



MASTER THESIS

THE NEXT STEP FOR THE EU?

EXAMINING THE CURRENT PROCESS OF A
UNIFIED EU MILITARY IN THE CONTEXT OF
HISTORICAL STATE FORMATION

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Abstract

The project aims to find the answer to the research question: How does the historical process of state formation relate to the contemporary process of EU integration?

This project takes an innovative approach in exploring the connection between the EU integration process and historical state formation. Major concepts of this study are drawn from the theories of North et al. and Charles Tilly. Both theories are chosen, since significant similarities in the assumption of both processes were discovered regarding EU integration and historical state formation. The EU is currently facing external threats of an increasingly assertive Russia, US nationalism and Brexit, which is part of the reason why Macron has recently proposed for the creation of a consolidated European military. German chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed his proposal. This development respectively shares similarities with Tilly's notion of "war" creating the structure of a state and the doorstep condition number three of North et al.'s theory, which is concerned with the creation of a consolidated military.

The underlying framework applied throughout the analysis is realist assumptions. These connect to the theories of North et al. and Tilly as well as the overall idea behind a military structure and the initial thought of the proposal of Macron of increased defensive capabilities. The research strategy is to look of parallels between historical state formation and the integration process of the EU, and thereby examine, if these theories can provide explanatory power to the case of EU integration. Therefore, the method chosen is historical document analysis and trying to pattern match EU integration to historical state formation. A secondary outcome discovered is the aspect of theory testing to a certain degree, by applying the theories to a different context and analysing their viability.

The analysis is focused on the theoretical framework of North et al.'s three doorstep conditions, comparing them to the internal integration processes of the EU in search for similarities and differences. Based on these findings the discussion will continue with an external view of the EU's current threats and their influence on the EU integration processes based on the notions of Tilly. A chapter criticising the findings, by way of introducing obstacles to the conclusions will be finishing the project before culminating.

The project concludes, there exists clear similarities between the historical process of state formation and the EU's current trajectory. We prove doorstep condition one and two are fulfilled within the EU structure, as the EU established rule of law for the elites, perpetual organisations and impersonal exchanges. We believe it might require a "big bang" to move the EU through doorstep condition three.

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1. Introduction

In the following paper the authors are going to search for parallels between the historical processes of state formation and EU integration, considering the recent EU military proposal. Internal and external processes are scrutinized utilizing the theories of North et al. and Tilly for the respective spheres (North, et al., 2009) (Tilly, 1990).

A “*true European Army*” is what Macron stated in November 2018 (Stevens, 2019), with Merkel joining Macron’s vision of an EU army (La Baume & Herszenhorn, 2018). The new leader of the CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), also supported the idea, stating a vision of a common aircraft carrier programme between Germany and France, where other EU members are welcome to participate (Sprenger, 2019). Macron thereby restarted a discussion of a unified European military, which can be traced back to 1952 with the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community. The treaty failed to get ratified, but the idea has persisted since then.

In 2015 the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, suggested the creation of an EU army, to progress EU integration. Therefore, Juncker also supported the recent proposal from Macron. However, the responses from the member states have been mixed, with Germany consistently supportive, but it received a negative remark from the withdrawing EU member state, the UK (Smyth, et al., 2016). Back in 2015, the United Kingdom mentioned that they would refuse to give up the control of their army to the EU. With the UK leaving the EU, one of the biggest opponents to the idea will be gone from the Union (Sparrow, 2015).

On 22 January 2019, Germany and France signed the Aachen Treaty in presence of the presidents of the EU Commission, EU Council and Council of the EU (French Government, 2019). The Aachen Treaty aims to build a Franco-German “*common military culture*” and eventually “*contribute to the creation of a European army*” (RTE, 2019). This treaty was signed on the day of the 56th anniversary of the Elyseé Treaty and can be seen as a further extension of their commitment towards cooperation (French Government, 2019). With the signing of this treaty and the official statements, the EU seems to move closer towards a unified military.

The Ukrainian Crisis and Georgia 2008 showed a more assertive Russia. Furthermore, the incumbent President of the US have potentially altered the status of Europe’s security (Hains, 2018). President Trump has discussed the possibility of the US leaving NATO. Other areas of his isolationist aspects of his tenure, are creating the possible need for Europe to provide for its own defence against the uncertainty created (Bullock, 2019).

The field of concrete military cooperation is a comparatively new one for the EU as Pohl explains, “*Since the Union’s European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP) became*

operational in 2003, the EU has conducted more than 20 civilian and military operations that broadly served to either deter aggression in host countries and/or build or strengthen the rule of law" (Pohl, 2014, p. preface). A significant aspect of the creation of the CSDP, has been the aim to supplement NATO and not to replace it, as he continues. The earlier cited speech of Merkel supporting Macron's vision reemphasizes this aspect (Pohl, 2014, p. preface).

This paper is going to deal with the historical process of state-formation and link it to the contemporary process of EU integration. A lot of state formation theory puts much importance on the control of a military, as one of the key variables in formation of a state. This can be seen in theory of Douglas North et. al., where consolidated control of the military is doorstep condition number three when going from a natural state to open access. This theory is only one of many, but non-the least the military generally plays an important role in state formation.

The complicated political project of the EU to create its own armed forces, could signify a major step in the establishment of the EU as a state and seriously impact the individual state's sovereignty. According to North et al. the consolidated control of the military, is a major part in the historical development of a state in Western Europe (North, et al., 2009, p. 169). Tilly highlights that "*States have been the world's largest and most powerful, organizations for more than five thousand years*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 1). Thus, this raises a lot of questions into the direction of the EU. As a result, the step of the EU to further integrate is significant and therefore analysed in the following chapters.

State formation theories, however, are designed for state level analysis, yet the question is whether these theories can explain the direction the EU is heading. Similar, to how they can explain the creation of Western state and military. Thus, the authors will look for parallels between the state formation in Europe and integration of Europe.

2. Research question

How does the historical process of state formation relate to the contemporary process of EU integration?

Using this research question, the authors aim to gain a better understanding of the subject of EU integration in relation to historical state formation, using the theories of North et al. and Tilly. In their theories, the foundation of a consolidated military and high concentration of coercive means are significant steps in the formation of states. Therefore, these steps will be the main issue of integration analysed. The research question aims to point towards the connection of similarities between the historical processes and the contemporary processes, ongoing in the EU.

2.1. Limitations

The following section addresses limitations, regarding the research question. These limitations consist of barriers, which could have affected the direction of the project. The project is bound to certain limitations connected to the topic itself and the means available at the time of creation. Firstly, the theme is a contemporary one, thus is subject to changes, as it is connected to a current possible agenda for some politicians in and of the EU, as well as outside actors.

The EU army that has been proposed by Macron has not been explained in detail, only mentioned as a direction Macron and Merkel want to go. The authors of this paper will not discuss or examine the details of how the army would or should operate nor the organizational setup. The authors will merely recognize this is where the EU might be heading and how an army could shift the role of the EU.

In this project the authors will refer to the project for a European Army, as the European Armed Forces (EUAF), rather than the European Army, which is the name given by the media and politicians. This is done, as it would otherwise suggest only the ground forces of each member state would be integrated into a supranational organisation, leaving the navies and air forces, to remain under the control of the separate states. By naming it the European Armed Forces, all military, by every member state is collected under the control of the EU.

Andrew Moravcsik describes the evolution of the EU market as a “...sequence of irregular bangs...” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 2), which put integration forward, while B. Pohl writes about “...sudden bursts of EU activity in the realm of external security...” (Pohl, 2014, p. preface). Both descriptions share the view that EU integration has been abrupt at times, which leads the authors of this project to conclude that some aspects of EU integration can happen suddenly and profoundly. Therefore, there exist certain limitations as to how feasible it is to offer predictions,

based on the past as “*irregular bangs*” could lead to suggested further integration happening soon or comparatively late after publication and thus impact credibility of some statements.

When applying the state formation theories, theories relating to so-called developing countries and development aid will not be used, as the European Union and Europe cannot be considered a developing state in the traditional sense of the term. We choose to use the term *state formation* rather than *state building*, as formation is focused on the initial formation of a state and to differentiate between the assisted process of state building connected with development aid.

Another aspect of limitation is that, the initial focus lies on the realist aspects of the relation of historic state formation, as will be explained further in the methodology and analysis sections of the project.

While we acknowledge the existence of other relevant theories of state formation such as cultural, anthropological, constructivist and other origin, we will mainly stay on the path of a realist perspective. Therefore, this will possibly limit the validity of the conclusions, since we are neglecting some theoretical approaches that might lead to different conclusions.

A comprehensive analysis of threats, posed by the region of the Middle East will be omitted, since the states of the Middle East do not pose a direct threat to the security of the EU. While it can be argued that the nuclear programme of the past of Iran can be considered an issue, the current relations of the EU and Iran are not pointing toward an issue that would prompt Macron or Merkel to pursue new defensive capabilities (Al Jazeera, 2019). Therefore, the authors decided to put focus on the main global and regional powers of the US and Russia in order to limit the scope of this study to a digestible degree.

Additionally, it was stated in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy that cyber security, climate change and pandemics are current threats to the EU (Oğuz, 2017, p. 63). Since these threats cannot be solved or prevented with the creation of a traditional military, it is irrelevant to include them in the project, while we acknowledge their existence and relevance to the security of the Union.

2.2. Contemporary relevance

In order to better understand the framework of this study the authors are offering a current context, to some issues at hand internally and externally for the EU. These events and factors shape the idea and outcome of the project and are therefore necessary to address. The following section is thus embedding the project in a context for the reader.

2.2.1. External factors

USA

Since announcing his run for presidency in 2015, Donald Trump has advocated for a policy of “*America First*”, wherein he advocates for isolationism and reduced activity on the international stage. This can be exemplified in a number of ways, such as Trump’s unwillingness to publicly support NATO and Europe in general. Further, the President stated that NATO is “*obsolete*” and suggested he would not intervene to protect Eastern European states (Hains, 2018). Trump also announced that he would pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a treaty which “*effectively*” protected Europe from nuclear weapons (The Week, 2018). The missiles affected by this treaty were short medium-range and intermediate-range, only effectively reaching over Europe. Plans for the use of these types of missiles can be seen in the Soviet “Seven Days to the River Rhine” battle plan, wherein Soviet Forces would initiate a seven-day nuclear war with NATO forces in Europe (Watt, 2005). Trump’s statements regarding Europe, NATO and US intervention, has made it clear that the EU can no longer rely on the US for support. Likewise, as with the Iran deal, Trump has also shown that the US, can no longer be trusted to uphold international agreements. When withdrawing from the INF Treaty, Trump failed to consult European countries, even though it largely affects Europe. President Macron commented on the event by saying “*When I see President Trump announcing that he’s quitting a major disarmament treaty which was formed after the 1980s Euro-missile crisis that hit Europe, who is the main victim? Europe and its security*” (Stone, 2018).

Foreign expansionism

The removal of the US from the international stage is not the only effect on Europe. Russia, is by many, seen as an increasing threat, with its involvement in Ukraine and the apparent wish to re-incorporate Belarus into Russia (Seidel, 2019). This is further solidified by the Vostok-2018 military exercise, which fielded more than 300,000 Russian and Chinese troops (AFP, 2018). Increased Russian aggression has caused

European countries to increase their defence spending for the first time since the end of the Cold War (Pothier, 2019).

China has also been increasing their presence on the international stage. Their Belt-Road Initiative has increased presence around the world, including the Balkans, where they help to expand states infrastructure, at the cost of states having debt to China and allowing Chinese companies access to the states (Vörös, 2018). China has also increased their defence spending, equalling that of the US, adjusting for purchasing power (Axe, 2019). China have also been increasing their carrier fleet and is projected to have six carriers by 2030 (Axe, 2019).

The overall situation on the international stage has created uncertainty within Europe, as America no longer can be expected or trusted to help or keep their international agreements. Without the nuclear umbrella of the US, Europe is left to fend for itself and ensure its own survival in a world where the balance of power is changing. The actions of Russia and China also create uncertainty with fears of possible conflict. This would fit with Tilly's notion of "*War made the state, and the state made war*", wherein the fear of war and general uncertainty would force the EU to come together to create a unified military and pool resources.

2.2.2. Internal factors

In the wake of Trump, Brexit, the 100-year anniversary for the armistices for World War I and six months before the 2019 European Parliament election, Macron in November 2018 stated that he wanted a "*true, European Army*" (Stevens, 2019). He stated that Europe had to be able "*to defend itself better alone*" (BBC News, 2018). Following the statement, leader of the German CDU Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK) came out in support, stating EU members are already working together on the Future Combat Air System, as was the case with the previous Eurofighter Typhoon fighter plane. She also said that "*As a next step, we could start the symbolic project of building an aircraft carrier to give shape to the role of the European Union as a global force for security and peace*" (Sprenger, 2019). Russia is another reason for the creation of a European military, as Jean-Claude Juncker himself has expressed, stating "... *a common army among the Europeans would convey to Russia that we are serious about defending the values of the European Union*" (Sparrow, 2015).

Currently, within the EU, there already exist several bilateral elements connected with a unified European military. Sweden and Finland have been integrating selected air force and naval units since 2013. Sweden, Norway and Finland's air forces conduct joint exercises

nearly every week and use one another's air bases. Belgium and the Netherlands maintain a shared naval fleet, and the Baltic States are considering building a combined navy. Together, France and Germany maintain a longstanding brigade. Due to budgetary cuts, The Netherlands disbanded their tank battalions, transferring the remaining elements to the German Army, which provide training, maintenance and command structure. Similar efforts are underway with German and Polish forces. Bilateral pooling improves efficiency and cuts down on costs (Braw, 2018).

In addition, on a more institutional level, in June 2018 the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, proposed to establish the European Peace Facility. This fund would have an estimated €10.5bn annually, which could be used to cover some of the costs associated with European military operations. If implemented, it would mark the first time the EU collected funds to support military operations. Though this has previously been opposed by Germany, as they argued that EU treaties forbid providing support to military operations. It has also been opposed by the UK who has vetoed the suggestion, as it was viewed as competition with NATO (Pothier, 2019). In 2017, Marcon proposed the European Intervention Initiative (E2I), which includes ten European militaries and works outside the current institutional frameworks of the EU (Pothier, 2019). The aim of the E2I, is to improve intelligence sharing, scenario planning, support operations and doctrine (Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2018). Likewise, in 2017, the European Defence Fund was launched, which aims to finance research & development, and equipment acquisition for EU member states. The fund is expected to reach a total of €5.5 billion by 2021 (Pothier, 2019). In June 2017, Brussels announced plans for the foundation of a European “*security and defence union*” by 2025 to rival NATO as Europe's military defender (The Week, 2017).

These initiatives are however far from creating an EUAF, though the EU is increasing its investments in the defence sector. The EU is planning to spend, (in the period 2021 and 2027) €13 billion on defence research & development, and equipment. In addition, the EU is planning to spend €6.5bn for military mobility with a possible addition of €10.5bn for the European Peace Facility (Pothier, 2019). Germany's national defence commissioner, Hans-Peter Bartels said that integration was “*inevitable*”, and stated “*In the end, there will be a European army*” (The Week, 2017).

The creation of various initiatives have proven successful, with better use of resources and collection of knowledge. The pooling of resources does however have an impact on the

individual state's sovereignty, with a perceived loss of sovereignty and decision-making. Should a military be created, there needs to be rules and focus on the individual state.

There is likewise an increase in policy making within the EU (Schultze, 2003, p. 136). This could follow a general wish from the EU to become a policy maker rather than a policy taker, meaning a unified military is needed for power projection and enforcement.

