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Lobbying in the EU:

A Danish Perspective



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Abstract

This master thesis involves an analytic investigation of Danish lobby organisations' influence through their lobby actions made on the institutions in the European Union. The core essence of the thesis revolves around the question, whether the Danish lobby organizations actually are influential in terms of the policies made in the European Union. To be able to investigate the influence of Danish lobby organisations' influence in the EU institutions delimitations has been made and a specific case has been chosen. This thesis focuses the lobby actions made in regard to the Common Agricultural Policy, the largest policy in the EU budget wise, and specifically on the current reformation of the Common Agricultural Policy, which is currently in development, the CAP 2020 reform. In terms of Danish lobby actions made regarding the CAP 2020, the Danish lobby organisations included in this thesis consists of the Danish Agriculture and Food Council and the Danish Society for Nature Conservation. These lobby organisations have been chosen due to their relevance and direct involvement in the CAP 2020 reform. The Danish Agriculture and Food Council and the Danish Society for Nature Conservation both represent Danish- cooperatives, companies, employees, and the interests of the civil society, who have interests regarding the CAP 2020. Beside the Danish lobby organisations, the Danish Agriculture and Food Council and the Danish Society for Nature Conservation, two pan-European lobby organisations, where the Danish lobby organisations has their membership, are being included in this thesis. The two pan-European lobby organisations are Copa & Cogeca and the European Environmental Bureau. The included EU institutions is the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union. The inclusion of these organisations and institutions creates a structural frame for the thesis, which enables the research to answer, whether the Danish lobby organisations have influence on the EU policy. This is an extremely relevant subject to investigate, since it can be used to answer questions about the Danish legitimacy and influence on EU policy more generally.

Most publications on lobbying at the European Union level are either made before the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which gave the European Parliament legislative power, where the tables were turned regarding how lobbyism the EU works, or are made after 2009, but primarily been focusing on quantitative research. This thesis strives to contribute to the existing literature and broaden the field of research of lobbyism in the EU by both being current and with the use of a qualitative approach.

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1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the overall scope and aim of this master thesis. This includes inter alia: What the focal point of this thesis is, the delimitations of this thesis (see 1.1), i.e. the focus of the thesis and which actors, institutions, policies etc. that are included in this thesis and which who are not, the research question of this thesis and following sub-questions (see 1.2 and 1.2.1), which will be the fundamental in which this study revolves around and the synopsis of this thesis (see 1.3). The introduction presents the overall focus on this thesis, which is the phenomenon of ‘Lobbyism’, why it is interesting and relevant as a focus for a master thesis, and what the puzzle is within lobbyism. In the first section of the introduction, the ‘Delimitation’ section, will the crucial aspects of this thesis be introduced, i.e. how to study the phenomenon of lobbyism, the what, the who, the why and the how to study lobbyism, including institutions, actors, policies etc. to include or exclude. The delimitation section will be divided into subsections each derived the various categories of delimitations as mentioned to create a more comprehensible view of the delimitations. In the next sections of the introduction, the research questions of this thesis will be presented as a direct result derived from the delimitations made in this thesis, this includes the sub-questions made from the overall research questions and a reasoning for why these specific questions have been chosen and why to include sub-questions in this thesis. The last section of this chapter will introduce a synopsis of this master thesis, i.e. a methodological and theoretical description of the general approach of how to answer the research question of this thesis. In this way, the introduction chapter should be seen as a structural hourglass, which broadly presents the scope of this thesis, then boils down the area of study, through the delimitations section, to a concentrated research question to present the methodological and theoretical approaches then again used throughout this thesis seen in the synopsis.

Lobbyism

Lobbyism is a growing phenomenon in politics and in the political heat of the European Union (EU), Brussels, where lobbyism especially is a big business (Dionigi, 2017, p.1). Lobbyism is the act, made by lobbyists, where lobbyists seek to gain influence in terms of policy outcomes by targeting decision-makers, either directly or indirectly, to advance their interests through information, arguments, or threats (Panke 2012, p. 129). Lobbyists perform a variety of roles ranging from information collected through to presentation of cases with officials and politicians from the European Institutions (see 1.1.3), and assistance provided to interests groups

and networks in their day-to-day operations, such as writing newsletters and, in a few cases, providing secretariat facilities (Greenwood, 1996, p. 6). When studying lobbyism in the EU, which is the area of lobbying which is in focus throughout this master thesis, Brussels can inarguably be neglected as the European epicentre of lobbyism, since Brussels would be described as the capital of the European Union, since it houses all of the main EU institutions, where most of the politics in Europe are born and made. The influence of interest groups is in particular a concern to scholars of European politics, since the EU constitutes a promising political opportunity for structuring organized interests (Klüver, 2013, p.1). The number of interest groups, lobbyists and NGO's to influence the EU's public policies has increased significantly over the last two decades as a result of the EU's increased regulatory competences through the introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure amended in the Lisbon Treaty, which briefly described involves, that i.e. the European Parliament has gained influence in the decision-making procedures in the EU (Coen and Richardson, 2009). This has led to, that the lobby organisation has increased in numbers, due to the fact, that they now have a broader spectrum to lobby through, with the gained influence through the European Parliament (Appendix H). Before the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament's legislative influence was relatively limited (Dionigi, 2017, p. 2). With the change that the Lisbon Treaty 2009 brought with it, changing the European Parliament to a genuine co-legislator together with the Council of the EU, the European Parliament has become an important lobbying venue for anyone seeking to influence EU legislation (Dionigi, 2017, p. 2). This is changed the whole lobbyism scene in the EU with a hard line between Lobbyism in the EU before 2009 and after 2009. To put this into perspective, the co-decision has become "the ordinary legislative procedure", covering almost all areas of EU law with power shared between the EP and the Council, who amend and pass EU legislation, for instance, 89 per cent of all proposals scrutinised by the EP was decided under co-decision and only 11 per cent under consultation (Dionigi, 2017, p. 2). Studying lobbyism and the influence of lobby organizations is crucial to our understanding of a political system, whereas the EU institutions often are been treated a black box, producing policies, without any attention to their internal configuration and the role of lobby organizations influence on the decision-making (Klüver, 2013, pp. 202-203)

Studying an as comprehensive phenomenon as lobbyism is, involving policy-making, policy-influencers, decision-making processes, the whole political system revolving the European Union's several institutions etc. requires a delimitation, a scope of focus, where the study gets narrowed down into a comprehensive research question

Contribution to the existing literature

This thesis adds to the current literature composed in relations to lobbyism in the European Union (Mazey & Richardson 1993, Greenwood 1996, Klüver 2013, Dionigi 2017). Existing literature on interest groups' influence primarily prior to the Lisbon Treaty 2009, when the European Parliament gained co-decision powers with the Council, often focuses on the Commission, and often also rely on quantitative text analyses to gauge the preference attainment of interest groups, which is the cases for both Mazey & Richardson 1993, Greenwood 1996. In the case of Klüver 2013 which was made after the Lisbon Treaty 2009, did include the European Parliament, however, it still relies on quantitative text analysis. In the case of (Dionigi 2017), which relies on a detailed qualitative examination of lobbyism after the Lisbon Treaty 2009, does however solely focus on the European Parliament. This thesis aims to add to the current literature of lobbyism in the European Union, by not only including either the Commission and the Council or the Parliament but all three institutions and by doing in with a qualitative examination of lobbyism.

1.1 Delimitations

The purpose of this section of the thesis is to boil down the topic, which this thesis wishes to study and investigate, i.e. the phenomenon of lobbyism, and narrow it down to a valid and usable research question which this study can rely on. This section and the following sub-sections will narrow down the academic approach of studying lobbyism part by part, by continuously delimiting the possible approaches of studying lobbyism into one final approach, which this thesis will rely on.

Firstly, since this thesis has been conducted as master thesis, a final and concluding thesis, as a part of the master's degree of social science programme in European Studies at Aalborg University, it is inevitable that to focus on anything else than Europe henceforth the European Union, and thereby delimiting to everything else outside the EU. This means, that this thesis delimits to focus on lobbyism only in the EU, more specifically in the EU institutions, which will be further elaborated in a following sub-section. This thesis does therefore not include lobbyism, policy-influence etc. that appears outside of the EU. This does however mean, that findings through this thesis may not be applicable on other 'political battlefields', i.e. in the political systems found in e.g. the United States of America or China to give an example of

possible instances, where lobbying could clearly differ from that made in the EU. The reasoning behind this delimitation should be clearly evident, the line of study. Even though this delimitation does apply, that findings in this thesis would only be applicable in the EU, this is still a considerable large area of study and it does not harm the general study of this thesis.

Secondly, to further narrow down the scope of how to study lobbying, it is chosen that this thesis is to focus on lobbying made on a specific policy within the 'political battlefield' of the EU, namely the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the ongoing reformation for the CAP after 2020 (CAP 2020). The CAP will be described furtherly in detail in the next sub-section. The reasoning of choosing a specific policy is in the first case to focus and scope down lobbying, since tracking lobbying all over the EU would be an infeasible and unstructured task to fulfil. By focusing on lobbying, i.e. lobby actions, made on a specific policy, it scopes the focus of which lobby actions that should be investigated. By choosing a specific policy it also scopes the focus on which lobby-organisations to investigate, i.e. which lobby-organisations and or policy-influencers are relevant to investigate in this specific matter of context. This delimitation does however result in, that far from all of the broad variety of lobby organisations and the various policies within the EU will not be included. Herby said, that lobbying may or may not differ from lobby organisation to lobby organisation and from policy to policy. However, since the focus is on the broader picture of the phenomenon of lobbying in the EU and therefore not do depict every lobby organisation in the EU, this study aims, not generalize lobbying as a constant which is chiselled in stone in every instance of lobby actions taken by every lobby organisation on every policy made in the EU, but aims to add to knowledge to both academic approaches, methods and theories of how to study lobbying, the choice of focusing on a specific policy still stands as reasonable. While focusing on lobby actions made on the CAP 2020 may not cover every instance of lobby action made on every policy in the EU, it does however cover the largest policy area in the EU, budget-wise, since the CAP covers 36% of the total EU budget, which will be elaborated in the following sub-section. It may not be the case, that every policy in the EU will be investigated in this thesis, but at least the largest policy area will be. This is the reason, why we choose the CAP 2020 as a focus of scope. (European Commission, 2019a)

Lastly, due to the fact, that this thesis is made in Denmark, on a Danish university, by two Danish master's degree students, the focus on the EU will be investigated from a Danish perspective, i.e. both in terms of which lobby organisations in place and from what angle to approach lobbyism. Instead of trying to oppress an inevitable influence of perception, this thesis tries to embrace this perception that various indicators have fostered for the researchers of this thesis and approach lobbyism from a Danish perspective. This should, since the focus is still lobbyism in the EU not matter for the study of lobbyism in the EU as a phenomenon, but create a uniqueness of approach, differentiating this thesis from previously academic study.

1.1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy

The function of this sub-section is to provide a brief description of the CAP, its history, its content, size, and matter as a policy in the EU and for all of the EU's member states.

The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a common policy for all the countries of the European Union and its managed and funded at European level from the resources of the EU's budget. The CAP launched for the first time in 1962 and it is a partnership between agriculture and society, and between Europe and its farmers. The goals of the CAP involve achieving support to the farmers and to improve agricultural productivity while still ensuring a stable supply of affordable food. It also involves safeguarding EU farmers to make a reasonable living by e.g. helping the farmers to tackle climate change and the sustainable management of natural resources. Another part of the CAP is maintaining rural areas and landscapes across the EU i.e. keeping the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-foods industries and associated sectors in these rural areas, rural development. (European Commission, 2019a)

Farming is unlike most other businesses, both in relation to the importance of farmers for the entire population and in relation to exceptional circumstances which affect the agricultural sector. Firstly, despite the significance of food production, farmers' revenue is around 40% lower compared to non-agricultural income. Secondly, agriculture is also more depending on the weather and the climate, i.e. drought, than numerous other sectors. Thirdly, there is an unavoidable time gap between consumer demand and farmers being able to supply, i.e. growing more wheat or producing more milk inevitably takes time to produce. Lastly, while the farmers are not only be expected to be cost-effective, is it also expected that they should work in a sustainable and environmentally friendly manner and maintain the soils and the biodiversity. These business uncertainties and the environmental impacts on the farming sector justifies the

significant role that the public sector plays for the farmers and therefore for the CAP in general. In that manner, the CAP acts with firstly, income support through direct payments that help ensure income stability for the farmers, and rewards farmers for environmentally friendly farming and for the farmers to deliver public goods that are normally not paid for by the markets, such as taking care of the countryside. Secondly, the CAP deals with market measures to administer with complex market situations such as a sudden drop in demand due to a health scare, or a fall in prices as a result of a temporary oversupply on the market. Thirdly, the CAP deals with rural development measures with national and regional programmes to address the specific needs and challenges facing rural areas. (European Commission, 2019a).

The CAP is financed through two funds as part of the EU budget. The European Agricultural Fund (EAGF) which provides direct support and funds market measures and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) which finances the rural development. Payments are however managed at the national level by each member country of the EU. The support for EU farmers through the CAP was in the EU 2018 budget at €58 billion out of a total budget at €160.11 billion, i.e. 36% of the total EU budget. Of these €58 billion, €2.7 billion went to support market measures, €14.37 billion went to support rural development and €41.74 billion went to support income support. This large level of payment for EU farmers from the overall EU budget reflects the numerous variables involved in guaranteeing continued access to high-quality food, which includes functions such as income support to farmers, climate change action, and maintaining vibrant rural communities. (European Commission, 2019a)

The CAP in Denmark

The function of this sub-section is to provide an insight into the impact of the CAP in Denmark by stating some factual information, i.e. numbers and statistics, to illustrate the importance of the CAP for Denmark

Denmark covers an area of 42.916 km² of which 51 pct. of this land are rural areas. Out of these rural areas (51 pct.) are 66 pct. agricultural land and 14 pct. forests. Out of the total population of Denmark with around 5.5 million are 28.9 pct. of the inhabitants of Denmark living in rural areas. Denmark is in relation to agriculture and the farming sector characterised by rather big farms, which includes 67.5 hectares compared to the EU-28 average of 16.1 hectares. (European Commission, 2016, June, p. 1).

Between 2007 and 2013, the CAP program invested more than €7.7 billion in Denmark's farming sector and rural areas with the purpose of supporting farmers' income, improving, and strengthening the sustainability of Denmark's farms and ensuring the supply of safe, affordable, and quality food for its inhabitants. In 2014, 44.270 beneficiaries received €917 million in direct payments and in 2014, the EU spent around €9 million on market measures in Denmark. In the period from 2007 to 2013, the CAP invested more than EUR 450 million in a whole variety of different projects subsidising agricultural production and benefitting Denmark's rural areas by maintaining its diversity and improving its economic strength. In concrete terms, Rural Development funds provided i.e. more than 1.400 new jobs, both in agriculture and in other sectors. (European Commission, 2016, June, p. 4).

The structural development in the farming sector in Denmark is substantial. The total number of farms was reduced from 92.000 farms in 1985 to 47.000 farms in 2006, and there were less than 37,000 farms in 2015. The average farm size has reached 70 hectares. In the main animal productions sectors, pigs and dairy, the production are constantly being concentrated on fewer and fewer farms. In the period 1998-2012, the number of dairy farms fell by 7-8% per year to 3.900 farms in 2012. In the same period, the number of pig farms was reduced by around 10% annually to reach 4.200 farms in 2012 (European Commission, 2019b, p. 1)

The Future of the CAP

The function of this sub-section is to narrow down, how the situation of the CAP is at the moment of when this thesis is being concluded. This will be both in terms on the political course, but also in terms on decision-making procedures, since the state of which the CAP is in the decision-making process influences how and where to approach the CAP in the thesis. The decision-making procedures will be elaborated further in section 3.2 and sub-section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

Since the CAP launched for the first time in 1962 has the policy been renewed, changed, expanded upon and as of latest on the 1st of June 2018 did the European Commission present legislative proposals on the common agricultural policy beyond 2020 (CAP 2020). These proposals aim to make the CAP more responsive to current and future challenges such as climate change or generational renewal while continuing to support European farmers for a sustainable and competitive agricultural sector. (European Commission, 2019a)

At the moment the CAP 2020 reforms have been presented in a proposal by the Commission, which was done on the first of June 2018. (ec.europa.eu) This was done after a public consultation in 2017, about how the future of the CAP should be. The outcome of this consultation was clear desires for a CAP, that was simpler for the user/participants, the EU farmers, so that more farmers easier and more efficient could make use of the possibilities of the CAP. (European Commission, 2019a)

In the Council of the European Union, the latest meeting regarding the CAP reforms was on the 15th of March 2019. The Council is still in the process of making their own position regarding the CAP 2020 reforms. (European Council, 2019, March 15)

The European Parliament has three reports, that they have created from the proposal given by the Commission. All of the three reports still need to be sent to the plenary, where the EP votes on its positions. According to the EP's statements, the CAP 2020 reforms are unlikely to go further, until the next EU budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), has been agreed upon. (Massot, 2018)

1.1.2 The Lobby Organisations

This sub-section will briefly introduce the different lobby organisations, which will be included in the research of this thesis. The selection of lobby organisations does of course reflect the delimitations mentioned in section 1.1, namely, that they firstly, overall are lobby organisations, that lobby in the EU, and that they secondly, all are lobby organizations, that are specifically interesting and relating to the CAP 2020 and agriculture policy in general. Lastly, do the selection of these following lobby organisation all reflect the previously mentioned "Danish perspective" by including two Danish lobby organisations, that both capture the previously delimited criteria.

The Danish Agriculture & Food Council

The Danish Agriculture & Food Council (DAFC) is a business organization for agriculture and for the food and agro-industry in Denmark. DAFC represents a large part of the food cluster with 186,000 direct and indirect employment which makes this organization to one of Denmark's most important occupations, with the export of over 22 billion euros annually and therefore accounts for 25 pct. of Denmark's total export of goods in the value of goods. The EU is

the biggest market for DAFC, but the organization is also dependent on markets outside the EU e.g. China, Norway, the US, and Japan. The overall goal and aim for DAFC are being responsible for joint tasks and business interests for Danish farmers and food companies. (Landbrug&Fødevarer, 2018).

Choosing the Danish Agriculture & Food Council is inevitable when studying lobbyism in the EU on the specific policy of agriculture from a Danish perspective. DAFC is one of the largest lobby organisations in Denmark and considered the largest lobby organisation within the agricultural sector in Denmark, which is why DAFC is included in this thesis.

Specifically have the relation to DAFC been conducted through the contact of an interview with Maria Skovager Østergaard (MSØ), an employee at DAFC at Axelborg in Copenhagen. MSØ has the title of chief consultant at DAFC, being a part of DAFC's EU-team in Copenhagen and Bruxelles and is a member of Paragraph 2 committee on Agriculture and Food (EU Special Committee). She functions tasks including EU agricultural policy in general, green requirements, environmental focus areas and the EU agricultural budget.

The Danish Society for Nature Conservation

The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (DSNC) is an association for members involved in nature conservation. The association's overall and long-term is that Denmark becomes a sustainable society with a beautiful and varied landscape, a rich one and diverse nature and a clean and healthy environment. The association will work for the benefit of Denmark's nature and environment and for the population's opportunity for good nature experiences. In terms of nature protection, the association works to ensure biological diversity and landscape values. Through protections and influence on the law work the association to preserve, care and restoring habitats for animals and plants and to ensure landscapes, geological formations, cultural history tracks as well as areas on it. Because of their location can be recreational interest. In terms of environmental protection, the association works to ensure that production, consumption, Transport, waste management and other human activities take place in a way that damages nature and the environment as little as possible. The association works to ensure nature and the population against pollution of water, soil, and air, including light and noise pollution. (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening, 2014).

The argument behind choosing The Danish Society for Nature Conservation matches the reasoning of choosing DAFC, both in terms of relation to the CAP and the fact, that DSNC does lobby in the EU. The reason to then also include DSNC is to create a comparativeness and a consistency of study, between DSNS and DAFC. By including both lobby organisations questions like these arise: “Do they both lobby in an equivalent manner?” “Do they both have the same amount of influence?” “Do they differ in any manner?”. A layer of depth is added to this thesis by including both organisations.

In the case of DSNC have the relation to been conducted through the contact of an interview with Jens la Cour (JLC), an employee at DSNC in Copenhagen. JLC has the title of EU and environmental senior policy advisor and is the primary connection between DSNC and their pan-European partner, The European Environmental Bureau (EEB). He is a board member at EEB, Brussels and is a member of the EU Special Committee on Environment and Paragraph 2 Committee on Agriculture and Food (EU Special Committee).

Copa & Cogeca

Copa & Cogeca is an umbrella organisation for business organization and associations from the agriculture and the food and agro-industry in the EU. It is composed of unification of two organisations, Copa and Cogeca. The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community signed on 25 March 1957 contained the most important framework provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The connection between the Community authorities and the representatives of the agricultural sector was left uncovered by the Treaty, but the Commission expressed its ambition for close cooperation at an early stage and invited representatives of agricultural organisations to attend the 1958 Stresa Conference as observers. Farmers themselves were convinced of the significance of the Community for their sector, and on 6 September 1958, the first European representative organisation, COPA, was created. One year later, on 24 September 1959, the agricultural cooperatives of the European Community created their European umbrella organisation, COGECA (General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives). COPA's Secretariat was established in Brussels on 1 April 1959, merging with that of COGECA on 1 December 1962. When COPA (Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations) first started out it had 13-member organisations from the then six Member States. Today COPA is made up of 60 organisations from the countries of the European Union and 36 partner organisations from other European countries such as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. This broad membership allows COPA to represent both the general

and specific interests of farmers in the European Union. Since its inception, COPA has been recognised by the Community authorities as to the organisation speaking on behalf of the European agricultural sector as a whole. When COGECA was created it was made up of 6 members. Since then, it has been enlarged by almost six times the size and now has 35 full members and 4 affiliated members from the EU. COGECA also has 36 partner members. COGECA, now called the “General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union”, currently represents the general and specific interests of some 40,000 farmers’ cooperatives employing some 660,000 people and with a global annual turnover in excess of three hundred billion euros throughout Europe. In line with the recent European Union enlargements, COPA and COGECA have together further reinforced their position as Europe’s strongest farming representative organisations. COPA and COGECA have jointly welcomed 38 national farmer and cooperative organisations from the new Member States. Overall membership of both organisations has thus risen to 76 organisations from the EU Member States. (Copa Cogeca, n.d.)

Choosing Copa & Cogeca as another lobby organisation should be seen as a further layer added when choosing to also include DAFC. As Copa & Cogeca is the largest collectively lobby organization in terms of agricultural policy in the EU including this organization would be inevitable when studying lobbyism in the EU on the specific policy of agriculture. Choosing Copa & Cogeca would be the natural choice for every thesis studying lobbyism in the EU in regard to the CAP 2020 and by adding DAFC to the study this thesis includes the previously mentioned Danish perspective.

The relation to Copa & Cogeca to be conducted through the contact of an interview with Paulo Gouveia (PG), Chief Policy Advisor for the secretary general at the Copa & Cogeca. Gouveia has the title of Chief Policy Advisor for the following policy areas: The CAP, Food Chain, The EU-Budget, and the Congress of European Farmers.

The European Environmental Bureau

The European Environmental Bureau (EEB) is the largest network of environmental citizens’ organisations in Europe and it currently consists of around 150-member organisations in more than 30 countries (all EU Member States plus some accession and neighbouring countries), including a growing number of European networks, and representing some 30 million individual members and supporters. The EEB tackles Europe’s most pressing environmental problems by agenda setting, monitoring, advising on and influencing the way the EU deals with these

issues. These include issues such as climate change, biodiversity, circular economy, air, water, soil, chemical pollution, as well as policies on industry, energy, agriculture, product design and waste prevention, among others. They are also active on overarching issues as sustainable development, good governance, participatory democracy, and the rule of law in Europe and beyond. While the primary focus of the EEB's work is on the EU and its decision-making processes, they also work on wider regional and global processes, at the level of the UN and the OECD, in particular on the Global Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is the only European umbrella organisation that covers such a large number of environmental policy issues and is at the same time open to membership for all bona fide NGOs active in the field of the environment. (EEB, 2019).

Yet again does the argument behind choosing EEB match the reasoning of choosing Copa & Cogeca, both in terms on relation to the CAP and the fact that they the largest lobby organisations in the EU in terms on the environment and therefore one of the largest in terms of agriculture. The reason to include then also EEB is again is to create a comparativeness and a consistency of study, between EEB and Copa & Cogeca and by including both lobby organisations the questions mentioned before arising yet again.

The relation to EEB to been conducted through the contact of an interview with Bérénice Dupeux, Policy Officer for Agriculture at EEB. Bérénice Dupeux is a part of the EU-policy team at EEB with the main focus being agriculture.

1.1.3 The EU Institutions

This section will briefly introduce the different EU institutions, which will be included in the research of this thesis. Following this section, the will the term 'EU institutions' herby refer to these following institutions.

The European Parliament:

The European Parliament (EP), is one of the EU's two law-making body of the EU. The members of the EP (MEP) are directly elected by the citizen of the EU. The EP, together with the Council, approves the proposals, inhere also the budget, made by the Commission. Since the Lisbon treaty in 2007, the EP have gained more influence and greater competences, making it a co-decision maker in the EU institutions, often having the same amount of power as the Council. The EP is also the democratic watchdog of the EU. It is the EP that has to make sure,

that the other institutions do not violate the democratic values of the EU. (European Union, 2019, February 13).

The contact to the EP has been through an official, Felix Mittermayer, who is stationed in the European Parliament's committee for Agriculture and Rural Development. Ideally would the contact to the EP have been made through a couple of relevant MEPs', but unfortunately has this not been possible since every relevant MEP declined to participate in this thesis, with the reasonings being limited time due to the election of the European Parliament.

The Commission:

The European Commission (the Commission) is the executive political independent organ of the EU. It is the Commission that alone is responsible for creating a proposal for new EU legislation, and the right of initiation, meaning that it is the Commission that is the only EU institution that is allowed to put forward proposals for new legislation (Klüver, 2013, p. 40). It is also the Commission that work out the decisions taken by the EP and the Council, making sure that the member states keep up with the decisions taken by the EU institutions. The Commission also works with the gathering of technical details and information, in regard to its many policy areas, since it maintains cooperation with experts, interest organisations, and the public. The Commission also represents and negotiates on behalf of the EU member states, when it comes to trade policies and humanitarian aid. The Commission is built up, so those different policy areas, trade, or competition, for example, has their own commissioner who then again has their own officials. Rather similar to how a national government functions with its ministries and ministers. Each member state has a commissioner. (European Union, 2019, March 13).

The contact to the Commission has been made through a senior expert in AGRI Info, Iman Boot, who have been involved in the last three reforms of the CAP. He is working in the policy unite, a unit that focuses on developing new policies and understanding how the current policies work and he has been the official behind the communication, from November 2017, that was sent out to the other EU institutions, which indicated what the Commission intended to do with the CAP reform.

Besides Iman Boot as an official from the Commission, the former Danish commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development from 2004-2009, Mariann Fischer Boel, have been contacted. Her role in this thesis will be primarily supplementary, since she has no contact with the CAP 2020 or EU policies after 2009. However, she can still enlighten the subject with valuable knowledge (see 2.4.4 and Appendix H).

The Council:

The Council of the European Union (the Council) acts as the voice of the EU member states governments and works with the adoption and coordination of EU law and policies. The Council has the authority to commit their national governments to the initiatives that are taken during their meetings. The Council is divided into several sub-councils, that deal with their respective areas of policy, for example, agriculture, environment, or energy etc. Its members are normally the national ministers and their officials. Together with the EP, the Council negotiates and adopts EU law and regulation, that is based on proposals given by the Commission. (European Union, 2019, February 19)

The European Council is the institution that includes the heads of state, for the EU member countries. It deals with the highest level of political cooperation in the EU and it lays down the political guidelines and priorities for the EU, although it itself does not make rules, laws, and regulations. It does have the ability to make a request to the Commission, to have it put forward a proposal on a specific area. The president of the European Council represents the EU when dealing with third countries, meaning non-EU member states. It is also the European Council that puts forward candidates for high profiled EU positions in institutions such as the European Central Bank and the Commission. (European Union, 2019, March 14)

Although the European Council is of great import in the EU, it will not be a focal point in this thesis, since the aim is to create an understanding of the process and procedures lobby organisations conduct in their work. Since the European Council consists of the leaders of the EU member states governments, they are unlikely to receive that much lobbying towards themselves directly.

The lobby actions that are conducted towards the Council, are mainly focused on the national level, more precisely, at the national ministries. With the CAP, for example, a lobby organisation that wanted to lobby the Council would then aim their lobby actions and efforts towards

the ministry of agriculture. Here they might then attempt to sway the ministry and thought that the policies that they would work towards in the Council.

The contact to the Council has therefore likewise been established on a national level through a Danish official stationed in the Danish ministry for Environment and Food, Morten Holm-Hemmingsen, who is working on the CAP and is a negotiator for the Danish government in the Council.

These three institutions have been chosen because they represent the political and legislative institutions of the EU. This is also where lobby organisations would attempt to try and gain influence on certain policy outcomes. Because of inter-institutional dynamics of the EU, looking into all three of the political institutions could provide a more fulfilling analysis and understanding of how lobby organisations work in the different institutions and where they might have an influence on policy outcome.

1.2 Research Question

The purpose of the previous section concerning the delimitation of this thesis was to narrow down the scope of the topic, which this thesis wants to study and investigate, i.e. the phenomenon of lobbyism. The narrowed down scope has enabled this study to focus on a specific approach, which this thesis will rely on. Based on the delimitations of this thesis the following research question has been conducted and it will function as the general overall research question of the study within this master thesis.

Research Question: *“Do the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU? I.e. the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and in the institutions of EU?”*

As indicated in the general overall research question of this thesis, it reflects upon the delimitations chosen throughout this study. As in general it focuses on the EU as an area of study and inquiry, which reflects the subjectivity and the preconceptions of the researchers ‘being’. The research question includes the wanting of a Danish perspective by including and focusing on two Danish lobby organisations as the focal point of data inquiry, which both are in deep relation to the Common Agricultural Policy and the Agricultural sector in general, which again

reflects on the delimitation on this specific policy matter. The research question aims towards finding out, whether or not, Danish lobby organisations have an influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU. The research question involves influence in the 'EU', which is specified in the latter part of the research question as the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and the EU-institutions, The European Parliament, The European Commission and the European Council, which all are disclosed in the delimitation section of this thesis. This research question captures all of the wanted and chosen delimitations in this thesis and is focused and narrowed down the scope of what this thesis strives to achieve in term on studying and investigating. However, to make this research question more compatible in terms of the specific method of approach, sub-questions will be aligned.

1.2.1 Sub-questions:

The function of this sub-section is to convert the general and overall research question "*Do the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU? I.e. the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and in the institutions of EU?*" into sub-questions, which are more focused on the technical approach in regard to the study of the thesis than to the overall goal of research. They should be considered as work-related questions, which creates a structural approach on how to answer the overall research questions. These three sub-questions divide the general overall research questions into three more comprehensible questions, which are feasible to answer.

The 1st sub-question is as follow:

"How does the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC lobby in the EU institutions?"

