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**Securitization of Development Aid:
A Case-Study of Danish Post-9/11
Development Aid Policy Discourse and Practice**



Master Thesis

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Abstract:

After the 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 'War on Terror' has become priority number one on the global political agenda. That 'War on Terror' has become the priority has caused concerns amongst development workers from British Overseas NGOs for Development, Oxfam and Christian Aid. This concern has revolved around the fear that post-9/11 international development aid has become securitized, i.e., turned into security. This fear has been confirmed as being warranted in the case of post-9/11 Danish development aid by Aning who argues that Danish development aid has been securitized since Danish development aid has increasingly been allocated to fragile countries which are perceived to presenting a threat to Danish and global security. This Brown and Grävingholt, however, refute. Due to these two contradicting views, this thesis is going to investigate

Has Danish post-9/11 development aid been securitized, and if so, to what extent?

This research question this thesis seeks to answer through a content analysis of Danish policy papers on development aid and a documentary analysis of annual reports on Danish development aid, which have both been produced after 9/11 by the Danish government development aid agency DANIDA. The study is based on deductive reasoning which seeks to test the Securitization Theory on the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid. The Securitization Theory claims that something becomes securitized by a security discourse.

By looking at the Danish policy papers on development aid and annual reports on Danish development aid, it can be concluded that Danish post-9/11 development aid has been securitized through 1) a security discourse, 2) allocation of development aid to fragile countries, 3) allocation of development aid to security sectors, and 4) coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts. Since Danish post-9/11 development aid has been securitized by development aid practices of allocation of development aid to fragile countries, allocation of development aid to security sectors and coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts, this thesis concludes that the Securitization Theory can only to some extent be applied to the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid to explain how it has become securitized.

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Moreover, the thesis concludes that Danish post-9/11 development aid, however, has only been securitized to some extent. Danish post-9/11 development aid has only been securitized to some extent since 1) development issues not become presented as posing a threat to the security of the donor countries, only '*migrants*' and development issues also become presented as threats to the developing countries themselves which serves justify that development aid is spent on promoting economic development and wellbeing for the developing countries and not just the strategic security interest of Denmark or development. 2) Nothing or as little as 4.3 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors. 3) Danish development have not been sacrificed to security since Denmark exceeded DAC's GNI target. And 4) Danish development efforts have only been coordinated in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia, and Mali not in other fragile countries.

Since Denmark can be seen as an extreme case, this finding might be generalizable for all donor countries indicating a general tendency that post-9/11 development aid of all donor countries may have securitized to some extent. Hence the fear of the development workers, that international development aid has become securitized has been warranted.

Keywords: Development aid, 9/11, 'War on Terror,' Securitization, Copenhagen School, Development aid policy discourse, Allocation of development aid, Coordination of development and military efforts, Case-study, Content analysis, Documentary analysis

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List of Abbreviations

DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
GNI	Gross National Income
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
UNMDGs	United Nations Millennium Development Goals
US	The United States of America
UK	United Kingdom
VLAK	Coalition government made up by the Danish Liberal party, Liberal Alliance and the Conservative People's Party.
WOT	War on Terror

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Chapter 1: Introduction

After the 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 'War on Terror' has become priority number one on the global political agenda. That 'War on Terror' has become the priority has caused concerns amongst development workers from British Overseas NGOs for Development, Oxfam and Christian Aid. This concern has revolved around the fear that post-9/11 international development aid has become securitized, i.e., turned into security as fragile developing countries increasingly have been presented as posing a threat to the security of donor countries and global security because of being a source of terrorism, international crime, and conflict due to development issues (Woods, 2005: 393) (Patrikova & Lazell, 2016: 494) (Howell, 2006: 123). This fear has been confirmed as being warranted in the case of post-9/11 Danish development aid by Aning (2010) who argues that Danish development aid has been securitized since Danish development aid has increasingly been allocated to fragile countries which are perceived to presenting a threat to Danish and global security (Aning, 2010: 17 & 18). This has been refuted by Brown and Gravingholt (2016). Due to these two contradicting views, this thesis is going to investigate

1.1 Research Question

Has Danish post-9/11 development aid been securitized, and if so, to what extent?

According to the development workers, the implication of development aid becoming securitized would be that development aid becomes a strategic resource for security interests of the donor countries in the 'WOT,' rather than a tool of poverty reduction. This would mean that the needs of people in the developing countries, would be become neglected since UNMDGs would become abandoned to donors' security objectives BOND, 2003: 1) (British Overseas NGOs for Development, 2003) (Commission on Human Security, 2003) (Oxfam, 2003) (Christian Aid, 2004).

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1.2 Purpose of this Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to test the Securitization Theory on the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid. This, this thesis becomes capable of by generation of knowledge of Danish post-9/11 development aid policy discourse and practice.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The purpose of this review is to review the existing literature on securitization of development aid, in addition to the study of Danish development aid by Aning and Brown & Grävingholt, as presented above. Securitization of development aid has mostly been studied by discourse analysis of policy papers on development aid (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016: 2). Here, discourse analyses conducted by Beall, Goodfellow, Putzel (2006) and Robinson (2006) can be mentioned. Securitization of development aid has mostly been studied in this way since securitization was conceptualized as a discourse which turns a hitherto non-security-related area into security by the Copenhagen School of International Relations (Buzan, Væver and de Wilde, 1998). They, therefore, found that development aid has been securitized by a security discourse which presents development issues as posing a threat to the donor countries.

Securitization has, however, also been studied through analyses of recipient country allocation and sector allocation of development aid and coordination of development and military efforts. Here, Tujan, Gaughran and Mollett (2004), Wood (2005), Duffield and Donnie (2014), Furness and Gänzle (2016) Carvalho and Potter (2016) Marchesin (2016) Wild and Elhawary (2016) and Brown (2016) analyses can be mentioned. Tujan, Gaughran and Mollett (2004) and Wood (2005) found that US, Japanese, Australian, and European development aid were on the threshold to becoming securitized in 2004 as development aid has increasingly been allocated to fragile countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Turkey which may not be the poorest countries (Wood, 2005: 54).

Duffield and Donnie found that development aid has been securitized because coordination of development and military efforts have been taking place (2014: 22). Furness and Gänzle conclude that development aid from the EU has been securitized since development aid from the EU has been allocated to Afghanistan, Gaza and the West Bank, Sudan and Balkan (Furness & Gänzle in Brown & Grävingholt: 154). Wild and Elhawary found that British development aid has been securitized since British development aid has been allocated to

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Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen and there has been experimentation with joint development and military efforts and security sector reforms (Wild & Elhawary in Brown & Grävingholt: 59). However, British post-9/11 development aid has not been securitized to the extent that British development aid has been allocated to security sector as the UK has continued to allocate most of its post-9/11 development aid to traditionally non-security-related development sectors (ibid: 43).

Marchesin concludes that French development aid has been securitized because the highest level of French development aid has been allocated to security-related sectors to be spent on non-development-approved military activities (Marchesin in Brown & Grävingholt: 73). Carvalho and Potter reach the conclusion that Japanese development aid has been securitized as Japanese military forces delivered most of the aid for security purposes (Carvalho & Potter in Brown & Grävingholt: 107). Brown found that Canadian development aid has been securitized as well because like the Japanese military forces, the Canadian military forces also delivered most of the aid for security purposes (Brown in Brown & Gravingholt: 130).

Securitization of development aid has also been studied in these ways since the narrow focus on discourse in the conceptualization of the process of securitization has been criticized as it does not provide an adequate foundation for examining security practices since development aid also can also be securitized by the allocation of development aid to fragile countries, allocation of aid to security sectors and coordination of development and military efforts. (McDonald, 2009: 579) (Balzacq, 2010: 56). As development aid also can be securitized by the said development practices, this thesis uses the term securitization in a way, that differs from the Copenhagen School and its dominant focus on discourse, which also includes allocation of development aid to fragile countries, allocation of aid to security sectors and coordination of development and military efforts in addition to the security discourse.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter, the used methodology, which is how this thesis will go about acquiring knowledge to answer the research question, is going to be presented. The methodology chapter consists of five sections: paradigm, choice of theory, research strategy, research design, research method, empirical data, and analytical approach.


3.1 Paradigm

The methodology of this thesis' study of post-9/11 Danish development aid is based on Critical Realism paradigm. Critical Realism views reality as being stratified because of consisting of empirical, real and factual domains (Nygaard, 2012: 53). The empirical domain consists of our subjective observable experiences such as concepts, theories, and hypothesis. The actual domain consists of objective social events, which exist separate from our ability to comprehend those (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005: 27). An example of a social event is a book that lies on a table. The real reality consists of not directly observable mechanisms, which under certain circumstances tend to constitute the social event in actual reality, which can be experienced in the empirical reality (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2005: 24). However, other mechanisms may be in play which modify the effect of the other mechanism. An example of a mechanism is gravity. Gravity affects things, e.g., a book, but a book may not fall to the ground due to other mechanisms which also is in play such as a table, which block gravity.

This thesis, however, only studies the effects of the mechanism, i.e., the social event of securitization which can be experienced in the empirical reality. This thesis is, therefore, only occupied with the reality of the empirical and actual domains and not real domain which constitutes securitization in the actual domain. Thus, this study does not generate knowledge of the mechanism which constitute a given event which studies based on a Critical Realism paradigm normally seek to do (ibid: 31).

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In Figure 1 below, reality from a Critical Realists point of view is illustrated



Because the reality is viewed as being stratified, Critical Realism takes an ontological position in between a realist and a relativist or social constructivist position which view reality and social events, respectively, as existing independent of human conception and construction (Porta & Keating, 2008: 21).

In addition to how social reality or phenomena are viewed, a paradigm determines “*what and how we can know about it*” and what should be regarded as acceptable knowledge (Bryman, 2012: 27). According to Critical Realism, we cannot know the event in advance, which is the effects of process and mechanism, because, as mentioned above, it is only under certain circumstances mechanism constitute the social event in actual reality. This is so because the actual reality is an open system which is affected by different mechanism in the real domain which can have different, unpredictable effects (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen: 31). Thus, Critical Realism views theories as fallible efforts to describe reality, since empirical reality is only able to reflect the full reality to a limited extent because it is stratified (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen: 33 & 34). We can, however, gain knowledge about the social events by using both social and natural

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science because behind social reality, a natural reality exists, which as mentioned is objective (ibid: 29).

3.2 Choice of Theory

Traditionally, mainstream realist security theories such as the Balance-of-Power, Balance-of-Threat, Security Dilemma, and Offense-Defense theories have not been chosen for this thesis. These have not been chosen because the focus is solely on the military sector of the state which is beyond the interest of this thesis. As this thesis wants to explore whether, and, if so to what extent a non-traditional security sector, such as the sector of development cooperation has been turned into security, the Securitization Theory has been chosen because of theorizing the process of securitization of a hitherto non-security related sector. Moreover, this theory has been chosen because it has been the predominant theory in Security Studies since its emergence in the late 1990s (Balzacq, 2010: 1)

3.3 Choice of Research Strategy

The research strategy behind this thesis is primarily a qualitative research strategy. It is primarily a qualitative research strategy since the weight of this thesis is put primarily on words and meanings in the collection and analysis of data which a qualitative research strategy emphasizes. However, since Critical Realism claims that the social practice of knowledge can be rationally assessed, the emphasis is also put on quantification in the collection and analysis of data. The weight is not put on quantification since quantification is only used to supplement words and meanings. Qualitative research strategies are typically based on inductive reason because they move from the specifics to the general due to their emphasis on words and meanings (Bryman, 2012: 36). Despite the fact that this thesis focuses on words, this qualitative research is, however, based on deductive reasoning which moves from the general to the specifics. This thesis is based on deductive reasoning, as the reasoning starts with the Securitization Theory which is being put to the test by being confronted with observations, which allows this thesis to either confirm or reject the theory in the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid. The qualitative research strategy has been chosen for this thesis on the basis of the ontological position of Critical Realism.

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3.4 Choice of Research Design

The chosen research design for this thesis is a case-study. A research design provides a structure for the collection and analysis of data (ibid: 45). A case-study has been chosen as research design because of being the most typically deployed research design for securitization studies (Balzacq, 2010: 33). Moreover, the design has been chosen because it due to an in-depth approach can reveal complexity and nuances of a case accordingly Stake (1995) which is what this thesis is interested in, to assess whether, and, if so to what extent Danish development aid has been securitized. Denmark has been chosen as case because of being an extreme case. An extreme case is the kind of case where you think that if something applies here, then it applies everywhere (Flyvberg, 2006). Given the fact that Denmark, since the 1980s, has been considered a top development aid donor who has lived up to OECD's 0.7 percent of GNI target and allocated the most of development aid to the poorest low-income countries, Denmark would be close to the last donor country where securitization should be expected (Gates and Hoeffler, 2004) (Narman, 1999) (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Thus, if Danish development aid were securitized, then it would seem plausible that the development aids of all donor countries were securitized.

3.5. Choice of Empirical Data

The empirical data which has been chosen for this thesis are policy papers on Danish development aid and annual reports on Danish development aid produced after 9/11, i.e., 2001 to 2016 by DANIDA. These are soft describing data and hard data in the form of numbers which are needed to assess the extent of securitization of Danish post-9/11 development aid. One could question whether these data are objective since DANIDA is evaluating its development aid practice. However, since this practice only has been evaluated by OECD in a less detailed way, these empirical data has been chosen.

All policy papers and annual reports, but "*DANIDA's Annual Report 2002*" were published in English. Because of being published in English, the target audience is English readers, which means that the securitization audience is the international community. However, since the English versions have been directly translated from the original Danish versions (DANIDA, 2008: 6), the target audience is also the Danish readers. Thus, the Danish population is also the securitization audience.

