

Why Move to Armed Intervention?

Nordic Countries Answer to International System Threats and
Make a disproportionate contribution

Peng Shiqing



Summary	-----	2
1. Introduction	-----	4
1.1 From Nordic Balance to Armed Intervention	-----	5
1.1.1 Limited participation under the "Nordic balance" strategy	-----	6
1.1.2 Active international participation: participation in armed intervention	-----	8
1.2 Problem Formulation	-----	10
2. Methodology	-----	11
2.1 Objectives	-----	11
2.2 Choice of theory	-----	12
2.3 Choice of data	-----	14
3. Theory	-----	16
3.1 Variables at the level of international system	-----	16
3.2 variables at unit level	-----	18
4. Analyze	-----	20
4.1 Overview of the Characteristics of Nordic Countries' Participation in Armed Intervention	-----	20
4.1.1 Denmark	-----	20
4.1.2 Norway	-----	23
4.1.3 Sweden and Finland	-----	24
4.2 The Overall Turn of Nordic Countries 'Foreign Policy after the Cold War	-----	29
4.2.1 The signals provided by the international system to the Nordic countries during the cold war	-----	29
4.2.2 The signals provided by the international system to the Nordic countries after the cold war	-----	31
4.2.3 Summary	-----	39
4.3 Why can Nordic countries make outstanding contributions?	-----	41
4.4 Why do Nordic countries have internal differentiation in armed intervention?	-----	46
5. Conclusion	-----	55
References	-----	57

Summary

This paper mainly explores the problem **why the Nordic countries are keen to contribute to the transatlantic alliance after the cold war.**

The Nordic countries are still generally regarded as peace-loving, strictly abiding by international norms and preferring neutrality by both the international community and academia. This stereotype is related to the Nordic countries' consistent performance in international participation, but after the end of the cold war, we should pay more attention to the "other face" of international participation of Nordic small countries.

In order to explain this problem well, I think there are two branch points that need to be explained. Firstly, after the end of the cold war, what caused the Nordic countries to undergo tremendous changes in their international behavior? This involves the question of what the first driving force behind the changes in international relations is. Secondly, Nordic countries can be called small powers in terms of economic volume and military strength, but why can they make a great contribution to the alliance, while other small powers or even some traditional big powers in NATO cannot? This is also a question that must be answered. Because if I assume that the level of the international system is the first driving force for changes in international relations, and only use it as the answer to the question, then I cannot explain why the same changes in international environment lead different countries to respond differently. Therefore, only by further discussing the general domestic situation of Nordic countries and answering the second

branch question well, can the core problem of this paper be meaningful. Besides, the task of this paper is to explain a macro trend, and to find out the factors that can explain the system level and domestic level in the existing empirical facts according to Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory, and then to find out whether the answer to the problem can be found, rather than to study a specific case in detail.

Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory creatively combines the factors at the international system level with those at the domestic level, takes the signals provided by the international system as independent variables, takes the domestic factors as intermediary variables, and takes the national behavior and international results as dependent variables, thus getting rid of the external determinism and complete reductionism. This provides a very suitable analytical model for explaining the problems raised in this paper.

In Analyze part, first I make an overview of the fact that Nordic Countries contributed to military intervention operation led by the United States and NATO, including Senior official's words and the fact recorded by some literatures. Secondly, according to the Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory, looking for the first driving force for the overall turn of Nordic foreign policy, namely, the signals provided by the international system. Thirdly, try to answer the branch question, That is, after explaining the signals provided by the system that prompted the Nordic countries to change their foreign policy, further explain why the Nordic countries can contribute to the alliance while other members in alliance almost cannot, and what internal reasons allow them to contribute in different ways?

1. Introduction

Scandinavia is often seen as the "island of democracy and peace" in international politics, and after the end of world war II , the Nordic countries were also defenders of the current international order. In the international community, Nordic countries not only have a tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations, but also have a strong voice in cooperation on security issues such as migration, poverty and climate change.¹ However, after the cold war, Nordic countries were actively involved in the armed intervention led by the United States and NATO. From the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq to the military operations in Libya, Iraq and Syria in recent years, we can see the extensive participation of Nordic countries. Denmark and Norway have repeatedly participated in the military action to strike the ground target and establish a no-fly zone, which makes them stand out among a number of NATO countries. As neutral countries, Sweden and Finland also joined the EU after the end of the cold war and established a cooperative partnership with NATO. In recent years, they have gradually strengthened cooperation with each other in the fields of armed intervention, joint exercises and military training. This undoubtedly challenges the stereotype of Scandinavian international participation and shows the tendency of Nordic countries to break away from traditional Nordic internationalism through militarized activism.²

¹ Mihai Sebastian Chihai, "Nordic states contribution to peace and security," *Revista Română de Studii Baltice și Nordice*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Nov. 2016) pp. 73-91.

² Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking

Existing literature on the participation of Nordic countries in armed intervention operations led by the United States and NATO, often answered in terms of *prestige*, *reputation* and *strategic culture*,³ failing to systematically explain the external and internal reasons of armed intervention, in other words, they didn't pay attention to the impact of changes in the international system, as well as the national internal process tracking. Some scholars believe that "The Nordic model in foreign and security policy is closely linked to the Social Democratic welfare state, using this societal model as a normative point of departure for foreign policy in regard to peaceful problem-solving, justice and equality".⁴ However, on December 15, 2001, the Danish government volunteered to send combat troops and air power to carry out armed operations before the United States requested it. In 2011, Sweden, Denmark and Norway actively participated in and contributed significantly to the military operation to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. These cases all require systematic explanation.

1.1 From Nordic Balance to Armed Intervention

In order to further demonstrate the different characteristics of the Nordic countries' international behavior before and after the cold war, we need to clarify some of the

Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Nov. 2017) , pp. 217-241.

³ See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Bandwagoning for Prestige: Denmark, Norway and the War on Terror" , Prepared for delivery at "the CEEISA-ISA Joint International Conference" , Ljubljana, Slovenia, June 22-25, 2016; Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2017, pp. 217-241; Fredrik Doerer, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture" , *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

⁴ Anders Wivel, "Birds of a feather flying apart? Explaining Nordic dissonance in the (post-)unipolar world," in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, pp. 85.

Nordic countries' behaviors. So, what follows is a description of the international behavior of the Nordic countries during and after the cold war.

1.1.1 Limited participation under the "Nordic balance" strategy

During the cold war, Nordic countries had limited choices in foreign policy and international behavior. The Nordic countries put themselves in a low-leverage confrontation environment through the *Nordic balance* strategy. Denmark and Norway have joined NATO, but only in limited cooperation. Finland also has more room to maneuver than other countries bordering the Soviet Union.⁵ In the practice of the strategy, Denmark and Norway reject troops from other NATO countries or nuclear weapons deployed on Nordic territory (excluding Greenland), and does not support NATO military action in the Baltic region, which also brought about the Soviet Union's self-restraint of Finland, such as not force to sign the treaty of alliance with Finland and not garrison on Finnish territory, as well as deployment of nuclear weapons. These policies ensure that Denmark and Norway, as members of NATO, enjoy military protection while maintaining self-restraint in the region, thus avoiding provocation against the Soviet Union. The political activities of Nordic countries during the Cold War were also limited to participation in trade and territorial defense, as well as other low-level political issues.

During this period, the Nordic countries actively constructed their national image

⁵ See E. Noreen, "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and practice," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar. 1983) , pp. 43-56.

in the international community, reflecting the characteristics of focusing on democracy and peace and actively assisting developing countries. In 1945, the Nordic countries began to increase assistance to developing countries and make it become a norm. In addition, the economic aid level of Nordic countries to developing countries is higher than that of humanitarian international organizations on average scale, among which the foreign aid of Norway accounts for 1.1% of its GDP. In addition, only Norway, Denmark and Sweden have reached the United Nations target in the 1970s that 0.7% of GDP of developed countries should be aided to developing countries.

At the same time, the Nordic countries have further developed their own identities. This means that the Nordic countries have a high degree of confidence in their own security environment, believing that they can be independent of the defense structure of Western Europe and engage in international affairs with a unique moral attitude. During the cold war, as the meeting place of the two political and military blocs in the east and the west, the Nordic countries had a unique international status, that is, they became the optional political cooperation objects of the two political blocs. On the one hand, in terms of foreign strategy, although Denmark and Norway have joined NATO, Nordic countries still keep their international participation in the field of low political degree. in terms of security issues, the Nordic countries have built a unique image of security in the international community through their commitment to peacekeeping, disarmament, human rights, ecological protection and solidarity with developing countries.

On the other hand, during the cold war, Nordic countries gained a high level of security by participating in less threatening coalition missions. Although Sweden remains neutral and does not belong to any group, declassified government documents after the cold war show that since the early 1950s, Sweden has been sharing military intelligence with NATO members and receiving promises of military protection.⁶ Denmark and Norway through the strategy of *Nordic Balance*, means that they joined NATO, but don't need to undertake the task of NATO defense construction actively and do not need to make a provocation to the Soviet union, then can enjoy military protection from NATO and the United States, and the mature international market in Western Europe, which means only take very limited defense cooperation tasks can enjoy adequate security. During the cold war, the Nordic region had more degree of freedom than the rest of Western Europe.

