then be linked to the theoretical basis to draw out implicit and explicit underlying ideas by finding keywords and categorising similarities and differences.[44]

As explained by Malcom Tight, there are five main types of document analysis; literature reviews, systematic reviews and meta-analyses, secondary data analysis, archival and historical research, and policy research, which often overlap in an analysis.[45] In this thesis, literature review, archival and historical review, and policy research will be applied, as common approaches in political science

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[37] Tight, Malcom (2019). *Documentary Research in the Social Sciences*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 13-14.
[38] Tight. op. cit. p. 18.
[39] Tight. op. cit. pp. 10-12.
[40] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 43-48.
[41] Keohane. Op. cit. p. 56.
[42] Harrison, Lisa; Callan, Theresa (2013). *Key Research Concepts in Politics and International Relations*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 11-12.
[43] Harrison; Callan. Ibid. pp. 11-12 + 29.
[44] Tight. Ibid. pp. 158-159.
[45] Tight. Ibid p. 62.

and international relations with an increasing bias towards online documentation,[46] and thus only these three will be explained.

Literature reviews can be used in many ways, and are often not the focus of analysis, but are rather applied as a method for providing a strong background knowledge, based on relevant literature that has already been written on the topic of analysis, and distinguishing what has already been done from the areas that lacks research.[47] This is also the case for the literature review in section 2.3, which is strictly used for providing a background knowledge and context, and finding holes in previous research on the topic.

In this thesis, archival and historical research has the purpose of providing an understanding of the underlying attitudes towards the chosen cases of security issues and towards regional security cooperation. Providing background and understanding is exactly the strength of archival and historical research, as it enables the opportunity of using any physical or virtual literature, primary or secondary, including film, photo, cultural artefacts, reporting, and personal or official text.[48] In this case, it will mainly consist of written reporting from media and official text from EU and ASEAN.

Policy research will be included in the analysis through a mix of national, regional and institutional policies. According to Tight, policy research is usually built on sets of contemporary policies. It is important that these policies are seen as dynamic factors, which are subject to interpretation based on certain standpoints, meaning they are not always implemented as intended or can sometimes create a minimum of response.[49] Thus, policy analysis must have a critical angle. It is described that analysis of policy can take two angles; 1) analysis of policy determination and effects or 2) analysis of policy content.[50] In this thesis, both approaches will be applied, as values and assumptions underpinning the polices are analysed, as well as the transformational processes and effects of the policies.

In order to analyse the difference in the strategies in cases of migration crises and natural disasters in EU and ASEAN, and how this could affect strategies in the securitisation of climate change, the grounds for the two regions' RSCs must first be established to provide an understanding of the focus and background for the regional security priorities. For this reason, the analysis will be started off by providing an understanding of the two regions and their internal strategies through both the Regional Security Complex theory by Buzan and Wæver, in order to analyse how the regions are structured and what effect this has on regional security, and the Neoliberal Institutionalism theory by Keohane, in order to understand the cooperative dynamics between the member states of each IGO.

In the analysis of four recent security crises, the Rohingya refugee crisis and the 2011 Southeast Asian Floods for ASEAN, and the Syrian migration crisis in Europe and the 2003 European Heat

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[46] Tight. Ibid. pp. 49-50.
[47] Tight. Ibid. pp. 74-77.
[48] Tight. Ibid. pp. 110-112.
[49] Tight. Ibid. 122-124.
[50] Tight. Ibid. p. 126.

Wave for EU, as stated in section 1 and 2.3, the theories will be applied alongside the regional strategies on the issues of these crises, as well as news articles to avoid a one-sided regional picture. This will enable a comparative analysis on two levels; 1) how migration crises and natural disasters are securitised differently on a regional basis and 2) how different types of regions securitise differently. Moving on, the results of this analysis will be applied in a discussion of how effective the different security structures and securitisation strategies of EU and ASEAN are. This will enable the formation of qualified ideas of how capable the two regions are of mitigating and adapting in a climate change situation. Thus, leading to an analysis of the greatest risks for each region in a climate-security situation, based on assessment reports from IPCC as well as regional strategies of climate-security. This, combined with the results of the previous analysis and discussion, will provide an understanding of how the strategies used in previous trigger events will affect the overall security risk of climate change.

All results obtained so far will be used in comparison to both Buzan and Wæver, and Keohane's theories in an analysis of what would be needed in a cooperation in order to minimise the risks related to climate change and adjust to unavoidable risks, and what would be needed to make such cooperation effective enough to improve general stability in EU and ASEAN. Ultimately, this analysis will lead to an answer to why migration crisis and natural disasters are securitised differently by EU and ASEAN, and how this affects the securitisation of climate-security risks.

2.5. Limitations of the project

There are three major limitations affecting this thesis, which are necessary to account for. These are the perspective of the author, challenges relating to data collection, and the nature of climate change as a topic.

It is important to keep in mind, that there is usually a certain case of bias towards the analysed data. In the case of this thesis, the author is born and raised in Denmark, which can possibly cause a certain mindset about the importance of climate-security. However, the author has built an understanding for the Southeast Asian perspective through living in the region for a year, first as a student of HELP University in Kuala Lumpur and later as an intern at the Royal Danish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The understanding of inter-regional relations between EU and ASEAN has further been strengthened through working with the Asia-Europe Foundation as the Danish participant of the 7th ASEF Rectors' Conference and Students' Forum on Higher Education Taking Action Towards Sustainable Development Goals: Perspectives from Asia and Europe. Thereby, there is a combined perspective and understanding providing a somewhat equal start to the hermeneutic spiral developing through the analysis.

The collection of data for this project, which is an especially important part of the document analysis as a method, has been challenged for two main reasons; a lack of official documentation in ASEAN and a lack of access to sources.

From ASEAN there is a general lack of transparency and official data on strategies related to climate-security, indicators for climate change, and political reaction to trigger events. Data on these topics can be found in other sources such as UN accounts for the region and newspaper

articles about trigger events. However, in order to make fair comparisons, equal sources must be applied to the case of EU as well.

The access to sources has been further limited by the SARS-CoV-2 crisis, as this has caused a series of legal restrictions, making it difficult to access any sources that cannot be found online. As mentioned previously, document analysis is already affected by a bias towards online sources, and a great deal of official data is now accessible online, making this a minor issue.

The last and possibly most critical limitation to this project is the nature of climate change as a topic, due to the nature of climate change as a dynamic, changing situation. Thus, it will only be possible to provide a momentary picture, based on the accounts of expectation to how the situation will develop from various instances. Further, the climate-security interaction is not yet fully understood and agreed on by the academic and political communities. However, as focus is mainly on understanding climate change security strategies through the analysis of past events, this should not be understood as a major concern.

3. Theoretical Framework

As mentioned in section 2.1, the theoretical arguments presented through the analysis will be based on Buzan and Wæver's theory on Regional Security Complexes, as well as the theory of Neoliberal Institutionalism by Keohane. This section will provide a thorough presentation of the two theories, which will be applied in the analysis as means to investigate the security effects of regional cooperation in EU and ASEAN.

3.1: Regional Security Complex Theory

Barry Buzan and Ole Wævers' theory on RSCs was published in the book *Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security* in 2003. Through the theory, Buzan and Wæver accounts for the regional level of international security as the most meaningful level of analysis. The key argument for this is that no nation's security is self-contained, and that the global level rather refers to an aspiration than a reality as the global level is not integrated enough to form more than limited generalities in security terms. The regional level as a contrast provides the option of analysing the point, where states are sufficiently linked to a degree that a security interdependence has arisen, and the major processes of securitisation and desecuritisation cannot be analysed or resolved purely on a state level.[51]

Smaller states will usually find themselves in RSCs with neighbouring states, whereas the great powers can penetrate other regions, and superpowers can range globally. Penetration from great- or superpowers usually occurs when there is an alignment between outside powers and states within the RSC e.g. due to internal rivalries.[52]

The criteria for a superpower in this theory are broad capabilities in both military-political and

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[51] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 43-46.
[52] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. p. 46.

economic terms, exercised in the international system, enabling the state to take part in securitisation and desecuritisation in all regions, and form universal values. Great powers need to be seen by others as having the potential to bid for superpower and be able to act in more than one region. Lastly, regional powers should have the necessary capacities to form security structure in the region, but not globally.[53]

According to Buzan and Wæver, a 1+4 structure of one superpower and four great powers (USA + China, Japan, Russia, and EU) is expected in the 21. century, while there is also a potential of a 0+X structure, where the great powers are only partially connected, and geography and regional nesting prevents the logistics of a global system. This case would then form a new X+0 system, as many of the great powers would be insulated by distance and practically create a situation, where they function as superpowers in a regional power balance.[54] The latter of the two seems more likely in the current global situation.

It is stated that in order to create purpose for any security theory, security needs to be defined. Buzan and Wæver provides a definition, which is also adopted in this thesis:
"*A security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival usually involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules for reasons of security*".[55]

Buzan and Wæver further provides the definition of RSCs as a system with its own security structure, made up from independent units, which are most commonly nation states. It is argued that, while other options are not ruled out, these RSCs are most commonly understood as being established through natural cultural, geographical, or historical boundaries but should most importantly be defined in functional terms of security, based on the fears and aspirations of each unit, thus these are partially derived from domestic features. While the complexes may be affected by global actors as well, there is still a certain autonomy from the patterns set by global powers in the complexes. It is argued that security complexes will be territorially based, as security issues are most likely to travel short distances in terms of military, political, or societal issues, however, some issues such as international terrorism or economy are more likely to be non-territorial. As the security issues are defined by who or what is being securitised, RSCs may change or overlap accordingly.[56]

Different types of RSCs exist but the basic structure is always formed by power relations and the roles of friend, rival, or enemy that define the system (amity-enmity). The essential structure is

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[53] Buzan, Wæver. Ibid. pp. 34-38.
[54] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 32-39.
[55] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. p. 71.
[56] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 43-48

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made up from four main components: 1) boundaries, 2) anarchic structures, 3) polarity, and 4) social construction. Within these complexes, especially ones with a large number of units involved, subcomplexes can also exist with the same criteria as any other RSC but with a distinctive pattern of security interdependence.[57]

The most common types of RSCs are standard and centred RSCs. Other types are Great power RSCs, supercomplexes, and absence of RSCs.

Standard type RSCs come in two forms; unipolar or multipolar. Common for both is the anarchic structure, and regional powers that define the agenda. As this type is not dominated by a global power, there is great distinctions between internal regional dynamics and external interfering global level dynamics. Thus, the main element of security politics is the internal relationship, which is setting the terms for minor powers and penetration from global powers.

Centred RSCs have four main forms: Unipolar with a great power, unipolar with a superpower, institutional, or total desecuritisation. The two first forms, unipolar RSCs centred around a super- or great power, are dominated by global level power, and what would have been counted as regional powers do not have the weight to define a regional pole. This generally creates a distorted or suppressed regional dynamic. In the RSCs centred around institutions, with EU as the most well-known example, the actors usually act friendly even if they are challenged, and rather desecuritise one another than securitise. The fourth form is total desecuritisation, where all security concerns are forgot, and the focus has shifted to a conscious aggregation of security concerns. This is not empirically significant and is to be seen as an extreme case.