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In the table below, Table 1, an overview of Danish policy papers and annual reports on Danish development cooperation can be seen (the policy papers and annual reports are attached in full length in the appendix):

Publication year	Title of policy papers/ annual reports
November 2002	<i>Denmark's Development Assistance 2001.</i> ¹
2003	<i>DANIDA's Annual Report 2002.</i>
June 2003	<i>A World of Difference: The Government's Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004-2008.</i>
2004	<i>DANIDA's Annual Report 2003.</i>
August 2004	<i>Security, Growth – Development: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2005-2009.</i>
August 2005	<i>Globalization – Progress Through Partnership: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2006-2010.</i>
2005	<i>DANIDA's Annual Report 2004.</i>
August 2006	<i>Commitment to Development: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2007-2011.</i>
October, 2006	<i>DANIDA's Annual Report 2005.</i>
May, 2007	<i>Denmark's Participation in International Development Cooperation 2006: DANIDA's Annual Report.</i>
August 2007	<i>A World for All: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2008-2012.</i>
June, 2008	<i>Denmark's Participation in International Development Cooperation 2007: DANIDA's Annual Report.</i>
August 2008	<i>A Value-based Development Policy: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance: Overview of the Development Assistance Budget 2009-2013.</i>
June, 2009	<i>Denmark's Participation in International Development Cooperation 2008: DANIDA's Annual Report.</i>
August 2009	<i>A Value-based Development Policy: Priorities of the Danish</i>

¹ Policy papers before 2005 and annual reports before 2003 are published in paper format.

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	<i>Government for Danish Development Assistance: Overview of the Development Assistance Budget 2010-2014.</i>
June, 2010	<i>Denmark's Participation in International Development Cooperation 2009: DANIDA's Annual Report.</i>
August 2010	<i>A More Effective Danish Development policy: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance: Overview of the Development Assistance Budget 2011-2015.</i>
August 2011	<i>Focus on Freedom: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance: Overview of the Development Assistance Budget 2012-2016.</i>
2011	<i>Denmark's Participation in International Development Cooperation 2010: DANIDA's Annual Report.</i>
August 2012	<i>Rights at the Centre: Focus on Freedom: Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Cooperation: Overview of the Development Cooperation Budget 2013-2017.</i>
2012	<i>DANIDA Annual Report 2011.</i>
August 2013	<i>Green Growth Benefiting All: Priorities of the for Danish Development Cooperation: Overview of the Development Cooperation Budget 2014-2017.</i>
2013	<i>DANIDA Annual Report 2012.</i>
August 2014	<i>A Responsible and Active Development Policy: Priorities of the for Danish Development Cooperation: Overview of the Development Cooperation Budget 2015-2018.</i>
2014	<i>DANIDA Annual Report 2013.</i>
August 2015	<i>A Reformed and Focused World-class Development Cooperation: The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2016: Overview of the Development Cooperation Budget 2016-2019.</i>
2015	No annual report publication ² .

² From 2015, annual reports were no longer published by DANIDA as the database Open Aid was launched instead. Open Aid contains data on sector allocation and Danish development aid recipient countries and development projects undertaken by Denmark. The database has been accessed in Danish, but, is also available in English

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August 2016	<i>The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2017: Part 1 of the Implementation of the new Draft Strategy for Development Cooperation: Overview of the Development Cooperation budget 2017-2020.</i>
2016	No annual report publication.

Table 1: Overview of the empirical data

Since empirical data on the Danish development aid after 2016, according DANIDA, is incomplete, this thesis will delimitate itself from including empirical data from after 2016.

The policy papers and annual reports will be divided into three clusters, regarding who politically rules Denmark and thus who is the securitizing actor³, which will be analyzed separately. From 2001 to 2010, Denmark had a Liberal-Conservative government. Thus, policy papers and annual reports from 2003 to 2010 will be analyzed together. From 2011 to 2014, Denmark had a Centre-Left Government, policy papers from 2011 to 2014 will be analyzed together. From 2015 and onwards, Denmark had Liberal- and VLAK-governments, which means that policy papers from 2015 and 2016 are going to be analyzed together.

3.5.1 Collection of Data

The policy papers and annual reports have been collected from the DANIDA's homepage www.danida-publikationer.dk or accessed through the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Data has been collected from DANIDA, as it was not possible to generate and collect own data on Danish post-9/11 development aid.

³ In addition to the Danish governments the securitization actor is also US governments because of being an indirect author to the policy papers. It can be argued that US is an indirect author of the policy papers since foreign policies including development policies are influenced by the policy of the world's hegemon.

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3.6 Choice of Method

The methods chosen for this thesis are content and documentary analysis.

3.6.1 Content Analysis

Since securitization, according to the Securitization Theory, is a discursive practice, where meaning of security is ascribed to non-security related objects, content analysis has been chosen as method. A content analysis emphasizes the content of meanings contained in texts and involves systematic observations of text (Hodder, 1994: 155). It can be used to study words and sentences within sets of texts or discourses (Bryman: 304). Both qualitative and quantitative content analysis is going to be deployed. A quantitative content analysis emphasizes the quantification of the content of discourses or texts regarding predetermined categories (Bryman, 289). Quantitative content analysis has been chosen because it allows this thesis to quantify security-related words in the Danish development aid policy discourse which indicates the the extent of securitization in Danish development policy discourse.

Because quantitative, as well as qualitative content analyses, have been used to examine the Danish development aid policy discourse, this thesis method triangulates. This thesis method triangulates to crosscheck the results of both content analyses on the basis of the logical inference that if development issues have been assigned meaning of security, the development discourse must also consist of a security discourse as security-related words are used to assign development issues with the meaning of security. If two different analytical tools lead to the same result, one can be more confident with the result (Bryman: *ibid*: 289).

3.6.2 Documentary Analysis

The second method which has been chosen to analyze Danish post-9/11 development aid is a documentary analysis which is an examination of documents. A documentary analysis has been chosen because it allows this thesis to investigate Danish post-9/11 development aid practices which are described in the document of post-9/11 annual reports on Danish development aid.

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3.7 Approach

3.7.1 Word Frequency Analysis

First post-9/11 Danish policy papers on Danish development aid are going to be imported into NVivo which is a qualitative content analysis software program. Next, the policy papers are going to be analyzed regarding word frequency. Word frequency becomes calculated by the method of the weighted average in percent, which can be seen in the figure below.

$$((\text{the number of policy papers} / (\text{the number a word appears in all articles})) \times ((\text{the number of appearance in a single policy paper}) / (\text{the total number of words in the policy papers})))$$

Figure 1: Calculation of word frequency

By running the word frequency function, a list of words which has a high occurrence is going to be generated. On the basis of Securitization Theory, which suggests that something is securitized by being articulated in the language of security, security-related words have been detected from the word frequency lists. Security-related words are then clustered together, and their frequency added to compare their occurrence with the occurrence of traditionally non-security-related development words which will also be clustered together. When these have been clustered together, the different types of development issues will be coded with each their color. Coding each enables one to get a sense of how each development issue is presented throughout the policy papers.

3.7.2 Study of Annual Reports

Next, a documentary analysis of Danish post-9/11 annual reports on Danish development aid is going to be conducted where each annual report, between 2001 and 2016, is going to be studied. First, the percentage of GNI which has been allocated to development aid is going to be extracted. The numbers indicate whether Danish development has been taken serious as one can infer that development aid is being taken serious if exceeding DAC's GNI target of 0.7 percent.

Second, the countries to which Danish development aid has become allocated is going to be examined regarding fragility. To be able to determine whether Danish development aid has become allocated to fragile countries, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's measurement of fragility is going to be used. These measurements are based on 1) demographic pressure 2) refugees and internally displaced people, 3) group grievance, 4) human flight and brain drain, 5)

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uneven economic development, 6) poverty and economic decline, 7) state legitimacy, 8) public services, 9) human rights and rule of law, 10) security apparatus, 11) factionalized elites and 12) external intervention. On the basis of these indicators, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have ranked countries from 0 to 120 where 0 indicates that countries are stable and 120 that they are highly fragile. Country which score above 59.9 can, according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, be considered fragile (The Fund for Peace, 2016). The rank of each country is going to be extracted and the average rank of the country's fragility calculated for the period of each Danish government.

The average score of each recipient country under each government is going to be calculated. However, since the Fragile State Index's ranking only goes back to 2005, the countries' fragility before 2005 is not going to be included in the calculated average under the Liberal-Conservative government (Please see detailed calculation in Appendix). Three of the recipient countries of Danish development aid, has, however, not been ranked. These are Bahrain, Kosovo, and the United Arab Emirates. Since these have not been ranked, this thesis is not able to determine their fragility.

Following the determination of whether Danish development has been allocated to fragile or stable countries, the countries are going to be examined regarding income-level to see whether Danish development aid still can be perceived as a tool of poverty reduction. To be able to determine whether Danish development aid has been allocated to poor low-income countries, this thesis is going to examine the GNI per capita in USD of each recipient country. GNI per capita is the total domestic, and foreign output claimed by residents of a country, consisting of gross domestic product, plus factor incomes earned by foreign residents, minus income earned in the domestic economy by nonresidents, which is divided by mid-year population. The GNI per capita in US dollars is calculated by the World Bank Atlas method (The World Bank, 2018).

Low-income countries are defined as countries having a GNP per capita of or below USD 1,005 in the fiscal years between 2001 and 2011, USD 1,025 in 2012, USD 1,035 in 2013, USD 1,045 in 2014, 1,045 in 2015 and USD 1,025 in 2016 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2015) (ibid: 2016). Middle-income countries are defined as having a GNI per capita of more than USD 1,005 in the fiscal years between 2001 and 2011, USD 1,025 in 2012, USD 1,035 in 2013, USD 1,045 in 2014, 1,045 in 2015 and USD 1,025 in 2016 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2015) (ibid:

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2016). High-income countries are defined as countries having a GNI per capita of more than USD 12,276 in the fiscal years between 2001 and 2011, USD 12,476 in 2012, USD 12,616 in 2013, USD 12,746 in 2014, USD 12,736 in 2015 and 12, 476 in 2016 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2012) (ibid: 2013) (ibid, 2014) (ibid, 2015) (ibid, 2016). No data, however, exist on the GNI per capita of Somalia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, Libya before 2002, Qatar and Afghanistan before 2004, Kosovo and Iraq before 2006, Syria after 2007 and Kosovo in 2015 and 2016. Due to lack of data, this thesis has been unable to determine the mentioned countries' income-level the given years.

Next, this thesis is going to look at the sectors to which Danish development aid have been allocated. The percentage of development aid which has been allocated to security sectors vis-à-vis development sectors are going to be extracted from the annual reports and compared to be able to get a sense of how much development aid that has become allocated to the security sector.


After the sectors to which Danish development aid has been allocated have been examined, descriptions of the extent of coordination of development assistance and military efforts are going to be extracted from the annual reports which will be supplemented with empirical data from the Danish Ministry of Defense.

Next, the structure of the thesis is going to be presented.

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3.9 Structure of the Thesis

Figure 2 below provides an overview of the structure of the thesis



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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

In the following chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. However, the concept of development aid which this thesis has been conducted on the basis of first needs to be explained.

4.1 The Concept of Development Aid

Development aid can be conceptualized as government aid to developing countries which can be defined as low and middle-income countries with a GNI per capita income below USD 12,276⁴. Development aid serves to promote economic development and welfare of developing countries (OECD, 2018). Development aid is allocated by OECD-DAC member countries which are committed to allocate at least allocated 0.7 percent of their GNI in development aid to be spent on sectoral allocation of aid, concessional loans and the provision of technical assistance (OECD, 2003).

4.2 Securitization Theory

The theory which, as mentioned, forms the theoretical framework for this study is Securitization Theory by Buzan, Wæver, Jaap de Wilde which was put forward in their book *“Security: A New Framework for Analysis”* in 1998. According to the theory, something becomes turned into security through a discourse in which issues hitherto non-related to security are presented as posing an existential threat to a reference object. Articulation in the language of security typically includes arguments of urgency due to the logic that if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant, because we will not be here. This discursive practice is performed by securitizing actors. For something to be successfully turned into security, the securitizing actors need to possess political power since it takes power for the definition and framing of an issue to be accepted (Væver, 2004: 13). The securitizing actors are, therefore, typically governments, political leaders, lobbyists, bureaucracies or pressure groups (Buzan, Væver and Wilde, *ibid*: 40). In the case of securitization of development issues in Danish policy papers, the securitization actors are Danish and US governments which are respectively direct and indirect authors of the policy papers.

The second step in the process of securitization is that the securitization audience accepts and believes that the issue is a threat (*ibid*: 31). Their acceptance of the threat depends on three factors which are the position of the securitizing actors, the language deployed within the

⁴ Atlas method

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discourse and reference to other objects which are generally held to be threatened. Concerning the language deployed, the language deployed within the discourse has to follow the security form, the grammar of security and construct a plot that includes existential threat and point of no return. In the investigated Danish case of securitization, it is assumed that the securitization audience which, as mentioned, is the international community and the Danish population accepts and believe that development issues are threats to global and Danish security. It is, however, only assumed since it has not been possible to ask the securitization audience as it would take the conduction of international and national surveys to know. Due to the limited amount of time and resources available for conducting the thesis a national survey has not been possible to conduct.

Now that the methodology and the theory have been presented, the analysis of Danish post-9/11 development aid can begin.

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Chapter 5: Analysis

5.1 Danish Development Aid During the Liberal-Conservative Government

5.1.1 Development Aid Policy Discourse

Since, according to the Securitization Theory, something becomes securitized by being articulated in the language of security this analysis section is going to investigate whether Danish development aid becomes articulated in the language of security.

In the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Liberal-Conservative government, both development and security-related words occur.

5.1.1.1 Development-Related Words

Table 2 below, documents the occurrence of development-related words in the Danish development aid policy discourse during the three terms of the Liberal-Conservative government.

Development-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
‘Development’ (1025) ‘poverty reduction’ (164), ‘human rights’ (141) ‘climate change’ (132), ‘HIV/AIDS’ (125), ‘women/ gender equality’ (117), ‘good/ poor governance’ (96), ‘democracy’/ ‘democratization’ (86), ‘education’/ ‘information’ (73), ‘health’ (66), ‘migration’ (47), ‘equality’/ ‘inequality’ (46), ‘corruption’ (29), ‘living conditions’ (24), ‘jobs’ /’employment’ (20), ‘humanitarian crises/ -disasters’ (6), ‘political oppression’ (2).	2,190	4.54

Table 2: Detection of development-related words in the development aid policy discourse during the Liberal-Conservative government.

