



Debating Migration.
A discourse analysis of the election programmes of the ÖVP

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Keystrokes: 160.139

Master Thesis

Development and International Relations

Global Refugee Studies

Aalborg University

Abstract

The present qualitative study set out to analyse changes in the political discourse of the Austrian conservative party (ÖVP) on the issue of migration alongside the following research question: How and why did the linguistic negotiation of migration change in the election programmes of the ÖVP between 1990 and 2017? and the two sub-questions: What are the prevalent topics in conjunction with migration? and which collective symbols, if any, are employed when negotiating migration?

The research question was answered through applying the discourse analytical approach of the Duisburg School and Van Dijk's concept for the analysis of political discourses, reading into relevant studies connected to the research interest, and an analysis of the historical context and of the election programmes of the ÖVP between 1990 to 2017 of the ÖVP. This study contributed to a deeper understanding of the subtle rather than direct and outspoken form in which the realm of the sayable is altered in a political discourse. Without explicitly calling migrants 'dangerous', which would be at odds with the self-description as a party of the moderate political center, the usage of natural symbolisms such as 'earthquakes' in connection with migrants nonetheless conveys a similar message. The alteration of the discourse of the ÖVP, which could be traced in the election programmes between 1990 and 2017 is first and foremost, comprised of subtle changes of this kind.

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Abbreviations

AFD	Alternative for Germany
BMS	Needsbased minimum benefit system
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CSU	Christian Social Union (Germany)
DF	Danish Folkeparti
DKF	Conservative People's Party (Denmark)
FPÖ	Freedom Party Austria
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
SPÖ	Austrian Social Democrats

1. Introduction, motivation and problem area

The inspiration for this study was drawn from a personal experience. When my father, who has been voting for the conservative Austrian People's Party¹, more or less his entire life, told me right after the 2017 general elections that he was not capable of voting for the ÖVP anymore, I paused for a moment. My father is and was engaged with local politics for decades. He was the vice-mayor of the village where I grew up and has been a local councillor for the ÖVP affiliated group "Junges Neustift" since before I was even born. He is a farmer, part of the ÖVP affiliated Austrian Farming Association and even a party member of the ÖVP, paying monthly contributions. My youth comprised of numerous hard discussions about his affiliation with the ÖVP and my disagreement with it. When I asked him why he could no longer vote for the ÖVP, he stressed that he could not vote for the ÖVP under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz and his standpoints in regard to *migration*.

Sebastian Kurz became the party chairman of the ÖVP in May 2017 and the ÖVP using its new name "Sebastian Kurz List - the new people's party (ÖVP) emerged as the clear winner of the general election held in October 2017, with their election programme named "the new path" ["Der neue Weg"]. The so-called 'Kurz-effect' was what some political campaign experts would call the *game changer*, changing the dynamic of the election campaign and determining the results of the 2017 elections. There are plenty of analyses, books and commentaries (Plasser & Sommer 2018; Horaczek & Toth 2017; Ronzheimer 2018) that deal with the particularly special political career of Sebastian Kurz, who was only 24 when he became state secretary for integration in 2011, and 27 when he became the youngest minister of foreign affairs in Austrian history in 2013 and was 31 when he was elected the youngest chancellor of all times. This study will not further elaborate on the 'Kurz-effect' or Sebastian Kurz himself, but rather the elections of 2017.

One phenomenon that was observed during the Austrian election campaign of 2017 was that the ÖVP under its new leader Sebastian Kurz was able to reframe its standpoints regarding topics that were formerly mainly addressed by the Freedom Party Austria². Most of the 2017 ÖVP voters who came from other parties, voted for the ÖVP because of its standpoints that directly addressed problems regarding migration, such as Kurz's restrictive stance against

¹ The Austrian pendant of the Conservative People's Party (DKF) in Denmark

² The Austrian pendant of the Danish Folkeparti (DF)

illegal migration, human smuggling and the so-called migration into the social welfare system. These stances bestowed upon the ÖVP new competences in thematic fields that were far removed from their traditional core competences (Plasser & Sommer 2018: 91-94).

A political-centre party that has reframed its standpoints in regard to migration is not a localised Austrian phenomenon. Examples of this include the German CSU pushing for harsh border restrictions and the Danish centre parties Venstre and the Social Democrats, who support the plans of sending people who were sentenced to deportation, to a remote island and putting them into a detention centre (Rothwell 2018).

It is highly contested which local as well as global developments contributed to this: the global financial crisis of 2008 and the affiliated neoliberal austerity politics that lead to an increase of unemployment figures in various European member states and outside of Europe, the huge poverty crisis in many countries of the Global South and the subsequent migration towards countries of the Global North, the impacts of the ‘Arab Spring’, the rising urge to protect the welfare state in many countries of the Global North, the huge success of right-wing populist parties in national elections all over Europe³ and in other countries as well⁴, the emergence of new fundamentalist religious movements, the launching of even stricter security measures after 9/11, the impacts of the long summer of migration 2015⁵ and so on. And, and this is important, it is also the dissatisfaction of many citizens with how traditional politics function, and how the latter is perceived as no longer capable to deal with and confront these new risks, challenges and dangers (Wodak 2015; Aigner et al. 2017; Jäger & Wamper 2017). This study will not be able to provide an answer to the above posed question but will rather contribute to the discussion by looking at the language of one European centre party, namely the ÖVP.

³ 20,5% for the Austrian FPÖ in 2013, 21,1% for the Danish DF in 2015, 13,2% for the French Front National 2017, 12,6 % for the German AfD in 2017 and 17,53 for the Sweden Democrats in 2018 (Wodak 2015).

⁴ Examples here would be the success of Donald Trump in the US elections of 2016 or the success of Jair Bolsonaro in the Brazilian elections of 2018

⁵ This study will intentionally not use just *one* practice of denomination in order to describe the heterogenous and fluid migration and refugee movements of past and current times. Furthermore, it will especially not make use of any collective symbols that would put these movements into certain derogatory frames, such as a natural catastrophe frame or a sickness frame, as this leads to the implication of certain mitigation strategies. These considerations will be taken up and explained further in the course of this study.

1.1. Type of study and its aims

This *qualitative* study sets out to explore *how* the political discourse of the Austrian conservative party ÖVP on the issue of migration changed in the period between 1990 and 2017. The object of investigation will be *one* genre⁶ of the political discourse of the political party ÖVP, namely their election programs from 1990 to 2017⁷. This timeframe was chosen since the perception of migration as a threat to security only started with the fall of the Iron curtain (Graf & Knoll 2017: 91-111) and 2017 being the year of the latest elections in Austria. Consequently, the findings of this study *cannot* be generalised for the whole political discourse of the ÖVP, but they can serve as a starting point for further analysis.

In order to study how the linguistic negotiation of migration in the election programs of the ÖVP changed over time, this research is build on the following theoretical pillars:

1. Social constructionism and critical discourse analysis which will be used to develop an understanding of how an idea is socially constructed through language.
2. Political discourse analysis which will provide a framework for analysing and contextualising the language used in the election programmes.

1.1.1. The election programme as an object of investigation

Election programmes are one of many genres of political discourse. They are formulated prior to elections and are bound to a specific time and space frame (in this case the respective date of a national election in Austria). They are thus to a certain extent constrained by this framework and need to be understood in the historical context of these elections. Therefore, Chapter II lays the grounds for the understanding of these contexts, by providing a historical overview of the Austrian elections and politics from 1990 to 2017. Election programmes (or manifestos) are formulated by political parties striving for power in order to inform citizens about their political goals, policy objectives and commitments or rather promises. They aim at forming and communicating a coherent party identity. This party identity can as a result be communicated to non-party members (Klymenko 2018: 634-636).

⁶ In social sciences the specific way of using language tied to a particular social activity is called a genre. It is characterised through the selection of lexical, phraseological and grammatical resources, and compositional structures (Klymenko 2018: 635)

⁷ The research approach of this study is an adaptive one, meaning that the time frame was redefined twice, after analysing the data and studying the historical context. A more detailed explanation of how the timeframe was determined, will be given in the Methodology Chapter.

This is especially relevant for this study as in contrast to the battles of daily politics, the point at which a party formulates its election programmes where the party generally states its political agenda. Hence, it is the general and comprehensive external communication of fundamental values and standpoints in regards to for example migration that makes party programmes especially interesting as an object of investigation. The analysis of party programmes has the potential to provide information about the stability and conversion of party goals, as they are produced over a longer period of time in contrast for example to statements made by politicians in interviews or TV debates.

1.2. Research Question

With the above in mind and through a discursive analysis of the election programmes of the ÖVP, this study will be answering the following question:

How and why did the linguistic negotiation of migration change in the election programmes of the ÖVP between 1990 and 2017?

In regard to the purpose of this study, it is therefore of interest which topics and statements⁸ in conjunction with migration were transposed into the realm of the sayable rather than being restricted to right-wing populist parties, and which ones were discursively moved into the field of the unsayable or even unthinkable.

Furthermore, this study aims not only to analyse how the discourse changed but also how certain logics on how best to deal with migration are discursively constructed, how other strategies are made invisible, unthinkable and henceforth politically impossible and which collective symbols were employed to support this.

In order to be able to define the how and why posed in the research question above, the following two sub-questions were identified:

Sub-question 1: *What are the prevalent topics in conjunction with migration?*

Sub-question 2: *Which collective symbols, if any, are employed when negotiating migration?*

⁸ The Duisburg School, whose approach to critical discourse analysis will be utilised in this study, following Foucault, distinguishes between (linguistic) *utterances* and (non-linguistic) *statements*. It is therefore the central concern of their discourse analytical approach to collect statements on the basis of utterances and by that describe the respective realms of the sayable. That is furthermore done through the analysis of discourse strands (Jäger 2010: 29, 30).

Sub-question 1 refers to the concept of *discourse strands* [*Diskursstränge*]⁹, in the case of this study the migration discourse strand that comprises of a variety of discourse fragments or rather topics. In order to understand the changes in the linguistic negotiation of the topic migration, it will therefore be of interest which were/are the prevalent topics in conjunction with migration.

Sub-question 2 is strongly linked to the question of which statements in relation to migration are made sayable and which ones are discursively moved into the field of the unsayable or even unthinkable. While subquestion 1 is tracing which topics are prevalent in the election programs, sub-question 2 is focusing on the statements. Jäger (2007: 26, 27) stresses that statements are the content-related common factor that can be retrieved from utterances in sentences and texts. And statements are especially conveyed through collective symbols as will be presented in the Theoretical Framework Chapter and as other research suggests (Jäger & Wamper 2017; Wichert 1994).

1.3. Relevance of the study

The topic of this study is relevant for several reasons. It will contribute to a deeper understanding of the political discourse of the ÖVP and will provide a basis for further research on how conservative parties and parties generally classified as being parties of the political centre took on argumentation and claims of right-wing populist parties in regard to the issue of migration. The Austrian case with the leading role of the ÖVP is a particularly well suited example, since the ÖVP is clearly taking a lead among conservative parties, and is often explicitly mentioned as the role model by conservatives trying to push their own conservative parties into a more restrictive direction on their stance on migration. Examples of this are Horst Seehofer and Markus Söder in the German case (Backfisch et al. 2018) or Richard Grenell, the new US ambassador to the Federal Republic in Germany, who wants to strengthen the conservatives in Europe and referred to Sebastian Kurz as a “rockstar” in a recent interview (Tomlinson 2018).

⁹ thematically uniform discourse processes (usually with a large number of sub-themes or rather consisting of different discourse fragments) are called discourse strands. Further explanation about the concept will be given in the Theoretical Framework Chapter of this study.

Election programmes are particularly well suited to examine this topic, since they indicate the dominant position of a party in time, uninfluenced by the horse trading and compromise finding politicians that constitute everyday life in politics.

Teun A. van Dijk, who is one of the most acclaimed racism researchers, presents the relevance of the topic of migration and its treatment by politicians as follows (1992: 200):

“The political discourse [...] plays an even bigger role for the definition of the situation of immigrants than the media discourse. Decisions by the administration and bureaucracy as well as debates in parliaments since the 1980s increasingly deal with issues regarding immigrants and refugees. Continuous social inequality, unemployment, social problems, detriments in the segment of education, rejection of immigrants, the arrival of new ‘waves’ of refugees from the South: those are some of the main topics, which are on the daily political agenda.”

This quote dates from 1992, thus the very beginning of the period analysed in this study and it can be claimed that the trend Van Dijk is describing, that debates and decisions made by the administration increasingly deal with issues regarding immigrants and refugees, has accelerated since then. This observation is still relevant for this study, even though the object of investigation will not be political debates and decision, but rather election programmes.

The focus of this thesis is not on analysing which legislative and administrative changes have been undertaken, but which linguistically fixed positions have been made possible to articulate in the respective election programmes. The thesis is therefore a *linguistic* contribution to the analysis of developments of Austrian society as a whole and in particular to developing an understanding of the political discourse of the ÖVP.

1.4. Literature Review

There is no comprehensive analysis of the discourse of the ÖVP in regard to its positions on migration. Therefore, finding other discourse analytical research proved to be a challenge. There are small studies just like the one conducted by Kratzert (2017) who analysed the political discourse of the ÖVP (and the SPÖ) through the political discourse *genre* interviews with politicians published in local newspapers. While it can be questioned how representative his findings are, as he used a very small sample of only 35 newspaper articles that were published between January and August 2016 and contained the keyword ‘integration’, he

found that the language use of politicians of the Austrian centre parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) regarding the discourse about integration, can increasingly be located within a right-wing populist set of values.

Utilising a study that did not follow a discourse analytical research approach, but rather analysed voting behaviour through conducting representative polls, Plasser & Sommer's (2018) research was helpful in developing an understanding of why the ÖVP was so successful in the 2017 elections. They analysed which topics voters, who stated that they would vote for the ÖVP for the first time, were most worried about. Their findings were as follows: 80% of the ÖVP voters that came from other parties were worried about the threat of a spreading of radical Islam, 77% were worried about a repetition of the long summer of migration 2015, 76% looked anxiously at the growing number of migrants and foreigners and 74% were bothered about the (alleged) misuse of social welfare benefits. A large number of this electoral group had voted for the FPÖ in preceding elections and represented an opinion in migratory matters that was very close to the electoral group that voted for the FPÖ¹⁰.

On language and politics in Austria there is a vast amount of literature, but those studies mainly analysed the political discourse of the FPÖ (Krzyzanowski (2013), Wodak (2011), Wodak (2013a), Wodak (2013b), Reisigl & Wodak (2009), Matouschek & Wodak (1993)). According to the two Viennese linguists Wodak and Reisigl (2000), there are different strategies of positive-self and negative-other representation, such as referential strategies¹¹, predicational strategies¹² or argumentation strategies¹³. These findings demonstrated the prevalence of the creation of positive-self and negative-other representation in political discourse on migration in Austria. However, these studies only focused on right-wing parties and did not take conservative parties into account. Nonetheless, this research was especially helpful for developing an understanding of strategies of positive-self and negative-other representation, the functionings of othering and the constructed fear of 'the other'.

¹⁰ 94% pleaded for a general admission stop for asylum seekers, who entered Austria illegally. 87% of the electoral group who came from other parties in 2017 demanded to close down borders for "economic refugees" and 77% declared themselves in favor of a headscarf ban in public institutions, kindergartens and schools (Plasser & Sommer 2018: 91).

