

Too much ado about nothing?

An analysis of right-wing populist anti-immigration agenda in Slovakia and Denmark



Master's thesis in Development and International Relations

Author: Klaudia Kušnírová

Student number: 20180632

Supervisor: Susi Meret

May 2020

Abstract

The 'so-called' 2015 migration crisis has influenced various European countries in many ways. Some were more affected than others. Despite some countries not undergoing direct impacts of the crisis, the issue of migration has been on the spotlight in discussion among many politicians, especially those of right-wing. Such a trend has also happened in the two cases analysed in this thesis – Slovakia and Denmark.

This thesis revolves around capturing standpoints towards immigration of the two right-wing populist parties in Denmark and Slovakia, namely Danish People's Party (DF) and People's Party Our Slovakia (LSNS). The thesis focuses on how these parties have dealt with this problem, even though, both of these cases have not experienced its direct effects. Looked upon through the lenses of securitization theory, social identity theory, and the concept of Islamophobia, the study takes a closer look at how the issue of immigration is perceived in these two cases. The issue is situated into the time frame of 2015-2020 following the events associated with the migration crisis.

A qualitative framing analysis was conducted on a number of publications issued by the Danish People's Party and People's Party Our Slovakia. The analysis focused on four main aspects – components of national identity, the conception of migrants as a threat, the blame of other actors, and positive actors. Due to the combination of these concepts a better understanding of several matters is perceived: how are the national identities of Slovakia and Denmark constructed, in what way do migrants represent a threat to these nation-states, what actors have contributed to the migration and also what can be the possible solution for solving this issue.

The analysis examines how the right-wing populist parties of Slovakia and Denmark are trying to provide security for their nation-states under the threat of migrants coming from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Although both the Danish People's Party and People's Party Our Slovakia are attempting to guarantee safety for its people, the approaches of how they are planning to do it may differ. Moreover, the ways of how the national identity of these nation-states is constructed vary from one case to another.

Keywords: right-wing populism, migration crisis, securitization, national identity, Islamophobia

Table of contents

Abstract.....	2
Introduction.....	5
Limitations.....	7
Methodology.....	7
Case selection.....	8
Research design.....	9
Selection and collection of data.....	10
Choice of theory.....	11
Research methods.....	11
Background.....	12
Migration in Denmark.....	13
Migration in Slovakia.....	14
Populism.....	16
Right-wing populism in Nordic countries.....	17
Danish People’s Party (DF).....	18
Right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe.....	19
People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS).....	20
Theoretical framework.....	21
Securitisation theory.....	22
Components of securitisation.....	23
Securitisation process.....	24
Critiques on the securitisation theory of CSS.....	24
Securitisation theory and populism.....	26
Social Identity Theory and National identity.....	27
Critiques of SIT.....	28
National Identity.....	29
Utilization of SIT and National identity.....	30
Islamophobia.....	31
Application of the theoretical framework.....	33
Analysis.....	34
Slovak case.....	35
Danish case.....	36
National identity.....	38
Slovak case.....	38

Danish case	39
Comparison	39
Threat	40
Slovak case.....	40
Danish case	41
Comparison	42
Blame	42
Slovak case.....	42
Danish case	43
Comparison	44
Positive actors	44
Slovak case.....	44
Danish case	46
Comparison	47
Discussion	47
Conclusion	51
Bibliography	54

Introduction

Migration has always been a part of human history and movement. However, it became more profound from the 19th century due to technological development, the boom of new inventions and the maritime discoveries. In the 21st century migration is among the most important features and challenges discussed daily and it affects cultural, political, social-economic, and environmental spheres (Divinský, 2007). One of the most influential occurrences of this century has been the 'so-called' 2015 migration crisis which was caused by a number of events such as the Syrian Civil War, the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the growing civil unrest and violence in Iraq, compulsory military service in dictatorship Eritrea, the continuous wars in Central Africa (for instance Southern Sudan and Darfur) (Hintjens, 2019). Between 2015 and 2017 over a million migrants arrived in Europe; the majority of them came by sea - more than 972 500 in 2015 only (BBC, 2015). These developments have immensely affected the migration policy decisions and agenda-setting in the whole of Europe, where various countries reacted differently to the situation.

Triggered by the migration patterns, populism and right-wing nationalist parties and far-right movements, in particular, have regained electoral strength across Europe. The Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* - FPÖ), The Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*), *Attack* (Атака) in Bulgaria, Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland* - AfD), Fidesz (*Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség*) and Jobbik - Movement for a Better Hungary (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*), the North League (*Lega Norte*), in Italy, Freedom and Direct Democracy (*Svoboda a přímá demokracie*, SPD) in the Czech Republic and Sweden Democrats or Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna* – SD) are just a handful of examples of right-wing parties that have successfully managed to get enough votes to get to into the parliament (Bergmann, 2017; Minkenberg, 2017b; Caiani & Císař, 2018).

Both terms, migration and right-wing populism, are familiar also to the Danish concept. Even though this Nordic land has been for long considered as a culturally homogeneous country, it has changed from the 1960s, when a wave of foreign workers arrived in Denmark. Years later the Danish migration policies were tightened as refugees and asylum seekers from countries as Yugoslavia, Iran, Lebanon kept coming. Moreover, Denmark has been one of the pioneers when it comes to mentioning the notion of the populist right with Mogens Glistrup and his Progress Party. Today, the term refers to the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti* – DF) which is a representation of right-wing populism, Danish nationalism, Euroscepticism, and

anti-Islamic stance. Due to all these measures Denmark is known to be certainly not the most welcoming country for immigrants in Northern Europe (Caiani and Císař, 2018). As of 2018 the share of the foreign population in Denmark represented 10 percent (‘Denmark Immigration Statistics 1960-2020’, 2020). The biggest groups of migrants represent Poles (41 529), Syrians (35 536), Turks (33 111), Germans (30 539), Romanians (29 443), Iraqis (21 840), Iranians (17 195), Bosnians (16 755) (Statista, 2020).

The topic of anti-immigration is often part of an agenda of right-wing populist parties. The most famous example of such a party in Denmark is Danish People’s Party (DF) that was created in 1995 and since 1998 has its position in the Danish Parliament.

Unlike Denmark, Slovakia has been dealing with a lot less migration due to being a part of the former Eastern Bloc with closed borders. Later, in the 2000s after entering the EU, it was considered a transit country for migrants coming from the East to the West. With such history taken into account, the country is not accustomed to deal with the ‘otherness’ or to anything foreign. This standpoint was clearly expressed following the 2015 migration crisis when Slovakia, among the other Visegrád group of countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) refused to allocate the EC’s refugee quota division (Zachová *et al.*, 2018). In the eyes of the V4 members such an event represented a potential threat for the traditionally homogeneous Christian country (Dubéci, 2016). Even though, the Slovak population consists of almost 20 percent minorities (which are culturally alike), Slovakia as a country is not accustomed to dealing with people of a different culture, religion, ethnicity, skin colour, etc. On the contrary, populism is a well-known concept in connection with Slovakia. A prior example of populist parties was the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar (Havlík V., 2012) and more recent examples are Slovak National Party (*Slovenská národná strana* -SNS) and The People's Party – Our Slovakia (*Ludová strana – Naše Slovensko*, ĽSNS).

Despite the fact that Slovakia and Denmark are very different, they both are in favour of strict migration policy rules and laws, defending the homogeneity of society. They also, both have populist parties, relatively low migration rates, and putting the issue of migration in the spotlight as one of the main problems to deal with in society and politics.

Having said this, the research question addressed by this thesis is:

Why do the right-wing populist parties in Slovakia and Denmark focus on the issue of immigration despite these countries having a relatively low migration rate?

Limitations

This thesis aims to investigate the anti-immigration right-wing populist agenda in Slovakia and Denmark as well as to answer the chosen research question: *Why do the right-wing populist parties in Slovakia and Denmark focus on the issue of immigration despite these countries having relatively low migration rate?* To be able to analyse this question, it is important to be aware of the limitations of this thesis.

The first limitation involves the language proficiency, since I do not master sufficient Danish language to be able to read complex political documents and literature, and this will highly influence the selection of source for my research. Even though my Danish proficiency may be considered a weakness, on the other hand, I have an advantage in being able to access first-hand information about Slovakia, written in the Slovak language.

Secondly, focusing on only two countries limits me from a more thorough investigation of the research question. Had I chosen to look at several countries from Western Europe and several of them from Central and Eastern Europe, I would be able to have a more detailed picture of the investigated issue. Even so, I chose to look at only two countries, by selecting one country 'representing' Western and one Central and Eastern Europe. This, gives me a good opportunity to cast light on at least two different examples of radical right-wing populism in the European context.

Thirdly, the choice of theories will affect the perspective of the above-mentioned research question, and this will of course also influence the final results of the analysis. In this case two theories were chosen: securitisation theory and social identity theory, which is complemented by an auxiliary concept of Islamophobia. As a result of choosing this particular combination of theories, the scope of analysing the research question has been narrowed down.

Fourthly, the selection of data can be considered as another limitation since I have decided to use it as my primary data party programs and issues of magazines, newspapers, or articles published by these parties. By making this choice, I need to be aware that the targeted audience of these publications are the parties' voters and supporters, which influences the language of how these documents are constructed.

Methodology

This chapter consists of multiple parts that aim at describing "the journey" of finding an answer to the research question of this thesis, which is:

Why do the right-wing populist parties in Slovakia and Denmark focus on the issue of immigration despite these countries having a relatively low migration rate?

Case selection

Following the research question, I compare two relatively small European countries that have a different history, location, political system, yet they share a common ground in protecting their homogeneity against 'otherness'. On the one hand, Denmark that has years of experience with immigration, but it is known to be one of the countries with rather restrictive protective measures against foreigners entering the country (Delman, 2016).

Also, it has a comparative longer history right-wing populism and anti-immigration stances, despite only having about 10 % of its population consists of immigrants and its descendants out of which around 4 % consists of Muslims ('Out of every 100 people, about how many do you think are Muslim?', 2020). Slovakia, on the other hand, has historically not had any significant experience with waves of immigration or integration of non-Western migrants. In 2018 there is approximately only 2,2 % of the population in Slovakia with a foreign background. Moreover, there are only about 5 000 Muslims in the countries which represents less than 0.1 % of the whole population (Choudhury, 2018). These numbers are very low compared for instance to countries such as Bulgaria with 11 % of Muslim population or France with 8,8 %, Sweden 8,1 %, the Netherlands 7,1 %, or in Austria 6,9 % (Ráčová, 2019). Although these numbers are really low, Slovakia has been for years a country with a rather protective approach when it comes to migration. The populist parties hold a nationalist, anti-globalisation and anti-migration sentiment and they loudly expressed their opinion about the events following the 2015 migration crisis when Slovakia among other V4 countries strongly decline the EU commission's refugee quota division which was seen as a threat to the homogenous Christian population of Slovakia against the 'foreign and potentially dangerous' migrants.


Despite Denmark and Slovakia not having much in common, they are both trying to protect its homogeneity from the 'otherness', migrants, foreigners, refugees, asylum seekers, and in particular Muslims of Middle Eastern origin. In fact, from anything that may potentially distort its cultural homogeneity and traditional Christian values. Another similarity between these two countries involves the history of the populist right-wing parties that in some way reflect the opinion of people voting for them. Often such parties are active in expressing their views on anti-migration, anti-globalism, terrorism threats, and some form of nationalist tendencies.

This brings me back to the research question and also to the core of the analysed issue. Despite Slovakia and Denmark coming from different backgrounds the two countries still share an alike viewpoint in terms of paying a lot of attention to, let's say a "non-existent" or relatively minor problem as concerns to immigration, integration of migrants: the represented by Islam to their culture and identity. This is also, what caught my attention in the first place, but in reality, I never really understood the balance between the perceived threat and the actual threat, when considering the share of the Muslim population in both countries.

The research formulation and my investigation bring me to a series of questions. What measures do the right-wing populist parties take to tackle the problem of the immigration crisis? How does immigration represent a threat to these nation-states? What are the similarities and differences between the Slovak and Danish right-wing populist parties when it comes to solving the issue of immigration?

Research design

In the, *Introduction*, presents the whole issue which will be investigated, also it states the research question of this thesis. Further, it points out limitations affecting the research and results of the thesis. The *Methodology* chapter, (pp. 7-12) consists of several parts - research design, choice of theory, case selection, and data selection. Research design describes the overall structure of this thesis, case selection describes the reasoning behind choosing this particular issue for the subject of analysis, theory selection clarifies why were the chosen theories selected, and data selection deals with the process of searching, choosing, and using the picked data. The third chapter, *Background*, (pp. 12-21) provides additional background information that is essential for the following chapter. In the fourth chapter, *Theory*, I lay out the presented theories (pp. 21-34), the main definitions, the way I employ the theories and supporters and critics on them. Moreover, I will explain the application of theory in the *Analysis* (pp. 34-47). The sixth chapter, *Discussion* (pp. 47-51) examines and comments upon the main results from the previous chapter and it attempts to address the question posed at the beginning. Finally, the chapter of *the Conclusion* describes final thoughts and summarizes all findings of this thesis.



Selection and collection of data

As in any other research, selecting appropriate and relevant data may influence the whole course of the analysis. Therefore, the selection of data should help with answering the research question. Various options of main data were considered for the analysis part. In the end, it was decided to focus on publications issued by the party members themselves, since this way I can get a better understanding of how their reality is constructed. For the Slovak case there is a focus on articles published by People's Party Our Slovakia with the time frame of 2015 till now. In other words, I used this particular time frame to analyse how has the situation changed since the beginning of the migrant crisis. Since there were a lot of articles to choose from, a decision was made to narrow the number down by applying a filter of the *migration crisis*, which left me with 42 articles for analysis. For the Danish case I also aimed to focus on the publication of the Danish People's Party with the same time frame as in the Slovak case. By doing this step, issues of *Europæisk Folkeblad* were chosen, a magazine that the party publishes. When focusing on the relevant articles I filtered out those that included code words like *refugee*, *asylum seeker*, *migrant*, *immigration*, *migration crisis*. This step has left me with 48 articles in the end.

Aside from primary data, there was a big amount of secondary data used to help me better understand and analyse the chosen issue. I studied several academic literatures, namely different research papers, books, book chapters, and articles. This was applied when writing the background information chapter and studying migration trends of Slovakia and Denmark, but also when learning about populism in these regions. Moreover, secondary data was very helpful while writing a chapter of the Theoretical framework.