A consolidated military force is crucial in state formation for North et al. and is described as doorstep condition number three (North, et al., 2009, p. 169). A proposal for a military is interesting, as it would mean that the political system set up in doorstep conditions one and two is robust enough for the member states to trust, ensuring the military would never be used against them. Thus, the question is whether the EU integration has followed these doorsteps and currently is at doorstep number three, since a proposal as important as a consolidated military is being discussed in the EU.

3. Methodology

In this chapter the authors are addressing how the study is conducted. The chapter includes a discussion of the method applied, including data collection, validity, reliability and generality.

Further the authors describe the main theories employed in the project and explain why and how they are used. Concluding the chapter in a section combining the methods and theories into a research design. This section explains how the analysis and discussion are conducted. The research design links the method with the theories and creates a strategy of analysing the research question.

3.1. Method

As mentioned before, in the following section the authors are going to discuss the methods applied throughout the paper to create an accessible gateway for understanding. This makes it possible to follow the authors on the path chosen for the analysis and discussion, mapping out the way for the analysis.

The underlying theoretical framework applied is realism and an assumption of rational choice actors. This is chosen since the core question revolves around "statehood" and the core actor of realism is the state. Furthermore, due to the choice of theory for the paper, realism is fitting into this framework as well. Tilly and North make up the core theoretical framework for the analysis and will be discussed in their respective sections.

Showcasing the realist nature of their theory Tilly explains that, "*Coercion is always relative; anyone who controls concentrated means of coercion runs the risk of losing advantages when a neighbour builds up his means*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 71). This statement highlights the underlying structural realism that is employed throughout his work. For instance, Kenneth Waltz defensive realism is described as, "*power maximization often proves to be dysfunctional because it triggers a counter-balancing coalition of states*" (Baylis, et al., 2011, p. 92). While offensive realist such as J. Mearsheimer provide the other side of the coin, regarding the relative nature of coercion, "*the structure of the international system compels states to maximize their relative power position*", further adding, "*all states are continuously searching for opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states*" (Baylis, et al., 2011, p. 92).

The authors are assuming actors who are taking agency due to rational choice. While the idea of what is rational and what isn't, is prone to being a constructed view and depending on which actor looks at the given issue and from what angle and background. North et al. offer a description of such behaviour in their work, "*What is in the perceived best interest of individuals is a complicated amalgam of their preferences over different outcomes, the alternatives that they*

face and their beliefs about how actions will affect the world around them" (North, et al., 2009, p. 28). According to North et al. rational actors operate in the direction of what they perceive to be in their best interest (North, et al., 2009, p. 28). On the one hand, this is a necessary theoretical assumption to take, as it is impossible to fully reconstruct each actor's "inner reality" for each decision taken. Secondly, it is required in order to go through with a realist perspective of analysis. The authors are going ahead in assuming that decisions, that were taken due to current ongoing affairs are the result of conscious reflection over at least part of the possible implications by the actors. "*People are intentional*", this is the terminology chosen by North et al., and reflects the difficulty of assuming an actor's rationality in their choices. The underlying assumption of this study thus includes that actors act deliberately to further their interests (North, et al., 2009, p. 28). Tilly's theory applied also interprets a "*unitary interest, rationale, capacity, and action to a state, a ruling class, or the people subject to their joint control*", and thus reflects the realist method applied (Tilly, 1990, p. 34).

In order to reduce the reliance on a single interpretation of the choices of the actors, as well as analysis potential results, two theories will be used. As Pohl explains, "*To minimize bias, however, it is also important to consider as full a range of expected causal relationships as possible prior to any in-depth analysis*" (Pohl, 2014, p. 9). He further cites from Walt, "*no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics*" (Pohl, 2014, p. 9). While both theories applied are partly a branching into different realist interpretations, they leave room for competing ideas in different places. They also complement each other, as will be explained briefly in this part and more comprehensively later on, in the chapter dealing with the justification about the theoretical approach. As Pohl concludes his methodological reflections, "*Explicit weighing of a range of alternative explanations should thus improve external validity of any conclusions*" (Pohl, 2014, p. 9). Therefore, the authors of this project decided to be inspired by such an approach and increase the validity of the research. Additionally, this offers a more in-depth analysis, by employing two theoretical approaches that complement each other in certain regards. Both fundamentally address the question of state formation and share the basic concepts of a realist perspective. For instance, North explains the development from personal to impersonal rule in state formation (North, et al., 2009, p. 148) and Tilly shares a similar conclusion. Tilly uses the head of a government as a metonym "*as if they represented a state's entire decision-making apparatus, thus reducing to a single point a complex, contingent set of social relations*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 34). This method is also reflected in realist theory, where the state is analysed as a unitary actor and not as a set of competing ideas and strands of opinion. Such a concept resonated with the development perspective of North et al., as the statements of Macron or AKK are taken to represent the entire decision-making institution. While this seems

like the opposite of impersonal rule, for realism it is not merely a matter of who is the head of a state, but merely that the head of state represents the state in a simplified form of metonymy. The fundamentals of a state and its international diplomacy and institutional set-up remain the same for a realist, no matter the head of state, as the international system and its mechanisms are the major influence in decision-making.

Discussing the issue of state formation leads to the question of the difficulties associated with the historical process of state formation. While the “*statehood*” was never the planned end goal of any one individual in the historic process, the state was built incrementally due to the outcome of the intentional and perceived rationality of their actions. The development of a society, which could be termed a “*state*”, cannot be seen as being engineered by any king or minister as Tilly points out (Tilly, 1990, p. 25). “*Rarely did Europe’s princes have in mind a precise model of the sort of state they were producing, and even more rarely did they act efficiently to produce such a model state*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 25). North et al. similarly state that “*Combined, the three doorstep conditions create the possibility of impersonal relationships within the elite, even though that was not necessarily the result elites intended*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 154). North et al. additionally argue that no one knew what an open access society was, meaning that the elite could not intentionally have created it: “*Time also complicates how we interpret the intentionality of elite decisions. Elite groups in eighteenth-century Europe could not have intended to produce a transition to open access because no one knew an open access society was a viable alternative, much less how to construct it*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 188). Thus, the process of state formation in Europe has been unintentional due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of the actions taken.

With the theoretical method explained, the method of the analysis itself will be a case study of the research question: *How does the historical process of state formation relate to the contemporary process of EU integration?*

The process of the analysis will be relating the historical process of state formation, through the lens of the theory applied to the contemporary process of what is happening and possible with the aforementioned proposals of officials. This is not necessarily a method of theory testing as the primary goal is not to try to falsify the theories, but to utilize them to create knowledge out of the contemporary ongoing process by applying existing historical knowledge. Pohl points out that, “*They [social science theories] necessarily miss the accidental, and their very utility lies in focusing attention on recurring patterns*” (Pohl, 2014, p. 8). Tilly describes the process of knowledge creation, “*...to discover or invent simple symmetry in complex events...*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 1). Thus, the method of utilizing the theories is to attempt to identify possible recurring patterns

and matching these, to the contemporary processes. These recurring patterns are searched for in historical processes.

3.2. Data collection

This study will focus on qualitative data in order to create understanding about the statements of public officials, the work of scholars, newspaper articles and web pages in context of the research question. This choice of data collection is done due to the aim of the project, to establish new knowledge out of historical events and existing literature about them, as well as ongoing affairs and their connection to the past. Creating understanding and meaning is the focus of the research, and therefore a document analysis of secondary qualitative sources, will be the focus of this research. While quantitative tools will be employed, these are not the focus of the authors and will be, just as the qualitative sources put in context of why and how they are used.

Some of the research consists of reconstructing and analysing possible decision-making processes of relevant actors. Pohl explains the difficulties associated with limited access to the inner proceedings and that some officially released documents do not represent a complete perspective on them (Pohl, 2014, p. 43). Strategic phrasing might take place in these documents as they reflect the perceptions that the officials attempted to publicize and might also be affected by their contemporary relevance in what is being published (Pohl, 2014, p. 43). Therefore, the sources will be analysed in the context of the research question and assumptions based on the underlying framework, might be taken that are not directly stated by the sources but are scrutinized in light of assuming intentional actions of perceived self-interest.

3.3. Validity, reliability and generality

These issues are addressed by the authors through a compound theoretical approach to decrease issues of shortcomings and pitfalls in validity, reliability and generality and create more room to interpret a complex reality.

While Cris Shore is writing from an anthropological perspective, his conclusions also remain relevant in the field of political science. There exists a plethora of definitions and works about the state, [the state] “...has been at the centre of political and philosophical debate...” after all (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad, 2005, p. 1). But as a construction of human ingenuity and imagination it hardly has tangible properties. On the other hand, Tilly defines the state as: “...state as coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” (Tilly, 1990, p. 1).

The authors are applying a realist method throughout the project, as the basis of the analysis and approach can be criticized for relying on a constructed world view. The weaknesses of the concepts provided by its theoretical framework, can be seen in the works of Wendt, who provided a significant contribution (Wendt, 1992). Yet, the authors are aware of issues that come with the approach and decrease its effect on the validity of the project through different methods. Firstly, through mentioning these issues and showcasing an awareness of potential biases and constructions. Secondly, as the state is the core actor of realism, it is “recreated” as a tangible actor in the international system and also analysed as an existing “organization” visible and tangible through its core actors of government, coercion and possessing a definition that enables a more tangible analysis. Therefore, the study should not be damaged by the chosen subject of its examination nor the chosen method.

As we follow a specific theoretical framework of North’s three doorstep conditions to construct our analysis, it supplies us with certain activities and actions of actors besides terms and concepts to search for in the case of state formation in the EU, throughout its history. This provides more validity and reliability, as it would be possible to reproduce a similar analysis following the same theoretical framework. The choice of mainly using qualitative sources, however, means that the data will be subject to interpretation and selections of some data over other, in the analysis. This in turn means that validity and reliability are challenged, as the casual relationships and chances of getting the exact same results in different study, depend on interpretation and possible bias of the authors. On the other hand, the theory of North et al. offers a clear framework to follow and concepts to search for, which provides theoretical reliability, since it makes it easier to produce a similar result. As the authors are aware of these pitfalls and follow a detailed theoretical framework, we argue that it will not damage our research.

There is a difficulty with the generality as Shore puts it, “...*the EU has no parallel in history and cannot be compared to other recognizable federal polities (such as the USA, Switzerland or Canada) as it is not a sovereign state in the conventional sense*” (Shore, 2005, p. 237). The generality of the research is limited by the complexity of the subject and its uniqueness, as it is a product of history, culture, and institutional set-up not similar to any other supranational organisation. The EU is an anomaly and therefore a unique analytical framework is required, which decreases the generality of the case study. This is further supported by Tilly, “*The long survival and coexistence of all three types [of states] tells against any notion of European state formation as a single, unilinear process, or of the national state...*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 21). Tilly explains that no national state has been created following the exact same process, which is why

the case of a possible state formation in the EU cannot be seen as a general process of state formation in other regional, supranational organizations elsewhere in the world.

3.4. Theories

This section will introduce the theories of Charles Tilly and North et al., justify their use and further discuss their weaknesses. Introducing the theories in a separate section will make it easier for the reader to follow the analysis and discussion chapter of this project. Also, the authors attempt to justify their use for this project and offer room for critique of their use. This will create comprehensibility about why the project follows these theoretical choices to answer the research question, while also leaving space for exposing potential weaknesses and addressing those to further increase validity.

3.4.1. Charles Tilly

Coercion, Capital, and European States, written by Charles Tilly and published in 1990 is one of two state formation theories that will be applied in the project.

Famous for the quote "*War made the state, and the state made war*" (Cohen, 1984, p. 329), this theory argues that war is the main reason behind the creation of the national state (Tilly, 1975, p. 42).

Tilly defines the state as: "... *coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 1).

The term national state, however, is a relatively new form of state that at some point in European history prevailed over other types of states including empires, city-states and theocracies. The national state is defined as: "*states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures...*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 2).

Despite the national state being the current common form of state, Tilly questions if and how the national state will survive international organizations such as NATO and what was then called the European Economic Community (Tilly, 1990, p. 3).

Tilly identifies four main available answers to state formation; mode of production, statist, world system and geopolitical theory that each tries to explain how the states once formed. He does, however, not agree with any of the theoretical frameworks and thinks of them as inadequate and unsatisfying. On the other hand, Tilly states he continues the research where,

Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan and Lewis Mumford left off, deriving from their research (Tilly, 1990, p. 14).

The national state as we know today, can be traced back to 990 in Europe, where the first states started to develop in the following 200 years. However, there is no linear process to how the national states we know today were created (Tilly, 1990, p. 21). Instead, it depends on different variables and the different kinds of states that existed in Europe at different times. Eventually five centuries later the system of national states spread to almost everywhere based on what took shape in Europe (Tilly, 1990, p. 5).

Capital and coercion are the two key words in this theory. The two concepts are mutually connected, as coercion was dependent on capital and vice versa (Tilly, 1990, p. 16), and one must understand both concepts to understand how the national state formed. Capitalists accumulated capital through production and exchange, and came long before capitalism itself, since they started as managers of production and owners of material rather than entrepreneurs, bankers and investors as the personification of the system of capitalism we know today, which began in Europe in 1500. Cities began to flourish as capital concentrated in certain areas due to accumulation, as households depended on employment and redistribution. Trade, banking and investment also benefited from each other, further contributing to a cluster of people and capital accumulating and concentrating in an urban territory focused around a centre. Accumulation alone will, however, only create smaller and scattered centres, whereas if there is high concentration and high accumulation it would create primate cities (Tilly, 1990, p. 18). Around every city was a zone of agriculture and trade, as people living in the city depended on food, fuel and transportation – necessities that needed to be efficiently produced and developed in order for the city to rapidly grow (Tilly, 1990, p. 19).

From coercion grew the state. Coercion is defined as: “...*all concerted applications, threatened or actual, of action that commonly causes loss or damage to the persons or possessions of individuals or groups who are aware of both the action and the potential damage*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 19). Soldiers and landlords were two groups of coercion, who were created in Europe. They received privileges and nobilities in return for supplying and serving the ruler. Just like capital, coercive means can also accumulate and concentrate, but only places where they are accumulating and concentrating can “...*they produce states; they produce distinct organizations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organizations operating within those territories*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 19).

With the coercive means for war and preparation for war along with the need for domestic control comes the need to administrate the lands, people and goods that have been obtained. This meant the wielders of coercion needed to extract resources through taxes, build infrastructure and distribute goods, income, services and other complementary organisations and by that an administration grew from war, which is the beginning of the national state (Tilly, 1990, p. 70).

Different states coexisted in Europe through many years. City-states and urban federations with a large military, left the administration to the regional power called fragmented sovereignty. This type of state was dependent on high accumulation and low concentration of coercive means as the urban militias were spread across the cities, meaning it was difficult for coalitions to form (Tilly, 1990, p. 21).

Tribute-taking empires had low accumulation of coercive means but on the other hand had a high concentration of the available means, as empires would disintegrate if they accumulated means (Tilly, 1990, p. 21).

National states on the other hand had a more central structure with military, extractive, redistributive and other centralized originations, with the distinctive aspect of bargaining with the population's possession of capital and coercive means and in return provide protection, adjudication and distribution with high accumulation and concentration of coercive means. The struggle between the classes and the ruler resulted in the creation of state structures alongside the national states competition with each other, giving the states their own identity as they took distance from each other (Tilly, 1990, p. 23).

