

# Riding two Horses at Once?

The EU-NATO Inter-Organizational Relationship and the Activation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation.

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**Abstract:**

The thesis examines the inter-organizational relationship between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the ‘sleeping princess’ of the Lisbon Treaty – also known as Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU or Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – has been awoken. The PESCO articles were invoked in the late 2017 during the Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU, which entail an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in security and defence. Furthermore, the PESCO articles are output oriented and should enable tangible progress on collaborative capability development goals, and the availability of deployable defence capabilities for combined missions and operations.

Concerns has been raised regarding the new development of these provisions because of how the PESCO articles may dilute NATO, as the cross-organizational member states could focus their military and defence resources towards the EU and the newly activated provisions. Thus, keeping the EU and NATO as separate organizations, of which they could rely on regarding military defence, thereby riding two horses at once.

As both the EU and NATO could end up attending to military deployment and crisis management, it is important to include both organizations in the aspect of foreign security and defence. Therefore, this thesis will be analyzing the inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO through a multilevel framework analysis in order to explore different aspects where the two organizations promote cooperation or aspects more prone to inter-organizational rivalry. This will provide hints as to whether there is something to the fact that the EU is riding two horses, or if it’s a totally different kettle of fish.

In addition hereto, this choice to invoke the PESCO articles will be discussed from a neoclassical realist perspective. Though utilizing a theory of International Relations (IR) might seem like an odd choice, as there is no specific IR theory of inter-organizational relations, neoclassical realism will provide with additional arguments for why the PESCO articles have been invoked.

The findings of the inter-organizational multilevel analysis show that there are a great deal of cooperation between the EU and NATO. However, the findings also show small tensions on member state level both between some cross-organizational member states as well as non cross-organizational member states. Yet, the overall relationship can be regarded as co-operative – at least to the best of their capabilities.

By utilizing the concepts of balancing, the discussion shows that for the cross-organizational member states, it is no longer viable to solemnly relying on NATO. In order for the EU member states to be safeguarded from potential aggressive states, it is therefore also important to actively increase their won military capabilities. This, however, does not mean without NATO. The EU member states must do this in cooperation with NATO and it must be an addition to the military defence partnership established by NATO.

**Keywords:** The EU; NATO; Inter-Organizational Relationship; PESCO; Multilevel Analysis; Neoclassical Realism

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## 1.0 Introduction

In Richard Haass' recent book, *A World in Disarray*, Haass provides an overview of the current challenges facing the global society, which is a somewhat chaotic and crisis-ridden world. The central premise of Haass' well written book is essentially that the tenets of today's global politics are up for grabs and the global society is moving from the current world order to 'World Order 2.0' (2017). Feeding into this depiction of the current world order, scholars (Howorth 2017; Græger 2017; Kellner 2018) point towards events such as the following as the reason for the international environment being in a turmoil; Russia's annexation of Crimea with a civil war still going on (Reuters01 2018); the same goes for the current situation in Syria (BBC 2018); the British decision to leave the European Union (EU) has not been as easy as some might have expected (Fraser 2017); President Trump and his countless unworldly statements cast a shadow of doubt on the validity of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the retention of Article 5, even though he retracted this statement the words has been uttered (Rogers and Skolimowski 2018); following the Sicily G7 meeting, Merkel announced that "the years in which we could fully rely on each other is over to some extent" (Kranitschnig 2017). With this gloomy view of the current stage of the global society, it stands to be questioned who will take the lead in the shaping of the new world order or World Order 2.0. Will it still be the United States of America? Will it be other countries such as Russia and China? Or will organizations such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) take the lead in shaping the future global society?