Choice of theory

Theory selection greatly influences the way of how the chosen problem is being analysed. In this case, I chose two theories: securitisation theory, social identity theory, which were supplemented by the concept of Islamophobia. Securitisation theory was used to explain the antagonist relation between right-wing populist parties and the migrants, in this case viewed as a threat. Since right-wing parties tend to make certain issues salient, the securitisation theory with the concept of existential threat seemed like a good candidate for explaining this aspect of the analysed issue. The second theory, social identity theory, focuses on two camps of people, the in-group and the out-group. And this is exactly what is common among populist actors when they divide people among 'us' and 'others'. Within the out-group I focus mostly on how national identity is constructed, what components have a great significance when it comes to the identification of an in-group. Third, the concept of Islamophobia was chosen, because the notion of the refugee crisis or migrant crisis is often associated with Islam or Muslims. For this reason, I have decided to study the relevance of this concept in the cases of Slovakia and Denmark, whether it is important and if yes, to which level. By selecting two main theories and an auxiliary concept, I can get a clearer overview of all the important aspects when looking for an answer to my problem formulation.

Research methods

For this thesis, a frame analysis was chosen which can be used either quantitatively or qualitatively. For the quantitative method one asks 'how many' and in qualitative methods, one can ask why, how, or what. This thesis uses a qualitative method that enables me to offer a better understanding and interpretation of the problem. Moreover, it permits using more complex data and also the way how data is produced and interpreted is more flexible than when using quantitative methods (Nilsson, 2018).

When it comes to identifying frames in framing analysis, there are two approaches for choosing: an inductive approach and a deductive approach. When choosing an inductive

approach, studied material is being analysed before setting frames in advance and the frames will be created during the analysis. Whereas in the deductive approach, we first identify the frames and then start analysing the given material (Nilsson, 2018). In this thesis, I initially conducted a deductive approach where I created a preliminary categorisation and then studied the given material. Later, after being familiar with the provided material I carried out an inductive approach where the frames were adjusted based on the data, I was already familiar with.

Framing is defined as *selecting some aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicative text, in such a way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the analysed issue (Entman, 1993). To define a problem is to decide what a causal agent is doing and with what costs and benefits. This item is often measured concerning cultural values. To diagnose causes means to recognise the forces causing the problem. To make moral judgments signifies examining causal agents and their effects. To suggest remedies means to provide and justify treatments for the issues and predict their effects (Entman, 1993). Further, he claims that frames can be seen as structures for interpretation that support a particular problem definition or causal interpretation of an issue (Heidenreich *et al.*, 2019). Moreover, Entmann (1993) says that frames “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Heidenreich *et al.*, 2019).

The core of framing analysis revolves around the fact that the media targets its attention on certain topics and then gives them meaning. In the view of Gamson (1992), the framing theory how a certain issue is presented, it may have a big effect on the choice people make based on how they process the information (Hee-Eun, 2017).

When using frame analysis withing the nexus of migration and media, these are the common frames used in this context. Economy frame focusing on the impact of migrant workers on labour market, Welfare frame revolving around the connection of migrants and a welfare system, and Crime or security frame concentrated on the securitisation (Heidenreich *et al.*, 2019).

Background

In this chapter fundamental information about Slovakia and Denmark will be presented. Since this thesis is focused on the anti-immigration agenda of right-wing populist parties, this chapter

starts with an introduction to the statistics of migration in recent years in both Denmark and Slovakia. Later, I will briefly look at the notion of populism, its types and pay closer attention to the right-wing populist parties in both the Nordic region and in Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on the two cases – Denmark and Slovakia. After this step, I will present the two parties that will be analysed in the further parts of this thesis – Danish People's Party (DF) and People's Party - Our Slovakia (LSNS).

Migration in Denmark

Denmark has historically been a homogenous country until the late 1950s when it has been mainly a net emigration country due to high unemployment rates. During this period the majority of migrants coming to Denmark originated from Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States (IOM, 2011). A change happened in the late 1960s when there was an increase of non-western migrants coming to Europe (Larsen, 2011). In this time, Denmark needed new workers due to a high unemployment rate and inability to fulfil the job capacities of its workers. The majority of guests working coming to Denmark during this period were citizens of predominantly Muslim countries – Turkey, Morocco, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. Firstly, the plan was to stay in Denmark for a limited time and later return home with the accumulated capital. Entering Denmark was relatively easy at that time and it attracted foreign workers. However, this has partly changed when the Danish Parliament passed new rules in November 1973 putting a formal stop to labour migration (Rydgren, 2010). However, in the 1980s, and for the next 30 years family reunions were still granted and asylum seekers came to Denmark due to conflicts and instability in their home countries. It started with Iranians escaping after the Islamic Revolution, after who followed Palestinians fleeing Lebanon due to civil war, later Somalis at the beginning of the 1990s and Iraqi escaping the regime ruled by Saddam Husain. Further people from Yugoslavia arrived in Denmark seeking asylum in consequence of the separation of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of war in this region. In 2001 Afghan refugees entered Denmark escaping war targeted on Taliban forces in Kabul (Nielsen, 2011). It used to belong to those European countries that had one of the smallest migration rates only 4 % at the end of the 1980s and grew to about 7 % in 2001. Approximately every second of these immigrants came from a country outside of Europe (Rydgren, 2010). The second major wave of immigrants happened after the year 2004 when several countries of Central and Eastern Europe joined the European Union and became part of the Schengen zone. This led to an influx of foreign EU-workers, but also the coming of international students.

Today, more than 10 % of the population in Denmark consists of foreigners. Of all foreigners the statistics of refugees in 2018 were 36 631 ('Denmark Immigration Statistics 1960-2020', 2020). The biggest groups of the total number of migrants represent Poles (41 529), Syrians (35 536), Turks (33 111), Germans (30 539), Romanians (29 443), Iraqis (21 840), Iranians (17 195), Bosnians (16 755) ('Number of immigrants in Denmark in 2020, by country of origin', 2020). Further, the topic of anti-immigration is often part of an agenda of right-wing populist parties. The most famous example of such a party in Denmark is the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti* – DF) that has been created in 1995 and has its position in the Danish Parliament till today.

Migration in Slovakia

Although in Slovakia around 20 % are registered immigrants, they mostly come from similar cultural backgrounds, such as citizens of the neighbouring countries – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine and then, the citizens of the south-eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Serbia. Slovaks are rather unfamiliar with "otherness" – people of different races, cultures, religions, customs, traditions, ways of dressing, different cuisines, etc. (Hlinčková and Mesežnikov, 2016). For a long time, it has been almost entirely a culturally homogenous country; even in the second half of the 20th century when during a large increase of migration in Europe. Migration to the Slovak Republic was firstly affected by the change of system after the Velvet revolution in 1989, later fall of communism, the openness of boundaries, economic transformation, separation of Czechoslovakia, and creation of Slovakia in 1993. After the opening of borders many Slovaks were migrating abroad, either short-term, long-term as a part of circular migration. After entering the EU in 2004 another important milestone was becoming a part of the Schengen zone in 2007 and the Slovaks' priority was the protection of the country's external borders against so-called external immigration.

In terms of illegal immigration, the statistics were low in the years 1993-1997, later they increased in 1998-2000 when Slovakia became a transit country of migrants from the East to the West. This trend, accelerated to its peak in the years 2001-2004. After Slovakia became a part of the EU, the number dropped down again. Nationality-wise in the years 1998-1999 illegal migration consisted mostly of people from Balkan countries (former Yugoslavia and Romania) and in 1999-2002 mostly refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. In 1999 there was also an increased number of economic migrants from Asia – India, China, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and later Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since 2003 there has been a boom of incoming illegal migrants from former USSR countries – Russia (Chechnya), Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia.

Applicants for asylum were increasing up to 2002-2004 when it reached its peak and after 2004 the overall amount started to decrease (Divinský, 2007).

Within the category of asylum seekers, the majority of applicants for asylum came from regions affected by wars, civil conflicts, instability or they were in danger because of their nationality, religion, race, political standpoint, etc. In the 90s the majority of asylum seekers came from the former Yugoslavia. Later the biggest part of asylum seekers consisted of applicants from the Middle East and Africa – Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Palestine, Iran and Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone. In 2001 by far the most common applicants came from Afghanistan (Divinský, 2007).

In 2015, 1 255 600 people were applying for asylum in the whole EU, 330 applied in Slovakia, but out of these only 8 persons obtained asylum (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016). Based on the numbers, the 2015 migration crisis on Slovakia did not have a direct effect on socio-economic development, but it rather became a popular topic for discussion before the upcoming parliamentary elections, which also affected the elections in 2016. This has led to discussions that created a rise in xenophobic sentiments and opinions (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016), the election of a right-wing extremist party, a strong anti-migration stand, EU-scepticism notably against the European institutions (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016). Several events contributed to this discussion: the increase of refugees from Northern Africa and the Middle East early 2015, the sinking of ships from Africa to Italy where more than 1200 died, the decision of Hungary to build a wall against refugees on the Serbian border in June 2015 and also terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 as well as the ones in Brussels in March 2016 (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016)

Overall, in Slovak society there is a presence of negative prejudices towards foreigners, especially those of different colour, race and to those practicing a different religion, mainly towards Muslims (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016). Another issue is that Slovak laws do not use, nor define the word migrant, they always work with the word *foreigner* when they refer to a person who is not a citizen of the Slovak republic. Moreover, there is a lot of vagueness and stereotyping among the used terminology and the generalizations made on these, or incorrect use of the words, which causes a complicated situation where media and social media create and share false information (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016).

Nowadays, only about 2 % of the Slovak population is another background than Slovakian. The number of migrants has increased over time (from 22,108 migrants in 2004 to 121,264 in

2018), however even with this increase, Slovakia belongs to EU countries with the lowest share of immigrants. Only five other countries have a lower percentage - Croatia (1.27 %), Bulgaria (1.22 %), Lithuania (0.97 %), Poland (0.63%) and Romania (0.57 %) (IOM, 2019). Out of all migrants residing in Slovakia, the majority of them come from the neighbouring countries. Almost half of the foreign population in Slovakia (43,4 %) come from - The Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. Aside from these groups, there is a significant number of people coming from south-eastern Europe – Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Russians. These form about 23 % of all immigrants in the country. Migrants from Asian countries like China, South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand represent 7.1 % of all foreigners. In 2018, 178 foreigners applied for asylum, and only 5 were granted it. The most common origin of these applicants was Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Azerbaijan, and Iran (IOM, 2019).

Moreover, Slovakia belongs to those EU countries which accepted the lowest amounts of refugees after 2015. Together with other countries from the Visegrád Group (V4) refused the refugee quotas. The refugee crisis may not have affected Slovakia directly, but it for sure gave a good opportunity for national populist right-wing to use this as a point in their agenda. The Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná Strana -SNS) and The People's Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová Strana – Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS) are good examples of this category (Vicenová, 2019).

Now that the history and current situation regarding immigration in Denmark and Slovakia have been presented, further information about populism will be discussed, with the focus on right-wing populist parties in Denmark and Slovakia. Firstly, the term populism will be shortly presented and its significance in the Nordic region and Central and Eastern Europe. After this, I will take a closer look at cases of Denmark and Slovakia and further describe the two right-wing populist parties which will undergo further analysis.

Populism

The notion of populism has been used by many scholars over the years. On the base of this term it distinguishes between the good and morally pure ‘people’ and a corrupt, self-serving ‘elite’ (Brett, 2013; Ágh Attila, 2017). Another definition by Canovan (1999) characterises populism as an “appeal to the people, against the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society,” (Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2009). Cas Mudde (2000) distinguishes different types of populism based on the social profile or the carriers of populism (Caiani & Císař, 2018). Political populism, economic populism, agrarian populism.

Agrarian populism was firstly found in both separate movements in the 19th century: in tsarist Russia under the name *narodniki* where it was dominated by urban intelligence and in the United States as the People's party that consisted of farmers (Caiani & Císař, 2018). The similarity of these two movements rooted in the importance of agricultural life as a pillar of society where peasants play an essential role as a source of morality. The second type, economic populism has its origin in Latin America, in the 1920s for which was typical charismatic leadership, *ad hoc* reformist policies. Other characteristics of economic populism may include the pro-active role of a state, increasing the amounts of protective tariffs, establishing supportive infrastructure, relocating income from export to the domestic sector, etc. The third type, political populism, is defined by Cas Mudde as a *political style that builds upon a rigid dichotomy of "the pure people" versus the "corrupt elite"*. This type of populism is often linked with the right-wing, it is present especially in recent years in many European countries (Mudde, 2000). In this dimension of the division of populism Rucht also recognizes working-class populism and petit-bourgeois populism. In all of these types the populist group is highlighting its status as the 'people'.

Another categorisation of populism distinguishes between the general leaning of the populist group: left-wing and right-wing populism. Left populists are aiming to establish a new form of society whereas right populists are seeking to renew the old and often romanticised order from past instead of looking into the future (Caiani & Císař, 2018) In this thesis the main focus will be on right-wing populist countries in connection to anti-immigration policies.

Right-wing populism in Nordic countries

In the Nordic region of Europe, populist parties tend to be more oriented towards the right, often combined with a nationalist perspective and xenophobic views. The examples of this combination are the Danish People's Party, the Finns, and the Sweden Democrats. Left-wing populism is not as common as the right-wing perhaps due to advanced welfare systems and a stable economy (Rooduijn, 2018).

Several names need to be mentioned when it comes to populism or right-wing movements. In Norway, the names Carl I. Hagen and Siv Jensen are linked with the Progress Party and their negative depiction of Muslims as a burden to the Norwegian welfare system. In Sweden, it is the Sweden Democrats and the rule of Mikael Jansson oriented towards far-right and associated with terms like xenophobia and neo-Nazi extremism. In Finland, it is the True Finns Party led

by Timo Soini which revolved around the protection of the Nordic welfare system, defending Finnish cultural heritage and Christian social values (Bergmann, 2017).

The history of right-wing populism in Denmark is linked with the 1970s when there was an influx of refugees which resulted in stricter immigration regulations. Danish politics were influenced by the 1973 OPEC crises and in the same year Mogens Glistrup came with an anti-elitist anarcho-liberal movement that had an anti-tax standpoint. He managed to gain almost 16 percent and ended up as the second biggest party in the parliament with 28 seats. This success has decreased over the years, until the leadership position took over his successor Pia Kjærsgaard. Pia Kjærsgaard has been the leader for two decades since 1995 till 2012 (Lazaridis and Campani, 2016). The Danish People's Party was founded in 1995 on the principles of ethno-nationalism and ethno-pluralism (Rydgren, 2004) and focused on anti-immigration (Bale *et al.*, 2009; Rydgren, 2010), particularly after the Iran-Iraq war and influx of refugees from this area. In 1997 the DPP was strongly against the massive immigration coming from Eastern Europe. Another aspect of why they became famous was distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' meaning ethnic Danes versus immigrant Muslims (Rydgren Jens, 2010). Probably the most infamous incident of Denmark's contemporary history is the 2005 *Jyllands-Posten* cartoon crisis (Bale *et al.*, 2010), in which Prophet Muhammad was satirically depicted. This led to a huge outrage, riots, and violent protests in many Muslim countries. In Denmark it caused even bigger distance between indigenous Danes and immigrant Muslims (Bergmann, 2017).