All rulers faced competitions to their hegemony and some empires tried to distribute the means of coercion unevenly to smaller coercive cluster out of necessity, and city-states tried to exercise control inside the city and its hinterland only. National states kept their power by tying powerful landlords to the crown either by giving them means of offices, tax exemption or military service, but still corruption and rebellion was occurring due to indirect rule until the French Revolution. The implementation of direct rule changed the state structure as household taxation, police and other invasions of private life became possible due to bargaining with legal and social rights for the populations. It was, however, never intentional to form such a state, it merely happened as by-products to carry out immediate tasks often to support armed forces in wars. States also influenced the state formation of other states alongside the bargaining with different classes in the population, as they affected the preparation for war, creating great variants in the character of states (Tilly, 1990, pp. 25-27).

As mentioned, Tilly argues that extraction of capital and coercive means for preparation of war created the central state structure. But there were different ways to extract resources and wars became more and more costly meaning fewer had the means to go to war. Firstly, warfare shifted from rulers extracting capital and means of coercion based on rent of land under their control and tribute. Secondly, rulers recruited contractors and were dependent on loans from capitalists. Thirdly, states drafted armies from their own national population as they were cheaper and more reliable, when they considered themselves citizens of the state (Tilly, 1990, p. 83), where armed forces were part of the states' administrative structure. Lastly, the era of specialization, where the military was separated from other government organisations (Tilly, 1990, p. 29).

During these four trends the combination of capital and coercion differed. These were not necessarily strategies, but more conditions the rulers were under due to relations with the social classes. "*The reshaping of relations between the ruler and ruled produced new, contrasting forms for government, each more or less adapted to its social setting*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 30).

The coercion-intensive mode got the means of war from the population, conquering and structures of extraction often found in tribute-taking empires. The capital-intensive mode meant rulers served the interest of capitalists in return for military force, as seen in city-states and urban federations, as this meant it was not necessary to build lasting state structures in line with the fragmented sovereignty. The capitalized coercion mode is a mix of the two above. This strategy meant rulers attempted to integrate capitalists and capital into the state structures, meaning possessors of capital and coercion cooperated like in France and England.

All three strategies eventually resulted in the creation of the national state, but the capitalized coercion strategy was far superior, as it was more effective in war, since the capital-intensive mode is too weak to sustain independence and the coercive intensive mode lacks capital. As the state required more and more from the population in war, such as fighting for the crown, the state also started to regulate economy, considered social welfare and other activities and services we know today, which as time went by took a life on their own (Tilly, 1990, pp. 30-31).

3.4.2. Douglas North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast

Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, written by Douglas North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast and published in 2009, is the second one of the two state formation theories that will be applied throughout this project.

The core idea of their work is the concept of doorstep conditions to state formation. These doorstep conditions are based on the notion that societies are created over a long period of time, rather than in an instant (North, 2009, p. 22), similar to Tilly.

The personal level is at the core of the natural state, where the legal system is unable to enforce every individual right, as people have different rights depending on their relationships with the dominant coalition and their social layer (North, et al., 2009, p. 63). Each of these layers has their own rules and responsibilities, based on the logic of the natural state, with farmers for example having other rights than Lords. The ruler of the natural state is above the law, this allows the ruler to change the laws, rules and privileges to suit the need of the coalition in power. The elites which gain power, must be granted more privileges, while elites losing power will have privileges taken away. The ruler makes these changes in the hopes of maintaining a coalition of support within the natural state and avoid coups and civil war (North, et al., 2009, pp. 74-75).

Natural state vs. open access orders

According to North et al., the natural state forms a dominant coalition, which manages violence, by limiting the access to valuable resources such as labour, land and capital, or valuable activities such as trade, education and worship to the elite groups (North, et al., 2009, p. 30). It is named the natural state as it has virtually been the only form of society larger than a few hundred people, which have been able to secure physical order and control violence (North, et al., 2009, p. 31). All states have to deal with the problem of violence, there should not be made assumptions that states hold a monopoly on violence, as this would assume the fundamental problem away (North, et al., 2009, p. 30).

Open access orders are generally more peaceful than natural states, wherein there exist political and social arrangements, which allow for the military and police force to legitimately use violence. These institutions are in turn controlled by certain political institutions which control the military and police force's use of violence. Control of the political institutions can be changed based on well-defined rules (North, et al., 2009, p. 110). Open access order creates a circle between control of violence and open access. The political system helps to

limit the access to violence, and open economic and social access ensures that access to the political system is open. Effective laws against the use of violence to compete, ensures open economic and social access, which is enforced by the political and judicial system.

Open access enables stable democracy and sustains a market economy, while natural states are not able to achieve this to the same degree (North, et al., 2009, p. 111). Open access can achieve this because a stable democracy and a market economy, can be sustained as they are mutually reinforcing. Firstly, citizens in open access share the same belief system, focused on equality, sharing and inclusion. For these beliefs to be able to endure, open access orders must have policies and institutions which share gains and mitigate risks from participating in the market economy. This includes universal education, social insurance programs and comprehensive infrastructure and public goods. Due to the programmes' effective redistribution of the gains from the market economy, citizens are less likely to demand redistribution, which could end up hurting the economy (North, et al., 2009, p. 111). Secondly, political parties compete for control in elections, which allows for control of those in power and ensuring they safeguard open access to help create a competitive economy. Thirdly, there exists several institutions and incentive systems, ensuring cost for the party in power, should it attempt to increase its power by limiting access. Mobile resources will leave the country, should a regime attempt to limit access, causing a fall in the global markets and popularity gaining with the opposition (North, et al., 2009, p. 111).

It is important in open access orders that there is an independence of political and economic systems. Economic organizations do not need to participate in political organisations in order to maintain their rights. Likewise, do politics intervene in the market but only as a way to constrain, control and regulate the markets without support of the political system (North, et al., 2009, p. 112).

First doorstep condition

In the natural state, the rule of law is biased, as the law covers people differently based on their level in the society (North, et al., 2009, p. 154). The difference in these laws and rights also cover elites of different levels, which often creates intra-elite conflicts between the elites, as they fight to gain the same rights or better rights. When all elites are given the same rights there is a level of peace, and this allows the elites to pool the combined resources and protect these rights. With the collected forces of the elites there is more power to uphold and protect the rights which they all possess, as it is easier for people to defend rights if they are equal (North, et al., 2009, p. 158).

Second doorstep condition

The second doorstep condition reinforces the first doorstep condition and allows for growth for a broader array of organisations, allowing them to take advantage of the opportunities created by the first. Previously, organizations had some degree of independence, however, they were never perpetual, meaning that if the leader died, the organization would die (North, 2009, p. 23). When moving from the personal to the impersonal, and with elites having the same rights, they are able to create institutions and organisations which are perpetual (North, et al., 2009, p. 164).

Creating a perpetually lived organisation, is based on the fact that the leader respects the predecessor's office, ensuring credible arrangements, allowing for organisations to continue unchanged (North, et al., 2009, p. 164). It allows operations to continue within the country and creates limited predictability for rules and laws. To be effective and valid, these rules and laws must also be recognized by the state and courts, meaning the state itself is transformed into a perpetually lived organization. With perpetually lived organisations, the controlling coalition of elites can commit to making certain changes, effecting the broader population, as they know the organisations will continue to exist (North, 2009, p. 23).

Third doorstep condition

The third and last doorstep condition is also the most difficult condition to achieve, according to North et al. (2009, p. 169). Consolidation of the military ensures that the threat of military force is placed solely with the military. However, there is no way to ensure that the military is used for illegitimate purposes. The civilian government therefore needs to have enough control over the military to ensure its proper use. Elite groups will only give up their own military power, if they are sure that the collected military will not be used against them and can be collectively controlled (North, et al., 2009, p. 172).

Within the military there has always existed the idea of a supreme commander of the military, as a person to have complete control, in cases of war or disaster. However, with the consolidation of the military, it is important to ensure that the commander-in-chief does not abuse this power. To ensure this does not happen, there needs to be political control of the military. This entails that the military does not control significant economic assets, which are acquired without the approval of the civilian government. The military is also forbidden from choosing its own commanders as this would not mean the military is under civilian control. Contrariwise, if political parties need support from the military, to gain or keep control of the civilian government, there is no political control of the military. Likewise, military personnel should not be allowed to hold powerful positions in government, such as legislators or

executives. However, all these should be seen to various degrees rather than absolutes (North, et al., 2009, p. 170).

3.4.3. Justification

To examine our research question, we have chosen Charles Tilly and Douglas North et al.'s theories as described above. The theory of Tilly has been chosen, as it can be considered a warfare theory, which identifies war as the main factor in state formation. The theory of North et al. instead focuses on the containment of internal violence as the main force in state formation, as they explain, "*This book lays out a set of concepts that show how societies have used the control of political, economic, religious, and educational activities to limit and contain violence over the last ten thousand years*" (North, et al., 2009, p. xi). Seeing the current reality, the EU is facing, we argue that preparation for war and protection of interest are what have driven European politicians to advocate for a common military, as discussed above. Tilly states: "*Over the long run, far more than other activities, war and preparation for war produced the major components of European states*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 28). Thereby we can identify a step and reason for the EU transforming into a national state, which are the proposal of a common military and the current external threats.

"*The question of the state has always been at the center of political and philosophical debate, but interest has intensified of late across the social sciences*" (Krohn-Hansen & Nustad, 2005, p. 1). They mention numerous reasons for such increasing interest as of late, globalization, the fall of the Soviet Union, the growth of corporate power and the European Union and its reaction to the Treaty of Westphalia. This statement reflects what this project is going to be about and the growing interest in the field of social sciences among the authors, who are attempting to contribute to the debate. It highlights the fundamental importance of the "organization" or "structure" that is the state. Tilly also emphasizes that, "*States have been the world's largest and most powerful organizations for more than five thousand years*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 1). Thus, the study of the state in the context of the European Union is a reasonable consequence, especially considering the recent statements of Macron and AKK mentioned earlier in the introduction and contemporary relevance. Tilly further explains that: "*These signs [creation of NATO, the European Economic Community and the Warsaw pact] show that states as we know them will not last forever and may soon lose their incredible hegemony*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 4), further emphasizing the importance in studying the future of state structures, the EU and its the possibility of state formation.

As these two theories will be applied concurrently, it is necessary to justify their use and explain their complementing and competing aspects.

The theories apply a realist perspective, meaning they don't have any fundamental differences that are irreconcilable to a certain degree, as discussed in the section of method. Their framework, as to how a state is first created and formed, are different and they use different terms, however, they still focus on the same concepts of violence, elites, power, institutionalization and military.

The idea of certain developments to constrain violence is shared by both. The starting point of state formation is, nevertheless, different for the theories. North argues that internal violence is the main factor for state formation. This makes the elite bargain among each other to have institutionalized deals, to ensure peace and stability, and in the open access state granting similar rights to all the members of society. Tilly agrees that all rulers face competition to internal hegemony and similarly provide powerful classes such as landlords and capitalists with perks of means of offices, tax exemption and military service to stop rebellions. Just like in North's theory, Tilly also explains how rights and benefits were expanded to the rest of the population in the formation of the national state similar to the transition to open access. For Tilly, the need to bargain with the population to be part of the national army, pay taxes to finance wars and other invasions to private life created social and legal rights to the rest of the population, especially after the French Revolution and the implementation of direct rule, as it was legitimized to invade the private life further. Thus, the biggest difference is the origin of the national state/open access state. North et al. argues that it is because of a rational deliberate process between the elite internally, whereas Tilly believes national states are created as a by-product of the response to external threats. Rulers see it as rational to prepare for war and go to war. This means the need for capital and coercive power, and as a by-product state organizations and institutions are created to serve the army and control the newly obtained territory after war.

This internal/external difference is useful for the analysis, as North et al. can explain the origins of the European Union with internal threats in the region in light of the Second World War in a more historic perspective. The theory of Tilly can contribute with explaining the current international situation, where the European Union is so well integrated that internal threats are non-existing, but external threats on the other hand are more currently present. Thus, it has been explained that the two theories in no way are contradicting despite differences, but these differences, mainly the internal/external factor, are useful in our analysis, as the theories can supplement each other, where they each lack explanatory power.

3.4.4. Criticism of theories

The theories employed offer a specific framework and view onto the topic of state formation. This view might be skewed in a certain direction, firstly from the authors of this research and secondly from the original authors of the theories. The concept of state formation is a loose concept, regarding what and when something constitutes a state and the evaluation of an "entities stateness". *"Much of the difficulty with analyzing the modern state lies in the fact that it is not easy to observe, nor is it the cohesive, tangible entity that traditional writing on the subject assumes"* (Shore, 2005, p. 238). It is difficult to distinguish different entities or actors and evaluate certain factors regarding state formation. The initial differentiation of certain entities or actors might already contain a bias as well as the factors of state formation might be retroactively implied. Social constructivism offers the perspective of states as entities being socially constructed and only existent in the human perception, hence it also creates the perspective of state formation and the "level of stateness" being an imaginary threshold a perceived entity passes. Taking the current understanding of what a state is as an endpoint is also possibly a reflection of historical developments, to the state and the possibility of an altered understanding of what a state constitutes or not. This is because there exists a current lack of knowledge of what is to come, which is the reason for choosing an imaginary endpoint. This reflects an ingrained bias towards the status-quo by the authors and the theories applied.

While the authors deem such criticism valuable in assuring that the framework, definitions of certain thresholds and entities studies as well as the research design is well defined. This is done, in order to attempt to make the project reproducible and comprehensible, while the constructed view of reality is natural to the human perception. Robert Cox for instance explains, *"The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future"* (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Therefore, while some of the labels are constituting a socially constructed label, the perception of someone is affected by many different factors of current position, heritage and possibly many others not mentioned in the quote. Hence, the best way to combat such criticism of the sources and framework applied as well as the authors of this research, is to utilize this framework is to ensure a well-defined research methodology. Furthermore, to create a comprehensible project, and to create new knowledge, since the core idea of social constructivism and its associated critique is unavoidable when dealing with such entities as the state.

3.5. Research design

The following section will explain our research design and how we intent to combine theory with method.

The theory of North et al. will be the main theory applied in the analysis, as explained in the justification. The analysis will follow the three doorstep conditions to state formation, as the it focuses on the internal process of EU integration. This project will be a historical document analysis, meaning we analyse the history of the EU and matching the patterns to the findings of North et al. Thereby, we try to understand if the process of EU integration is similar or parallel to the process of state formation in Europe. The analysis will be split into three parts of the three doorstep conditions to examine and identify the EU integration and developments, chronologically to history and look for similarities and differences from North et al.'s findings. It is necessary to understand whether or not EU integration history actually follow the doorsteps in the proper order, "*as the doorstep conditions built on one another in the first societies to move to open access*" and "*All three conditions are necessary to establish extensive impersonal exchange among elites*" (North, et al., 2009, p. 151).

The analysis will be concluded, and the findings will be expanded in the discussion, supplemented by the theory of Tilly focusing on the current external threats the EU is facing. The discussion will focus on contemporary international relations of the EU, as the interesting aspect lies in the current proposal of a common EU army, why it has been proposed and what it means to the international relations. It is, however, essential to first investigate if EU integration will lead to the member states becoming one national state.

Additionally, it is crucial that we adapt North et al.'s theory to fit our analysis. This analysis will focus on the regional level, whereas North et al. are working on state level. In our approach, we translate the elites of North et al. to the EU member states and the state to the geographical area of Europe, further explained in the assumptions. The analysis is additionally based on three assumptions, that were necessary to make in order to adapt the theory, which will further be explained in the beginning of the analysis. This is difficult but not harmful to the analysis, as it is theory testing, meaning we investigate if the theory even has explanatory power in our case.

Thus, the overall research strategy is to explore what these theories can bring to a different subject and get a better understanding of the EU integration, by applying these theories.