The function of this sub-question is to define the lobby actions made by DAFC and DSNC in the EU. This both includes the EU institutions and the pan-European organisations. By defining the lobby actions made by DAFC and DSNC it enables the possibility to investigate whether these actions have influence, i.e. to answer if the lobby actions made by DAFC and DSNC have influenced one must know, what actions are made. This question does also heavily rely on the methodological approach of process tracing (see 2.3), where the goal is to depict the case of the phenomenon of lobbyism (see 2.2.1 through 2.2.4).

The 2nd sub-question is as follow:

“Are the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC able to influence their pan-European organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB?”

The function of this sub-question is investigate, whether the Danish lobby organisations have influence on their pan-European organisations, to investigate a possible outcome, that in the case on influence of lobbyism on the EU-institutions in the case of the CAP, is it solely the pan-European organisations who are the influential actors, or do the Danish lobby organisations themselves have influence? This question could also derive questions on “what” the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC, have an influence on, the pan-European organisations, the EU institutions, neither or both?

The 3rd sub-question is as follow:

“Does the lobby actions made by the pan-European lobby organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB, have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions?”

The function of this sub-question is to investigate whether the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions.

The three sub-questions mentioned above, should enable the structure in the thesis, that can support and give answers to the overall research question: *“Do the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP in the EU? I.e. the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and in the institutions of EU?”*

However, before it is possible to answer any of these questions, some concepts are needed to be defined, especially *influence*, due to the fact, that one cannot conclude, whether any of these lobby organisations have influence, in the term *influence* is not well defined. As seen throughout the following chapters, “Method” and “Theory”, this thesis heavily builds upon the fundamental elements of the methodological approach, which Maja Kluger Dionigi presents in her book “Lobbying in the European Parliament” from 2017 on how to analyse lobbyism in the European Parliament, which this thesis aims to further develop on, which is indicated through this thesis. Due to that fact, this thesis relies on a similar definition of influence, as Dionigi herself uses to create consistency and reliability in what we in this thesis tries to investigate.

Dionigi defines influence as: *“I define influence as the achievement of interest groups’ goal in decision-making, which is caused by interest groups’ own intervention (lobbying activity) and/or MEPs’ anticipation of them.”* (Dionigi, 2015, p. 6).

In this thesis influence will be defined as:

“The achievement of lobby organisations’ interests in the following steps of the policy cycle: Feedback, agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making, which is caused by lobby organisations’ own intervention (lobbying actions) and the institutions’ perception of them (The European Commission, The European Council and the European Parliament).”

This definition works in a remarkably comparable manner to the definition of influence from Dionigi’s approach. The definition of influence used in this thesis does only differ in terms of, that it does not only focus on influence in the decision-making process, but on the broader aspect of the policy cycle (see 3.2) and in terms of, that this thesis aims to include all of the three large institutions in the EU and not only the European Parliament.

The term ‘interests’ is defined as *“The goals and aims, which the lobby organisations set as their own criteria for success and influence”*. I.e. if a lobby organisation wants to change, add, or subtract a certain aspect of a policy, regulation etc., the aspect they want to change, add, or subtract is their *interest* and if they are able to change, add or subtract this, they got ‘influence’.

1.3 Synopsis

This sub-section will briefly introduce the overall approach regarding how to answer the research questions. For a detailed presentation of the various aspects of the overall approach see their respective chapters.

This master thesis aims to answer the research question *“Do the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU? I.e. the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and in the institutions of EU?”*. The puzzle, which this research question revolves around is, are Danish lobby organisations, which in this specific case is the DAFC and the DSNC, representing both Danish- cooperatives, companies, employees, and the interests of the civil society, able to influence policy on an EU level, in this case

on the CAP 2020. Do Danish lobby organisations, representing Danish interests, have influence on the EU policy. This is an extremely interesting subject to investigate, since it may be used to answer questions about the Danish legitimacy and influence on EU policy more generally.

This puzzle, which the research question spawns, will be sought answers through the use of multiple methodological tools: Process tracing, counterfactual analysis, attained and perceived influence (see 2.3), which reflects an inspiration from the work of Dionigi (Dionigi, 2017). These methodological tools will be used as a structural foundation for setting up an interview-guide (see 2.4.4), which will function as a guideline for the interviews of the relevant interviewees, which is included in this thesis (see 1.1 and 2.4). Besides the methodological tools, since this thesis makes use of the theoretical orientated case study (see 2.2.2), the interview-guide does also include a theoretical oriented foundation, which incorporate the theories embedded in this thesis (see chapter 3) into the interview-guide. These theories include inter alia the political actors in the EU institutions (see 3.1), policy-making in the EU (see 3.2), hereunder the theory of policy cycle (see 3.2.1), which plays a crucial role in the interview-guide (see 2.4.4).

On the basis of the transcribed interviews (see appendix A-H and 2.4.5) and with the use of the theoretical scope of this thesis (see chapter 3), following the methodological approach in line with the theoretical orientated case study (see 2.2.2), will these interviews be analysed upon. The analysis is structured, so that it is divided into three parts, representing each of the three sub research questions (see 1.2.1) and are subsequently follow by a sub-conclusion to each of the respective chapters (see 4.1.3; 4.2.3 and 4.4). The analysis of these interviews will rely on a theoretical interview analysis (see 2.4.6) and will finally be concluded (see chapter 5) and reflected upon (see 6.1). Further work will be presented afterwards (see 6.2).

2. Method

This chapter introduces the structural scope of this project. In the first section of this chapter, the theory of science will be described (see 2.1). Secondly, the research design of this project, namely the case study will be presented: What is a case study, what type of case study is being used and how does the case study cope with the method of choice? (see 2.2). In the next sections the methods, which will be used throughout this research project will be introduced, firstly the ‘Process Tracing Method’, ‘Counterfactual Analysis’ and ‘Perceived and Attained influence’ (see 2.3), which will function as methodological tools that soil the grounds for the “Interview Method” (see 2.4) which will be introduced secondly, including the “Interview Guide” (see 2.4.4).

2.1 Theory of Science

The theory of science in this research project relays on the ontological and epistemological thoughts embedded in the methodological orientation of constructivism. Constructivism is best described as a methodological orientation that based on a social ontology, which insists on the fact, that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and their collectively shared system of meaning, i.e. culture as in the broader meaning of the word (Risse, 2009, pp. 145-146). Constructivism does in that way stand in contrast to the methodological individualism of rational choice, in that sense, that the crucial part of the methodological individualism is, that social life is the individual humans' actions, i.e. that human agents are independent to other agents' action and behaviour and exists regardless of another human agents' presence (Risse, 2009, pp. 145-146). The crucial point to take notice of in terms of the uses of constructivism in this research project is that constructivists often insist on the continuativeness of social structures and agents, where the social environment, in which we find ourselves, constitutes who we are and our identities as social beings (Risse, 2009, pp. 145-146). This is an important aspect in terms of the ontology of this research project in relations to how the interviewees themselves, their apprehension and their told lifeworld are perceived, in this research project, in regard to their social environment. The interviewees cannot be isolated from their social environment, which influences how they present their lifeworld, i.e. their statements in relations to the subject matter of this research project, namely the phenomenon of lobbyism. For further description of the theory of science in relation to the ‘Interview Method’ see section 2.4 and its sub-sections

As well as human actors', do institutions play a significant role for constructivists, whereas institutions are understood to broadly include not only formal rules but also informal norms, that are expected to constitute actors, i.e. shaping the human actors' identities and their preferences (Pollack, 2015, p. 21). The human actors' preferences are therefore not exogenously given and fixed, as it would have been the case, which methodological individualism had been used (Pollack, 2015, p. 21). Constructivism, therefore, offers a view of human agency that suggests that institutions influence individual identities, preferences, and behaviour i.e. that individuals' identities are shaped and reshaped by their social environment, the institutions in which they exist (Pollack, 2015, p. 21). Put this into perspective, these hypotheses are consistent with other research, that the institutions of the European Union have indicated to shape not only the behaviour but also the preferences and identities of individuals related to the structure of the union (Pollack, 2015, p. 21). Yet again is this aspect of constructivism, set in relation to theory relating to the EU, important specifically to this research project, since the human agents, i.e. the interviewees, are embedded in what constructivist would describe the EU as 'a social structure', which in accordance with the methodological orientation of constructivism would have an impact on the interviewees' perceived reality.

2.2 Research Design

This following section describes the research design of this project, by outlining the application of the case design in relations to the subject area.

2.2.1 The Case Study

Using case study research as a research design still remains one of the most challenging of all social science endeavours, which requires a personal devotion which one as to follow a stringent methodological path. The methodological path begins with a thorough review of the relevant literature (see chapter 1) of the subject matter followed by the carefully and thoughtfully construction of research questions or objectives for the research project (see 1.1 and 1.2). Furthermore, does the research design of the case study, like any other research designs, requires an open acknowledgement and an understanding of the strengths and limitations of case study research. (Yin, 2014, p. 32). The strengths and limitations of the study research will be further outlined in sub-section 2.2.3.

Case study research is a methodical tool in social science, in which the main task is to make a study that portrays a nuanced and in-depth depiction of an object, with the reasoning being the fact that the perspective of ‘the whole’ is greater than the collective sum of the parts (de Vaus, 2001, p. 221). I.e. portraying the study of an object nuanced and in-depth facilitates a greater research value of the object than combining various parts of researched aspects of the object. There are various forms of sampling in the case study, i.e. ‘the extreme’ case, which can be well-suited for getting a point across in an especially dramatic way (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). The specific form for case study sampling in this thesis will be the information-oriented selection, which strives to maximize the utility of information from small samples and single cases, in which the cases are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230), i.e. The cases are selected with a preinterpreted perception of the outcome of information, which they will result in. Specifically, is this depicted in this research project by not only researching lobby organizations’ lobby actions in e.g. the European Parliament but on the contrary the research of this project incorporated the values of including other relevant institutions of the European Union e.g. The European Commission. By both striving to depict a nuanced picture of the study of an object, while still managing to achieve an in-depth study of an object does as a matter, of course, stipulate certain demands of the lines of demarcation, in terms of relevance (de Vaus, 2001, p. 221). One cannot depict every singular aspect and perspective in a study of an object, hence one has to delimit the scope of the research area (de Vaus, 2001, p. 221). A complete account of the delimitations in this research project and the reasoning behind the choice of them is found in section 1.1.

Case study research may include several sources of evidence and information, among these, are documents, observations, interviews, archival records, and participant-observations. (Yin, 2014, p. 277). In this research project, interviews will have a significant role alongside with participant observations, since most of the gathered data come inquired interviews with the chosen lobby organisations and EU institutions alongside participant observations from the researcher’s observations previously being working as interns in one of the investigated lobby organizations.

The case study researcher investigates as mentioned a contemporary phenomenon, which is the “case”, in its real-world context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clear (Yin, 2014, p. 31). The researcher is in this instance an analytic observer of actions delimited on the subject matter.

2.2.2 The Theoretical Orientation Case Study

The case study is not a singular methodical research design tool - it comes in various flavours both in terms of path and goal. There are four general strategies of case studies: either rely on theoretical propositions, working your data from the “ground up,” developing a case description or examining rival explanations. Furthermore, can any of these four general strategies be used in practice combined with one of five specific techniques for analysing the case study: pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis. (Yin, 2014, p. 178).

This research project will in term of case study strategy be using a theoretical orientation case study, which relies on the general case study strategic of ‘theoretical positions. This is due to the theoretical focus of this project on lobby actions and how the theory of lobbyism correlate to how the included lobby organisations conduct their lobby actions. A case study inquiry often benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2014, p. 48). Relying on ‘theoretical propositions’ as a chosen path of case study inquiry implies designing research of the case study in such a way, that it is founded on propositions reflected by the theoretical framework of the research project, which in this particular instance implies the theories of lobbyism (Yin, 2014, p. 183). The theoretical founded propositions embedded in the theory of lobbyism direct the shaping of the data collection plan of the research and therefore yields certain analytic priorities (Yin, 2014, p. 183). The theoretical proposition helps to organize the analysis by pointing to relevant contextual condition and explanations, which needs to be described and examined (Yin, 2014, p. 184).

In practice will the general strategy of the theoretical propositions be combined with the analytic approach of explanation building, which in political science research is often called process tracing (see 2.3). The explanation building technique is a special type of pattern matching, but it entails a different procedure and a different goal. The goal in the explanation building technique is to analyse the acquired case study data by building an explanation about the case. The general idea is to explain a phenomenon to stipulate a presumed set of causal links about it, or “how” or “why” something happened (Yin, 2014, p. 196). The causal links may be complex and difficult to measure in any precise manner (Yin, 2014, p. 196).

2.2.3 Strength and Limitations of the Case Study

Rigorous enough? One of the greatest concerns that have risen in relations to doing case study research is a presumed need for a greater rigour approach to the research. Often have case study researchers been proven untidy in their approach to the case study research by not following stringent systematic procedures, or cases, where the researcher has allowed equivocal evidence to influence the direction of the findings which would cause a disturbance in the truthfulness between the research questions and the final conclusions. It is therefore important when using case study research to be stringent and using a rigorous path of inquiry. (Yin, 2014, p. 51).

Generalizing from case studies? Another concern about the case study research is the thought apparent inability to generalize from case study findings, where critics of the case study research design question the possibility to generalise from a single case (Yin, 2014, p. 52). This common misunderstanding involves that one cannot generalize on the basis of individual cases and that the case method is claimed to be most useful for generating hypotheses in the first steps of a total research process, whereas hypothesis testing and theory building are best carried out by other methods later in the process (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). However, the same critic could be brought forward in the case of research based on a single experiment and the ability to generalize from that single experiment (Yin, 2014, p. 52). In fact, generalization in science are rarely based on a single experiment, they are instead usually based on a set of multiple experiments, that have the replicated effect of the conclusion on a specific phenomenon under different conditions, i.e. same result different condition (Yin, 2014, p. 52). The same approach is used in social science with the use of case study research but do however requires a different concept of the appropriate research design. The answer to, whether it is possible to generalize from a case study is, that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to the populations or universes (Yin, 2014, p. 52). The goal of case study research will then be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalizations) and not to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalizations). By that meaning, that the aim and goal of case study research design are not to generalize anything about the interviewees, their lived world, or their perception of it, but to generalize to known theory. This correlates with the use of the theoretical orientation case study with the use of theoretical propositions (Yin, 2014, p. 52). Robert. K. Yins approach to generalizations from case studies cope with the intention of this thesis. The overall goal of this thesis is not to generalize upon the chosen population i.e. the lobby organisation and the EU institutions, but to describe a single case and or instance of lobby actions and by

doing this research it will hopefully add to previously known approaches and theory of both how to investigate lobbyism and lobby organisations influenced and to add to the known theory of lobbyism.

Unmanageable level of effort? A persistent concern regarding producing case study research is that the case studies can conceivably take an exceedingly long time to perform and furthermore result in extensive indecipherable reports if the researchers want to depict every aspect of a case. This is however incorrectly confusing the case study research with a specific method of data acquisition, such as ethnography or participant-observation. Ethnographies habitually demand lengthy periods in the field and emphasize detailed observational and interview evidence. Participant-observation may likewise seize a substantial investment of field effort. In contrast, a case study research is a form of inquiry that does not depend solely on ethnographic or participant observer data. It is even possible to produce a valid and high-quality case study without leaving the telephone or the internet, depending on the topic being studied. (Yin, 2014, p. 53).

Since this case study research heavily relays on the outcomes of the acquired interviews, it clearly contradicts a method of case study data acquisition with an unmanageable level of efforts such as it would be the case with the primary focus being data acquisition begin from either ethnographies or participant-observation. This should, however, be said while not neglecting the large, but comprehensible, amount of effort regarding producing a case study research with the use of the interview method. This research project, however, in some cases relay the use of participant-observation, but in those instances, the participant-observation are considered previously acquired knowledge of the researchers as former research.

2.2.4 Validity and reliability: The Case study

An important part of practising any form of research design or any application of a method in academic research is to ensure good practice of use, i.e. ensuring validity and reliability through the academic research. In general, the research designs are supposed to represent a logical set of statements, and thereby is it possible to judge the quality of any given design according to certain logical tests. Four tests have been used to establish the quality of any empirical social research. (Yin, 2014, p. 80).

The four tests for judging the quality of research designs consist of: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2014, p. 81). As a further parameter than the ones mentioned by Robert. K. Yin, transparency throughout the research project, especially in regard to the application of the method will also be judged as an important matter.

Constructed validity

Constructed validity involves identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. This first test of quality, constructed validity, is especially challenging in regard to case study research. Critics of case study research have often pointed to the fact that a case study researcher fails to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and instead uses subjective judgments on how to collect data, in such a way, that the data and therefore the conclusion of the research are tending to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions. To meet the test of construct validity, an investigator must be sure to cover two steps: 1) define terms of specific concepts and relate them to the original objectives of the study and 2) to identify operational measures that match the concepts, preferably citing published studies that make the same matches (see 1.2.1). (Yin, 2014, p. 82). In this research project will the constructed validity tried to be accomplished by defining specific concepts and original objectives of the phenomenon of lobbyism that are operational with concepts of previously cited published research. This will amongst others be indicated with the use of Dionigi's approach to lobbyism, by following similar operational measures of lobbyism and by following a similar approach to investigating lobbyism, inter alia. the similar definition of influence, this thesis compared to the work of Dionigi (see 1.2.1). For further explanation see section 2.3.

Internal validity

Internal validity seeks to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. This second test of quality, internal validity, have been identified to be of concern mainly when dealing with spurious effects. Internal validity is typically a concern for explanatory case studies when the researcher is trying to explain how and why event 'x' led to event 'y'. If the researcher incorrectly concludes that there is a causal relationship between 'x' and 'y' without acknowledging that some third factor 'z' which may actually have been the cause to 'y', the research design has failed to deal with the common threats to internal validity. (Yin, 2014, p. 83). The specific tactics for ensuring internal validity can be difficult to identify when doing a case study research, however by following a specific analytic case study research tactic stringent, it will

help to ensure internal validity. Pattern matching i.e. process tracing is one of the evident analytical tactics of choice in ensuring internal validity. (Yin, 2014, p. 84). For a further and deeper explanation see sub-section 2.2.2 and section 2.3.

External validity

External validity involves defining the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized. The third test of quality, external validity, deals with the difficulty of recognising whether the findings and of the research of a case study are generalizable beyond the immediate study, regardless of the research method used (e.g., experiments, surveys, or case studies). (Yin, 2014, p. 84). In sub-section 2.2.3 are the strength and limitations of the case study presented, amongst others a discussion of generalizing in case study researching and how case study research is not centred towards aiming for a general generalization, but on an analytic generalization with focus on theory and generation of it.

Reliability

Reliability involves demonstrating that the operations of a study i.e. the data collection procedures, can be repeated, with the same results. The fourth test of quality, reliability, strives toward the goal of making sure that, if a later researcher wishes to perform the same procedures as described by an earlier researcher and conducts the same case study over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusion. The goal of reliability can in that way be described as to minimize the errors and biases in a study. The common way of approaching the problem of reliability is to make as many of the chosen steps in the research as operational as possible and to conduct one's research as if someone were looking over one's shoulders. The good conduct of reliability in case study research is consequently to direct the research so that an examiner could in principle repeat the procedures and hopefully arrive at the same results. (Yin, 2014, p. 84).

2.3 Methodological tools

In these next sections, process tracing, counterfactual analysis and attained and perceived will be presented. These four methodological tools will create the foundations in which the interview method will be based upon. Dionigi uses process tracing, counterfactual analysis and attained and perceived influence as methodological tools with the main function being to ensure

adequate acquired data when conducting research using the interview method. As so, that Dionigi too analyses lobbyism, particularly in her instance lobbyism in the European Parliament, will following a similar methodological approach to a similar case accommodates for this research to achieve higher reliability, by following a similar path of previous research. Furthermore, will this research hopefully be able to expand on how to the methodological approach lobbyism. This research project does, of course, differ both in terms of theoretical and methodological perception but do however still try to follow a similar approach of acquiring data, which the why the usage of process tracing and counterfactual analysis in this research project will be based on Dionigi's approach to these two methodological tools.

Dionigi makes use of the four methodological tools in her approach to evaluate the influence of the lobby organisations: *process tracing, counterfactual analysis, and interest groups' attained and perceived influence* (Dionigi, 2017, p. 6). It will be on the basis of these four tools, that the interviews in this thesis will be conducted. By using these tools, they should enable this research to achieve the required data to answer the research question which this thesis is built on.

Process Tracing involves in general, that the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, other sources of data material with the purpose to test whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes implies in a case is, in fact, evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 6). Process tracing focuses on the sequential processes within a particular case and not on the correlations of data across different cases, which makes it fundamentally different from a statistical analysis, and a suitable method of choice to this research project, due to the fact, that this research project focuses on a single case (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 13). The focus of process tracing has important implications for theory testing, namely, that a single unexpected piece of process tracing evidence can result in a requirement for altering the interpretation and theoretical significance of a case (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 13).

Process tracing will in this research project used as a tool which focuses on analysing the process of what the lobby organisations have been giving to the political actors in terms of pieces of information, knowledge, concrete political amendments, political direction etc. throughout the policy process and how these actors have made use of this data and the inputs that are given to them. The theory-oriented case study resonates well with the use of process

tracing because this method can be used to uncover the causal mechanisms, i.e. independent static factors that under specific conditions connect causes to effects, which are central to causal explanation and vital for the internal validity of this thesis.

The counterfactual analysis is defined as “*the mental construction of a course of events which is altered through modifications in one or more ‘conditions’*” (Weber, [1905] 1949, p. 173). The counterfactual analysis is a methodological tool which entails, that the researcher produces an imaginary construction which stresses the importance of visualizing of what might have happened in this specific case and or scenario if one or more variables were removed from the chain of events (Biersteker, 1995, p. 318).

The counterfactual analysis will in this research project be used as a “what if” tool, that attempts to answer how the outcome of lobbyism might have been if one or more variables were removed from the chain of events. Although it is impossible to know, how the case would be without the influence of lobbyism either completely or partly, one can by asking the interviewees, how they would imagine that outcome may have looked like if there had been no lobby action taken place in the specific case. In this case study research, the counterfactual analysis does help to illuminate how the lobby organisations view their own lobby action and their influence. Even though the counterfactual analysis and the imaginative thought construct it creates, can only be based on guesswork as there does not exist alternative cases or scenarios where the EU institutions internal policy process has not been influenced or attempted to be influenced by the lobby organisations, to compare a case with. The counterfactual analysis can, however, illuminate how the lobby organisations view the impact of their lobby action. (Dionigi, 2017, p. 6).

Attained influence involves the analysing of lobby organisations interests and to what degree lobby organisations had their preferred interest and goals present in the final policy formulation. This is however rather tricky to measure, since the influence of a lobby organisation and the interests and goals of a political institution, such as the EP, might be aligned i.e. a MEP could have had the same interests and goals as a lobby organisation and the policy outcome on a specific dossier might consequently not be due to the efforts of a lobby organizations’ lobby actions, due to the MEP personal agenda. There might not be causality between a lobby action and the policy outcome. (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 6-7). This is a relevant note to make, when analysis the influence of the lobby organisations in the EU institutions.

Perceived influence is the assessment that lobby organisations give themselves, regarding their influence as well as their perception of their influence. This one does require some self-reflection from the lobby organisations since it is about how they perceive their own influence and the effect of their work. (Dionigi, 2017, p. 7) The lobby organisations might have several diverse ways of identifying if they have made an impact on a certain policy, therefore their own interpretation holds significant value. Both for themselves, their members and for the people and organisations that they work with. A lobby organisation that can install the picture of itself as being successful, might be able to convince others as well.

2.4 Interview Method

The following chapter describes the interview method in general followed by an outlining of the application of the method in relation to the case study research design and to the subject area, including the interview guide.

2.4.1 The Qualitative Interview

The aim and goals of qualitative research interview to understand the world from the point of view of the interviewed subjects and hereby unfold the meaning of their experiences of the world, to discover their precepted lived world (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 22). Even though using the term 'subject' to describe the designate interview participants, henceforth the out of fashion in qualitative research, it is still important to emphasize the meaning behind the term 'subject' (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 3). Researches, that use the qualitative interview, approach people not as objects, mechanically controlled by casual laws, but on the contrary as persons, i.e. as subjects who act and are actively engaged in making meaning (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 3). At the same time, the term 'subject' also indicates that people are subjected to discourses, power relations, and ideologies that are not of their own making but that nonetheless affect and perhaps even constitute what they talk about and how (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 3). This is an important notice to making in how the interviewees themselves and their perception of their lived world is perceived in this research project, both in term of how to perceive the interviewees' description of their lived world as a reality, but also taking discourses, power relations and ideologies affecting the interviewee into account.

2.4.2 Methodological issues in research interviewing

When doing research interviewing one has to consider what is purpose is of the interview method and what kind of knowledge, data, is sought in doing so. Typically, one would devote oneself to an epistemological and ontological position, whereas i.e. phenomenologists typical would be interested in outlining how human subjects experience life world phenomenons, hermeneutical scholars would address the interpretation of meaning and discourse analysts focus on how language and discursive practices construct the social worlds in which human individuals exist. However, by approaching these epistemological and ontological differences between philosophies of qualitative inquiry pragmatically one avoids being forced into a specific philosophy of inquiry. Instead by using a pragmatic approach the methodological approach is being based on reflections on how to conduct and analyse interviews based on what the researcher is interested in knowing, i.e. whether it be experiences of concrete episodes, the meanings of specific phenomena, comprehension of specific concepts, processes of discursive construction or something different. Being reflective and making an informed choice about what to do when conducting interview researched, will allow the researcher to engage more profoundly with the sort of knowledge the chosen research will produce. Throwing oneself out unknowingly and unreflected of the conduction of interview research, only driven by a clever idea, one might end up with a transcribed interview, which might be interesting but without purpose and content which might lead to a research project, that only reproducing common opinions and prejudices. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 15).

When approaching interview research both pragmatically, reflected, and methodological the researcher has to ask oneself questions e.g. “Who and how many subjects to interview” “How to avoid influencing the subject” “How to ensure validity and reliability?” “How to analyse the interviews?” etc. (see 2.4.3 and 2.4.4)

2.4.3 Validity and reliability: Interview Method

An important part of practising any application of a method in academic research is to ensure a good practice of use, i.e. ensuring validity and reliability through the research. Validity and reliability have previously been mentioned in regard to the research design and to avoid repetition, this sub-section will serve as a supplement to the previous section, only stating any further needed discussion of validity and reliability related to the interview method.

Validity

Validity, in general, refers to the truth, correctness and the strength of a statement and is in social science often defined by asking the question: “*Are you measuring what you think you are measuring?*”, i.e. qualitative research in social science is considered invalid if it does not result in measurements. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 282). In relations to the interview method, validity involves the integrity of the subject’s reports and the quality of the interviewing, which should include a careful questioning to the meaning of what is said, and continual checking of the information obtained as validation in situ. In relations to transcribing, the question of validity involves choosing a valid translation from oral to written language by choosing a linguistic style of the transcription, being transparent about the style and begin consisting in the use of it. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 284).

Reliability

Reliability, in general, concerns the consistency and integrity of the research’s findings and is often discussed in relation to the issue of whether a finding is reproducible at other points of times and by other researchers. In relations to the interview method, reliability involves whether the interviewees would change up their statements or opinions during an interview and whether they would give contradictory or varied responses to various interviewers i.e. researchers. Regarding the potential issue of an interviewee changing his or her statements or opinions during an interview, entails an important but challenging task for the interviewer, to minimize the influence of the interviewer and to avoid leading the interviewee in terms of wordings and questioning. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 281).

This is notably a problem when dealing with the semi-structured interview, due to the, unfortunately, fact, that the interviewer often presents the mistake of applying leading follow-up questions to the primary structured questions, hereby maybe leading to unintentionally answers or opinions, which might not be of the interviewee. Whereas the unstructured interview completely let the interviewee guide the interview, interfering as less as possible and the structured interview not deviating from the same structured questionnaire. Regarding the potential issue of reproducibility, this research project strives to be transparent in form of a questionnaire with an explicit interview-guide (see 2.4.4), including a questionnaire and potential follow-up question with an explicit description of aim and goal of each individual question achieving maximized reliability and transparency of the method. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 281).

Another ‘reliability challenge’ in regard to the interview method involves the transcription of the interviews, both in term of intersubjective inference in the transcripts, which emerge when the same passage is transcribed by different researchers (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 281). To ensure reliability in this research project the transcriptions will be included as annexes and a more thorough presentation will follow in sub-section 2.4.5. in regard to the transcription.

2.4.4 Interview Guide

There is a need for two different sets of questions since the lobby organisations and the European institutions have distinct roles to play in the making of the Common Agricultural Policy. The questions will also be different, but still similar enough to allow a comparison between their answers, that hopefully will give insight into the lobby actions taken by the lobby organisations, and how these actions were received by the European institutions.

Interview-guide for lobby organisations:

1: How did you set up your interests?

1.1 Can you describe your working process with the Common Agricultural Policy?

2: How did you promote your interests in the different EU institutions?

2.1 ... In the European Parliament?

2.2 ... In the European Commission?

2.3 ... In the European Council?

2.4 How often did you meet with these institutions?

2.5 Would you describe your contact with these institutions as formal or informal?

3: How did you work with Common Agriculture Policy, chronologically?

3.1 Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agricultural Policy?

3.2 Did you participate in the agenda-setting process of the new Common Agricultural Policy?

3.3 Did you participate in the policy formulation process of the new Common Agricultural Policy?

3.4 Did you participate in the decision-making process of the new Common Agricultural Policy?

4: Did you have a lobby action strategy?

4.1 What was the goal of your lobby action strategy?

5: How would you define the effectiveness of this lobby action?

5.1 Was there a specific institution where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?

5.2 Was there a specific stage in the policy process, where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?

6: How might the outcome have been, if you had not acted?

Questions one to four of the lobby organisation interviews are focused on the process tracing elements, as described from Dionigi theory. The aim of these questions is to try and create an understanding of what the lobby organisations have been doing, and the process of their lobby action, relating it to the policy cycle (see 3.2 and 3.2.1.)

Question five then relates to the last two elements of Dionigi's analysis, the attained influence, and the perceived influence since it aims at their own definition of success with the lobby action.

Question six will try to perceive the counterfactual analysis of the lobby organisations influence, by asking them of an outcome in a case without their influence, and her by analysing their perceived influence. However, this question will be best answered by asking the institutions a similar question, since they would be the ones, that worked with the "raw material" given to them. The lobby organisations might be able to give information in this regard, which would then most likely be given in the fifth question.

Interview-guide for the EU Institutions:

The questions asked to the EU institutions working with Common Agriculture Policy would be a little different from the ones asked to the lobby organisations, but still fairly similar:

1: What was your political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy?

2: How did you pursue these interests?

2.1 Can you describe your working process with the Common Agricultural Policy?

3: How was the collaboration with stakeholders?

3.1 How often did you meet with stakeholders?

3.2 Who took the initiative to make contact?

3.2 Would you describe these meetings as formal or informal?

3.3 Were you in contact with Copa & Cogeca?

3.4 Were you in contact with The European Environmental Bureau: EEB?

4: How did you perceive their inputs?

4.1 How would you describe a “good” input?

5: Did their inputs change or add to your political interests?

