

ANALYSIS OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP AS  
GOVERNMENTALITY IN CSDP  
INTERVENTIONS  
THE CASE OF EUCAP NESTOR

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## **Abstract**

*Since the turn of the 21st century the principle of local ownership has substantially changed the rhetoric within the development sector and corresponding international peacebuilding interventions. It is uncontested that local ownership is a necessary principle to ensure sustainability peace through interventions. The EU's externally policy statements have strong references to the importance of this local aspect, however, despite the strong rhetoric the EU have struggled to live up to this principle in its operationalization and implementation of its interventions. The dissertation argues, by using EUCAP Nestor as evidence, that the discrepancy between the local ownership rhetoric and implementation is driving by a political rationality of advanced democracies, and not by the host states. The thesis draws on a document analysis conducted through a Foucauldian genealogical analysis and a regime of practices analysis. Three arguments are on that basis presented. First, the local ownership principle echoes the colonial governance structure of indirect rules. Second, local ownership is in practice operationalized through a top-down approach driven externally. Thirdly, the EU's efforts to implement local ownership are inhibited by the politics and policy-making procedures of CSDP*

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## List of Abbreviations

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| EC     | European Commission                        |
| EEAS   | European External Action Service           |
| EP     | European Parliament                        |
| ESDP   | European Security and Defense Policy       |
| EUGS   | European Global Strategy                   |
| CMC    | Crisis Management Concept                  |
| CMPD   | Crisis Management Planning Directorate     |
| CONOPS | Concept of Operation                       |
| CPCC   | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities |
| CSDP   | EU's Common Security and Defense Policy    |
| CTL    | Country Team Leader                        |
| FGS    | Federal Government of Somalia              |
| HoM    | Head of Mission                            |
| JAP    | Joint Action Plan                          |
| JAES   | Joint African and European Strategy        |
| OPLAN  | Operational Plan                           |
| PSC    | Political and Security Committee           |
| TAM    | Technical Assessment Mission               |

## Introduction

There have during the last decades in international relations (IR) and peacebuilding praxis been a paradigm shift to participatory development increasing the focus on local ownership as a necessary principle in peacebuilding operations. The local ownership principle is based on a premise that international support to peacebuilding only is viable if it relies on a certain degree of local capacity and participation (Nymanjoh: 2018: 323) (Ejdus: 2017: 463) (Lee & Aplaslan: 2015: 19) (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 24) (Billerbeck: 2015: 299). The EU has been in the forefront of this trend endorsing local ownership across its external policies claiming it to be a principle inherent in the European approach to peace-building and peace-keeping missions as exemplified in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy emphasizing words as "locally owned" relating to security sector reforms in partner countries (Ejdus: 2017: 465) (Kammel: 2018: 551). However, despite this strong rhetorical emphasis on local ownership in international interventions, the implementation of the principle has been far from smooth and the EU has struggled to live up to the principle in its crisis management interventions launched as part of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 15). There thus exists a discrepancy between the EU's rhetoric on local ownership and how the principle is being applied on the ground. The thesis focuses on explaining this discrepancy of why the handing over of ownership fails adopting an institutional perspective. It moreover fills in a gap in the existing literature which often assumes local actors always will consent to ownership, either due to own interest or lack of resources to oppose it, thus, overlooking that local actors can choose to transform or reject ownership (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 25). Furthermore, local ownership has been a rarely researched aspect of CSDP interventions which mostly has focused on the role of EU as an international security actor (Ejdus: 2017: 462-465) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 4-5).

The thesis draws on existing literature analyzing local ownership through the lenses of Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, in order to examine why the application of local justice in CSDP interventions has not produced the expected outcome. It particularly takes it onset in Ejdus' investigating thereof applying the same perspective of local ownership as a political rationality. The governmentality concept describes a set of rationalities and techniques for the execution of power in liberal societies. In international relations some Foucault-inspired studies have accepted the local ownership principle as a liberal form of global governance, while others have criticized it as an illiberal governmentality acting as a rhetorical cover-up for imposition (Ejdus: 2018: 29). However, none of the existing studies (except for Ejdus) investigate the governmental rationality behind the

local ownership principle and does not account for why its ends up with the opposite of the intended outcome of local ownership, restricting autonomy of those who are on the receiving end of interventions. The central argument in the thesis is that the local ownership principle is driven by the political rationality of advanced liberal democracies and not driven by the political rationality of the host states and societies. The thesis will therefore seek to examine how the political rationality of the European Union contribute to developing a discrepancy between the rhetoric and practices of local ownership and leading to challenges in implementing local ownership in its CSDP missions.

The aim of the thesis is to examine how the objects and techniques of government have emerged with a focus on the concrete practices applied through the political rationality of local ownership. The thesis makes the following arguments. First, the local ownership principle echoes the colonial governance structure of indirect rules. Secondly, local ownership is in practice operationalized through a top-down approach driven externally, thus, resulting in the low degree of participation and acceptance of ownership in the host states. Thirdly, the EU's efforts to implement local ownership are inhibited by the politics and policy-making procedures of CSDP. The arguments are illustrated in the case of the EUCAP Nestor, which was a CSDP mission focusing on assisting local actors in maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa. The mission was chosen as a focus because it shares many characteristics with other EU interventions.

The structure of the thesis will firstly provide an overview of the methodological aspects elaborating on data collection as well as a literature review. The following section will provide a background for the understanding of the complex concept of local ownership, further explore how the principle has been expressed in EU external policies and give an account of the case. Then follows a theoretical account of the concept of governmentality and its limitations. Next, how governmentality can be used as an analysis strategy through the practice regime and genealogical approaches. The last sections before the conclusions will provide with a genealogical analysis of local ownership and a practice regime analysis of the case of EUCAP Nestor.

## Methodological Considerations

The following gives an overview of the content of the thesis and the underlying reasoning of the chosen topic and approach applied. It will deliberate on the methodological implications of the thesis to understand both its contributions and limitations. The reasoning behind the choice of topic, data collection and research design will be presented.

The topic of local ownership has gained more popularity in academia as the principle has become more prominent in external interventional policies. Despite this recent trend, the principle of local ownership has passed fairly under the radar in academic research conducted on the effectiveness and impact of EU's CSDP missions (Ejdus: 2017: 465). So far, Ejdus is the primary leading researcher on the topic, and the dissertation applies the same onset arguing the failure of implementation of local ownership in EU external interventions is due to the political rationality dominating CSDP politics. However, the thesis distinguishes itself from Ejdus and supplements his research by conducting an analysis of the general regime of practice the local ownership principle is part of and further carries out a genealogical analysis of local ownership.

The topic of the dissertation has due to too broad a scope, accessible data and a realistic timeframe been narrowed down to focusing solely on EU as an external actor through its CSDP policies adopting an EU-institutional viewpoint. Moreover, the main argument is that the implementation of local ownership has proven to be troublesome due to the institutional procedures in CSDP politics, even though there exists an array of reasons and arguments. There will further be touched upon some of the other reasons for the failure of local ownership implementation in the chapter on the local ownership principle e.g. lacking local capacities and different priorities.

### Research Design

The purpose of the thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of local ownership within external interventions investigating why it has proven difficult to succeed in implementing. The research domain of the thesis is, thus, within international relations with the aim of examining the political rationality of local ownership behind external interventions. Furthermore, the research was approached with an inductive reasoning.

The qualitative research approach was chosen since it allows more in-depth and flexible analyses making it possible to gain detailed knowledge on how policies, procedures, mechanisms etc. are carried out and constituted. Contrary to a quantitative approach, the qualitative is not generalizable. It is thus important to remember that each intervention and case of implementation of the local ownership principle varies and different factors might occur in each situation both internally in the host countries and at the EU level. The qualitative examination was carried out through the application of Foucault's governmentality concept as an analysis strategy<sup>1</sup>, more precisely through a genealogical analysis and a regime of practices analysis. Applying Foucault's archeology and

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of analysis strategy has been picked up from Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (1999)

practice regime approaches can be argued as countering the tendency of governmentality studies becoming merely repeated descriptions of liberalism's assumptions as well as the notion of liberalism as a modern government rationality (Villadsen: 2002: 84). Moreover, the criticism of governmentality studies having difficulties maintaining a critical distance to their study object can be prevented by using Foucault's work as a method, since Foucault's ambition was to not describe, but to throw a critical light over actual forms of practices and truths (Villadsen: 2002: 84-85). Both the regime of practice and genealogy approach will be further described, and its strength and weaknesses discussed in the section of governmentality as an analysis strategy.

Governmentality theory analyzes how authorities think about rule in terms of problematizations and political rationalities. Political rationalities are a type of discourse focusing on the discourses found in technical policy papers dealing with governance in a programmatic manner, in contrast to most discourse analyses in political studies that focuses on public pronouncements by government actors (Merlingen: 2011: 152). Methodologically, this will be approached through a combination of discourse analysis, document analysis and narrative process tracing. The Foucauldian discourse analysis is relevant for revealing the structural biases that characterize the uses of seemingly apolitical technologies, while the narrative process tracing is about elaborating stories with a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way (Merlingen: 2011: 154). This looser form of process tracing is well suited to inductive research that aims at producing thick descriptions of how phenomena are linked (Merlingen: 2011: 154). The document analysis was used to investigate among others the routines, procedures, instruments, measures and policies of CSDP external interventions. The documents were analyzed using coding, which is *"a system of classification- the process of noting what is of interest or significance, identifying different segments of the data, and labelling them to organize the information contained in the data"* (Dale Bloomberg & Volpe: 2016: 198).

### Data Collection

The thesis applies an institutional perspective building upon secondary literature on local ownership, peacebuilding, EU foreign policy and CSDP. When using secondary data, the researcher is naturally more distant from the original source of information and it is important to ensure a healthy skeptical sense in where the data is from. The data in the dissertation mostly consists of official EU policy documents such as strategies, guidelines, agreements, handbooks, reports, EC communications, EC conclusions, and joint staff documents, gathered from official EU websites. The data have provided insight into the procedures, practices, culture, habits etc. of CSDP politics.



However, the usage of secondary sources especially has its drawbacks when analyzing local ownership from a governmentality perspective, since it focuses on examining everyday micro-practices like technical tools, practices and conduct. There exists an immense difference between official documents and regulations to what is being conducted in praxis. The thesis therefore supplements its data with academic journals that have carried out on ground interviews in EUCAP Nestor<sup>2</sup>. However, it is to be noted that these interviews are elite interviews with ranking officials in the mission both from the EU's side and the side of the host states. This is mostly due to extreme difficulties in getting access to local contact on the ground. The thesis thus has a predominant EU institutional perspective on local ownership implementation, instead of a local perspective. Furthermore, since the CSDP missions often includes state sensitive material, the amount of public official EU documents is limited. The main reason for the prominent use of secondary data are adopted in the thesis, instead of a more local perspective, has been due to the challenges of both time restraints and lack of connections in gathering and conducting interviews with the implementing personnel and the locals who are supposedly to have ownership.