1.1.2 Active international participation: participation in armed intervention

Unlike the Nordic countries' previous image of upholding peace and neutrality in the international community, after the end of the cold war, the Nordic countries participated in almost the whole process of armed intervention led by the United States and NATO. Among them, Denmark and Norway made outstanding contributions in

⁶ Ann-Sofie Dahl with Pauli Järvenpää, "Sweden, Finland and NATO, Security partners and security producers," Edited by Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 124.

military operations, dropped a huge number of bombs for NATO, and participated in direct attacks on targets. Sweden and Finland mainly participate in intelligence collection, air support, vigilance and post-war construction of armed intervention, which reflects the continuity and reliability of their contributions to the transatlantic military alliance. The participation of Nordic countries in military intervention has far exceeded the limitation they once defined for themselves, and the participation of Sweden and Finland in military intervention is contrary to their tradition of neutrality.

Table 1

	Kosovo 1999	Afghanistan 2001-2011	Iraq 2003	Libya 2011	Syria-Iraq 2011-
Den	√	√	√	√	√
Nor	√	√	-	√	√
Swe	-	-	-	-	-
Fin	-	-	-	-	-

Table 2

	Kosovo		Afghanistan		Iraq		Libya	
	Military	Non-M	Military	Non-M	Military	Non-M	Military	Non-M
Den	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Nor	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Swe	√	√	√	√	-	-	√	√
Fin	√	√	-	√	-	-	-	-

图表来源：Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Nov. 2017), pp. 217-241.

Table 1 reflects the first phase of these operations, namely direct military strikes

(including air force strikes and ground attacks). It can be seen that Norway and Denmark are enthusiastic about their participation, while Sweden and Finland are not involved in these direct military strikes. Sweden dispatched fighter planes to monitor and guard the air during the 2011 Libya operation, although it did not strike. Table 2 reflects the second stage of military intervention, which is closer to typical peacekeeping operations and post-war construction. Sweden showed greater enthusiasm at this stage, while Finland preferred economic assistance. Although the Nordic elites have repeatedly emphasized that the Nordic countries' military intervention and support activities are to safeguard world peace and freedom and order. But from the experience of Nordic countries participating in armed operations, a clear trend is that, on the one hand, Danish and Norwegian military strikes far exceed the needs of ordinary peacekeeping operations and have a significant preference for U.S. and NATO-led operations. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland, which are more order-abiding, are gradually taking NATO relations as the center of their foreign policy, although the two countries are undertaking more support-oriented tasks than strike-oriented ones. However, there is still a clear tendency to focus on NATO's actions, although the two countries still have no plans to join NATO.

1.2 Problem Formulation

In the following cases, we can see that in the armed intervention led by the United States and NATO, Danish and Norwegian fighter planes are praised as rock stars in the air and become NATO's war pioneers. Norway and Sweden have also made the actions

led by the United States and NATO the central task of their foreign policy and have continued to strengthen military cooperation with the United States and NATO. So, the core question of this paper is **why the Nordic countries are keen to contribute to the transatlantic alliance after the cold war.**

2. Methodology

2.1 Objectives

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the problem why the Nordic countries are keen to contribute to the transatlantic alliance after the cold war. In order to explain this problem well, there are two branch points that need to be explained.

Firstly, after the end of the cold war, what caused the Nordic countries to undergo tremendous changes in their international behavior? This involves the question of what the first driving force behind the changes in international relations is. Compared with completely reductionism, I tend to assume that the first driving force of international relations comes from the level of the international system.

Secondly, Nordic countries can be called small powers in terms of economic volume and military strength, but why can they make a great contribution to the alliance, while other small powers or even some traditional big powers in NATO cannot? This

is also a question that must be answered. Because if I assume that the level of the international system is the first driving force for changes in international relations, and only use it as the answer to the question, then I cannot explain why the same changes in international environment lead different countries to respond differently. Therefore, only by further discussing the general domestic situation of Nordic countries and answering the second branch question well, can the core problem of this paper be meaningful.

2.2 Choice of theory

Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory creatively combines the factors at the international system level with those at the domestic level, takes the signals provided by the international system as independent variables, takes the domestic factors as intermediary variables, and takes the national behavior and international results as dependent variables, thus getting rid of the external determinism and complete reductionism. This provides a very suitable analytical model for explaining the problems raised in this paper.

Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory was proposed at the end of 2015, by Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell. The authors' main conclusion is that neoclassical realist theory in past is stuck in what they call Type I or Type II literature: Type I focuses on explaining anomalous cases, whereas Type II uses neoclassical realist theory as a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy.

When the *Type III Neoclassical Realist Theory* (Type III NRT) is constructed, it takes structural realism as the benchmark of the theory and carries out a new deduction. Type III NRT first negates the problem of "extrinsic determinism" of structure realism. And, while agreeing with the concerns of structural realism about threats and opportunities offered by the level of international system, Type III NRT does not believe that countries will respond decisively and mechanically to changes in the international environment. The reasons given by the theory are as follows. First, the international system does not always provide countries with clear information about threats or opportunities; Second, leaders do not always recognize the right signals from the international system; Third, Type III NRT holds that the rational assumption of structural realism is flawed. Even if leaders can correctly recognize the stimulation of the international system, they will not always make rational choices. Finally, it is necessary to recognize the ability of countries to mobilize resources. Structural realism assumes a fully independent and flexible country that can not only correctly identify the stimulation of the international system, but also make a correct and rational response quickly. However, not all countries are capable of carrying out activities completely according to their own wishes.

At the same time, Type III NRT also denies the complete reductionism and abandons the view that domestic factors determine the international behavior of a country. It holds that the liberalism theory of international relations is the most

influential subset of the reductionist path.⁷ The hypothesis of liberalism theory is based on the bottom-up political view, that is, the needs of individuals and groups precede politics, and that the state is not an autonomous or independent actor, but a projection of the preferences of dominant social alliances, which ultimately determines national policies and drives international political changes. It is these social actors, not external international pressures or changes in international structures, that cause changes in national behavior, that is to say, domestic factors have become the first driving force. Therefore, whether it is competition, game or cooperation, the purpose of formulating and participating in the international system is to enable the country to satisfy its internal benefits, so that each domestic group can obtain the best benefits, whether wealth-related or security-related. In addition, constructivism, like liberalism, despises the importance of the distribution of relative material strength.

2.3 Choice of data

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Nordic countries are keen to contribute to the alliance's military operations after the end of the cold war, and the guiding theory to analyze this problem is Type III NRT. Therefore, the research method adopted in this paper will strictly follow the research method of Type III NRT, and relevant data will also be collected according to the needs of this theory.

⁷ 【加】诺林·里普斯曼，【美】杰弗里·托利弗，【美】斯蒂芬·洛贝尔著，刘丰，张晨译：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，上海：上海人民出版社 2017 年版，第 4 页。

First, **Type III NRT adopts soft positivism research method.**⁸ Type III NRT scholars still firmly believe that if we cannot use empirical evidence to test theory, so as to determine which theory can better guide us to solve problems, then the actual effect of theoretical construction is very limited.⁹ However, they also acknowledge the limitations of theoretical testing in the social sciences that study human behavior, which leads to problems with using hard positivism. After all, it's easy for researchers to agree on how to measure the temperature of metals or the volume of liquids, but it's very difficult and complex to measure social phenomena such as "self-esteem" and "norms". In the process of quantifying social phenomena, researchers are either forced to rely on their own subjective assumptions or design an indirect method to measure the variables they are interested in. Therefore, Type III NRT follows a soft positivist approach and **seeks rules that transcend different cases.**

Second, the core research questions of this paper require that I should not confine my eyes to a specific and detailed case, but seek a general explanation through different cases, as mentioned above, that is, to follow the requirements of theory. According to Type III NRT, it is necessary to collect some reasonable information to help me conduct qualitative research, such as: what kind of signals do changes in the international system after the cold war provide to the Nordic countries? What kind of information can help me prove that this signal really exists? Will the leaders of the Nordic countries make

⁸ See 【加】诺林·里普斯曼，【美】杰弗里·托利弗，【美】斯蒂芬·洛贝尔著，刘丰，张晨译：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，上海：上海人民出版社2017年版，第104页。

⁹ Ibid, pp. 104

cooperation with the United States and NATO the center of their foreign policy? Are there any public statements from leaders that can be proved?

Therefore, the task of this paper is to explain a macro trend, and to find out the factors that can explain the system level and domestic level in the existing empirical facts according to Type III NRT, and then to find out whether the answer to the problem can be found, rather than to study a specific case in detail.

3. Theory

3.1 Variables at the level of international system

In the reconstruction of research variables, Type III NRT further refines the variables at the system level as the first driving force. Type III NRT regards the signals presented by the international system to countries as independent variables and divides them into two kinds: information scope (clarity) and information content (constrained/inclusive strategic environment), which are also the two most critical variables. Unlike structural realism, which attributes the source of uncertainty to the characteristics of the international system itself, Type III NRT regards uncertainty as the result of the interaction of agents and the international system.

