EU Arctic Policy

An Analysis of EU Involvement in the Arctic, with Special Regards to Greenland

This thesis attempts to explain the European Union’s increasing interest in the Arctic region, based on the EU Arctic Policy. Special attention is paid to Greenland, given its special position in the Arctic. The International Relations theories realism and complex interdependence serve as the theoretical framework for the thesis.
Abstract

Within the past decades, the Arctic region has increasingly become an area of interest for scholars, not least due to several governments’ issuing of Arctic Policies and the attention paid towards climate change. The EU is among the numerous actors getting involved in the Arctic and strives to participate in shaping Arctic governance.

Therefore, this thesis is based on the EU Arctic Policy. The objective of this thesis is to explain why the EU became involved in the Arctic and why Greenland is given special consideration in the EU Arctic Policy. In order to determine the rationale behind the EU’s engagement in the Arctic, the thesis draws on the theoretical frameworks of realism and complex interdependence.

Climate change has altered the political sphere of the Arctic and this meant an increased accessibility to Arctic resources as well as the opening of new sea routes in the Arctic Ocean. The consequences of global warming have led to an increased focus on the Arctic and have been one of the factors to why the EU engaged in the Arctic. Hence, multiple official documents of the EU have been set forth in trying to determine the appropriate response to the development of the region. The EU’s involvement in the Arctic has to a large degree been determined by the external events, which have increasingly made their way onto the agenda of the EU. Recently, Russia and China have gained an increasing influence in the Arctic. Therefore, this thesis identifies the main reason for the EU’s involvement in the Arctic to be based on the notion of ensuring its internal security as well as its security of supply. This assumption is based on the fact that the EU itself acknowledges both the geopolitical significance of the region and the vast potential in resources. The strategies set forth in the Arctic Policy are highly focused on international cooperation and the sustainable development of the Arctic region, which is based on mutually beneficial frameworks. Thus, the EU’s strategy is identified as soft power measurements of attraction, which evidently serve the EU’s end goal to ensure and extend its zone of prosperity. Therefore, the thesis has also compared the EU Arctic Policy to the European Neighborhood Policy. Noticeably, they seem to share the underlying rationale, although the two policies differ in context. The thesis portrays an intricate relationship between the EU’s utilization of economic power projection and soft power measures that shape the EU’s response to the changing Arctic region, as the explicit approach assumed by the EU seems to serve the implicit goal of the EU Arctic Policy.
Acknowledgements

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Furthermore, we owe special thanks to the Representation of Greenland to the European Union, the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen and Arctic Consensus, who were all available for interviews. The personal communications with representatives of these organizations not only enhanced our master thesis with inside knowledge, but also pointed us in the right direction.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Arctic Council</td>
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<td>AGSG</td>
<td>Act on Greenland Self-Government</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>European Committee of the Regions</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Fisheries Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>IMP</td>
<td>Integrated Maritime Policy</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>Northern Dimension</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
<td>North East Passage</td>
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<td>NWP</td>
<td>North West Passage</td>
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<td>OAD</td>
<td>Overseas Association Decision</td>
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<td>OCT</td>
<td>Overseas Country and Territory</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>REE</td>
<td>Rare Earth Element-Deposits</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>TSR</td>
<td>Transpolar Sea Route</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
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1. Introduction

In recent years, the Arctic region has received much attention in a relatively short period of time. The Arctic first received its interest through the military presence during World War II and during the Cold War. Nonetheless, after this period the Arctic was again a somewhat neglected region. However, in the last years, the Arctic has regained its importance, mainly due to its geostrategic importance and climate change. Climate change is posing a threat to the Arctic but, at the same time, it presents new opportunities in access to new fisheries, mineral extraction and new shipping possibilities (Eritja, 2013, p. 459). The many challenges and opportunities facing the Arctic have led to an increased role internationally and naturally gained the interest of many stakeholders, of which the European Union (EU) is one. The EU started its long and rocky road towards the adoption of an Arctic Policy in 2008, when the European Parliament (EP) adopted its first official Resolution on Arctic governance. Although the EU is not an Arctic power in geographical terms, it is still associated with the Arctic. Three of its Member States; Denmark (Greenland/ Faroe Island), Sweden and Finland are located in the High North, where Greenland and Finland are located in the Arctic. The EU is also associated with two Arctic states, Iceland and Norway, through the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Therefore, even though the EU is not a major power in geographical terms the EU possesses competences to influence the Arctic through its Arctic Member States and through its close ties with Norway, Greenland and Iceland. The EU also relies on a vast amount of resources coming from the Arctic and therefore it is necessary for the EU to contribute to the development of the Arctic in a sustainable way, in order to ensure its demand for resources and to address the geopolitical implications. Finally, the EU has a special relationship with Greenland, as Greenland exited the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985 and afterwards became associated with the EU through Denmark and gained the status of Overseas Country and Territory (OCT). Greenland has a Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) with the EU, where the EU buys fishing quotas from Greenland, and a Partnership Agreement (PA), where the EU funds Greenland’s development, mainly in the educational and social sector. Due to the EU’s interest in both the Arctic in general, and Greenland in particular, we seek to understand:

Why has the EU become involved in the Arctic and especially in Greenland? And what strategy does the EU pursue?
In order to analyze the EU’s interest in the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, we need to identify the causal effects of the EU Arctic Policy, the Arctic Policy itself, and the EU’s relationship with Greenland. We deem it appropriate to conduct a two-fold analysis by testing two IR theories, namely realism and complex interdependence. In the analysis, we will focus on four issue areas; Arctic resources, climate change, geographic significance, and the potential independence of Greenland and the relationship’s comparability with the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). First, we will investigate the EU Arctic Policy through the framework of realism. Second, we will analyze the Arctic Policy along the lines of complex interdependence. This two-fold analysis will contain a ‘both sides of the coin approach’, in which we aim to determine why the EU is interested in the Arctic and in particular Greenland. This will however be elaborated in section 2, but before that we find it necessary to determine what constitutes the Arctic region.

The Arctic is a region defined by many things, and the simplest definition is that it is a region based above the Arctic Circle. The Arctic Circle encompasses most of the North. The definition of the Arctic recognized by the European Commission (EC) includes the Arctic Ocean and territories belonging to the ‘Arctic 8’; Denmark (Greenland), the United States (Alaska), Canada, Norway, Russia, Finland and Iceland (European Commission [EC], 2008a). Nonetheless, only five of the Arctic countries have coastlines bordering the Arctic Ocean, and they are known as the ‘Arctic 5’; Denmark (Greenland), the United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia and Norway. In the Arctic, no state or organization controls the territories exclusively (this naturally excludes the landmasses belonging to the states in the Arctic). Therefore, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is often referred to as the regulative power in the Arctic. UNCLOS sets out the limits of the territories in the Arctic. The area within 12 nautical miles of the baseline remains under the territory of the state. This means that the coastal states have exclusive regulatory rights over shipping, fisheries and resources. The area up to 200 nautical miles constitutes the area called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where the coastal states remain to have exclusive rights over fisheries and resources, but less control over shipping. Exceeding the 200 nautical miles, the coastal states lose rights to fisheries and resources, unless proven that the ocean floor belongs to their landmass, in which they have claim to resources in the seabed (United Nations, 1982, p. 27; Murray & Nuttall, 2014, p. 14).
2. Methodology

In order to specify the framework of this thesis, further methodological considerations have to be made. The outline of this thesis is based on the sole goal of answering the posed problem formulation as thoroughly and comprehensive as possible. While it would be advantageous to adapt the role of an independent and objective researcher, we deem this to be too complex in this case, as in reality there may be many other causal effects for the EU’s interest in the Arctic, and Greenland in particular. Therefore, we acknowledge that we can identify indicative causal effects through the empirical data. However, the reality we come to produce with our attempt to answer our problem formulation will inevitably be based on our personal opinion as researchers. This is due to our understanding of the theories and the way in which we interpret the chosen data.

We adopt a mixed-methods approach, which means we include both qualitative and quantitative data, as neglecting one of these would lead to a one-sided argument and thus we will be unable to identify the causal effects and to give a comprehensive answer to our problem formulation. Furthermore, the mixed-methods approach will enable us to analyze the relationship between the empirical data and the theoretical framework. We believe that this approach will give us a broader and more in-depth perspective on the topic. One of the advantages of this approach is that two types of data can be collected simultaneously. By this, we can draw on the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative data. On the other hand, one weakness of the approach is the need for transformation of data in a way that facilitates the integration of both types of data in the analysis (Bryman, 2016, pp. 620-633; Statistics Solutions, n.d.). Consequently, through the transformation of data, we as researchers add a certain degree of subjectivity to the data. The qualitative data includes interviews with the Representation of Greenland to the EU, the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen and Arctic Consensus, and official policy documents of the EU on Arctic matters, as well as academic sources on the issue area. The main reason as to why we mainly focus on qualitative data is because we put much emphasis on the very construction of the meaning of the texts, in special regards to the policy documents of the EU, in order to identify the underlying factors that led to the creation of the policy documents. The rationale behind the quantitative data is to back our claims based on the qualitative data for the sake of triangulation. Our quantitative data is derived from various statistics and surveys concerning the economic aspect of the question of the Arctic’s relevance for the EU.
We acknowledge that our research approach is predominantly qualitative, however applying quantitative methods as well. Thus, we firmly believe that by adopting this mixed-method approach we will reach a more nuanced conclusion.

The approach of the thesis will be deductive, meaning we adopt a top-down approach, focusing on theoretical reflections to understand and present why the EU has shown an increased interest in the Arctic in recent years. The deductive approach gives us the possibility to explain the causal relationship between the concepts and variables - meaning we test the proposed theories of this thesis on the specific case of the EU’s interest in the Arctic and in particular in Greenland.

2.1. Thesis Objective

The overall objective of this thesis is to answer why the EU has become involved in the Arctic and especially in Greenland, and what strategy the EU pursues. This thesis thus aims at investigating the EU Arctic Policy and the presumed importance of Greenland. Additionally, we put emphasis on those policy areas that Greenland controls autonomously, which leads us to neglect Denmark’s dominant position in the community of the realm. This is because we deal with the very specificities that bind the EU and Greenland together, in order to get a deeper insight in why the EU is engaged with Greenland, and the Arctic region. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to contribute perspective to the existing discussions on the Arctic and the EU’s approach towards the Arctic and in particular Greenland, by examining chosen empirical data within our theoretical framework.

To achieve the objective of this thesis naturally means that we had to limit our scope significantly to go into detail with the selected material. Firstly, we chose to focus on what we identify to be the three main issue areas of the EU Arctic Policy; Arctic resources, climate change, and geographic significance. This means that other focus areas of the EU’s policy towards the Arctic region have been largely excluded from the scope of this thesis. This is however not to say that they do not have significant value, but rather that we identify them to be of less value than the above-mentioned issue areas. This is because the three areas we focus on have been a cornerstone of the EU Arctic Policy since its beginnings, whereas the other important areas have increasingly been focused on in more recent publications of EU Arctic Policy. Additionally, we have focused on Greenland’s independence and the similarities that the Arctic Policy bears to the ENP, as we believe this provides additional understanding to the discussion of the EU’s interest in the Arctic as the ENP provides similar policies in regards to
areas in the proximity of the EU. Furthermore, because of our choice of theories (see section 3.4) we have largely focused on the state and international level, leaving aside the importance of local stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples and their relevance for governance in the Arctic. However, we encourage others to take up these areas, as they indeed can present an interesting angle to the discussion.

Despite the claimed relevance of our choice of theories and issue areas, it may still be difficult to validate a conclusion in which we confidently can state that A leads to B. In the sense that other areas not included in this thesis could also play a significant role in determining the rationale behind the EU’s interest in the Arctic region.

2.2. Theoretical Considerations

In order to conduct an analysis based on the aforementioned problem formulation, it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework that can guide the analysis in a clear direction. The field of international relations, like other academic disciplines, is devoted to investigating and understanding international politics. The task of understanding different aspects of the world requires extensive amounts of material, and in reality, material can point in many directions. Therefore, we need theory to guide our train of thought, as one easily can get lost in what matters and what does not. Thus, it is necessary to rely on a set of theories which offer tools one can utilize in an attempt to make understanding of the material. Nonetheless, theories have specific assumptions and this may lead to distinct answers although analyzing the same material (Smith, Owens, & Baylis, 2014, pp. 3-7).

We have chosen to work with two theories, namely realism and complex interdependence. The rationale behind this choice is based on the observation that the EU, in its pursuit to develop an Arctic Policy, both relies on realist ideals as well as liberal ideals. Therefore, the combination of two distinct theories allows us to identify the causes on both sides of the coin, and therefore we argue the two theories are complementary. Overall, realism focuses on power and security and highlights the importance of external factors for the EU Arctic Policy. Complex interdependence, on the other hand, focuses on the increasing role of international organizations and the significance of issues other than military ones, and allows us to understand the interdependent relationship of states. Furthermore, we are able to analyze how other actors involved in the Arctic are playing an active part in contributing to Arctic governance. Further theoretical discussions will follow in section 3.4.
2.3. Choice of Empirical Data

Our process of data collection led us to prioritize official documents published by the European Commission, the High Representative, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Furthermore, we focus a great deal on academic and scholarly publications to gain a greater insight in this certain topic.

We supplement the above data collection by conducting semi-structured interviews with two representations of the Government of Greenland; the Representation of Greenland to the EU and the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen. Both transcripts can be found in the appendix. Additionally, we conducted an informative interview with Arctic Consensus in Aalborg, which served the purpose of gaining greater insight in the topic area. However, this interview will not be included in the appendix, as it was an informal discussion that merely served the purpose of guidance. Moreover, we have been in close contact with the Representation of Greenland to the EU, as Anton Witt did his internship at said Representation. The Representation of Greenland to the EU has referred us to Arctic correspondents of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which allowed us to gain a deeper insight in the processes behind the walls of the EU. This means we rely on both primary and secondary data. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the interviews were conducted with our previous scope in mind, namely the trilateral relationship between Denmark, the EU and Greenland, which explains why the interviews might be somewhat ill-fitting towards our scope. However, we argue that we still achieved some data and knowledge that can be utilized in investigating the EU’s interest in the Arctic. We moved away from the previous scope, as we through our interviews realized that the scope was simply to broad, as too many factors had to be looked upon, and especially factors that had diverging interests, which would have produced a too incoherent and unsatisfactory thesis. We therefore chose to merely focus on the EU’s interest in the Arctic based on the Arctic Policy and as a result we excluded factors such as identity, culture and postcolonialism. This is not to say that these factors are not important in regards to the EU Arctic Policy and therefore we encourage other researchers to look upon these.

The data for the empirical analysis will consist of both qualitative and quantitative data, as previously mentioned. The qualitative data will be based on our semi-structured interviews along with official EU documents and academic literature. The quantitative data will predominantly consist of economic statistics that support our arguments.
2.4. Limitations

Throughout the process of writing, we had to make several decisions that were necessary to stay within the defined scope. These decisions resulted in certain limitations which we want to account for in this section.

First, the chosen theories limit our work in the sense that other theories could have contributed to our research with different concepts, suggesting different findings. However, this will be discussed in detail in section 3.4.

Second, the fact that our problem formulation underwent considerable adjustments underway led to a reduced benefit of the semi-structured interviews we conducted. Another interview opportunity with our final topic in mind would have been appreciated as we do believe this would have given us a better understanding of the EU’s engagement in the Arctic region. The lessened relevance of the interviews is naturally because we focused on different factors, such as culture, identity, and the trilateral relationship between the EU, Denmark and Greenland, which has much less significance for this thesis than expected at the time of completion.

Third, as depicted above, we have to acknowledge that our analysis most likely will be biased to some extent as both the theories and the data are subject to our personal interpretation of such. Arguably, one or two theories more could have given a more nuanced portrayal of the EU’s interest in the Arctic region. This suggests that, despite efforts to work objectively, our findings cannot be seen as the sole answer to the studied issue as other researchers probably would have concluded differently, based on their individual perceptions of the theories and the qualitative data at hand.

2.5. Justifications

As a matter of simplicity for analyzing the EU’s Policy towards the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, we have chosen to consider both Greenland and the EU as coherent states. That is mainly due to realism merely accepting states as actors in international relations. As of Greenland, we justify our decision to do so with the fact that since the coming into force of the Act on Greenland Self-Government (AGSG), Greenland enjoys autonomy over certain issue areas that are of relevance for our analysis, including the fishing industry and the exploitation of raw materials. In this sense, we deem it appropriate to regard Greenland as a state, as it enables for the analysis of interstate cooperation between the EU and Greenland in realist
terms. Furthermore, for the same reason we take for granted the unitary character of the EU, despite being aware of the fact that the EU is “neither a sovereign state nor merely an international organization” (Pieper, Winter, Wirtz, & Dijkstra, 2011, p. 229). Based on Jupille and Caporaso’s conceptualization of actorness, four criteria define an actor: recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. First, the fact that the EU is part of the international dialogue on Arctic issues indicates its recognition. Second, the EU has the authority to act internationally, either in the form of exclusive, mixed, or national competences. Third, the EU possesses autonomy through certain institutions, such as the Commission, that can rely on their own resources and ability to implement policy. Fourth, the EU’s cohesion becomes evident when there is complete backing of EU institutions and member states, which gives third states reason to interact with the EU as entity rather than its parts (2011, pp. 229-230). Finally, the fact that the EU Arctic Policy is set forth by the EU as an entity supports the decision depicted above.

2.6. Analytical Approach

The mixed-method approach means that the analysis will be characterized by a continuous interplay between qualitative and quantitative data concerning the question why the EU shows an increased interest in the Arctic region. This calls for a two-fold analysis of which we first focus on realism and then complex interdependence, as the latter is a direct response to the former. Both theories will be tested on the four issue areas we previously identified as the most important ones; Arctic resources, climate change, geographic significance, and Greenland’s independence/the comparison to the ENP. Realism is expected to contribute to the understanding of why the EU is interested in the Arctic based on the idea that the changing Arctic region poses new geopolitical issues. We expect complex interdependence to be complementary in the sense that the theory will emphasize the areas which realism is incapable of explaining. Therefore, emphasis will be put on providing insight on the causal effects of why the EU has pursued its Arctic Policy and why it has particular interest in Greenland. The main findings of the analysis will be discussed with the purpose of highlighting the complementary nature of the theories at hand. Finally, in the conclusion, our findings will be brought into direct connection with our problem formulation.

2.6. Thesis Structure

In the forthcoming chapters we will present the theories, followed by a theoretical discussion, aiming to elaborate on the theoretical model and the divergence, as well as the complementary
nature of the theories. Additionally, we will introduce possible alternatives to our choice of theory and what outcome we could expect from testing those theories. Following the presentation of the theories we will provide an empirical background relevant for the understanding and analysis of this certain phenomenon. The section will be followed by the analysis, which will focus on the four issue areas that we have highlighted in the above. In the analysis we will present factors of geopolitical importance as well as interdependent cooperation and how these also serve to strengthen the EU’s presence and ultimately security of the Arctic region. The structure of the analysis will be split in two, where we focus on analyzing the empirical data based on the theoretical frameworks individually for the sake of simplicity. The discussion will thus consist of a complementary discussion on the main findings. Therefore, the discussion will connect the dots defined throughout the analysis. Finally, the analysis and discussion will be brought together by a conclusion. To provide a simple overview over the thesis we have created the following depiction of the research design.
3. Theory

3.1. Realism

In this section, we will try to illustrate the realist school of thought by shedding light on its three major types, as per Feng and Ruizhuang: human nature realism (classical realism), state-centric realism (neo-classical realism), and system-centric realism (neo-realism/structural realism). According to Feng & Ruizhuang (2016), realism is “much more than a single theory, realism is a school of thought containing numerous related branches” (p. 109).

In general, the essential core of realism is “the assumption that the state is the principal actor” and “the view that the environment that states inhabit is a perilous place” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 100). Furthermore, states are unitary actors, meaning there is one voice speaking and acting on behalf of the state. Also crucial to realism is the assumption that “decision-makers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national interest” (Antunes & Camisao, 2017, p. 15). Despite the probable differences among the three types of realism, three core elements can be identified that apply to classical realism as well as structural realism and neo-classical realism: statism, survival, and self-help. Before going into depth with each type of realism, these three core elements that are essential to the realist school of thought should be considered in more detail.