Looking to the rarer cases, great power RSCs have more than one great power in the region, and thus the dynamic of the RSC will affect the global level. Supercomplexes create a fourth level instead of domestic, regional or global; the super-regional level, where the inter-regional level is strong and create a spill-over effect, ultimately merging two RSCs into one despite the continuing existence of regional dynamics. The last of the forms, absence of RSCs, is defined by having no pattern of security interdependence. This is caused by either 1) overlay by great power interests transcending mere penetration and dominating heavily enough for local security patterns ceasing to exist, or 2) unstructured local states having a capacity too low to project power beyond their own boundaries and/or geographical insulation. [58]

Of course, there are possible evolutions for RSCs. They can either maintain status quo, experience internal transformation, due to changes within the existing outer boundaries of the region, or experience external transformation, most commonly due to splits or mergers.[59] However, a great account of the predictive scenarios is irrelevant in the case of this thesis, as focus lies on the functionality of RSCs rather than development.

On the analysis of security, it is argued that the best approach is comparative on the regional level.[60] In analysis, the referent object that is to be secured should be accounted for, along with the

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[57] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 50-53.
[58] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 55-63.
[59] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. p. 53.
[60] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. p. 11.

securitising actors that makes claims about security, and not only look at security as a matter of military-politics but also as societal security against an insecure society or a society threatened in terms of identity.61

This theory will allow for a qualified analysis of the structures shaping security in several areas within Europe and Southeast Asia in order to understand the reasoning behind security strategies in a broader perspective.

3.2. Neoliberal Institutionalism

Robert O. Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism after hegemony was presented in his 1984 book *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Through the theory, Keohane argues for the importance of international regimes in order to create cooperation internationally. In his 2005 preface for the book, Keohane mentions that despite changes in foreign- and security politics since 1984, especially as a result of 9/11 and the rapid development of countries such as China and India, the central argument of the book is still relevant today, possibly now more than ever, as the hegemony of USA has indeed been challenged and the world has moved into an post-hegemonic state.

Keohane sees nation states as rational actors in the political economy. Political economy, he defines as the pursuit of wealth and power through reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations. He defines wealth as the pursuit of marketable means of want satisfaction, and power as the control over actors in the pursuit of marketable means of want satisfaction. Wealth and power are not distributed by a world system, but are distributed through bargaining and are often affected by security matters, which is why cooperation is often attractive in international relations.62

Keohane presents three possible scenarios for the world political economy; harmony, cooperation, or discord.
Harmony is defined as a situation, where one country's policies facilitate the goals of others, despite being made purely from self-interest with no regard for the interest of other countries. As such harmony is apolitical, and no communication or influence is needed. In a harmonious situation, cooperation is not needed, and attempts of cooperation in harmony may even harm the situation, as it would give harmonious countries the chance to exploit one another.
Cooperation occurs when two countries or more reach conformity through policy coordination and agree to adjust behaviour and preferences in order to gain mutual benefits. This may be encouraged through positive or negative inducements. Often in cooperation, continuous negotiations are needed as cooperation rarely occurs without discovering conflicting policies first.
Discord is not simply disagreement; it is a situation with no harmony and no attempt of cooperation. The interests of the involved countries are simply incompatible with one another, and no cooperative solution to make all parties better off can be found.63 Discord can potentially occur

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61 Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 70-71.
62 Keohane (1984). Op. cit. pp. 18-21.
63 Keohane. Ibid. pp. 51-54.

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even if countries attempt to cooperate and have found ways to mutually benefit if one or more countries fail to coordinate actions.[64]

One way to obtain cooperation, according to Keohane, is through hegemony, whereas a single dominant power creates stability in the international world economy. In order to do so, the hegemon must have power over raw material, sources of capital, markets, and competitive advantages in production of highly valued goods, as well as it must be willing to be a leader in international relations.[65] The hegemon will gain power by forming shared interests by using benefit and punishment.[66] Further, the hegemon should have the military power to protect the international order, without giving the picture of military power as a threat to potential allies.[67]

However, it must be kept in mind that while a certain sense of asymmetrical cooperation is needed to obtain hegemony, hegemony is not needed in order to obtain cooperation.[68]

Another way to obtain cooperation in international relations is through international regimes. These do not rely on one strong state to create and maintain stability, but rather on establishing patterns of either common or at least complementary interests to provide favourable conditions between political actors in the international system, with a small group of states measuring outcomes to ensure compliance.[69] Keohane rests on the definition of international regimes as;

"*Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice*".[70]

International regimes are usually built on issue-areas in order to provide norms of behaviour. However, regimes can be fragile, as they can be seen as conflicting with state rules and sovereignty, and usually international regimes cannot establish legal liability but only suggest and incorporate bits and pieces of law into agreements, that often need to be broken, bend, or renegotiated for the sake of complying with laws and capabilities of nation states. Thus, they should only be seen as being motivated by self-interest, which, of course, can also affect values within a nation state.[71] Yet, nations join international regimes, as they are not always stringent rational actors and thereby willing to satisfice rather than maximize[72] and join the regime as they would be at least as well of as part of an international regime as they would be without it, as it provide the chance of gaining though reciprocal relations.[73]

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[64] Keohane. Ibid. p. 65.

[65] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 31-35.

[66] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 78-79.

[67] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 39-40.

[68] Keohane. Ibid. p. 49.

[69] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 78-79.

[70] Keohane. Ibid. p. 57.

[71] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 61-63 + 88-89.

[72] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 110-114.

[73] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 72-73 + 131.

Of course, it is a danger in international regimes that certain actors are irresponsible and make commitments that they cannot or do not intend to carry out, or that some expect more than what is realistically possible. Further, stronger states with more research, development, and resources may end in a situation where they carry the load of the cooperation, providing weaker states with a higher incentive to cooperate but a weaker incentive to develop and fund new research.[74] However, stronger states are still inclined to join international regimes, not for the sake of the common good but as an investment in power and the chance to create a framework for rules and practices.[75] States will commonly see rules of international regimes as moral obligations[76] and choose to comply out of fear for retaliation and bad reputation.[77]

Keohane does point out, that a major shortcoming of this theory is that domestic politics are not regarded as important to the theory, when domestic politics will indeed affect international relations.[78] By combining this theory with the previously presented theory by Buzan and Wæver, this shortcoming is avoided as it is necessary to look at certain domestic reactions to regional security.

Using this theory will allow for a thorough analysis of how cooperation can be used for establishing stronger security systems, feasible for all parties. It will also provide the opportunity to analyse how cooperation may affect mitigation effectiveness in EU and ASEAN.

4. Analysis

The analysis, leading to a conclusion to the problem statement presented in section 1.1, "*Why is there a difference in strategies against migration crisis and nature crisis in both EU and ASEAN, and how does this affect regional climate-security?*", will focus on the strategies of EU and ASEAN in the cases of the most significant, recent migration crises and natural disasters, and compare the effectiveness of strategies and approaches to minimise security risks, in order to see how this may affect the regional security in a climate change situation.

First, an understanding of the role of regional IGOs in responding to security risks will be provided with a focus on theories by Buzan and Wæver, and Keohane, in order to compare the strategies of the two regions and their structure of cooperation. The approaches used in the four chosen crises will then be analysed on the base of comparative document analysis of news articles and strategies on the events. This will lead to a discussion of the effects of these approaches, and of whether current regional strategies approaches will be feasible in a climate change situation or if a new approach is needed.

[74] Keohane. Ibid. p. 96.

[75] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 22-25.

[76] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 126-127.

[77] Keohane. Ibid. p. 106.

[78] Keohane. Ibid. p. xiii.

4.1. Regional Security Complexes in Europe and Southeast Asia

Due to working with EU and ASEAN, which are both regional IGOs, it would be tempting to analyse both regions as institutional RSCs, as these are the RSCs centred around and integrated by a regional institution. This entails that the regions rather treat each other like "friends," and solve internal issues as normal political, societal, or economic problems, than securitise one another, thus working together with a high level of amity and desecuritisation.[79] However, as regional IGOs, the nature of EU and ASEAN are different to a large extent in terms of political power, even though both parties serve as political organs, which also take part in solving crises that threatens the security and stability of their member states. Therefore, both will need to be assessed individually in order to establish the right type of RSCs for Europe and Southeast Asia. This is analysed by applying Buzan and Wæver's RSC theory to official papers on the structure and security of EU and ASEAN, which will then be compared to Keohane's Neoliberal Institutionalism theory, in order to investigate how the member states benefit from cooperation, and what the role of the regional IGOs are in a security crisis situation.

To the 27 member states of EU (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden)[80], the IGO plays a great role with a boarder-free area, common flag and anthem, a common currency for 19 of the member states, a shared budget, shared legislation, and more.[81] The EU and its institutions and legislations have grown strong enough that according to Buzan and Wæver, one could even start wondering if EU still has a high enough level of autonomy to qualify as an RSC or whether it should in fact be seen as a great power.[82] As EU is still an IGO of independent states, who still has their own laws and the choice to not take part in chosen EU-initiatives, despite by some being seen as one unit, EU will be analysed as a cooperation between individual nations.

Looking at EU through a security lens, where processes of securitisation and desecuritisation are so interlinked that security issues of the member nations cannot reasonably be solved individually[83] between the more than 4 million km2 and 446 million inhabitants, that EU covers,[84] the EU member states are definitely reliant on one another in security situations such as energy security, climate change, political instability, organised crime, illegal immigration, terrorism, and nuclear programmes outside of the region.[85] Historically, during world wars and even before that, frequent, bloody wars were not uncommon in Europe. EU (at that time, under the name *the European Economic Community*) was established with the goal of ending internal European wars and shift to

[79] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 56-57.
[80] EU (2020:A). Countries. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en (25.05.2020).
[81] EU (2020:B). About the EU. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en (25.05.2020).
[82] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 56-58.
[83] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. pp. 43-44.
[84] EU (2020:C). Living in the EU. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en (25.05.2020).
[85] Council of the European Union (2009). European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf (25.05.2020). pp. 7-15.

a structure of cooperation through economic partnerships first,[86] thus creating a high level of amity for nations to join out of interest or legitimacy.[87]

Looking at the essential structure of EU as an RSC, consisting of boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction will make it possible to identify the RSC-type of EU.[88]

The boundaries of EU, do not completely separate them from neighbours, and actually states such as Lichtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, Vatican City and more are surrounded by EU member states but are not members themselves.[89] For this reason, some security issues affecting EU, will also affect these states. Hereby, it is already obvious that EU takes part in two types of RSCs; one for the security issues mainly concerning EU member states and one, which also concerns its neighbouring countries.

Looking to the anarchic structure of EU, it is clear that the union is made up from individual anarchic states, which have democratically chosen to take part in various EU-initiatives, while maintaining their status, structures, and constitutions as nation states.[90]

EU's polarity is unipolar, with the union as the major power of the region. However, the union is built on a number of institutions and bodies such as the European Council, which is setting the overall political direction, and the European parliament, the council of the European Union and the European Commission, which are the main institutions of EU legislation.[91] These are all results of the values of the EU; Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights,[92] and that all member states should be democratically involved in the processes of EU.