5.1 Did you inform the stakeholders/lobby organisations of your perceived view on the inputs that they gave you

6: How might the outcome have been, if you were not approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations?

Question one and two focuses on the processes tracing with the EU institutions. Understanding their own process should prove to be useful in analysing the work conducted by the lobby organisations since it makes it possible to compare the working procedure of the two. It is also these two questions that might be able, to help with the counterfactual analysis, since it can give an indication on what a policy outcome might have been if the lobby organisations had not been involved.

The remaining question, three, four, five and six, focuses on the attained influence of the lobby organisations since it aims at getting information about the collaborations and interactions between the stakeholders and the EU institutions and

The EU institutions cannot answer the perceived influence of the lobby organisations since they will not be able to tell how the lobby organisations view their own influence. These questions, when answered should be able to give a decent picture of the work the lobby organisations had put into the Common Agriculture Policy as well as the effect the lobby action had on the EU institutions and on the feedback-, agenda-setting-, policy formulation- and decision-making process of the Common Agriculture Policy.

Interview-guide for the Mariann Fischer Boel:

Beside the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC, the pan-European lobby organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB and the three EU institutions, Mariann Fischer Boel (former commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development) was interviewed. Due to the fact, that Boel is a former commissioner and therefore is not involved in the CAP 2020, another questionnaire has been made, to accommodate this issue. These questions focus more on the general

interaction between the Commission and the lobby organisations in the agricultural field and is more in line with the purpose of including her as an interviewee. NB: The questions in the interview-guide for Mariann Fisher Boel has been translated from Danish into English. To see the questions in their original form, see Appendix H.

1: How was the relationship between lobby organizations and the European Commission?

2: How would you describe the contact between lobby organizations and the European Commission?

2.1 Was it formal? Was it informal? In relation to DG-AGRI meetings, working groups, specific/individual inquiries, etc.

3: How important do you think lobby organizations and their inputs to proposals were for the EU Commission?

4: Did lobbying organizations, during your time as Commissioner, have a negative or positive impact on EU work?

5: Do you feel that over time there has been a better relationship between lobby organizations and the European Commission, then?

6: Do you want to describe this as a positive or negative development?

7: What were your ambitions about the CAP when you were Commissioner?

8: Do you have position towards the new CAP?

Question one and two focuses on the processes tracing aspect of the interaction between the lobby organisations and the Commission. The remaining question, three, four, five and six, focuses on the attained influence of the lobby organisations, while question seven and eight involves a more personal positions from Boel in regard to the CAP, both the previous CAP's and the CAP 2020, to create a more holistic view of the work of a commissioner.

2.4.5 Transcription

The quality of transcriptions is seldom addressed in the literature concerning quantitative research in social science, even though the quality of the transcriptions holds a prominent place in terms on ensuring validity and by neglecting potentially issues in the transcription, the interview researcher's road to hell becomes paved with transcripts. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 203). As mentioned in sub-section 2.4.3 does validity in the transcription process involves the question of choosing a valid translation from oral to written language, choosing a linguistic

style of the transcription, being transparent and consistent in the use of this style (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 284). Whereas an interview is an evolving face-to-face conversation between two persons, the transcription transforms this conversation into a static written form. Often in researches using the interview method is the transcribed interviewee considered the solid rock-bottom of the empirical data of the interview research, which for the critical researcher should startle questions regarding the importance to ensure, that the oral-to-written translation is indeed valid. The interview is a live social interaction where the pace of the temporal unfolding, the tone of the voice, the bodily expressions are immediately available to the interviewer and the interviewee in the face-to-face conversation, which can be complicated to illustrate and to carry over from the oral conversations to the written text. The audio recording of an interview is the first abstraction from the live physical presence of the interview, where the body language such as posture and gestures are lost in the process and secondly in the transcription process, where the tone of the voice, the intonations, pauses are lost too. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 204). However, since this research thesis does not have the intention to research and analyse linguistic details, pronunciations, wordings i.e. in general the “how” of how the interviewees explain their live world, but instead focuses on the “what” in what the interviewees explanation of their perceived lived world, these issues becomes obsolete. The relevance of potential linguistic details and the psychological presence of the interviewee will not be neglected, but it will not be included in the transcription process unless it causes a major impact on the interview or on what the interviewee says. Yet again, due to the fact, that this thesis does not focus on linguistic details, will this be reflected in the transcription approach, which will be written in an as fluent as possible written style, emphasizing the meaning of what the interviewees say and not to include pronunciations, stutter etc.

2.4.6 Theoretical interview analysis

The function of this sub-section is to present specific chosen approach of how to analyse the interviews used throughout this thesis. Many interview analyses are performed without the use of any particular analysis technique, which is the case of this thesis, where the interview analyses will not use specific analytical procedures but will be based on a general reading of the interview texts combined with theoretically influenced interpretations based (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 303). Knowledge of the subject of the analysis here weighs heavier than the use of certain analytical techniques (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 303).

Theoretical reading involves an understanding of a theoretical propositions or paradigmatic, which is the basis of the reading of the interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 305). A researcher can read his interviews over and over again, reflecting theoretically on specific interesting topics, and printing interpretations without following any systematic method or combination of techniques (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 305). In many important interview studies from the past decades, no systematic analysis techniques have been used for the analysis of the interview (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 305). A theoretical reading of interview texts may include new contexts for considering the interview topics and generating new dimensions of well-known phenomena (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 309). However, can a theoretical reading also result in unilateral caching, where readers only observe the aspects of the phenomena that can be seen through their theoretical lenses (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015, p. 309). Since this thesis rely on a theoretical oriented case study, in which the thesis is oriented towards theory-testing and building upon existing literature of the known subject and phenomenon, this struggle seems to be less of a problem. However, it is still important for the interviewer to listening carefully to the interviewee, while being open and sensitive to the many nuances of what the interviewees explain, since this approach might give a nuanced and more in-depth depiction of the phenomenon and therefor illuminate certain previous neglected aspects of the theory.

3. Theory

This chapter introduces the theoretical scope of this thesis. In the first section of this chapter, theories involving political actors in the EU institutions will be described. Secondly, the theories of lobbyism in the EU institutions will be presented: lobbyism in the EP, lobbyism in the Commission and lobbyism in the Council and how they differ from each other. In the next section, the theories of policy-making will be presented including the theory of policy-cycle and decision-making procedures in the EU institutions. This chapter will give the theoretical knowledge of how to comprehend lobbyism and answer the research question throughout the analysis of this thesis.

3.1 Political actors in the EU institutions

It is important to know who the different actors are in the policy-making arena of the EU when trying to understand the development of the policies. In a liberal democratic system, the principal actors are politicians, officials and the different lobby organisations operating in the specific policy area.

As mentioned in the interview guide earlier, this master thesis will attempt, to conduct interviews with both politicians, lobby organisations and with the officials of the European Union to create a wholesome depiction of the phenomenon of lobbyism. By doing so it should enable an analysis that can create a enlighten conclusion to the thesis research question and sub-questions.

The politicians occupy a very central and significant role in the policy-making process since they are the ones that often, create the broader framework of different policies. The politicians will often have their own goals and desired designs on how policies should be formed. In an EU perspective, the politicians would be a large and diverse group of people and political ideologies. There are the directly elected members of the European Parliament, coming from all the current 28-member states of the Union, as well as the members of the European Council and the Council of the European Union, that represents the national governments and heads of state in the EU. (Young, 2015, p. 50) The elected representatives of the European people, the parliamentarians of the EP, are fairly different than that of their national colleagues since the EP and its members do not have the same amount of competences as the national parliaments

in the member states. It does however still hold significant power when it comes to the creation and formulation of EU legislation (European Parliament, n.d.).

In this thesis, the politicians in focus should have been the MEPs. Here the thesis would have attempted to reach out to the key political actors of the EP in regard to the CAP negotiations that are currently taken place. It was decided that MEPs would not be included as part of the analysis directly, since it turned out not to be possible to acquire interviews with relevant MEPs. The possibility to contact previous MEPs was considered, but was decided against, since it was believed that it would not prove useful for the analysis, since these former MEPs had not taken part in the negotiations or formulation of the new CAP. Amongst these former MEPs Niels Busk was considered, a former MEP from Venstre (the Danish liberal party). Although Niels Busk was part of the AGRI Committee during his time in parliament, his term was before 2009, and therefore before the EP was giving a co-decision role in the EU. The lobbying that was conducted in the EP before it achieved its current co-decision role, would most likely have been vastly different, since there was less initiative/motivation for it.

The officials are, just like the politicians, closely positioned to the centre of policy-making. Traditionally officials would be considered to also have special interest, both personal and professional, which can be understood as, that they might work towards pushing for legislation that could improve their own situation, like salary, or they might work towards bettering their own section of the bureaucracy, either for prestige or increased responsibilities and competencies. (Young, 2015, p. 50). The officials in the EU, occupies a more significant part, when it comes to areas such as agenda-setting and policy formulation (both of these will be mentioned later on, in this chapter), but does not have the influence, when it comes to the implementation of policies, then that of their national counterparts (Young, 2015, p. 51). Since it was not possible to get interviews with the MEPs, the officials are going to play a larger role in this thesis. Partly because of the significant role that the officials play in the EU decision procedure, and also because of the simple fact, that it was possible to get interviews with them.

This master thesis will attempt to reach out to both Danish and EU officials. The Danish officials will allow the thesis to gain an understanding of how the lobby organisations have lobbied in the Danish part of the Council. Just as with the politicians this will enable the thesis to see what has been done in regard to lobby actions aimed towards the Council, which takes place on the national level since the Council represents the national interests of the member states of

the EU. The EU officials are the people employed inside of the Commission and the EP. Since it is the Commission that puts forward the first draft of most policy areas, it will allow for an interesting and necessary part of the thesis, to examine if any lobby actions have taken place at the Commission level.

The lobby organisations influence might differ depending on what area of policy they are working in. The lobby organisations are composed of either individuals or collaborations of different organisations, that cooperate in the attempt to achieve their goals, by promoting their interest towards the policy process currently taken place (Young, 2015, p. 50). Lobby organisations work very similarly on the national level as they do on the EU level. Several interest organisations, such as DAFC, have joined together with other “sister organisations” in a pan-European setting, such as Copa & Cogeca, so that they might be able to unite their resources, and thereby archive enhanced results for their members, in the policy areas that they have focused on. Similar has the DSNC joined together with a “sister organisations” the EEB, yet again to enhance results and influence in their specific policy area. These “sister organisations”, which are crucial to the lobby organization's goals to archive enhanced results for their members. (Dionigi, 2017, p. 21).

Furtherly, does Justin Greenwood in his book “Representing Interest in the European Union” from 1996, also gives a detailed explanation on how different actors, interest organisations, attempt to influence the policy making process in the EU. Greenwood’s key role in this thesis, has been to either support or contest the theory and approach put forward by Dionigi. By looking into whether Greenwood had a similar consensus with Dionigi, it would be possible to either put greater trust in the approach of Dionigi or to show that one should be more careful, when making use of Dionigi’s theory and definitions. Greenwood will also be used as a supplement to Coen and Richardson, and their descriptions on how to conduct lobby actions in the EU institutions.

Greenwood argues, that larger firms and organisations would have a challenging time in the EU, if they did not have any representation in Brussels. Having an office in Brussels, can provide an organisation with the information it needs to be at the front of the developments in the EU, and it also allows the organisation to take advantage of the openness of the EU institutions, making it possible to participate even more in the policy process that takes place. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 129).

3.2 Policy-making in the EU

When the different actors in the policy-making arena of the EU have been presented it is then important to know, how the policy is made in the EU by these institutions mentioned in the previous section of the chapter. Firstly, will there in this section of the chapter be presented the theory of policy cycle, which is a general theory of policy-making, but in this instance will the theory be tailored to fit into the policy-making arena of the EU. Secondly, will the decision-making procedures in the EU be presented.

3.2.1 Policy cycle

The policy cycle, as explained by Young, is divided into five stages. These stages attempt to create an understanding of the process that is undertaken when a policy is being created. Therefore, it is necessary to understand all of the stages, if one aims towards examining policy in greater depth.

Feedback is created after the implementation of a given policy. This is the stage of the policy-making cycle where the entire process is evaluated, so as to see if the policy is efficient, how the political work and feedback is, and if there should be any spill-over effects from the policy. The effects of the policy go beyond its intended area, thereby influencing elements, not originally intended for it. The most normal feedback is to look into, whether or not the policy addresses the problem it was intended for. If not, then the policy-makers might be pushed towards actions in rethinking the policy. (Wallace, Pollack, & Young, 2015, p. 6) In the EU institutions, the Commission takes on a significant part of the feedback process, and have several implemented routines, that they make use of, so that they can be attempting to give a full a truthful conclusion to the policy that they are looking into. (European Commission. (n.d. b)).

Agenda-setting is the process where the policymakers work on deciding what to decide, meaning deciding on the specifics of the agenda, what areas that are important to keep a focus on, and what areas are not of greater importance, for the specific policy. (Young, 2015, p. 54) Lobby organisations are among the active actors in this part of the policy-making process since they attempt to frame the agenda to make it more favourable for their organisation, by attempting to make sure that their interests and goals become part of the agenda, possible in a formulation that fit with their own desires.

Policy formation is the process where the policymakers have to figure out, what they are capable of doing, what options are available to them and what options are not. Policy networks are considered to play a significant role in regard to policy formation. Policy networks are formations of formal institutional and informal linkages among governmental and interest actors, situated around common, often endlessly, negotiated beliefs and interests in the making of policy and the implementation of it. The term attempts to capture the distinct types of relationships between the public and private actors in the policy-making process. These networks help determine what the different possibilities for the policymakers are. (Young, 2015, p. 56).

Decision-making, this part of the policy process is, as the name suggests, all about deciding on what should or should not be decided. How this is done varies greatly depending on what kind of institution is deciding. In the EP the norm is to form rather large coalitions so that the EP would be able to negotiate from a stronger position with the Council. (Young, 2015, p. 59)

Implementation happens after the decision on what to do has been made, it is necessary to figure out the next steps, which makes the decided policy come into effect. The implementation can be quite different, pending on what kind of legislation it is. In certain areas, it is up to the member states themselves to work out, how best to implement policies, and in others, the Commission, EP, and the Council decide the implementation together. (Young, 2015, p. 64)

Furtherly, Justin Greenwood, adds that in the implementation stage of a policy, the lobby organisations have a great opportunity to attempt to get influence, since both the EU institutions and the national governments need the knowledge and knowhow that the lobby organisations have in their specific fields (Greenwood, 1996, 29-30). Here agriculture is a fine example, where the lobby organisations such as DAFC have a substantial knowledge on how the implementation could be successful, since their members, the farmers and food producers, are the ones that are directly impacted.

3.2.2 Decisions procedures in the EU.

The Ordinary Legislative Procedure (co-decision):

With some exceptions, such as foreign and security policy, most EU policy areas now fall under what is normally called the co-decision procedure or the ordinary procedure. Under the co-decision procedure, the EP has significantly more influence than when they merely have under

the cooperation procedure. When a policy is being made under the co-decision procedure, the EP gains veto rights on the same level as the Council, which mean that they have close to the same amount of influence as the Council. The Commission is at times seen as having lost influence under this procedure to the EP since they have gotten a larger role here. (Young, 2015, p 62-63) Under the co-decision procedure, both the EP and the Council have veto rights, meaning that they have both have the ability to block any legislation proposed by the Commission. After the Commission has made their proposal, the EP and the Council will normally propose certain amendments to it. The Commission proposal then stands or falls on whether or not the Council and the EP, are able to come to an agreement and decide a final proposal.

The CAP falls under the category of co-decision procedure, and therefore it is important that all of the EU's political institutions, EP, Commission, the European Council and the Council of the European Union, are taken into consideration, when examining the influence of a lobby organization, since all of the institutions have significant roles to play in creating, formulating and implementing the CAP.

The Special Decision Procedure:

Under the special decision procedure, it is still the Commission who has the right of initiation, but the Council is in practice the only legislator, since they hold the decision power. In regard to the role of the EP under the special legislative procedure, then the EP can either have a consent role, meaning that the EP has to accept or reject a proposal. Under this procedure the EP is not allowed to make amendments to a proposal. The EP can also have a consultation role, where they submit their opinion on a legislative proposal. The Council does however not have to be obliged to the opinion of the EP, but it does have to receive the opinion, before making a decision. This procedure is used in areas such as internal market exemptions and competition law. When it comes to international agreements under common foreign and security policy, then the EP must also be consulted. (European Council, 2018, October 1) Since the CAP is under the co-decision procedure, the special decision procedure will not be a point of focus in this thesis. It was however included to give context to the co-decision procedure.

3.3 Lobbyism in the EU institutions

In her book regarding lobbying in the EP, Dionigi puts forward to various kinds of lobbying; formal lobbying and informal lobbying, both playing important roles when it comes to the success for the lobby organisations work.

Formal lobbying:

Dionigi describes formal lobbying as consisting of the official documents, reports, standpoints, amendments to proposals in the EP and goals that the lobby organisations present to the institutions. These can be in the form of their own lobby actions and strategies, that has clear aims and goals towards improving the situation for the lobby organisations and their members, but it can also be in the form of information and knowledge, given by the lobby organisations to the institutions when requested. Formal lobbying is thereby specific and requires either a proposal, if in Commission or the Council, or a dossier when in the EP. (Dionigi, 2017, p. 22).

Informal lobbying:

Informal lobbying is built up though time and is what Dionigi describes as “long-term lobbying”. The goal of informal lobbying is to create a bond of trust between the lobby organisation and the EU institution(s) (Dionigi, 2017, p. 22). Dionigi argues that the; “*physical presence enables interest groups and lobbyist to mingle regularly with key decision-makers through participation in conferences, receptions, and events in Brussels*” (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23). This “face-to-face” contact can make the lobby organisations seem more trustworthy for the politicians and officials inside of the EU institutions, and since trust is one of the most essential elements of the relationship and cooperation between lobby organisations, a presence in Brussels should not be underestimated.

Dionigi argues that the majority of lobbying done in the EP, is informal lobbying, stating that the lobby organisations use more time on cultivating their relationships with the politicians and their assistants in the EP, and the officials working in the Commission and the Council. For a lobby organization to be able to successful there is a need for both formal and informal lobbying. The formal lobbying, as it is described, is what the EU institutions are normally after, the lobby organisations knowledge and expertise. However, for the lobby organisations to be able to effectively make use of their knowledge, there needs to be an established trust between the

lobby organisation and the EU institution that they are attempting to lobby. According to Dionigi this trust is build up over time and involves both the transfer of knowledge between the lobby organisations, and ideally in close proximity between them as well, for this trust to develop. Because of the significant importance that trust plays in the relationship between the lobby organisations and the EU institutions, and thereby the lobby organisations ability to perform their work efficiently, the lobby organisations have little incentives for given out biased information and knowledge to the EU institutions, since such actions would damage the trust of the institutions. (Dionigi, 2017, p. 22).

With the trust and the cooperation, the lobbyist, the politicians, and the officials involved in the policy making procedure, certain networks will most likely develop in time. These networks can enable the different actors, to focus their attention on the right places and people. (Dionigi, 2017. Page 21) For example, a lobbyist could through his/her own network know which person is the right one to contact, that being either a politician or an official or even another lobbyist, if they need knowledge or they believe that they have information that they could give. A strong network can support the efforts of all the actors, since they would have a better understanding of the "field" they are playing on. This of course also enables the actors to root out the ones that are not able to help them. For an official that could be lobbyist that does not give them any added information or data, that might help them in their work, but only gives them political statements and opinions, that in themselves are useless for the official. As mentioned by Dionigi, the good networks are built over a long time, and on the exchange of information and ideas. (Dionigi, 2017. Page 21)

According to Greenwood, it is the resource strong lobby organisations that are able to get the point brought forward the best, since they often have the information and data that the EU institutions, the Commission, and the EP, since they often lack resources of their own. (Greenwood, 1996, page 20)

3.3.1 Lobbyism in the EP

After the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaty came into effect, the power of the EP has been enhanced, making the EP a far more attractive target for lobby organisations to aim their focus. Since the EP is a far more political orientated institution, compared to the Commission, the lobby organisations cannot just offer expert knowledge as the only thing. The MEP's can to a certain extend rely on the knowledge and data given to them from the Commission, so the

lobby organisations also have to be able to provide political capital, that can improve the standing of the MEP's in their home countries, giving them a greater chance for re-election, as well as given them a better standing in the Brussels community. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 9) Therefore it is important that the lobby organisations that wish to influence the EP are able to linkage their interests to that of issues that the greater public also considers important, for example the environment, global competitiveness, or job creation.

As mentioned earlier in the thesis, it was not possible to have interviews with any of the relevant MEPs, mainly because of the EP election on the 26th of May 2019. It was however decided that a theoretical understanding of how the MEPs conduct their work, could have been useful, since the EP as an institution is present in the thesis.

The pan-European lobby organisations might focus on the rapporteur and its members, the national organisations, would then focus on the MEP's from the member states. The pan-European lobby organisations might not have the same relationship with individual MEP's, making it more difficult of the organisation to influence the policy making process. The national lobby organisations however might have developed a much closer relationship with the MEP's from their own countries, and therefore have a more direct and easier access to them, and thereby begin able to better attempt to influence them to support amendments that favours their organisations. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 52)

The EP is a natural target for the lobby organisations, because of its increasingly greater role in the formulation and policy making process in the EU. According to Greenwood it is not only the MEPs that are in the sight of the lobby organisations in the EP, but also the officials working in the different committees. Each committee has a secretariat that provides support to the committee. The officials here, are also in contact with the different lobby organisations, that often contact the secretariat for information on what the committee is currently doing. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 43) The officials should therefore have a substantial understanding of what has been going on, regarding lobby actions, in the committees.

3.3.2 Lobbyism in the Commission

As mentioned earlier in this master thesis, the Commission has the right of initiative, meaning that the Commission is the only EU institution that has the right to propose new legislation. The Council and the EP can however suggest that the Commission make a proposal on certain

areas. This makes the Commission an important arena for lobby organisations to focus on, since this is where the agenda-setting part of the policy making process begins.

According to Dionigi, the lobby organisations have great initiatives towards lobbying in the Commission, since the Commission is the only institution that can propose legislation, the lobby organisations could potentially get themselves onto the “ground floor” of the proposal and influence it before anything is written down. (Dionigi, p. 22) This could give the lobby organisations a significant amount of influence on the agenda-setting aspects of the policy-making process.

Since the Commission is in charge of the management of the EU’s finances, it is both lobbied by the member states and lobby organisations, all attempting to have more funds relocated towards their interests. This means that the Commission is always being targeted by lobby actions from all sides, both private and state actors. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 8) The member states and the lobby organisations are both interested in making sure, that funds are relocated to them. The CAP is a perfect example of this, since both the member states and the lobby organisations, are attempting to provide their own national agricultural sector with additional funds. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 21).

If a member state is not implementing an EU policy, then individuals or organisations that believe that they have been damaged, financially, or otherwise by this lack of implementation, have the option to ask the Commission to act against member states that have not implemented EU policies. This is something that pan-European lobby organisations, such as Copa & Cogeca and EEB, might have a focus on, since they might seek to make a level playing field for their members, making sure that all the member states would have the same EU policies implemented, thereby making it so that all of their members would have the same possibilities, and none would be at an disadvantage.

One of the key elements in the relationship between the Commission and the lobby organisations, is the resource dependency between the two. The lobby organisations need to be able to have access to the Commission, so that they can try to influence them in the agenda-setting and policy formulation stages of the policy making process, since their reason for existing relies on their ability to show their members, that they can influence decisions that support them. The Commission on the other hand, needs the expert knowledge of the lobby organisations. This

expert knowledge is crucial to the Commission, when making policy proposals, since the Commission itself, does not have the manpower to nor the hands-on knowledge that the lobby organisations have. The Commission can also give their proposals a certain amount of legitimacy, which can strength the position of the Commission when it comes to the inter-institutional decision-making process. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, pp. 22-23)

When looking at how the Commission is organised, it is important not to view it as a single unitary organisation. According to Coen and Richardson, the Commission is an internally very fragmented organisation, although one with a strong hierarchy. There are 53 Directorate-Generals (DG) and Executive Agencies in the Commission, that handle the many different areas, that the Commission must work with. (ec.europa.eu) Therefore it is important that one know where to direct request and inquiries, if they are to be useful. A lobby organisation would therefore attempt to maintain a close relationship to the DG that works with their area. For Copa & Cogeca and EEB, that would for example be DG AGRI (agriculture), DG CLIMA (climate) and DG ENV (environment). These DG's also work with their counterparts in the Council (working groups) and in the EP (committees). (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 23). The DG's are more accessible to the lobby organisations, then the commissioners themselves, so the bulk of the lobby actions towards the Commission normally takes place here, with the lower officials begin the main receivers of the lobby effort. These are also the officials that do the majority of the preparatory work, that often lays the foundation of the policy proposal, and therefore is a major part of the agenda-setting and early policy formulation stage of the policy making process. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, page 25) According to Coen and Richardson it is important for the lobby organisations to get into the "ground floor" of the policy making process, that takes place in the DG's, since it enables them to attempt to influence the agenda-setting stages. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, page 25).

An important aspect of lobbying in the Commission is the civil dialogue groups. The goal of the civil dialogue groups is to help the Commission, in understanding matters related to a specific policy area, in this case the CAP. The meetings here, support the Commission by bringing together the different stakeholders, who then can give information and positions to the Commission. The Commission can also give information to the stakeholders, which should enable all of the parties, to have a clear understanding of the current procedures. (European Commission (n.d.) a).

The Commission prefers actors who have the ability to provide it with authoritative collective opinion. An organisation that is not able to provide the Commission with clear positions and viewpoints, will have more difficulties presenting itself as a serious organisation, since the organisation might be given of signals indicating that it does not have an internal consensus with its own members. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 123)

3.3.3 Lobbyism in the Council

Compared to the Commission and the EP, the Council can seem rather closed for the lobby organisations, since it meets behind closed doors and does not keep a record of interest mediation. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 10) Since the Council represents the interest of the EU member states and a great part of the lobby effort towards the Council is located on the national level. Therefore, it is possible to talk of more of a bottom-up approach when it comes to lobbying the Council, since lobby organisations, does not have the same level of access here, as they do in the Commission and the EP. If an interest organisation wishes to block a particular proposal, the Council is often one of their main targets for a lobby action, since they play a significant role in all EU policy making and have veto rights as well.

Coen and Richardson argue, that most of the lobbying towards the Council is done on the national level, since the important policy makers here, the national ministers and their officials, are normally based in the member states capitals around the EU. They do however have several working parties in Brussels, that are able to do most of the preparatory work, before it is approved back in the national capitals. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 79) It might also be worth mentioning, that unlike the Commission and EP, the Council is not as dependent on the stakeholders for information, as the other two institutions. This is because the Council, in its many different sections, has their national governments and ministries that come with their own officials and experts. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 71)

Coen and Richardson explain that it is more difficult to find information regarding lobbying in the Council, compared to the Commission and the EP. The Council has been working towards opening up and being more transparent. The Council is however still far from the level of transparency seen in the Commission and EP. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, p. 73).

When lobbying the Council, the lobby organisations need to make use of the national level of lobbyism, going to the officials in the ministries and in certain cases even the ministers, and they need to understand how the national governments work coordinate their work when working in EU Regi (Greenwood, 1996. Page 31). The lobby organisations have to know how their national government works when it is about Council matters, if they wish to have greater impact on the national level, when it comes to EU policies. Greenwood places the Council as being the most important of the EU institutions, when it comes to making the final decisions on policy making in the EU. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 31)

For a lobby organisation to have a greater chance of success in the EU institutions, support from the home country can have significant importance. Greenwood states that it is often impossible for a lobby organisation to get influence in the EU institutions, if it does not have the support of the government in its home country. The lobby organisation will then have to either depend on another organisation, such as a pan-European one, like EEB or Copa & Cogeca, to get influence on specific policies. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 32-33)

According to Greenwood, it is the resource strong lobby organisations that are able to get the point brought forward the best, since they often have the information and data that the EU institutions, the Commission, and the EP, often lacks because of their own lack of resources. (Greenwood, 1996, page 20)

4. Analysis

This chapter introduces the analytic part of this thesis. The analysis will be divided into three sections, in which each of the sections will relate corresponding to each of the three sub-questions under the overall research question in this thesis (see 1.2.1). Subsequently after each respective section, there will be a sub conclusion, wrapping up the analysis of the specific section and hereby answering the specific respective sub-question of the thesis.

In the first section of this chapter, the sub-question 1) *“How does the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC lobby in the EU institutions?”* will be answered. This section will therefore be focusing on the two Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC, their answers and how they relate to known theory and methodological approach to lobbyism. This will include a process tracing (see 2.3) of how the lobby organisations have conducted lobbyism and will include question one through four in the interview guide (see 2.4.4). By using process tracing of how the Danish lobby organisations conduct lobbyism it will enable the research to correlate and compare their approach. In the second section of the chapter will involve answering sub-question 2) *“Are the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC able to influence their pan-European organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB?”*. This section will in general be focusing on a process tracing of how the pan-European organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB, conduct lobbyism, i.e. question one through four (see 2.4.4), but also include DAFC and DSNC in instance, where they discuss their own perceived influence as being a member of the pan-European organisations. The third and last section of this chapter will revolve around sub-question 3) *“Does the lobby actions made by the pan-European lobby organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB, have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions?”* which will introduce the three EU institutions, how they have been working with the CAP 2020 and conclude whether the pan-European lobby organisations have had an influence on their work with the CAP-2020. This will include a process tracing of how each of the individual institutions have been working with the CAP 2020 indicated with the questions one through two and include the attained influence of the lobby organisations with the questions three through six. The attained influence will be compared with the perceived influence of the lobby organisations, which will be based on the questions five and six, asked to the lobby organisations (see 2.4.4)

4.1 The Danish Lobby Organisations

The function of section of the analysis is, through the use of process tracing (see 2.3), to answer “*How does the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC lobby in the EU institutions?*” The function of this section is to analyse the lobby actions made by DAFC and DSNC in the EU, this both includes the EU institutions and their pan-European partner organisations. By defining the lobby actions made by DAFC and DSNC it enables the possibility to investigate whether these actions have influence, but before answering that question, one must know what lobby actions were made. The structural approach of this section is divided into two parts, which respectively introduce each of the two Danish lobby organisations separately. This section will be conclusion with a comparison between the two lobby organisations.

4.1.1 Danish Agriculture and Food Council: Maria Skovager Østergaard (Appendix A)

To be able to create an understanding of what the DAFC have been doing in terms of their lobby actions process, we start by examining how they have come up with their interests, i.e. their goal, which they want to achieve, the subject matter of their lobby actions.

When Maria Skovager Østergaard (MSØ) was asked “*How did you set up your interests?*”. She stated, that “*The Danish Agriculture and Food Council is a member organization and those who ultimately decide in our member organization are those who have voted in our boards.* This indicate a normal structural approach in a member organization. In this since she added, that prior to the board’s decision of direction, the staff of DAFC have collected information from its members, by talking with “*various sub-segments of our members. It can be the ecologists. It can be family farming. It may be the larger agriculture, etc.*”. It is important in this matter to take notice, that DAFC is a member organisation, which represents a large part of the Danish food cluster with over 186.000 direct and indirect employment and therefore represent the interest of many employees with various specific interests and needs. This does both requires a lot of resources in terms of talking with the members, and finally compress all of these interests together to one final compromise, which can be presented to the board, which discuss the matter and set up the direction of hand. This process of specifying the interest and direction of the organisations is the first step in their lobby action.