Unlike structural realism, Type III NRT holds that it is not the system itself that

stimulates the country, but the information *scope* and *content* that the system provides to the country. Among them, "*the scope of information*" is defined as "*clarity*" and "*the content of information*" is divided into two categories: the *constrained or inclusive strategic environment*. We can judge from three perspectives what clarity the international system provides to countries: the degree of recognition of threats and opportunities; whether the system provides information on the time range of threats and opportunities; and whether the best policy options stand out.¹⁰

Another important international system variable of the theory is the content of information, that is, the *inclusive and constrained strategic environment*. The distribution of power in the international system may be an inclusive or constrained strategic environment for a country.¹¹ In other words, a temporarily stable international system may provide a constrained strategic environment for Country A while an inclusive strategic environment for Country B. In fact, not all countries will receive the same signal from the system, which is the point that Type III NRT different from the structure realism. In Type III NRT, the concept of "polar" is more like a dynamic function that describes the relative power distribution among major countries in the international system, rather than a fixed mode, which makes the theory is dynamic. Moreover, the international system can provide different clarity, whether in an inclusive

¹⁰ See [加]诺林·里普斯曼、[美]杰弗里·托利弗、[美]斯蒂芬·洛贝尔：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，刘丰、张晨译，上海人民出版社 2017 年版，第 59 页。

¹¹ [加]诺林·里普斯曼、[美]杰弗里·托利弗、[美]斯蒂芬·洛贝尔：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，刘丰、张晨译，上海人民出版社 2017 年版，第 47 页。

or constrained strategic environment.

3.2 variables at unit level

One of the important criticisms of neoclassical realism for a long time is that it often adopts the method of incorporating ad hoc variables in pursuit of stronger explanatory power, lacking the accuracy of description and not being clear about when and what role these variables will play. And Type III NRT after the reintegration is fully capable of solving these problems.

Type III NRT abandons the eclecticism of Type I and Type II, and integrates the mediating variables at unit level into four basic types: leader's cognition, strategic culture, state-social relations and domestic institutions, and these four mediating variables run through the three domestic processes of cognition, decision-making and policy implementation.¹² Type III NRT also answers the timing and degree of different mediating variables' influence on independent variables. Among them, the leaders' cognition dominates the decision-making in the short-term crisis period, and other variables are rarely involved. Variables such as strategic culture, state-social relations and domestic institutions are all involved in domestic processes and exert greater influence in the short to medium and medium to long term. In addition, according to table 3, when independent variables are combined with intermediary variables, their

¹² See 【加】诺林·里普斯曼，【美】杰弗里·托利弗，【美】斯蒂芬·洛贝尔著，刘丰，张晨译：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，上海：上海人民出版社 2017 年版，第 60 页。

interaction reflects the conditions under which imperfect system signals and imperfect agents act: In a highly clear constrained environment, faced with urgent choices and high-intensity threats, foreign policy executors and domestic interest groups are unable to engage in sufficient bargaining. At this time, leaders' cognition is the intermediary variable that plays a greater role, and other factors are unlikely to have direct and significant impact. In a highly clear inclusive environment, the influence of factors other than leaders' cognition is more prominent, and the importance of individual leaders decreases with time.¹³

Table 3: Mediating variables combining system clarity and strategic environmental characteristic ¹⁴

		System clarity	
		High clarity	Low clarity
Strategic environmental characteristic	Constrained environment	Leader' s cognition	Leader' s cognition Strategic culture
	Inclusive environment	Strategic culture、 Domestic Institutions、 State-social relations	Uncertain

¹³ See 【加】诺林·里普斯曼，【美】杰弗里·托利弗，【美】斯蒂芬·洛贝尔著，刘丰，张晨译：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，上海：上海人民出版社2017年版，第92页。

¹⁴ Table source：【加】诺林·里普斯曼，【美】杰弗里·托利弗，【美】斯蒂芬·洛贝尔著：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，刘丰，张晨译，上海：上海人民出版社2017年版，第91页。

4. Analyze

4.1 Overview of the Characteristics of Nordic Countries' Participation in Armed Intervention

4.1.1 Denmark

Denmark's involvement in armed intervention and contribution are clearly characterized by its firm adherence to the United States. For the past 20 years or more, the core objective of Denmark's foreign policy has been to maintain cooperation with the United States.

*“Denmark has been a persistent ally to the United States throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and unquestionably supported US policies in both countries as well as in the wider Middle East. Instead of being a reluctant ally, Denmark has worked hard to become and remain an ‘impeccable’ US ally. This has established Denmark as a core NATO member, a dependable US diplomatic ally and a consistent contributor to US-led military coalitions.”*¹⁵

Former Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen reiterated the importance of “do our part,” emphasizing direct engagement with the U.S. and criticizing

¹⁵ Kristian Sjøby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, “Denmark’ s Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of ‘punching Above Your Weight’ ,” in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 63.

Denmark's world war ii adaptation policies.

*“We are in the middle of a showdown with the policy of adaptation, which has dominated Danish foreign policy since the defeat [to Prussia] in 1864 ... Cooperation with the US is not adaptation. It is equal cooperation with a friend, a partner, an ally, who honor the same principles and values as we do: democracy, freedom of speech, market economy, and human rights.”*¹⁶

His foreign minister, Per Stig Møller, also sees the United States as a strategic ally:

*“The USA is incredibly important to us. If we find ourselves in a crisis it will be the US that can help us. No one else can help us.”*¹⁷

In 1999, Denmark skipped UN security council authorization to participate directly in the military operation in Kosovo and sent 16 F-16 to join the strike mission to show its support for the armed intervention. Support for the United States is more reflected in the "9/11" incident. On December 5, 2001, Denmark first proposed to provide aircraft and ground troops to participate in the operation, and then received the request from the United States. It is important to note that Denmark places its military movements under U.S. command and does not limit its use of Danish troops. When Denmark became one of the three EU members involved in the 2003 Iraq war, it was

¹⁶ Kristian Sølby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, “Denmark’s Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of ‘punching Above Your Weight’,” in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

¹⁷ Kristian Sølby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, “Denmark’s Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of ‘punching Above Your Weight’,” in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

seen by the Danish prime minister as boosting his standing in Washington and earning a reputation as an elite ally.¹⁸ Similarly, in 2011 Denmark was one of only eight NATO members to take part in the bombing of Libya, believing it was the right thing to do with the right country.¹⁹ In 2016, Denmark decided to follow the U.S. in the fight against ISIS in Syria/Iraq by sending air and ground troops.

Denmark has abandoned all its adaptation policies and increasingly sees itself as part of a global influence, following the footsteps of the United States and participating in almost all U.S. -led armed interventions, and this policy has a strong continuity, that is, whether it runs the Social Democratic Party or the Conservative Liberal Party. The faction, which regards the use of force as an effective method, will continue.

*Both center-right (liberal-conservative) and center-left (social democratic) governments have increasingly used the Danish armed forces as a key component or tool of this active foreign policy. This use of armed force abroad as a central instrument of Danish foreign policy makes it possible even to label Danish foreign policy as military activism.*²⁰

¹⁸ See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose and Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Bandwagoning for Prestige: Denmark, Norway and the War on Terror," Prepared for delivery at the CEEIDA-ISA Joint International Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, (June 2016) , pp. 22-25.

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Kristian Sjøby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, "Denmark's Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of 'punching Above Your Weight' ," in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

4.1.2 Norway

Norway, shortly after the end of the cold war, still strictly limited its international participation to the United Nations peacekeeping framework. However, since 1999, it has turned to NATO-led operations. In the same year, the Norwegian government adjusted its armed forces to make them more suitable for overseas armed operations, in order to compensate for the fact that Norway lost its strategic importance and was marginalized, which was also the driving factor for its participation in military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Active participation in the Afghan war and effective combat operations have raised Norway's status and attracted the attention of the United States. Norway's defense minister believes that Norway's main purpose is to show its special ability by doing something to show that it is a good ally.²¹

From undertaking military strikes to post-war peacekeeping and reconstruction, Norway's active participation testifies to its support for the alliance. Contrary to Mr. Gates's criticism of NATO Allies, Norway has been praised on several occasions. Despite a rare split during the Iraq war in 2003 that kept Norway out of a direct strike on Iraq, Norway immediately sent troops to help when the United Nations issued a call to stabilize Iraq in May of that year. With its high-profile involvement in Libya in 2011, where it dropped 8% of the war's bombs, Norway has been hailed as a disproportionate contributor to the country and a heavy-hitter in NATO. It is vital for Norway to include

²¹ Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping*, 2018, Vol. 25, No. 2, 217-241.

the United States' interest in its defense policy planning, and only by supporting the United States can it better balance the potential threats of regional powers to its interests.²² The benefits for Norway are still considerable because the Norwegian political elite, rather than trying to build a seamless relationship with the United States, as Denmark does, is trying to prove its value to the union and its continued relevance to its actions. In the possible conflicts of interest, the United States and NATO can support them because of the cost and the contribution they have paid.

4.1.3 Sweden and Finland

Sweden and Finland both see the United States as the driving force and the ally who can contribute most to strengthening NATO's presence on its eastern flank, as well as the real guarantor of regional and European security.²³ As NATO membership is not an option for domestic political reasons, the United States has become Stockholm and Helsinki's priority partner for defense co-operation.

Sweden initially refused to take part in the air campaign in Kosovo, but chose to keep troops there, mainly as peacekeepers and advisers. Sweden provided more than 1,000 troops to Kosovo from 1999 to 2013 and ended its military involvement there in 2013. Sweden has more volunteer roles in the International Security Assistance Force

²² See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose and Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Bandwagoning for Prestige: Denmark, Norway and the War on Terror," Prepared for delivery at the CEEIDA-ISA Joint International Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, (June 2016) , pp. 22-25.

²³ Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański, "Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States" , *OSW/COMMENTARY*, NUMBER 205, 2016, pp.1-7.

(ISAF), such as providing intelligence, medical and logistics services, as well as advising military personnel and even Afghan forces, than Denmark and Norway have been directly involved in military strikes. In 2011, the ISAF returned its mandate to Afghan forces, ended its mission and set up a new NATO-led training and advisory mission, to which Sweden did not hesitate to join.