The social construction, covering the patterns of amity and enmity among the member states, has already been mentioned previously in the fact that EU has established a high level of amity among the member states.

Through this analysis, EU qualifies as an RSC centred around an institution. In security matters including neighbouring states, who are not themselves part of EU, EU would however function as the great power, in great power centred RSC.[93] Thus, there will be a distinction between the EU RSC as the institutionally centred RSC, and the European RSC with EU as a great power.

Due to Brexit, EU is currently experiencing an external transformation, where the outer boundaries contract. This should not be seen as a major transformation leading to a drastic changes of EUs essential structure, as it is only the sovereign state, the UK, leaving the EU.[94] It is difficult to tell the exact consequence of Brexit yet, as new deals between EU and UK are still being negotiated, but there is a clear desire between both parties to maintain trade deals and movability between the

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[86] EU (2020:D) The history of the European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en (25.05.2020).

[87] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. p. 50.

[88] Buzan; Wæver. Ibid. p. 53.

[89] EU (2020:A) Op. cit.

[90] European Institute of Public Administration; European Center for the Regions (2012). *Division of Powers between the European Union, the Member States and Regional and Local Authorities*. https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/division_of_powers/division_of_powers.pdf (25.05.2020).

[91] EU (2020:E). Institutions and bodies. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies_en (25.05.2020).

[92] EU (2020:F). The EU in brief. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en (25.05.2020).

[93] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 56-57.

[94] Buzan; Wæver Ibid. p. 53.

two in order to 'limit the damage' and create a soft transition. Yet, with UK as one of the larger economies in EU, Brexit will leave a gap in EU-budgets and contributions to defence and foreign policy.[95] Further external transition takes place with the candidate countries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey), which have already adjusted policies to fulfil requirements for EU membership and are now in the process of integrating EU legislation into national law.[96]

The fact that EU is in a position, where the member states desecuritise one another does not mean that EU is in a harmonic position, as the desecuritisation is built on policy coordination and agreements rather than an automatic process, where states facilitate each other's goals. It is built on cooperation. Even though EU plays a great role in this cooperation, it should not be seen as a hegemonic situation with EU as the hegemon, as EU is built on democratic processes including all member states rather than force, it should be seen as a cooperation in an international regime.[97] This means, that EU rests on a set of principles, norms, and rules,[98] that the member states have decided will make them better off by joining the cooperation than not being part of it.[99] What EU as a regional regime and RSC has to offer its member states, in terms of security, will be elaborated under the analysis of the Syrian civil war migration crisis in section 4.2.1, and of the 2003 European Heatwave in section 4.3.1.

On the other hand, ASEAN's 10 member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam)[100] have a more distanced relationship, and the IGO exists as an institution for facilitating cooperation with the purpose of creating peace, stability, and prosperity, without interfering with internal national matters and sovereignty for the member states.[101] This means, that the role of ASEAN in responding to regional crises is also different from the EU case, as EU has the possibility of forming shared laws and demanding a deeper commitment from member states, while ASEAN merely has the option of planning collaboration strategies, that the member states are not necessarily obligated to follow, and many member states have their own strategies as the top priority. Asides from the nations in ASEAN, the geographical area of Southeast Asia also counts Timor-Leste.[102]

Despite ASEAN, like EU, being an a regional IGO with a common motto, flag, strategies, and trade agreements, the difference in commitment from the member states to the organisation as a regional regime makes it reasonable to question, whether ASEAN should also be seen and analysed as an institutionally centred RSC or if the group of nations would belong in another category.

[95] BBC News (2020:A). Brexit: The UK has officially left the EU – What happens next. 31.01.2020. In: *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51307874 (25.05.2020).
[96] EU (2020:A). Op. cit.
[97] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. pp. 78-79.
[98] Keohane. Ibid. p. 57.
[99] Keohane. Ibid. p. 61-63.
[100] ASEAN (N.D.:A). ASEAN Member States. https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ (25.05.2020).
[101] ASEAN (N.D.:B). Overview. https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview/ (25.05.2020).
[102] Nations online (2020). Map of Southeast Asia. https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map_of_southeast_asia.htm (25.05.2020).

ASEAN was established in 1967 and built on economic, social, cultural, technical, and educational cooperation, as well as promotion of regional peace and stability between the otherwise fragmented and conflicting nations in the region,[103] thus creating a higher level of amity[104] as more nations joined the association. Currently, ASEAN covers an area of nearly 4,5 million km[2] with more than 600 million inhabitants.[105] When looking at securitisation and desecuritisation, it is inevitable that some issues would include a majority of the region, examples are infectious diseases, environmental degradation and natural disasters, organised crime,[106] migration,[107] terrorism, maritime tensions, and missiles and nuclear weapons outside of the region.[108]

The essential structure of Southeast Asia as a security region with boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction[109] will, as with the case of Europe, be applied to form an understanding of which type to RSC the region belongs to, and thus how it should be analysed. The boundaries of ASEAN do not seem as complicated as those of the EU, as only one nation in the geographical region of Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste, is not a member of ASEAN.[110] Further, the region as such is mainly separated from its neighbours by water and only shares a dry boarder with Bangladesh, India and China to the North, and Papua New Guinea on an island in the South. The way the boarders in the region could complicate the security situation is in terms of disputes over sea area both internally and externally, as well as ownership over small islands.

The anarchic structure of ASEAN is, as previously mentioned, seemingly higher than that of the EU. However, while the association is open to any nation in the Southeast Asian region, it is required that potential member states subscribe to the aims, principles, and purposes of the institution.[111] ASEAN has become increasingly binding, despite the institution being built on principles of small steps, and voluntary and informal agreements,[112] as well as "*1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 2. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; 3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 6. Effective cooperation among themselves.*"[113] Based on these principles, it can be argued that, while there are

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[103] ASEAN (N.D.:C). History: The Founding of ASEAN. https://asean.org/asean/about-asean/history/ (25.05.2020).

[104] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. p. 50.

[105] ASEAN (2018). ASEAN Community. https://asean.org/storage/2019/01/17a.-October-2018-ASEAN-Community-2018-folded-brochure.pdf (25.05.2020).

[106] ASEAN Secretariat (2006). ASEAN Regional Security: The Threats Facing it and the Way Forward* By ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-regional-security-the-threats-facing-it-and-the-way-forward-by-asean-secretariat (25.05.2020).

[107] Searight, Amy (2019). Southeast Asia in 2019: Four Issues to Watch. 15.01.2019. In: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-2019-four-issues-watch (25.05.2020).

[108] Dancel, Raul (2017). Asean seeks greater resolve to tackle security challenges. 14.11.2017. In: *The Straits Times*. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/asean-seeks-greater-resolve-to-tackle-security-challenges (25.05.2020).

[109] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. p. 53.

[110] Nations Online (2020). Op. cit.

[111] ASEAN (N.D.:3). Op. cit.

[112] ASEAN. Ibid.

[113] ASEAN (N.D.:2). Op. cit.

certain principles and agreements that should be adhered to, the ASEAN member states maintain a relatively high level of anarchy.

Looking at the polarity in ASEAN, the association is not meant to be a supranational entity, and it has no powers of enforcement or any judicial system. A goal of the association is to keep the region secure of intervention from the great powers in the world, while still maintaining good relationships with them.[114] It is clear that, possibly as a result of the difference in development status between the member states, certain states have more power than others internally. The three most powerful nations in Southeast Asia count Indonesia at the top, likely as a result of the country's historic military role in the region combined with its current rapid development. Asides from this, Singapore and Viet Nam should also be counted in as regional powers, Singapore on account of its economic strength, and Viet Nam as a result of its international profile and political stability.[115] It should be kept in mind, that ASEAN is in close proximity to both China, Japan and India, which are all likely to insert themselves further in politics in ASEAN, whereas they could also affect the security situation,[116] and the RSC situation of the region.

On the last point, the social construction of ASEAN, the region lies in the middle grounds between amity and enmity, leaning more towards the amity side as there is a distinct cooperation and regional friendship, shaping the region, while rivalry is also seen from time to time. Rivalry is experienced through situations such as the haze caused by 'slash and burn' practices in forests,[117] religious tensions, and migration.[118]

Thereby, it can be concluded, that the RSC among ASEAN member states would qualify as a standard multipolar RSC, despite having a well-established regional IGO. The RSC is based on an anarchic structure, alliances, and regional powers, setting the terms for security in the region.[119] Thus, the RSC will be referred to as a Southeast Asian RSC rather than an ASEAN RSC, as the regional IGO is not the centre of the security cooperation between the nations in the region. How this affects the Southeast Asian nations in crisis situations will be presented under the analysis of migration crisis in section 4.2.2 and natural disaster in section 4.3.2.

By attempting to desecuritise one another, and to a large degree succeeding to do so through ASEAN, while still being affected by regional powers, the ASEAN member states have indeed shown the benefits of cooperation through an international regime[120] With the anarchic structure in in ASEAN and the Southeast Asian RSC, a pitfall could be that nations make commitments that

[114] Ramos, Fidel Valdez (2000). Speech: *The World to Come: ASEAN's Political and Economic Prospects in the New Century*. 17.05.2000. At: The Economic Strategy Institute's Global Forum 2000: The World to Come – Value and Price of Globalization, Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington D.C., USA. 17.05.2000.

[115] Kurlantzick, Joshua (2019). Indonesia: Southeast Asia's Once and Future Regional Power?. 20.07.2019. In: *Aspenia Online: International analysis and commentary*. https://aspeniaonline.it/indonesia-southeast-asias-once-and-future-regional-power/ (25.05.2020).

[116] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (N.D.). Paradox of Progress: East and Southeast Asia. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/the-next-five-years/east-and-southeast-asia (25.05.2020).

[117]Reuters (2019). Malaysia officially complains over haze as Indonesia forests burn. 06.09.2019. In: *New Straits Times*. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/09/519267/malaysia-officially-complains-over-haze-indonesia-forests-burn (25.05.2020).

[118] Searight (2019). Op. cit.

[119] Buzan; Wæver. Op. cit. p. 55.

[120] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. p. 57.

they are not capable of following through,[121] or that the region fails to coordinate actions, thus causing discord[122] and ultimately braking the amity of the RSC.

On a global scale, it is possible that both the European and Southeast Asian RSCs can be affected by great powers. In Europe, mainly as a result from a close cooperation with USA historically, an increasing relation to China as a growing power, and, lastly, both conflict and cooperation with Russia over the previously Soviet nations in Eastern Europe. In Southeast Asia, the powers most likely to affect the region are China, India, and Japan due to the close geographical connection, with China as the most likely, as a result of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which also includes cooperation with Southeast Asia, as well as disputes over the South China Sea. Further, the region can be affected by USA and EU through trade relations.

4.2. Migration crises

Migration is an issue that affects both EU and ASEAN in recent times through the ongoing crises of mass migration of Syrian refugees to Europe and Turkey due to the Syrian civil war[123] and the regional migration of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar to Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian Nations due to a military crackdown by the Myanmar army.[124] Current strategies against migration crises are important to understand, as migration is expected to be one of the great consequences of climate change in the future. Despite the difference in the two situations, that the crisis on the ASEAN side is more or less an internal crisis as the migration stems from a state that is part of the Southeast Asian RSC, while the crisis is external on the EU side, both RSCs have needed to create strategies to solve the crises.