With the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016 named "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy" (European External Action Service01 2016), it was reaffirmed that the key concept of autonomous action, now renamed strategic autonomy in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) launched in 1998 is still the essence and goal of the EU. In the foreword by High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, emphasis was put on the crises and challenges within and beyond the borders of the EU – the same line of thought, as provided by Haass – but and the outcome of the British referendum as some of the underlying reasons for the necessity of the need to rethink how the EU works and how we want the EU to work (ibid.). The EUGS not only provides policy goals for internal security questions such as creating job opportunities but it also focuses on enhancing military capabilities. This aspect has now become a more plausible proposition and work has already begun as the 'sleeping princess' of the Lisbon



Treaty, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has been awakened during the Estonian presidency of the Council in the last half of 2017, which opens up for military cooperation between the EU Member States in the framework of the EU. Thus, as HR/VP Mogherini puts it “[f]or Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand” (ibid.: 4). With the EUGS explicit underlining the importance of and the need for European strategic autonomy scholars have been questioning how EU will achieve this strategic autonomy and if they do, what is the use of NATO? On the other hand, if EU does not achieve strategic autonomy, what is the use of the CSDP? (Howorth 2017).

It seems now more than ever that the impetus of European defence – in the context of activating Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU (PESCO) as well as the international environment – is slowly driving a wrench between the cooperation of the EU and NATO, at least to some extent. Thus, this thesis seeks to apply an inter-organizational multilevel framework of analysis to the EU-NATO relationship to do an estimation of whether or not the interactions of the two organizations can be viewed as a cooperation or rivalry, and to this extent argue if the activation of PESCO is or is not a competitor to NATO prerogatives. Therefore, the research question of the thesis will be the following:

*Why have the Member States of the European Union thought it necessary to activate Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU as most of the EU Member States share a cross-organizational membership with NATO?*

The activation of the PESCO articles (of no less than 25 EU Member States<sup>1</sup>) will indeed add a new factor to the future discussion of the EU-NATO relationship, but as the external environment is ever changing, global events will always influence the agenda of the international society. To this extent, the world of academia will always have to adjust to and take into consideration changes in the external environment, thus events such as the above-mentioned is always relevant to discuss in different analytical and theoretical frameworks. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to apply an inter-organizational multilevel framework of analysis to the EU-NATO relationship to do an estimation of and to discuss if whether or not the EU-NATO relationship fosters cooperation or rivalry on different levels of cooperation. This inter-organizational analysis will provide a basis for

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<sup>1</sup> The only countries not participating in the PESCO framework is; the UK, Denmark, and Malta.

a further discussion on whether or not PESCO as a tool of further deepening EU military cooperation can be viewed as a competitor to NATO prerogatives and ultimately, why EU member states have activated the PESCO articles.

## **2.0 Methodological Considerations**

In order to provide a sufficient answer to the project's research question, the methodological considerations are highly important and according to Alan Bryman (2016) two important reasons stand in particular out: (1) the methodology will help avoiding any pitfalls one might have in the process of conducting the research correctly and thus keep the project on the right track; and (2) if the conducted research is consistent with the applied methodology, the project will be fundamentally well-grounded, thus should the project be scrutinized and replicated by others, the outcome of the replication should be the same (Bryman 2016: 3).

### **2.1 Research Strategy**

As briefly touched upon above, a research strategy will create a framework for any type of research, and not only in social sciences. The research strategy applied in this project will be a qualitative research because the vast amount of data used in the analysis will be of textual form in order to derive meaning from them in relation to the context in which they were written.

Data and sources of qualitative research refer to a vast array of different textual analysis based on various observations, interviews, and documents (Miles and Huberman 1994: 9). Due to the fact that this thesis will be based more or less solemnly on different textual analysis, the nature of the research method will be that of qualitative research. According to Bryman (2016: 32), the general assumption is that by conducting qualitative research, the relationship between theory and the research is to utilize an inductive approach, which emphasizes a starting point in empirical data and from that point a theory can be tested. However, this thesis does not follow Bryman's argumentation that qualitative research needs to be inductive in nature. This project will be deductive as data and the information needed in the analysis has already been fixed into categories because of the utilized analytical framework, which will be further explicated in section 2.3.1.