4. Analysis

4.1. Introduction and Foundation of Assumptions for the Analysis

The authors assume the step of an EU army, as a major step in state formation, is similar, to how North et al. describe the importance a well-defined system of the legitimate monopoly on violence. The steps previously taken must have laid the foundation for such a major step (North, et al., 2009, p. 110). As was explained earlier, the doorstep conditions are key in explaining the advancement of a natural state of a society to an open access society, forming a sophisticated state. Thus, the doorstep conditions are looked at in the following part.

Since the theory, that is primarily aimed at explaining the transition of a society called “*the natural state*” to an “*open access order*” is used, the authors are going to adapt the assumptions of the theory to the case. Instead of confining the theory to a sovereign area of a nation state, the authors are going to adapt the theoretical framework to the region of Europe. The region of Europe is described by Emek Uçarer regarding that the Treaty of Rome, written in 1957, removed internal borders and created a common external border (Uçarer, 2016, p. 282). Any assumptions of analysing an area retrospectively and assuming constructed borders teleologically, meaning for instance why and how the Federal Republic of Germany developed, are consequently subject to their own assumption of when to start and interpret a “*beginning*” of an area. Thus, the authors are taking a broad definition of a region, applying the theoretical framework of North et al. and combining it with realist theory to explain the transition in closer accordance to the theory and thus fulfilling the “*task*” of a social science study. “*The task of social sciences is to explain the performance characteristics of societies through time...*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 1).

Firstly, the authors are going to assume the region of Europe as a fragile natural state, where elites are engaging with each other and attempts to limit or manage violence repeatedly fail and the development of the doorstep conditions is set back. A realist anarchy is the status-quo of this assumption, the region lacks a central authority or shaping actor to dictate the development, leading to a recurring issue of violence. Therefore, the first assumption to address is that the pre-WWII is characterized by an anarchic structure, where states attempted to increase their power to eventually become hegemon in the region, with political power struggles that ultimately resulted in the Second World War, meaning any alliances before and during the Second World War were very fragile. Robert Keohane describes the international system of anarchy the following, “*It is anarchic in the sense that it lacks an authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules of behaviour*” (Keohane, 1984, p. 7). This is similar to what was happening in the natural state, where no one was able to efficiently control the violence and create a stable social order as coalitions were only personal instead of institutionalized, but on the other hand not a

society in complete chaos as before the natural state. This puts the issue of managing violence and a fragile system at the core and is therefore in accordance with the logic of the natural state and North et al.'s requirements, specifically number one (North, et al., 2009, p. 150).

This assumption leads directly into the next of assuming the existing states of Europe at the time to be the equivalent of the elites of North et al.'s theory. This analysis represents a transition of elite-discussions to a regional level. The decision of interpreting states as the main actors and representative of the elites is connected to the application of realist theory and an assumption of the head of government of a state being a representative of the dominant elements of an elite.

The third and last assumption is that knowledge of state formation was already existent within the actors of the EU during its development, and therefore doorstep condition one and two can be attempted to be accomplished both in tandem, since the actors already know they need equal rule of law and perpetual institutions for a system to be resilient – this is ahistorical. “*No teleology or inevitable forces move societies toward more mature institutions*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 101). With this statement they highlight that even though time passes there is no guarantee for institutions to develop and mature to inevitably create a state. This is key for the research question of whether the process of integration of the EU can lead to institutions capable of supporting a state. Due to the reason that the natural state of Europe is not “*pure*”, meaning the second and third assumptions of North et al. (2009, p. 150) are not perfectly applicable, since there is already existent knowledge for the actors. “*In the modern world, in contrast, intentional decisions by elites to open access, [...], are possible*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 188).

This also explains the rapid development and integration of the EU compared to the slow process of historical state formation, since the actors already have knowledge about state formation and institutionalization. Considering we have adopted a rational perspective, the actors will have a rational approach to integration and peace in Europe, which is going to be analysed in the following.

4.1.1. The Marriage of Realism and North

The first doorstep condition highlights the importance of rule of law for the elites and its development. The states of Europe have been waging war and fighting for resources, influence, territory and many other reasons therefore they could be argued to correspond to a form of natural state or in realist terms; anarchic. No central authority or institutional set-up with coercive power existed to enforce peaceful coexistence, instead states acted according to Mearsheimer's theory of structural realism to achieve hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30). “*Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their*

rivals, with hegemony as their final goal" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 29). This can be corresponding to the natural state and lack of the fundamentals of the first doorstep condition of North et al. theory. "*Natural states are dynamic, and their internal structures undergo regular if episodic change. Regimes and dynasties rise and fall, relative prices adjust, climates fluctuate, neighbouring competitors appear and disappear, and boundaries and borders shift*" (North, et al., 2009, p. 150). Thus, similarly to how the natural state has to manage the issue of violence among its individual actors, the international system has faced the issue of managing violence among its actors as the ordering principle is anarchic.

This framework can be applied to pre-World War II Europe and is fitting as an analytical perspective of structural realism – states warring for power and constant shifts of the landscape of power and borders, connecting to elites vying for power in their respective society and due to the lack of rules attracting competitors and mistrust. This state of uncertainty is reflected in Mearsheimer's work the following way, "*States can never be certain about other states' intentions.*", as well as North et al.'s work, "*All societies face the problem of how to survive in the face of uncertainty, the never-ending set of new challenges, dilemmas, and crises*" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 31) (North, et al., 2009, p. 133). These conclusions are part of the understanding for the events of the Second World War and extend the foundation of this project's analysis.

4.2. Doorstep conditions 1 & 2

After establishing the assumptions and interconnection of the theoretical framework, the analysis will begin with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The "*institutional structure adopted by the ECSC [...], was to serve as a model for all future developments*", Derek Urwin points out, which is why the authors deem this to be a reasonable starting point (Urwin, 2010, p. 21). Following the research design, the analysis will match the patterns of the development of the EU to the theory of North et al.

4.2.1. The Foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community

Historian Tony Judt described Europe after the Second World War as offering "*a prospect of utter misery and desolation*", and of "*broken cities and barren fields*" (Judt, 2005, p. 13). The situation that the societies of Europe found themselves in, can be understood as having offered futile soil for the proposals of Schuman and other figures of the early stages of the later European institutions. For instance, Cini & Borragán points toward the strength of the anti-war rationale for European integration in their introductory chapter and emphasizing the Second World War as a "*catalyst for renewed interest in European Unity*" in the second chapter of their work (Cini & Borragán, 2010, p. 2) (Urwin, 2010, p. 16). D. Dinan, explains

the reasons for the ideas of a European Union are found in “*the disastrous decades of the early twentieth century. The miserable legacy of European heroic nationalism...*”, continuing with the comment that this memory was “*not lost on the peoples of Europe, who were receptive to the idea of treaty-based and highly institutionalized economic and political integration after World War II*” (Dinan, 2014, p. 1). Additionally, Judt stated that “*the war changed everything*” and that a return to the ways prior to the war “*was out of question almost everywhere*” (Judt, 2005, p. 63).

Therefore, an idea of managing the issue of violence was attempted, not only internally for the states, but also externally for Europe. This lays the foundation for an analysis, based on the assumption of the states, who later became member states of the EU, being part of a “Northian” elite-discussion, forming coalitions to manage violence. “*The transition proper begins when elites find a common interest in transforming some elite privileges into impersonal elite rights shared by all members of the elite*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 190). This common interest is reflected in the elites will to find a solution to the existing issue of violence between one another, for our case of post-World War II Europe and the transition of a natural state toward an open access society can commence.

“*The European integration process was initiated in the 1950’s largely as a consequence of the negative experiences of the founding member states during and in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Maintaining peace was a primary objective at the time*” (Cini & Borragán, 2010, p. 2). Cini & Borragán explain in their introductory chapter of their book, **European Union Politics**, for students “*who are completely new to the study of the EU*”. “*This edited book remains true to its earlier ambition, which was to offer students of EU politics an introductory text that would be both accessible and challenging, written by authors who are experts in their field. It was designed with undergraduates in mind [...] but we know that it has also been proven a useful basic text for more advanced students*” (Cini & Borragán, 2015, p. preface). This book will be used extensively throughout the project. While, they state this book was designed with undergraduates in mind, they further add that it is also a useful text for more advanced students and highlight the involvement of experts, which increases reliability. Additionally, the book will be complemented with the use of other sources, to decrease the overreliance on a single source.

This quote is a futile starting point for the analysis of the EU and its implications for North et al. theory of state formation (Cini & Borragán, 2010, p. 1). It complements the earlier provided descriptions of Judt and emphasizes the situation of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and core values at the time of its creation. These values

of maintaining peace as a primary objective are also reflected in North et al.'s work as they point out, "*All societies face the problem of violence*", and continue, "*at best it can be contained and managed*" (North, et al., 2009, p. 13).

The Schuman declaration proposed the establishment of the ECSC. It aimed to make war "*not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible*" (European Union, 2017). This was the first step taken by the states of Western Europe to establish common norms and practices into intergovernmental institutions, that can be considered the foundation of today's EU, as Baldwin and Wyplosz point out. They further mention, the institutional set-up of the ECSC, especially referring to the High Authority, as "*the forerunner of today's European Commission*" (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2015, p. 11). Derek Urwin similarly describes the importance of the development of the ECSC by highlighting, "*The institutional structure and operation of the European Union (EU) can trace a direct line of descent back to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*" (Urwin, 2010, p. 16).

While viewing the creation of the ECSC solely based on the historical background it was established is a simplistic view, this paper is not about an analysis of the abundant existence of theories about European integration, but a provision of an explanation for the incentive of its founding members to act accordingly. Additional difficulties arise out of the statement of Barnard & Peers describing that development of the EU and its description is "still unfolding" (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 9).

For further explanations, Urwin mentions that the establishment of the ECSC was "*the product of a combination of integrationist impulses and ideas, national self-interest and international circumstances*" (Urwin, 2010, p. 21). While other theorists, such as Andrew Moravcsik, highlight three main factors of commercial advantage, relative bargaining power of important governments and the incentive to enhance credibility of interstate commitments, to name other scholars of such processes. These place importance on other, or more precisely from their perspective, more vital factors of European integration than the historical background (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 2-3). Nonetheless, as the previously cited scholars point out, the historical background has played an important role in the initial formation of the ECSC, which later lead, due to various reasons, to more and more integrated forms of interactions and is in its essence not antagonistic toward an analysis based on arguments provided by Moravcsik. D. Dinan also provides an explanation of historical decisions based on "*national advantage*", similar to arguments of commercial advantage, "*Member states (and prospective member states) are motivated not by nebulous visions of European unity, but by concrete calculations of national advantage*" (Dinan, 2014, p. xiv). Therefore, it seems as

consensus among scholars of the field, that the historical background of the ECSC's foundation plays a significant role in its creation.

4.2.2. The development of the ECSC

Returning to the core of the analysis in the form of looking at the form of interactions that lead to the initiation of the doorstep conditions for the members of the ECSC. The field of economics, the core of the ECSC, was the first field of sovereign national policy touched by the supranational institutions that would later become the EU.

“When a natural state develops institutions, organizations, and beliefs that allow elites to treat each other impersonally, then that society is on the doorstep” (North, et al., 2009, p. 148). The development from state-to-state relationships to relationships that are institutionalized in an intergovernmental, possibly federal institution, represents the advancement of personal to impersonal negotiations among the elites, the states of Europe.

The institutions that were set-up, represent the development from *“a group of individuals bound together by mutual interests and threats”*, who constantly interact with each other and through that interaction develop new forms *“of regularizing behaviour through rules, both informal and formal”*. These rules culminate in further leading to the identification of *“procedures for arbitration and mediation”* and *“formalized into a machinery of government and justice”* (North, et al., 2009, p. 151). The early establishment of the ECSC can be considered to be exactly that, a formalization of rules and conduct formalized into new institutions. The institutional structure of the ECSC also included a supreme judicial authority, fitting the theme of the first doorstep condition of a systematic framework of rule of law for the elites:

“In recent years the citizens of Europe had even acquired their own court. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), set up in 1952 under the same Treaty of Paris that established the European Coal and Steel Community, had started out with the limited task of ensuring that EC legislation (‘Community law’) was interpreted and applied in the same way in each member-state. But by the end of the century its judges – originally one from each member-state – were authorized to settle legal disputes between member-states and EU institutions, as well as hear cases brought against lower court decisions or even against national governments” (Judt, 2005, p. 732).

The ECSC was mainly about ensuring that an intergovernmental body possessed supervisory authority about how its members administer their coal and steel resources, the core materials to wage war at the time. This supervisory institution was called the High

Authority, “*the main executive institution with decision-making powers*” (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 13). The Authority is one pillar of the embodiment of what North et al. term, “*managing violence*”, a fundamental aim of a society that is capable of forming a structure akin to a state. Moravcsik concludes in his work, “*Choices to pool and delegate sovereignty to international institutions are best explained as efforts by governments to constrain and control one another...*” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 9). This conclusion further highlights the theme of “managing violence”, while in his case among governments, it might as well be understood as between the sovereign heads of members of an elite group. In realist terms this might be understood as decreasing uncertainty, whereas the principle of anarchy in the international system is antagonistic towards the view that sovereign states are constrained by international organizations, especially if they do not possess coercive means. Therefore, the continuation of member states to engage in the development of these institutions embodies a slow retreat of the applicability of realist theory to the case – a system of collective security. But such a conclusion at this point would be premature, as it can be highlighted that the initial concern for the states can be understood as finding a way out of a perpetual strife and competition between states in an anarchic structure. “*In this view [neo-realist], integration is a means of strengthening cooperation among alliance partners against a common threat; in Cold War Europe, the preeminent threat stemmed from the Soviet Union and domestic Communist parties allied with it*”, is a statement of Moravcsik’s study on the topic of integration and how realism can provide an explanation for these questions (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29). Such issues will further be explained in the discussion section of this paper, while the authors leave the point of a systemic approach to “*manage violence*” among elites highlighted.

After the creation of the ESCS, the members continued and set out to create the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome about the EEC was signed in 1957 and marked the birth of the concept of a single market, enabling goods to move freely across the borders of its members. The EEC shared part of its institutions with the ECSC and thus increased its powers and importance but keeping to the idea of institutionalized and impersonal rule.

The states, that are developing these institutions are developing a framework of rule of law for themselves and decreasing intra-elite competition and uncertainty. A concrete example includes the result of putting the production of these resources under an international institution was “*consciously designed to assuage fears that Germany might covertly rearm*” (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 13). Resulting in decreased uncertainty for neighbouring actors of Germany, re-integrating Germany into a framework of rules and ensuring its conduction,

thus beneficial for Germany and every member of the elite on different levels of politics, economics and security.

This is in line with reflections in Dinan's conclusion that, "*National leaders decided to share sovereignty in supranational organizations primarily because they perceived that it was in their countries' (and therefore their own) interests to do so*" (Dinan, 2014, p. 2). The member states found themselves to be "*bound together by mutual interests and threats*" as cited earlier of North et al. The common interests lead to an array of ever-increasing and redefinitions of treaties dealing with the ECSC and slowly leading to the development of today's European Union, manifesting a more institutionalized framework of interaction, impersonal, governed by a set of rules through legal and perpetual offices.

The core tenant the establishment of the ECSC, provided was more than the traditional security arrangements that the governments of Europe were usually more interested in (Urwin, 2010, p. 18). It provided a formal platform, a supranational institution, to formalize interaction of its member states, the elites of our analysis. "*By instituting a common set of rights held by all elites, rule of law for elites created a common interest in defending those rights*" (North, et al., 2009, p. 157).

The development of EU institutions throughout its history, starting from the ECSC to today's EU has been a trajectory of peace and the development of common norms and practices to stabilize the interactions between the states.