¹¹ refer to naming people in a pejorative manner, which serves to determine who can be part of an in-group and who cannot and by that exclude people

¹² are those which label social or in this case especially, political actors. The two strategies can overlap, as for example calling someone a social welfare scrounger labels a social actor in a negative way

¹³ are usually utilised when trying to justify the unequal treatment of in- and out-groups

Jäger and Wamper (2017) from the Duisburg Institute for Social and Linguistic Research (DISS) analysed in a large-scale research project how the realm of the sayable in regards to discourse about refugees and migration changed as a consequence of the sudden increase of migration in the summer of 2015. Their research was especially helpful in understanding shifts of the realm of the sayable over time. They found that statements which would have been valued racist five years ago, today are part of the realm of the sayable in regard to discourse about refugees and migration¹⁴. They also describe different transitions in regard to the realm of the sayable: from the emphasis of the neediness of refugees to constituting the neediness of the states because of the refugees, from the necessity to protect refugees to protect from the refugees, from suspending the Dublin Regulation to suspending the right to asylum, from praising people who assisted refugees to discrediting the latter, from refugees to irregular migrants.

What is seen as lacking after going through all kinds of literature on the topic of language and migration in Austria, are studies that contribute to an understanding of the political discourse of the ÖVP in regard to migration. This study sets out to contribute to this process of developing an understanding of the latter by analysing one genre of the political discourse of the ÖVP.

1.5. Clarification of Concepts

In the course of this paper, terms and concepts will be used that are part of everyday language, but which are inconsistently used and therefore require clarification if used in a scientific context.

Migration/Migrant. This term refers to any movement of a person or a group, across an international border or within the state¹⁵. In political discourse this term is often used to downgrade the obligations arising out of signing the Geneva Refugee Convention towards refugees by referring to them as migrants. It is generally used in many different ways, referring to many different types of movement, forced or voluntary. Henceforth, I include both types of migration, forced and voluntary, into the definition.

¹⁴ Those statements included: they are not useful, a danger for inner peace, for the European solidarity, a danger to women, competitors for poor people, a terroristic threat, they do not measure up to democratic standards, they produce racism through their presence.

¹⁵ including refugees, displaced persons, immigrants and people moving for other purposes, such as family reunification

The legal difference in Austria is as follows:

Immigrant. An immigrant is a non-national that moves to another country for the purpose of settlement.

Asylum seeker. An asylum seeker is a person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and still awaits the decision on the application for refugee status.

Refugee. A refugee is any person who "...owing to *well-founded* fear of being *persecuted* for *reasons* of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is *outside the country of his nationality* and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, it unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." (Art. 1.A RC1951)

1.6. Structure of the thesis

In order to answer the research question posed above, this study will be structured as follows:

Chapter II will outline the Theoretical Framework that was used to interpret the data. The meta-theoretical perspective guiding this study, critical discourse analysis approach of the Duisburg School and Van Dijk's (1998) concept for the analysis of political discourses will be presented.

Chapter III sets out to give an overview of the methodological considerations taken, namely the research approach, the data basis, data analysis and data processing, the dimensions of the analysis and the methodological limitations.

Chapter IV presents the historical context in which the discourse strand is embedded in.

Chapter V will present the reader with an integrated presentation of both the findings and their discussion.

Chapter VI finally will present the main conclusions that can be drawn from the study as well as giving an answer to the posed research question. Furthermore, the author's reflection on the analysed topic will be given as well as suggestions for future research.

2. Theoretical Framework

As stated in the introduction, in order to study how and why the linguistic negotiation of migration in the election programs of the ÖVP changed over time, this research is built on the following theoretical pillars: social constructionism, critical discourse analysis and political discourse analysis.

The following chapter will first present the meta-theoretical perspective that is guiding this research. Afterwards the discourse analytical approach utilised for this research and developed at the Duisburg School is presented. This will give a definition of the concept of discourse, present the structure of discourses, define what the realm of the sayable is and show what collective symbols are and what influence they can have when used in political discourse. This will provide the grounds for developing an understanding of how an idea is socially constructed through language.

The second part is concerned with political discourse analysis and will give an introduction to the social domain of politics, why election programs can be understood as discursive practices, how election programs are political actions and why it is important to understand the structure of political discourses before analysing political text and talk. This will provide a framework for analysing and contextualising the language used in the election programmes.

2.1. Social Constructionism

The meta-theoretical perspective of this study is a social constructionist¹⁶ one. According to Burr (1995: 2) it is not accurate to provide one definition for all social constructionist approaches. However, following Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), drawing from Burr (1995) and Gergen (1985), there are four premises that are shared by all social constructionist approaches and those are as follows (4-6):

A critical approach to taken-for-granted-knowledge

Our knowledge and representations are not treated as objective truth but rather as product of our way of categorising the world we live in. Hence, our knowledge and representations are not a reflection of the reality ‘out there’, as reality is accessible to us only through categories.

¹⁶ often used interchangeably, social constructionism in contrast to social constructivism, is concerned with the creation of knowledge through social context and shared production. Social constructivism on the other hand refers to the creation of meaning in the mind of the individual (Talja et al. 2005: 81).

Historical and cultural specificity

We know what we know because we are historical and cultural beings. All knowledge is *contingent*: this means that what we know could be different and it can furthermore change over time. The belief that all knowledge is contingent represents an anti-foundationalist perspective. The belief that discourse is a form of social action that plays a part in the production of the social world (including knowledge, identities and social relations) and thereby maintains specific social patterns, is anti-essentialist.

Link between knowledge and social processes

The ways in which we understand the world we live in, is constructed and maintained by social processes. Common truths are constructed through social interaction and the competition about what is true and false.

Link between knowledge and social action

Finally, the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences. Different forms of social action are perceived normal, while others are unthinkable. Hence, different social understandings of the world result in different understandings of what the appropriate social action would be.

The relevance of the above to the analysis of political discourse, especially the notion that an idea is socially constructed through language and that a certain worldview is not a reflection of the ‘world out there’, is why this meta-theoretical view was chosen for the development of an understanding of *how* and *why* the social construction of an idea proceeds or evolves and *how* and *why* the *linguistic* negotiation of migration in the political discourse of the ÖVP has changed.

2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

While the approaches of other CDA scholars (Fairclough 2012; Meyer & Wodak 2009; Van Dijk 1998, Jørgensen & Phillips 2002) will also be taken into consideration to complement it, the methodological procedure of this study is guided by the discourse analytical concept as developed by the Duisburg Institute for Social and Linguistic Research (DISS) also known as the Duisburg School. The Duisburg School draws upon the discourse analytical reflections made by the French social philosopher Michel Foucault (2015 [1981]; 2017 [1972]) and

refined by the German literary scientist Jürgen Link (1997). The main reason why I chose to utilise the approach as developed by the Duisburg School is that it provides an extensive ‘tool box’, which proved to be suitable to my research interest. The Duisburg School follows Foucault and takes discourses as a quantity of (non-linguistic) *statements* that belong to the same formation system. The surface of the discourse is formed by (linguistic) *utterances*. To make this more clear, I will give an example: the (linguistic) utterance that foreigners do not like to work can point to a (non-linguistic) racist statement. Hence, statements are the content related common factor that can be retrieved from utterances in sentences and texts (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 26, 27). Statements are especially conveyed through collective symbols as will be presented in section 2.2.4 in this chapter and as other research suggests (Jäger & Wamper 2017; Wichert 1994).

2.2.1. The concept of discourse

Among scholars working with discourse analysis there is a multitude of author-specific definitions. Discourses do not *represent* reality, but *constitute* it, meaning that texts are never ‘just’ something individual but always also socially as well as historically embedded (Jäger & Zimmermann 2010: 66). This is why the first part of Chapter IV will give an overview about the historical context relevant for this study. Following Foucault, discourse is defined by the Duisburg School (Jäger 2007: 23) as “free flow of knowledge or rather baggage of social knowledge in time, which by all means can also flow backwards and creates guidelines for the subject formation and the structuration and formation of societies, which prove to be extraordinarily diverse.”

For the purpose of this study, discourse henceforth will be understood as a collection of statements that represents a certain aspect of the world (in this case migration) and contribute to the constitution of a societal reality. Furthermore, the analysis of discourses answers the question of what at a specific time is sayable and what is not and how that changes over time.

2.2.2. The structure of the discourse

Jäger and Jäger (2007) in their book “Fighting about Meaning. Theory and Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis” suggest categories for the analysis of discourses. These categories shall contribute to the disentanglement of closely interwoven discourses, or, as the authors describe it: discourse analysis has to untangle the “discursive swarming”, which is

formed by closely interwoven and closely entangled discourses (25). The relevant categories for this research will be presented in the following paragraphs:

Discourse strands. The entire societal discourse comprises of a broad variety of topics. In the Duisburg School's account of discourse analysis, thematically uniform discourse processes (usually with a large number of sub-themes or rather consisting of different discourse fragments) are called discourse strands [Diskursstränge]. The one analysed for this study is the migration discourse strand.

Foucault analyses discourses as lines of statements and not as collections of sentences and texts. As mentioned above, he distinguishes between (linguistic) *utterances* and (non-linguistic) *statements* (Jäger 2015: 50). This is relevant for this study, as it will be investigated which statements in relation to migration were made sayable. And in most cases, those statements may not be clearly stated but rather implied by a number of utterances. An example of this can be found in the 2017 ÖVP election programme where it says that people rescued on the Mediterranean shall be brought to so-called 'Rescue Centres' outside of European territory. Only people who enter Europe through resettlement programs shall be allowed to stay (ÖVP 2017b: 20). I do not want to delve into analysis at this point, but to make a point here, this is only one utterance and no statement can be retrieved from only one utterance. Nevertheless, what the presented utterance points to is an exclusionary statement: being able to apply for asylum on European territory, shall not be possible anymore.

Discourse levels. The above described discourse strands operate on different discourse levels such as the levels of science, media, literature, education, etc. This study will analyse a discourse strand ('migration') on the discourse level of politics. Those discourse levels could also be described as the social place from where someone speaks or writes. What needs to be taken into account is that these discourse levels relate to and influence each other and one discourse level can be of good use to another level. Political discourse is often influenced by scientific or media discourse and vice versa. This influences the context of this study, as according to Van Dijk (1992), political discourses are "showcase" discourses as most political text and talk is covered by the media (201). Political discourse, just like media discourse is interdiscursive insofar as different discourse levels relate to each other, influence each other and create value for one another. Especially regarding socially pressing subject matters such as migration, the media and the political discourse often show remarkable

similarities. Through this interdependency, political discourse legitimises and reproduces hegemonial political practice (Jäger & Zimmermann 2010: 95). I am not claiming here that this is an aspect I can comprehensively study through analysing one genre of the political discourse of one political party in Austria. What this study can do, though, is contribute to a wider scientific discussion of how political discourse influences media discourse and vice versa.

Discourse fragments. A discourse fragment is a text or part of a text that deals with a certain topic, for example the topic of integration (Jäger 2015: 80).

Discourse position. The category discourse position represents the specific politico-ideological location of a person or a group. In the context of this study, this is also relevant for problematising the discourse position of the researcher, which will be done in section 3.5 of Chapter III. Those positions can only be defined after having conducted a discourse analysis.

2.2.3. The realm of the sayable

The aim of this study is to examine how the realm of the sayable in political discourse and more specifically in the genre election programme of the ÖVP, has shifted over time. Discourse analysis examines the sayable at a certain time in a certain society, in its qualitative range and in all its utterances and hence statements. Furthermore, the strategies through which the realm of the sayable is altered are an object of investigation. Those strategies can be everything from denial strategies, relativization strategies to removal or taboo strategies. If such strategies can be determined it usually points to statements that are sayable or aren't sayable anymore at a certain time in a certain society. The realm of the sayable can be expanded or narrowed through direct prohibitions and restrictions, allusions, implications, and explicit underlining of taboos but also through conventions, internalisations, etc. (Jäger in Keller et al. 2006: 85, 86). General historical examples to this are the opening of marriage for different sexual orientations or the introduction of women's voting rights.

2.2.4. Collective symbols

As mentioned above, discourses are a collection of statements that represent a certain aspect of the world. Statements convey themselves in part through *collective symbols*¹⁷. The deployment of such symbols can have enormous effects, because they facilitate orientation in the society that a person inhabits. Every modern industrial society has a system of collective symbolism, which is more or less an interdiscursive set of rules, whereas interdiscursive elements are those which interlace specialised discourses (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 39). Natural elements like ‘water’ and ‘tides’, natural disasters like ‘tsunamis’ or ‘floods’, military terms like ‘invasion’ - persuasively representing ‘migration’ or ‘migrants as something that has to ‘stemmed’, ‘held back’ or ‘fought against’ - are examples of collective symbols. Widely known is also the ‘ship’ metaphor, symbolising the effects of migration on nation states as an ‘overcrowded boat’ or the ‘house’ and ‘door’ metaphor which depicts the (national) territory of in-groups as a ‘house’ and stopping immigration as ‘closing’ or even ‘bolting the door’ (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2017: 27, 28).

Following this, it is clear how collective symbols make a decisive contribution to the impacts of discourses, as an important discourse supporting element. There are especially two characteristics that make collective symbolism an element that stabilises discourses (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 39):

- collective symbols produce rational as well as emotional tainted knowledge, because they simplify complex realities, make them plausible and thereby interpret them in a specific way
- as far as collective symbols unfold their power impacts within a certain system, they produce a knowledge within a particular order that suggests a particular logic and particular options for action that stem from that knowledge

Jäger (1993: 251) provides a helpful definition: “The system of collective symbolism serves to hide contradictions of societal reality, to paint a harmonic picture of the (same old ‘normal’) own world, to integrate any dramatic change symbolically, to distinguish clearly between ‘normality’ and ‘deviation’”. An example of this is the medical term ‘cancer’. Few people would be able to state the exact medical definition. If, however, a politician states that

¹⁷ often also called *topoi* in discourse analysis.

terrorism is the ‘cancer of society’, the degree of collective comprehensibility would be quite high.

The basic structure of the collective symbol concept can be described as a circular entity, the borderlines of which concurrently also symbolise the borders of the social system. The social system can be two-parted horizontally, vertically and diagonally. Thus, a right-centre-left-axis is created, which is characteristic for locating political positions, parties, groups, etc. It is an axis that particularly favours the place of the centre, because of its ‘stability’ (Disselnkötter & Parr 1994: 52).

Through the symbolic encoding of events, these borders illustrate when, and if so what action is needed. For example, at the ‘border of terrorism’, society is asked to take action and bring about a state or situation of ‘normality’.

Especially for conflict discourses, to which the discourse about migration belongs, these symbols are important in order to frame the ‘outside’ and the ‘inside’ area. With the symbols or lines of symbols, distinctions can be made in order to mark who belongs to one’s own group and who does not. In other words, who is a friend and who is an enemy. Those symbolic opposites (inside vs. outside, ordered vs. chaotic, etc.) imply valuations, which are fundamentally ideological. The own system is mostly depicted as the good, ordered and stable; the unknown or foreign point of view often as a chaotic outside, which in certain cases threatens the ordered and stable inside (Drews et al. 1985: 270).

There are significant differences between the collective symbols used to describe the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’. The ‘inside’, being ‘the Western World’ or ‘Austria’ in this case, most often coded as car, ship, house, body etc. and, in contrast, bugs, a storm, stream, flood or illness used to code the ‘outside’ (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 42).

2.3. Political Discourse Analysis

The discourse level that will be analysed in this study is politics. As stated above, those discourse levels could also be called the social place from where someone speaks or writes. Hence, the following will give an introduction to the social domain of politics and provide the framework for analysing and contextualising the language used in the election programmes.