Development-related words are detected 2,190 times in total: ‘*development*’ occurs 1,025 times, ‘*poverty reduction*’ 141 times, ‘*human rights*’ 141 times, ‘*climate changes*’ 132 times, ‘*HIV/ AIDS*’ 125 times, ‘*women and gender equality*’ 117 times, ‘*good and poor governance*’ 96 times, ‘*democracy*’ and ‘*democratization*’ 86 times, ‘*education*’ and ‘*information*’ 73 times, ‘*health*’ 66 times, ‘*equality and inequality*’ 46 times, ‘*corruption*’ 29 times, ‘*living conditions*’ 24 times,

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'jobs /employment' 20 times, *'humanitarian crises'* and *'disasters'* 6 times and *'political oppression'* 2 times.

5.1.1.2 Security-Related Words

The table below shows the frequent occurrence of security-related words in Danish development aid policy discourse during the three terms of the Liberal-Conservative government.

Security-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
'Security' (92), 'fight' (76), 'conflict' (59), 'stability'/'instability' (56), 'terrorism' (43), 'fragile states' (29), 'emergency' (16), 'crises' (13), 'combating' (12), 'eradicate' (10), 'risk' (10), 'threat' (8), 'police' (5).	429	1.36

Table 3: Detection of security-related words during the Liberal-Conservative government

Security-related words occur 429 times in total; *'security'* occurred 92 times, *'fight'* 76 times, *'conflict'* 59 times, *'stability'* and *'instability'* 56 times together, *'terrorism'* 43 times, *'fragile states'* 29 times, *'emergency'* 16 times, *'crises'* 13 times, *'combating'* 12 times, *'eradicate'* and *'risk'* 10 times, *'threat'* 8 times and *'police'* 5 times. Due to this frequent occurrence, Danish development aid policy discourse during the Liberal-Conservative government consists of a security discourse. Since development-related words, as mentioned, occur 2,190 times, and the weighted percentage of the occurrence was 4.54, the development-related words, however, occur almost 400 percent more than security-related words. However, because of consisting of a security discourse development aid was articulated in the language of security.

How development aid was articulated in the language of security is what this thesis is going to look at now by looking at how development issues are presented.

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5.1.1.3 Presentation of Development Issues

The first excerpt, Excerpt 1, shows that the development issues such as '*human rights violations*', '*political oppression*', '*the lack of free speech and democracy*', '*corruption*' and '*poor governance*' becomes indirectly presented as posing an existential threat to the security of donor countries, in the Danish development aid policy discourse during the three terms of the Liberal-Conservative government.

- (1) *It is also clear that **human rights violations, political oppression, a lack of free exchange of opinion, and corrupt and irresponsible governance** can breed unstable, political radicalization and become a cause of violence and conflict and in the final extreme, terrorism.*

(DANIDA, 2004: 17)

'*Human rights violations*,' '*political oppression*,' '*the lack of free speech and democracy*,' '*corruption*' and '*poor governance*' become presented as posing an existential threat on the basis of the assumption that they can lead to instability and the deployment of the metaphor '*breed*.' This feeds into the threat construction because of bringing forth associations to exponential growth or something out of control.

That '*lack of education*,' '*information*,' and '*unemployment*' become presented as posing existential threats to the donor countries, can be seen in Excerpt 9, below.

- (2) *Widespread poverty, a **lack of education and information, a lack of jobs** and future prospects, and a lack of legitimate democratic channels for the expression of frustration and dissatisfaction lead to alienation and internal unrest in many countries. This could create fertile soil for extremism and terrorism [...] If intolerant and extremist groups succeed in controlling schools and the public arena, there is a great risk of the level of knowledge being reduced, prejudices and stereotypes thriving, and cultural patterns being frozen in a reactionary battle against modernization and progress. This will lead to the loss of the opportunities offered by modernization and globalization also to the loss of the countries of the wider Middle East.*

(DANIDA, 2004: 9 & 10)

In this excerpt, '*lack of education, information, and unemployment*' become framed and thus presented as posing existential threats, on the basis of the assumption that they lead to disability.

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Besides this framing, the above development issues become also constructed as security issues through security-related words such as '*extremism*,' '*terrorism*,' '*unrest*,' and '*risk*' as well as the metaphorical security reference '*battle*' which conveys the meaning that a special struggle is taken place.

Additionally, the metaphor '*fertile soil*' is used to underline urgency, since this is where the threat originates. This sense of urgency is also established by the claim that if intolerant and extremist groups succeed in controlling schools, it is implied that if we do not tackle this problem, this issue will grow bigger. Thus, emergency measures are required to be taken.

The third development issue which becomes presented as posing a security threat to global security is '*deteriorated living conditions*.'

(3) ***Deteriorated living conditions** may lead millions of poor to flee as well as contribute to social unrest and conflicts.*

(DANIDA, 2007: 13)

'*Deterioration of living conditions*' becomes framed as a security issue because of leading to migration. Besides this framing, Moreover, many security-related words have been deployed such as '*illegal*,' '*insecurity*,' '*unrest*,' '*conflicts*' and '*die*.'

The fourth development issue which has been framed as a security issue is '*poverty*.' An example of how '*poverty*' has been framed can be seen in Excerpt 4 and 5, below:

(4) ***Poverty** is one of the most important and most fundamental threats to stability and development in the world.*

(DANIDA, 2003: 1).

(5) *Like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, **poverty** must be regarded as a threat to global stability.*

(DANIDA, 2005: 14)

Quotes 4 and 5 exemplify that '*poverty*' becomes framed as a security issue on the basis of the assumption of threatening world stability. In addition to this framing, '*poverty*' becomes constructed as a security issue by the deployment of a comparison to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. By '*poverty*' being compared and thus associated with '*terrorism*' and '*weapons of mass destruction*' which respectively make up security threats to people at the scene and the humanity, poverty becomes thus presented as posing an existential threat to the donor and the developing countries.

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The sixth and seventh development issues which become framed as security issues to global security are '*inequality*' and '*population growth*.' An exemplification of how inequality and population growth become framed as security issues can be seen in Quote 5, below:

(6) *There is a world of **difference between the living conditions** experienced by people in the rich countries and by those in the poor countries. Together with the **population growth rate**, this difference threatens political stability and security, first and foremost in poor countries but also in our part of the world.*

(DANIDA, 2003: 2).

This excerpt exemplifies that '*inequality*' and '*population growth*' become framed as security threats by the assumption that they cause '*instability*.' In addition to this frame, they become constructed as security issues by security-related words such as '*threatens*' '*security*' and '*stability*.' Because of this assumption, '*inequality*' and '*population growth*' become presented as posing an existential threat to the security of the developing and the donor countries.

The next excerpt, Excerpt 7 shows that '*failed states*' become presented as posing an existential threat.

(7) *In **fragile states**, human rights are often systematically trampled on, and the living conditions are atrocious. Furthermore, fragile states export instability; instability that can exacerbate the threat to international peace and security – conflict, disease epidemics, refugees, radicalization, and terrorism.*

(DANIDA, 2007: 15).

'*Failed states*' become presented as posing an existential threat to global security on the basis of the assumption that fragile states are counter-productive to the world's security because they '*export instability*' beyond their borders. '*Failed states*' become constructed as an existential threat by the deployment of security-related words such as '*threats*,' '*instability*,' '*terrorism*,' '*radicalization*' and '*conflict*' and a negatively connoted word such as '*exacerbate*.'

In addition to presenting development issues as a threat to global security, development issues also become presented as a threat to the security of the developing countries themselves. Next, the development issues of '*gender inequality*' becomes presented as posing an existential threat to the developing countries. An example of this presentation can be seen in Excerpt 8 and 9, below.

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- (8) ***Great inequality** between men and women contributes to keeping many developing countries locked in a vicious circle of poverty and weak economic growth.*

(DANIDA, 2006: 11)

‘*Gender inequality*’ becomes presented as posing an existential threat to the developing countries due to the assumption of leading to the fact that they are unable to break free from the ‘*vicious circle*’ of poverty. Gender inequality has been constructed as an existential threat by the negatively connoted idiom ‘*vicious circle*.’

- (9) *In far too many developing countries women continue to experience **marginalization and oppression**.*

(DANIDA, 2006: 18)

In Excerpt 9, ‘*gender inequality*’ has been framed as an existential threat to women themselves due to ‘*oppression*’ and ‘*marginalization*.’

The second development issue which becomes framed as an existential threat to the developing countries is ‘*diseases*.’

- (10) ***Diseases** that today can be prevented or treated cause millions of deaths every year.*

(DANIDA, 2004: 8).

Excerpt 10 shows that ‘*diseases*’ becomes framed as an existential threat on the basis of the assumption of causing a significant number of deaths annually. Diseases are, thereby, constructed as an existential threat by the use of numbers which convey the meaning of gravity and urgency since so many people are dying. Because of being framed as an existential threat, ‘*diseases*’ are presented as posing an existential threat to the developing countries.

The next excerpts are going to show that ‘*HIV/ AIDS*’ becomes framed as an existential threat to the developing countries:

- (11) *Southern Africa is particularly severely hit by the effects of the **HIV/AIDS** epidemic...*

*One out of three of the world's almost 40 million people who are infected with HIV come from Africa[...] The **HIV/AIDS** epidemic is a great human tragedy. It makes orphans of children, breaks families up and robs society of its most important resource — the human being. The epidemic is not an isolated health problem; it is an important barrier to sustainable development and growth.*

(DANIDA, 2004: 14)

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(12) *The spread of **HIV/AIDS** represents a serious threat to sustainable development —, especially in Africa.*

(DANIDA, 2006: 3)

'*HIV/AIDS*' become just as '*diseases*,' framed as an existential threat to people in the developing countries on the basis of the assumption that many die from '*HIV/AIDS*' and by the direct statement that it is a threat (as in Excerpt 12). Besides this framing, '*HIV/AIDS*' become constructed as an existential threat by the metaphorical security reference '*hit*' which feeds into the threat construction since if you are hit severely enough, you can die. Moreover, it becomes constructed as an existential threat by the deployment of the words '*rob*' and '*break up*' which are metaphorical references to security because they refer to a criminal act which therefore feeds into the threat construction. '*Break up*' feeds into the threat of construction because the breakup of something can lead to destruction. '*Rob*' feeds into the threat construction since if one is robbed off, it may be hard to survive. Since the '*breakup*' of something can lead to destruction and being '*robbed of*' can lead to hardship in surviving, the meaning of existential threats are conveyed. Also, negatively connoted words such as '*tragedy*,' '*problem*,' '*barrier*' and '*epidemic*' become deployed in the threat construction. Thus, due to these framing and constructions '*HIV/AIDS*' becomes presented as an existential threat to the developing countries.

The fourth, fifth and sixth development issues which become presented as existential threats primary to developing countries, but also the global as a whole, are '*climate changes*,'. An example of how these have becomes presented, as existential threats, can be seen in the Excerpts 7 and 8, below.

(13) *Developments in recent years have shown how sensitive the planet is to **climate changes**. The costs of global warming are potentially huge.*

(DANIDA, 2005: 16)

(14) *Despite the fact that the poorest countries bear the least responsibility for man-made **climate changes**, these countries are hit the hardest.*

(DANIDA, 2008: 4)

The above excerpts exemplify that '*climate change*,' becomes presented and framed as existential threats on the basis of the assumption of its implication. Additionally, the metaphorical security reference '*hit*' serves to add to the threat-construction since a '*hit*' can lead to death.

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The seventh and eighth development issues which become presented as security issues to the developing countries are '*migration*.' Below the presentation of '*migration*' and '*deterioration of living conditions*' as a security issue to the security of the developing countries can be seen.

(15) [...] *Economic stagnation and unemployment lead to a great pressure of **migration** that is threatening to drain the individual societies of their well-educated members.*

(DANIDA, 2004: 9)

(16) *The **migration** of well-educated people can drain poor home countries of essential knowledge and experience – the so-called brain drains – while illegal immigrants can die in their attempts to escape poverty and insecurity in the hope of finding a better life [...]*

(DANIDA, 2007: 11)

'*Migration*' becomes presented as both a security issue and an existential threat; a security issue to people living in the donor countries to which migrants migrate and an existential threat to the local community and those migrating, hence the developing countries. Moreover, '*migration*,' is constructed as security and existential threats by the metaphorical reference to the loss of an educated workforce '*brain drain*' which adds to the threat construction since if the educated workforce has left, it may be hard for the community to survive. In addition, many security-related words have been deployed such as '*illegal*,' '*insecurity*,' '*threatening*' and '*die*.'

Now that the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Liberal-Conservative government has been analyzed, this thesis is going to look at Danish development in practice. Since the size of development aid indicates whether development aid is being taken serious, the next analysis section is going to look at the size of Danish development aid during the Liberal-Conservative government.

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5.1.2 The Size of Danish Development Aid

Table 4 below shows the percentage of GNI, Denmark spent on development aid during the Liberal-Conservative government.

Year	Percent of GNI spent on development aid
2003	0.85
2004	0.84
2005	0.81
2006	0.80
2007	0.81
2008	0.82
2009	0.88
2010	0.90

Table 4: Overview of % of GNI, Denmark spent on development aid during the Liberal-Conservative government.

In 2003, Denmark allocated 0.85 percent of its GNI in development aid (DANIDA, 2004: 14). In 2004, 0.84 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2005: 17). From 2003 to 2004, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was thus raised by 1 percent. The subsequent year, 0.81 percent of Denmark's GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2006: 16). The GNI percentage allocated in development aid had therefore been reduced by three percent from 2004 to 2005. In 2006, Denmark allocated 0.80 percent of GNI in development aid (DANIDA, 2007: 32). Since 0.80 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid in 2005, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was reduced by one percent. The next year, in 2007, 0.81 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2008: 31). The GNI percentage allocated for development aid was, therefore, raised by one percent from 2006 to 2007. In 2008, Denmark allocated 0.82 percent of its GNI in development aid (DANIDA: 2009). Since 0.81 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid the year earlier, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was yet again raised by one percent. The following year, 0.88 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2010, p 91); (DANIDA, 2010: 154). The GNI percentage allocated in development aid was therefore raised by no less than six percent from 2008 to 2009. The last year under the Liberal-Conservative government, 0.90 percent of Denmark's GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2011).

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Since 0.88 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid the year in 2008, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was yet again raised, this time, by two percent. Since, as mentioned 0.85 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid in 2003, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was raised with five percent under the Liberal-Conservative government. Not only did Denmark allocate this amount of GNI in development aid, but Denmark also worked internationally on getting other donor countries to do the same (DANIDA, 2005: 30). Because of exceeding DAC's GNI target, working for getting other countries to spend more of their GNI on development aid and increasing development assistance between 2003 and 2010 Denmark was committed to DAC's 0.7 percent of GNI target and the eighth UNMDGs.