When MSØ was asked “*Can you describe your working process with the Common Agricultural Policy?*” she summed up, that the start of their working process of their lobby actions is “*to find out what we mean*” and then “*to try to make others aware of what we mean.*”. This process involves, according to MSØ, to make some kind of material which are representable to the individuals, i.e. policy-makers, political actions etc., who are either willing to listen to their interests or someone, who according to DAFC should listen to their interests.

Now that it is clear, how the DAFC produce their interests, the next step is to analyse, how they promote these interests in the different EU institutions. MSØ was asked “*How did you promote your interests in the different EU institutions?*” and she replied, that they have different approach depending on which of the EU institutions they want to lobby. This correlate with the theory, that strategical lobby action approach varies between the different EU institutions.

When asked, about how DAFC promote their interests in the European Parliament, MSØ replied, that it is not a single solution, that “*we do that on many various levels.*”. Within this frame, she mentioned, that DAFC has a permanent office in Brussels, which enables them to have regular contact with the European parliamentarians, their cooperative colleagues stationed in the European Parliament secretariat and stating, that DAFC “*have good contacts with them*”. According to Dionigi, the “*physical presence enables interest groups and lobbyist to mingle regularly with key decision-makers through participation in conferences, receptions, and events in Brussels*” (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23). The physical presence in terms of having a permanent office in Brussels enables DAFC to have “face-to-face” contact with the various EU institutions. It makes them seem more trustworthy for the politicians and officials inside of the EU institutions, which is why physical presence in Brussels should not be underestimated. In terms of the contact with the European Parliament, they regularly hold meetings with the parliamentarians when there is something relevant on the agenda, where present their interests and “*possibly give some background knowledge or help to formulate*”, indicating, that DAFC both want the decision-makers in the European Parliament to know their interest, background knowledge, which the DAFC find important or directly formulate positions and or amendments to the European Parliament in the worlding of DAFC’s own interest.

When MSØ was asked *How did you promote your interests in the European Commission?*” she immediately mentioned the Civil Dialogue meeting, which is described as “*a way of making one’s voice known to the European Commission*”. Furthermore, she added, that in addition

to the Civil Dialogue meetings they have a lot of contact with the European Commission, i.e. the Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG-AGRI). “*We ask for meetings, to talk about what our wishes for the future agricultural policy are, but we have also had a lot of meetings with the European Commission, which is about dealing with concrete issues in the current EU rules*” “*In addition, we also have regular meetings with cabinets for Phil Hogan.*”. These types of meetings clearly point to a predominantly amount of formal contact and lobbyism from DAFC to the Commission. However, as MSØ mentions, is there still a lot of informal contact and lobbyism through to the Commission “*In addition, you meet for various events in Brussels and in addition there is informal contact when talking to officials outside the Commission for various events.* The establishment of a strong network is clearly an essential element for DACF, and as Dionigi also describes, that having a good and board network is key, when it comes to successful lobbying in the EU. (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22) In interesting aspect of these informal meetings at various event is, that MSØ point to the fact, that it has been her superior, who attend these events, indicating a clear hierarchy, in the context of specific lobbyism and meeting with high officials in the Commission.

In the instance of “*How did you promote your interests in the European Council*”, MSØ answered, that “*It is the more nationally focused in reality.*” which align perfectly with the mentioned theory of how to lobby in the Council, that compared to the Commission and the EP, the Council is rather closed for lobby organisations, since the meetings is behind closed doors and does not keep a record of interest mediation (Coen and Richardson, 2019, p. 10). Furtherly, the theory points to, that when it comes to lobbying the Council, the lobby organisations follow a bottom-up approach, lobbying through their national officials. (see 3.3.3). Specifically, DAFC is a member of the Paragraph 2 committee, “*(...) which is a committee that is heard every time there is a case that is up at the ministerial meeting and then we get the opportunity, typically one written consultation response, where we announce our position on this proposal which is underway*”. Subsequently after these meetings, it is however only the officials of the ministry who solely present a position to the Food Committee in the Danish Parliament, who discuss the presented proposal and bring that position to Brussels and discuss the matter in the European Council. DAFC do have a permanent link to the European Council through the Danish ministerial officials, but only in a formal and very rule strict manner.

When DAFC was questioned how they promote their interests in the EU institutions, beside mentioning the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, MSØ pointed to, that their cooperation as being a member of Copa & Cogeca is an important part of how they promote their interests in the EU institutions. Therefore, will this part also be examined. The reasoning behind, given by MSØ, for why being a member of Copa & Cogeca is important is, that, “(...) *if what they think also reflects our position, then you are much stronger than if it is just ourselves that goes around and thinks something.*” This is a quite common procedure of lobbyism in the EU institutions, to join up with “sister organisations” in a common pan-European organisation, to gain strength, power through the improved network as a pan-European organisation have given to a national member organisation. For DAFC it is important when dealing with Copa & Cogeca to “(...) *make them aware of what we mean and hopefully they take in some of our positions we have into their policies as well.*”. In that way, one could say, that DAFC tries to lobby their pan-European partner into align with their own opinion. Greenwood argues, that large national organisations, cannot afford not to be present in Brussels, since the majority of EU legislation is created there. Not being present could mean that DAFC would lose its ability to have influence outside of Denmark, and it could also mean that they might have greater difficulty in having their influence heard inside of Denmark, both in terms of lines of actions and the loss of image of professionalism (Greenwood, 2007, page 129) The specific lobby actions made by DAFC in Copa & Cogeca happens in the working groups, which Copa & Cogeca hold, where DAFC tries to convince the other national members to adopt a common position including as much of the opinions, that is in the interest of DAFC. Perhaps a commonly overlooked and neglected aspect of lobbying and gaining in the pan-European organisations, henceforth the EU institutions, is the fact, that becoming a part of the presidency of either the whole pan-European organisations or at least a part of the presidency of a working groups can be considered as a part of a lobby strategy by a lobby organisations which also do relate to the influence that specific national member can get. This has been a specific lobby strategy by DAFC in which MSØ is a part of the presidency of the working group of “Direct Payment Agreement”, which works with EU’s agricultural policy, for Copa & Cogeca. In terms of the influential aspect of this strategy see section 4.2.

In terms of whether MSØ would describe their contact and lobby actions towards the various EU institutions as formal or informal, she indicated, that they do use both formal and informal lobbyism, but did however indicate, that they are dependent on each other, that “*one can say that sending papers to them [formal lobbyism] is typically something we have done in when we*

have had direct contact with them [informal lobbying].” When MSØ was asked “How often did you meet with these institutions?” she responded, that “It can, of course, fluctuate very decisively depending on where you are in the political process.”. When this is read with the theoretical knowledge included in this thesis, this clearly points to, that the theory of policy cycle is present in the EU and that the lobby organisations are aware of this. This answer resonates well with the theory of Dionigi. Here it was described, that for a lobby organisation to be properly successful, it needs to be able to navigate in both formal and informal lobbying (Dionigi, 2017. Page 22)

When asked, how DAFC “Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agricultural Policy?” MSØ responded “Yes, we were very much, Partly through Civil Dialogue Groups, partly through... There were also some hearings that I remember - formal hearings”. MSØ only mention interaction with the Commission in the feedback process, which makes sense it is the Commission who has the right of initiative and therefore the primary institutions to collect feedback to potential further improvement of their legislations. The specific lobby action from DAFC in the feedback process has, beside participation in these mentioned meetings, to form position papers on the topic, which they could lobby to the Commission.

In the agenda-setting process MSØ responded “Yes, absolutely. We were.” In this process MSØ focuses on, that “(...) Denmark is a small country and therefore the chance for some of us is to be early out - produce some ideas - so we were out early with policy development in the Danish Agriculture and Food Council. In the mind of DAFC agenda-setting and policy formulation is connected, that to be able to set the agenda, one need a policy formulation to lobby with, a discourse one could say. The interesting point is that due to the size of Denmark DAFC find it more necessary to be an early bird to be able to gain influence. This policy formulation was the basis for their early lobby actions both in the Commission and in Copa & Cogeca.

In terms of the decision-making process MSØ mentioned lobby actions in the European Parliament, how they formulate amendments to the MEP’s. This stage of the policy cycle seems like from the aspect of DAFC as a separate stage compared to the rest, which appear after the Commission has presented a proposal and why lobbying in the European Parliament becomes more relevant, than in the Commission.

Lastly, when MSØ was asked “Did you have a lobby action strategy?”, she replied, that they “Yes, you can say that we have, but it is not written down” and added, that it follows the natural policy phases, which they have to be a subject to. The lobby organisations have to work within the political and bureaucratic timing in the policy cycle in the EU and do not have any control of ‘when’ in this matter. In regard a specific goal for a lobby action strategy she only added, that the CAP 2020 should focus on improving “ECO-Schemes,”

4.1.2 Danish Society for Nature Conservation: Jens La Cour (Appendix B)

As with DAFC, to understand the lobby actions made by DSNC, one has to examine how they have produced their interests, i.e. their goal, that they want to achieve. The first thing Jens La Cour (JLC) mentioned, when asked the question “*How did you set up your interests?*” was, that “*We are a member of EEB, which is the largest green umbrella organization in the EU.*” and that DSNC in collaboration with EEB investigated, what the main priorities in the CAP 2020 was. In addition to the collaboration with EEB, DSNC also investigated the essence of the Danish challenges in relation to the CAP, from the perspective of DSNC. Here it is important to note, that DSNC is an association, which includes them having local departments, which is run by volunteers, and that it is the main board, which consists of democratic elected members of the organisations, who direct the course of directions for the DSNC.

“So it is the way we look at it, what is our interests in relation to the CAP, and then we look at it together with our EEB colleagues who collect conclusions throughout the EU, on what the main priorities can be, and then we also look on whether there are any special Danish conditions that we must be aware of.”

From the quote it seems like, that the collaborate between DSNC and EEB is somewhat different from how the DAFC collaborate with Copa & Cogeca, in the sense that, that the collaboration between DSNC and EEB seems closer, in terms of how they develop a position. The position of DSNC is adopted by the EEB, which to a greater extent collect information from the national members i.e. DSNC, and then incorporate any special Danish conditions, if they appear, into the common position of EEB. In contrast to this, does it seem like that the DAFC focus more on lobby actions towards Copa & Cogeca, to influence their position, than it is Copa & Cogeca who actively seeks information from the DAFC. The collaborate between the Danish lobby organisations and the pan-European ones will be elaborated furtherly throughout

this section and the following section of the chapter in terms of influence (see 4.2). An interesting note is, however, that JLC points out, that they find lobbying on agriculture from the perspective of a Danish environmental lobby organisations especially difficult, due to that Denmark, “*have very intensive agriculture*”, which is indicated in the introduction of this thesis (see 1.1.1.)

When JLC was asked to describe their working process with the CAP, he responded, that “*We were active the last time there was this CAP, and we made some consultations in Denmark, prior to the last CAP*” which they did both in collaboration with the EEB and other environmental organizations in Denmark. Specifically JLC mentioned, that DSNC participated in two ‘rounds’ of meeting concerning the CAP, one was a in midterm review made by the European Commission, and the another a consultation also in the Commission “*(...) in relation to the mid-term review and consultation up to the upcoming CAP, we have talked to our European network, about what our priorities are.*”. In terms of priorities JLC mentioned ‘greening’, just like MSØ from DAFC did. However, JLC stated that this initiative which unfortunately became thoroughly watered down, clearly not excited about the result.

Now that it is clear, how the DSNC set up their interests, the next step is to analyse, how they promote these interests in the different EU institutions. To the question “*How did you promote your interests in the European Parliament?*” JLC replied, that “*This time we have not talked much with Danish MEPs, mainly because there are few of those who are interested in the CAP.*” and furtherly adding, that “*EEB has contact with some of the key players in this context. So, it is primarily through EEB our contact with the EP lies.*” This is an interesting aspect of the lobby actions made by the DSNC especially compared to that of DAFC. From what JLC explain, the DNSC only lobby in the parliament, when there are relevant Danish MEP’s interested in subject matter. In any other case, all lobby action in the European Parliament happens through EEB. When comparing to DAFC, who regularly have direct formal and informal meetings with the EP, who provide background knowledge to the EP and help the MEPs formulate amendments, the difference in amount of lobby actions between the DSNC and DAFC in the EP seems significant. Noted, that the DAFC in fact has an office in Brussels, where DSNC have not, do play a significant role in this matter (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23). Another interesting aspect of this is, that DSNC doesn’t mention the secretariat for Agriculture and Rural Development (COM-AGRI) as a possible connect to the EP, when there in the perspective of DSNC is no relevant Danish MEPs on the CAP. NB: that COM-AGRI do have two Danish MEPs,

Jørn Dohrmann and Jens Rohde, but since either of these were willing to participate in this thesis, we cannot investigate, whether they do have interest in the CAP 2020 or not.

When asked, how DSNC promote their interests in the European Commission, JLC said, that *“we have participated in the consultations that are in place and the EEB also have contacts to the Commission, DG-AGRI and DG-Environment.”*. This answer does also indicate, that DSNC only makes use of formal lobbyism in the Commission and let the EEB do all of the informal lobbyism, together with the contact to both DG-AGRI and DG-Environment. The outcome is the same, when asked about the Council, where JLC said, that *“Together with the EEB, we have contributed to writing a number of letters to the European Council when they have been negotiating the matter.”*. It would seem like, that the DSNC mostly or solely use formal lobbyism, and extraordinarily little or non-informal lobbyism, and that the EEB actually do most of the formal lobbying for DSNC.

When asked, if JLC would consider, that they mostly use formal lobbyism, he agreed and said, *“It is very formal lobbying we use.”* which is furtherly underlined, when asked, how often DSNC meet with the EU institutions and JLC reply *“In relation to EU institutions, we have almost never met with any of them, for that we have EEB, who has an office in Brussels.”*. The lack of physical presence has a direct link to the amount of face-to-face meeting with the decision-makers in the EU. When talking about formal lobbyism JLC added *“We obviously have better contact with the Danish ministries, but it is a very formal entrance.”* When compared to, what the MSØ from DAFC said, that informal lobbyism is needed, to be able to do proper formal lobbyism, this will make an interesting point, when later analysing the influence of DAFC and DSNC. In relation to theory, two points are worth mentioning. One point being, that both that informal and formal lobbyism is crucial factors for a good lobby strategy, and another point being, that in terms of access to the Council, the best approach is trough national ministries (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23; Greenwood, 1996, p 31)

When asked further into the lobby actions in the Council, on a national level, JLC added, that *“We have a dialogue to the extent possible. It has previously been easier.”* and that DSNC, like DAFC, have a seat in the Paragraph 2 committee. Here DSNC and DAFC have the same level of entry, but interestingly do DSNC point to, that it is formal entry and that it has become more difficult to gain access, to lobby in the Council, through being seated in the Paragraph 2 committee.

When JLC was asked *“Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?”*, he replied with mentioning the midterm-reviews in the Commission, where DSNC have participated, presented their position and raised their concern, but as was the case of DAFC, who actively sent out a position paper on their own, it doesn't seem to be the case of DSNC. When asked about the agenda-setting process, JLC said *“It is the EEB who has done this. They have held some conferences”*. Interestingly enough does DSNC not participate in the agenda-setting process in the EU and more noteworthy was, that JLC furtherly added, that *“When we are in the work with the Commission and EP, it is EEB that is working for us on the CAP.”* Making it clear, that beside participating in the feedback process in terms of formal meetings in the Commission and lobbying the Council through the national ministry, the EEB does every other lobby actions for the DSNC. Furtherly, JLC adds, that *“We do not write anything that is contrary to the EEB”*. This will be further discussed in section 4.3, how choosing this lobby strategy affect the influence that the DSNC has in the EU institutions.

Lastly, when JLC was asked *“Did you have a lobby action strategy?”*, he replied by saying *“Both yes and no, understood in the way that in relation to ourselves there we have a timeline that we are working on when something happens to the CAP.”*. This answer is remarkably similar to the one MSØ from DAFC gave, that the lobby organizations does not have a specific written strategy, both is subject to the natural policy cycle in the EU, which they have to follow and obey. More specific, DSNC look at, where they think, that they can get influence, and asses, how many resources they have to spend, in order to get the wanted amount of influence. In relations to their specific goals on their lobby actions, JLC points to both ‘Crop rotation’ that which involves that you change up the type of crops instead of growing the same crop all the time and more focus on ‘greening’ and not using funds dedicated to rural development on farmer support. These are some of the goals, which DSNC try to promote in EEB's positions and in mid-term review and Consultation from the Commission.

4.1.3 Sub conclusion

This sub conclusion sums up the analysis of the sub-question 1) *“How does the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC lobby in the EU institutions?”*. DAFC and DSNC are remarkably similar in terms of the structure of their organisations, both having members that elect a board, that then layout the general direction and or position. The only difference being, that DAFC is business oriented, whereas DSNC is not, being a non-profit organisation. Both DAFC

and DSNC started their lobby actions by forming their positions, investigating their main priorities on the CAP 2020, asking their members for inputs and opinions, so that the board of the organisations can form a position. They do however differ in that sense, that DSNC to a higher degree forms their position in cooperation with their pan-European organisation. The difference between how DAFC and DSNC lobby in the EU institutions mainly relate to how they cooperate with their pan-European organisations. DAFC lobby in the EP by regularly holding meetings with the parliamentarians, where they help formulate amendments where DSNC in contrast does not lobby directly in the EP but do through their cooperation with the EEB. In terms of the Commissions they both are either directly or indirectly represented through the Civil Dialogue Groups meetings, where DAFC however have the more direct contact to the DG-AGRI. In terms of the Council DAFC and DSNC follow the same approach by both being a member of the Paragraph 2 committee, DSNC does however argue that they have had more difficulties when it comes to getting their positions presented in the Danish ministries, in the new negotiations, than they had in the previous CAP reform. At the same time, DSNC believes that DAFC have easier access to the ministry.

In terms of lobby strategy both DAFC and DSNC say, that they do not follow a specific written lobby strategy but follows the policy cycle which is present in the legislative system in the EU. When comparing DAFC and DSNC the physical presence seems to largely influence how they lobby in the EU, face-to-face meetings, informal meetings etc (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23). DSNC are far more national orientated than DAFC. Having physical presence in Brussels does costs a lot of resources and one could argue, that you need money and resources to be able to conduct informal lobbyism in the EU.

4.2 The Pan-European Organisations

The function this section of the analysis is, through the use of process tracing (see 2.3), to answer the sub-question " *Are the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC able to influence their pan-European organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB?*". The aim of this section is to analyse the lobby actions made by Copa & Cogeca and EEB in the EU institutions and relate them to the lobby actions made by the two Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC, to see, if they have had any influence on the actions made by their pan-European organisations. By defining the lobby actions made by Copa & Cogeca and EEB it enables the possibility to investigate whether these actions have influence, in the EU institution (see 4.3), and whether DAFC and DSNC have any part of these lobby actions. The structural approach

of this section is divided into two parts, which respectively introduce each of the two pan-European lobby organisations separately. This section will be concluded with a comparison between the two pan-European lobby organisations.

4.2.1 Copa & Cogeca: Paulo Gouveia (Appendix C)

To be able to investigate the process behind Copa & Cogeca's lobby actions on the CAP 2020, it is necessary to examine how they have come up with their interests. When Paulo Gouveia (PG) was asked "*How did you set up your interests?*", he replied by saying, that this question is pretty straight forward. He said, that "*we started a discussion with our member in the context of working groups that are focusing on specific issues and we have one working group that focuses on the CAP.*". Copa & Cogeca does in this way work in a remarkably comparable manner to DAFC, following a typical member organisations structural approach, asking its members for opinions, gather this opinion, to create a mutual understanding. Where Copa & Cogeca and DAFC do differ is the type of members, which they have. The members of Copa & Cogeca is ultimately the farmers and producers, but firstly it is the individual national farmer organisations, who are the members of Copa & Cogeca, whereas the members of DAFC directly is the farmers and farmers associations. Furtherly, PG adds, that "*So, as soon as, we started hearing the Commissions idea about the future CAP, we started organizing meeting and discussions with our members and we organized quite a number of meetings with our members, where we discussed things.*". This do both point to the fact, that Copa & Cogeca is earlier out in terms of their lobby actions, and it does also point to, that the position made by the DAFC is at least heard by Copa & Cogeca. If DAFC had influence in this matter will be elaborated furtherly upon. PG explains, that they also invite officials from the Commissions, and asks them to "*(...) present and explain word for word what their ideas is and then we try to come up to a common understanding of what we think.*". Once Copa & Cogeca have asked its members for their opinions and held informational meetings with the Commissions, they present a document to the presidency of their members, which contains the general opinion of all of the member organisations and if the presidency agrees, then Copa & Cogeca "*have what we call a position and on the basis of that position we start our lobby actions.*". Summon up, Copa & Cogeca set up their interests just as DAFC do, asking for opinions by its members, which the presidency decide upon. Copa & Cogeca invites the Commission to present their proposals before formulating a position, and when the final position is ready, they are able to start their lobby actions.

When PG was asked, “*How did you promote your interests in the different institutions? Like the Parliament? The Commission? And the Council?*” the answered, that he gave, indicate, that there is clear direct path of approach from setting up the interests of Copa & Cogeca and how to promote these interests. PG replied, that:

“As soon as we have a position and during the course of this discussion that is so far, we have adopted, meaning our presidency, have adopted three positions, which are gradually more detailed as soon as we have a better understanding of things then we can continue to discuss internally and then agree on something more detailed. When we have these positions we basically go to the Commission, to the Council, to the European Parliament and we talk to those who are responsible and present our idea.”

Besides there being a clear direct path of approach from setting up the interests of Copa & Cogeca and how they do their lobby actions, it is also noteworthy, that for Copa & Cogeca a positions, or in this instance three positions, is fundamentally important for the lobby actions in the EU institutions, i.e. having a specific written positions to lobby upon rather than lobby on a broader direction or subject, as it seemed in the case of DSNC. That Copa & Cogeca aims their lobby actions towards all of the EU political institutions, seems a bit contradictory with some of the theory, that is being used in this thesis. Greenwood argues that a lobby organisation, should know its limits, if they are to build up a successful network and reputation in the institutions. In that perspective, Copa & Cogeca might be “putting more in their mouth than they can chew”, and thereby end up damaging their own reputation, and ability to conduct lobby actions in the future. (Greenwood, 2007. Page 6)

When it comes to promoting the interests of Copa & Cogeca PG also mentioned, that Copa & Cogeca do not do this all alone by themselves. He mentioned specifically, that when it comes for an instance to the Council, Copa & Cogeca coordinate with their member originations, so that they can also lobby their positions through both their permanent representations and their national parliaments. The fact, that Copa & Cogeca lobby through their members organisations, when it comes to the Council do both align with, what MSØ from DAFC said, when describing how they lobby the Council and align with the theory of lobby organisations lobby in the Council not directly but through the national parliaments and ministries. Interestingly does this not only apply to the national lobby organizations, but also, at least to one, pan-European lobby organizations. This lobby action strategy does create a dependency between the pan-European

lobby organisations and the national member, i.e. Copa & Cogeca is dependent on DAFC to lobby in the Danish parliament to gain influence on the Council. The questions, which still remains is, whether they do have influence in the Council and whether the DAFC have had any influence in the positions which they then promote in the Danish ministries. PG says, that *“For instance, in the case of Denmark, we coordinate with our Danish members, the Danish Agricultural and Food Council, and they also know what to go to the Danish Permanent Representation and what to say and what argument to present in regard to the position.* He says that the lobby actions made by Copa & Cogeca is not an individual work made by Copa & Cogeca, but it is made by coordinated work between Copa & Cogeca and all of their members. When it comes to the Parliament PG adds, that Copa & Cogeca *“(…) takes the lead when it comes to the top of them who is in charge of the European Parliament”*. The fact, that Copa & Cogeca takes the lead, when the case is to lobby the top politicians and officials of the Parliaments, align with the hierarchy, that both MSØ from DAFC and JLC from DSNC mentioned, that when it comes to lobbyism in the top of the EU institutions *“it requires more stars on the shoulders”*, as JLC said. PG added, that Copa & Cogeca will continue their current strategy of how to lobby in the EP up until the election *“then the work will continue, and we will see who will have the lead. It will, of course, be the plenary in the record to the rule of procedure, but the details of exactly who has it then we will adjust focus and power of strategy”*. The fact, that Copa & Cogeca as a pan-European lobby organization focuses on the top of the EP match the theory of lobbying in the EP, that pan-European lobby organisations focuses more on e.g. the rapporteur, whereas the national members focus on MEP’s from their own member states.

When PG was asked *“How did you promote your interests in the Commission?”* he firstly mentioned the Civil Dialogue Groups set up by DG-AGRI. He said that the purpose of these Civil Dialogue Groups is to discuss the actuality of the political matter, for the civil society to come with their input to the agenda. An important notice is that PG makes it clear that the Civil Dialogue Groups *“It is not a decision-making body. It is a body made by the Commission for listening to, what the civil society thinks.”* making it clear, that does not directly decide on the political matter, but it is a way to influence or at least make the Commission aware of the positions of the lobby organisations. PG also mentioned in terms of promoting their interests in the Commissions, that the *“The Commission is the one that has the right of legal initiative, so any text that is tabled and prepared by the European Commission, so the beginning of our lobby activity starts with the Commissions, because the best is to start talking to them and convincing of what we think is the best route even before they start writing something.* That the

Commission is the first EU institutions, where the lobby organisations seeks to gain influence is now both evident in the cases of Copa & Cogeca, DAFC and DSNC and is likely also to be the case for EEB (see 4.2.2), which would follow the theory of how the policy cycle functions on the EU policy level (see 3.2.1).

When PG was asked “*Would you describe your contact with these institutions as formal or informal?*” he said, that you have both formal and informal as a part of your lobbyism. “*There are moments for which the formal is necessary. There are other moments where more informal contact is preferred.*” What was interesting in his reply to this question was, that PG said, that behind all contact is ‘*network*’ and that need to have your own network in Brussels, meaning, that you know people that you can contact. He added have it is “*Because you don’t lobby over the phone. You need to be able to meet face-to-face and basically see the body language of the other person, because you need to be trustworthy. It is about interpersonal relationship. It is not only about the political content of messages that you transmit, it is about you relate to other people.*”, meaning, that lobbyism needs to be done face-to-face, that it is not about the political content, but about interpersonal relationships. Dionigi also puts significant importance on the creation and maintaining of networks, stating that these are crucial to any lobby organisation, that wishes to be successful. (Dionigi, 2017. Page 21) This is a remarkably interesting statement to give. It would inter alia imply, that ‘*influence*’ on the CAP 2020 would not rely on the political content, whether you are being an agricultural or an environmental lobby organization, but the level of skill of the lobbyists. It would also imply, that DSNC would not have any influence on CAP 2020 if not for the EEB, where it is still not clear, whether they have influence through or not.

When PG was asked “*Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?*” he replied that there process was all about gathering the opinion of their 76 members, creating a positions that unites everybody, so that they could extract a common position, and then you could start communicate that positions, the feedback to the old CAP, to the Commissions. Likewise, with the other interviews with the lobby organizations, Copa & Cogeca only mentions the Commissions in relation to the feedback process, which makes sense due to their role in the political cycles in the EU.

In terms of the *agenda-setting process* PG mentioned, that “(...) *one of the basic rules of lobbying is to be attentive to policy development and to be able to identify as soon as possible of what is coming up in term of the political agenda*” and that Copa & Cogeca had a specific focus on the CAP 2020 to be prepared with positions, so they have something to say on the get go, as soon as the Commissions made a proposal. He added, that “*When you have something to say immediately from the get go, you have a better chance of influencing or at least striving it away from the wrong direction.*” and also implying, that by the *agenda-setting process* and the *policy formulation process* is connection in terms of their lobby actions approach.

To the question “*Did you have a lobby action strategy?*” PG started by saying, that having a position “(...) *is not the end. It is the end of the beginning.*” When Copa & Cogeca have made up their interests PG said “*After that, you need to discuss and decided with your members again, about WHAT you are going to, WHEN you are going to do it and TO WHOM you are going to talk to, to make sure that you try to convince those who takes the decisions and to go into the direction, that you want.*” To this matter PG did not specified a written plan but do refer to. It is however necessary to note, this answer could also partly refer to, what both MSØ and JLC said in regard to the natural policy cycle, which is a general recurring response to having a lobby action strategy. When asked “*Was there a specific institution where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*” PG said, that “*it is always difficult to say, because... It depends a lot on which state the legislative proposal is on.*” and boiled it down to, that “*the earlier you can say something, the easier it is to get influence*”. He did however briefly mention, that “*Something it is easier to get through the European Parliament*”, which could indicate, that from the perspective of Copa & Cogeca, they find themselves more influential in the EP than the rest of the EU institutions. Coen and Richardson give a similar description of the EP, stating that it is often more open, and the MEPs are open towards the lobby organisations and their inputs. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 52)

To partly answer the sub-question “*Are the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC able to influence their pan-European organisations, Copa Cogeca and EEB?*”, do DAFC have any influence on Copa & Cogeca? According MSØ from DAFC, she pointed to, that their cooperation as being a member of Copa & Cogeca is an important part of how they promote their interests in the EU institutions. She argued, that if Copa & Cogeca agrees with DAFC, then they would ‘be stronger’ and therefore more influential. When phrasing it in this manner, it

does however also indicate, that it is not given, that DAFC and Copa & Cogeca agrees, meaning, that DAFC are at least not able to absolutely direct the position of Copa & Cogeca. MSØ said “(...) *make them aware of what we mean and hopefully they take in some of our positions we have into their policies as well.*”. Still phrasing it, so that they hopefully can influence Copa & Cogeca to include their opinion. MSØ is a part of the presidency of the working group of ”Direct Payment Agreement”, which works with EU’s agricultural policy, for Copa & Cogeca, which do indicate, that they have influence and combined with the answers from PG of Copa & Cogeca, saying, that they asks their members for opinion, and they need DAFC to lobby through the Council, DAFC do indeed have some influence in Copa & Cogeca. Since this thesis does not ‘measure’ influence, it is difficult to say, how much influence they got. What can only be said is, that DAFC do influence Copa & Cogeca, but it is not a matter of course, they do actively lobby Copa & Cogeca to gain influence and seen from the perspective, that Copa & Cogeca have 76 members with different opinions, the chance of getting the maximal influence seems smaller.