Whether or not migration should in fact be securitised has been widely discussed. Some claim that migration pose a threat to a country, as it challenges the country's culture, norms and values, imposes a significant economic burden, creates a larger unemployment, and rises the risk of terrorism, violence and other types of crime, while others see refugees as a group that must be protected from war and political persecution and helped at all cost, and as a group that could be a positive addition to a country's culture and workforce, if properly integrated. Thus, the issue poses a political discussion, that will likely never be put to an end.

Both crises will be analysed on a basis of strategies from the regional IGO in question, supported by articles on the crises from various news sources. It should also be included if any nations in each RSC are untouched by the issue, or if any 'outsiders' are included. Both cases of analyses will include analysis on the cooperation within the RSC based on Neoliberal Institutionalism and the analytical principle of referent objects and securitising actors from Buzan and Wæver. Further, the analysis will be based on the type of RSC found in Europe and Southeast Asia, as analysed based on the RSC theory in section 4.1. This will ensure that the right parameters of the specific RSC types are taken into account.

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[121] Keohane. Ibid. p. 96.
[122] Keohane. Ibid. p. 65.
[123] BBC News (2016). Op. cit.
[124] Lau (2019). Op. cit.

For the EU case, the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU functioning as an institutionally centred RSC means that the analysis will mainly be based on strategies and legislation on the matter from EU. With this as the case, strategies from the most affected nations should be taken into consideration as important aspects for the security situation, along with cooperation statements between the non-EU nations and EU, in order to provide a full picture of the situation. However, it must also be included if any member states have chosen not to cooperate, or if any nations outside of the EU institution are incorporated in the securitisation/desecuritisation.

For the Southeast Asian RSC, as a standard multipolar RSC with Indonesia, Singapore and Viet Nam as regional powers, ASEAN strategies are still relevant despite ASEAN not forming the structure of the RSC. It should still be included, as the association facilitates the cooperation between the member states, and thus still plays a significant role in the RSC. What is further necessary to include is statements and strategies from the regional powers, which have a great influence on securitisation/desecuritisation in the RSC. Statements from the government of Myanmar should also be included to provide an understanding of how the situation is tackled in the country of origin, as this is an internal crisis within the RSC.

4.2.1. EU: Syrian civil war migration crisis

While the Syrian civil war migration crisis in Europe was at its peak in 2015, it is still ongoing today. However, the issue roots back to a violent government crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations and demands for the resignation of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad already in 2011, ultimately causing an ongoing civil war and leaving a space for the Islamic terror group Daesh (Islamic State) to grow and join the protests.

This combination created a 'war within the war', including the Syrian government, protesters, Daesh, and a US-led coalition fighting terrorism, which included Europe.[125] Within the first year (2011-2012), more than 700,000 Syrians had been displaced as refugees,[126] by 2020, this number had exceeded 12 million; from these 6.7 millions had fled Syria.[127] At the peak of the crisis in 2015, EU had a total of more than 1.3 million asylum claims. Of course, not all of these were from Syria. The statistics include more than 350,000 refugees from Syria, more than 175,000 from Afghanistan, more than 125,000 from Iraq, as well as significant numbers from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran, and Ukraine.[128] As shown in figure 1 below, the number of asylum claims were spread unevenly across the EU, which caused issues of inequality for the EU member states. The UK is included in these numbers, as the Brexit referendum did not take place until June 2016, whereas the UK was still part of the EU at the peak of the refugee crisis.

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[125] BBC News (2016:B) Syria: The story of the conflict. 11.03.2016. In: *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (25.05.2020).

[126] Our World in Data (N.D.). Refugee population by country or territory of origin, 2009 to 2017: Syrian Arab Republic. https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/refugee-population-by-country-or-territory-of-origin?tab=chart&time=2009..&country=Syrian%20Arab%20Republic (25.05.2020).

[127] UNHCR (2020:B). Syria Refugee Crisis Explained. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/ (25.05.2020).

[128] BBC News (2014:A). Op. cit.

Asylum applications pr. 100,000 local population in EU in 2015

Country	Value
Hungary	1799
Sweden	1667
Austria	1027
Finland	591
Germany	587
Luxemburg	445
Malta	430
Belgium	397
Denmark	307
Bulgaria	283
Cyprus	267
Netherlands	266
Italy	138
Greece	122
France	114
Ireland	71
UK	60
Poland	32
Spain	32
Estonia	18
Latvia	17
Czechia	14
Slovenia	13
Lithuenia	11
Portugal	8
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Croatia	5

Figure 1: Asylum applications pr. 100,000 local population in 2015.[133]

The uneven numbers and differences in national sentiments towards the refugees between the EU member states did cause tensions in EU, especially with Hungary as the country with the largest number of asylum seekers, and Italy and Greece as locations where most refugees initially arrive to Europe,[129] while Germany as an example presented an open arms approach to welcome refugees. The situation further caused nationalist and right-wing populist backlashes in EU member states,[130] which meant that several member states chose to reinstate border control after two decades of open borders. Hungary even opted to build a fence across the border to Serbia to keep refugees from entering the country.[131]

By September 2015, along with a statement from European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker that "*We Europeans should know and should never forget why giving refuge and complying with the fundamental right to asylum is so important.*",[132] EU put forward a package for the member states to address the refugee crisis in accordance with the EU agenda on migration, which had already stated four pillars to manage migration; 1) Reducing incentives for irregular migration, 2) border management – saving lives and securing external borders, 3) a strong common asylum policy, and 4) a new policy on legal migration.[134] This package included a list of safe countries of origin, where asylum seekers could be returned to, an EU action plan for returns, and public procurement rules for

[129] BBC News. Ibid.
[130] Tharoor, Ishaan (2020). Europe can't wish away Syrian Refugees. 03.03.2020. In: *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/03/europe-cant-wish-away-syrian-refugees/ (25.05.2020).
[131] Spindler, William (2015). 2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis. 08.12.2015. In: *UNHCR*. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html (25.05.2020).
[132] European Commission (2015:A). Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_5596 (25.05.2020).
[133] BBC News. Ibid.
[134] European Commission (2015:B). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGION: A EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (25.05.2020). pp.6-17.

refugee support. The most radical part of the plan was the relocation of 160,000 refugees, notably from Hungary, Greece, and Italy, within the EU member states, with relocation quotas based on the criteria of 40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum seekers, 10% of the unemployment rate.[135] Thereby reforming the Dublin principle, which stated that refugees in Europe should stay in the nation they initially arrived in.[136]

While both Norway and Lichtenstein, which are not EU member states, opted into the relocation scheme, some EU members were not as fond of the plan. Despite the legal obligation of the EU scheme, Poland and Hungary refused to take in any asylum seekers, while Slovakia and Czechia only accepted a very limited number.[137] The failure from parties of the EU RSC to comply with the legally binding agreement on refugee relocation quotas naturally challenges the patterns of common interest within the EU and the principle of carrying the refugee burden as a joint union. The reason behind nations like Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia having entered into the commitment and chosen not to carry it out,[138] according to Keohane's Neoliberal Institutionalism, is that the countries are still rational actors, acting according to self-interest,[139] despite being part of EU and having a responsibility towards the cooperation. Thus, the commitment may have served a larger burden than expected and was no longer more attractive than simply opting out and taking the consequence.

Outside of the RSC, EU has responded to the crisis by mobilising more than €17 billion to support vulnerable Syrians, while urging all parties of the conflict to respect international humanitarian laws and allow safe humanitarian access to assist people in need. Further, EU has provided funds for humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey.[140] It is noteworthy, that humanitarian aid funds for Turkey is part of a strategy to limit the flow of immigrants to Europe through an agreement with Turkey to close the borders to Greece for refugees in exchange for EU funding to bear the economic burden of the mass migration.[141] Thus, presenting Turkey with a seemingly attractive cooperation with the union, which Turkey is striving to become part of. A deal that, according to Keohane, any rational actor in the political economy would accept.[142] Further, this makes it reasonable to believe that similar strategies would be the case of funds to Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt.

In 2020, the crisis shows in EU again, after the agreement with Turkey had caused the number of

[135] European Commission (2015:A). Op. cit.
[136] European Commission (2018). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL MANAGING MIGRATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS: PROGRESS UNDER THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0798 (25.05.2020).
[137] Amnesty International (2017). EU: Countries have fulfilled less than a third of their asylum relocation promises. 25.09.2017. In: *Amnesty International*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/eu-countries-have-fulfilled-less-than-a-third-of-their-asylum-relocation-promises/ (25.05.2020).
[138] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. p. 96.
[139] Keohane. Ibid. 61-63.
[140] European Commission (2020). Syria. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/syria_en (25.05.2020).
[141] Tharoor (2020). Op. cit.
[142] Keohane. Op. cit. pp. 18-21.

new arrivals of asylum seekers to fall to 125,000 in 2019,[143] as compared to the previously mentioned 1.3 million in 2015. The reason behind this is that Turkey has chosen to open the borders to Greece for refugees, letting thousands of migrants from mainly Syria and Afghanistan cross the borders by sea or land. For Turkey, this is a reaction to a frustration of lack of help from the West in coping with the refugee burden and resolving the crisis in Syria, sparked by airstrikes and increasing refugee pressure on Turkey, thus attempting to pressure NATO and EU.[144] A reason for the increased refugee pressure on Turkey may be the unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Idlib in the northwest of Syria, causing more than a million people to be displaced between December 2019 and March 2020.[145] As a reaction, Greek security forces are using tear-gas and weapons in forceful attempts to get the refugees to return to Turkey. Thereby, Greece has breached EU agreements and international law, causing EU to react promptly by hosting emergency meetings to solve the new issues in the case.[146]

Finding the referent object and the securitising actor,[147] in this specific case, is fairly simple. The EU should be the securitising actor and prove its worth as an institution in order to protect the referent object, which in this case to some are the member states needing to be protected from the economic burden and other risks of mass migration, and to others the refugees needing protection from war and political prosecution. The internal tensions within EU proves that there is a disagreement of whether the many refugees should be seen as referent objects needing protection, or if they should be seen as being the actual threat. Further, entering into the now broken agreement with Turkey, EU attempted to push the burden as a securitising actor off on the shoulders of Turkey through cooperation, which turned out to be less attractive for Turkey than expected, a situation that is not unlikely in cooperation through international regimes.[148]

4.2.2. ASEAN: Rohingya refugee crisis

In the South East Asian RSC, the most significant, recent refugee crisis, the Rohingya refugee crisis, is also still ongoing. The Rohingyas, who in the beginning of 2017 counted more than a million in Myanmar, are only one of many ethnic minorities in the predominantly Buddhist nation with their own culture and language, who have been in the country for generations. The government of Myanmar denies citizenship for Rohingyas, and sees them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, which is also why the group was not included in the 2014 census.[149] Due to escalating discrimination and violence, thousands of Rohingyas started to flee Myanmar in 2015.[150]

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[143] Financial Times (2020). EU calls emergency meeting on deepening Turkey-Syria crisis. 01.03.2020. In: *Financial Times*. https://www.ft.com/content/faefa0a8-5be3-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4 (25.05.2020).
[144] Tharoor (2020). Op. cit.
[145] European Commission (2020). Op. cit.
[146] Tharoor (2020). Op. cit.
[147] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 70-71.
[148] Keohane (1894). Op. cit. p. 96.
[149] BBC News (2020:B). Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis. 23.01.2020. In: *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 (25.05.2020).
[150] Pagano, Antonietta (2016). The Rohingyas Refugee Crisis: A Regional and International Issue?. 10.03.2016. in: *Middle East Institute*. https://www.mei.edu/publications/rohingyas-refugee-crisis-regional-and-international-issue (25.05.2020).