Next, the thesis is going to look at to which countries Danish development aid was allocated under the Liberal-Conservative government.

5.1.3 Danish Development Aid Recipient Countries Allocation

Danish development aid was both allocated to relatively stable and fragile and conflict-affected countries under the Liberal-Conservative government.

5.1.3.1 Fragile Countries

In the table below, fragile countries to which Danish development aid was allocated under the Liberal-Conservative Government can be seen.

Sudan (112.6)	Cameroon (91.9)	Nicaragua (81.4)
Somalia (112)	Guinea-Bissau (91.5)	Mali (81.2)
Zimbabwe (111.1)	Burkina Faso (90.2)	Serbia (80.4)
Chad (110.2)	Colombia (89.5)	Mozambique (78)
Iraq (109.3)	Rwanda (89.5)	Peru (77.4)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (108.1)	Syria (89)	Jordan (77.1)
Afghanistan (104.8)	Egypt (88.8)	Saudi Arabia (77.1)
Pakistan (102.7)	Eritrea (88)	Vietnam (76.9)
Myanmar (98.9)	Iran (86.9)	Thailand (76.9)
Ethiopia (98.4)	Bhutan (86.8)	Honduras (76.2)
Bangladesh (97.3)	Cambodia (86.5)	India (74.2)

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Yemen (96.6)	Angola (85.1)	Benin (73.6)
Uganda (96.2)	Indonesia (84.8)	Macedonia (73.3)
Timor-Leste (96)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (84.8)	Libya (69.2)
Burundi (95.6)	Philippines (83.7)	Albania (69.1)
Kenya (95)	Bolivia (82.8)	Malaysia (67.4)
Nepal (94.8)	China (82.3)	Botswana (67.3)
Sri Lanka (94.7)	Gaza and the West Bank (82.3)	Ghana (64)
Sierra Leone (93.6)	Zambia (81.9)	Tanzania (63.9)
Niger (93.4)	Lesotho (81.7)	South Africa (62.2)
Liberia (93.2)	Guatemala (81.6)	Kuwait (61.9)

Table 5: Fragility rank of the fragile countries which received aid during the Liberal-Conservative government.

As the table shows, 62 countries to which Danish aid was allocated during the Liberal-Conservative government were fragile (DANIDA, 2001) (ibid, 2002) (ibid, 2003) (ibid, 2004) (ibid, 2005) (ibid, 2006) (ibid, 2007) (ibid, 2008) (ibid, 2009) (ibid, 2010). These fragile countries were Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Yemen, Uganda, Timor-Leste, Burundi, Kenya, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Niger, Liberia, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Rwanda, Syria, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Bhutan, Cambodia, Angola, Indonesia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Philippines, Bolivia, China, Gaza and the West Bank, Zambia, Lesotho, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mali, Serbia, Mozambique, Peru, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Thailand, Honduras, India, Benin, Macedonia, Libya, Albania, Malaysia, Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa and Kuwait. These countries can, according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Fragile State Index, be defined as fragile due to a score above 60 which indicates that there is an alert or warning for vulnerability to conflict or collapse (The Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy).

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5.1.3.2 Relatively Stable Countries

Danish development aid was allocated to 3 relatively stable countries which did not present a security threat per se toward Denmark nor global security (DANIDA, 2002: 24,25 47,48 & 49) (ibid, 2003: 32, 50, 54 & 60) (ibid, 2004: 32, 50 & 54) (ibid, 2005: 51 & 71) (ibid, 2006: 40 & 86) (2007: 105 & 106) (2008: 40, 43, 108 & 156) (ibid, 2009: 82, 51 & 91) (ibid, 2010: 82, 87 & 91) (2011: 142, 150 & 154). These countries can be seen in the below-standing table 6.

Montenegro (56.6)
Qatar (52.5)
Oman (46.5)

Table 6: Fragility rank of relative stable countries which received aid during the Liberal-Conservative government.

Montenegro, Qatar, and Oman can be categorized as relatively stable countries due to their score of below 59.9 in the Fragile States Index. Countries having a score between 59.9 and 30 can namely be seen as more or less stable countries (Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy).

5.1.3.3 Low-Income Countries

In the table below, Table 7, the low-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated during the Liberal-Conservative government can be seen.

Liberia (130/ 120/ 80/ 90/ 120/ 130/ 160/ 180/ 220/ 250)	Mozambique (280/ 250/ 280/ 310/ 350/ 370/ 400/ 440/ 460)	Pakistan (500/ 510/ 560/ 640/ 730/ 820/ 910/ 1,010/ 1,030/ 1,080)
Ethiopia (130/ 120/ 110/ 130/ 160/ 180/ 220/ 280/ 340/ 380)	Mali (300/ 290/ 350/ 400/ 460/ 490/ 540/ 610/ 670/ 690)	Zimbabwe (520/ 470/ 420/ 420/ 430/ 410/ 310/ 380/ 300/ 370/ 490)
Burundi (130/ 130/ 120/ 120/ 130/ 150/ 170/ 190/ 190/ 210)	Ghana (300/ 280/ 320/ 390/ 470/ 600/ 800/ 1,160/ 1,200/ 1,250)	The Democratic Republic of Congo (610/ 650/ 670/ 750/ 930/ 1,150/ 1,320/ 1,740/ 1,840/ 2,070)
Sierra Leone (150/ 200/ 270/ 280/ 290/ 300/ 360/ 420/ 440/ 420)	Tanzania (300/ 310/ 320/ 350/ 400/ 450/ 510/ 580/ 630/ 690)	Cameroon (650/ 640/ 740/ 920/ 1020/ 1080/ 1,130/ 1,260/ 1,340/ 1,350)
Niger (170/ 160/ 190/ 210/	Cambodia (310/ 320/ 350/	Lesotho (690/ 630/ 700/ 840/

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250/ 260/ 280/ 320/ 330/ 350)	400/ 560/ 520/ 590/ 670/ 700/ 750)	1,040/ 1,150/ 1,310/ 1,340/ 1,270/ 1,330)
Myanmar (170/ 190/ 230/ 270/ 300/ 360/ 480/ 650/ 860)	Sudan (340/ 370/ 410/ 480/ 580/ 730/ 910/ 1,110/ 1,170/ 1,250)	Indonesia (720/ 790/ 900/ 1,080/ 1,220/ 1,370/ 1,600/ 1,940/ 2,140/ 2,520)
Chad (190/ 190/ 210/ 340/ 470/ 530/ 630/ 700/ 830/ 910)	Zambia (340/ 350/ 400/ 450/ 550/ 710/ 880/ 1,160/ 1,260/ 1,390)	Timor-Leste (790/ 700/ 620/ 710/1,180/ 1,850/ 2,490/ 2,500/ 2,810)
Eritrea (210/ 210/ 210/ 24/ 280/ 290// 300/ 300/ 350/410)	Benin (390/ 390/ 440/ 530/ 600/ 630/ 670/ 750/ 790)	Bhutan (810/ 850/ 940/ 1,060/ 1,210/ 1,330/ 1,620/ 1,730/ 1,810/ 1,970/ 2,150)
Rwanda (220/ 220/ 210/ 230/ 270/ 320/ 370/ 450/ 510/ 560)	Angola (390/ 540/ 610/ 800/ 1,090/ 1,490/ 2,150/ 2,760/ 3,10/ 3,240)	Sri Lanka (840/ 850/ 940/ 1,060/ 1,210/ 1,360/ 1,550/ 1,790/ 2,010/ 2,420)
Nepal (240/ 240/ 260/ 280/ 310/ 340/ 370/ 440/ 480/ 540/ 540)	Kenya (400/ 390/ 410/ 460/ 520/ 590/ 710/ 840/ 910/ 980)	Bolivia (960/ 930/ 920/ 970/ 1,030/ 1,120/ 1,240/ 1,490/ 1,640/ 1,810)
Afghanistan (210/ 250/ 270/ 330/ 360/ 460/ 500)	Vietnam (430/ 450/ 500/ 580/ 630/ 720/ 830/ 980/ 1,100/ 1,250)	Nicaragua (980/ 970/ 1,010/ 1,100/ 1,180/ 1,210/ 1,300/ 1,450/ 1,440/ 1,530)
Uganda (240/ 250/ 250/ 270/ 300/ 340/ 370/ 420/ 490/ 540)	Bangladesh (430/ 420/ 450/ 490/ 490/ 530/ 640/ 710/ 780)	Honduras (980/ 1,070/ 1,130/ 1,210/ 1,290/ 1,370/ 1,500/ 1,660/ 1,650/ 1,760)
Guinea-Bissau (240/ 290/ 320/ 370/ 420/ 430/ 460/ 500/ 550/ 570)	India (450/ 450/ 510/ 600/ 700/ 790/ 920/ 1,000/ 1,110/ 1,220)	
Burkina Faso (240/ 240/ 280/ 340/410/ 430/ 460/ 520/ 550/ 570)	Yemen (470/500/ 530/ 600/ 690/ 790/ 880/ 990/ 1,080)	

Table 7: GNI per capita in USD of the low-income recipient countries of Danish aid under the Liberal-Conservative government.

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As the table shows Danish aid were allocated to 40 low-income countries which were Liberia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Niger, Myanmar, Chad, Eritrea, Rwanda, Nepal, Afghanistan, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Mali, Ghana, Tanzania, Cambodia, Sudan, Zambia, Benin, Angola, Kenya, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Yemen, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Lesotho, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras. These can be defined as low-income countries because of having a GNI per capita of less than USD 1,005 accordingly the World Bank, (The World Bank, 2011).

5.1.3.4 Middle- and High- Income Countries

In the table below, Table 8, the middle- and high-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated during the Liberal-Conservative government can be seen.

Syria (1,100/ 1,210/ 1,240/ 1,380/ 1,510/ 1,640/ 1,840)	Jordan (1,740/ 1,790/ 1,910/ 2,180/ 2,360/ 2,540/ 2,760/ 3,110/ 3,470)	South Africa (2,810/ 2,630/ 2,870/ 3,660/ 4,900/ 5,530/ 5,820/ 6,160)
China (1,010/ 1,110/ 1,280/ 1,510/ 1,760/ 2,060/ 2,510/ 3,100/ 3,690/ 4,340)	Iran (1,770/ 1,860/ 2,180/ 2,490/ 2,930/ 3,450/ 4,230/ 4,900/ 5,460/ 6,140)	Botswana (3,110/ 2,800/ 3,240/ 3,790/ 4,790/ 5,300/ 5,620/ 5,650 / 5,260/ 5,570)
Philippines (1,220/ 1,180/ 1,220/ 1,340/ 1,430/ 1,540/ 1770/ 2,060/ 2,260/ 2,470)	Macedonia (1,790/ 1,820/ 2,090/ 2,560/ 2,990/ 3,310/ 3,580/ 4,330/ 4,610/ 4,700)	Malaysia (3,550/ 3,790/ 4,160/ 4,740/ 5,280/ 5,850/ 6,650/ 7,550/ 7,640/ 8,290)
Albania (1,330/ 1,410/ 1,690/ 2,150/ 2,670/ 3,090/ 3,480/ 3,950/ 4,230)	Peru (1,940/ 1,990/ 2,110/ 2,310/2,570/ 2,820/ 3,220/ 3,780/ 3,940/ 4,360)	Libya (5,170/ 5,170/ 5,150/ 6,870/ 8,600/ 10,410/ 12,210/ 12,110/ 12,440)
Gaza and the West Bank (1,390/ 1,300/ 1,390/ 1,480/ 1,650/ 1,570/ 1,600/ 1,680/ 2,090/ 2,310)	Thailand (1,960/1,990/ 2,180/ 2,530/ 2,790/ 3,100/ 3,520/ 3,970/ 4,140/ 4,580)	Oman (7,920/ 7,960/ 8,260/ 9,380/ 10,620/ 15,000/14,460/ 17,380/ 17,700/ 18,170)
Egypt (1,410/ 1,330/ 1,260/ 1,200/ 1,210/ 1,300/ 1,510/ 1,810/ 2,090/ 2,330)	Montenegro (1,970/ 2,440/ 3,100/ 3,660/ 4,320/ 5,120/ 6,470/ 6,920/	Saudi Arabia (8,480/ 8,330/ 9,440/ 11,000/ 12,610/ 14,120/ 15,760/ 17,880/ 18,750)

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Serbia (1,450/ 1,430/ 2,260/ 3,070/ 3,630/ 3,970/ 4,580/ 5,650/ 6,040/ 5,850)	Iraq (2,020/ 2,510/ 3,540/ 4,030/ 4,430)	Bahrain (11,500/ 12,100/ 12,950/ 14,580/ 16,550/ 17,890/ 19,660/ 20,860/ 18,830/ 18,970)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,600/ 1,760/ 2,040/ 2,550/ 3,110/ 3,440/ 3,910/ 4,720/ 4,960/ 4,930)	Colombia (2,300/ 2,330/ 2,340/ 2,580/ 2,920/ 3,430/ 4,070/ 4,660/ 5,090/ 5,540)	Kuwait (18,670/ 18,890/ 22,520/ 28,100/ 34,400/ 41,350/ 47,590/ 51,790/ 46,000/ 42,060)
Guatemala (1,600/ 1,620/ 1,860/ 2,010/ 2,160/ 2,370/ 2,570/ 2,610/ 2,700)	Kosovo (2,510/ 2,800/ 3,100/ 3,280/ 3,420)	Qatar (35,890/ 38,280/ 51,430/ 59,430/ 67,810/ 63,730/ 66,360)

Table 8: GNI per capita in USD of the middle- and high-income recipient countries of Danish aid under the Liberal-Conservative government.

As Table 8 shows 22 of the recipient countries of Danish development aid were middle-income countries, 4 were partly middle- and partly high- income countries and two were high-income countries. The middle-income countries were Syria, China, Philippines, Albania, Gaza, and the West Bank, Egypt, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Jordan, Iran, Macedonia, Peru, Thailand, Montenegro, Iraq, Colombia, Kosovo, South Africa, Botswana, and Malaysia. These can, according to the World Bank, be defined as middle-income countries because of having a GNI per capita of more than USD 1,005 (The World Bank, 2011).