4.2.2 The European Environmental Bureau: Bérénice Dupeux (Appendix D)

Similar to the other lobby organisations this sub-section investigates the process behind EEB’s lobby actions on the CAP 2020 and in relations to this, it is necessary to examining how they have produced their interests. When Bérénice Dupeux (BD) was asked “*How did you set up your interests?*”, she replied similar to the rest of the lobby organisations, that they are a membership organization, that both have national members and regional members. “*So, we have working groups. Not every member is interested in every issue. Some members, for instance, are more interested in agriculture than others. So those ones are very active, and we organize working groups and in between working groups we have tasks force to facilitate the exchange of information and to come up with the position.*” This approach acts remarkably similar to Copa & Cogeca, but does however differ a bit, since Copa & Cogeca’s members all are active and interested in agriculture, and since EEB focuses on a broader environmental perspective, it does not necessarily include agriculture. The overall approach is however the same. In terms EEB’s working process with the CAP 2020, BD said, that they made a position based on the first document that was communicated from the Commission on the future CAP. BD added, that “*There is another document, where I drafted, let’s say, our position and then circulated it our members, who reacted to it and then we discussed it during our working group and then we establish our position.*” This approach do somewhat seems to have a lot of member included in the establishment of the positions of the EEB, especially when BD adds to the subject that

“It is also based on our members experiences that they have faced on the field and on the past implementation of the CAP.” directly saying, that the members of EEB is heard and directly included in their position.

When BD was asked, *“How did you promote your interests in the different institutions?”* she said, that:

“So, basically what we do, is that we have regular meetings with the MEPs and the Commission and all of the permanent representations. We also have our members, who actually have meeting with the MEPs in their constitutions back home in their own country and also, they try to influence their own national government. So, this is how to proceed. We try to have a multi-layer strategy. We coordinate EEB at the EU-level with the MEP and the Commission, while the members to it at a national level and then we share information.”

This fairly lengthy quote is included, because it captures, fairly short, the essence of how EEB promote their interests in the EU institutions. The EEB focuses on the MEPs in the EP and the Commissions, excluding the Council at an EU-level, which align with the theory of lobbying the EU institutions (see 3.3). Dividing up the EU institutions, in those were the important actors are in Brussels, Commission and EP, and those that functions in the national states (the Council), is similar to the understanding of how to lobby in the EU, that Coen and Richardson set up. They place get importance on the fact that the Commission and EP should be lobbied in Brussels, while the Council is best approached from the national level. (Coen and Richardson, 2009, page 79) The Council is a fairly closed institutions, discussing behind closed doors, which is why the focus is on the Commission and the EP. This quote does also explain, that EEB do have lobby action strategy, a multi-layer strategy, which also include the actions of its members. The members of EEB, similar to the case of Copa & Cogeca, lobby their national governments and their national MEPs, which is the same approach, which PD from Copa & Cogeca described. In general, at lobby actions strategy, which requires the help and actions of the members of EEB. When asked *“How often did you meet with these institutions?”*, she said, *“This really depends on the political timeline.”* referring to, the natural policy cycle and elaborating, that *“because it is a Commission initiative so let’s say, maybe twice a month we meet with the Commission at least, at the beginning of the reform.”* and later in the cycle, when the Commission's proposal went to the EP *“then it was very intense for instance for the new parliament to set up a position, so they had 6 months to set up a position, which is really, really*

short. So, basically, we had several meetings a week with assistants of MEPs, most of the time.”. This is interesting, compared to the number of meetings, or the actual the absence of meetings from the DSNC, that the EEB have had a lot of meetings with the EU institutions, and that the number of meetings reflect, that difference between the Commission and the EP as an institution. Whereas the Commission held mainly formal meetings, not neglecting the informal lobbyism part in the Commissions, where it seems that the EP is more open for meetings, which could indicate that the EP is more fractured in terms of its decisions-makers in terms of the MEPs. BD also said, like Copa & Cogeca, that they do both informal and formal lobby work, which indicate, that even though DSNC only do formal lobbyism, could their positions be lobbied by the EEB with informal lobbyism.

When BD was asked how the EEB have worked with the CAP 2020, related to the policy cycle, some fairly interesting replies were made. Firstly, in terms of the *feedback process* she said, that “*Actually, by law, the Commission actually have to do an impact assessment of the current CAP, which they didn't, but if you go to the EEB-website we actually have provided an impact assessment done by scientists on the current agricultural policy, so we did, yes.*” Which clearly shows, that the EEB have played a part in the *feedback process* and uses this impact assessment as a lobbying tool for the CAP 2020, which they could use for formal lobbying in the Commission. Greenwood mentions, that it is important for a lobby organisation to know what it is capable of doing, so that it does not overextend itself. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 6) EEB shows here, that they know their own limits. In terms of the *agenda-setting process* BD said, that “*We tried to influence the priorities, of course. We tried. It doesn't mean, that we did... there is different consultations done formally by the Commission. We systematically replayed to those and informally we tried to influence it of course.*”. This quote is interesting, due to the fact, that BD specific mention, that they use both formal and informal lobbyism in the Commission in the *agenda-setting process* and that they tried to again influence, which an emphasize on tried. In this time of matter, it is difficult to know if there is a causality between the lobby organisations, which is included in this thesis, and the work of other NGOs. In BD was waked in terms of the *policy formulations process* she said, that their narrative in some of general positions, concerning to modernise approaches in the agricultural sectors have been taken up for the CAP 2020 proposal. When asked with the EEB had participated in the *decision-making process* BD mention their work in the EP and with the MEPs but also added, “*So, it is difficult to say, if it is due to our work or if the MEP had already decided on going in this*

direction.”, that it is difficult to measure their actions. This is also why this thesis do not quantitative measure influence.

When BD was asked “*Did you have a lobby action strategy?*” and “*What was the goal of your lobby action strategy?*” she replied, that “*Our goal is to maximize influence on decision-makers and the willingness for them to take our position.*”, which besides being a very broad goal of a lobby action strategy, which does not tell anything specific, it does however works very similar to the definition of influence in this thesis. So much so, it the reply of BD to arguably be translated into ‘influence’. We asked BD to specify the goal of their lobby actions strategy, she said “*It is difficult to say now, because we are in the middle of the road now, and that it is very strategical, and because we are in the middle of that, I would like to keep that information for myself.*” As BD previously referred to the natural political cycle in the EU institutions, her response to lobby actions strategy is similar to the other lobby organisations.

4.2.3 Sub conclusion

This sub conclusion sums up the analysis of the sub-question 2) “*Are the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC able to influence their pan-European organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB?*”. Copa & Cogeca and EEB are structurally similar organisations, both of them being membership organisations that have both have national and regional members. This means, that both organisations discuss their positions with their members, include their opinions and positions. The only difference being, that EEB focuses on a broader environmental perspective, which does not necessarily include agriculture, and therefore not the interests of every member organisations of the EEB, as the case of Copa & Cogeca. In the case of Copa & Cogeca, Paulo Gouveia, explicitly mentioned that they coordinate with DAFC and is dependent of their work. When it comes to the national level, the Council, both Copa & Cogeca and EEB, rely on their member organisations. Since the Council is notorious for being a closed institution, where it is hard to reach both officials and politicians. This however is not the case, when approached from the national level. Here the Council is significant easier to access, especially for national organisations, such as DAFC and DSNC. The pan-European lobby organisations also dependent on their members to reach out to the MEPs from their countries, since they are believed to have easier access to their countrymen. DSNC did however point out, that they had not been successful when talking to the Danish MEPs, since these had shown little interest in the positions of DSNC.

With the information collected through the interviews, it could be argued that DSNC is more dependent on EEB, than DAFC is on Copa & Cogeca. DSNC needs EEB to carry its voice and positions in the Commission and in the EP. DSNC also lack a physical presence in Brussels, something that according to Dionigi is particularly important to maintain a network in Brussels (Dionigi, 2017, pp. 22-23). DAFC however does have their own office in Brussels, which means, that they are less dependent on Copa & Cogeca to carry out their lobby actions in the EU institutions.

4.3 Influence in the EU institutions

The function of this section of the analysis is, through the use of process tracing, counterfactual analysis, perceived and attained influence (see 2.3), to answer “*Does the lobby actions made by the pan-European lobby organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB, have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions?*”. By analysing, whether the lobby actions made by Copa & Cogeca and EEB have influence in the EU institutions, it establishes the missing link between the Danish lobby organisations and the EU institutions. Since both DAFC and DSNC cooperate and lobby partly or fully through their pan-European organisations, their influence could be related directly to the influence of the Danish lobby organisations. The structural approach of this section is divided into three parts, which respectively introduce each of the three EU institutions separately. This section will be concluded with an analysis and a discussion, whether Copa & Cogeca and the EEB have had influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions and how that influence may relate back to DAFC and DSNC.

4.3.1 The European Parliament: Felix Mittermayer (Appendix E)

For the interview with the EP, an official named Felix Mittermayer agreed to participate. It was however to be pointed out, that Felix as an official working in the EP, would only be able to give out his own opinion, not that of the EP. In this thesis, it was decided that it would be best to have an official from the EP be the interviewee, since none of the MEPs were able to participate. An official however should still be able to explain how the lobby organisations have been conducting their work towards the EP and the MEPs, since the great focus on transparency in the EP, requires the MEPs and the lobby organisations to let it be known when they have meetings. Greenwood adds that all committees in the EP, has their own secretariat that gives the MEPs support, and maintain and overview on what the committee is currently working on. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 43)

In relations to the EP's *political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy* Felix explained the procedure on how the EP works when dealing with a new policy reform. In November 2017, the Commission sent out a communication, wherein they presented the Commission's proposal for the CAP 2020 reform and then in June 2018 where the actual proposal was sent out to the EP and the Council. The EP presidency then assigned the relevant committees that would work with this policy, namely the AGRI (agriculture) committee and the ENVI (environmental) committee. While it is the AGRI committee that is the main one, ENVI has been giving shared competences, this was however only the case of the García report, since the CAP also have significant impact on the environment in the EU. The many different political areas that the CAP encompasses did, according to Felix, make it harder to find that committees should give opinions on the CAP, since there were a great many places where there was overlapping competences between committees.

The next part for the EP, on *how to pursue these interests*, was to select three rapporteurs, one for each of the reports, the shadows from the other political groups in the EP, and the rapporteurs from other committees, that would give opinions from those committees. According to Felix the EP and the MEPs were under great time pressure, since they only had a couple of months to complete the reports. Two workshops were organised in October 2018, where both experts and the EPs own research department, helped with information and data. Stakeholders were also able to attend the meetings, since all of the meetings in the EP are open to the public, as long as they are in the transparency register. These two workshops were the only two official organised events in the EP regarding the CAP 2020 reform. There was however also, according to Felix, several other meetings, that the MEPs and the political groups in the EP set up themselves. This was not only in the AGRI committee, but in all of the committees involved in the CAP, where they would invite both politicians and stakeholders. This was normal in the EP according to Felix.

On the 21st of November 2018, the reports were presented to the AGRI committee. After this the technical and shadow meetings would begin to take place.

When it comes to *the collaboration with stakeholders, how the EP perceive these inputs and whether these inputs change or add to the political interests of the EP*, Felix said, that the *stakeholders can have considerable influence in the EP*. Some stakeholders are able to get their

own amendments directly put forward by MEPs, that does not change anything about them. This gives the stakeholders an opportunity to directly influence the reports made by the EP. There was however also a significant difference in who the stakeholders aimed their lobby actions at. The non-business stakeholders, such as EEB, did not necessarily have contact with the same as Copa & Cogeca, likewise with their member organisations. Greenwood explains that it is the resource rich lobby organisations, that can have the greatest amount of impact when it comes to the EP, mainly since the MEPs does not have the time or resources to collect their own data, nor to conduct their own research. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 20) Since the MEPs often would be part of committees that they had some personal or political interest in, the committees might be filled up with MEPs that had similar mindsets, when it came to what kind of policies are needed. The stakeholders were, according to Felix, very much aware of the influence that they could have on policies in the EP.

When it comes to the counterfactual analysis of *“How might the outcome have been, if you weren’t approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations?”* Felix said, that without the stakeholders the reports from the EP would have been of a much lower quality. Felix stated that without the stakeholders, the reports would have had to be built upon the knowledge of the MEPs themselves, which would not have had been as board or insightful as that of the stakeholders. The MEPs needed the stakeholders, to know how the situation was in the member states. Being the elected representatives for 500 million people meant that you could not speak directly with them all, but had to make use of their other representatives, the stakeholders of the many different European interests. Just as Coen and Richardson stated that the Commission was dependent on the stakeholders to give them information and inputs, the same can be seen with the EP, like it has been explained by Felix. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 22-23)

When asked why some organisations, such as EEB and DSNC felt that they had more difficulties than organisations such as DAFC when it came to lobby in the EP, Felix stated that they all had used the same door to get in. Meaning that none of them were given an advantage from an institutional side, when it came to the EP. It was up to the lobby organisations themselves to present their viewpoints in a way, so that the MEPs would take them on. If one organisation was better than another one, then it was not the EP’s fault. Felix explained that while the smaller organisations, might not have the same resources as the big ones, they could still have a substantial impact in the EP, as long as they knew how and where to focus their attention. The

important thing for the EP as an institution, was that all of the meetings were transparent, and that the public could find out which organisations had visited the EP.

4.3.2 The European Commission: Iman Boot (Appendix F)

The interviewee from the Commission was Iman Boot, a senior expert in AGRI Info. Iman had been involved in the last three reforms of the CAP, and is working in the policy unite, a unit that focuses on developing new policies and understanding how the current policies work. Iman was the official behind the communication, from November 2017, that was sent out to the other EU institutions, which indicated what the Commission intended to do with the CAP reform. It was a formal document that was adopted by the Commission. It was also used to inform the stakeholders, as part of the policy process.

According to Iman, *the Commission interest for regarding the CAP*, was that it had to be simplified and more open for new elements that the Commission knew they would not have been able to implement into the current CAP. Iman brought up the subject of the greening initiatives of the current CAP, as an area where it had failed, since this proved to be un-understandable in the implementation stage.

When it comes to *pursuing these interests and the working process of the Commissions with the CAP*, the Commission is the first institution to start work, when it comes to policy reforms. Iman stated that the Commission let some of their ideas for the reform fly around in among the institutions and the stakeholders, so that the Commission can see how they react to these ideas. There was also a great deal of interaction with the other DGs in the Commission, mainly Environment and Climate, two separate DGs, that were also actively involved in the CAP reform, since it has a significant impact on their focus areas. Coen and Richardson also touch the subject, that the Commission should not be viewed as a single unite, but a more in the understanding of all the different DGs and commissioners having different goals and interests, that they attempt to achieve through their work. (Coen and Richardson, 2007. Page 23) Doing this *working process with the CAP*, Iman and his colleagues at DG AGRI gathered up the ideas, reactions, and inputs that they had received from both stakeholders and EU institutions, as well as the member states, and then created from this the communication that was sent out November 2017.

When asked, about *how was the collaboration with stakeholders was*, Iman stated that the Commission was dependent on the information, that they got from the stakeholders, since the Commission was not able to obtain all the needed information itself. One of the Commission goals was to have a clear understanding of what the stakeholders had in the term of interests regarding the new CAP reform. This information was according to Iman especially important for the Commission, even though the Commission might not always take these interests into account when they made their proposals, it was important that they knew what the stakeholders wanted. Coen and Richardson have the same understanding on how the relationship between the Commission and the stakeholders is. Both of them need each other. The Commission needs the stakeholders for their knowledge and to give themselves more legitimacy in their work. The stakeholders need to be able to show their members that they can influence the Commission, or at least try to influence it. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 22-23)

In terms of *how often the Commission meet with stakeholders*, Iman said, that there was *regular contact between the Commission and the stakeholders* involved in the CAP 2020 reforms. This was both in the form of the stakeholders sending papers to the Commission and requesting meetings with them, but it was also the Commission reaching out to the stakeholders, that they had not heard from, so that they could make sure, that all of the different stakeholders had been heard.

Most of the time however, it was the stakeholders that reached out to the Commission. Iman's own estimation was that *60-70 % of the time, it was stakeholders that took the initiative to contact the Commission*.

According to Iman *there was both formal and informal meetings taking place between the Commission and the stakeholders*. Among the formal meetings was the civil dialog groups, where all the stakeholders were placed together, so that some clarity on the various positions can be collected. The informal meetings take place on a more loose fashion, where it was often the stakeholders that reached out to the Commission, since they had information, ideas, or data that they wanted to share with the Commission. Furtherly, according to the former Danish commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Mariann Fischer Boel, was the lobby organisations considered great sources for information in regard the current situations in the member states, but the Commission always had to mind reasoning of why the lobby organisations provided them with these information (Appendix H).

There was regularly contact and meetings with Copa & Cogeca, but according to Iman the Commission was also extremely interested in meeting with the national member organisations of Copa & Cogeca. This was because Copa & Cogeca as an organization often had difficulties, according to Iman, when it came to formulate their points of view and goals. Because of the internal structure in Copa & Cogeca means that the organization often has to go for the lowest common denominator, which means that their standpoints often does not say much, about what their national members actually wish. So, the Commission has an interest in meeting with the national members of Copa & Cogeca, since they can give clear standpoints and often also better information, according to Iman. Furtherly, according to the former Danish commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Mariann Fischer Boel, did the internal structure of Copa & Cogeca, in her term of office, also exampfied the low unity and Copa & Cogeca's ability to create clear and progressive points, and potentially stunned their actions in the Commission (Appendix H).

With the EEB, the contact was somewhat different. According to Iman it was the Commission that had to ask the EEB for information and their interests regarding the CAP reform. Iman stated that the EEB was not a very outgoing organization, which was a shame since their data and information was something that the Commission found to be of high quality. Iman did however explain, that this might be because that the EEB went through a different DG in the Commission, such as Environment, when they wished to deliver their information and standpoints.

When Iman was asked, *how he perceived the inputs from the stakeholders*, he said, that in general, there had been appreciation for the inputs given to the Commission, these inputs did however differ in value. Iman described good, useful inputs, as being new information or data, that the Commission did not have before. Data on insects and biodiversity was brought up was an area where the Commission wished for more data. The inputs of less value were that which was more in the form of statements and positions. While being something that the Commission did not mind knowing, it was not information that they could build their proposal on.

To the question *Did their inputs change or add to your political interests*, Iman said, that the inputs given to the Commission from the stakeholders did, according to Iman, help change the

political interests of the Commission. Iman explained that the inputs given by the stakeholders, was especially helpful when it came to try to figure out what the EP and the Council might act.

Iman also added that in the political late stages of the policy circle, it was close to pointless for the lobbyist to try and influence the Commission, since the proposal would then already have been made. The lobby organisations would have fare greater success with their attempts in the earlier technical stages of the reform, then they would at the political stage, when it came to the Commission. Coen and Richardson also point out, the importance of “getting in on the groundwork”, since it should be easier to have influence on something, that has not yet been made. (Coen and Richardson, 2009. Page 25)

According to Iman, when asked the question *Did you inform the stakeholders/lobby organisations of your perceived view on the inputs that they gave you*, the professional lobby organisations are aware of the influence that they have on the EU institutions, not just the Commission. Iman listed three elements that a professional lobby organization need: 1) have the means to collect useful information and data, and the means to follow the political life inside the Commission. 2) they should know what the institutions, Commission, EP and Council, are working on as well as the member states themselves and 3) they should know what to say to the institutions, that being both with statements and when giving information to the institutions.

In the counterfactual analysis of *how might the outcome have been, if you weren't approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations*, Iman acknowledged that without the inputs from the stakeholders, the quality of the Commission's proposal would have had a lower quality, since the Commission did not have the same amount of knowledge as the stakeholders regarding the many areas that the CAP 2020 reform was relevant for.

4.3.3 The Council of European Union: Morten Holm-Hemmingsen (Appendix G)

Morten Holm-Hemmingsen, an official working in the Danish ministry for Environment and Food, was the interviewee for the questions to the Council. Morten worked on the CAP and is a negotiator for the Danish government in the Council.

When asked *what your political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy was*, Morten explained that as a representative of the Danish government in the negotiations on the CAP, it was the national interests of Denmark that he worked to promote. The Danish *political*

interests in regard to the CAP was, that it should have a greater focus on creating a competitive and sustainable agriculture sector in Europe. These priorities had to be in accordance with the interests of the Danish government and the Danish national parliament, since the government gets its mandate to negotiate in the EU, by the parliament. Since the ministry has to obtain a mandate from the national parliament before they can go to Brussels, there would already have been an opportunity for lobby organisations to have conducted lobby actions towards the officials and the Danish politicians.

In terms of how the Danish government *pursue their interests relation to the CAP*, Morten explained that the that since the Danish government is represented in the Council, one of their assignments is to find out if they can find create common positions with the EP, because since the CAP is under the co-legislation procedure, the Council and EP have close to the same amount of influence under this procedure. Being one of the negotiators representing the Danish government in the Council, Mortens role was to try and find common ground with other members of the Council. This was done through the participation in several forums, although mainly in what is called the special committee on agriculture. This committee's main responsibility is to prepare for the work in the Council, especially the cases and areas that involve the CAP. In this meeting there are also officials from the Commission present. (consilium.europa.eu) Besides the formal meetings, as the one that takes place in the special committee, there were also several informal meetings, according to Morten these meetings were with other member states where they would try to find and make alliances with other like-minded members of the Council.

The collaboration with stakeholders followed a certain protocol in the Danish government. This was mainly when it came to the formal level of lobbyism, which mostly took the form, of ministry organised meetings, where a wide variety of stakeholders was asked to attend and send in their positions and remarks on policies, in this case the CAP 2020 reform. With this information the ministry would then gather it into a sole document that the ministry then would be able to bring with them to the European Affairs Committee (Europa udvalget), a committee in the Danish parliament. There was also the paragraph 2 group, a forum where the ministry, invites different stakeholders, who are then given the opportunity to state their opinions and come with ideas for the CAP, what they understand and do not understand, both when it comes to the CAP itself, but also to what the position of other member states is.

Although Morten had not been attending more than a meeting every other month, a significant amount of contact had already taken place with the stakeholder, especially between experts that discussed specific items with the stakeholders. Morten stated that he expected that there would be greater intensity of meetings with the stakeholders, when the CAP would move forward in the negotiations.

According to Morten on *who took the initiative to make contact*, he said, that the contact was a two-way street, with both the ministry and the stakeholders seeking out the other party. There was however a tendency for the stakeholders, being the ones that took the most *initiative to contact the other party*, the ministry, since they would seek the ministry to deliver information and data.

According to Morten, the ministry *did not have contact with Copa & Cogeca or EEB*. Morten explained that it was though the Danish members of Copa & Cogeca and EEB, that the ministry was made aware of what these two pan-European organisations interests was. This fits rather well with Greenwood, who explained that the best way to lobby the Council was though the national route, (Greenwood, 1996, page 31) meaning that it would make little sense for example Copa & Cogeca or EEB to actively try to lobby the Danish ministries, since they do not have the same amount of knowledge or network with in Denmark, with the exception of their member organisation. Morten also said that it was to be expected that the Danish organisations would be in contact with the Danish government, and that the pan-European organisations, would maintain focus on the Commission and EP, since they are all based in Brussels. The procedures that the ministry has in Denmark, is something that a pan-European lobby organisation might not have been aware of, especially the part where their inputs, views and interest would be put into a document with the inputs from other organisations, some that might have significant different standpoints than them. Knowing how the system works is an especially important trait for a lobby organisation to have, according to Greenwood, lobby organisations have to know their limits. Therefore, a pan-European lobby organisation would delegate work in the Council to its national member, such as is the case for both Copa & Cogeca and EEB in this case. (Greenwood, 1996. Page 6) Dionigi also share some knowledge on this topic, in the form of the significant importance placed on networks and trust between lobby organisations and institutions and governments that they attempt to influence. Weak networks will mean that it is harder to find the right people to talk to, and weak trust might mean that those people could

be less favourable towards the inputs and information that they receive from the lobby organisation. (Dionigi 2017. Page 21)

Coen and Richardson also join in, stating that from an EU-level perspective, the Council is harder to lobby, since it does not have the same amount of transparency as the Commission or the EP, and it also does not have the same amount of permanent personal in Brussels. (Coen and Richardson, 2019. Page 73-74)

In relation to *how the Danish government perceived the inputs from stakeholders*, Morten stated that there were several distinct kinds of inputs, and that the value of these inputs varied quite a lot. The inputs that would be considered not that useful was for example statements, made by the stakeholders. A stakeholder could for example state, that they wanted to disband the direct payments in the CAP. Now while it might somewhat useful for the ministry to know what the stakeholders in their country wants, this is not something that they themselves can use in the negotiations with the other member states in the Council meetings. *The good inputs* were the ones that added information to the ministry, that either being new data that they did not have or inputs on implementation, such as which elements in the CAP would it be possible to actually implement and what would not be possible. Proposals for improvements were always well received according to Morten. During the feedback process of the current CAP, Landbrugsstyrelsen received feedback from the stakeholders on a daily basis, on what did and did not work in the CAP. Morten also mentioned that this feedback was mostly focused on the elements that did not work in the CAP. So DAFC would give information about the parts that they were ineffective or that the accreditation process was too heavy. The environmental lobby organisations, such as DSNC, would explain that the environmental impact was too great.

When it came to discussion about the *effects of the inputs on the political interest* of Danish government, Morten stated that it was still too early to give a concrete answer to that question, stating that the CAP was still in the policy formulation stage, since the proposal was still on the table, and not ready to be voted on yet. Morten also mentioned that the Danish position although more or less set was not consolidated and not formally adopted yet.

In relation to the question *did you inform the stakeholders/lobby organisations of your perceived view on the inputs that they gave you*, it was made clear throughout the interview that there was both formal and informal lobbyism taking place in the ministry. The ministry themselves arranged several formal meetings between the parties, but Morten also stated that there

were several informal meetings, between the ministry and the stakeholders, where they exchanged information and ideas. The explanation of the feedback process however, points towards that there was more informal lobbyism than there was formal. This can be argued from the description that Morten gave of the almost daily contact between the ministry and the stakeholders, where the stakeholders tried to come in contact with the ministry and thereby establish themselves as an important informational source the elements in the CAP, that they believed did not work properly. This fits into Dionigi's theory, that the majority of lobbyism that is conducted is informal lobbyism that happens more often and in a more fluid stream (Dionigi, 2007. Page 22).

When it comes to the counterfactual analysis of *how the outcome might have been, if you were not approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations*, Morten stated that it was impossible to say, *how the outcome might have been, if the stakeholders had not been involved*. Since the ministry has to navigate in a political environment, where the government makes decisions that are to a certain degree reflective of what society and the external actors views as important. It would always be necessary to consider the inputs giving by the stakeholders. The amount of impact that these inputs have would however be a topic of discussion. Applying the theory of Coen and Richardson once more, this relates to the possibility that the Council often is harder to lobby, potentially because the ministries has a greater amount of resources available than the DGs in the Commission or the EP. Therefore, even though the national governments are also in need of the inputs given to them by the stakeholders, they might not have the same level of dependency as the Commission or EP has) (Coen and Richardson, 2017. Page 71)

An interesting comparison could be made between the EP and the Council here. Morten explained that the ministry had to gain the approval of the Danish parliament, before they could present the Danish position in the Council meetings. This would mean that just like in the EP, the Council on the national level would also have to contend with national members of parliament. These national politicians might have behaviours that resemble those of the MEPs. Therefor lobbying in the Council, taken though the national level, could easily be just cluttered as the lobby actions that are aimed towards the MEPs.

4.3.4 Sub conclusion

This sub conclusion sums up the analysis of the sub-question 3) "*Does the lobby actions made by the pan-European lobby organisations, Copa & Cogeca and EEB, have influence on the*

CAP 2020 in the EU institutions?”. Both theory and information given in the interviews, points towards a conclusion, where in the EP is by all means the most accessible EU institution for lobby organisations. This is also indicated in the interview of Paulo Gouveia, where he states, that even though it depends a lot on which state the legislative proposal you are, it is often easier to get through the European Parliament. That being said, there is little that points towards that the lobby organisations should not have influence in the EU institutions, the amount might however differ from institution to institution. However, Bérénice Dupeux mentioned, that they had extremely difficulties lobbying the agricultural decision-makers in the Commissions, i.e. COM-Agri, DG-AGRI, while COM-ENVI were more willingly to exchange interests and information (See 6.1). The institutions fit in at various stages of the policy cycle, meaning that the lobby organisations would aim their lobby actions towards a specific institution at a specific time. For example, it would make more sense to aim at the Commission in the feedback process then it would the EP. And when a policy reaches the later political stages, the Council and the EP are far more suitable targets, since as stated by Iman, when the Commission has handed in its proposal, there is little that the lobby organisations can do to make the Commission change its positions. Because of the national perspective, the Council would a suited target throughout the majority of the policy cycle, maybe with the exception of the agenda-setting stage, since that will depend on the Commission's proposal, which is in turn is created from the guidelines set out by the European Council. Similarly, is this indicated in the interview with Bérénice Dupeux, saying that they have stronger influence on the Parliament and the Commission and have no directly influence with the European Council.” This do point to, that both Copa & Cogeca and EEB have influence in the EU institutions, however as Greenwood has stated that the lobby organisations, would need to know their limits, if they wanted to be successful (Greenwood, 1996. Page 6) The lobby organisations used in this thesis, have shown that they to a certain extend know their limits. The two Danish seem to both be aware that they are in need to pull their resources with others on a pan-European level, if their goals are to be realised in the EU. At the same time, the pan-European lobby organisations, are aware of that they do not have the means and network to successfully conduct lobby actions on the national level. Here they need their members, since they have the networks and the knowledge to be establish the necessary contact.

5. Conclusion

This chapter introduces the final conclusion of this master thesis. The conclusion is based upon the analysis chapter (see chapter 4), which analysed the conducted interviews of this thesis (see section 2.4.4 and Appendix A-H), following the methodological approach embedded in this theory (see chapter 2) in relation to the chosen theory (see chapter 3). The conclusions should be seen as the final answers to the overall research question of this thesis *“Do the Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU? I.e. the pan-European lobby organisations, EEB and Copa & Cogeca, and in the institutions of EU? And therefore, the final conclusion of this thesis. This chapter will summarize the sub-conclusion of the analysis (see 4.1.3; 4.2.3 and 4.3.4), and thereby the sub research questions in this thesis (see 1.2.1) unifying and concluding upon the analysis of this thesis.*

Throughout the analysis, by including both the theory and the information given by the interviewees through the use of the interview method the sub conclusions of the analysis suggests a conclusion, where there is little that emphasize, that the lobby organisations should not have influence in the EU institutions, and thereby at least to some degree have influence in the EU institutions.. However, the amount of influence in the EU institutions might differ between each of the EU institutions i.e. in the case of the EP, which by all means seems to be the most accessible EU institution for lobby organisations. This notion is also present in the interview of Paulo Gouveia, where he indicates, that even though influence in the EU institutions depends on which state the legislative proposal is in, i.e. the policy cycle, it is often easier to go through the EP. An important aspect to mention in regard to influence in the EU institutions is, that the, influence in the EU institutions also depend highly on the policy cycle embedded in the EU. The fact, that the policy cycles a significant role for the lobby actions in the EU institutions is present in all of the interviews, which all seems to indicate, that the policy cycle is the primary factor that affect who to lobby and when to conduct lobby actions . For example, it would make more sense to aim at the Commission in the feedback process than it would make sense to do it in the EP. When a policy reaches the later political stages, the Council and the EP are far more suitable targets, since as stated by Iman, the official from the Commissions, that when the Commission has handed in its proposal, there is very little that the lobby organisations can do to make the Commission change its positions. Having the policy cycle in mind, while not

neglecting, that there might be difference in the amount of influence that the lobby organisations can have in the respectively EU institutions, it may seem like, that Copa & Cogeca and the EEB do have influence in the EU institutions.

