Against all odds: Power of small island states in the climate change negotiations

Case study of AOSIS in UNFCCC negotiations

Dominika Floriánová

Master's Thesis
Culture, Communication and Globalization
Aalborg University
September 15, 2019

Abstract

This thesis is exploring the structuralist paradox of state's power, i.e. a case when weaker parties can effectively negotiate with stronger parties. The success of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the United Nations climate change negotiations (UNFCCC) on the issue of loss and damage (L&D) was chosen as an extreme/unique case. The problem formulation was addressed through answering two specific research questions focusing on the strategies of AOSIS in the climate negotiations on the L&D issue and the way how can the concept of state power be understood through this case.

Qualitative data for this analysis were collected from both primary and secondary sources, including two interviews, the author of this thesis conducted with actors involved in the negotiations on behalf of AOSIS.

The theoretical framework of this thesis builds upon social constructivist stances and the concept of power. Moreover, to understand AOSIS strategies in the UNFCCC negotiations the literature on small states and its strategies in the negotiations have been investigated and transformed into a coherent and relevant theoretical framework. Specifically, the framework of 'borrowing' of power as developed by Rubin and Hartman (2000) and Betzold (2010) is applied on the analysis of AOSIS negotiation strategies and divides the strategies into four distinct categories (process-based, context-based, target-based and third-party based). Additionally, an overarching distinction of hard vs soft strategies is used.

The analysis showed that despite their heterogeneity, the countries of AOSIS succeeded in building a common diplomatic discourse and impactful strategy thanks to its tight coordination and cohesiveness, the justness of its cause and support of the outside expertise. Their main success lied in their recognition as competent actors by other Parties in the negotiations. Furthermore, strong interlinkages between individual categories of negotiation strategies were observed. AOSIS used all of them extensively and no direct preference for a particular strategy was identified as one strategy hardly works without the other.

The power AOSIS was able to construct in the negotiations can be understood as 'issue-specific' power as it is dependent on the context and is specific to the issue of climate change. Therefore, the power of AOSIS has to be understood only in this specific context and cannot be generalized on other institutions or matters. Moreover, the case of AOSIS redefines the traditional understanding of external sources of power as its climate vulnerability becomes a moral asset in the negotiations.

Overall, the case of AOSIS proves that leadership in international affairs is not a simple translation of power to outcomes. Considerations such as moral standing and the urgency of the matter prove to be significant aspects that allowed the Alliance to act 'above politics'.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

While the effects of climate change are already being felt across the globe, some regions are feeling them more intensively than others. Among those who are most likely to suffer first and most from climate change impacts, despite contributing to them the least, are small island developing states (SIDS). While the rise of sea temperature threatens marine ecosystems, on which small island populations are usually strongly dependent, the expected sea-level rise threatens the physical survival of some of the island nations, especially those in the Pacific region. Low capacity of SIDS to adapt to climate change impacts is based on several intrinsic aspects that also led to their historical marginalization in the global political arena. However, their involvement in the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) tells a different story. (Betzold 2010, 131; IPCC 2007, 689; De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282)

SIDS have a vital stake in the international efforts to combat climate change and thus the disengagement with the international political system was not an option. Through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) small islands actively participate in the UNFCCC negotiations, in fact much more than would be expected based on their limited structural power. AOSIS became one of the most vocal participants in the negotiations and is now widely recognized as one of the key players in the climate change regime. Taking into account the limited size of AOSIS and almost negligible political clout, their recognition and influence on the negotiation process is truly are remarkable. (Betzold 2010, 131; De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282; Depledge and Yamin, 2004; Larson 2003, 135)

Traditionally, small states are portrayed as reactive players in international relations, they are expected to respond to international politics but not to lead (Benwell 2011, 199). Because of this, the case of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations serves as an example of so-called 'structuralist paradox' in negotiations. Structuralist paradox represents a case when weaker parties can effectively negotiate with stronger parties. (Betzold 2010, 132; Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 157).

This paradox is demonstrated especially through the negotiations on the issue of *loss and damage* (L&D) resulting from climate change (Calliari 2018, 742). The concept of L&D refers to the climate change impacts that are exceeding the adaptive capacity of countries and ecosystems. These impacts are mostly slow-onset processes like above-mentioned sea-level or temperature rise (Climate Analytics 2019).

It was AOSIS who opened the debate on the L&D issue and intensively advocated for its institutionalization under the UNFCCC. However, this was in no way easy. The issue of L&D is politically very contentious to many of the developed countries as it touches upon the concepts of state responsibility, liability and compensation (Benjamin and Thomas 2017, 2371; Huq 2017). "*Developed countries have generally been critical and provided the opposite stance to developing countries on negotiations around L&D*" (Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 161). In many ways, the contestation over L&D is part of a larger picture of enduring mistrust between developed and developing state parties in global environmental governance (Hestbaek and Vanhala 2016, 2).

Despite these challenges, after many years of negotiations, developing countries managed to push through the establishment of specific L&D mechanism in 2013 at the climate conference in Warsaw and two years later also a stand-alone article on the L&D issue in the Paris Agreement. Both of these events are considered milestones for the L&D and major victories for developing countries. It is necessary to point out that a leading role in the process was assumed by AOSIS. (Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 157; Calliari 2018, 725)

1. 1. Research gap

The capacity of small island states to influence the UNFCCC negotiations has been previously explored by for example Betzold (2010), Benwell (2011) or De Águeda Corneloup and Mol (2014). While these studies shed light on a relatively overlooked topic they were conducted with limited time frames, differing design and none of them specifically addressed loss and damage.

According to Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski (2019) L&D serves as an interesting case in the field of international relations due to its "r*elevance of power dynamics in the climate change negotiations setting and its complex, asymmetrical and multilateral characteristics"* (156). Also according to Calliari (2018), the L&D issue is neglected in the international relations' research (725).

Additionally, Calliari (2018) also points out that further research on the sources of negotiating power of the developing countries would be beneficial (742). This was previously suggested by Corneloup (2014) who claims that "*there has been little systematic research on the resources, strategies, and effectiveness of small islands in recent international climate change negotiations*" (282). The research gap is further supported by Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) who conclude that the role of small states has been largely neglected in the research of the process and outcome of multilateral negotiations.

1. 2. Problem formulation

Building upon the provided introduction this thesis will be exploring the structuralist paradox from the perspective of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations on the issue of loss and damage. Power is one of the main concepts in international relations and element in the state's negotiations. However, in the traditional terms, these small island states do not possess any 'real' power, therefore they had to construct some of it or redefine the traditional concept to negotiate with real outcomes and to make their voice heard.

The **problem formulation** for this thesis was stated as follows:

How can we understand the structuralist paradox of small state's power through the case of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations on the issue of loss and damage?

Specific focus was articulated in two **research questions**:

- What are the strategies of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations towards L&D issue?
- How can the concept of state power be understood or redefined through the AOSIS role in these negotiations?

2. Methods

The following chapter serves to provide an overview of the research methods and aims to explain how the research was conducted 'step by step'. Firstly the research design of the case study is introduced together with the justification of case and theory selection. Secondly, the research strategy outlines the general nature of this research and explains both how the data were collected and analyzed. Finally, some limitations of this case study are identified together with ways of how the researcher tried to balance them.

2. 1. Research design

This thesis aims is to explore the strategies and power of AOSIS in the UN climate change negotiations, specifically concerning the issue of loss and damage. The formulation of the research aim already suggests that the research design for this thesis is a **case study**.

The case study design entails a detailed analysis of a single case that should contribute to the researcher's knowledge about the individual, group, organizational, social, political and related phenomena. Case study comprises an all-encompassing method that covers the logic of the research strategy, data collection and approach to the analysis. However, a case study does not only mean a study focusing on a certain group, an event or a geographic location, but it should also aim to reveal the unique features of the chosen case. (Bryman 2015, 60-61; Yin 2003, 1, 41) The case study of this thesis aims to explore and understand the unique phenomena of micro-states gathering influence and making their voice heard in enormous multilateral format negotiations.

The case study was identified as an appropriate way for research by Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) who in his extensive research argues that the strategy is often misunderstood and unjustly oversimplified. According to him, even though the case study is a detailed examination of a single case, it does not automatically mean that its conclusion cannot relate to a broader class of cases (220). Further on, Flyvbjerg claims that "*formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the force of example is underestimated*" (2006, 228). Through this reasoning, even though the case chosen for this thesis is very unique, the author believes it can contribute to broader research on the power of small states in the multilateral negotiations.

Hans Eysenck (1976), who originally regarded the case study as nothing more than a method of producing anecdotes, later realized that "*sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases, not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something*" (9). In line with this Flyvbjerg argues that while finding proofs is not always possible in social science because of missing 'hard' theory, learning certainly possible is (2006, 224).

2. 1. 1. Case selection

The strategic selection of a case can have direct implications for increased generalizability of its findings. Especially extreme or unique cases can often reveal more information about the studied

phenomenon as they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the studied situation. (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229; Yin 2003, 40)

The case for this thesis was chosen through "*information-oriented selection*" which "*maximizes the utility of information from small samples and single cases*". According to Flybjerg's definition of cases, the chosen case of this thesis can be classified as the least-likely under the extreme/deviant case category (2006, 230-231).

AOSIS members are not just small states but most of them are micro-states that are geographically isolated and mostly developing, their military capacities and economic resources are extremely limited and thus based on traditional criteria they do not possess any power that could transform into political influence in the multilateral negotiations. Moreover, the case focuses on AOSIS influence specifically through the lens of the L&D which is a politically very contentious issue under the UNFCCC negotiations which makes the success of AOSIS even more unique. For these reasons, the author of this thesis believes that the chosen case fulfills the characteristics of a least-likely and thus extreme or unique case. Focus on the L&D was chosen also to limit the scope and to narrow the focus of the research.

According to Yin (2003), "*the previous literature can become a guide for defining the case and unit of analysis*" (26). This was also the way how the case of this thesis was identified. For personal motivation and the topicality of the matter, the author was searching for a thesis topic within the field of climate change. Firstly, the author became aware of the L&D issue which holds potential for research. While reading literature on loss and damage the surprising role of the small island states in the climate change negotiations surfaced and "planted a seed of curiosity". Moreover, as previously outlined in the introduction, the author identified gaps in both the recent research on AOSIS role and strategies in the UNFCCC negotiations and the L&D issue from the international relations' perspective.

The time boundaries within the selected case were not established because they would result in the loss of context, necessary for the understanding of this case. The analysis thus goes from the establishment of the AOSIS at the beginning of the 90s to the most recent empirical example which is used from June this year (2019). However, to effectively contribute to the research on this topic and to make the thesis relevant in this point of time, the analysis is focused mostly on the period starting from 2013 (the year when the first mechanism on L&D was established) until today.

Besides the time constraints, the specific focus on L&D issue limits the scope and narrows the focus of the case study. The scope of the research is also narrowed by focusing mostly on the most significant climate conference Conference of the Parties (COP) that happens by the end of each year, as this year's COP did not yet take place, the last climate change conference that took place in June this year (SBSTA 50, Bonn) is also included.

2. 2. 1. Theory selection

Yin argues that the complete research design of case study embodies a 'theory' of what is being studied. However, this theory can in no way be understood as a formal grand theory in social science. The theoretical propositions should rather aim for "*sufficient blueprint of the study*". This

theory should serve as "*(hypothetical) story about why acts, events, structure and thought occur*". Through this, the design will be strong to determine what data to collect and what are the strategies for analyzing them. (Yin 2003, 29)

The theoretical framework of this thesis was developed in line with the above-suggested procedure. Through a brief literature review on the case, the appropriate approach was chosen. Firstly, to be able to understand the chosen case more broadly the social constructivist stances and within it, the concept of power were included. Power is a central concept in a field of international relations and the social constructivism with its focus on other than material aspects proposed the only possible framework from the traditional international relations' theories. To understand specific aspects and activities of AOSIS that might be behind its influence in the climate change negotiations, the literature on small states and its strategies in the negotiations have been investigated and transformed into a coherent and relevant theoretical framework that provided 'a template' for the collection of the data and its analysis.

2. 2. Research Strategy

The research strategy applied in this thesis to collect and analyze non-numeric data is of a **qualitative** nature. The qualitative research has an explorative aim and unlike quantitative strategy, it usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman 2015, 374). The role of the qualitative researcher can be understood as a detective who is looking for and analyzing information that can contribute to answering the research question (Hendl 2016, 46).

In line with the problem formulation and the qualitative research strategy, this project will be influenced by an **interpretivist** approach. Interpretivism differentiates between the social and natural sciences and has as its goal the understanding of the meaning of social phenomena (Bryman 2016 26-27). Moreover, according to Lamont (2015), the interpretivist approach often relies upon case studies that focus on particular discourses in a given context, representations of particular individuals or events (43). This thesis focuses on particular individuals/actors (AOSIS), events (climate change negotiations) and aims at understanding some kind of phenomenon. Moreover, social constructivism, on which the theoretical framework of this study is based, belongs to the interpretivist branch of social theories.

The aim of this thesis is not a formulation of a new theory, thus, even though the qualitative research typically takes an inductive approach, that is not the case here. Furthermore, the problem formulation is not based on theory nor hypothesis as it is typical for a deductive approach. The theoretical framework was established after initial empirical research and therefore the relation to the theory in this thesis can be understood as **iterative**. According to Bryman (2015), the iterative approach is demonstrated by weaving back and forth between the data and the theory (22-23). While the theoretical framework of this thesis is written in a relevant way to the analysis it is written in a general way and through the theoretical reflections in the analysis, the process comes all together, as the concrete aspects of the theoretical framework are tied up with the analysis' findings.

2. 2. 1. Data collection

The data set for this research consisted of a wide range of both primary and secondary sources. The triangulation of data through different sources and collection methods aimed at enhancing the internal validity of the case study.

Primary sources collected for this thesis consisted of relevant UNFCCC agreements, AOSIS' speeches, videos from opening and closing segments of the climate conferences and most importantly two interviews conducted by the author of this thesis with actors involved in the negotiations on behalf of AOSIS.

The author tried to conduct more interviews by sending email with the request for possible contacts directly to the AOSIS group, several governments of AOSIS countries, several NGOs and also the UNFCCC Secretariat, however in the end only three people responded (some of the responses included possible contacts, however this number includes only direct offers for participation in the rsearch). Low response rate can be possibly attributed to the fact that the emails were sent during summer period, when people are likely to be on holidays. Fortunately, all people that answered were willing to contribute to the research, however, the third person was not able to answer the questions before the deadline of this thesis.