However, in addition to traditional peacekeeping and support missions, Sweden deployed eight Gryphon fighters and one C-130 transport aircraft to help set up a no-fly zone in Libya, the first time since 1963 that Sweden has used fighter planes in peace operations.²⁴ Sweden has also demonstrated its efficient military mobilization and air support capabilities. It has demonstrated its military and political values and has also been positively evaluated by NATO. Although Sweden's consistent approach is military assistance for non-military strikes and post-war reconstruction, a series of non-United Nations-led armed operations have repeatedly proved that partnership with the United States and NATO is the central foundation of Swedish foreign and security policy. Similarly, Sweden has participated in democracy-building activities in Iraq and Syria, trained soldiers and provided humanitarian assistance, and has pledged its willingness to help in the long term. Although not a NATO country, it still proves its trustworthy value. The alliance is satisfied with its military contribution and is confident that it is willing to share risks, which increases the possibility that Sweden will be protected by

²⁴ Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" , *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Nov. 2017), pp. 217-241.

NATO in the future.²⁵

Although the Swedish government publicly criticized the U.S. foreign and security policies on many occasions in the early days of the end of the cold war, Stockholm's leaders believed that rapid assistance from the United States and NATO was the only opportunity to avoid Russian occupation.²⁶ “The partnership with NATO is central basis for Swedish foreign, security and defense policy,” said Reinfeldt, former Prime Minister of Sweden.²⁷ According to Sweden's new security strategy 2016-2020 adopted in 2015, we can see three characteristics. First, Stockholm sees transatlantic co-operation as center of ensuring European security, and the United States is the only country able to lead. Second, to cooperate with the United States in military exercises and training, armament research and development, and overseas operations and take them as a priority for the Swedish military; Third, unless Sweden joins NATO after 2018, its security policy will be based on bilateral co-operation with the United States.²⁸

However, as will be analyzed later, the neutrality policy during the cold war left Sweden with a stubborn political legacy and was not occupied by Denmark or Norway in the Second World War. This has led Swedish political elites to believe that non-

²⁵ Ramus Brun Pedersen, “Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?” , *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Nov. 2017), pp. 217-241.

²⁶ Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański, “Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States” , *OSW/COMMENTARY*, NUMBER 205, 2016, pp.1-7.

²⁷ Fredrik Doerer, “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture” , *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

²⁸ Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański, “Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States” , *OSW/COMMENTARY*, NUMBER 205, 2016, pp.1-7.

alignment and timely compromise (supplying steel to Germany in the Second World War) have benefited the country and will remain non-aligned in possible future wars. By contrast, accession to the EU is more about identity than security. In addition, the Swedish elite will also take Russia into consideration in foreign policy, even if it is protected by the West, it will not act too provocatively against Russia itself. In the foreseeable future, the Swedish elite will also not give the West a commitment to join NATO. In short, on the one hand, Sweden demonstrates its full capacity to participate in armed intervention, on the other hand, through continuous military exercises and institutionalized cooperation, it demonstrates its unique advantages, which makes NATO have to pay attention to the region.

Finland has been the most low-key and cautious of the four. Russia's increasingly aggressive activities in the Baltic have forced Sweden and Finland to reassess their Baltic security policies. However, because of its large border with Russia and its large trade volumes, there is no reason for the Finnish elite to deteriorate relations with Russia. Although the entry of the Baltic states into NATO has changed the geographical environment, it is the consensus of the political elites and the public of Finland that it is possible to build a relatively harmonious relationship between Russia and the west. As a result, it is inevitable to seek the intervention of external forces. The 2015 center-right government noted that the us and NATO played a key role in securing the Nordic Baltic region and hoped their participation would deter potential Russian aggression.²⁹

²⁹ Johan Eellend, "Friends, But Not Allies: Finland, Sweden, and NATO in the Baltic Sea," *BALTIC*

Given Russia's aggressive and revisionist policies, the Baltic region may become a stage for Russia to confront the West. Finland has also overcome the cold war taboo, ended its dependence on Moscow and adopted the route of integration with the West (joining the European Union, but not NATO).³⁰ Friendly relations with the United States are part of Finland's relocation of foreign and security policy. In 1992, the purchase of 62 F-18 Bumblebee fighter jets was particularly significant, as it contributed to continued military cooperation between Finland and the United States in pilot training, exercises and aircraft modernization. In addition, the Finnish Armed Forces have been strengthening interoperability with the United States Army, mainly within the framework of multilateral regional exercises under the Partnership for Peace Project.

Since 1999, Finland has sent its armed forces to participate in various NATO-led peacekeeping operations, providing training and consultation as well as long-term post-war assistance and expanding the scope of assistance to judicial, legal, medical, maternal and child human rights assistance. In the battle against the Islamic State, Finland joined the demilitarized coalition against the Islamic State and focused on providing humanitarian assistance.

BULLETIN, June 13, 2016, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/06/friends-not-allies-finland-sweden-nato-baltic-sea/>, log in time : 12/6/2019.

³⁰ Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański, "Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States" , *OSW/COMMENTARY*, NUMBER 205, 2016, pp.1-7.

4.2 The Overall Turn of Nordic Countries 'Foreign Policy after the Cold War

A comprehensive description has been made above, and it is found that the Nordic countries' foreign policy has undergone an obvious and clear overall turn after the cold war. According to Type III NRT, to study the root causes of the transformation of national foreign policy/strategy, we need to first identify the signals provided to Nordic countries at the level of international system, because the information provided to countries at the level of international system is the first motive force for countries to consider the transformation of foreign policy/strategy. This paper argues that the information provided by the international system and received by the Nordic countries after the end of the cold war is an inclusive strategic environment with clear threats and clear policy options. According to Type III NRT, in an inclusive strategic environment, a series of possible foreign policy choices are appropriate because the country is not facing the urgent threat of life and death. Therefore, according to the theoretical assumptions, the Nordic countries should make a more active foreign policy shift in this context.

4.2.1 The signals provided by the international system to the Nordic countries during the cold war

During the Cold War, the Nordic countries faced a clear and long-term constrained strategic environment. The choice of their foreign policy/strategy and the use of their

material strength faced systemic obstacles. The overall confrontation between the two poles has led to a high-pressure situation in Europe, which has greatly reduced the choice space of sovereign countries' own strategies. Nordic countries are located in a special region, which contains four high-tension zones: High North, Greenland, Oresund Strait and parts of Sweden and Finland.³¹ High North area, namely the Barents Sea, Norway and the far north of Sweden, besides the competition between the two blocs for maritime transport lines, there are also important factors such as nuclear war. Close to the launch trajectory of ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles from both sides will enter orbit through this area. Not far from the Kola Peninsula, the base of Soviet military and nuclear submarines is also deployed. The Northern Fleet was also deployed here, which is the core force of the Soviet Union's second nuclear strike. Many radar stations and communications facilities here also demonstrate the key role of the sub-region in intelligence and early warning for the two major groups.³² Located near Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, the Oresund Strait is the throat that holds the Baltic Sea in and out of the Atlantic Ocean. During the Cold War, the Nordic countries were situated at the strategic crossroads of the two blocs. Among them, Denmark and Norway abandoned their neutrality completely after the Second World War and joined the Atlantic Military Alliance. Sweden indicated that they remained in the middle. However, it secretly exchanged information with NATO.

³¹ Ann-Sofie Dahl, "Security in the Nordic-Baltic region", in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 69.

³² Ann-Sofie Dahl, "Security in the Nordic-Baltic region", in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 69.

Finland was severely restricted by the Soviet Union on Trade and regional cooperation. The Oresund Strait was listed as one of the targets of the Soviet Union's nuclear attack.³³

In such an environment, the security and economic threats to the Nordic countries are clear and persistent, and the options for foreign policy are very limited, because in a constrained strategic environment, the time range for responding to threats and seizing opportunities is relatively short, and there are not many options other than mitigating threats and utilizing opportunities. At this time, the influence of unit factors on foreign policy becomes less important.³⁴ As stated earlier, during the Cold War, the Nordic countries only resorted to the Nordic balanced strategy to engage in limited international activities.

4.2.2 The signals provided by the international system to the Nordic countries after the cold war

With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the new world order has brought greater freedom to many countries. In Europe, the high-pressure situation of confrontation between the two blocs ceased to exist, and the subsequent expansion of NATO and the acceleration of European integration further expanded the scope of the Western "liberal world". For Sweden and Finland, the

³³ Ann-Sofie Dahl, "Security in the Nordic-Baltic region," Edited by Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 70.

³⁴ [加]诺林·里普斯曼、[美]杰弗里·托利弗、[美]斯蒂芬·洛贝尔：《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》，刘丰、张晨译，上海人民出版社2017年版，第56页、第141页。

collapse of the Soviet Union has sharply reduced the pressure from the East. The foreign policies of the two neutral countries can also be more flexible. The strategic environment facing the Nordic countries has also changed from a *constrained* strategic environment to an *inclusive* strategic environment. At the same time, this international system has brought highly clarity to the Nordic countries. First, although the cold war is over, the new threats are very clear. After the end of the cold war, the inclusive strategic environment facing the Nordic countries enabled them to redefine their scope of interests and modify their foreign policy practices. However, the power vacuum in the Baltic Sea and the northern region, which emerged rapidly after the cold war, has constrained and threatened the expanding scope of interests of the Nordic countries; moreover, regional security. In the perspective of economic cooperation, on the one hand, the Nordic countries' own community building went bankrupt completely, on the other hand, the acceleration of European integration and the expansion of NATO's global action have achieved remarkable results. Nordic countries are gradually away from regional security and economic arrangements, while lacking the necessary cooperation objects and frameworks.