Since the overall research questions do not relate to, whether Copa & Cogeca and the EEB have influence in the EU institutions, but relates to the whether the *Danish lobby organisations, DAFC and DSNC have influence on the CAP 2020 in the EU institutions*, it is crucial to point out, that DAFC and DSNC is cooperating with respectively Copa & Cogeca and the EEB, which has been concluded to have influence in the EU institutions. Paulo Gouveia from Copa & Cogeca explicitly mentioned that they coordinate with DAFC and is dependent of their work and with the information collected through the interviews, it can also be concluded, that the EEB is depend of DSNC. This is especially evident when it comes to the national level, the Council, where both Copa & Cogeca and EEB heavily rely on their member organisations, DAFC and DSNC, since the Council is notorious for being a closed institutions, where it is hard to reach both officials and politicians, where it is significant easier for DAFC and DSNC to access, through the national level. The pan-European lobby organisations are also dependent on their members to reach out to the MEPs from their countries, in case the Danish MEPs, since they are believed to have easier access to their countrymen. DSNC did however point out, that they had not been successful when talking to the Danish MEPs, since these had shown little interest in the positions of DSNC. Both DAFC and DSNC seem to be aware that they need to pull their resources with other lobby organisations on a pan-European level, if their goals are to be realised in the EU. At the same time, the pan-European lobby organisations, are aware of that they do not have the means and network to successfully conduct lobby actions on the national level. Here they need their members, since they have the networks and the knowledge to be establish the necessary contact.

Summarized, the causal link between the research of this thesis, the research question and the conclusion seem to be, that Copa & Cogeca and EEB have influence on the EU institutions, and due to the fact, that. Copa & Cogeca and EEB both listen and are dependent on DAFC and DSNC in their lobby work, which means, that DAFC and DSNC have influence on Copa & Cogeca and EEB then the analysis of our interview's points to the fact that DAFC and DSNC should have influence on CAP 2020 reform in the EU.

6. Perspectivation

The function of this chapter is to evaluate and reflect on the research throughout and beyond this master thesis. This chapter will therefore outline both previously mentioned and additional methodological-, theoretical, and overall structural considerations in relation to the research in this thesis. The structural overview of this chapter is, that it is divided into two parts, the first reflecting and evaluating upon the methodological-, theoretical and overall structural approaches used in the thesis (see 6.1) and the other part introducing considerations for further work, and how both proceed with this research and or how whether it could have been done differently (see 6.2).

6.1 Reflection

This section reflects and evaluate the research within this thesis. This will be done in both regard to how the research in this thesis have aligned with the chosen methodological path and theoretical fundamental.

In terms of the methodological path chosen throughout the research of the thesis, certain tests and criteria of quality have been introduced, with their function being to guide and ensure a good conduct of method and research. In terms of validity, this thesis introduced three types of validity, the constructed validity, the internal validity, and the external validity (see 2.4.3). Evaluating upon these tests of quality the validity seems to be uphold. This thesis uses concepts and definitions, which relies on previous research, this can be seen both in terms of the definition of influence and the concept of lobbyism. In terms of internal validity, this thesis does not incorrectly conclude upon any misguided assumptions when it comes to causality between what is analysed. Through the analysis, through the methodological use of process tracing, causal links is being made between empirical material and theory. The conclusion of this thesis does not conclude on certainty, but valid indications for link between casualties. Doing research in this way indicate knowledge of limitations of research on what do conclude and when to generalise or not. It has never been the goal of this thesis to extrapolate probabilities and making statistical generalisations, but to make an analytical generalisation, expand upon known literature, method, and theory in regard to the subject matter. Evaluating on the reliability, the research has been transparent throughout the research of the thesis, both in terms of approach and content. This thesis includes a synopsis, outlining the structural compositions of this thesis,

creating an overview of the overall approach, which strengthen the reliability of the thesis. Every choice made has been followed by an argument for relevance to the subject matter. However, in some instances of executions of the interviews, subjectivity and leading questions may have appeared, but as argued throughout chapter 2 involving the method, this is a common risk of working with a semi-structured interview method. However, the implications are considered minimal in terms of influence on the reliability in this thesis, both due to the inclusion of interview-guide and transcription of the interviews.

The theoretical inclusion of the theory of policy cycle has through the research provided both theoretical knowledge of political processes, both in general and relating to the EU and its institutions. The inclusion of 'policy cycle' has also been used as a structural mechanism, influencing the interview-guide on how to interview the interviews. What has appeared evident through the analysis of the interviews is that most, if not all, of the interviewees has a familiarity to the policy cycle in the EU, are clearly aware of its presence, its relevance and do also indicate, that they are subject to it. With this in hand, one could argue, that giving the 'policy cycle' a larger focus could have been beneficial for this thesis and the research within.

Lastly has the qualitative approach on how to investigate lobbyism in the EU, not only being new and unresearched, but it has also provided this thesis with more in-depth knowledge of lobbyism in a specific case and on how lobby organisations work, which would not have been able to be acquired through the use of a quantitative approach

6.2 Further work

This section reflects upon the opportunities for further work on this subject, following the conclusion of this thesis. The involves both new, interesting, and relevant aspects, which might not have been included in this thesis and different approaches or delimitations, which the research in this thesis has been forced to make.

It has been made clear several times throughout this thesis, that the inclusion of interviews with MEPs who worked with the CAP 2020 would have beneficial to our research. As states several times in the analysis, our interviewees from the lobby organisations mention their interactions through various lobby actions to the MEPs. By not including the MEPs, as mentioned not willingly excluded, but due to the fact, that they MEPs declined participation in our thesis, it was

not been able to get a first-hand perspective from the MEPs themselves on how they view the interactions between them and the stakeholders. The inclusions of an official from the EP has however enabled the research to in some degree still investigate the interactions between the lobby organisations and the EP, but regardless it would have benefitted this thesis, to have had included MEPs.

Furtherly, it has become evident, that an inclusion of both the EP's Committee for Environment (COM-ENVI) and the Directorate General for Environment in the Commission (DG-ENVI), could have been beneficial to the research. Since this thesis included two environmental lobby organisations and the fact, that both COM-ENVI and DG-ENVI are co-decisional on the CAP 2020, the inclusion of these institutional departments, would enlighten certain aspects, which has not happened in this thesis. This has become more evident, when the EEB mentioned, that they find themselves more influential in these departments.

For further research in continuation of this thesis, one could take an identical approach and investigate another EU country to see, whether Denmark is a unique case, or has similarities to other countries. Similar could further research involve the identical approach, but on another EU policy than the CAP 2020, since an additional case, could provide more data on how the lobby organisations conduct their work, and possibly highlight any similarities or contradictions, that might occur between the chosen cases.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Interview with Maria Skovager Østergaard

INTERVIEWER: Det første spørgsmål er *How did you set up your interests?*

MSØ: Kunne i ikke lige uddybe, hvad i mener med det spørgsmål, så jeg er sikker på, at jeg forstår det?

INTERVIEWER: Det handler om, at vi godt kunne tænke os at vide, hvad i havde af mærkesager eller mål...

MSØ: Så hvordan vi finder ud af, hvad vi egentligt mener?

NSM: Ja

MSØ: Godt nok. Der kan man jo sige, at Landbrug & Fødevarer er en medlemsorganisation og dem der i sidste ende bestemmer i vores medlemsorganisation, er dem, som er stemt ind i vores bestyrelser. Så det vi jo gør, når vi skal danne os en overordnet holdning til vores landbrugspolitik er, at vi får vores bestyrelse til at tage en beslutning om, hvilken retning, det er, at vi skal gå. Der har vi i den forbindelse haft en proces forud for dette typisk, hvor vi har været ude og snakke med forskellige delsegmenter af vores medlemmer. Det kan være økologerne. Det kan være familielandbrug. Det kan være det større jordbrug osv. For at få en fornemmelse af, hvor de står henne ift. de centrale spørgsmål inden for det her politikområde. Når vi så har været rundt der, så prøver vi at samle det hele sammen og se, hvor kan vi finde et kompromis efter af have set på, hvilke mærkesager vi har med at gøre og så lægger det op til bestyrelsen, hvor de diskuterer det videre og planlægger, i hvilken retning, vi skal gå.

INTERVIEWER: *Can you describe your working process with the Common Agricultural Policy?*

MSØ: Jamen det har jeg jo nærmest godt – Har jeg ikke? Man kan sige, at arbejdsprocessen er først at finde ud af, hvad vi mener, så skal vi lave noget, som vi kan bruge til at forsøge at gøre andre opmærksomme på det, som vi mener. Det er først og fremmest at lave noget materiale, som man kan bruge og i næste omgang er det at komme ud over rampen og tale med nogle af dem, som vi gerne vil tale med og fortælle om, hvad vi mener.

NSM: *How did you promote your interests in the different institutions?*

MSØ: Det gør vi jo på forskellige måder. Man kan sige, hvordan definere man institutioner? Nu kan jeg se, at i skriver længere nede 'Parlamentet', 'Kommissionen' og 'Rådet', men man kan sige, at et sted, hvor vi også starter med at bruge vores krudt, er i Copa Cogeca, vores fælles landbrugsorganisation i Europa. Fordi dét, det jo er, at hvis man kan sige, at det som de mener, også afspejler vores holdninger, så står man jo meget stærkere, end hvis det bare er os selv, der går rundt og mener et eller andet. Så det er jo første step i forhold til os at tale med dem og gøre dem opmærksom på, hvad det er, at vi mener og forhåbentligt tager de nogle af de holdninger, som vi har, ind i deres politik også. Det er jo den ene del af det og den anden del af det er, at så gør vi jo også det, at vi på forskellige områder går sammen med forskellige andre landbrugsorganisationer, som har de samme holdninger som os, hvor vi laver nogle fælles papirer, som vi både fremlægger i Copa Cogeca, men også bruger i alle mulige andre sammenhæng og så har vi jo kontakt til de forskellige institutioner på forskellige måder, men det kan vi jo også tage mere detaljeret under næste underspørgsmål?

INTERVIEWER: Ja, men nu nævnte du selv Copa Cogeca, kan du fortælle lidt, hvordan man arbejder igennem dem?

MSØ: Ja, det er jo sådan at Copa Cogeca de har en lang række forskellige arbejdsgrupper for en række forskellige politik områder, og jeg sidder selv i den arbejdsgruppe der hedder "Direct Payment Agreement", som jo arbejder med EU's landbrugspolitik og det er jo typisk sker er, at man møder op til disse arbejdsgruppemøder, hvor man så diskutere udviklingen af Copa Cogeca politik, på et eller andet område. Og så man kan sige, at lige på EU's landbrugspolitik er der en anden arbejdsgruppe, som hedder CAP-gruppen, hvor man kan sige, som mere overordnet tager nogle beslutninger om retningen for landbrugspolitikken, hvor min chef Niels Lindberg sidder i den gruppe. I sidste ende, når der er udviklet noget politik, så går det til Copa Cogeca's præsidiemøde, som afholdes engang om måneden...? Det ved du bedre end jeg.

INTERVIEWER: Jeg mener, at det var engang hver anden måned?

MSØ: Nej, man kan sige, at først er der en politik-koordineringsgruppe, hvor Bruxelles kontorerne i de forskellige organisationer kommer, koordinere og arbejder videre. Når det har været igennem der, så ender det til præsidiemødet, hvor man tager beslutningen om, om det er Copa Cogeca's holdning på den ene, eller den anden eller den tredje måde såå... Det er jo den proces, der er i Copa Cogeca, kan man sige og for os, der sidder i de her arbejdsgrupper, så er der jo både et arbejde i at have kontakt til de sekretariatsmedarbejder for de forskellige grupper og selvfølgelig være aktive på møderne og kontakt til formandskabet. Nu sidder jeg jo selv i formandskabet i den gruppe, som jeg sidder i. Det man kan sige, at man også bruger arbejdsgrupperne til det er, at der typisk til mange af dem er en pendant til de Civil Dialogue Groupes i Kommissionen. Det her er jo også en del af kontakt til Kommissionen, de her Civil Dialogue Groupes, som EU Kommissionen invitere til, hvor de invitere en lang række stakeholders, hvor de kan diskutere og give deres mening til kende på en række politikområder, som Kommissionen er ansvarlige for.

INTERVIEWER: Lad os hoppe en til 2.1 ... *In the European Parliament?* Hvordan har i arbejdet med MEP'erne?

MSØ: Jamen det gør vi jo på mange forskellige planer. Vi har jo vores Bruxelleskontor, som er i løbende kontakt med en række af disse parlamentarikerne og nogle af dem de arbejder med i sekretariatene. Dem har de gode kontakter til og så er det jo sådan, at vi løbende holder møder med parlamentarikerne, når der er noget relevant på dagsordenen i forhold til dem og giver vores holdning til kende og eventuelt giver noget baggrundsviden eller hjælp til at formulere det ene, det andet eller det tredje. Det hjælper vi jo gerne med i forhold til de enkelte parlamentarikere og så har vi jo selvfølgelig rigtig meget kontakt til de danske parlamentarikere, men også til nogle fra de andre lande, hvor det er jo sådan nogle gange, at man skal finde dem, som har en central stemme i forhold til forhandlingerne til et eller andet forslag, som er på vej. Så det er jo sådan det helt overordnede

INTERVIEWER: (...) *In the European Commission?*

MSØ: Ja, nu har jeg jo nævnt de her Civil Dialogue møder, som jo er en måde at give sin stemme til kende på i EU Kommissionen. Derudover har jo også meget kontakt – nu taler jeg for mit eget område – men der har vi jo meget kontakt til DG-Agri på forskellige måder. Der

beder vi om møder, for at tale om, hvad vores ønsker for fremtidens landbrugspolitik, men vi har jo også haft en del møder med EU Kommissionen, som handler om at håndtere konkrete problemstillinger i de nuværende EU-regler, som spænder ben for, at man kan gøre de rigtige ting nationalt, eksempel i forhold til at reducere de administrative bøvl i forbindelse med vådområdeprojekter, eller hvad det nu kan være af forskellige ting. Derudover mødes man jo til forskellige arrangementer i Bruxelles og derudover er der den uformelle kontakt, når man taler med embedsmænd uden for Kommissionen, til forskellige arrangementer. Derudover har vi jo også løbende møder med kabinetter for Phil Hogan. Det er jo ikke nødvendigvis noget, som jeg har været en stor del af. Det har typisk været min chef eller endda Martin Merrild. Martin Merrild har jo i en periode været formand for Copa, hvor man havde mange møder med Kommissionen.

INTERVIEWER: (...) *In the European Council?* Hvordan har processen været der?

MSØ: Det er jo mere nationalt fokuseret i virkeligheden. Det er jo en helt formel kanal, som hedder, at Landbrug og Fødevarer sidder i paragraf 2 udvalget, som er et udvalg, der bliver hørt hver gang der er en sag, som er oppe på ministerrådsmødet og så får vi mulighed for, typisk et skriftligt hørings svar, hvor vi tilkendegiver vores holdning til det her forslag, som er undervejs. Derudover har vi jo løbende kontakt både til departementet i Miljø og Fødevareministeriet og til landbrugs styrelsen, som sidder med mange af de her regler i forhold til det ene og det andet område, så ministeriet er hele tiden gjort opmærksom på, hvad Landbrug & Fødevarers holdning er til de forskellige tiltag. I sidste ende, så er det jo embedsmændene i ministeriet, som laver et oplæg til en holdning, som så ryger det videre og bliver diskuteret i fødevareudvalget i folketinget og som mindsterenten så har med til Bruxelles, når han er til rådsmøder dernede.

INTERVIEWER: *How often did you meet with these institutions?* Måske, hver især, i forhold til mødefrekvensen.

MSØ: Ja, det er et svært spørgsmål. Det kan jo svinge meget afgørende, hvor man er i den politiske proces. Det har jo været en periode, hvor der har været meget fokus på parlamentet, fordi man forhandler i landbrugsudvalget om CAP-reformen for eksempel. Fokuset på Kommissionen var meget i processen op til at de lagde forslaget frem. Det var jo der, hvor de sad og arbejdede med idéer til, hvordan forslaget skulle være til EU's kommende landbrugspolitik og Rådet, det er jo løbende, hele tiden. De her forslag til EU's landbrugspolitik, som man drøfter lige nu, de er jo nærmest i høring engang om måneden i øjeblikket forud for hvert rådsmøde og derudover er der jo løbende drøftelser med ministeriet omkring det.

INTERVIEWER: Hmm... Okay. Vil du så sige, at det er Rådet, som man er mest i kontakt med fra Landbrug & Fødevarers side?

MSØ: Neeeeej... Det ved jeg ikke, om jeg vil sige?... Dem snakker vi i hvert fald rigtig meget med, især herhjemme i Danmark. Nogle af dem, som sidder på vores Bruxelles kontor, så ville de jo ikke sige, at vi snakkede med Rådet, men så ville de jo nok sige, at vi snakkede rigtig meget med Parlamentet, tænker jeg. Det kommer jo også lidt an på, hvilken kasket man har på her i huset, ville jeg tro.

INTERVIEWER: Det er jo dét. *2.5 Would you describe your contact with these institutions as formal or informal?* Du har nævnt det lidt allerede.

MSØ: Det er jo begge dele, men man kan jo sige, at dét der med at sende papirer til dem, det er typisk noget vi har gjort i forbindelse med, at vi har haft direkte kontakt med dem. Man kan jo sige, at hvis vi havde lavet et fælles holdningspapir med de nordiske og baltiske lande, så er det jo ikke sikkert, at vi har den direkte kontakt til Kommissionen i forhold til det specifikt, men især, når det er nogle af vores egne ting, så har vi direkte kontakt.

INTERVIEWER: Lad os hoppe videre til nummer 3 *How did you work with Common Agriculture Policy, chronologically?*

MSØ: Kan du ikke lige uddybe lidt, hvad du mener med det?

INTERVIEWER: Det er jo lidt, som underspørgsmålene siger ”*Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?*” om vi var med i den af processen?

MSØ: Ja, det var vi i høj grad. Dels gennem Civil Dialogue Groups, dels gennem... Der var også nogle høringer, som jeg husker – formelle høringer – og derudover så lavede vi jo et fælles papir sammen med en række af de andre europæiske landbrugsorganisationer i forhold til at ønske om at få forenklet de regler, som der var på det tidspunkt og det papir, det er jo noget, som vi har promoveret rigtig meget i forskellige henseender med EU-Kommissionen i forbindelse med de forskellige udfordringer, som der har været. Det har vi jo brugt rigtig mange kræfter på, især under den overskrift der hed ”Der er brug for forenkling af reglerne”

INTERVIEWER 3.2 *Did you participate in the agenda-setting process of the new Common Agriculture Policy?* Var i med til at sætte rammerne for, hvad den nye CAP-skal indeholde?

MSØ: Ja, absolut. Det var vi. Man kan jo sige, at Danmark er et lille land og derfor er chancen for sådan nogle som os jo at være tidligt ude – komme med nogle idéer – så vi var jo tidligt ude med politikudvikling i Landbrug & Fødevarer. Vi havde et politikpapir, som vi gik i byen med, allerede på et tidligt tidspunkt, og talte både med EU-Kommissionen og andre forskellige gode folk, også i Copa Cogeca osv. Derudover holdte vi også en konference, hvor vi drøftede idéer og principper i forhold til, hvordan EU’s landbrugspolitik skulle udvikle sig.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, så har du sådan set allerede svaret på 3.3 også – så det er jo super.

MSØ: Ja... ja, det hænger jo sådan lidt sammen, kan man sige. En af de ting, som vi var med til at sætte på dagsordenen var jo, at det var vigtigt, at man i søjle 1. havde muligheder for at give nogle direkte betalinger til landmændene samt også til at lave miljøtiltag og hvis man så ser på, hvordan forslaget kommer fra EU-kommissionen, hvor de foreslår de her nye ECO-schemes. Det er jo noget, som vi i hvert fald nogle gange ynder at sige, at det er kraftigt inspireret af den tankegang og de idéer, som vi havde inden Kommissionen kom ud med de formelle forslag til reformen af EU’s landbrugspolitik.

INTERVIEWER: Så lad os hoppe ned til 3.4 *Did you participate in the decision-making process of the new Common Agriculture Policy?*

MSØ: Man kan jo sige, at det jo er det, som der er i gang nu og man kan sige, at det jo ikke os, som tager beslutningerne. Det er jo hverken medlemmer af Rådet eller Parlamentet, men vi prøver jo løbende at tilkendegive vores holdninger i forhold til det, som vi mener, er relevant at kigge og fokusere på.

INTERVIEWER: Nu har jeg jo selv set de forslag, som i har stillet og sendt ind til de danske MEP'er med ændringsforslag til rapporten. Vil du sige, at der er i også rigtig aktive i den proces?

MSØ: Ja, absolut... ja. Det er jo også det, som jeg tidligere nævnt, at hjælpe med nogle formuleringer. Det er jo sådan et punkt, hvor vi forsøger at hjælpe med, at i forhold til vores politik, så skulle forslagene være formuleret på den her måde og det kunne selvfølgelig været fint, hvis parlamentarikerne kunne lade sig inspirere af nogle ændringsforslag, der peger i den retning.

INTERVIEWER: Jeg tænker, at vi hopper ned til nummer 4 *Did you have a lobby action strategy?*

MSØ: Ja, det kan man vel sige, at vi har, men den er jo ikke skrevet ned på den her måde. Den har jo sine naturlige faser, fra vi diskutere idéer til vi diskutere konkrete forslag eller ændringsforslag – hver ting til sin tid, som man siger.

INTERVIEWER: Lad os alligevel prøve med 4.1 *“What was the goal of your lobby action strategy”*, altså havde i et overordnet mål – altså noget, som bare skulle med, eksempelvis? For det skulle ses som værende en succes.

MSØ: Ja... Jamen det er jo altid svært at... man kan sige... jeg ved ikke, om man kan sige, om der var et overordnet mål, som man skulle nå, men man kan jo sige, at noget af det, som vi har haft meget fokus på, det er de her ECO-Schemes, som er noget, der skal kunne komme igennem og blive en succes. Det, at man kan give incitament betalinger til landmændene. Det er i hvert fald en af tingene, som er ret vigtige for os.

INTERVIEWER: Lad os hoppe videre til nummer 5 *How would you define the effectiveness of this lobby action?* – har det båret frugt, dét, som i har arbejdet med?

MSØ: Ja... i egentligt eller anden grad, så har det.

INTERVIEWER: 5.1 *Was there a specific institution where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

MSØ: Det ved jeg ikke helt, hvad jeg skal sige til?... Det ved ikke, om der er en, som er mere succesfuld end andre. Det er jo et sammensurium af det ene og det andet. Lige nu er der jo heller ikke en konklusion på reformen nu, så vi ved jo ikke, hvor den ender henne. Den er jo ikke politisk vedtaget, hvis det er den nuværende reform, som vi taler om.

INTERVIEWER: 5.2 *Was there a specific stage in the policy process, where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

MSØ: Altså man kan sige, så tror jeg, at vi fik noget ud af at være tidligt ude med nogle idéer, hvor alle andre sådan 'lurepassede lidt'

INTERVIEWER: 6 *How might the outcome have been, if you had not acted* – Kunne du forestille dig, at noget havde gået tabt, hvis i ikke havde været aktive?"

MSØ: Det er jo svært at sige... hvordan verdenen havde set ud, uden os... Vil jeg sige.

Appendix B: Interview with Jens La Cour

INTERVIEWER: *How did you set up your interests?*

JLC: Vi er medlem af EEB, der er den største grønne paraplyorganisation i EU. I samarbejde med dem så kiggede vi på, hvad hovedprioriteter der var i CAP'en. Derudover så kiggede vi også på, hvad i grunden især de danske udfordringer, i forhold til CAP'en og i DK har vi jo et meget intensivt landbrug, man har jo desværre gjort det man har prøvet at få alle landene til at gøre, nemlig højt intensivt landbrug. Det har selvfølgelig nogle skadelige virkninger for sine omgivelser. Så det på den måde vi kigger på hvad vores interesser er i forhold til CAP'en, og så kigger vi på det sammen med vores EEB-kolleger som indsamler konklusioner i hele EU, på hvad hovedprioriteterne kan være, og så kigger vi også på, om der er nogle særlige danske forhold, som vi skal være opmærksomme på.

INTERVIEWER: *Hvordan er jeres opbygning?*

JLC: Vi er bygget op som en klassisk forening, med en masse lokale afdelinger der drives af vores frivillige. Så har vi to årlige repræsentantskabsmøder, hvor repræsentanter fra alle de her afdelinger mødes, og så har vi en hovedbestyrelse, som er dem der bestemmer den politiske linje. Derudover har vi også et sekretariat der hjælper hovedbestyrelsen. Så det er demokratisk valgt. Bestyrelsen har et relativt bredt mandat til at lave deres linje.

INTERVIEWER: *Can you describe your working process with the Common Agricultural Policy?*

JLC: Vi var aktive sidste gang der var den her CAP, og der lavede vi nogle høringer i DK, forud for den sidste CAP-revision og det lavede vi sammen med EEB og nogle andre grønne organisationer i DK. Så har vi selvfølgelig fulgt den, og set hvilke virkemidler der var i den gamle CAP, eksempelvis "greening" der jo desværre blev godt og grundig udvandet. Der følger vi, hvilke erfaringer der med det hvis det er man skal forsætte med det, eller skal gøre noget andet. Så har vi deltaget i to runder omkring CAP'en, i midtterm-review, og så har der være denne her konsultation op til at Kommissionen kom med noget sidste år, her har vi også deltaget. Og i forhold til det med midtterm-review og konsultation op til den kommende CAP, der har vi talt med vores europæiske netværk, omkring hvad vores prioriter. Hvordan de forskellige ting virker. Vores arbejdsproces er også sådan, at vi kigger på om vi får noget foræret. I sidste environmental implementation review, som Kommissionen lavede i 2017, de har også lige lavet en for 2019 dog siger denne ikke så meget, da der snart kommer en ny Kommission, men den i 2017 der brugte DK hovedsageligt pengene i søjle 2 til forurenelses bekæmpelse, hvilket ikke var meningen. Fint det har vi også hele tiden sagt, at forurenelses bekæmpelse fra landbruget ikke burde bruge midler fra landdistriktsfonden, da disse burde bruges på at skabe noget mere natur.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you promote your interests in the different EU institutions? (...) In the European Parliament?*

JLC: Denne gang har vi ikke talt meget med danske MEP'er, hovedsageligt fordi der ikke er mange af dem der er interesseret i CAP'en. Det er selvfølgelig ærgerligt, til gengæld så har

EEB kontakt til nogle af de centrale spillere i denne sammenhæng. Så det er primært gennem EEB vores kontakt til EP er.

INTERVIEWER: (...) *In the European Commission?*

JLC: I forhold til Kommissionen der har vi selvfølgelig deltaget i de konsultationer der er og EEB har også kontakt til Kommissionen, i DG AGRI og DG Environment.

INTERVIEWER: (...) *In the European Council?*

JLC: Sammen med EEB har vi været med til at skrive en række breve til det Europæiske Råd, i forbindelse med at de har forhandlet om dette.

INTERVIEWER: Hvordan er samarbejdet med de danske ministerier?

JLC: Vi har en dialog i det omfang det er muligt. Det har tidligere været nemmere. Vi har indsendt nogle punkter hvor vi mener at der er noget DK skal arbejde. Vi er også med i paragraf 2 udvalget og her har der også været nogle ting i høring omkring den danske holdning. Den danske holdning skal afgives af Folketinget, så hvis DK vil mene noget skal der sættes et mandat i FT. I DK gør man meget brug af at sætte det igennem disse udvalg, hvor vi giver et høringssvar der så bliver refereret og sendt til fagudvalg og til Europa-udvalget. Vi har også været aktive omkring de høringer der har været i specialudvalget (paragraf 2 udvalget), omkring dette her.

INTERVIEWER: *How often did you meet with these institutions?*

JLC: I forhold til EU-institutioner så har vi næsten ikke mødtes med nogen af dem, det har vi EEB til, der jo har kontor i Bruxelles.

INTERVIEWER: *Så det er meget formelt lobbyisme i har der?*

JLC: Det er meget formel lobbyisme vi har der, vi har selvfølgelig bedre kontakt til de danske ministerier. Men det er en meget formel indgang. Der er dog både formelle og uformelle møder i ministerierne omkring dette her.

INTERVIEWER: Tror du det er en fordel eller en ulempe at i ikke har en fast plads i Bruxelles?

JLC: I forhold til at få indflydelse så er det selvfølgelig bedre at være tilstede, men da vi er en organisation i DK med 130.00 medlemmer, så skal vi have mere end en person hvis vi skal have noget masse. Det er heller ikke sikret at de vil snakke med os. I har formentligt snakket med L&F, og de har jo Copa & Cogeca, to organisationer der jo er der. Og jeg kunne godt forestille mig at de også sørger for at have nogle bilaterale møder. Eftersom L&F har et kontor i Bruxelles, så vil jeg da forestille mig at de har sådanne møder, og de især kæmper for de danske interesser. Vi har ikke resurser til at have sådan et kontor. Så der bruger vi vores EU-netværk og vores EU-organisation til disse opgaver.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you work with Common Agriculture Policy, chronologically? Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?*

JLC: Vi har både deltaget i midtterm-review, EEB har gjort noget med midtterm-review, og peget på nogle af de ting der har været problematiske og som ikke har leveret. Og kigget på de ting der har leveret, det er der jo også nogle der har.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you participate in the agenda-setting process of the new Common Agriculture Policy?*

JLC: Der er det EEB der har gjort dette, de har holdt nogle konferencer og jeg har også nogle få kolleger der har været nede i Bruxelles til det. Når vi er inde i arbejdet med Kommissionen og EP så er det EEB der foretager arbejder for os på CAP'en.

INTERVIEWER: Det er i DK i er en aktiv part?

JLC: I DK er vi en aktiv part, og søger informationer osv., i forhold til at sige hvor den peger henad. Vi har f.eks. været meget kritiske over den udmelding om, at man skal have langt større handlerum i de enkelte lande til at fastsætte virkemidler, hvilket vi ikke mente var en god ide, da landene så bare konkurrerer om at have den laveste fællesnævner på de grønne elementer. Vi har også sammen med EEB det mål, at flere midler i søjle 1 skal bindes på at landbrug levere mere til samfundet (grønomstilling og tiltag). De skal ikke blot have penge.

INTERVIEWER: Kunne du fortælle lidt omkring jeres kommunikation til EEB, altså hvor ofte i lever data til dem omkring den danske position?