Before conducting the interviews the set of 15 questions was prepared based on the theoretical framework, general context and gaps in the collected data. The first person who answered the questions over email was Dr Ian Fry, international environmental law and policy expert, who participates in the climate change negotiations as Ambassador for the Delegation of Tuvalu since its beginning. I saw his name in the literature and then found his contact details online. The second person, who also is directly involved in the negotiations for many years, answered the questions over a Skype call that lasted for more than an hour. Due to the fact, the interview happened over Skype there was a possibility to react to the answers and ask additional questions. However, this contact wished to remain anonymous and in this text is cited as AOSIS consultant. The second contact was obtained through the Government of Maldives.

Secondary sources used in this thesis included peer-reviewed journal articles and books, NGOs' and governmental reports, information from AOSIS and UNFCCC websites as well as newspaper articles. Most of these sources were obtained through an internet search, articles and books were mainly obtained from scholarly databases accessed through Aalborg University's library. The secondary sources were collected both by inserting keywords into the databases and through snowball sampling (going through bibliographies or noticing relevant sources in the literature).

2. 2. 2. Data analysis

After the data were collected they were analyzed and structured according to the problem formulation and theoretical framework.

The analysis was divided into two interlinked parts. First section included empirical data on the general context that sets up the building ground for the findings of the following analytical section and theoretical reflections. The contextual part of the analysis was also in line with some important

aspects of the theoretical framework, especially the importance of context and identity for the social constructivism, together with exploring some main characteristics and lack of traditional power resources of small island states and the way in which the climate change and L&D issues specifically is particularly salient to them.

The second part of the analysis was structured based on specific categories of negotiation strategies as described in the theoretical framework section. The empirical data were thus sorted and analyzed through pre-defined categories. The focus here was put on using concrete examples and quotes to understand the practical aspects of the phenomenon.

The final stage of the analysis involved gathering the analytical findings, discussing them and connecting them to the theoretical framework. This process also happened on the two levels, on the more specific one when the findings were linked to the theories of negotiations strategies and on the broader level when they were linked to the social constructivism and concept of power.

In the process of the analysis, the author was coming back to some literature and already written thesis' sections, especially the theoretical framework. Firstly, this was ensuring cohesiveness of the texts and findings, secondly, coming back to some of the text in various stages of the process always brought new perspectives and findings.

2. 3. Limitations

The main limitation of this research stems from the nature of the UNFCCC negotiations where much of the process is informal and happens 'behind the closed doors' without any kind of documentation. And even though this is a regular practice in diplomacy, climate change negotiations are especially infamous for this (AOSIS consultant 2019; Odell 2013, 17). For example, during the last UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties in Katowice, many of the observers complained that almost the whole second week of negotiations unfolded behind closed doors with few reports coming back from the ministerial consultations (IISD 2018c).

The author tried to offset this limitation by conducting interviews with people who are directly involved in the negotiations, however, it is assumed that even they do not have access to all levels of the negotiations plus some of the internal aspects are expected to be concealed from the researcher. Moreover, the way they answer the questions might be subjected by their direct involvement on the side of AOSIS. Nevertheless, the interviews were extremely beneficial to the research as they served as kind of a 'reality check' for the secondary sources and added more detailed knowledge of the negotiation process. The possible subjectivity of the interviews was thus offset by critical evaluation of the answers and combination with other sources.

Another source that helped to partly offset the inability to be present at the negotiations were the reports called *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* (ENB) published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). ENB offers comprehensive and objective daily coverage and overall summaries of the official UNFCCC negotiations for the last 25 years. However, one disadvantage of these reports is the fact that not always are the countries directly named in the reports, often the text refers only to 'developing country' or 'group of developing countries' and it is impossible to conclude whether that means AOSIS.

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework created in order to analyze and discuss the problem formulation of this thesis. The theoretical framework as outlined below can be understood as a funnel set-up divided into three parts, starting from the most general moving to the specifics. The whole framework does not aim to provide the only possible understanding or solution but it sets up a frame in which the analysis and its findings are to be understood and discussed. Together with building up the framework for the analysis, this chapter also defines main concepts and terms, such as power or negotiation. The description of the theoretical framework also aims to be as specific as possible in relation to the defined problem formulation and research questions.

Firstly, **social constructivism** as a general frame and ontology is depicted. Section focusing on the **concept of power** follows. This section covers definitions and traditional understandings of power in international relations and moves towards its understanding in the context of social constructivism and negotiations. The theoretical framework is finalized with a section focusing on the **negotiation process and strategies** which especially small states can apply to increase their power in international negotiations, including some of their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an explanation of how will be the chosen theoretical framework utilized in the following analysis.

3. 1. Social constructivism

Social constructivism, even though often put together with realism and liberalism as a trio of the most prominent international relations theories, is more of an **ontological position** than a theory in a traditional understanding (Krpec, Kříž, Suchý and Pšeja 2016, 95). As a theoretical paradigm, it is relatively recent and in many ways, it challenges both realist and liberal theories in explaining power relations and international negotiations (Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166).

The fundamental feature of constructivism, that distinguishes it from the former schools of thought the most, is the ontological assumption that the world is being **socially constructed** (Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166; Downie 2014, 19; Guzzini 2013, 219). Thus, contrary to positivism, constructivism assumes there is no objective reality or truth. Some facts can only exist because people attribute certain function or meaning to them, hence the **meanings** are being constructed as human beings interact with the world they are interpreting (Bouckenooghe et al. 2008, 325; Guzzini 2013, 201). Thus, the truth is not seen as something that can be objectively observed in the world, but rather something that is a product of social interactions with others (Burr 1995).

"As we are all born into a world of meaning that is shaped by context and culture, the basic generation of knowledge always has a social dimension, arising in and out of interaction with the community" (Bouckenooghe et al. 2008, 325).

According to Guzzini's (2013) summary, constructivism is epistemologically about the social **construction of knowledge**, and ontologically about the **construction of social reality.** Furthermore, Guzzini also emphasizes the reflexive relationship between the social construction of

knowledge and the construction of social reality, in other words in what ways can the social construction of knowledge affect the construction of social reality and vice versa. (219)

"*How people and states think and behave in world politics is premised on their understanding of the world around them, which includes their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they participate"* (Hurd 2008 in Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166).

The concepts of **identity** and **practice** are another central building blocks in social constructivism that are inextricably related. The international system, as seen by constructivists, is socially constructed through practices and through social processes identities are being constituted and seen as a variable. (Neumann and Williams 2000, 362; Guzzini 2013, 21) Through the context of identities, perceptions of the situation, in which actors find themselves and the courses of action they view as reasonable to pursue, are being constructed. Moreover, legitimate identities are bound to roles and to structures of power (Neumann and Williams 2000, 362, 364).

For an actor to establish an identity, it is firstly important to locate itself in **the context** of a past and a future and therefore the construction of identity is one which stresses the role of **narratives structures** within the process (Neumann and Williams 2000, 362). The narrative and discursive structures do not emerge instrumentally but rather as practical responses to emerging situations (Neumann and Williams 2000, 385). In formulating the responses, actors are sensitive and contingent to historical, social, political and normative contexts (Burr 1995; Adler 2002 in Downie 2014, 19).

Constructivists also emphasize the *logic of appropriateness* in a state's behavior, in other words, a belief that states base their decisions on what seems like 'the right thing to do' (Downie 2014, 19). Constructivism is showing that **norms** matter and thus **ethical and legal standards** have importance in guiding world politics (Snyder 2004 in Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166). In relation to this thesis it is relevant to point out that scholars have found shared norms play a role in shaping the negotiation process in an international organization. "*Norms can empower certain actors as legitimate in the process, rule certain arguments out of order, and determine which discursive strategy will be effective*" (Odell 2013, 12).

3. 2. Concept of Power

The concept of power is one of the central, if not the most central, concepts in the field of international relations. For example, Kaplan and Lasswell (1950) described the concept of power as "*perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science*" (75) and Elster (1976) has written about "*the most important single idea in political theory*" (249). Many more similar examples could be shown here, however the importance of the power as a concept in international relations is obvious, its understanding, however, not as much. Power is a concept that has been discussed by countless scholars and not one explanation can be considered as the 'right' one because *power* has variety of purposes as well as understandings.

In traditional realist definition, power equates with force. However, such an explanation of power seems very insufficient and narrow and especially not acceptable in the constructivist view. As was

outlined above, there is no single definition of power, nevertheless, in order to understand the concept in more depth and especially in terms of this paper, few definitions will follow.

For example, according to Zartman (1997) power is exercised when "*an actor's moves can negatively or positively alter the value of a particular action's outcome for the target*" (231). On a similar note, other scholars have agreed on a definition that "*power is the capacity to move somebody in a direction he would not have chosen without the interference of somebody else*" (Dahl 1957, 203; Habeeb 1988: 15) or in other words power can be defined as *"an action by one party intended to produce movement by another*". In the sense power is not seen as a component (resource) nor as a result (cause) but, in between the two, as a purposeful action. (Zartman 1997).

3. 2. 1. 'Measuring' power

Traditionally, power is measured by economic resources (such as the national product, per capita income or the share of the world trade) and military capacities. Some scholars are also adding resources, population, national character, diplomatic skills or factors such as climate, topography, education or demography. However, the approaches focusing purely on material power resources and traditional indicators of power are not sufficient, especially in the context of negotiations, because they disregard the capabilities necessary to transform material capacities into political action. "*The political will, energy and dedication to a political program are of equal importance and determine the relations among governments in their negotiations*". Even though the possession of material resources can definitely help in achieving the goals in negotiation they do not necessarily lead to satisfactory results. (Landau and Pfetsch 2000, 28, 35, 40; Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019)

Defining power in terms of resources seems logical as it enables relatively precise, direct, even quantifiable, measure. However, resources come in many shapes and sizes, often even shapelessly, for example in a form of leadership or moral sources of power, these cannot be measured at all. (Zartman 1997)

3. 2. 2. Power in social constructivism

According to Baldwin (2013), in existing conceptions of power concerns, the most basic distinction is whether power is a capability (something that one owns) or a relation (a social dynamic). While capabilities, as explained above, are traditionally the focus of realists, constructivist scholars focus on the social aspects. Some power resources are only produced locally, in and through a particular practice. (Guzzini 2013, 5; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, 891-892)

Constructivism belongs to the interpretivist branch of social theories and as such it simply cannot perceive power in terms of resources alone (Guzzini 2013, 5). Neumann and Williams (2000) argue that social constructivism needs to incorporate into its analyses a focus on the multiple sources and structures of social power (360).

Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) concluded in their research, which focused on the theorizing of power in practice, that except material capabilities and discursive dominance while studying power

it is necessary to look at it from the perspective of everyday social interactions with the inclusion of how various resources are deployed. Central to their framework is a concept of 'emergent power' referring to the endogenous resources, such as social skills or competences, generated within the practice. The concept of competence is seen as fundamental in their research and is defined as a social skill with "*the ability to engage others in collective action*". However, the authors admit that there are no grounds from which to evaluate competence objectively. (891-895, 909)

3. 2. 3. Power in negotiations

Power is a crucial concept to be considered in terms of negotiations. Power structures, either real or perceived, are the underlying basic elements of the negotiating process and they determine, to a certain extent, the final outcome (Landau and Pfetsch 2000, 25). In line with previously outlined power definitions, "*negotiating power means the ability to move the decisions of the other side in the desired way*" (Rubin and Zartman 2000, 255).

As a measure of influencing negotiation outcomes, power has both an internal and external dimension. External power resources, such as most notably country's economic strength, are "*determined by an actor's environment and therefore difficult to change during the course of negotiations*" (Bailer 2004, 100). Internal sources of power, which include for example delegation size and the negotiation skills of the diplomatic staff, are more subtle from the external sources of power and thus possible to be changed during the negotiations. The presence and especially skillful use of internal power sources "*can lead to negotiation dynamics that cannot be explained by appeal to external power resources alone*". For this reason, internal factors can be crucial in understanding the negotiations process and outcomes. However, Internal power resources of states are more complicated to observe and are mostly linked to their diplomatic delegations. (Weiler 2012, 555-556).

As previously mentioned, aggregate measures of power might provide little understanding about power positions in specific bargaining circumstances, such as climate talks. Some of the issue areas might be heavily influenced by the skillful use of non-material capabilities, such as for example knowledge or expertise (Guzzini 2013, 211). Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski (2019) in their research conclude that a relevant indicator in such contexts is '*issue-specific power*' - "*the amount of relevant resources a Party can use for a specific conflict or concern*". The delegation size and capacity are deemed as two main resources relevant in a multilateral setting such as the UNFCCC. (165) Furthermore, along the constructivist line, Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski (2019) assume that L&D negotiations are shaped not only by material power sources or state interest but also by competition between states surrounding different understandings and framings (170).

It was already emphasized previously in this section that the traditional focus on power as force and possession, provides only little insight and a weak basis for the analysis of negotiations. Instead, this way of thinking sets up the so-called 'structuralists paradox', the fact that the most powerful party in terms of force or resources does not necessarily win at negotiations. (Zartman 1997)

Small states more than others are traditionally seen as lacking the conventional dimensions of power, nevertheless, as Chong and Maass (2010) stress, they are by no means powerless. The

challenge often lies in identifying particular and unconventional sources of small states' power but the authors go as far as to claim that once this power is exerted it can "*stabilize international order by addressing humanitarian and moral issues that larger states have condoned*". (381) On the same note, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted in 1998 that global leadership is exactly what small states have to offer in certain issue areas, especially where there is the necessity of cooperation for 'the common good'. Moreover, in the literature focusing on small states, it is often argued that "*size is not and objectively given fact but a social construction*" (Panke 2012, 314)

3. 3. Negotiation process and strategies

To continue building up the theoretical framework further on, it is first appropriate to conceptualize the understanding of negotiation as a process for this thesis. Negotiation can be understood as "*a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands, arguments, and proposals to each other for the ostensible purpose of reaching an agreement"* (Iklé 1964, 711 in Odell 2013, 2).

This thesis is specifically focusing on a multilateral type of negotiations. Unlike bilateral negotiations that are associated with measurable costs and benefits, multilateral negotiations are often thought of as problematic, diffuse and difficult to manage. However, Larson (2003) in her study also suggests that due to the nature of multilateral negotiations, which is more inclusive and transparent than the bilateral type, low-power parties can step up as influential participants in the debates (133, 145).

In addition, the negotiations in which the position of AOSIS is to be analyzed are of asymmetric nature as negotiations under the UNFCCC are characterized by power asymmetries, especially in the case of AOSIS (Calliari 2018, 728). Betzold (2010) points out that even though the research on asymmetric negotiations is quite scarce, the existing studies suggest that the 'less powerful' actors in the traditional sense can in fact still obtain substantial and often even better than expected results (132).