### Theoretical Considerations

The dissertation applies Foucault's concept of governmentality as its theoretical point of departure. Governmentality theory is a tool to study networked governance beyond the states. Its research profile is characterized by a focus on power and micro-practice from a critical perspective (Merlingen: 2011: 150). It addresses the relationship between knowledge and power and is compatible with post structuralism. Moreover, Foucault and his governmentality concept are part of the critical theory school and challenges existing structures and discourses. The methodological approach of the dissertation is within the liberal paradigm, as it is argued the political rationality of local ownership is driven by a (neo)liberal agenda to either consciously or unconsciously export liberal norms to host states and govern at distance.

Despite the shift in focus towards "the local" most of the research on the role of EU as an international security actor has focused on the EU institutions, instruments, decision-making, grand strategies and capability development and the CSDP research has been dominated by a focus on effectiveness and policy outputs (Merlingen: 2011: 165). Governmentality theory brings added value to CSDP research by emphasizing minor but nevertheless important details of CSDP governance and provides a toolset to which the microphysics of governance can be illuminated

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<sup>2</sup> Will mainly draw the descriptions of conducting interviews from Ejodus 2018 and Ejodus 2017

(ibid). Furthermore, even though governance theory and governmentality somewhat overlap e.g. by stressing forms of rules characterized by public-private co-operations, the role of ideas and norms and multileveled forms of cooperation. There exist some essential differences between the two which has contributed to the usage of governmentality in the thesis. Firstly, by focusing on the minor aspects but of CSDP governance, which are typically ignored by more mainstream and governance approaches, governmentality theory gains analytical leverage (Merlingen: 2011: 156). Secondly, it prioritizes the analysis of the role and effects of power in CSDP governance. While governance research does analyze different faces of power, it downplays a concern with power for an emphasis on deliberation, mutual accommodation of interests, joint problem solving and learning in the field of EU studies (ibid). Thirdly, governmentality theory argues that postmodern rules cannot be understood without paying attention to changes in political rationalities and problematizations informing policy making, while governance theory uses the changing nature of the state and emergence of new policy issues to explain the rise of specific governance (ibid). Finally, the toolbox of governmentality theory is available for analyzing the technical work behind the functions of governance. By denaturalizing governance and focusing on the actors that lie behind it, governmentality has capacity to generate critical perspectives on CSDP governance questioning official CSDP discourses (ibid).

Furthermore, the thesis applies an epistemological focus which allows analysis of the everyday micro-practices including the technical tools, practices and conduct, which the governmentality theory highlights (Dean: 2006: 11-15). The epistemological perspective compared to the ontological as well as the strengths and limitations of governmentality will be further discussed in the section of Foucault and the concept of governmentality.

### Limitations of the Thesis

There exist some limits within the thesis's chosen focal point, which are important to highlight. The governmentality theory is conceptually ill-equipped to investigate how non-discursive conditions and contexts interact with and shape discursive practices. It thus, have a considerable narrower analytical focus than that of mainstream theories in the field of European studies (Merlingen: 2011: 165). It e.g. has a rather small toolbox of concept. A considerable amount of what is of interest to students of CSDP, such as bureaucratic politics among Brussels-based security policy actors, socialization in CSDP committees and working groups and intergovernmental negotiations cannot be dealt with in any depth by governmentality theory (ibid). The fact that the dissertation is based on secondary data are a limitation, since it increases the risk of focusing too much on the

institutional perspective, and the advantage of the governmentality research is its ability to go beyond institutionalist analyses (Merlingen: 2011: 162). The limitations and weaknesses of both local ownership and governmentality will be depicted closer in their separate theoretical sections.

Furthermore, the governmentality theory's epistemology does not translate into causal explanations grounded in the notion of "expectability" in which an explanation establishes the explanandum as something that was to be expected under the circumstances, instead governmentality provides thick descriptions of the explanandum (Merlingen: 2011: 165). The genealogical and regime of practice approaches thus possess a perspectivist character and the mere description provided by governmentality can be argued as insufficient unless combined with analytically more ambitious theories (ibid) (Dean: 2006: 61). The value of the thesis's analysis can thus be criticized as inadequate due to lacking comparison with other perspectives and explanations brought on by other alternative analysis.

## The Local Ownership Principle

The emerging of the principle of local ownership in the peacebuilding community represents a doctrinal shift in the fields of development and peacekeeping (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 6) (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 19) (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 24). Since its introduction in the 1990s local ownership has become a new custom in international interventions currently functioning as a norm and guiding principle within international peacebuilding operations (ibid) (Nymanjoh: 2018: 323) (Ejdus: 2017: 463). This shift in the international peacekeeping agenda has among others been exemplified in the UN's Brahimi Report from 2000 stating that "*effective peacebuilding requires active engagement with local parties*" as well as the adaptation of the local ownership principle into the UN Charter making it an unavoidable principle of international law<sup>3</sup> (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 6) (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 21). The principle has further been incorporated into UN's peacekeeping operation principles and guidelines from 2008 (UN PKO) and a UN report from 2011 followed the same line recommending international interventions to foster existing national capacities and support national institutions from within (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 22) (Billerbeck: 2015: 301-302). This increased emphasis on the importance of local ownership is built on an almost universal consensus among policymakers that local ownership is necessary for successful international support to peace- and state-building. Local ownership is understood to render peacebuilding more

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<sup>3</sup> The local ownership principle is in the UN Charter expressed as self-determination (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 21) (Billerbeck: 2015: 300).

sustainable, democratic and legitimate, by protecting self-determination and minimizing the degree of external imposition on the host country (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 24) (Ejdus: 2017: 463) (Billerbeck: 2015: 299). This causality, however, is lacking empirical validity with multiple documented problems in the implementation of local ownership (Nyamnjoh: 2018: 323) (Ejdus: 2017: 464). As an example, the UN have failed to match its rhetoric on local ownership in practice, and the EU has as well struggled to live up to the principle in its crisis management interventions launched as part of CSDP (Billerbeck: 2015: 302) (Ejdus: 2018: 29).

Insufficient local ownership remains a key challenge in international interventions, despite the strong rhetorical shift on its importance. Implementation problems is rooted in the methodological challenge of measuring degrees of ownership and operationalization of the concept in practice (Ejdus: 2017: 464) (Ejdus: 2018: 29). While the nature of the problems will be related to the specific local contexts, it can still be argued that the implementation difficulties, firstly, occurs domestically within the host states and societies due to lacking local capacities, competing visions among local groups and lack of national identity and social heterogeneity (ethnicity, religion and tribe) (Ejdus: 2017: 464) (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 8-10). Secondly, the source of implementation problems occurs at the international level where local ownership is hampered by the interveners' focus on stability, high-politics and deep-seated everyday practices (Ejdus: 2017: 464). Thirdly, the weak ownership can be caused by a combination of international and domestic forces misunderstandings and incompatibility leading to a hybrid form of ownership (ibid). Furthermore, there exists a clash between the principles of local ownership and non-imposition with the peacebuilding objectives of the international society, making it risky for international institutions to handover responsibilities to the local actors (Billerbeck: 2015: 300) (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 27). A full handover would endanger the two operational goals of delivery of demonstratable short term outputs and a liberalization of the recipient state, causing a contradiction between their operational and normative duties (Billerbeck: 2015: 299). International interventions are moreover based on the assumptions that local actors have weak capacities, lacking skills and knowledge to take on complex processes of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding and are illiberal and will not act according to liberal principles, meaning that ownership cannot fully be turned over to local actors (Billerbeck: 2015: 302). Local ownership thus tends to be regarded as empty rhetoric lacking substantial action and has been criticized for being a buy-in principle reflecting the ideas of the donors (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 7).

Most of the literature on local ownership have been initiated and directed by international experts whose perceptions are strongly influenced by liberal peacebuilding focusing mainly on the role of external factors like guidelines, long-term goals, project design and evaluation methods (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 7) (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 25). It is in the literature often assumed local actors passively consent to ownership, either due to own interest or lack of resources to oppose it (ibid). There is thus a gap in the literature on local ownership since it does not consider that local actors can choose to transform or reject local ownership. In the thesis the focus is on explaining the failure of handing over ownership and therefore tries to fill this gap in the literature assuming the local actors might not consent to ownership. Following the thesis arguments of the contemporary principle of local ownership is driven by the political rationality of advanced democracies and not by the rationality of the host states. In international relations some have accepted the local ownership principle as a liberal form of global governance, while others have criticized it as an illiberal governmentality serving as a rhetorical cover-up (Ejdus: 2018: 29). However, none of the existing studies investigate the governmental rationality behind the local ownership principle accounting for why it does not results as intended.

### The Concept of Local Ownership

While the precise meaning of local ownership<sup>4</sup> is disputed, it is always based on the premise that international peace- and state-building interventions only are viable when including local capacity and participation (Ejdus: 2018: 28) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 13). Local ownership can, however, broadly be defined as the degree of control domestic political actors exert over domestic political processes<sup>5</sup> (ibid). However, the concept of local ownership remains very vague and both the meaning of *local* and *ownership* are highly contested causing misunderstandings between practitioners and academics, and local and international actors (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 4) (Rayroux & Wílen: 2014: 25). The term ownership originally meant one's right over their property and became an important political principle understood as a nation governing itself. It has often been used referring to the relation between a state and external actors, thus, containing connotations against interference by foreigners (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 20). The term *local* can be defined as

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<sup>4</sup> There can be made a distinction between national and local ownership. National ownership was firstly introduced to confirm there was no element of colonialism or unjustifiable interventions by external forces. In recent debates ownership has become more diversified introducing local ownership to reflect the many identities within a nations (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 22). However, the thesis does not take this distinction into account and the term national and local ownership will be used interchangeably.

<sup>5</sup> An emerging group of studies argues that local ownership should not be regarded as a condition or outcome, but as a process in which peacebuilding initiatives are discussed and developed together with local populations, therefore insisting the debate should focus on how to strengthen indigenous actors' capacity and enable them (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 6)

opposite from the international. However, this binary definition has been criticized for being overly simplistic since the locals vary according to context and thus is comprised of a wide range from traditional structures to the population, from central government to civil society organizations, and from professional and specialized groups to local groups (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 7) (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 6). Different local actors also have varying degrees of resources, capacities and levels of authority and autonomy. It is thus assumed local actors will have varying types and degrees of abilities and capacities, and accordingly affecting the effect of local ownership on the sustainability and legitimacy of the intervention (Nyamnjoh: 2018: 323). Diasporas can for instance also be considered as local actors, which argues for a great deal of fluidity of the locals as an identity and contribute to a deterritorialization of the locals (Nyamnjoh: 2018: 324).