Regarding the considerations of ontology; how to understand the world surrounding us (Andersen et al. 2012: 22), there are two extremes in ontology: (1) constructionism, which states that the social actors does not exist independently from the world surrounding us, meaning that

social actors have the possibility to influence the social reality in which we live (Bryman 2016: 29-30). This stands in contrast to the other ontological extreme, which is objectivism (ibid.: 28-29). Objectivism is the opposite of constructionism meaning that it does not believe that the world can be influenced by social actors but that they live independently from each other (ibid.). To this extent, it is believed that both NATO and the EU will act as social actors each in their own capacity and thereby influence the world. Furthermore, in the same line of thought, based on the multilevel framework of analysis in this project, each level is analyzed with the primary goal to estimate how they each influences the overall possibility for inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO, in other words, how the two organizations influence each other respectively. In accordance with this, the ontological view will reflect that of constructionism. In this project, the ontological constructionist approach will be utilized, especially at the individual level in the analysis.

The question concerning the epistemological considerations; how to concede the world surrounding us (Andersen et al. 2012: 22), underlines what we should and should not accept as knowledge (Bryman 2016: 24). As was the case of ontology, epistemology also has two poles; (1) positivism, which believes that only what we can observe with our senses is knowledge; and (2) interpretivism, which is the opposite of positivism, meaning that not only should we observe but we should also allow for subjective values (ibid.: 26). The latter of the two epistemological positions matches the views of this project because of how interpretivism underlines the importance of social actors, and in this specific case, the interactions and organizational relationship between the EU and NATO as well as the environment and internal milieu affective both organizations, which cannot be deduced to quantitative facts and numbers. This, again, is shown in the analysis as i.e. external pressure in the international environment can influence two organizations to work together in order to safeguard their matching values.

### **2.1.1 Research Strategy Criteria**

It is essential that the research meet a set of criterions in order to add value to or close gaps in the existing literature as well as test dubious claims because science is in fact the systematic production of knowledge (Andersen 2012: 97). In this sense, Bryman (2016: 41-44) puts forth three important criterions for the evaluation of – in this case – social research. These are (1) reliability; this term questions whether or not the project can be repeated; (2) replication; as the term might indicate, the methodological procedures of the study must be explicated in such way that if other scholars were

to replicate the research it should be possible to reach the same outcome (Andersen 2012: 97), and (3) validity; can be concerned with questions such as whether or not the result can be generalized beyond the research context (Bryman 2016: 42).

Reliability questions whether or not a result can be repeated, which means that the based on the same measurement, or the collection of data, will it provide us with same result – is it consistent? (ibid.: 42). As this project seeks to add value to the research of the activation of the PESCO articles and since previous research on this topic is somewhat limited due to the fact that the activation of the PESCO articles is a relatively recent EU decision, we will as researchers be drawing from already conducted research and existing knowledge from different scholars and intellectuals. Consequently, this project will draw heavily upon journal articles, various news articles, as well as books. Furthermore, the journal articles as well as academic books utilized in this project have consistently shown up in the bibliography of scholars researching the topic of EU-NATO cooperation, thereby supporting the reliability of this project.

Replication questions whether or not the conducted research can be replicated. In this sense the researcher must explicitly state how the research is conducted in great detail, which will allow for others to replicate the findings of the project, if other researchers do not believe that the findings of the project match that of others (ibid.). The question of whether or not the findings can be applied at other times, this project will first and foremost explicate all the academic steps in order to reach the conclusion and contextual analysis do not deviate from this principle. This will provide other researchers to replicate the project to their liking and reach likewise conclusion, but as John K. Smith (1983: 10-13) notes, when conducting qualitative research it is nearly impossible to reach complete objectivity. Therefore, it should be highlighted that the researcher should conduct the research in good reflexivity of potential personal biases should not influence the project and its conclusion (Bryman 2016: 388). Such personal biases could be when – as in this case – the researcher has a prejudiced opinion about a certain president and his (or hers) ways of communicating to the masses.