The Danish Association (Den Danske Forening—DDF) was a right-wing movement founded in 1987 that was strictly against immigration. This standpoint is explained in three points: first as a threat to Danish culture and ethnic identity; second, as a cause of crime; and third, as a burden on the welfare state (Bergmann, 2017). They viewed the Danes as a homogenous nation with Christian values. They were trying to 'secure Danish culture, language, and mode of life in a world threatened by chaos, overpopulation, violence, and fanaticism' (Rydgren, 2004).

Danish People's Party (DF)

The Danish People's Party (DF) was established on October 6, 1995 in Christiansborg by MPs Pia Kjærsgaard, Poul Nødgaard, Ole Donner, and Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who used to be members of the Progress Party. After its creation, they did not succeed, when they took part in the national election for the first time. However, in the later years they were successful, as the table below shows. (*Historie*, 1997). As it is displayed below, the party achieved the biggest victory in the 2015 elections, when the party ended up on the second place.

Year of election	% of votes	Number of total votes	Electoral success	Seats in the parliament
1995	3,7 %	-	No	-
1998	7,4 %	252 000	Yes	13
2001	12 %	414 000	yes	22
2005	13,3 %	444 000	Yes	24
2007	13,9 %	480 000	Yes	25
2011	12,3 %	437 000	Yes	22
2015	21,1 %	742 000	Yes	37
2019	8,7 %	308 000	Yes	16

The main program of Danish People’s Party (DF) consists of several main points: Denmark’s independence, monarchy in Denmark, national church, foreign policy, Danish cultural heritage, immigration, social welfare, family, etc. When speaking of Denmark’s independence, DF emphasizes on Danish cultural heritage and protecting the freedom of the Danish people in their own country. In terms of religion, the party explains the importance of the church being an inseparable part of people's lives for centuries and how Christianity has affected the lives of Danes. In regards to foreign policy, DF imagines Denmark’s relations to be continued with all democratic and ‘freedom-loving’ nations while maintaining its freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of belief) and keeping its sovereignty. Moreover, it objects EU, but is in favour of being part of NATO and supporting Danish membership in the UN. In Danish Cultural Heritage, attention is drawn to maintaining and strengthening the Danish culture. The section of immigration starts with a clear message of DPP: *“Denmark is not an immigration country and never has been. We will therefore not accept a multi-ethnic transformation of this country.”* Further, there is an emphasis on securitisation of the Danish citizens and the government (*Principprogram, 1997*).

Right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe

In the area of Central and Eastern Europe the populist parties are not only oriented towards the right, but it is spreading all over the spectrum. Many of populist parties are mainstream ones and located in the centre of the spectrum. The examples of this occurrence are Fidesz in Hungary, Law, and Justice in Poland and SMER-SD in Slovakia (Rooduijn, 2018). Often the agenda of populist parties in Central and Eastern regions is more focused on the issues of minorities such as Roma minority rather than migration issues. This is due to the fact that they

have historically not been a typical destination for incoming migrants and therefore, migration was never an issue in these regions. However, following the 2015 refugee crisis, the political agenda changed and the issue of migration was highlighted as the main problem that these countries were facing.

In the region of Central and Eastern Europe, there are several names linked with right-wing populism. In Hungary, it is the mainstream political party Fidesz and also Movement for a Better Hungary: Jobbik which focuses on anti-Roma issues. In Poland, it is the social movement Kukiz'15 that emerged as a political party that stands protection of Poland's Catholic identity against the threat of Islamic terrorism. In the Czech Republic, the names that have to be mentioned are Freedom and Direct Democracy created by Tomio Okamura and the right-wing populist party ANO founded by Andrej Babiš (Caiani & Císař, 2018).

Since the establishment of the Slovak Republic there have been many right-wing and populist political parties as well as right-wing nationalist movements. The main actors on this scene are Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná Strana: SNS) with its nationalistic agenda and a more radical party: Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová Strana-Naše Slovensko: ĽSNS). ĽSNS, today in Slovak National Parliament (since 2016), is a far-right nationalist party that has a negative stand against many ethnic, racial, religious, sexual minorities, Slovakia's withdrawal from the Eurozone, the EU, and NATO, has negative stand against immigration and also supports Slovakia's interwar fascist state. It gained electoral success with its leader Marian Kotleba in 2016 with 8 % (Minkenberg, 2017a; Vicenová, 2019) of votes and again in 2020 with 8 % of votes. Aside from right-wing parties there are also present right-wing movements like Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť: SP) which focuses on years of Slovak and Slavic traditions. The second ultranationalist Slovak Revival Movement (Slovenské hnutie obrody: SHO promotes 'traditional values' (family, culture, honour, and faith. Historically, Slovakia has held its distance from any minorities and anything that would resemble 'otherness'. When the 2015 crisis erupted, many parties politicized this issue and misused in for sharing false information and spreading xenophobia (as well as the ruling party Smer-SD) (Vicenová, 2019).

People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)

People's Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko) was firstly established in 2010 by the party's leader Marian Kotleba. The party describes itself as the only alternative to the

corrupted and thief democratic system and is based on national, Christian, and social principles (*About us*, 2011).

In the first election after the establishment of the party in 2010, LSNS did not manage to get seats in the parliament due to gaining only over 33 000 votes and 1,33 % of total votes. Later, in 2012 the party was again unsuccessful with 1,58 % of votes and only over 40 000 votes. In 2016 the situation has changed and the party has successfully managed to get 14 seats in the parliament by getting in total almost 210 000 votes and 8 % of total votes (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, no date a). In the last elections in 2020 LSNS managed to get in total almost 230 000 votes, 17 seats in the parliament, and 7,9 % of total votes, which got them a fourth place in the election (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, no date b).

The party's main targets aim to achieve political independence and a self-sufficient economy without the help of the EU. LSNS does not want to be a part of the EU and strives to re-establish the Slovak national currency – Slovak crown. The Party also refuses to be part of NATO which the party views as a 'terrorist pact' that can harm the Slovak territorial integrity. Further, they point out the importance of nationalistic tendencies that are not in favour of ethnic minorities (especially Roma minority whom they refer to as 'gypsy parasites') and immigrants, the importance of strengthening the national borders. Moreover, the significance of domestic trade and entrepreneurship is highlighted and the party does not support foreign investors who supposedly 'distort Slovak market with cheap imports of low-quality products from abroad'. Additionally, there is an emphasis on traditional Christian values and critique of Western liberalism This is applied to the sphere of education which should be based on traditional national and Christian principles and values. Besides, the party refuses to accept any other marriage or partnership than between a man and a woman (to same-sex couples/ partnerships refers to 'sexual deviants') (*About us*, 2011; People's Party Our Slovakia, 2020).

Theoretical framework

In this chapter, two theories will be introduced – securitisation theory and social identity theory, supplemented by the auxiliary concept of Islamophobia. With the help of these three approaches, I will be able to analyse the given material to answer the research question. By choosing securitisation theory I am able to look into the perspective of right-wing populist parties and how they perceive immigrants as representing 'otherness' and an existential threat

to nation state. Through the lens of social identity theory, we get a better understanding of how national identity plays an important role in social categorisation of an in-group – *the nation that is under the protection of a right-wing party* and an out-group – *immigrants*. Lastly, the concept of Islamophobia allows me to find out to what extent the concept of religion is relevant to this issue.

Securitisation theory

The concept of security has sparked many debates among scholars in the post-Cold War era (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Some wanted to broaden its definition while others prompted, quite the opposite, to narrow the concept down. The traditionalists inclined more towards realism where security can be seen as a freedom nation state from military threat to the state survival in an anarchic system (Šulović, 2010). This is where the Copenhagen school for Security (CSS) comes into play. CSS came into existence from the Conflict and Peace Research Institute of Copenhagen and its academic roots can be traced back to Barry Buzan's 1983 book *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Šulović, 2010). Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, scholars of Copenhagen School for Security studies, redefined the term by extending the traditional concept that referred to namely securitization in connection with stability and persistence of a state and its sovereignty. From their perspective the notion does not only include the military sector, but stretches out into political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors (Šulović, 2010; Middleton, 2016; Wojczewski, 2020). Moreover, the term should also be used to refer to other than the state entity i.e. individuals, social groups, and humanity as a whole. By applying a widening of the term, the question to answer became also: "what quality makes something a security issue"? This can spark many controversial debates as was mentioned by Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde (1998) (Šulović, 2010). By expanding the concept of securitisation, both vertically and horizontally, it creates identification of new referent objects, such as national sovereignty (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security) or species and habitats (environmental security) as stated by Emmers, 2011 (Does, 2013).

According to Buzan, "security is about survival" and therefore, this notion can be applied to any matter that represents "an existential threat to a designated referent object" (Does, 2013) and therefore "justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them." Hence, each and every referent object being, or feeling under threat, is endorsed by the right for "actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Middleton, 2016). From the perspective of Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde security can be described as a process of the social construction of threats

involving a securitisation actor (an actor who securitises issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatening). This securitisation actor proclaims that a certain issue as an urgent matter and a posing threat for the survival of the referent object (things that are seen to be existentially threatening and that have a legitimate claim to survival). In a such case, the referent object is legitimate for the utilization of extraordinary measures for neutralization. These measures, however, have to be formally accepted by the audience (those securitising act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific nature of some issue) (Šulović, 2010; Balzacq, 2015).

The securitisation theory refers to the rhetorical structure of decision-makers when presenting an issue with an attempt to persuade the audience of its high importance and also urgency and therefore it can lead to usage of extraordinary political measures. This is what is the speech act – 'by saying the words, something is done, like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship' according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). In this way, the words do not only describe reality, but they also form a new reality where initiates certain reactions (Eroukhmanoff, 2018; Shipoli, 2018).

Components of securitisation

In short, the securitisation theory consists of the following: the securitising actor, the referent subject, the referent object, the audience, the context, and the adoption of distinctive policies ('exceptional' or not).

The *referent object* is the most essential part of the securitisation theory. It is the object that has the right to survive and the object that should be defended by all means. Moreover, steps for ensuring that the referent object is defended, by all means, should be taken immediately. *Securitising actors* are those, who make the speech act, add the existential importance to the referent object, identify the threats, and introduce the security issue to the public. They can be individuals or groups, but they must be influential, mainly political leaders, government, lobbyists, interest groups, and bureaucrats, and also have to be appropriate while securitising an issue. Besides, there is a *referent subject*, which is the thing that threatens or the threatening event that needs to be securitized (Balzacq, 2005). Further, there needs to be a *threat* to be capable of securitising an issue and such a threat has to be removed for the survival of the referent object. Buzan et al. (1998) distinguish two types of threats: the existential and the non-existential threats. Different parts of securitisation are functional actors that directly impact the process of securitisation. These actors can be the building blocks that do not securitise an issue

or are not the referent objects, like factories in the environmental security sector or religious parties in the societal and political sectors, with the condition that they do not take a direct role in securitising an issue or being the referent object. When there is a referent object whose existence is under threat, securitising actors make a *securitising move*, which is an essential part of the securitising process. The *securitising move* is headed towards *the audience* which has to approve the securitising actor. After giving its approval, the securitising actor legitimizes to use any means to make sure the survival of the referent object. Moreover, the audience also verifies the acts of the securitizing actors. However, the audience must be an enabling one i.e. has a direct connection with the securitized issue and has the right and ability to empower the securitizing actor to take measures to secure the referent object. Additionally, *the speech act* can be referred to as a performed action, that is neither true or false according to Jane Austin (1962). Moreover, security is also viewed as a communicative act since it can affect the audience and can make them act accordingly (Shipoli, 2018).

Securitisation process

As stated by Emmers (2011), the securitisation process consists of two phases. In the first phase certain issues are being depicted. The second phase refers to convincing the audience whether a specific referent object is existentially threatened and therefore the securitisation process is a success. Moreover, the so-called 'speech act' can be viewed as the starting point of the process of securitization. In the first phase of securitisation particular issues, persons, groups, or entities are viewed as existential threats to a target object or community. The issues are portrayed as national or international security issues which give them higher importance than others. Sometimes they can be even exaggerated or dramatized. In the second phase, the securitising has the role of persuading the audience that a particular referent object is in serious danger. Only after the audience's acceptance, special political measures can be used for combating the threat (Does, 2013; Balzacq, 2015).

Critiques on the securitisation theory of CSS

As probably any other significant theory that contributed to the expansion of knowledge about a certain topic, also CSS's securitisation theory has been challenged and critiqued by many. In this section, I will refer to criticisms drawn on the audience, excessive focus on the 'speech act', security in the environmental sector, and lack of coverage regarding religion.

Firstly, the audience in securitisation theory has undergone a wave of criticism is 'audience' due to being described as too unspecific, too vague. This has resulted in formulating advice on

how to clarify and enhance the role and the composition of the audience. As a response to this critique Roe (2008) specifies its role by splitting it into two groups (1) the general public providing moral support for an issue to fall within the area of security and (2) policy-makers (e.g., parliamentarians).

Secondly, another critique regards the context of securitisation that is not being included in the structure of securitisation, it rather dwells on the “performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions, in which securitization itself becomes possible” as McDonald (2008) mentions (Does, 2013). Excessive concentration on the speech act creates a risk of ignoring other forms of representation – such as images, material or bureaucratic practices that a significant role in building and communicating security and that are not only consequences of the speech act itself (Does, 2013).

Thirdly, the next concept being criticized are the power relations of the securitising actor concerning the relevant audience. The result of securitisation process can be highly influenced by the power of such an actor. According to Williams, the securitisation move is dependent on 'the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats' and Wæver says that 'by definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so' and that 'power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it' (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2015).