The partly middle-income partly high-income countries were Libya which was a middle-income country from 2002 to 2009 and a high-income country in 2010, Oman which was a middle-income country from 2002 to 2005 and a high-income country from 2006 to 2010, Saudi Arabia which was a middle-income country from 2001 to 2004 and a high-income country from 2005 to 2010 and Bahrain which was a middle-income country in 2001 to 2002 and a high-income country from 2003 to 2010) and two high-income countries.

The high-income countries were Kuwait and Qatar. These can be defined as partly or pure high-income countries because of having a GNI per capita of more than USD 12,276 (the World Bank, 2011). Because of having a GNI per capita above USD 12,276, Libya from 2010, Oman from 2006, Saudi Arabia from 2005, Bahrain from 2003, Kuwait and Qatar were not

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developing countries. Thus, Danish development aid went to six developed countries during the Liberal-Conservative government.

The next section is going to look at the sectors Danish development aid was allocated to during the Liberal-Conservative government.

5.1.4 Danish Development Aid Sector Allocation

During the three terms of the Liberal-Conservative government, Danish development aid was allocated to both the development and security sectors.

5.1.4.1 Development Sectors

The table below, Table 9, shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to non-security sectors.

Sector/Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Education	8.1	9.7	8.2	6.7	6.4	7.7	6.6	7.7	6.5
Health	10.8	10.3	9.5	7.9	7.1	5.4	4.9	6.5	6.1
Reproductive health and population program	0	1.1	1.9	1.8	2	2	1.8	2.6	2.2
Drinking water and sanitation	8	7.2	8.7	7.2	8.6	7.8	7.1	7	7.1
Other social infrastructure	14.7	4.5	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.7	2.8	2.6	2
Productive sectors	14.9	12.9	12.5	11.8	10.9	10.2	10.1	9.8	11.1
Transport	12	10.6	9.3	7.4	7.7	6.5	7.8	6.3	4.3
Energy	4.4	4.5	5.9	5.2	2.4	4.5	2.7	1.7	1.6
Public administration and civil society	2.2	16.6	16.2	14.8	16.2	18	17.2	20.3	19.4
Banks and financial services	0	0.1	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0	0.1
Other economic infrastructure	0.5	0.7	1.4	1.5	1.8	2	2.7	2.4	2.4
Debt relief	2.7	1.9	3.9	2.5	8.7	8	5.4	0.3	2.7
Communication	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.6	1.1	0.4	0.2	1	0.1
Multisector, integrated	8.3	7.7	11.9	9.6	7.8	6.9	8.4	10.5	12.2

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development projects									
Program assistance/ program aid and food	5.9	1.4	1.9	3.2	2.4	5	4.1	5.1	4
Emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin	0	0	1	13.2	11.5	9.1	10.5	8	9.1
Other non-categorized bilateral assistance	9.7	9.7	4.6	4.1	2.6	3	5.9	6.2	6
Development sectors in total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>99.4</u>	<u>99.1</u>	<u>98.4</u>	<u>98.3</u>	<u>98.3</u>	<u>96.4</u>

Table 9: Allocation of Danish aid to the development sectors during the Liberal-Conservative government in %.

5.1.4.2.1: 2002

In 2002, 100 percent of Danish aid was allocated to development sectors as 8.1 percent was allocated to the education sector, 10.8 percent to the health sector, 8 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 14.7 percent to other social infrastructure, 14.9 percent to the productive sectors ⁵, 12 percent to the transport sector, 4.4 to the energy sector, 2.2 percent to the public administration and civil society sector, 0.5 percent to other economic infrastructure, 2.7 percent to debt relief, 0.2 percent to the communication sector, 8.3 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 5.9 percent to program assistance and 9.7 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance. Because Danish development aid was allocated to these sectors, aid went to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing reduce child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership for development. Since development aid went to these purposes, Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs in 2002.

5.1.4.2.2: 2003

In 2003, 100 percent of Danish aid was allocated to development sectors as 9.7 percent was allocated to the education sector, 10.3 percent to the health sector, 1.1 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7.2 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 4.5 percent to other social infrastructure, 12.9 percent to productive sectors, 10.6 percent to the transport sector, 4.5 percent to the energy sector, 16.6, percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.1 percent to other economic infrastructure, 0.7 percent to debt relief, 0.1 to the

⁵ The productive sectors include agriculture, forestry, fisheries, industry, mineral resources, trade and tourism.

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communication sector, 7.7 percent to multisector and integrated development projects including environment and women-oriented activities, 1.4 percent to program assistance, 0.8 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 9.7 to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (2004: 53 & 54). Since Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as the year earlier, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2003 which means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2003.

5.14.2.3: 2004

In 2004, 100 percent of Danish aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 8.2 percent was allocated to the education sector, 9.5 percent to the health sector, 1.9 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 8.7 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2.3 percent to other social infrastructure, 12.5 percent to productive sectors, 9.3 percent to the transport sector, 5.9 percent to the energy sector, 16.2 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 1.4 percent to other economic infrastructure, 3.9 percent to debt relief, 0.7 to the communication sector, 11.9 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 1.9 percent to program assistance, 1 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 4.6 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid 2005: 53 & 54). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2004 which means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2004.

5.1.4.2.3: 2005

In 2005, 99.4 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 6.7 percent was allocated to the education sector, 7.9 percent to the health sector, 1.8 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7.2 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.9 percent to other social infrastructure, 11.8 percent to production sectors, 7.4 percent to transport sector, 5.2 percent to the energy sector, 14.8 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 1.5 percent to other economic infrastructure, 2.5 percent to debt relief, 0.6 to the communication sector, 9.6 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 3.2 percent to program assistance, 13.2 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 4.1 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2006: 88). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2005. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2005.

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5.1.4.2.4: 2006

The following year, 99.1 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 6.4 percent was allocated to the education sector, 7.1 percent to the health sector, 2 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 8.6 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.9 percent to other social infrastructure, 10.9 percent to production sectors, 7.7 percent to transport sector, 2.4 percent to the energy sector, 16.2 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 1.8 percent to other economic infrastructure, 8.7 percent to debt relief, 1.1 to the communication sector, 7.8 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 2.4 percent to program assistance, 11.5 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin, 2.6 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance and 0.3 percent to conflict prevention and resolution (ibid, 2006: 88). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2006. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2006.

5.1.4.2.5: 2007

In 2007, 98.4 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 7.7 percent was allocated to the education sector, 5.4 percent to the health sector, 2 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7.8 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.7 percent to other social infrastructure, 10.2 percent to production sectors, 6.5 percent to transport sector, 4.5 percent to the energy sector, 18 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.2 percent to bank and financial services, 2 percent to other economic infrastructure, 8 percent to debt relief, 0.4 percent to the communication sector, 6.9 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 5 percent to program assistance, 9.1 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 3 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2008: 158). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2007. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2007.

5.1.4.2.6: 2008

In 2008, 98.3 percent of Danish foreign aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 6.6 percent was allocated to the education sector, 4.9 percent to the health sector, 1.8 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7.1 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2.8 percent to other social infrastructure, 10.1 percent to production sectors, 7.8 percent to transport

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sector, 2.7 percent to the energy sector, 17.2 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.4 percent to bank and financial services, 2.7 percent to other economic infrastructure, 5.4 percent to debt relief, 0.2 percent to the communication sector, 8.4 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 4.1 percent to program assistance, 10.5 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 5.9 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2009: 84 & 85). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2008. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2008.

5.1.4.2.7: 2009

The subsequent year, 98.3 percent of Danish foreign aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 7.7 percent was allocated to the education sector, 6.5 percent to the health sector, 2.6 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2.6 percent to other social infrastructure, 9.8 percent to production sectors, 6.3 percent to transport sector, 1.7 percent to the energy sector, 20.3 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 2.4 percent to other economic infrastructure, 0.3 percent to debt relief, 1 percent to the communication sector, 10.5 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 5.1 percent to program assistance, 8 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 6.2 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2010: 84 & 85). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2009. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2009.

5.1.4.2.8: 2010

The last year under the Liberal-Conservative Government, 96.4 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 6.5 percent was allocated to the education sector, 6.1 percent to the health sector, 2.2 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 7.1 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2 percent to other social infrastructure, 11.1 percent to production sectors, 4.3 percent to transport sector, 1.6 percent to the energy sector, 19.4 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.1 percent to bank and financial services, 2.4 percent to other economic infrastructure, 2.7 percent to debt relief, 0.1 percent to the communication sector, 12.2 percent to multisector and integrated development projects, 4 percent to program assistance, 9.1 percent to emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin and 6 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2009: 84). As Danish development

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aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2010. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2010.

5.1.4.2 Security Sectors

The table below shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to the security sector.

Sector/Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security	0	0	0	0.6	0.9	1.6	1.7	1.7	3.6

Table 10: Allocation of Danish development aid to the security-sector during the Liberal-Conservative government in %

In 2005, 0.6 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to the security sector (ibid, 2005: 30). The subsequent year, 0.6 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to the security sector (ibid, 2006: 88). In 2006, 0.9 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to the security sector (ibid, 2007: 108). The following year, 1.6 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to the security sector (ibid, 2008: 158) (ibid, 2009: 84). In 2008 and 2009, 1.7 percent was allocated to the sector (ibid, 2009: 84) (ibid, 2010: 84). The last year under the Liberal-Conservative government, 3.6 percent was allocated to this sector (ibid, 2010: 84) (ibid, 2011:145).

Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security included activities of ensuring that small-scale humanitarian and rebuilding projects such as renovation of local hospitals and health clinics, as well as water projects could be undertaken by DANIDA by deployment of Danish armed force in Iraq and the Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. Moreover, the capacity of the Iraqi police was built by training at the regional police academy near Basra (ibid, 2008: 59).

5.1.5 Coordination of Danish Development and Military Efforts in Fragile Countries

In 2004, Danish development assistance and military efforts were coordinated in Afghanistan by the introduction of a ‘whole-of-government’-approach which was introduced as part of the “2005-2009-Defense Agreement”. In 2008, developments, military, and political objectives in

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Afghanistan were further coordinated by an inter-ministerial Afghanistan taskforce which consisted of Danish ministers and civil servants from the Danish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, and Defense (DANIDA, 2010: 76). In 2009, a joint-up strategy for development and military efforts was adopted by the “*Inter-Ministerial Global Framework*” and in 2010 the “*Peace and Stabilization: Denmark’s Policy towards fragile states 2010-2015*” (DANIDA, 2011: 76). The purpose of this coordination was to stabilize and normalize the fragile or conflict-affected countries first and then ensure that Danish development activities of improving governance and developing rule of law, i.e., state-building could be carried out in Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010: 1).

5.1.6 Part Conclusion: Development aid During the Liberal-Conservative Government

The analysis of Danish development aid during the Liberal-Conservative government revealed that Danish development aid was securitized through 1) a security discourse, 2) allocation of development aid to fragile countries, 3) allocation of development aid to security sectors, and 4) coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts.

When it comes to the extent to which Danish development aid during the Liberal-Conservative government has been securitized, the analysis revealed that Danish development aid has, however, only been securitized to some extent.

Danish development aid has only been securitized to some extent since 1) the development issues also become presented as threats to the developing countries themselves which serves to justify that development aid is spent on promoting economic development and wellbeing for the developing countries and not just the strategic security. 2) Nothing or as little as 3.6 percent of Danish development aid when at its highest, was allocated to security sectors. 3) Danish development was not sacrificed to security since Denmark exceeded DAC’s GNI target. And 4) Danish development efforts were only coordinated in Afghanistan, and not in other fragile countries.

Now, this thesis is going to proceed examining Danish development aid during the Centre-Left government.

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5.2 Danish development aid During the Centre-Left Government

5.2.1 Development Aid Policy Discourse

In the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Centre-Left government, both development and security-related words occur.

5.2.1.1 Development-Related Words

The table below shows the occurrence of development-related words in the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Centre-Left government.

Development-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
‘Development’ (408), ‘human rights’ (56), ‘humanitarian disaster’ (55), ‘poverty reduction’ (51), ‘climate change’ (51), ‘education’/ ‘information’ (47), ‘democracy’ (36), ‘health’ (32), ‘women’/ ‘gender equality’ (28), ‘good/ poor governance’ (23), ‘employment’/ ‘jobs’ (22), ‘agriculture’ (19), ‘debt’ (18), ‘food’ (17), ‘AIDS/ HIV’ (15), ‘corruption’ (8), ‘malaria’ (7), ‘tuberculosis’ (4).	911	5.23

Table 9: Detection of development-related words during the Centre-Left government

Development-related words occur 911 times in total: ‘*development*’ occurred 408 times, ‘*human rights*’ 56 times, ‘*humanitarian relief*’ 55 times, ‘*poverty reduction*’ 51 times, ‘*education/ information*’ 47 times, ‘*democracy*’ 36 times, ‘*health*’ 32 times, ‘*women*’ and ‘*gender equality*’ 28 times, ‘*good governance*’ 23 times, ‘*health*’ 66 times, ‘*migration*’ 47 times, ‘*equality and inequality*’ 46 times, ‘*corruption*’ 29 times, ‘*fragile countries*’ 29 times, ‘*living conditions*’ 24 times, ‘*jobs*’ and ‘*employment*’ 22 times, ‘*agriculture*’ 19 times, ‘*debt*’ 18 times, ‘*food*’ 17 times, ‘*AIDS/ HIV*’ 15 times, ‘*corruption*’ 8 times, ‘*malaria*’ 8 times and ‘*tuberculosis*’ 14 times.

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5.2.1.2 Security-Related Words

Security-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
‘Stabilization’/ ‘stability’ (51), ‘fragile states’ (25) ‘fight’ (24), ‘conflict’ (18), ‘crises’ (13), ‘security’ (13), ‘protection’ (11), ‘prevention’ (10), ‘police’ (9), ‘defense’ (7), ‘emergency’ (6), ‘eradication’ (5)	192	0.91

Table 10: Detection of security-related words during the Centre-Left government

Security-related words occur 192 times in total; ‘*stabilization*’ and ‘*stability*’ occurred 51 times, ‘*fragile states*’ 25 times, ‘*fight*’ 24 times, ‘*conflict*’ 18 times, ‘*crises*’ 13 times, ‘*security*’ 13 times, ‘*protection*’ 11 times, ‘*prevention*’ 10 times, ‘*police*’ 9 times, ‘*defense*’ 7 times, ‘*emergency*’ 6 times and ‘*eradication*’ 5 times. Due to this frequent occurrence, Danish development aid policy discourse consists of a security discourse also during the Centre-Left government. Since development-related words, as mentioned, occur 911 times, and have a weighted percentage of 5.23, development-related words, however, occur more than 400 percent more than security-related words. However, because of consisting of a security discourse development aid becomes articulated in the language of security also in the development aid policy discourse during the Centre-Left government.