A typical distinction within the literature on local ownership is between the problem-solving literature and the critical literature (Nyamnjoh: 2018: 325) (Ejdus: 2017: 463). The problem-solving camp endorses local ownership as a fundamental principle within the liberal peace- and state-building efforts. The critical camp questions the liberal peacebuilding project critiquing local ownership as a rhetorical cover (ibid). These two approaches to local ownership will be further elaborated on in the following subsections.


#### The Problem-Solving Approach

The problem-solving approach is a dominant mode of thinking about the local aspect arguing for the need of implementing local ownership in peace- and state-building efforts (Ejdus: 2007: 463). It is a liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding treating the locals as a remedy to the excesses of imposition, universalism, and rigidity of the liberal peace project (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 8). The local aspect is thus needed to make up for the contradiction between the notion of liberal peace and indigenous ideas of peacebuilding, since the liberal peace is based on European values and inadequately reflects the indigenous authority structures, legitimacy and methods of conflict resolution or the conduct of the local population (Lee & Alpaslan: 2015: 2).

The problem-solving perspective especially seek to operationalize local ownership countering criticism of the concept being too vague. There is usually made a distinction between a minimalist and maximalist perception of local ownership. The minimalist perspective narrows down the meaning of ownership to a gradual buy-in of local elites, whereas the maximalist perspectives draws on communitarianism, where ownership is construed as a genuine leadership based on broad participation of locals (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 14) (Ejdus: 2017: 463). The middle-ground between

the two stresses the need for a between international norms and local traditions, empowering drivers disempowering spoilers, human rights and stability, and imposition and restraint, and the minimalist and maximalist approach have therefore both been criticized as incomplete strategies for building sustainable peace (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 14) (Ejdus: 2017: 463). There can further be identified four possible types of local ownership corresponding to the different perspectives of ownership (see figure 1). Firstly, corresponding to the minimalist (top-down) approach, buy-in uses local ownership in more passive terms aiming to secure popular support for externally generated model of reform through transforming local elites to capable actors. Secondly, on-going consultation between local actors and international actors, with the aim of produce consensus. Thirdly, active participation which is situations where local actors are involved in planning and implementation of reform (no leadership capacity of local actors). Finally, corresponding to the maximalist (bottom-up) approach, local ownership is interpreted as full indigenous control of reforms (from formulation to implementation) that does not require significant or any international intervention (Nyamnjob: 2018: 325) (Ejdus: 2017: 463-464).

*Figure 1. Overview of Perspectives and Types of Local Ownership*



### The Critical Approach

The critical approach revolves around skeptical investigation of the local aspects outside the institutions, ideas and practices of the liberal peace project exposing its limitations and pathologies. It criticizes the attempts of exporting liberal norms, institutions and practices, based on the Western political experience, to contexts with little social preconditions for a liberal state (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 7-8). The critical literature claims indigenous cultures not necessarily provide good sources for stable peace and sustainable development making local ownership risky and likely to end in failure. This is largely due to the contexts in the war-affected host countries which usually is characterized by patriarchy and privilege (Lee & Aplaslan: 2015: 2). Moreover, the increasing emphasis put on local ownership by the international community can be claimed as merely another way of obtaining legitimacy in external actors' interventions as well as addressing the danger of dependency on foreign aid. The processes of setting strategies for local empowerment have mostly been controlled by international agencies with little empirical evidence for successful handovers of

ownership to local actors, indicating local ownership is used to downplay instances when the international community has usurped sovereignty of national actors to get speedy outcomes or to support a premature exit strategy (Lee & Aplaslan: 2015: 3, 24) (Nyamnjoh: 2018: 324). Radical critics further claim that adoption of the local ownership rhetoric not only mask the power asymmetries underlying the liberal peace ideas, but also limits the autonomy and freedom of the locals (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 8).

The critical approach has theoretically drawn from poststructuralism as well as Foucault's critique of (neo)liberalism (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 8). Foucault's concept of governmentality has also extensively been used to question the spread of liberal norms, practices and institutions in the world politics (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 8) (Ejdus: 2018: 31). Some scholars in international relations have characterized local ownership as another form of liberal governmentality (project-solution), while others have critiqued local ownership as an essentially illiberal practice undermining political autonomy, legitimacy and identities (critical) (Ejdus: 2018: 31). The harsh difference between the interpretation of local ownership from a project-solution and critical approach is rooted in the different angles from which the principle is being viewed. The former focuses on the liberal discourses surrounding the principle, while the latter focuses on the contradiction between the liberal rhetoric of ownership and the lack of ownership in the practical operationalization (Ejdus: 2018: 31). The thesis does not subscribe to either approach since neither investigate the political rationality behind the local ownership principle, but draws on notion of political rationality to show that local ownership is generally in peacebuilding interventions driven by the rationality of the interveners despite being coated in liberal idioms. The thesis seeks to contribute to the gap in the governmentality studies of local ownership lacking to account for the reasons and ways in which local ownership turns from being an attempt to govern across borders through freedom into the opposite as practices being resisted by the host states for limiting freedom and autonomy.

### Local Ownership in CSDP Interventions

The new shifting focus on the local ownership principle was consolidated in the 21<sup>st</sup> century becoming the standard of successful peace- and state-building in internationally. EU was in forefront of this trend advocating for local ownership across its external policies, and thus ratifying its ambition to become a global peacebuilder (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 5) (Ejdus: 2018: 28) (Kammel: 2018: 547). Language of ownership was first integrated into EU's development policies in the late 1990s implying that developing countries have the primary responsibility for creating an enabling environment for mobilization of their own resources (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 13) (Ejdus:



2017: 465). The local ownership principle has in the last years been adopted as a core principle underpinning all external policies, including development, enlargement, neighborhood, conflict prevention, and crisis management (Ejdus: 2017: 465) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 13). References to local ownership has therefore become a buzzwords repeated endlessly across EU's external policy statements. It has e.g. been articulated in the European Global Strategy (EUGS)<sup>6</sup>, the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP partner countries and the Lisbon Treaty (Ejdus: 2017: 465) (Kammel: 2018: 551). (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 5). Local ownership has achieved such strong resonance in EU's policy rhetoric since it fits into the way EU perceives its role in world. In the latest EUGS EU self-defines as a responsible conflict manager aiming to address the root causes of conflicts and facilitate locally owned agreements and long-term commitment (Ejdus: 2017: 465).

In 1999 the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was born, later renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), in which the core objective for EU's foreign policy was stated as employing operational capacity (civilian and military assets)<sup>7</sup> to be used beyond the borders in peacekeeping and conflict preventing matters (Kammel: 2018: 549) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 4). Local ownership was in the early years of CSDP construed in a top-down fashion as a local buy-in of local governments into the objectives of the interventions. However, in recent years a different policy rhetoric of ownership has emerged striking a middle-ground between top-down imposition and bottom-up self-restraint by understanding ownership as a process of negotiation that requires a combination of international and local resources (Ejdus: 2017: 465-467). This transformation has e.g. been exemplified in the European Consensus on Development emphasizing "joint efforts" and "joint responsibility" (Kammel: 2018: 551) (Ejdus: 2017: 466). EU has in recent years put in effort of translating its rhetoric into concrete practices through tools such as Joint Action plans. However, empirical investigations reveal these practices often fall short of achieving its goal, and EU has, thus, struggled to achieve local ownership in its CSDP interventions, despite its rhetorical endorsement of the principle (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 15) (Ejdus: 2017: 462-469). The implementation problems can be hampered by some universal obstacles in the field of

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<sup>6</sup> The European Global Strategy does not utilize the term local ownership, rather referring to the facilitation of locally owned agreements. It stipulates that EU is committed to work through development, diplomacy and CSDP to pursue locally owned rights-based approaches on Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in partner countries (Kammel: 2018: 551) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 5) (Ejdus: 2017: 461).

<sup>7</sup> In the EU terminology CSDP missions and operations are given a prefix depending on the nature of the mission: civilian or military. Civilian CSDP interventions are always called missions regardless of them having an executive mandate, while military CSDP interventions are referred to as operations if having an executive mandate. The thesis will not take on this distinction between missions and operations, and the words will be used interchangeably, and the term interventions will also denote both missions and operations.

peacebuilding, such as missions by default taking place in difficult context where locals have little to no capacity, and the ingrained practices and habits of imposition that exists in the peacebuilding culture (Ejdus: 2017: 468) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 15). In addition, EU CSDP interventions are further hampered by the politics and policymaking of CSDP. The intergovernmental nature of CSDP require the EU member states to approve unanimously each step of an CSDP intervention ensuring the control of the member states. Though, this micro-management might make sense from a political perspective, it results in a lengthy decision-making process and insufficient flexibility with no-feed-loop (Ejdus: 2017: 468-469).

Local ownership has been one of the least studied aspects of CSDP interventions with most of the research on the role of EU as an international security actor focusing on the EU institutions, instruments, decision-making, grand strategies and capability development adopting a top-down approach (Ejdus: 2017: 462-465) (Ejdus & Juncos: 2018: 4-5). This top-down approach to investigating local ownership has increased the knowledge on macro-drivers and obstacles affecting the implementation in CSDP missions, while local dynamics and its interaction with the EU largely have been overlooked. The thesis does not look at the local dynamics, but as most other studies take on the perspective from the EU institutional angle.