Fourthly, another criticism revolves around the environmental sector and the guarantee of the survival of a referent object which is viewed in the environmental sector as a paradox. This is since 'in order to secure civilization from environmental threats, much of civilization has to be reformed drastically or even be pulled down'. Further, the efforts to securitize the environment 'primarily [result] in politicization only' because 'most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitization (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2015)

Lastly, some point out the lack of coverage of religion in the securitisation theory, since it does not have its own category. For this matter, Laustsen and Wæver (2000) pointed out three items of how religion can be part of international politics and categorisation of security:

- (1) A religious group is believed to be a threat to the survival of the state.
- (2) Faith is seen as threatened by whoever or whatever “non-religious” actor or process
- (3) Faith is viewed as threatened by another religious discourse or actor (Shipoli, 2018)

Securitisation theory and populism

In this section the nexus of securitisation theory and populism will be explained. And as we know in populism, there is always a mention of some kind of antagonistic link between the 'people' and the 'elite'. In the face of CSS' security sectoral division, the 'people' as a referent object of security fall into the categories of politics and society. The survival of society as a community is built upon a shared sense of identity that can be grounded in a shared language, ethnicity, culture, or religion. However, from the perspective of populists, societal security revolves around the identity of ordinary people and threats against this group coming from the 'corrupt' elite, rather than ethno-cultural or religious identities (Wojczewski, 2020).

Further, Bonansinga points out to several aspects that securitisation and populism share in common. Firstly, it is the imagery of *existing existential threats* and a need for *salvation*. According to Buzan et al., it is important to view security as survival. This way a security problem appears, once an existential threat represents a problem for the referent object. In right-wing populism there is a narrative of securitizing threats that could weaken the referent object, so-called 'salvation logic'. Secondly, the existence of *a crisis* and the appearance of *emergency actions*. Populism tends to react on behalf of and crisis and often inclines towards dramatization with the use of its emergency options. This way, securitisation can be seen as an absolute priority against assumed threats. Thirdly, it refers to *moralism* and *authoritative claims*. The securitising actor has to hold a position of power within the society and possesses the ability to give guidance to citizens since this increases the chance of the audience accepting an instance of securitisation. According to William (2013) securitisation needs an authoritative claim. And populism gives a perfect place for authoritative claims in morality since the populist leader acts on behalf of the 'people' (Bonansinga, 2018).

In summary, the nexus of securitisation and populism can be concluded in three main points that highlight their common features:

- (1) Dramatisation and fearmongering: summoning and maintaining the sense of existential threats to 'the people';
- (2) Simplification and scapegoating: identifying and blaming the establishment as the single cause of this state of danger and 'the people' as a collective victim;
- (3) Propagation of a state of emergency: shifting and keeping particular issues into the domain of emergency politics as justification for populist politics. (Wojczewski, 2020)

Social Identity Theory and National identity

Social Identity Theory (SIT) was firstly introduced in the 1970s by social psychologist Henri Taifel and his student John Turner and till today is viewed as one of the major theories in social psychology (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). It aims to explain under which circumstances social identity becomes more important than one's identity as an individual. Moreover, it focuses on how social identity influences intergroup behaviour (Levy, 2014). The theory was based on Taifel's personal experience of discrimination and personal conflict since he was a Jewish survivor of World War II of Polish origin (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). It emerged from a number of studies done by Taifel and his team which is known as minimal-group studies. In this study, individuals were randomly divided into groups and asked to assign points in between their group members and the other group members. The study ended up with a discovery that group members divided points more easily to their in-group members the out-group ones, even though they did not have any personal benefits from doing so. From conducting this study, the concept of 'mere categorisation' was created which indicates that individuals put into group started to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012) Simply put, this categorisation created in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. Based on these findings, Taifel introduced the concept of social identity in which can be defined according to him as *'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership'* (Levy, 2014).

SIT consists of three fundamental cognitive components: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. The first cognitive process, *social categorization*, is when separate individuals are put into social groups to understand the social world. Once they are put into the same group, they are sharing some main group-defining features (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). People are usually sorted into a social group based on their similarities in the same one and differences in the other one. One can be part of multiple social groups (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012; Levy, 2014), but the importance of belonging to each one of the groups is based on social circumstances. At the end of the social categorisation we are able to identify people based on the groups they belong to. Second, the cognitive component, or *social identification* is a process in what is stated how group members of one particular group should behave. By socially identifying the group, the individuals will start behaving in the way as the group members believe one should act. It points out why groups of people are different from object categories: the fact that the self can also be viewed as being part of a

social group. The third cognitive concept, *social comparison* which is usually done by comparing the characteristics (e.g., traits, attitudes, behaviours) that are to define them to the characteristics ascribed to other groups as stated by Taifel (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). Social comparison is a process in which one group is being compared to another regarding prestige and social standing. For the sake of preserving self-esteem, a member of a group has to view the in-group with more prestige or with higher social standing than the out-group. This can, however, lead to negative outcomes like discrimination, prejudice, or stereotyping of the other group (Vinney, 2019).

As the main principle, people are driven to feel positive about themselves and preserving their self-esteem. When they do so, it can lead to their self-esteem having a tighter bond to the social standing of their in-group. If it is not possible to come to one's positive evaluation, then there are three ways of how to reach this point. Firstly, it is *individual mobility* where an individual can try to leave his or her group and seek one with higher social standing. In other words, one tries to escape, avoid, or deny belonging to a devalued group or be included in a group that is more highly valued (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). Secondly, it is *social creativity* where the in-group members try to improve the social standing of their existing group by enhancing some items of the between-group comparison. This can be done in three ways: by concentrating on other dimensions of intergroup comparison, by involving other members in the comparison or by altering the meaning of low-status group membership. Thirdly, it is *social competition* in which the in-group members aim to upgrade the social status of the group by working together to change the status quo of the group (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012; Vinney, 2019).

Critiques of SIT

Some researchers consider SIT to be too vague and unclear (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Jost and Elsbach, 2001). Others were trying to clarify these theoretical statements (Ellemers et al., 2003; Haslam and Ellemers, 2005; McGarty, 2001).

As Ellemers and Haslam (2013) state, the main issue with the SIT is that it focuses only on mere categorization and in-group favouritism which leads to several problems:

- a) *fails to notice that the theory recognizes many different identity-enhancement strategies (i.e., not only social competition but also individual mobility and social creativity),*
- b) *neglects the fact that the core predictions of SIT refer to specific boundary conditions,*
and

c) overlooks the moderator variables that are expected to influence people's use of particular identity-enhancement strategies

National Identity

National identity can be viewed as a sense of one's belonging to the nation in which the individuals perceive membership of this nation with great importance. The term refers to the sense of attachment, or belonging to the nation (Mader *et al.*, 2018). When mentioning the term 'nation', in certain languages it has a linkage to 'birth'. An example of this can be found in Spanish where [nacer = to be born; nación = nation]. Once one is born in a certain place, there is a sensation of belonging to a group in which one was born (Worchel *et al.*, 1998) When speaking of the notion of 'national sentiment' four elements need to be mentioned that the term is built upon: (a) territoriality, (b) shared culture, (c) historical memory of genealogical communality and (d) the existence of a nation-state (Worchel *et al.*, 1998).

The first element, *territoriality*, traces back to the biological grounds of animal territoriality and the concept of territorial imprinting. Ardrey (1967) refers to 'biological nation' as 'a social group containing at least two mature males which hold as an exclusive possession a continuous area of space, which isolates itself from others of its kind through outwards antagonism, and which through joint defence of its social territory achieves leadership, cooperation, and capacity for concerted action' (Worchel *et al.*, 1998).

Second element *culture*, is linked with a number of concepts such as music, language, customs, shared values. Such concepts are shared among individuals of a particular culture and transmitted from generation to generation. In this thesis, I focus on two cases – Slovakia and Denmark. In the context of Slovakia, the main values revolve around: family, religion, closeness to nature, defence of Slovak nation and culture, also there is a strong attachment to folklore and folk art as well as to popular traditions. Further, education is highly valued and there is a visible sense of historical victimization as well as a noticeable lack of self-confidence. In the view of Lewis (2006), Slovaks are more punctual than other Slavs, the culture is male-dominated, nationalistic, somewhat opinionated, sensitive to criticism. Based on the Comparative Report of Country Findings (2015), the competencies of leadership and the ability to make decisions is very valued in Slovak society. On the other hand, creativity, ability to prioritize, competitiveness, and ability to think critically have very low competence in this society (Čiefová, 2017). In the context of Denmark, it is very important to treat everyone with equal respect, the society takes a pride in liberal values, freedom of expression, as well as

democracy, equal treatment, gender equality, and secularism. Promotion of certain particular liberal principles, Danish culture and history play a significant role. Liberal values are very much interconnected with the Danish culture and to understand and accept them, one must be familiar with Danish history and be able to assimilate into Danish culture (Rostbøll, 2010). Society can be described as an assimilationist one, where any minority group needs to integrate into society (Olsen, 2011). Also, multiculturalist where the existence of different cultural and religious groups in society are noticed (Olsen, 2011). According to Østergaard (2003) Danish political culture is associated with the concept of '*folkelighed*' which refers to a common feeling of consensus in the population. Overall, the national identity of Denmark is rather cultural than civic, and its crucial element is the social welfare system (Olsen, 2011).

The third element, *ethnicity* is often misused with the term race. Often, ethnicity is associated with common land, elements of a common culture, and something of great relevance as Smith (1991) states (Worchel *et al.*, 1998).

The fourth element, *state*, is an important factor in creating national sentiment through the use of ideology (Worchel *et al.*, 1998).

When speaking of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination, it can have a negative effect on the out-group. In the case of Europe and immigrants, immigrants are categorised as an out-group and the individuals of a particular EU country are the in-group. The in-group favouritism and social creativity of an in-group can jeopardize the social identity of the out-group, in this case, the immigrants. Such a thing can happen due to unsuccessful integration policies that may lead to the out-group feeling alienated, the creation of more ethnic definitions can cause increased discrimination of the immigrants (Erisen, 2017).

Utilization of SIT and National identity

SIT can be very helpful when studying public opinion on immigration. According to Wright (2011) influx of immigrants can cause that they will be perceived as a threat to social harmony and disrupt the nation's identity. The term 'immigrant threat' can be viewed as a danger to a national identity of a certain nation where the out-group does not respect cultural norms and provoke a cultural change (Mangum and Ray Block, 2018).

Unfortunately, religious identity is often overlooked or neglected, even though it is a common component when talking of immigrants and diversity and also is an important part of many people's lives. In the case of Muslims, the categories of ethnicity and religion often overlap (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012).

When looking into particular the three key cognitive components of SIT, in terms of national identity, the social comparison comes in forms of different dimensions: the size of the countries, political systems, state of the economy, 'well-being' or 'happiness' of the inhabitants, etc. This stage of SIT is significant regarding national identity because it influences both the salience of the category along with its evaluation and affects the development of a positive social identity (Worchel *et al.*, 1998).

Islamophobia

Islamophobia is a widely used concept by many scholars in social science (Bleich, 2011). Still, there is no broadly accepting definition of this term and its definition is influenced based on location, , time, social groups, or levels of analogous categories, namely racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia (Bleich, 2011). In the view of Esposito & Mogahed (2007) Islamophobia can be defined as intolerance towards Muslims' religious and cultural beliefs (Bakali, 2016). The conceptions of Western superiority and the barbaric 'Otherness' of Muslims (Bakali, 2016) can be seen as a group categorisation.

The term Islamophobia is often linked with Critical Race Theory (CRT), which is attempting to research and modify the relationship between race, racism, and power, on the contrary to the traditional civil rights movements, questions the bases of the liberal order (Kolivoski, Weaver and Constance-Huggins, 2014). Moreover, it stands on two main principles. Firstly, it aims to grasp how the regime of white supremacy along with its inferior group of peoples of colour emerged and has been able to survive in society. Secondly, it is about comprehending the relationship between law and racial power and aiming towards changing the status quo (Bakali, 2016). Nowadays, the CRT is not solely applied with regard to racial discrimination, but this term refers also to Islamophobia (Hervik, 2019). With this being said, media have contributed to creation of these notions due to presenting ideas of cultural incompatibility", unwanted presence, fixed identities, racial-cultural logic of belonging, etc. and it co-constructs racialization (Hervik, 2019). All of this has led to the society being even more polarised.

The notion of Islamophobia has been used synonymously or in relation to neo-Orientalism (Bakali, 2016), anti-Muslimness (Hervik, 2019), or cultural racism (Bakali, 2016). It has a French origin dating back to 1925 used by Etienne Dinet, where it was referred to as 'accès de délire Islamophobe' ('Islamophobic delirium') (Bakali, 2016), and Slima Ben Ibrahim and in English, it was mentioned for the first time by Edward Said in 1985. The term was also noted by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who expressed his concern in a UN

conference on “Confronting Islamophobia” as Islam is viewed and interpreted as a religion of terror and extremism in the West (Bleich, 2011; Moten, 2012). Following up on the social identity theory, where one craves a positive self-identity within an in-group. In-group members view themselves positively whereas the out-group people are looked upon negatively (Moten, 2012).

Historically, the terms Islam and Muslims have been used in times of colonialism. During these times, the West was formed as an ancient and developed civilization where people had their freedom whereas the Muslim world was seen as a barbaric and uncivilized place where the Western people went on a mission in order to civilize them (Moten, 2012). However, many scholars point out, that the islamophobia nowadays is not led by the history, but rather by recent events such as the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, July 7th, 2005 bombings in London and the train bombing in Madrid (Moten, 2012; Bakali, 2016). In recent years, there has been an instance when Islam religion was depicted as a violent one for example in the controversy of 2012 *Charlie Hebdo* and French satirical magazine, where he satirically portrayed Prophet Muhammad, but also the crisis after Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005 published satirical cartoons (Bakali, 2016). This occurrence caused many inconveniences, among others, attack to the Danish embassy in Lebanon, burning the Danish flags causing a number of deaths on account of the cartoons. These actions were seen by the Muslims as deeply offensive, whereas in the West it was understood as a freedom of speech (Raj, 2016). Other events, that have created a negative picture of Islam and Muslims in the media are the Arab Spring and recent events with ISIS which have created even for prejudice and stereotyping (Raj, 2016).

As mentioned above, Islam has been viewed as a threat in many Western cultures. For instance in the USA, it can be seen as a distortion to the American identity consisting of liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and so on (Moten, 2012). In Denmark, it can be interpreted as a threat to the social welfare system, freedom of expression, liberal values, gender equality (Olsen, 2011). In the Slovak context, we can look at it as a threat to traditions and culture, Christian religion, and family values (Čiefová, 2017).

According to some scholars, Islamophobia is solely about fear (or dread) (Abbas, 2004; Lee *et al.*, 2009), heading towards either Islam or Muslim whereas Stolz (2005) claims that "Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals based on prejudice and stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g., discrimination, violence)" (Bleich, 2011). As said by Yilmaz (2012),

in CRT it is obvious that that the West rejects Islamism and that Islam is seen as a construct that rejects the West. Overall, we can see that suppressing or rejecting Islam has become a norm in the West (Raj, 2016).