Statism

As mentioned above, the state is the principal actor, and sovereignty over a certain territory is what defines the state. Therefore, realists agree with Max Weber’s definition of the state as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (as cited in Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 107). Furthermore, realists principally agree upon that the issue of security and order is solved domestically, but certainly not in the international system. According to realism, the absence of order and security in the international system can be traced back to the absence of a sovereign. In this state of anarchy, states are in constant competition with one another for power and security. The fact that realists view this competition in zero-sum terms, “makes agreement on universal principles difficult, apart from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states” (2014, p. 107). However, this principle does not apply when it comes to relations between powerful states, as they may override the principle of non-intervention for the benefit of international order, or simply their own national security.
As mentioned previously, according to realists, states constantly struggle for power. Thus, a definition of power in realist terms is necessary to understand the way realists attempt to describe state behavior. Hans Morgenthau defines power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men,” which suggests that power be “the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 107). Apart from that, realists argue that power is both a relational concept and a relative concept. Relational, because power is exercised in relation to other actors, and relative, because other states’ power capabilities are as important to detect as one’s own. An alternative approach was put forth by Kenneth Waltz who tried to shift the attention to capabilities rather than power. “Size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” are the areas capabilities can be classified within (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). Finally, also embedded in the concept of statism is the neglect of international organizations and transnational corporations in the struggle for power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 108).

**Survival**
Survival is the superior goal in world politics and the “precondition for attaining all other goals” (2014, p. 108). There is, however, disunity among realists when it comes to the significance of security and power. Defensive realists see states as security maximizers, while offensive realists see them as power maximizers. Security maximization requires only as much power as needed to ensure the state’s survival which will not be jeopardized in order to obtain more power than necessary. Offensive realists, on the contrary, believe that states “are always willing to take risks with the aim of improving their position in the international system” (2014, p. 108).

**Self-help**
As realists see no other entity in the international system than the state, there is no supranational authority that could provide for peace and security, or oppose the application of force. States are therefore on their own when it comes to achieving security (2014, p. 108). Consequently, one state’s attempt to promote its own security will inevitably lead to increasing insecurity of other states. This vicious cycle is known as the security dilemma. According to realists, states are suspicious since they cannot be sure whether another state’s military buildup is for security purposes only, or rather for offensive purposes. The consequence of said security dilemma is that “states often feel no more secure than before they undertook measures to enhance their own security” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 109). Regarding the balance of
power, structural realists are convinced that such a balance is natural and unavoidable as the balance of power is in all states’ interest for their survival. Thus, in order to maintain a balance, structural realists argue that alliances among weaker states may well be formed for the purpose of countering threatening states. Classical realists, on the other hand, believe that said balance must be constructed. Therefore, they stress the importance of state leaders and diplomats when it comes to upholding the status quo, the balance of power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 109).

The bottom line is that “states can ultimately only rely on themselves,” as there is no established hierarchy in the international system which means that in the context of anarchy, no one is in charge internationally (Antunes & Camisao, 2017, pp. 15-16).

Having discussed the three core elements of realism that all branches of the realist school of thought widely agree upon, we will now proceed to defining the above-mentioned three main branches of realism; classical realism (human nature), structural realism (system-centric), and neo-classical realism (state-centric).

Classical Realism

The key thinkers of classical realism are Thucydides (known for The Peloponnesian War), Machiavelli (known for The Prince), Thomas Hobbes (known for Leviathan), and Morgenthau (notable for Politics among Nations).

Classical realists attempt to describe and analyze state behavior by referring to the nature of human beings. They argue that states’ will to dominate and constant strive for power is “a reflection of the characteristics of human beings”, and it is from these characteristics of man that war, competition, and fear - international politics’ fundamental features - can be accounted for (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, pp. 103-104).

In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides essentially exemplifies the aforementioned security dilemma, namely that one state (in this case Sparta) felt threatened by another’s (Athens) increasing power. A change in the distribution of power, and thus the balance of power, meant a direct threat to Sparta’s existence, which eventually led Sparta to go to war with Athens. According to Thucydides, war was inevitable since it is in each state’s interest to survive (2014, p. 104).

However, in classical realism, the issue of moral consideration pops up, as key thinkers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli were concerned with “the degree to which state leaders could be guided by ethical considerations” (2014, p. 104). By Machiavelli, basically everything is allowed to state leaders that maintains or promotes the security of the state. Therefore, in the name of security, imperial expansion is as legitimate as the violation of alliances and treaties.
stroke up with other states. Nonetheless, more recent classical realism acknowledges that the absolute neglect of moral consideration and ethical principles may well eventuate in self-defeating policies (2014, p. 104). In Antunes and Camisao’s (2017) words; “[f]or realists, the highest goal is the survival of the state, which explains why states’ actions are judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral principles” (p. 21).

**Structural Realism/Neo-realism**

Structural realism mainly refers to thinkers such as Kenneth Waltz (notable for *Theory of International Politics*) and John Mearsheimer (known for *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*). According to Feng and Ruizhuang (2006), realists of this branch “borrow heavily from and attempt to extend [Hobbes’] systematic description of the state of nature” (p. 115). The main difference between structural realism (system-centric realism) and classical realism is that structural realism does not attribute the struggle for power to human nature. To a greater degree, they believe the lack of a superordinate authority to be responsible for competition and inter-state conflict (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 104).

According to structural realists, the relative distribution of power in the international system is the key independent variable in understanding important international outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. (2014, p. 104)

This assumption is based on the third element of Waltz’s definition of the structure of the international system, namely *distribution of capabilities*. The remaining two elements are *organizing principles* and *differentiation of units*. According to Waltz, there are two organizing principles; anarchy (in the international system) and hierarchy (the basis for domestic order). Since the units are functionally fairly equal, variation of the unit-level is insignificant (2014, p. 104). That leaves the element of *distribution of capabilities* as crucial for Waltz, and other structural realists. By means of defining the distribution of capabilities/power, structural realists seek to rank states which, in turn, enables them to identify the number of great powers at any given moment in history. Based on that, realists argue for the existence of a bipolar system during the cold war, and a unipolar system since the end of the cold war (2014, p. 104). As mentioned above, power maximization of one state often prompts counter-balancing alliances among other (threatened) states. Therefore, Waltz believes states to be security maximizers instead of power maximizers. This becomes evident in Waltz’s contention: “[b]ecause power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate
amount of it,” adding “[i]n crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security” (Waltz, 1988, p. 616). Consequently, Waltz is associated with defensive realism. Mearsheimer (2001), on the contrary, put forth the theory of offensive realism which mainly differs from Waltz’s approach as to “the question of how much power states want” (p. 21). Moreover, Mearsheimer claims that “all states are continuously searching for opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states”. It is the very structure of the international system that forces states to maximize their relative power position (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 106).

**Neo-classical Realism**

According to Gideon Rose (1998), neo-classical realism is - besides Innenpolitik theories, defensive realism, and offensive realism - a foreign policy theory (p. 146). Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, and William Wohlfart are scholars belonging to this branch of realism (Feng & Ruizhuang, 2006, p. 121). In common with other types of realism, neo-classical realism presupposes “that politics is a perpetual struggle among different states for material power and security in a world of scarce resources and pervasive uncertainty” (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro 2009, p. 4). Rose terms this state-centric type of realism ‘neo-classical’ because its key thinkers draw certain insights from classical realism and, further on, argue “that the impact of [...] power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level” (Rose, 1998, p. 146). One such variable would be state leaders and the way they understand the distribution of power. Schweller, for instance, disagrees with Waltz’s assumption that all states have similar interests and unity-level variation, therefore, is inconsequential. Instead, he believes that “states have different capacities to translate the various elements of national power into state power,” and, consequently, “cannot be treated as ‘like units’” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, pp. 104-106).

In Feng and Ruizhuang’s (2006) words, “[t]he fundamental tenets of neo-classical realism are that foreign policy is an outcome of international structure, domestic factors and of a complex interaction between the two” (p. 122). Thus, neo-classical realists attempt to reason states’ foreign policy behavior. As opposed to classical and structural realists, they identify factors such as state identity, state-society relationships, and the perceptions of state leaders as influencing state behavior, while still acknowledging the importance of the relative distribution of power (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 106). According to Rose (1998), neo-classical realists claim that foreign policy analysis ought to begin with the “relative material power vis-à-vis the
rest of the international system” (p. 150). Furthermore, he argues that neo-classical realists “assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment,” (Rose, 1998, p. 152) which further distinguishes them from structural realists.

Having identified different types of realism and their overall idea, we find it important to reflect critically over the theory. The main criticism concerned with realism is its assumption that states are the principal actors in a system of anarchy. Based on this idea, realists neglect the significance of international organizations whose importance in agenda-setting and decision-making is undeniable today. Furthermore, the realist school can be argued to bear discord in regards to certain concepts. One example is the disagreement between security maximizers on the one hand, and power maximizers on the other hand which have a different understanding of the rationale behind states’ actions. Finally, another downside of realism is the fact that it mainly focuses on ‘high politics’, neglecting the importance of what they define as ‘low politics’ in world politics.

However, despite obvious criticism, based on the concepts described above we expect realism to give insight in the causal effects that paved the way for the EU’s engagement in Arctic governance. Thereby, we examine concepts of all three types of realism depicted above in order to shape our analysis. This means we explore our analysis through a collective realist lens. We see realism as valuable to explain the perceived geopolitical implications identified in the EU Arctic Policy, especially when related to security issues. On the other hand, we expect realism to be insufficient to explain the EU’s transgovernmental and transnational cooperation, as realism focuses on inter-state negotiations exclusively. Based on the neglect of the actorness of international organizations, we deem realism to be incapable of accounting for the increasing role of such organizations and their ability to set the agenda in the arena of international relations.
3.2. Complex Interdependence

Complex Interdependence is a theory constructed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye as a critical answer, or an alternative, to realism. Thus, complex interdependence can be seen as the opposite of realism. Three major realist assumptions are criticized by Keohane and Nye:

First, states are the predominant actors in world politics where they act as coherent units.

Second, the threat of, or actual use of force is the most effective policy instrument and thus the main way of achieving power. Third, there is a hierarchy of issues in world politics where ‘high politics’ (military security) prevail ‘low politics’ (economic and social affairs) (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 19). Complex Interdependence is an ideal type that challenges these three core assumptions which leads to a different view on world politics; “a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy” (2012, p. 20).

However, three main characteristics of complex interdependence are defined by Keohane and Nye; multiple channels, the absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role of military force.

Multiple Channels are interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. Whereas interstate relations are the channels that are accepted by realists, transgovernmental and transnational channels challenge the realist assumption that states are the only units in world politics and they act as coherent units. According to Keohane and Nye, “multinational firms and banks affect both domestic and interstate relations” which makes these actors important in two ways: “their activities in pursuit of their own interests” and their acting as transmission belts that leads to decisions across national boundaries in the sense that domestic policies of one country increasingly have a bearing on domestic policies of another country. The result of this, by Keohane and Nye (2012), is the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy (p. 21).

Absence of Hierarchy among Issues first and foremost puts behind the realist assumption of ‘high politics’ dominating ‘low politics’. Thus, complex interdependence suggests that the wide range of interstate relationship issues lacks consistent hierarchy, which allocates economic and social issues just as much relevance as military power, if not more. Since it becomes more difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign issues, interstate relationship issues, or foreign affairs agendas, have to be “considered in several government departments (…) and at several levels” (2012, p. 20). “The extensive consultative
arrangements developed by the OECD, as well as the GATT\textsuperscript{1} [now WTO], IMF\textsuperscript{2}, and the European Community [now European Union], indicate how characteristic the overlap of domestic and foreign policy is among developed pluralist countries” (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 22). Hence, Keohane and Nye put forth the idea that hierarchy of issues in interstate politics no longer is adequate in times where transgovernmental and transnational organizations have a clear impact on decision making in the arena of international relations.

**Minor Role of Military Force** is closely connected to the previous characteristic in the sense that military security issues do not dominate economic and social matters. Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye recognize that this primarily applies to the relationship between governments within the same region. They admit that military force might well be relevant for political and military relations between governments of different regions. In Keohane and Nye’s (2012) words, “[m]ilitary force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for the alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc” (p.21). According to Keohane and Nye, industrialized, pluralist countries hardly fear attacks, and much less by one another. Thus, military force becomes hardly relevant as an instrument of policy for those countries, since there exist “intense relationships of mutual influence” between them (2012, p. 23). However, Keohane and Nye define two qualifications that apply even for those countries whose relations come close to the ideal type of complex interdependence:

\begin{quote}
(1) drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important direct instrument of policy; and (2) even when elites’ interests are complementary, a country that uses military force to protect another may have significant political influence over the other country. (2012, p. 23)
\end{quote}

As mentioned earlier, Keohane and Nye constructed the theory of Complex Interdependence as to be in opposition to realism. Therefore, they also compare political processes under conditions of realism and complex interdependence respectively. The following table illustrates the differences of complex interdependence and realism in terms of goals of actors, instruments of state policy, agenda formation, linkages of issues, and roles of international organizations.

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\textsuperscript{1} General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
\textsuperscript{2} International Monetary Fund
A closer look at these differences is necessary in order to understand the political processes of Complex Interdependence.

**Linkage Strategies**

Keohane and Nye argue that, according to traditional analysis, militarily and economically strong states are likely to use “their overall dominance to prevail on their weak issues” in order to “ensure a congruence between the overall structure of military and economic power and the pattern of outcomes on any one issue area” (2012, p. 25). Complex Interdependence, on the other hand, sees such congruence happen less often since it will be difficult for militarily strong states to “control outcomes on issues in which they are weak”, due to devaluation of military force (2012, p. 25). Certainly, this is linked to the second characteristic of complex
interdependence (the absence of hierarchy among issues), as military force is largely immobilized due to the equalization of military power with other issues.

Agenda Setting

Also based on the assumption that a hierarchy among issues is nonexistent, Keohane and Nye (2012) “expect that the politics of agenda formation and control will become more important” (p. 26). Traditionally, not much attention has been payed to agenda setting since issues other than politico-military ones would only be considered important when they affect security and military power. However, “[i]nternational monetary politics, problems of commodity terms of trade, oil, food, and multinational corporations” are, by Keohane and Nye, all nonmilitary issues that have been emphasized in interstate relations, although not all of them enjoyed much attention on interstate agendas (2012, p. 27). Furthermore, not least due to the line between domestic and foreign policy being blurred, issues that traditionally were considered of domestic nature are forced on interstate agendas. Under complex interdependence, “international and domestic problems created by economic growth and increasing sensitivity interdependence”, and not only shifts in the balance of power, will affect the agendas significantly (2012, p. 27).

Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations

As “[t]he availability of partners in political coalitions is not necessarily limited by national boundaries,” transnational relations are expected to affect the outcomes of political bargaining (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 28). Moreover, Keohane and Nye argue that multinational corporations are important in two ways; “as independent actors and as instruments manipulated by governments” (2012, p. 28). However, multiple channels of contact are not reserved for non-governmental actors, but may be used by governments as well. Such contact may lead to transgovernmental coalitions on particular policy issues. In some cases, coalitions can be used by powerful states to penetrate weaker states, or the other way around (2012, pp. 28-29).

Role of International Organizations

For realists, international organizations are insignificant in world politics, as states are the main actors whose behavior is determined by self-interest and a constant struggle for power and peace. By Keohane and Nye (2012), on the contrary, “in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased” (p. 29). Consequently, international organizations participate in setting the international agenda, enable
political initiatives and linkage especially by weak states, and promote coalition-formation. International organizations are capable of gathering officials and thereby facilitate coalitions in world politics. Less developed countries in particular benefit from international organizations and their ability to collect state representatives, as they are rarely represented in other countries in the form of embassies (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 30).

Having discussed the characteristics and the political processes of complex interdependence, it is now time to discuss the role of power in interdependence, which is crucial to the understanding of the theory of complex interdependence. Traditionally, power was connected to military capability. World affairs were believed to be controlled by the states with the most military power. The postwar era, however, has brought forth a different understanding of power, as “the resources that produce power capabilities have become more complex” (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 9).

*Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes.* (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 10)

According to Keohane and Nye, it is difficult to measure power. One can look at the initial power resources that should enable an actor to make other actors do something, or one can measure the actual influence on outcomes (2012, p. 10).

Nonetheless, Keohane and Nye distinguish between two dimensions; sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence in order to explain the role of power in interdependence. The main difference between sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence is that sensitivity takes for granted a fixed framework of policies that cannot be changed, while vulnerability does not. This can be due to a shortage of time to adequately adjust policies to a given situation, or due to “a commitment to a certain pattern of domestic and international rules” (2012, p. 10). **Sensitivity** is concerned with the “degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework” and the question of “how quickly […] changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great […] the costly effects [are]” (2012, p. 10). Sensitivity interdependence, according to Keohane and Nye, can be social, political or economic, while especially social sensitivity has been augmented by tremendously increasing transnational communications (2012, p. 11). **Vulnerability**, on the other hand, is concerned with the question of what the costs of adjustment to outside change would be. This is in a situation where the policy framework very well may be changed and, consequently, new and
different policies were possible. By Keohane and Nye, “[t]he vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face” (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 11). In other words, states are less vulnerable to outside change if they have the possibility of turning to affordable (domestic) alternatives. States are more vulnerable if they have no (cost-efficient) alternatives on hand.

*In terms of the cost of dependence, sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.* (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 11)

Thus, sensitivity interdependence usually qualifies for situations of immediate effects of external changes, whereas vulnerability interdependence requires adjustment over a period of time, and the costliness thereof, in order to be measured (2012, p. 11).

Nonetheless, also complex interdependence has been subjected to criticism and we consider it important to account for some criticism here. Firstly, Keohane and Nye’s *Power and Interdependence* is incapable of explaining the origin of interdependence, as they do not incorporate technology, economy and communication media as the driving forces for interdependence. In fact, the do not reflect “on the driving forces of interdependence” (Spindler, 2014, pp. 67-68). Especially Waltz criticizes complex interdependence as he is convinced that the unequal distribution of capabilities among states leads to dependence rather than interdependence. Scholars of the school of *dependencia* support this notion referring to “dependence as a form of international interdependence” (2014, p. 70). Furthermore, Spindler argues that a ‘theory of the state’ is necessary in order to account for the changes that lead to interdependence. Complex interdependence is incapable of presenting the state’s changing role as it takes a systemic focus. Finally, it is argued that the rise of China (and India) “will change the parameters on any ‘politics of interdependence’ that puts faith in institutionalized global cooperation” which is supported by failed climate change negotiations or the failure to resolve recent conflicts in Syria (2014, pp. 69-71).

Despite the criticism, the theory of complex interdependence is expected to prove beneficial when attempting to explain the interdependent relationship between the EU and the Arctic, and Greenland in particular. We deem the theory useful to explain the actions taken by the EU in regards to its Arctic Policy and to some extent why the Arctic Policy unfolded this way. Furthermore, based on the concept of the absence of hierarchy, we deem it useful in
accounting for the appearance of ‘low politics’ issues, such as climate change and social issues, on the international agenda. Moreover, the focus of the theory on international organizations will be useful to illustrate such organizations’ role in Arctic governance. In turn, what we believe complex interdependence to be incapable of is explaining the local aspects and the role of civil-society as well as the inability to highlight the geopolitical implications in the Arctic region.

3.3. Soft Power vs Hard Power

The concepts of soft and hard power complement the above theories with their ability to identify specific measures taken to implement policy.

Nye’s concept of soft power, which he developed in the 1990s, allows for analysis on how the EU agenda is done on other grounds than military and economic power. Soft power is: “(...) the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideal, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye, 2004, p. x). Nye developed the concept of soft power in relation to American power but he identifies Europe as being the closest competitor to the US in terms of soft power. The rationale behind soft power is to influence others through other than the “traditional” means of military power or economic sanctions. Whereas hard power is utilized to influence others through commands or coercion, soft power tries to influence others through cooperation, agenda setting and attraction.

According to Nye, soft power is the intangible attraction that makes us go a certain direction, without the explicit use of force or coercion (2004, p. 7). However, Nye recognizes the inter- relational relationship between hard and soft power, as both are aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of the others. The distinction of the two is how you achieve it. Hard power relies on, what Nye calls, command power that is the ability to change what others do, and it is achieved through inducement or coercion. Soft power, on the other hand, relies on, what Nye calls, co-optive power, which is the ability to shape what others want. Co-optive power is achieved by “attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic” (2004, p. 7). Nevertheless, Nye stresses that the relationship between command- and co-optive power is not a fixed condition and therefore the lines are somewhat blurred. Nye argues that the product of soft power often arise from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, for example it is
defined by its internal practices and policies, and how it handles relationships with others (Nye, 2004, p. 8).