#### The Case of EUCAP Nestor

EUCAP Nestor is like most other CSDP interventions a non-executive and civilian mission in Africa. The mission was limited to five nations: Somalia, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Kenya and Tanzania, with the aim to assist in improving the capacity of these countries to control their territorial water and support the development of maritime elements of the rule of law sector in Somalia with the aim of fighting piracy (Tejpar & Zetterlund: 2013: 13). EU had deployed its first naval counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) in 2008, however, when it became clear the roots of the piracy issue was ashore the mission was faced out and EUCAP Nestor was dispatched in its place (Ejdus: 2018: 35) (Ejdus: 2017: 470). EUCAP Nestor was launched in 2012 with an initial mandate of two years with the aim of assisting the development of enhancing maritime security in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States (Ejdus: 2018: 30). The mission was launched to protect the European shipping industry threatened by piracy outside the cost of Somalia (Ejdus: 2018: 35). It was the first mission of its kind in terms of its regional approach and its maritime security focus (Ejdus: 2017: 470). The mission failed to objectively assess the needs and expectations of the recipient countries, even where the EU had a permanent presence, and the mission was generally ill-conceived in the region

(Ejdus: 2017: 472). There was a lack of interest in the mission from the partner countries, since they did not see piracy as a pressing maritime concern, and only the Seychelles was reportedly eager to engage (Ejdus: 2017: 741). Moreover, the mission had no presence in Somalia during the first two years because of security considerations, despite the fact the root causes of piracy was in Somalia. It is thus little surprise that the mission the first two years had no significant impact on assisting in enhancing the Somali authorities' abilities to improve policing and rule of law (ibid). The mission was therefore faced out in 2015 from the regional focus to only including Somalia. It was renamed EUCAP Somalia in 2016 and its mandate was extended to 2020 (Ejdus: 2018: 30) (Ejdus: 2017: 474). For the first time since the start of the mission, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was finally consulted about their needs in the process of creating the new operational plan for EUCAP Somalia and as a result it does not treat piracy as an isolated crime but aims to support the governance of maritime civilian law enforcement authorities, institutional development of maritime civilian law enforcement structure, and development of operational capabilities (Ejdus: 2017: 474).

EU insisted from the beginning on respecting the local ownership principle in EUCAP Nestor and announced in its Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa how "*its response will be underpinned by the principles of regional ownership and mutual responsibility*" (Ejdus: 2017: 471). Moreover, Somalia's ownership and responsibility are in the Joint Staff Working document one of the three core parameters for EU action (ibid). However, despite these rhetoric, the low degree of local ownership has been the soft spot of the mission from the beginning. The EUCAP Nestor mission has thus been chosen as an empirical illustration because it is a great example of failed international governmental efforts in fostering local ownership. It was the first EU mission to have a regional focus and to deal with maritime capacity-building. Furthermore, the degree of ownership varies from one intervention to another, so the practical challenges of the implementation in EUCAP Nestor have not been unique and is not generalizable. However, it illustrates well the structural obstacles to ownership common in a most CSDP interventions through illuminating the governmentality rationality behind the local ownership principle in general.

## Foucault and the Concept of Governmentality

The contemporary interpretation of government predominantly takes its onset from the state or another sovereign institution that possess monopoly on violence and execution of power inside a given territory (Dean: 2006: 41). This perspective on governance focuses on determining one source of power (often the state apparatus), examining which actors commands the power and whether it is

legitimate (ibid). The concept of governmentality puts itself in opposition to this comprehension of government by defining governmentality as an attempt to specify the presence of power in modern society and addressing the close link between power relations and processes of subjectification or objectification (Dean: 2006: 14) (Lemke: 2001: 191). When disassembling the concept into *govern* and *mentality*, it refers to the governance of mentality (a collectively shared view communicated through discourses) by means of techniques of power (calculated tactics aiming to govern social conduct in accordance with norms) (Ettlinger: 2011: 538). Governmentality was a notion proposed by Foucault during his lectures at Collège de France in 1978-1979<sup>8</sup> (Lemke: 2001: 190-191) (Dean: 2006: 29) (Ettlinger: 2011: 538). Foucault redefined government as *conduct of conduct* to realign it with the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century understanding of the concept ranging from governing of the self to governing of the population (Lemke: 2007: 45) (Ettlinger: 2011: 539). The understanding of government in Foucault's idea of governmentality was thus denoted as any calculated acts of governance executed by authorities through technics and forms of knowledge in order to shape behavior in compliance with a defined set of norms and goals (Dean: 2006: 44).

Governmentality utilizes a genealogical perspective drawing ties to historical processes that has led to contemporary governance programs and knowledge processes (Dean: 2006: 12). Foucault actively used genealogy to analyze the development of the modern liberal state by arguing there was a change in governmentality developing in Europe from the 18<sup>th</sup> century and onwards (Ejdus: 2018: 30) (Lemke: 2007: 44). Thus, describing a shift from sovereign repressive execution of power (sovereign rationality) to an execution of power which tactically seeks to form, stimulate, cultivate and secure the population's welfare (liberal rationality) (Ejdus: 2018: 30) (Dean: 2006: 14). This implies that governmentality in contemporary society, firstly, are population-oriented with the goal of securing the population's welfare. Secondly, are focusing on enabling and securing the individual instead of controlling and disciplining individual actions. Thirdly, are governing through executives of power and knowledge, like institutions and practices that develop technics of governance, which are far from located in one clear state apparatus (ibid.). In other words, governmentality denotes in the broadest sense any historic form of rational rule and the underlying reciprocal relationship between power techniques and forms of knowledge which are underpinned by political rationalities (Ejdus: 2018: 30) (Lemke: 2002: 191). In the narrower sense, governmentality signifies an

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<sup>8</sup> Foucault first introduced the term in his lecture: *Security, Territory, Population*, and continued to develop it in his subsequent lectures.

ensemble of liberal discourses and practices that have populations as their target (Ejdus: 2018: 30). Governmentality is therefore especially useful in exploring the relational connection between societal discourses and everyday practices that are directed towards shaping social conduct (Ettlinger: 2011: 538) (Villadsen: 2002: 78). The concept goes beyond a typically narrow focus on the direct execution of state power to the examination of more subtle methods of power exercised through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques, which act to regulate social conduct (Joseph: 2010: 225).

Foucault's understanding of governmentality was gradually modified throughout the progression of his arguments with most of it found in notes that were not prepared for the public, which contribute to making his genealogical analysis of governmentality appear more as a fragmentary outline than an elaborated theory (Lemke: 2007: 45) (Joseph: 2010: 226). Nevertheless, the concept of governmentality has in the last 20 years inspired a wider field of governmentality studies based on Foucault's thought (Ejdus: 2018: 31) (Villadsen: 2002: 78) (Lemke: 2007: 45). The studies have yet to be denoted as a tradition or school, thus, the governmentality literature refers to the collection of studies taking on inspiration from Foucault and to a great extent share the epistemological onset and the critical agenda (Villadsen: 2002: 78). This thesis will mainly draw on the broad governmentality literature that have further developed the governmentality concept based on Foucault's notion<sup>9</sup>. A major focus in the governmentality literature has been the shift towards free market policies and the rise of neo-liberal political projects in Western societies (Lemke: 2007: 45). The neoliberal discourse problematizes post-war solutions to issues of health and wellbeing of the populations, by stressing the need to move away from centralized government activity and Keynesian forms of government intervention (ibid) (Joseph: 2010: 227). Foucault and the governmentality literature are well matched with the current dominance of neoliberal thinking describing less direct state involvement and giving the state a more managerial role as an overseer of social processes promoting various forms of governance through institutions and organizations that foster individual responsibility, privatized risk management, market mechanisms etc. (Lemke: 2007: 25) (Joseph: 2010: 227). Neoliberal governmentality is therefore reflected in the extension of the norms and values of the market to other areas of social life as the widespread application of terms like competition, initiative, risk-taking and prudence across various social domains (Joseph: 2010: 228). It is important to establish clarity on different types of governmentality, of which this thesis puts

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<sup>9</sup> The chosen primary focus of the used literature is mainly the work of Dean, Lemke Miller & Rose, since these have had a large impact and often is equated with the governmentality literature

emphasis on governmentality's current neoliberal forms. The thesis applies the neoliberal governmentality by arguing that local ownership is another form of liberal governmentality. This focus on the distinctively liberal character of governmentality is necessary in order to maintain a distinction from disciplinary power, which are crucial when looking at the application of governmentality internationally (ibid).

Another crucial distinction to make is between domestic and international governmentality. The domestic governmentality is as described above studied by Foucault and takes a Eurocentric approach by focusing on governmentality in advanced liberal contexts (Lemke: 2007: 45-46). It can therefore be difficult to apply governmentality internationally in non-liberal contexts, which will be further explored under the section limitations of governmentality. However, the thesis applies the concept of international governmentality as driven by the political rationality of liberal states who use it to shape institutions, behavior or policies of democratizing, developing and conflict-affected areas (Ejdus: 2018: 32). The origins of contemporary international governmentality can be traced to the colonial era and the practices used by imperial powers to govern their colonies (ibid).

International governmentality in the post-colonial world relies more strongly on governance at a distance in order to regulate social conduct than during the colonial era (ibid). It is more used as an instrument by powerful states and their international institutions to govern states having weaker or lacking democratic and liberal institutions (ibid). The attempts to use governmentality across borders usually fails due to this unevenness and starkly different socio-political conditions in recipient states (ibid) (Joseph: 2010: 237). It could be interesting to further explore the failures and successes of governmentality in a broader social context adopting an ontological perspective. This thesis explores instead how and why local ownership turns from an attempt to govern across borders through freedom into practices and strategies producing the opposite outcome of what was intended and being resisted by those who it was supposed to help. It is in order to understand this necessary to analytically distinguish discourses from material practices. A majority of governmentality studies adhere to a post-structuralist ontology only concerned with discourses taking a meta-theoretical standpoint (Ejdus: 2018: 31-32). However, the focus in this thesis is to examine how the objects of governance and the governance techniques have emerged with a focus of the concrete practices applied through the political rationality of local ownership, which requires an epistemological orientation (Dean: 2006: 11, 15). In other words, the thesis uses an epistemological approach in order to analyze the everyday micro-practices including technical tools,

practices, conduct, and to examine the circular processes through which knowledge and power is introduced, constituted and reproduced (ibid).

### Key Characteristics of Governmentality

The previous section has provided an overall depiction of governmentality as a concept and briefly touched upon crucial distinctions. The following will provide a more in-depth description of two central characteristics of governmentality. The first is the abolition of the state apparatus as the center of power execution. The second is the concept of political rationality which plays a main role in the formulation of the goals, objects and execution methods of governance.

### Decentralization of Power

A central characteristic in governmentality studies is the ambition to abolish the notion of the state apparatus as a center from which the governance of society is lead. Instead governance is examined as part of a network of relations which crosses the divide between state and civil society, public and private sector etc. (Dean: 2006: 11) (Villadsen: 2002: 78) (Joseph: 2010: 231). Governmentality is not concerned with the possession of power, but with the exercise, application and effects of power represented through institutions and practices that creates the objects of governance and develop the technologies through which governance is executed (Dean: 2006: 14) (Joseph: 2010: 231). The governmentality studies consequently focus on programs and techniques like budgetary measures and contracts, which seek to govern or intervene in social behavior (Villadsen: 2002: 78). This perspective follows Foucault's understanding of power as something extending far beyond the state (Ettlinger: 2011: 547). Additionally, Foucault defined power as productive (not destructive), as diffuse (not located in a hierarchy), and as something that is executed in decentralized relations on free individuals with the intention of constructing or securing their actions (Ettlinger: 2011: 538) (Dean: 2006: 11). The governmentality literature therefore rejects the idea of power as a capacity that can be located to specific actors since individuals are the vehicle of power and not its point of application (Ettlinger: 2011: 547). Instead they investigate, on the one hand, discourses which articulates the exercise of power through goals, objects and means (political rationalities), and on the other hand, the practices, methods and techniques that are applied to manage various social domains (technologies of governance) (Villadsen: 2002: 78).