Application of the theoretical framework

In this section, I will state the reasons why I have selected the above-mentioned theories and also, I will explain how I plan on applying them in the analysis.

Firstly, by making the decision of selecting securitisation theory, the antagonist relation between 'us' and the 'others' can be examined, since it is very common among populist parties. In this case 'us' represents the nation states of Slovakia and Denmark and 'others' the incoming immigrants posing a threat to these nation states. The aspects of doing the migrants represent a threat will be investigated in the analysis chapter and later the cases of Denmark and Slovakia will be compared. Moreover, by using this theory I will be able to identify all components of the securitisation process in both Slovak and Danish cases, and then the similarities and differences between them will be analysed. I will also take a closer look at the nexus between populism and securitisation as stated earlier by Bonansinga: dramatization and fearmongering, simplification and scapegoating, propagation of a state of emergency (Bonansinga, 2018).

Secondly, social identity theory will be used to look closer to the categorisation with the connection of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination – in this case favouritism of nation state and discrimination of the incoming immigrants. By selecting this theory, I will identify in the analysis part all three fundamental cognitive components: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison, in both cases of Slovakia and Denmark. Later, a comparison between these two examples will be carried out. Further, I will scope the importance of national identity and analyse which components are the most significant ones, when it comes to the construction of cultural values in Denmark and Slovakia. This way, I will be able to understand more what features are the most important ones that both of these cases will try to protect from the existential threat.

Thirdly, the concept of islamophobia was chosen to supplement the two previous theories, since this issue of religion is not specifically discussed in neither securitisation nor social identity theory. This approach, enables me to take a closer look into the issue of religion when it comes to analysing anti-immigration positions of right-wing parties. Such parties often point out the problem of different religions and different cultures. For this reason, I will examine to what

extent this has significance in this case and what meaning Islam takes when debated by the radical right-wing.

Taking everything into account, by selecting these theories, I can get a better perspective on all aspects that I plan to analyse (see the analysis section pp. 34-47). With securitisation theory, I can better understand the connection between securitisation and populism, with social identity theory I get a better perspective on the importance of national identity and what it includes in the two cases selected and with the concept of islamophobia I can grasp further information on the relevance of religion in this context. All of these approaches will be applied in the analysis chapter and addressed later in the discussion chapter.

Analysis

Accessed through the official webpage of People's Party - Our Slovakia *Ludová strana Naše Slovensko*¹ a series of articles were chosen. Due to the big amount of articles available (of which many were deemed not relevant to this case), a filter by the words string of *immigration & crisis* was used. Based on this step, I managed to collect 42 articles with the time frame of June 2015 till March 2020. Some of the articles also included videos or reportages which I took into account. In the Danish case, I also search for data on the official site of Danish People's Party *Dansk Folkeparti*² and decided to cover all available issues from the paper *Europæisk Folkeblad* covering the time frame of May 2015 till April 2019. Moreover, I studied the main points of their program to get a better understanding of their values and viewpoint. I also ended up accessing a lot of data which I narrowed down to articles revolving around code words such as *refugee, asylum seeker, migrant, immigration, migration crisis*, etc. By doing this, a pool of 48 articles resulted in matching the criteria. After this step I went through all the selected articles, began to categorise certain passages and this led me to the identification of four main themes: 1) threat, 2) values, 3) blame, and 4) problem solutions or defence. In the Slovak case I ended up having 139 findings and in the Danish case 318.

After doing the initial categorisation based on the theoretical framework and so far, studied materials, I have decided to create a new framing template that fits better the content used for the analysis. Therefore, a frame matrix was established. For both cases the frame matrix consists of four frames: *threat, blame, national identity, and positive actors*. Each of these main frames has several sub-categories. Other parts of the frame matrix include a description

¹ <http://www.naseslovensko.net/>

² <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/partiet/europaeisk-folkeblad/>

of the frame, description of the sub-frames, and a number of occurrences of how many times have these sub-frames been spotted.

Slovak case

The frame matrix for the Slovak case consists of 4 main frames: *Threat*, *Blame*, *National Identity* and *Positive actors*. *Threat* includes 4 main components addressing migration crisis which are: migrants as an economic burden, migrants as a security issue, migrants as 'otherness', migrants as a social burden. In *Blame*, there are sub-categories of Government; EU; the West, and liberalists. *National identity* includes three sections – Sense of nationalism and protectionism; Family and Religion. *Positive actors* consist of LSNS (People’s Party Our Slovakia); Common people and Other positive actors.

Slovak case				
Frames	Description	Sub-frames	Description	Number of occurrences
Threat	An existential threat of immigrants endangering the survival of Slovak nation state	Migrant as an economic burden	A threat to the Slovak labour market	5
		Migrant as a security issue	A real threat for Slovak people, increased rate of criminality	18
		Migrant as 'otherness'	distortion of Slovak values, culture, national identity	14
		Migrant as a social burden	migrants misusing social benefits that are paid from the taxes of Slovak people	8
Blame	A common characteristic of populist parties when playing a victim role. In this case, I am referring to all out-group members, actors who by their plans and actions may cause a threat to the Slovak people	Government	Leading party in the Slovak parliament	21
		EU	EU as an institution, politicians in Brussels	10
		The 'West', liberalists	Out-group actors who are with their stance and action not in line with what LSNS stands for	9
		Other actors - media and NGOs	Other subjects with liberal views	14
National identity	A cluster of common traits how LSNS views the Slovak nation	Sense of nationalism and protectionism	Need to protect its people, need to preserve its traditions, customs, values	17

Positive actors	All members of the in-group of the Slovak case	Family	Importance of family, family as a value	5
		Religion	Christianity, Catholicism	10
		LSNS	Main actor when it comes to the protection of the Slovak nation state against its existential threat - migrants	34
		Common people	Slovak people, people threatened by incoming immigrants, hard-working people	5
		Other positive actors	Other governments, parties, movements with plans and actions similar or in favour of LSNS and their viewpoint	14

Danish case

In the Danish case the frame matrix also consists of 4 frames – *threat*, *blame*, *national identity*, and *positive actors*. In *threat*, there are four sub-frames: migrants as an economic burden; migrants as a security issue; migrants as 'otherness' and migrants as a social burden. *Blame* revolves around three topics: Danish liberal parties; EU and liberalists, NGOs. *National identity* refers to the sense of nationalism and protectionism; Freedom of speech; Religion; Homogeneity/ Danishness; Equality and Social Welfare. The last frame, *positive actors*, includes the Danish People's Party (DF) and Other actors.

Danish case				
Frames	Description	Sub-frames	Description	Number of occurrences
Threat	an existential threat of immigrants endangering the survival of Slovak nation state	Migrant as an economic burden	A threat to the Danish labour market	7
		Migrant as a security issue	A real threat for Danish people, increased rate of criminality	42
		Migrant as 'otherness'	Distortion of Danish values, culture, national identity	11
		Migrant as a social burden	Migrants misusing social welfare that is paid by the tax-payers in Denmark	13

Blame	A common characteristic of populist parties when playing a victim role. In this case, I am referring to all out-group members, actors who by their plans and actions may cause a threat to the in-group of Danish case	Danish liberal parties	left-wing parties, pro-European parties, liberal parties	14
		EU	EU as an institution, politicians in Brussels, Angela Merkel	80
		liberalists, NGOs	Out-group actors who are with their stance and action not in line with what DF stands for	13
National identity	A cluster of common traits how DF views the Danish nation	Sense of nationalism and protectionism	Need to protect its people, need to preserve its traditions, customs, values	12
		Freedom of speech	Importance of one's ability to express themselves no matter the situation	5
		Religion	Christianity	3
		Homogeneity/ Danishness	A set of customs, traditions, traits defining the Danish people	9
		Equality	Gender equality, social equality, the importance of the equal division of resources among all Danish people	5
		Social welfare	Due to high taxes, developed and functioning social system	5
Positive actors	All members of the in-group of the Danish case	DF	main actor when it comes to the protection of the Danish nation state against its existential threat - migrants	48
		Other actors	Other governments, parties, movements with plans and actions similar or in favour of DF and their viewpoint	37

Following the established frame matrix, the cases of Slovakia and Denmark will be analysed and compared. Firstly, I will look into how the *national identity* of these two cases is

constructed, what are components of this category and I will mention concrete examples of each sub-frame. After this, I will compare the two cases and also will look for similarities. In the frame of *Threat*, I have the same sub-frames applied for both Slovakia and Denmark, and this way I can properly analyse how is the notion of migrants as a threat viewed by these actors and in what way does this concept present an existential threat to the selected nation states. Further, the frame of *Blame* will be applied in both cases, and similarly like in previous frames, a comparison will be made in the end. Lastly, *Positive actors* will be presented and their viewpoints shared. In the comparison part I will focus on what suggestions they have for solving the problem of the immigration crisis.

National identity

In this section, I will look into the components of the national identity of the cases Denmark and Slovakia. I will find out which parts of these national identities are emphasized the most and at the end of this section I will make a comparison between these two cases.

Slovak case

In order to have a better understanding of how to characterize a certain in-group, it is important to illustrate its main traits, values, etc. In the case of Slovakia, four items in this category were chosen to represent the reality of how LSNS perceives principal Slovak values – sense of nationalism and protectionism, family, and religion. Like many other radical right-wing populist parties, also LSNS emphasizes religion, namely Christianity. I found this to be expressed multiple times in the analysed data. Even the party's motto revolves around faith: "For God, for the nation!" ('Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.', 2015). The significance of Christianity is portrayed multiple times throughout the articles, such example we can see here: "Few can unite Slovaks as if someone touches on their families and the Christian faith." ('Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.', 2015), Another aspect of LSNS's identity is family: "Our moral duty is to take care of our own children, our nation, our state." ('Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.', 2015). The most significant characteristic flashed out is the sense of nationalism, a protective stance towards the Slovak nation, which is expressed several times and places: "And that is why we refer all enemies of Slovakia and Europe - we will not give our Fatherland! We will defend ourselves!" ('Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.', 2015) or "We Slovaks will not let our land be stolen and overwhelmed by foreigners." (Mazurek, 2018b).

Danish case

In the Danish case, the national identity is portrayed through equality; freedoms, mainly freedom of speech; Christianity, sense of security and safety (*tryghed*) and nationalism, social welfare, Danishness, and/or homogeneity. Similarly, to the LSNS, also in the DF articles there is the frequent use of expressions in the category of nationalism, and protectionism. Some examples are: "We are committed to our Danish cultural heritage and our responsibility to each other as people. That is why we want to strengthen the country's external and internal security." (*Principprogram*, 1997) or "More Denmark - Less EU". Is it so hard to understand?" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2015', 2015). Equality or equal treatment of all members of Danish society is an important asset which also DF highly values: "The care and care of the elderly and the disabled is a public task. It must be ensured that these groups of citizens are given a dignified and safe life with equal conditions throughout the country." (*Principprogram*, 1997). Among other important aspects freedom of speech and other types of freedoms are particularly emphasised: "We value the fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of belief, emphasising the importance of respecting these freedoms to other peoples as well." (*Principprogram*, 1997). It is common in the Nordic region that these countries are proud of their developed and well-functioning welfare system, which also DF acknowledges: One of the things we get out of the high tax we pay in Denmark is the relatively high social benefits we have. ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019', 2019). Further, DF emphasizes the homogeneity of Danes and mentions the term 'Danishness'. "We, therefore, want a broad effort to strengthen Danishness everywhere." (*Principprogram*, 1997). Lastly, DF puts emphasis on religion, namely Christianity, as a part of Danish culture, heritage: Christianity has for centuries been asserted in Denmark and is inseparable from people's lives. The significance that Christianity has had and has is immense and influences the Danes' way of life. It has throughout the years been a guide and guide for the people (*Principprogram*, 1997).

Comparison

Looking at these cases, we can see that in both instances the sense of nationalism and protectionism is highly emphasized and its importance is repeated in many ways and many times. In the Slovak case there were 17 instances of this category and in the Danish case 12. Both of the cases are keen on preserving their country's culture, customs, and traditions. Moreover, both parties are pointing out to the importance of religion, which is interesting in the Danish case, since nowadays religion does not play a big part in Danish society. While both

of them have tendencies of protecting their nation from the threat of incoming immigrants, in the Slovak case, LSNS is trying to save the Slovak values, the Christian religion, traditional families whereas in the Danish case, liberal values, equality, and various freedoms are highlighted. Even though, the concept of gender equality holds a big value in Danish society, in the analysis it was not mentioned much. When speaking of equality in general, it was mostly referred to as equal distribution of freedoms among all citizens of Denmark. When DF talks about an equal distribution of benefits among all people, they are taking a rather chauvinist approach in which the 'right' for equality, freedoms, and benefits of any sort coming out of the Danish system, should claim only by those with Danish background, who have worked for these rewards for many years. Consequently, there is a fine line between those who 'deserve' to access the benefits of the Danish social welfare system and request all freedoms and those, who are not entitled to this.

Threat

This section, will be present how the notion of threat is constructed around the migration crisis. Since this thesis is revolved around the issue of the migration crisis, the main focus is on the party framings of the migrant as different types of threats - migrant as an economic burden, migrants as a security issue, migrants as 'otherness' and migrants as a social burden. Firstly, I will start with the Slovak case, then with Danish, and in the end, I will make a comparison of these two cases.

Slovak case

To begin with, migrants as an economic burden can signify a problem for the state's budget or a risk to the state's economy by taking up job positions for the citizens. LSNS expresses their fear when stating that both Slovakia and Europe have other issues to deal with: "Europe and Slovakia are in such a situation today that even a single immigrant is too much!" ('Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.', 2015) and also points out to a situation in a town in Western Slovakia: "At present, Jaguar has brought nothing but problems with the crime of foreigners in Nitra and the loss of a huge amount of money." (Mazurek, 2018a). In the category of the migrant as a security issue, is the most frequent type of migrant threat in the eyes of LSNS. Their concerns are marked in many passages: "We visited ghettos, which according to the media do not exist. Rape and murder are the order of the day." ('REPORTÁŽ: V Londýne sme navštívili slušných Slovákov aj nebezpečné getá', 2019) or "Many of the "refugees" in Europe murdered, raped, robbed." ('Milan Uhrík do očí eurokomisárovi pre imigráciu: Zradili ste celú Európu!', 2019).