As opposed to the concept of soft power, hard power predominantly comprises states’ use of military capabilities, or threat thereof. In Keohane and Nye’s (2012) words, “[h]ard power is the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward” (p. 216). Another, similar definition of hard power is, according to Joseph Nye (2011), “the ability to get the outcomes one wants through coercion and payment” (p. 16). Thus, the actions a state performs in order to achieve desired outcomes, rather than the resources used to yield such outcomes, are crucial to differentiate between soft and hard power. By Nye (2009), “[m]ilitary and economic resources can sometimes be used to attract as well as coerce” (p. 160). Consequently, resources often associated with hard power, namely military and economic ones, may well be attributed to soft power. According to Nye (2004), “hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others” and further “the distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources” (p. 7).

This is exemplified in the figure below. Therefore, coercion and payment is what really defines hard power, and distinguishes it from soft power. Generally associated with hard power are tangible resources such as force and money, while intangibles usually are attributed to soft power. Unfortunately, the distinction is not always that easy. Threats to use force are clearly a dimension of hard power, but they are not tangible. Likewise, military capacity is affected by certain intangible resources like legitimacy, patriotism, and morale (Nye, 2011, p. 19). Moreover, Nye (2011) claims that “a tangible hard power resource like a military unit can produce both command behavior (by winning a battle) and co-optive behavior (attraction) depending on how it is used” (p. 19). Hence, it is necessary to identify the way a state achieves desired outcomes, rather than the type of resources used for that purpose.

However, in order for states to develop effective strategies and produce an effective foreign policy, a sensible combination of hard and soft power is necessary. Nye, in order to refer to said combination, coined the term ‘smart power’. By Nye (2011), smart power as a concept is both evaluative and descriptive, while especially the evaluative nature distinguishes it from soft power (p. 20).
We expect the concepts of hard and soft power to contribute to the understanding of how the EU intends to implement its Arctic Policy and especially its enhanced cooperation with Greenland. Said concepts are thereby estimated to come in handy in particular when it comes to the analysis of specific actions taken by the EU to accomplish the strategies put forth in its policy towards the Arctic region. However, apart from the nature of the measures taken by the EU, the concepts of hard and soft power will not be able to explain much of the EU’s interest in the Arctic and its connection to Greenland.

3.4. Theoretical Discussion

In this section we will discuss the theoretical approaches we took into consideration but ended up not focusing upon. Consequently, we will end up with a rationale for choosing realism and complex interdependence to set the theoretical framework for this thesis and not the alternative theories presented below. The alternative theories we deemed relevant are neo-functionalism, democratic peace theory, and constructivism.

**Neo-functionalism**, as presented by Ernst B. Haas, is an integration theory that aims at explaining how cooperation between states progresses and ultimately leads to a political community, such as the EU. In this context, Haas examined under what conditions “technical cooperation would lead to political cooperation and ultimately to a political community” (Conzelmann, 2014, p. 92). Neo-functionalists generally see integration solely as the process, while concepts as technical cooperation, political cooperation and political community are different stages of integration. A key component of the neo-functionalist approach is the concept of ‘spillover’, which Haas explains to be the code for integrative achievements - a mechanism that explains why different stages of integration ‘spillover’ into another stage of
integration (Conzelmann, 2014, pp. 93-94). In this context, we argue that neo-functionalism could have explained why the EU initiated the economic FPA with Greenland after Greenland’s formal exit of the EEC in 1985, and why this economic agreement developed into the political PA. Furthermore, we would expect neo-functionalism to provide an understanding of why the EU Arctic Policy’s initial issue areas developed into the most recent issue areas. Haas introduced the concept of ‘geographical spillover’, which attempts to explain how parties outside the regional grouping find it desirable to deepen their ties with the integrating block (Haas, 2004, pp. 313-314). This could have contributed to the understanding of the integration of the European Arctic into closer economic cooperation including the access to the Single Market. However, we chose not to include the theory of neo-functionalism, as complex interdependence also provides evidence to why cooperation takes place and due to the fact that we are yet to see explicit integration of the European Arctic into the EU. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that neo-functionalism could have provided a supporting point of view to complex interdependence. Nonetheless, due to our scope we deemed the theory to be too focused on the actual integration process, rather than the causal effects of the EU Arctic Policy. This is due to neo-functionalism generally being accepted as a European integration theory. In fact, Haas himself pointed towards interdependence theories, such as the one by Keohane and Nye, as they facilitate a more comprehensive picture (Jensen, 2016, p. 60).

The next theory we considered was **democratic peace theory** which puts forth the idea that democracies are less prone to go to war with one another. The theory contains a structural and a normative explanation. The structural explanation focuses on the institutions of the representative governments that hold the elected leaders and their decision makers accountable. Therefore, based on cost-benefit consideration, war is an unattractive option for the governments and its citizens (Russett, 2009, pp. 21-22). The normative dimension, on the other hand, focuses on how democratic values promote peaceful conflict resolution and because of shared democratic values it decreases the probability of war, as disputes are usually settled peacefully (Elman, 1997, pp. 11-12). However, the theory has been criticized by many scholars as the absence of war can be explained in many other ways without focusing on whether states are democratic or non-democratic. Moreover, the theory does not provide explanation of the causal mechanism behind peace which makes it difficult to be certain of genuineness of democratic peace (Owen, 1994, pp. 87-88). As the theory mainly attempts to explain the absence of conflicts in the international system based on the regime type, we believe it to lack the ability to account for the EU’s involvement in the Arctic, which is due to more than
maintaining peace. That being said, democratic peace theory could have contributed in the sense that it supports the idea of interdependence and the unlikelihood of military conflict. However, as complex interdependence is capable of accounting for the overall absence of conflict in the Arctic, we deemed the theory to be sufficient in explaining the maintenance of peace. It must although be acknowledged that democratic peace theory could have served as a supporting theory to complex interdependence in order to determine the relative peace in the Arctic region. Finally, democratic peace theory could have complemented complex interdependence in the discussion of the comparability of the Arctic Policy and the ENP, as it focuses on the promotion of “domestic norms of conflict resolution” (Mello, 2017, p. 473).

Another theory we considered to include in this thesis is constructivism. The main rationale behind constructivism is that the world and international relations are shaped by the interactions and actions of actors such as influential citizens or leaders, and thereby are socially constructed. Furthermore, constructivists believe that the ability to act depends on the beliefs and ideas that actors hold. Therefore, changing beliefs and ideas ultimately shape social relationships in the international system (Theys, 2017, pp. 36-37). This stands in stark contrast with the realist belief that state behavior is determined by the international system’s anarchic structure. Moreover, constructivism claims that states’ interests emerge from their identities. This is closely connected to social norms which also define states’ identities and thereby their behavior. In connection with social norms and the expected state behavior, constructivists would explain the recent joint mitigation of climate change as constructed by the general expectation of securing the survival of humanity (2017, p. 38). This leads us to the aspect of constructivism that would have been beneficial for our thesis. Constructivism puts forth the tools to understand the norms and values that shape the EU’s identity and ultimately their interests and actions. That could have contributed to the analysis of the appearance of issues like climate change on the EU’s agenda. Hence, constructivism would have allowed us to define the rationale behind the EU’s increased focus on social issues that are obviously less connected to material capabilities and the expansion of power. However, as we chose to focus on the geopolitical aspect and cooperative nature of the issue at hand, and not so much on the social norms and identities of states, we deemed constructivism as less appropriate than realism and complex interdependence in combination. That being said, the ‘rational choice’ concept of constructivism (Barnett, 2014, p. 166) would have complemented our discussion of measures taken by the EU to achieve its goals. In this regard, the discussion about whether soft or hard power is the appropriate means to achieve the EU’s interest could have been supplemented by
constructivism. However, the combination of realism and complex interdependence and the concepts of soft and hard power gave sufficient insight in the rational choice of the EU.

Having discussed the three alternative theories’ beneficial elements, we will now justify our choice of theories. Despite the above discussed advantageous aspects of each of the three theories, we deemed realism and complex interdependence to be providing the appropriate frameworks to answer our problem formulation, as we prior to choosing the theories in fact did identify core concepts of both theories to be present in the official documents of the EU on its Arctic Policy. Additionally, the anticipated complementary nature of said theories has proven to allow us to gain a deeper understanding of why the EU Arctic Policy has been portrayed this given way.

We decided to investigate our problem through the lens of realism because it allows us to analyze the explicit geopolitical concerns of the EU, and the security aspects clearly present in the official documents of the EU. This suggests that realism provides the appropriate tools to analyze said geopolitical implications. Additionally, the rise of China and its increasing involvement in the Arctic do in fact imply the need for political reaction from the EU of which we argue realism can provide a satisfactory argument to. Furthermore, realism can also, to some extent, account for the responses that the EU has taken in regards to the changing political environment of the Arctic region.

Complex interdependence has been chosen partly because it criticizes core concepts of realism and provides an alternative to it, and partly because it accounts for an entire aspect that realism seems to neglect, namely the one of the interdependent relationship of the international system. Moreover, complex interdependence provides support for the specific ways of which the EU ensures the security of its proximate northern neighborhood. Thus, the theory turned out to complement realism in the sense that international organizations and their role in agenda setting is taken into consideration. Furthermore, complex interdependence facilitates an understanding of the absence of military force in Arctic governance, which is an aspect realism struggles to explicate. Consequently, the combination of the two chosen theories allows us to account for some of the criticism given to the theories, which we argue gives us a more wholesome analysis. We argue that the two theories accompany each other to a more fulfilling extent than a combination of the above-mentioned alternative theories. We however, acknowledge that the inclusion of the above-mentioned theories would have given us a more complete understanding and portrayal of the processes of the EU Arctic Policy, but as this
would have required an extensive amount of time and specific excellence, we chose instead to focus on the two theories at hand.
4. Background

4.1. Greenland’s Road to Self-governance

In order to understand Greenland’s role in the EU’s Arctic strategy it is necessary to define Greenland’s state-building process, which the country has been immersed since the 1970s. Crucial for Greenland’s strive for Home-Rule was the fact that Greenland was forced into joining the EEC based on Denmark’s decision to join in 1972, despite 70% of Greenland’s population voting against an EC membership (Sørensen, 2015). Consequently, the national congress strived for a Home-Rule similar to the one established on the Faroe Islands that would enable Greenland to leave the EEC. The wish for Home-Rule was a direct reaction towards the Danish entrance into the EEC, although there was a clear Greenlandic opposition, mainly based on the fisheries industry would be moved from Copenhagen to even further away Brussels. The Home-Rule was introduced in 1979 and Greenland was recognized for its special culture and geographic position (Hjemmestyreloven, 1979). One of the first political tasks of the Home-Rule was to withdraw from the EEC due to the wish of having full sovereignty over fisheries and to minimize direct foreign influence.

Based on Greenland’s withdrawal from the EEC in 1985, the Greenland Treaty was formed which declared Greenland to be a special case. This special case was portrayed through a multilateral fisheries agreement, which is elaborated in section 4.2.1. Moreover, Greenland got tax and tariff free access to the EEC market as long as Greenland provided satisfactory fishing quotas to the EEC. The Home-Rule gave Greenland more autonomy and some foreign policy capacities (Hjemmestyreloven, 1979, §16). These capacities allowed Greenland to enter the Nordic Council in 1984 and to exit the EEC in 1985 - becoming the first country to leave the EU. In the wake of Greenland’s exit, the country was granted the status of an OCT (Hjemmestyreloven, 1979).

At the popular referendum of November 25, 2008, 75.5% voted in favor of the Self-Government. As a result of the referendum, the AGSG was accepted in the Danish Parliament on June 21, 2009. The AGSG officially replaced the Home-Rule Agreement of 1979. Alongside with the Danish Constitution, the AGSG defines Greenland’s position within the Unity of the Realm (Eritja, 2017, p. 67; Statsministeriet, 2009). The AGSG allowed the Government of Greenland to assume legislative, executive and judicial powers, which was under Danish authority beforehand. Although, Denmark keeps power over areas regarding
foreign affairs, security and defense and economic policy (Eritja, 2017, p. 67). The AGSG breaks with any hierarchical subordination of Greenland and its people in the Community of the Realm by using words such as ‘mutual respect’, ‘partnership’ and not least ‘equality’ (Thisted, 2011, p. 612). Strikingly, the AGSG removes any juridical impediments that hitherto prevented Greenland’s full sovereignty; “Greenland’s autonomy is a choice that must be made by the Greenlandic people” (Statsministeriet, 2009).

It is stated in the AGSG that it “has the right of use and the right to exploit mineral resources in the subsoil in Greenland”. Hence, the Greenland Self-Government authorities have gained full autonomy over the mineral resources found in the subsoil of Greenland (Greenland Self-Government, 2009). However, foreign, defense and security policy is one of the areas that have not been transferred to Greenland authorities in the wake of the AGSG due to certain restrictions in the Danish Constitution. Nonetheless, a 2005 authorization arrangement empowers the Government of Greenland “to negotiate and conclude international agreements with foreign states and international organizations, including administrative agreements, which exclusively concern Greenland and entirely relate to fields of responsibility taken over by Greenland” (Statsministeriet, 2009).

The AGSG also defines Greenland’s access to independence. According to the provisions set out in the act, the Governments of Denmark and Greenland may negotiate Greenland’s independence as soon as the people of Greenland opt for independence. Subsequently, an agreement between said governments has to be accepted by the Parliament of Greenland (Inatsisartut) and supported by a referendum in Greenland. Finally, such an agreement needs the approval of the Danish Parliament (Eritja, 2017, pp. 67-68; Statsministeriet, 2009).

4.2. Greenland’s Relationship with the EU

Greenland’s resignation from the EEC meant that the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not apply to Greenland (Eritja, 2017, p. 68). Greenland is an important gateway to the Arctic region for the EU since it is part of the Arctic 5, through Danish connections, and assumes a proactive role in the AC, as well as other fora. The role of the AC is visible in the EU’s interest in the Arctic, as the AC benefits its members through its existence, along with its acceptance of non-Arctic states trying to become Observers. This confirms and protects the Arctic states’ positions as the leading actors in Arctic international relations. This reflects how “an international institution, as a political
process, can create a new shared interest in its continued existence (…)” (Byers, 2017, p. 393). Greenland has enjoyed constant cooperation with the EU since 2007. At around the same time, the EU Arctic Policy was initiated and was laid out in the 2007-2013 period. Since Greenland’s exit of the EEC, the legal framework for relations between the two are embedded in three main instruments: “the Decision of Association together with the Joint Declaration on relations between the EU and Greenland; the Fisheries Agreement; and the Overseas Association Decision with the OCTs” (Eritja, 2017, pp. 68-69 & 95).

The EU’s relationship with Greenland has certain similarities to the EU’s relationship with countries subject to its ENP and in this regard it is important to briefly mention the ENP. The ENP focuses on the promotion of democracy; the rule of law; respect for human rights; and social cohesion. The revised policy intends to consolidate more effective partnerships between the EU and its neighboring countries to build towards a more stable neighborhood.

The ENP translates the EU’s wish to build on common interests with partner countries of the East and South and commitment to work jointly in key priority in political, socio-economic and security terms. Strengthening the state and societal resilience of the EU’s partners is a key priority in the face of threats and pressures they are experiencing, including the challenges associated with migration and mobility. (European External Action Service, 2016)

4.2.1. The Fisheries Partnership Agreement

The first fisheries agreement between the EU and Greenland was adopted right after Greenland’s exit from the EEC in 1985. In 2007, the Council adopted Council Regulation No 753/2007 of 28 June 2007 on the conclusion of the FPA between Greenland, the EC and Denmark. In January 2013 Council Regulation No 927&2012 of 16 July 2012 defined the fishing opportunities in Greenland’s EEZ and EU’s financial contribution. This was followed by Council Decision 2014/48, which concluded the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution, which was clarified in the FPA. The current EU Decision 2015/2013 includes a new protocol applying to the fishing relations between Greenland and the EU, which covers the period of 2016-2020 (Eritja, 2017, p. 70). As mentioned in the above, after Greenland successfully exited the EEC, it became a special case. The special case became embedded in a bilateral fisheries agreement between the EEC and Greenland that allowed Greenland to export fish products without being subject to tariffs and taxation. Additionally, Greenland would keep its financial support from the EEC (European
Union [EU], 1985). The FPA also ensured that sovereignty over Greenland’s EEZ remained under Greenlandic control. The protocol of the FPA establishes the fishing opportunities, the economic support to Greenland, categorizes the fishing activities, opens the door for further financial cooperation within fisheries and the possibility to create common companies, which includes businesses from both the EU and Greenland. To ensure that fishing in Greenland’s EEZ is done on sustainable practices the agreement includes cooperation in the scientific field (Naalakkersuisut, n.d.a; EU, 2007). In 2013 the new commercialized FPA between the EU and Greenland came into force. The EU’s financial contribution amounted to 17.8 million EUR per year for fishing rights and quotas in Greenland’s EEZ. The main objective of the FPA is to provide the EU with fishing quotas and to strengthen the bilateral relationship in fisheries (Naalakkersuisut, n.d.a; EC, n.d.).

4.2.2. The Partnership Agreement

In 2003, the FPA was split into two. Following this, a Joint Declaration on the partnership between the EU, Denmark and Greenland was signed in 2006 and was the first political EU document on Greenland that goes beyond fisheries, since the introduction of the Greenland Treaty. Based on Article 3 of the Council Decision 2014/137, the main areas for cooperation for the period of 2014-2020 are: education and training; tourism and culture; natural resources, including raw materials; energy; climate; the social sector; and research and innovation in these areas (Eritja, 2017, p. 69). Moreover, Greenland also advocated for continuation of the principle of free access of goods (Kobza, 2016, pp. 134-139). In the adopted Council Decision, Greenland was referred to as a ‘privileged neighbor’ and its significance was no longer bound by the standard relations set forth in the framework of the OCTs. In 2007, the multiannual programming document prepared by the Directorate-General Development Cooperation pointed out that the main areas of cooperation were, in fact, education and training. This was based on the EC’s ambitions to build a more independent economy in Greenland, which ultimately would give Greenland a sustainable economy (2016, pp. 139-140). Since 2007, Greenland has had constant cooperation with the EU and this is consolidated in the Council Decision 2014/137 - for the period of 2014-2020. This Council Decision has a double aim: the first is minded towards the objective of the PA, which is to strengthen the relations and cooperation between the EU and Greenland on various subjects, however, the focal sector remains to be education and training with the aim of developing this sector with regards to sustainable human development (Naalakkersuisut, n.d.b). The second is aimed at the EU’s contribution to the capacity of administration of Greenland to enhance the ability to implement
national policies of mutual interest, as set forth in Article 4(1) of the PA (Council of the European Union, 2014a, pp. 11-12; Eritja, 2017, p. 69). The PA follows the Multi Financial Framework of the EU and therefore has to be renegotiated every sixth year. The current PA is effective in the period of 2014-2020. In this period, the EU allocates a total of 217 million EUR to Greenland (roughly half of Denmark’s annual contribution) and this is almost exclusively allocated to the educational sector. It is the Government of Greenland that administers the funds through a Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of Greenland, which highlights the priorities of the 2014-2020 period - focus is on education, professional training and secondary schooling (Naalakkersuisut, n.d.b; Eritja, 2017, p. 70). The partnership strengthens the relations between the EU and Greenland and is set forth in the Joint Declarations of 2006 and 2015 between the EU, Greenland and Denmark. Although, the programming document is not a legally binding document it affirms the EU’s ties with Greenland and underlines Greenland’s important position (Eritja, 2017, p. 70).

4.2.3. Greenland’s Role as an OCT

All the OCTs are bound upon the Overseas Association Decision (OAD) of which the purpose is bound upon Part IV Articles 198-204 of the TFEU. In the most general sense the purpose of the association of the OCTs is that the EU shall promote the economic and social development of the OCTs, and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole (EU, 2012, Art. 198-203). It is however underlined in Protocol No. 34 that Greenland has special arrangements, i.e. the FPA and the PA. The OAD Decision 2013/755 of 25 November 2013 replaces the former Decision of 2001. The emphasis of this OAD is outlined in its three pillars: “(1) enhancing competitiveness, (2) strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability and (3) promoting cooperation and integration between the OCTs and other partners and neighboring regions” (Council of the European Union, 2013, art. 6). These three pillars are the cornerstone of the mutual beneficial relationship between the OCTs and the EU. Furthermore, the Decision emphasizes respect for “the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development” (Council of the European Union, 2013, art. 3, §2).

4.3. The EU Arctic Policy

The EU has developed its Arctic Policy for several years, which had its beginnings in the EU Parliament’s Resolution and the EC’s Communication, in 2008. The EU has made much progress in its approach to the Arctic, which is visible in the Joint Communication of the EC
and the High Representative (HR) from 2012 and with the latest Joint Communication from 2016. The latest series of policy statements is titled “An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic” (Stępień & Koivurova, 2017, pp. 11-12).