Because governmentality focuses on institutions and practices in the plural, it rejects the state-centric approach of most theories in international relations, while at the same time talking about state power in a new way (Joseph: 2010: 232). Governmentality studies further distance themselves

from traditional sociological and political focuses on the legitimacy and possession of power as well as the divide between state and civil society (Villadsen: 2002: 78). The governmentality literature manages to conduct detailed studies on how power is exercised through specific techniques and in limited social domains without seeing these practices as an isolated phenomenon, but instead as relational networks (ibid).

### The Concept of Political Rationality

A main purpose of governmentality analyses is to examine changes in political rationality which have occurred within a certain institution or administration (Dean: 2006: 15). This makes the concept of political rationality a central analytical concept in the governmentality literature. However, Foucault rarely used the concept and when he did it was often unsystematic and without definitional considerations<sup>10</sup> (Villadsen: 2002: 79). The governmentality studies have usually drawn on Foucault's analysis of the development of the modern liberal state in order to interpret political rationality. Foucault applies the term to describe the shift from the feudal societies' use of pastoral power (discipline and sovereignty) into a more modern and liberal governance rationality<sup>11</sup> (Villadsen: 2002: 79) (Cornelissen: 2018: 126). The central changes in this shift of rationality were the goal of governance (the power of the sovereign vs. the welfare of the population), the object of governance (territory and the minions vs. national economy) and the code/medium (the law vs. science of the state) (Villadsen: 2002: 80). While the direct power forms of sovereignty and discipline rely on the rationality of the sovereign ruler or the rationality of the state (*raison d'Etat*), liberalism is exercised indirectly relying on the rationality of the governed population (Ejdus: 2018: 33). This thesis claims that local ownership is driven by the rationality of advanced liberal democracies, which will be elaborated further on later in the thesis.

Based on Foucault's analysis, the general understanding of political rationality within the framework of governmentality studies<sup>12</sup> is that political rationality is the mentality that underlies and orients the practice of governing (Cornelissen: 2018: 132). It is thus argued that political rationality is a regime of power-knowledge presuming the possibility and legitimacy of the

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<sup>10</sup> It is also unclear whether the term only applies to one political rationality or if there can exist more competing rationalities. Foucault implied the idea of multiples when he commented that "political rationalities is linked with other forms of rationality (Foucault: 2000: 416).

<sup>11</sup> Throughout the governmentality literature there is a tendency for political rationality and governance rationality to entail the same and will thus be used interchangeably in the thesis.

<sup>12</sup> In other words, primarily the conception of political rationality that Rose, Miller, Lemke, Dean and others developed in the 1990s.



instruments of governmental practice and is the normative reason from which the goals and objects of governance is forged (ibid). The thesis applies this understanding of political rationality as well as the more overall perception as “*the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing*” (Foucault: 2008: 2).

### Limitations of Governmentality

While the concept of governmentality provides a promising tool for the analysis of transformations, there are also some limitations to be noted (Lemke: 2007: 45). The following will apply an ontological perspective as well as a neoliberal interpretation of governmentality in order to examine the constraints of the application of the concept. First are the limitations of the Eurocentric approach focusing on the liberal states of the western world, making the application of governmentality internationally troublesome due to different degrees of advanced liberalism in the world. Second are the limitations concerned with the deployment of governmentality as a general theoretical explanation.

### Governmentality at an International Level

Foucault depicted the state as indispensable for governmentality as being “*a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities*” (Foucault: 2007: 286). The sovereign nation state therefore typically serves as the frame of reference in the governmentality literature. This perspective is usually dominated by a Eurocentric approach ignoring non-western and non-liberal contexts as well as rarely considering if forms of government on a national level are linked with international developments (Lemke: 2007: 45-46). It can thus be interesting to discuss if modes of government are existing at the transnational and global scale (Lemke: 2007: 46). However, this seems unlikely, since there exists no international equivalent of the state to utilize the micro-practices of governmentality more globally (Joseph: 2010: 225).

It is necessary to apply caution when using governmentality internationally. The liberal aspect of governmentality is extremely explicit raising the question of how something placing so much emphasis on the creation of free subjects, individualization and self-responsibilization can be applied outside of its liberal context (Joseph: 2010: 332). There is a large difference between a society having its own conditions for governmentality and a society having governmentality thrust upon it by outside international institutions and organizations operating in a neoliberal way (Joseph: 2010: 233). The workability of governmentality is thus limited in parts of the world where conditions of advanced liberalism does not apply (Joseph: 2010: 239). This makes international

governmentality difficult in practice even if there is a will to try and impose it (Joseph: 2010: 225). Such an imposition of neoliberal governmentality on societies lacking stable bodies, like the state, have consequences in terms of the effectiveness of such techniques and often result in reversion to the threat of brute force and disciplinary power rather than the widespread application of sophisticated techniques and self-regulations (Joseph: 2010: 237). It is therefore necessary to explain these failures of governmentality and the attempt of international institutions applying these techniques based on advanced liberal societies to completely different social conditions, which can be interpreted as a new type of imperialism (ibid). Governmentality studies accounts rarely discuss the failure and limitations of governmentality because their focus usually remains at the level of the techniques employed rather than the underlying social context that makes governmentality meaningful (Joseph: 2010: 239). The thesis examines the use of the international governmentality's aim of regulating social conduct at a distance to govern weaker states lacking liberal institutions. Investigating how the political rationality of local ownership fails when applied in non-liberal context, however, the focus is not ontologically, but instead on one given example.

#### Governmentality as a Catch-all Concept

An inherent vulnerability in the concept of governmentality is its tendency to become a catch-all concept that are being applied to generally (Joseph: 2010: 226). The governmentality literature is haunted by a tension between specificity and generality which sometimes result in ambitious contemporary analyses becoming generalized totalizing descriptions of the concept (Villadsen: 2002: 81). This is not helped by the way the concept slowly emerges in Foucault's lectures being modified in more general terms as his argument progresses (Joseph: 2010: 226). It is thus dangerous when applying the concept at an internationally level that the claim of a liberal international order is enforced (Joseph: 2010: 242). Some governmentality studies tend to retell descriptions of this liberal aspect in governmentality bordering on a collective grand narrative appearing to have an overarching global character (Villadsen: 2002: 82). However, as mentioned in the previous part, despite efforts of neoliberal international institutions the differences in advanced liberalism throughout parts of the world suggests that this all-embracing liberal order is far from reality making it a troublesome deduction (Joseph: 2010: 242).

Governmentality explains a particular set of practices and techniques but is limited in explaining the context in which these practices and techniques best operate. It would require a wider ontological viewpoint to account for the successes and failures of governmentality (Joseph: 2010: 241).

Nevertheless, governmentality approaches tend to focus overly much on governmentality as a political rationality missing out on investigating the social, structural and institutional possibilities and limitations of the concept (ibid). The reality of governmentality depends on a wider social context that cannot be explained simply by reference to the how of governmentality practices and techniques or discursive aims, means and ends. These approaches are unable to discuss how governmentality differs in different parts of the world and thus how social struggles might develop (Joseph: 2010: 242). However, Foucauldians would claim that the aim is to analyze the how of governmentality and not the why, and would insist on a focus of the everyday micro-practices (Joseph: 2010: 232, 242). Foucault is useful in highlighting techniques and practices of discipline and control, but there is a risk of missing out on the macro-implications of e.g. the unevenness of the international system (Joseph: 2010: 230).

When using governmentality, it is thus important to be mindful of the different nature of societies to avoid generalizing governmentality as an explanation across the global and to remember that governmentality primarily is a matter of techniques, practices and strategies and should be distinguished from wider questions of hegemony in the international system. This thesis has adopted a perspective focusing on the micro-practices of the local ownership principle on a specific case and does not seek to draw any general conclusions on that basis.

## Governmentality as an Analysis Strategy

The existing governmentality literature gives several indications on how to complete and conduct an analysis of governmentality (Dean: 2006: 67). The most commonly applied is an analytics of government and Dean describes two important elements in such an analysis, respectively an analysis of regimes of practices and genealogy. These two aspects will be elaborated in the following subsections. An analytics of government is a type of study concerned with analyzing the specific conditions under which certain entities emerge, exist and change. It attempts to reach clarity of the conditions under which we think and act, reflects on how we govern ourselves and others and examines the conditions under which regimes of practice come into being, are maintained and transformed (Dean: 2006: 80-85). Thus, it deals with means of calculations (forms of knowledge and techniques) and means of governance (object to governed, goals of governance and results of governance) (Dean: 2006: 44). Two central characteristics of an analytics of government are the identification of problematizations and its priority of how-questions. Firstly, the starting point of an analytics of government consists of identifying and examining a specific

situation. A problematization of governance is identified through questioning how we form and regulate conduct and it occurs within a regime with the help of techniques, concepts, analysis and systems of evaluation, and specific forms of knowledge and expertise (Dean: 2006: 68). Secondly, the governmentality literature gives how-questions a specific priority. An analytics of government therefore examines those practices of government which is the basis for problematizations and the essential elements for a certain regime of practices and the broad conditions for governance (e.g. coordination activities and administrative structures) (Dean: 2006: 69-70) (Lemke: 2007: 49).

An analytics of government distinguishes itself from other classical theoretical perspectives by seeing the execution of power as anything but natural and as something that requires analytical attention, and further breaks with state theory's characteristic themes like the legitimacy problem, concept of ideology and questions of possession and the source of power (Dean: 2006: 41). It thus attends to the singularity of the means of governing, and the practices of government are therefore not treated as an ideal type or concepts, neither is it regarded as impacts of a law (Dean: 2006: 85). Moreover, an analytics of government avoids the pre-analytical distinction between micro- and macrolevel, individual and state by extending its concept of technology by distinguishing a plurality of governmental technologies and conceiving both processes of individualization and practices of institutionalization as technologies of government (Lemke: 2007: 49). It thereby avoids the pitfall of reducing technologies to an expression of social relations. In addition, the analytic operates with a concept of technology that includes not only material but also symbolic devices. Discourses and narratives are not seen as pure semiotic propositions but are instead regarded as performative practices (ibid). Governmental technologies denote a complex of practical mechanisms, procedures, instruments and calculations through which authorities seek to guide and shape the conduct and decisions of others in order to achieve specific objectives e.g. methods of examination, notation techniques, routines for timing etc.