2.3.1. The social domain of politics

While the majority of studies on political discourse is about the text and talk of professional politicians, this study is not about the latter but rather a collective form of political discourse, namely the *genre* of party programs. Following Van Dijk (2002) “political discourse itself is not a genre but a class of genres defined by a social domain, namely that of politics” (19). Hence, party programmes are among the many genres that belong to the social domain¹⁸ of politics.

Ranging from sessions and meetings of political institutions to demonstrations and political campaigning, political actions are concrete acts and interactions, typical for the domain of politics. Within the more complex political process those actions are also defined in terms of their purposes, goals, functions and intentions. Hence, for the purpose of this study, election programs will also be understood and analysed as a form of political action.

Van Dijk (2002: 19) argues that political discourse is institutional, meaning that it is produced in institutional settings, in the case of this study the institutional setting of the political party ÖVP. Especially interesting in this case is that election programs have political functions and implications and thus are not only political actions but also *discursive practices*.

This relates to the sociopolitical aspiration of CDA approaches to unravel the discursive construction and reproduction of social inequalities. Fundamental to all those approaches is the conception of *language* as a form of *social practice*, hence language or rather language use is primarily analysed within the respective social context. This refers to *discursive practice*, which is a form of social practice that “reproduces or changes other dimensions of social practice just as other social dimensions shape the discursive dimension” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 19). Election programs in this study are also understood as a discursive practice, as they have political functions and implications.

¹⁸ Domain labels such as Health, Business, Law or the Arts play important roles in common sense. The same applies to politics, especially when it comes to judging political actions and discourse. That can be both, positive and negative. When for example research is prohibited because it is no longer deemed in the domain of science but in the domain of politics instead. Furthermore, social actors are expected to know or it is at least assumed that they know in which domain they are currently acting (Van Dijk 1998: 16).

2.3.2. Election programs as discursive practices

As described above, the concept of discourse, following Foucault, merely comprise the linguistic part of discursive practices. Beyond discourse, discursive practices also encompass rules of verbalisation, scriptualisation and medialisation. This speaks to Van Dijk's claim that political discourses are institutional. Link and Link-Heer (1990) furthermore elaborate that Foucault analyses correlations between *words* and *things* or rather between *discourses* (as specific statement formations) and its *objects* (e.g. madness or sex). Hence, discursive practice must be understood as a materialistic instrument of production through which and thereby in an orderly manner, the production of historical-social objects is made possible. Critiques of Foucault at this point often claim that he thereby presupposes that the world was constituted by discourses alone and did not exist before. Foucault does however mention *non-discursive practices*, for example economics. Contrary to what terms like *text* or *work* might suggest, *discourse* in Foucauldian terms does emphasise the close link to practices on the one hand side and the priority of discourses as a scattering of statements opposite to the relative unity of texts on the other side (88-90).

This relative unity of texts is questioned by Jäger (2015) as in his opinion also single texts consist of different *topics* and one text can address more than one topic, so that discourses that are thematically consistent in themselves, are not only composed of texts, but of (thematically consistent) *discourse fragments*. As explained above, Jäger calls these thematically consistent discourses *discourse strands* (24).

Foucault on the other hand understands this phenomenon as scattering. In his foundational book "The Archaeology of Knowledge [L'archéologie du savoir]" he formulates: "The discourse is a quantity of statements that belong to the same formation system. And so I will be able to talk about the clinical discourse, the economic discourse, the natural-history discourse and the psychiatric discourse." (Foucault 2015 [1981]: 156). Foucault primarily dealt with specialised discourses ie. scientific discourses. Therefore, I agree with Jäger who wants to avoid the Foucauldian formation system in relation to knowledge production as it implies in Jäger's opinion that those formation systems are generating and self-contained systems that just create or produce knowledge. He therefore uses the german term *Diskursstränge* [*discourse strands*], as just mentioned, in order to describe those thematically consistent discourses, as it allows for a more flexible analysis of discourses, especially over time (Jäger 2015: 79-81).

Summing up and returning to political discourse, it is important to acknowledge that election programs too are a discursive practice. They contribute to knowledge production and influence legislation. They are not only a quantity of statements, but they contribute to knowledge production and influence legislation by forming thematically consistent discourse strands consisting of topically coherent discourse fragments.

2.3.3. Political Discourse as a Political Action

Van Dijk (1998) stresses that political discourse analysis in many respects is about both political discourse and a critical analysis. It deals especially with the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance. In particular such an analysis deals with the discursive conditions and consequences of social and political inequality that results from such domination” (van Dijk 1998: 13). In other words and interesting for this study, PDA is about analysing the relations between discourse structures and political context structures as using collective symbols or metaphors may serve the legitimisation of political power. In other words, using positive self- and negative other-representation in political discourse often serves to constitute the *other* as a threat for all of *us*.

While without doubt not all analysis of the political should be done through the lens of discourse analysis, PDA can especially contribute to unravel hidden cognitions, processes and structures behind supposedly humanist- or tolerant sounding rhetoric. Political text and talk need description and analysis in their own right. In order to understand all the kinds of possible influences or effects party programmes for example may have on political cognitions and the public at large, we need to know how they are organised, structured and expressed. A critical analysis of political texts allows us to make inferences about political context features such as power relations, othering, group interests and so on (Van Dijk 1998: 41).

2.3.4. Political Discourse structures

While recognising that socio-economic factors of immigration for example do have an influence on the political discourse about immigration, this study is especially interested in what contribution political discourse has on the growing resentment against foreigners and how such discourse influences political action and hence political structure (Van Dijk 1998: 42). Therefore, it makes sense to examine the different levels and dimensions of discourse

structure and thereby to unravel which strategies can be deemed *political*. These discourse levels and dimensions will be utilised for the analysis of the election programmes.

Topics. Political discourse is typically and, in contrast to other discourses, reflexive. This means that campaigning politicians will most probably mostly talk about themselves and election programmes, and often deal with the bad policies of opponents or predecessors and so on. Another characteristic of political discourse is discourse entanglement or interdiscursivity (Van Dijk 1998: 25). A discourse entanglement is present when a text deals with different topics or when only one topic is addressed but references to other topics are made. More precisely, when for example in a commentary that deals with immigration references are repeatedly made to economic lines of discourses (Jäger 2015: 87).

Textual schemata. Discourse genres and in the case of this study, the political discourse genre of election programs are organised by schematic structures that carry out different functions. One of those functions is to highlight preferred information and even delete or hide dispreferred information for political reasons. It does influence the way in which meaning is distributed in discourse if information is put in a headline, summary or a conclusion. It is a political choice which information is put where.

Lexicon (Wording). Positive-self and negative-other representation can be carried out through lexical choice and variation as well. Habits and actions of *our* group are described in a euphemistic and those of the *others* in a negative way (Van Dijk 1998: 33). An example of this would be human smuggler vs. border crossing helper or terrorist vs. freedom fighter.

Syntax. Less obvious but nevertheless not less important is the manipulation of syntactic style in political discourse. The most relevant syntactic variations for this study are:

- the use of deictic pronouns, such as *we*, *us* (or possessive *our*). The use of these pronouns has strong implications for a political position, solidarity, empathy, alliances to a political actor and the respective in-group that is constructed.
- word order, which usually has two types of political functions. The first one is creating more emphasis through the more or less prominent placement of words and phrases and the second one is how underlying semantic roles are focused on.
- topicalisation, through the fronting of words or the use of active sentences vs. passive sentences. The fronting of words may contribute to emphasise the good things *we*

have done in contrast to the *others*, and the use of active vs. passive sentences correlates with putting more or less emphasis on specific meanings. An example here would be the well-known headlines Police killed demonstrators vs. Demonstrators killed by Police vs. Demonstrators killed (Van Dijk 1998: 34).

2.4. Summary

The aim of this study is to describe *how* and *why* the ÖVP's linguistic negotiation of the topic 'migration' in their election programs changed over time. Both have yet to be described. The object of analysis is therefore the political discourse of the ÖVP and more specifically the statements made in the election programs regarding migration. Hence, this is a study of the changes of discourse over time.

It will be therefore of interest, which topics and statements in relation to migration are made sayable and which ones are discursively moved into the field of the unsayable or even unthinkable. Furthermore, it is of interest to find out how certain strategies on how to best deal with migration are constructed and other strategies are made invisible, unthinkable and henceforth are made politically impossible and which collective symbols were employed to support this.

Analysing which collective symbols were used to frame the other as a threat, and thereby open up space for certain political action, will be particularly interesting. Positive self- and negative other-representation in political discourse, especially through the use of collective symbols, serves to constitute the *other* as a threat for all of *us*. For example, the reception of refugees can be inter alia framed as a *threat* to society or as a *challenge*, with completely different implications for political action. Therefore, political discourse itself is also a form of political action.

Furthermore, and as stated above, political analysis can help to identify hidden cognitions, processes and structures behind supposedly humanist-sounding rhetoric. In regard to the aim of this study, this will also help to unravel which strategies were used to expand or narrow the realm of the sayable. Finally, the presented levels and dimension of political discourse enable an expansion of the Duisburg School's discourse analytical concept and include deeper semantic aspects and considerations.

3. Methodology

The aim of this *qualitative* study is to analyse how a discourse and the construction of meaning change over time and how power and ideology are played out in a localised place (ie. Austria). More specifically, *how* the linguistic negotiation of the topic ‘migration’ in the election programs of the ÖVP changed over time. A discourse analysis of a political discourse can contribute particularly to unravelling hidden cognitions, processes and structures behind different sounding rhetoric (Van Dijk 1998: 41). As mentioned above, CDA offers the theoretical perspective as well as being the methodological approach to this study. Nine ÖVP election programs will be taken as a final sample. Therefore, this study looks at the social domain of politics through the *genre* election programme. The analysed political actor is the political party ÖVP in whose institutionalised setting the election programs came into being.

Elections programmes were selected as the object of investigation because they comprise the political goals and policy proposals of the ÖVP at a specific place in time, namely the respective general elections and therefore allow for an analysis of changes in discourse over time. However, this is a small sample for a qualitative study of *one* genre of the political discourse of the ÖVP. Therefore, no generalisations concerning the entire political discourse of the ÖVP will be made, as this would be methodologically invalid.

3.1. Research Approach

Following the philosophical perspective of this study (ie. *social constructionism*), it followed an *inductive*¹⁹ research approach, since, for the above mentioned understanding of *how* the social construction of an idea proceeds or evolves it is necessary to first look at what the actual ideas or topics, presented in the election programmes, are. Still, this study also comprises parts of a *deductive*²⁰ approach as it was assumed in the beginning that the discourse of the ÖVP has changed and this change ought to be tested through CDA. Hence, it can be argued that by combining parts of inductive and deductive research approaches, I use an *adaptive* approach for this study. An adaptive approach is beneficial in the context of this

¹⁹ “Inductive analysis refers to approaches that primarily use detailed readings of raw data to derive concepts, themes, or a model through interpretations made from the raw data by a researcher. This understanding of inductive analysis is consistent with Strauss & Corbin’s (1998) description: “The researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data.” (Thomas 2006: 238).

²⁰ “Deductive analysis (...) refers to data analysis that set out to test whether data are consistent with prior assumptions, theories, or hypotheses identified or constructed by an investigator.” (ibid.)

study, as it allows me to adjust the research approach on the basis of the analysed data and to make sure that no topics or elements of the analysed discourse are left out, because of sticking rigidly to either a purely inductive or deductive approach (Layder 2011: 16).

3.2. Data basis

After the end of World War II, Austria was reconstituted as an independent republic, yet the Allied Council controlled the decisions of the government between 1945 and 1955. Only with the signing of the state treaty in 1955 did Austria retrieve its full state sovereignty. Therefore, the original sample of election programmes started with the first election programme issued after 1955 even though the ÖVP was founded in 1945. A first readthrough of the data (no mention of migration related topics in the election programmes of 1956, 1962 and 1966) and the fact that the ‘Raab-Olah-Agreement²¹’ of 1961 marked the beginning of the structured worker migration period in Austrian history, resulted in my decision to narrow the time frame for the first time. Hence, the final sample for the first round of analysis consisted of 15 election programmes, starting with the 1970 election programme and ending with the most recent 2017 one. In a second round, it was decided to further narrow the time frame and to remove the following election programs: 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983 and 1986. This was on the one hand influenced by the lack of relevant findings in those election programmes, and on the other hand to allow for a more in-depth analysis of the remaining election programs.

The final sample for the analysis was therefore comprised of the following election programs:

Year	Title	Candidate
1990	“Vote for the upswing! With us it is certain.” [“Den Aufschwung wählen! Mit uns ist er sicher.”]	Josef Riegler
1994	“The Erhard-Busek-plans for Austria. For our Heimat. For our economy. For our security.” [“Die Erhard-Busek-Pläne für Österreich. Für unsere Heimat. Für unsere Wirtschaft. Für unserer Sicherheit.”]	Erhard Busek
1995	“The Schüssel-Ditz-path” [“Der Schüssel-Ditz-Kurs”]	Wolfgang Schüssel
1999	“The better way” [“Der bessere Weg”]	Wolfgang Schüssel

²¹ This agreement constituted the resulting recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964), and Yugoslavia (1966) (Rupnow 2017: 39)

2002	“The Austria programme of the People’s Party” [“Das Österreich-Programm der Volkspartei”]	Wolfgang Schüssel
2006	“Coursebook future - modern. secure. humane” [“Kursbuch Zukunft - Modern. Sicher. Menschlich”]	Wolfgang Schüssel
2008	“A new start for Austria” [“Neustart für Österreich”]	Wilhelm Molterer
2013	“Future-oriented. Austria 2018: The programme of the ÖVP for the general elections 2013” [“Zukunftsweisend. Österreich 2018: Das Programm der ÖVP zur Nationalratswahl 2013.”]	Michael Spindelegger
2017	“The new path. For Austria” [“Der neue Weg. Für Österreich”]	Sebastian Kurz

I retrieved the data partly from the internet, as some election programmes are still available online. The rest were sent to me directly by the staff members of the ÖVP office in Vienna.

3.3. Data analysis

One of the characteristics of CDA is that it is not comprised of a standardised coding process that guides the analysis and specifies which parts of the texts will be looked into. This is a weakness on the one hand as it increases the subjectivity of this methodological approach (this will be addressed further in section 3.5) but at the same time it represents one of the strengths of CDA, as it allows the researcher to be more ‘open’ towards the data. This means that, with CDA, the researcher is able to look for more subtle linguistic and stylistic nuances in the text which are sometimes overlooked when applying a more rigid, standardised procedure (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002).

In the case of this research this was solved by posing three sub-questions deeply rooted in the Theoretical Framework, as described above. In order to investigate which topics were prevalent in the election programmes from 1990 to 2017, I first collected all the discourse fragments dealing with migration issues. As a next step I then organised them according to what they were ‘actually’ talking about ie. which topic an utterance was addressing. For example, when talking about implementing quotas or who should be allowed to participate in the Austrian labour market or who should be entitled to social welfare benefits, the topic that is actually talked about is the *welfare state*.