The crisis peaked in 2017 due to a military crackdown on Rohingya Muslims from the Rakhine state on the west coast of Myanmar (bordering to Bangladesh). Rohingya militants had attacked more than 30 police posts in Myanmar, and the military responded by attacking Rohingyas[151] with rapes, shootings, tying people to buildings, mass killings, and burning nearly 400 villages in a genocidal intent, according to the UN.[152] While the Myanmar army claims that it was only fighting Rohingya militants without targeting civilians, and Myanmar's state councillor, the Nobel Peace Prize receiver Aung San Suu Kyi, denies all allegations of genocide, UN has deemed the situation a textbook example of ethnic cleansing, and the International Criminal Court, which Myanmar is not a member of, has ruled that Myanmar should take emergency measures to protect Rohingyas.

By 2019, more than 900,000 Rohingyas had fled to Bangladesh according to UN,[153] while others fled to Southeast Asia, mainly to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as a smaller number in other ASEAN states.[154] 101,580 Rohingyas are registered as refugees in Malaysia,[155] 800 in Indonesia,[156] and a majority of the 93,298 refugees in Thailand are ethnic minorities from Myanmar,[157] many of these refugees have been illegally trafficked to their current destination, despite regional conventions against human trafficking.[158]

Despite Myanmar stating that the country is prepared for the Rohingyas to return, the country has gone through minimal efforts in preparing and reconstructing villages, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), leaving the Rohingyas against the idea of returning due to a fear concerning safety and lack of citizenship.[159]

With this large number of refugees coming from a country within the Southeast Asian RSC due to what by some is defined as an ethnic cleansing, it would be natural for ASEAN and member states to take action towards the situation, especially when keeping the ASEAN principles of promoting peaceful communities and respect for justice in mind.[160] In 2018, ASEAN and Myanmar made agreements for Myanmar to take practical measures towards repatriation of the Rohingyas.[161] The issue further played a great role in The ASEAN annual summit in 2019.[162] However, in the

[151] BBC News (2020:B). Op. cit.

[152] The ASEAN Post team (2020). Op. cit.

[153] OCHA (N.D). Rohingya Refugee Crisis. https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis (25.05.2020).

[154] Yi, Beh Lih (2015). Philippines offers refuge to desperate migrants trapped on boats. 10.02.2015. In: *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/philippines-offers-refuge-to-desperate-asylum-seekers-trapped-on-boats (25.05.2020).

[155] UNHCR (2020:C). Figures at a Glance in Malaysia. https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance-in-malaysia.html (25.05.2020).

[156] Bemma, Adam (2019). Rohingya refugee voices amplify across Southeast Asia. 08.07.2019. In: *The Jakarta Post*. https://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2019/07/08/rohingya-refugee-voices-amplify-across-southeast-asia.html (25.05.2020).

[157] UNHCR (2020:D). Refugees in Thailand. https://www.unhcr.or.th/en (25.05.2020).

[158] Bemma (2019). Op. cit.

[159] The ASEAN Post team (2020). Op. cit.

[160] ASEAN (N.D.:B). Op. cit.

[161] Taw, Pyi Nay (2019). ASEAN, Myanmar to implement practical measures on Rakhine situation. https://asean.org/asean-myanmar-implement-practical-measures-rakhine-situation/ (25.05.2020).

[162] Barber, Rebecca (2019). The ASEAN Summit and the Disregard of Rohingya Refugees. 26.06.2019. In: *Australian Outlook*. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-asean-summit-and-the-disregard-of-rohingya-refugees/ (25.05.2020).

Chairman's Statement of the summit, the refugee crisis was only mentioned in two paragraphs under the ASEAN Socio-cultural community, without ever mentioning the Rohingya but referring to the crisis as "*the situation in the Rakhine State*".[163] While recognising that there is a need for resources in supporting basic services in the state, ASEAN's strategy for solving the crisis mainly consists of welcoming voluntary support from ASEAN member states in addressing the humanitarian situation, expressing support for Myanmar's commitment to ensure safety, and looking forward to a cooperation between Myanmar, Bangladesh, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[164] The UN now describes the crisis as being at a complete standstill,[165] and ASEAN is criticised for the lacking efforts in supporting the Rohingyas, and for putting diplomacy between members, and the institutions non-interference policy, before human rights.[166] However, as mentioned in section 4.1, the Southeast Asian RSC, is not centred around the institution of ASEAN but rather based on the amity and cooperation between the individual nations in the region, whereas it may be expectable that the efforts made in such crisis depends on the involved nations and the regional powers rather than ASEAN as an institution.

When looking at the opinions of the refugee crisis, and Myanmar and ASEAN's response to the situation, 54,6 % of ASEAN citizens disagree or strongly disagree with the strategy and efforts of ASEAN. There is a majority of people with this opinion in all nations except for Myanmar, Viet Nam, and Laos. However, 61% are against the idea of resettling the Rohingya in their own country of residence, even in the predominantly Muslim countries Brunei and Malaysia, whereas the Rohingyas are most welcome in Indonesia, which is also predominantly Muslim, and the Philippines. With a percentage of 66, Myanmar has the highest unwillingness to resettle the Rohingyas, according to the survey.[167]

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, as the countries with the highest numbers of Rohingya refugees, are also the most outspoken on the issue. As these countries, like most other ASEAN member nations, have not ratified the UN Refugee Convention, they are not obligated to protect refugees, and have no plans to assimilate the Rohingyas, but have allowed for refugee centres to be built and supported. The only ASEAN nation, which has ratified the convention and also offered to resettle Rohingya refugees, is the Philippines.[168] Thus, it seems that most ASEAN nations are unwilling to take responsibility and go through greater measures towards ending the Rohingya refugee crisis.

When taking the key principle from Keohane's theory of Neoliberal Institutionalism, that nations are rational actors, acting according to best self-interest based on risk/benefit,[169] into account,

[163] ASEAN (2019:A). Chairman's Statement of the 34th ASEAN Summit: Bangkok, 23 June 2039 Advancing Partnership for Sustainability. https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/chairmans-statement-of-the-34th-asean-summit-bangkok-23-june-2019-advancing-partnership-for-sustainability/ (25.05.2020).

[164] ASEAN. Ibid.

[165] Barber (2019). Op. cit.

[166] The ASEAN Post team (2020). Op. cit.

[167] The Straits Times (2020). Asean divided on Rohingya crisis: Poll. 17.01.2020. In: *The Daily Star*. https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/asean-divided-rohingya-crisis-poll-1855399 (25.05.2020).

[168] Bemma (2019). Op. cit.

[169] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. pp. 18-21.

reasons behind the unwillingness to take serious measures and pressure Myanmar to end the crisis could be a fear of challenging the amity in the region, by disagreeing with the actions and decisions of Myanmar and going against the non-interference principle of ASEAN, as well as a fear of having to deal with the economic consequence of up to a million refugees, a situation that could have severe consequences for any nation, especially developing nations, which many of the ASEAN member states still are.

What could possibly change the situation and generate a support system for the Rohingyas, and other vulnerable minorities, is a pressure from the regional powers Indonesia, Singapore, and Viet Nam.
As mentioned, the most recognised of the regional powers, Indonesia is fairly welcoming to the Rohingyas compared to the rest of the RSC. Indonesia wants a voluntary, safe and dignified repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar, and in support of this, Indonesia has donated US$ 536,000 and constructed a hospital in the Rakhine state, involving local people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds in the construction work.[170]
In Singapore, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan has stated that while Singapore nor ASEAN are in any position to impose deadlines for the repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar, they are ready to provide support for healthcare, education facilities, and promotion of dialogue, as soon as the Rohingya refugees have confidence that they can return in a voluntary, safe and dignified manner.[171]
Viet Nam, holding the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2020, has not made grand statements on the crisis in any direction. However, the country has donated US$ 50,000 through the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.[172]

The great fragmentation of opinions on the Rohingya refugee crisis creates a complicated picture of referent object and securitising actor in the RSC in this specific case. Myanmar started out as the securitising actor in protecting the country against extremist Rohingyas, who then again were most likely attempting to be a securitising actor in protecting the Rohingya community against discrimination from Myanmar's government. It seems that the general situation has developed to make most ASEAN member states, as well as Bangladesh, securitising actors in support of a safe repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar, despite disagreements on the right approach to do so.

4.3. Natural disasters
Natural disasters, like migration crises, will inevitably be one of the greatest climate-security risks, that the world will experience in the future, making it important to understand the reaction patterns

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[170] Mariska, Diana (2019). Indonesia provides Rp 7.5b to Support Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees. 20.12.2019. In: *Jakarta Globe*. https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-provides-rp-75b-to-support-repatriation-of-rohingya-refugees/ (25.05.2020).
[171] Lim, Adrian (2019). Parliament: Asean ready to support Rohingya refugees but can't impose repatriation deadline, says Vivian Balakrishnan. 13.02.2019. In: *The Straits Times*. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-why-asean-cant-impose-deadline-to-start-rohingya-refugee-repatriation-vivian (25.05.2020).
[172] WFP (2019). Vietnam offers support to WFP Cox's Bazar operations. https://www.wfp.org/news/vietnam-offers-support-wfp-coxs-bazar-operations (25.05.2020).

of RSCs in the case. Natural disasters have already been experienced in both Europe and Southeast Asia, however, more frequently in Southeast Asia.[173] The greatest natural disasters, affecting the largest amounts of the population, of the two regions are the 2003 European heatwave, killing nearly 30,000 people,[174] and the 2011 Southeast Asian floods, affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands families.[175]

Like the migration crisis in section 4.2, these natural disasters will be analysed according to the RSC theory and types stated in section 4.1, through the lens of Neoliberal Institutionalism in order to understand the cooperation within the RSCs in the crisis situations. What must be taken into account for both RSCs is the strategies of the regional IGOs to mitigate regional natural disasters. Further, the consequences of the crises in the most affected countries must also be taken into account, as there is a relevance in including reactions and long-term consequences in the most affected nations, as well as assistance from the less affected.

To EU some of the most affected nations of the 2003 European heatwave were France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the UK. [176] As the UK was still part of the EU in 2003, and Brexit was only years later, it will be seen as an EU member state trough the analysis. Further, as the heatwave not only concerns EU member states, focus will be on the European RSC with EU as a great power, as described in section 4.1. With EU as a great power, it is still relevant to include strategies from the EU to minimize the risk of high numbers of fatalities of heat waves in the future.