Validity, in this regard external validity, concerns the possibility of drawing parallels between this research and (potentially) other research. The problem arises due to the fact that the research design of this project (as we will see in chapter 2.2) is a case study. As a consequence of the case design, it will be difficult to make comparison to and draw parallels between other research simply because activating PESCO articles or likewise articles, which deepen and enhance military

cooperation between sovereign states on a legal basis. That being said, one should not completely refuse that this thesis could in its entirety spark interest of further research in this or other adjacent policy fields. Furthermore, one could also argue that inter-organizational multilevel framework analysis between the EU and NATO could be transferred to other areas of EU-NATO cooperation and policy outcomes, because this will generate a description, which other researchers can use as a database for making their own judgments (Bryman 2016: 384).

## 2.2 Research Design

The research design is the planning of the empirical investigation (Andersen et al. 2012: 66). This chapter will thus concern the challenge of planning the investigation of why it was necessary to invoke the PESCO articles. In this case, the research design will be that of a single case study because it is seemingly straightforward that this project entails a single case (or event), the activation of Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU. This is in line with the argumentation of Bryman (2016: 60) that the research is interested in the complexities and particularities of the case in question.

### 2.2.1 Case Study and Case Typology

Noted by Bryman (2016: 688), a case study is a detailed and intense analysis of a single case, but Jack S. Levy (2008: 2) argues in his journal article, *Case Studies: Types, Design, and Logic of Inference*, that even though a case study as a design in qualitative research has been – and still is being – widespread design tool applied on an array of different research, there still seem to lack a consensus of the definition of the terms *case* and *case study*. As a consequence of this lack of clear definition has led to a different view and applicability of the case study, thus varying cases and case studies, fall under different categories or typologies.

Lijphart (1971: 691-693) presents six case typologies. In relation to this specific project, the kind of typology, which fits with the objective of the investigation of why the PESCO articles have been activated during the Estonian presidency in the second half of 2017, it can be argued that this specific case belongs in the typology of the deviant case. The reason this characterization of the case study has its base in the fact that this case is unique in itself, as this is the first time these articles have been invoked, thus no precedence has yet been established when it comes to deepening European defence through such legal framework.

### **2.2.1.1 Critique of the Case Study**

Bryman (2016: 64) notes that the standard critique of the research design of case studies relates to that of the inability of generalizing its findings. Flyvbjerg, a scholar very fond of the case study as a research design, sways of this criticism by stating that the critique does not hold water because the generalization is not about 1:1 duplication but it is about how to add value to the scientific development through generalization as alternatives to other designs and methods. Consequently Flyvbjerg (2006: 228) concludes that: “the force of example is underestimated”. In this case, however, it does portray some difficulty concerning the generalizability for the deviant case of the activation of Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU in relation to the inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO. How can this case be generalized? It is not that there are other organizations likely to even cooperation in the field of security and defence?

Furthermore, the case study research has a tendency to confirm the investigator’s preconceived ideas (Idowu 2016: 185). In this regard, Flyvbjerg (2006: 234-237) assesses the subjectivity in qualitative research specifically in the case study research design, in which he finds that subjectivity is present in qualitative research as well as quantitative research. In relation to this project, it is already noted that the researcher should conduct the research with good reflexivity, try as best as possible to avoid any personal biases clouding the judgment. To this extent, it can be argued that Flyvbjerg has a valid point that no research either qualitative or quantitative is free from preconceived notions. What is important when conducting qualitative case study research is that the investigator is aware of points of which the research method is critiqued or falls short.

### **2.2.2 Argument for the Case Type**

To briefly sum up, we have so far in this chapter showed that this project is a single case study with the typology of deviant as categorized Lijphart (1971). Adding to this typology, in which the specifics of a single case are studied in depth, the approach to this is idiographic because of its focus on the revealing unique features of the case (Bryman 2016: 61). As pointed out by Flyvbjerg (2006) the case study as a design does provide relevant knowledge to the scientific community, which is why the deviant case study is used in as a research design throughout this project. On this basis, the research question of why EU Member States thought if necessary to activate Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU, when most of the EU Member States share a cross-organizational membership with



NATO, will be regarded as a deviant single case study due to its focus on the activation of the PESCO articles.