As we have covered the pre-existing mindset of the founding states of the ECSC and the effect it had on them. Further, we have identified the fulfilment of the first two doorstep conditions of the theoretical framework, the change from personal to impersonal interactions between the elites, including a system of clearly defined rules and norms of behaviour.

4.2.3. Opt-outs and Asymmetrical Rights in the European Union

While the rule of law via intergovernmental, or to some extent federal institutions, can decrease the intra-elite competition. This means the competition between the states for more power and influence among one another, North et al. highlight the importance of identical rights. They are "*more easily defended than idiosyncratic privileges; a legal compromise of one elite's right becomes a precedent that compromises the rights of all elites*" (North, et al., 2009, p. 158). Therefore, the authors are going to analyse the opt-out clauses as an example of existing obstacles and bastions of sovereignty for the elites.

This is an issue the EU sees itself confronted with on many fronts. Urwin points out the existence of complexities around the story of integration, consisting of subplots, varying

strategies and different ambitions (Urwin, 2010, p. 17). Some member states of the EU, which in North et al. terms can be seen as the dominant coalition of elites, have received so called “opt-outs”, that have been granted to certain member states since the early 90’s. As cited by Bomberg et al. several member states have negotiated different opt-outs, e.g. Denmark for the Euro currency and “*aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*” or the UK and Ireland from the Schengen Agreement (Bomberg, et al., 2012, p. 86). These opt-outs are a strong sign of sovereignty for the member state toward EU integration and can be understood as weakening the EU as the dominant coalition. North et al. describe how a system that has certain privileges for some members of the elites carries the risk of damaging the whole coalition through the precedent set that can affect the behaviour of other members (North, et al., 2009, p. 158). Some members might enjoy privileges, others might understand such privileges as a lack of commitment and assurances toward the shared goals. North et al. highlight this dilemma by identifying a dichotomy of ideas for the elites, “*Most elites benefit, in principle, from well-defined rules enforced in an unbiased manner*”, while on the other hand, “*...elites know that political, economic, and military power are not distributed equally throughout the coalition*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 154). Some member states have a different culture on certain aspects of EU law, while others enjoy a powerful position that enables them to enforce opt-outs that favour their national sovereignty over the coalition. It can be understood as their rational interests to maximize their gains, while compromising the least to achieve a comparatively better position against their rivals, while on the other hand this behaviour damages the whole stability of the coalition’s gains. Moravcsik describes this situation in the development of the EU as, those “*who gained the most economically from integration comprised the most on the margin to realize it, whereas those who gained the least or for whom the cost of adaptation were highest imposed conditions*” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 3). This can explain the imposition of opt-outs for some members via an economic perspective.

Urwin describe, Konrad Adenauer, the former Chancellor of Germany, as someone who “*saw it as potentially valuable element of his policy of tying the Federal Republic firmly to Western Europe politically, economically, and militarily. Submerging the country in European ventures, he hoped, would further reassure his neighbours that West Germany had abandoned the aggressive nationalism of the past*” (Urwin, 2010, p. 21). This can serve as an example of a state willing to compromise comparatively much to gain back trust and reduce uncertainty of neighbouring actors to foster political, economic and even military cooperation in order to enhance the credibility of its commitments, to use the earlier introduced terminology of Moravcsik.

Other aspects include the idea from North et al. about the existence of knowledge of the structure of relationships among individuals is elevating “*the value of elite, exchange and produces valuable information for all elites*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 154). This provides another example of North’s theory of the doorstep conditions concluded impact that are affecting all members, who are participating the establishment of a common set of rules for all the elites. Thus, deals under the newly established framework remain not only profitable for elites who agree on deals, but for all members of the coalition and future members, even if some members decide to opt-out of certain agreements, as a common set of rules is established and “*valuable information*” distributed providing certainty and credibility.

4.2.4. Institutional Set-up to Mitigate Preferential Treatment

The existence of rule of law for the elites creates a mutual interest among the coalition members to defend those rights, but can lead to intra-elite conflicts, as North et al. explain (North, et al., 2009, p. 157). The recreation of a similar situation prior to a coalition sharing rights and norms existed could increase uncertainty and diminish the initial gains for the members of those privileges, which provides incentive to perpetuate the status-quo of what has been achieved. This is primarily reflected in doorstep condition two.

“*The EU is not a state, though it exercises powers which are normally exercised by states*” (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 98). They further add that there is use in comparing most EU institutions to political institutions of states on a practical level, highlighting the degree of similarity (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 39).

The EU consists of a complex system of institutions to mitigate the alienation of its members and offers a system of balance between the different members to mitigate the power some members can exercise over others. Among those measures are systems such as qualitative majority voting (QMV), the rotation of the Chair of Council Presidency, the existence of one Commissioner for the EU Commission each member to enable “*equal*” rights and treatment as well as power or the distribution of EU institutions throughout its member states.

Jeffrey Lewis describes the institution of the Council of the European Union as the “*heart of EU decision making*”, which thus creates reason and importance to describe in part, some of the mechanisms of its decision-making process and how it can fit into the framework of North et al. (Lewis, 2010, p. 142).

The QMV is the default system of rule for the European Council of Ministers, as stated in Article 16(3) of the TEU (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 57) (Council of the European Communities, 1992). It is a system, where the votes of different members have a different

weight in order to balance the comparative size of their population, which is not uncontroversial, as to issues of how to calculate such a qualified majority or the reason for employing this system in the first place (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 57). While, besides simplifying the work of the Council to find majorities for decisions compared to unanimity, the system makes the votes of each participant more meaningful, if each vote holds a certain value, in order to balance such different actors as France and the Netherlands due to sheer population. Thus, there exists a system to balance population and number of votes in favour or against, so called “*dual-majority*” (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 59).

It is impossible to provide detail on all the technicalities of the treaties and the functioning of its institutions due to the scope and focus of this project. Therefore, these examples represent deliberate choices by the authors to be included and are to illustrate some mechanics of the EU to mitigate preferential treatment of some members over others, in order to adhere to a system, such as the one laid out in the theoretical framework of North et al.

Further details on institutions of the EU and their functioning will be given in the next part, which is more specifically about doorstep condition two, but remains linked to issues of preventing preferential treatment of some members over others. Thus, this part will be left with conclusive remarks of Barnard & Peers that, “*Institutional cooperation is consequently required in the exercise of most governmental functions*” (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 89). Showcasing, that not one institution can dominate EU policy nor can any state that could potentially establish a grasp on one institution, dictate its will on others as a balance is required for the system to work.

4.2.5. Perpetual Institutions and Impersonal Leadership - a closer look at Doorstep Condition 2

“*In legal terms that came to characterize impersonal organizations in the Western tradition, these are perpetually lived organizations: organizations whose existence is independent of the lives of their members*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 23).

The system of impersonal institutions is key to the functioning of a transition for a natural state toward an open access society, as pointed out by North et al.

Jackson & Rosberg’s study is comparatively old and some of their findings are outdated to a certain extent. Their study of “*weak states*”, including the analysis of why those states are “*weak*”, remains relevant and provides empirical evidence for such claims. They identified three factors as to why governments fail to exercise control, the relevant factor for this study is about “*domestic authority*” or more precisely, the lack of “*constitutional and institutional*

offices that are independent of their [rulers] personal authority has not taken root (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 7). This situation leads to instability, due to a *“disaffection of important elites from the government”* and leading to an increased number of military coups, which *“is perhaps the best indication of elite alienation”* (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 8). These findings of their study, highlight the importance of establishing impersonal institutions for leadership of a state to create a stable system.

“Allowing the growth of a broader array of organizations that could take advantage of the new opportunities that arose out of the result of the first condition. The organizations had to have some degree of independence. And, in particular, they had to have perpetual life” (North, 2009, p. 23).

As mentioned earlier the complex system of bureaucratic institutions set up to ensure equal rules for all members, which must fulfil certain conditions in order to pass the second condition set out by North et al.

A prime example of an EU institution fulfilling such requirements is the EU Commission. *“A key feature of the Commission’s functioning is that it is ‘completely independent’ and cannot take instructions from governments or any other body”* (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 47). Furthermore, it consists of many commissioners, one for each member state, delegates for a specific field of policy. Additionally, there are two primary figures leading major positions of power, the Commission’s President and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. This bureaucratic construct ensures independence, while also enabling the institution decreased reliance on personalistic rule, due to diminished reliance on any specific individual or member. The institution of the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy is not reliant on one specific individual, but will persist and function similarly, independent of the incumbent in the essence of its objectives.

Another core part of doorstep condition two for a natural state to develop into an open access order, is the ability to participate in impersonal organizations. *“An open access order exists only if a large number of individuals have the right to form organizations that can engage in a wide variety of economic, political, and social activities”* (North, et al., 2009, p. 23). This is possibly best reflected in parliamentary structures, that are also present on the EU level via the European Parliament (EP). *“The European Parliament is perhaps the most familiar EU political institution for those searching for parallels between the EU political system and national political systems”* (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 48). Here, Barnard & Peers reiterate the similarity between the EU’s institutions and the institutions of national states and highlight the level of development of EU institutions regarding state formation.

The institution of a parliament, including its members and a system of party politics are an example of perpetual institutions. The possibility to access and participate in the political process of the EU is given through Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is about the freedom of assembly and association for individuals (EUR-Lex, 2012). Thus, we have established the general possibility for citizens of the European Union to take part in the decision-making process of the EU through joining civil organizations, trade unions or political parties – all of which are examples of perpetual institutions themselves. This system offers the opportunity for large scale sustained relationships among members of the elite and a platform of competition outside the realm of violence, reiterating the idea of “*managing violence*”. Party politics represent the essence of perpetual institutions in participating in policy-making and other aspects of governance, as they are not bound by a single person of leadership but in part as a group of individuals bound together in the pursuit of a framework of policy ideals.

The EU Parliament developed alongside the EU, from a marginal institution as the Common Assembly of the ECSC to what it is today, having undergone probably more substantial changes than any other major EU body, as Roger Scully traces its history (Scully, 2010, p. 163). Such development highlights the importance of a representative body for legitimacy, but not only for the citizens of the Union, but also for the elite members, who might have an interest in the establishment of institutions for debate to solve intra-elite conflicts.

The European Parliament (EP) began its function as only being consulted on a selection of draft measures (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 51). But since the 1970’s its powers have been “*greatly enhanced*”, to include “*legislative and budgetary functions*” as main powers (Scully, 2010, p. 165) (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 51). Other powers include “*most important power of political control*” in appointing and the ability to dismiss the Commission and its President (Barnard & Peers, 2014, p. 51). There exist many more technicalities of EU law and the functions of the EU parliament, what the authors aimed to highlight in this chapter is the increasing importance of the institution of the EP and its role in fulfilling doorstep condition two. As the authors point out, this institution can further be attributed to offer platforms for managing intra-elite competition and proposing a significant part in the system of checks and balances. The EP also offers a broader part of the population outside of the elites the ability of participation and control, increasing legitimacy for the Union’s policy and an important aspect of an open access order.

4.3. Doorstep Condition 3

“Achieving consolidated control of the military appears to be the most difficult doorstep condition for a natural state to achieve” according to North et al. (2009, p. 169). However, there are already several minor examples of consolidation of the military within the EU. As mentioned in the section of contemporary relevance, several states have already, or are proposing to, pooling army, navy or air force units together in efforts to save on financing and maintaining a certain standard of quality. Likewise, is the shift on the international stage with the US losing international power, while China’s is increasing, forcing the EU to be able to stand alone (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). The economic crisis has also created an environment for closer cooperation, as pooling of resources is more cost effective, in terms of procurement and upkeep (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 253).

4.3.1. Collection of the military

The first step towards a unified military was seen with the attempted creation of the European Defence Community, which would have been the de facto European Army (Phinnemore, 2016, p. 15). It however, failed to get ratified by France, the sponsor of the treaty, as a number of internal and external factors affected the French Parliament on its vote (Lindley-French, 2007, pp. 20-21).

Countries which are against the creation of a unified European military, fear that it would cause a loss of US/NATO support, choosing to stay in NATO, rather than attempting to create something new (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). This fear is based on the US’s global economic and military power, potentially being lost by creating a new military alliance which excludes the US. Furthermore, would the protection from the US nuclear umbrella also be at risk.

Some states have taken more responsibility and deployment costs than others when doing military missions for the EU (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). This is apparent with the EU Battlegroups (EUBG). These battle groups were created to ensure the EU had a rapid deployment and reaction force, to react to military conflicts or natural disasters. It is built on a concept like that from NATO and is placed under the direct control of the Council of the EU. The EUBG consists of states who willingly participate in the project, where the states’ soldiers are rotated on a six-month basis. Some of the participating states are more invested than others, choosing to supply headquarters and support capabilities. This project has, like all other EU projects, never been used in real combat (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 246). The different perspectives on foreign policy, its use and commitment to the EU military project are clearly varying.

The Treaty on European Union, signed in 1993, should cover “*all areas of foreign and security policy*”, and, in time, work towards creating a common policy of defence and unified defence, if members so wished (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). Thereby, marking the first significant and firm step towards a unified military, however with the caveat that the military could only be created, if there was a general wish from the members states. This treaty outlined the objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy, by defending common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the Union (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). Likewise, it would also promote international cooperation and security, strengthen the security of the Union, and develop and consolidate democracy, the rule-of-law, and respect for human rights (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). By outlining common values, the treaty gained support from the member states as they felt the need to defend these values.

It also established the three-pillar structure of the EU, wherein the second pillar placed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the control of the EU Council to moderate and safeguard the intergovernmental character of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), there also needs to be unanimity for decisions, giving each member veto rights, on any policy or operation (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, pp. 242-243). Placing the CFSP under the control of the Council, has allowed for civilian control over the military, granting control to the member states. The introduction of the veto right, has likewise ensured that member states will not be the target for military actions, and further allows for member states to object against military actions they deem wrong. However, this does not fit with the theory of realism, as a realist explanation would not comply with rules as constraints in an anarchic structure. This is therefore more in line with theory of liberal institutionalism. “*In this theory, the principal guarantors of compliance with commitments are reciprocity (including both threats of retaliation and promises of reciprocal cooperation) and reputation*” (Keohane, 2002, p. 3).

Within the treaty, there were two possible ways for change in the EU. The first was member state’s own foreign policy. The second was cooperation and consultation within the CFSP, thereby increasing international leverage (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 243). The treaty was ineffective for the first few years, as common defence policies were focused on the lowest common denominator. However, in 1997, with the Amsterdam European Council, it was allowed for states to abstain from voting, thereby saving them from using their veto power (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 243). The introduction of abstaining, allowed for greater implementation of policies, ensuring that policies would not be removed because single

states were against these policies. The introduction of abstaining would however not affect the larger issues, where the veto still can be used.

At the Saint Malo Summit, in 1998, it was declared that “*the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises*” (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 245).

To make the Saint Malo summit more than a promise, EU states agreed that the EU should be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days, being operational for one year. It was planned to be possible by 2003, but was extended to 2010, though this too has not been possible (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 245). The failure of the Saint Malo summit to deploy 60,000 troops, shows that countries have been unable or unwilling to help to realize the goal.

At a meeting in Cologne in 1999, it was decided that military personnel, expertise and equipment be pooled together, for it to be used in EU-led military operations (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 245). With this pooling, EU states took a step towards a unified military, as this would allow for close cooperation and creating a foundation for sharing.

In 2009, the aim of the CSDP was expanded to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice, and post-conflict stabilization (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 243). This shift in policy, by allowing for a broader range of missions, has allowed for states which would be against regular military intervention, to be able to participate in joint efforts of the EU.