Other than viewing migrants as a safety threat to the Slovak people, the migrants are portrayed as a potential risk because of their different cultures, customs, and/or religion. LSNS talks about this matter when addressing the situation in Western Europe: "Western Europe is really lost. It is only a matter of time before immigrants from foreign cultures take over literally entire countries, which they gradually transform into their image." (Uhrik, 2018b). LSNS addresses the issue of migrant a social burden in the case of a small town of Humenné, where migrants would be allocated: "How is it then possible that this government is reluctant to distribute thousands of euros to foreign immigrants who have absolutely no benefit for Slovakia and for Humenné." (Mazurek, 2018b).

Danish case

DF together with LSNS, views migrants as a threat in several aspects. Their concern regarding migrant as an economic burden was expressed by Jannich Kofoed as: "that immigration will cost European societies billions." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2015', 2015). By far, the biggest threat against Danish society is national security. Martin Hjort states: "We have to admit to each other that almost all the terror we see in Europe is due to radical Islamism. But paradoxically, there is widespread fear of radical Islam in the EU, and it prevents effective counter-terrorism" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2018', 2018). Further, there is a concern from Karsten Lorentzen: "Denmark will be an obvious target for terrorists and holy warriors because of the drawings of the Muslim prophet and our international involvement in the fight against the terrorist hatching sites in the Middle East." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3 2016', 2016). The construction of migrants as undeserving 'others' refers to Denmark's homogeneous system which is endangered by those who are unable to integrate into Danish society: "These are people who are not primarily fleeing from war, but from hopeless living conditions and lack of perspectives in their home countries, where the Islamic regime, in particular, has not been able to build a single well-functioning and democratic society." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2015', 2015). However, the representation of migrants as a social burden is discussed multiple times as seen by Peter Koefod: "In Denmark, it is a reality that many municipalities now openly announce that they will cut their welfare budget next year. This is due to the costs of the many new immigrants who must have housing, language lessons, reception classes, interpreting assistance, crisis assistance, and other public services." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2015', 2015). The category of migrants as a social burden does on only refer to the non-western immigrants, but also to those from Eastern European countries, who can access easily the social benefits of the Danish welfare system since their arrival, even from day one. Such cases have

been more common since many of the Central and Eastern European countries have become part of the EU ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019', 2019).

Comparison

In both cases, by far the most common perception of the migrant as a threat was in terms of security, with 18 instances in the Slovak case and 42 in the Danish one. There was an emphasis on 'waves' or a 'flood' of incoming migrants was present pointing out to the causes of that will cause an increase in criminality and the people of Denmark and Slovakia may be affected by terrorism, robberies, rapes, and murders. After this category, the second common one in the Slovak case was migrants as 'otherness' (14 instances), where it is being highlighted how different cultures and people believing in different religions may negatively affect local people. Moreover, LSNS points out on the situation in various Western European countries where diversity and multiculturalism have taken over and how things have drastically change to the worse since the countries welcomed immigrants coming from non-western countries. While migrants as 'otherness' ended up in second place in the Slovak case, in the Danish case it is migrant as a threat to 'social welfare' (13 instances). DF expresses its concerns about immigrants misuses the social benefits of the welfare system that Denmark has and about unsuccessful integration policies. The category migrant as an economic threat was mentioned the least in both cases, with 7 instances in the Danish case and 5 in the Slovak case.

Blame

The category of blame focuses on the out-group member who does not share the same viewpoint as the selected cases of LSNS and DF. I look into what specifically these parties criticize the out-group members of and I will look into the similarities and differences surrounding these two cases.

Slovak case

Thirdly, a concept of blame is commonly associated with populist parties, when they play the role of victim that needs to point out to an enemy endangering the common people. In the Slovakian case, LSNS considers as an enemy anyone or anything that supports liberal viewpoints or values, namely: EU, the media, the NGOs, the 'West' (or Western Europe), but also the leading or mainstream parties in Slovakia. Firstly, I will cover how LSNS blames the EU as an institution, which they do not trust and not want to be part of. Overall, LSNS criticizes plans, policies, and actions that the EU does: "Under the baton of Brussels bureaucrats and treacherous politicians who took control of Slovakia after 1989, the foundations of our

European security and prosperity are at stake.” (Mišún, 2017) or “There were also the names of all the traitors from the ranks of MEPs who voted for mandatory quotas for immigrants.” (‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.’, 2015). The Slovak government is blamed most often – especially the leading coalition of Robert Fico (PM till 2018 and his SMER-SD as a leading party till February 2020). Their anger or frustration is expressed in a number of ways: “They all made clear what they thought about the hypocritical policy of the Fico government,” (‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.’, 2015) or “unlike the Fico government and the so-called standard political parties we not only speak but also act.” (‘Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko podala petíciu proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko!’), 2016). When referring to the ‘West’, LSNS points out mainly to Western European countries or the USA, but also any type of liberal actor. One of the common habits of LSNS is to blame liberal media: 'In today's world, we are constantly confronted and bombarded with "guaranteed information" or facts that will ultimately prove to be misleading or completely misleading' (‘Vláda uvoľnila azylovú politiku pre cudzincov. V NR SR sme boli razantne proti’, 2018), but also to critique work of various NGOs: ‘Various non-foreign-paid non-government organizations who claim that it is our moral duty to take care of immigrants’ (‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.’, 2015).

Danish case

In the Danish case, the trend looks similar, since the party is also mostly focused on criticizing the EU and the leading party. EU is by far the most criticized concept within the frame of blame. Karsten Lorenzen addresses the EU’s work satirically: “Anti-terrorism - most effective without the EU” (‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2015’, 2015). A common concern is criticizing EU's security policies, especially when it comes to the protection of external borders: "When external border control in the EU does not work" (‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 8 2015’, 2015) or “because the EU is unable to guard its external borders at a time when the next wave from North Africa to Italy is on its way across the Mediterranean.” (‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016’, 2016). Further critique on the EU is shown: "The "European" solution consists of welcoming, to say the least, anyone who wants to come to Europe, give them food, shelter, and welfare. At the same time, the countries that oppose this crazy logic will be punished." (‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3, 2018’, 2018). The centre-right Danish parties are mostly blamed for being very pro-EU: "Liberals Denmark's most pro-European party” (‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2, 2019’, 2019) and “their pro-European hearts find it infinitely difficult to stand on the side line when the integration train runs and Denmark does not sit on the carriage” (‘Europæisk

Folkeblad nr. 2, 2019', 2019). Moreover, DF expresses their concern about Western Europe and their lack of protectionism: "But the "humanists" in Brussels and the surrounding area, of course, prefer the criminals' business rather than protect Europe" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3, 2018', 2018). Similarly to LSNS, also DF puts a critique on NGOs and some of their activities: "A sea of NGOs are doing charity in the camp and providing food for the residents" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2016', 2016).

Comparison

In the Danish case, DF blames the EU and its activities the most, which is shown by 80 instances among the analysed data. EU is being accused of not handling the migration crisis properly and claims that the used refugee policies will lead to a humanitarian disaster. Further, they mention that the EU is unable to protect its external borders. This category that is mentioned the most, might be influenced by the fact that I have been using materials from the issues of *Europæisk Folkeblad* which is focused mainly on matters within the EU region. In the Slovak case, LSNS blames the most often the government (21 instances) and the leading party SMER-SD (leading party till February 2020) and accuses it of not doing enough job. Both parties, LSNS and DF are criticising activities of various activists and NGOs (14 instances in the Slovak case and 13 in the Danish case) who are trying to help immigrants from Northern Africa to safely arrive on the shores of Europe. Moreover, they are blaming mainstream liberal media and do not show the 'right' picture of immigrants, but are trying to shows them in the role of an innocent victim.

Positive actors

This section focuses on the in-group members and highlights their plans, strategies, and actions regarding handling the migration crisis. I will examine both parties, LSNS and DF, and later do a comparison of how they are aiming to solve the issue of the migration crisis.

Slovak case

In the case of Slovakia, there are types of positive actors – LSNS, the party itself, the common people, and Other actors, which refers to any other governments and/or movements with similar standpoints as LSNS. Common people are not mentioned as often, only in the instances when the party thanks to them for participation in protests organized by this party: "On 11 July 2015, the second protest against the arrival of immigrants to Slovakia took place in Žilina. Almost 2,000 people have once again made it clear that they are opposed to any placement of immigrants from Africa or Muslim countries in our towns and villages." ('Protest proti

príchodu imigrantov v Žiline’, 2015). LSNS takes pride in their nationalist tendencies and in the organization of protests against incoming immigrants where express their opinions such as: “It is our moral duty to take care of our own children, our nation, our state.” (‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.’, 2015) or “We have thus made it clear to the government that the people of Slovakia do not want a single immigrant in our state!” (‘Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko podala petíciu proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko!’ , 2016). Martin Beluský (LSNS Party member) gives a possible solution to the migration crisis in Europe: “A solution to this crisis is possible only if the peoples of Europe uphold the fundamental values on which Europe is built,“ (Beluský, 2016). Further, LSNS was trying to pass through an anti-immigration law, which would make it illegal to cross the state borders of Slovakia. This act would be classified as a criminal offense for which would trespasser face up to three years in a prison. This law was, however, not accepted by the National Council (‘LS Naše Slovensko predstavila prvý protiimigračný zákon. Médiá to zamlčali!’ , 2018). In the view of Uhrík, stresses that current migration policies are ineffective and he sees that solution in helping locally: „if we want to help people in Africa, let us help in Africa, leave them alone, or give some development aid like the Union, but immigration is not the solution, because the whole of Africa will not fit into Europe” (‘V Európarlamente bez servítky – Afrika sa do Európy nezmestí!’ , 2019). When it comes to other solutions for migration crisis suggested by different actors, LSNS is satisfied with the decision of V4 countries to act together (Hlinčeková and Mesežnikov, 2016) and to refuse the quotas for refugee division that was imposed by the European Commission: “Those quotas have been abolished so far, they have been abolished only because Brussels is afraid of active resistance in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary.” (‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov v Žiline’ , 2015).

Another instance of acknowledging a good job of other actors, was in 2019 when the party expressed their satisfaction: "The incredible has become a reality. Conservative Members of the European Parliament managed to block the motion for a new resolution no. B9-0154 / 2019 to intensify the resettlement of immigrants from Africa to the EU. This resolution was not passed very narrowly - 288 MEPs voted in favour of the resolution, 290 MEPs voted against the resolution.” (‘2 hlasy europoslancov Uhríka a Radačovského rozhodli o odmietnutí intenzívnejšieho presídľovania imigrantov z Afriky!’ , 2019).

Danish case

In the Danish case, there is also the party itself, DF viewed as a positive actor, together with any other with nationalistic movement, strategy, or action that is in line with the DF's stance. When it comes to other actors, DF is a fan of Central and Eastern European countries which are against accepting migrants: "On the other hand, countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland say stop. They do not want more immigrants - and not Muslims at all. In Poland, the National Conservative Party P.i.S (translated: Law and Justice) won an overwhelming victory on a promise of a halt to receiving more refugees from countries such as Syria." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 6 2015', 2015) and "in Eastern Europe, they say no, thanks" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2015', 2015). Moreover, "Eastern European countries are much closer to reality than the European Commission. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, Poland has refused to accept more asylum seekers, and Slovakia is taking legal action against the EU for refusing coercive quotas, while Hungary is preparing a referendum on refugee quotas" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016', 2016). Further, the DF supports the protective actions of president Viktor Orbán in Hungary: "Hungary's Prime Minister chose to erect border fences and shut down the Balkan migrant route, creating a domino effect with border control from Sweden in the north to Macedonia in the south." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3, 2018', 2018) and "While Hungary and other countries with their borders have stopped mass immigration from Turkey" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2016', 2016).

DF expresses its stance on the migration crisis with the following quotes: "More Denmark - Less EU". Is it so hard to understand?" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2015', 2015) and "Europe cannot become a new home for millions of refugees" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016', 2016). But also, "We must secure our own boundaries. Nobody does it for us. Each Member State is left to its own destiny." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 6 2016', 2016).

The solution to the migration crisis is presented by DF as: "A first step is to effectively secure the EU's external borders. The next step is the repatriation of economic migrants and an overhaul of the outdated conventions that bind the EU's rulers on their hands and feet - that debate has already embarked on a country like Austria, and more will follow." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016', 2016). The emphasis on borders is presented several times: "We want a strong national border control, supplemented by high requirements for documents and strong external border control." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2, 2019', 2019). Anders Vistisen, also highlights how important it is to make agreements with the EU and with the countries located in Northern Africa, from where many of the migrants originate. ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3,

2018', 2018). However, the most repeated and emphasized way of solving the migration crisis, is the suggestion to use Australian model: "We must implement the Australian model in which anyone who tries to enter our continent illegally is rejected and sent back. It is the only way we can take the bread out of human smuggling, save the thousands of human lives that go to the Mediterranean and the African desert, and control migration" as stated by Martin Hjort ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019', 2019). Also, Anders Vistisen supports this idea: "No one should be able to illegally cheat on our countries and be allowed to stay. This model, which Australia has been practicing for years, has completely stopped the traffic of illegal migrants, ruined the human smuggler's business model, and given Australians the self-determination over who should live and live in their country." ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3, 2018', 2018).

Comparison

When it comes to the category of positive actors, both parties, LSNS and DF see themselves as the right answer when it comes to solving the migration crisis. DF suggests making the external borders stronger and points out to the 'Australian immigration model' in which the migrants coming through the sea, would be sent back to where they came from. In the instance of LSNS, they do not see a reason in helping immigrants by accepting them in Europe but rather would see a solution by helping them in their home countries.

Moreover, both parties have a negative opinion about the EU, its stance, and most importantly its so far actions targeted at addressing the refugee crisis. Further, both of them do not wish to be part of the EU and want to solve its problems on a national level, since they view the EU as a failure, in regards to solving the migration crisis. However, what is different, is that DF gives at least some ideas on how to solve the migration crisis, whereas LSNS only strictly refuses this idea by saying no, no way, whereas does not give any solution to how this issue could be solved.

Discussion

In this chapter, the findings of the analysis will be addressed and discussed based on the previously mentioned theories. By doing this step, there will be a clearer overview of how LSNS and DF deal with the problem of immigration posing a threat.