In an analytics of government, the practices of government are not understood in terms of the values assumed to underlie them. The approach is through this aspect distinguishable from the more normative political theory, like Habermas (Dean: 2006: 77). Rather, the statements functioning as values are examined as components of the rhetorical practice of government and are thus part of different forms of governmental and political reason (ibid). Regimes of practice should not be viewed as expressions of values. The values are instead incorporated into diverse technique of governance, but these technologies do not take its onset in the values (ibid). So, rather than viewing regimes of practice as expressions of values it is important to question how values function in

various governmental rationalities, what consequences they have in forms of political argument, how they get attached to different technique etc. Values, knowledge, techniques are all part of the mix of regimes of practice, but none alone acts as guarantor of full ultimate meaning.

Since governmentality refers to indirect governance of a population through calculated acts, an analysis rests on the assumption that actors have choices and can conform, reproduce, elaborate or challenge discourses and norms (Ettlinger: 2011: 539). Consequently, for resistance to emerge, it requires a holistic critical understanding of how the governance objectifies, dominates and produces behavior (ibid). A proactive choice therefore presumes critically informed actors that are permitted the possibility of developing autonomy from the system to be able to challenge it. Additionally, governance contains a utopian element implying that it is possible to effectively change human behavior and attributes, thus assuming a better world, society, way of doing things or way of living are possible to achieve (Dean: 2006: 76). It is necessary to extract this utopian element in an analysis of governmentality, so when producing regimes of practice their ultimate ends and utopian goals are to be isolated (ibid).

There can be noted two theoretical implications of an analytics of government. One the one hand, the distinction between soft and hard, material and symbolic technologies, between political technologies and technologies of the self, becomes precarious (Lemke: 2007: 50). An analytics of government investigates the dynamic interplay of elements that usually are systemically separated (ibid). On the other hand, an analytics of government questions the notion of a state apparatus confined to the organizational characteristics of the state as an institutional unit (ibid). This is reversed in analytics of government by conceiving institutions as technologies, focusing on technologies that are materialized and stabilized in institutional settings.

### The Regime of Practices Approach

An analytics of government examines the conditions under which a regime of practices appear, are maintained and transformed (Dean: 2006: 85). A regime of practice are institutional practices and includes the institutionalized routine and ritualized ways people act and talk in certain situations, and includes the ways in which institutions are thought of, made and object of knowledge and submitted problematization (ibid) (Villadsen: 2002: 58). Regimes of practice are never identical with a specific institution and depend on diverse forms of knowledge and relate to each other through an object for definite and explicit programs (Dean: 2006: 59). An analysis of a given regime of practice minimally seek to identify the appearance of the regime and investigates its

constituted elements through the processes and relations in which the elements exist. It investigates how the regime feed and pulls on specific forms of knowledge and analyze the techniques, instruments and mechanism through which the regime operates, seek to realize its goal and achieve a series of effects (Dean: 2006: 58-59).

An analytics of government seek to reconstruct the inherent logic or strategy of a practice regime through examining specific programs, theories or political reforms (Dean: 2006: 60). The strategical logic of a practice regime can only be construed by looking at its operation as an intentional but not subjective linking of all its elements, which means that the logic of a practice regime cannot be reduced to the explicit intention of actors, but show an orientation towards a specific system of goals and aims (ibid). It is important to distinguish between a practice regime's strategies and those programs that seek to apply a specific purpose, because the programs are internal compared to the processes of the practice regime (ibid). To evaluate the value of the analysis it is necessary to compare perspectives and explanations brought on by other alternative analysis, because the governmentality analysis only is one perspective of power and there is no absolute set of norms which the analysis can be held against (Dean: 2006: 61). The analysis thus has a perspectivist character.

An analytics of government is largely material focusing on technologies, institutions and practices, describing the relations that exists between a regime of practice and various elements, as well as drawing a network of interacting elements (Dean: 2006: 17, 61, 71). It is in a regime of practice possible to distinguish between four dimensions respectively illustrating visibilities, knowledge, techniques and practices, and identities (see Table 1). These axes are coexisting and presupposing one another without reducing each other to only one of the dimensions (ibid). Transformations of practice regime can happen through any of the dimensions which can lead to alterations on the other axes. Some of the dimensions are not restricted to an analytics of government e.g. the discourse analysis and the dimension of knowledge include the same elements (Villadsen: 2002: 78) (Dean: 2006: 16). However, an exclusive contribution is that the analysis of both the dimensions of visibility and techniques and practices stresses that seeing and doing are mutually connected (ibid).

*Table 1. Overview of the Four Dimension in a Regime of Practices*

|  | <i>Aim</i>  | <i>Materiel Form</i>  |
|--|---|---|
| <i>The Visuel Dimension</i>                    | To illuminate which elements/objects are highlighted and which angle is put on the governance and relations | Graphs, tables, management flowcharts, frameworks   |
| <i>The Technical Dimension</i>                 | To illuminate how values, ideologies and world views are governed and achieved through technical means      | Mechanisms, procedures, instruments, techniques and specific vocabulary use.  |
| <i>The Knowledge-Producing Dimension</i>       | To illuminate which form of thoughts, expertise and rationality are applied in practices of government.     | Graphs, regulations, set of rules, guidelines<br>Implicit organized through habits, rituals, procedures and actors conduct. |
| <i>The Individual and Collective Dimension</i> | To illuminate which personalities, selves and identities are assumed present in practices of government.    | Statuses, capacities, attributes and qualities attached certain actors.<br>Duties and Rights.                               |

The first dimension is the visual and spatial aspect of government. It characterizes a regime of practice through how objects are illuminated and defined as well as which elements are kept in the shadow (Dean: 2006: 72). The tools used to shed light on the objects is e.g. a management flowchart, a map, a pie chart, a set of graphs and tables (Dean: 2006: 17, 72). These all make it possible to visualize who and what is to be governed and how relations of authority and obedience are constituted, as well as how different locals and agents are connected with one another and what problems and objects are to be solved or found. It is thus in more general term possible to identify different regimes of practices with certain forms of visibility (ibid).

The second dimension focuses on the technical aspects of governance by asking with help of which means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques and vocabularies how authority is constituted, and rule accomplished (Dean: 2006: 73). One of the key implications on this emphasis on government as techniques is to oppose the models of government that solely view it as a manifestation of values, ideologies, worldview etc. If a government is to achieve end or seek to realize values, it must use technical means. Those technical means also operate as condition of governing by imposing limits over possible actions e.g. concern for balance rates (ibid).

The third dimension concerns the forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activities of governing (Dean: 2006: 73). The governmentality here investigates what forms of thinking, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation or rationality are employed in practices of governing and how thoughts seek to transform these practices and render something to be true.

Thoughts are relatively rare and has a specific time and place taking definite material form e.g. a graph, a set of regulations, a text etc. One of the aspects of government is that authorities and agencies must ask questions of themselves employing plans, forms of knowledge and know-how, as well as adopting visions and objectives (Dean: 2006: 74). There thus exists an intrinsically programmatic character making it important to attend to the less explicit purposive attempts to organize institutional spaces, routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of actors in specific ways. Programs are all attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practice with explicit degrees of explicitness (ibid).

The final and fourth dimension of a regime of practice relates to the various forms of the individual and collective through which governing operates (Dean: 2006: 74). The governmentality literature here asks which personalities, selves and identities are presupposed in different practices of government and what sort of transformation the practices seek. It concerns itself with statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations assumed of those who exercise authority and those who are to be governed and which conduct are expected (including duties and rights). The forms of identity promoted by practices and government programs should not be confused with subjectivity. A regime of practice does not determine forms of subjectivity but elicit, facilitate and attach certain capacities, qualities and statuses to certain actors (Dean: 2006: 75). These are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities (e.g. rational decision making), qualities (e.g. having a sexuality) and statuses (e.g. active citizen) (ibid).

### The Genealogical Approach

Governmentality analyses often use a genealogical perspective showing historical specific processes that has led to contemporary governance programs and knowledge processes which is the unnecessary products of historical clashes, control strategies, coincidences etc. (Dean: 2006: 12). A regime of practices can in principle be executed in a specific time period without an historical perspective. The genealogy, however, complements the analysis of a practice regime by investigating how the regime has developed through historical elements (Dean: 2006: 17). It thus constitutes a form of transformation analysis detecting how certain types of power correspondingly develop, replace and infiltrate each other instead of successive replacement (Dean: 2006: 18). Foucault's ambition was not to describe the history but use it as a memory to throw a light over actual forms of practice and truths (Villadsen: 2002: 85). The genealogical perspective more generally shows that the practice and knowledge forms, which today are considered as natural, legitimate and necessary etc., are a result of the struggles, eliminations and coincidences in history



(ibid). The analytical tools of genealogy, on one hand, prove discontinuity (when history seem to be continuous) and on the other hand, prove continuity (when history is divided into eras etc.). A mean to highlighting these trends is to analyze forms of knowledge and practices and investigate how objects, subjective positions and concepts are established through discourses (ibid).

The onset for an analysis is a problematization of an actual regime of practice. The goal is to produce an analysis, that shakes and destabilizes such a practice regime by showing that it contains continuities and discontinuities which have occurred through historical battles and coincidences. This can be illustrated through investigating the genealogical tracks of practices which have numerous historical threads containing discursive transformative points, breaks, frozen points and boundaries, or forgotten knowledge (ibid). It is not possible to examine every track, and thus a choice on which aspect of the regime of practice that will be problematized has to be made. The genealogical approach, as Dean describes, can therefore be seen as case-histories.