Those topics, in turn, informed how the first part of the analysis, namely the analysis of the historical context, would be structured. Here, I included information about changes regarding migration related legislation. I found it important to provide that information, as the ÖVP was part of every government since 1990 and had, therefore, at least partly determined those changes. Furthermore, events that fall under the term 'discursive event' in conjunction with migration, and which occurred during the analysed time frame, were included in the historical context chapter as well. A discursive event is defined by Jäger (2015) as one that received great media attention and is capable of influencing the direction of the lines of discourse to which they belong. Whether a discourse moment becomes a discursive event is also determined by political dominances and the respective discursive context in which it takes place. Furthermore, the determination of such discursive events is essential in order to trace what influenced the present discursive context (82, 83). Determining such discursive events is essential in order to trace what influenced the present discursive context. As it would exceed the scope of my study to conduct an in-depth analysis on which discursive moments during that time span became discursive events, I included the findings of other researchers (Reisigl & Wodak 2000; Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009; Jäger & Wamper 2017). How the analysis of the historical context is structured is a reflection of the adaptive research approach of this study.

3.4. Dimensions of analysis

This is a study of the change of discourse over time. This will be done by applying different analytical dimensions. Both Jäger's and Van Dijk's theoretical as well as practical work was used in order to establish those. The analysis will be structured according to the three sub-questions but, within those, the analytical dimensions as presented in section 2.3.4 'Political Discourse structures' of Chapter II will guide the analysis.

The analysis of textual schemata or *argumentation* will focus on how logics of how to deal with migration were constructed through relativisation, denial and generalisation. (Jäger 2015: 107). This will focus on what is presented as a fact, and is closely related to what Jäger identifies as *fighting about meaning* [*Deutungskampf*]. This is important in regard to the nexus between power and knowledge²², and the sustaining of ideas and the perpetuation of

²² Power and knowledge are two of the central terms in the works of Foucault. Knowledge is connected to the realms of the sayable. Discourses as *carriers of knowledge* exercise power, they are therefore power factors

them as ‘common sense’, which is what constitutes hegemony. The discourse analytical concept as developed by Jäger problematises these interpretative patterns and enables the researcher to critique hegemonial discourses (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 8).

As part of a textual analysis, the focus will also be on the lexical style ie. *wording*. According to Van Dijk (1998: 33), positive-self and negative-other representation can be carried out through lexical choice and variation as well. Habits and actions of *our* group are described in a euphemistic and those of the *others* in a negative way. It will therefore be of interest if and how the ÖVP makes use of this in their election programs or rather who is included into the *we* group and who is not (Jäger 2015: 107).

Special attention will also be drawn to the manipulation of *syntactic style*. This will help to understand how political positions, solidarity, empathy and in-/out-groups are constructed. Furthermore, it is of interest for this study how and where words and utterances are placed, meaning if they are placed: whether they are placed in a more or less prominent position, how much space an idea gets, and so on. Additionally, also the topicalisation, through the fronting of words and thereby placing more or less emphasis on specific meaning, will be of interest for this study (Van Dijk 1998.: 34).

Finally, what is not said in the election programmes but rather is implied through metaphors or symbols, will also be explored (Jäger & Zimmermann 2010: 68).

3.5. Methodological limitations

The following will present the methodological limitations of this study:

Discourse position. As I am presenting, interpreting and critiquing discursive realms of the sayable, my own discourse position influences the analysis. Humanities as well as social sciences have always been political. The analysis of a societal reality is always done in the context of a knowledge that the scientific subject, in this case me, has developed throughout the course of its life. This knowledge has been passed on as well as changed. This knowledge will influence the analysis of utterances and the elaboration of statements in the election programs of the ÖVP. I am therefore aware that my scientific statements as well as findings

themselves as they are suitable to induce behaviour and other discourses. They therefore contribute to the structuration of power and dominance structures in the respective societies (Jäger 2015: 38).

will be influenced by my historical position. This position is a result of a discursive process and my findings as well as my critique are part of the discourses as well. There will always be a scientific battle about different interpretations of reality; as a result, this study is also just a contribution to further scientific discussion (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 15, 16).

Validity. Social constructionism and henceforth also discourse analysis reject the assumption that certain standards that qualify academic research as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ do exist. Still, there is also no consensus on which criteria to apply instead. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 125, 126) suggest that by providing *coherent* analytical claims, presenting the *fruitfulness* or rather the benefits that come from studying a certain subject through discourse analysis and by being *transparent* about the methods and the analysis, one can determine validity. Therefore, it is crucial to give the reader access to the empirical material, or at least to reproduce longer extracts of the material in the analytical chapter. As mentioned above, it will be inevitable that my own discourse position influences the findings of this study. Nonetheless, I will do my best in being transparent and presenting the empirical material in a way in which the reader can judge the coherence and validity of my conclusions.

Data analysis. Various authors (Fairclough 2003; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002) point to the fact that there is no universal or standardised approach for conducting a CDA. Discourse analysis is rather a series of interdisciplinary approaches and no clear consensus exists within those about how an analysis should be carried out. Subjectivity is clearly one of the biggest issues here, in the sense that if the analysis would have been carried out by another researcher, he or she would have possibly chosen different theoretical concepts and dimensions for analysis leading to different findings. Readers at this point are advised to consult other research on the topic and compare as well as contrast findings and conclusions. As Fairclough (2003: 14) rightfully stresses: there is no definitive analysis of text and talk.

Translation. As this study is analysing the election programmes of the Austrian party ÖVP, translation as an issue needs to be addressed, as metaphors and symbols, for example, vary from culture to culture and are often language-specific (Abma et al. 2010: 314). The election programmes were published in German and all the presented quotes in this study were translated into English. While German is my mother tongue and my English proficiency is C2

according to CEFA²³, some meaning inevitably got lost during the translation process. This is important for the reader to know as it might impact the analysis and the findings to some extent.

Furthermore, parts of the theoretical foundation of this study derived from the discourse analytical work as developed at the Duisburg School in Germany. Parts of their publications were available in English as well, but some of their analytical concepts and tools needed to be translated into English and this proved to be a challenge as well, as some scientific terms simply would not work the same way in the English language. I tried to solve this challenge by adding footnotes comprising of additional information or rather a definition.

Representativeness and generalisation. This qualitative study analyses election programmes, *one* genre of the political discourse of the ÖVP. And within this genre it focuses on one line of discourse, namely that of migration. Hence, making generalisations according to the conclusions comes with clear limitations. Therefore, the findings of this study *cannot* be generalised for the whole political discourse of the ÖVP, but they can serve as a starting point for further analyses of, for example, other genres of the political discourse of the ÖVP, or other methodological approaches, such as policy analysis.

²³ Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

4. Historical Context

Every discourse strand is situated in a discursive context and is part of that discursive context. It is necessary to outline the relevant discursive context, because the meaning and the content of a discourse strand can only be understood and interpreted based on that background (Jäger & Zimmermann 2010: 42). The discursive context, as stated by Busse (2007: 82) is “the epistemic-cognitive background, which makes possible the understanding of the respective linguistic character-strings or communication acts in the first place.”

In this regard the following chapter sets out to provide a historical overview of the context of the empirical data of this study, making no claim to be exhaustive. The chapter is structured as follows: the first section describes the period from the 1960s, when structured worker migration in Austria started to the 1990s and the fall of the iron curtain, which led to growing refugee movements and a changing public discourse in regard to migration. The following three sections present the hegemonial topics, discursive events, relevant legislation and information about the respective election campaigns of the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s in conjunction with migration. As presented in the Methodology Chapter, those topics were identified through an inductive research approach.

4.1. From structured worker migration to the fall of the iron curtain

The following section provides the grounds for an understanding of what influenced the way the ÖVP linguistically negotiated migration at the beginning of the 1990s.

Migration and more specifically immigration²⁴ became a topic for the first time in 1956, when refugees from Hungary were arriving in Austria as a result of the Hungarian Revolution. There was a huge (although in hindsight often glorified) consensus that those people were welcomed in Austria. Other cold war refugees included refugees coming from the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia at the time) in 1968/69 following the ‘Prague Spring’ (Graf & Knoll 2017: 91, 92). The numbers of these refugees were quantitatively small, which is why these refugee movements were never really problematised in public discussion. The first huge event in regard to migration was the ‘Raab-Olah-Agreement’ of 1961²⁵, which marked the beginning of the structured worker migration period in Austrian history. This

²⁴ Emigration was the general pattern before in the 20th century.

²⁵ allowing a contingent of 47.000 foreign workers to come to Austria (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 73).

agreement laid the foundation for the following recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964), and Yugoslavia (1966) (Rupnow 2017: 39)

In the 1960s and 1970s, laws regarding immigration were continuously liberalised, with permitted quotas rising, resulting in a substantial increase of foreign labour in the Austrian market. Refugees coming from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), who were trying to flee to Western Germany, made use of those liberalisations. However, the oil crisis of 1973 led to a sudden economic crisis which consequently led to a period in which economic growth was considerably declining. A further consequence was that the liberalisation of immigration laws regressed again (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 73, 74).

Despite ambivalent policies towards them at the time, there is in retrospect often a romanticisation of the way Austria handled cold war refugees. Austria's *humanitarian tradition*²⁶ is a narrative that is often employed in political text and talk. Those coming from Hungary in 1956 (around 160,000 people) and from Czechoslovakia in 1968 (around 100,000 people), were indeed mostly warmly welcomed, but that quickly changed. In contrast to the mostly positive reception of these refugees, the Polish refugees arriving in 1981/82 and the refugees that followed the upheaval in Romania at the end of the 1980s, were perceived as 'economic migrants' (Graf & Knoll 2017: 93-111).

The general political upheaval of the late 1980s, which coincided with the fall of the iron curtain, led to Austria seeing a significant rise in asylum seeking and immigration (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 73, 74). However, those who wanted to emigrate to Austria, as well as those who were already there and had applied for asylum already, were no longer recognised as victims of persecution, which led to the deportation of around 3,000 Poles and Hungarians. Procedures for receiving asylum were constrained, and when Czechoslovakia relaxed its travel restrictions in 1989, the Austrian government stressed that it was not a country of immigration but would rather serve as a transit country for those refugees (Reisigl & Wodak 2000: 149). People transiting the borders in 1989, were increasingly perceived a threat to Austrian security, as was the concept of open borders in general (Graf & Knoll 2017: 93-111).

²⁶ often employed also by NGOs in order to refer to a turnaround of the humanitarian tradition in Austria after 2015.

Another topic that was already on the political agenda prior to 1990 was the *welfare state*. The Austrian welfare state was significantly expanded during the 1950s and this expansion continued up until the 1970s. As in so many other Western European countries this period is referred to as the ‘golden era of the welfare state’. The oil crisis brought stagnating and worsened economic conditions, which led to a decline in measures taken to further expand the welfare system. And the 1990s brought a move towards more restrictive measures, such as aggravating the conditions of entitlement to unemployment benefits (1991, 1993 and 1995) as well as sanctions in connection with misuse in the form of the unemployment insurance act 1996 (Fink & Tálos 2001: 3-8).

4.2. The 1990s: Introducing quotas and becoming an EU member state

The topic of migration polarised Austrian Society since the beginning of the 1990s and accelerated when the FPÖ launched the ‘Austria first’ referendum, often referred to by critics as the ‘Anti-Foreigner’ referendum that sparked an unprecedented wave of protests. One of the demands of the referendum, among many others, was to render “Austria is not an immigration country” a constitutional provision.

Relevant legislation introduced in that time period was the Residence Act of 1992, which was the first of a series of immigration laws passed in the 1990s. It was particularly directed at the ‘unwanted immigrants’²⁷, whose number, as illustrated above, increased in the years after the fall of the iron curtain and the dissolution of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The Residence Act of 1992 introduced a number of crucial changes²⁸ to Austrian immigration policies that influenced the policies’ overall direction up until today. The Act was also perceived as the first official ‘reaction’ to growing immigration numbers since 1989. It was initiated by the SPÖ and supported by the ÖVP. The introduction of the Act took place in the context of EU-wide changes to immigration policies. Germany for example introduced similar legislation earlier that year (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 53-55).

²⁷ people fleeing from countries outside of the EU

²⁸ the most important and influential were: 1. the introduction of quota for newly arriving migrants, which is fixed by the decree every year by the Austrian government 2. the introduction of the rule that applications for residence can only be made from abroad, 3. prohibition of the transfer from tourist status to residence status, 4. the introduction of temporary residence permits (subject to quota) within the first five years of residence and the possibility of obtaining permanent residence only after five years of temporary residence

The campaigns about the EU accession referendum transitioned smoothly into the election campaigns for the elections of 1994. Following the ‘Austria first’ referendum, the FPÖ under the leadership of Jörg Haider primarily campaigned with the topic immigration, foreigners and security (Hayek 2016: 71,72).

Only 14 months after the 1994 elections, Austria’s citizens had to vote again, because the Grand Coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP was dissolved as a result of discrepancy over the national budget (Hayek 2016: 73,74).

As a consequence of the war in Bosnia (1992 - 1995), around 90,000 people sought refuge in Austria, out of which 60,000 stayed (Hill & Yildiz 2015: 139). The handling of this refugee intake was characterised by pragmatism. Fleeing from acts of war does not fall under the definition of a refugee according to the Geneva Refugee Convention. Nevertheless, the Austrian government equated the people fleeing from Bosnia with refugees, while publicly announcing that they would be prepared to take even more people in, if necessary.

Following the EU accession of Austria in 1995, migration related legislation passed during that period was the 1997 Foreigners Act and the Asylum Act. The Austrian government through that Act introduced a stricter handling of visa applications and different forms of residence permits, divided into “temporary residence permits”²⁹ and “settlement permits”³⁰.

4.3. The 2000s: Security and Integration

“One of the most dramatic election campaigns in the Second Republic” - this is how the 1999 election campaign is often described (Plasser et al. 2000b: 50). Polls showed high gains of voting shares for the FPÖ at the expense of the ÖVP and SPÖ. As a reaction to this, the ÖVP changed its strategy and their candidate Wolfgang Schüssel famously stated in a television interview that if the ÖVP does not at least win second place, the ÖVP will not be part of the government. With this statement, the ÖVP was seeking direct confrontation with the FPÖ. The media coverage of the following weeks was therefore dominated by the discussion about possible forms of government. What followed was a surprise. The ÖVP did only win third place in the elections, but nevertheless formed a government with the FPÖ, which ultimately

²⁹ which is issued for foreigners who want to stay in Austria for a defined period of time, but do not wish to settle in Austria. This form was limited by quotas (such as so-called “key worker” quotas).

³⁰ which is issued to foreigners who wish to settle in Austria on a permanent basis.

led to Wolfgang Schüssel becoming the first ÖVP chancellor of the Second Republic since 1970 and the constitution of the first ÖVP-FPÖ government (Hayek 2016: 74,75).

Integration became an important topic at the turn of the millenium. In 2000, the ÖVP-FPÖ government introduced the so-called ‘Integration Agreement’. Being a combined revision of several key migration related laws (Foreigners Act, Foreign Labour Act and Asylum Act), the name of the joint revision was ‘Integration Agreement’³¹. The aim, as stated by the ÖVP-FPÖ government, was to build a bridge between all the people living in Austria - both Austrian and non-Austrian citizens - in order to guarantee a peaceful coexistence. The target groups of the Integration Agreement were key workers and their families, unemployed nationals of non-EU countries, people who did not yet hold a residence permit under the terms of the Foreigners Act. The law, or rather the agreement, carried obligations (such as compulsory German classes) that, if not met, resulted in fines or sanctions (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 58-60). Not only Austria but also countries like Denmark, France and the Netherlands installed so-called ‘integration contracts’ that impose duties on arriving migrants and result in negative consequences if a migrants wishes to stay long term, but is not able to fulfill those contracts (is not able to pass the required language tests, etc.) (Miller 2016: 135, 136).