3. 3. 1. Small states in negotiations

In general, small states are usually less active in the international negotiations or seen as such, because they often lack cognitive, financial and administrative resources as well as bargaining leverage. For these reasons, small states tend to have smaller and less well-equipped delegates. The smaller the delegation is, the less it is also able to participate in the informal part of the negotiations where the most contentious issues are likely to be discussed and solved. Larger delegations can also react faster to new proposals or to come with compromises, but on the other hand, they might also take longer to decide than smaller delegations. Moreover, small states also possess fewer resources for developing compelling arguments or appealing framing strategies and with limited staff, it is also more difficult for them to approach other actors in the negotiation process. For these reasons, the small states often have to prioritize and instead of paying attention to all issues in great detail they invest the limited resources in issues of the highest importance for them in order to achieve some positive outcomes in the negotiations. (Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 167; Bailer 2012, 540; Panke 2012, 313, 319)

Small states face several disadvantages when it comes to the international negotiations, in order to compensate for these they can employ negotiation strategies. Even though these are in principle the same strategies that can also be used by ‘stronger' parties, there are certain specifics that need to be considered by ‘weaker' party when deciding which strategy is appropriate. (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 348)

3. 3. 2. Negotiation determinants and strategies

As the previous sub-section on the concept of power proposes, next to power resources, states and their respective diplomatic delegations can use a variety of negotiation strategies in order to raise their odds in the negotiations (Odell 2010). The term ‘strategy' in the context of negotiation is usually referring to “*the overall behavioral pattern of a negotiator or delegation*”, whereas the term ‘tactic' usually describes “*a move within an overall negotiation plan or strategy*” (Bailer 2012, 535).

The analytical part of this paper aims to explore the the strategies of AOSIS used to construct their power in the UNFCCC negotiations and it will therefore also examine the tactics these strategies consist of. Such an approach seems to be appropriate as a great deal of the success or failure of a UNFCCC meeting rests on the strategies applied by the different country delegations (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012, 528). However, it should be noted that these strategies are not completely distinct from each other and to a certain extent, they overlap and complement each other, not only theoretically, but also in practice (Betzold 2010, 138).

First of all, one important determinant, not strategy per se, should be mentioned - **the salience of an issue** to an actor in negotiations. Generally, salience indicates the importance of an issue for an actor, in the context of this thesis salience indicates how important climate change is for a country or the degree to which it is affected by it. The previous research suggests that the level of vulnerability of a country to climate change can have a positive influence on its negotiation success. Firstly, the salience gives a reason and especially motivation to be very vocal during negotiations which results in situations when these states are hard to ignore. Secondly, high-level salience can provide the country with certain moral authority which can transform into another source of power. On the other hand, the pressure that comes from high vulnerability can result in accepting worse deals due to the urgency to solve the issue. (Bailer 2012, 537-538; Weiler 2012, 556)

The negotiation strategies of states can be divided between **hard and soft strategies**. Hard, so-called conflictive or aggressive strategies, aim to benefit one country over another. They might include for example threats and demands, shaming tactics, criticizing or purposefully denying an agreement. Soft strategies, also defined as cooperative or friendly, might include compromising, proposing solutions, showing flexibility or offering concessions. While hard strategies tend to lead to win-lose situations, soft strategies can often end up in win-win situations. Some scholars have claimed that weaker states tend to choose soft strategies over the hard ones because it would not look credible otherwise. However, others claimed that in the UNFCCC negotiations, even small states can deploy hard strategies because every country has the power to veto a given proposal. Use of hard strategies by weaker states might also be successful when the issue being negotiated is notably salient for them. It is thus suggested that highly vulnerable countries are more likely to

use hard negotiation strategies. (Bailer 2012, 536-537; Gupta 2012, 634; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012, 530; Weiler 2012, 557-558)

One of the most characteristic features of multilateral negotiations is the strategy of **coalition forming**. "*A coalition is a set of parties who coordinate explicitly among themselves and defend the same position*" (Odell 2013, 9). Coalitions can help in exchanging information and reducing uncertainty as they are able to affect the interests of other actors than states acting alone (Touval 1989, 161). As a member of a coalition, it is easier to specialize on specific issues or profit from the expertise of other members and thus negotiate more effectively. For small states, coalition-building can offset a number of obstacles and is, therefore, a logical strategy. However, winning coalitions of small states are rather rare and in such case, the coalition might also be quite risky because the stronger parties build coalitions as well. The larger the coalition becomes, the more difficult it is to stay cohesive. (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 345-348; Drahos 2003, 92–94)

Continuing in the similar spirit, small states can offset the limited resources and staff numbers in delegations or ministries through **contacts with NGOs or industry lobbyists**. Drawing upon such external resources can provide small states with inexpensive scientific expertise, information about the situation on the ground or additional information regarding risks and opportunities of different policy options. According to Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski (2019) in the UFCCC process, the NGO support plays a crucial role in leveling asymmetries in terms of capabilities (173).

According to Downie (2014) one of the most effective ways in which actor can make an impact on another state's behaviour in negotiations is by strategically framing debates and thus drawing attention to their concerns. Downie further emphasizes that other actors also concluded that if an actor or coalition of actors successfully establish a frame consistent with their goals they might achieve their goals in negotiations. (175) Framing or arguing can be categorized as **persuasion-based strategies** which are based on constructivist theoretical assumptions (Panke 2012, 319).

In framing, **moral and normative claims** can also play an important role in influencing the outcome of multilateral negotiations. In moral argumentation, small states might have an advantage over the stronger parties. "*They can turn their smaller size into an asset, as actors may regard smaller states as more impartial than bigger ones*" (Panke 2012, 321). Furthermore, as Sell (2003) puts it "i*deas that are seen as legitimate, appropriate, or correct have a better chance of prevailing in policy contests*" (182).

De Águeda Corneloup and Mol (2014) in their paper focus on the role of leadership in negotiations. Even though many of the leadership strategies are based on the structural power of an actor that small states mostly lack, other leadership strategies relevant to small states are identified. Moreover, the authors based on their conclusions formulate new leadership category labelled as **moral leadership** that they directly connect to the role of small island states in climate talks. (292)

One way through which the weaker party can aim to become equal with stronger party in the asymmetrical negotiations is through '**borrowing' of power**, in other words, the weaker party draws upon external sources of power (Zartman 1997; Landau and Pfetsch 2000; Rubin and Zartman 2000; Betzold 2010). This theoretical framework, that mostly encompasses above-

mentioned strategies, was developed by William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin (2000) and consists of four interrelated categories of strategies, depending on the power resource used.

The framework was also used and broadened by Carola Betzold (2010) in her research which aimed to explain the structuralist paradox. Moreover, Betzold (2010) points out that focusing only on the successes and outcomes in the negotiations might be misleading and lead to overlooking smaller nuances of influence during the process, which can be for example recognition by other actors (136).

The four categories into which the concept of power borrowing, as developed by Rubin and Zartman (2000) and Betzold (2010), is divided are:

1) **process-based strategies** - mostly forming coalitions to boost active participation in the process, the playing field during the negotiation can be levelled by skillfully 'playing the game', active participation is often difficult for small countries due to limited resources and thus forming cohesive coalitions seems like a logical step, other process-based strategies might include for instance first-mover advantages which emphasized that moments of opportunities should not be missed (Betzold 2010, 136)

2) **context-based strategies** - appealing to norms (e.g. deploying the discourse of vulnerability in the climate negotiations), strategic use of norm-based arguments can provide moral power, which has been previously identified as an important source of leverage for those who "*possess and pursue preferences in line with the standard of legitimacy*" (Betzold 2010, 136)

3) **target-based strategies** - borrowing power from stronger negotiation partner which is the target, this type of strategy appeals to the common interest of parties, it suggests solutions to common problems or pair positions, the ultimate objective is to invoke the opponent's self-interest by demonstrating that preference of party A is in the interest of party B (Betzold 2010, 136)

4) **third-party strategies** - involves support obtained from third parties such are NGOs and lobby groups, as already outlined above NGOs can provide useful information and especially expertise, the public support can be then gained through the media, even though this impact is more indirect (Betzold 2010, 136)

3. 4. Application of the theoretical framework

This theoretical framework built up from the literature review should provide an appropriate way of analyzing and discussing the problem formulation of this thesis. The broader frame of social constructivism and power is reflected already in the first contextual chapter of the analysis and will be further reflected on in the last section of the analysis. Moreover, it provides a general frame for the topic of this thesis and the way data were chosen.

The second section of the analysis is mostly built upon the concept of ‘borrowing' of power which provides a systematic way for how to analyze empirical data. The data are thus sorted into four categories of negotiation strategies based on the process, context, target and their parties. The ‘borrowing' of power framework stems from the general overview of the negotiation strategies described above and encompasses them in the specific categories. The linkage and overlaps of individual strategies will be later discussed in the final part of the analysis.

The distinction between hard and soft strategies is more general and overarches all the specific ally named negotiation strategies. The distinction will be used as an additional category to evaluate the AOSIS’ strategies on a more general level and to observe whether the small island states are prone to use one or the other in the climate change negotiations.

Additionally, the salience of an issue as an important determinant for the success in the negotiations will be considered as well. However, thematically it fits mostly to the first contextual part of the analysis.

4. Analysis

The analysis of this thesis is divided into three subsequent parts. Firstly, the context for the analysis is introduced. Secondly, the negotiation strategies of AOSIS are analyzed through the specific categories described in the theoretical framework. Finally, the findings are summarized and linked to the theoretical considerations of this thesis.

4. 2 Context

The following chapter will introduce some necessary background information relevant to the ultimate goal of addressing the problem formulation for this thesis. Firstly, the contextual part is simply needed for a proper understanding of this paper and serves as a building ground for the analysis. Secondly, it is needed due to the chosen theoretical framework that already outlined the importance of context in social constructivism. All of the terms explained below are interlinked and directly connected to the topic of this thesis.

The contextual chapter firstly introduces climate change as a global issue of today. It further continues with defining the UN framework set up for dealing with climate change on the international stage with specifically mentioning its biggest conference which is the primary concern for this thesis. Simplified introduction of the loss and damage concept and its history in the UN climate negotiations follow. Finally, small island developing states and its special characteristics are described as well as the main actor in this paper the Alliance of Small Island States.

Both terms are given notice because the literature is often confusing in their usage, often they are used referring to the same states or mixed up. The terms SIDS and AOSIS are not completely the same, however almost all member states of AOSIS are SIDS, that is why the author of this thesis considers it useful to include these subchapters as separate but fully intertwined.

4. 2. 1. Climate change

Climate change could be defined as any change in climate over time, either caused by natural variability or resulting from human activity. In fact, according to scientists most of the global warming happening over the last decades can be attributed to human activity (Larson 2003, 134). Atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases causing global warming have risen considerably for example due to fossil fuel burning, deforestation and livestock farming among other activities (Depledge and Yamin 2004).

Climatologists expect that climate change will have varying and uneven consequences, many of them undesirable and some even devastating (Gordon 2007, 1575). Some impacts of climate change include rises in sea levels, changes in agricultural yields, forest cover and water resources as well as an increase in the occurrence of extreme events such as storms, cyclones, landslides or floods. Moreover, these impacts will affect the environmental, social and vital economic interests of all states and have serious consequences for essentially all aspects of human society. (Depledge and Yamin 2004)

Climate change thus truly is a global problem and failure to address it risks abrupt or irreversible changes in the earth's climate (Downie 2014, 6; IPCC 2013, 53). It is now generally understood that in order to avoid some of the worst risks of climate change, the average rise in global temperature must be kept to no more than 2˚C above pre-industrial levels. If no action to reverse the climate change and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions is taken, scientists predict that by the end of the century average global temperature may rise to 5˚C above pre-industrial levels. Such an increase would bring horrific if not fatal results. Even the scenario of "only" 2˚C increase would already bring significant consequences like rising sea levels, acidifications of the oceans and rising frequency, intensity and length of extreme weather events. These consequences are especially daunting for small islands and low-lying coastal countries (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 356; Downie 2014, 5-6; UNFCCC 2007).

4. 2. 2. Climate change on the UN level

As a global issue climate change entered the scene during the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Twenty years later, at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, was the UN established as a global forum for the deliberation of climate change and other security issues related to the environment and development. (Larson 2003, 134)

4. 2. 2. 1. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

The beginning of the international political response to climate change is dating back to 1992 when the *UN Framework Convention on Climate Chang*e (UNFCCC) was adopted. The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 197 parties. It established an institutional structure in which parties can aim toward more concrete and specific legal obligations, it also sets out the basic legal framework and principles for international climate change cooperation. (Betzold 2010, 134; Gordon 2007, 1583; IISD 2018c, 1) The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is the "*stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system*" (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 355).

Most significant agreements related to climate change adopted under the UN after the above mentioned Convention are the *Kyoto Protocol* (adopted in 1997) and the *Paris Agreement* (adopted in 2015). Parties to these three agreements have progressively reaffirmed the UNFCCC's secretariat role as the entity tasked with supporting the global response to the threat of climate change (UNFCCC 2019).

The decision-making under the UNFCCC is based on consensus, therefore disagreement around the voting majority required for certain decisions has until now prevented the adoption of the rules of procedure. According to Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski (2019), this set-up implies that, unlike with other multilateral fora where each Party is given a single vote and thus given equal weight, the final outcomes in the UNFCCC are likely to mirror Parties' capacity to shape and influence the decision-making process (157).

4. 2. 2. 2. Conference of the Parties

The secretariat of the UNFCCC usually organizes and supports between two and four negotiating

sessions a year. The largest and most important of those events is the Conference of the Parties (COP) which is held annually while hosted in different locations around the world. (UNFCCC 2019a)

As the largest annual UN conference, it is attended by an extensive number of participants. For example, the last COP, which was held on December 2018 in Katowice, brought together over 22 000 participants, including nearly 14 000 government officials, over 7 000 representatives from UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society organizations, and 1 500 members of the media (IISD 2018c, 1; UNFCCC 2019a).