## **2.3 Research Method**

The research method is in fact the method we apply when collecting data, whereas the research design represents the structure of the data is later analyzed (Bryman 2016: 40). Regarding the methods applied throughout this project for gathering data is content analysis. This section of the methodological considerations will firstly look at the content analysis and its critique; secondly; we will move on to a section of data collection; and lastly, we will examine an inter-organizational multilevel framework of analysis as proposed by Joachim A. Koops (2017).

### **2.3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis**

As the thesis operates in the field of social sciences, we have yet to exhaust the sources of data – which probably would be near to impossible, on which the thesis is based are textual in nature and the method will concern the collection of texts as well as information about the texts so as to gain an insight about the society and communities – or in other words, we seek to explain what is in the text (Atkinson 2017: 84). This thesis will not rely on interviews conducted by the author, even though having conducted different types of interviews could have been beneficial and very useful regarding the analytical structure of this project

Seeking to explain what is in the different texts, such as to uncover underlying meanings is the method of qualitative content analysis (*ibid.*), which is quite different from that of quantitative content analysis. This is due to the fact that the qualitative content analysis seeks to actually understand the latent patterns and meanings, instead of just making quantifications of in-text themes and terms as the quantitative content analysis (Atkinson 2017: 84-85).

Krippendorff (2004: 18) provides a definition of the content analysis, which is as follows “[c]ontent analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inference from texts (or other meaningful matters) to the context of their use”. To this extend, Krippendorff (2004: 18-19) argues that the content analysis, as a technique, includes procedures, which is both learnable as well as divorceable from the investigator, thus the content analysis can provide new insights and aspects to different areas of studies – which has proven successful especially in political analyses. Furthermore, another important distinction within qualitative content analysis exists which is

presented by Philip Mayring (2000). In his article he claims there are two modes of how qualitative content analysis is applied in research: inductive category development and deductive category application. In the latter mode, the investigator applies already prepared categorical frames in order to examine the text prior to the analysis (Mayring 2000; Atkinson 2017; 85-86). In respect to this thesis, it is sought to understand and explain why the PESCO articles have been activated, and in order to do so, it is needed to examine different texts to determine the narrative components related to the problem formulation as well as the theory in question. Thus, the deductive content application will be used as there has been preordained categorization of the analytical division prior to the analysis. The reason these preordained categories is simply because of the fact that the multilevel framework analysis sets out these categories by default. As a consequence, the process of qualitative content analysis will be the case of the investigator seeking out empirical data fitting into the framework analysis. Thus reflecting the research strategy of deductive research as outline in section 2.1.

### **2.3.1.1 Critique of Content Analysis**

One of the main criticisms concerning the content analysis revolves around the fact that the research can only be as good as the documents upon which the researcher relies (Bryman 2016: 305). This means that should be assessed by its authenticity, credibility, and representativeness (ibid.). Generally speaking, a document fulfilling all of these criteria could be a peer reviewed journal article. In this project, a vast amount of such data has been utilized throughout the analysis. But as this field of research also attempts to work with the newly implemented PESCO articles, the journal articles are rather limited, as this is a new provision only just adopted. As a consequence, it is needed to look elsewhere in order to find information, which can be either in official EU documents, or in news articles with focus on European politics.

A second critique of the content analysis is how it is nearly impossible to create coding manuals because the coding schemes depend on the interpretation of the one who does the coding (ibid.). In relation to this project, the coding manuals have been preordained through the multilevel framework analysis, which have already underlined what kind of information belongs in each of the five different analysis levels. But arguably, it is the researcher who filters – with all the reflexivity he/she can muster – what goes into these categories. Yet, as mentioned above, it is important for the researcher to depart from his or hers personal biases on the investigated.