In the Lisbon Treaty, 2007, the Solidarity Clause states that member states are obliged to assist other members if they are attacked by terrorist or in events of disasters, natural or otherwise. Along with it, the Mutual Assistance Clause, stated that if there is a case of armed aggression, the other states have an “*obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on self-defence*”. This clause is binding for all members of the EU but does not affect their neutrality or their NATO membership. While it could appear like a defence agreement, military capabilities are controlled by the individual states ((Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 247). These two clauses are moving towards a closer Europe, as states are willing to assist other states in cases of aggression or accidents. Though this can be attributed to the fact, that states will not have to give up their own military to be able to uphold either of the two clauses.

The European Defence Agency (EDA), was established in 2004 and focuses on pooling resources and modernizing the militaries of EU member states, through a number of

programmes and initiatives. It is, however, unable to use the member states' military (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 249).

The creation of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), means that EU states are thinking more of joint operations and cooperation. As this fighter plane system would greatly decrease the different types of materials used for joint operations, meaning fewer changes needed for cross-national use in munitions, training and more.

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is a process which monitors EU member states' military operations, analysing for possible collaborative operations. CARD will however, only be realized by the end of 2019 (European Defence Agency, 2019). Along with the CARD, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) also works to create better integration within the member states (EEAS, 2017). These two will allow for states to be operating closer together in military operations and creating along with the FCAS, closer integration of EU militaries, both on a structural level and on the material level.

4.3.2. Legitimate civilian control

Westphalians view international relations as independent sovereign states with security, foreign, and defence policies, but with closer cooperation this will be lost (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). Others however, believe that these are natural extensions for the EU, and are needed in order to shoulder its international responsibilities and heighten its soft and hard power (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). The loss of the control over policies will not be the only loss for the states. Most states, according to North et al., also fear that when they give up their military it will be used against them, leaving them defenceless or be used in unwanted or unjust wars. This is exemplified in the differences in foreign policies regarding intervention. With states such as the UK and France wanting to intervene in international affairs, whereas states such as Germany are more reserved. This also comes as some of the states will put more importance on the UN and its mandates than others (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 242). Without institutions to ensure this, states will be unwilling to give up their military. It is therefore important to create institutions, which will protect the states from this threat, as North et al. highlight. Consolidated control of the military, which is constrained by the political system decreases the frequency of violence in a state (North, et al., 2009, p. 154). Therefore, the suspicion of illegitimate use of force against the elites is unwarranted, as history has shown that such a structure decreases the frequency of violence in a state.

With the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the name was changed from the European Security and Defence Policy, to the Common Security and Defence Policy, which showed an ambition

for closer cooperation within the EU (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 246). It also removed the EU pillar system. The treaty ended the rotation of the EU presidency, creating a more permanent position, but giving away its power on the ESDP to the HR. The CFSP was however still intergovernmental and decisions within the EU Council still had to be voted on unanimously (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 246). With the abolition of the pillar structure, the EU structure was simplified to create a legal person, something which is required in doorstep 2, expanding the position of the High Representative. The position now resembles something of a minister of foreign affairs or minister of defence. This, along with the position of a permanent Presidency, can be interpreted, as the creation of a civilian command structure as seen in most states. The insurance that issues must be voted on by unanimity, ensures states are safe from European aggression, however the need for unanimity also creates bureaucracy and can result in lowest common denominator policies, with little power.

With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Commission is only able to present Common Foreign and Security Policies along with the HR, and the Commission has no power over the military aspect of the CSDP, though they do have control over civilian elements such as budgeting and missions. By allowing the Commission to plan for the budget of EU military tasks, there is created a clear divide between the military and the civilian branch of government, ensuring civilian control of the military. The EU Parliament has no influence on the CFSP but is kept informed of issues. The EP also has direct influence over the appointment of the HR (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 249). This has weaknesses but ensures civilian control over the military.

Another way that there has been created institutions wherein states are able to discuss foreign issues is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). Here the ministers of foreign affairs from the member states meet with the HR, to discuss foreign affairs issues relevant to the EU. Ensuring all members have the possibility to be heard, will result in states that are more sure military control will not be lost or used against itself. Though there has been talks of militarization within the EU, there has yet to be a council for the ministers of defence, though they sometimes participate in the FAC (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 247). Should a Defence Council be created, states will be able to have larger control and say over the EU military and military related decisions.

European External Action Service (EEAS) serves as the EU's foreign and defence ministry, with staff from member states, who represent the EU and their own country. Within the EEAS, the members attempt to create common EU foreign policy, while still representing their own country (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 248). This allows states to have a forum, where all can

be heard and discuss foreign policy, by allowing for independence from each state. Furthermore, they will each have the possibility to have their own mark on the EU policy.

EU member states control the CFSP through the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC is occupied by diplomats, and has several committees and working groups, who all help to serve as the main advisor for the FAC. The PSC also monitors and analyses security issues within the EU, and drafts common policies based on this. Once these policies are approved by the FAC, the PSC oversees the implementation of these. With this, there is great civilian control of the policies implemented, and further helps to create policies which are approved by each member state. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) helps the HR and PSC, with advice on missions and policies. The EUMC contains the chiefs of defence from member states, while the EUMS has the national Chiefs of Staff (Dover & Kristensen, 2016, p. 249). The EUMC and EUMS also help to create an existing military structure, that also allows states to have influence within the current and future EU military structure.

4.3.3. Political control

In terms of financing for European military, the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) and European Defence Fund, are examples of how the EU plans to increase the overall military spending and create funds for which national militaries will be able to receive financing for improvements to their military and thereby the EU defence as a whole. These structures of the EU highlight the retreat of the applicability of realist theory inside the region of Europe, while on the other hand the increasing interdependence and alignment of security interests is emphasized. The states who contribute to finance and support military capabilities of other states, willingly sacrifice the possibility of increasing their own capabilities. Instead, the commitments to the institutions and interdependence created by the EU are creating incentives for the states to remain stable and capable of defence to the outside. This could be extended with the foundation of consolidated control of the military for the EU, since it would eliminate the extra steps currently necessary.

The proposed European Peace Facility would help with the financing of EU member states' military, and possibly the EU military as well, in actual military operations. This marks a big step for the EU to have a more active foreign policy, which will be able to support its own military operations abroad. Though this has previously been opposed by Germany, as they believe EU treaties forbid the EU from providing support to military operations (Pothier, 2019). While this might seem like a problem, the project has continued, creating a new joint way to

finance the military within the EU, without leaving the bill for the few states involved or those willing to pay for it.

As stated in the theory, by North et al., there needs to be institutional safeguards against the military's power and influence within the states. With the theory, this was important as there needed to occur a transition to Open access. However, since all member states of the EU already ensure separation of power between the political and military people, there is less need to focus on this criterion. The need to keep civil–military relations at a minimum, is however mentioned in the Copenhagen criteria from 1993, where it was decided all member states must have democracy and respect the rule of law (Juncos & Borragán, 2016, p. 231). The fear of military participation or intervention within the democratic process can therefore largely be disregarded for the EU.

4.4. Findings of the analysis

This section will summarize the findings of the analysis and open the gateway for the discussion to take place on a bigger scale.

“That a complex entity of this sort would be created was not something one could have predicted with any certainty when Robert Schuman made his surprising statement on May 9, 1950”, this statement by William Diebold Jr. shows the difficulty of attempting conclusions about this topic (Diebold, 1959, p. 622). Diebold, at the time, was faced with difficulties in predicting the outcome, of, from today's standpoint, the first and most “*basic*” integration of the EU institutional set-up, just as today, we are faced with attempting conclusions based on more or less loose statements put forward by another French government official.

Thus, the authors can conclude that there is definitely, a parallel between the historical process of state formation and EU integration, since both processes happened organically without the actors constantly attempting to reach a final goal of a state. Instead, their rational and intentional choices slowly lead to increasing development of the doorstep conditions and state formation, due to the incentives offered by integration in the respective fields.

Tracing the arguments of North et al., a core feature of a peaceful open access society is the well-defined monopoly of the legitimate use of violence (North, et al., 2009, p. 110). Thus, we can identify, that a central EU authority such as the Commission, equipped with well-defined rules on the legitimate use of violence is a major step in the development of a peaceful open access society and a functioning state. But the powers of the danger of misuse of violence is a fundamental need to be addressed, they further point out (North, et al., 2009, p. 22). As we pointed out, certain constitutional and charter rights such as the veto right, systems of QMV and

rule of law provide a layer of protection against potential illegitimate use of force as established in the first two doorsteps.

North et al. state it is possible for a natural state to adopt and create the same institutions such as courts and military, as seen in Western Europe. This does however not mean, that these organisations will be stable, as the natural state is fragile without rule of law and perpetually lived organisations. Considering North et al.'s argument about the ability for the modern world to create an open access society based on existing knowledge, as explained in our assumptions, it is still not certain that the creation of a European Court or a European military for instance is the same as state formation: *"even when the path to open access is laid out for them by the historical experience of other societies – suggests that the problem lies deeper than the will of elites to share their power"*. Based on the analysis it is, however, reasonable to conclude that the EU organisations and institutions not only are superficial creations but are based on transitions laid out by the first two doorstep conditions. Therefore, the authors conclude the EU to be currently situated in the process of doorstep three.

The anarchic structure of realist assumption was slowly eroded for the members of this Union, profiting from decreasing uncertainty and thus managing the threat of violence among one another. This development directly fosters economic development according to North et al. (North, et al., 2009, p. 1). *"By the end of the century, however, the elites and institutions of the European Union were so intertwined and interdependent that armed conflict, while never impossible, had become somehow inconceivable"* (Judt, 2005, p. 734). But as the authors will explore in the discussion chapter, the underlying structure of realist thought was not lost, it is still existent within the Union and merely moved the spotlight to the outside. Yet, exactly this development of *"inside"* and *"outside"* of the Union, visible through policy projects such as the European Neighbourhood Policy or The Common Foreign and Security Policy is a hint at the level of *"stateness"* the Union is potentially moving toward. Furthermore, projects such European Defence Fund and European Intervention Initiative are prime examples of the interests of the members of the EU increasingly aligning toward security and defence.

5. Discussion

In the following chapter the authors are going to discuss external factors impacting the EU army proposal and its effect on state formation. After having dealt with the internal factors via North et al.'s theory, Tilly will be the main source for the discussion of external factors, as he argues state formation begins externally with war. The key thought of Tilly, is the idea of "*war makes the state and the state makes war*" (Tilly, 1975, p. 42), showcasing the external outlook of the idea of state formation, thus the authors deem it necessary to include this perspective of externality to the discussion of the research question. Additionally, the question of an armed forces is inherently connected to external factors, as the military is primarily focused on external defence.

The authors have discovered that the creation of an EUAF is possible according to the findings of applying North et al.'s theoretical framework. Therefore, this chapter discusses further factors impacting the prospects and feasibility of an EUAF and its effect in state formation, built upon the foundation of the earlier findings.

Firstly, the three models for state formation of Charles Tilly will be analysed in context of the research question. Furthermore, the potential of the model the contemporary EU fits best regarding the foundation of an EU national state, will also be analysed.

The discussion is an analysis beyond the findings of the analysis chapter, taking them into account and complement it by adding the theory of Charles Tilly. This will, as discussed earlier, enhance validity and reliability, as well as make the points of the conclusion more comprehensive, due to adding in another layer of analysis.

5.1. Charles Tilly

5.1.1. External Threats

Following the doorstep conditions, a consolidated European military seems like a natural next step for the EU integration, as we have seen a rule of law for the elite and perpetual lived organization that continuously have evolved since the Second World War. This has created the internal peace that the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman wanted from the European Coal and Steel Union he advised almost 70 years ago. Today, internal war and uncertainty seems almost unimaginable in Europe. Since, the states have become so integrated and economically interdependent that no EU member state could harm another member state, without it having major political, economic and cultural consequences on oneself.

It can be discussed whether the political system of the EU is robust enough to handle a consolidated military, but none-the least it has been proposed by Macron. Charles Tilly's theory can provide explanatory power, as to why this proposal has been made now. Even though peace is prospering internally, it is a different case outside the European borders. As previously explained in the beginning of this project, European states are facing different external threats and uncertainties such as the US pulling out of the INF treaty without consulting the EU, despite the fact the missile range reach within Europe and not the US (Stone, 2018). This is only one of many threats and both Macron and Merkel agree that it is time that the EU is responsible for its own security as Merkel and Macron respectively stated "*The time when we could rely on others are over*" (La Baume & Herszenhorn, 2018) and "*We need a Europe that is increasingly able to defend itself by itself – and without solely depending on the US*" (Franke, 2018).

It is not the first time a unified military has been proposed, as the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, suggested to create an EU army to further integrate in 2015. It is, however, the first time in recent years that the state leaders from some of the most powerful European states, military and economically speaking, are willing to hand over the control of the military to a centralized European military organization. They show trust in the system, that the power will never be used against them. This highlights the current international relations, which brings us back to Charles Tilly. Tilly states that "*War made the state and the state made war*" (Tilly, 1975, p. 42). He argues that war was first created because "*...rulers normally tried to establish both a secure area within which they could enjoy the returns from coercion and a fortified buffer zone to protect the secure area*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 184). In the later phase of nationalism, the rulers lost the ability to go to war on their own behalf and instead war was made because of national interest. Through the different phases the need to control territories and maintain or gain power has been the general goal, and when these fundamentals have been threatened states have gone to war. Similarly, these external threats, the EU are facing, can be argued to be the catalyst for the unified military proposals using Tilly's theory. The EU is, however, not in direct war, as the theory describes, but the threats alone have made European state leaders react to protect themselves. Since war or the threat of war made the state according to Tilly, it can be argued that the external threats have acted as the "*shock*" providing the fundament for a United State of Europe. This is not necessarily intentional to create such a state, as Tilly explains that the national state at that time was created as a by-product of war. If "*war*" or "*preparation for war*" (Tilly, 1990, p. 28) in this case the current external threats have sparked the discussion of a consolidated European military. It is not unlikely that further integration will take place and new policy

areas, institutions and organizations will be created, to carry out immediate tasks to support unified armed forces in potential wars or increasing defensive capabilities. Similarly, such conclusion connects to the previously explained irregular bangs of integration (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 2).

5.1.2. Possibility of a European national state

As explained, we know from Tilly that he operates with three different types of societies, the coercive-intensive, capital-intensive and capitalized coercive societies. However, the capitalized coercive society was far superior in war making and ultimately created the national state. As Tilly's theory is explained, capital and coercive power must be somewhat balanced to "...sustain a competent military power married with sustained economic development" (North, et al., 2009, p. 180). The capital-intensive society was too weak to sustain international political independence because of weak government even though they were economically successful. The Coercive-intensive society got the means for war from the population and conquering territory, but urban commercial centres were never created, as the rural political elite prevented it, meaning they lacked capital.

If the capitalized coercive society is the only long-lasting society, can Europe then become one single national state? Comparing the EU with the three types of society the EU has most in common with the capital-intensive society. The foundation of the EU we know today, is the internal market, which has been mostly beneficial for most member states creating economies of scale, harmonization and limiting internal protectionism, to some extent serving the capitalist as the capital-intensive society. Tony Judt supports the view of economic benefits produced by the EU, "*the economic benefits of the single markets have been real, as even the most ardent British Eurosceptic have come to concede*" (Judt, 2005, p. 732). Many, however, question the military power of the EU but not the economic power "*In the end, the real problem is that Europe as an aggregate power is immense: the combined EU economy is the second-largest in the world. But without political integration, Europe can't field military power equivalent to its economic power*" (Peck, 2018). It can be argued that the EU is similar to what Tilly describes as a city-state, with low concentration of coercive means. As they are scattered around in the different states of Europe, just as coercive means were scattered around urban militias across the city-state. The city-state never needed to create a central state structure as defence was bought when needed, just as NATO up until now has been the main defence for the EU without the need to create consolidated military organisation. We, however, in some sense already see a high accumulation and concentration of capital in the EU, as states pay contributions to the EU and are required to

coordinate fiscal policies and not exceed limits on government debt and deficit since the economic and monetary union was created (Wind, 2018).