The main purpose of the COP is for the Parties to review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts, as well as to take decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative arrangements. Moreover, the COP serves to review the national communications and emission inventories submitted by the Parties. Based on this information, the COP assesses the effects of the measures Parties have taken and the progress they made in achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention. (UNFCCC 2019b)

However, the various locations of secretariats for conventions and COP venues often make it difficult for small developing countries with limited resources to send representatives which poses challenges for active participation in the policymaking. Moreover, there are also challenges in terms of compliance and implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), for example, the Paris Agreement. "*National reports required by MEAs are often so burdensome that they are submitted late, if at all*". (Bolon 2018)

4. 2. 3. Loss and damage

Loss and damage (L&D) is an emerging topic in climate change negotiations and in the implementation of climate change action as well as in research and policy (van Der Geest and Warner 2015, 3). Even though it was long opposed from the side of the developed countries, L&D is now being referred to as the 'third pillar' or 'emerging third paradigm' in international climate policy next to *mitigation* and *adaptation.* Therefore L&D now is part of the climate change reality and must be tackled (Benjamin and Thomas 2017, 2371; Harmeling 2015, 4).

Despite this, there is no internationally agreed definition of L&D resulting from climate change. This might not be so surprising given the controversial nature of many issues associated with the L&D discourse and the varying perspectives on what exactly is L&D referring to and whatnot. Nevertheless, some aspects of the concept have been relatively widely accepted and there is an understanding that it relates to those negative impacts of climate change "*that cannot be avoided through mitigation and adaptation efforts*". L&D thus started to be discussed because there are limits to how much climate change can be mitigated or adapted to (Climate Analytics 2019; Craeynest 2010, 6; Harmeling 2015, 8; Hestbaek and Vanhala 2016, 11; Luxemburg Stiftung 2019; 3)

Even though adaptation is often put on the same line with loss and damage concerning climate change, these concepts are very different. While adaptation costs relate to activities undertaken to

adapt to the impacts of current and future climate change (e.g. irrigation schemes, sea defenses, crop changes), loss and damage refers to the social, environmental and economic costs after an adverse climate event (e.g. buildings destroyed, loss of crops, loss of lives, people displaced, water contaminated), often despite mitigation and adaptation measures having been in place. (Craeynest 2010, 9-10)

Adaptation starts showing its limits when extreme weather events resulting from climate change become increasingly severe or frequent. Moreover, it might prove impossible to adapt to slow-onset impacts that continue to develop while leaving territories uninhabitable and unproductive. Among these events that prove to be major challenges to adaptation efforts are rising sea levels, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat, salinization, land and forest degradation, desertification or loss of biodiversity. (Harmeling 2015)

L&D is also related to mitigation, which aims to combat climate change by reducing the concentrations of greenhouse gases. The potential costs of future climate change depend to a large extent on the intensity of climatic disruptions, which in turn depend on mitigation efforts globally (van Der Geest and Warner 2013, 369).

Athough the UNFCCC does not directly distinguish between losses and damages and often refers to those two terms as largely synonymous they should not be considered as such. The definition distinguishes losses from damages based on the irreversibility of the negative impacts. The term ‘loss’ applies to the complete disappearance of something, such as human lives, habitats or species. These are gone forever and cannot be brought back. On the other hand, the term ‘damage' is describing something that can be repaired, such as a road or a building. (Calliari 2018, De Souza and Huq 2016; Durand and Huq 2015, 2-3)

As suggested above, the issue of loss and damage from climate change has been a very politically contentious issue in the international negotiations under the UNFCCC from the beginning due to its connection to the issues of historic responsibility, liability and compensation (Benjamin and Thomas 2017, 2371; Huq 2017). Some literature sources simplistically refer to L&D mostly in connection to liability and compensation. Often L&D is understood as a concept in which rich countries, who have historic responsibility for climate change, are asked to be liable to developing countries who are already facing the effects of climate change and experiencing L&D even though they contribute least to it. (Karunungan 2017; Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2203)

However, while issues of liability and compensation are significant elements of L&D that are important to many developing countries advocating for the L&D, focusing only on these aspects trivializes the complexity of the issue and inaccurately reduces the debate to one of solely determining liability and seeking compensation (Barbosa et al. 2014, 1; Boyd, James and Jones 2017). Such framing is problematic also because there are challenges in evaluating many losses and damages from an economic point of view. L&D must be viewed through both economic and non-economic lens. “*Permanent loss and damage from slow-onset disasters goes far beyond economic loss. In addition to losing their livelihoods and homes, communities suffer important non-economic losses if they must lose their culture, community and social structures*”. It seems very problematic and some suggest even unethical to attach a monetary value to factors such as life or culture. (Calliari 2018, 726; Harmeling 2015, 5, 8)

The enduring problem around the L&D concept that many authors point out is that despite being one of the main topics to have emerged within climate negotiations in recent years, it still lacks a clear conceptualization. Because of the political and scientific context of the negotiations, forming a specific L&D definition has been challenging and has often been bypassed in order to make progress in other discussions. (Calliari 2018, 727, 740-741; Durand and Huq 2015, 2) The debate is thus still broad, diffuse and somewhat confusing. Analysts and observers have argued that the lacking conceptualization "*have hampered understanding and progress towards effective policy formulation, as well as practical implementation*" (Mechler et al. 2019, 5).

4. 2. 3. 1. History of L&D under the UNFCCC

Even though the L&D concept has only received wider attention in the last couple of years, it is not exactly new. Vulnerable countries that experience loss and damage from climate change have been proposing to focus on this issue from the beginning of the UNFCCC negotiations in the 90s. In 1991, Vanuatu proposed an international insurance scheme to compensate small island developing states for the damages incurred as a result of rising sea levels. A further rationale for this proposal was a hope that assigning costs to climate impacts would boost mitigation action. This proposal did not make it through but the idea of insurance kept coming up also at later UNFCCC meetings. (Durand and Huq 2015, 1; Harmeling 2015, 13; Hestbaek and Vanhala 2016, 8; Mechler et al. 2019, 4).

Nevertheless, it took about twenty years, together with increasing evidence, public awareness of climate change impacts and reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN's body for assessing the scientific evidence related to climate change, for L&D to be recognized at the institutional level. In 2007 at COP13 in Bali, the Parties first broadly considered means to address the issue and even though that was the first explicit reference to L&D it took until 2012 when Parties at COP18 in Doha first considered institutional arrangements to address L&D. The first distinct L&D decision agreed in Doha defines the role of the Convention in addressing the issue and decides to establish an institutional framework for L&D at the following COP. (Harmeling 2015, 13; Mechler et al. 2019, 5)

The most significant progress thus came in 2013 at the COP19 In Warsaw where the W*arsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts* (WIM) was established. The adoption of WIM came as big a surprise due to the controversial nature of the issue and because key state parties, such as the United States, had historically opposed the policy. Therefore, the establishment of this mechanism is considered to be a major success for developing nations that have long advocated for the cause. Some even referred to a "*profound paradigm shift*" in the history of the UNFCCC. (Hestbaek and Vanhala 2016, 3)

The WIM was established with essentially three functions: to enhance knowledge; strengthen coordination; and enhance action and support including finance (UNFCCC 2019c). It is charged to "*address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change*" (UNFCCC 2013, para 1). However, the WIM does not refer to the issues of liability nor compensation as it does not make any tangible commitment for helping low-income

and small developing island states to cope with losses and damages (Calliari 2018, 726). At the following COP20 in Lima, the initial two-year work plan for WIM was agreed and its first meeting took place on September 2015 (Hermeling et al. 2015, 14).

Next institutional milestone for L&D came with a conference in Paris in 2015 (COP21). Before the COP21, many groups of developing countries emphasized the importance of L&D for the upcoming negotiations. *The Paris Agreement* included Article 8 in which L&D is basically recognized as the third pillar of climate action under the UNFCCC as it is referred to as distinct from adaptation which was one of the main goals on the side of developing countries. (Calliari, Mysak and Surminski 2019, 160). Through the article "*Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events*" (UNFCCC 2015, para 1). Even though Article 8 assures the continuation of WIM, it is ignoring the question of its financing plus it once again emphasizes that Article 8 "*does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation*" (Heyward and Page 2017, 358; UNFCCC 2015, para 52). This had been a requirement from the United States, which otherwise would not agree to the other elements of the overall deal (De Souza and Huq 2016).

L&D was in the center of a heated discussion also in 2017 at COP23 in Bonn which is not so surprising since the presidency of this conference was led by Fiji, a small island developing state. Some developed countries, like Australia and the EU, claimed that there is not enough statistical evidence to prove that extreme weather events like typhoons are solely caused by climate change. Moreover, developing countries kept insisting that the negotiations need to focus on financing loss and damage which is still being avoided. (Karunungan 2017)

This year at the COP25 in Chile will be the first time the WIM will undergo a formal review of its last five years. The negotiators are due to review the work plan and a series of studies that could contribute to better understanding of how to help countries deal with losses and damages resulting from climate change (Perez Catala 2019). However, once again it is expected that hard-fought battle will take place between developed countries, emphasizing insurance and placing responsibility on vulnerable countries to manage the risks and pay insurance premiums, and developing countries fighting for the WIM to be fully operationalized in order to meet its mandate of "*enhancing support, including finance*" (Luxemburg Stiftung 2019).

4. 2. 4. Small Island Developing States

In order to better understand the origins of AOSIS, it is necessary to understand a category known as Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Already in its first assessment report, the IPCC has recognized small islands and atoll countries as being highly vulnerable to climate change, notably to sea level rise (Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2201). Moreover, Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC refers to "*the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change ... especially on: (a) Small Island countries; (b) Countries with low-lying coastal area*s; …" (UNFCCC 1992, 8). It is the large exposure of SIDS to the climate change impacts and natural disasters in combination with their limited ability to respond, which puts them among the most vulnerable on the planet (OECD 2018, 23).

SIDS are spread across different regions as well as income categories which might suggest that they present diverse and heterogenous group of countries, nevertheless they share strong commonalities (OECD 2018, 21). Several intrinsic characteristics are leading to their low capacity to adapt to climate change impacts. "*They are usually small countries in terms of territories and population with restricted economies, which remain highly dependent on their natural resources and imports of goods. Their geographical remoteness induces isolation from global markets, networks, and communications*". (De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282) The majority of SIDS is located in regions with a tropical climate, they usually have high population density, a limited range of natural resources with a narrow range of skills and thus also low economic resilience (Harasawa, Lal and Takahashi 2002, 179).

Rising sea levels are one of the most threatening climate impacts for SIDS and they are also one of the more certain of all potential consequences brought by global warming, the loss of habitable land is a threat to the very survival of these countries and it seems to be an inevitable reality for many of them. Such a threat appears to be very real even with ambitious scenarios that predict limited temperature increases and with good adaptation programs in place. (De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282; Harasawa, Lal and Takahashi 2002, 180) For example, the government of the Maldives, which have 80% of the total land less than one meter above sea level, has already started to allocate part of its annual budget to a fund meant to buy a new 'homeland' somewhere else (Craeynest 2010, 6).

Recent studies also point at the links between climate change, disasters and conflict in the Pacific region, where many of the SIDS lie. The conclusions suggest that relocations due to climate change might become more frequent in the region already by the year 2040. In relation to this, Fiji recently announced that it identified 676 coastal communities in need of relocation out of which 42 would need to be relocated already within the next decade. In fact, SIDS in the Pacific region occupy the top categories in the World Risk Index for natural hazards, with Vanuatu consistently ranked on the top. (Handmer and Nalau 2019, 365-367)

Apart from rising sea levels, other climate impacts will have overall effects also on water resources, agriculture, fisheries, health, food security and economic development of these countries (Barnett and Campbell 2010, 12). Some communities in the Pacific already experience seasonal food shortages and malnutrition is also common (Mechler et al. 2019, 27).

Economic opportunities for many SIDS are already very limited due to a combination of remoteness, size, geographic dispersion and environmental fragility (Handmer and Nalau 2019, 371). Additionally, many island states depend heavily on tourism for income and there is no doubt these negative effects of climate change can only cause harm to this sector of the economy (Gordon 2007, 1596).

Furthermore, given the small size of SIDS economies, a single natural disaster can result into losses of up to 200% of GDP which would eventually lead to disappearing of entire economic sectors and disrupting the development gains accumulated over last decades. According to OECD and World Bank statistics, SIDS make up two-third of the countries suffering the highest relative losses (between 1% and 9% of their GDP each year) from natural disasters. (OECD 2018, 22) Another statistic shows that "*developing countries face six times as much direct loss and damage*

from extreme events per unit of GDP than rich countries, losing USD 92 billion in total each year on average for the last twenty years" (Luxemburg Stiftung 2019, 11).

Such statistics are alarming, especially taking into account that small island states, due to their level of economic development and relatively low populations, contribute next to nothing when it comes to global warming as they are responsible for about 0.003% of the total greenhouse emissions. That is why SIDS, with its low adaptive capacities, high vulnerabilities, and small contributions to global warming, have a vital stake in the international climate change negotiations and that is why they also have been among the most proactive. (Betzold 2010, 13; De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282; Hoad 2015, 260; Larson 2010, 135)

Despite the fact, that these states are small and with relatively no power in the international politic or economic spheres, earlier research on the role and influence of small island states in the international climate change negotiations suggests that "*mice can roar"* (Shibuya 1996), meaning that small island states are able to influence the course of the negotiations. As already mentioned in the theoretical framework of this paper, previous research also suggests that climate impact vulnerability of countries can have positive correlations with the influence they have in climate negotiations. (De Águeda Corneloup and Mol 2014, 282; Weiler 2012)

4. 2. 5. Alliance of Small Island States

Small island states have proved to be very successful in some aspects of the international climate change negotiations by creating a cohesive coalition, the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS). The beginning of this alliance dates back to the second World Climate Conference in 1990 when small island countries widely recognized the disproportionate vulnerability of their territories and populations to the negative consequences of climate change. The main purpose of AOSIS is to defend the interests of its members in the negotiations under the UNFCCC. Although AOSIS has to a certain degree broadened its scope, its main focus remains in the climate change negotiations and despite the small size and lack of political leverage of its members it has become one of the key players in the climate change regime. (AOSIS 2019a; Betzold, Castro and Weiler 2012, 591-594; Larson 2003, 135)

Currently, AOSIS has 44 members, including 5 observers, covering 3 world regions (AOSIS 2019b):

1. **African, Indian and South China Seas**: Cabo Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Maldives, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Singapore

2. **Caribbean**: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago

3. **Pacific Ocean**: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

4. **Observer States**: American Samoa, Guam, Netherland Antilles, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands

Most of AOSIS members are SIDS that represent about 28% of developing states and 20% of the UN membership. However, despite the name, not all of its members are actual islands (e.g. Guyana) or ‘small' (e.g. Papua New Guinea) (Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2202).