Because of internal disputes in the FPÖ, the coalition between the FPÖ and the ÖVP was dissolved after only two and a half years. The ÖVP focused on its candidate Wolfgang Schüssel and wooed disappointed FPÖ voters. The other parties were unable to convince those group of voters and so the ÖVP won the elections and was able to continue the coalition with a weakened FPÖ (Hayek 2016: 76-78).

In 2005 the ‘Foreign Nationals Legislative Package’ [Fremdenrechtspaket] was introduced, which still regulates most of Austria’s immigration related legislation today³². It was announced that this ‘package-deal’ was introduced in order to implement several EU directives (such as family reunion, free movement of EU citizens, the fight against human trafficking, long-term residence etc.). Furthermore, it was communicated that the aim of the

³¹ The Integration Agreement was widely criticised in academic circles for several reasons, but for example also because of the misleading name, as no one was asked to agree, but had to and the policy was no perceived capable of contributing to any real degree of integration (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 60).

³² several amendments to the ‘Foreign Nationals Legislative Package’ followed since 2005, steadily becoming more restrictive

“Foreign Nationals Legislative Package” was also to strengthen measures against illegal immigration and ‘fraudulent’ marriages and adoptions (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 60-62).

Security was of one of the dominant topics at the time and the ‘package-deal’ also included a number of provisions that officially referred to terrorism, in the aftermath of terror attacks in the US (2001), Spain (2004) and the UK (2005). These provisions officially followed the urge to protect Austria’s ‘homeland security’. What Krzyzanowski & Wodak (2009) observed as well though is that the deal subtly, but very effectively served as a tool to change Austria’s immigration policies following the EU accession of several countries in the East. The aim was to stiffen the policy towards third country nationals, as Austria was not capable anymore of denying residence to previously excluded foreigners from Central and Eastern Europe (63).

Furthermore, it can be stated that the 9/11 terror attack, which is a clear example of a discursive event, and continues to have an impact on how European states frame the implementation of immigration restrictions: namely in a security frame, rather than discussing them linked to Human Rights Conventions or other social or economical considerations (Wodak 2015: 54).

The elections of 2006 resulted in the formation of a grand coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Hayek 2016: 79).

As the restrictive path in regard to immigration policies continued, in 2007 interior ministry introduced the so-called ‘integration-plattform’. For the first time in Austrian history, integration was officially recognised as a political topic and was put on the agenda of the government. An integration ‘bureaucracy’ was established, by upgrading the Austrian Integration Fund [Österreichischer Integrationsfond], which was awarded its own scientific department as well as the responsibility of carrying out courses on integration (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2009: 63).

The ÖVP terminated the grand coalition with the SPÖ in 2008 and vice-chancellor Wilhelm Molterer announced this termination with the famous “it is enough” [“Es reicht”] at a press conference in July 2008. The SPÖ in general was more successful in indicating election

campaign topics and had the notable support of the Austrian tabloid media, especially of the *Kronen Zeitung*, and the two free newspapers *Österreich* and *heute* (Hayek 2016: 80).

In 2009 the ‘National Integration Pact’ [Nationaler Integrationspakt] was adopted. Prior to this, migration had been presented mainly as a security issue and integration mainly as the political obligation of immigrants, but now, for the first time, the necessity to fight against discrimination and to grant immigrants better participation possibilities was addressed. This development on a national level was accompanied by the drafting and implementing of regional integration strategies.

4.4. The 2010s: Integration through performance and the summer of migration

Current chancellor Sebastian Kurz became state secretary for integration in 2011 and introduced a new approach to integration: ‘Integration through performance’. One of his first official acts was to make 200,000 Euros available for so-called ‘study cafés’, where refugees could learn the German language. His slogan was: it doesn't matter where someone is from, but what someone contributes. Positive examples of migrants who, according to Kurz, had successfully integrated into Austrian society, were presented as role models.

What influenced the following elections of 2017 more than any other event were the migration movements of the summer of 2015. What Europe witnessed during the summer of 2015 was what in discourse study is called a discursive event, as explained above³³. The departure, or rather outbreak, as a result of worsening conditions in refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan, and the mobilisation of thousands of people who started to walk towards the Austrian border at the beginning of September 2015 was supported by a myriad of solidarity networks all over Europe, after Germany announced that it would suspend the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees. The summer of 2015 can therefore also be understood as an expression of a new and solidified Europe from below. In German this was referred to as

³³ Discursive events are events that received great media attention and are capable of influencing the direction of the lines of discourse they belong to. If a discourse moment becomes a discursive event is also determined by political dominances and the respective discursive context in which it takes place. Discourse analyses can determine if such discourse moments become discursive events or not. Furthermore is the determination of such discursive events essential in order to trace what influenced the present discursive context (Jäger 2015: 82, 83).

‘Welcome Culture’ [Willkommenskultur]. What followed this first wave of solidarity though was a reinforcement of the European border regime (Hess et al. 2016: 6-20).

What followed was a general discursive shift (defined in the Literature Review Chapter (Jäger & Wamper 2017). From emphasis on the need and misery of the refugees, discourse shifted to a constitution of the need and misery of the nation states because of the refugees. From the necessity of providing protection for the fleeing people, discourse shifted towards protection from the latter. From the debate about suspending the Dublin II Agreement, discourse shifted to suspending the human right to asylum and so on (Jäger & Wamper 2017b: 76-78). This shift was further intensified and the public discussion about islamic terrorism in Europe reached a new prevalence following the attacks of 2015 and 2016³⁴.

In February 2015 the new Islam Law³⁵ [Islamgesetz], a revision of the applicable Islam Law dating back to 1912, was enacted by the National Council³⁶.

In December 2015 first results of a scientific study on ‘Islamic kindergartens’, by order of the State Secretariat for Integration, were presented, suggesting that those kindergartens promote the creation of parallel societies. The presentation of the study led to a broad discussion about the existence of parallel societies on a political level as well as in the media (Aslan 2016).

The ÖVP was in crisis when polls in the autumn of 2016 suggested that if there were elections held on the next day they would only receive 20 to 21 percent of the voting shares. A representative poll, which determined voting intentions before and after the appointment of Sebastian Kurz painted a clear picture: instead of the 22% percent who would have voted for the ÖVP before the appointment of Kurz, 33% stated that they would vote for the ÖVP after the appointment of Kurz. This was an unprecedented demographic change (Plasser & Sommer 2018: 71-76). This illustrates to the so-called ‘Kurz-effect’, which has already been touched on in the introduction.

³⁴ European examples are (incomplete list): Paris (13.11.2015), Brussels (22.03.2016), Nice (14.07.2016) , Berlin (19.12.2016)

³⁵ some of the main points were: explicit determination of the priority of Austrian law over islamic basic religious duties, explicit acknowledgement of islamic dietary rules, protection of islamic holidays, prohibition of external financing of political representatives

³⁶

<https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundesnormen/20009124/Islamgesetz%c2%a02015%2c%20Fassung%20vom%2031.01.2019.pdf>

The elections of 2017 ended the phase of the grand coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP, which had been governing Austria since 2006. The election campaign was dominated by the topic of migration, and interpretations of crisis were superimposed over the intensive phase of the election campaign, such as the following. It was especially relevant for the political parties to communicate competence in regards to migration matters, as, according to polls, every second person that was allowed to vote was worried about problems with refugees and immigrants (Plasser & Sommer 2018: 93).

4.5. Summary

The historical context has shown that from the 1980s onwards migration was seen as a security issue. This was influenced by the economic crisis of 1973 and the increased number of people coming to Austria as a result of political upheavals in many Eastern European countries towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

The 1990s brought the introduction of the first relevant legislation in regard to migration and the Austrian public discourse was influenced, among other things, by the ‘Austria first’ referendum of the FPÖ, sparking an unprecedented wave of protests. In 1995 Austria entered the European Union.

The 2000s saw more introductions of relevant legislation in regard to migration, steadily getting more restrictive and security becoming one of the dominant political topics, following the 9/11 terror attacks. Furthermore, the topic of integration became increasingly more important. Austrian politics and especially the ÖVP introduced new approaches in regard to integration of foreigners, such as ‘integration through performance’.

Finally, the beginning of the 2010s brought increased public as well as political discussions on questions of culture and especially of Muslim culture. The main discursive event of the decade so far were the migration movements of the summer of 2015 resulting in a huge impact on the 2017 elections.

In regard to scientific issue of this study the findings of this chapter will serve to understand changes in the political discourse of the ÖVP in the respective historical context. This is necessary, as has been described above but shall be again stressed here, because the meaning

and the content of a discourse strand can only be understood and interpreted based on its historical context.

5. Analysing the election programmes

In this chapter, the election programmes that were selected as a data basis will be analysed in detail with respect to the posed research question and sub-questions and the analysis dimensions as described in the Methodology Chapter. The findings of this analysis will be discussed and presented with respect to the theoretical basis, previous research on the topic, and the historical context that has been presented above, at the end of each section.

5.1. 1990 - “Vote for the upswing! With us it is certain”

The 1990 election programme “Vote for the upswing! With us it is certain [“Den Aufschwung wählen! Mit uns ist er sicher.”] consists of 30 pages, 5 of which (16%) deal with migration.

5.1.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

In the introduction, the ÖVP takes stock of the last four years as a governing party. Migration plays only a minor role in the 1990 election programme, and after the introduction the party presents a list of 34 successes. The one success relevant for this study is number 31 in that list: “strengthening the fight against criminal tourism” (ÖVP 1990: 3).

In the last section of the party programme, under the sub-headline “Security, Law and Order” the party touches upon the issue again: “security bodies must be provided with reasonable support in the handling of new tasks, such as those created as a result of combating criminal tourism” (ibid.: 30). These quotations support the observation that migration at the beginning of the 1990s was increasingly perceived as a threat to national security (Graf & Knoll 2017: 91-111). The implications of the use of this collective symbol will be discussed in the next subsection. The fight against the supposed influx of people who are purportedly only coming to Austria to commit crimes is not given the highest importance, however.

Under the headline “Help for people in other countries” the party states:

“Economic migrants can be received by Austria only insofar as workplaces are available and Austrian employees are lacking. Under these circumstances, the possibility to employ foreigners must be granted to the economy, especially for cross-border commuters and seasonal workers. Illegal employment and criminal tourism must be simultaneously combated.” (ÖVP 1990: 6)

While touching upon security issues, this quotation addresses discussions concerning the welfare state. Elsewhere under the sub-headline “Social working environment” the party states: “Generally speaking, Austrian workers are to be prioritised over foreign workers. If there is a corresponding need, access to the Austrian labour market must be facilitated” (ÖVP 1990: 24) and “to combat illegal employment of foreigners, corresponding controls are necessary.” (ibid.). Both utterances seem to be given less prominence as they are the last and second to last issue addressed under the respective sub-headline.

The topic of integration is featured as part of the section “For a new solidarity” and under the sub-headline “people in need”. Here, it says that “refugees and asylum-seekers [Asylanten] must be offered the possibility to fully integrate into society and the economy” (ÖVP 1990: 26). The authors make no use of deictic pronouns here.

5.1.2. Wording

Two new concepts are introduced in reference to migrants, namely ‘economic migrants’ and ‘criminal tourists’. In a highly polemic and offhand manner, the party suggests that certain foreigners only come to Austria in order to commit crimes. As mentioned in the above section, it was mainly people from Romania that were entering Austria at this time. Using the term ‘criminal tourism’ to refer to them implies that these people were not refugees who were fleeing as a result of the spillover of political upheaval in Romania, but rather tourists who were only coming to Austria to commit crimes and then returning to their home country with their obtained goods, as tourists do.

5.1.3. Syntax

No relevant manipulation of syntactic style could be observed in the 1990 election programme.

5.1.4. Summary

Evident topics in conjunction with migration were security, integration and the welfare state. The constructed logics in this programme are that as long as the economy needs an additional workforce that cannot be covered by the Austrian workforce, ‘economic’ migrants will be allowed into Austria. People that migrate to Austria otherwise are ‘criminal tourists’, and their illegal movement must be combatted.

Although there is a significant amount of aggressive language such as ‘criminal tourism’ used against certain groups of migrants (though not explicitly stated, in the context of the public discourse most likely directed against migrants from Eastern and South Eastern Europe), migration is also positively referred to as an important and very much welcomed feature of a dynamic and modern economy.

5.2. 1994 - “The Erhard-Busek-plans for Austria. For our *Heimat*³⁷. For our economy. For our security.”

The 1994 programme “The Erhard-Busek-plans for Austria. For our *Heimat*. For our economy. For our security.” [“Die Erhard-Busek-Pläne für Österreich. Für unsere Heimat. Für unsere Wirtschaft. Für unsere Sicherheit.”] consists of 57 pages out of which 10 (17%) deal with migration.

5.2.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

Generally speaking, in the 1994 election programme migration is discussed in terms of human rights (asylum), security, the welfare state, integration and *Heimat*.

The introduction to the 1994 election programme focuses on the term *Heimat*. Bearing in mind the historical context, this is most likely aimed at differentiating the party from the standpoint of the FPÖ, which clearly excluded foreigners from being part of its Austrian *Heimat*. The FPÖ initiated the ‘Austria First’ referendum in 1992 and was successful in dominating the election campaign of 1994 with the following topics: immigration, foreigners and security (Hayek 2016: 71, 72). This attempt to distance the party line from that of the FPÖ is illustrated by the following quote: “In light of the radicality of the FPÖ party leadership, we are the only possible political partners for the modern and achievement-oriented citizens of Austria” (ÖVP 1994: 2).

³⁷ The polysemous, mystic, evaluative and very often also geographically bound notion of the German term “*Heimat*”, has much more emotional connotations than for example ‘state’ or ‘nation’ and there is also no proper translation into English, as both ‘fatherland’ and ‘homeland’ do not cover the full meaning of the German *Heimat*. (Reisigl & Wodak 2000: 151-155). The ambivalence of the term is especially apparent in connection with discourses about migration and refugees, as the debates are typically full with who belongs to a (discursively constructed) *Heimat* and who does not (Costadura & Ries 2016: 17). In order to keep the full meaning of the term, *Heimat* will not be translated into the English language henceforth.

Other examples are:

“By this we do not mean the ideology of nationalism, which puts the subjective need for comfort and cultural identity of individual people into a uniform, on command equalises everything, and incites in strict lockstep against the foreign and the other” (ÖVP 1994: 7).

“What *we* mean by *Heimat* is not the shallow and folkloristic. We are not aiming at the glorification of the past in order to flee from the present. We are not talking about what gloriously differentiates us from foreign others” (ÖVP 1994: 7).

“A *Heimat* has to include the political centre, progress, dynamism, Europe, our neighbours, the foreign citizens and fleeing people. We want to provide a *Heimat* to the homeless. *Heimat* to us, is having the possibility to live” (ÖVP 1994: 7).

Later in the election programme, under the subheading “Residence of foreigners” it says that “Austria will, if the ÖVP has its way, live up to its reputation as an asylum country and provide protection and assistance to politically, racially or religiously persecuted people.” (ÖVP 1994: 48). Two paragraphs later the programme stresses that a balanced legislative package [the Residence Act of 1992] has been introduced, which regulates the conditions of residence of foreigners as well as the asylum procedure for political refugees. The programme stresses that “through the new asylum legislation it is ensured that only those who are actually persecuted find asylum in our *Heimat*.” (ibid.). It then states that this new stance on migration has quickly spread internationally, which is demonstrated by the declining asylum applications coming from former Communist countries in Eastern Europe. The section ends with an affirmation of the new asylum laws and the following utterance: “For us it must concurrently be ensured that the execution is based on human rights and human dignity” (ibid.).