The Arctic is becoming more relevant due to climate change and the possibilities the thawing ice brings; such as the new trade routes through the Northeast Passage (NEP) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) and extraction of rare minerals in Greenland. Cooperation in matters of Arctic Policy is highlighted, as the EU after 2008 attempted to create its own Arctic Policy (Kobza, 2016, p. 145; participation in Arctic Future Symposium). Apart from the open access to these new sea lanes, the EU is also interested in “maintain[ing] its competitive lead in developing the technology required for Arctic conditions, i.e. specially-designed icebreakers and cargo vessels” (Erokhin, 2019, p. 28). In this context, especially the NWP is recognized as of having great potential in the future. Apart from the NWP, the potential of the NEP and the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) are discussed in international fora. By Raspotnik (2016) however, the NEP is most interesting as the TSR remains a hypothetical route, while the NWP is hardly used (p. 147).

4.3.1. The Beginning of an EU Arctic Policy

The causal effects of what directly influenced the EU to initiate its Arctic Policy are blurry, as many matters have been defined in various contexts. Therefore, we go back to when the Arctic gained its initial interest. The US gained foothold in Greenland during World War II and constructed a military base on the island. The *de jure* guarantor of American interest in Greenland was based on the defense treaty of 1951 (Dragsdahl, 2005, p. 488). During the Cold War, the American military interest in Greenland was strengthened and the US even offered to buy the island from Denmark (Loukacheva, 2007, p. 132). During the Cold War the Arctic region was of geostrategic importance and therefore the focus was mainly on asserting military power because the Arctic lies between the two main contenders at the time, the USSR and the US (Breum, 2018, p. 43). Therefore, focus on the Arctic in this period of time can be seen in purely military terms and the build-up of military capacities. However, the Arctic largely disappeared from the EEC’s political agenda after Greenland left the EEC and the Cold War came to an end (Wegge, 2012, p. 14).

The Arctic first gained attention of EU policymakers at the end of the 1980s, when members of the EP started questioning the state of the environment in the Arctic. When Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, the Union was represented north of the Arctic
Circle again. With the Finish presidency in 1997, the initiative to create the Northern Dimension (ND) was launched. While the scope of the ND was limited, it later came to include an ‘Arctic Window’ which mainly focused on the Baltic States and Sweden and Finland’s relationship with Russia (Wegge, 2012, p. 14; Offerdal, 2011, p. 865). A tipping point of EU interest in the Arctic was the dramatic changes caused by global warming and in 2008 the US Geological Survey started geopolitical debates and became the standard reference point to portray the future race for resources in the Arctic. These trends were acknowledged in a document entitled ‘Climate Change and International Security’, which the HR and the Commission addressed to the European Council in March 2008. A report, widely known as the Solana report (after Javier Solana the HR at this time), explicitly referred to the Arctic region and this initiated political debate in Brussels, concerning the opportunities and risks in the High North. Additionally, an external event that played a major role in the EU’s engagement in the High North was due to the increased media awareness and the “geopolitical implications” caused by the Russian flag-planting, at the bottom of the sea, at the North Pole (Offerdal, 2011, p. 867). The interesting thing about the report is that almost exclusively focused on realist notions of security and geopolitics and therefore the report suggested that the Member States should “develop an EU Arctic Policy based on evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account, inter alia, access to resources and opening of new trade routes” (EC, 2008). Similar reasoning was present in the year earlier Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) that the first Commission led by Barroso set forth. Although, the Arctic was barely mentioned in the 2006 Green Book, this was changed in the presentation of the Blue Book on IMP in October 2007. These were the first documents to put the Arctic on the EU agenda (Offerdal, 2011, p. 867; Wegge, 2012, p. 14; Weber & Romanyszyn, 2011, p. 852). As a result of external developments, the Commission set forth an interservice working group to develop a draft proposal on EU’s engagement in the Arctic. The group consisted of 20-25 policymakers from various EU agencies and Directorate Generals. The IMP should be the model which an Arctic strategy should be based on and thus the Maritime and Fisheries Directorate General found himself to have a leading role in formulating the draft report, accompanied by a former General of External Relations. Based on this, the Commission set forth the first Arctic Communication in 2008, which we will elaborate later on. In the Solana report, climate change was included as well but rather as a threat multiplier. Climate change was what should legitimize the EU’s step into Arctic affairs with the slogan ‘fighting climate change and promoting sustainable development’ (EC, 2008). The EC recognized a need to propose action in related areas, such as environment, energy, research, transport and fisheries to deal with this.
Former Commissioner, Vladimir Spidla emphasized that the protection of the environment was an absolute priority (EC, 2008; Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011, p. 853). The EC’s position was backed by the Member States at the Council of the European Union, the Council elaborated on the Arctic Policy in 2009 (see section 4.3.3). The EP played a vast role in the emerging Arctic Policy and held four plenary meetings on the Arctic in the period of 2008-2011 and three plenary debates on the Arctic in the same period. The parliamentarians questioned the Commission on the Arctic extensively to attract more interest to the region. Diana Wallis, a British parliamentarian, was an important actor in promoting an Arctic agenda, and already in 2006 she delivered a speech to the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, where she argued that an Arctic Charter should be demanded and should be regulated similarly to the Antarctic Treaty. This idea was controversial and did not have any support from the Arctic five. Despite the controversy, Wallis and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe were one of the main drivers behind the Parliaments 2008 resolution on Arctic governance (Wegge, 2012, p. 16; Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011, pp. 854-855). In 2009, the Parliament’s report on a sustainable EU Policy for the High North was approved in plenary without any votes against. Although the focus still was on climate change, the Parliament saw the economic opportunities in the High North (Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011, pp. 856-857).

The TFEU outlines multiple areas in which the EU could have the legal basis for adopting an Arctic Policy. The areas where the EU has the possibility to enact Arctic Policy is thus, as follows: Article 43 on agriculture and fisheries; Articles 91, 100 and 172 on terrestrial, sea and air transport; Article 114 on the single market; Article 153 on improving living and working conditions; Article 167 on cultural matters; Article 168 on public health; Articles 177 and 178 on economic, social and territorial matters; Article 180 on research; Articles 191 and 192 on environmental and climate change; and Article 207 on trade (Eritja, 2013, pp. 466-467). The EU’s competences on Arctic governance have thus only been partially exercised and remain within the areas that clearly influences the Arctic, these are as follows: “environment, climate change, energy, transport and fishing; the development of an integrated maritime policy, which combines ocean management and international governance; the protection of indigenous peoples; and, from a geostrategic perspective, the inclusion of the Arctic issues in the EU Security Strategy” (2013, pp. 467-468).

This section highlighted the internal and external factors that led to the creation of an EU Arctic Policy, where all EU institutions expressed risks and opportunities on Arctic governance.
4.3.2. The EU Arctic Policy 2008

The EP started the EU Arctic Policy process when it published its 2008 resolution on Arctic governance. In the resolution, the EP acknowledges and identifies clear concerns over the effects of climate change and the sustainability of the lives of indigenous people in the region and thereby underlines that “any international decision relating to these issues must fully involve and take account of all peoples and nations of the Arctic” (European Parliament [EP], 2008). The Parliament also identifies that the time of action has come instead of the time for diagnosis, as the warming of the Arctic is occurring at a pace two times faster than the observed global average temperature. The EP’s great interest in a separate EU Arctic Policy is embedded in the above. Hence, the EP points to four issues that it hopes the EC will bring up in its future communication:

1. the state of play in relation to climate change, and adaptation to it, in the region;
2. policy options that respect the indigenous populations and their livelihoods;
3. the need to cooperate with our Arctic neighbors on cross-border issues, in particular maritime safety; and
4. options for a future cross-border political or legal structure that could provide for the environmental protection and sustainable orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreement over resources and navigable waterways in the High North; (EP, 2008)

The EC adopted its first Arctic Communication the same year. The Commission identifies that the Arctic is a region that is vital for the Earth’s environment and climate system and underlines its vulnerability to change. The Commission underlines: “[a]ccelerated loss from the Greenland ice sheet would raise sea levels rapidly and considerably (...) EU policies in areas such as environment, climate change, energy, research, transport and fisheries have a direct bearing on the Arctic” (EC, 2008). This shows the commitment of the EU in taking action to combat climate change in the Arctic. Furthermore, the Commission and the HR for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) support an EU Arctic Policy by pointing out that environmental changes are affecting the geostrategic dynamics of the Arctic, which potentially can have consequences for the international stability and European security. On the basis of this, the EC sets out EU interests and encourages action for Member States and stakeholders around three main policy areas: (1) protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population. In this context, the EU clearly shows its engagement in the Arctic with the key priorities of research, monitoring and assessment of the Arctic along with the EU’s funding to
Arctic research (EC, 2008). (2) Promoting sustainable use of resources: The Commission focuses on the promotion of sustainable use of resources to secure its own energy demands through the possibilities that lie within the Arctic. (3) Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance: The Commission refers to UNCLOS to provide the basis for dispute settlements by ensuring security and stability (EC, 2008).

Finally, in this 2008 Communication, the Commission already recognizes Greenland’s special role in the Arctic and underlines a wish to enhance Arctic-related cooperation with Greenland, and that additional efforts should be made to make Greenland an even more important partner for the EU (EC, 2008).

4.3.3. Council Conclusions of 2009 on Arctic Issues

In 2009, the Council adopted conclusions on Arctic issues. The Council considers that the EU Policy on Arctic issues should be based on: (1) measures to mitigate climate change and to preserve the Arctic; (2) reinforced multilateral governance; (3) UNCLOS; (4) implementing EU actions and policies that respect the ecosystems and biodiversity of the Arctic and its people; and (5) maintaining the Arctic as an area of peace and stability and highlighting new possibilities for transport, resource extraction and other entrepreneurial activities (Council of the European Union, 2009). The Council approves the three main policy objectives, as proposed by the Commission Communication of 2008: (1) protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, (2) promoting sustainable use of resources and (3) contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance (2009). The Council conclusively expresses its continued support for the EC to obtain Observer Status within the AC which was denied in 2009, most likely due to the EU’s seal ban (Council of the European Union, 2009).
4.3.4. The EP Resolution of 2011 on Sustainable EU Policy for the High North

The EP was ready with a resolution on a sustainable Arctic Policy for the High North in 2011. The resolution states that the Commission’s Communication constitutes the first formal steps toward the Parliament’s call for a formulation of an EU Arctic Policy and the Council Conclusions should be regarded as a further step of development on an EU Arctic Policy. Like the previous EU work on Arctic Policy the Parliament states that the formulation of an EU Arctic Policy needs to be done on existing multilateral international legal framework, such as UNCLOS and therefore states: “(...) the Arctic region is not to be regarded as a legal vacuum, but as an arena with well-developed tools for governance; the Parliament nevertheless points out, those existing rules need to be further developed, strengthened and implemented by all parties concerned” (EP, 2011). This suggests that the Parliament continues to develop an Arctic Policy on the same course as previously affirmed (EP, 2011).

4.3.5. The HR & the EC’s Joint Communication of 2012

In 2012, the Commission and the then newly established EEAS finally published the Joint Communication that the Council requested back in 2009. The Joint Communication is detailed about the EU’s contributions to the Arctic, which shares the similar principles as earlier publications - the focus is still on: mitigating climate change, research, sustainable development, indigenous people and shipping and maritime safety (EC & High Representative [HR], 2012). The document also underlines that the EU has funded over 1.14 billion EUR to sustainable development in the Arctic in the period of 2007-2013. Moreover, the EU has through the Seventh Framework Program (FP7) contributed around 200 million EUR to Arctic research. Additionally, it is underlined that Arctic Research needs to be brought to a higher level in the period of 2014-2020. The Joint Communication emphasizes the progress made and how it should develop. Therefore, the Commission and the HR propose to do this through three policy objectives: “(1) support research and channel knowledge to address the challenges of environmental and climate changes in the Arctic; (2) act with responsibility to contribute to ensuring economic development in the Arctic is based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise; and (3) intensify its constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic States, indigenous peoples and other partners” (EC & HR, 2012). The Commission proposes a strengthened partnership between the EU and Greenland and provides the possibility to cooperate on matters of Greenland’s environment, while developing and diversifying its economy. Furthermore, a Letter of Intent on Cooperation on Mineral Resources was signed on 13 of June 2012. In this letter, four areas of cooperation have been proposed:
geological knowledge, analysis of infrastructure and investment needs, competence building, and environmental issues related to mining and social impacts of mining. The EC deems it important to “diversify Greenland’s economy, build stronger EU-Greenland industrial relations, contribute to Greenland’s economic development and secure sustainable supply of raw materials for the EU industry as part of the raw materials diplomacy” (EC, 2012).

Moreover, the EU adopted its Raw Materials Strategy in 2008 and reinforced it in 2011, stressing Greenland’s potential in terms of raw materials. In connection with this strategy, the EC developed the so called EU critical raw materials list of fourteen elements. In six of which Greenland has an especially strong potential and thus, a strategic significance for the EU (EC, 2012). Raw materials appear on said list if they display “a high importance to the economic value chain and a high vulnerability to possible supply constraints,” that is e.g. if a raw material “is produced in only a few countries in the world which are not always marked by great political and economic stability, it is difficult to substitute or it has a low recycling rate” (EC, 2012). Further attention is given to Greenland’s increasing importance in terms of Rare Earth Element-deposits (REE), taking into account that the Commission estimates Greenland to hold 12 million tons of REEs, which translates to 9.16% of the global REEs resources (EC, 2012). The Commission has also submitted a legislative proposal to renew the partnership with Greenland for the period 2014-2020. The Commission proposes “an enhanced dialogue on Arctic issues that would not only allow the EU to gain additional understanding of remote Arctic societies, but also allow for the sharing of valuable know-how on issues of mutual concern” (EC, 2012; EC & HR, 2012).

4.3.6. EP Resolution on the EU’s Arctic Strategy for the Arctic of 2014 & Council Conclusions on developing an EU Policy towards the Arctic Region

The EP presented its resolution on EU Arctic strategy in response to the Joint Communication of the Commission and the HR. The Parliament suggests the Joint Communication needs more development and therefore calls for a coherent strategy on the EU’s engagement in the Arctic. The Parliament also “[s]tresses the EU’s strong relations with Greenland and the geostrategic importance of that territory; takes note of the priorities of the Government of Greenland, with a renewed emphasis on economic development and the exploitation of raw materials; asks the Commission and the EEAS to explore how the EU and EU-based actors from science, technology and business can contribute to and assist in the sustainable development of Greenland” (EP, 2014). Finally, the Parliament calls for an Arctic Policy that serves the Arctic region as a whole (EP, 2014).
It was agreed in the Council that the EU should seek to enhance its contributions to the Arctic and thereby enhance cooperation, as the region is of growing importance. Furthermore, the Council encourages Canada to resolve the remaining issues of the seal ban and thereby lifting their veto against the EU’s application for Observer Status in the AC (Council of the European Union, 2014b). After Canada and the EU had solved the seal ban issue, it was Russia that vetoed the EU’s Observer Status in the AC, presumably based on EU sanctions against Russia after the Crimea crisis (EP, 2014). In the conclusions it was also underlined that the EU should continue to strengthen its bonds with Denmark and Greenland. Conclusively, it was requested by the Council that the EC and the HR present proposals for the development of an integrated and coherent EU Arctic Policy (Council of the European Union, 2014b).

4.3.7. The EC Joint Communication to the EP and the Council: An integrated EU Policy for the Arctic 2016

The Joint Communication of 2016 builds on the previous initiatives and therefore sets out the case for an EU Policy that focuses on “advancing international cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate change on the Arctic’s fragile environment, and on promoting and contributing to sustainable development, particularly in the European part of the Arctic” (EC & HR, 2016; author’s emphasis). It highlights that in recent years the Arctic’s role in climate change has become much more prominent, as warming of the Arctic is occurring at almost twice the speed compared to the global average rate. Therefore, mitigating climate change is part of the EU’s objectives. The EU Arctic Policy turned out to be an important factor in implementing the global agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2015, which set out an action plan to limit global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius. The EU also refers to the Paris Agreement, as a comprehensive and collective global goal against climate change (EC & HR, 2016; Head of the Representation of Greenland to the EU, personal communication, December 5, 2018). Due to the Arctic’s role in regulating the climate the EU has a “duty to protect the Arctic environment and strengthen ecosystem resilience” (EC & HR, 2016; author’s emphasis). The EU should also focus on sustainable development in the Arctic, considering both the livelihoods of the people living in the region and the effects that economic development has on the Arctic’s fragile environment. Therefore, the EU should seek to enhance economic, social and environmental resilience of the societies in the Arctic. Due to the EU’s need for Arctic resources the EU invests considerably in the area of sustainable development. Investment by European companies helps advance the development in the region, aided by the European
Structural and Investments Funds and initiatives under the Investment Plan for Europe. The final area outlined in this Joint Communication is that the Arctic region has acquired a higher profile in international relations in the last years, due to its environmental, social, economic and strategic importance. The EU contributes substantially to Arctic research, satellite observation and regional development, as well as with the work of the AC, where the EU remains to achieve formal Observer Status, while other countries such as India, Japan, Republic of Korea, China and Singapore now have Observer Status. The changes occurring in the Arctic present both opportunities, but also have the potential to increase tensions in the region, through competition for resources and increased economic activity. The EU therefore, underlines that “it is now more important than ever to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace, prosperity and constructive international cooperation” (EC & HR, 2016). Additionally, the EU emphasizes the importance of developing the Arctic region to protect the Arctic seas, in view of climate change and increasing activity in the region. The EC and the HR for the CFSP issued an integrated EU Arctic Policy with the following three main areas: (1) climate change and safeguarding the Arctic Environment; (2) sustainable development in and around the Arctic; and (3) international cooperation on Arctic issues (2016).

**Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment**

The Commission underlines the tangible effects of climate change are the decreasing summer sea ice that has decreased by more than 40% since 1979 and correlated rising sea levels. The thawing permafrost can also potentially release short lived greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, which could alter the Arctic and global climate (2016). The EU’s policy response to climate change mostly concerns research.

**Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic**

This second priority area has particular focus on the European Arctic, as the region is sparsely populated over large areas and therefore suffer from lack of transport links because the EU does not hold a complete north-south traffic connection, which could strengthen its links to the Arctic (2016). Through its Member States and its close ties with Iceland, Norway, as well as Greenland the EU can play an influential role in shaping the future development of the European Arctic through the application of EU rules relevant for the EEA and the deployment of financial instruments.

**International Cooperation on Arctic Issues**

The EU also recognizes the need for joined-up response at regional and international level, as
wider geopolitical dynamics may further add to the complexity of the changes affecting the region. Therefore, the EU has strong interest in maintaining the Arctic as a zone of constructive international cooperation “where complex issues are addressed through negotiated solutions, and where common platforms can be established in response to emerging risks” (EC & HR, 2016, see section 3.1 of the EC & HR Joint Communication).

4.3.8. The EU Arctic Policy after the Joint Communication of 2016

Following the Joint Communication of 2016 the Council Conclusions of June 2016 emphasized the EU’s role in the Arctic and that the EU should engage in close cooperation with its Member States in the context of Arctic challenges as well as continuing with the goals set out in the Joint Communication. The Council also recognizes the urgent need for global action to reduce and prevent the significant risks posed by climate and environmental impact in the region, notably by global activities (Council of the European Union, 2016).

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) adopted an opinion on the EU Arctic Policy December 2016 in which the EESC concludes that the Joint Communication is based on three pillars: (1) climate change; (2) sustainable development; and (3) international cooperation. Furthermore, the EESC argues that one of the consequences of climate change is the opening of new waterways in the north, creating specific opportunities for shipping, fishing and mining, which increase the risk of perils at sea in the Arctic. Therefore, the EESC recommends treating issues of safety and security in broader terms. The EESC also states that European policies should be taken into account in the Arctic; this applies to the EU’s structural policy, the common agricultural policy, fisheries policy and maritime policy. The EESC stresses the need to incorporate the Arctic civil society to play an active role in promoting interests and concerns for the people living in the region. Lastly, the EESC points out that the success of the integrated EU Arctic Policy will depend on EU’s diplomatic skills and therefore international cooperation is of main concern (European Economic and Social Committee, 2016).