When talking of the social identity theory we need to mention the three main cognitive concepts: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison (Ellemers and Haslam, 2012). Moreover, when referring to the notion of social categorization, it is important

to distinguish the concepts of an in-group and an out-group. In this instance, the in-group consists of the two chosen parties – DF and LSNS, their supporters – the people, and other governments and movements with a similar viewpoint. People are usually sorted into a social group based on their similarities in the same one and differences in the other one (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012; Levy, 2014). In this case, it is referred to as the framing of national identity which concludes the common attributes of these in-groups. Both actors have nationalistic and protectionist tendencies with the aim to preserve their cultural heritage, values, and traditions. In the Danish case, it is important to mention equality, freedoms, and liberal values, whereas the Slovak case revolves around traditional values, religion, and family. The out-group in this instance refers to the frame of blame which consists of EU, liberal actors such as media NGOs, left-wing parties, and any actor who does not hold a traditional or a protective stance in this situation. Another out-group in this case is formed by the non-western migrants, viewed as a threat to the previously mentioned in-group. This second out-group does not share a lot of similarities with the in-group and it embodies the essence of the 'otherness' according to the two parties.

Once, the categories are defined, their main features may be identified. The in-group may be characterised based on the elements of national identity. In the Slovak case, it is a sense of nationalism and protectionism, religion, and the traditional family. Slovakia overall cares about the preservation of traditional values, customs, practices. In the Danish case, it is being talked about the sense of nationalism and protectionism; freedoms, namely freedom of speech; social welfare and social cohesion, and also, to some extent, gender equality. In this case, there is a greater emphasis on liberal democratic values such as freedoms and equality within the Danish society, whereas in the Slovak case, mainly the traditional values are highlighted. The first out-group which is referred to in the frame of blame consists of EU, liberal actors such as media NGOs, left-wing parties. These components can be described as very open-minded and too liberal, which may cause endangering the nation-states of Slovakia and Denmark. The second out-group, migrants may be portrayed as those who possess different thinking, viewpoint, cultures, traditions, and believe in a different religion. All of these differences may cause problems for the existence of the in-group. In what ways this out-group may cause threats to the in-group, was investigated in the analyses chapter. Out of the different approaches of how migrants may represent a threat to the Slovak and Danish society, the most significant type were migrants imposing a security threat. This type of threat was mentioned 42 times in the case of Denmark and 18 times in the Slovak case. As stated in the chapter of analysis, the main

concerns of these two parties regarding migrants as a security threat refer to increase in criminality, robberies, rapes, and murders. The Danish case recognizes as the second most severe threat migrants as a social burden that may endanger the Danish welfare system. On the one hand, DF refers to costly and ineffective integration policies paid from the taxes of citizens from the state's budget. These measures are meant to help with the integration of non-western migrants into Danish society. On the other hand, this issue is concerning numerous immigrants coming from Central and Eastern Europe who can claim benefits since the first day of arrival, due to being citizens of the EU ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019', 2019). The issue viewing migrants as a burden to the social burden was mentioned 13 times. In the Slovak case, the perception of threat regarding migrants as 'otherness' ended up on the second place with 14 instances. LSNS expresses their fear and inconvenience of how Muslims as the 'others' are incapable of integrating into Slovak society.

Within the category of migration as a security issue, both parties LSNS and DF, view the security threat as a real existential threat and therefore, the need to impose extraordinary measures or 'actions outside the normal political procedure' (Middleton, 2016) to ensure the safety of a nation-state. Since crisis demands the utilization of emergency actions, that is exactly what parties are trying to do. In the case of LSNS, the leaders managed to organize several protests against immigrants to let the world know that Slovakia is definitely not interested in accepting any immigrants. They emphasise on the importance of border security. In the case of DF, the party demands for stricter immigration and integration laws and also suggests using the Australian model, when it comes to illegal migration. This way, the migrants sailing across the sea to the EU territory, would have to be sent back from where they came from. Regarding migrants as a security threat, there are several how the parties plan on tackling this problem. However, concerning the other sub-frames: migrant as 'otherness', migrant as an economic burden, and migrant as a social burden, the parties do not give a clear answer to have to deal with these issues. They simply just do not plan on accepting illegal migrants or asylum seekers or want to make the migration and integration policies stricter so fewer migrants will decide to reside in these countries. The issue will simply become non-existent.

When speaking of the securitization theory, the securitization process consists of two parts – in the first one, certain issues are portrayed and in the second one, the securitizing actor (LSNS and DF) is trying to convince the audience (the electorate) that the referent object (nation-state and national identity) is under existential threat (migrants) and therefore, the securitization process can begin.

Populist parties tend to influence the audience in multiple ways. Firstly, once they realize that there is an existential threat, they express the need for salvation (Bonansinga, 2018). Secondly, when there is a crisis, the usage of emergency actions is taken into consideration (Bonansinga, 2018). Thirdly, it is the parties acting as a moral leader or a guide, since in this position, it increases the chances of the audience accepting the suggestions for securitization (Bonansinga, 2018).

Moreover, the parties are using several ways of how to impose their proposals on the audience: by dramatising certain instances or by fearmongering, by simplifying and scapegoating and by the propagation of a state of emergency (Wojczewski, 2020). In the case of LSNS, this emphasises portraying Northern and Western Europe as lost due to the Muslim immigrants, whose neighbourhoods are taken by ethnic minorities and wherein some urban areas the police do not want to enter (Uhrik, 2018a). By illustrating this example, the parties contribute to spreading concern and panic among public opinion. In the case of DF, they also blame other actors for the failed examples of migrant integration. They stress that the descendants of immigrants in France and Britain despite being born and raised in those countries are still unable to accept Western values and immigrants are trying to destroy the country ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2015', 2015). This can refer to the claim that the survival of a society is constructed on a shared sense of identity (which may include a common language, ethnicity, culture, or religion) (Wojczewski, 2020).

In terms of securitisation, I can also talk about national sovereignty when referring to national security (Does, 2013). Both parties, LSNS and DF, express they desire not to be part of the EU. They disagree with many strategies and actions that the EU institutions have decided for and they express their refusal of Brussels having more power over them than the governments of these countries themselves. DF refers to the importance of keeping the decision-making competence in Danish hands ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 4 2015', 2015) and also expresses its standpoint very clearly: "More Denmark - Less EU". Is it so hard to understand?" ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016', 2016). In the case of LSNS they mention that they are not planning to accept a single migrant in the country, even if Brussels would impose such order on Slovakia ('Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko podala petíciu proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko!', 2016).

Shipoli (2018), addresses religion in categorisations of security and states that a religious group may be considered a threat to the survival of a state. Moreover, it can be under a threat due to

non-religious actors or processes because of another religious actor or discourse (Shipoli, 2018). When looking at the two analysed cases, it may seem that Christianity is threatened by another religious actor, namely the incoming migrants who are Muslims. When referring to the category migrants as 'otherness', LSNS views the migrants as invaders coming from Asia and Africa who want to impose Islamization ('Nezastavili nás! Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko v Gabčíkove!', 2015) and cause disintegration of the Christian faith or may be the destruction for Christian Europe ('ĽS Naše Slovensko sa zúčastnila na Demonštrácii vôle a odhodlania brániť Európu v Brne', 2016). Furthermore, Muslim immigrants can be seen as a threat that may cause restrictions in freedoms, namely freedom of speech. DF, especially, is worried due to the 2005 *Jyllands-Posten* cartoon crisis and they fear that Denmark could be an easy target for Muslims due to this event. Moreover, they stress that the presence of fear within the EU region is due to radical Islam ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2018', 2018). It almost seems, that there are conceptions of Western superiority and the barbaric 'Otherness' of Muslims (Bakali, 2016), especially when talking about protection of the values, traditions, and national identity. In the Danish case it refers to freedoms, mainly freedom of speech; Christianity, sense of security and safety (*tryghed*) and nationalism, social welfare, Danishness and/or homogeneity, whereas the Slovak case it involves traditional values, family, religion, and sense of nationalism and/or protectionism.

On the one hand, it is claimed that Islamophobia is solely about fear (or dread) (Abbas, 2004; Lee *et al.*, 2009), whereas on the other hand, Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes (Bleich, 2011). It seems that in these two cases, we should talk about the second option. The whole concept of migrants as a threat is much more than solely revolving around fear. In the case of LSNS, the party refuses anything in relation to Islam and claims that even one migrant is too much for Slovakia. DF also has a very negative stance about Muslims representing 'otherness' and they even state that Islam dictates how to live your life ('Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019', 2019).

Conclusion

The thesis aimed to look at the issue of migration crisis through the standpoint of right-wing populist parties in Slovakia and Denmark, namely People's Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) and Danish People's Party (DF). The results of the conducted analysis were looked upon through the lenses of securitization theory, social identity theory, and the concept of islamophobia.

Following the conducted analysis, there are several ways of how LSNS and DF may perceive migrants as a threat – endangering social, economic, and cultural security or causing a real physical danger to Danish and Slovak people. Based on the findings from the analysis part, in both cases of LSNS and DF migrants are mainly considered as a security issue which may cause an increase in criminality in these countries. Both parties are pointing at various examples of failed integration in Western Europe and mentioning the occurrences of terrorist attacks in recent years. Moreover, they mention the problem of 'otherness' linked with different cultures, customs, and religions, emphasizing on radical Islam. Conceptualizing migrants as 'otherness' is perceived as a threat to these nation-states because it may cause potential distortion of the cultural values of Slovakia and Denmark.

The findings from the analysis indicate that both LSNS and DF are trying to preserve the homogeneity of their people. Even though these two countries are built on a series of different values – Slovakia being more conservative with their values and with the emphasis on religion and Denmark inclining more towards freedom, equality, and other liberal values, the two countries share in common the need to protect themselves from any kind of 'otherness'. In order to do so, both parties hold a strict standpoint of not accepting any illegal migrants into their country. In the case of DF, the main solution to the issue of immigration is to strengthen the national borders of Denmark, so only legal migrants can come in. Further, the party in favour of the Australian model and agrees on sending migrants back to the country where they came from. Moreover, DF is viewing Eastern European countries as an example handling the migration crisis for their anti-immigration stance. In the Slovak case, LSNS has organized several anti-migration protests over the course of the last few years to express clearly their standpoint regarding this issue. Furthermore, they tried to pass through a law that would make illegal crossing of the Slovak state borders a criminal offence. Securing the national borders of Slovakia is a top priority for LSNS in order to secure the existence of the Slovak nation-state. Similar to DF, LSNS is also a fan of various Central and Eastern European countries who have clearly said 'no' on the topic of immigration.

All of the above-mentioned information leads to answering the research question: *Why do the right-wing populist parties in Slovakia and Denmark focus on the issue of immigration despite these countries having a relatively low migration rate?* As stated before, the immigrants are perceived as an existential threat in the view of right-wing populist parties LSNS and DF. Migrants represent a threat to these nation-states for several reasons and therefore these parties put this issue in the spotlight, so they can raise awareness of the seriousness of the problem.

This is being done by pointing out to unsuccessful cases of integration in various Western European countries. Moreover, LSNS and DF are trying to protect their national borders to avoid happening in such a situation. Even though, both Denmark and Slovakia are not considered to be the European countries impacted by the migration the most, they still recognize this issue as an existential threat to the homogeneity of their population.

Bibliography

‘2 hlasy europoslancov Uhríka a Radačovského rozhodli o odmietnutí intenzívnejšieho presídľovania imigrantov z Afriky!’ (2019). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/imigracna-kriza/2-hlasy-europoslancov-uhrika-a-radacovskeho-rozhodli-o-odmietnuti-presidlovania-imigrantov-z-afriky/>.

Abbas, T. (2004) ‘After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State’, *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 21(3), pp. 26–38. doi: 10.35632/ajiss.v21i3.506.

About us (2011) *Ludová strana Naše Slovensko*. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/en/about-us/>.

Ágh Attila (2017) ‘INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM FACADE DEMOCRACIES TO VELVET DICTATORSHIPS’, *Baltic Journal of Political Science*, 5(5), pp. 21–39. doi: 10.15388/BJPS.2016.5.10334.

Bakali, N. (2016) *Islamophobia Understanding Anti-Muslim Racism through the Lived Experiences of Muslim Youth*. Rotterdam: SensePublishers, Rotterdam. doi: <https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1007/978-94-6300-779-5>.

Bale, T. *et al.* (2010) ‘If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe’, *Political Studies*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 58(3), pp. 410–426. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00783.x.

Balzacq, T. (2005) ‘The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), pp. 171–201. doi: 10.1177/1354066105052960.

Balzacq, T. (2015) ‘The “Essence” of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological science of security’, *International Relations*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 29(1), pp. 103–113. doi: 10.1177/0047117814526606b.

Balzacq, T., Léonard, S. and Ruzicka, J. (2015) ‘“Securitization” revisited: theory and cases’, *International Relations*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 30(4), pp. 494–531. doi: 10.1177/0047117815596590.

- BBC (2015) 'Migrant crisis: One million enter Europe in 2015', *BBC*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35158769>.
- Beluský, M. (2016) 'ĽS Naše Slovensko sa v Ríme zúčastnila medzinárodnej konferencie proti imigrácii a terorizmu'. People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/ls-nase-slovensko-sa-v-rime-zucastnila-medzinarodnej-konferencie-proti-imigracii-a-terorizmu/>.
- Bergmann, E. (2017) *Nordic Nationalism and Right-Wing Populist Politics: Imperial Relationships and National Sentiments*. Available at: <https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1057/978-1-137-56703-1>.
- Bleich, E. (2011) 'What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55(12), pp. 1581–1600. doi: 10.1177/0002764211409387.
- Bonansinga, D. (2018) *Emotionality in Right-Wing Populism Security Discourse and Its Impacts on Information Processing*. Available at: https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2018/DB_Paper_PSA.pdf.
- Brett, W. (2013) 'What's an Elite to Do? The Threat of Populism from Left, Right and Centre', *The Political Quarterly*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 84(3), pp. 410–413. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2013.12030.x.
- Caiani, M. and Císař, O. (eds) (2018) *Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe*. 1st Editio. London. doi: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315123851>.
- Choudhury, S. (2018) 'Slovakia outlaws Islam', 12 November. Available at: <https://www.weeklyblitz.net/news/slovakia-outlaws-islam/>.
- Čiefová, M. (2017) 'Characteristics of Slovak Culture in the Context of Bilateral Austrian-Slovak Relations', *Journal of Intercultural Management*. Berlin: Sciendo, 9(2), pp. 81–101. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/joim-2017-0009>.
- Deegan-Krause, K. and Haughton, T. (2009) 'Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia', *Politics & Policy*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 37(4), pp. 821–841. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00200.x.
- Delman, E. (2016) 'How Not to Welcome Refugees', *The Atlantic*, 21 January. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/denmark-refugees-immigration->

law/431520/.

‘Denmark Immigration Statistics 1960-2020’ (2020). Macrotrends LLC. Available at: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DNK/denmark/immigration-statistics>.

Divinský, B. (2007) *Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republike*. Available at: <https://www.iz.sk/download-files/sk/iom/sfpa-boris-divinsky-Zahranicna-migracia-v-Slovenskej-republike.pdf>.