In terms of aggregate power, AOSIS, is a coalition of socially, economically and environmentally vulnerable small island nations and thus can initially be defined as a low-power actor in international negotiations. Together, member states of AOSIS, comprise less than 1% of world territory, population, GDP and greenhouse gas emissions, in fact, the sum of all their GDPs equals the annual economy of the city of London. (Bezold, Castro and Weiler 2012, 594; Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166)

It should be noted that despite the unifying factors of smallness and climate vulnerability AOSIS still is heterogeneous group with several geographical, cultural, social and economic differences. Thus, the creation of such a unique coalition illustrates “*the importance of climate change-induced threats for island communities, as well as the increase in their leaders’ awareness of such issues*”. That is also why, many of AOSIS leaders, heads of states, heads of governments or ministers, have made climate change a focus of their foreign diplomacy. (Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2201-2202)

The first major achievement of AOSIS was the recognition of small islands as a distinct category in the UN. The term ‘small island developing states’ was defined in 1992 at the Rio Conference where at the same time their special environmental and developmental needs were recognized in Chapter 17 (G) of Agenda 21. Moreover, the most important institutional process achievement has been securing a special seat on the COP Bureau, alongside traditional five UN regional groupings. This decision, was an innovation under the climate change regime as it was the first time a seat was specifically reserved for a group other than a UN regional group. This recognition helped AOSIS to have an impact on the overall coordination of the negotiations and to ensure its voice is heard in the process. This achievement is remarkable especially taking into account that OPEC countries fought to obtain a special seat on the board in a similar fashion but did not succeed. This decision further created a precedent for AOSIS representation also in other committees and groups under the UNFCCC. (Benwell 2011, 203-204; Betzold 2010, 139)

AOSIS showed initiative and proactive approach since the beginning. Besides the already mentioned proposal on the insurance scheme from Vanuatu, AOSIS was the first political group that submitted a proposal for a protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases. Additionally already during the 1992 Rio Each Summit, delegates from Maldives and Vanuatu were elected as vice presidents to the conference. (Larson 2003, 135-136)

In terms of structure, the Alliance works rather informally as it has no formal charter, regular budget or secretariat, its decision-making is, however, based on consensus and every few years one member state is voted to be a Chair and leads the group through the negotiation process. Since the beginning of this year the Chair is Belize. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Betzold 2010, 135)

4. 2. 5. 1. AOSIS on the L&D agenda

The issue of L&D belongs among the top priorities of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations. The only issue that might be considered ‘higher' on the agenda is the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible. Under the slogan ‘1.5 to stay alive’ and backed by the scientific reports AOSIS advocates for the goal of keeping the global warming below 1.5°C. However, these issues are directly connected, because only ambitious mitigation reduces the risk of catastrophic losses and damages. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Benwell 2011, 202)

AOSIS has been a front runner on L&D and their influence and advocacy are behind every important milestone mentioned in the section on the history of L&D under the UNFCCC. All the IISD daily reports from the COPs are mentioning how AOSIS is urging Parties, showing concern over the lack of progress or calling for the inclusion of the issue.

As mentioned previously, it was Vanuatu, on behalf of AOSIS, that proposed the first international insurance scheme in the 90s and thus opened the debate on the issue. The ultimate goal was to establish some kind of mechanism, which was achieved in Warsaw. For AOSIS the establishment of WIM, even if it was not perfect, is considered a real triumph and the Alliance proved it can progressively influence the UNFCCC process. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Calliari 2018, 735).

After Warsaw, the ambition of AOSIS did not disappear but evolved. Next step was to ensure that WIM will be a longterm solution that is dealing with the issues relevant to SIDS. For these states, it was still crucial to distinguish the L&D as a separate concept from adaptation. As it was becoming clear that the COP in Paris can bring global climate change action, AOSIS became determined to make L&D part of it. One of the steps was to also ensure that the mechanism is fit for this purpose. During Paris negotiations, AOSIS fought hard, created a political momentum for the issue and helped to negotiate Article 8 dedicated entirely to L&D. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Bolon 2018; Fry 2019; Maldives: MEE 2018, 21) Through Article 8 “*the most vulnerable countries have achieved an important step towards the recognition of the fact that there are climate change-induced impacts that cannot be adapted to*” (Wuppertal Institut 2018, 11).

As of now, the governance of the WIM still stays an open question and thus the upcoming review of WIM at the COP25 in Chile is critical for AOSIS. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019)

4. 3. Negotiation strategies of AOSIS

Before going into the specific strategies AOSIS applies in the UNFCCC negotiations, it seems relevant, for a better understanding, to briefly describe the practical and logistical aspects of these negotiations from AOSIS perspective.

The UNFCCC process consists of different conferences and meetings and it culminates with the most significant Conference of the Parties some time at the end of the year (usually in November or December). However, for Parties, the preparations for the negotiations are taking place all year. Therefore, the current Chair of AOSIS is trying to find moments during the year before the important UNFCCC meetings to bring Parties together to discuss important issues and to develop negotiation positions which have to be agreed on by all member states. A number of AOSIS

members also attends ministerial meetings in advance of COPs which offer other opportunities for developing strategies. The Chair of AOSIS and some of its members are also arranging meetings with other developed and developing Parties to understand both differences and areas with common ground ahead of the COP. The frequency of all these meetings also depends on countries' resources. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019; Maldives: MEE 2018, 18)

Once at the negotiations, the Alliance distributes the responsibilities across a number of countries. For each issue, thematic coordinators are chosen from already trusted and experienced members. These negotiators then lead smaller subgroups and provide regular updates to the rest of the group. The outcomes and negotiation positions are being discussed on a daily basis and after the coordinators get a mandate to move ahead. The main focus of AOSIS is thus to work effectively as one group together. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019)

Further on this section will analyze negotiation strategies as defined in the theoretical framework. The structure is divided into four categories of negotiation strategies according to the 'borrowing' of power framework with the added overarching distinction of hard vs soft strategy.

4. 3. 1. Process-based strategies

"*Finding commonalities means being stronger in the process*".

(AOSIS consultant 2019)

Coalitions are a defining feature of multilateral negotiations and therefore also an integral part of the climate change regime. It is mostly due to the complexity of the UNFCCC regime as it would be logistically almost impossible to conduct negotiations among 196 individual country delegations. Coalitions offer means for maximizing bargaining for its members, they help to streamline the negotiation process as well as transaction costs. The core functions of coalition set-up are very significant for small countries like like members of AOSIS which only possess limited negotiation resources and political influence in multilateral negotiations. However, despite being an integral part of the UNFCCC process, coalitions are relatively understudied. (Betzold, Castro and Weiler 2012, 595; Carter 2015, 207; Dupont 1996).

Coalition forming in the UNFCCC, especially among developing countries, is very much an issue of insufficient resources which limit the ability to follow the vast amount of topics during the negotiations. "*For meetings during the year two delegates usually get money to come from AOSIS countries, for the bigger conferences it can be up to three delegates. If you look at the multiple-level agenda and the number of important issues that is nothing, especially in comparison to delegations of the US, the EU and other developed countries that have massive numbers of delegates coming*", explained AOSIS consultant during an interview. The playing field is not levelled and it never really was. It is important to understand that the problem does not lie only in the pure number of people coming but also in the actual time the small delegations have to develop strategies and positions or talk to each other. Moreover, while developed countries have experts that are only focused on the topic of climate change, small island states' delegates have to often deal also with responsibilities on the national level. (AOSIS consultant 2019) The problem of resources can be resolved also by forming coalitions with non-governmental parties, however, this strategy will be further explored under the section devoted to third-party strategies.

For the above-mentioned reasons, it seems only logical that small island states, despite their geographical dispersion and many differences, decided to come together as a cohesive group in the coalition of AOSIS that was already previously introduced in detail. It is quite unlikely that any of the individual member states would be able to generate power that AOSIS managed to gather as one block. However, the cohesiveness of the group is not a given. It is not always easy to find common denominators among 44 countries taking into account that despite their common vulnerability they are threatened by climate change in different ways. In case of low-lying atoll states, such as Maldives, Tuvalu or Kiribati, the climate change impacts pose a threat to their very existence, on the other hand, countries like Belize can expect serious impacts on the coasts but they still have a chance to adapt. (Betzold, Castro and Weiler 2012, 594; Betzold 2010, 141)

To be able to advocate for their cause in a complex process that the UNFCCC negotiations are, AOSIS needed to seek support beyond the coalition of small island states, building an alliance with broader group of developing countries thus seemed to be a logical step (AOSIS consultant 2019; Calliari 2018, 735; Larson 2003, 145). The alignment with Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the African Group and most importantly the G77 and China resulted from AOSIS' conceptual re-shaping of the L&D concept in the 2000s. Initially AOSIS aimed their claims only on losses resulting from sea-level rise (as in its first 1991 proposal), eventually, they realized that focusing on residual impacts from slow onset events as a whole and the financial risk associated with extremes made a more relevant case for other developing countries to support the cause. (Calliari, Surminski and Mysiak 2019, 168)

However, neither the positions amongst the larger group of developing countries are identical per se. For a long time, there was not the same understanding of what L&D is. When AOSIS stressed the life-threatening dimension of the issue, the LDCs focused more on its impact on the development and the way how L&D affects the quality of life, livelihoods, food security and household level (Calliari, Surminski and Mysiak 2019, 168). For AOSIS is crucial especially the support of the coalition of G77 and China and even though, now there is mostly consensus on supporting each other when it comes to adaptation and L&D issues, it was not always like this. To get the whole block on board was not easy, it took a lot of internal discussions and persuasion and often the negotiations within the group proved to be more challenging than amongst all the parties. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019)

Negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement in 2015 can draw an example of how this larger coalition can work. For AOSIS countries it was extremely important to have specific recognition as the most vulnerable mentioned in the final text and for this, they teamed up with the the LDCs to have themselves recognized as such collectively. The special circumstances of both SIDS and LDCs are recognized in the Agreement in the context of financial support for countries that are especially vulnerable to the climate change impacts and that have capacity constraints and need for support. Furthermore, AOSIS worked in collaboration with LDCs on ensuring that the L&D is incorporated in the Agreement. An important step in this strategy was to get the whole G77 and China group on board, with the strong support from Bolivia and some careful text adjustments, the G77 and China coalition, in the end, agreed to a common text on L&D and it thus became no longer an issue just for SIDS and LDCs but for all developing countries. In Paris, AOSIS also often served as a ‘bridge' between G77 and China and other parties on critical issues amongst which

was L&D and in general made sure the group stayed focused and cohesive. (Fry 2016, 107-108; Maldives: MEE 2018, 20)

AOSIS is taking advantage of the UNFCCC process also through its active participation. The Alliance can do so mostly because of its recognition as an important player in the climate regime. As explained previously, the first major achievement of AOSIS was the recognition of small islands as a distinct category in the UN and securing a special seat on the COP Bureau. This recognition was not only formal but it directly reflected on the negotiation process. Delegates of AOSIS states are often invited to chair or co-chair negotiation groups on various issues which enables them to have a direct impact on the process. For example, once the WIM was established Pepetua Latasi from Tuvalu was elected on to the Executive Committee on the WIM and became co-chair. Latasi has been very active on the Committee ever since. (Benwell 2011, 204; Betzold 2010, 142; Fry 2019; IISD COP reports) Big achievement came also in 2017 in Bonn when it was Fiji as first SIDS ever presiding the COP (Ruptly 2017).

AOSIS is also actively engaged in drafting and submitting their own proposals. On the issue of L&D they are usually amongst the first ones who initiates action and stirs the discussion. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 359; Fry 2019) For example, AOSIS already produced a draft of legally binding Agreement including L&D at the COP15 in Copenhagen and even if not successful, it is considered to be the first attempt that prepared ground for what was later achieved in Paris (AOSIS consultant 2019). The activity is obvious also in the frequency of AOSIS statements, for example during the closing ceremony of COP21 in Paris, 13 out of the 58 countries that took the floor were members of AOSIS (Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2206).

Finally, the recognition of AOSIS as a competent player can be demonstrated through their participation in bilateral negotiations with powerful developed states. For example, when the COP21 in Paris was nearing its end, the US Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Tuvalu engaged in bilateral discussions, primarily to resolve the issue of liability (Fry 2016, 108). This serves as an evidence for the key role AOSIS played during the Paris negotiations. Maldives, the Chair of AOSIS at the time talks about "*the group's finest hour*". Until the last moments, AOSIS was consulted by the COP President, the Chair of the G77 and China coalition and other major sub-groups as the talks were balancing on the verge of collapse. (Maldives: MEE 2018, 20).

4. 3. 2. Context-based strategies

"*Imagine the world knew global warming was about to destroy 43 nation, but not which 43.*"

(Enele Soponga, UN Ambassador of Tuvalu in Benwell 2011, 208)

According to previous researches, much of the influence AOSIS was able to gather stems from the moral dimension they brought to the negotiations. Their strategy mostly resolves around the discourse of vulnerability based on existing principles, such as 'polluter pays', and relentless moral pressure which reinforces their 'power' over the other Parties. (Betzold 2010, 138; Calliari 2018, 735) In line with that, "*delegates of AOSIS regarded themselves not just as partners or negotiating bodies, but also as 'the moral voice' and 'the moral authority' in the negotiations*". Ultimately, AOSIS presents itself as an advocate of global public goods and aims to depoliticize the issue of climate change. (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 358).

The model argument for AOSIS is that "*the countries who had done the least to create the problem are the ones who will be suffering the most*" (Betzold 2010, 138; Calliari 2018, 735). Looking at their emissions, which are close to none, this argument is hard to dispute. Thus to underscore the message of a common threat, small island states have kept emphasizing their status as 'innocent victims' (Benwell 2011, 208). Central is also the frame in which climate change is as a delegate of the Marshall Islands once stated "*matter of life or death*" (Magnan and Ourbak 2017, 2206). At COP in Katowice, delegate of Maldives, Chair of AOSIS at the time, said: "*We are not prepared to die. We are not going to become the first victims of the climate crisis. Instead, we are going to do everything in our power to keep our heads above water*" (Chestney 2018).

Moreover, to highlight that climate change is not solely an issue for the negotiation rooms but something that is real and has real victims, AOSIS states in the past used references to natural disasters that have occurred in the year of the COP. In 2013, it is believed, that emotional appeals about Typhoon Haiyan, that slammed the Philippines just when the COP in Warsaw opened, had a significant impact on shifting the international concerns. (Maldives: MEE 2018, 15)

Another way how is AOSIS recalling norms and ethical principles is by framing the climate change as unfair and labeling developed countries as the ones who carry the historic responsibility and therefore should have the moral duty to take action (Benwell 2011, 207; Betzold 2010, 138; Calliari 2018, 739). For example on one occasion during COP24 in Katowice, AOSIS Chair urged action on L&D by stating: "I*t would be suicide not to use every level of power we have to demand what is fair and just*" (Benson Wahlen 2018). On another occasion, during COP24 the representative of Maldives pleaded: "*We don't think that this is asking for much. We are just only saying: please do not kill us*". (Gabbatiss 2018). Additionally, just this year in June at the Climate Change Conference in Bonn, AOSIS in its opening statement said: "*By virtue of geography, as well as, historical and contemporary actions of others, we are saddled with the greatest risks and have the least responsibility for the unprecedented challenge before us*" (AOSIS 2019c).

