

**Power Relations in the Somali Civil War: a realist perspective on  
internal and external actors in interventions**

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## Abstract

This paper examines the power relations in interventions in the Somali Civil War, more specifically two interventions, UNOSOM II and Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi. The starting point for the paper is qualitative methods, the interpretation of texts. Theoretical perspectives of power and realism from Morgenthau, Krieg, and Gilbert provide the basis from which an approach to measuring power is formulated. This approach is being used to analyse the power relations between external and internal actors in the two interventions, with the purpose of further analysing what some of the hindrances to the termination of the Civil War have been and thereby understand what possible measures might be needed to counteract the hindrances. It is concluded that a better way to approach the conflict can be achieved by taking into account three key aspects: a realistic assessment of the situation in Somalia, allocating enough resources to the mission, and looking beyond self-interests.

## 1. List of Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IR	International Relations
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
SNA	Somali National Alliance
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
US	United States (of America)

## 2. Introduction

More than 1 million internally displaced persons, more than 1 million refugees, and a span of more than thirty years (BBC, 2018a; BBC 2018b). These are a few of the numbers that characterise the Somali Civil War. The Somali Civil War is particularly interesting to examine, since it is a contemporary civil war that has been going on for many years and with numerous interventions that have not solved the conflict. Several scholars have argued that Somalia is an instance of insufficiency of the international society (Blattman & Miguel, 2010, p. 43; Easterly, 2008). Furthermore, it can be argued that a danger of the conflict spreading beyond Somalia's borders exists, since Kenya's involvement has triggered increased terror attacks and terror threats in Kenya (BBC, 2018a). As can be seen with the interventions in the Somali Civil War, there have been several actors with different interests and, as a result, different power struggles.

Within International Relations (IR), power is closely associated with realism. All of the IR schools have understandings of power and how power works, but realism has been the most influential school to the study of power. Realist schools argue that power is the most important factor in international relations and is a key concept in understanding war and peace. Schmidt (2005) argues that: "Thucydides's ancient dictum that the strong do what they want and the weak endure the consequences is as relevant today as it was when he described Athens' behaviour toward the tiny island of Melos in 400 BC" (p. 523).

Therefore, this paper takes a realist power perspective and applies it to two of the interventions in the Civil War, respectively the UNOSOM II and Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, and analyses some of the power structures in these interventions in order to understand what has hindered the stabilisation of the Civil War and thereby understand what measures need to be taken in order to counteract these hindrances. The starting point for this paper will be the following research question: **How can a characterisation of the power relations between external interventions and internal actors in the cases of UNOSOM II and Somali National Alliance and Kenya's Linda Nchi and Al-Shabaab help provide an understanding of the measures needed to counteract the hindrances to the stabilisation of the Civil War?**

This research question will be examined using realism and our approach to measure power, which will be based on Morgenthau's power and realism, Gilbert's anti-democratic feedback thesis, and Krieg's realist intervention concept. The project is based on qualitative methods, the interpretation of text, and uses secondary sources as the empirical materials.

We recognise that “counteracting the hindrances” might sound like an attempt to solve the conflict, which would be an extremely ambitious and difficult task and something far beyond the scope of this paper. What is meant by “counteracting the hindrances” is that we will provide our perspective on how to better approach the Somali Civil War, based on the analyses of the power in the interventions (section 6.).

The next section, section 3., will describe the methods of this paper. Section 4. explains the theoretical concepts used. Section 5. provides a description of the Civil War and some of the key events. In section 6., the two interventions will be analysed, using the aforementioned theoretical concepts. Section 7. discusses the power relations in the interventions and how the analysis of these might contribute to understanding what has hindered the stabilisation of the war and what might counteract these hindrances. Finally, section 8. concludes and summarises the findings, and section 9. discusses some important considerations and implications of the paper.

### 3. Methodology

The ontological position of this project is realism, by which we mean that we understand the world through the eyes of the realist school of International Relations. This will be described in depth in the following (see section 4.1.), but it essentially means that we perceive international relations as relations of states and these states we perceive to be self-centred and concerned with their own interests. The epistemological position is epistemological realism. This perspective means that "we know the world as it is in itself" and that the world exists independent of our perceptions of the world (Tegtmeier, 2014, p. 196). It is a reaction to Kantian idealism, holding that the world as we know it is only how we perceive it, and that we do not know the world "as it is in itself" (Tegtmeier, 2014, p. 196).

The empirical materials are made up of secondary sources, primarily journal articles, and reports. The main point of these empirical materials has been to extract information, and the information provided from the texts will then be analysed (see section 6.), using the theoretical concepts described in section 4. Most of the information used for the analyses is extracted from the following texts: Baumann, Yates & Washington (2003); United States Institute of Peace (1995); Doboš (2016); Olsen (2018); and Anderson & McKnight (2015).

Generally, the texts reflect a realist understanding of and perspectives on the interventions in the Somali Civil War. This can for instance be seen in the Doboš' (2016) article, which focuses a lot on political might, such as territories and infrastructure, and in Olsen (2018) who openly takes a realist perspective. For this paper, it means that the analyses and the conclusions made will be shaped by this perspective. As this paper also holds a realist angle, using materials with a realist perspective might confirm or reinforce our own perspective. This can be a positive thing, since it makes the perspective of this paper more valid when more scholars hold similar perspectives, but it can also be a negative thing, since there will be a lack of a new angle or a lack of a challenge to our perspective.

The texts by Baumann et al. (2003) and United States Institute of Peace (1995) provide a lot of information with numbers, for instance concerning economy and troops, in relation to UNOSOM II, while this information is not provided in relation to the SNA. This affects the arguments in the analysis, since there is concrete information on troops and economy in UNOSOM II, which gives a good measurement of political and economic might, but this information is a lot harder to extract from the texts when it comes to the SNA. Therefore, the arguments concerning the SNA's economic and military might will not be based on numbers,

which will make it more difficult to compare the SNA to the UNOSOM II, since there is an imbalance in the information available in this context.

As mentioned, the empirical materials for this paper are secondary sources, and this holds both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include accessibility, saving time, and gaining different perspectives provided by different authors. The disadvantages include that the quality of the texts might vary, and that the texts do not always correspond with the points we are seeking to make or the information needed. Generally, this means that our analyses are shaped by the sources. This can be a positive thing, since new insights might be gained. It can also be a negative thing, since the sources might affect with their perspectives and in a way restrain our analyses. Furthermore, secondary sources are an interpretation of other materials, whether primary or other secondary materials, which might mean that something could have been "lost in translation", perhaps causing a restriction on our own interpretation. We will attempt to compensate for some of these disadvantages by being aware of them and by having a critical stance towards the materials.

The methodology used in this paper is qualitative methods, the interpretation of texts. Theoretical concepts form the basis of our approach to measuring of power. These theoretical concepts are respectively: Morgenthau's power in realism, Krieg's realist intervention concept, and Gilbert's anti-democratic feedback thesis (see section 4.). Our approach to measuring power will in the analyses (see section 6.) be applied to the two interventions and the different actors in these interventions.

Two interventions, the UNOSOM II and Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi, have been chosen to form the basis of our analysis. The framework of this paper has made it necessary to limit the scope and studying two interventions rather than for instance all of the interventions in the Somali Civil War would fit within the framework. These two interventions have been chosen because they were the most interesting in terms of power struggles between external interveners and internal actors, since they both involved two major actors directly exerting power against each other.

## 4. Theories

In this part of the paper we will elaborate upon our theoretical concepts. First, the concept of realism will be explained. This will be followed by a section on Morgenthau's concept of power in realism, and then a section on Gilbert's anti-democratic feedback thesis. Subsequently, Krieg's realist interpretation of intervention will be explained. Next, we will provide ground for how the mentioned theories connect. Finally, we provide our interpretation of power and how to measure power, based on the theoretical concepts explained.

### 4.1. Realism

Realism is one of the two most prominent theoretical concepts in international relations; the other being liberalism/idealism. Realists believe that states are the main actors in world politics, and they act as extensions of human beings, meaning they are power-hungry and self-interested. They are rational, in the sense that they pursue their own interests within the limitations of their abilities and resources. Their goals are national interests defined as power, which is expressed in economic, political, and military might. Realists believe that states exist in an anarchic system, meaning that there is no global government, and that the states in this system operate to look out for their own interests and only pursue alliances if they can help enhance defence and power (Anderson, Peterson, Toops & Hey, 2015, pp. 127-129). In the international sphere, there is a hierarchy of states in which the great powers are the most important states, and international relations are primarily understood as a struggle for security and domination between the great powers (Jackson & Sørensen, 1999, p. 68-69).

Realism is mostly applied to states and relations between states, but we recognise that the theory can also be applied to other actors than states, such as factions, organisations, and human beings, and the theory will in this paper also be used for the purpose of analysing and understanding other actors than states.

### 4.2. Hans Morgenthau's power in Realism

Hans Morgenthau is widely considered to be one of the key founding fathers of modern realism and has for centuries been a key figure in understanding international relations using realist thinking (Williams, 2007, p. 1). For Morgenthau, modern realism, like classical realism, argues that states are the main actors in international relations and that the main focus of realism should be on power relations. Thus, Morgenthau argues that the overall importance in understanding

international politics is an understanding of national interests which is defined in terms of power (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 11-12).

This interpretation of power coined by Morgenthau is elaborated upon in his 1948 book “Politics Among Nations” in which he describes the balance of power in IR as best understood in two different dynamics. The first dynamic explains the balance of power as the unintended result of great powers engaged in a pursuit of domination which creates a conflicted environment in which every actor pursues their own interests. The second dynamic has been produced from the realisation that the struggle for power in its nature is self-destructive (Little, 2007, pp. 137-140).