The European Committee of the Regions (COR) adopted an opinion in February 2017 in which it stresses that the challenges the Arctic faces requires efforts at local, regional and international level. The COR stresses “Arctic region's strategic importance to the EU is increasing all the time, as is the need for the EU to take steps to overcome the challenges posed by the Arctic region's natural environment and specific socio-economic conditions” (European Committee of the Regions, 2017).
Finally, the EP adopted a resolution on an integrated EU policy for the Arctic in March 2017. The Parliament welcomes the Joint Communication as positive steps towards an integrated EU Arctic Policy and the three priority areas outlined in it. The Resolution however, stresses the EU’s engagement in the Council of the Baltic Sea Region, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the full membership of the Commission in these bodies. The Parliament also stresses the ND policy, which affects both the EU’s internal affairs and external relations, has developed into an equal partnership between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland. The Parliament also addresses the “Russian Federation had established at least six new bases north of the Arctic Circle, including six deep-water ports and 13 airfields, and has been increasing the presence of ground forces in the Arctic” (EP, 2017). Additionally, the Parliament “stresses China’s growing interest in the Arctic region, especially as regards access to shipping routes and the availability of energy resources” (EP, 2017).

To sum up, the background section dealt with Greenland’s road to Self-Governance, its status as an OCT and its agreements directly with the EU and the development of a comprehensive EU policy towards the Arctic. Furthermore, the major communications, conclusions and resolutions concerning an EU Arctic Policy have been presented. Based on these documents, it becomes evident that the EU Arctic Policy is a joint product of several EU institutions, including the EEAS, the EC, the EP, the HR and the Council. Thus, to grasp the complexity of the Arctic Policy, it is necessary to refer to a wide range of institutions and their products (Senior Expert for the EEAS, personal communication, May 9, 2019). Moreover, the various documents described above show that certain issues appear continuously on the EU’s agenda, which is why the forthcoming analysis will focus on Arctic resources, climate change, geographic significance. Additionally, the analysis will deal with the potential independence of Greenland and the consequences thereof.
5. Analysis

The forthcoming analysis will be based on a two-fold approach, where we focus on the issue areas of Arctic resources, climate change, geographic significance and the potential independence of Greenland, combined with a comparison of the Arctic Policy to the ENP. The reason why we focus on these first three areas is their prominence in the EU Arctic Policy and the last one, as a potential independence referendum might have consequences in regards to the EU Arctic Policy. The main findings will be discussed in the discussion section, where we contribute with our understanding of how realism and complex interdependence complement each other. The analysis will be conducted with the focus of answering our problem formulation that is: **Why has the EU become involved in the Arctic and especially in Greenland? And what strategy does the EU pursue?**

5.1. Realism

5.1.1. Arctic Resources

Based on the US Geological Survey of 2008, the issue of Arctic resources has increasingly found its way onto the agenda of the EU Arctic Policy. As a result of climate change, the perspective of extracting rare earths and raw materials from the once frozen areas of the Arctic has led many scholars to define this as the ‘race’ for the Arctic resources (Bailes, 2010, pp. 220-221; Cavalieri et al., 2010 p. 39; Raspotnik, 2011; Łuszczuk et al., 2014 p. 82; Heininen, 2011, p. 91). Realism can indeed explain the increased role of the potential resources, as realists deal with the idea of relative gains, rather than absolute gains. In a zero-sum game, there can only be one absolute beneficiary of the available resources. Therefore, the EU has increasingly put the potential of these resources on the agenda of the Arctic Policy. As highlighted in the Joint Communication from the HR and the EC of 2008 the “increased accessibility of the (...) resources (...) is changing the geostrategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests” (EC & HR, 2008, p. 8). The consequences highlighted by the EU are explicable through realism because the potential for resource exploitation combined with the Asian thirst for Arctic hydrocarbon resources open up for new geopolitical discussions, as realists presume that Arctic resources will attract competition, which translates to a destabilization of the balance of power. The potential of Asian States being able to extract resources from the Arctic also leads to the idea...
that resource exploitation could potentially become a shipping enhancer, which would mean more Asian/Russian presence in the European Arctic (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 147). This presents itself as an explicit security concern of the EU and therefore realism can indeed explain why the EU is interested in the question of potential Arctic resources. The perceived threat of Asian States’, in particular China’s, interest in Arctic resources, which is facilitated by the opening of sea routes adds to the uncertainty of the state and underlines the state of anarchy due to which states are in constant competition with one another for power and security. Both the EU and Asian actors, alongside other actors, have a demand for these resources and therefore the debate about Arctic resources can be identified as high politics within the scope of realism, as it has direct bearing for the survival of the state. In the Arctic Policy, it is stated that Arctic hydrocarbons and raw materials could enhance the EU’s security of supply (EC, 2008, p. 6), and therefore, along the lines of realism, one would presume this would happen through military power and economic coercion. However, when the Arctic Policy set out the notion of ‘contributing to enhanced multilateral governance’ it was received by some of the Arctic States as the EU assuming the position of an aggressive outsider wanting to enter the Arctic stage, which resulted in the EU to reiterate its discursive approach. This leads the EU to rely on matters of economic and political cooperation to serve the ultimate goal of securing its homeland and its northern neighborhood. The continuation of hard power would presumably drive the Arctic States and thereby their resources to other actors, potential Asian States, which would only destabilize the EU even further, which contradicts the ultimate goal of realism, namely ensuring survivability. This suggests that the EU solves high politics through low politics. Therefore, realism struggles to explain cooperation as a probable case of ensuring survivability, as they tend to stress self-help (however with some exceptions that see cooperation as a final possibility). Since the EU still maintains great influence over the Arctic it seems, in this case, that the goal defeats the methods to achieve the goal, meaning the rationale of the outcome surpassed the methods applied to achieve the beneficial outcome. Due to the phenomenon known as the security dilemma, especially China’s attempt to promote its own security by engaging in the Arctic, based on China’s White Paper on Arctic Policy 3, leads to increased insecurity of the EU where the EU, in turn, tries to optimize its own security, which evidently leads to what realists identify as the eternal struggle for power. From an external perspective, the Arctic Policy was supposed to “open new cooperation with the Arctic states” to decrease the region’s perceived instability and thereby increasing the EU’s own

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3 See The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China
security (2008, p. 12). This statement by the EC in particular underlines the realist nature of the Arctic Policy, namely to ensure the stability of the Arctic, which in turn secures the Union. This shows how the EU acts as a self-helping actor, relying on its material capabilities to ensure survival. However, the EU is limited in its potential of hard power politics because of the Ilulissat Declaration, which the Arctic 5 signed in 2008 where one of the main goals was to ‘block’ new regimes to govern the Arctic (Centre for International Law, 2008). Additionally, UNCLOS protects the sovereignty of coastal states. However, strong states (although the EU is a constellation of states their shared power is undeniable) might override the principle of non-intervention for the benefit of national security. However, as hard power is presumably self-defeating, in this specific case, the EU seeks to maintain the status quo, which is ensured through material rather than military capabilities. What might trigger military force is if other strong states, such as China or Russia, seek to interrupt the status quo to enhance their own capabilities. Nonetheless, as the Arctic remains a somewhat peaceful region, this is unlikely, as it might drive the Arctic states towards cooperation or even alliances with other partners, to ensure their overall security. It must nevertheless be mentioned that the instability of the Arctic has been steadily increasing in recent years due to the China-Russia Joint Declaration on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership and China’s White Paper on Arctic Policy (Chakrabarti, 2019, p. 101). We have yet to see exclusive military capabilities in the Arctic, but following the theory of realism we will potentially see a build-up of such in the future. Additionally, if it should occur that another strong actor utilizes military capabilities, it would in realist eyes trigger similar reactions within the EU, in order to ensure survivability, which could mean the reintroduction of military bases on Greenland and other European Arctic states. In Antunes and Camisao’s (2017) words; “[f]or realists, the highest goal is the survival of the state, which explains why states’ actions are judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral principles” (p. 21). This provides evidence for the inability of realism to understand why there is a lack of military build-up in the Arctic. What is evident is that the EU still succeeds in ensuring security, however through means which realism is struggling to understand. At most, it can be seen as a case of utilization of economic capabilities, as straight out military power in the Arctic might lead to self-defeating policies. Nonetheless, cooperation in realism is not seen as a viable solution.

As analyzed so far, it is clear that realism is able to explain why the Arctic resources present themselves as a geopolitical issue, as both the EU and other actors are dependent on the exploitation of the Arctic resources. The case of Arctic resources aligns well with the realist
notion about the competition for power and material capabilities. So far, however, we have exclusively analyzed from a standpoint where the resources are easily accessible, whereas in reality the extraction of the presumed resources can be a costly business (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 178), and in fact prove itself to defeat the purpose of extraction and thus only be a viable option for the future. Although easy accessibility of resources would have made the exploitation more attractive, it does not change much in respect to the zero-sum game, as it is concerned about the control of the resources. In the realist sense, if the EU disregards the possibility of enhancing its material capabilities by engaging in Arctic resources, it succumbs to the losing side in a zero-sum game, as other actors are likely to engage, although the potential for extraction is fairly low, at the time of writing. Following realism, it is because the control over the resources still adds to the power of the entity in control and especially in regards to relative gains. Adding to the necessity of control is the debate on the uncertainty of what other actors might do. Therefore, in order to ensure the status quo, realists would presumably argue for the continuation of control as anything else would have negative influence on the prospects of survivability.

Greenland has in particular received attention in the EU Arctic Policy and with good reason, as Greenland has an important geostrategic location (as analyzed in section 5.1.3). Not least due to its expected 11% share of hydrocarbon resources along with multiple raw materials and fisheries production (2016, p. 133) and because of the prospects of Greenlandic independence (analyzed in section 5.1.4). As China has been showing interest in the island’s resources, some of the EU Member States fear that China could ‘win’ the battle over Greenland’s resources, which would intensify the global shift towards China. This evidently portrays security concerns for the EU and therefore further cooperation with Greenland is imperative (2016, p. 253). Accordingly, the Commission and Greenland signed a Letter of Intent on the Cooperation on Mineral Resources in June 2012 (EC, 2012). Greenland’s potential resources are vast, but it is evident that the prospect of hydrocarbon resources (50 billion barrels oil and gas, which translates to 11% (Eritja, 2017, p. 82)) and raw materials (over 9% of the global REE resources (EC, 2012)) (especially due to the existence of uranium in the Greenlandic soil) bear the most geopolitical significance, whereas fisheries play a smaller role. Therefore, realism struggles to explain the importance of fisheries as the fishing industry has not gained broader international awareness (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 152). Furthermore, it does not arouse much emphasis in realist terms due to the inability to exploit fisheries to enhance military capabilities, and to some extent material capabilities, which is
why we do not go further into detail with this issue here. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the EU has a clear demand for fisheries, but as fisheries does not directly translate into power, realism does not concern itself much with the importance of fisheries.

As we have concluded multiple times now, military capabilities play a smaller role in Arctic governance, which does not add up to how realists define foreign policy. However, realists do not exclusively focus on military capabilities, they also highlight material capabilities i.e. money, because money talks. Hence, the geopolitical concern connected to Arctic resources is largely based on the ability of building financial power, which in turn increases the overall power of the entity in control. As raw materials and rare earths play a huge role in the present and future development of the EU, it is necessary for the EU to acquire control over these resources to build material power, which in turn ensures survivability. This leads the EU to rely on other means than traditional power politics, as these have continuously proven to be self-defeating. This therefore constitutes the rationale in the cooperation with, especially, the European Arctic and in particular Greenland. Jari Vilen, Senior Advisor in Arctic Policy matters in the European Political Strategy Centre, argues that these resources are considered strategic for the continued development of the European industry, as it is expected that there will be a shortage of these materials, in the future. This highlights the security concerns connected to these resources, as other states need these as well and in the continuing competition over power the Arctic resources are increasingly playing a larger role. Greenland is especially important in this regard, as the island holds many of these materials (Breum, 2019). Realists therefore stress that the future will only bring more instability to the Arctic and increasing competition over these resources, as lack of the resources translates into stagnation of development, which ultimately means decreasing power that leads to limitations of security. Realists, however, might struggle to understand why the EU asserts many of their material capabilities to Arctic development and research, to Greenland alone it is over 217 million EUR, as these states might shift alliance and as a result the EU contribution will be a self-defeating cause, as it will rather benefit the new alliance and put the EU in a worse condition and even lessen its material power. However, our argument is that the material capabilities set aside to Arctic development only constitute a small amount of the overall EU material capabilities, as the EU’s GDP was assessed to 17.3 trillion US dollars in 2017 (World Bank, n.d.) and the perceived benefit of ensuring these materials will benefit the Union in the long run, both through material capabilities and in terms of its position in the balance of power system. It is evident that for the EU to benefit in the long run, it needs to maintain control over,
at least, the European Arctic. This provides argument as to why the Arctic Policy has increasingly focused on strengthening the cooperation with the Arctic states and especially the consolidation of its bilateral agreements with, in particular, regards to Greenland. The three overall goals of the 2016 Joint Communication can thus in realist terms be identified to be explicit soft solutions that serve the overall goal of ensuring the implicit hard problems, as increased cooperation serves the rationale of keeping the Arctic closer to the EU, rather than China. The soft power measures are also received positively by the Arctic states, as their benefits are explicitly portrayed and result in the legitimacy of the EU presence in the Arctic which benefits the overall power of the EU. Therefore, the realist argument is that through the utilization of material power the Union succeeds in ensuring external and internal security and survivability. However, what adds to the destabilization of the status quo is definitely China’s White Paper on Arctic Policy, as it can be identified to serve the same implicit purpose of the EU Arctic Policy, although not as ambitious, and as a response the Union calls for a new policy paper, which can be identified, along the lines of realism, as a response to the increasing instability of the Arctic (Breum, 2019).

Through the analysis of Arctic resources it is clear that realism can indeed explain why the EU is interested in the Arctic and why the EU adopted this specific Arctic Policy and in particular in regards to Greenland, as Greenland is an attractive part of the world, which highlights the geopolitical implications, connected to it (Appendix II). However, it has to be acknowledged that the pursuit of power and security by the EU does seem to follow a somewhat complex road, in regards to how realism normally would regard maximization of power and security. What remains unclear to realists is why the EU engages in transnational and transgovernmental cooperation on Arctic matters and especially why it engages in dialogue and trade agreements with its perceived ‘enemies’, as in realist terms they only seek to destabilize the European power. Looking at the case of the Chinese interest in Arctic resources, the realist school struggles to explain why the EU took no more aggressive steps towards protecting its interest, both economically in regards to the association with Greenland, but also security wise by promoting military measures.

5.1.2. Climate Change

As this section exclusively focuses on the effects of climate change the spillover areas are regarded in their respective sections.
Realism focuses on the limitations of politics as a result of the egoism of men and the lack of an international government and therefore there is the need for importance in power politics and security (Donnelly, 2009, pp. 31-32). The initial cause of the Arctic Policy was seen in the light of global warming and the state of the Arctic. As realists tend to focus on ‘high’ politics, the focus here is not on how to mitigate climate change but rather what opportunities and risks it presents. This is clear in the Solana report, as the focus was on the changes of geostrategic importance, trade routes and access to new resources. However, over the years we have seen a decreasing importance of geopolitical concerns in the Commission’s and the Council’s communications on the Arctic, whereas the Parliament remains the singular institution that explicitly focuses on these. The rationale is not that the EU focuses less on security matters, but rather that to ensure cooperation and survival it must find soft solutions to hard problems. The cooperation between the Arctic States, particularly Greenland, and the EU seems to adhere to the realist sense of cooperation, as it is based on mutual survival and environmental security matters and does not include a pooling of sovereignty, though still not seen as a viable option. Through the cooperation the EU manages to extend its zone of prosperity, which serves to enhance European security. Therefore, in the case of combating climate change, realism emphasizes upholding the survivability and security. In order to explain the EU’s vast engagement in combating climate change through the framework of realism one has to think of this as a security matter. As the melting of the ice will ultimately have direct consequences for the low lying areas of the EU, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, as sea levels will rise, it will mean a decrease in territorial control and thus a limitation of power. This is not acceptable in realist thought, as this compromises the core idea of survival of the state, and therefore this presents why the EU Arctic Policy puts much emphasis on mitigating climate change. However, realism is incapable of explaining why the EU focuses on protecting indigenous peoples as well and to why the EU engages in transgovernmental and transnational cooperation to mitigate climate change, as it is more concerned with geopolitical implications caused by climate change, rather than with climate change as an issue in itself (Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011, p. 852). This might also be due to the perception that pooling efforts to mitigate climate change might have consequences for national interests. Therefore, climate change, in realist terms, is perceived as a threat multiplier, which intensifies the existing conditions in terms of Arctic security and enhances the risks of possible security concerns. This can be identified as something that directly had an influence on the EU’s interests in the Arctic, as a periphery that has a somewhat peaceful history all of a sudden opens up for new possible power disputes, as a result of climate change.
(Raspotnik, 2016, p. 200). Nonetheless, realism is still incapable of explaining the global response and the multilateral governance connected to the EU’s wish to engage with multiple actors and institutions to find solutions on climate change, as it goes beyond the principles of self-help and statism. Moreover, realism seems unfit to explain the extensive funding the EU has provided to Arctic research and development. Since states exist in a constant state of anarchy it does not make sense to “hand over” its material capabilities to other countries, as this compromises states’ own survivability, unless it could ensure power projection in return. The argument, in realist sense, is therefore that unless the EU directly benefits from aiding the Arctic periphery to develop it does not make sense to attribute funding to the region. As climate change is an existential crisis for small island states, like Greenland, the EU will lose access to the island’s resources, if it does not aim to mitigate climate change. Therefore, the prospects of relative gains might be an argument to why the EU aids in combating climate change. We assume this discussion has been highlighted in plenary discussions, as realism stresses that states are rational actors. The rationale behind the funding given to the Arctic can also be found in Rose’s (1998) idea that neo-classical realists “assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment,” (p. 152). Given the fact that the EU is uncertain about what the geopolitical changes caused by climate change might bring, it makes sense to assume some control, to ensure its security and survivability in the long term of which the EU funding can be seen as the legitimizing attribute of asserting European presence in the Arctic. Therefore, if the EU assumed a position of traditional military power capabilities, it would rather drive away or even push the states it tries to influence in the other direction, with which the Union would be even worse off. Thus, in this time of uncertainty of what might happen to the Arctic, it makes sense to find soft solutions to hard problems, and as a result ensure the survivability of the Union, although this is in contrast to how realists think (Haftendorn, 2010, p. 811).

In conclusion, realism is able to explain why climate change presents itself as an issue but instead of focusing on the environmental issue it poses it focuses on the geopolitical opportunities and risks caused by climate change. Therefore, to some extent realism can explain why the EU focuses on mitigating climate change, as it poses a risk for the EU, in terms of decreasing territorial areas due to rising sea levels. What realism is incapable to explain is why climate change is being prioritized similarly to matters of security and high politics. Furthermore, realism struggles to find evidence, as to why mitigation of climate change stresses the need for transgovernmental and transnational cooperation, as this far
surpasses the realm of inter-state negotiations. This links with the inability of realism to give credit to international institutions such as the UNFCCC and international agreements such as the Paris Agreement. Lastly, realism also struggles to understand the international cooperative effort to mitigate climate change.