The issue of responsibility of developed countries is a base for the compensation argument on L&D. Already back in the 1990s, the group proposed international insurance scheme which should have been funded by compulsory contributions from developed Parties that would be calculated based on their Gross National Product and relative GHG emissions. (Calliari 2018, 733). However, it is interesting to mention that the compensation argument on the side of AOSIS has over the years evolved to a certain degree from an 'end' to a 'mean'. "*It could be argued that rather than being an objective per se, compensation has been used by AOSIS as a bogeyman to increasingly get concessions on L&D from the developed countries*" (Calliari 2018, 740). On the other hand, in terms of compensation, ethical arguments were also used against AOSIS when Parties pointed out the inappropriateness of putting a price on the lives, livelihoods and assets of the most vulnerable countries and populations (Calliari 2018, 739).

An important part of the moral appeals from AOSIS was also the sense of identity and the responsibility these countries have for their future generations. Former AOSIS Chair at the time of COP24 said in an interview that all the inhabitants of the Indian Ocean want is "*to live in our own homelands, we want to live with our communities, with our culture, with our people*" (Gabbatiss 2018). Later at his statement at the conference, he stated: "*Our generation has a moral*

*responsibility to ensure that our children and grandchildren can enjoy the same beautiful islands and rich ecosystem as us. If we fail, they may never forgive us" (*AOSIS 2018b).

In fact, AOSIS previously brought children and young people from the region to the negotiations to deliver speeches that ensure emotional impact. At the COP in Paris, Selina Leem, an 18-year-old girl was part of the Marshall Islands delegation. In an interview she said that she had already seen the islands changing dramatically in her short life, seawalls that have been destroyed, coconut trees she climbed as a child are gone and the graves of deceased loved ones are being washed away (Mortimer 2015). One of the children that spoke during the High-Level Opening Segment at the COP in Bonn was 12-year-old Timoci Naulusala from Fiji, his speech with an urgent call for 'leadership action' received an ovation from world leaders and later went viral on the social media and thus raised awareness of AOSIS' cause. "*My home, my school, my source of food, water, money was totally destroyed. My life was in chaos,*" said the boy whose village was hit by a devastating cyclone the previous year. (The Fiji Times 2017)

4. 3. 3. Target-based strategies

"*What you do for small islands, you do for the world.*"

(Maldives as AOSIS Chair, Maldives: MEE, 2018)

Moral arguments and emotional appeals to abstract principles often proved to be not enough. To understand this, it is important to understand how highly politicized the negotiations on climate change are. As one of the interviewees stated, the climate change debate always comes down to a debate about energy and development that are highly politicized issues in themselves and unfortunately for developing countries the debate will always be surrounded by concerns about economic costs (AOSIS consultant 2019). Therefore, a target-based way of argumentation aims to emphasizes the higher costs of passivity and to conjure the self-interest of all Parties, in this case describing climate action as an action that is ultimately in everybody's interest. Thus in combination with the context-based strategy, AOSIS states managed to frame themselves as an 'international conscience'. (Betzold 2010, 139)

Already back in the 90s, Vanuatu pointed out that even though small islands are on the frontline of climate change and thus will be hit first, they will certainly not be the only victims, rather their example is serving as an "*early warning system*" to the others (IISD 1995). Further, the Marshall Islands' representative stated that no costs can be attached to the obliteration of entire countries (IISD, 1996). Similar statements were made also at the last COP in Katowice, during the opening prime minister of Fiji, as a president of the COP previous year, said that all the states are in "*the same canoe*", he further appealed to the common conscience in the room by warning that "*we don't want to become the generation that betrays humanity*" (Ruptly 2018). The representative of Maldives, Chair of AOSIS at the time, during the opening statement, again emphasized that "*while small islands states will be hit first and hit the hardest, you will be next*" (AOSIS 2018a, 1).

Some authors argue that AOSIS by combining the arguments of strong exposure to changing climate conditions with emphasizing the negative effects of climate change for all nations worldwide helped them to forge coalitions with more powerful groups of countries (Betzold, Castro

and Weiler 2012, 594). Through this AOSIS could strengthen their argumentation by referring to an agreement with other delegations, especially with the EU countries, whose support was very important for AOSIS. However, this shows how important it can be for a small party to gain the support of 'developed western country' although AOSIS already had a big coalition of G77 and China on their side. Such an observation in a way undermines the argument that even small parties can obtain power in international negotiations. Furthermore, even though, AOSIS was able to get the support of some developed countries on the issues like 1.5°C target, the issue of L&D is a different story as it is very hard to relate it to other than developing countries. Nevertheless, AOSIS always positioned themselves in sort of a 'bridge' between developed and developing countries. (Betzold 2010, 140)

At the COP in Warsaw in 2013 where the unique L&D mechanism was established, veteran observers gave credit to AOSIS with helping to push developed countries much further than most believed was possible. The small islands made their cause in Warsaw so omnipresent that it made it to the talking points of some of the world's most influential leaders at the time, including US President Obama, French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel. (Maldives: MEE 2018, 15, 19-20).

One of the interesting tactics of AOSIS that can be included in this section is 'attacking the ego' of developed countries by questioning their ability to lead. This tactic was by some labelled as 'theatrical interventions', nevertheless it proved overtly effective. Back at the COP13 in Bali, the delegate of Papua New Guinea targeted the US in his statement saying: "*I would ask the United States, we ask for your leadership. But if for some reason you're not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us. Please get out of the way."* Just a little while later, to the surprise of many in the room, the US negotiator Paula J. Dobriansky withdrew the objection to the Bali Roadmap and stated that the US is ready to join the consensus. (Benwell 2011, 205) Another example can be used from the last year's COP in Katowice, when President of Nauru criticized lacking progress since Paris and stated that willingness to implement system change would be the "*benchmark for true leadership*" (IISD 2018a, 1).

4. 3. 4. Third-party strategies

Crucial support for the efforts of AOSIS in the climate talks comes from the sector of civil society. As some authors pointed out, without the NGOs involvement, AOSIS would not be able to establish itself as a serious negotiating partner. NGO support translates into power and levels the power asymmetry in the climate change negotiations as it allows small island states to participate in the process with much larger and better-resourced delegations (AOSIS consultant 2019; Betzold 2010, 140-141; Calliari, Surminski and Mysiak 2019).

The support of NGOs is extremely beneficial for the high level of expertise it brings to the table. Some NGOs focus only on environmental issues and can devote a big part of their budget just for the climate change negotiations. NGOs can provide scientific expertise, technical information as well as legal advice. NGOs' experts and lawyers can help draft texts and submit proposals in proper legal language, they help with researching background during preparations and often also report on the negotiations before and after which enhances the transparency of the process. Moreover, NGOs do not provide support only right at the negotiations but also throughout the year

to ensure that AOSIS is well prepared. Ambassador Ian Fry also confirmed heavy reliance on the help of civil society and he especially emphasized the role of the NGO called Climate Analytics which holds regional meetings in Pacific and Caribbean where strategies and policies are being developed further. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Betzold 2010, 140-141; Fry 2019)

The support of the NGOs can be divided into direct and indirect. While the direct support is mentioned above and consists of technical, scientific and legal expertise, the indirect support involves general endorsement of AOSIS and developing countries' positions and in the active campaigning made before and during COPs (Calliari 2018, 735). For example, Ambassador Fry concerning this mentioned NGO Climate Action Network which generally supports the positions of AOSIS and helps to raise awareness by presenting them in their ECO magazine and through the media (Fry 2019). Another example is used from the COP in Katowice where NGO called Women and Gender added to AOSIS discourse when in it in the statement highlighted that climate change is a cause of loss and damage, urged all parties to accept this reality and stressed that it is not acceptable for the most vulnerable to pay the 'climate change bill' (IISD 2018c, 31).

AOSIS was able to use the support and advices of the NGOs to their advantage. They obtained the necessary tools for 'playing the game' and understood how to make use of the process. This third-party strategy is thus directly intertwined with the process-based strategy that, as mentioned in the relevant section above, includes also the activity of AOSIS during the negotiations, the ability to submit their own proposals and taking the advantage of the first moves. However, although AOSIS was very open and appreciative of this support, it was not the same for all developing countries. AOSIS earned criticism from the side of the G77 and China coalition, who looked at the outsiders' influence with suspicion. (Betzold 2010, 141) On the other hand, some praised small island states for their partnership with environmental NGOs as innovators in the negotiation process (Benwell 2011, 204).

Another very important third-party that can be identified is science, especially the scientific reports issued by IPCC. Science always played and continues to play an immensely important role in the climate regime and thus for AOSIS' moral argumentation to be convincing it needs to be rooted in scientific facts. AOSIS recognized this early on and thus they almost always refer to the best available science in their statements. As AOSIS consultant said in the interview, they have a moral high ground but that does not mean it is not constantly supported by science and evidence. To put it simply, AOSIS countries can not just come and say "*hey we are vulnerable and this is what is happening*", they come and say "t*his is what science is telling us and that is why we have this position in the international arena*". The use of scientific evidence is also very often facilitated by NGOs. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Betzold 2010, 140; Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 358)

AOSIS is referring to the IPCC reports especially in regards to the 1.5°C degree goal. This was evident at the COP in Katowice that was taking place shortly after a new IPCC report was published and which some of the developed countries refused to take into account in the negotiations. AOSIS supported by many developing but also developed countries like the EU, Canada, New Zealand or Norway in their statements repeatedly urged "*welcoming rather than noting*" the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C in the draft conclusion. (IISD 2018b, 2). Moreover, just this year in June at the Climate Change Conference in Bonn AOSIS said in their opening speech: "*The best available science provided by the IPCC must be our guide. Science*

must be the basis for action" (AOSIS 2019c, 3). Later on, at the same conference, Belize, the current Chair of AOSIS, expressed its disappointment that "*not all parties could accept the messages of scienc*e" (IISD 2019, 8).

Finally, media as a third-party with an influence on the general public outside of the negotiations often proved to be very effective in raising awareness of AOSIS' cause and thus indirectly enhancing their efforts during the negotiations (Magnan and Our 2017, 2202). One media stunt that proved to be extremely effective was pulled by the Maldives in the lead-up to the COP in Copenhagen in 2009. To highlight the possibility of disappearance due to sea-level rise and the threat of climate change to their very existence, Maldives held an underwater cabinet meeting. This 'show' delivered international attention and brought a spotlight on the Maldives and ultimately AOSIS ahead of the Conference. (Bolon 2017) The media were also partly credited for the establishment of WIM as they gave a tremendous amount of attention to the cause. And again since the opening days of the COP in Paris, global news were focused on the role of small islands in the talks with sensation-made headlines of 'David vs Goliath'. (Maldives: MEE 2018, 15, 18)

4. 3. 5. Hard vs soft strategies

The issue of L&D serves as a good example to show the evolution of AOSIS strategy. As the Alliance was championing the issue for a long time it has taken a fairly hard approach, even among the other developing countries. In fact, for a long time, the discourse around L&D was that it is this "*strange AOSIS issue*". Therefore, in the beginning, AOSIS needed to harden its approach to take the other developing countries on board. AOSIS was willing to stand up and explain to everybody what they mean and why it is important. The moment this message started to get across and to be more understood, especially in the larger group of G77 and China, AOSIS could afford to step back a bit and take a softer approach by aligning themselves with a broader coalition of developing countries. (AOSIS consultant 2019)

As outlined previously in this section, AOSIS role on L&D since then developed into the role of a 'bridge', 'advocate' and in some cases also the role of 'honest broker' and 'explainer'. It could be said that the soft approaches prevail, however, AOSIS always has a strong position on the issue of L&D and there are times that hard approach is needed to get the message across. Moreover, the fact that AOSIS never gave in on the issue proves they were 'hard' in maintaining their stance against stiff opposition. (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019)

One concrete example of hard approach on the side of AOSIS was already described previously in this analysis. Among hard strategies, as defined in the theoretical framework, belongs also tactics of 'shaming' and criticizing. The analytical section on target-based strategies concluded with AOSIS tactic that is aiming at 'attacking the leadership ego' of the developed countries. This criticism can be considered as shaming tactic since AOSIS aimed to shift positions of developing countries by inducing feelings of shame for the lack of their leadership in the multilateral arena.

Ambassador Fry (2019) agrees that the strategy depends on the issue but in general, it is not easy for AOSIS to take on hard approach as they are missing the political might. In general, AOSIS thus has to rely on others to support their views and therefore the choice of this strategy is strongly linked to the application of other, previously introduced, strategies. An important role in choosing

whether the approach should be soft or hard depends on whether a coalition is built and whether there is the support of other Parties like NGOs. On the other hand, the initial hard approach that aimed at gaining this support was depending on the context-based strategies and the salience of climate change for AOSIS.

4. 4. Summary and theoretical reflections

The following section will summarize the analytical findings and reflect on the chosen theoretical framework by connecting the findings with the specific theoretical aspects and suggestions. This section is structured in an opposite way to the theoretical one as it starts with the reflection on most specific parts of negotiation strategies and determinants and moves to the general reflections on the concept of power and social constructivism. Therefore, the goal of this section is to round up the analytical findings in the iterative spirit and to prove the appropriateness of the chosen theoretical framework for this thesis.

4. 4. 1. Reflection on negotiation strategies

Despite their heterogeneity, the countries of the Alliance succeeded in building a common diplomatic discourse and impactful strategy. Even though AOSIS certainly does not win all its fights, it is 'boxing above its weight' thanks to its tight coordination and cohesiveness, the justness of its cause and support of the outside expertise. Their main success lied in their recognition as competent actors by other Parties in the negotiations.

When it comes to the four categories of the 'borrowing' of power framework, it is obvious that AOSIS checks all the boxes. Due to their extreme vulnerability to climate change impacts the issue is salient to them as much as it can be and the Alliance additionally uses all four strategies extensively. No direct preference for a particular strategy can be identified. In fact, such a preference would not be effective as the strategies are strongly interlinked and, especially in the 'fragile' case of AOSIS, one would hardly work without the other.