4.2.2.1 Regional Power Vacuum in Nordic after the Cold War

After the cold war, the Baltic Sea region and the High North region became a power vacuum, which threatened the security arrangements and interests of the Nordic countries. The Nordic region, once regarded as an important strategic choice by Europe and the United States, disappeared from the strategic map of the West after the collapse

of the Soviet bloc and became a forgotten flank. In the early 1990s, the global strategic contraction of the United States could be considered as the first cause of power imbalance. With the emergence of a new international order after the cold war, as the only superpower, the United States began to learn how to deal with global affairs. On the one hand, the crisis in the Balkans has attracted the attention of the United States. Should it respond to it quickly? Whether this crisis will spread to the European continent or not is an urgent issue for the United States to consider. On the other hand, the expansion of NATO also needs urgent attention from the United States. Many former Warsaw Treaty members and former Soviet Union allies tried to open NATO's doors. Whether to expand NATO or adjust its strategy requires the United States to make a choice. By contrast, the Baltic Sea seems to be in an insignificant position, not to mention Norway's highly concerned northern region, which is also marginalized. In the above-mentioned regions, the United States will not personally participate, even if it has concerns, but through regional agents to achieve its objectives. The participation of Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt in negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic Sea region is a typical example.³⁵

For Nordic countries, the rapid decline in their strategic position is worrying, and the tendency of the United States to withdraw from the region seems even more worrying, which makes Nordic countries unable to protect their interests. For example, with the reassessment of the potential of Arctic oil development in the late 1990s and

³⁵ See Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 5, 1994, pp. 72-85.

the peak oil production and bleak prospects, Norway began to realize the importance of expanding to the high north, and in 2003 proposed that the High North is full of opportunities and has become the center of Norwegian security and defense policy.³⁶ Norway is aware of the economic value of High North because of its rich energy reserves and increasingly clear transport potential. But as Russia becomes more aggressive and competes with the Nordic countries in the Arctic, they are worried. With the prominence of energy and transportation advantages and development potential of the high northern region, this region has once again become a hotspot of the game and will have a profound impact on the economic and security interests of Nordic country.

In addition to the initial strategic contraction tendency of the United States, the power imbalance in the Nordic region is also reflected in the restructuring of NATO and the threat of regional powers.³⁷

*“The reorganization of NATO’s command structures strengthened this sense of vulnerability. In particular in Norway, where the CINCNORTH command outside Oslo was replaced by the new AFNORTHWEST in High Wycombe close to London, a step which detached Norway militarily from the Continent and left it isolated in the north. Furthermore, Denmark was now placed under the Central European Command (AFCENT) in the Netherlands.”*³⁸

³⁶ See Ramus Brun Pedersen, “Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?” *International Peacekeeping*, 2018, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2017, pp. 217-241.

³⁷

³⁸ Ann-Sofie Dahl, “Security in the Nordic-Baltic region” , in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 73.

This is undoubtedly a huge blow to the Nordic countries, especially Denmark, which formulates its strategic interests in the Atlantic region, and Norway, which anchors its objectives in the northern region. Compared with the indispensable position of the region in the cold war period, the sharp reduction of Western military input after the cold war has brought tremendous changes to the security environment of the Nordic countries, and also caused a huge psychological gap. In addition, despite losing its status as a superpower and its allies, Russia is still a strong regional power, and the Kola Peninsula is still the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, which makes Russia still have strong military capabilities to enter the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea and the High North. In the 1990s, Yeltsin's strong intervention prevented the Baltic countries from joining NATO in the first time; in 2008, Russia's military action against Georgia seemed to be an undoubted military threat to the Nordic countries; and the Ukrainian incident exacerbated Nordic countries' concerns about Russia. With the progress of technology, Russia and NATO countries are seeking further expansion in the high Arctic region and the Arctic, which means that the Baltic Sea and the high Arctic region, which were under high pressure deterrence during the cold war period, showed certain vulnerability after the end of the cold war: the stability brought by the prudent action of all parties under high pressure deterrence during the cold war period, has now been replaced by unstable military power comparisons and political uncertainty. The Nordic countries, which had relied on relatively stable environment, were suddenly forced to face unbalanced regional power comparisons after the end of the cold war, which made them

attempt to retrieve the investment of their allies or major powers in the region, thus safeguarding their increasingly widening geographic interests and seeking new policies and institutional security.

4.2.2.2 Institutional Dilemma of Regional Cooperation

After the end of the cold war, the Nordic integration construction was completely declared bankrupt, which brought the Nordic countries institutional dilemma at the development level. This forced the Nordic countries to make a change in their foreign policy to cope with the threat posed by the change of the system. The power vacuum in the region and the accelerated development of European integration have prevented Nordic countries, which have failed to establish regional security and economic communities, from continuing to enjoy the benefits of security arrangements and common markets without assuming responsibility. Denmark and Norway have shifted their targets to the Atlantic Ocean and the High North respectively, but their capabilities are limited. Sweden and Finland fell into the Great Depression at the beginning of the 1990s.

During the Cold War, the Nordic integration process was not able to produce substantive cooperation due to geographical constraints, and the mechanism construction was not formed. For a long time, the Nordic will to establish a regional security community focused more on the pursuit of their own security and image construction, neither institutionalized efforts nor efforts. Enough material strength is

guaranteed. As early as the 1940s, some Nordic scholars launched the "Romanticism" movement, which gave birth to Scandinavianism, which sought and shared Nordic common values. At the beginning of the end of the Second World War, the cooperation between the governments of the Nordic countries developed rapidly. The landmark achievement was the establishment of the Nordic Council. However, the cooperation of Nordic countries during the Cold War was limited to the pursuit of domestic policy coherence and social welfare-oriented areas. Its greatest achievement was the establishment of a unified Nordic labor market. The Nordic Council is essentially a deliberative body, unable to provide defense and foreign policy guarantees, and has no legislative or even binding power. Similarly, Sweden proposed the establishment of the Scandinavian Defense Union in 1948, Denmark attempted to form the Nordic Customs Union in 1968, and so on. The attempt with the nature of community and alliance was quickly declared unsuccessful. Although attempts to establish a security community led by Sweden and Finland have continued in recent years, the essence of defense cooperation between Nordic Defense Support and Nordic Battle Group is still based on NATO and EU actions and has not yet been able to achieve the requirements of independent defense activities.

After the end of the cold war, the accelerated development of European integration, the maturity of the common market and the security cooperation with NATO led to the complete bankruptcy of the Nordic Security Community. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has greatly expanded the choice space of foreign policy of small countries

in Central and Eastern Europe. The process of European integration has also been accelerated. The EC has also moved rapidly from unilateral trade and market integration to a composite entity of foreign and security policy integration. The OSCE has opened the Helsinki process, which has brought complete security measures and preventive crisis management to the world as a model of "common security". This process embodies the wisdom of the European continent: Europeans value the convergence of various schools of thought,³⁹ pay attention to the various mechanisms of deep cooperation between national and transnational actors, and transcend the simple international anarchy; at the same time, they are good at combining regional research with global change and advocating cooperation and dialogue.⁴⁰ After nearly 40 years of development, the maturing mechanism of CSCE has guaranteed the long-term supervision of the crisis, strengthened the ability of member states to prevent crises, and ensured effective restriction capacity. In addition, on the basis of advocating common security, the process has formed a systematic measurement of security, such as linking traditional security with non-traditional security elements, linking individual rights with the international community, and forming a package of soft solutions such as negotiation, consultation and communication, to solve complex non-traditional problems after the cold war. On the road to peace and development, the European Continent has offered solutions that are better than the Nordic Security Community in terms of institutionalization, coercion, methodology and sustainability, which is still in

³⁹ 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海：上海人民出版社 2018 年版，第 264 页。

⁴⁰ Ibid, 265.

the concept of Nordic countries. Nordic countries have to participate in the U.S. -led security order in the transformation of the international environment. A hitchhiker for European integration. Compared with the wide-ranging and deep-seated integration process in Europe, the persistent low-political international participation of Pan-Scandinavianism lacks the opportunity to form an entity. At the same time, due to the end of the cold war, the regional environment of the Nordic countries is essentially all integrated into the Western camp dominated by the United States and Europe, and their regional security Based on the institutionalization of Europe and the military input of the United States, the Nordic countries could not start a new story.

4.2.3 Summary

After the cold war, the international system presented a clear and long-term threat to the Nordic countries, namely, regional power vacuum and institutional dilemma at the level of cooperation. However, this long-term threat to security and development is not an urgent, life-or-death threat, so unlike during the cold war, the strategic environment facing the Nordic countries after the cold war is inclusive. Inclusive strategic environment has relatively little hindrance to the use of material strength to achieve national interests in the international arena. A wide range of strategies may be appropriate, and the country has a longer time range to respond to potential threats and opportunities. Therefore, the signals provided by the international system to the Nordic countries provide a source of impetus for the transformation of their foreign policies after the cold war, and also provide a clear choice of foreign policies and strategies, that

is, to adopt more active foreign policies and integrate themselves into the overall arrangements of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance and the region so as to secure their interests.