For Morgenthau, the power restraints necessary for an equal power balance and the prevention of a dangerous society is achieved through establishing a constitutional government, the nearest approximation to which is through the establishment of peace treaties following conflicts. In a constitutional government, institutions can watch over each other, thereby ensuring that power is distributed rather than hoarded. Thus, emphasising an almost constructivist argument, that the structures in society related to the notion of power can be ameliorated when the realisation occurs that pursuit of hegemony is self-destructive. Thus, power and power balances in IR for Morgenthau are deeply intertwined and best understood as a pursuit of national interests. However, he also notes that a materialistic pursuit of national interests is destructive in nature which has presented a frame of relevance for his second dynamic which entails stabilising power relations. Something that most commonly happens when actors realise the destructive nature of conflict and become willing to establish a power equilibrium (Little, 2007, pp. 158-159).

#### 4.3. Gilbert’s anti-democratic feedback thesis

Many scholars of international relations have attempted to forge concrete political theories using power theories such as the one posed by Morgenthau into what one might call a more modern realist idiom. In doing so they have attempted to detach a soft rhetoric of power into a more putative conceptualisation of power (Gilbert, 1999, p. 3). This realist idiom has been debated by Alan Gilbert in his 1999 book on how global politics constrain democracy, in which he elaborates upon how great power realism and protection of actors’ own interest harbours conflicts, something he describes in his writings on what he calls the ‘anti-democratic feedback thesis’. The ‘anti-democratic feedback thesis’ quite briefly incorporates the arguments made by Morgenthau into a more contemporary interpretation and explains how leaders in

inegalitarian societies make use of international power competition to improve their own position in terms of power. For Gilbert these leaders use power competition to 'make enemies' of any actor opposing them interest-wise. Furthermore, by drawing upon differences politically and racially, even going to war can be legitimised and used as a tool for manipulating individuals living in inegalitarian societies. This manipulation is carried out by using power competition and opposing interests as a pretext to spark up nationalist or patriotic support from those supporting any given leader. Furthermore, power competition and opposing national interests can also serve as a method to eliminate and discredit any internal, thereby strengthening the divide between power actors in a conflict (Gilbert, 1999, p. 28).

#### 4.4. Krieg's realist intervention concept

Krieg (2013) argues that interventions of the post-Cold War era have mostly been driven by national interests (p. 135). From a realist perspective, he argues that states will not use military or financial resources for improving anything other than the interests of its own citizens. Thus, the states will all try to maximise their own power in relation to other states while mainly providing for their own citizens (Krieg, 2013, p. 43). Some realists argue that interventions on humanitarian grounds have been used as foreign policy tools in international relations to maintain or gain legitimacy. Humanitarian interventions are military operations with actual costs, which is why states will only do what is necessary to maintain a certain reputation and spend a minimum of resources without focusing on what needs to be done (Krieg, 2013, p. 43-44). Leaders, particularly in democratic states, will invest efforts in understanding the costs, the benefits, and the probability of success in order to gain support from the public for the decisions made. Furthermore, if a humanitarian crisis will have no effect on national interests, the state faces a dilemma of keeping the costs low in order to maintain or gain internal legitimacy and still follow the international call for intervention in order to maintain or gain external legitimacy. Some realists argue that "interventions motivated by general moral justifications or conceptual appeals to the validity of international order will either fail to occur or will succumb to half-hearted commitments (as the cases of Rwanda and Somalia showed)". Thus, states will only accept the costs and the losses of interventions that serve national interests (Krieg, 2013, p. 44). Krieg argues that national interests are "decisive dynamics in international relations, also in the decisions to intervene to help people in need" and that national interests can "exist on their own as a sole motivation for intervention", which was

essentially what took place in Iraq and Afghanistan, where "the level of altruism was not noteworthy" (Krieg, 2013, p. 131).

#### 4.5. Connecting Realism, Morgenthau Gilbert and Krieg

Our theoretical stance throughout this project is that of realism. More specifically, we have used the writings of three different realist thinkers; Morgenthau, Gilbert, and Krieg. Using Morgenthau, we gain an understanding of how power works in inegalitarian power competitive societies such as Somalia and how one might stabilise such power relations. These views are then supported by Gilbert in his anti-democratic feedback thesis in which he argues that leaders in inegalitarian societies use this power competitiveness to intensify and/or worsen conflicts. Krieg is used more in a context of external action as he argues that interventions, even humanitarian ones, are rooted in a pursuit of national self-interests. Thus, these three thinkers allow us to regard both external and internal actors from a realist perspective, which we will elaborate upon in the following section.

#### 4.6. Our interpretation of power

Having now accounted for different interpretations of power in realism, we can elaborate upon the aspects we find relevant for our analysis of the Somali conflict, thereby providing our own theoretical understanding of what constitutes contemporary realist power. Our interpretation is based upon realist power in general in which we believe that political, economic, and military might to be the key constituents when measuring power. We, however, also recognise that these terms are closely related and to some extent overlap and interact very intimately with each other.

With regards to these three key constituents of power we believe political might to be measured in terms of the extent to which a leadership has the support of the individuals it governs, i.e. how legitimate a leadership appears to be. Political might also involves measuring territorial control and security within this given territory. Identified both in terms of the quantity of land a group governs, as well as *how* they govern it, with regards to factors such as infrastructure and institutions as well as security measures to withhold others from acquiring the territorial control. If a nation or an actor technically controls a large amount of land, but cannot control the entirety of said land or guarantee security within this domain, the individuals under the given territorial control may consider the leadership weak or illegitimate leading to less political might in a realist interpretation. Also prominent in political power is external

support, in regards to allies, support with funds, military personnel, and/or armaments. The support not only provides material things, but also credibility to the faction, state, or organisation. Political power also encompasses political decision making processes behind attacks on other power actors, e.g., ambushes, kidnaps, terror attacks, interventions, raids, and sieges, as well as the legalities of said attacks.

The second key constituent in our power measurement is that of economic might which for us comes naturally as the utilisation of, e.g., military power, collective security, and trade power naturally requires a certain amount of economic means. Thus, economic power plays a key part in the armament of a power and its ability to obtain the required resources to remain a functioning military power and keep the individuals it governs satisfied. Having an economic foundation for the goals you seek to accomplish is vital for an intervention to intervene successfully, they need economic surplus for the sake of ensuring population, armaments, and provisions. Alternatively, for non-state actors, economic surplus is vital for the sake of attracting new members, especially in a country as poor as Somalia. Moreover, without money they cannot ensure provisions for their army and members as well security and infrastructure to maintain their own interests in the work they do, including winning political power over a certain territory. Economic surplus ensures increased growth, prosperity, and legitimacy and is, thus, very important for the sake of obtaining and maintaining power.

Economic might leads on naturally to our last key constituent, military power. It becomes apparent when analysing power actors seeking their own interests in a world system of power competition that military might is of utmost importance when one wants to pursue their own interests. Most evident facets of military power lie in population, in terms of the quantifiable number of armed soldiers or troops who can partake in military activity, as well as available armaments for the sake of achieving mandates with military might. As mentioned, this is closely related to other power aspects such as economic might, which is naturally used to acquire military equipment. It is also closely related to external support; whose financial support often includes the supply of armaments. Without military might, power actors will not be able to protect their territories and members or intervene successfully.

Thus, our interpretation draws upon both realism and the writings of Morgenthau, Gilbert, and Krieg. By using Gilbert to relativise Morgenthau's writings, we have formulated our own approach to measuring power which is applicable to the case of the conflict in Somalia. Quite briefly, our approach to power recognises that in realist power, actors tend to pursue their own interests in a power competitive environment and that the power these actors assert against each other is measurable by analysing political, economic, and military might. However, we

also recognise that power is a complex concept to measure and we therefore emphasise that this interpretation is merely what we believe to be a convincing way of measuring power.

## 5. Background for the Somali Civil War

The Civil War raging in Somalia has conflicts stemming from decades upon decades of internal turmoil and distress, ensuring a civil war that is so deeply ingrained in the political and social sphere of the country that countless interventions from outside sources have not successfully put an end to the war.

Succinctly, Somalia's future looked hopeful during the first few decades after reaching independence in 1960. They had many years without armed conflict, with a vibrant albeit corrupt multiparty democracy. In 1969 the military took over the country in a coup lead by Siyad Barre, who reframed the political sector to a socialist one during the era of the Cold War (World Bank, 2005, p. 9). Between 1977 and 1991 the country endured three separate armed conflicts mainly between Somalia and Ethiopia as well as conflicts between the military and civil society movements. With regards to the armed conflicts, a civil war was already on the drawing board, and with the totalitarian leadership of the Siyad Barre regime, the country spiralled further into despair (World Bank, 2005, pp. 9-10). One could write books on the respective conditions that laid the groundwork for the war that is still fuming to this day, but with the armed conflicts, the leadership of Siyad Barre, and the famine raging in the region, the basics of the conflict is drawn. Siyad Barre fled the country in 1991 leaving the country without replacement and was instead followed by a prolonged state of warfare and violent anarchy. The wars were motivated mainly by power and regional control and was fought between varying clan militias and warlords (World Bank, 2005, p. 11). The lack of security, political stability, and governance held the country from recovering from its collapse even splitting the country apart<sup>1</sup>, however, since 1992 a continuing stream of interventions from the UN, the AU, the US, and Kenya to name a few who have all sought to resolve the conflict and create a working government. While there has been progress made, the Civil War is still in full effect (Erdağ, 2017).

In this paper we will seek to understand how the power relations at play in the conflict have had an effect on the attempt to stabilise the conflict. Of the many interventions, we have chosen UNOSOM II and Operation Linda Nchi, analyses we will proceed to in the following.