### 2.3.3 Data Collection

It is important to show the pre-understanding/(s) the researcher has of the topic of investigation. Such pre-understanding entails three elements: (1) the theoretical pre-understandings revolving the topic; (2) the concrete knowledge of the empirical data; and (3) own preexisting notions of the topic (Elklit and Jensen 2012: 119). Of these three elements, it is important that only the theoretical and the empirical elements, which affect the collection of data. Thus, the investigator must make clear when deciding how to tackle the research question in order to conduct objective research (ibid.). Either way, it is the research question and the data best suited for answering the project, which is the essential (ibid.: 121).

This project utilizes a multilevel framework for the analysis. Such framework, which will be further explicated in the following section, clearly explicates what kind of data is important in each of the different levels. The fact the framework so clearly states what kind of data is relevant for answering the research question is helpful when it comes to being objective in the data collection itself because it points in the direction of where to look for relevant and objective data. In relation to the three elements above, having these fixed directions concerning data collection will thus make sure that own preexisting notions of the topic do not affect the collection of data.

### 2.3.4 Structure of Analysis

The structure of the analysis will be that as presented by Joachim Koops (2017) in his chapter contribution, *Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis*, in which he argues that inter-organizational relationships should be seen as a multilevel phenomenon, which would involve different actors and key individuals at different levels. Thus, in cases relating to the relationship between organizations it is important to take notice of the different impacts each level has as well as how this influence the interaction in a wider context of organizational rivalry or cooperation (Koops 2017: 189). In this case, taking use of this inter-organizational multilevel framework of analysis will provide some kind assessment or basis of the current state of the EU-NATO relationship. It is estimated that this framework of analysis will project a good assessment of the relationship status as the framework involves different actors and players, which potentially can influence decisions heavily.

As the name of the framework indicates there are different levels, in which it is possible to look at different stages in the life cycle of the inter-organizational relationship; the formation stage,

in which relations between different organizations are established; the interaction stage, in which it is determined whether or not the relationship of the organizations promote cooperation or rivalry; and the impact/outcome stage, where it can be determined if two organizations will eventually produce an outcome together (Koops 2017: 191). For this project, the focus will be on the second stage concerning the interaction stage. This is mainly due to the fact that the first stage is concerning the formation of an inter-organizational relationship, which had already been established between NATO and the EU, thus it would be of little interest to investigate further in this aspect. Secondly, the third stage of impact/outcome focuses more in-depth on possible outcomes of such relationship, which would be more in the hypothetical sense, thus it would not provide any value to the research question.

In regard to the multiple levels as mentioned, Koops (2017: 191) mentions five different levels of which are beneficial to investigate because each of the levels reflects some or more of the recurring questions posed by scholars in the field of inter-organizational relations. Each stage will be explicated individually in the following sections, but in order to establish a brief overview it is beneficial to look at the table below:

Interaction		
	<i>Cooperation</i>	<i>Rivalry</i>
<i>International system</i>	Major crises at int. level may require more than one actor; cooperation between IOs needed	Shifts in the structure of the international system may prompt organizations to focus on the same tasks and thus leads to clashes
<i>State/Member State (MS)</i>	MS promote cooperation between IOs	MS deliberately keep IOs apart; promote one IO over the other
<i>Individual</i>	Strong relations between core individuals? Individual leadership?	Dislike and antipathy between individuals?
<i>Bureaucratic</i>	Strong units dealing with other	Own IO's survival and success

	IO; interest in joint problem-solving	against partner; weak units dealing with partner IO
<i>Inter-institutional/inter-secretariat</i>	Inter-organizational epistemic community? Strong institutionalization	Strong IO-loyalty against partnership; prioritizing own survival/power position

(Source: Koops 2017: 192)

This relates to the data and the research method, as discussed above, in the way that the investigator, prior to the analysis, has preordained categories as well as knowledge of what kind of data these different categories encompasses. Thus, the classification of data into preordained categories evidently points in the direction of the deductive category application.