## Analysis 1: Genealogical Cut of Local Ownership

The following will provide an analysis showcasing continuities and discontinuities in the management of “*the locals*” in external interventions. It must be underlined that it in this context is impossible to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth analysis, and it is rather an illustration hinting at the discursive complexity and strife that characterizes the principle of local ownership. Even a genealogy wishing to describe every continuity and breaks throughout several hundred years cannot describe every defining event or discourse but must analytically construct a certain homogeneity on basis of the amount of statements. The analytics, thus, actively constructs its discourses, and there is a risk of reductionism and too great homogeneity in an analysis (Villadsen: 2002: 89). The following analysis are thus based on some choices connected with the practice regime focusing on local ownership. The contemporary principle of local ownership has important ties to the imperialistic and colonial era (Nymanjoh: 2018: 323) (Ejdus: 2018: 38), and the analysis therefore focuses on the late 19<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Going back to the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century the term “*the locals*” were not applied in connection with governing in and/or assisting external countries. Instead the local population was referred to as the indigenous people, which were term usually associated with a lower status non-civil culture (Modern World History). As the 19<sup>th</sup> century moved along, European interest in African resources expanded and in the later part of the century the European countries negotiated a partition of dividing the African territory among themselves (without locals’ present) in Berlin 1884 (American

Historical Association). There existed to predominately two form of governing colonies, either through indirect rule (preferred by the British) or through direct rule (preferred by the French) (ibid). In the latter, European officials would themselves establish and administer rules and regulations in their colonies, while the former used existing tribal structures and traditions as conduits for establishing rules and regulating resulting in form of “governing form a distance”. The indirect rule became the preferred approach as the 20<sup>th</sup> century moved along (Lawrence: 2016: 2).

In order to understand the rationale and arguments deeming the concept of indirect rule legitimate a connection can be made to numerous discourses, which not necessarily have to be centered around indirect rule. In other words, it is necessary to read more broadly about in the period literature. The concept of indirect rule can in this sense be seen as a product of multiple discourses. The one discourse that will be focused here are the beliefs of European cultural values, race, and civic morals were superior to other nations and indigenous groups. It was in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century believed that imperial conquest would bring successful culture to inferior groups and the inferior races should be conquered in order to civilize them (Modern World History). This discourse also explains the rationale behind the colonial governing through direct rule in order to enrich, civilize and in some instances save the indigenous population from their savage ways. However, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century indirect rule started to win popularity as a correction of the perceived problems following direct rule due to difficulty of absorbing indigenous population that are too culturally backwards to become civilized (Lawrence: 2016: 2). Even the French, known for their centralized approach to imperial rule, began speaking of “*association*” instead of “*assimilation.*” (ibid). The indirect rule received thus normative praise “*as a deference to native agency and, in more enlightened self-descriptions, as a form of cosmopolitan pluralism, one that recognized the specificity of native society*” (Mantena: 2010: 6). Furthermore, the indirect rules had financial advantages in lower administration costs in the colonies, allowing to supervise and govern at distance without taking on all the responsibilities (Lawrence: 2016: 2). Moreover, security concerns and fears of violent rebellions affected the choices of the imperial powers willingness to empower indigenous leaders, since local populations were less likely to rebel against their own leaders compared to imposters (ibid).

Which forms of continuities and discontinuities is present between the colonial administration through indirect rule in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century and the contemporary rationale of local ownership? Frederic Lugard, who described the system of indirect rule during his tenure in Nigeria, portrayed strikingly similar steps of indirect colonial rule to those used today (Lawrence: 2016: 2) (Ejodus:

2018: 38). These steps are contemporary laid out by OECD, as “*the first step is to lay out a specific plan, with clear time lines and success indicators, that identifies the various local actors who will be involved in programme design and implementation, their roles and responsibilities, how they will be engaged, and what will be achieved through their engagement*” (OECD: 2007: 64). The contemporary emphasis and usage of local ownership can be read aligned with the colonial rule as driven by European liberal values aiming to either consciously or unconsciously export liberal norms to the host states and govern them at a distance. However, the post-colonial world relied more strongly on governance at a distance in order to regulate social conduct than during the colonial era (Ejdus: 2018: 32). It can therefore also be argued that the Western states still believe that its democratic institutions and liberal concept like individual freedom are superiority to other, though such strong rhetoric would not be used openly. Furthermore, reasons for intervening in an external countries are contemporary argued more as due to security and stability grounds on the host countries term, instead of due to interests in resources and economic trade agreements.

## **Analysis 2: Regime of Practices of Local Ownership in EUCAP Nestor**

The following section will analyze the case of EUCAP Nestor based on the regime of practices approaches and its four dimensions. The practice regime will be the overall CSDP interventions with a focus on the key principle of local ownership within this regime.


### **The Visual Dimension**

The EU adopted a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa in 2011 before the approval and outline of what was to become EUCAP Nestor. The framework underlined the importance of addressing the Horn of Africa as a regional issue and noted the comprehensive toolbox available to the EU. It is in the strategic framework stipulated that EU’s involvement among others should focus on the development partnership, political dialogue and strengthening of partnerships with both international and regional organizations present in the areas (EU: 2011: 5). It is emphasized that the engagement will “*be underpinned by the principles of regional ownership and mutual responsibility*” (EU: 2011: 8). Furthermore, it is stated the EU among other would pursue its objectives in the region through the CSDP and mediation for the ownership, better understanding and sustainability of processes and developments in the region (EU: 2011: 11). The diasporas of the Horn are further mentioned, underlining once more the importance of the inclusion of the local aspects, and EU emphasis the inclusion of diasporas as a potential positive resource in achieving its objective (EU: 2011: 8). The strategic framework assessment from 2012 continued to highlight the positive sides of local ownership and pointed out that EUCAP Nestor was “*a step in the right*

*direction towards more comprehensive engagement*” (Soliman et. al.: 2012: 43). It further called for the need of a wider local engagement in EUCAP Nestor asserting that local needs in the development, security and governance sectors needed to be addressed in order to properly tackle the piracy issue, emphasizing that EU patrolling along the coast of the Horn of Africa would be insufficient in itself without the local aspect. This rhetorical emphasis on the positive and necessary inclusion of ownership is also indicated in the strategic framework with the overwhelming usages of verbs such as “*assist*” and “*support*”, implying a high level of local control with EU as the “*assisting/supporting*” partner. This was equally reflected in the Council Decision 2012 stating the EUCAP Nestor would have no executive function but should assist the host states in developing sustainable capacity in enhancement of their maritime security (EU: 2012).

The management structure of the EUCAP Nestor is depicted in figure 2 showing the structure on the ground. The mission is structured into different departments (planning and operations, security, press and public information, and mission support) as well as having a political and legal advisor, and all the departments head answers to the Head of Mission (HoM). These cells are further divided into project cells, training units etc. Furthermore, the mission had Country Teams with their own Country Team Leaders (CTLs) and political advisers in order to adjust for the different needs and conditions existing in the host countries. A considerable challenge for EUCAP Nestor was the management of the different Country Teams from the Mission Headquarter without unduly restricting the autonomy required by the teams (Tejpar & Zetterland: 2013: 28). The figure illustrates well the organizational structure but does unfortunately not indicate a direction of the flow of management, thus, lacking an indication of how, where and if the local aspects and bottom-up approach dominates the mission. During the mission there was challenges related to, especially procurement and logistics, as well as securing coordination within and with various external actors (Tejpar & Zetterland: 2013: 16). These challenges all make it harder to secure local trust and cooperation.

Figure 2. Management Structure in EUCAP Nestor



Source: From the EUCAP Nestor Official Website<sup>13</sup>, found in Tejpar & Zetterland: 2013: 16

To sum up, local ownership is highlighted through CSDP interventions frameworks and strategies as a positive and necessary element to secure sustainability. In EUCAP Nestor it is likewise framed as an essential element in order to achieve any long-term result in handling the piracy and maritime security issue.

### The Technical Dimension

CSDP missions' implement local ownership through a range of different techniques like capacity building, joint planning, mentoring, training, advising, evaluation, conducting needs assessments etc. These techniques have also shaped everyday practices in EUCAP Nestor. The strategic framework for Africa's Horn states, EU seeks to make its engagement in the region more effective by "reinforcement of its political coordination, and by focusing more clearly on the underlying challenges of the region" (EU: 2011: 8). It will be guided by the overall objectives of the 2003 European Security Strategy and its implementation report, the eight partnerships of the JAES and the 2009 EU Policy on the Horn of Africa. The EUCAP Nestor operates within the guidelines provided by the *New Deal Compact* 2013 for Somalia, which is initiated by the FGS, regions and

<sup>13</sup> The EUCAP Nestor Official Website is no longer in function after the mission's termination and is now replaced by the website for EUCAP Somalia.

people of Somalia and the international community. It has five priority areas for post-conflict transition (peacebuilding and state-building goals, inclusive politics, justice, economic foundations, services and revenues) and includes a special Arrangement for Somaliland. The communique highlights the bottom-up approach “...involved consultation with the people and regions of Somalia” (EU: 2013: 1).

An often-used instrument is joint planning in which EU and host government settle on joint actions plans (JAP) and compact agreements, usually used for negotiating mutually agreed objectives and activities. This instrument is usually used in the beginning of a mission setting up mutually agreed objectives and targets. Hereafter, EU established joint monitoring and evaluation bodies to oversee implementation. In the case of EUCAP Nestor, the EU mission agreed with the Government of Somaliland that the main priority was “to develop a common and agreed starting point for the desired Somaliland Coast Guard capability target” (Ejdus: 2018: 39)<sup>14</sup>, and further emphasizes the JAP process was demand driven following a bottom-up approach aligned with Somaliland. The EU common procedure thus indicate a certain degree of local ownership in the mission process.

However, an interview with a representative of Somaliland’s foreign ministry<sup>15</sup> highlighted that EUCAP Nestor was in the driving seat through the process, and the EU was thus in firm control of the entire process (Ejdus: 2018: 40). Moreover, EUCAP Nestor trained and mentored a group of young coast guard officers as a part of capacity building and increasing local ownership over the JAP (ibid). Somaliland was the one place in Somalia, in which a degree of local buy-in appeared to succeed. The Strategic Review from 2015 documented an improved pace in the field office of Hargeisa, which was credited to the negotiated JAP with the local authorities stating that the agreement followed a bottom-up approach being aligned with Somaliland’s vision<sup>16</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 473). However, both interview of representatives from EUCAP Nestor and the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized the EU had the lead throughout the process, essentially conducting the JAP on basis of how they wanted to assist<sup>17</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 474).

During the first years of the mission, the activities mostly consisted of training and workshop seminars, which was conducted without proper mapping, legal framework, follow-up and monitoring. The training and the knowledge transfer were not accompanied by equivalent capacity-

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<sup>14</sup> A quote from an internal document, without public access, from a Cooperation Agreement the 8<sup>th</sup> June 2014 between the Government of Somaliland and EUCAP Nestor. The quote was found in Ejdus 2018.

<sup>15</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2018

<sup>16</sup> The strategic review is an internal document, not open for public viewing. It is therefore using Ejdus 2017 as a quoting source.

<sup>17</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017

building resulting in unsustainability due to lacking facilities and resources in which to maintain the knowledge<sup>18</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 473). The locals attending workshops further expressed a redundancy and disconnect from the local context in the training, where e.g. the available resources in training like computers were not always accessible in everyday work life. This was amended in 2016 with the creation of EUCAP Somalia in which the mission stopped the dominating focus on training, instead focusing on enhancing civilian law enforcement in coastal areas and support authorities in developing necessary legislative structures (EU: 2016: 2).