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<sup>1</sup> Somaliland in the north of the country declared independence in the early 1990s and Puntland in the north eastern part of Somali becoming semi-autonomous in the end of the 1990s (Doboš, 2016, p. 942)

## 6. Analysis of the Power Relations

We will now analyse two cases of power relations in regard to the Somali Civil War. The first being United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from 1993 and the power it asserted in that operation. The Kenyan clan militia the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Mohamed Farrah Aideed, were actively fighting against the UN Operation, and we will thus analyse the SNA and the power they asserted against the UN Operation. Second to that, we will analyse the Kenyan 2011 military intervention, Operation Linda Nchi, and the power they project. Kenya's motivation for the attack was to destabilise Al-Shabaab, an organisation whose power relations will also be subject of analysis in this paper. Lastly, we will analyse how the power relations between Kenya and Al-Shabaab functioned.

### 6.1. The UNOSOM II and the Somali National Alliance (SNA)

This part of the paper will characterise the power relation seen between the UN as an external actor and the SNA and Mohamed Farrah Aideed as an internal actor. Important to note here is that the Somali internal power actors are comprised of several factions of warlords, and analysing all of them would be a quite complex undertaking. Therefore, while we recognise that many different factions of power actors operate internally in Somalia, we have chosen to focus on the SNA leader Mohamed Farrah Aideed who was arguably the strongest of the warlords and the most noticeable the UNOSOM II opposition (Baumann, Yates & Washington, 2003, pp. 104-105). We will first present the background for the UNOSOM II and Aideed's SNA, and afterwards we will progress into an analysis of the power characteristics of the two. Subsequently, we will account for how the power connected with their self-interests as a starting point. Lastly, we will analyse the power relation.

#### 6.1.1. Background

##### *Background for the UNOSOM II*

The interventions of the United Nations started in 1992 with UNOSOM I which was their first mission in the region and was later followed by the UNOSOM II. The UNOSOM I quite briefly sought to facilitate and provide humanitarian assistance following the Somali Civil War which escalated in 1991 as President Barre fled the country. The UNOSOM I, however, proved to be relatively ineffectual and was followed by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which facilitated the transition into the UNOSOM II, a more elaborate intervention (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 99). The UNOSOM II was a mission in which the UN received assistance from the United

States who offered to take charge in a mission mainly comprised of American forces seeking to establish a secure environment for humanitarian aid, political reconciliation, and economic assistance using any means necessary, thereby legitimising coercive action as well (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 101). This, however, was no easy task and the mission arguably had far more extensive and optimistic goals than were realistically possible with the available manpower and resources. Eventually, this evolved into confrontation after most US troops were withdrawn from the UNOSOM II, making the entire operation vulnerable, which presented a tempting opportunity for the SNA leader Mohamed Aideed to make his move (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 11). This created several clashes between the UN and the US on one side and Aideed on the other which meant that the mission to ensure an environment for humanitarian aid developed into a manhunt for Aideed (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 12). Overall, the UNOSOM II failed to achieve its mandate and ended up being a completely different mission than it was meant to be in the beginning (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 99).

#### *Background for Aideed's SNA*

The opposition faced by the UNOSOM II was quite extensive and involved several warlords and different rebel groups, most noticeable of these warlords was the SNA and its leader at that time Mohamed Farrah Aideed. The SNA furthermore was the primary antagonist in the UN led quest for peace and security for humanitarian aid in Somalia. As the UN-US coalition the UNOSOM II sought to stabilise the region for humanitarian purposes, Aideed and the SNA realised that should the UNOSOM II succeed it would be highly undesirable for Aideed and indeed cripple his ability to remain a major power actor in the region. Furthermore, the continued activities of the UN and the US in the region created a very untrusting relationship between the UN leadership and Aideed. Aideed perceived the continued activities as a very potent threat to his power dominance at the time among the warlords of the area and a threat to his desire of achieving presidency. With an entire political institution built around him to function in a conflict-torn nation such as Somalia at the time, Aideed would not benefit the slightest from the UNOSOM II succeeding in stabilising the ongoing conflicts. Thus began the SNA's resurgence against the external power actors of the UN and the US which ended in numerous clashes between the two actors (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 11-12).

### 6.1.2. Analysis

#### *Power in the UNOSOM II*

It becomes apparent when regarding the background for the UNOSOM II and the SNA that a very large-scale power relationship and power battle existed between these two actors, with Aideed seeking to fend off any UN intervention and limitation to his dominance in the region and the UN attempting to stabilise the region for humanitarian aid to arrive. This part of the analysis will examine how the UNOSOM II asserted political, economic, and military power as defined in our theory section (see section 4.).

The political power or might possessed by the UN-US coalition in the UNOSOM II is quite complex to measure. The UNOSOM II as an actor had a massive political backing from outside Somalia with numerous countries providing support for the mission, most importantly the US providing extensive amounts of troops and military power. However, while the UNOSOM II was supported in the world society the story is quite a different one on the ground in Somalia where the operation was meant to have an impact.

This is something elaborated upon by Lidwien Kapteijns (2013) in his article on the UN-US humanitarian mission in Somalia. Kapteijns argues that the mission in Somalia overall was characterised by a very poor collaboration and political structure between the US and the UN and furthermore poor leadership and decision making, which crippled the UNOSOM II from its very beginning. Kapteijns emphasises the way in which the US consciously ‘helped’ the opposition within Somalia by simply withdrawing their troops early, leaving the UN vulnerable to attack, an opportunity that was utilised by opposition leader Aideed. Therefore, the internal political structure in the UNOSOM II mission was unstable and not clearly defined between the UN and US, something that for Kapteijns set the UN up for failure (Kapteijns, 2013, p. 422).

Kapteijns’ arguments are supported by Baumann who argues that the UNOSOM II’s wide focus on stabilising the entire region and building a nation in Somalia threatened to undermine the warlords. This in return created a politically very hostile environment for the UNOSOM II to be carried out. Baumann et al. (2003) states: “That [to build a nation] was not in the best interests of the warlords, who wanted, each of them, to control, and of course Aideed was the strongest of the warlords” (p. 105). So politically, not only was the UNOSOM II hindered by poor political power in the internal governing structures between the US and the UN, it was also hindered by its objective of building a nation in Somalia, something that created massive opposition within Somalia, most noticeably from Aideed. Moreover, we argue that the

political power weaknesses of the UNOSOM II come to show when considering that they changed their main objective away from securing an environment for humanitarian aid and towards simply capturing Aided. Seemingly, Aided's massive political backing and control of territory created an environment in which he was able to completely obstruct the UNOSOM II goals, which is also quite apparent when considering the security and humanitarian mission ended in war with Aided (Kapteijns, 2013, pp. 431-432). Therefore, we argue that merely regarding political power, the UNOSOM II was quite weak on the ground in Somalia and arguably quite susceptible to Aided's attempts in disrupting the entire operation

The assertion of political power requires economic means which thereby leads naturally to the characterisation of the economic means possessed by the UNOSOM II. The economic power of the UNOSOM II is quite extensive when considering the backing it had from member countries around the world and furthermore the backing it received from the US. However, economic means must align with the desired scope of an operation, meaning that with only a relatively narrow objective, a limited budget would suffice and thus with a larger scope, one must expect the budget and available resources to increase accordingly. This is where the UNOSOM II had certain critical shortcomings.

According to the official mandate of the UNOSOM II, as also stated in the UN Charter, the operation was meant to not only facilitate a secure environment for humanitarian aid but also establish peace between factions, securing lines of communication, and preventing any outbreaks of armed conflicts in order to thereby establish an environment in which a Somali state could arise (Baumann et al., 2003, pp. 100-101). Baumann et al. goes on to argue that the UN's failure to limit themselves to simpler objectives meant an undertaking of a so-called 'herculean' operation, which from its very beginning did not have the required resources and manpower to successfully achieve this mandate (Baumann et al., 2003, pp 101-102). This argument is supported by the United States Institute of Peace (1995) as they argue that achieving the ambitious goals set by the UN would require far greater resources and staffing than what was realistically ready for the UNOSOM II (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 11). Thus, it seems that the massive undertaking of the UNOSOM II in building a nation in Somalia was unrealistic considering their economic power, which is defined in terms of their available resources and manpower compared with their desired area of impact. The UNOSOM II simply did not have the resources nor the manpower for it to achieve the desired goals.

Further challenges to the economic power of the UNOSOM II become apparent when considering the later stage of the operation in which the United States, as mentioned, withdrew its troops from Somalia, which left UNOSOM II vulnerable. With the UN being too ambitious

in their goals and the operation's change of focus into a manhunt for Aideed, the support for UNOSOM II outside Somalia fell drastically leaving member states questioning the very purpose of investing manpower and resources into the operation (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 12). Thus, one might argue that Aideed's successful disruptions of the operation, which meant that a manhunt for Aideed became the new focus, actively crippled the support for the UNOSOM II leaving it far weaker in terms of manpower and resources for it to achieve its goal.

Measuring the economic might of the UNOSOM II is a quite complex undertaking due to it being an operation supported by numerous UN member states. Being an operation conducted by a large scale organisation such as the UN, we expect them to have had sufficient economic means. However, as argued, the UNOSOM II still faced critical weaknesses when it came to its economic power to make an impact in Somalia and achieve its goal of establishing peace. Wanting to rebuild an entire nation simply required more manpower and resources than what was available to the UNOSOM II. Alongside the lacking resources, the UNOSOM II faced challenges after it turned into a manhunt for Aideed, something that left member countries questioning the very purpose of the mission, ending in the early withdrawal of troops and the end to the operation as a whole in 1994 (Daze, 1995, p. 2). These arguments excellently portray how the UNOSOM II as it progressed lost support from resource and troop contributors and thus slowly decreased in terms of economic power, leaving Aideed in a favourable position to maintain his dominance in the region.

Similar to the aforementioned arguments on economic power, military power must be understood in connection with the desired impact of an operation. In an operation with a relatively small desired impact, the amount of military required is arguably less than in a mission such as the UNOSOM II. The UNOSOM II, however, had a massive desired impact as it sought to establish a peaceful environment throughout Somalia, which could help rebuild a functioning Somali state, which as argued would have required far more extensive staffing than what was available to the operation. Therefore, we argue that even though the military power held by the UNOSOM II on paper was quite impressive, it was arguably not extensive enough to achieve their goals.