It is clear that putting the small island states together into one coalition and further seeking coalitions with other groupings in the UNFCCC regime is the most important aspect of all as that is what enabled these states to have any voice at all in the first place. One state can have a great strategy or even resources but in the multilateral scheme of the climate change regime, it would not be able to achieve much. However, the analysis also showed how much AOSIS has to rely on the support of the other actors (state or non-state) and that alone as a coalition in itself is not able to gather the necessary influence. Thus, even though, it is hard work for AOSIS to ensure the support of other groups and its own cohesiveness, it is work that is both worth it and necessary.

Coalition forming as a strategy is extremely important, especially for micro-states such as AOSIS but without deploying other negotiation strategies, it is not enough. Calliari, Surminski and Mysiak (2019) pointed out in their research: "*While AOSIS has surely benefitted from liaising with other developing countries in bringing L&D high on the UNFCCC agenda, this cannot deterministically explain why outcomes on L&D were obtained. Coalition-building in itself is not a sure means for any grouping to impact substantively on negotiations*" (168).

In terms of coalition, process-based strategies can further be linked also to target-based strategies as these are credited for opening the doors to coalitions with more powerful actors. Besides coalition forming, process-based strategies also showed the active participation of AOSIS in the process. Through this, the process-based strategy is directly linked to the third-party strategy that seeks the support of the NGOs and helps AOSIS level the 'playing field' by offering the expertise and resources needed for this level of activity.

The salience of an issue, outlined in the context-section, is directly linked to the context-based strategy of AOSIS. While the salience consists of the objective scientific facts proving the vulnerability of small island nations, subjective moral and normative appeals stemming from this salience transforms it into an impactful strategy. Within this strategy, AOSIS is using several frames (e.g. climate change is life or death issue, the unfairness of climate change, victimization) and thus the context-based strategies can be at the same time identified as persuasion-based strategies as discussed in the theoretical framework. Additionally, in line with the suggestions of the theoretical framework, the salience of an issue has in the case of AOSIS proved to have a positive influence on its negotiation success.

Through the context-based strategies, AOSIS was able to establish itself as a 'moral leader'. The higher moral ground comes from the hardly disputable argument, that even though they are contributing least to the climate change they are threatened by it the most. However, this leadership was not based only on the subjective normative aspects, AOSIS made sure that nobody can question their claims by always supporting them with scientific facts and evidence. In this way, they were able to establish themselves not only as moral leaders but also as credible leaders. Such conclusion suggests that context-based strategies are directly linked to third-party strategies. Science was identified as a third-party and additionally, the NGOs often facilitate access to this expertise.

The distinction of hard vs soft strategies also offers certain linkages. The evolution of AOSIS from hard to soft strategies revealed a link to process-based strategies as the hard approach was used to collect the support of other developing countries. However, even though the theoretical framework suggests that highly vulnerable countries are more likely to use hard negotiation strategies, this cannot be confirmed. Even though AOSIS uses a combination of both strategies and the vulnerability indeed triggers the hard approach, the hard approach still needs to be considered very carefully as the political might is missing and the moral high ground is not excluding the negative outcomes.

Overall the framework of power borrowing, as defined in the theory section of this thesis, offers good means for a systematic way of analyzing empirical data. The four categories can also be linked to the other strategies and in many cases, they are encompassing them. All strategies are interlinked and they overlap, however that is also why it is not always easy to put them into strictly defined categories.

One shortcoming, the author of this thesis identified in the theoretical framework, is that the framework is strongly focusing on the macro aspects but is not sufficient for identifying micro aspects such as a role of individuals in the negotiations. Although the skills of individuals are more an asset than a strategy, they need to be considered as influential in the process. This aspect was

highlighted by both internal sources. AOSIS consultant, for example, emphasized the importance of strong and skilled leadership of AOSIS first chair Ambassador of Vanuatu Robert Van Lierop (AOSIS consultant 2019; Fry 2019). Additionally, Magnan and Ourbak (2017) also pointed out the role of the individuals in the Paris Agreement. "*AOSIS machinery was also fueled by talented negotiators and advisors, thus facilitating the process. This helped AOSIS to stand as a block, even if differences with and within regions became clear during the COP21 negotiations themselves"* (2203).

4. 4. 2. Reflections on the concept of power and social constructivism

Looking at the definition of negotiation power outlined in the theoretical framework it can be concluded that AOSIS indeed has a certain level of power on the L&D issue as it it was previously able to achieve its goals by changing the opinions of other actors. Power AOSIS was able to construct in the negotiations can be understood as 'issue-specific' power. This power is depending on the context and is specific to the issue of climate change, in terms of this thesis specific to the L&D issue. Therefore, the power of AOSIS has to be understood only in this specific context and cannot be generalized on other institutions or matters. Furthermore, even this issue-specific power must be perceived as limited because it depends on the enhancement through strategies and 'borrowed' power resources.

The theoretical framework on the concept of power also distinguishes between external and internal power resources. The external power resources in the case of AOSIS postulate kind of a paradox as they must be understood 'reversely'. By traditional means, AOSIS lacks the external power resources such as the economic strength, however in a simplified way it is possible to conclude that the power of AOSIS lies in its powerlessness. That is why the case of AOSIS sets up the structuralist paradox in the UNFCCC negotiations. Even though their geography and climate change vulnerability generally represent disadvantages in the international arena in this specific case they are the means to certain, if only morally perceived, power. These negative external resources give them the moral high ground and thus also offer opportunities for gathering the support of NGOs and other countries.

Internal power resources are pointing out to the role of individuals that are missing in the framework of negotiation strategies. However, as already stated before and proven in the analysis, the internal power resources are complicated to observe. Nevertheless, the internal coordination and cohesiveness of the group are a prove of these resources being demonstrated by AOSIS in the negotiation process.

Social constructivism highlights the importance of the context. Actors are in the formulation other responses influenced and dependent on historical, social, political and normative contexts (Adler 2002 in Downie 2014, 19). These considerations proved to be very relevant for exploring the case of AOSIS role and power in the UNFCCC negotiations. It is not possible to understand the place AOSIS has in the UNFCCC negotiations now without understanding the historical context. Furthermore, to understand the case of AOSIS in the climate change negotiations and specifically on the L&D issue it is necessary to understand why L&D is salient issue to the Alliance, what are the small island states specific circumstances in relation to climate change and it is also important to see how AOSIS got included in the UNFCCC process in the first place.

In social constructivism, the concepts of practice and identity are intertwined. Perceptions of the situations in which actors find themselves and the courses of action they view as reasonable are being constructed through the context of identities. Actors establish their identity by locating themselves in the context of a past and a future. (Neumann and Williams 2000, 362). This is reflecting in the identity of AOSIS as an actor in the practice of the UNFCCC negotiations.

Small island states are being disproportionately affected by climate change, the effects they were already able to see in their countries, here understood as *the past*, were a trigger for creating a coalition of states with the same characteristics that would help them to negotiate better *future* for themselves. Establishment of AOSIS and its active engagement in the negotiations thus represents a practical response to an emerging situation. The analysis also showed how is the importance of AOSIS' identity emerging in their context-based strategies which correlates with the constructivist assumption that the construction of identity emphasizes the role of narratives structures within the process (Neumann and Williams 2000, 362).

Moreover, this goes in line with the statement that states in the world politics behave based on their understanding of the world around them and their own beliefs (Hurd 2008 in Calliari, Mysiak and Surminski 2019, 166). In this case, the states of AOSIS recognized the need to make their voice heard in the UNFCCC negotiations because of the existential threat climate change and losses and damages associated with it pose to their nations. They believed that something needs to be done and it needs to be done as fast as possible. Additionally, they were able through the moral justifications, active advocacy and skillful use of negotiation strategies expand this ‘belief' to other Parties in the negotiations.

The logic of appropriateness that social constructivists accentuate in state’s behavior can also be linked these arguments and to the context-based strategies of AOSIS. AOSIS believes in the justness of their cause and that ambitious climate action is what needs to be done, it is ‘the right thing to do’. As seen in the previous analysis, AOSIS' appeals to ethics and norms proved to be effective which supports the constructivist belief that these principles are important in guiding world politics and that they determine effective discursive strategies. (Downie 2014, 19; Odell 2013, 12)

5. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to explore the structuralist paradox, a situation when a weaker party in terms of power resources can be successful in the negotiation process with a stronger party. The success of AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations on the L&D issue was chosen as the extreme case. The problem formulation was addressed through answering two specific research questions focusing on the strategies of AOSIS in the climate negotiations on the L&D issue and the way how can the concept of state power be understood through this case. Such thesis focus enabled the author of this thesis to fill in gaps in existing research on power dynamics and strategies of small island states in climate change negotiations as well as on the L&D issue from international relations perspective.

The analysis showed that AOSIS managed to build considerable capacity and overcome their traditional marginalization by skillfully applying a wide range of strongly interlinked negotiation strategies that helped them to offset the lack of traditional sources of power. AOSIS made use of the process as well as the unique context, it targeted the international conscience of developed states and draw upon resources of third parties.

Overall, the case of AOSIS proves that leadership in international affairs is not a simple translation of power to outcomes. Considerations such as moral standing and the urgency of the matter prove to be significant aspects that allowed the Alliance to act ‘above politics’. Besides moral claims and coalition forming, they achieved this through tactics of de-politicization and appeals to science and common interests. In this way, the case of AOSIS proves that small states can in certain circumstances step up as key players when there is a necessity to cooperate for the 'common good’.

The concept of state power in the case of AOSIS can be understood as specific to the general context and the issue of climate change. AOSIS influence in the climate negotiations proves that the power must be understood beyond the traditional criteria that are assessing material capabilities. Moreover, AOSIS’ case in the climate negotiations is a proof that by focusing limited resources on a specific issue and effectively employing appropriate negotiation strategies the small states and even microstates can achieve positive outcomes in multilateral negotiations with stronger parties.

The case of AOSIS redefines the traditional understanding of external sources of power that are determined by an actor’s environment. Under different circumstances, the geography and climate change vulnerability of AOSIS would be understood as a disadvantage. However, in the case of climate negotiations, the external factors of small island states transform into an advantage that provides moral leverage and emphasizes the justness of their cause.

Despite the AOSIS undeniable achievements in the climate negotiations on the L&D issue, many questions remain and the battle is far from over. The small island states are now preparing for the crucial WIM review at the COP25 in Chile and they hope for positive outcomes on its many aspects. Nevertheless, even if successful, with the slowly rising temperatures and sea levels the thought might occur if this is not too little too late.

6. Bibliography

1. Adler, E. (2002). 'Constructivism and International Relations'. In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and B.A. Simmons (eds.). *Handbook of International Relations.* London: Sage Publications. In Downie, C. (2014). *The politics of climate change negotiations: strategies and variables in prolonged international negotiations*. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.4337/9781783472116.

2. Adler-Nissen, R. and Vincent Pouliot. (2014). 'Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya'. *European Journal of International Relations*, *20*(4), 889-911.https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1177/1354066113512702

3. Annan, K. (1998, July 15). *Secretary-General lauds role of small countries in work of United Nations, noting crucial contributions.* Press Release SG/SM/6639. United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980715.sgsm6639.html

4. AOSIS consultant. (2019, August 20). Author's interview.

5. AOSIS. (2019a). 'About us'. https://www.aosis.org/about/

6. AOSIS. (2019b). 'Member states'. https://www.aosis.org/member-states/

7. AOSIS. (2019c, June 27). *Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) Opening Statement at the Joint Closing of the SBI50 and SBSTA 50 Sessions World Conference Center*. Bonn, Germany. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201907011227---AOSIS%20Closing%20Statement%20-FINAL.pdf

8. AOSIS. (2018a, December 01). *AOSIS COP 24 Opening Statement*. Katowice, Poland

9. AOSIS. (2018b). *Statement by His Excellency Dr. Hussain Rasheed Hassan, Minister of Environment of Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States at the 3rd Biennial Ministerial High-Level Dialogue on Climate Finance – "Translating climate finance needs into action"*. UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/AOSIS%20-%20HLMD%20statement%20pdf.pdf

10. Bailer, S. (2004). 'Bargaining success in the European Union: the impact of exogenous and endogenous power resources'. *European Union Politics,* 5(1), 99-123. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1177/1465116504040447

11. Bailer, S. (2012). 'Strategy in the climate change negotiations: do democracies negotiate differently?' *Climate Policy*, 12(5), 534-551. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.691224

12. Baldwin, D.A. (2013). 'Power and international relations'. In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and B.A. Simmons (eds). *Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 273-297. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587.n11

13. Baldwin, D.A. (2016). *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach*. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. http://www.jstor.org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/j.ctt1q1xsp6

14. Barbosa, A S. et al. (2014). *Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage: Moving from polarizing discussions towards addressing the emerging challenges faced by developing countries*. http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2014/cc140101/Opinion%20LD-060114.pdf

15. Barnett, J. and John Campbell. (2010). *Climate Change and Small Island States: Power, Knowledge and the South Pacific.* London. Earthscan.