#### 2.3.4.1 The International System Level

According to Koops (2017: 195) the arguably most important underlying factor when it comes to either assessing the formation of the relationship between international organizations (IOs), the interaction of the IOs, or the outcome of that relationship is the international system and its structural changes that comes with it. Major events on the international level will inherently create both constraints as well as opportunities for IOs (ibid.). Changes in the international structure/the external environment do not solemnly mean structural changes, but this can also indicate normative changes, thus it is a good idea to research not only major changes in the international power constellation, crisis, or international structures, but also research emerging new ideas, norms, or practices (ibid.).

That being said, a lot of major crises exist without creating fundamental structural shifts in the international system in such way as the fall of the Soviet Union, and therefore important events in the international milieu, such as regional crises, will also provide opportunities the same way as mentioned above (ibid.: 196). This kind of opportunity is important when different IOs are aiming to resolve such crises, which will either result in inter-organizational coordination and cooperation, or it will end up in an uncoordinated response and lead to competition and rivalry (ibid.). Consequently, major crisis, geographically determined or not, do act as important events that influence the inter-organizational relations, but as Koops (2017: 196-197) notes “[s]cholars of inter-organizational relations should thus keep in mind as a starting point and core conceptual and

empirical context the level of the ‘international system’, with ‘external shocks’ being one major causal mechanism possibly inspiring cooperation”.

#### **2.3.4.2 The Member State Level**

The interesting question in play is how precisely do member states influence the relationship between organizations (ibid.)? Koops (2017: 198) states that “[u]nfortunately, theory-guided and IR-inspired studies on the role of the member states in *the IOR life cycle* are still rare”, thus noting a limitation to this aspect. On the other hand, Hofmann (2009) points toward how the member states can possess an either blocking or obstructing role when it comes to the relationship between two organizations, but for this multilevel analysis, the role of the member states are central actors in what is dubbed by Koops (2017: 198) “areas of high politic in IOR”, and they are as follows: (1) the member state needs to political approve future negotiations between executive heads of two organizations; (2) the member state is needed in order to approve the contractual relationship between two organizations; (3) the member state is needed to provide resources to implement joint inter-organizational projects; (4) the member state is needed to provide resources facilitating inter-organizational liaison office posts; (5) the member state has the power of veto or generally obstructing inter-organizational cooperation; (6) a member state has the possibility to pit organizations against each other to promote special interests thus influencing political outcomes; (7) the member state can influence the national diplomat to take different positions in different organizations; and (8) the member state can facilitate cooperation between organizations by limiting the organization’s domain thereby restricting duplication (Koops 2017: 198-199). This indicates the power the individual member state has as tools for influencing inter-organizational relationship.

As a recommendation from Koops (2017: 199-200), it is important for investigators interested in the cooperation and rivalry of inter-organizational relations to look at the leading governments, which seek to influence the inter-organizational relationship. In this regard, this project will focus on the major players or key role governments in in the EU as well as in NATO.

#### **2.3.4.3 The Individual Level**

The individual level is also an important factor for understanding as well as analyzing inter-organizational relations as this relates to the executive heads and how these are one of the building blocks in a general level of analysis framework (Koops 2017: 201). This means that it is often the



individuals and their relations to others, which can lead to either empathy across organizations thus fostering cooperation, or it can lead to antipathy thus leading to rivalries between organizations – also if the inter-organizational relationships already is strongly institutionalized (*ibid.*). To this extend it is important for investigators researching the relationships and interaction between two or more IOs to dive further into the key individuals who possess a boundary-spanning role, which – according to Christer Jönsson (1993: 466) – are individuals who are in the position to span their activities beyond the boundaries of what was initially intended of their own or partner organization (Koops 2017: 202; Biermann 2008: 166). Thus, investigators should in their attempt look into the level of the individuals and focus on features such as: (1) staff in senior positions working for or in supporting roles of the executive head; (2) the staff who works in the units with boundary-spanning elements; (3) liaison offices; (4) individual leaders, foreign ministry experts in national governments, or ambassadors; (5) the staff operating in the field missions; and (6) evaluation officers (Koops 2017a: 203).