JLC: EEB er delt sådan op, at der er nogle forskellige arbejdsgrupper på forskellige områder, hvor medlemmerne sidder med. Ved landbrug har vi også en sekretær der har møder med kommissærer og ofte vil policy direktøren også deltage, da der skal være flere striber på skulderen. Så vores positioner bliver fastlagt gennem samarbejde mellem sekretariat og en arbejdsgruppe. Så kan der være nogle hjørner i nogle af tingene der bliver arbejdet med i arbejdsgrupperne som er lidt uheldige fra det dansk synspunkt eller rigtige heldige at pointere og så arbejder vi os frem med det til arbejdsgruppen og EEB's position.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you have a lobby action strategy*

JLC: Både ja og nej, forstået på den måde, at i forhold til os selv der har vi en tidslinje som vi arbejder på med hvornår der sker noget i forhold til CAP'en. Og der har vi kigget på, hvor det er vi kan gøre vores indflydelse gældende, hvor mange resurser har vi at bruge på dette, og hvor tror vi at vi kan rykke på noget. Så det er det som vi følger. Det lægger ret tæt op ad det som EEB arbejder med, men vi fokuserer så på hvor der er nogle danske positioner, som vi skal kigge meget på. I DK er udfordringen jo, at 2/3 af vores land er beslaglagt af landbruget. Det er Europa rekord og måske også verdens rekord, og det giver nogle særlige udfordringer i forhold til hvordan man kan lave landbrug i forhold til omgivelserne. Der adskiller vi os jo fra nogle af de andre lande. Så kigger vi på om der er nogle af de andre lande der har et tilnærmelsesvært lige så stort landbrugsareal og hvordan ser det ud der, og der er der faktisk krav om, at der skal være permanent græs, og det græs er meget bedre end pløjet jord da det ikke frigiver lige så meget CO₂. Det er et virkemiddel som vi rigtig gerne vil have fremmet i CAP'en, at man skal have mere permanent græs. Crop-rotation, der blev indført sidste gang, det skal udvides rigtig meget, altså at man skifter afgrøder i stedet for at dyrke det masse hele tiden. Så sådanne ting prøver vi at fremme i EEB's holdninger og i midtterm-review og Consultation osv.

INTERVIEWER: Skal i til tider promovere EEB holdninger i DK?

JLC: Ja det gør vi jo, vi har jo en samlet holdning vi arbejder ud fra. Når vi f.eks. skal kigge på danske positioner der bliver forlagt i specialudvalgene, så er det jo klart at vi også lige ser på, hvad EEB's position er på dette her. Vi skriver ikke noget der er modsat det som EEB synes. Vi kan tone op og ned i forhold til hvad der er vigtigt for DK.

INTERVIEWER: *How would you define the effectiveness of this lobby action?*

JLC: I forhold til den mængde ressourcer vi bruger, så mener vi at det er et rigtigt samarbejde vi har med EEB, sådan så vi har nogen til at få nogle detaljer ud og få drøftet nogle ting, som vi mener er vigtige for DK. Men det er et fællesskab, hvor nogle ting til tider kan være mindre relevant. EEB levere ganske udmærket på dette her.

INTERVIEWER: Vil du sige at der er nogle steder på den nuværende CAP, at her har i haft indflydelse?

JLC: Processen er lidt anderledes end sidste gang, det er jo afgående Kommission, en Kommission der helst ikke vil lægge sig ud med medlemslandene. Vi har også haft en Kommission i den forgangene periode der har været relativ passiv i forhold til at gå til den især på miljøområdet. Der er stort set ikke blevet rejst nogle lovbrud selvom der er åbenlyse brud på EU's regler, nu snakker jeg ikke om CAP'en, men om miljøområdet. Så i det lys er det sværere for os at side i DK og gennemskue processen, end det var sidste gang, da man lavede 2014 revisionen. Det er sværere for os at se hvad der foregår i dette spil. Vi får selvfølgelig nogle meldinger tilbage, men nogle af de linjer som Kommissionen har lagt ud, er helt klart også politiske. Landene kræver lidt mere selvbestemmelse og Kommissionen blander sig mindre i hvad de gør. Vi minder at der skal være så meget som muligt i CAP'en der er mandatory. Det er landene selv kan definere deres niveau synes vi er en dårlig ide, vi vil gerne have det mere mandatory. Der skal være en fælles lavets fællesnævner, og det har vi svært ved at se, hvor den lægger lige nu.

INTERVIEWER: Er der noget fra det danske miljøministerium, som du kan sige de har taget med fra jer af?

JLC: Vi har som sagt desværre ikke gennemskuet det denne her gang. Vi har også en regering der er mere lukket denne gang omkring nogle af de her ting. SÅ det er svært at følge med i. Vi kender godt regeringens holdning, for den har jo været i FT da de skulle have mandat på den. Der er nogle ting i den som vi synes er fine og nogle ting vi synes er mindre fine. Den danske holdning før der kom en udmelding fra Kommissionen var meget åben. Det var meget blødt men nu er det blevet mere specifikt på nogle ting. Den danske holdning er ikke fra vores betragtning dårlig. Det DK mener i forhold til CAP'en er ikke dårligt. Man skal være realistisk omkring CAP'en, og man slipper ikke af med en stor blok af søjle 1 støtten. Der skal dog ikke rykkes penge tilbage til søjle 1 fra søjle 2, snare tværtimod. Vi er imod at man blot for penge for at have jord. Man skal have penge fordi man gør noget godt for samfundet.

INTERVIEWER: SÅ i støtter meget de nye greening tiltag, det med at man får penge hvis man går ind for nogle miljøkrav?

JLC: Ja, men den måde det er opstillet i Kommissionens forslag, det synes vi ikke er godt. Det lægger et niveau under det man har nu. De erfaringer der har været med greening er ikke alt

for gode. Det er for nemt at sige at en græsgrøft ved vejen ned til gården er greening. Det er for slapt.

INTERVIEWER: *Was there a specific stage in the policy process, where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

JLC: I forhold til midtterm-review har vi kigget på hvordan det er gået. Har den levret noget? Vi har også kigget på i hvilken grad man i DK har brugt søjle 2 midler. For det første kunne DK have valgt at flytte flere penge fra søjle 1 til søjle 2. Vi mener dette er et bevis for, at der skal være nogle krav om, at man skal have flere penge i søjle 2. Så har vi kigget på hvordan søjle 2 midler er blevet brugt i DK og har også kigget på, om det er det rigtige snit, til at bruge til miljø tiltag. Det har vi så brugt til vores konsultation til Kommissionen og vores EEB-kreds. I forhold til at få forment en fornemmelse af hvordan den nuværende CAP er og hvordan den kommende CAP skal se ud der har arbejdet omkring midtterm-reviewet jo været fint, i forhold til at få dette på plads. Dertil har der også været konsultation, og de har jo lavet en meget åben konsultation. Den var bemærkelsesværdig åben i forhold til mange ting der var åbne, eksempelvis young farmers, noget der jo egentligt ikke har med os at gøre. På de åbne dele var vi i tæt dialog med vores EEB-kolleger, og lavede til en vis grad også vores svar sammen.

INTERVIEWER: *How might the outcome have been, if you had not acted?*

JLC: EEB ville selvfølgelig stadigvæk havde gjort deres, men de problemer som vi kan se i en dansk kontekst, de ville ikke have været blevet afspejlet og nogle af de virkemidler som vi savner de ville jo ikke have været kommet med. EEB ville forsat have gjort deres, men eftersom DK er så voldsomt et landbrugsland fordi vi har så utroligt meget landbrug i forhold andre lande, så de problemer vi har ville ikke have været med, hvis vi ikke havde været aktive.

Appendix C: Interview with Paulo Gouveia

INTERVIEWER: *How did you set up your interests?* So how did you find out what Copa & Cogeca wanted as goals in regard to the Common Agricultural Policy?

PG: Okay, that one is pretty straight forward. We, between Copa and Cogeca, that are two different organizations, but have a common secretariat, we started a discussion with our member in the context of grouping groups that are focusing on specific issues and we have one working group that focuses on the CAP. So, as soon as, we started hearing the Commissions idea about the future CAP, we started organizing meeting and discussions with our members and we organized quite a number of meetings with our members, where we discussed things. We asked, “*What is their understanding of things?*”, we invited officials from the Commission to present and explain word for word what their ideas is and then we try to come up to a common understanding of what we think. Once we have that, we presented it to the meeting of the precedence of our members and they decide on the document, that was presented to them which present the general opinion of the organizations and if they agree, we have what we call a position and on the basis of that position we start our lobby actions. So, this is the more direct response to your question.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you promote your interests in the different institutions?* Like the Parliament? The Commission? And the Council?

PG: Well... that is easy. As soon as we have a position and during the course of this discussion that is so far, we have adopted, meaning our precedency have adopted three positions, which are gradually more detailed as soon as we have a better understanding of things then we can continue to discuss internally and then agree on something more detailed. When we have these positions we basically go to the Commission, to the Council, to the European Parliament and we talk to those who are responsible and present our idea. Of course, we don't do this all alone because, when it comes for an instance to the Council, we coordinate with our member originations so that they can also discuss with their permanent representations. For instance, in the case of Denmark, we coordinate with our Danish members, the Danish Agricultural and Food Council, and they also know what to go to the Danish Permanent Representation and what to say and what argument to present in regard to the position. So, this is not an individual work by us, it is a team and coordinated work between us and all of our members. Of course, we take the lead when it comes to, for an instance, the top of them who is in charge of the European Parliament and that is what we did from last year... from June last year, when the legal proposal from the Commission was presented all the way to earlier this week and again to Monday next week, when the last of the vote will take in the European Parliament in the committee for Agricultural and Rural Development in the European Parliament. That is at least what we do up until the election of the European Parliament, then the work will continue, and we will see who will have the lead. It will, of course, be the plenary in the record to the rule of procedure, but the details of exactly who has it then we will adjust focus and power of strategy

INTERVIEWER: *How often did you meet with these institutions?* Would you say, that there was one of the institutions you meet with the most or had the most contact with in the process so far?

PG: Well we have contact with both. It is a co-decision process, meaning that the decision is taken by both the Commission and the Parliament, so cannot forget anybody, we treat everybody in the same manner. Potentially it may seem that we pay more attention to the European Parliament, but no, that is not the case. It is a different process with the Parliament, but we treat both institutions in the same manner.

INTERVIEWER: Like what about the Commission? I know of the Civil Dialogue Groups. Would you say, that they also...? Would you describe them for us a bit?

PG: Well okay... Civil Dialogue Groups they are platforms set up, in this particular case, set up by the DG-AGRI who basically sit around the table, European organizations involved in the Agricultural sector, strict between what we call agronomic operators, meaning those representing the farming and the agricultural cooperative sector and the non-agronomic actors, who are basically Non-Governmental Organizations and the purpose of these different platforms, and they are structured according to sectors of things. For instance, there is Civil Dialogue Groups on the CAP, the international aspect of agricultural, on the environment, on rural development and on the specific sectors like cereal or dairy etc. So, the purpose of these Civil Dialogue Groups is to discuss... what is the actuality and what is the input to the agenda and among these, of course, there is the CAP, that is discussed between everybody, It is not a decision-making body. It is a body made by the Commission for listening to, what the civil society thinks. Now, this is about the Civil Dialogue Groups. About our interaction with the Commission. So, as you know, the Commission is the one that has the right of legal initiative, so any text that is tabled and prepared by the European Commission, so the beginning of our lobby activity starts with the Commissions, because the best is to start talking to them and convincing of what we think is the best route even before they start writing something. So, this is the situation.

INTERVIEWER: *Would you describe your contact with these institutions as formal or informal?*

PG: You have everything. You have everything. There are moments for which the formal is necessary. There are other moments where more informal contact is preferred but again behind all of that there is network and you need to have your own network here in Brussels, meaning, that you know people that you can contact. Because you don't lobby over the phone. You need to be able to meet face-to-face and basically see the body language of the other person, because you need to be trustworthy. It is about interpersonal relationship. It is not only about the political content of messages that you transmit, it is about you relate to other people.

INTERVIEWER: Let's move on to the next question. It is about the process of the Common Agricultural Policy and how you have worked with it. *Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?*

PG: Yes...

INTERVIEWER: Can you describe how you did that, a little? What was your role?

PG: Again, what we did was discuss with our members. Put together their opinion and build up our positions, because you can easily that with 76 members, originations, from all across the EU, you end up with pretty different views. So, you have to discuss with them and try to can bring them closer together and identify what are the issues, that unite everybody, so that

you can extract a common position, which I usually call ‘the middle of the road’. Once you do that, it is again trying to make sure, that everybody agrees, and when everybody agree you can then communicate that positions to the Commissions in turns and indicate what we think about the old policy and even the current one, that we have and what is more relevant, the one that they are presenting for the future.

INTERVIEWER: How would you say the role Copa & Cogeca *in the agenda-setting process of the new Common Agriculture Policy*

PG: Well... Errrrhm... I mean, one of the basic rules of lobbying is to be attentive to policy development and to be able to identify as soon as possible of what is coming up in term of the political agenda and in this time, we tried to be prepared, so that when things comes up, we have something to say. When you have something to say immediately from the get go, you have a better chance of influencing or at least striving it away from the wrong direction.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you participate in the policy formulation process of the new Common Agriculture Policy?*

PG: Well... Of course, that was what I meant, when I referred to our preparatory work. During the preparation and following the... [The connection was lost].

PG: The connection went down. Okay, go ahead, because I need to go to a meeting in about 2-3 minutes.

INTERVIEWER: Okay then we will skip a bit ahead. *Did you have a lobby action strategy? An official plan or goals, of what you wanted to achieve in the proposal for the new CAP.*

PG: I mean... once you... It is not enough to have a position, it is not the end. It is the end of the beginning I would say. After that, you need to discuss and decided with your members again, about WHAT you are going to, WHEN you are going to do it and TO WHOM you are going to talk to, to make sure that you try to convince those who takes the decisions and to go into the direction, that you want. So, it is not only agreeing on the content, it is agreeing on the rest of the plan. This is also something, that we do and again from the previous responses, that I gave you, you know, what we ended up doing. The Commission, The Council and the Parliament and then some of the timings of these actions are not in our hand, meaning if you have specific moments for instance in the parliament to contact the MEP’s so that they can table amendments that go in the directions that you want to, you need to be able to say something within these time limits, for example, in this week we have vote on Monday and Tuesday, you have to tell them, how they should vote according to us. That’s what we did the week before the vote. This is the timeline that you have to follow, which is out of our hand. So that is why, in many respects “lobbyism is a reactive activity and not a proactive one”

INTERVIEWER: *Was there a specific institution where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

PG: ... It is always difficult to say, because... It depends a lot on which state the legislative proposal you are. Something it is easier to get through the European Parliament, but then again in the final stages of the process, when it is the dialogues, meaning the final stage of the negotiation between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, when they start, it is very difficult to get influence because it is a kind of... it is very close and it is very secret and you

don't really know, what is being discussed. So, it boils down to, that "the earlier you can say something, the easier it is to get influence"

INTERVIEWER: *Was there a specific stage in the policy process, where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

PG: I mean success can only be measured at the end of the game, because it is still too early, however, we have had, what I would say, at least until now, some small victories, one of them being, that we managed to convince members of the parliament, that school scheme for milk should remain in the current legislative framework with the specific budget and level that it has and not move somewhere else, where there would be a risk of weakening the budget allocated to it, in sort of financing. Anyway, nothing is decided until the end, so you really have to wait until the end.

NVM: *How might the outcome have been, if you had not acted?*

PG: For once, this issue of the school scheme, as I mentioned, would most likely not have gone through and another example where we tried very hard to maintain a minimal level of direct payment in the farmer's income, which you know, that the farmer's income is current around at 46,5 % of the income in other sectors of the economy. It is much lower than the income in other sectors. So, we managed to secure in the future policy, that there is special attention to the direct payment and the contribution to the farmer's income. So, if we hadn't acted, most likely it would have been eroded.

Appendix D: Interview with Bérénice Dupeux

INTERVIEWER: *How did you set up your interests?* In the EEB in regard to the newly proposed CAP. Your position.

BD: Okay, so actually the EEB is a membership organization, so we have national members and then regional members. So, in the case of any type of policy, in this case the agricultural policy, we actually get around and look on what is the current policy of them is and what is our recommendations for the future. So, do you want me to present the position or just how we came up with the position? The later, right?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, yeah.

BP: So basically, we have working groups. Not every member is interested in every issue. Some members, for instance, are more interested in agriculture than others. So those ones are very active, and we organize working groups and in between working groups we have tasks force to facilitate the exchange of information and to come up with the position. So, for instance, for the future CAP, the first document that we had was a communication from the Commission on the future CAP. There is another document, where I drafted, let's say, our position and then circulated it our members, who reacted to it and then we discussed it during our working group and then we establish our position. It is also based on our members experiences that they have faced on the field and on the past implementation of the CAP.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you promote your interests in the different institutions?* Like how you promoted it *In the European Parliament?*

BD: So, basically what we do, is that we have regular meetings with the MEPs and the Commission and all of the permanent representations. We also have our members, who actually have meeting with the MEPs in their constitutions back home in their own country and also, they try to influence their own national government. So, this is how to proceed. We try to have a multi-layer strategy. We coordinate EEB at the EU-level with the MEP and the Commission, while the members to it at a national level and then we share information.

INTERVIEWER: *How often did you meet with these institutions?*

BD: Well this really depends on the political timeline. So, at the beginning of a reform, because it is a Commission initiative so let's say, maybe twice a month we meet with the Commission at least, at the beginning of the reform. Then it goes to the Parliament and then it was very intense for instance for the new parliament to set up a position, so they had 6 months to set up a position, which is really, really short. So, basically, we had several meetings a week with assistants of MEPs, most of the time.

INTERVIEWER: So, you don't have that many regular meetings with the Commission?

BD: Like I said, that in the beginning of the proposal we have regularly meetings with the Commission, maybe once of twice a month. It is not only these meetings, but also small events in Brussels, where we all meet.

INTERVIEWER: *Would you describe your contact with these institutions as formal or informal?*

BD: Both, we do both. We do both informal and formal lobby work.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you work with Common Agriculture Policy, chronologically? Did you participate in the feedback process of the old Common Agriculture Policy?*

BD: Actually, by law, the Commission actually have to do an impact assessment of the current CAP, which they didn't, but if you go to the EEB-website we actually have provided an impact assessment done by scientists on the current agricultural policy, so we did, yes.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you participate in the agenda-setting process of the new Common Agriculture Policy?*

BD: What do you mean by *agenda-setting*?

INTERVIEWER: I mean, when the Commission made up their proposal of what the new CAP should include, for instance on what focus areas that should be included in the CAP proposal.

BD: We tried to influence the priorities, of course. We tried. It doesn't mean, that we did... there is different consultations done formally by the Commission. We systematically replayed to those and informally we tried to influence it of course.

INTERVIEWER: Now you said, that you had a lot of meeting with particular the assistances of the MEPs. Were you able to influence the *agenda-setting process* in the Parliament, when they established, what they thought it should be.

BD: It is difficult to know if there is a causality between my work and the work of other NGOs and what comes out of Parliament. We are trying then to identify that but because they change things it is difficult to say.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you participate in the policy formulation process of the new Common Agriculture Policy? Have any of your positions been able to make it through to the current negotiations?*

BD: Have some policy positions that involves moving away from, let's say, an antiquated approach to a more recent-day approach and this narrative have been taking up in this future CAP proposal.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you participate in the decision-making process of the new Common Agriculture Policy? Have you been able to push some of the decisions-makers into your direction?*

BP: Yes... Well like I said it is difficult to say if it is due to our involvement or if it is only due to fact, that the MEP was already sensitive to that course – was already sensitive to that course of direction. So, it is difficult to say, if it is due to our work or if the MEP had already decided on going in this direction.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you have a lobby action strategy?*

BD: Yes, we did.

INTERVIEWER: *What was the goal of your lobby action strategy?*

BD: Our goal is to maximize influence on decision-makers and the willingness for them to take our position.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have some more definitive goals, like ‘more focus on greening’ for instance? Or everything you can point to, saying “They really something we want them to include in the proposal?”

BD: It is difficult to say now, because we are in the middle of the road now, and that it is very strategical, and because we are in the middle of that, I would like to keep that information for myself.

INTERVIEWER: *How would you define the effectiveness of this lobby action?* Like is there a specific institution or a specific stage in the policy process, where you feel, that you are listened to the most.

BD: When it comes to... When we are talking about the Common Agricultural Policy we have extremely difficulties with the normal agricultural decision-maker. So, agricultural ministries, COM-Agri, DG-AGRI and the Commission are not the people who are welcoming our message the most. Of course, if we talk to COM-ENVI they are much more willing to exchange about it and have more interests in gather information from us, however they have less to say in the decision-making process. They are not the most influential decision-makers in this process.

INTERVIEWER: Said quite interesting, because we had the same answer from your Danish member organization.

BD: Yes, I would guess, that this is reflected on a national level in every EU-country.

INTERVIEWER: *Was there a specific stage in the policy process, where you had greater success promoting your goal of interest?*

BD: It is difficult to say, because there is so many variables, but of course for the EEB we have stronger influence on the Parliament and the Commission, so we don't have any influence, whatsoever, with the European Council. So, as long as the decision-making process was in the hand of the Parliament mostly, yeah, there we had an influence.

INTERVIEWER: So, on the three reports, that the Parliaments is working on, you have been able to influence, for instance, the amendment that have been tabled.

BD: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: *How might the outcome have been, if you hadn't taken action?*

BD: It would be cocky to say, “this is because of us. I we would not have been here, this would not have happened”. If I was to say that, that would be extremely cocky.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think, however, that you have been able to influence the CAP proposal in, for an instance, in a more environmental direction?

BD: No, unfortunately not. I don't think so. The only thing, that we might succeed to do is to include more players around the table.

INTERVIEWER: We have also been in contact with the agricultural organizations and they have been more positive in their responses for influence.

BD: I am not surprised of that. I mean, they are the most influential lobby in the CAP process, so I am not surprised. They have a specific interest.

Appendix E: Interview with Felix Mittermayer

FM: I am a staff member of the AGRI committee, so I am a civil servant, so anything that I say, is just my own opinion. It is not what the institution says, to find what the institution says, then you need to look at the official documents. If you speak to a MEP, then that would also just be their own opinion. Mein will just a an approximal opinion.

FM: If you really want to speak to the MEPs, you need to call or show up at their office.

INTERVIEWER: *1 What was your political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy?*

FM: The Commission submits its proposal, first a communication that was sent out in November last year (2017) and in June 2018 the Commission sent out their proposal to the Council and the Parliament. Then the presidency assigned it to the AGRI Committee and several other Committees to also give their opinions and one Committee to also have shared competences, this meant that it took some time, to settle it down, because of overlapping competences between the Committees. The ENVI Committee was of course the one with most overlap. The presidency decided to have AGRI and ENVI have shared competences, because of how much the CAP also goes into environmental areas. So, they have shared competences on a certain amount of articles. That only concern one of the three “proposals” from the EP. The next part was to find the three rapporteurs for the reports, the shadows and the rapporteurs on the opinions given. Because of time sensitivity, two workshops were organized in October (2018), where experts and the EP’s own research department, helped with information and data. On the 21st of November (2018) the reports were presented by the three rapporteurs, on the Commission's proposal. After this we started with the technical and shadow meetings.

INTERVIEWER: *Where the stakeholders invited to the workshops?*

FM: Yes, all the meetings of the Committee are open to the public, although you need to register, either as a single person or as a lobby organization. You would also have to register in the transparency register. The programs for these two events can be found on the EP’s website. These where the only two official organized events, however the MEPs, the political groups, all of them had their own events as well. They can invite whoever they want, and can make use of the rooms of the EP. This has happened in all of the Committees that are involved in the CAP, and it is a very normal thing in the EP.

INTERVIEWER: *Was there any other kind of contact or event with stakeholders, between the Parliament and the stakeholder?*

FM: Officials organised, nothing besides these two events, but of course there was a serie of events organised by the different groups in the Parliament, the greens, the EPP, the S&D, they all had their events. The can request a room and translation in Parliament for a potitcal group event and then they can invite whomever they want, and they can use the facilities. So, there you have to go to the individual sites of the political groups to find all the events. Not only in the AGRI-committee, the ENVI-committee and all the other owns involved in the CAP. There was quite a lot going on. This was a normal Parliament procedure.

INTERVIEWER: *Was Copa & Cogeca or the EEB part of these events?*

FM: You would have to read about that on the events. If they were in the plenum then it should say so. Normally they are here. Copa has their people here, and the EEB cooperates with other organizations for example WHO or the Greenpeace so they are also often here.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you perceive their inputs?*

FM: Once the report has been published and sent out to the members and of course also to all the stakeholders. So, what the stakeholders do, is that they send their own amendments to all the MEPs that they consider would have an open ear. So, the NGO's send to some and the interest organizations send to others. To see this all you have to do, is to take the amendments sent by the interest organisations and make cross-references with what has been put forward and what has been agreed to in the EP. The member states do the same thing.

INTERVIEWER: How does the member states send in their opinions?

FM: The same, they send in their own concrete amendments to proposals. There are also meetings, both formal and informal, where the amendments are explained.

INTERVIEWER: *Did their inputs change or add to your political interests? Would you say, in your own opinion, that these inputs have an impact on what gets decided in the EP?*

FM: Yes absolutely, some amendments from MEPs have the exact same wording as what has been put forward by the interest organisations. The same with the member states. Some MEPs take the amendments from their member states and send them directly to the Committee.

INTERVIEWER: *Did you inform the stakeholders/lobby organisations of your perceived view on the inputs that they gave you*

FM: Yes, that is why they are here. They know they can deliver, and that they can prove to their constituents, be that donors or members, even member states, they have evidence that they can deliver. They have a lot of impact.

INTERVIEWER: *How might the outcome have been, if you weren't approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations?*

FM: Of course, they would propose something much less based on reality on much more on their own personal knowledge and experience which is not good enough. The MEPs does not know what is going on in every member state. It is their job to relay the messages that they get from the people. If you have to speak on behalf of 500 million, then of course you speak with them through their organisations. It is very important and very relevant. The important thing is that you have to make sure that the process is transparent. That is how it is in the EP, all the documents can be seen, and you can go to the interest organisations websites and find their amendments. Then you can see where an amendment comes from. You do have to register for the transparency register, so that it is stated who you are and who you represent. If you do this, then you are welcome to join the debate.

INTERVIEWER: *We have been talking to the interest organisations, and we have been getting the opinion that the environmental organisations have a harder time getting through with their opinions, in for example in the AGRI Committee, compared to COPA & Cogeca. Do you have any opinion or comment on that?*

FM: Well that is their perception of them. Maybe they should have made a better argument of had some better data or evidence. For me this is an open competition. Our job in the secretariat is to make sure, that it is the same for anyone, and that it is done in transparency. If a MEP is approached by an interest organization, no matter where they come from, we want to see that they properly transparent. If some are better than others at setting up meetings, then that is their problems. Follow the rules and let the better argument win. The smaller organisations have less money and expertise then the big ones, but they can still have a big impact.

Appendix F: Interview with Iman Boot

INTERVIEWER: Tell us a bit about your function

IB: I am what you would call a senior expert. I have been working in AGRI Info for a long time, and I have been involved in the last three reforms. I am working in a unite called policy perspective, which is supposed to be the policy unit, so developing new policies, thinking about what is going on ect. For this reform (the new one in the making), I basically sent out the communication that was sent out, coordinated the work on the CAP reform, so the drafting of the regulation.

INTERVIEWER: Who was this communication sent out to?

It was essentially for the EU institutions. The communication of November 2017, where we indicated what we intended to do with the CAP reform. It is a formal document that is adopted by the Commission and then sent to the Council and EP. We also do use it to inform stakeholders, but it is part of the policy process.

INTERVIEWER: *What was your political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy?*

IB: I am a civil servant, I do not have a political interest in the CAP, I do what my political masters tell me. So, what the Commissions line was in the current CAP reform. What our line was, was that we had to simplify, because greening was such a disaster that we knew that we had to transits. And at the same time, we wanted to open up the CAP for many new things that we knew where not easy to implement into the current policy. So, we mad to simplify, and we had to modernize/update the CAP.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you pursue these interests?*

IB: We draft a policy. We start quite early, using conferences and papers and making some events. By letting some ideas fly we can see how people react. Then we talk to a number of different stakeholders and to the other colleagues inside the Commission, like DG Environment, DG Climate. These are the main DGs for us. We also talk to our political masters, to see what direction we want to go to. And then gradually to start to collect your ideas and checking out what member states and MEPs want to do. This ends in a communication, like the one I mentioned earlier. This is still just an initial stage, for you look at how people react, what is the feedback we get, and then you can make the proposal that came last year (June 2018).

INTERVIEWER: *3 How was the collaboration with stakeholders?*

IB: We are dependent on the information what we get from the stakeholders, both formal and informal consultations. But I think that the informal consultations are more important, since this is where you try to find out what people think and what people want. This is something that we really active pursue, also now that we are working on the new Commission program, we go and try to make lists, so what are the interests of the stakeholders. Rather or not we chose to take this into account differs, but we have to know what the stakeholders want.

INTERVIEWER: *3.1 How often did you meet with stakeholders?*

IB: We meet quite often with stakeholders, they send us papers, they want to speak to us they want to see us. But we also constantly check if we cover everything, are there parts of society, stakeholders, that we do not see? And then we will go and try to find them from our side.

INTERVIEWER: *3.2 Who took the initiative to make contact?*

IB: Most of the case it is the stakeholders that make the initiative to make contact, not always. But 60-70 % it is the stakeholders that contact us.

INTERVIEWER: A quick follow up for that question: Does the Commission have the resources to actually confirm the things/inputs that they get from the stakeholders?

IB: We always ask for what their basis for saying this is, what is their data? It has been public available studies and things like that. We have to be able to check what they sent us. We never just take it for face-value. In reality I work with the technical aspects, so I am far more interested in the facts and real data, and the stakeholders can be extremely help in digging out information, that we might not otherwise see. But it is data and studies we want to see, not so much policy views. Those we can more or less predict.

INTERVIEWER: *3.3 Would you describe these meetings as formal or informal?*

IB It is the informal approach that the stakeholders normally take. And in those meetings, we always make sure, that there are at least two from the Commission present. We have a formal consultation called Civil dialog group, where you place all stakeholders together. In our experience these meetings are not useful. We do not get information in these meetings, and the other stakeholders does not get any real information. It is a legal obligation for us to have these, but they are not useful for us. They are useful for the stakeholders, since they get a lot of information from the Commission.

INTERVIEWER: *3.3 Were you in contact with Copa & Cogeca?*

IB: We meet very regularly with Copa. But we are also interested in meeting with the individual members of Copa, because as a European organization Copa has difficulty formulating points of view, since they have to come to a common view in their organization. This make their views rather bland and it does not tell us very much. And that is why we are very interested in meeting with the members of Copa, since they give us more clear views and better information.

INTERVIEWER: *3.4 Were you in contact with The European Environmental Bureau: EEB?*

IB: They never approach us, we approach them. They have very good information, but they are not very outgoing. On the environmental front it is not really EEB but "Bird life" (? 14.16) that is the main stakeholder. Possible WWF is a good one. And you got thinktanks, "IIP" (14:25) in London that is very good. So EEB has very good information, but they do not go through us. Maybe they make use of another DG. Also, they are an official, so they do not have to sell us their product.

INTERVIEWER: *4: How did you perceive their inputs?*

IB: Is in line what I said earlier. Data and statistic, the big problem is that we do not have any big data on biodiversity trends. So, if a stakeholder comes and have data on like insects, that is

very interesting for us. On policy views we are interested but this more for seeing how it might turn out in EP. It is new information that we like.

INTERVIEWER: 5: *Did their inputs change or add to your political interests?*

IB: Of course. We actively try to see how it might go in Council and in EP. So, we do take into account what they say. The political level is in the late stages (that is where the Commissioner is active). It is at the technical level stakeholders can have an influence. At the political level it is pointless for the stakeholders to try a change the Commission view, since they have already made their proposal. Instead they go to the EP. They talk to MEPs and member states and try to have them make amendments.