16. Benjamin, L. and Adelle Thomas. (2017). 'Management of loss and damage in small island developing states: implications for a 1.5 °C or warmer world'. *Regional Environmental Change*, 18(8), 2369-2378. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1007/s10113-017-1184-7

17. Benson Wahlen, C. (2018, November 13). 'AOSIS Chair Urges Increased Focus on Loss and Damage at COP 24'. *IISD: SDG Knowledge Hub*. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/aosis-chair-urges-increased-focus-on-loss-and-damage-at-cop-24/

18. Benwell, R. (2011). 'The Canaries in the Coalmine: Small States as Climate Change Champions'. *The Round Table*, 100(413), 199-211. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2011.565632

19. Betzold, C., Castro, P. and Florian Weiler. (2012). 'AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations: from unity to fragmentation?'. *Climate Policy*, 12(5), 591-613. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.692205

20. Betzold, C. (2010). 'Borrowing' power to influence international negotiations: AOSIS in the climate change regime, 1990–1997. *Politics*, 30(3), 131–148. https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01377.x

21. Bolon, C. (2018, November 17). '1.5 to Stay Alive: The Influence of AOSIS in International Climate Negotiations'. *E-International Relations Students.* https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/17/1-5-to-stay-alive-the-influence-of-aosis-in-international-climate-negotiations/

22. Bouckenooghe, D., Buelens, M., Mestdagh, S. and M. Van De Woestyne. (2008). 'Methodological issues in negotiation research: a state-of-the-art-review'. *Group Decision and Negotiation,* 17(4), 321-345. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1007/s10726-007-9097-3

23. Boyd, E., James, R. and Richard Jones. (2017, September 25). 'What Is Loss and Damage from Climate Change? First Academic Study Reveals Different Perspectives, Challenging Questions'. *New Security Beat.* https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/09/loss-damage-climate-change-academic-study-reveals-perspectives-challenging-questions/

24. Bryman, A. (2015). *Social Research Methods*, 5th edition. Oxford University Press.

25. Burr, V. (1995). *An introduction to social constructionism*. London: Routledge.

26. Calliari, E. (2018). 'Loss and damage: a critical discourse analysis of Parties' positions in climate change negotiations'. *Journal of Risk Research*, 21(6), 725-74. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2016.1240706

27. Calliari, E., Surminski, S. and Jaroslav Mysiak. (2019). 'The Politics of (and Behind) the UNFCCC's Loss and Damage Mechanism'. In Mechler, R., Bouwer, L., Schinko, T., Surminski, S. and Bayer, J. (2019). *Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options*. Cham: Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-72026-5_6.pdf

28. Carter, G. (2015). 'Establishing a Pacific Voice in the Climate Change Negotiations'. In Fry, G. and Sandra Tarte. (2015). *The New Pacific Diplomacy*. ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt19w71mc.23.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A25c6b1fe909c0c88f416cd7b54efbc89

29. Chestney, N. (2018, December 13). 'Maldives tells U.N. climate talks: 'We are not prepared to die'. *Reuters.* https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-accord-maldives/maldives-tells-u-n-climate-talks-we-are-not-prepared-to-die-idUSKBN1OC1QG

30. Chong, A. and Matthias Maass. (2010). 'Introduction: the foreign policy power of small states'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23(3), 381-382. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2010.505131

31. Climate Analytics. (2019). 'Loss and damage'. https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/loss-and-damage/

32. Craeynest, L. (2010). *Loss and damage from climate change: the cost for poor people in developing countries*. Discussion Paper. Johannesburg: Action Aid. https://actionaid.org/sites/default/files/loss_and_damage_-_discussion_paper_by_actionaid-_nov_2010.pdf

33. Dahl, R.A. (1957) 'The concept of power'. *Behavioral Sciences* (July) 2: 201–215.

34. De Águeda Corneloup, I. and Arthur P.J. Mol. (2014). 'Small island developing states and international climate change negotiations: the power of moral leadership'. *Int Environ Agreements: Politics*, 14, 281–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9227-0

35. De Souza, R. M. and Saleemul Huq. (2016, January 12). 'Climate Compensation: How Loss and Damage Fared in the Paris Agreement'. *New Security Beat*. https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2016/01/loss-damage-fared-paris-agreement/

36. Deitelhoff, N. and Linda Wallbott. (2012). 'Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 345-366. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.710580

37. Depledge, J. and Farhana Yamin. (2004). *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

38. Downie, C. (2014). *The politics of climate change negotiations: strategies and variables in prolonged international negotiations*. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.4337/9781783472116

39. Drahos, P. (2003) 'When the weak bargain with the strong: negotiations in the World Trade Organization'. *International Negotiation*, 8(1), 79–109.https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1163/138234003769590677

40. Dupont, C. (1996). 'Negotiation as Coalition Building'. *International Negotiation,* 1(1), 47–64. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1163/157180696X00287

41. Durand, A.and Saleemul Huq. (2015). *Defining loss and damage: Key challenges and considerations for developing an operational definition*. ICCCAD. http://www.icccad.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Defininglossanddamage-Final.pdf

42. Elster, J. (1976). 'Some Conceptual Problems in Political Theory'. In *Power and Political Theory.* Ed. Brian Barry. New York: Wiley, 245-70.

43. Eysenck, H. J. (1976). 'Introduction'. In Eysenck (ed.), *Case Studies in Behaviour Therapy.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

44. Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). *Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research*. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1177/1077800405284363

45. Fry, I. (2019, August 07). Author's interview.

46. Fry, I. (2016). 'The Paris Agreement: An Insider's Perspective - The Role of Small Island Developing States -'. *Environmental Policy and Law*, *46* (2), 105-108.

47. Gabbatiss, J. (2018, December 14). 'Please do not kill us: COP24 climate talks 'failing' and threatening survival of Maldives, leader warns'. *Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change-cop24-maldives-global-warming-fossil-fuels-poland-mohamed-nasheed-a8683301.html

48. Gordon, R. I. (2007). 'Climate change and the poorest nations: further reflections on global inequality'. *University of Colorado law review*, *78* (4), 1559-1624.

49. Gupta, J. (2012). 'Negotiating challenges and climate change'. *Climate Policy,* 12(5), 630-644. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.693392

50. Guzzini, S. (2013). *Power, Realism and Constructivism*. London: Routledge, https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.4324/9780203071748.

51. Habeeb, W.M. (1988). *Power and Tactics in International Negotiations: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations.* Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.

52. Handmer, J. and Johanna Nalau. 2019). 'Understanding Loss and Damage in Pacific Small Island Developing States'. In Mechler, R., Bouwer, L., Schinko, T., Surminski, S. and Bayer, J. (2019). *Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options*. Cham: Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-72026-5.pdf

53. Harasawa, H., Lal M. and Kiyoshi Takahashi. (2002). 'Future climate change and its impacts over small island states'. *Climate Research*, 19(3), 179-192. https://www-jstor-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/stable/24866780

54. Harmeling. S. (2015). *Loss and Damage Climate Reality in the 21st Century*. CARE International. http://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Loss-and-damage-climate-reality-in-the-21st-century.pdf

55. Hendl, J. (2016.) *Kvalitativní výzkum: Základní teorie, metody a aplikace.* Praha: Portál.

56. Hestabek, C. and Lisa Vanhala. (2016). 'Framing Climate Change Loss and Damage in UNFCCC Negotiations'. *Global Environmental Politics*, 16(4), 111-129. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/GLEP_a_00379

57. Heyward, C. and Edward A. Page. (2016). 'Compensating for Climate Change Loss and Damage'. *Political Studies*, 65(2), 356–37. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1177/0032321716647401

58. Hoad, D. (2015). 'Reflections on small island states and the international climate change negotiations (COP21, Paris, 2015)'. *Island Studies Journal*, 10(2), 259-262. https://www.islandstudies.ca/sites/islandstudies.ca/files/ISJ-10-2-Hoad.pdf

59. Huq, S. (2017, February 01). 'Climate compensation'. *International Centre for Climate Change and Development.* http://www.icccad.net/climate-compensation/

60. Hurd, I. (2008). 'Constructivism'. In Snidal, C. and Reus-Smit Duncan (ed.). *The oxford handbook of international relations*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 298–316. In Calliari, E., Surminski, S. and Jaroslav Mysiak. (2019). 'The Politics of (and Behind) the UNFCCC's Loss and Damage Mechanism'. In Mechler, R., Bouwer, L., Schinko, T., Surminski, S. and Bayer, J. (2019). *Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options*. Cham: Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-72026-5_6.pdf

61. IISD. (2019). 'Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: 17-27 June 2019'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin*, 12 (759). http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12759e.pdf

62. IISD. (2018a). 'Katowice Highlights: Monday, 3 December 2018'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin*, 12 (737). https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12737e.pdf

63. IISD. (2018b). 'Katowice Climate Change Conference Saturday, 8 December 2018'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin*, 12 (742). https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12742e.pdf

64. IISD. (2018c). 'Summary of the Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2018'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin*, 12(747). http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12747e.pdf

65. IISD. (1996). 'Report of the Third Session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate 5–8 March 1996'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin,* 12 (27). https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb1227e.pdf

66. IISD. (1995). 'Summary of the First Conference of the Parties for the Framework Convention on Climate Change: 28 March–7 April 1995'. *Earth Negotiation Bulletin,* 12 (21). http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb1221e.pdf

67. Iklé, Fred Charles (1964) *How Nations Negotiate*. New York: Harper & Row. In Odell, J.S. (2013). 'Negotiation and bargaining'. In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and B.A. Simmons (eds.). *Handbook of International Relations.* London: Sage Publications.

68. IPCC. (2013). *Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers*. Stockholm: IPCC Secretariat. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/

69. IPCC. (2007). I*PCC fourth assessment report: Climate change 2007*. Cambridge: IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf

70. Kaplan, A. and Harold D. Lasswell. (1950). *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*. Yale University Press.

71. Karunungan, R. J. (2017, November 11). 'COP23: What you need to know about loss and damage'. *Climate Tracker*. http://climatetracker.org/cop-23-need-know-loss-damage/

72. Krpec, O., Kříž Z., Pšeja, P. and Petr Suchý. (2015). *Moc a zájmy v mezinárodním systému. Procesy, aktéři a problémy v mezinárodních vztazích*. Brno: CDK.

73. Lamont, C. (2015). *Research Methods in International Relations*. London: Sage Publications.

74. Landau, A. and Frank R. Pfetsch. (2000), 'Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations'. *International Negotiation*, 5(1), 21–42. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1163/15718060020848631

75. Larson, M.J. (2003). 'Low-Power Contributions in Multilateral Negotiations: A Framework Analysis'. *Negotiation Journal*, 19(2), 133-149. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023645817323

76. Luxemburg Stiftung, R. (2019). *Climate and Gender Justice: what's needed to finance loss and damage?.* Climate Technology Centre and Network. https://www.ctc-n.org/resources/climate-and-gender-justice-whats-needed-finance-loss-and-damage

77. Magnan, A. K. and Timothée Ourbak. (2017). 'The Paris Agreement and climate change negotiations: Small Islands, big players'. *Regional Environmental Change,* 18 (8), Regional Environmental Change 18 (8), 2201-2207. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10113-017-1247-9.pdf

78. Maldives: MEE. (2018). *"What you do for small islands, you do for the world" 2015 – 2018*. Maldives: Ministry of Environment and Energy. http://www.environment.gov.mv/v2/wp-content/files/publications/20181106-pub-what-you-do-for-small-islands-you-do-for-the-world-2015-2018.pdf

79. Michaelowa. A. and Katharina Michaelowa. (2012). 'Negotiating climate change'. *Climate Policy*, 12(5), 527-533. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.693393

80. Mechler R. et al. (2019). *Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions*. In: Mechler R., Bouwer L., Schinko T., Surminski S., Linnerooth-Bayer J. (eds) Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Climate Risk Management, Policy and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-72026-5.pdf

81. Mortimer, C. (2015, December 12). 'COP21: 'The Pacific countries that need the Paris 1.5C temperature rise agreement to stay alive'. *Independent.* https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/cop21-the-marshall-islands-and-other-pacific-countries-paris-need-the-15c-temperature-rise-agreement-a6770766.html

82. Neumann, I.B. and Michael C. Williams. (2000). 'From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(2), 357-387. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020801

83. Odell, J.S. (2010). 'Three islands of knowledge about negotiations in international organizations'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(5), 619–632. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.1080/13501761003748534

84. Odell, J.S. (2013). 'Negotiation and bargaining'. In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and B.A. Simmons (eds.). *Handbook of International Relations.* London: Sage Publications London. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587.n15

85. OECD. (2018). *Making Development Co-operation Work for Small Island Developing States.* https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264287648-6-en

86. Panke, D. (2012). 'Dwarfs in international negotiations: How small states make their voices heard'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 313–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.710590

87. Perez Catala, A. (2019, July 02). 'We summarized what happened at Bonn SB50'. *Climate Tracker.* http://climatetracker.org/we-summarised-what-happened-at-bonn-sb50/

88. Rubin, J. Z. and I. W. Zartman. (2000). *Power and negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

89. Ruptly. (2018, December 03). *LIVE: COP24 climate summit kicks off in Poland* [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DmPBkEtxut4

90. Ruptly. (2017, November 06). *LIVE: COP23 kicks off in Bonn* [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XlFtBofs6A

91. Shibuya, E. (1996). “Roaring Mice Against the Tide”: The South Pacific Islands and Agenda-Building on Global Warming. *Pacific Affairs,* 69 (4). In De Águeda Corneloup, I. and Arthur P.J. Mol. (2014). 'Small island developing states and international climate change negotiations: the power of moral leadership’. *Int Environ Agreements: Politics*, 14, 281–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9227-0

92. Sell, S. (2003). *Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In Downie, C. (2014). *The politics of climate change negotiations : strategies and variables in prolonged international negotiations*. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. https://doi-org.zorac.aub.aau.dk/10.4337/9781783472116

93. Snyder, J. (2004). 'One world, rival theories'. *Foreign Policy,* 53–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944. In Calliari, E., Surminski, S. and Jaroslav Mysiak. (2019). 'The Politics of (and Behind) the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage Mechanism’. In Mechler, R., Bouwer, L., Schinko, T., Surminski, S. and Bayer, J. (2019). *Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options*. Cham: Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-72026-5_6.pdf

94. The Fiji Times. (2017, November 15). *Timoci Naulusala opens COP23 High Level Segment* [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4PXL72Vjxw

95. Touval, Saadia. (1989). 'Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytic Approach’. Negotiation Journal, 5(2), 159-173. https://link-springer-com.zorac.aub.aau.dk/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBF01000728.pdf

96. UNFCCC. (2019a). 'About the Secretariat'. https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat

97. UNFCCC. (2019b). 'Conference of the Parties’. https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop

98. UNFCCC. (2019c). Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage-ld/warsaw-international-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage

99. UNFCCC. (2015). Decision 1/CP.21 and *Article 8 of the Paris Agreement*. https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/ref_8_decision_xcp.21.pdf

100. UNFCCC. (2013). Decision 2/CP.19. *Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.* https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf

101. UNFCCC. (2007). *Climate change: impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries*. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/2759_pub07impacts.pdf

102. UNFCCC. (1992). *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf

103. Van der Geest, K. and Koko Warner. (2015). *What the IPCC 5th Assessment Report has to say about loss and damage*. UNU-EHS Working Paper, No. 21. Bonn: United Nations University Institute of Environment and Human Security. http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3172/What_IPCC_WG2_AR5_WP21.pdf

104. Van der Geest, K. and Koko Warner. (2013). *Loss and damage from climate change: local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries*. Bonn, Germany: UNU-EHS. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2185/13d7ed0bb5f3c07be9fd9a846bdfe3633008.pdf?_ga=2.122913608.2109220173.1566122948-873427162.1562143586

105. Weiler, F. (2012). 'Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations'. *Climate Policy*, 12(5), 552-574. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.691225

106. Wuppertal Institut. (2018). *Paris Fine Print Adopted, Implementation Pending*. An Assessment of COP24 in Katowice. Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie gGmbH. https://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/COP24_First_Assessment_en.pdf

107.Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.*Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications .

108. Zartman, I.W. (1997). 'The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation'. In Lewicki, R.J., Bies, R.J. and B.H. Sheppard (eds.). *Research on Negotiation in Organizations*, Vol. 6 , Greenwich: JAI Press, 227–245. http://id.cdint.org/content/documents/The_Structuralist_Dilemma_in_Negotiation.pdf