After the end of the cold war, the highly clarity and the evolution of the strategic environment have stimulated the Nordic countries, which has led to the overall shift of foreign policy. However, if we just sum up this reason, we can neither fully explain the core problem of this paper nor conform to the research paradigm of the Type III NRT. In order to fully explain the core problem and conduct more valuable research, we need to solve the second small problem proposed in this paper. Despite the fact that Nordic countries are developed countries and have the highest per capita GNP in the world, they are still small countries with limited material strength. Their economic aggregate, army numbers, standing weapons and equipment strength and strategic support capabilities are not very prominent, but why are they able to make contributions to NATO in armed intervention? Why can they make a "disproportionate" contribution? By contrast, most of the small developed countries that follow the United States and NATO, and sometimes even Britain, a traditional power with strong material strength, cannot make effective contributions, which has been criticized many times by the US Defense Secretary. Moreover, although the Nordic countries as a whole follow the foreign policy of bandwagoing to United States, Denmark and Norway show typical militarized activism in concrete practice, while Sweden and Finland, although they send ground troops or even air force to assist in action, still tend to carry out "auxiliary" behavior and participate in military activities with limited participation. What is the

cause of this differentiation? Only by answering these questions can we explain more fully the core question of why the Nordic countries participated in armed intervention and made outstanding contributions to the alliance after the cold war.

4.3 Why can Nordic countries make outstanding contributions?

Type III NRT attempts to integrate the research on the degree of harmony between the state and society (including the degree of decision-making by the state relative to the society, the consistency of internal political alliances, and the ability to apply force) into two variables: state-social relations and domestic institutions. The variable of state-social relationship is set up to describe the interaction between the core system of the state and of the economic and social groups. The purpose of setting up the domestic system is to further specify the state-social relationship. Nordic countries share values, social systems and political norms, and their social cohesion, government and citizenship consistency are better than other small NATO countries, and even better than traditional liberal countries such as Britain. This paper holds that Nordic countries can make outstanding contribution to the alliance because of their strong social cohesion, government mobilization ability and internal consistency, which enable them to implement the established policies smoothly, rather than being influenced by domestic factors. In this part, this paper focuses on the variable of *state-social relationship* in Nordic countries. Because Nordic countries belong to “western democracy” countries and have similar cultures, the domestic political characteristics will not cause significant differences among each other, so the variable of “domestic

system” is not discussed.

“Democracy” and “power restriction” are the traditional characteristics of Nordic countries. As early as the piracy period of the Nordic community, the primitive clan parliamentary democracy was preserved, and in the 13th century a charter restricting the power of the king appeared.⁴¹ Because of the unique democratic tradition, peasants entered national parliaments at the beginning of the 17th century. In the 19th century, the regimes of the three Nordic countries were under the leadership of peasant political parties. In modern Nordic society, there was no confrontation between the peasant class and the bourgeoisie. After the economic reform of social welfare system after the 1930s, inequality was regarded as a kind of injustice.

Firstly, the mature welfare system has won the trust of the people and interest groups to the government, which makes the society and the state relatively consistent in foreign policy. Despite repeated weakening of welfare expenditure provided by the public sector, Nordic countries are essentially different from liberal welfare countries. Nordic countries adhere to the principles of universalism, high taxes, high income and anti-social stratification, especially the welfare guarantees for children and women, which are unparalleled globally and particularly effective in dealing with the problem of long-term unemployment.⁴² Secondly, the welfare system in Nordic Europe is state-

⁴¹ See 刘玉安,《论北欧模式的社会历史条件》,载《欧洲》1993年第2期,第34-39页。

⁴² See Magnus Ryner, “The Nordic Model: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?” , “*New Political Economy*,” Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, pp. 61-70.

dominated, and high taxes make the public sector get the vast majority of resources. At the same time, government spending on social security accounts for a large proportion of GDP.⁴³ In this case, the Nordic countries have produced welfare systems that are different from traditional European liberalism. The citizens of traditional European countries may worry about the market effects of their countries' international actions, which may directly impact their employment and welfare. However, due to the state-dominated welfare in Nordic countries, especially the separation of individuals and families, the welfare is directly targeted at individuals rather than families, so that individuals gain greater benefits and satisfaction.

Secondly, there is a cross-class alliance of farmers and workers in the Nordic countries, and there is also a broad cross-party political identity (for example, all parties regard "upholding the rights of the people to help those who cannot help themselves" as the primary principle of governance, and are committed to maintaining equality among all classes), and social-democratic parties and non-social democratic parties all represent a wide range of social components.

*"... the peasants and workers have had a central place in the Nordic politics and culture and the welfare project itself was achieved through cross-class alliance and cooperation. "*⁴⁴

⁴³ See 参见林卡：《北欧国家福利改革：政策实施成效及其制度背景的制约》，载《欧洲研究》2008年第3期，第99-110页。

⁴⁴ M. Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism and The Welfare State After the 'Golden Age' ", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2007, pp. 9-26.

In addition, there is a strong policy continuity among the parties. This common social structure and culture further promote the Nordic countries' concept identification and value sharing. Despite the increasing diversity of society, Nordic countries remain homogeneous politically, ethnically, culturally and religiously.⁴⁵ Unlike the individual liberalism of the traditional Western European countries, although there are voices of anti-immigration and anti-pluralism in the society, the Protestant religion (Lutheran Sect) has played an important role in the development of the Nordic society in history, which makes the influence of religion in politics and society lack of dominance, and make the country holds a monopoly position in the history of political legitimacy and morality.⁴⁶ This feature can provide specific and efficient solutions to social and economic problems.

Finally, the Nordic countries also have a high level of government allocation capacity, whether it is financial allocation or military operational capacity. The Danish government did not hesitate to provide funds for the military. When NATO was ready for action, the government had received parliamentary support. When the Foreign Minister announced the deployment, the media would not raise any obstructive questions. Denmark's F-16 fighter jets immediately flew to Sicily.⁴⁷ The Nordic

⁴⁵ See Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace' ", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1996, pp. 451-467.

⁴⁶ See M. Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism and The Welfare State After the 'Golden Age' ", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2007, pp. 9-26.

⁴⁷ See Kristian Sjøby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, "Denmark' s Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of 'punching Above Your Weight' ", in Michael Wesley, eds., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

countries are at a high level in terms of social and government coherence, the harmony of a wide range of domestic alliances, and the mobilization ability of the government. Therefore, in the choice and practice of foreign policy, the society and the state are often able to maintain consistency. This consistent state-social relationship is a reinforcement of the policy-making and practice process in Nordic countries. For Denmark and Norway, this "unanimous relationship" strengthens the country's response to system stimulus, creating not only an image of follow-up, but also a great contribution to the Allied Forces in concrete practice by virtue of excellent mobilization ability, which is superior to other small NATO members. Despite Denmark's historic high number of casualties, public support has remained remarkably stable in the Afghan military operation, with 40-50% of the population supporting the mission, making Denmark and the United States the two countries with the highest public support in the Afghan operation.⁴⁸ This consistency in turn strengthens Sweden's foreign policy orientation of extensive cooperation with Finland, the United States and NATO, but refuses to join the military alliance. When the Swedish and Finnish governments expressed their preference for not joining NATO, their people also maintained a high degree of consistency with the government, and the number of people willing to join NATO was less than 30%.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ See Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, "In Denmark, Afghanistan is worth dying for: How public support for the wars maintained in the face of mounting casualties and elusive success," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2015, pp. 211-227.

⁴⁹ Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" , *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2017, pp. 217-241.

Compared with other small countries in the alliance, the Nordic countries have a high degree of national-social coherence. Because of the monopoly role of the government in welfare and morality, and the improvement of welfare system and egalitarianism, the domestic cohesion, resource allocation capacity and the ability to use force are higher than those of other small countries, and even better than those of other small countries even traditional powers in Western Europe. It is precisely because the Nordic countries have these characteristics, in the process of military mobilization and support for armed intervention, the Nordic countries are hardly affected by domestic factors, so they can do something without taking into account domestic factors.

4.4 Why do Nordic countries have internal differentiation in armed intervention?

Leader's cognition and national strategic culture are also important intermediary variables of the Type III NRT. Leaders' cognition influences the first process of the domestic process: perception of the impending system stimulus and formation of "cognitive filtering"; strategic culture forms the strategic understanding of political leaders, social elites and even the public. In Nordic countries with highly consistent national-social relations, people and political elites share strategic culture.

Firstly, in the definition of leadership image, Type III NRT includes the factor of "political strongman". However, in the specific cases of Nordic countries, the "political

strongman" factor is excluded. The unique history and political culture of Nordic make the restriction of power and egalitarianism become the internal norms of the community. The pursuit of a wide range of interests, harmony and social welfare is the normative justice within the Nordic countries. "In this world, consistency and the maintenance of collective security and stability always overwhelm individual risk-taking and creative impulses of genius. Here, the play of personality is strictly restricted, and there is no soil for strongman politic to play a strong role.⁵⁰ The strategic culture of Nordic countries defines strategic choices through collective expectations and makes Leaders' perceptions and social expectations relatively consistent, shaping the state's perception and decision-making toward systemic stimulus.