INTERVIEWER: What about the personal goals of the Commissioner?

IB: This is difficult for me to judge. The Commissioners change, and they have different goals of course. The Commissioner look at it politically. If they fear they might lose the argument in EP, then they take greater note of the stakeholders' view. Some stakeholders have better access to MEPs and their national politicians, and so the Commissioner has to take note of how the powerplay might turn out. The Commission proposal must be realistic (able to be adopted/accepted by the other institutions).

INTERVIEWER: Do you think that the Council and EP have the same thoughts in their proposals, that it also has to be accepted in other institutions?

IB: I think the member states has the same thing on national level, but EP is chaotic. It is not that well organisaed. A little anecdote, I once had an NGO say: "Yes I have to go, I am making an amendment". And I was looking a little surprised and asked how? "We will send the amendment to a MEP that will then propose the amendment" And I asked, does the person understand it? "No, we just give it to them".

INTERVIEWER: 5.1 *Did you inform the stakeholders/lobby organisations of your perceived view on the inputs that they gave you*

IB: The professional ones know they have influence. Not all have the resources and knowledge to build up. A professional lobby organisation has the means to collect good information and data, and the means to follow the political life inside the Commission. They should know that the Commission is working on. They should know the EP and what the member states are doing. They should know what to say, so that they can play the game.

INTERVIEWER: 6: *How might the outcome have been, if you weren't approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations?*

IB: Of course. Our proposal would have had a lower quality, because we do not have the knowledge the same amount as them. So, they make it better.

Appendix G: Interview with Morten Holm-Hemmingsen

INTERVIEWER: *What was your political interest regarding the Common Agricultural Policy?*

MHH: I represent the Danish government in the negotiations of the Common Agricultural Policy, so the political interest is that of Denmark. So, we worked to promote a CAP that to the largest extent possible underpins a competitive and sustainable agriculture sector in Europe. So, we have a number of priorities in that regard, that are of course in accordance with what the government thinks and present it to parliament,

INTERVIEWER: *2: How did you pursue these interests?*

MHH: Well the Danish government is represented in the Council, so the CAP is of course proposed by the Commission, who has the right to propose legislation, and then we need to find common ground between the EP and the Council as part of the co-legislation process. My role was mainly to negotiate on behalf of Denmark within the Council, that is where we are currently trying to find a common position within the Council. This means that I negotiates on behalf of Denmark in various forums, mostly in what is called “special committee on agriculture” that meets on a regularly basis that contains all members of the European Union, but we also of course have experts that go to more technical working parties and then we of course also have informal meetings with other member states, to make alliances and propose making interest that way.

INTERVIEWER: *3: How was the collaboration with stakeholders?*

MHH: We have a standard procedure ahead of every Council meeting, so there are around, lets say nine-ten agricultural council meetings in Brussels and Strasburg every year, and they are prepared according to a standard procedure, where lets say the Danish government has to go to the European Affairs committee in parliament, the Friday before the Council the week passed it before we go to the European Affaires Committee, altså Europa Udvalget, then we have to have a consultation with stakeholders. So normally this is a written consultation, we will write up what we call the “samle notat” so it is a sort of document sorting the agenda items for the Council and the Danish government and the position of the Danish government. That will then be sent to external stakeholders, so a wide of variety stakeholders, such as NGOs, business organizations ect. Ect. And then they will send in their writing comments on that material, and we will include it in the document that goes to the European Affaires Committee, so Folketinget can see what the position of the stakeholders is. So that is the formal thing that happens more or less ten times a year and then in addition to that there is a process both in the ministry and in the Danish agency for agriculture, that is Landbrugsstyrelsen, they have a setup where they invite a wide variety of stakeholders for meetings where these stakeholders can give their opinions and can come with varies ideas for the CAP. Then we of course also have informal meetings with stakeholders if they wish to have more informal meetings where we can exchange views or sometimes it is about just trying to understand the proposals, what do they understand, how do they see it working in practices, trying to understand other member states positions, trying to understand others things that can either be exploratory or it can be like they have a specific measures they want to deliver or we have specific measures that we deliver to them, or it can be various types of interactions.

INTERVIEWER: Does working groups that you have with national stakeholders, is that protocol 2 or what is it called?

MHH: Yeah that is paragraph 2, that is the formal group.

INTERVIEWER: *3.1 How often did you meet with stakeholders?*

The meetings for me personally would probably not more than every second month. But the thing is, that if you look at the ministry and on the agency, then there would be more regularly contact, because then there are specific experts that discuss the specific items with various stakeholders. Lets say for me personally, this would be a bit rare because in the beginning there was more interactions as trying to understand the proposal and trying to understand the position (9:00 ???) I have had fewer meetings, but I guess that when we get to a more decisive face of the process there would probably be an increase number of meetings again. But I think it is, yeah you could also discuss how important is frequency of the meetings, and I guess that is limited because you can also just have written in times, and as I said opinions of the stakeholders. So meetings themselves are not necessary the only tool, so you can have many tools.

INTERVIEWER: So not that great an importance on face-to-face contact?

MHH: Yeah it is important, but it depends on the context, depends on what the stakeholders have to say in a face-to-face meeting, weather they call on the phone or weather they send a written reply, I think that I would justice it from the context.

INTERVIEWER: *3.2 Who took the initiative to make contact? 10:20*

MHH It can be both ways, we can ask questions to the stakeholders if we have concrete ideas and they can then give their feedback on if that would fly, but of course most often the stakeholders they come to us cause they want to have information they want to deliver.

INTERVIEWER: *Were you in contact with Copa & Cocega?*

HMM: DAFC is a member of Copa & Cogeca and a very active member, so we don't speak to them. We speak with DAFC and they tell us what Copa & Cogeca is doing.

INTERVIEWER: *Were you in contact with The European Environmental Bureau: EEB?*

The same story. We are in contact with DSNC and Økologisk landsforening, and they have their pan-European groups, EBB and ifoam is it is mostly this way that we speak with the Danish organisations and the pan-European they speak with the Commission and the EP, since they are based in Brussels.

INTERVIEWER: *How did you perceive their inputs?*

MHH: That is a very board question, because the inputs they vary a lot. So the short answer is hat some inputs are, lets say we take note of the inputs and for one reason or the other we do not react to it. Other inputs are very valuable. Some inputs are not valuable to us because maybe they concern things that are outside our mandate, for example if they are in relation to the EU budget, the IMF negotiations, then as the ministry of Food and Environment we can not do anything it, because that part of the negotiations are handled by the ministry of Finance and the prime minister's office. So when L&F tells us that they want a larger budget, we take note of it, but it is not useful input for us. Useful inputs are when they give us new information, like

this idea would not work in practice, or they have an idea for change so this could work better in practice.

INTERVIEWER: *How would you describe a “good” input? (So there is a specific form of inputs that you are more favorable towards?)*

MHH: Yeah exactly because, and I think that the interest groups know themselves, that if they have a position on something, it will sometimes just be stated, but if that position does not concern us or if it is unrealistic, someone might say that the budget for the CAP should be lowered or that the CAP should be disbanded, then we take note of it, and we might agree on some of it, but it is not really useful inputs because it is not something that we can use in the negotiations and that is where we are right now. So for inputs to be useful it has to be relevant, perspirant and acute (?).

INTERVIEWER: So less political statements and more facts and knowledge about the sector?

MHH: Exactly and concrete proposals for improvements.

INTERVIEWER: *Did their inputs change or add to your political interests?*

MHH: I think that it is too early to say. The negotiations started last year in June, with the Commission proposing the next CAP and I think that it will be up to you, the scholars, to analyze because we still, if not in the early stage, not in the decisive stage in the reform process. We are still examining some of the details of the proposals and when though the Danish position is more or less set it is not consolidated, it is not formally adopted, so it is too soon to say rather different inputs have made changes, since it can still happen.

INTERVIEWER: *If you were to say where you were in the process of the new CAP, would you say that you are in the policy formulation face or in the agenda-setting face?*

MHH: We are differently in the policy formulation face, because the proposal is on the table, this is policy formulation, what we did prior to June 2018, that was trying to set the agenda, and trying to set the headlines that we wanted, like more green, receptive, less subsidies, less market distortions. That is agenda-setting or trying to, and where we are now it trying to create details on the proposals.

INTERVIEWER: *About the feed-back process from the current CAP, how was your collaboration with the stakeholders there? Because they have told us that they were a part of the feedback process.*

MHH: On a daily basis, Landbrugsstyrelsen received feedback on how the CAP works and doesn't work. Mostly stakeholders told where it did not work, they would complain about ineffective processes, they would complain about heavy accreditation processes, about all those things that don't work and the green NGOs they focused on what made an environmental impact. It was not like that you had a seven years process and then received feedback, it was a constantly occurring, both formally and informally exchanged views on how things are working out with the stakeholders, so I would say that the feedback was very frequent.

INTERVIEWER: *How might the outcome have been, if you weren't approached by stakeholders/lobby organisations?*

MHH It would be interesting to hear what the stakeholders would say here. It is impossible to say, especially because we navigate in an political environment where the governments has to make decisions that are somewhat reflective of what society and the external actors that form society. You would always need to navigate according to the inputs that the stakeholders and society gives. You always make your decisions based on the society that you are in. It is of course impossible to say what their inputs mean.

MHH: The ministry and the agency are very apricate of the inputs that they receive.

Appendix H: Interview with Mariann Fischer Boel

INTERVIEWER: Vores første spørgsmål er: *Hvordan var forholdet mellem lobby organisationer og EU Kommissionen?* og der tænker vi, om du vil beskrive dine egne erfaringer her?

MFB: Jo det bliver det jo. Altså det kan da godt være, at der er andre måder at gøre det på, i forhold til andre kommissærernes ressortområde, men for landbrug og landdistrikt udviklet var vi selvfølgelig i udgangspunkt åbne over for at møde andre - møde forskellige organisationer, men det var jo afgørende, at vi vidste, hvem de var, altså at det ikke var nogle selvbestaltede grupper, der bare ønskede at få adgang. Som udgangspunkt mente vi, at man godt kunne lære noget eller høre noget, som man ikke vidste i forvejen og så var vi selvfølgelig fuldstændige beviste om, hvem det var, som vi var sammen med. De kom med det klare formål om at gøre deres indflydelse gældende. Vi var jo bestemt ikke altid enige – bestemt ikke! Fordi jeg som kommissær havde lagt den linje, at jeg ville gøre europæisk landbrug mere konkurrencedygtigt, åbne det for mere frihandel, og det var jo ikke altid det, som var på dagsordenen hos nogle af de lobbyorganisationer, som vi ”samarbejdede” med, kan man vel godt sige. Nogle af organisationerne har også et problem, kan man sige, lad os nu tage COPA, som et eksempel, som er landbrugsorganisationernes lobbyorganisation i Bruxelles. Der sidder medarbejdere, folkevalgte fra alle medlemslande, og når jeg var til møde med dem, var det helt indlysende, at man var nødt til at finde den laveste fællesnævner, for ellers var der blevet revolution, fordi der jo er nogle lande, som ingenting ville, som ville bevare alting, som det altid havde været og som ikke så i øjnene, at vi levede i en meget mere globaliseret verden. Derfor var det sommetider rædselsfuldt at være til de møder hos COPA fordi, man havde hele paletten af holdninger fra de nordeuropæiske lande, Danmark og Sverige, som måske sammen med de mest udpræget, Holland og England på sidelinjen og så de sydeuropæiske lande og i udpræget de øst/central-europæiske lande, som jo ikke ønskede at tingene skulle ændre sig. De ville bare gerne have de penge, som de havde fået ved deres medlemskab og så skulle det bare blive, som det altid havde været. Så lobbyorganisationer er meget forskellige. Der var også nogle, som repræsenterede en enkelt sektor, f.eks. vinsektoren inden for mit ressortområde. Selvfølgelig var deres medlemmer ikke ens, men de havde lettere ved at finde fælles fodslag. Det kan man sige, at hvis en lobbyorganisation har et bagland, som er stærkt og enigt, så får de mere indflydelse. Det er jo altid nemmere, f.eks. hvis du havde COPA, så kunne du bare høre alle holdningerne og sige ”fint, tak. Det var interessant” og så går man igen eller også så smider man dem ud af kontoret igen.

INTERVIEWER: Nu nævnte du før, at det ikke var alle, som man bare snakkede med – lobbyorganisationer, at man ikke bare ville have dem ind, for at have dem ind. Hvad var det helt konkret man ledte efter hos de lobbyorganisationer, som man ville tale med?

MFB: Det er klart, at aktiviteten fra lobbyorganisationernes side altid var kraftigste, når der var et lovforslag på bordet. Nu var det sådan, at vi indenfor mit ressortområde var lovgivere og vi skulle så blive enige med ministerrådet om, hvordan tingene skulle udvikle sig. Når man er lovgivere, så er det klart, at lobbyorganisationerne havde en stor interesse i at komme ind og påvirke udviklingen. Det er klart, at vi lyttede, men vi vidste også godt selv, hvor vi ville hen.

Det er jo ikke sådan, nogle steder, at fordi der kommer en lobbyorganisation ind, at man så klapper i hænderne og siger ”Neii, hvor lyder det fantastisk godt”. Selvfølgelig prøvede vi det af og det strittede sommetider i alle retninger

INTERVIEWER: Lad os hoppe videre til 2. spørgsmål *Hvordan vil du beskrive den kontakt der var imellem lobby organisationer og EU Kommissionen?*

MFB: Altså generelt var den god. Vi havde jo ingen interesser i at skabe en dårlig en kommunikation med lobbyorganisationer, altså de store etablerede lobbyorganisationer indenfor de forskellige grene. Der var også de mere uorganiserede lobbyorganisationer, f.eks. indenfor mælkeområdet, hvor jeg jo havde afskaffet mælkekvoter, og det skal jeg lige garantere for at det skabte furor. Det var sådan, at jeg i perioder blev nødt til at være fuldstændigt dækket af med sikkerhedsvagter, fordi de var parat til at likvidere mig. Det var jo en lille gruppe specifikt på mælkeområdet, hvor nogle af dem var rimelige håndfaste, så det var ikke alle, som kunne finde grænsen, vel? Det var blandt dem, som var rimeligt militante, når det kom til stykket. De stillede i en periode om i Bruxelles hver måned, når vi havde rådsmøde, med deres store traktorer, gyllevogne, halmspredere og blokerede rundkørslen ved Kommissionen og Ministerrådet, så det var jo mundret. Sådan kan det også være.

INTERVIEWER: Hvis vi skal vende tilbage til, lads os sige, de mere ordentlige lobbyorganisationer, *vil du så sige, om kontakten var formel eller uformel?*

MFB: Den var, når de kom ind på mit kontor i Kommissionen, så var den rimelig formel, men de havde jo også kontakt til... jeg havde jo et kabinet på... Det ved jeg jo ikke, om i har arbejdet lidt med – den model vi kørte efter... I Danmark har en minister en spindoktor. Det er efter min opfattelse en frygtelig opstilling, fordi der putter man én person ind imellem dig selv og hele apparatet i ministeriet. I kommissionen har man et kabinet og der får man selv lov til at udvælge syv akademiker og syv ”sekretærer”, men de arbejder lidt anderledes end almindelige sekretærer, og selvfølgelig dem man skulle bruge til arkiv, og sådan noget. De 14 mennesker skal være fra fire forskellige nationer, så man kan ikke drive national politik. De havde selvfølgelig også kontakt med mange af de forskellige lobbyorganisationer, når vi var i en proces med at lave lovgivning. Så det var ikke mig alene, der havde kontakten, men vi var selvfølgelig meget bevidste om, hvem vi tog ind og hvor åbne vi også kunne være over for dem. Man behøver ikke fortælle alt, hvad man ved, hvis man ikke bliver spurgt.

INTERVIEWER: Vil du sige, at de var gode til at sende jer idépapir osv.?

MFB: De havde mange idéer og altså nogle af. Vi kunne jo ikke vide alt, hvad der skete rundt om i 26 medlemslande, så var det jo også en god informationskilde og vi vidste jo fuldstændig, hvorfor de kom og hvad de ville med det og når man har den indgangsvinkel, så lader man sig jo ikke pådutte noget. Så kan man jo filtrere det ud af det, som man kunne have brug for at vide. For mig, var lobbyorganisationerne ingen klods om benet, bestemt ikke. Det var en kilde til informationer, som vi måske ikke altid var i besiddelse af. Om vi kunne bruge dem eller ej, var jo en anden sag.

INTERVIEWER: Så er vi allerede ved spørgsmål tre om, *Hvor stor betydning vil du mene lobby organisationerne og deres inputs til forslag var for EU Kommissionen?*

MFB: De var nyttige, men det betød jo så ikke, at vi per automatik 'cashede' ind, hvad de sagde. De kom jo med en helt klar dagsorden og i nogle tilfælde mente de, at jeg var for liberal og synes, at jeg var alt for konservativ. Så vi fandt som regel et sted midt i mellem. Når var situationen jo, da jeg var i Bruxelles, at Europa Parlamentet ingen indflydelse havde på landbrugspolitikken. Det vil jo sige, at når jeg skulle have et lovforslag igennem, skulle jeg "kun" igennem Ministerrådet, altså de 26 landbrugs-/fødevarerministre. Det var dem, som jeg skulle finde et kompromis med. Det var jo ikke per hoved, men per antal stemmer, som det enkelte medlemsland havde. Hvis det nu havde været sådan, at jeg skulle rundt om Europa Parlamentet, så havde det været meget, meget, mere vanskeligt at have lavet noget, der virkede flyttede tingene. Noget på handelsområdet, som var liberalt, som åbnede markedet, der fratog eller reducerede støtten til landbruget. Det ville have været meget, meget, vanskeligt igennem Europa Parlamentet. Man kan jo sige, at Europa Parlamentet var en slags lobbyist ift. Kommissionen dengang. Det er jo lavet om med Lissabon-traktaten og måske er det i dag svære at lave nogle reformer, som virkelig flytter noget. Det var så lige et sidespring.

MFB: Og så til spørgsmål fire, om *lobby organisationerne, under min tid som kommissær, havde en positiv eller negativ indflydelse arbejdet*. Altså jeg synes jo ikke, at det havde en negativ indflydelse. Som sagt, så var de en informationskilde til nogle, sådan 'nitty gritty details', som vi ikke altid havde øje på og det var så med danne det endelige store puslespil, når vi skulle beslutte, hvordan reformerne skulle udformes. De var jo inde på det tidspunkt, hvor vi begyndte at arbejde med en reform. Det var jo ikke sådan, at når vi først havde fremsat en reform, så var det jo altid vanskeligere at gå ind og få indflydelse, når det er sat ned på papir. Så længe, at vi arbejdede med forskellige scenarier for en ændring af, f.eks. vin eller grønsager, så længe vi arbejdede med forskellige scenarier, så var mulighederne for at få indflydelser større, ind når det endelig lovforslag var fremsat. Det var lobbyorganisationerne selvfølgelig obs. på at komme tidligt ind i processen.

INTERVIEWER: Så det var ved fastsættelsen af dagsordenen, hvor du vil mene, at lobbyorganisationerne var mest aktive?

MFB: Nej, altså når vi skulle arbejde med et nyt lovforslag. Det kunne være 'greening' af landbrugspolitikken, den nye grønne dagsorden. Det var jo undervejs i hvert fald seks måneder og inden vi lagde et stykke papir frem i kollegiet, blandt mine 25 kollegaer i de ugentlige møder, hvor man skulle have sit forslag godkendt, så i processen op til, så var det klart, at lobbyorganisationer var mere aktive, end når lovforslaget først stod på papiret.

INTERVIEWER: Så det var ikke selve formuleringen, som de var inde i?

MFB: Nej nej! Det får de ikke nogen indflydelse på! De kan få indflydelse på hvad retning, altså meget mere overordnet "Hvad vi vil med det her". Selv formuleringen fik de slet ikke lov

til at blande sig i. Altså det er mere det overordnet, ”hvad er det jo en linje vi lægger?” ”hvad er det vi vil med den europæiske vin-, grønsags- eller mælkeproduktion?” De var slet ikke nede i udformningen af lovforslagene. Det var noget vi... altså udover kabinettet havde jeg jo et direktorat, det der kaldes generaldirektoratet for landbrug. Der sad jo 1.100 mennesker, der havde stor viden om landbrugspolitikken, både på det praktiske og på det juridiske plan. Så det er jo ikke sådan, at vi sidder 16 mennesker over i højhuset ved Schumann og laver det hele selv. Det ville vi ikke have nogle muligheder for. Så de lobbyister, som svævede omkring i systemet, tog jo også sat i generaldirektoratet for landbrug, de tog fat i kabinettet og de tog fat i mig, så der var hele vejen rundt.

INTERVIEWER: Så lade os gå videre til spørgsmål 5 *Føler du, at der med tiden er kommet et bedre forhold mellem lobby organisationerne og EU Kommissionen, sidenhen?*

MFB: Hvordan det fungerer i dag? Der er nogle, der gerne vil høre, hvad andre mener og der andre, som ikke gider at blive generet af, hvad andre mener. Sådan tror jeg altid, at det har været, men jeg har ikke et indtryk af, at der er kommet et dårligere forhold. Der er jo de lobbyorganisationer, som ikke kender grænsen, og de bliver jo ’sidelinet’. Dem giver man simpelthen ikke mødes med, hvis f.eks. hvis de går helt over steget på, både i deres sprogbrug og måden de viser sig frem på. Det er et ’no-go’.

INTERVIEWER: Altså vi har jo tidligere i dag faktisk snakket med Copa & Cogeca’s policy chef...

MFB: Hvad siger han?

INTERVIEWER: Han har måske lidt varmere ord for, hvor vigtig lobbyorganisationerne er. Det er jo hans job?

MFB: Det har han. Det skal han have. Selvfølgelig skal han have det. Det siger jeg jo også. De har da en mission, men der er altså nogle af dem, som ikke kan finde ud af de. De der mælkefolk var helt uden for kanten. Det kan jo ikke være rigtigt, at man skal have fire stærke mænd om sig, når man skal mødes med dem. Der er også en kant.

INTERVIEWER: Det giver jo et godt indblik i de forskellige metoder, som nogle lobbyorganisationer er villige til at bruge, skræmme metoder osv.

MFB: Ja, meget håndfaste metoder, vil jeg sige.

INTERVIEWER: Altså ja, ift. spørgsmål 6, om det er *positiv eller negativ udvikling*, er måske lidt svært at sige noget om?

MFB: Ja, det har jeg lidt svært med at svare på, for jeg har ikke længere fingeren på pulsen, men jeg vil da tro, at det går den rigtige retning, men det kan jeg jo ikke sige med 100% sikkerhed, men der er jo ikke nogen... at hvis man som kommissær ikke vil mødes. Hvis der

opstår den holdning, at man blandt lobbyorganisationerne ikke vil mødes med dem, det tror jeg bestemt ikke vil være godt for den pågældende kommissær. Så får man det er ”jeg er alene med” mærkat.

INTERVIEWER: Jeg var bl.a. til et præsidiemøde i COPA-COGECA og der fik man da indtrykket af, at de har et fantastisk godt forhold til Phil Hogan, den nuværende landbrugskommissær.

MFB: Ja, ja. Det vil jeg også sige. Han er jo irer og de er jo ikke så svære at have med at gøre. Jeg har også et fint forhold til COPA i den periode der. Vi havde nogle sammenstød, men det var når polakkerne og spanierne, ja mest polakkerne, at jeg havde lavet nogle reformer på sukkerområdet, så blev de altså vrede, men sådan er det jo. Der prøvede deres kollegaer jo at hidse dem ned, altså med større eller mindre held, vil jeg mene. Når man vil forandre tingene, så kan man jo ikke undgå, at man vil få nogle negative tilkendegivelser, for hvorfor skulle man så være der?

INTERVIEWER: Du sagde tidligere, at du måske havde nemmere ved at få ændringer igennem, fordi du ikke havde parlamentet at skulle igennem. Vil du tro, at de havde lobbyorganisationerne kunne have denne mere voldsomme reaktion, fordi de ikke havde mulighed for at lobby ligeså meget i rådet.

MFB: Altså det er klart, at de i dag vil lobby kraftigt i Parlamentet. Det havde de ikke mulighed for, eller det betød jo ikke noget, så det var nemt at have møde med Parlamentets landbrugsudvalg, for man kunne jo tale pænt til dem og så kunne man sige, at det var det og det, som man havde tanker om og når jeg kom med de der sukkerreformer, så buhede de jo og jeg havde ikke mange venner på det tidspunkt, men det er jo en anden situation i dag. Det er jo klart, at lobbyisterne er meget aktive, fordi de kan jo tage kontakt til enkelte parlamentsmedlemmer, som bor i en region, hvor det der er fremsat, efter lobbyorganisationerne ville have en negativ effekt, og så prøve at skubbe til den vogn. Så lobbyorganisationerne må have fået travlt siden indførelsen af Lissabon-traktaten i 2009.

INTERVIEWER: *Hvad var dine ambitioner omkring CAP'en da du var kommissær?* var der noget, som du gerne ville opnå.

MFB: Jeg ville gerne opnå at gøre landbruget mere konkurrencedygtigt, fordi i den periode sad vi jo og forhandlede WTO, om at åbne markederne, især fordi, vi havde et ønske om, at LDC, altså 'least developed countries', havde en mulighed for at komme ind på det europæiske marked, at vi gjorde, at europæisk ville kunne stå distance uden, at de ville blive kørt over. Et andet eksempel var, at irerne var skrækslagne, at man åbnede op, eller at man sænkede tolden på oksekød fra f.eks. Brasilien. De er jo meget konkurrencedygtigt på det område, så det er jo billigt. De skal hverken have stalde eller have dem inde om vinteren. Så der var jo mange forskellige holdninger, hvordan man stillede sig til det. Det lykkedes at komme igennem med alle de reformer, som jeg lavede i den periode, selvom det ikke altid endte med det forslag, som jeg fremsatte. Ministerrådet var jo heller ikke altid på sådan på reform-linjen, men vi fik da

flyttet nogle af de nødvendige områder, såsom vin og sukker, hvor vi Europa havde en situation, hvor vores sukkerpris var tre gange så høj som verdensmarkedsprisen. Det var klart, at det kunne ikke fortsætte. Vi havde tabt en panelsag hos WTO. Det betød jo også, at når vi havde for meget sukker, så sendte vi det jo ud af Europa med restitutioner, altså man gav tilskud til europæiske sukkerproducenter, så de kunne komme af med deres overskudssukker og de dumpede så priserne på de markeder, hvor de måske havde behov for at kunne komme ind på de europæiske markeder. Det var fuldstændigt uholdbart, men der var jo vild opstandelse blandt nogle af de store sukkerproducenter, men alligevel lykkedes det så at komme igennem. Jeg tror vi reducerede prisen med 36-37 %. Det var en af mine store sejre. Jeg var frihandel, liberal så det var derfor, man i denne periode reducerede støtten til den enkelte landmand. Altså reducere budgettet simpelthen.

INTERVIEWER: Det var ikke sådan, at i fjernede de direkte betalinger eller skar i dem?

MFB: Nej nej, det var aldrig kommet til at ske, selvom nogen ville synes, at det var en god idé. Det vil aldrig kunne lade sig gøre heller i ministerrådet at komme igennem med en total afskaffelse. Det kan man ikke. Så går 95% af europæiske bønder konkurs. Så det kan man ikke... Man kan reducere i en takt, hvor erhvervet kan følge med, uden at korthuset totalt vælter. Bare det, at man går ind på nogle områder, f.eks. vin, der var er en regel om, at hvis vinbønderne havde overskud af vin, så skulle Kommissionen købe det op. Jeg tror, at vi brugte 7-8 milliarder. Der er jo ikke noget incitament for at ændre tingene, hvis man vidste, at man bare kunne sælge det på det der spotmarked til Kommissionen. Det var dårlig vin, og de fik heller ikke meget for det, men det løb jo op. Der sagde jeg, ”at det vil jeg ikke være med til. Det vil jeg ikke stå model til. Den her mulighed skal bare fjernes.” og det er jo klart, at det var de ikke meget begejstret for nede i den sydvestlige del af Frankrig. Der havde de været vænnet til at producere noget rigtig kedelig og dårlig vin og de kæmpede selvfølgelig med næb og klør, men efterfølgende kom de jo alligevel og sagde, at ”det er jo rigtigt, for nu er vi blevet tvunget til at forbedre vores produktion, vores kvalitet, søge nye markeder”, så selvom det ikke var nemt, så var det jo det rigtige, kunne man se i bakspejlet.

INTERVIEWER: *Har du holdninger til den nye CAP?*

MFB: Altså... Nu har Hogan jo ikke... Der har ikke været de store reformer i hans perioder, så hvad Kommissionen går og tumler med, det tør jeg ikke sige noget om, men jeg er helt sikker på, ikke hvad Kommissæren tumler med, men at der i Kommissionen er et ønske om at reducere det budget, som landbruget har fået tildelt. Nu skal man jo lave en flerårig finansiel ramme og der kommer landbruget til at holde for. Man har jo taget et skridt i den rigtige retning, hvor man har besluttet af 30% af den direkte støtte skal målrettes det man kalder ’greening’, altså grønne tiltag, at man skal opfylde særlige krav, for at kunne modtage de sidste 30% af støtten, altså bræmmer langs vandløb og man må ikke have monokultur. Der er mange forskellige muligheder for at gøre det mere miljørigtigt. Det tror jeg vil fortsætte. Det eneste der er vigtigt, det er, at man undgår, at det bliver for bureaukratisk tungt, for jo flere forskellige kasser man laver, jo vanskeligere bliver der for medlemslandene at kontrollere. Kontrollen bliver voldsom, når man skal ud og kontrollere de mange forskellige tiltag i CAP’en, så afbureaukratisering

står højt på dagsordenen, men det er ikke nemt, når man vil gøre det så specifikt. Derfor kunne man også i perioder, efter hvor jeg var stoppet, at der steg fejl raterne i medlemslandene. For det er jo i medlemslandene, at man skal lave kontrollen, men så går Kommissionen jo ind og kontrollere de enkelte medlemslandes måde at gøre det på. Altså jo mere kompliceret det blev, jo højere blev fejlraten. Det betyder jo, at medlemslandene skal ind og betale pengene tilbage og det er jo ikke sådan særligt populært. Jeg kan huske, at man i Grækenland altid har haft en rimelig stor bomuldsproduktion og grækerne, især i de år, hvor der var valg dernede, så var der jo ingen grænser for, hvad de politisk valgte ville tilbyde de der bomuldsproducenter, så sommetider fik de alt for meget i støtte. Så måtte vi jo gå ind bagefter og reducere, men så er det jo ikke de enkelte bomuldsproducenter der skal betale, men derimod statskasserne og derfor var det jo... det var jo en dyr valgkampagne, men den virkede jo på de der bomuldsproducenter, så dem var vi voldsomt meget efter. Bottomline synes jeg, at CAP'en bevæger sig i den rigtige retning. Man er klar over, at man ikke kan blive ved med at betale en støtte uden at få noget igen og det man nu får igen, det er initiativer der støtter miljøtiltag.