The next subsection deals with illegal immigration, border security and illegal employment:

“Since the mid-eighties we have observed with great concern that a growing number of people from Eastern and Southeastern Europe are fleeing from the economic situations of their home countries and pursuing to rebuild their lives in the economically prosperous countries of Europe.

The consequently arising problems for Austria must be solved with a focused and goal-oriented immigration policy” (ÖVP 1994: 48).

The ÖVP also demands the formation of border police in 1994. The reasoning they provide is that “our day-to-day security starts at our borders. The national borders of Austria with Eastern and Southeastern European countries will gain new significance and become more important from 1st January 1995 onwards [the EU accession of Austria]” (ÖVP 1994: 47). The ÖVP moreover demands that illegal immigration and illegal employment is consequently combatted (ibid.: 48).

The above illustrates the construction of a logic on how to deal with ‘unwanted’ immigrants from Eastern European countries. Beginning by describing the good habits of *our* group, namely sticking to human rights conventions and offering a *Heimat* to the ‘real’ refugees (ie. those who are actually persecuted), leading on to describing the bad influences (illegal employment) that result from the growing immigration of people belonging to the *out-group* (people from Eastern European countries) and completing with the logic consequence: stricter immigration policy and more impermeable borders.

The following subsection deals with the welfare state and integration and follows the previously presented logic, stressing that the residence of foreigners must be regulated according to qualitative, quantitative and administrable criteria: “this also means: selecting and restricting” (ÖVP 1994: 48) According to the text, this must be done in order to make integration possible, because

“the residence of foreign nationals must not solely be oriented among the requirements of the labour market, but simultaneously among the social compatibility of the local population. An immigration policy to the detriment of the Austrian population cannot exist! In concrete terms, this means that the stay of foreigners is obliged to comply with the absorption capacity of the school system and the regional housing market” (ÖVP 1994: 49).

In 1994 the ÖVP frames integration as a positive ‘challenge’ and states: “The People’s Party wants to address new challenges and wants to institute the following measures for foreign students (...)” (ÖVP 1994: 49).

In the subsection “Economic and social security”, the ÖVP presents a list of the problems of the welfare state and describes how the welfare state comes under pressure for several reasons, one being that a growing number of people feel that it is not themselves who profit most from how the welfare state is organised but those who know how to best exploit it (implicating that those are foreigners). The section ends with a sub-headline “Against social abuse”. Three out of four proposals on how to combat social abuse are linked to foreign workers: (unemployment benefits abuse, family allowance abuse, and abuse through illegal employment) (ÖVP 1994: 54, 55).

5.2.2. Wording

New collective symbols are employed in reference to the movement of people, at the very end of the above presented sub-section that deals with the welfare state and integration. The ÖVP stresses that “as with the topic of environmental protection - the new ‘mass migration’ poses a global challenge” and “in order to effectively get to grips with the global migration flows of millions of people, the international community is called upon to take effective economic aid measures for the countries of the East and South.” (ÖVP 1994: 55). Using metaphors that reference forces of nature at the end of the subsection dealing with the welfare state and integration clearly contributes to the constructed logic of having to combat migration in order to keep the welfare state intact.

5.2.3. Syntax

Deictic pronouns are used frequently establishing an understanding of how the ÖVP gives meaning to the term *Heimat* and constructing who can be part of that *Heimat* and who cannot.

The use of deictic pronouns has many strong implications, including for political positions and solidarity, as Van Dijk (1998: 33) suggests. In the introduction of the 1994 election programme the concept of *Heimat* is continuously referred to as *our* *Heimat*, foreigners and refugees are included as well, hence making them part of the in-group. Later, however, this matter is presented differently, as has been shown above. Those who qualify as part of the in-group include refugees who fall under the definition of the Geneva Convention, but not immigrants from Eastern European countries, who come to Austria for economic reasons, in order to improve their life.

5.2.4. Summary

The 1994 election programme clearly reveals contradictory tendencies that were also present in the 1990 programme, but are now intensified: Refugees and migrants are in part referred to in an increasingly aggressive manner, unambiguously creating an out-group of Eastern Europe, that draws a clear line between Austrians and people coming from Eastern Europe (often from countries that less than 100 years ago were part of the Austrian Empire). On the other hand, there is a strong emphasis that Austria, both as a state, and as the even more undefined and emotionally loaded entity ‘*Heimat*’, should clearly encompass refugees and migrants. Moreover, while stating that only through a restrictive immigration policy is integration possible, the matter is framed in a positive way, suggesting that the ÖVP is ready to take on this challenge.

5.3. 1995 - “The Schüssel-Ditz-path”

The 1995 election programme “The Schüssel-Ditz-path” [“Der Schüssel-Ditz-Kurs”] consists of 26 pages out of which none deal with migration issues.

The coalition between the SPÖ and ÖVP was dissolved after only 14 months as a result of discrepancy over the national budget, and as a result a new election programme was drafted in 1995. This election programme does not mention any issues or topics regarding migration, but rather focuses on setting out the party’s position in regard to the national budget and the economy (ÖVP 1995).

5.4. 1999 - “The Better Way”

The 1999 election programme “The better way” [“Der bessere Weg”] consists of 97 pages out of which 15 (15%) deal with migration issues.

5.4.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

In the 1999 election programme, migration is discussed in terms of security, the welfare state and asylum.

Cross-border crime is the focus of issues regarding security and migration:

“We will build up effective crime control within the EU and concurrently improve cooperation with security authorities in Middle, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. We have to contain the organised trafficking of illegal immigrants. The increasing brutality and the use of new technologies by these gangs requires a Europe-wide strategy. Member states need to secure the external borders of the EU against illegal immigration and the organised trafficking of illegal immigrants” (ÖVP 1999: 52).

This was the second programme written after Austria joined the EU in 1995. While the election programme of 1995 did not include any topics related to migration, the ÖVP in 1999 for the first time addressed the external border security of the EU:

“The external borders of the EU must be increasingly protected against illegal immigration and streams of refugees. Regardless of the necessity for a European refugee and migration policy, the appropriate border controls must be conducted in order to be able to implement political aims and objectives” (ÖVP 1999: 64).

The last quotation belongs to the section “The ÖVP brings more security into life”. At the beginning of that section it says:

“We demonstrate a clear approach in regard to foreigner and asylum policy”³⁸ Austria has always practiced a clear-cut asylum policy towards persecuted persons, and has furthermore preserved its traditional role as a country of first asylum, even within the new legal framework. However, the attempt to integrate new reasons for asylum into the Geneva Refugee Convention must be rejected.” (ÖVP 1999: 53)

Later on in this chapter, there is another subsection dealing with migration entitled “More security through consequent foreign policy”. It says there:

“Austria is an asylum country: the pressure of immigration on Central Europe continues due to the political developments of some states within Europe and outside of Europe. While maintaining the positive role of Austria as a country of asylum, definite borders must be created in regard to immigration, in order to maintain social peace in Austria.” (ÖVP 1999: 63)

³⁸ This sentence was also put in bold letters in the election programme.

5.4.2. Wording

By using the metaphor of ‘streams’, that references forces of nature (which are hardly subject to human control and pose a significant and likely lethal danger) and the term ‘immigration pressure’ in order to refer to the number of people entering Austria as refugees and migrants, the issue is framed as a problem that is no longer humanly manageable and that will eventually ‘blow up’ (the result of not releasing built-up pressure). Therefore the logic that is unfolded here is that Austria is in danger, threatened by natural forces, leading to the conclusion: borders must be sealed off, in order to keep the ability to act.

5.4.3. Syntax

Throughout the programme the party makes use of active sentences and writes certain sentences in bold letters. This places more emphasis on the relevant sentences. An example of this is the following: “**any foreigner who commits a crime and thereby misuses our hospitality, must leave the country and must not be able to come back.** We will consequently take action against foreigners who are located in Austria illegally or just short-term” (ÖVP 1999: 52).

In regard to the discussion of the expansion of the EU, it says in bold letters: “**the expansion of the EU necessitates a willingness for dialogue and a lack of slogans of fear [Angstparolen]**” (ÖVP 1999: 77). This is followed by utterances emphasising how much Austria has profited from the fall of the iron curtain and the emerging markets of Eastern European countries. This illustrates a change in the handling of Eastern European countries and their influence on Austria’s welfare state. The programme now frames the issue as a positive challenge: “For the Austrian labour market, the huge pay gaps between Austria and these neighbouring countries means a special challenge” (ibid.: 76).

5.4.4. Summary

The 1999 election programme continues to show contradictory tendencies already present in the 1990 and 1994 election programmes, but are intensified through a sudden use of language that suggests potentially lethal threats posed by migration: cross-border criminality is addressed at various points of the election programme in conjunction with migration and the maintenance of social peace in Austria is linked to effective border control. The logic that is constructed is that in order for the state to keep its ability to act, borders must be secured and the state must control who is allowed to enter and who is not. This is supported by employing

a natural symbol (streams of refugees) which puts what is happening into the realm of the unmanageable (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 56). There is still an emphasis on Austria being an asylum country and offering refuge to those who are persecuted, but this is weakened by the employment of collective symbols that imply that inner Austrian social peace is threatened if migration is not strictly regulated.

A change can be observed in regard to the representation of Eastern European countries. As the analysis of the historical context has shown, this is most likely connected to the decision taken by the EU to start accession negotiations in 1997 with ten countries out of which four were Austria's neighbouring countries: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. As those countries become European member states, the policy conditions change and they become part of the European Single Market and Schengen.

Integration of foreigners is not mentioned throughout the entire programme.

5.5. 2002 - "The Austria programme of the People's Party"

The 2002 election programme "The Austria programme of the People's Party" ["Das Österreich-Programm der Volkspartei"] consists of 81 pages out of which 10 (10%) deal with migration.

5.5.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

The logic of Austria only being able to maintain its sovereignty if its borders and the external borders of the EU are secure is continued in the 2002 election programme. This is illustrated by the following quotation, which is part of the introduction of the 2002 election programme: "social, internal and external security are the cornerstones of social peace and prosperity in the commercial, working and residential place of Austria. In light of worldwide developments, reforms are necessary in multiple areas in order to secure the the achievements and the future of our country" (ÖVP 2002: 5).

Security is divided into two chapters for the first time, which are 'internal security' and 'external security'. This can be explained by the fact that the election programme was written in the year following the September 11 attacks, commonly referred to as 9/11. Migration is

part of both chapters. One out of two subsections is concerned with migration in the external security section, two out five in the internal security section.

Another relevant observation in regard to textual schemata is that every subsection is concluded with a summarising bullet point list, stating the respective “ÖVP initiatives” (ibid.: 5). The bullet point list concluding the subsection “Successfully fighting against the most dangerous criminality” mainly deals with cross-border criminality in the aftermath of 9/11. Here, the programme inter alia states that “we want European border police at European borders. The responsibility for control must lie with the member states.” (ÖVP 2002: 54).

The second subsection in the ‘internal security’ section is “acceleration of asylum procedures and initiatives against asylum abuse [Asylmissbrauch]”. The ÖVP’s proclaimed initiatives in this regard in 2002 are as follows (ÖVP 2002: 57):

- “We want a quick and efficient asylum procedure, consistent with human rights standards and the Geneva Refugee Convention on the basis of a European consensus
- We want reception centres in which the primary intake assessment can be performed within a maximum of 72 hours in an ‘asylum street’
- We demand an obligation to cooperate from the asylum seeker
- We are against the possibility to improperly prolong the asylum procedure by so-called ‘chain applications’ [Kettenanträge]
- We are in favour of one overall procedure for families and for only being able to file an application on Austrian national territory
- We stand for an outsourcing of the care responsibilities for asylum seekers to non-governmental organisations or private enterprises
- We want a European as well as an inner-Austrian burden sharing that takes regions more into consideration”

Integration is part of the section ‘society and life’ and is framed as a positive challenge, under the subsection ‘Immigration: Proper integration’. In the introduction of the subsection the programme names different problems in conjunction with migration but concludes by stating: “Our integration policy, which is oriented at Christian democratic principles, appeals to an objective problem statement and solution.” (ÖVP 2002: 79). The ÖVP then clearly differentiates between voluntary and forced migration and suggest that those two phenomena

require two separate immigration policies. Voluntary migration belongs to economic, educational and social politics, while forced migration belongs to human rights politics, according to the programme in 2002, and “for us integration policy is explicitly more than only actions related to the immigration police” (ibid.). In bold letters the party writes in the next paragraph: “**Yes to diversity**” and continues by stating “We have a clear sociopolitical message, which is that our society welcomes diversity, and that any political discourse which incites racial hatred, xenophobia or ethnic prejudice is condemned” (ibid.). In regard to human rights, it is furthermore stressed that the party stands for the effective combating of xenophobia and racism (ibid.: 47).

5.5.2. Wording

A new collective symbol, namely that of the house when stating that only through clearly regulated asylum procedure can immigration through the backdoor be avoided (ÖVP 2002: 56). This implies that national borders can be closed just like the back door of a house. This, according to Jäger & Jäger (2007) is a simplification of a complex reality and implies that governments could seal off their territory as easily as a homeowner can seal off his or her house by closing all doors (39). A gross simplification of entities such as nation states. The logic constructed here is that in order to protect the *inside* from the dangers coming from *outside*, the government must seal off its territory ie. implementing more effective border security.

5.5.3. Syntax

Manipulation of syntactic style can mainly be observed in the 2002 election programme in regard to the increased usage of active sentences and the boldening of words and sentences. This, according to Van Dijk (1998), puts more emphasis on utterances such as “We want an obligation to cooperate from the asylum seeker” in terms of security issues and more specifically asylum abuse, or “Yes to diversity” in terms of integration (33).

5.5.4. Summary

The main topics in regard to migration are security, and more specifically border security and integration. As mentioned above, the narrative of having to protect Austria’s national borders to enable the country to retain its ability to act is continued in the 2002 election programme, as is a contradictory tendency in terms of migration. While, on the one hand, pushing for

stricter and more effective border security, on the other hand the programme also takes a rather pragmatic angle in terms of integration and takes a clear stance against hatred-inciting political discourse.

This is the last election programme analysed in which there is such a clear distinction between voluntary and forced migration and in which voluntary migration is so explicitly classified as an issue of economic, educational and social politics.

5.6. 2006 - “Coursebook future - modern. secure. humane”

The 2006 election programme “Coursebook future - modern. secure. humane” [“Kursbuch Zukunft - Modern. Sicher. Menschlich”] consists of 104 pages out of which 14 (13%) deal with migration.

5.6.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

Every section of the 2006 election programme begins with a box that supposedly demonstrates the successes achieved during 1999 and 2006 and with one illustration per section that underlines one success to which the ÖVP wants to direct special attention. Similarly to the 2002 election programme, each section is rounded off with a box that comprises a summarising bullet point list stating the planned initiatives for the respective sections.

A general intensification of the discursive entanglement of migration and security can be observed. The section entitled “Secure Austria” is arranged as follows: the part on terrorism, “We want to strengthen international and national networking, because this is the first key to success in this field. It needs the highest possible level of vigilance in order to identify terror threats” (ÖVP 2006: 84) is followed by the paragraph on integration, “In this context, successful integration - to which the ÖVP commits - and the prevention of parallel societies is of vital importance” (ibid.) which links the prevention of developing parallel societies with combating terrorism. Without explanation or figures on how many immigrants actually engaged in drug-related crime, the following point made in the same paragraph is that the ÖVP’s measurements against drug-related crime have reaped tangible rewards and shall be continued (ibid.).