Fredrik Doerer, a Swedish scholar, defined the national strategic culture too narrowly in his research on the strategic culture of Nordic countries. At the agent level, he believed that the strategic culture was only related to the national policymakers, but on the carrier, he believed that the strategic culture was more related to the force (such as the core task of the army, the willingness to use the army and the organizational framework of the task, etc.)⁵¹ Type III NRT's strategic culture view base on Charles Kupchan's view of "broad strategic culture". It holds that the scope of agents is no longer limited to elite consensus, but further extends to the deep-rooted knowledge of the general public, forming a collective expectation with policymakers to restrict or

⁵⁰ [英]尼尔·肯特：《瑞典史》，吴英译，北京：中国出版集团 2010 年版，序言第 2 页。

⁵¹ See Fredrik Doerer, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

guide national behavior. On the carrier level, strategic culture is a common norm formed by the focus of collective expectations. Besides, it can restrict Leaders' cognition, or change dynamically because of the deliberate guidance or involvement of the government in major historical events. In the case of Nordic countries, strategic culture includes a high degree of recognition of peaceful neutrality and humanitarian intervention, transnational institutional democratic norms, the importance of "gaining reputation through practice", and the conditions and scope of the use of armed forces. This paper argues that, after eliminating the excessive interference of political strongmen, it is the differentiation of Leaders' cognition and strategic culture that leads to the division between "one-sided" pursuit and "self-restraint" active cooperation.

The Nordic countries used to have a very similar strategic culture. They have not fought against each other since 1815 and have maintained the unity of negative and positive peace in the region. Negative peace refers to the absence of war between Nordic countries. Only in the mid-19th century, Prussia and Austria jointly attacked Denmark and were involved in world war ii. Many other events have shown the non-war character of the Nordic region. For example, the independence of Norway in 1905, the independence of Iceland in 1918, the Oland islands dispute between Sweden and Finland, and the east Greenland dispute between Denmark and Norway, they all choose non-war means despite the high risk of war, and since the second world war, the Nordic countries are not prepared to attack either side.⁵² Positive peace means that Nordic

⁵² See Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace' ," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No.4,

society has tried many times in history to establish a unified community, and to solve problems in accordance with Nordic social, cultural and political norms and ways of behavior, so as to achieve common peace. Trust and restraint among the Nordic countries not only weakened the possibility of war, but also further formed a mutually recognized system of shared values. In the 19th century, the Pan-Scandinavian doctrine proposed by the social elite continued to this day. The convergence of the mainstream ideology, the shared value system and the high degree of national-social coherence make the Nordic countries not regarded as war-prone and maintain the tradition of neutrality and actively practice international humanitarian action and transnational democratic norms.

However, the impact of major historical events and the role of external forces can shape and reconstruct a country's strategic culture. Since the establishment of the Westphalia system until the end of the Second World War, the Nordic countries (except Sweden) have been on the periphery of the world because of their limited military capabilities and remote geographical location. In the two world wars, Nordic countries also tried to remain neutral. During World War I, the three Nordic countries (Iceland and Finland were not independent) adopted a neutral policy to prevent Norway from being involved in the British side while Sweden joined the German side, thus making Denmark a battlefield for both sides. In the second world war, as with Norway's "unspoken" dependence on Britain, the Nordic countries continued to opt for neutrality,

1996, pp. 451-467.

which was unrealistic.⁵³ Britain's strong military strength did not provide substantial protection for the Nordic region. Nordic countries' pursuit of free trade and moderate neutrality policy plunged more than half of the Nordic countries into war. Denmark and Norway were occupied by Germany without almost any resistance.⁵⁴ Although Finland moved to the German side during the Second World War because of the "vinterkriget", to a greater extent because of the aggression of the Soviet Union, it temporarily abandoned its neutral declaration at the outbreak of the Second World War and, Finland in addition to trying to recapture the lost territory and to assist the German army to attack the Soviet union, was not involved in axis attack other allied military action. The Second World War could become a dividing line in the Nordic countries' foreign policy positions, resulting in the division of security concepts in the region.

Denmark and Norway completely abandoned the concept of neutrality and moved towards militarized activism. The Second World War was an important event that led to the differentiation of Nordic countries in collective norms. Although Denmark's armed forces were not allowed to use force beyond self-defense during the Cold War,⁵⁵ however, in the Post-Cold War era, with clear signals and inclusive strategic environment, the collective norms of Denmark and Norway have undergone significant

⁵³ Paal Sigurd Hilde, "Nordic-Baltic security and defense cooperation," in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 94.

⁵⁴ Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace' ," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1996, pp. 451-467.

⁵⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Denmark and UN peacekeeping: glorious past, dim future" , *International Peacekeeping* , Vol. 23, No.5, 2016, pp. 741-761.

changes, which are highlighted in the aspects of international humanitarian intervention and participation of international forces: from traditional peacekeeping operations to offensive international participation, from adherence to neutral peace to follow-up; leader's gradually forming their own "cognitive filtering", that is, although there is widespread criticism of themselves and the United States by the international community, Denmark and Norway take a firm one-sided follow in specific foreign policy practice. Although Denmark's 2008 white paper indicates that it is impossible to identify a territorial threat to Denmark in the foreseeable future and to describe Denmark's security environment as "unprecedented". However, Danish politicians are aware that changes in European geopolitics will change the conditions of Danish security policy.⁵⁶ Denmark no longer believes that it is advisable to place security on Western European countries, on the one hand because trust in history has not brought peace, on the other hand, because they believe that active and more valuable foreign policy can not only ensure their own security, but also effectively safeguard the expanding interests. Denmark therefore abandoned its passive Cold War security policy and withdrew from the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, thus withdrawing from the defense arrangement of European integration and turning completely to unconditional support for the United States. Contribute to the actions led by the United States and become a dedicated ally of the United States.

⁵⁶ Kristian Sjøby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, "Denmark's Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of 'punching Above Your Weight' ," in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

Denmark seems to have become a specialist bomber for the United States and NATO, launching in Iraq in 2014-2015 and in Iraq/Syria in 2016-2017. Per Stig Møller, Denmark's Former foreign minister, admitted after many praises from the United States: "If there is a crisis, Americans will help us. No one else can help us."⁵⁷ When the British delegation visited Washington in 2013, senior officials of the Obama administration said that Britain should behave more like Denmark, which is a model that can be followed.⁵⁸

The "strong tradition of neutrality" is an unavoidable issue when discussing Swedish and Finnish issues. This paper also regards the tradition of neutrality as the strategic cultural characteristics of the two countries but does not think it is the real core of their strategic culture. That is to say, it is not the superficial neutral tradition but the essence of its collective norms that really suppresses the stimulus from the international system. Sweden's neutrality can be traced back to the Napoleonic War, not only to elite orientation and popular choice, but also to a solid tradition. Sweden is still a strictly neutral country for the Swedish public, even though there were top-secret contacts with NATO during the Cold War. Finland's choice of neutrality is based on historical and geographic considerations: in 1918, Finland became independent from Russian's rule,

⁵⁷ Kristian Sølby Kristensen and Kristian Knus Larsen, "Denmark's Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of 'punching Above Your Weight' ," in Michael Wesley, ed., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

⁵⁸ See Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, "Size and Reputation-Why the USA Has Valued its 'Special Relationships' with Denmark and the UK Differently since 9/11" , *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr. 2015), pp.135-153.

and then was civil war. From 1939 to 1945, Finland experienced three wars, two against the Soviet Union and one against Germany. The term "Finnization" is used to describe the skillful manipulation of Finnish politicians in maintaining sovereignty and not falling into war under serious political and military tensions.⁵⁹ However, the tradition of neutrality is only a feature of the strategic culture of Sweden and Finland. The essence of their collective norms is a flexible means between great powers' great pressures. Finland's neutrality originated from geopolitical pressure, which is the best solution to please the Soviet Union and keep distance from the West, and is a policy choice to separate itself from external pressure; Sweden's neutrality is more regarded as a flexible neutrality, which was born from the decline of its own strength and escape from the scourge of war on the European continent, but it does not deny the possibility that get rid of neutrality. In World War II, Sweden repeatedly imposed double standards, such as maintaining trade volume with Germany in wartime while sharply reducing trade volume with Britain and agreeing that Germany attack the Soviet Union by way of Swedish railways but forbidding Finland to enter Sweden. Thus, the neutrality of Sweden and Finland is not strictly based on the neutrality of international law, but a self-proclaimed foreign policy. In other words, their tradition of neutrality is a political tool that allows them to stay out of big power disputes and avoid damaging themselves as much as possible. This neutrality is an operational political feature whose confidence interval derives from the behavior it exhibits and the credibility of its strategic culture,

⁵⁹ Ann-Sofie Dahl with Pauli Järvenpää, "Sweden, Finland and NATO, Security partners and security producers," in Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics: Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world*, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014, p. 132.

not from the strict definition of international law or the strict supervision of the international community. Sweden and Finland declared in 1992 that they would change their neutrality policy to military non-alignment and interpret it as a necessary measure for the security of the Nordic region. This concept of soft security has actually lowered the concept of neutrality to the minimum. In response to the regional power vacuum and the institutional dilemma of cooperation, Sweden and Finland have to make positive changes and make full use of flexible means of neutrality.