### 5.1.3. Geographic Significance

In realist thought, as climate change is changing the dynamics of the geopolitics it is safe to say that the Arctic region’s most important resource, in respect to the EU, is its geographic position. The melting sea ice brings with it the opening of new sea routes that allow shorter maritime routes that increasingly connect the world. This creates implications for the overall security of the EU, as Russian, American and Chinese vessels have facilitated access to the Arctic waters and have all shown an interest in the resources that exist in the Arctic. The NEP, NWP and the TSR present facilitated access in prior inaccessible waters; this is cause to concern for the EU. In realist terms, the Russian flag planting episode in 2007 is a case of Russia projecting sovereignty over unclaimed land, which creates great security concerns for the EU, as Russia could build up military and material capabilities in the backyard of the EU. Realism can explain why this was one of the external factors that led to an EU engagement in the Arctic, as it requires a certain response to dismiss the potential threat of increased Russian influence in the backyard of the EU. Realists would however argue that it would require military build-up to ensure security, especially Russia already has a strong military presence in the Arctic, as portrayed in section 4.3.8. This we have seen not to be the case. Rather, the EU has engaged in close cooperation with the Arctic states and established some kind of trade relations with the European Arctic, particularly Greenland, through the FPA, the PA and its special position among the OCTs. Based on our justification we see this relationship as inter-state bargaining where the EU projects material power through the partnership, which serves to enhance security of the periphery of the EU and thereby the EU’s security. The EU’s engagement in the Arctic is by all means a geopolitical discourse set forth alongside the Union’s core values. The Arctic Policy primarily emphasizes the development of a sustainable Arctic and to ensure a peaceful region, in times where geopolitics increasingly find its way onto the EU agenda. However, the EU ensures stability and democracy through political and economic cooperation, which can be seen as an instance of the EU utilizing financial power to ensure the solution to the hard problems, rather than through the ‘traditional’ idea of military presence or projection of relative power (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 48). This enhances the speculation that realism can indeed highlight and identify the underlying geopolitical
discourses and the need for securitization but evidently lacks clear cut tools of explaining the process taken by the EU to ensure the Arctic remains a peaceful area in the backland of the EU. The EU engagement in the Arctic, in realist terms, is an attempt to keep the region close to the Union’s influence and keeping outside influence out. The EU Arctic Policy is strictly set forth by the institutions of the EU and therefore the entity can act as one collective actor, as highlighted in section 2.5. Acting as a collective actor is, according to defensive neo-realism, caused by the ‘condition of anarchy’, as states band together to maximize their own security. This balance of power presumes that states will act rationally in order to maximize their power and thus, come together in alliances of convenience (Donnelly, 2009, pp. 31-32). While this is not in particular a traditional alliance, it is an alliance of mutual needs, as the European Arctic benefits from economic funding and the EU benefits from the Arctic presence and control, which allows for the build-up of material capabilities. Furthermore, as portrayed in section 5.1.1, the EU demands the resources coming from the Arctic and by engaging in cooperation rather than building up military capabilities the Union seems to succeed in two areas. The EU ensures Arctic resources, which improves their position in the zero-sum game and dramatically increases its presence in the Arctic. Additionally, the EU succeeds at keeping unwanted influence out. What seems complex in the EU Arctic Policy is that external factors are identified as the first steps towards establishing an EU Arctic Policy. However, the issues that are defined as ‘high politics’ by realists are not necessarily addressed through hard power measures, as preferred by realists, but rather through soft power measures. This links with the claim that the EU reaches its goals through an interplay of hard power and soft power, which is why realism struggles to account for the way in which the EU implements its Arctic Policy. The best explanation put forth by realism is the idea of utilization of material capabilities to ensure security of the northern neighborhood and, consequently, the EU. The cooperation that the EU engages in with the Arctic states is seen viable by realists. However, they tend to think of cooperation as means that do not last in the long term. One reason to why the EU does not engage in traditional means of military power but rather relies on other means of power projection is because the EU’s military power is derived from its Member States and since Greenland, for example, is still under Danish sovereignty and Denmark being a Member State means the EU exercises power through its Member State. Moreover, Greenland and the EU are closely associated and through the association the Union acts out power as well. Realists think of power as “the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do” (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014, p. 107). By engaging in cooperation with multiple Arctic states the EU succeeds in multiple areas, as it ensures relative gains and fends off possible alterations of
power by other actors, such as the US, Russia and China. This is made possible because of the EU’s relational power, as it is able to influence the Arctic through cooperation and projection of material power. In respect to Greenland, the EU continually consolidates the various agreements of which it successfully enhances EU presence and influence over the territory. Therefore, the EU realizes its implicit goal of securing the Arctic through other explicit means that are based on liberal values, as portrayed in section 4.2.3, by focusing on climate change and sustainable development. As highlighted in the Solana report, the explicit measures undertaken were to ensure the implicit need of securitization, which supports the realist notion of the survival of the state. Arguably, Russia’s aggressive stand in the North Pole has ultimately been a factor in the establishment of a cooperative High North, as traditional means of military power could have been too costly. Thus, realism can indeed explain why external factors and alterations of geopolitical power resulted in a response of the EU. What realism, in particular, struggles to understand is why the response is mainly based on cooperation and material power projection, rather than military power projection. One reason for this might be that the Arctic region is not a single state but rather a collection of states. Putting realism into the framework of this thesis therefore exempt it from being able to explain interstate bargaining, as in fact bargaining, in this case is based on the grand perspective of the Circumpolar Arctic, and this is done through transnational and transgovernmental cooperation.

In the EU Arctic Policy, we have seen a decrease in explicit geopolitical concerns, although the geopolitical concerns are not as explicit as they have been in previous Communications on Arctic Policy, they are still very much present. This is however likely to change as the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, personally addressed the geopolitical implications caused by climate change this year, and therefore calls for a Policy Paper on the EU’s Arctic priorities (Breum, 2019). This is based on concerns of increased Russian and Chinese interest, and especially Chinese interest, as China adopted its “White Paper” on their Arctic Policy in 2018. China’s Arctic Policy is strikingly similar to the EU’s (The State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2018) and this increasingly creates security concerns and, from a European perspective, unwanted competition on Arctic resources. China’s role has increasingly become a matter of concern, as the retreating sea ice allows for an ‘Arctic highway’, through the Arctic Ocean, facilitating China’s access. From a realist standpoint the increased Chinese interest and accessibility adds to the instability of the Arctic region and further enhances the state of anarchy. Not only does this intensify the race

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for Arctic resources, as described in the sections above, but also for the Union’s influence in the Arctic, as realists would presume China to exert power through military and material build-up in the Arctic. Therefore, realism can explain why the EU calls for a new policy paper, as to ensure security maximization. Although it is still unsure what the new policy paper might say, it is safe to say that, in realist terms, it might serve to enhance cooperation between the EU and the Arctic and possibly the build-up of material capabilities to ward off China, i.e. to maintain the EU’s power projection over the Arctic and thereby maintain the status quo of the balance of power. Accordingly, the EU attained an external security dimension, cf. the ENP, where the areas outside the Union are seen as unstable and this adds to threats for the EU’s internal stability. Therefore, the EU projects power on areas beyond the Union’s boundaries, in this case the Arctic (Germond, 2013, p. 81). As previously mentioned, the projection of European power happens through political and economic cooperation that serves the purpose of ensuring continued European influence. Realism can therefore provide argument as to why the control of areas bordering up to the Union is vital for the European security and survivability. Through the eyes of realism, it is likely that we will see an increased role of Greenland in the coming years due to Greenland’s presumed abundance of Arctic resources, as described earlier, and because of its geographic position. A forthcoming ‘battle’ over Greenland seems plausible in realist terms, as in the game of zero-sum, there can only be one winner. The traditional forms of military build-up and traditional ‘hard’ power politics seem implausible, at the time of writing, in the case of Arctic governance, as the geopolitical discourse needs a certain legitimacy to have any real relevance. Therefore, the EU’s security is bound upon maintaining political and economic cooperation. Accordingly, the increasing instability of the Arctic as a result of increased interest from China and Russia might in the future lead to military conflicts, through the eyes of realism. Borgerson (2009) argues that questions on the future of the Arctic are yet to be determined, whether it will become a “Hobbesian free-for-all” or a region defined by international rule of law. This is not to say that the EU cannot project external power through cooperation, but rather that military power politics might in fact prove to have an opposite effect and ultimately turn the areas of which it seeks to incorporate into another direction and put bluntly “into the arms of China”. The projection of European power happens through the incorporation of the EU’s core values, as a basis of cooperation. Similar to the ENP, the EU ‘forces’ cooperation to be based on its core value of democracy. This is even highlighted in the OAD, which includes Greenland and serves to bind Greenland closer to the Union (Council of the European Union, 2013, Art. 1). Realism can explain how the EU projects power, through its financial means because the beneficiary of these financial means
has to incorporate the EU’s core values and thereby the EU achieves the goal of securing its backland. The EU’s relative power is thus bound upon its cooperation with the Arctic states to ensure a sense of inclusion that will maintain European influence and ultimately control (Germond, 2013, p. 81; Scott, 2012, pp. 89–90). The EU Arctic Policy bears resemblance to the ENP, in that the main objective remains to ensure external security in areas close to the borders of the EU and thereby ensuring internal security. However, this is further discussed in section 5.1.4. The main objective in the Arctic Policy is implied to ensure European presence in the Arctic which is seen as material power projection by realists. Nonetheless, pure material power projection in realist terms would be based on measures of hard power politics, such as coercion, whereas in this case it is more a matter of material power projection through soft power means of attraction. This is in fact due to the need to legitimize the EU’s presence in the Arctic, as traditional hard power politics might yield unsatisfactory results and even self-defeating policies. This might be a vague explanation as to why the EU seeks cooperation, as state survival is emphasized as the most important factor. One last attempt to explain why the EU emphasizes cooperation to ensure its security in the changing geopolitical context of the Arctic can be found in Waltz’s balance of power theory, which assumes that states act rationally, seek self-preservation, and at maximum universal domination in a self-help system. States build economic capital and military measures and develop smart strategies. The key word is smart strategies, as the Union relies on soft power measures of attraction of the inner market and projection of its core values to engage in cooperation based on mutual benefit with the Arctic states and in particular Greenland. The argument here is that through the use of smart strategies the EU relies on soft power to ensure the ‘high’ politics. While it is important to argue that realism is incapable of explaining why the EU does not utilize hard power as a method to ensure survivability, to some extent it can explain why cooperation is a plausible way to do so. A supporting argument is the fact that the Arctic states acknowledge and to a certain degree have signed UNCLOS (with the exception of the US), which underlines what areas belong under the sovereignty of the Arctic states. Realism presumes this will lead to instability, as strong states will tend to ignore the legislation to achieve a higher degree of power, but as we identified the Arctic as an area of multipolar balance of power system, hard power politics as these could serve the opposite result. Furthermore, because realists stress that states are rational actors, traditional military acts might be too costly within the multipolar balance of power system of the Arctic.
The extension of the EEZ also bears security issues, due to increased sovereign area translates into larger proportions of resources available and therefore a higher degree of relative gains. Therefore, realism can explain why the EU seeks to maintain UNCLOS because for the time being the EU has access to multiple EEZs and therefore stands to make the highest degree of relative gains, which improves the Union’s position in the zero-sum game. However, this situation might be subject to change. This once again portrays how realism can in fact explain the geopolitical implications caused by the opening of new sea routes and the importance of particularly Greenland’s geographic position, but still comes short in explaining why the pursuit of power and security does not follow traditional ways. One way realism can see why the EU wishes to maintain the status quo is because the Arctic is currently a conflict free region which the EU benefits from. Therefore, by maintaining the status quo, the EU achieves a high degree of security. Following this thought it also makes sense, through realism, as to why the EU wishes to implement yet another policy paper on Arctic governance, as China has become a larger proponent in Arctic relations, which destabilizes the EU’s security.

Realism can indeed explain why climate change brings new geopolitical concerns to the EU, as the opening of the NEP, NWP and TSR allows facilitated access to the Arctic region, allowing Russia and China easier access to the backland of the EU. This underlines how realism can identify the Russian flag planting to be an external event that was one of the main reasons to why the EU engaged in the Arctic to ensure the stability of the region. Realism can also explain why the EU is particularly vulnerable to geopolitical changes in the Arctic due to the Union’s proximity to the Arctic region. As we have argued in this section, realism explains why the EU focuses on material build-up and cooperation rather than military measures, as we perceive the EU to value the status quo rather than trying to expand its influence even further, as expansion, through hard power, can in fact prove to have self-defeating consequences. What realism, in turn, struggles to explain is why the EU does/did not assume a more aggressive approach to Arctic governance, as realists would presume an adequate response to the aggressive approach adopted by the Russian/Chinese partnership to be similarly aggressive. Furthermore, realism struggles to explain what we identify to be soft power measures adopted by the EU to engage in Arctic governance, as realism does not emphasize the importance of low politics.

5.1.4. Greenland’s Independence and EU Neighborhood Policy
The ENP explicitly states that the rationale of it is to ensure stability and security which benefits both the states in question and the EU. By realists, the overall idea of the ENP is to
ensure the EU’s security. We see the same rationale to be applicable in the context of the Arctic Policy, although its explicit geopolitical references have been watered down over the recent years, yet the overall goal to ensure stability in the region is still very much present. Although the EU focuses on the circumpolar Arctic in its Arctic Policy, it is arguably Greenland that is set to have most significance in the coming years, as the autonomous island is allowed to declare independence by virtue of the AGSG. The question of Greenlandic independence therefore opens up for new geopolitical discussions, as what stops Greenland following the overall trend of world order shifting towards Chinese emphasis, as portrayed in the figure below, which shows the presumed evolution of the economic center of gravity.

![Map of the world with economic center of gravity evolution](image)

(The Economist, 2012)

The uncertainty of what the future brings for Greenland and the EU is indeed what promotes this geopolitical insecurity, as a potential shift of alliance would dramatically destabilize the northern neighborhood of the EU, which hence will have negative effects for the EU. Therefore, in realist terms, it requires preemptive action, as to ensure that a potential destabilization will never occur. Similarly to the ENP, the Arctic Policy can be defined as the Union’s attempt to establish a “macro region of stability and prosperity, informed by common goals and values and hence coherent in its response to security challenges” (Scott, 2011, p. 147). In the sense of realism, the attempt to widen the sphere of European influence up north is seen as projecting power externally that serves to maximize the EU’s relative power as well as its overall security. Though, realists would presume this would be done through military build-up, as a response to the perceived Chinese aggression in trying to procure an abandoned naval
base in Greenland, trying to invest in infrastructure projects, trying to utilize diplomatic power to assert trade relations, and sending hundreds of Chinese workers to Greenland on “holiday” (Chakrabarti, 2019, p. 101 & 103; Head of the Representation of Greenland to the EU, personal communication, December 5, 2018). However, the EU has instead continuously consolidated its association with Greenland through the FPA, the PA and its position as an OCT, which in realist sense can be seen to serve the purpose of ensuring stability in the region and thereby the security of the EU. It is however important to point out the way in which the EU realizes this. It is here that the resemblance between the ENP and Greenland’s various association agreements is most strong. As with the ENP, the EU offers privileged partnerships, as it has with Greenland, based on common values, which aims at developing its ‘partners’. The partnerships are however based on the conditionality that the recipients adopt EU norms and this is a “de-facto sine qua non” (Scott, 2011, p. 147). Therefore, realism can explain how the EU utilizes its material capabilities to persuade Greenland to adopt European values, noted that some were introduced years before due to Danish influence (Appendix I), and the argument is therefore that the adoption of European values in Greenland ensures EU security. The rationale behind the utilization of material capabilities is the attempt to make Greenland feeling a sense of belonging towards the EU, which in theory should drive the island closer to the EU. The Arctic Policy and the ENP also have the similarity of being instruments to extend the European zone of prosperity, which realists see as a way of maintaining control over its external borders. What seems striking, through realism, is that the EU does not utilize military capabilities, when Russia is the largest Arctic country and has navy vessels in such capacities that it is troubling for other countries. In the purest form of realism, this certainly portrays a paradoxical approach adopted by the EU. However, when assuming a more pragmatic standpoint, the outright aggressive approaches adopted by both China and Russia is what actually makes the EU succeed in its utilization of material capabilities, as the benevolence of the EU makes the other Arctic states move closer to the Union. This is explainable through neo-realism, as the condition of anarchy drives weaker states to go into alliances of convenience and because most of the European Arctic shares the same values. Thus, it makes sense to ensure security by engaging in closer partnerships with the Union (Donnelly, 2009, pp. 31-32). A supporting factor is that Norway perceives the Russian threat as key in its defense policy regardless the fact that the two cooperate in maritime matters (Pasko, Staurskaya, Gryaznov, & Zakharchenko, 2019, p. 14). This leads back to the previous sections in which we identify military power to present itself as self-defeating policy in the Arctic. The instability of the Arctic has only increased in the recent years, first by the Russian annexation
of Crimea, then by the 2017 China-Russia Joint Declaration on Further Strengthening Comprehensive, Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, followed by the 2018 Chinese White Paper on Arctic Policy (Chakrabarti, 2019, p. 101). Through the eyes of realism, Russia and China are certainly building up their material capabilities to counter the European presence in the Arctic and therefore, as part of the security dilemma, the EU tries to strengthen its ties to the European Arctic, as to build-up its own material capabilities to counter the Russian and Chinese build-up. This is certainly a case of the never ending competition of power where both sides try to optimize their power to ensure their survivability. Therefore, Greenland bears vast significance in this regard, as the prospects of independence could potentially have dramatic effects for the EU, if the island should choose to “change sides”. Thus, in realist sense, it would be imprudent to treat Greenland harshly, but rather ensure continued European control through mutual beneficial cooperation, which serves to make Greenland an area for EU action. In this regard, the EU’s geopolitical discourse is bound upon its material power to guarantee European security and this therefore limits the EU’s external power projection (Germond, 2013, p. 81). Jones (2011) defined the ENP to be a construct consisting of symbolical, territorial and institutional space that allows the EU to extend its power and to deal with challenges exceeding its own territorial area (p. 42). Although Jones identified this to be the case with the ENP, we see a similar approach in the Arctic Policy. In the realist sense, this means the EU is able to securitize areas in its closest proximity, which evidently strengthens the EU’s security dimension. However, we found no hardcore evidence to back our claim that Greenland might change sides in the case of an independence referendum and therefore the argument is purely speculative. Nonetheless, the above debate might become relevant if Greenland is to change sides. Although, this seems unlikely, as in the case of independence a representative of Greenland suggests that the island will continue cooperation with the Western world as well as: “Greenland would become a member of NATO and have various alliances that would aid Greenland making decisions on areas that have relevance for foreign and security balances” (Appendix I). This suggests that the EU’s ‘carrot on a stick’ approach has been successful, as it seems that Greenland, at this point of time, will maintain under the Western influence and thus cooperate with the EU on matters of security.

Realism can indeed explain the perceived instability of the Arctic region as well as the seemingly multipolar balance of power system of which the EU and the China/Russia conflict is seen as the most prominent, as both sides are building up its material capabilities (Pasko et al., 2019, p. 15). The US, however, is seen as a rather reluctant actor in Arctic matters after the
Cold War (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 98). Through realism, it is therefore possible to highlight the importance of Greenland in the case of a potential independence referendum, as if the island changes sides it will have dramatic security consequences for the EU. This is due to Greenland’s geographic location and its proximity to the EU as well as the financial means the EU has attributed to Greenland over the years will rather serve to benefit Russia/China instead. However, realism struggles to explain why any actors have yet to assume external power projection through military measures. Moreover, Realism presents an argument as to why security is ensured through financial means of economic and political cooperation with the European Arctic other than the imprudence and apparent self-defeating policies of military measures. This is most likely connected to the idea that states are rational actors and the costs of military measures would be of larger consequences than benefits. Therefore, the battle over the Arctic is characterized by state competition, based on economic capabilities rather than military ones. Furthermore, the argument that the European Arctic states will go into alliances of convenience to ensure their survivability is rather questionable, as this would potentially mean a limitation of their sovereignty, which seems unlikely in realist terms. Additionally, the idea that Russia and China will assert to military power to exert power over the Arctic is rather slim, as this would trigger international response, as it would not only have implications for the EU but also the US and Canada, due to the opening of the Arctic Ocean.
5.2. Complex Interdependence

5.2.1. Arctic Resources

As depicted in the background section, the Arctic has a great potential in terms of resources. This includes critical raw materials, petroleum, and not least fish. Greenland is of particular relevance for the EU regarding its affiliation to an EU member state, Denmark, and its current status as an OCT, which presupposes a certain degree of cooperation and interconnectedness.

Perhaps the most developed area of cooperation between Greenland and the EU concerns the fishing industry. According to Salmon (2018), Greenland exports 81.8% of their total exports to EU member states, while most of it consists of fish (pp. 39-42). This suggests both that Greenland relies heavily on the European market, but at the same time the EU receives a great amount of fish from Greenland. This highlights the symmetrical interdependence in terms of fisheries, which is underlined by an interviewee’s comment:

*If the EU wishes to do something they do not have the legal jurisdiction to make Greenland do it. Naturally, there is the partnership agreement and the fisheries partnership agreement and the money connected to these that might have some control over Greenland, but if the EU withdraws its financial contribution through the partnership agreement, then Greenland will withdraw its fishing quotas to the EU.*

(Appendix I)

Looking at the FPA through the lens of complex interdependence, it becomes evident that certain policy instruments are at play. According to the theory, “power resources specific to issue areas will be most relevant” (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 31). Thus, it can be argued that in the issue area of fisheries, the EU’s power resource clearly is the European Single Market. The EU can offer Greenland access to the single market which means duty free trade with EU member states. Hence, the EU is able to achieve their goals by the means of attraction rather than force. The access to the single market is attractive enough for Greenland to meet certain EU demands in turn. This definitely supports the assumption of Keohane and Nye that military power is not the most effective instrument of policy. Additionally, Nye’s concept of soft power is verified as the EU manages to achieve their goals through attraction, rather than coercion. As Nye argued, co-optive power is related to the ability of shaping what others want and is achieved through the attractiveness of one’s culture and values. The following excerpt will show how Greenland appreciates the values of the EU:
The values of the EU and the values of a partnership are good values. The EU is for peace, good food standards, good environmental standards, sustainable growth and human rights. The EU has many good values that we [Greenland] also wish to be a part of. (Appendix I)

The EU’s regulatory power, its relations with its trade partners and its influence in international processes along with its internal market appeals to developing countries to integrate with the Union (Stępień and Koivurov, 2017, p. 16).