In Southeast Asia, the most affected nation of the 2011 Southeast Asian floods was Thailand, however, the entire region experiences annual monsoon seasons, and it is not uncommon that these lead to floods. As a standard multipolar RSC, it is, apart from strategies from ASEAN and Thailand, also relevant to look at reactions and assistance from the regional powers, Indonesia, Singapore and Viet Nam. Lastly, as similar events are highly likely, any regional strategies to avoid great floods and other consequences of the monsoon season should be taken into account.

4.3.1. EU: 2003 European heatwave

While heatwaves as a result of climate change have become more common in Europe, and the continent experienced record-breaking heatwaves in several European nations during the summer of 2019, the most deadly European heatwave, which is still referenced to until this day, was that of 2003,[177] which caused between 35,000 and 70,000 premature deaths all over Europe. It is deemed as likely, that the temperatures during the 2003 European heatwave will be the new normal for European summer time by 2040,[178] meaning that there is a significant reason to wonder how Europe

[173] The New Humanitarian (2010). Asia most at risk from natural disasters*. 31.04.2010. In: *The New Humanitarian*. http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2010/05/31 (25.05.2020).

[174] Jha (2006). Op. cit.

[175] Al Jazeera and Agencies (2011). Op. cit.

[176] Jha (2006). Op. cit.

[177] Knox, Patrick; White, Debbie (2019). Euro Inferno – Europe heatwave 2019: Which countries have been affected, and how many people have died?. 26.07.2019. In: *The Sun*. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9383682/europe-heatwave-number-of-deaths-2019/ (25.05.2020).

[178] Schaart, Elaine; Nelsen, Arthur; Deutsch, Jillian; Cokelaere, Hanne (2019). 4 ways Europe is tackling extreme temperatures. 08.07.2019. In: *Politico*. https://www.politico.eu/article/4-ways-europe-is-preparing-for-the-next-heat-waves/ (25.05.2020).

choose to handle the rising temperatures in order to protect both the people in Europe, but also the nature and livestock, which is also challenged by the rising temperatures.

When focusing on the RSC of the underlaying security crisis of the 2003 European heatwave, obviously EU still has a large role to play, but global warming is of course in no way limited to the members of EU, nor is the response to the issue, as opposed to a migration crisis where a country could potentially choose to close their borders and not deal with the crisis in any way. Therefore, in this issue, the EU and the member states do not form the RSC singlehandedly. Rather Europe forms an RSC, where EU, as an institution and a strong union between a majority of the European countries, serves as a great power. Thus, forming a European RSC centred around a great power,[179] as also stated in section 4.1.

The main reason why the 2003 heatwave is seen as one of the most serious natural disasters in the history of Europe is the high death toll,[180] which as mentioned above was estimated to be between 35,000 and 70,000 people, while experts have struggled to find more exact numbers.[181] However, the reason behind the many fatalities and the danger of high heat for humans is more well known. At 42_oC the human body starts to 'cook', and the body may suffer a heatstroke, which can be fatal, if the temperature is not brought down quickly. Even before that, the heart gets overworked, as water from the blood evaporates, causing the blood to thicken, which also increases the risk of strokes and heart attacks as a result of clotting. There is a simple solution to this and no reason why anyone should die from heatwaves, as long as they have the chance to stay cool and keeping their water and salt levels high enough for sweating, which today is the situation for a majority of Europeans also in the most affected nations including; France, Germany, Spain, UK, Netherlands, Poland, Czechia, Denmark, Austria, Italy, and Bosnia.[182] Further than human fatalities, the 2003 heatwave had the consequences of crop harvests being down by 30%, and the alpine glaciers melting one-tenth in 2003 alone.[183]

This proves, that Europe, including civilians and governments, at the time may have been extremely ill prepared for a heatwave, as nations in warmer climate have not experienced the same numbers of fatalities purely as a result of heat. It is argued that there are plenty of measures Europe could have taken to prevent the heatwave from becoming fatal to humans, including: emergency warnings from public health officials, education of the most vulnerable groups, and on a long terms, efforts to reduce human-induced climate change and measures to adapt to a changed climate e.g. by remodelling houses to make cooling easier.[184]

The EU and the rest of the affected European RSC did take measures to avoid a similar crisis from heatwaves in the future. Already in 2000, EU had launched the First European Climate Change

[179] Buzan; Wæver (2003. pp. 59-60.
[180] Jha (2006). Op. cit.
[181] Schaart; et. al. (2019). Op. cit.
[182] Jha (2006). Op. cit.
[183] European Environment Agency (2004). *Europe needs adaptation strategies to limit climate change impacts*. https://www.eea.europa.eu/media/newsreleases/climate_report-en (25.05.2020).
[184] Jha (2006). Op. cit.

Programme (ECCP), running until the end of 2004, with a range of working groups identifying options for reducing emissions in a cost-effective manner, resulting in several initiatives including the EU Emissions Trading System. The second EPPC was launched in 2005, included working groups on reviewing the implementation of the first EPPC, aviation, CO_2 and cars, carbon capture and storage, adaptation, and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships.[185] Directly related to the 2003 heatwave, the EU stated efforts in "*preparing sustainable adaptation measures towards an increase of drought frequency and intensity in the future*" in order to protect crops and environment. This included efforts to boost agroforestry, systems for crop rotation, and strategies for water conservation.[186] Yet, climate change was not mentioned in the European Security Strategy, launched in December 2003.[187]

The majority of efforts in ensuring a stabile infrastructure, making European homes suitable for warmer temperatures, and cooling humans to avoid fatalities was up to the individual nations. To ensure public transport, it was attempted to paint train tracks white in order to avoid overheating. To prepare households for warmer temperatures, it was recommended to install reflecting blinds or even build more homes with air-conditioning systems. To protect humans from heatstroke initiatives such as opening cooling centres, extending opening hours for parks and public swimming pools, planting more trees in cities, and even deploying the red cross for emergency medical assistance were seen.

Despite these efforts, after the 2019 heatwave, which indeed had less fatalities, but higher temperatures[188] and a larger numbers of wildfires,[189] Europe, including EU and European national governments, was criticised for not launching a greater Europe-wide response against climate change after the 2003 heatwave, which could have been a trigger. It is even stated, that with the current goal of limiting global warming to $+2_oC$, Europe will still experience a significant increase in heatwaves of high intensity.[190]

When taking the individualistic approach in finding solutions against future crises like the 2003 European heatwave into account, from a neoliberal perspective it would seem, that climate change was not yet seen as a great enough issue, that it wouldn't be solved in a harmonious manner, where the individual states would all work towards the goal of avoiding great consequences of natural disasters caused by climate change without greater cooperation schemes,[191] and norms, rules and values.[192]

[185] European Commission (N.D.:A). European Climate Change Programme. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp_en (25.05.2020).
[186] Schaart; et. al. (2019). Op. cit.
[187] Council of the European Union (2003). European Security Strategy: A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf (25.05.2020).
[188] Hallali, Ruben (2019). Europe failed to act after the 2003 French heatwave. We cannot ignore this one. 01.07.2019. In: *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/01/europe-failed-2003-french-heatwave-record-temperatures-climate (25.05.2020).
[189] Knox; White (2019). Op. cit.
[190] Hallali (2019). Op. cit.
[191] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. pp. 51-54.
[192] Keohane Ibid. p.57.

As EU plays the role of a great power in the European RSC to the security threat of climate change and natural disasters, EU also has a key role as a securitising actor in protecting Europe, including human populations, animals, environment, livestock, etc. as previously mentioned, which in this case becomes the referent objects, against the threat of heatwaves and thereby also climate change. However, the fact that EU did not mention climate change, heatwaves, or other related issues in the European security strategy of 2003, gives the indication that EU was not ready to securitise climate change at the time. Therefore, the countries in the European RSC would have to be individual securitising actors and find their own solution for the crisis, except from a few relatively vague initiatives from the EU.

4.3.2. ASEAN: 2011 Southeast Asian floods

In the summer and fall of 2011, storms and floods during the annual monsoon season killed more than 2,000 people in Southeast Asia,[193] and over all affected more than 176 million people,[194] and destroyed businesses from rice farms to factories. While Thailand was the most affected nation, the natural disaster also had significant effects in the Philippines, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam.[195] In Thailand, the consequences caused the army to be deployed to help victims and use army bases as housing for evacuees.[196] In 2011, Asia and the Pacific experienced 107 natural disasters, which is nearly half of the worldwide total. It is estimated that the total regional economic loss accumulated to US$ 295 billion.[197] Due to climate change, it is expected that natural disasters will be a more common event in Southeast Asia's Monsoon season, unless actions are taken to secure rivers, improve draining systems, and reduce GHG emissions.[198]

To Southeast Asia, especially to developing nations such as the six most affected by the 2011 floods, the cost of natural disasters, combined with relatively weak public support systems, has great consequences for the economic development and has the potential of leaving thousands out of homes and jobs. Thus, it is important for the regional security, that the Southeast Asian RSC securitise the situation and make joint efforts to avoid a humanitarian disaster.

During the crisis, Indonesia and Singapore proved their worth as regional powers by driving forward the ASEAN disaster management and the agenda for disaster response to support national governments,[199] while Viet Nam as a victim of severe flooding was in need of support itself. Indonesia, which also had the ASEAN chairmanship in 2011, donated a total of US$ 3.1 million to Thailand, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines (Thailand: US$ 1 million, Viet

[193] Al Jazeera and Agencies (2011). Op. cit.

[194] OCHA (2012). Humanitarian chief highlights disaster management in South-East Asia.
https://www.unocha.org/fr/story/humanitarian-chief-highlights-disaster-management-south-east-asia (25.05.2020).

[195] Hunt, Luke (2011). Top 10 ASEAN Stories of 2011. 23.12.2011. In: *The Diplomat*.
https://thediplomat.com/2011/12/top-10-asean-stories-of-2011/ (25.05.2020).

[196] Al Jazeera and Agencies (2011). Op. cit.

[197] OCHA (2012). Op. cit.

[198] Channel News Asia (2020). After Indonesia's deadly floods, few hear climate 'wake up call'. 04.01.2020. In: *Channel News Asia*. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/jakarta-floods-indonesia-climate-change-environment-wake-up-call-12233124 (25.05.2020).

[199] OCHA (2012). Op. cit.

Nam: US$ 500,000, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines: US$ 400,000 each),[200] while Singapore donated US$ 100,000 to the Singapore Red Cross to support the affected countries, as well as donating assistance to ensure water quality in Bangkok, and tents, generators, blankets, lamps, and water containers, alongside 45 motorised boats, sandbags, bed sheets, and blankets from the Singapore Armed Forces to the Royal Thai Army.[201]

From a Neoliberal Institutionalist cooperation point of view, the solidary response with significant donations and support to the most affected nations from Indonesia and Singapore is entirely sensible. The efforts from the two nations may prove to strengthen their positions as regional powers in Southeast Asia, enabling the two nations to act as strong states setting the agenda for the norms, principles and rules of the international regime,[202] by proving themselves as strong states, capable of 'saving' the region after the floods. Thereby, this is a natural approach for Indonesia and Singapore in the pursuit of power.[203]

From ASEAN as an institution, the ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) was dispatched to Thailand with men from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in order to assess immediate needs, oversee the distribution of relief goods, and monitor the floodwater diversion operation.[204] Further, when the 2011 ASEAN summit was hosted in Indonesia in November, only a short time after the peak of the crisis, a big topic was "*cooperation in flood prevention, mitigation, relief, recovery and rehabilitation*"[205] between the member states of ASEAN. It was recognised that there is a definite need for cooperation on flood prevention and disaster management in order to cope with "*increasingly unpredictable weather conditions which may be attributable to climate change*".[206] Thereby the region recognises that there is a serious need for cooperation to tackle the increasing number of natural disasters, but not that this would be a definite result of climate change and that efforts should be made in order to prevent the increasement by working against climate change. Yet, the ASEAN member states did agree to enhance cooperation in risk management and mitigation by sharing best practices, coordinating post-disaster relief to improve effectiveness, and strengthen ASEAN humanitarian assistance and disaster management to make better recommendations on cooperation in flood prevention, response and recovery.[207] Thus, the ASEAN approach to crisis mitigation and relief mainly consists of coordination of cooperation efforts.