How development aid becomes articulated in the language of security is what this thesis is going to look at now by looking at how development issues become presented.

5.2.1.3 Presentation of Development Issues

In the development aid policy discourse under the Centre-Left government, ‘*poverty*’ and ‘*youth unemployment*’ becomes presented as existential threats to global security. That ‘*poverty*’ and ‘*unemployment*’ becomes presented as existential threats does the next excerpt, Excerpt 17 indicate.

(17) *Without security, law, and order – no development. And without **economic prosperity** and **youth employment** - no peace and stability.*

(DANIDA, 2013: 5).

These become indirectly presented as existential threats to the security of the donor countries since ‘*unemployment*’ and ‘*poverty*’ are linked to ‘*unrest*’ and ‘*instability*.’

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In addition to presenting development issues as threats to global security, development issues also becomes presented as security threats to the developing counties which can be seen below.

(18) *Environmental degradation, climate change or lack of access to energy deprives many poor people of their livelihood and ability to improve their situation.*

(DANIDA, 2011: 5)

The above excerpts exemplify that ‘*environmental degradation*’ ‘*climate change*,’ and ‘*lack of access to energy*’ becomes presented and framed as existential threats to the developing countries on the basis of the assumption of their implication. In addition to this frame, these become constructed as existential threats by the deployment of the negatively connoted word ‘*deprive*.’ This word constructs these as threats since the consequences of deprivation of one’s livelihood may be the inability to survive.

Now that the development policy discourse during the Centre-Left government has been analyzed, this thesis proceeds examining development aid in practice starting with the size of Danish development aid.

5.2.2 The Size of Danish Development Aid

The table below shows the GNI percentage allocated in development aid under the Centre-Left government.

Year	Percent of GNI spent on development aid
2011	0.85
2012	0.83
2013	0.85
2014	0.86

Table 11: Overview of % of GNI, Denmark spent on development aid during the Centre-Left government.

In 2011, Denmark allocated 0.85 percent of its GNI in development aid (DANIDA, 2012). In 2012, 0.83 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2013). From 2011 to 2012, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was thus reduced by 1 percent. The subsequent year, 0.85 percent of Denmark’s GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2013). The GNI percentage allocated in development aid was therefore raised by two percent from 2012 to 2013. The last year under the Centre-Left government, Denmark allocated 0.86 percent of GNI in development aid (DANIDA, 2015). Since 0.85 percent of GNI was allocated

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in development aid in 2013, the GNI allocated in development aid was once again raised by one percent.

Since, as mentioned, 0.85 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid in 2003, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was raised by one percent under the Centre-Left government. Not only did Denmark exceed DAC's 0.7 percent of GNI target, but also took the initiative to establish a network to encourage others to make efforts to achieve the 0.7 percent of GNI-target (DANIDA, 2015). Because DAC's 0.7 percent GNI target was exceeded and development aid was raised by 0.1 percent of GNI during the Centre-Left government, Denmark took its spending on development aid serious by not reducing spending to be sacrificed to security. Because of taking development aid serious, Denmark was committed to DAC's 0.7 percent of GNI target under the Centre-Left government.

Next, the thesis is going to look at the Danish development aid recipient countries of Danish development aid during the Centre-Left government

5.2.3 Danish Development Aid Recipient Countries Allocation

5.2.3.1 Fragile Countries

In the table below, Table 14, fragile countries to which Danish development aid was allocated under the Centre-Left government can be seen.

Somalia (113.7)	Malawi (89.5)	Algeria (78.4)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (110.3)	Iran (89.1)	Honduras (78.2)
Sudan (109.8)	Burkina Faso (88.8)	India (77.9)
The Central African Republic (106.1)	Cambodia (88.4)	Moldova (77.8)
Afghanistan (106.6)	Togo (88.1)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (77.8)
Zimbabwe (105.5)	Kyrgyzstan (87.2)	Thailand (76.8)
Yemen (104.3)	Lebanon (86.6)	Belarus (76.4)
Iraq (103.8)	Angola (86)	Jordan (75.4)
Pakistan (102.4)	Tajikistan (85.9)	Turkey (75.3)
Nigeria (100.3)	Zambia (85.6)	Morocco (74.5)

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Niger (98.2)	Georgia (84.5)	Tunisia (74.5)
Kenya (98.9)	Colombia (84.5)	Vietnam (73.9)
Ethiopia (98.2)	Mali (84.1)	Serbia (73.9)
Burundi (97.7)	Philippines (84)	Cuba (73.3)
Uganda (96.3)	Mozambique (83.6)	Mexico (73.2)
Myanmar (95.8)	Bhutan (82.2)	Peru (73)
Syria (94.8)	Gaza and the West Bank (81.7)	Armenia (71.7)
Liberia (94.1)	Libya (81.4)	Ghana (68.7)
Cameroon (93.5)	Bolivia (81.1)	Macedonia (68.6)
Timor-Leste (92.5)	Tanzania (80.9)	Malaysia (67.3)
Nepal (92.3)	Guatemala (80.1)	Ukraine (67.3)
Sierra Leone (90.9)	Indonesia (79.3)	South Africa (67.1)
Bangladesh (90.4)	Nicaragua (79.6)	Albania (65.2)
Egypt (89.7)	Benin (78.9)	Brazil (63.2)

Table 12: Fragility rank of the fragile countries which received aid during the Centre-Left government.

As the table shows, 72 countries to which Danish aid was allocated during the Centre-Left government were fragile (DANIDA, 2012) (DANIDA, 2013) (DANIDA, 2014). The fragile countries were Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, Myanmar, Syria, Liberia, Cameroon, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malawi, Iran, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Togo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Angola, Tajikistan, Zambia, Georgia, Colombia, Mali, Philippines, Mozambique, Bhutan, Gaza and the West Bank, Libya, Bolivia, Tanzania, Guatemala, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Benin, Algeria, Honduras, India, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Thailand, Belarus, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Vietnam, Serbia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Armenia, Ghana, Macedonia, Malaysia, Ukraine, South African Albania and Brazil. These countries can, according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Fragile State Index, be defined as fragile due to a score above 60 which, as mentioned, indicates that there is an alert or warning for vulnerability to conflict or collapse (The Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy).

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5.2.3.2. Relatively Stable Countries

Danish development aid was only allocated to 2 relatively stable countries during the Centre-Left government (DANIDA, 2012) (DANIDA, 2013) (DANIDA, 2014) which did not present a security threat per se toward Denmark nor global security. These countries can be seen in Table 15 below.

Montenegro (55.4)
Chile (42.1)

Table 13: Fragility rank of the relatively stable recipient countries of Danish aid during the Centre-Left government.

Montenegro and Chile can be defined as stable due to their score of below 59.9 in the Fragile States Index. Countries having a score between 59.9 and 30 can, as mentioned namely be seen as more or less stable countries (Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy).

5.2.3.3 Low-Income Countries

In the table below the low-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated during the Centre-Left government can be seen.

Burundi (230/ 260/ 280/290)	The Central African Republic (480/ 500/ 330 / 340)	Benin (800/ 820/ 890/ 930)
Liberia (320/ 340/ 370/ 370)	Afghanistan (560/ 670/ 680/ 650)	Colombia (810/ 880/ 970/ 1,020)
Niger (360/ 390/ 400/ 420)	Uganda (600/ 610/ 620/ 660)	Cambodia (810/ 880/ 970/ 1,020)
Ethiopia (390/ 410/ 470/ 550/)	Nepal (600/ 690/ 720/ 730)	Bangladesh (870/ 940/ 1,010/ 1,070)
Sierra Leone (420/ 530/ 650/ 690)	Burkina Faso (600/ 650/ 690/ 680)	Kyrgyzstan (880/ 1,040/ 1190/ 1,250)
Togo (450/ 470/ 490/ 540)	Zimbabwe (690/ 810/ 890/ 900)	Tajikistan (1,000/ 1,140/ 1,320/ 1,340)
Malawi (470/ 440/ 390/ 350)	Mali (730/ 730/ 770/ 810)	
Mozambique (480/ 520/ 590/ 620)	Tanzania (730/ 770/ 840/ 920)	

Table 14: GNI per capita in USD of the low-income recipient countries of Danish aid during the Centre-Left government.

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As Table 18 shows, Danish aid was allocated to only 20 poor low-income countries which were Burundi, Liberia, Niger, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Malawi, Mozambique, The Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Uganda, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Tanzania, Benin, Colombia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These can be classified as being low-income countries, according to the World Bank because of having a GDP per capita of or below USD 1,005 in the fiscal year of 2011, USD 1,025 in 2012, USD 1,035 in 2013, USD 1,045 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2012) (ibid: 2013) (ibid, 2014).

5.2.3.4 Middle-and High-Income Countries

In the table below, Table 17, the middle- and high-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated during the Centre-Left government can be seen.

Kenya (1,010/ 1,070/ 1,150/ 1,260)	Gaza and the West Bank (2,550/ 3,070/ 3,060/ 3,090)	Peru (4,880/ 5,670/ 6,270/ 6,340)
Myanmar (1,020/ 1,140/ 1,230/ 1,230)	Philippines (2,620/ 2,980/ 3,300/ 3,470)	Macedonia (4,810/ 4,740/ 5,000/ 5,200)
South Sudan (1,110/ 1,190)	Guatemala (2,850/ 3,090/ 3,310/ 3,450)	Iraq (4,810/ 6,140/ 6,900/ 6,720)
Pakistan (1,150/ 1,260/ 1,360/ 1,390)	Morocco (3,000/ 2,970/ 3,080/ 3,050)	Thailand (4,950/ 5,520/ 5,750/ 5,760)
Vietnam (1,360/ 1,530/ 1,710/ 1,860)	Indonesia (3,000/ 3,570/ 3,730/ 3,620)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (4,970/ 4,930/ 5,180/ 5,170)
Cameroon (1,380/ 1,390/ 1,450/ 1,510)	Ukraine (3,120/ 3,500/ 3,800/ 3,560)	Serbia (5,910/ 5,700/ 6,000/ 5,840)
Ghana (1,400/ 1,560/ 1,730/ 1,590)	Timor-Leste (3,190/ 3,230/ 3,540/ 2,870)	Belarus (6,210/ 6,620/ 7,010/ 7,600)
Zambia (1,390/ 1,670/ 1,730/ 1,560)	Georgia (3,300/ 3,870/ 4,240/ 4,490)	Iran (6,790/ 7,050/ 6,950/ 6,470)
India (1,380/ 1,480/ 1,520/ 1,560)	Angola (3,390/ 3,800/ 4,340/ 4,440)	South Africa (6,970/ 7,540/ 7,340/ 6,760)
Nicaragua (1,640/ 1,770/ 1,860/ 1,940)	Jordan (3,560/ 3,680/ 3,790/ 3,870)	Montenegro (7,250/ 7,000/ 7,330/ 7,320)

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Nigeria (1,730/ 2,480/ 2,700/ 2,980)	Kosovo (3,640/3,790/ 3,950/ 3,990)	Lebanon (8,600/ 8,530/ 8,460/ 8,290)
Honduras (1,900/ 2,000/ 2,040/ 2,040)	Tunisia (3,980/ 4,090/ 4,130/ 4,130)	Malaysia (9,060/ 10,150/ 10,450/ 10,760/ 11,010)
Moldova (1,990/ 2,140/ 2,470/ 2,560)	Armenia (3,530/ 3,880/ 4,120/ 4,150)	Mexico (9,140/ 9,810/ 10,010/ 9,860)
Bolivia (2,010/ 2,280/ 2,620/ 2,870)	Albania (4,410/ 4,360/ 4,540/ 4,540)	Brazil (11,010/ 12,280/ 12,730/ 12,020)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (2,060/ 2,330/ 2,430/ 2,520)	Algeria (4,580/ 5,140/ 5,480/ 5,470)	Turkey (11,230/ 11,820 / 12,530/ 12,590)
Egypt (2,520/ 2,790/ 2,990/ 3,180)	Libya (4,730/ 11,710/ 10,960/ 7,800)	Chile (12,380/ 14,410/ 15,360/ 15,140)

Table 15: GNI per capita in USD of the middle- and high-income recipient countries of Danish aid under Centre-Left government

As Table 17 shows no less than 46 of the recipient countries of Danish aid were middle-income countries, one was partly middle-income, and a high-income country and one was a high-income country during the Centre-Left government. The middle-income countries were Kenya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Honduras, Moldova, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gaza and the West Bank, Philippines, Guatemala, Morocco, Indonesia, Ukraine, Timor-Leste, Georgia, Angola, Jordan, Kosovo, Tunisia, Armenia, Albania, Algeria, Libya, Peru, Macedonia, Iraq, Thailand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Belarus, Iran, South Africa, Montenegro, Lebanon, Malaysia Mexico and Turkey. Middle-income countries can be defined as countries having a GNI per capita of more than USD 1,005 in the fiscal year of 2011, USD 1,025 in 2012, USD 1,035 in 2013, USD 1,045 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2012) (ibid, 2013) (ibid 2014).

The partly middle-income and high-income country was Brazil which was a middle-income country in 2011, 2012 and 2014 and a high- income country in 2014.

The high-income country was Brazil. High-income countries can be defined as countries having a GNI per capita of more than USD 12,276 in the fiscal year of 2011, USD 12,476 in

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2012, USD 12,616 in 2013 and USD 12,746 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2011) (ibid, 2012) (ibid: 2013) (ibid, 2014). Because of having a GNI per capita above USD 12,276 Brazil from 2012, Turkey and Chile were not developing countries. Thus, Danish development aid went to three developed countries.

The next section is going to look at the sectors Danish development aid was allocated to during the Centre-Left government.

5.2.4 Danish Development Aid Sector Allocation

During the Centre-Left government, Danish development aid was also allocated to both the security and non-security sectors.

5.2.4.1 Development Sectors

The table below shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to non-security sectors.