For the first time, integration is part of the security section in the 2006 election programme, and comes directly after the section on ‘external security’. The subsection about integration is introduced with a list of the successes achieved during the preceding years, such as the decline in the numbers of asylum applications or the decline in granted citizenships due to the new legislation “citizenship new [Staatsbürgerschaft Neu]”. The principle that was promoted in this election programme was integration first, “new immigration” second. Furthermore, integration is depicted as a process, the success of which merely depends on the foreigners’ efforts, rather than requiring an effort from both sides (ÖVP 2006: 96-99).

5.6.2. Wording

Towards the end of the ‘A secure Austria’ section, the ÖVP makes use of a new collective symbol, namely: ‘asylum and visa shopping’. The ÖVP demands in this programme that ‘asylum and visa shopping’ should finally be stopped. When using the term for the first time, the term appears between quotation marks, which is no longer the case at the end of the chapter, which summarises the main points of the preceding chapter (ÖVP 2006: 84, 85). The term ‘shopping’ implies that a positive response to an asylum application or a visa is something foreigners can easily attain. It completely neglects the fact that strong restrictions were already in place in 2006. Several legislative measures, such as the ones described in the preceding chapter of this study, have been introduced since the beginning of the 1990s, steadily making it harder for people to legally migrate to Austria. Since 2001, for example, it has not been possible to conduct an asylum application at an Austrian embassy abroad, and difficult obstacles for third-country nationals who wanted to apply for a visa have been in place (Krzyzanowski & Wodak 2017: 43 - 71).

5.6.3. Syntax

With regards to migration no new syntactic manipulation could be identified in the 2006 election programme.

5.6.4. Summary

The main topics found in conjunction with migration in the 2006 election programme are security, asylum and integration. The topic of terrorism, which has been part of the political discourse of the ÖVP since the 9/11 attacks in the US, is linked to the frequently addressed topic of foreigner criminality or cross-border criminality. Furthermore, through employing the terms ‘asylum and visa shopping’ it is suggested that up to now positive asylum decisions

and positive visa applications were something foreigners could easily attain, leading to the conclusion that more restrictive laws are needed.

Integration for the first time is part of the security section and is not presented as a two-way relationship anymore, but rather the obligations of the people who need to be integrated are emphasised. The welfare state and discussions concerning the labour market are not addressed.

5.7. 2008 - “A new start for Austria”

The 2008 election programme “A new start for Austria” [“Neustart für Österreich”] consists of 23 pages out of which five³⁹ (21%) deal with migration.

The 2008 election programme starts with some aggression targeted at the coalition partner SPÖ: “It was not possible any longer to cooperate with the SPÖ. Everything was brought to a standstill. It was enough!” (ÖVP 2008: 1). This statement is a reference to the ÖVP’s termination of the grand coalition with the SPÖ, which was the reason for the snap election in 2008.

5.7.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

The language used in connection with migration is distinctly aggressive: “We want a free and secure society. Freedom without security is not possible. (...) For us there are rules that are not negotiable. Zero tolerance for asylum abuse, criminality and violation of our fundamental values” (ÖVP 2008: 16). This quote is the introduction to the chapter on security. Terms such as ‘zero tolerance’ belong to the rhetoric of law and order, invoking authoritarian state responses to illegal activities. ‘Asylum abuse’ is the very first crime that is mentioned. There is no mention of asylum being a human right or Austria’s tradition of being a receiving country: “Austria must be able to decide on its own on who can and who cannot immigrate” (ibid.: 19). Asylum seekers are addressed as a group that need to be reminded (in a pedagogic manner), that rules are to be followed: “whoever is granted asylum in Austria must know that he or she cannot do what they want. Delinquency must require an assessment on whether the reason for asylum still exists, otherwise the person will lose their asylum status” (ibid.). The

³⁹ all of those five pages are part of the security section.

notion that some foreigners misuse the asylum application system to attain a residence permit without actually being a refugee (as Austria legally defines them) is illustrated by this quote: “The right to asylum is applicable solely for actual persecuted refugees, not immigration under the guise of asylum” (ibid.: 19).

Heimat is also addressed in the introduction of the initial chapter on security. The section says that “we do not just want to remain one of the safest countries in the world, but we also want to defend the cultural identity of our country” (ÖVP 2008: 16). This illustrates a change, as for the first time ‘cultural identity’ is made a topic in regard to *Heimat*, and yet another *we* vs. *them* dichotomy is presented, as issues connected to migration (asylum abuse, criminality) are presented as a threat to *our* cultural identity. This is further supported by the subsection “Mastery of German language before immigration, zero tolerance for ‘cultural crimes’ (ibid.: 19). Highlighted in a separate box, the programme defines three main points of this subsection and thereby specifies what ‘cultural crimes’, as they perceive them, are: “1. Cohabitation requires clear regulations; 2. No immigration without German language course; 3. Longer sentences for ‘forced marriage’, ‘honour killing’, or ‘genital mutilation’” (ibid.: 20).

Terrorism is another issue that is discussed in the security section of the 2008 election programme, but for the first time a discourse entanglement with Islam is made. The programme states that “parallel societies and sealed off milieus are often the breeding ground for the risk of terrorism. (...) So-called ‘hate preachers’ play a central role in the system of influencing, through religiously fanatic bodies of thought and promoting a willingness for terroristic acts. (...) We will consequently deport convicted ‘hate preachers’” (ÖVP 2008: 18). Though no explicit mention of the Islamic religion is made, the term ‘hate preachers’ indicates that the discourse concerns muslims, since that concept is rarely used to refer to orthodox preachings of other religions.

The welfare state and the narrative of the so-called ‘migration into our social system’ are approached directly under the headline, “Integration before moving, quick asylum procedures, clear consequences for delinquency!” (ÖVP 2008: 19). The question of what is meant by “integration before moving” is left unanswered, but the the programme states that “immigration into unemployment and unemployment assistance [Notstandshilfe] will not exist under the ÖVP” (ibid.). It is implied that a foreigner could simply arrive in the country and immediately receive unemployment benefits, which is not the case. A minimum of 52

weeks of employment within a timeframe of 24 months prior to application is required before being able to apply for unemployment benefits for the first time.

5.7.2. Wording

The term ‘criminal tourism’ is used again for the first time since 1990. The implications of this term have already been described in the analysis of the 1990 election programme.

The term ‘culture-specific crime’ [“Kulturverbrechen”] is introduced for the first time and suggests that homogenous cultures exist to which certain crimes can be attributed to. Yilmaz (2016: 17) refers to this phenomenon as *culturalisation of discourse*. ‘Culture’ has become the dominant frame in political discourses regarding citizenship, security, economy, etc. (Soysal 2009 in Wodak 2017: 47). Even though particular nationalities are sometimes disproportionately represented in crime statistics, the attribution of entire types of offenses to certain cultures is in no way appropriate.

5.7.3. Syntax

The above presented introduction of the 2008 election programme is also interesting in regard to the syntactic manipulation of text. To introduce the security chapter, which deals with a wide range of matters, including “zero tolerance for asylum abuse, criminality and violation of our fundamental values” (ÖVP 2008: 16), renders it the prime issue.

The ÖVP, in its 2008 election programme, makes use of instruction sets in conjunction with migration and thereby directs special emphasis to utterances such as: “We will demand 600 hours of German language courses from every immigrant. Whoever wants to immigrate to Austria must already take German classes in his home country and must verify that with a language certificate” (ÖVP 2008: 20).

5.7.4. Summary

The prevalent topics in conjunction with migration in the 2008 election programme are security, integration, culture and the welfare state. The tendency to discuss migration primarily as a security issue is intensified, illustrated by only addressing it as part of the security section of the programme. What is added to the argumentation about foreigner criminality and terror is the concept of ‘culture’, which leads to a culturalisation of the political discourse of the ÖVP. Migration is increasingly presented as a threat and the

narrative of the “migration into our social system” constructs a picture of the foreign ‘social welfare scrounger’, who lives off our social system.

Generally speaking and in contrast to the beginning of the 1990s, the discursive construction of a stricter dichotomy between the Austrian in-group and the foreign out-group can be observed.

5.8. 2013 - “Future-oriented. Austria 2018: The programme of the ÖVP for the general elections 2013”

The 2013 election programme “Future-oriented. Austria 2018: The programme of the ÖVP for the general elections 2013” [“Zukunftsweisend. Österreich 2018: Das Programm der ÖVP zur Nationalratswahl 2013”] consists of 85 pages out of which five (6%) deal with migration and migration related issues.

The 2013 election programme starts out with a completely different tone than its predecessors. In contrast to the 2006 and 2008 election programmes, the 2013 election programme has a strong focus on the future. Every section ends with a bullet point list with suggestions on how to tackle the respective issues, and each section furthermore consists of a personal statement, given by either the respective ÖVP minister or a state secretary. The tone is therefore much more positive than that of the two preceding election programmes.

5.8.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

The main topics observed in conjunction with migration are integration and security. Integration is not part of the security section in the 2013 programme, but is presented in the section with the headline “For a good cohabitation in Austria”.

The headline of the subsection is “Integration and values: rules for cohabitation.” The statement in this section is attributed to Sebastian Kurz, who was the State Secretary for Integration then: “Despite many differences, we build on a shared foundation: our values.” The State Secretary for Integration was a new position that had been established by the ÖVP in 2011, and Sebastian Kurz was installed as the first holder of this post. In the introduction of that subsection it says:

“With the establishment of the State Secretariat for Integration we have developed a new dialogue culture in Austria. The discussion about people with a migratory background was long dominated by the unrealistic demands of left-wing utopian dreamers and the partly xenophobic slogans of right agitators. As a party of the political centre, the ÖVP rejects all radical positions. We have de-emotionalised the debate and put it where it belongs: into the centre of society. Integration is a topic that concerns everybody, a giving and taking of people with a migratory background and those who have long called Austria their *Heimat*. This requires a welcome culture in Austria on the one hand, and on the other hand a willingness of the immigrants to integrate.” (ÖVP 2013: 58).

The ÖVP in 2013 frequently claims to be a moderate party, a party of the centre, and free of any radical position.

The leading slogan of their 2013 integration concept is integration through performance: “we do not ask where someone comes from but if someone is willing to participate” (ÖVP 2013: 59). This quote represents a strong commitment to being an immigration country and therefore illustrates an inconsistent tension in the argumentation of the ÖVP’s 2013 election programme.

As part of the section “Internal security: comprehensive and everywhere”, cross-border criminality is still an issue, although to a smaller extent than in previous years. A statement of Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner is presented, emphasising the importance of the ÖVP’s ability to react to global developments: “Types of criminality change. We keep track.” (ÖVP 2013: 72). This leads on to a focus on terrorism, during which Islam is again implicitly mentioned: “Austria is very successful in the fight against terrorism and extremist crimes. Not least because of that we have been spared. We will continue to take action against hate preachers with zero tolerance, ideologically motivated extremists and all those who question our democracy. Every open society needs effective instruments in order to defend it against its enemies” (ÖVP 2013: 72).

The section on internal security ends with another list of measures that will be taken by the ÖVP in order to make Austria more secure. The list ends with the following point: “Clear regulations and consistent enforcement of asylum and foreigner legislation” (ÖVP 2013: 73).

5.8.2. Wording

Throughout the parts of the 2013 election programme that deal with migration, the ÖVP emphasises its position as a political party of the centre. This is not new in itself and has been

done in earlier election programmes as well, but what is new is the increased accentuation of it when arguing the party's position towards migration. As described in the Theoretical Framework chapter, collective symbols reveal their effects within a topical system. This topical system consists of a right-centre-left axis which favours the place of the centre, because of its positive evaluation of being a place of 'stability'. Radicality therefore is considered negative, where as being balanced and moderate are positive attributions that are attributed to the stable centre (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 40, 41).

5.8.3. Summary

What is especially interesting about the 2013 election programme is that it represents a backlash to some extent towards the intensification of the discursive construction of an unambiguous dichotomy between the Austrian in-group and the foreign out-group. Migration is again addressed in a contradictory manner, continuing, on the one hand, the presentation of migration in connection to questions of inner security (criminality, terrorism), but, on the other hand, also positively referring to migration as a challenge that can be mastered. This is underlined by the previously presented quote: "Despite many differences, we build on a shared foundation: our values" (ÖVP 2013: 58).

5.9. 2017 - "The New Path"

The 2017 election programme "The new path" ["Der neue Weg"] consists of 271 pages out of which 36 (13%) deal with migration and migration related issues.

The election programme is divided into three parts, which bear the following titles:

1. "New Fairness and Responsibility"
2. "Awakening and Prosperity"
3. "Order and Security".

The main topics observed in conjunction with migration are security, the welfare state and *Heimat*.

5.9.1. Textual schemata and argumentation

The introduction of the first part defines fairness and it says: “Fairness has the following dimensions for us:

- anyone who works shall not be the loser
- anyone who wants to receive social security benefits must first contribute his or her bit
- anyone who is entitled to a social security benefit shall receive it non-bureaucratically
- anyone who is not able the help him- or herself, needs to receive help” (ÖVP 2017a: 6).

The introduction concludes with: “Fairness must still be the outcome of work and not of redistribution. If we offer a comfortable life on the basis of government support to people who are healthy and fit to work, we should not be surprised that they have little incentive to live from gainful work. We should also not be surprised if our social system is attractive for immigrants coming from inside and outside of the EU” (ÖVP 2017a: 6.).

Under the sub-headline “Fair giving, fair demanding: for all of us” the Austrian welfare state is addressed:

“Our generous social system is also attracting people who want to settle in our country, because the social benefits in Austria by far exceed what they would receive in their home country. This starts with direct benefits in the case of social indigence. Not to be underestimated are also the payments in kind of our social system. We must therefore make a clear distinction between those who have already contributed to our system and those who only recently came to us. The access to social benefits shall be staggered accordingly” (ÖVP 2017a: 13).

Further down, in the first part of the election programme, the topic of the welfare state and the topos of a ‘migration into our social system’ is taken up again under the headline “Applying uniform regulations to the needs-based minimum benefit system (BMS) throughout Austria as a whole” (ÖVP 2017a: 64). This subsection is introduced with a box that presents the ‘solution’ in terms of the needs-based minimum benefit system, namely: “capping at 1,500 Euros, consequences in the event of misuse, a reduced BMS light for persons entitled to asylum” (ibid.).

The ÖVP wants to introduce a ‘BMS light’ for people entitled to asylum and those granted subsidiary protection. The amount of the BMS will be connected to the applicant’s length of stay and thereby put an end to direct immigration into the full entitlement to BMS (ÖVP 2017a: 67).

Right after this, another issue connected to the welfare state and migration is addressed under the headline: “Access to social benefits only upon a continuous residence of five years in Austria” (ÖVP 2017a: 68). The ÖVP stresses that “we have to remember that our welfare state was established by hard work. All those who diligently work and pay taxes maintain our system. This solidarity only functions if the system is fair and not exploited. Neither from within Austria nor from within Europe” (ibid.).