But this flexible neutrality also does not allow Sweden and Finland to get too close to the Western Union. After all, in history, keeping flexible neutrality without completely turning to either side is the way to ensure that they will not be destroyed. Because the cost of completely breaking neutrality is unbearable and subject to the long tradition of neutrality, successive leaders of Sweden and Finland will not regard joining the military alliance as their political goal. But unlike Finland, Sweden is more active in participating in armed intervention led by the United States and NATO, which stems from another feature of Swedish strategic culture, namely, participation in international activities through a wide range of moral dimensions.⁶⁰ From another point of view, Sweden's preference is to prove its strong military mobilization and air support capabilities, but not to participate in substantive target strike missions. Finland pays attention more on territorial defense. Finland's willingness to use force is limited to

⁶⁰ Fredrik Doerer, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture" , *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

defensive purposes, because the lesson of history is that defensive rather than offensive fighting pays off. Similarly, political rather than military measures should be given priority while participating in armed intervention. Finnish President Urho Kekkonen once said, "Finland should be a doctor, not a judge."⁶¹

5. Conclusion

The information provided by the post-cold war international system to the Nordic countries is the regional power vacuum and institutional cooperation dilemma in the inclusive strategic environment, which brings threats and challenges in security and aspects to the Nordic countries and urges them (except Iceland) to make positive foreign policy adjustments to cope with threats. The strategic orientation and consensus of leaders in Denmark and Norway were strengthened by "state-society relationship" and followed by militarized activism. Domestic factors in Sweden and Finland have become powerful inhibitors, weakening the national response to systemic stimuli. Participation in armed intervention is a means, not an end, of the Nordic countries.

In the foreseeable future, it will be difficult for the international system to return to the bipolar or even unipolar structure, which objectively avoids tension and high-intensity confrontation in the international environment, and small countries will not face high-intensity war and threat of survival. First of all, the signals presented by the

⁶¹ Fredrik Doerer, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture" , *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

international system to the Nordic countries will remain an inclusive and highly clarity strategic environment, which will enable the Nordic countries to continue to adopt positive foreign policies. Nordic countries have been fully integrated into the North Atlantic alliance led by the United States and NATO in regional security arrangements. Denmark has almost become a small country with the closest relationship with the United States. Its "Opt-Out" for European common defense and close military cooperation with the United States and NATO have almost separated it from Europe. The bondage of common security and defense is bound to be further away from the EU's own security and defense policy in the future, so as to gain closer alliance with the United States through more active military action. Norway has not yet become a member of the European Union. It is not only confident in providing security by NATO, but also self-reliant without the EU Common Market. Norway regards the High North region and even the Arctic region as its strategic core interests. It has always been Norway's trend to enjoy the energy and products of the Arctic and the North Pole alone. This interest needs more normal military cooperation with the United States and NATO (including bilateral and trilateral military exercises, arms maintenance, coordination of overseas operations, etc.). Only by ensure that can they maintain this political and economic ecology; Sweden and Finland will not join NATO as a military alliance in the foreseeable future. Although their military cooperation with the United States and NATO has been normalized and NATO has repeatedly sent obscure invitations, the leaders of Sweden and Finland are well aware of their collective expectations and strategic culture, since they have already made important contributes and thus get

reward and trust from the NATO and the United States, and gained the common market and institutional power by adjusting the neutral policy to join the European union, it will be dangerous and irrational to break the balance and completely turn to the military alliance. In addition, Nordic countries' superior social cohesion, domestic resource mobilization ability and public-government coherence make the above-mentioned foreign policies of Nordic countries not be affected by domestic forces but will be strengthened by these characteristics.

References

Chinese references

Monograph

[1] 王逸舟:《西方国际政治学:历史与理论》[M],上海:上海人民出版社 2018 年版。(Western International Politics: History and Theory)

Translation Monograph

[1] [加]诺林·里普斯曼、[美]杰弗里·托利弗、[美]斯蒂芬·洛贝尔:《新古典现实主义国际政治理论》[M],刘丰、张晨译,上海人民出版社 2017 年版 (Neo-classical Realism Theory of International Politics)

- [2] [英]尼尔·肯特：《瑞典史》[M]，吴英译，北京：中国出版集团 2010 年版，序言第 2 页。(History of Sweden)
- [3] [美]斯蒂芬·沃尔特：《联盟的起源》[M]，周丕启译，北京大学出版社，2007 年版，第 16-47 页。(The Origins of Alliance)
- [4] [美]肯尼思·沃尔兹：《国际政治理论》[M]，信强译，上海：上海人民出版社，2017 年 8 月第一版，第 75-76 页。(International Politic Theory)
- [5] [美]兰德尔·施韦勒：《没有应答的威胁：均势的政治制约》[M]，刘丰，陈永译，北京：北京大学出版社 2015 年 1 月版，第 118 页。(Unanswered Threats-Political Constraints on the Balance of Power)

Journal Articles

- [1]徐隆彬：《有关苏芬战争的几个问题》，载《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》[J]. 2013 年第 5 期，第 67-74 页。
(Several Issues Concerning the Soviet-Finnish War)
- [2]刘玉安，《论北欧模式的社会历史条件》，载《欧洲》[J]. 1993 年第 2 期，第 34-39 页。(On the Social and Historical Conditions of the Nordic Model)
- [3]林卡：《北欧国家福利改革：政策实施成效及其制度背景的制约》，载《欧洲研究》[J]. 2008 年第 3 期，第 99-110 页。
(Welfare Reform in Nordic Countries: The Effectiveness of Policy Implementation and the Restriction of Its Institutional Background)
- [4]于铁军：《进攻性现实主义、防御性现实主义和新古典现实主义》，载《世界

经济与政治》[J]., 2000年第5期, pp. 29-34。

(Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism and Neoclassical Realism)

[5]陈志瑞、刘丰:《国内体系、国内政治与外交政策理论——新古典现实主义的理论构建与经验拓展》,载《世界经济与政治》[J]. 2014年第3期, pp. 111-128。

[6]李巍:《从体系层次到单元层次——国内政治与新古典现实主义》,载《外交评论》[J]., 2009年第5期, pp. 134-150。

(From System Level to Unit Level: Domestic Politics and Neoclassical Realism)

[7]吴志成, 杨娜:《北欧的国际关系研究评析》,载《教学与研究》[J]., 2011年第10期。

(A Review of Nordic International Relations)

[8]董青岭:《建构主义是一种国际政治理论吗?》,载《欧洲研究》[J]., 2012年第5期, 第79-99页。

(Is constructivism an international political theory?)

[9]姜鹏、李书剑:《虚幻的不相容与想象的安全困境——权力转移进程中敌意身份的互主性建构》,载《国际安全研究》[J]., 2017年第1期, 第47-67页。

English References

Monograph

[1] Michael Wesley, eds., *Global Allies, Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, Canberra, ANU press, 2017, pp. 59-76.

[2] Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics:*

Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world, Abingdon: Routledge Press, 2014.

[3] Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p.14.

[4] Tomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958*, New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

[5] Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffery W. Taliaferro, eds., *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

[6] Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, ed., *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002, p.211.

Journal Articles

[1] Mihai Sebastian Chihaiia, "Nordic states contribution to peace and security," *Revista Română de Studii Baltice și Nordice*, Vol. 8, No. 2(Nov. 2016) pp. 73-91.

[2] Ramus Brun Pedersen, "Bandwagon for Status: Changing Patterns in the Nordic States Status-Seeking Strategies?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Nov. 2017) , pp. 217-241.

[3] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose, Håkon Lunde Saxi, "Bandwagoning for Prestige: Denmark, Norway and the War on Terror", Prepared for delivery at "the CEEISA-ISA Joint International Conference", Ljubljana, Slovenia, June 22-25, 2016.

[4] Fredrik Doeser, "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic culture", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016, pp.284-297.

[5] J. Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No.3 (Sep. 2003) , pp. 325-342.

[6] Dov S. Zakheim, "The United States and the Nordic Countries During the Cold War," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 33, No. 2, (June 1998), pp. 115-129.

- [7] Ole Waever, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," *International Affairs*, vol. 68, No. 1, 1992, pp. 77-102.
- [8] George Schöpflin, "NATO and the Nordic Balance", *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1966, pp. 114-122.
- [9] E. Noreen, "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and practice," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1983, pp. 43-56.
- Magnus Ryner, "The Nordic Model: Does It Exist? Can It Survive?," *New Political Economy*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, pp. 61-70.
- [10] Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, "In Denmark, Afghanistan is worth dying for: How public support for the wars maintained in the face of mounting casualties and elusive success," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol, 50, No. 2, 2015, pp. 211-227.
- [11] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Denmark and UN peacekeeping: glorious past, dim future", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23, No.5, 2016, pp. 741-761.
- [12] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theory of Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No.1, (October 1998), pp. 144-172.
- [13] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-41.
- [14] William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War", *World Politics*, Vol. 61, no. 1, pp.28-57.
- [15] Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment", *International Security*, Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 5-51.
- [16] Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 1996), pp. 451-467.
- [17] Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 5, 1994, pp. 72-85.
- [18] John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition", *American Political Science Review*, vol.91, no.4(1997), pp.899-912.
- [19] M. Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism and The Welfare State After the 'Golden Age'", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2007, pp. 9-26.
- [20] Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, "Size and Reputation-Why the USA Has Valued its 'Special Relationships' with Denmark and the UK Differently since

9/11”, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr. 2015), pp.135-153.

[21] Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański, “Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States”, *OSW|COMMENTARY*, NUMBER 205, 2016, pp.1-7.

Internet Sources

[1] Johan Eellend, “Friends, But Not Allies: Finland, Sweden, and NATO in the Baltic Sea,” *BALTIC BULLETIN*”, June 13, 2016, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/06/friends-not-allies-finland-sweden-nato-baltic-sea/>, log in time : 12/6/2019.

[2] THOM SHANKER, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future, “ June 10, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html>, log in time : 3/5/2019.