In a publication by the UN Department of Public Information, the concrete military power of the UNOSOM II is presented as an estimated 28,000 military and police personnel (United Nations, 1997), something that as argued by Baumann et al. simply was not enough military power to assert dominance and establish peace. This argument is elaborated upon by the United States Institute of Peace as they state that not only did the amount of troops and

resources not align with the scope of the operation, the aforementioned poor internal communications meant that the limited available military power held by the UNOSOM II was not being used efficiently (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 11). Thereby, the military power of the UNOSOM II suffered from similar issues as seen in the characterisation of both political and economic power. Poor command structures led to inefficient deployment of troops and thereby a military power that can best be described as both limited in terms of numbers and not up to full strength in terms of its application in Somalia.

### *Realism in the UNOSOM II*

It seems the best way to describe the various political, economic and military power held by the UNOSOM II is comprehensive and large scale on paper, though with massive challenges in the form of too far-reaching goals and ineffective use of resources. Thereby, the power that the UNOSOM II asserted on the ground in Somalia proved actually to be quite limited which is also seen in the operation's failure to achieve its mandate. These findings allow for an interesting take on the entire mentality behind the operation from the UN-US side. As argued by Krieg, humanitarian missions also serve a purpose in realism as they allow intervening states to earn legitimacy and reputation in the public, thereby pursuing national interests. For Krieg, this is why states carrying out humanitarian missions will use too few resources without focusing on what really needs to be done. This exact point is supported by the power analysis of the UNOSOM II, where it was emphasised that the mission critically underrated the power held by local clan groups and thus had an almost arrogant and naive approach to achieving peace in Somalia (Baumann et al., 2003, pp. 106-107). In particular, these tendencies can be seen in the widespread criticisms of the UN's too ambitious goals which underlined the naive approach to required resources. This argument is in accordance with Krieg's theory in which he argues that intervening states will attempt to spend least possible resources in order to achieve their goals, something that also led to a quite ineffective impact in Somalia (United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 11).

Furthermore, the underrating of Aideed's SNA in return led to the transformation of the operation into a manhunt during which the US administration realised that the costs began to outweigh the benefits of being in the area. This becomes apparent in the aftermath of the Battle of Mogadishu as public opinion in the United States began to diminish due to a lack of results aligning with the amount of spent resources, i.e., a negative cost-benefit balance. Continued involvement in Somalia proved ineffective and thus only hurt the US administration's

reputation among the US citizens which ultimately ended in withdrawal of troops early after widespread public criticisms in 1994 (Baumann et al., 2003, pp. 165-166). This goes to show that the US administration's interests in Somalia were arguably based on gaining legitimacy at home and that as their various attempts in asserting power in Somalia failed the US no longer had any interests of its own in staying in Somalia. This argument coincides with Krieg's arguments of states only pursuing goals as long as they coincide with their interests and in general portrays a picture of the UNOSOM II that despite it being a humanitarian operation was an operation to pursue the interests of the UN and the US.

### *Power in Aideed's SNA*

This part of the analysis will examine how Aideed's SNA asserted political, economic, and military power as defined in our theory section (see section 4.6.).

Politically, Aideed had far more extensive amounts of support for his leadership and a much larger support base than seen in the case of the UNOSOM II within Somalia. Baumann et al. elaborates on this and goes on to argue that alongside his much larger support base, Aideed also managed to direct clashes between him and the UNOSOM II to his political advantage and thus increase the support for him. One example of such is seen in the time after the UNOSOM II shifted focus towards a manhunt operation for Aideed, where he excellently displayed his political power by conducting what Baumann et al. (2003) name "psychological operations" (p. 110). These psychological operations entail a framework for discursively portraying the UNOSOM II as an unjust attack on peaceful protesters, something that allowed Aideed to fuel animosity towards the UNOSOM II leadership while still maintaining his public image as a peacemaker. Furthermore, Aideed was able to utilise Somali infrastructure to assist his political dominance, this is for example seen in his use of Radio Mogadishu, a national radio station, which broadcasted his anti-UNOSOM II message which in return was followed by him publicly inviting the UN to stop the violence against innocent Somalis (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 110).

These arguments by Baumann et al. paint a picture of a leader who skilfully was able to use his political power in Somalia to hurt the very credibility of the UNOSOM II by villainising the UN and the US to the public, thereby creating an 'us versus them' rhetoric which crippled the nation building ambitions of the UNOSOM II. In continuation of the psychological operations by Aideed, the UNOSOM II force commander stated that "Rising tensions would undermine success in Somalia" (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 110); a statement that cements

Aideed's political power within Somalia and his success in utilising it to disrupt the UNOSOM II operations. Furthermore, Aideed was keen on protecting his territory in Mogadishu which led him to order the attack on any UN personnel attempting to enter the capital which is a display of political might in ensuring Aideed's territory, the details to which we will return.

These political tools utilised by Aideed would not be possible without economic means necessary in order to accomplish them, which creates a frame of relevance for discussing the economic power of Aideed's SNA.

Aideed's economic power is hard to measure due to a lack of concrete data on the subject. Arguably, Aideed's economic power arose alongside his skilful use of political power which gave him the leadership of first another clan militia, United Somali Congress military wing, and from there slowly provided him with increased legitimacy in the public. Thereby meaning that as Aideed was able to increase his political power, he was able to increase the amount of support for his vision as well and thereby resources in the form of manpower and provisions from those supporting him (Hall, 2015, p. 9). Whereas this does not provide us with exact budgets and numbers it does paint a picture of a leader who slowly gained more political support and quickly became what Baumann et al. named the most powerful of the clan leaders, a point that emphasises not only an increase in political power but subsequent increase in economic means as well in the form of supporters.

Further evidence for Aideed's increased economic power becomes apparent in the form of his overall control over infrastructure which allowed him to orchestrate numerous ambushes on the UNOSOM II personnel in what Baumann et al. (2003) name "a coordinated scheme of attack against UN personnel and resources" (p. 108). Thus, while no direct implication is given of the economic power available to Aideed and the SNA, we are able to derive from these examples that Aideed did rise to power and gained a larger network of support opposing the UNOSOM II. The growing network of support in return provided him with increasing resources to oppose the UNOSOM II, something that as argued earlier was a quite successful endeavour.

Similar to the aforementioned arguments from the characterisation of the UNOSOM II, the military power of Aideed and the SNA is closely connected to political and economic power. Important to note is that due to Aideed and the SNA being only one of many military factions within Somalia, the SNA's power would be expected to be limited, compared to larger well coordinated interventions such as UNOSOM II. In continuation of this, an adequate measurement of the military resources held by the SNA and Aideed's forces in general does not exist.

With this argument in mind there are certain pointers towards the military power displayed by Aideed and the SNA, which quite briefly was successful in derailing the UN quest for peace and political reconciliation in Somalia. Baumann et al. elaborate upon this exact point and argues that while the military numbers were not immense, Aideed was able to orchestrate well organised ambushes on the UN personnel killing multiple soldiers and successfully forcing the UN to put their humanitarian mission on hold (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 109). Thereby, Aideed excellently made use of the resources available to him to create an environment of tension around Mogadishu in which the UN personnel could not operate without fear of their safety. Moreover, without safety insurance around Mogadishu both NGOs and the UN agencies were unable to continue their operation thereby marking the impressive accomplishment of Aideed's somewhat limited actual military power (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 110).

Aideed's limitations to power, however, also showed during the latter phase of the UNOSOM II as the UN personnel successfully carried out raids with the assistance of US troops which simply were too extensive for Aideed's forces to handle. The raid was somewhat successful for the UN personnel as it collected a massive amount of Aideed's armaments and captured more than 100 prisoners (Baumann et al., 2003, pp. 112-113). Thus, characterising the military power of Aideed is quite complex. While the concrete number of troops might not be immense, Aideed cleverly utilised said troops to his advantage as he successfully derailed the UN operation and forced them into armed conflict. Thereby the UN was prevented from nation building in Somalia, ultimately benefiting his interests of achieving presidency, something that for Aideed would be easier with his dominant role maintained in the ongoing clan wars in Somalia (Baumann et al., 2003, pp 113-114).

### *Realism in Aideed's SNA*

This section will draw upon the aforementioned power characteristics analysis of Aideed's SNA and examine an analysis of the pursuit of own interests, i.e., a realist perspective, can be seen.

As argued, Aideed wanted to maintain a system of conflict within Somalia due to this being in his best interest of eventually achieving the presidency. With a politically dominating militia Aideed would have no interest in the UNOSOM II succeeding in stabilising the conflict and thereby effectively eliminating the clans from the political spectrum and allow a

transitional government to arise. Therefore, his opposition to the UNOSOM II becomes quite apparent throughout the analysis of his power assertions against the UNOSOM II.

If we consider our theory section, Gilbert (see section 4.3.) argues that in inegalitarian societies, actors tend to use the power competitive environment to promote nationalism or support for themselves. A tendency which is clearly visible in Aideed's use of political power where it was argued that he used the Somali media for his psychological operations to portray the UNOSOM II as being an unjust attack on civilians. He thereby effectively crippled the very credibility of the UNOSOM II and spun it to his political advantage by villainising the UN and the US ultimately creating support for himself. Moreover, his support politically meant an increase in available economic means and resources to combat the UNOSOM II which as argued was seen in his display of military power in Mogadishu creating a very hostile environment with frequent ambushes in which the UN was unable to operate. This in return meant that the UNOSOM II could not gain control of Mogadishu and could not function effectively as their well-being depended largely on being able to work without fear of an attack (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 110)

Thus, in general Aideed's SNA, despite their limited power, effectively disrupted the UNOSOM II in order to protect Aideed's own national interest of becoming president. Should the UN effectively create peace and establish a working government in Somalia, Aideed's power would suffer, which therefore led him to politically, economically, and militarily oppose the UNOSOM II forces.