The third part of the 2017 election programme “Order and Security” is introduced by addressing the concept of *Heimat*:

“We can be proud of our Heimat, of our Austria. We can stand up for what we are and who we are. And we can demand from those that want to immigrate that they live according to our values and expectancies. There is no space for parallel societies in our country. (...) Racism and extremism shall have no space in Austria. We must vehemently stand up against developments that are happening in other countries, where subcultures undermine applicable law and form their own law systems, where religious provisions restrict the basic rights of humans and where women are massively oppressed and patronized. Many of the rights that we enjoy in Austria today seem natural to us: freedom of speech, democratic codetermination, equality between men and women. But in Austria in particular we should be aware that those rights are the result of sacrifices and of years of effort. Standing up for our rights and the maintenance of our fundamental principles is something we owe to those who fought for them (ÖVP 2017b: 10).

Whereas hate speech and religious extremism were previously only implicitly linked to migrants and especially those of Muslim origin, this connection is now made more explicitly. Other forms of domestic extremism, however, are not included as examples of such extremism. Furthermore, whenever the ÖVP was talking about the fight against racism in their election programmes prior to the 2017 one, it was always directed at hatred- and racism-inciting discourse carried out by other political actors or the media. Here, for the first time, racism is attributed to migrants and the reasoning is turned around: if we want to combat racism and extremism we have to regulate migration otherwise conditions will worsen in

Austria, as they did in the United Kingdom, where, according to a quote later in the election programme, 85 Sharia courts exist parallel to the British legal system (ÖVP 2017b: 24).

The third part of the 2017 election programme goes on to deal with migration issues under the headline “Back to the top. With a stop to illegal immigration. For all of us.” (ÖVP 2017b: 17). The first section is named “No allowance for illegal immigration” and the section starts out with the following:

“The year 2015 was a political earthquake, a shock for many people in this country and massively burdened the trust in our constitutional state. Through the politics of just waving people through, the number of asylum applications had explosively increased up to nearly 90,000. It was a hard battle, in Austria as well as in the European Union, to change behavioural patterns and to put an end to the politics of just waving people through. Austria had single-handedly organised the closing of the Balkan route with our neighbouring countries. We were heavily criticised for that at first. Today this closing is celebrated as a big success and there is hardly anyone left who doubts the effectiveness of this measure. The refugee streams [Flüchtlingsströme] decreased massively within a few days’ time, by around 98%” (ÖVP 2017b: 18).

The ÖVP also suggests that if Austria wants to reasonably control migration in the future, the system must be changed. They want to focus on two groups in doing so:

- “The poorest and weakest, those who really have to fear for their lives, because they are persecuted on the basis of their religion or ethnicity: those we must provide with on-site help or rather help through specific resettlement programmes.
- Honest skilled labourers, who bring know-how and talent to Austria which does not already exist in that way in Austria, and who strengthen Austria as a location” (ÖVP 2017b: 19).

The above quotation shows that the ÖVP follows the general EU-wide focus on providing assistance on-site, which eventually leads to a total externalisation of refugee assistance⁴⁰. The ÖVP, in this regard, also states that the EU asylum system needs to be redesigned to

⁴⁰ “Externalisation” in this regard refers to the transfer of border management and more specifically asylum processing to third countries . This has been subject to heated discussions in regards to human rights and the law of the nations. Further research on that topic has been done by Hyndman & Mountz (2008); Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011) or Haddad (2014).

focus on border security and on stopping illegal migration at the external borders of the EU (ibid.: 20).

The next subsection is entitled “Showing zero tolerance towards political Islam”. The box which in this case again presents a ‘solution’ states: “Political Islam has no place in our society - we have to fight against radicalisation and terrorism with all possible means” (ÖVP 2017b: 22). Across four pages, the ÖVP states why political Islam poses a threat to Austrian society. This focus on political islam points to a reaction to the intensified public discussion regarding the IS and the terror attacks in 2015 and 2016 in France and other European states.

Concerning integration, the ÖVP in 2017 states that they want to make integration possible, through stopping illegal immigration (ÖVP 2017b: 19). The leading slogan “integration through performance”, in regard to integration, is picked up from the 2013 election programme, but extended through a small, but impactful sub-clause: “who entered Austria legally”, meaning that only those who entered Austria legally are welcome to stay and integrate (ibid.: 28).

5.9.2. Wording

Making use of natural disaster and military symbols, which the ÖVP does continually in the 2017 programme, and thereby dramatising the interpretation of existing conditions, can result in the felt necessity to normalise the notion that conditions are out of hand and to direct them into regulated channels again (Jäger & Jäger 2007: 39).

The year 2015 is referred to as ‘catastrophic year 2015’: “It will take years to regain the lost trust after the catastrophic year of 2015. But we must not wait one single day to start working towards that. After the refugee crisis we were left with an enormous challenge in terms of integration. Thereby, social order and societal life, as well as, ultimately, the question of our identity, have been placed into question. Whoever immigrates to Austria has to know that there are cultural imprints, values and regulations we will not negotiate and we envision that they are infinitely respected. Immigration has to take place according to the interests of the state and its citizens. Clear criteria and strict order is therefore needed” (ÖVP 2017b: 21).

Not only particular aspects of the various migration movements of 2015 are referred to in a negative way here, but the entire year in general. Rather than also seeing positive aspects to

the sudden elevated influx of foreigners to the country, it is entirely negatively connotated in the strongest terms.

5.9.3. Syntax

All three parts of the election programmes show frequent use of deictic pronouns and every section begins with a slogan directed at one of the respective themes and is followed by the catchphrase ‘for all of us’. Another catchphrase that is repeatedly used throughout the election programmes is ‘for our Austria’. This, again, has implications for an even clearer constructed dichotomy between the in-group and the out-group. The political position the ÖVP is adopting here is clear: building up an emotionalised picture of ‘our Austria’, of which the ÖVP is taking good care, and which is in a tight spot because of the massive intake of foreigners and refugees, who threaten the identity of the society (through, for example, undermining legal systems by installing Sharia courts).

5.9.4. Summary

Analysing the 2017 election programme, it needs to be taken into account that among other things the election programme was written in the context of a sudden increase of asylum application in the year 2015 (+214,78%⁴¹) and the context of an increasing number of voters being worried about issues in regards to migration, as has been presented in the Literature Review Chapter (Plasser & Sommer 2018: 91).

What is shown in regard to the welfare state is that in order to pursue austerity politics, migrants are continually referred to as exploiting the welfare state and receiving social welfare benefits that they do not deserve, as they have not yet paid taxes and therefore not yet contributed to the Austrian social welfare system.

The increased focus on referring to values characterised as ‘our’ values, while neither specifying who comprises the in- and out-group and not holding these values respectively nor clarifying what those values are (which is not as such new, but is noticeably intensified) and the represented threat to that ‘values’ stemming from the great intake of refugees in 2015, focuses on what Wæver (1993 in Betts 2009: 71) calls ‘societal security’⁴². This means that

⁴¹ https://www.bmi.gv.at/301/Statistiken/files/Jahresstatistiken/Asyl_Jahresstatistik_2015.pdf

⁴² Ole Wævers (1993) concept of ‘societal security’ provides a useful tool for understanding how migration has come to be seen as a security issue in the West. “The concept emphasises that external threats are often values

through focusing on the cultural values of a group that is perceived as a threat, rather than material things, migration increasingly comes to be conceived as a security issue. This is supported by the construction of threats in relation to a social group, such as the threats arising from having muslims in the country, which leads to an even stronger opposition between *them* vs. *us*.

and identities rather than material entities. In particular, threats are frequently perceived to exist in relation to cultural identity - for example, to language, ethnicity, or religion” (Betts 2009: 71).

6. Conclusion

This qualitative study set out to analyse changes in the political discourse of the Austrian conservative party (ÖVP) on the issue of migration alongside the following research question: *How and why did the linguistic negotiation of migration change in the election programmes of the ÖVP between 1990 and 2017?*

The question was divided into two sub questions:

Sub-question 1: *What are the prevalent topics in conjunction with migration?*

Sub-question 2: *Which collective symbols, if any, are employed when negotiating migration?*

The research questions were answered through applying the discourse analytical approach of the Duisburg School and Van Dijk's concept for the analysis of political discourses, reading into relevant studies connected to my research interest, analysing the historical context, and an analysis of the election programmes between 1990 to 2017.

Migration started to be addressed as a threat to security in the election programmes of the ÖVP in the 1990s. The 1990 election programme is the first to reflect the new situation Austria found itself in the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain, suddenly being confronted with immigration and cross-border traffic that was inconceivable only a few years earlier. In this election programme, the general attitude towards migrants coming in from Eastern and South Eastern Europe, being the main group of migrants at the time, is a welcoming one. There is however a contradictory tendency to take up migration at the same times positively as fundamental and welcomed part of Austrian society as well as negatively as being the cause of 'criminal tourism' and a threat to the Austrian workforce. This contradictory tendency is further accentuated in subsequent programmes. In the 1994 and the 1995 programme, being written in the context of Austria's accession to the European Union, Austria is again addressed as an immigration country, which can also become the Heimat of migrants and refugees. Refugees and migrants are thereby included in the in-group that can legitimately call Austria their Heimat. They are however also excluded through being addressed as being the ones bringing along 'cross-border criminality', a topic raised by the FPÖ in 1992 in their 'Austria First' referendum, in which the party advocated a rigorous restriction of the amount of people allowed to come to Austria as migrants. The 1999 and the 2002 election programmes take on a stance towards migrants from Eastern and South Eastern

Europe in which the focus is on threats, both in terms of criminality and in terms of strains on the labour market. In 2006, in the context of 9/11 and other attacks security became the main topic in connection with migration, now being understood primarily in terms of criminality as well as terrorism. A new and distinct characteristic of the 2008 election programme is the culturalisation of the political discourse of the ÖVP through a linking of security and entire foreign ‘cultures’.

The analysis of the 2013 election programme revealed that neither the up to that programme increasing focus on the negative aspects of migration nor the culturalisation of security were a simple linear trend. In stark contrast to its predecessors, the 2013 election programme has a quite different tone. Migration is still presented as a challenge, yet not a threat, but a challenge that can be mastered. The 2017 election programme was written in the context of the sudden significant increase of migration movements Austria experienced in the summer of 2015. Apart from returning to the employment of the notion that large numbers of migrants are culturally incompatible with Austrian society and potentially dangerous, a particular emphasis is put on the welfare state. A supposed exploitation of the Austrian in-group through the provision of social benefits to the migrant out-group is addressed, and a two-tiered welfare systems, paying unequal sums to Austrians than to foreigners is suggested as solution.

The prevalent topics in conjunction with migration in the political discourse of the ÖVP from 1990 to 2017 as identified in this study were (arranged according to their prevalence in the election programmes) security, the welfare state, the concept of Heimat and integration.

Security was addressed in conjunction with migration throughout the entire analysed period. The logic that if the state wants to keep its ability to act, migration must be regulated, was present in the election programmes since 1990. It was however inconsistently present. From focusing on foreigner criminality and cross-border crime in the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s the focus subsequently changed to cultural questions from 2008 onwards. An increased focus on values characterised as ‘our’ values, while not specifying their content, can be observed. Additionally, the values of social groups and in this case the constructed homogenous (which is by no means homogenous) group of migrants is attributed with ‘values’ that are increasingly perceived as a threat, which subsequently leads to an increased interrelatedness of migration and security.

In all of the analysed election programmes except the one of 1990, the *welfare state* was addressed in connection with migration. Already in 1994 the ÖVP started to include the proclamation that an immigration policy to the detriment of the local population shall not be allowed to exist into their election programme (ÖVP 1994: 49). Even though the logic that in order for the welfare state to be kept intact, immigration must be restricted, has continuously been part of the political discourse of the ÖVP, the extent to which foreigners were cast a financial burden on the domestic population sharply increased after 1994. The depiction of foreigners as financial burden on the rest of society was subsequently put forth in the legitimization of differences in the entitlement to welfare payments.

The rather mystified concept of *Heimat* is taken up in all election programmes. It is partly used to determine who is and who is not part of the in-group that may refer to Austria as *Heimat*. The tendencies are quite ambivalent. Refugees and migrants are included and as well as excluded from the in-group that can call Austria their *Heimat* continuously. While in 2006 and 2008 a tendency towards excluding migrants from being part of the Austrian *Heimat* can be observed, in 2013 they are included to a certain extent again by showing a strong commitment to being an immigration country. In contrast to that the 2017 election programme again follows the tendency towards excluding migrants and constructing a dichotomy between the Austrian in-group and the out-group of the foreign other. Such ambivalent tendencies could interestingly also be identified within single election programmes. When for example describing Austria as an immigration country in 1994, open to everybody who wants to make Austria his or her *Heimat*, while at the same time referring to refugees and migrants in an aggressive manner, unambiguously creating an out-group.

Integration is linguistically negotiated in an incoherent manner throughout the analysed timeframe. In the 1990s and early 2000s it is framed as a positive challenge. In 2008 it is presented in the security section of the election programme, then back in the societal life section 2013 and again discussed in conjunction with security in 2017. Furthermore, the focus shifts from integration being a two-sided relation a one-sided focus on the obligations of the persons to be integrated.

The collective symbols, employed when negotiating migration were the *house symbolism* [Haus-Symbolik] and the *nature symbolism* [Natur-Symbolik] were the prevalent collective symbols throughout the time analysed.

Utilising nature symbols, such as floods, earthquakes and streams in connection with migration, implies that migration could turn into a force beyond human control and as dangerous as a natural disaster. In 1994 this was employed in talking about the global challenge the ‘new mass migration’ supposedly poses: “in order to effectively get to grips with the global migration flows of millions of people, the international community is called upon to take effective economic aid measures for the countries of the East and South.” (ÖVP 1994: 54, 55). The use of the collective symbol ‘streams of refugees’ invokes the picture of an infinite arrival of large cohorts of refugees. Another example can be found in the 2017 election programme: “the year 2015 was a political earthquake, a shock for many people in this country and massively burdened the trust in our constitutional state” (ÖVP 2017b: 18). By using the term ‘earthquake’ the notion is fed of having to restore order and rebuild what has been shaken up.

Using house symbols implies that a nation-state can seal off its territory in the way a homeowner can seal off his or her own house by simply closing and locking the doors, which does not correspond to the complexity of a nation state. An example is the 2002 election programme where it says that “only through clearly regulated asylum procedures, immigration through the backdoor can be avoided” (ÖVP: 2002: 56).

This study contributed to a deeper understanding of the subtle rather than direct and outspoken forms in which the realm of the sayable is altered in a discourse. Without explicitly calling migrants ‘dangerous’, which would be at odds with the self-description as a party of the moderate political center, the usage of natural symbolisms such as ‘earthquakes’ in connection with migrants nonetheless conveys a similar message. The alteration of the discourse of the ÖVP, which could be traced in the election programmes between 1990 and 2017 is first and foremost, comprised of subtle changes of this kind.

6.1. Author's note

In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the alteration of the ÖVP it would be interesting to analyse other genres of the political discourse of the ÖVP. Given that the current leader of the ÖVP Sebastian Kurz is referred to as 'rockstar' by Richard Grenell, new US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany in 2018, this study might be relevant for the analyses of comparable tendencies in other conservative parties in other countries. by other conservative parties

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Original Data

ÖVP (1990): Den Aufschwung wählen! Mit uns ist er sicher. Appendix A.

ÖVP (1994): Die Erhard-Busek-Pläne für Österreich. Für unsere Heimat. Für unsere Wirtschaft. Für unsere Sicherheit. Appendix B.

ÖVP (1995): Der Schlüssel-Ditz-Kurs. Appendix C.

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