Does, A. (2013) ‘3. Securitization theory’, in *The Construction of the Maras : Between Politicization and Securitization*. 3rd Editio. Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications. doi: <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.iheid.719>.

Dubéci, M. (2016) ‘Slovakia: Migration trends and political dynamics’, *GLOBSEC*, 18 May. Available at: <https://www.globsec.org/publications/slovakia-migration-trends-political-dynamics/>.

Ellemers, N. and Haslam, S. A. (2012) ‘Social Identity Theory’, in *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 2*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 379–398. doi: 10.4135/9781446249222 NV - 2.

Entman, R. (1993) ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, *Journal of Communication*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 43(4), pp. 51–58. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x.

Erisen, E. (2017) ‘Seeking refuge in a superordinate group: Non-EU immigration heritage and European identification’, *European Union Politics*. SAGE Publications, 18(1), pp. 26–50. doi: 10.1177/1465116516680301.

Eroukhmanoff, C. (2018) ‘Securitisation Theory: An Introduction’, *E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS*. Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/>.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2018’ (2018). ECR, p. 20. Available at: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ECR-Magasin-nr.-1.pdf>.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 1, 2019’ (2019). ECR, p. 24. Available at: https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/24883_EUROPÆISK-FOLKEBLAD-NR.-5_WEB.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2, 2019’ (2019). ECR, p. 24. Available at:
<https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/EUROPÆISK-FOLKEBLAD-NR.-6.pdf>.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2015’ (2015). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/94046-ECR-02-2015_01-08_I.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 2 2016’ (2016). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/99991-ECR-02-2016_web.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3, 2018’ (2018). ECR, p. 24. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/21491_EUROPÆISK-FOLKEBLAD-NR.-3_web.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 3 2016’ (2016). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Europæisk_Folkeblad3.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 4 2015’ (2015). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/94048-ECR-04-2015_01-08_I.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2015’ (2015). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/94049-ECR-05-2015_01-08_I.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 5 2016’ (2016). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EUROPÆISK_FOLKEBLAD_5_2016_web.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 6 2015’ (2015). ECR, p. 5. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/94050-ECR-06-2015_01-08.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 6 2016’ (2016). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EUROPÆISK_FOLKEBLAD_6_2016.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2015’ (2015). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/94051-ECR-07-2015_Alle_III.pdf.

‘Europæisk Folkeblad nr. 7 2016’ (2016). ECR, p. 8. Available at:
https://danskfolkeparti.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EUROPÆISK_FOLKEBLAD_7_2016_web.pdf.

- Hahm, H.-E. (2017) *Media Framing of Refugee Crisis in Germany and Austria*. Seoul National university. Available at: <http://space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/129162/1/000000142643.pdf>.
- Havlík V., P. A. et. al. (2012) 'Populism in Slovakia', in Spáč Peter (ed.) *Populist Political Parties in East Central Europe*. Brno: Munipress Brno, pp. 227–258. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2773568.
- Heidenreich, T. et al. (2019) 'Media Framing Dynamics of the "European Refugee Crisis": A Comparative Topic Modelling Approach', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 32(Special_Issue_1), pp. i172–i182. doi: 10.1093/jrs/fez025.
- Hervik, P. (2019) 'Racialization in the Nordic Countries: An Introduction BT - Racialization, Racism, and Anti-Racism in the Nordic Countries', in Hervik, P. (ed.). Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 3–37. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-74630-2_1.
- Hintjens, H. (2019) 'Failed Securitisation Moves during the 2015 "Migration Crisis"', *International Migration*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 57(4), pp. 181–196. doi: 10.1111/imig.12588.
- Historie* (1997) *Dansk Folkeparti*. Available at: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/partiet/historie/>.
- Hlinčková, M. and Mesežnikov, G. (2016) *Otvorená krajina alebo nedobytná pevnosť?* Edited by M. Hlinčková and G. Mesežnikov. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. Available at: <https://cz.boell.org/cs/2016/12/13/otvorena-krajina-alebo-nedobytna-pevnost-slovensko-migranti-utecenci>.
- IOM (2011) 'DENMARK'. IOM. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/countries/denmark>.
- IOM (2019) 'Migration in Slovakia'. Available at: <https://www.iom.sk/en/migration/migration-in-slovakia.html>.
- Kolivoski, K. M., Weaver, A. and Constance-Huggins, M. (2014) 'Critical Race Theory: Opportunities for Application in Social Work Practice and Policy', *Families in Society*. SAGE Publications Inc, 95(4), pp. 269–276. doi: 10.1606/1044-3894.2014.95.36.
- 'Kotleba – Ludová strana Naše Slovensko podala petíciu proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko!' (2016). People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/reportaze-z-akcii/podali-sme-peticiu-proti-prichodu-imigrantov-na-slovensko/>.

Larsen, B. R. (2011) 'Becoming Part of Welfare Scandinavia: Integration through the Spatial Dispersal of Newly Arrived Refugees in Denmark', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Routledge, 37(2), pp. 333–350. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.521337.

Lazaridis, G. and Campani, G. (eds) (2016) *Understanding the Populist Shift Othering in a Europe in Crisis*. 1st Editio. London: Routledge. Available at: <https://www-taylorfrancis-com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/books/e/9781315656779>.

Lee, S. A. *et al.* (2009) 'The Islamophobia Scale: Instrument Development and Initial Validation', *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*. Routledge, 19(2), pp. 92–105. doi: 10.1080/10508610802711137.

Levy, N. (2014) 'International Peacebuilding and the Politics of Identity: Lessons from Social Psychology using the Bosnian Case', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. Routledge, 8(1), pp. 68–90. doi: 10.1080/17502977.2014.877633.

'ĽS Naše Slovensko predstavila prvý protiimigračný zákon. Médiá to zamlčali!' (2018). People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/ls-nase-slovensko-v-nr-sr/ls-nase-slovensko-predstavila-prvy-protiimigracny-zakon-media-to-zamlcali/>.

'ĽS Naše Slovensko sa zúčastnila na Demonštrácii vôle a odhodlania brániť Európu v Brne' (2016). People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/ls-nase-slovensko-sa-zucastnila-na-demonstracii-vole-a-odhodlania-branit-europu-v-brne/>.

Mader, M. *et al.* (2018) 'How political are national identities? A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the 2010s', *Research & Politics*. SAGE Publications Ltd, 5(3), p. 2053168018801469. doi: 10.1177/2053168018801469.

Mangum, M. and Ray Block, J. (2018) 'Social Identity Theory and Public Opinion towards Immigration', *Social Sciences*, 7(3). doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030041>.

Mazurek, M. (2018a) 'Ficova vláda sa zbláznila! Na západ ide dovážať tisícky cudzincov, z východu ide spraviť cigánsku enklávu'. People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/nase-nazory/ekonomika-a-hospodarstvo/ficova-vlada-sa-zblaznila-na-zapad-ide-dovazat-tisicky-cudzincov-z-vychodu-ide-spravit-cigansku-enklavu/>.

Mazurek, M. (2018b) 'POSTAVILI SME SA PROTI PRÍCHODU IMIGRANTOV NA SLOVENSKO!' People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/postavili-sme-sa-proti-prichodu-imigrantov-na>

slovensko/.

Middleton, A. (2016) *Populist radical right parties and the securitization of migration in France*. Available at:

https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2430/?utm_source=digitalcollections.sit.edu%2Fisp_collection%2F2430&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.

‘Milan Uhrík do očí eurokomisárovi pre imigráciu: Zradili ste celú Európu!’ (2019). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/imigracna-kriza/milan-uhrik-do-oci-eurokomisarovi-pre-imigraciju-zradili-ste-celu-europu/>.

Minkenberg, M. (2017a) *The Radical Right in Eastern Europe*. Palgrave Pivot, New York. doi: <https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1057/978-1-137-56332-3>.

Minkenberg, M. (2017b) ‘The Rise of the Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Between Mainstreaming and Radicalization’, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. Georgetown University Press, 18(1), pp. 27–35. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26396049>.

Mišún, M. (2017) ‘Islamský teror sa stupňuje. Zachráňme európsku civilizáciu!’ People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/vase-nazory/islamsky-teror-sa-stupnuje-zachranme-europsku-civilizaciju/>.

Moten, A. R. (2012) ‘Understanding and Ameliorating Islamophobia’, *Cultura*, 9(1), pp. 155–178. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5840/cultura20129127>.

Mudde, C. (2000) ‘In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe’, *East European Politics and Societies*. SAGE Publications Inc, 15(1), pp. 33–53. doi: 10.1177/0888325401015001004.

‘Nezastavili nás! Ludová strana Naše Slovensko v Gabčíkove!’ (2015). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/nezastavili-nas-ludova-strana-nase-slovensko-v-gabcikove/>.

Nielsen, J. (ed.) (2011) *Islam in Denmark*. Lexington Books. Available at: <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aalborguniv-ebooks/detail.action?docID=836982#>.

Nilsson, M. (2018) *Presumptions about populism in the press*. Uppsala University. Available at: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1211679/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.

‘Number of immigrants in Denmark in 2020, by country of origin’ (2020). Statista. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/571909/number-of-immigrants-in-denmark-by-country-of-origin/>.

Olsen, T. V. (2011) ‘Danish Political Culture: Fair Conditions for Inclusion of Immigrants?’, *Scandinavian Political Studies*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 34(4), pp. 269–286. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00272.x.

‘Out of every 100 people, about how many do you think are Muslim?’ (2020). Statista. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/655704/estimated-and-actual-muslim-population-share-in-denmark-norway-sweden/>.

People’s Party Our Slovakia (2020) *Our program – Ten Commandments of our Party*. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/en/our-program/>.

Principprogram (1997) *Dansk Folkeparti*. Available at: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>.

‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov na Slovensko. Ako to bolo naozaj.’ (2015). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/protest-proti-prichodu-imigrantov-na-slovensko-ako-to-bolo-naozaj/>.

‘Protest proti príchodu imigrantov v Žiline’ (2015). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/protest-proti-prichodu-imigrantov-v-ziline/>.

Ráczová, O. et. al (2019) *Europe’s Migration Myths*. Available at: <https://www.globsec.org/publications/europes-migration-myths/>.

Raj, R. (2016) ‘Islamophobia, Racism and Critical Race Theory’, *International Journal of Safety and Security in Tourism and Hospitality*. Available at: https://www.palermo.edu/Archivos_content/2016/Economicas/journal-tourism/edicion15/02_RacismWithinMulti-culturalSociety.pdf.

‘REPORTÁŽ: V Londýne sme navštívili slušných Slovákov aj nebezpečné getá’ (2019). People’s Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/reportaze-z-akcii/reportaz-v-londyne-sme-navstivili-slusnych-slovakov-aj-nebezpecne-geta/>.

Rooduijn, M. (2018) ‘Why is populism suddenly all the rage?’, *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/political-science/2018/nov/20/why-is-populism-suddenly-so-sexy-the-reasons-are-many>.

Rostbøll, C. F. (2010) 'The use and abuse of "universal values" in the Danish cartoon controversy', *European Political Science Review*. 2010/11/01. Cambridge University Press, 2(3), pp. 401–422. doi: DOI: 10.1017/S175577391000024X.

Rydgren, J. (2004) 'Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark', *West European Politics*. Routledge, 27(3), pp. 474–502. doi: 10.1080/0140238042000228103.

Rydgren Jens (2010) 'Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden', *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 30(1), pp. 57–71. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1353/sais.0.0070>.

Shipoli, E. A. (2018) 'The Securitization Theory', in *Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 71–100. Available at: <https://doi.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1093/her/12.3.363>.

Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (no date a) *Elections and Referenda*. Available at: <https://volbysr.sk/en/data02.html>.

Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (no date b) *Final results*. Available at: <https://volbysr.sk/en/data02.html>.

Šulović, V. (2010) 'Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization', *Belgrade Centre for Security Policy*, (October), pp. 1–7. Available at: [http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/sulovic_\(2010\)_meaning_of_secu.pdf](http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/sulovic_(2010)_meaning_of_secu.pdf).

Uhrik, M. (2018a) 'Navštívili sme imigrantské getá v európskych mestách. Sfilmovali sme desivé zábery a rozhovory, ktoré vám v médiách neukážu'. People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/cinnost/navstivili-sme-imigrantske-geta-v-europskych-mestach-sfilmovali-sme-desive-zabery-a-rozhovory-ktore-vam-v-mediach-neukazu/>.

Uhrik, M. (2018b) 'VIDEO: Navštívili sme imigrantské getá. Pozrite si desivý reálny dokument o rozklade Európy'. People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/nase-nazory/video-navstivili-sme-imigrantske-geta-pozrite-si-desivy-realny-dokument-o-rozklade-europy/>.

'V Europarlamente bez servítky – Afrika sa do Európy nezmesť!' (2019). People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/imigracna-kriza/v-europarlamente-bez>

servitky-afrika-sa-do-euro-py-nezmesti/.

Verkuyten, M. and Martinovic, B. (2012) 'Social Identity Complexity and Immigrants' Attitude Toward the Host Nation: The Intersection of Ethnic and Religious Group Identification', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. SAGE Publications Inc, 38(9), pp. 1165–1177. doi: 10.1177/0146167212446164.

Vicenová, R. (2019) 'The role of digital media in the strategies of far-right vigilante groups in Slovakia', *Global Crime*. Routledge, pp. 1–20. doi: 10.1080/17440572.2019.1709171.

Vinney, C. (2019) 'Understanding Social Identity Theory and Its Impact on Behavior'. ThoughtCo. Available at: <https://www.thoughtco.com/social-identity-theory-4174315>.

'Vláda uvoľnila azylovú politiku pre cudzincov. V NR SR sme boli razantne proti' (2018). People's Party Our Slovakia. Available at: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/ls-nase-slovensko-v-nr-sr/vlada-uvolnila-azylovu-politiku-pre-cudzincov-v-nr-sr-sme-boli-razantne-proti/>.

Wojczewski, T. (2020) "'Enemies of the people": Populism and the politics of (in)security', *European Journal of International Security*. 2019/10/29. Cambridge University Press, 5(1), pp. 5–24. doi: DOI: 10.1017/eis.2019.23.

Worchel, S. *et al.* (1998) *Social Identity : International Perspectives*. London, UNITED KINGDOM: SAGE Publications. Available at: <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aalborguniv-ebooks/detail.action?docID=537732>.

Zachová, A. *et al.* (2018) 'Visegrad nations united against mandatory relocation quotas', *EURACTIV*, July. Available at: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/visegrad-nations-united-against-mandatory-relocation-quotas/>.