Sector/Year	2011	2012	2013	2014
Education	9.8	11	5.9	5.2
Health	4.7	4.9	2.8	3.5
Reproductive health and population program/ population policies	3.1	1.9	1.7	1.7
Drinking water and sanitation	5.1	3.7	3.8	5.7
Other social infrastructure and services	1.5	2.6	2.2	1.8
Productive sectors	10.6	10.5	5.6	7
Transport and storage	5.5	5.3	0.7	0.5
Energy generation, distribution and efficiency	3.6	0.6	3.8	2.5
Public administration and civil society	18.9	20.6	16.7	13.5
Banks and financial services	0.1	0.1	0.04	0
Other economic infrastructure/ business and other services	4.2	3.8	3	2.6
Debt relief	0.7	0.1	0.03	0.01
Communication	0	1.1	0.04	1
Multisector and cross-cutting integrated development projects/	10.6	9.9	8.2	6.6
Program assistance/ program aid and food/ commodity aid and general program assistance	3.9	4.5	2.4	1.9

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Emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin/ humanitarian aid	9.4	10	13.8	14.1
Other non-categorized bilateral assistance	5.6	6.4	12	9.8
Refugees in donor country	0	0	7.6	11.8
Administrative costs of donors	0	0	6.7	7.7
Development sectors in total	<u>97.7</u>	<u>96.9</u>	<u>97.8</u>	<u>97.1</u>

Table 18: Allocation of Danish aid to the development sectors during the Centre-Left government in %

5.2.4.2.1: 2011

In 2011, 97.7 percent of Danish aid was allocated to development sectors as 9.8 percent was allocated to the education sector, 4.7 percent to the health sector, 3.1 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 5.1 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.5 percent to other social infrastructure, 10.6 percent to productive sectors, 5.5 percent to the transport and storage sectors, 3.6 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 18.9, percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.1 percent to bank and financial services, 4.2 percent to business and other services, 0.7 percent to debt relief, 10.6 percent to multisector and cross-cutting integrated development projects, 3.9 percent to commodity aid and general program assistance, 9.4 percent to humanitarian aid and 5.6 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2012).

Since Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in during the three terms of the Liberal-Conservative Government, aid went to promoting the UNMDGs also in 2011, during the Centre-Left Government. That development aid went to promoting UNMDGs means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2011.

5.2.4.2.2: 2012

In 2012, 96.9 percent of Danish aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 11 percent was allocated to the education sector, 4.9 percent to the health sector, 1.9 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 3.7 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2.6 percent to other social infrastructure, 10.5 percent to productive sectors, 5.3 percent to the transport and storage, 4.5 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 20.6, percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.1 percent to bank and financial services, 3.8 percent to business and other services, 0.1 percent to debt relief, 1.1 to the communication sector, 9.9 percent to multisector and cross-cutting development projects, 4.5 to

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program assistance, 10 percent to humanitarian aid and 6.4 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance (ibid, 2013).

Since Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as in 2003, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2012. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2012.

5.2.4.2.3: 2013

In 2013, 97.8 percent of Danish aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 5.9 percent was allocated to the education sector, 2.8 percent to the health sector, 1.7 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 3.8 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 2.2 percent to other social infrastructure services, 5.6 percent to productive sectors, 0.7 percent to the transport and storage, 3.8 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 16.7 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.04 percent to bank and financial services, 3 percent to business and other services, 0.03 percent to debt relief, 0.04 to the communication sector, 8.2 percent to multisector and cross-cutting development projects, 2.4 percent to commodity aid and general program assistance, 13.8 percent to humanitarian aid 12 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance, 7.6 percent to refugees in donor country and 6.7 percent to administrative costs of donors (ibid, 2014).

Since Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as the other years, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2013. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2013.

5.2.4.2.4: 2014

In the last year under the Centre-Left government, 97.1 percent of Danish aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 5.2 percent was allocated to the education sector, 3.5 percent to the health sector, 1.7 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 5.7 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.8 percent to other social infrastructure services, 7 percent to productive sectors, 0.5 percent to the transport and storage, 2.5 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 13.5 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 2.6 percent to business and other services, 0.01 percent to debt relief, 1 to the communication sector, 6.6 percent to multisector and cross-cutting development projects, 1.9 percent to commodity aid and general program assistance, 14.1 percent to humanitarian aid, 9.8

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percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance, 11.8 percent to refugees in the donor country and 7.7 percent to administrative costs of the donor (ibid, 2015).

Since Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as the other years, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2014. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2014.

5.2.4.2 Security Sectors

The table below shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to the security sectors under the Centre-Left government.

Sector/Year	2011	2012	2013	2014
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security/ Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution	2.3	3.1	1.8	2.2
Security system management and reforms	0	0	0.5	0.7
Security sectors in total	<u>2.3</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.9</u>

Table 19: Allocation of Danish aid to the security sectors during the Centre-Left government in %

In 2011, 2.3 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security. In 2012, 3.1 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to this sector. The next year, in 2013, 1.8 percent of development aid went to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Also, 0.5 percent of Danish aid was allocated to security system management and reforms. Thus, in total 2.3 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors in 2013. The last year during the Centre-Left government, 2.2 percent of Danish aid went to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Additionally, 0.7 percent was allocated to security system management and reforms (DANIDA, 2015). Therefore, 2.9 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors the last year under the Centre-Left government.

Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security included activities of protection of delivery of development assistance by Danish police and defense forces on its way to and from Mogadishu from attacks by pirates, in the Helmand province in southern Afghanistan and Iraq (DANIDA, 2012: 4). Security system management and reforms included training of Indonesian,

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Bangladeshi, Afghan and Iraqi police by the Danish police and advocacy for a government-owned and implemented national counter-terrorism policy in Bangladesh (DANIDA, 2014).

5.2.5 Coordination of Danish Development and Military Efforts in Fragile Countries

In 2013, a new joint strategy for development and military efforts in Afghanistan was adopted with the *“Afghanistan Plan 2013 to 2014”* (Danish Ministry of Defense, 2013: 4). In addition, Danish development and military efforts were further coordinated during the Centre-Left Government as two new joint strategies for development and military efforts were adopted for South Sudan and Somalia with the *“Strategy for Danish Counter-piracy effort 2011 to 2014”* and *“Policy paper for Denmark’s engagement in Somalia 2011”* (DANIDA, 2012). The purpose of this coordination was, like the coordination of development and military efforts in Afghanistan, to ensure that Danish development activities of improving governance and developing rule of law, i.e., state-building could be undertaken in South Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

5.2.6 Part Conclusion: Development Aid During the Centre-Left Government

The analysis of Danish development aid during the Centre-Left government revealed that Danish development aid also was securitized through 1) a security discourse, 2) allocation of development aid to fragile countries, 3) allocation of development aid to security sectors, and 4) coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts.

When it comes to the extent to which Danish development aid during the Centre-Left government has been securitized, the analysis revealed that Danish development aid has, however, only been securitized to some extent. Danish development aid has only been securitized to some extent since 1) few development issues become presented as posing a threat to global security and development issues also become presented as threats to the developing countries themselves which again serves to justify that development aid is spent on promoting economic development and wellbeing for the developing countries and not just the strategic security. 2) As little as 2.1 to 3.1 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors. 3) Danish development was not sacrificed to security since Denmark exceeded DAC’s GNI target. And 4) Danish development efforts have only been coordinated in Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Somalia, and not in other fragile countries.

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Now, that the Danish development aid during the Centre-Left government has been treated, this thesis is going to continue examining Danish development aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments.

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5.3 Development Aid During the Liberal and VLAK Governments

5.3.1 Development Aid Policy Discourse

In the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Liberal and VLAK governments, both development and security-related words occur.

5.3.1.1 Development-Related Words

The next table, Table 6, documents the development-related words which have been detected in the Danish development aid policy discourse.

Development-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
‘Development’ (140), ‘human rights’ (30), ‘women’/ ‘gender equality’ (21), ‘climate changes’ (18), ‘HIV/AIDS’ (15), ‘good/ poor governance’ (15), ‘democracy’ (13), ‘education’/ ‘information’ (13), ‘fragile states’ (12), ‘poverty’ (10), ‘corruption’ (6).	293	2.24

Table 16: Detection of development-related words in the development policy discourse during the Liberal and VLAK-governments.

Development-related words were detected 345 times in total; as ‘*development cooperation*’ occur 140 times, ‘*human rights*’ 30 times, ‘*women*’ and ‘*gender equality*’ 21 times, ‘*climate changes*’ 18 times, ‘*HIV/AIDS*’ 15 times, ‘*good/ poor governance*’ 15 times, ‘*democracy*’ 13 times, ‘*education*’ and ‘*information*’ 13 times together, ‘*fragile states*’ 12 times, ‘*poverty*’ 10 times and ‘*corruption*’ 6 times.

5.3.1.2 Security-Related Words

The following table shows the occurrence of security-related words in the Danish development aid policy discourse during the Liberal- and VLAK- governments.

Security-related words	Count/ frequency	Weighted %
‘Migration’ (52), ‘security’ (13), ‘conflict’ (12), ‘stabilization’/ ‘stability’ (18), ‘crises’ (8), ‘police’ (4).	101	0.63

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Table 17: Detection of security-related words during the Liberal and VLAK-governments.

Security-related words occur 101 times in total; ‘*migration*’ occurs 52 times, ‘*security*’ 13 times, ‘*conflict*’ 12 times, ‘*stabilization*’ 11 times, ‘*crises*’ 8 times, ‘*stability*’ 7 times and ‘*police*’ 4 times. Due to this occurrence, Danish development aid policy discourse during Liberal and VLAK governments consist of a security discourse. Since development-related words, as mentioned, occur 293 times and had a weighted percentage of 2.24, development-related words, however, occur more than 400 percent more than security-related words. However, because of consisting of a security discourse development aid become articulated in the language of security. How development aid becomes articulated in the language of security is what this thesis is going to look at now by looking at how development issues become presented.

5.3.1.3 Presentation of Development Issues

Excerpt 19, evidences that ‘*migration*’ is presented as a security issuee.

(19) *The **migration pressure** continues and is expected to increase in the years to come as a consequence of the population growth especially in Africa [...] Millions of people are **displaced** and live in camps or temporary housing in their country of origin or neighboring areas.*

(DANIDA, 2016: 5 & 6).

‘*Migration*’ is constructed as a security problem on the basis of the assumption that ‘*migration pressure*’ is going to increase in the future and the use of numbers to establish a condition of urgency. Due to this assumption, migration and displacement of people are implicitly presented as posing a threat to the donor countries.

Now that the development policy discourse during the Liberal and VLAK governments has been analyzed, this thesis proceeds examing development aid in practice starting with the size of Danish development aid.

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5.3.2: The Size of Danish Development Aid

The table below shows the percentage of GNI, Denmark spent on development aid under the Liberal and VLAK-governments.

Year	Percent of GNI spent on development aid
2015	0.85
2016	0.75

Table 18: Overview of % of GNI, Denmark spent on development aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments

In 2015, Denmark spent 0.85 percent of its GNI on development aid (DANIDA, 2016). The next year, 0.75 percent of GNI was allocated in development aid (DANIDA, 2017). From 2015 to 2016, the GNI percentage allocated in development aid was reduced by 10 percent.

Despite the reduction in the size of Danish development aid was not undermined significantly, as Danish development aid was still exceeding DAC's GNI target. Because of exceeding the target, Denmark was still committed to DAC's 0.7 percent GNI target also under the Liberal and VLAK governments.

Next, the thesis is going to look at the Danish development aid recipient countries of Danish development aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments.

5.3.3: Danish Development Aid Recipient Countries Allocation

5.3.3.1: Fragile Countries

The table below, Table 23, shows fragile countries to which Danish development aid was allocated under the Liberal- and VLAK governments.

South Sudan (114.1)	Nepal (90.8)	Algeria (78.9)
Somalia (114)	Timor-Leste (90.6)	Honduras (78.9)
Sudan (111.1)	Egypt (90)	Benin (78.8)
The Central African Republic (112)	Angola (89.2)	Jordan (77.4)
Yemen (109.8)	Iran (89.1)	Turkey (77.3)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (109.8)	Burkina Faso (88.8)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (76)

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Syria (109.3)	Cambodia (88.4)	Ukraine (75.9)
Afghanistan (107.9)	Togo (88.1)	Tunisia (75.1)
Iraq (104.5)	Mozambique (87.3)	Indonesia (74.9)
Pakistan (102.3)	Kyrgyzstan (87.2)	Belarus (74.7)
Nigeria (103)	Malawi (87.2)	Morocco (74.4)
Zimbabwe (100.2)	Lebanon (86.6)	Moldova (73.1)
Burundi (99.3)	Zambia (85.7)	Serbia (72.9)
Niger (98.1)	Philippines (85.4)	Peru (72)
Kenya (97.8)	Tajikistan (83.6)	Ghana (71.5)
Ethiopia (97.3)	Guatemala (81.8)	Vietnam (71.5)
Uganda (97.3)	Colombia (81.3)	Mexico (71.1)
Liberia (96.4)	Tanzania (81.3)	Armenia (69.6)
Cameroon (96)	Gaza and the West Bank (79.5)	South Africa (68.4)
Libya (95.8)	India (79.4)	Cuba (66.8)
Myanmar (95.5)	Nicaragua (79)	Malaysia (66)
Mali (94)	Georgia (79)	Macedonia (65.7)
Sierra Leone (91.4)	Bolivia (78.3)	Brazil (64)
Bangladesh (91.2)	Thailand (78.9)	Albania (61.5)

Table 19: Fragility rank of the fragile countries which received aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments.

As Table 23 shows, 72 countries to which Danish aid was allocated during the Liberal- and VLAK governments were fragile (DANIDA, 2015) DANIDA, 2016). The fragile countries were South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Niger, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Liberia, Cameroon, Libya, Myanmar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Egypt, Angola, Iran, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Togo, Mozambique, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Lebanon, Zambia, Philippines, Tajikistan, Guatemala, Colombia, Tanzania, Gaza and the West Bank, India, Nicaragua, Georgia, Bolivia, Thailand, Algeria, Honduras, Benin, Jordan, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Tunisia, Indonesia, Belarus, Morocco, Moldova, Serbia, Peru, Ghana, Vietnam, Mexico, Armenia, South Africa, Cuba, Malaysia, Macedonia, Brazil and

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Albania. These countries can, according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Fragile State Index, be defined as fragile due to a score above 60 which indicates that there is an alert or warning for vulnerability to conflict or collapse (The Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy).