### 6.1.3. The Power Relation: the UNOSOM II and Aideed's SNA

It becomes evident from these power characteristics analyses that an immense power struggle occurred between the UN-US coalition UNOSOM II and the local clan groups and militias with the most powerful of these being Aideed's SNA. This section of the paper will compare the UNOSOM II and Aideed's SNA in order to emphasise the ways in which power interacted between these two actors and, furthermore, how they were able to use their various power to derail the agenda of their respective opposition. An understanding of this will provide us with findings which in return will allow us to better discuss and understand how one might approach the conflict in future interventions with a better outcome than seen so far.

The power analyses portrayed a picture of two power actors pursuing two wildly different interests, which is the entire driving force behind the power struggle. This is an argument that is also supported by Baumann et al. (2003) as they argue that the region in general was

characterised by “far too many weapons in the hands of far too many groups with far too different agendas” (p. 17) which thereby fuelled the ongoing conflicts in the area. Thus arguably a realist mentality quite clearly represents the approach from both the UNOSOM II and Aideed’s SNA as they both pursued their own interests thereby leading to armed conflicts between the two.

Within this realist mindset, the intervention was hindered by ideology, another key term concerning power, which was not a part of our approach to measuring power. The UNOSOM II failed to recognise that the ideology of the clan groups was not changeable, which meant that as they intervened in the area with their Western approach to nation-building, they were met with resistance from ideological faction. Baumann et al. (2003) argue that: “disregarding the long-established Somali cultural order, the U.N. felt that, in the interest of creating a representative, democratic Somali government, they would be better served by excluding the clan leadership. The policy reeked of arrogance coupled with cultural ignorance” (p. 106). Thereby emphasising that ideology in itself constitutes a type of power that goes beyond our interpretation.

Having uncovered the realist mind-set behind the conflict, it becomes interesting to examine further how the concrete power assertions happened between these two actors and how they pursued their agendas using very different types of power to disrupt the opposition’s agenda. Thus understanding the ways, the UNOSOM II and Aideed’s SNA were susceptible and non susceptible to different kinds of power will allow us to argue a perhaps more efficient way of approaching the conflict power-wise in future interventions by drawing upon the lessons learned from our power analyses.

The differences between the two are one of the key features that make this power struggle interesting. Both actors seek very different agendas using very different variations of power to influence one another, which becomes apparent when considering that the two power actors while utilising very different means of asserting power, were able to influence and disrupt each other’s operations.

In our characterization of the different powers held by each actor we focused on the political, economic, and military power utilised by both actors in achieving their interests and found some interesting tendencies throughout the duration of the UNOSOM II. The general and perhaps key overlying principle of this power struggle was the notion that the UN underrated the political, economic, and military power held by the clan groups in Somalia and most importantly Aideed’s SNA. Politically, Aideed proved very effective in organising and drumming up support for himself and portraying the UNOSOM II negatively both in terms of

their use of power as well as their intentions, thus hurting the very credibility of the UN and the US. Furthermore, the UNOSOM II leadership undeniably failed to recognise Aideed's military capabilities which in return meant success for Aideed in derailing the UNOSOM II.

On the other hand, apparent from our analysis of UNOSOM II is that despite their immense resources, military personnel, and political backing still did not achieve their goals due to Aideed's opposition. Politically, UNOSOM II had immense backing for its operation internationally but proved to be lacking when it came to its political support on the ground in Somalia during the UNOSOM II, whereas Aideed succeeded in spinning the UN operation as an unjust attack and thereby discursively spun events to his political advantage. Economically and militarily however is where the UNOSOM II came out stronger than Aideed. While he was able to disrupt their operation, the UNOSOM II forces still carried out several raids with such force that Aideed's forces succumbed and they lost a large portion of armaments and personnel (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 113).

The overall failure of the UNOSOM II in preparing for the actual opposition by Aideed's SNA is even supported by the UN itself in their official 'after action report' of the UNOSOM II, as it states that "the UNOSOM II staff, like that of UNITAF, underrated the intentions of the Aideed-led [United Somali Congress] USC/[Somali National Alliance] SNA. At worst, UNOSOM II expected large-scale street riots." (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 107). This argument furthermore emphasises that the UNOSOM II from its very beginning was not prepared for the large scale opposition it would be facing from Aideed's SNA. Moreover, it arguably more or less took the success of the very ambitious nation building task for granted, a task that was argued by Baumann et al. to be 'herculean' in its very nature which in return led to the UNOSOM II failing in achieving their mandate due to Aideed's opposition (Baumann et al., 2003, p. 99).

## 6.2. Operation Linda Nchi and Al-Shabaab

Operation Linda Nchi is the latest of the military interventions in Somalia. It was partly motivated by threats from Al-Shabaab to Kenya's northern border with Somalia, from which Somalia directed counterattacks, herein lying terror attacks. The power dynamic of these two actors will thus be the case for analysis in the following section. We will first provide background for Operation Linda Nchi, and Al-Shabaab. Subsequently, we will analyse Operation Linda Nchi and the power therein as well as a characterisation of how the power influenced their pursuit of self-interests. Secondly, we will analyse Al-Shabaab's use of power

and discuss their power in accordance with self-interest from a realist position. Lastly, we will discuss how the two sets of power clashed during the intervention and the years ensuing.

### 6.2.1. Background

#### *Background for Operation Linda Nchi*

Operation Linda Nchi meaning ‘Operation Protect the Nation’ in Swahili was a Kenyan invasion launched in October 2011, where Kenya dispatched approximately 2000 troops across its Northern border into Somalia, quickly expanding the operation to at least 4600 troops (Olsen, 2018, p. 39). Kenya’s official reasoning for the intervention was due to Al-Shabaab threatening national security as they had carried out numerous cross-border raids in the months leading up to the intervention, as well as a series of kidnappings that had taken place on Kenyan territory (Olsen, 2018, p. 39; Birkett, 2013, p 427). Kenya thus sought to effectively put an end to Al-Shabaab who had been gaining momentum in power, specifically with regards to territory, and support the TFG instead. The motivation was unlike that of the UNOSOM II in the sense that they did not enter Somalian soil with the intent to stabilise the conflict. It can be argued, however, that, due to the fact that Kenya supported the TFG, they actively sought to stabilise the country, as they believed a working government could effectively end the conflict. The intervention was somewhat successful in that it took territorial control away from Al-Shabaab, e.g., the towns of Baidoa and Afgoye to Kenyan, African Union and Somali government forces (BBC, 2018). Kenya also managed to gain control of the strategic port of Kismayo in Southern Somalia in 2012. Despite these efforts, Al-Shabaab did not suffer majorly and still remains present in the countryside of Somalia, the intervention did, however, significantly change the tactics of the organisation and they, among other things, did not shy away from attacking Kenya in the years following the intervention (Doboš, 2016, p. 945).

#### *Background for Al-Shabaab*

The organisation started as a small, radical militant wing of the ICU, with whom they assisted heavily in armed combat mostly against the Ethiopian military intervention in 2006. As the ICU gained traction in the mid-2000s, Al-Shabaab grew accordingly, especially as the ICU had effectively gained control of most of Southern Somalia by 2006 (Doboš, 2016, p. 943). As internal traction in the ICU grew more prominent, Al-Shabaab managed to gain political advancement on its own, reaching its peak period in 2008 and 2009. Professor of political science Oscar Gakuo Mwangi even portrays Al-Shabaab between 2009 and 2011 as “the best

equipped, financed, and organized group in southern Somalia and which controlled the largest share of territory” partly by exploiting an increasing sense of nationalism (Doboš, 2016, p. 944). The organisation pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2010 and merged with them in 2012, a decision lead by A. Godane who ran the internationalist faction of Al-Shabaab, and lead the organisation with an iron-fist for seven years. (Doboš, 2016, p. 945). The Kenyan invasion in 2011 strengthened Al-Shabaab’s regional and global goals, despite the fact that the intervention left the organisation significantly more fragmented and with less territoriality than they had before; they for instance lost the strategic port of Kismayo to the Kenyan forces.

### 6.2.2. Analysis

#### *Power in Operation Linda Nchi*

In this section of the analysis we will seek to understand the various powers present in the Linda Nchi intervention. We will be analysing Kenya’s power as we had characterised in the theory section (see section 4.6.), specifically political, economic, and military might.

Starting off with political might, Kenya was extensively backed by external actors. Merely days after the intervention started, the British Newspaper ‘the Independent’ ran a story stating that Kenya was backed by the West. Moreover, the African Union, the US, the UN, the EU, Israel, and France had all come out in support of the invasion as well as widespread support from the citizens of Kenya. (Olsen, 2018, p. 39; Birkett, 2013, p. 440). With this support, Kenya and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had more leverage to intervene successfully, as they had more funds, more expertise to draw from and a heightened sense of legitimacy across their platform. Additionally, Kenya, as a sovereign state, has the right to self-defence in the case of an armed attack according to Article 51 of the UN Charter (“UN Charter”, n.d.) in which it is stated: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. A clear indication of political power is thus that due to Kenya being a member of the UN they have the power to self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

Kenya had key economic interests playing deeply into the decision to intervene, e.g., Kismayo and Jubaland that has oil reserves as well Kismayo being an important financial port leading into the Indian Ocean. Not only did Kenya and the KDF seek those economic interests for themselves, they also wanted to deprive the Al-Shabaab of the very same gains, as coal and sugar were exported through the port of Kismayo that was a key revenue for the Al-Shabaab (Olsen, 2018, p. 48). Not only did Kenya seek to ensure the funds from oil and export

management, they also sought to maintain funding from outside sources, which Olsen (2018) claim to be a key factor in the decision to intervene. Kenya had been a key US ally for decades leading up to the intervention, with reasons being that Kenya had historically assisted the West in anti-terrorism endeavours, e.g., after the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Nairobi as well as the 2011 attack in New York City (Olsen, 2018, p. 45). In 2009, however, the US criticised Kenya for failing to implement sufficient political and economic reforms, and Kenya thus had to prove to the US that they ought to still be considered an important ally in the region and a recipient of generous financial aid. The intervention was therefore partially motivated by an image management strategy aimed at pleasing the US and maintaining their economic ties (Olsen, 2018, p. 46).