National states on the other hand have a more central structure with military, extractive, redistributive and other centralized organizations, with the distinctive aspect of bargaining with the population's possession of coercive means and provide protection, adjudication and distribution with high accumulation and concentration of coercive means. This has not been the role of the EU but the job of the member states within their own borders. This is also what separates the state formation in early Europe with our case. National states already exist, and they provide their population with protection, legal and social rights in return for taxes and interventions into private life. So why should these tasks be handled by a centralized EU organization? One answer is that the European states individually are relatively weak in comparison to Russia and the US. Looking from a defensive realist perspective, it is a strategy of survival for smaller powers to form coalitions against any aggressor (Waltz, 1979). However, NATO already have managed to be just that, a coalition, without forming a national state. None-the least a strong national state needs balanced capital and coercive means to be sustainable. For the European states and their population, the concentration of coercive means would require them to "*disarm*" and hand over their military to the EU and that commitment to the EU would be a process of bargaining, as Tilly describes. After the French Revolution the implementation of direct rule changed the state structure as extractions of capital (household taxation), extraction of coercive means such as national soldiers and other interventions in private life became acceptable (Tilly, 1990, pp. 25-27). A more democratic approach to the EU could become necessary, if a United States of Europe would be based on nationalism similar to a national state, as the EU has been accused of having a democratic deficit (EUR-Lex, n.d.). If, however, the EU manages to create an EUAF it is reasonable to conclude that a national state can be created, since the EU will then be a capitalized coercive society.

As we have seen in the analysis, the current state of the EU could be described to be situated in doorstep condition three. While a considerable time has passed, since one could argue that the thresholds for the first two conditions have been passed, the integration process moved forward in rather small steps in regard to consolidated control of the military.

The European Coal and Steel Community was created based on internal threats within the European region, because of the uncertainty and violence of the WWII-period. This can be considered a "big bang", which initiated the integration process. In the recent, past many events have happened that had a more or less direct impact on European Foreign Policy,

such as the Ukraine Crisis, the election of Trump and his policy of isolationism and nationalism or Brexit. This could be argued to have led Macron to push for new ways of integration, due to their effect on the balance of power. Due to the unpredictable nature of the EU and the recency of these events, it is difficult to assess if these events are what will propel integration forward.

A United State of Europe could grow unintentionally if war or preparation of war is considered a serious issue and an EUAF becomes a reality. This could create other EU organizations as by-products of war, as seen in European state formation hundreds of years ago, according to Tilly. Possibly, international uncertainty and threats are what it takes to drive the integration process further and getting closer to form one single European national state.

5.2. Further external aspects

Continuing the discussion, the following section will present further external aspects, which complement and extend the theory of Tilly.

5.2.1. The EU as a security actor - replacing NATO?

NATO is the primary defence mechanism of Europe aside from national armed forces of each individual state. The EU traditionally tried to supplement NATO instead of replacing it with its foreign policy (Pohl, 2014, pp. 1-7). As mentioned earlier the US is questioning the institution of NATO, which can be damaging for a defensive alliance. Yet, NATO remains to be the primary organization tasked with defence and is therefore a direct “competitor” to the idea of an EUAF. Thus, the research question and a discussion of external factors naturally leads to NATO.

The authors have identified that the applicability of realism on the countries joining the EU has dwindled, as the theory offers little explanatory power to discuss the integration process. But this does not apply to the context of the EU and its member states toward outside EU states, like Russia, US or China.

In the earlier chapter about contemporary relevance, the authors presented a core assumption for uncertainty on the European continent being the increasing American isolationism and nationalism, reflected in statements of the US President in “*America First*” and NATO being “*obsolete*” (Hains, 2018). These differences have especially amplified uncertainty within the eastern border regions toward Russia, as the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as an example of the dangers, since many of these states inhabit a significant

Russian minority.¹ For this aspect, especially the Baltic states are faced with the issue of an assertive and unpredictable neighbour in the Russian Federation. Knud Jørgensen explains that, “*the EU has never played any role concerning territorial defense, particularly because the area has been considered a national or NATO alliance task*” (Jørgensen, 2007, p. 167). With decreasing support of the US for NATO, Europe is left to establish a system to defend its own interests, not only economically but also in the realms of security.

Differences of views in the realms of security cooperation have also shown to be existent during times of security crisis on the European continent. Pohl for instance explains that peace-building efforts in Bosnia have “*time and again been hampered by differences of opinion between the two Atlantic shores*” (Pohl, 2014, pp. 48-49). While it would be wrong to attempt to conclude the EU and US to be antagonistic toward each other, recent events has shown that the relationship of these allies has been strained and created uncertainties. Pohl further supports such a conclusion by explaining regarding the situation in Bosnia, “*The combination of Washington’s decisive role and US ambiguity ‘forced an understanding’ on Europeans that the US could no longer be relied on to be there and might well not be reliable when it was*” (Pohl, 2014, p. 49). Historical precedent for a decreasing reliability on the US as a guarantor of peace and security on the European continent was set and could therefore be seen as a factor for the EU and its members to look for its own security framework, possibly beyond national strategies. “*A number of analysts have asserted that the Union’s motives for taking on EUFOR Althea had less to do with Bosnia than with the EU’s desire to establish itself as a credible security actor*”, Pohl mentions in his study (Pohl, 2014, p. 50). S. Oğuz also emphasizes that since the onset of the post-Cold War era, “*The Union felt it was ready to decouple from the US and NATO to some extent and become a global player on its own*” (Oğuz, 2017, p. 60). While on the other hand, Layne calls attention to the US continuing to be “*the preponderant power in European security affairs*”, following the immediate post-Cold War era (Layne, 2000, p. 59).

A foundation for further cooperation has been laid with such earlier projects like Althea. This project could also be seen as the EU as a “*sovereign*” actor with its own interests. This highlights the EU and EU officials develop their own agenda fitting EU interests instead of simply following national agendas, while on the other hand serving as an example of the many members coming together in shared interests of a military nature. The Treaty of Rome, written in 1957, removed internal borders and created a common external border (Uçarer, 2016, p. 282). The creation of a common area for goods, services, people and capital to

¹ Latvia: 25,2%, Estonia: 24,8%, Belarus: 8,3%, Lithuania: 5,8%, Bulgaria: >0,7%, Romania: 0.1% (CIA, 2019)

move freely, commonly referred to as the four freedoms, was seemingly conducive to the alignment of security interests, to some extent. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 has strengthened Europol and has been “*continuing the trajectory of expanding legal and judicial cooperation across the EU*”, signifying the alignment of internal security interests, that come along with the four freedoms (McCartney, 2013, p. 545). Similarly, it seems reasonable to conclude an alignment of security interests towards outside threats due to the importance of internal trade and stability.

As the authors have mentioned earlier in the chapter regarding limitations of this study, Pohl states that in the early 2000’s there has been a “*sudden burst of EU activity in the realm of external security*”, which he attributes to the creation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Pohl, 2014, p. Preface). Thus, the foundation for further cooperation is set, as is also visible in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which “*introduced the possibility of eventually forming a defense policy*”, as Jørgensen points out (Jørgensen, 2007, p. 167). The terminology of “*sudden bursts*” is comparable to how Moravcsik describes the process of EU integration as a “*sequence of irregular bangs*” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 2). Therefore, an assumption of a similar development in the field of external security for the EU can be done. This means that a comparatively “*sudden burst*” could happen in the area of defence, if it is possible to detect reasons for such a development. For instance, Delreux and Keukeleire mention the shock effects of the September 11 attacks and the following Iraq and Afghanistan wars, creating further motivation for the EU states to enhance its foreign policy capacities and the EU project in general (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 57). Such an analysis also highlights the difficulty of measuring the weight of any factors detected and puts emphasis on the hardships any prediction will face considering history unfolding.

5.2.2. Financial Politics of “internationally” organized military forces

The following part will address the lack of financial commitment to NATO by most of its members and discuss, if an EU structure could face similar financial issues. The financial deficiency of NATO is amplifying the external threats, the EU is facing and therefore an integral issue to be discussed. Without an EUAF, NATO is of paramount importance for the defence of Europe, which is why it is necessary to discuss its capabilities in terms of fundraising and discuss comparatively to a potential EU structure. The authors attempt a more predictive discussion about the EU army proposal of Macron and the research question by assessing the feasibility of financial aspects.

If the authors are to assume the adoption of a common military framework, including armed forces under control of an EU institution, the question of how it would affect the member

states in regard to finances arises. Questions about how to finance such endeavour and how a model can impact the individual members influence over the project are to be dealt with. This part will primarily serve as a comparative analysis, with the functioning of NATO as a primary example of a military international institution. Oğuz or Tardy also heavily draw from the comparison of their analysis between the two ideas, as is the seemingly obvious connection of both institutions would serve similar tasks in a similar region (Oğuz, 2017) (Tardy, 2017). Tardy also mentions that the institutions that have already been created, have initially been modelled after NATO equivalents (Tardy, 2017, p. 1). Therefore, the comparison of NATO with a potential structure of EU Armed Forces and command is a tangible approach.

At the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, the attending members ratified a commitment to increase and maintain their capabilities, in accordance with NATO's increasing challenges (Ek, 2007). These "*capability commitments*" included a "*recommended guideline*" of a defence spending of at least 2% of the GDP (Ek, 2007). This model could serve as a blueprint for a funding structure for the EU. It also provides a political purpose beyond the idea of a framework for capability maintenance and improvement. For instance, King points out that the funding structure can also serve as an organic way of creating transatlantic solidarity and even citing that the structure of common funding is "*the central glue that binds 28 separate nations into a common military fighting machine*" (King, 2015, p. 115 & 119). While he adds that the approach of individual member state contribution through national defence spending has proven to be flawed, as it failed to provide NATO with the supplies and services it needs (King, 2015, p. 115). Regarding NATO and the 2% goal, Germany, the biggest member state of the EU has consistently failed to reach the goal and the military spending has been more or less decreasing continuously since the 60's (The World Bank, 2019). This has led to a major issue with the current state of its military equipment. According to reports, only 39% of German heavy military equipment is ready for use, with none of the submarines, most of its Eurofighter Typhoons and many main battle tanks out for repairs. It was estimated that the Bundeswehr, would need a month to mobilize (Peck, 2018).

In fact, many NATO members undercut their spending (The Economist, 2017). For instance, between 1992 and 1999 the defence expenditure of European NATO members fell by 22% (Ek, 2007, p. 4), possibly, among the biggest factors, the fall of the Soviet Union. King also adds that in favour of funding a common NATO budget directly, the member states favoured to support NATO through national defence spending since it gives them sovereignty over the amount and what it is spent on (King, 2015, p. 119). This highlights weakness of the funding structure. Nonetheless, NATO remains capable of complex and quick action as Libya has

recently shown according to former NATO General Secretary, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, while on the other hand King concludes that the cuts in military spending have “*had a clearly detrimental effect on NATO’s ability*” (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 2) (King, 2015, p. 121). The issue is that the members who spent less are “*covered*” by members who spent more, since it is a collective effort of defence, therefore incentivising the individual members to pay as little as possible. Such issues could be circumvented through EU measures, like a more inclusive system of democratic participation for the members, as well as the general idea of a “*European*” defence institution. In line with this, Tilly argues that a national army is more efficient and committed, as they fight for their national state and own interests (Tilly, 1990, p. 83). On the other hand, Tilly also argues that the citizens need to be given some benefits and rights for them to see themselves as part of the national state (Tilly, 1990, p. 99). Tilly’s arguments can explain the lack of commitment to NATO, as the states and the citizens don’t identify with NATO and feel committed like you would to a national state. Applying this argument, it is reasonable to consider that it could be another case in the EU, especially if the EU focus on democracy and the feeling of “*being European*”. Democratic participation could be achieved through similar methods that are currently employed by other EU institutions, such as qualitative majority voting frameworks or a rotating system similar to that of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. This could on the one hand increase democratic participation and eagerness to engage in the new project, while on the other hand limit and constrain the power of “*Big*” actors in Europe dominating the smaller members as well as increase solidarity.

Regarding EU military operations in Bosnia, Pohl has described that, “*France was ‘pushing an open door’ when it came to persuading Berlin of the proposal*”, referring to the proposal of EU takeover of the NATO mission in Bosnia. He continues by saying that the idea “*received widespread support among EU governments*” (Pohl, 2014, p. 51). This could also emphasize the idea of a more enthusiastic support for military spending and cooperation regarding an EU project compared to a NATO project, as states such as Germany or France are currently predominately pro-EU in their agenda. Fogh Rasmussen concludes that, “*the way forward lies not in spending more but in spending better*”, since most states in Europe are unlikely to change the trajectory of their military spending (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 4). Thus, an approach of a pooled military budget for EU defence could be the solution to remain capable of complex military action, as King has previously pointed out, a budget managed by the institution that is tasked with the defence is more effectively spent than having individual national contributions (King, 2015). This part has shown that the question of the methodology and

institutionalization of military contribution towards a common project is key in achieving a capable and politically sustainable solution.

5.2.3. International response to the proposal

The international responses of Russia, the US and the UK are key to discuss, because they fundamentally addressed the issue of feasibility of the project of an EUAF. Potential red lines drawn by either Russia or the US could seriously impact the likelihood of an EUAF happening in the near future. Similarly, the response of the UK is important as the UK historically has been against the idea of a united European military, with many pointing to Brexit as the catalyst for the renewed talks (Braw, 2019). Additionally, the UK has historically been a key actor in European military affairs and as a nuclear power continues to play a key role, even if outside of the EU.

China will be omitted in this part since China is not a direct military threat, capable of delivering a shock in the vicinity of the EU. China recently founded its first military base abroad in Djibouti and could become increasingly assertive due to its increasing economic and military power (SIPRI, 2019). While due to the Belt and Road projects in Serbia and Montenegro and the concept of a Chinese “*debt trap*”, China could be expected to establish a base there, but the authors deem it rather unlikely (Taj, 2019) (Barkin & Vasovic, 2018). It could seriously damage relations with its European partners. Also, Serbia and Montenegro joined the early accession process of EU membership, therefore a Chinese military base could decrease their chances of joining (Barkin & Vasovic, 2018) (ENPEN, 2019). Thus, the authors decided to step away from the distant and overly implausible idea and decided to omit China from this discussion about the responses toward the proposal. It also offers the authors the possibility to emphasize the importance of the actors mentioned for the EU and the immediate project as well the idea behind Macron’s initial proposal.

Russia

Putin has since Marcon’s statement expressed sympathy for the idea, stating “*Europe is ... a powerful economic union and it is only natural that they want to be independent and ... sovereign in the field of defence and security,*” and it is “*a positive process,*” continuing that it would “*strengthen the multipolar world*” (RT, 2018). This would be in line with Russia’s wish for creating a multipolar world, removing the US as the world hegemon, and causing fracture within the Western world (RIA Novosti, 2008). It could also be seen as common diplomatic discourse of Putin to embrace the idea in some way, to not create any immediate anger due to his response or further accelerate the process through remarks of misfortune or threat.

However, the establishment of a EUAF, could greatly provoke Russia, according to John Mearsheimer and his idea of offensive realism. Following the Ukrainian Crisis, Mearsheimer stated that EU and NATO expansionism caused Russia to invade Ukraine, in an effort to protect Russian interests from Western expansion (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 1). Should the EUAF become a reality, the reaction from Russia can be theorized to be similar, from an offensive realist perspective. The act will create uncertainty within Russia, fearing the EU as a united front against Russia. Russia will feel threatened, possibly attempting to secure Russian interests the same way as with Ukraine, creating a security dilemma.