5.3.3.2: Relatively Stable Countries

Danish development aid was only allocated to 2 relatively stable countries which did not present a security threat per se toward Denmark nor global security (DANIDA, 2016) (DANIDA, 2017). These countries can be seen in the below-standing table.

Montenegro (54.7)
Chile (41.7)

Table 20: Fragility rank of the relative stable recipient countries of Danish aid during the Liberal and VLAK Governments.

5.3.3.3 Low-Income Countries

In the table below, Table 25, the low-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated during the Liberal- and VLAK-governments can be seen.

Burundi (280/ 280)	Mozambique (580/ 480)	Mali (790/ 780)
Malawi (340/ 320)	Afghanistan (600/ 580)	Benin (870/ 820)
The Central African Republic (360/380)	Ethiopia (600/ 660)	Zimbabwe (890/ 890)
Liberia (380/ 370)	Togo (610/ 600)	Tanzania (910/ 900)
Niger (390/ 370)	Burkina Faso (620/ 610)	South Sudan (1,020/ 390)
Nigeria (390/ 370)	Uganda (670/630)	
Sierra Leone (550/ 480)	Nepal (740/ 730)	

Table 21: GNI per capita in USD of the low-income recipient countries of Danish aid during Liberal- and VLAK-governments

As Table 25 shows, only 19 of the recipient countries of Danish aid during the Liberal and VLAK government was poor low-income countries. These were Burundi, Malawi, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Nepal, Mali, Benin, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania, South Sudan. These can be classified as being low-income countries because of having a GDP per capita of or below

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USD 1,045 in the fiscal year of 2015 and USD 1,025 or below in 2016 (The World Bank, 2015) (ibid: 2016).

5.3.3.4 Middle- and High-Income Countries

In the following table, Table 26, the middle-income countries to which Danish development aid was allocated can be seen

Cambodia (1,060/ 1,140)	Timor-Leste (2,980/ 2,290)	Macedonia (5,100/ 4,990)
Kyrgyzstan (1,180/ 1,110)	Bolivia (3,000/ 3,080)	Iran (5,340/ 5,470)
Myanmar (1,190/ 1,190)	Egypt (3,310/ 3,410)	Serbia (5,540/ 5,300)
Bangladesh (1,190/ 1,330)	Morocco (3,010/ 2,880)	Thailand (5,710/ 5,700)
Tajikistan (1,240/ 1,110)	Indonesia (3,430/ 3,410)	Iraq (5,960/ 5,420)
Kenya (1,310/ 1,380)	Gaza and the West Bank (3,440/ 3,380)	Libya (5,970/ 5,110)
Pakistan (1,430/ 1,500)	Philippines (3,520/ 3,580)	South Africa (6,070/ 5,490)
Cameroon (1,470/ 1,400)	Guatemala (3,610/ 3,790)	Peru (6,160/ 5,950)
Ghana (1,490/ 1,390)	Jordan (3,890/ 3,920)	Belarus (6,720/ 5,620)
Zambia (1,560/ 1,360)	Tunisia (3,930/ 3,690)	Colombia (7,130/ 6,350)
India (1,600/ 1,680)	Kosovo (3,980/ 3,880)	Montenegro: 7,280/ 7,120
Vietnam (1,950/ 2,060)	Albania (4,030/ 3,770)	Libanon (8,040/ 7,970)
Nicaragua (2,020/ 2,100)	Armenia (4,030/ 3,770)	Mexico (9,860/ 9,010)
Honduras (2,090/ 2,160)	Angola (4,030/ 3,450)	Malaysia (10,450/ 9,860)
Moldova (2,230/ 2,140)	Georgia (4,120/ 3,830)	Brazil (10,100/ 8,860)
The Democratic Republic of Congo (2,350/ 1,700)	Algeria (4,830/ 4,360)	Turkey (12,000/ 11,230)
Ukraine (2,650/ 2,310)	Bosnia and Herzegovina: (5,050/ 4,940)	Chile (14,720/ 13,430)

Table 22: GNI per capita in USD of the middle-income and high-income recipient countries of Danish aid during the Liberal- and VLAK-governments

As Table 26 shows no less than 50 of the recipient countries of Danish development aid during the Liberal- and VLAK- governments were middle-income countries and one was a high-income country. The middle-income countries were Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Kenya, Pakistan, Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia, India, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Honduras,

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Moldova, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, Timor-Leste, Bolivia, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, Gaza and the West Bank, Philippines, Guatemala, Jordan, Tunisia, Kosovo, Albania, Armenia, Angola, Georgia, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Iran, Serbia, Thailand, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, Peru, Belarus, Colombia, Montenegro, Lebanon, Mexico, Malaysia, Brazil and Turkey. These can, according to the World Bank, be defined as middle-income countries because of having a GNI per capita of more than USD 1,045 but less than USD 12,736 in the fiscal year of 2015 and a GNI per capita of more than USD 1,025 but less than USD 12,476 in 2016.

The high-income country was Chile which can be defined as such because of a GNI per capita of USD 12,736 or above in 2015 and 12,476 in 2016 (The World Bank, 2015) (ibid, 2016). Because of having a GNI per capita above USD 12,276 Chile and Turkey from 2016 cannot be seen as developing countries. Thus, Danish development aid went to two developed countries.

The next section is going to look at the sectors Danish development aid was allocated to during the Liberal and VLAK governments.

5.3.4: Danish Development Aid Sector Allocation

During the Liberal and VLAK governments, Danish development aid was also allocated to both the development and security sectors.

5.3.4.1: Development Sectors

The table below, Table 27, shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to development sectors.

Sector/Year	2015	2016
Education	4	3.4
Health	2.8	3.7
Reproductive health and population program/ population policies	2	0.8
Drinking water and sanitation	3	4
Other social infrastructure and services	1.5	1.4
Productive sectors	6.2	5.9
Transport and storage	0	0

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Energy generation, distribution, and efficiency	1.5	1.3
Public administration and civil society	18.7	12.5
Banks and financial services	1.3	0.6
Other economic infrastructure/ business and other services	2.4	3.3
Debt relief	0	0.3
Communication	0.5	0.7
Multisector and cross-cutting integrated development projects/	6.2	5.8
Program assistance/ program aid and food/ commodity aid and general program assistance	0.9	0.6
Emergency aid and refugees in regions of origin/ humanitarian aid	9.6	14.7
Other non-categorized bilateral assistance	6.9	4.8
Refugees in the donor country	21	24.6
Administrative costs of donor	7.5	8.4
Development sectors in total	<u>95.7</u>	<u>96.2</u>

Table 23: Allocation of Danish aid to the development sectors during the Liberal and VLAK governments in %

5.3.4.2.1: 2015

The first year under the Liberal government, 95.7 percent of Danish aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 4 percent was allocated to the education sector, 2.8 percent to the health sector, 2 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 3 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.5 percent to other social infrastructure and services, 6.2 percent to productive sectors, 1.5 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 18.7, percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 1.3 percent to bank and financial services, 2.4 percent to business and other services, 0.5 percent to communication sector, 6.2 percent to multisector and cross-cutting integrated development projects, 0.9 percent to commodity aid and general program assistance, 9.6 percent to humanitarian aid, 6.9 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance, 21 percent to refugees in donor countries and 7.5 percent to administrative costs (DANIDA, 2016). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as during the Liberal-Conservative and Centre-Left Government, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2015. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2015.

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5.3.4.2.2: 2016

In 2016, 96.2 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to non-security sectors as 3.4 percent was allocated to the education sector, 3.7 percent to the health sector, 0.8 percent to reproductive health and population program sector, 4 percent to the drinking water and sanitation sector, 1.4 percent to other social infrastructure, 5.9 percent to productive sectors, 1.3 percent to the energy generation, distribution and efficiency, 12.5 percent to public administration and civil society-sectors, 0.1 percent to bank and financial services, 0.6 percent to business and other services, 0.3 percent to debt relief, 0.7 percent to the communication sector, 5.8 percent to multisector and cross-cutting development projects, 0.6 percent to program assistance, 14.7 percent to humanitarian aid, 4.8 percent to other non-categorized bilateral assistance, 24.6 percent to refugees in donor country and 8.4 percent to administrative costs of donor (DANIDA, 2017). As Danish development aid was allocated to the same sectors as the other years, aid went to promoting UNMDGs also in 2016. This means that Denmark lived up to the UNMDGs also in 2016.

5.3.4.2 Security Sectors

The table below shows the relative allocation in percent of Danish development aid to the security sectors during the Liberal- and VLAK-governments.

Sector/Year	2015	2016
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security/ Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and resolution	2.3	2.8
Security system management and reforms	2	1
Security sectors in total	<u>4.3</u>	<u>3.8</u>

Table 28: Allocation of Danish aid to security sectors during the Liberal and VLAK-governments in %

In 2015, 2.3 percent of Danish foreign aid was allocated to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Moreover, 2 percent of Danish aid was allocated to security system management (DANIDA, 2016). Thus, in total 4.3 percent of Danish development aid went to security sectors. The following year, 2.8 percent and 1 percent of Danish aid were allocated to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution and security system management and reforms (DANIDA, 2017). Therefore, in total 3.8 percent was allocated to security sectors in 2016.

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Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and resolution include activities of protection of delivery of Danish development assistance in Syria and Afghanistan (Danish Ministry of Defense, 2015). Security system management and reforms included activities of training and counseling of the Free Syria Police and Afghan national police by the Danish police force and provision of non-lethal equipment to the Free Syrian Police.

5.3.5: Coordination of Danish Development and Military Efforts in Fragile Countries

In 2015 and 2016, new joint strategies for development and military efforts were adopted in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali with the *“Afghanistan Plan 2015-2017”*, the *“Denmark-Mali Country policy paper 2016-2021”* and the *“Denmark-Somalia Partnership Policy 2015-2017”* (Danish Ministry of Defense, 2015) (Danish Ministry of Defense, 2016). The purpose of the coordination of development and military efforts in Mali was, like the coordination of development and military efforts in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia, to ensure Danish development activities of improving governance and developing rule of law, i.e., state-building could be undertaken (DANIDA, 2016: 8).

5.3.6 Part Conclusion: Danish Development Aid During the Liberal and VLAK Governments

The analysis of Danish development aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments revealed that Danish development aid also was securitized through 1) a security discourse, 2) allocation of development aid to fragile countries, 3) allocation of development aid to security sectors, and 4) coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts.

When it comes to the extent to which Danish development aid during the Liberal and VLAK governments has been securitized, the analysis revealed that Danish development aid has, however, only been securitized to some extent. Danish development aid has only been securitized to some extent since 1) development issues not become presented as posing a threat to the security of the donor countries, only *‘migrants’* 2) As little as 3.8 to 4.3 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors. 3) Danish development was not sacrificed to security since Denmark exceeded DAC’s GNI target. And 4) Danish development efforts have only been coordinated in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia, and Mali not in other fragile countries.

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Now that the analyses of Danish development aid during the Liberal-Conservative, Centre-Left and Liberal and VLAK governments have been completed, this thesis is going to proceed with a conclusion.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

To sum up, the aim of this thesis was to investigate whether Danish post-9/11 development aid has been securitized and, if so, to what extent. The three separate analyses of Danish development aid policy discourse and practice during the Liberal-Conservative, Centre-Left and Liberal and VLAK governments showed that Danish post-9/11 development aid had been securitized through 1) a security discourse, 2) allocation of development aid to fragile countries, 3) allocation of development aid to security sectors, and 4) coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts.

Since Danish post- 9/11 development aid has also been securitized through development aid practices of allocation of development aid to fragile countries, allocation of development aid to security sectors and coordination of Danish development efforts with military efforts, this thesis concludes that the Securitization Theory only to some extent can be applied to the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid to explain how it has become securitized. Thus, Balzacq's critique of the theory that it does not provide an adequate foundation for examining security practices in real situations can be confirmed.

When it comes to the extent to which Danish post-9/11 development aid has been securitized, the analyses revealed that Danish post-9/11 development aid has, however, only been securitized to some extent. Danish post-9/11 development aid has only been securitized to some extent since 1) development issues not become presented as posing a threat to the security of the donor countries, only '*migrants*' and the development issues also become presented as threats to the developing countries themselves which serves justify that development aid is spent on promoting economic development and wellbeing for the developing countries and not just the strategic security interest of Denmark or development. 2) Nothing or as little as 4.3 percent of Danish development aid was allocated to security sectors. 3) Danish development have not sacrificed to security since Denmark exceeded DAC's GNI target. And 4) Danish development efforts have only been coordinated in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia, and Mali not in other fragile countries.

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Since Denmark can be seen as an extreme case, this finding might be generalizable for all donor countries indicating a general tendency that post-9/11 development aid of all donor countries may have securitized to some extent. Hence the fear of the development workers, that international development aid has become securitized has been warranted. However, since Danish post-9/11 development aid has only been securitized to some extent, it has only become a strategic resource for security interests of Denmark in the WOT to some extent. That Danish development aid has only become a strategic resource to some extent means that the needs of people in the developing countries have not been neglected and the UNMDGs not abandoned. Thus, Danish post-9/11 development aid continues to be a tool of poverty reduction, albeit one could argue that the tool has been compromised to some extent. The tool has been compromised to some extent because Danish development aid has been allocated to more middle-income developing countries than the low income-income developing countries as the majority of the fragile countries were middle-income developing countries at least during the Centre-Left and the Liberal- and VLAK governments.

Chapter 7: Further Research

For a more in-depth understanding of securitization of Danish post-9/11 development aid, one could further investigate why Danish post-9/11 development aid to some extent has been securitized by investigating the mechanism in the real domain which constitutes securitization, which this thesis does not investigate. This could be investigated by process-tracing which looks at the neglected social and historical contexts of the securitization which has made designations of security threats possible. By investigating the social and historical context of securitization, it could potentially and tentatively be deduced that Danish post-9/11 development aid policy discourse may have been securitized to support the US in its fight against terror, rhetorically and thereby secure means for DANIDA to continue doing its traditional development work. Hence, the empirical case of Danish post-9/11 development aid could potentially confirm the critique of securitization being a self-contained practice, as 9/11-context externally may have been influenced securitization as a type of soft-power which practice may have little to do with emergency measures.

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Appendix