The ways in which they sought economic power, worked financially in their favour. Due to the counterterrorism efforts from the US, Kenya has been a recipient of significant financial aid, which has resulted in a more confident and combatant military which the State Department argued: “increased counterterrorism funding from US dollars 4.5 million in 2006 to estimated US dollars 8 million in 2011” (Branch, 2011, p. 2). With significantly more funds from the US, Kenya has sufficient economic capital to ensure military population and armaments in competing against the likes of Al-Shabaab. It should also be noted that Kenya being a sovereign state, its funds are significantly higher than Al-Shabaab, whose funds derived mostly from foreign sponsors, e.g., Islamist charities and checkpoint funds from exports running through Kismayo port (Doboš, 2016, p. 947). Having the economic might that a sovereign state can ensure, the security, population, and armaments to name a few can stand a high chance of being at an advantage against that of Al-Shabaab, and thus have a higher chance of winning in combat.

As we will get back to later, Al-Shabaab managed to surge past their competition in regards to territory and economic support, by gaining support amongst business classes, who funded the ICU and Al-Shabaab to a large extent, as well as support from Eritrea. Despite doing really well in Somalia, the fact that they had to attend close combat with the Kenyan forces did mean that their odds of winning were very slim. Kenya is a sovereign state with the right to intervene under US Charter, with support from the West and its citizens and funding from the US. Thus, regardless of how good the organisation is, it will still be challenging to compete against a state. Kenya thus had the political and economic upper hand against Al-Shabaab, which meant that all they needed was a strong army who could defeat Al-Shabaab in combat, target their territoriality, and diminish their role politically.

The KDF, while being Kenya's national army, are also an autonomous force in Kenyan society, that had generally not been perceived kindly by the public, where they were not only criticised but ridiculed for being ill-equipped and lacking in experience, as well as numerous corruption allegations. They then also had something to gain by intervening in 2011, as they sought public recognition and approval. The KDF quickly gained control of the city of Kisumu, proving that they did possess military might to a great extent, which actively ensured widespread support from the Kenyan population (Olsen, 2018, p. 46-47). Despite the takeover of Kisumu, it took over a year to gain control of the port of Kismayo, which was an important source of income and a strategic port for Al-Shabaab. The failure to gain control of the port for a year did prove a hindrance to the support of the KDF.

The KDF did have a good foundation for intervening successfully, especially in regards to foreign support and economy. An infantry battalion was deployed with air, armour, and artillery along with several thousand troops across the Somali border (Chau, 2018, p. 226). The KDF was also very well prepared for the invasion, according to Doboš (2016), mainly due to the large influx of funding from the US (p. 47). Moreover, in this period, Kenya upgraded their military hardware (Doboš, 2016, p. 47). Later, they were formally incorporated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with the number of troops rising to over 4400 troops all paid by the UN<sup>2</sup>, that also supplied logistical support, e.g., medical. The change of scenery meant that the KDF's aim was now officially to maintain peace, instead of destabilising Al-Shabaab (Anderson & McKnight, 2014, p. 6). Despite the various accomplishments, Al-Shabaab is still in force to this day, which stands as a threat to the domestic political climate and security in Kenya, something we will get back to later. It is worth mentioning though, that because Kenya and the KDF managed to diminish but not defeat Al-Shabaab, the mission could be construed to be a failure, and something that will most likely challenge internal affairs for years to come.

### *Realism in Operation Linda Nchi*

In this section we will explore how the aforementioned characteristics provide an understanding of how the power influenced their pursuit of self-interests.

Many interventions, such as the UNOSOM II, will argue that its motivations for intervening are based on humanitarian principles, and as we discussed in the analysis of that intervention (section 6.1.2), we found that regardless of perceived and apparent humanitarian

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<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the EU; the sources are ambiguous on this fact.

principles, actors are ultimately motivated by self-interest (see section 6.1.2.). Contrary to the UNOSOM II and most interventions alike, Kenya was very frank in its notion that the intervention was motivated by and serving their own interests. By their own accord, they intervened due to security reasons arguing that “from a coercive perspective, Kenya launched Operation Linda Nchi on 14 Oct. 2011 with the objective of creating an enabling climate for development to defend our vital interests. This underpins Kenya’s resolve to do whatever it takes, where necessary, to use military power to defend our citizens and our economic well-being” (Kabukuru, 2014, p. 30). In addition to the security reasons they argued to be the motive, as mentioned previously, one could easily argue that both economic and image-management were among the reasons they intervened. Regardless of whether the actual motive was one of these or a mixture of all, all serve the same conclusion, being that Kenya sought its self-interests as they intervened.

Given that Kenya and the KDF possessed all three types of power to a grand extent, one could very easily assume that the battle would be swift and pain-free. With external support, large amounts of funds, a large and well-organised army, and a strong political backbone, the decision to launch the operation was versed. Where Kenya failed the operation was in neglecting the power of Al-Shabaab and the resources it had to retaliate against Kenyan forces. Had they been able to successfully take down Al-Shabaab and enable the TFG, then the image-management part of Kenya’s motivations for intervening would have likely turned out better in their favour. Regardless of the relative failure in the mission, it would be unfair to state that it has damaged Kenya’s public image in any way, although the take-down of Al-Shabaab would have resulted in fewer terror attacks on their soil.

It is thus obvious that Kenya sought to serve their self-interests as they intervened, and despite an extensive effort to be prepared for the invasion in terms of political, economic, and military power, the operation did not prove fully successful in that it did not fulfil the interests they set out to acquire, i.e., abolishing Al-Shabaab as an organisation. Their interests still stand strong, however, regardless of whether the interests encompass security, image-management, or economic gain.

### *Power in Al-Shabaab*

In this section of the analysis we will seek to understand the various powers Al-Shabaab displays, as we had characterised in the theory section (see section 4.6.), specifically political, economic, and military might.

What is most prevalent in examining Al-Shabaab's presence of power is in regards to territoriality and economic output, the latter of which we will be returning to shortly. Territoriality was among the ways in which Al-Shabaab surpassed the many other clan militias in Somalia who also sought power. In the height of the Al-Shabaab "kingdom", it successfully gained control of the region between Mogadishu and Kismayo which it held between 2009 and 2012, which is the part of Somalia most densely populated (Doboš, 2016, p. 947). It even managed to set up institutions resembling that of a government to control the territories in Southern Somalia that it held, a process they initiated in 2008. The government was based on Islamic laws, and was the feat of establishing institutions is something that no other clan has been able to do during the Civil War<sup>3</sup>, and greatly shows the political willpower of Al-Shabaab. They held the government office until they lost their territory following the Linda Nchi operation (Doboš, 2016, p. 946). Additionally, Al-Shabaab was able to ensure basic infrastructure which helped them better control and secure the territories as well as provide security to its members, mainly due to economic output (Doboš, 2016, p. 948). In general Al-Shabaab's political might stood strong, as is evident in the territory it held and the accomplishments they had through their run as a powerful political force in Somalia. They did, as mentioned, lose a lot of their territoriality after Linda Nchi, but that did not stop them from seeking to gain and/or show political might, as is evident in the many years following the intervention.

As mentioned, Kenya's reasoning for intervening was self-defence, as Al-Shabaab had performed numerous kidnappings and cross-border raids onto Kenyan soil in the months leading up to the intervention. These instances were not stand-alone cases in regards to terror attacks directed at Kenya from Al-Shabaab, as they happened both before the 2011 invasion as well as afterwards. The most significant of which sprung after the invasion, with the most lethal being the 2015 massacre at Garissa University where 148 people died, as well as the Westgate Mall that was stormed by gunmen in 2013 killing at least 71 people and attacks in and around the city of Mpeketoni for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility (BBC, 2017). These attacks and the many more that have occurred are said to be direct retaliation against the 2011 invasion and the presence of the KDF in Somalia. Anderson and McKnight (2014) argue that Al-Shabaab through their attacks are exploiting local political quarrels to further their cause (p. 2). Thus, the organisation is proving that they have the political might to cause problems in mainland Kenya as a blowback for the invasion.

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<sup>3</sup> With the exception of Somaliland.

Before the invasion, one of the ways it remained powerful and able to assure territory was through funding both from lucrative exports, e.g., charcoal and sugar off the port of Kismayo, from which Al-Shabaab gained funds through managing checkpoints, something that reportedly raised \$25 million in revenue for Al-Shabaab (Anderson & McKnight, 2014, p. 8). Moreover, “it is estimated that in addition to the charcoal trade, throughout its history Al-Shabaab has been financed from state sources – mainly Eritrea, which used the organization as a proxy against Ethiopia – and many Islamic charities around the world” (Doboš, 2016, p. 947). This means that despite the size of the organisation, it manages to secure significant funds for the sake of running their business. Moreover, among the reasons why the ICU and later Al-Shabaab managed to surge above clan militias and war lords was because of its business effort. According to Professor Aisha Ahmad (2015), the ICU had the ability to sell security to prospective buyers in the business elite across both tribal and ethnic divisions at lower rates than protection rackets that target a more limited ethnic or tribal base. By courting the valuable support of the business class, Islamists are thus able to monopolise the market for providing security (p. 114-115). As the ICU got the support of the business classes, they also systematically withheld funds for other militias and clan-based warlords. As the competition lost both support and economic output, the ICU and Al-Shabaab managed to secure the market and increase their share of territory (Ahmad, 2015, p. 101-102).