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[200] ASEAN (2011:A). Six ASEAN Member States Receive Flood Assistance from Indonesia. https://asean.org/six-asean-member-states-receive-flood-assistance-from-indonesia/ (25.05.2020).
[201] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore (2011). MFA Press Statement: Singapore's Humanitarian Assistance to Thailand. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2011/11/MFA-Press-Statement-Singapores-Humanitarian-Assistance-to-Thailand (25.05.2020).
[202] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. pp. 78-79.
[203] Keohane. Ibid. pp. 18-21.
[204] ASEAN (2011:B). The ASEAN-Emergency Rapid Assessment Team Dispatched to Respond to Floods in Thailand. https://asean.org/the-asean-emergency-rapid-assessment-team-dispatched-to-respond-to-floods-in-thailand/ (25.05.2020).
[205] ASEAN (2011:C). ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Cooperation in Flood Prevention, Mitigation, Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation. https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/documents/19th%20summit/Flood.pdf (25.05.2020).
[206] ASEAN. Ibid.
[207] ASEAN. Ibid.

In this cooperative response, it is likely that some nations will be more capable or willing to put a greater effort into the cooperation, but, as mentioned before, the incentive of the capable, stronger states to participate in the cooperation is the fact, that it can be seen as an investment in power.[208]

As a standard RSC with multiple regional powers,[209] as mentioned in section 4.1, it does make sense that ASEAN as the main regional IGO mainly works on coordinating efforts, without imposing explicit regulations and legislations for what the member nations are expected to do in a crisis situation. Normally, the securitising actors in a crisis situation such as the 2011 floods in the Southeast Asian RSC would be the three regional powers, Indonesia, Singapore, and Viet Nam. However, since Viet Nam was severely affected by the crisis, the nation was in no position to be a regional securitising actor but only had the resources to protect itself. Thus, in this case, the securitising actors were mainly Indonesia and Singapore, with assistance from Malaysia and Brunei, while significant efforts were also required from the affected states. The referent objects where both the Southeast Asian citizens and their homes, but also the regional economy, highly affected by flooding of farming land and factories.

4.4. Comparing approaches: Fighting current crisis or preventing future risks?

In the analysis up until this point, it has become apparent that there are indeed highly different reactions and strategies to minimise the risks of migration crisis and natural disasters in the RSCs of Europe and Southeast Asia. This could likely be a result of the different securitisation processes taking place in different types of RSCs. In this section, it will be analysed and discussed whether the two regions are using strategies of fighting current security crises or preventing future security risk, and which effects this have on the nations of each RSCs. This will be analysed by holding the results of the analyses on migration crises and natural disasters against each other in combination with Keohane's theory on Neoliberal Institutionalism, in order to investigate the cooperation in different security situations, and Buzan and Wævers theory on RSCs, to understand the underlying reason for the difference between the European/EU RSC and the Southeast Asian RSC. This will be followed by an application of these results compared to expected climate-security risks in Europe and Southeast Asia in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, in order to analyse how the two regions would respond to a securitisation of climate change based on experience and reaction from previous trigger events.

As a last point of analysis, before reaching a final conclusion to the problem statement and objective presented in section 1.1 and 1.2, it will be discussed if the expected approaches are effective, or if they will need to be improved in order to secure the regions and enable them to adjust to climate change and mitigate climate crises, in section 4.4.3.

Looking at EUs case of migration crisis in the Syrian civil war refugee crisis, it shows that EU did not have a proper response system, ready to deal with mass migration into Europe, nor was there agreement on whether or not the influx of refugees should even be seen as a security threat further than economically. As mentioned, before the mass migration to EU had begun, the region had

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[208] Keohane (1984). Op. cit. p. 96.
[209] Buzan; Wæver (2003). Op. cit. pp. 55-63.

applied the Dublin principle, that asylum seekers were to stay in their country of arrival, a principle that was overturned due to the unevenness of the mass migration, possibly in order to 'split the bill' of the refugee crisis. However, the lack of strategies and the disagreements in cooperation also had political consequences within the EU RSC and the EU member states, leading to a rise in right-wing populism and a fall in confidence towards the EU system, which has possibly been part of the reason behind the current external transformation that EU is undergoing with Brexit.[210]

In dealing with a natural disaster like that of the 2003 European heatwave, it also seemed that the support system for such crises where not yet in place, possibly due to the fact that Europe, especially the areas of the region with traditionally lower temperatures, had not experienced heatwaves of such high severity before or even expected it to occur. While EU as the great power of the European RSC did put forward suggestions of systems, that would possibly help to reduce the risks of heatwaves and rising temperatures, the main efforts in securitising the situation was in the hands of the member states, and EU did not yet recognise natural disasters and climate change as a great security risk. The fact that this has changed during recent years is visible in the EU strategies against climate change and the goal of Europe becoming the first zero-emissions continent by 2050.[211] Thus, the EU has made a statement of climate change being a serious issue, requiring serious effort and initiatives.

Looking at both cases, it seems that EU has taken an approach of fighting the occurring crises, rather than create strategies and systems to understand and prevent the risks that may come in the future. However, looking at a recent European security strategy,[212] it is clear that the EU has learned from these trigger events, to start preparing for the future issues, before they arise. This strategy is likely to lead to a higher stability, not only for the EU member states, but also the rest of Europe, as it ensures mitigation and support systems in dealing with future crises, and thereby eliminating uncertainties of safety and stability.

With ASEAN's greatest recent case of migration crisis, the Rohingya refugee crisis, the Southeast Asian RSC is in a complicated refugee crisis, also involving Bangladesh, which at a large scale has proven to be challenging for the internal amity in the RSC. In the situation, the nations within the RSC are bound by the regional IGO's principle of non-interference in order to let the Southeast Asian nations maintain an anarchic structure, meaning that despite nations', both the regional powers and others, goal of having Rohingya refugees return safely to Myanmar without fear of genocide or lack of citizenship, it is not possible to pressure Myanmar without creating a diplomatic crisis, which could have consequences for the regional cooperation. Thus, the issue is not being securitised, and strategies on the matter are only vague. For this reason, UN organisations have deemed the crisis to be at a standstill.

In the great regional disaster of the floods during the Southeast Asian monsoon season in 2011, the region experienced high numbers of fatalities, affected households, and businesses, which also lead

[210] Brinded, Lianna (2015). The refugee crisis is killing Britain's chances of staying within the EU. 19.10.2015. In: *Business Insider*. https://www.businessinsider.com/hsbc-research-refugee-crisis-could-cause-an-eu-referendum-brexit-2015-10?r=US&IR=T (25.05.2020).
[211] European Council (2020). Climate change: what the EU is doing. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/ (25.05.2020).
[212] Council of the European Union (2009). Op. cit.

to harsh effects on the regional economy, despite flooding not being unusual during the monsoon season. In this issue, since there was a more common understanding, that this situation was a serious security risk for the region, as opposed to the Rohingya refugee crisis, there was more of a regional approach to the issue including support in the forms of crisis relief and monitoring, coordinated by ASEAN, as well as significant support in the form of economic funds and other recourses from the regional powers, Indonesia and Singapore, excluding Viet Nam, which was highly affected by the floods. However, this crisis did not lead the Southeast Asian RSC to tackle climate change as a security risk. This situation has changed today, as the issue has become a topic of the annual ASEAN Summits,[213] and several Southeast Asian nations have launched goals of reducing GHG emissions to combat climate change.[214]

From these two different cases, it can be seen that while the Southeast Asian RSC does have a certain degree of cooperation, there is also a great focus on maintaining the autonomy of the individual nation to such a high degree, that it can potentially mean that securitisation or desecuritisation cannot exist on a regional level without risking the diplomatic stability of the region. However, in the cases where there is a common goal or security risk, both ASEAN and the regional powers are willing to cooperate to reduce the negative outcome of a crisis and in working on ensuring regional stability in future crises. Thus, the Southeast Asian RSC proves that regional desecuritisation is not always the most effective security approach, as demands and legally binding regulations are sometimes a necessity to ensure cooperation from all involved parties.

Comparing the approaches to regional security cooperation in the European/EU RSC and the Southeast Asian RSC, it seems that Europe has previously used a strategy mainly focused on limiting the consequences of crises that are already a threat to the regional security, which has now shifted to an approach focusing more on preventing crises from arising in the first place by improving the overall stability and forming long-term security strategies. This is especially clear in the EU strategies against climate change. The region is highly focused on equality, joint efforts, common rules and laws, and strengthening the weakest links of the RSC in a cooperative effort. This strategy may have become so important to the European/EU RSC, as it has been discovered that common approaches to security, with shared efforts, strengthen the overall stability in the region, as the region is developed enough to have both the economical and technical resources to create a strong common support system. What may serve as an issue for the European/EU RSC and their institutionally centred approach is, that it may challenge the amity between nations, when some nations choose not to cooperate, either due to the feeling of disagreements on what exactly needs to be securitised or how to do it, or from the feeling in some nations of providing more to the cooperation than what is gained.

The Southeast Asian RSC's approach in the two cases has proven, that the region is still at a point where establishing strong patterns of cooperation and joint efforts is missing in order to politically prevent regional disasters rather than combatting existing threats. The regional focus is on creating a high level of amity, maintaining autonomy between the nations, and jointly ensure political and economic development. Thus, a regional support system is established, but without legally binding

[213] ASEAN (2019:A). Op. cit.
[214] The ASEAN Post Team (2019). Op. cit.

requirements for participation, which lets each nation contribute as much as they themselves feel capable of. Further, in securitising processes, the non-interference policy means that nations may be 'too kind and positive' towards one another to maintain a security system supporting all population groups in a region with many religious and ethnic minorities. This is most likely caused by the fact that the nations in the Southeast Asian RSC are at different stages of development, meaning that the region experience a challenge of variating states of economic and political stability. The focus on maintaining autonomy may be caused by a regional history, where colonisation has caused security issues for the Southeast Asian nations, thus, creating a high regard for national self-determination and independence.

As such, both regions have found strategies to ensure regional efforts in crises situations. Despite very differentiated approaches between Europe and Southeast Asia, both regions have managed to improve stability, amity, and security. What may prove as a challenge for both regions is disagreement in categorising security threats and how to prevent and mitigate risk to ensure stability. For the case of climate change, this could be the question of whether human actions affect climate change, as well as how much resources should be spend, and how willing nations are to incorporate changes to the current ways of life to ensure green development, and how nations should cooperate to adapt to a changed climate and environment.