However, while the fishing industry is a valid example for economic interdependence between Greenland and the EU, other resources are addressed in the EU Arctic Policy as well. The EU interest in Greenland’s natural resource potential becomes evident when we look at the EU Raw Materials Strategy. Based on the fact that Greenland is able to supply 6 of the 14 critical elements, the EU can be argued to be somewhat dependent on Greenland’s raw materials, which is why the sustainable exploitation of raw materials is a crucial part of the EU’s Arctic strategy. Seen through the lens of complex interdependence, the EU would be vulnerable to a potential change in its current suppliers’ policies, as this might imply the need to rely on other suppliers or the change of policy. In other words, the fact that the EU industry is strongly dependent on the import of raw materials makes the EU vulnerable, as there are no cheaper alternatives at hand. In 2018, the EU imported raw materials worth over 81 billion EUR, whereas it exported for around 51.9 billion EUR, which leaves the EU with a trade deficit of around 30.8 billion EUR, supporting the claim that the EU is dependent on the import of raw materials (Eurostat, 2019). Therefore, an adjustment would be rather costly. Thus, it might be the EU’s intention with its raw materials related policy towards Greenland to assure itself of access to sustainable supplies of raw materials, in particular to avoid such costly changes. This is seen in the EU Arctic Policy where research and the sustainable use of Arctic resources is promoted (EC & HR, 2016). This reduces the Union’s vulnerability considerably, as it faces a relative availability of affordable alternatives. Consequently, it makes sense for the EU, in the long term, to invest in Greenland and assure a sustainable development, so that Greenland’s raw material potential can be integrated in the European market. Again, the single market serves as power resource for the EU, as duty free trade of raw materials with all member states of the Union is of interest for Greenland. On the other hand, it is of the EU’s interest to rely on stable democratic countries with affiliation to Europe that support EU
values, rather than to be depending on other, more unstable countries (Stępień & Koivurova, 2017, p. 15).

Looking at the share of REEs, by 2010, Greenland supplied 4.89 million tons or 3.44% of the world’s deposits. Including the latest project figures, however, Greenland is estimated to supply 12 million tons of REEs and thus has a share of 9.16% of the global REE resources, which puts Greenland in the position of a midsize supplier along with Vietnam and the CIS countries in an REE market dominated by Brazil and China (EC, 2012). Apart from access to the single market, the EU tries to attract Greenland through the development of Greenland’s economy, which supports the claim that the EU uses soft power to achieve its goals, which is visible through the contribution of 217 million EUR to the development of the educational and social sector, as well as the contribution of 17 million EUR towards fisheries. The EC deems it important to “diversify Greenland’s economy, build stronger EU-Greenland industrial relations, contribute to Greenland’s economic development and secure sustainable supply of raw materials for the EU industry as part of the raw materials diplomacy” (2012). In the eyes of complex interdependence, this may be seen as an attempt to decrease the EU’s overall vulnerability in terms of raw materials supplies, as Greenland is a more stable partner than certain other supply countries. Thus, the cooperation between the EU and Greenland can be seen as mutually beneficial, since, in a liberal perspective, the absolute gains count over relative gains. Nonetheless, the fact that the Commission stresses the diversification of Greenland’s economy suggests that the EU is interested in Greenland becoming an even stronger trading partner in the future. A diversified economy could lead to cooperation on multiple areas which brings the two actors closer to one another and thereby increases interdependence.

Furthermore, the claim for the application of soft power politics is supported by the EC writing the following in their memo on Greenland’s raw materials potential; “the fact that Greenland voluntarily signs up to free trade principles in raw materials trade is an important step in this direction and securing sustainable supply of raw materials through dialogue is the way to follow” (2012). Especially the fact that the Commission believes in dialogue as a means to achieve the EU’s interest corroborates with Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence in which they argue for the minor role of military force. Moreover, taking a closer look at the Arctic’s potential in terms of oil and gas, a US Geological Survey evaluation of 2008 assessed that “three main basins around Greenland could hold around 50,000 million barrels of oil and gas” which makes Greenland increasingly interesting from a geological point of view (Eritja,
Greenland is expected to hold 11% of the oil and gas in the Arctic. Further 12% are estimated to be located in Norwegian territory, while the US is allocated 20% and Russia 52% of the Arctic oil and gas supplies (Pasko et al., 2019, pp. 10-11). Taking into account the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence, it can be argued that the EU is rather sensitive when it comes to changes in its oil and gas imports. Russia e.g. is still the main supplier of natural gas and petroleum oils to the EU followed by Norway (Eurostat, 2018). Thus, changes in Russia’s oil and gas export policy towards the EU would essentially bring about costly effects within the EU, given that the Union is heavily dependent on import from Russia. The EU’s involvement in the Arctic, and in particular its strategy in the field of raw materials and crude oil, can be explained in complex interdependence terms as an attempt to lower its overall sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence towards its yet largest supplier country, Russia. By strengthening its ties to Greenland, the EU can be argued to see an opportunity in having access to the vast amount of oil and gas at hand in and off Greenland, which would constitute the relative availability of alternatives the EU faces. By Keohane and Nye, states are less vulnerable to outside change if they have the possibility of turning to affordable alternatives. Therefore, having Greenland’s oil and gas supplies at its disposal, the EU would be less vulnerable to potential changes through its largest supplier for the time being. Potential changes might be underway, as Russia increasingly turns towards China when it comes to cooperation in the field of oil and gas, especially since the imposition of international sanctions on Russia (Pasko et al., 2019, p. 11). This stresses the importance of having affordable alternatives available, precisely for the purpose of decreasing the EU’s vulnerability. According to Raspotnik (2016), the Arctic’s “presumed on- and offshore energy resources have been publicly perceived as one source of imported hydrocarbons in the decades to come, able to ensure future EUropean energy needs” (p. 177). Hence, the EU’s involvement in the Arctic, and its trade relations with Greenland including access to the Single Market, can be explained in complex interdependence terms as the alleviation of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence.

In this context, the concept of symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence should be discussed as well. The energy interdependence between Russia and the EU can be argued to be asymmetrical as the EU is (still) strongly dependent on Russia’s oil and gas supplies, as indicated above. Similar to the previously discussed concept of vulnerability, the asymmetrical nature of EU-Russia energy interdependency can be altered by turning to alternative opportunities for the supply of oil and gas. With the EU having the ability to rely on alternative suppliers, it would be less dependent on Russia which potentially would equate the
interdependence between the two, leading to a symmetrical interdependence instead. Thus, said asymmetrical energy interdependence can be argued to be incentive for the EU to develop a mineral resource related policy towards the Arctic, and Greenland in particular.

To sum up, complex interdependence proofs itself valuable when it comes to explaining the EU’s approach towards Greenland, and the Arctic in general. Especially the fact that the EU uses the Single Market as means of attraction and as the main power resource when it comes to trade agreements, such as the FPA, correlates with the theory of complex interdependence and Nye’s concept of soft power. This also underpins Keohane and Nye’s claim of declining significance of conventional military power. Furthermore, the EU’s policy regarding Greenland’s raw materials potential points especially to one concept of the theory at hand, namely vulnerability interdependence. By this concept, the EU’s investment in Greenland can be seen as an attempt to lower its overall vulnerability concerning the import of critical raw materials, oil and gas. The reduction of the EU’s vulnerability through increased cooperation with Greenland and other Arctic states becomes evident when we look at the energy interdependence between Russia and the EU. In this context, complex interdependence was beneficial in explaining the EU’s investment in Greenland and the development of a more diversified economy in order to be less dependent on Russia and other external suppliers.

5.2.2. Climate Change
Climate change is an issue that enjoys ever increasing attention in world politics. Hence, it is attributed importance in the EU Arctic Policy as well. Approaching this issue with a complex interdependence angle, it can be argued that climate change is a perfect example for the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy, cf. Keohane and Nye. Since the EU recognizes that the changing climate affects not only areas where it is most tangible, e.g. the Arctic region, and Greenland in particular, but the entire planet, it makes it difficult to distinguish whether climate change is a domestic or a foreign issue. The increasing interdependence in terms of climate change becomes evident when acknowledging the fact that the melting of the ice in the Arctic is a direct consequence of CO2 emissions mainly caused by the US, China and Europe. In turn, the melting of the ice has an effect on the European mainland since the rise in sea level threatens certain European regions, which makes climate change also a matter of security and existence. This shows the interdependence of the Arctic and the EU and explains the blurred line between foreign and domestic issues. In connection with the alleged merger of domestic and foreign policy, complex interdependence suggests that issues other than military power and security will appear on the agendas. Climate change can
be argued to be such an issue that traditionally has not been given much attention on international agendas. However, due to the above described indistinct line between domestic and foreign issues, climate change is a problem that affected agendas significantly. Thus, it has become an increasingly important issue in EU-Greenland relations. In a wider perspective, the appearance of climate change on agendas can also be connected to the increasing importance of international organizations, cf. complex interdependence. As Keohane and Nye argue, “organizations will set agendas, induce coalition-formation, and act as arenas for political action,” (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 31) which is exactly what the United Nations do. Not least with the Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015, a milestone was set and the issue of climate change gained importance on the international agenda. This provides evidence to what Keohane and Nye argued to be the absence of hierarchy among issues, as it is clear that an area, which would be considered low politics in the framework of realism, presents itself of similar or even greater importance than traditional high politics.

Focusing on climate change cooperation between the EU and the Arctic, three areas can be defined to constitute the EU’s approach to mitigating climate change: (1) funding to Arctic Research, (2) referring to other international initiatives to mitigate climate change, and (3) aims to solidify cooperation with Arctic states. The EU referring to other international initiatives supports the above argument and stresses the importance of international organizations that complex interdependence describes. At the same time, the multiple channels, cf. complex interdependence, become evident as international organizations such as the UN, but also the EU itself, act as transmission belts, which leads to decisions across national boundaries.

The fact that the EU has not achieved the status of a permanent Observer of the AC presents itself as an obstacle to the EU’s Arctic governance in theory, but in reality the EU has some leverage within the AC through its Member States; Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as well as the Observer Status of other Member States (Breum, 2019). Furthermore, the EU’s increased investment in the Arctic region can be seen as a soft power measurement to influence the Arctic in a way that benefits the EU’s goals in terms of climate change. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the EU needs the cooperation with the Arctic in order to successfully mitigate climate change. This explains why the EU invests in Arctic research and stresses the importance of the exchange of know-how to effectively address the issue of climate change. The increased focus on areas connected to climate change bears evidence to the increasing interdependence in the Arctic region as multiple legislative frameworks bind the Arctic region
closer together. Although geopolitical questions are still regarded as important, they bear less significance in the overall scheme. This however, might be subject to change in the future.

Through complex interdependence, climate change evidently portrays the absence of hierarchy among issues, as environmental politics have gained significant importance. Due to the interdependent nature of Greenland and the EU, climate change presents itself as a security issue that brings political and economic consequences. As no response to climate change will have negative effects for both actors because of their interconnectedness, it makes sense to engage in mitigating climate change to ensure joint benefits, rather than joint losses. Climate change presents itself as an existential crisis for the Arctic and Greenland in particular, and although it has much less dramatic consequences for the EU, it will have economic impacts in terms of loss of access to resources and trade thereof. Moreover, the direct consequences of climate change will, at some point, affect the EU through rising sea levels. Although environmental factors have not been emphasized in Keohane and Nye’s framework, we argue that the ever-changing world brings about new areas of potential cooperation, as discussed under the theory section. Therefore, following the typology of complex interdependence, we argue that climate change cooperation enhances the degree of interdependence, as it forces the multiplicity of actors involved to work together in order to utilize each other’s capabilities to find solutions.

All in all, complex interdependence, even though not concerned with climate change per se, comes in handy when describing certain aspects of climate change. Especially the increasing significance of international organizations becomes evident in the way climate change is addressed internationally. The UN Climate Change Conference is just one example of agenda-setting by an international organization. Moreover, the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policies, cf. complex interdependence, comes true due to the global consequences of climate change. Consequently, the theory proves beneficial for explaining the EU’s approach to handling climate change and the Union’s enhanced focus on global warming throughout the years of Arctic Policy development.

5.2.3. Geographic Significance

As portrayed in the above section, climate change has entered international agendas due to its negative impact on not only the Arctic, where global warming is most noticeable, but also other regions of the world including Europe. Nonetheless, the melting of the ice entails certain positive consequences as well. Among them are “potentials for maritime transportation and
navigation, oil, gas and rare earth exploration, fishing and tourism” (Raspotnik, 2016, p. 12), some of which have already been discussed in earlier sections of the analysis. This section will primarily focus on the EU’s connection with the Arctic states’, and in particular Greenland’s, increasing significance based on its geographic position. The fact that global warming opens up for alternative sea lanes brings about an additional incentive for the EU to get more involved in Arctic issues. As recognized by the Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, the navigation through Arctic waters “could considerably shorten trips from Europe to the Pacific, save energy, reduce emissions, promote trade and diminish pressure on the main trans-continental navigation channels” (EC, 2008, p. 8). Hence, the opportunity of new sea lanes accessible for everyone is of great interest for the Union, not only due to potential environmental advantages but also the economic potential.

Through the eyes of complex interdependence, the general acceptance of UNCLOS allows for relatively conflict free access to the Arctic Ocean, which stresses the multiple channels at play and thus the increasing role of transnational and transgovernmental relations. Such cooperation under UNCLOS comes not as a surprise for complex interdependence as the international accessibility of new sea lanes as the NWP and the NEP is of mutually beneficial character for all actors involved and does not harm their long-term interests. That translates to the idea of absolute gains that liberal thinkers adhere to, rather than relative gains that realists focus on.

Furthermore, through complex interdependence, crisis containment might be facilitated by the transgovernmental channels of contact that play a role in agenda setting. This is due to the fact that talks between diplomats can alter the perspectives and lead to coalitions on particular issues, which ensures common approaches to particular problems. For example UNCLOS and the cooperative manner between the Arctic 5 leads to limitations on disputes of territory. As a result, the limitation of disputes caused by interdependence leads to the increased security of the EU, which is why it makes sense for the EU to acknowledge UNCLOS. In this context, Keohane and Nye’s concept of linkage strategies becomes evident in the sense that sanctions against Russia did not have an effect on other issue areas, since the linkage between areas becomes more difficult. Hence, cooperation on Arctic issues continued under international fora such as UNCLOS, not least due to Arctic states’ shared interest in the application of UNCLOS (Byers, 2017, p. 389).

According to Vasilii Erokhin (2019), “EU member states combined have the world’s largest merchant fleet that is why the EU’s policies in the Arctic are focused on the development of shipping routes in polar water” (p. 28). However, the NWP created some
dispute between major actors - Canada, the US and the EU - as Canada claims sovereignty over parts of the NWP arguing the passage leads through internal waters. The US and the EU agree upon the international nature of the waters through which the NWP guides, based on the above described notion of mutual beneficial outcomes. The fact that these disputes do not lead to the involvement of military measures clearly underpins Keohane and Nye’s notion that military power serves little purpose as policy instrument when it comes to resolving disagreements between industrialized, pluralist countries. In this regard, Pasko et al. (2019) argue that “the transition of the conflict to the acute military phase is unlikely, because the US and Canada have been partners in security and economic issues for a long time” (p. 14). Confer complex interdependence, the interdependence between the US, the EU and Canada is too great as for either of them to turn to military force to solve the dispute over the internationality of the NWP. Furthermore, the EU can be argued to be interested in the internationality of the NWP and the NEP since it facilitates international trade and thereby increases the prospects of economic interdependence. This potentially leads to the unlikeliness of the use of military force in the European Arctic.

According to Pieper et al. (2011), “UN bodies are the primary organ for regulating shipping” regarding the global nature of maritime transport (p. 232). This supports Keohane and Nye’s assumption that international organizations are important actors in world politics who participate in setting international agendas and promote coalition formation. The EU’s status as party to UNCLOS proofs its recognition as part of maritime governance. As member of UNCLOS, the EU can intervene in, or influence, proceedings on the disputed NWP. Nonetheless, given that the Union is neither member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) nor of the AC, the EU has less influence on the “drafting of a regulatory framework for Arctic shipping” (Pieper et al., 2011, p. 232). This further supports one of the major contentions of complex interdependence, namely the increasing bearing of international organizations such as the IMO and the AC, through which standards for vessels are created globally, and for the Arctic in particular. Consequently, the EU has “little leverage in influencing [...] the existing governing framework for maritime transport” (2011, p. 233), due to the increased role of the IMO and the AC in political bargaining concerning the legal framework of Arctic maritime transport. However, the EU can be argued to be indirectly represented in these fora through the membership of the EU Member States: Denmark, Finland and Sweden and other Member States that influence said organizations through their Observer Status. This stresses the interdependent ties between the EU and the Arctic region.
Another aspect of complex interdependence that becomes evident in the context of the increasing geopolitical significance of the Arctic region is that of multiple channels at hand. By Erokhin (2019), “[t]he recent distinctive feature is a transition of national policies of Arctic countries from regulation of specific issues to the elaboration of complex normative documents which define general principles and rules of activities in the Arctic zone and collaborating with other actors in the region” (p. 48). This exemplifies how decisions are made across national boundaries in the sense that domestic policies of one Arctic country have an impact on the domestic policies of another country in the region. According to Keohane and Nye, transgovernmental and transnational channels, such as the AC, act as transmission belts for such cross-national decision making. Furthermore, the notion of complex interdependence that multiple channels (transgovernmental and transnational organizations) gain influence in world politics becomes visible with “connections between the legislative bodies of Arctic and non-Arctic countries; [and] multilateral cooperation in the format of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, regional and subregional associations and units” (Erokhin, 2019, p. 48). The fact that collaboration on Arctic issues is conducted through transgovernmental and transnational fora underpins one of the three main characteristics of complex interdependence, namely multiple channels.

In summary, complex interdependence turns out to be useful for the understanding of the significance of international organizations in world politics. The fact that UNCLOS, the IMO and the AC are crucial fora, and widely accepted as such, stresses Keohane and Nye’s notion of the enhanced role of international organizations. Moreover, the EU’s application for Observer Status for the AC proves its interest in participation in such international fora in order to have an influence on the development of the Arctic region. Moreover, the transgovernmental and transnational ties that exist in the Arctic are also important to describe why the Arctic is a region that engages in cooperation and why it remains a rather peaceful area. Indeed, complex interdependence presents itself viable in explaining why the EU is interested in the Arctic, as it proves to be a peaceful region of which the EU can engage in economic cooperation, which both serves to fulfill the EU’s resource demand as well as ensuring its northern neighborhood. Greenland has also proven to be a viable focus for the EU, as close cooperation and increased interdependence ensure an economic cooperation in the long term. However, what complex interdependence lacks, are the tools of explaining why the different issue areas are increasingly interconnected.
5.2.4. Greenland’s Independence and EU Neighborhood Policy

In this section, the EU Arctic Policy will be compared with the ENP in order to demonstrate the interdependent relationship between the EU and its Arctic periphery, first and foremost Greenland. Noticeably, the EU engages in particular in the European Arctic to foster cooperation to achieve higher Arctic influence, which shows a limited relevance of military capabilities, as the cooperation ensures stability in the region and reduces the vulnerability of the EU, which follows the framework of Keohane and Nye. Taking into account the objectives of the EU Arctic Policy as outlined in section 4.3, it is similar to the ENP in the sense that the EU aims for a sustainable development and the promotion of European values in regions of immediate proximity. In complex interdependence terms, this strategy might be explained by the increasing interdependence of states, especially of the same regions, which can be argued to be true for both Greenland, and Eastern European countries addressed under the umbrella of the ENP. Due to said interdependence, it is in the EU’s interest to support the development of stable democracies in its periphery as this significantly lowers the EU’s sensitivity and vulnerability by extending the EU’s zone of prosperity. This is also evident under the OAD, as the beneficial relationship is set forth on the condition that the OCTs adopt the fundamental principles of the EU, which is described in section 4.2.3. Furthermore, what characterizes both the ENP and the EU Arctic Policy is the promotion of European values of human rights, rule of law, and good governance. The EU’s attempt to create prosperity in its immediate proximity can be traced back to the interconnectedness and economic interdependence among states. Especially the way in which both the ENP and the EU Arctic Policy are implemented is explicable through core concepts of complex interdependence. First and foremost, there is no consistent hierarchy among issues which makes economic and social issues more important than military power, or at least equally significant. This becomes evident when looking at the three pillars of the 2016 Joint Communication: climate change, sustainable development, and international cooperation. Military power is not emphasized in the EU Arctic Policy, nor is it in the ENP. Instead, economic and social issues are put on the agenda and accredited with importance. Thus, Keohane and Nye rightfully criticize the realist assumption of high politics dominating low politics. Nonetheless, even under complex interdependence, military force might be a relevant policy tool when it comes to relations between governments of different regions. An example for that might be the increasing China’s interest in the Arctic region, which is in the EU’s immediate proximity. But even in this context, the EU has not turned to military measures. Instead, the Union tries to keep Greenland within its own ranks by supporting Greenlandic development and the diversification of the island’s economy. This
supports the notion of a decreasing role of military force in world politics. Comparing that approach to the ENP, which we claim is similar to the EU Arctic Policy, we can return to the incident of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which has been discussed previously in the context of energy interdependence. Since Ukraine is subject to the ENP, the Russian invasion of sovereign Ukrainian territory necessarily triggered an EU response. Under complex interdependence, “drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important instrument of policy,” especially when it comes to military and political relations with a rival bloc (Keohane and Nye, 2012, pp. 21-23). However, the EU’s response came in the form of economic sanctions rather than military capabilities. This does not conform to the above notion of complex interdependence, but supports complex interdependence in general, in the sense that military force is increasingly irrelevant. Furthermore, Keohane and Nye merely acknowledge that, even under the ideal type of complex interdependence, military power might re-enter the stage of foreign policy, although it is not a must. The EU’s response comprised sanctions against Russia which are clearly of hard power character, as it is a form of coercion or payment to reach outcomes in favor of the EU. This is a case of economic resources being used to coerce, cf. Nye (2009). This approach can be explained by Nye’s concept of ‘smart power’ in which he recognizes that efficient foreign policy ought to contain both hard and soft power. The EU’s reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea therefore supports Nye’s notion, since the EU, normally relying on soft power measures, also draws on hard power actions for the purpose of effective foreign policy. However, an example of failed hard power politics is the seal skin issue that ultimately became an issue for the EU, as it resulted in Canada vetoing the EU’s application for Observer Status. Consequently, the EU had to solve the issue through soft power measures, as hard power proved to be self-defeating. Hence, in liberal theory, hard power is often one of the last measures taken to achieve one’s goals.