Due to the economic support from foreign actors as well as the money they themselves generated, they had sufficient military might to properly protect their territory. Specific numbers regarding population and armaments in the Al-Shabaab army are hard to come by, however noting the previous points on security and infrastructure, it stands very clear that Al-Shabaab had good military might to protect its territory, secure funding, and outcompete other prominent clan militias. Moreover, despite Kenya invading Somalia in October 2011, the KDF did not manage to take over the port of Kismayo until September 2012, which is a very successful operation from Al-Shabaab, to withhold the port of Kismayo from Kenya for over a year (Doboš, 2016, p. 945). Without a sufficiently populated and armed military, this could not have been feasible.

### *Realism in Al-Shabaab*

In this section we will explore how the aforementioned characteristics provide an understanding of how the power influenced their pursuit of self-interests.

Naturally, in the wake of an attack, Al-Shabaab would seek to protect themselves against the Kenyan invasion. Their interests, economy, military, and territory stand to be lost to an actor with whom they have had years of power struggles, so not only would they lose what we, and presumably they, value to be the most important facets to the power they hold, but they would lose it to an enemy of theirs. Their desire to protect self-interests were quite straightforward, they did, however, have more specific interests they were protecting, including the desire to internationalise.

In the theory section under Gilbert (see section 4.3.), it is argued that in inegalitarian societies, power competitions are used as a tool to drum up nationalism. The ICU definitely did this, as the organisation sought to unite the Somalis across national borders and cross-clan identity, challenging the TFG and other militias, using these power competitions to further their ideology of identity and nationalism (Doboš, 2016, p. 943). Al-Shabaab did it differently though. As mentioned, Godane came from the internationalist faction of Al-Shabaab, who after achieving leadership in the organisation, drastically changed the organisation to project those values. They thus used the power competitions not to project nationalism, but rather internationalism, as they sought to expand to a global jihad, among which was the decision to merge with Al Qaeda in 2012. This was then one of the interests that Al-Shabaab was protecting under the Linda Nchi Operation, an interest that was dramatically halted as a consequence of the invasion.

To say that Al-Shabaab was merely protecting their interests against Kenya and the KDF would be a misleading statement. The years leading up to the operation was characterised heavily by armed attacks on Kenyan soil, prompting many to wonder why Kenya invaded when they did, as opposed to the many years prior where their national security had been put in danger by Al-Shabaab in an equal manner compared to that of 2011. Likewise, after the invasion in 2011, as we have discussed, Al-Shabaab retaliated with several heavily fatal terror attacks. The actions prior to the attack and the subsequent attacks were not self-defence or in service of protecting their interests against the Kenyan forces. This could be argued to be in service of signalling political power, despite Kenya's invasion heavily challenging the organisation's political strategy. It also serves to project their goal of a global jihad by infiltrating the Kenyan system and challenging their political structure. Among other ways, this is done by seeking to recruit Kenyan Muslims and ethnic Somalis (Anderson & McKnight, 2016, p. 21). The political power was one of Al-Shabaab's strongest qualities, and despite the fact that the organisation is a lot smaller now and they possess significantly less territory, they

still have funding and military, which allows them to keep attacking Kenya and other factions as they promote their internationalist interests.

Thus, determining that they act according to a realist position, in service of their self-interest, is not as hidden as it was in our analysis of the UNOSOM II (see section 6.1.2.), or as debatable as it was in the Linda Nchi Operation, but instead provides a more apparent indication of the interests they sought to protect as they fought against the KDF, as well as the interests they sought to serve in the work they did before Operation Linda Nchi, during, and beyond.

### 6.2.3. The Power Relation: Kenya in Operation Linda Nchi and Al-Shabaab

It is evident that Kenya and Al-Shabaab have had years of turmoil characterised by fatal attacks with the most significant case being Operation Linda Nchi. We will now seek to understand how the various power characteristics relate to the power relation between Kenya and the KDF under Operation Linda Nchi and Al-Shabaab. Moreover, we will characterise how said power functioned in opposing the interests of the other actor.

The KDF was successful in the invasion in the sense that they dramatically changed Al-Shabaab's role in the political climate of Somalia, but they were also widely unsuccessful in their invasion in the sense that Al-Shabaab is still operating to this day and have retaliated against Kenya on numerous occasions since. The attacks have endangered and are endangering Kenya's domestic politics and security, thus in many ways, Operation Linda Nchi was unsuccessful as Al-Shabaab proved stronger than they had anticipated both around the invasion and afterwards, a miscalculation proving to be very dangerous to Kenya. Positively however, Kenya did manage to disrupt Al-Shabaab's territorial power and promote the TFG, which in turn set the foundation for the Federal Government of Somalia to be established, which is the current government complete with a sitting President. Naturally, this cannot be fully attributed to Kenya's endeavours, but they did assist the process, as the invasion did result in positive change for the country.

We argue that because Kenya's position was so strong in terms of political, economic, and military power, the insurgence they experienced from Al-Shabaab was beyond what they expected to occur during the invasion. They had a weak perception of how well Al-Shabaab was doing politically, i.e., the fact that they had operating institutions and a government in Southern Somalia. They also undermined Al-Shabaab's military might and the power it had to retaliate against the KDF and take part in armed combat to protect its territories and its people.

This is exhibited in the fact that it took the KDF a year to take control of the port of Kismayo. And while Kenya ultimately managed to destabilise Al-Shabaab and take away their territorial control, Al-Shabaab is still a fully operational organisation, whose terror attacks have proven to be catastrophic to domestic affairs in Kenya, e.g., the attacks on Mpeketoni, the Westgate attack, and the Garissa University massacre.

As discussed, the two actors sought to protect and expand their self-interests and both actors acted in self-defence after years of power struggle as well as armed combat and attacks from both parties. Given the fact that both parties sought to protect wildly different interests, there were bound to be conflict regarding which actor has the most political, economic, and military power. Both actors did seek interests beyond self-defence, as Kenya had image-management strategies and sought to gain financial support by intervening, and Al-Shabaab sought to gain territorial power and further their ideology of a global jihad. The fact that both actors were willing to spend copious amounts of funds on projecting these interests through the use of force, indicates how important securing and obtaining power was for both Kenya and Al-Shabaab. They not only wanted to further their own interests; they also wanted to hinder the other actor from furthering their interests as it opposed their own.

The power struggle quickly surged from being merely the KDF against Al-Shabaab to entering into the field of post-9/11 USA sporting ‘the war on terror’, who were now on Kenya’s side along with a number of other Western allies along with the UN and the AU. Al-Shabaab became outnumbered, losing more power as time passed. Al-Shabaab had managed to withhold the KDF from advancing, especially with the port of Kismayo as has been mentioned. However, as Kenya and the KDF gained more external support, Al-Shabaab’s power diminished in comparison. Their financial input did not increase, and they lost military personnel by the dozen. The fact that Al-Shabaab is still functioning to this day is not a testament to the work Kenya and the KDF did necessarily, but the fact that ideology cannot be exterminated simply with power was something that Kenya and its allies left out of the equation. What Al-Shabaab also failed to realise was that Kenya’s ideology also could not be exterminated. Thus, what is evident is that ideology is a type of power in itself, that goes beyond our understanding of political, economic, and military might (see section 4.6.). This proves that even if Kenya did have the power necessary to invade successfully, Al-Shabaab would still be a functioning organisation. Given that Al-Shabaab proved their worth on the battlefield and refused to be eliminated, and Kenya refused to be a target of terror attacks, both ended up not accomplishing much from Operation Linda Nchi. Al-Shabaab as an organisation lost territorial power, was drastically diminished in size, and had to change organisationally, and Kenya had

had to suffer as a result of the subsequent terror attacks and spent significant funds on the operation.

## 7. Analysis of the power in the interventions and the hindrances to the stabilisation

This section seeks to analyse how the power relations and the different actors' power in the interventions have functioned, drawing on the analyses in section 6. Furthermore, this section examines how the analysis of power contributes to an understanding of the factors that have hindered the stabilisation of the war and how these hindrances might be counteracted.

### 7.1. Power in the interventions

The two interventions can be characterised by the intervening actors failing to recognise the the oppositions' power, and the intervening actors not having sufficient power to fulfil their own mandate: the UNOSOM II underestimated Aideed's influence in Somalia and his military might, which caused the mission to not have enough power achieve their goals, since Aideed was a much larger challenge than previously expected. The UN did not have sufficient political, economic, and military power, which along with the underestimation of Aideed meant that they ultimately did not achieve their goals, something which is also argued by both United States Institute of Peace and Baumann et. al. Similarly, Kenya had underestimated Al-Shabaab's power and how much interest Al-Shabaab had in keeping their territories, which ended up backfiring as more terror attacks were carried out in Kenya by Al-Shabaab after the Linda Nchi Operation. However, the invasion did weaken Al-Shabaab's power, as Kenya took most of their territories. Both actors had a lot of political, economic, and military power, however, Kenya managed to gain more support as time passed which meant that they were able to take over Al-Shabaab's territories. Thus, the two interventions have had some similar traits regarding power, as the external actors had miscalculated the internal actors' power, causing the interveners to not achieve their mandates.

### 7.2. The factors that hindered the stabilisation of the Somali Civil War

An examination of these general power traits allows us to understand the specific factors that hindered the stabilisation of the Somali Civil War. In general, the key principles that hindered the stabilisation of the war according to our analyses are best understood three-fold; first, underestimating the opposition, second, the scarce resources, and third, not being able to look beyond one's own interests. In the case of the UNOSOM II, these tendencies are seen in the UN's approach to the conflict in Somalia, attempting to establish peace throughout Somalia

and create a transitional government. While this intended approach embodied exactly Morgenthau's arguments on how to balance power relations and establish peace, it was simply way too ambitious considering their available economic and military power. This created the possibility for Aideed, who the UNOSOM II leadership underestimated, to successfully disrupt and derail the operation, thereby asserting his power to hinder the stabilisation of the region. Generally, the UN assumed that the operation would be much simpler than it turned out to be. Thereby, the UNOSOM II did not understand nor did it take into account the resources needed to establish peace throughout Somalia. Lastly, the conflict was fuelled by actors with wildly different interests which meant that the very idea of simply establishing peace was utopian, the UNOSOM II did not expect the large scale military opposition to peacebuilding that Aideed posed, which in return meant the failure of the UNOSOM II in achieving its mandate.