To sum up, EU's values and liberal worldview is achieved through instruments like joint planning and its emphasis on mutual inclusion and local ownership. The principle of local ownership is in practice incorporated into EU procedures in its CSDP interventions and are thus more than just rhetoric. However, the practices are based on the rationality of the EU instead of the locals seeking the locals to achieve a sense of ownership over the implementation of objectives that are not of their own making.

### The Knowledge Dimension

It is standard procedure before approving an intervention to consult experts having them conduct a fact-finding mission. In the case of EUCAP Nestor this was done by the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the fall of 2011. However, there was strong political pressures and lobbying from the shipping industries to deploy a mission sooner rather than later, which affected the conducting of the fact-finding mission. Furthermore, an EU delegation representative<sup>19</sup> expressed that another challenge was the interlocutors who were to articulate local needs being uninformed about the EU's intent to launch a CSDP mission, thus not able to correctly inform the locals needs (Ejdus: 2017: 472). The next step was the PSC in December 2011 tasking the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC) to start operational planning and to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). CPCC is the body within EEAS that manages the operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian mission (Dari et. al.: 2012: 29). Civilian and military CSDP missions are to some degree separate from each other, which also is the case when considering procedures and decision-making processes. The Council created CPCC to manage civilian operations in 2007 leading to a boost in CSDP mission. However, EU representatives based in Brussels stated that it was clear from the planning and management of EUCAP Nestor, that the CPCC is overstretched

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<sup>18</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017

<sup>19</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017

unsurprisingly due to the relatively large number of civilian missions conducted by EU<sup>20</sup> (Tejpar & Zetterlund: 2013: 37). In February 2011 CPCC led a one-month Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) with assistance in maritime expertise from the EU member states. However, they did not send enough maritime advisors, which were critical importance for the mission (Ejdus: 2017: 472). The assessment team consisted of experts in the areas of politico-strategic expertise, operational experts and mission support, including security and logistics. They visited both political and operational stakeholders in the identified countries, concluding that the conditions and needs were different in all five, and presented the findings at CONOPS in March (Tejpar & Zetterlund: 2013: 13-14). The mission, however, failed to assess the needs and expectations in each host countries and an interview with one EU diplomat stated that the EUCAP Nestor was highly ill-conceived<sup>21</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 472). The forms of expertise informing the mission were therefore flawed because it was conducted in too short a timeframe (a month), which resulted in an initial overambitious mandate compared to the financial and human resources the EU put in the mission, resulting in EUCAP Nestor suffering from limited capacity (Tejpar & Zetterlund: 2013: 27).

The intergovernmental structure of CSDP are organized so that member states plays a large part, and can become a great obstacle in the implementation of the local ownership principle, since the EU member states need to approve unanimously each step of an intervention from planning strategic documents (CMC) and operational documents (CONOPS and OPLAN) (Ejdus: 2017: 468). This is unlike other entities that deploy peace support operations. The member state delegates in PSC negotiate and decide internally how and what the mission should look like based on the limited understanding from fact-finding and technical assessment missions. This organization of the PSC have led to a micro-management of many of CSDP interventions resulting in slow-decision making, inflexibility and lack of feed-back loop. This is also the case of EUCAP Nestor in which the structure implicitly affected the conduct of EU representative on the ground, and an interviewee have explained most the time was spend on paperwork justifying the operation instead of on the actual implementation<sup>22</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 472). Furthermore, the rigid CSDP structure and lack of flexibility, in the beginning of EUCAP Nestor, lead to missed deadlines with projects being stuck in PSC over a year (ibid). Moreover, the achievement of local ownership is hindered by the fact that CSDP intervention must renew the mandate every two years and approve budgets yearly. This

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<sup>20</sup> Interview from Tejpar and Zetterlund: 2013: 37.

<sup>21</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017

<sup>22</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017



inflexibility and lack of clear knowledge from onset further lead to the mission being spread to wide across five countries, and it was later realized the root of the piracy and maritime security problem was in Somalia, resulting in EUCAP Somalia replacing EUCAP Nestor in December 2016.

To sum up, achieving local ownership is challenging due to the everyday habits and ingrained rituals and practices of imposition existing in general within the international peacebuilding culture and more specifically within CSDP. Additionally, the rationale and expertise on which EUCAP Nestor was established, were more dominated by EU than the inclusion of local priorities and needs, and the deployment was restricted by limitation of the budget and human resources, which did not correspond with the high ambition.

### The Individual and Collective Dimension

A characteristic of EUCAP Nestor is the unclarity around the civilian and military aspects. It is labelled a civilian mission with military expertise without defining whether the functions and duties of the coastguard are civilian or military (Tejpar & Zetterland: 2013: 27). In some countries the coastguard is civilian and in others it is military, which means that some of the mission's host states are military while others are civilian. However, some aspects of EUCAP Nestor's mandate are strictly civilian like rule of law and coastal police. This characteristic of EUCAP affected the duties and expectations of the staff's qualities resulting in most staff being hired as civilians with military backgrounds. It proved troublesome during the first year to recruit personnel with the right skills<sup>23</sup>. The fact that EU emphasized the importance of the military attributes was reflected in the many EU calls for contribution in which military experience was required and that the first Head of Mission (HoM) Jacques Launay had a high-profile military background (ibid). The first HoM had besides his military profile, substantial experience of the region and was respected for his knowledge on piracy issues as well as for his extensive network in the Horn of Africa. However, his lack of experience with EU institutions and of leading a civilian mission (Tejpar & Zetterland: 2013: 28). However, it proved difficult to merge military cultures and working practices with civilian CSDP practices. The military culture is primarily based on hierarchy and a top-down structure. While the military expertise was beneficial in areas like facilitating liaison with local counterparts, especially when these have been military, it was problematic for military background personnel to

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<sup>23</sup> Interview from Tejpar & Zetterland 2013

comprehend the CSDP structures and adapting working routines that aligned both to the mission's support capabilities in the field and in Brussels<sup>24</sup>.

Additionally, the EU culture of seconded staff, including advisors, has been characterized by a high turnover rate in the mission, typically staying onboard for a year and a half to quickly return to their national systems. The seconded staff are usually held accountable at their own national systems making the HoM powerless if they do not pull their weight on the ground (Ejdus: 2017: 469). There is often a long gap before the new person fills up the vacant position with no direct handover of duties, which negatively affects the local trust and thus interest in participation or ownership. A representative of the Attorney General Office in Somaliland has mentioned that the EU seconded staff leave just as they have been there long enough to understand the local context resulting in no continuity<sup>25</sup> (Ejdus: 2017: 473). Moreover, the substandard pre-deployment training for the staff are in the hands of the EU member states further aggravating the problem making them less prepared and in tune for the local needs and conditions.

To sum up, the types of capabilities, attributes and qualities assumed by EU to their seconded personnel in EUCAP Nestor has been characterized by military background and knowledge, despite the mission being civilian. The military missions are typically managed in a more top-down manner due to necessity in carrying out the mission (usually have execute mandate) and the more hierarchical culture dictating the military field. This have on one side contributed to some positives in establishing connections with local army men, but on the other side created trouble in understanding the everyday procedures embedded in the CSDP structure. The EU seems to have slightly corrected for this by recruiting new HoMs with an EU civilian background, like Maria-Christina Stepanescu, who was HoM from the fall of 2016.

## Conclusion

Local ownership is a principle universally endorsed by international state- and peacebuilders. EU has been a frontrunner in endorsing the trend by adopting local ownership across all its external policies. Despite the high rhetoric, local ownership persists as one of the weakest links in international interventions, and EU has struggled in its implementation thereof in its CSDP missions. The increasing literature on local ownership have not dealt systematically with CSDP intervention, and similarly the literature on CSDP have had very little focus on the challenges of

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<sup>24</sup> Interview from Tejpar & Zetterland 2013

<sup>25</sup> Interview from Ejdus 2017

ownership. The dissertation positions itself within this gap in the literature examining how the principle of local ownership has been conceptualized within the EU, the genealogical ties to colonialism, to what extent it has been implemented in the case of EUCAP Nestor and reasons behind the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice. By using evidence from EUCAP Nestor, the thesis's main argument is that local ownership does not produce its intended outcome due to its political rationality, which are driven by rationality of the EU and advanced democracies and not by the host states.

Through an analysis of the practice regime of the local aspects within EU external interventions, it is shown that political rationality of powerful intervening states can be translated through technology of governance into concrete techniques, mechanism, instruments, procedures, modes of conduct, expectations and framing. Drawing on document analysis and secondary literature, including official EU documents and academic journals references interviews, an analysis was conducted through a genealogical and regime of practices' approach, the thesis presented three arguments. First, the local ownership principle echoes the colonial governance structure of indirect rules both through its emphasis on exporting its liberal values abroad and its practical implementation process of outlying indicators and objectives, then identifying the local actors to be involved. Second, the thesis shows that the practice of local ownership in EUCAP Nestor has not matched EU's policy rhetoric and tended to be operationalized through an externally driven top-down approach. Third, a reason for the EU's struggles of implementing local ownership are inhibited in part to the politics and policy-making procedures of CSDP, due to e.g. slow feed-back loop and decision making, as well as micromanagement from the EU member states.

For further research it would, firstly, be relevant to more fully capture "the local" aspect in EU peacebuilding by conducting extensive fieldwork going beyond the elite interviews with officials that the thesis has drawn on. Most of the extant empirical research focuses on the EU side of the equation, while very little work has been done to unearth local discourses and practices. It could thus instead be interesting reaching out to local stakeholders and achieve a broader scope of the actual recipients of EU's peacebuilding efforts e.g. through participant observation or content analysis of the local press and surveys among the host population. However, this could prove difficult in praxis, since EU interventions usually targets narrow sections within the local security sectors, which are difficult to access in conflict-affected societies, and it would require a strong linguistic expertise and area proficiency. Secondly, it would be interesting to conduct a comparative study examining some of the local ownership issues across a more than one cases e.g. through a

small N studies across regions (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe). Comparing different techniques of ownership and local aspects of peacebuilding initiatives in different geographical contexts, but also in different stages and types of conflict would fill a gap in the current literature. Furthermore, a comparison of different international actors' peacebuilding efforts e.g. like the EU, UN or AU would also be highly interesting. Finally, a normative scholarly debate could be relevant on whether the principle of local ownership is relevant or should be abandoned altogether due to the overwhelming implementation problems and if peacebuilders can continue to justify the application of local ownership.

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