As the discussion about Greenlandic independence has been prominent since the introduction of the AGSG, it makes sense for the EU to engage in closer cooperation, due to two prominent factors. First, the EU wishes to maintain the sustainable supply of resources coming from the Arctic, where Greenland has many of the resources that the EU needs, as portrayed in the above sections. Second, the EU wishes to maintain Greenland as an important partner and as a gateway to the Arctic. It seems that the EU succeeds in maintaining close cooperation with Greenland, also after a potential independence referendum, as can be seen in the following statement of the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen.
it is us [Greenland] that have the legislative and executive power in Greenland then
it is also us that choose our collaborators and we have chosen to work with Denmark on
many projects. We have also chosen to work with the EU and the Americans and to a
larger degree also other parts of the world, whom become our new collaborators
(Appendix II).

Due to the Arctic actors and institutions involved in the complexity of Arctic governance, it
makes sense for the EU to develop multilateral and bilateral agreements, in order to exert as
much influence in the Arctic region, as possible. The EU’s increasing involvement in the
Arctic, and Greenland in particular, can also be explained by Greenland’s aspiration after
independence. In order for the EU to keep its influence in the Arctic region even after a
potential Greenlandic independence, and the hereto connected loss of influence through
Denmark, it makes sense for the EU to enhance interdependence through direct partnership
agreements, which in turn enhances the interdependence between them (Bailes & Ólafsson,
2017, p. 59). This conforms to the complex interdependence idea that cooperation fosters
interdependence which also decreases the risk of potential conflict. Along these lines, we
identify Greenland’s progress towards independence as another external reason for the EU’s
Arctic involvement. The latest Joint communication provides evidence to the increased
attention paid towards Greenland. As brought up in the interview with the Representation of
Greenland to the EU, Greenland also sees potential in enhanced cooperation with the EU, even
after a potential independence and the loss of the status as an OCT:

(...) there might be another status, a clearer partnership. It could be similar to the one
Norway has or other countries for that sake. OCT status is not necessarily the only
status, and not necessarily a status that solves everything (Appendix I).

Bailes and Heininen (2012) argue that “creating direct institutional links with Greenland
improves the odds on its staying politically in the European orbit even in the case of full
independence (p. 96). In complex interdependence terms, increasing interdependence between
states, especially within the same region, tremendously decreases the possibility of military
conflict. Based on this, it makes sense for the EU to uphold its cooperation with Greenland in
order to prevent it from making alliances with states from other regions. Additionally,
cooperation also ensures economic growth for both entities, which in turn furthers enhances
interdependence. This underlines Keohane and Nye’s idea of economic interdependence, as
through mutually beneficial agreements both entities ensure their goals. The EU manages this
economic interdependence by funding areas of which the EU can see a benefit for itself, which proves that the EU wants to manage the economic interdependence between them. Moreover, the interdependence of the two actors also strengthens their resilience towards external events, such as changes in the dynamics in Arctic international relations, and thus reduces their overall vulnerability.

To sum up, complex interdependence proved of use to compare the EU’s engagement in the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, with the ENP especially through the concept of vulnerability. By advancing sustainable development, and promoting European values in its periphery, the EU is able to lower its overall vulnerability due to stabilizing its neighborhood. Furthermore, one of complex interdependence’s core characteristics, the absence of hierarchy among issues, proves to be true as economic and social issues are valued equally if not higher than military issues. In terms of a potential independence of Greenland, the theory can explain the EU’s enhanced focus on Greenland through direct partnership agreements and investment as a means to ensure future cooperation and interdependence, irrespective of Greenland’s affiliation to Denmark. Thus, complex interdependence contributes to the understanding of why the EU developed its Arctic Policy, with special regards to Greenland, and the main focus areas of climate change, Arctic resources and Arctic development. Finally, the concepts of soft and hard power turned out beneficial in the context of EU sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea, as they exemplify the nature of measures taken by the EU to achieve its goals.
6. Discussion

Having analyzed what we identified to be the most important issue areas of the EU Arctic Policy, we will now conduct the discussion where we explicitly highlight the main findings and how we see the two theories to complement each other.

Overall, we find realism convenient when trying to understand the EU’s involvement in the Arctic region. Hereby, realism explains the EU’s interest through the concepts of survival and self-help, meaning that the exploitation of raw materials, addressing the geopolitical significance of Greenland, and the Arctic in general, etc. serve as a matter of securing the EU’s survival and security of supply. Thus, our analysis shows that realism can in fact explain why the EU became engaged in Arctic governance, as actions had to be taken in order to have a role in influencing the development of the Arctic region. Complex interdependence, on the other hand, proved beneficial when analyzing the specific measures taken to develop the EU’s increased influence in the Arctic. Furthermore, it provides evidence to why realism, to some extent, struggles to explain why social issue and membership in international organizations are important sources of power projection in the Arctic, as well as why Arctic governance is characterized by a high degree of cooperation. In this regard, complex interdependence emphasizes the minor role of military power and the enhanced importance of international organizations, especially in terms of agenda setting. The relevance of international organizations in Arctic governance also bears evidence of the interdependent nature of the Arctic, as a high degree of interdependence lowers the possibilities for straight out utilization of military capacities. Where we see the two theories to be complementary is when we identify the main goal of the Arctic Policy to be simply to ensure the Arctic as a macro region of stability. This is underlined, when we compare the ENP with the Arctic Policy, as they seem to share the same rationale. What realism lacks is a clear understanding of the extensive funding given to the Arctic, as realists presume cooperation will be unattractive in the long term, where complex interdependence, in contrast, believes it is based on the soft values of attraction.

Generally, we identify the EU in regards to its EU Arctic Policy to be rather reactive than proactive, given that the EU’s institutions react to external changes and challenges. Therefore, we argue that those internal factors we discuss, namely several EU institutions’ communications etc., are primarily the EU’s response to external factors, such as climate change, the possibility of raw material exploitation, and the accessibility of new sea lanes, which determine the debate on the Arctic. Furthermore, complex interdependence stresses the
opportunity for cooperation and, consequently, win-win situations. Realism, on the contrary, takes an antagonistic standpoint, focusing on the zero-sum game rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. This conforms to our claim that realism is incapable of explaining the way in which the EU decides to implement its Arctic Policy, as it is built upon the idea of cooperation and the possibility of win-win situations, which points towards complex interdependence. The strength of realism, on the other hand, is its ability to explain the geopolitical consequences and external factors that led to the EU’s engagement in the Arctic, and the EU’s attempt to influence through its material capacities.

In terms of the significance of Arctic resources, realism focuses on the relative gains and sees the EU’s involvement as the participation in the ‘race for resources’ against other actors, such as Russia and China. Complex interdependence, on the contrary, stresses the absolute gains, which suggests the focus on mutually beneficial cooperation rather than a constant competition for power and material capabilities. As mentioned before, realism comes in handy when reasoning for the EU’s interest in the Arctic, as realism, in our context, is concerned with issues that pose a threat to the overall security of the EU. Especially defensive realism connects states’ actions with the strive for security maximization. However, realism struggles to explain the EU’s reluctance to rely on military measures to achieve their overall goal of survival. This is where complex interdependence can complement and contribute to the understanding of the EU Arctic Policy. By claiming that military force is (no longer) an efficient policy instrument, complex interdependence proves to be useful to account for the EU’s use of soft power measures, such as attraction through the access to the Single Market. In fact, we identified the Single Market to be the EU’s most relevant power resource, through which the EU manages to achieve most of its goals in regards to cooperation with Greenland and influencing Arctic governance. As stated, we argue that, in realist terms, Arctic resources are all about security and the build-up of material capabilities, where it is important for the EU to secure its access to resources in the Arctic region, despite the undeniable costliness of exploitation of such. In complex interdependence terms, it makes sense for the EU to invest in Greenland in order to have a ‘local’ and cost efficient alternative that potentially decreases the EU’s energy dependency on Russia. Hence, the alleviation of the EU’s sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence is argued to be one of the desired outcomes of increased involvement in the Arctic. Consequently, both theories can explain the EU’s interest in Arctic resources, whereas in different ways. Complex interdependence also provides evidence to why military capabilities prove themselves to be self-defeating in this case, as in complex
interdependence the likelihood of military dispute is significantly lowered, due to the interdependence between actors. This supports the claim that although realism would assume a military build-up in the region in order to assume control over the resources, we have yet to see one, as the high degree of interdependence limits the likelihood of such. This shows the interplay between the two theories where the combination of the two provides a more wholesome picture.

Realism struggles to explain the environmental consequences of climate change, but rather interprets it as a security concern and what opportunities and risks climate change embeds. The strongest finding of realism in regards to climate change is how it functions as a threat multiplier and therefore action is required in spillover areas connected to it, namely geopolitical alterations and the race for Arctic resources, as these, in realism, have a direct bearing on the security of the state. Additionally, realism is incapable of explaining the environmental consequences of climate change, as it embodies the realm of low politics, which is an area of politics realism does not touch upon. This means that realism is more concerned with explaining the factors caused by climate change, rather than climate change itself. We therefore acknowledge realism comes short in explaining the EU’s vast focus on mitigating climate change. Complex interdependence, on the other hand, is able to explain, through the concept of absence of hierarchy, why low politics do in fact matter and why mitigation of climate change is important. Complex interdependence is also relevant when explaining the role of international organizations and the importance to transgovernmental and transnational cooperation, and why multiple actors cooperate with the goal of mitigating climate change. Complex interdependence can indeed explain why cooperation in this issue area occurs, nonetheless still lacks clear approaches to analyze the consequences of it. This might be due to the fact that complex interdependence as a concept was developed in the 1970s where matters of climate change were rarely regarded as important factors. Additionally, as we pointed out in section 3.2 one of the critiques of complex interdependence, is its inability to explain the changing power-political parameters of the international system. As a result, both theories come short in explaining why matters such as sustainability and indigenous people are on the agenda of the EU Arctic Policy, as they simply lack the tools to give a valid explanation for the appearance of climate change on the agenda, other than that international organizations such as the UN increasingly set the agenda, cf. complex interdependence. Furthermore, realism comes short as it does not acknowledge the actorness of international organizations and, in consequence, cannot explain engagement in the Paris
Climate Change Conference and the resulting decisions across national boundaries, whereas complex interdependence can. Additionally, it does not concern climate policies, as these might have harmful effects on shorter-term national interests.

Regarding geographic significance, realism and complex interdependence provide two very distinct ideas as to what role geographic position plays. Realism sees the opening of the Arctic Ocean to pose great risks as it facilitates the access to the Arctic region, which lies within the proximity of the EU. Especially Greenland portrays itself to be an important area in this regard, as both China and Russia have shown increased interest in the island. Hence, realism stresses the necessity of an EU response to the upcoming security threats, in order to ensure the EU’s survival. To some extent, realism is able to highlight the aggressiveness of China’s and Russia’s approach to the Arctic, which in turn drives to more cooperation with the EU, to ensure the overall security of the European Arctic and the EU. Complex interdependence, on the other hand, argues that the interdependence between actors leads to relatively conflict free areas, which is ensured by the recognition of UNCLOS. The opening of the Arctic Ocean is seen as mutually beneficial for all actors involved, due to the perception of joint gains, as trade is facilitated by the increased accessibility of new sea lanes. However, complex interdependence seems to lack the understanding of why specific action towards the Arctic is taken by the EU, in regards to geographic significance. The focus point where the two theories strongly differ is that realism sees the opening of sea routes as a threat multiplier, whereas complex interdependence sees it as a factor for strengthened interdependence. However, where they indeed complement each other is that realism is able to explain the causal effects for EU engagement, but to some extent lacks the tools to explain the actions taken, whereas complex interdependence provides explanation to why cooperation and international organizations play a part in defining how governance in the Arctic plays out.

In regards to Greenland’s potential independence, it has to be mentioned that what the theories can and cannot explain is purely hypothetical as Greenland has not declared independence (yet). That being said, realism is mostly concerned with the uncertainty about Greenland’s future as a potential shift towards China would present another source of insecurity for the EU. Hence, through the eyes of realism, it makes sense for the EU to stabilize its Northern neighborhood similar to its Eastern neighborhood, for the purpose of security maximization. What realism struggles to explain is, again, the strategy chosen by the EU to do so. This is where complex interdependence shows its strengths as it is able to account for the EU’s reluctance to use military force to secure its immediate proximity. Also, the fact that the
EU focuses on both economic and social issues is evidence for the absence of hierarchy among issues. As opposed to realism, through the lens of complex interdependence, we did not identify Greenland’s potential independence to be a security issue, as the EU already has partnership agreements and a close economic relationship with Greenland. Thus, the increasing interdependence between the EU and Greenland, and the acceptance of EU norms and values by Greenland, decrease the risk of ‘losing’ Greenland to e.g. China tremendously. Realism, however, does not account for such interdependence, which is why, under realism, the EU is concerned with the threats to its security a potential independence of Greenland could entail. Nonetheless, realism would argue that at some point the EU will adopt military measures to secure its neighborhood and thereby itself, however what we see is rather the EU utilizing its material capabilities, which serves to enhance its security. That being said, realism does account for the importance of economic capabilities, as they can be used to influence as well. We portrayed in the analysis that realism can explain the securitization of the Arctic through economic power projection. Finally, supporting complex interdependence, we identified the EU’s measures to be primarily of soft power nature. However, as the Crimea crisis showed, the EU is willing to take hard power measures in the form of sanctions to achieve its goals. This supports the concept of smart power, as the combination of soft and hard power seems to be most efficient in the long run.

As expected, realism proved useful to explain the influence of external factors on shaping the EU’s response in the form of its Arctic Policy. In this regard, the theory of realism gave us in fact an understanding of the security issues related to the Arctic region and their implications for the EU. Additionally, realism portrays how the EU does influence the Arctic region through economic power. However, what realism turned out to be incapable of explaining is the role and recognition of international organizations and their part in shaping the Arctic region. This conforms with our expectations to the theory, as put forth in section 3.1. Complex interdependence, in turn, came in handy to highlight the reason for cooperation between the EU and the Arctic. Furthermore, the measures that are taken by the EU to achieve its goals in the Arctic are explicable through the theory, which fits with our expectations, as presented in section 3.2. Nonetheless, as expected, complex interdependence does not concern itself with the local dimension, civil society issues, and the geopolitical implications concerned with security.

Consequently, as put forth in the discussion above, we argue that the theories complement one another and, in that manner, provide an explanation for the EU’s interest in
the Arctic, with particular focus on Greenland, and its development of this specific Arctic Policy.
7. Conclusion

This thesis attempts to explain why the European Union has become involved in the Arctic, especially in Greenland, and what strategy the EU pursues. As put forth in section 2, we chose a two-fold analytical approach based on the theoretical framework of realism and complex interdependence, respectively. This allows for the identification of the complementary nature of the two theories which enables us to conclude the following.

Based on our analysis and discussion, we claim that there are distinct reasons for the EU’s involvement in the Arctic. Realism stresses the geopolitical implications in the Arctic region which call for the EU’s reaction in order to ensure its security. However, it turned out that the measures taken by the EU in order get involved in Arctic governance do not accord with traditional realist means. The rather cautious approach of the EU is partly explained by the fear of driving its allies, arguably Greenland, more towards China and Russia which would result in the influence of said great powers in the immediate proximity of the EU. Complex interdependence, on the other hand, does not see a security threat in recent political development in the Arctic, but rather stresses the opportunity for enhanced cooperation and the increasing improbability of military conflict connected to it. Through complex interdependence, we were also able to identify the increasing role of international organizations in terms of agenda setting and decision-making in the Arctic. Thereby, we were able to explain the EU’s acknowledgement of, and interest in participating in, such international organizations. Furthermore, both realism and complex interdependence showed why economic and security issues, such as access to new sea lanes, the exploitation of raw materials, as well as climate change appear on the EU Arctic Policy.

Consequently, realism and complex interdependence strongly indicate that the development of an EU Arctic Policy is due to the need of the Union to react to external changes in the Arctic region, which we identified to be changes in the geopolitical nature of the Arctic, as well as climate change. Based on our analysis, we identified that the EU took a more reactive rather than proactive approach towards Arctic governance, which supports our claim that the EU acts cautiously. Our findings suggest that the EU increasingly became involved in the Arctic due to the need of creating sustainable resource flow, building up material capabilities to ensure the EU and its northern neighborhood against external changes, as well as mitigating climate change. What supports our findings that the EU Arctic Policy is mainly a matter of ensuring European influence over, and security in, the Arctic is the comparison to the
ENP, as similar rationale is apparent in the ENP. We set out to analyze whether Greenland had a special position in the EU’s approach towards the Arctic, where we found evidence of Greenland having a special role based on its association agreements with the EU, its geographic significance, and its available resources. This has been underlined numerous times by the EU itself, as it gives credit to Greenland and its special position. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the extensive funding provided to Greenland is based on the rationale of maintaining Greenland as an area subject to European influence, even in the case of independence. In regards to the EU’s specific strategy, we find that the EU bases its financial support and closer cooperation with the Arctic, and Greenland in particular, on the expected mutually beneficial outcome and the prospects of securitization. In this context, the access to the Single Market is the EU’s strongest means of attraction which defines the beneficial outcome for Greenland, whereas the EU can profit from the extraction of raw materials and the access to fishing quotas. Moreover, the EU benefits from cooperation as the funding of research in the Arctic enhances the EU’s capability of mitigating climate change.

On this foundation, we attempt not to make a generalizing conclusion, stating this is the one true answer to this certain question, but rather that our findings suggest that external matters played a vital role in the development of the EU Arctic Policy. We conclude that security concerns and international organizations play a significant part in shaping the EU’s approach towards the Arctic region. Additionally, the interviews we conducted seem to justify our findings, as we have seen a strong connection between Greenlandic officials and how they feel towards the EU. The portrayed empirical data indicates that external events of security implication, resource management and climate change all play a vital role in shaping the EU Arctic Policy and do indeed seem to dictate its internal changes. Although, to determine the degree to which other factors played a role in the shaping of the EU’s approach to the Arctic, further research and studies must be conducted. As we have chosen to analyze the international factors that affect the EU’s approach we acknowledge that we neglect the role of the local actors and the role of civil society and how they are part of shaping the Arctic and the EU’s approach towards it. Additional focus on these matters would give a more fulfilling picture of why the EU developed an Arctic Policy, and why this specific strategy. We identified alternative theories in section 3.4, which we believe all can provide additional insight to the understanding of the development of the EU Arctic Policy.
8. References


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9. Appendix

9.1. Appendix I
Interview with the Representation of Greenland to the European Union

(Separate document)

9.2. Appendix II
Interview with the Greenland Representation in Copenhagen

(Separate document)