Similar traits can be argued are present in the case of the power relation between Kenya and Al-Shabaab. Among the main reasons Kenya did not successfully end the conflict in Somalia was fundamental problems with how they intervened. They did not lack neither political, economic, nor military power, but they did lack basic understandings of what they were to expect. Moreover, despite being more powerful than Al-Shabaab on all accounts, they were met with armed combat ready to defend the territory Al-Shabaab held, which meant that it took a year for the KDF to gain control of the port of Kismayo and also meant that they never managed to remove Al-Shabaab as a political influence in Somalia. What they failed to account for was that ideology cannot be fought with military power. As long as Al-Shabaab functioned with its ideology as an interest, and as long as other powerful actors shared that interest, political, economic, and military power can be sustained. Thus, Al-Shabaab despite having lost its territoriality still manage to make themselves present in the political arena in Somalia and beyond. As a consequence, Al-Shabaab will continue to pursue its interests both nationally and internationally, as well as retaliate against the political interests of Kenya through the various terror attacks. Due to the problems they faced, both actors were largely left in a state worse than the one that was before.

The UNOSOM II and Operation Linda Nchi both held the potential to stabilise the war, but their seeming lack of success in doing so can basically be attributed to three factors. The two first factors are based upon the writings of respectively: Doboš, Olsen, Anderson & McKnight, United States Institute of Peace, and Baumann et al., whereas the third is based on our realist analysis of the power relations in the two cases. The first factor is that the external actors lacked a realistic estimation of the power of the opponents that they would be facing. Second, the UNOSOM II and Operation Linda Nchi lacked the resources necessary to go

through with their intentions of stabilising the War. Third, the interventions were rooted in self-interests. Kenya's intervention was quite openly rooted in self-interests; as argued by Olsen (see section 6.2.2.), it was basically rooted in the three factors: security, image management, and economy. As discussed in section 6.1., the UNOSOM II can also be argued to have been rooted in self-interests, since the resources spent were kept at a minimum, in line with Krieg's theory of intervention and realism, and the withdrawal of the US troops after major public criticism also showed that their own interests weighed more than the larger humanitarian goal (Baumann et al., 2003, pp. 165-166).

### 7.3. Counteracting the hindrances to the stabilisation of the war

In relation to the three main points made in section 7.2., three points can be derived of what can be done to counteract the hindrances in an attempt to stabilise the conflict: first, in order for the mission to work, there needs to be a realistic assessment of the internal actors and their power, and what the situation is in Somalia. Second, the mission has to have enough power and it needs to have the resources required to achieve the goals set out and affect the conflict positively. Third, as argued by Krieg, when the nations are concerned with their own interests and are analysing the costs and benefits of interventions rather than being concerned with the larger humanitarian perspectives of the interventions, they will fail because they will only provide the missions with a bare minimum of resources (Krieg, 2013, pp. 43-44). Therefore, looking past one's own interests in interventions is necessary when seeking to counteract the hindrances to the stabilisation of the Somali Civil War.

As described in section 4.3., Gilbert argues in his anti-democratic feedback thesis that in inegalitarian societies leaders will make use of power competitions to improve their position, a trend that was clearly seen in the UNOSOM II, the SNA, Kenya, and Al-Shabaab cases. Thus, from a realist perspective, the absolute focus when intervening must be: first, a recognition of the required power to fulfil one's goals, and second, to avoid ending in a power competitive environment such as what happened to the UNOSOM II after they failed to broker peace between the clan groups (Baumann et. al., 2003, p. 101). This is where Gilbert and Morgenthau's arguments on how to best achieve stabilisation becomes important, as they argue that the best way to build peace is to negotiate between parties and reach agreements, something that was only briefly attempted in the case of UNOSOM II before it became a full-on power competition with Aideed (Baumann et. al., 2003, pp. 101, 104-105). As described in section

4.2., in his first dynamic of power, Morgenthau argues that power competition in its nature is self-destructive and only when actors realise this can they proceed to his second dynamic, which is an actual recognition of the destructiveness of power competition and thereby actively engage in negotiating towards a power equilibrium and thereby peace. An equilibrium of power is the best precondition for a functioning government to arise in which institutions can watch over one another, thereby promoting common security and peace (Little, 2007, pp. 158-159). Additionally, evident from the power struggle between Kenya and Al-Shabaab is that all conflicts cannot be solved simply by getting more political, economic, and military power. Other factors can be hindrances as well, which in this case is ideology, something we felt was necessary to include in our analyses of both power relations, as it became clear that it was a shortcoming of our initial framework on measuring power. Therefore, if we understand ideology as a type of power and as a hindrance to the stabilisation of the conflict, we would have required a more in depth discussion on how to counteract the hindrance ideology is posing in a power relation. This could have been done by including aspects outside the realm of just achieving more power for the sake of stabilising such a conflict. Similarly to Morgenthau's argument on peace agreements, diplomacy is needed for the sake of reaching a common denominator. To successfully compose a peace agreement between two actors locked in a power struggle, the same criteria are necessary: research, resources, and the ability to look beyond one's own interests.

## 8. Conclusion

In this project we set out to examine the power relations between external interventions and internal actors in the cases of the UNOSOM II and the SNA and Operation Linda Nchi and Al-Shabaab in order to gain an understanding of what had hindered the war from stabilising, and what measures would be needed to counteract these hindrances.

Our approach to the analyses of power and the nature of power relations between actors was based on the realist theories posed by Morgenthau, Gilbert, and Krieg which allowed us to formulate our own interpretation of how to measure realist power. Our interpretation encompassed the three characteristics: political, economic, and military might. These would allow us to understand how power functioned in the relations between the different actors and, furthermore, how one might reconsider future approaches in order to more effectively stabilise the conflict. Importantly, as became apparent from our analyses, one of the shortcomings of our framework of power has been the lacking inclusion of ideology. Ideology as a theoretical concept proved to be too important to leave out of our analyses. For future research, one could achieve a broader understanding of power by including ideology as a main theoretical concept.

The UN-US led UNOSOM II and Aideed's SNA showed very different assertions of power. Whereas the UNOSOM II was arguably a much more elaborate and resourceful intervention than the ones it ensued, Aideed's SNA successfully disrupted their operation using much fewer means. This boils down to the UNOSOM II attempting to impact the entirety of Somalia even though their political, economic, and military power did not suffice for the operation to fulfil its mandates which proved to be too ambitious. Basically, the UNOSOM II failed in recognising the power possessed by Aideed politically and militarily and did not expect his forces to be able to assert sufficient dominance to compete with the UN forces.

During Operation Linda Nchi, Kenya and the KDF had political, economic, and military power to a great extent, as they sought to overthrow Al-Shabaab. Kenya had suffered under numerous attacks directed towards them, motivating the invasion, along with economic and image management strategies. The KDF were met with power unlike what they had expected, as Al-Shabaab retaliated with armed conflict when the KDF sought to remove territory from their opposition, as Al-Shabaab's power had surged to the extent that they managed to protect their interests against the Kenyan forces. Kenya managed to destabilise Al-Shabaab and remove their territoriality, and despite significant effort, did not manage to exterminate the organisation, as it is still functioning and exerting political influence, among other ways through terror attacks directed towards Kenya.

We identified three main features that characterised both cases of interventions based on the writings of Doboš, Baumann et al., Anderson & McKnight, Olsen, the United States Institute of Peace. Out of these three features, the two first were based on the writings of the authors mentioned, whereas we identified the third. The first features, the intervening actors tended to underestimate the opposition they would be facing in Somalia, and in both cases, the intervening actors failed to adequately evaluate the internal actors. Second, the intervening actors did not allocate sufficient resources to accomplish their respective goals and to stabilise the conflict. Third, the intervening actors' concerns with their own interests hindered them from stabilising the conflict. We argue that a better way to approach the conflict can be achieved by taking these three key aspects into account, derived from our analyses: first, a realistic assessment of the situation in Somalia, second, allocating enough resources to the mission, and third, looking past self-interests. By taking these into account one might be able to more effectively work towards a power equilibrium, something argued by Morgenthau as essential when attempting to establish peace. Thus, for future reference, to assist the stabilising of the Somali Civil War, the aforementioned constituents cannot be ignored and are necessary to the fulfilment of a mandate as grand as the stabilisation of such a deep-rooted war.

## 9. Considerations and Implications

It is no secret that this project is permeated by realism and power. They have been the main theoretical perspectives, and they have dominated the arguments and the conclusions made. This massive focus on realism and power has for our arguments and conclusions meant that the attention has been paid to the “hard” aspects of international relations, such as the concepts that dominate our approach to measuring power, namely economic, military, and political might. The analysis is thus only seen through the eyes of these perspectives of realism and power, and it is lacking a perspective on the importance of the softer values, for instance cooperation and international institutions. Our characterisation of power that included political, economic, and military power could thus have been extended to include “softer” values in power. Our conclusion of the characteristics necessary for the stabilisation of the Somali Civil War more would encompass things more in line with diplomacy, cooperations, civil society, and the importance of international institutions, rather than our current conclusion, which emphasises research on the internal actors’ power and the situation on the ground, having sufficient resources, and looking past self-interest.

Moreover, incorporating more than two cases to such an analysis would provide more depth and perspective when seeking to understand the tendencies to avoid when intervening in the Somali Civil War. It was, as mentioned, out of scope for this paper, but could definitely provide tools to better understand or emphasise how to stabilise the conflict in future endeavours.

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