4.4.1. EU: A zero-emissions goal

The EU RSC has already established strategies and cooperation for reducing human impact on climate change, and the region has plans to be a leading force in driving climate action forward, with efforts in monitoring emissions closely, emission trading systems, reducing emissions for land use and transportation, green energy, and strengthening adaptation capacities,[215] as well as significant reduction targets and plans to be the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 with all member nations legally bound to reach the 2050 deadline. [216] Further, the EU is the top provider of economic support for climate change efforts in developing countries.[217]

According to the IPCC, the climate change scenarios are varying in Europe depending on geographical location and GHG emissions. However, it is expected that the region in general will experience more extreme seasons and events like heat waves, droughts, and heavy precipitation. This is expected to lead to increasing sea levels and flooding, reduction in water availability, and extreme heat events, which will include the consequences of coastal erosion, people affected by flooding, reduced labour productivity, reduced crop production, wildfires, lower air-quality, impacts on health and well-being, and increased economic loss. The IPCC acknowledges a change in European responses to climate change with EU as the driving force for climate development policies, which may, if followed through, create a different outlook.[218]

[215] European Commission (N.D.:A). CLIMATE CHANGE: Overview of EU policy, legislation and action to address climate change. https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climate-change-environment/topics/climate-change_en (25.05.2020).
[216] European Commission (N.D.:C). EU climate action and the European Green Deal. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action_en (25.05.2020).
[217] European Commission (N.D.:C). Op. cit.
[218] IPCC (2014:B). Op. cit. pp. 1274-1299.

In a 2018 survey, the belief in climate change impacted by human activity in Europe ranged between 82.7% and 95.7% with Lithuania as the lowest of the EU member nations and Spain as the highest,[219] which would indicate that Europeans in general are aware of the security threat of climate change and willing to take action. However, the goals and strategies of EU are challenged by the highly coal-dependent nations, especially on the Eastern bloc, which experience high costs of the green transition.[220] This type of reaction and disagreement of whether a security issue, which is not yet significant for a nation, is worth the financial efforts could cause disagreements in the RSC, but as the majority of European nations are in agreement, it is most likely possible to create a great enough pressure under the cooperation, which, combined with financial support from the EU, would make climate efforts attractive to participate in.

4.4.2. ASEAN: Need for climate friendly development

While the 10 member states of ASEAN have all ratified the Paris Agreement, it is expected that energy demands in the region will rise by 60% by 2040, which is a troubling situation as the region, due to greater demands, have been increasing the use of coal and coal capacities.[221] However, in 2017 the ASEAN member nations decided to harmonize approaches to measuring, reporting and verifying GHG emissions, including potential solutions of carbon pricing and taxes.[222] Further, Climate Change, Food Security and Food Safety was identified as one of 37 cross-cutting issues in the 2019 ASEAN Political-Security Community Outlook.[223]

According to IPCC, it is very likely, that the Asian region will experience temperature rises of between 2°C and 6°C, as well as more extreme cyclones and monsoons in Southeast Asia. As a result, the IPCC deems it as likely that this will result in higher crop failure, water shortage, increased flooding, coral reef decline, and mountain-top extinctions, which then will lead to food insecurity, malnutrition, water-borne diseases, infectious diseases, heat and flood-related mortality, damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, poverty, inequality, mental disorder, higher migration especially from coastal areas, and new vulnerabilities in general.[224]

What may challenge the cooperation to reach a joint effort to stabilise the situation and prevent climate change for the Southeast Asian RSC is the fact that the region still shows a certain degree of scepticism towards the climate-security link, as well as whether or not climate change is affected by human actions. As an example, in the main regional power, Indonesia, only 18% of the population

[219] Poortinga, Wouter; Fisher, Stephen; Böhm, Gisela; Steg, Linda; Whitmarch, Lorraine; Ogunbode, Charles (2018). *European Attitudes to Climate Change and Energy: Topline Results from Round 8 of the European Social Survey*. London: The European Social Survey ERIC. p. 4.
[220] Astuccia (2019). Op. cit.
[221] The ASEAN Post Team (2019:B). Is ASEAN Losing the battle with climate change?. 26.11.2019. In: *The ASEAN Post*. https://theaseanpost.com/article/asean-losing-its-battle-climate-change (25.05.2020).
[222] UNFCCC (2017). ASEAN Countries Join Forces for Climate Action. https://unfccc.int/news/asean-countries-join-forces-for-climate-action (25.05.2020).
[223] ASEAN Political-Security Community (2019). *APSC Outlook – ASEAN's Journey as a Political and Security Community: A Snapshot of 2018 and a Preview of 2019, APSC Outlook, Volume 1 (2019): ASEAN's Journey as a Political and Security Community*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. p. 8.
[224] IPCC (2014: B). Op. cit. pp. 1334-1353

believe in the link between human activity and climate change.[225] Because of this, it is possible that climate change efforts in the RSC will eventually reach a standstill, as previous security crises has shown that the ASEAN nations are relatively unwilling to pressure each other out of respect for the non-interference policy of ASEAN. The main focus of most nations in the region is still on economic development, which could also prove as a challenge, as climate securitisation is seen as an economic burden, which would limit development and consumerism. In order to avoid a standstill, the focus of the Southeast Asian RSC should be green development, making climate-security an integrated part of economic development.

4.4.3. Regional cooperation to reduce security threats

So far, GHG emissions on a world basis are still rising, the planned reduction in production of fossil fuels does not live up to the Paris Agreement, and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) does not expect that the rise in temperatures will stay within $1,5_o$C.[226] In order to avoid serious security risks of climate change, it is necessary for both Europe and Southeast Asia to create approaches to reduce emissions, ensure climate-friendly lifestyles, and form strategies for adapting to threats that are already seen as very likely despite efforts to reduce climate change.

While the regional efforts to mitigate and solve crisis in both the European/EU RSC and the Southeast Asian RSC have had significant effects in strengthening amity and stability in the regions, of course, neither of their different regional approaches are flawless as seen both in previous crises of migration and natural disasters, as well as current approaches to minimize climate change and the related security risks. One way to strengthen the approaches against climate-security risks may be found in larger inter-regional security cooperation. In 2019, ASEAN and the EU decided to enhance cooperation to protect the environment and limit climate change. This is agreed to be done in the main areas of mitigation, adaptation, long-term strategies, and sustainable finance by sharing best practises, assessing progress towards climate goals, and designing regional enabling conditions to protect the environment.[227] A cooperation in this area enables the two regions to fight climate change on larger scale, which could be needed in order to stop European plastic waste from being shipped to Asia,[228] ensure the sharing of technologies from Europe that would be useful to Southeast Asia as means to establish green development, ensure that factories have the knowledge and means to ensure green production for a more climate-friendly consumption available, as well as minimise other challenges that would be difficult to solve strictly on a national or regional basis.

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5. Conclusion

How different types of crises are tackled is highly dependent on the type of regional security complex (RSC) that is securitising or desecuritising the crises, as well as how the security situation in perceived in terms of what the actual threat consist of and the seriousness of it, who or what the referent object, needing protection is, and lastly, who the securitising actor in the situation should be. These factors will indeed also have an impact on the securitisation of climate change, as well as regional adaptation capacities.

As most security issues rather concern a geographical region than single nations, regional cooperation becomes an important assent in ensuring coordinated strategies, efforts, and reporting systems, in a manner that enables nations to run strong efforts towards realisation of a common goal of minimising risks. Generally, regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), serve an important role in ensuring security and stability by facilitating the cooperation and joint efforts between the member nations, as well as create partnerships with non-members.

Within Europe, two types of RSCs can be found, one for security issues mainly concerning the 27 EU member states, which is an institutionally centred RSC, meaning that the member states and securitisation/desecuritisation is mainly focused around the IGO. However, due to shared laws, courts, economic systems, security strategies, principally open borders, etc, EU has been made a special case, with such a tightknit IGO that it could also be seen as one unit, which has a global role as a great power. Thus, in security issues concerning all of the European region, a European RSC centred around EU as a great power is the case.

In Southeast Asia, despite 10 out of 11 countries being members of ASEAN, the RSC cannot be described as an 'ASEAN RSC' but rather a 'Southeast Asian RSC'. The reason behind this, is that there is a much higher regard for maintaining national autonomy, than what is seen in the EU. Thus, there is a higher focus on individual national laws, capacities, and opinions. The Southeast Asian RSC is a standard RSC with multiple regional powers; Indonesia, Singapore, and Viet Nam, which are in a position to provide support and set the agenda for the regional cooperation coordinated through ASEAN.

Through the analysis of recent trigger events for security reactions, in the form of refugee crises and natural disasters experienced in Europe and Southeast Asia, it is clear that the situations are tackled differently both between the types of crises and between the two RSCs.

The EU RSC case of the Syrian civil war refugee crises has shown that the RSC was unprepared for mass migration, which resulted in a challenging situation, as disagreements rose on whether the refugees were the security risk or the referent object. With EU attempting to set quotas for how many refugees each country should take in, several countries objected to the decision, ultimately causing significant disagreements within the RSC. In the approach to the natural disaster of the 2003 European heatwave on the other hands, the European RSC was more united, as there was a clear threat to the common security situation, that everyone agreed on. However, as the underlying issue was at the time still rather abstract, solutions ended up being focussed on national efforts and strategies.

In the Southeast Asian RSC, the security approach towards Rohingya Refugee crisis, arising internally in the RSC in Myanmar, has shown that the non-interference policy of ASEAN, while fit for the type of RSC, can also have a negative consequence and leave security issues as a standstill in the case of disagreements between nations on whether an issue should be securitised or not, and who should bear the responsibility of providing the framework for solving internal issues. In the crises of the 2011 Southeast Asian floods during the monsoon season, the ASEAN member states had a greater level of cooperation, possibly a result of a more common opinion on the floods as a serious security risk of the region, providing a greater sentiment for especially the regional powers to act as a support system in providing security in the region. This further let to more elaborate regional strategies for mitigation natural disasters in the region from ASEAN.

In all cases, regional cooperation has proven to strengthen cooperation and the regional security systems. However, none of the approaches are without pitfalls. In the case of climate change, of course regional cooperation means that there will be stronger joint efforts to limit the change, mitigate risks, and improve adaptation capacities, while nations would support one another in taking action. Yet, the major pitfall is that some nations do not see climate change as an immediate security risk, as consequences are still rather uncertain. As a consequence of this, some nations are not currently willing to bear the economic burden of securitising the issue and minimise climate-security risks.

As all nations should be included in ensuring climate-security, due to the globalised nature of the issue, this means that the goal of limiting global warming to $1,5_oC$ as agreed under the Paris Agreement is unlikely to be met, and that regional efforts against climate change could reach a standstill.

In order to induce long-term changes preventing consequences exceeding the worlds adaption capacities, cooperation should include legally binding agreements, shared expectations, understandings of the threat and best practises, joint technological development, and financial support systems. One way of enabling this is through the inter-regional cooperation between developed and developing nations, which EU and ASEAN has started to develop.

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