USA/NATO

President Trump has called NATO outdated and called for less reliance on the US for support, thereby sowing doubt of the US's commitment to the alliance, while he is still an avid supporter of the US-centric military alliance. Following the statements from Merkel and Macron calling for a European military, Trump called the idea "*Very insulting*", continuing "*perhaps Europe should first pay its fair share of NATO, which the U.S. subsidizes greatly!*", clearly indicating support for the institution, despite his wishes for a more independent EU (Gould, 2018). This is not the first time the US has opposed European defence, in the first term of George W. Bush, there was strong opposition before giving up and channelling the ideas into NATO (Valášek, 2018).

The US and NATO can be considered elements of each other, as US stands for the largest expenditures of NATO. Furthermore, it is the only state outside EU, apart Canada, however, the US has considerably more political capital. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC) warned the EU of the EUAF concept as "*duplicative*" and "*unwise*". He continued stating that NATO already had a strong alliance, questioning the reason for "*duplicating*" or "*replicating*" (Gould, 2018). Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, likewise stated "*It will be not a wise decision by all those nations who are members of both NATO and the European Union to start to have two sets of command structures*" (Gould, 2018). Stoltenberg, however, commended the EU's wish to become more active and have a larger focus on defence. Though, should the EU choose to act without the US, Stoltenberg told EU states they would still have to use the NATO command structure (Gould, 2018).

The United Kingdom

The UK's relationship with the EU and European military has been varied. Prior to Brexit, the UK proposed to become leader of a battlegroup, however, many conservatives fear an EU led military. Conservative tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mail, reported on a joint EU military exercise in England, by saying experts feared the UK was being "*sucked*" into an EU military.

The paper continued with a quote from the British Minister of Defence, who said the UK was being “*pressured to surrender its national defence to the EU*” (Smyth, et al., 2016).

While there has been opposition from the UK, there is still a belief in a protected EU, with the Defence Secretary stating Britain never would be alone in fighting again, due to the close cooperation which exists between EU states (Smyth, et al., 2016). Likewise has the UK’s Military Representative to NATO stated that “*Our prime minister’s unconditional commitment to European security of course stands*” (McTague & Vinocur, 2017).

Britain wants to remain an important member of European security and hopes to do so, due to its expansive military experience, unrivalled by most EU states. It also has some of the best capabilities to command larger operations, which is currently limited to France, Italy, Germany and Greece (McTague & Herszenhorn, 2018).

The UK hopes the cooperation between itself and the EU, could give it favourable conditions in decision-making normally not given to countries outside the EU. Should the UK not get a deal, they will most likely leave according to UK officials. High Representative, Federica Mogherini, stated “*Obviously, once you are not a member state you cannot take part in the decisions, but you can take part [in the missions]*” (McTague & Vinocur, 2017).

5.2.4. Effects on the option of entering/leaving the EU

There are currently several countries wishing to join the EU, with most of them being from the Balkans. To join the EU, they must fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, which has three areas that needs to be in order: politics, economics, and administration (ENPEN, 2016). Currently, under the third criterion of administration, there are elements for supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Should the EUAF, become a reality, this criterion would have to be greatly expanded. Candidate countries would have to restructure their armed forces, standardizing their command structure, uniform, munitions and equipment. This will increase accession time and costs. Countries in the Balkan already have a long history of nationalism (Ziabari & Mujanovic, 2019). Introduction of a united EU military will not make them more eager to join, but more likely the opposite.

Brexit has shown existing difficulties with leaving the EU. With the creation of a unified European military, the difficulty of this process would either be increased and made more complicated or could mean the removal of Article 50. With the integration of the EU militaries, materials, uniforms and personnel will be joined with the other member states, to a very large level. This level will make it difficult to discern the ownership of different materials should a new split occur.

Thus, we can conclude that the creation of the EUAF, could lead to the process of joining the EU to become a nearly irreversible process, similar to historical state formation.

6. Criticism of the proposal

As we concluded from the analysis and discussion, the integration process of the EU has parallels to state formation theories. The following chapter is going to offer an introductory look at some critical points to the possibility of the EUAF. This is done to increase validity and highlight some factors that are not in line with the theories of Tilly and North et al. The validity of this project's conclusion benefits from a reflection of critical points towards the previous findings that influence the direction the conclusion will take.

6.1. Issues of implementation of EU law

In a work from 1998 Finnish scholars have studied different and national effects on the implementation of EU directives (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998). Among those effects were political institutions, interest organization structure, political culture and mass opinion (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998, p. 231). They conclude that, "*stable political culture combined with efficient and flexible institutional politico-administrative design are the best predictors for successful implementation of common European policies*" (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998, p. 248). Further they add, "*unimplemented directives remain a serious threat to the development of common European policies and thus strengthening of the integration process. A key problem seems to be that despite its massive monitoring body, the Commission, the EU lacks an effective control system and appropriate enforcement strategies to control member states*" (Lampinen & Uusikylä, 1998, p. 249). While their study is to be taken with a critical eye due to its age, such fundamental findings of differences in the implementation process of EU directives are possible to persist. In a more recent essay on the topic, Mónica Roig mentions that there remain limitations on the ability of the Commission to monitor the implementation process (Roig, 2016). Nowadays, the Commission publishes yearly monitoring reports about the implementation of EU law into national legislation, thus a form of monitoring and evaluation exists (European Commission, n.d.). Furthermore, the Commission engages in judicial training activities, the improvement of administrative capacities and the identification process of potential barriers to implementation (Smith, 2018). Therefore, the findings about the apparatus of the Commission lacking an effective control system are to be partly dismissed, while Lampinen & Uusikylä's study similarly concludes that coercive means are necessary to ensure certain developments in a society. The part of their findings that opens up for criticism toward the idea of EUAF, is that some member states find it more difficult in adapting to new EU legislation, while others find it easier. This is something which is also visible in the annual reports. As long as such differences persist, it is unlikely to expect a "*sudden burst*" of EU development as previously discussed, which could lead to the establishment of an EUAF and an EU state. Since the differences in national legislation

and adoption of common laws are too drastic for it to remain a stable system due to the differences of national legislation. Such a conclusion is an estimation of a possible barrier to the development of an EUAF and the establishment of an EU state from a different perspective and could therefore offer a reason for further postponement of the developments discussed in this project, even if the international framework might allude to the conclusion of it being a reasonable estimate. The study of the implementation of EU law into national legislation is a key indicator for the legitimacy of EU legislation effects on the sovereignty of national states. As long as deficits remain in this field, it is unlikely to expect further integration into more sensible areas much fewer tangible developments toward concrete state formation. So, any discussion about deeper integration into more sensitive policy fields, are to be scrutinized under the light of current issues of legislative implantation.

6.2. Rise of the “new right” in the EU

Another issue that any conclusion of this study faces is the recent rise of “*right-wing populism*” in many European states. Anti-EU sentiments have been increasing in countries such as Poland and Italy, which could have problems for the creation of the EUAF (Stevens, 2019). It is not only anti-EU sentiment, but also opposition to the Franco-German lead of the EU, with Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini stating, “*It is time to oppose the Franco-German axis with an Italian-Polish axis*” (BBC NEWS, 2019). Anti-EU sentiment countries’ policies consists to a certain extent on an anti-EU sentiment and is inward focused. For instance, Christensen mentions the policy of the PiS-Party in Poland to be “*EU defiant*” (Christensen, 2018, p. 32). Podobnik et al. predict if a certain inflow of migration continues toward some of these states, that the rise of right-wing populist parties could “*prevail*” and lead to a rapid decrease in globalization, specifically regarding movement of labour and other forms of migration (Podobnik, et al., 2017). Due to the policy outlook of these parties and some predictions, it seems to be decreasingly likely that EU integration will move forward in the near future. Even more so, the landscape of international politics for the EU might take a decreasing role if those parties continue to exhibit influence and focus on internal politics, isolationism and protectionism – meaning a re-focus on national sovereignty. In context of the rise of these parties in the European and national Parliaments Chih-Mei Luo concludes that, a trust crisis is among the reasons for their rise and adds, “*it could eventually undermine the legitimacy of the whole European project*” (Luo, 2017, p. 417). Thus, not only the reliability of any predictions is exposed to their increasing importance, the possibility of any EU policy leading to state formation of the EU could also be decreasingly likely as issues of sovereignty and a lack of legitimacy are pitfalls for the project of an EUAF.

6.3. Perception of the role of the EU

The idea of a European military as previously explained, has been proposed by Macron and supported by Merkel, though many European politicians and leaders take distance from the idea of a consolidated European military (Peck, 2018). Although the EU, in some areas, has more power than national states, and the EU has redistributive and regulative powers and covers policy areas from health to transportation to energy and innovation (Kelstrup, et al., 2012), many still consider the EU be an economic bloc and economic power (Peck, 2018). The Treaty of Rome, which is the foundation of the EU, was mostly based on economic integration with new institution such as the internal market and the elimination of internal tariffs and the free movement of goods, capital, services and labour. A functionalist would argue that integration ever since has been a political spill over effect of the economic integration (Haas, 1958). In recent years the EU has however experienced political integration but still the most significant policy areas are the internal market, economy and agriculture (Kelstrup, et al., 2012). The question is whether Europe is politically integrated enough through the EU that member states would trust to hand over their military capabilities to one centralized organization, as it would require to disarm the member states, just as national states disarmed the population when consolidating control of a professional army (North et al., 2009, p. 169). North et al. describe how the militaries in Western Europe took a hundred years to be consolidated completely and involved bureaucracies and public treasuries to grow in order to collect revenues to finance and run armies (North, et al., 2009, p. 169). Considering that that the EU has not even harmonized taxation, a consolidated army seems difficult. Oğuz concludes that the major reason for the EU to not have an effective security and defence policy with global impact is “*the inherent difficulty in reaching consensus among the 27-member states, who often pursue different agendas*” (Oğuz, 2017, p. 60). This further supports that the EU consists of member states, who all have a different vision and perception on where the EU is and its direction.

6.4. UK military support

Following Brexit, the hope for creating a European military reignited. However, Elisabeth Braw, associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, noted issues with the idea.

She states that the UK will still play a large part of European defence, as they have the most military experience and materials, as the UK owns 44% of all heavy transport aircraft and 18% of all frigates within the EU (Braw, 2019). The UK is already leading the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a force which can be deployed in cases of natural catastrophes or other emergencies and is based on voluntary commitment. On the JEF, Braw stated “*It’s much less ambitious than a European army but they are actually already doing it. It’s a giant expeditionary force where nine*

countries already work together and can deploy to wherever these countries deem it to be necessary” (Stevens, 2019).

6.5. Cultural obstacles

There also exists major cultural differences between the member states, which makes integration difficult. European countries have long and varied histories, which creates cultural differences between member states. The example used is the Franco-German Brigade, which was created in 1989, but was never used before a training mission in Mali in 2015. It has never been formally used, as there have been differences in opinion regarding the risk countries were willing to involve their troops in (Besch, 2016). The examples used to advocate unified European military, have only been possible due to the longstanding cooperation, existing command structure, a similar political process concerning deployment, matching needs and the same military equipment (Braw, 2019). This is however not possible for the EU (Besch, 2016).

This is combined with member states of the EU having different views on the use of a potential military, and are unwilling to put them in harm's way, meaning there is a reluctance to supply troops for deployment. With the current possibility of veto within the EU, it also means a single member state can block any deployment (Besch, 2016).

6.6. Competition for NATO

Furthermore, NATO still exists as an option, with 22 of the 28 EU member states also being members of NATO.² NATO already has the military capabilities, with a complete command structure. Attempting to recreate the same, just within the EU would be a waste of time and money according to Jens Stoltenberg (Besch, 2016). The danger from attempting to create a European military, is that the US might pull their support leaving the EU by itself (Braw, 2018). According to Braw *“NATO’s role is to defend the security or territorial integrity of Europe, so it’s unclear what Macron is suggesting that NATO is not already offering”* (Stevens, 2019). While there is a wish to be separate from the US, Lord Guthrie said *“When things get really serious, we need the Americans. That’s where the power is. If the Americans had been around at the time of the Ukraine events, I doubt whether Putin would have dared be so bold”* (Worley, 2016).

According to Braw, the best course of action for the EU is to focus on NATO and increase defence spending for overall improved capabilities (Braw, 2018). Additionally, it has also been postulated that funding for the EUAF, would have the same result as with NATO, with most states refusing to reach a certain percentage of their GDP (Stevens, 2019).

² Non-NATO members are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

6.7. Aspect of nuclear deterrence

According to Braw, to create a working and effective European military, there needs to be “*an independent European nuclear deterrent, the ability to ensure collective defence of Europe, and the ability to carry out military-crisis interventions anywhere in the world*” (Braw, 2018). Currently the US and Russia both have approximately 6500 nuclear weapons, while the UK has 215 and France has 300 (Kristensen & Korda, 2019). While 300 nuclear weapons are no small amount, it is not comparable to the amounts offered by the US/NATO nuclear umbrella.

7. Conclusion

The authors conclude that the theory of North et al. provides valuable insight into the institutional set-up required to understand state formation from the “*inside*”. While the theory could not be applied to the same degree due to its assumptions, that is often the case theories of social science face if applied to the reality of the social world, consisting of imperfections and not models (Cox, 1981, p. 126).

In the analysis, the authors found that the doorstep conditions of the theoretical framework are fulfilled to a certain extent. The EU consists of a sophisticated network of institutions, modelled similarly to those of federal states. They are led by impersonal and institutionalized leadership and provide a platform for the elites as well as citizens to handle disputes. Therefore, the internal set-up for a state is provided.

The EU has taken several steps towards creating an environment for a consolidated military. In addition, the EU has established a number of institutions which are focused on exercising control over the military, with the HR and President having some personal control. They are however, not far enough to create a total command structure.

It is reasonable to conclude that the integration process of the EU, has parallels to the historical process of state formation seen through the theoretical framework of the doorstep conditions. But North et al. mention, “*Achieving consolidated control of the military appears to be the most difficult doorstep condition for a natural state to achieve*” (North, et al., 2009, p. 169). The authors can conclude that this step is facing unpredictability, because of the technicalities the EU will face in realizing consolidated control of the currently existing military structures of the national states, e.g. finances, legitimacy or variables of the international system. Thus, the finalization of the third doorstep condition remains unfulfilled.

According to Tilly’s theory the current experience of threats toward the EU in addition to possible the retreat of the protective umbrella of NATO, could lead to the integration process moving on and creating a state out of the EU. Tilly states “*Over the long run, far more than other activities, war and preparation for war produced the major components of European states*” (Tilly, 1990, p. 28). Therefore, the sudden need for new ways of protection and the disruption of the balance of power could create an EUAF, which would create the need for new supporting organizations and institutions, ultimately creating a state. This development is visible in the speech of Merkel approving Macron, “*The times when we could rely on others are over*” (La Baume & Herszenhorn, 2018).

But as of right now, the EU is facing obstacles indicated throughout the chapters about criticism, such as a re-emerging of nationalism and protectionism and existing differences in culture and

perception, making it difficult to predict the outcome. Furthermore, the EU is a unique and complex structure and the events are currently unfolding, which complicates any prediction. Nevertheless, when the external threats appeared the immediate response was to create an EUAF to great extent following Tilly's process of state formation.

It must be added that the findings of this study are to be viewed in light of its methods. Other frameworks of study might lead to different or complementary conclusions.

This explorative study has showcased that these theories, outside of their initial purpose of explaining state formation in Western Europe, have proven to be capable in explaining the contemporary process of EU integration, as it has shown to have similarities.

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