For this thesis, there will be a special focus on the individual leaders, both organizational leaders in the EU (including the HR/VP) and NATO but also government leaders in the respective countries, as they also are key individuals.

#### **2.3.4.4 The Bureaucracy Level**

The level concerning the role of the bureaucracy is important and revolves around the day-to-day management of the interrelated organizations (Koops 2017: 2004). This means that it is not only the workings of permanent inter-organizational institutions such as permanent committees, but it also entails joint declarations, memorandum of understandings, and joint action plans (*ibid.*). Therefore, it is important to assess the capacity, which by Rodrigo Tarvares (2010: 17-18) is referred to as being: (1) organizational capacity, which entails elements such as legal mandates, resources, and procedures; and (2) operational experience, which entails the ability of an organizations to act, which is described by Koops (2017: 205) as “to what extent are specific administrative units and bureaucracies equipped to deal both at the material and at the ideational/normative level with partner organizations and which instruments, resources, expertise are available for building long-term partnerships”.

With this in mind, this project will look at the institutional interactions on a more bureaucratic level, in order to assess and explicate the extent to which the EU and NATO cooperate institutionally.

#### **2.3.4.5 The Inter-Institutional Level**

The last level of interest in the multilevel framework concerns the inter-institutional or inter-secretariat relations between two or more organizations. At this level, Koops (2017: 206) notes that investigators venturing into the framework analysis should focus their investigation on the workings as well as the outcomes of cooperation forums, inter-institutional committees, or regular meetings/institutionalized arrangements between the organizations in question – in other words, the formal and institutional relationship between organizations. But, it should also be noted that such institutional channels can become empty shells caused by member state disagreements, thus it is argued that the inter-institutional or inter-secretariat relations between some organizations have shifted to more informal channels of communication (Koops 2017: 206), which is especially the case of the EU-NATO relationship (Græger and Haugevik 2011; Biermann 2015). In this regard, when looking into the inter-institutional level it is worth investigating the following aspects: (1) declarations and formal agreements setting the guidelines of institutional cooperation; (2) political statements such as action plans and joint evaluations; (3) look at the different liaison offices; (4) regular meetings and dialogues; and (5) working groups and agreements between the organizations (Koops 2017: 207).

Regarding the fact that informal institutional channels also play an important role in the inter-institutional level points toward that it would be ideal to use participant observations or interviews with key persons operating in these forums to gain a good insight in the daily functions as only focusing on the outcome of action plans and joint evaluation might become too declaratory in nature (ibid.).

#### **2.3.5 Critique of the Multilevel Framework of Analysis**

The main reasons for highlighting the aspects of criticism, when it comes to the analytical framework used throughout the project, is in order to retain objectivity – so as not to dive head first into the analysis without hesitation. Furthermore, by outlining the aspects of the framework of

analysis that has been criticized, this will eventually provide the researcher as well as the reader with a better perspective as to the where's and why's constrictions can occur.

What is basically essential concerning criticism in the scientific community is the fact that scholar's journals can be peer reviewed by others. This usually takes some time because the core tenets of the published journals – in the case, the multilevel framework for inter-organizational analysis – will have to be tested thoroughly by other scholars. Being a relatively new framework for inter-organizational analysis (from 2017), this leaves us in what can be called a predicament. The reason simply being that this analytical framework proposed by Koops (2017) has not yet thoroughly been peer reviewed. This will not necessarily lead to a bad analysis, but it is an important factor to note and to keep in mind.

## **2.4 Choice of Theory**

Perfectly stated by Biermann and Koops (2017: 12) “[...] there is no specific IR theory of inter-organizational relations [...]”. This fact put the project in a kind of predicament, as a clear IR theory of inter-organizational relations would have been a great tool. On the other side, the fact that there is no specific IR theory will push the investigator to be creative and to think outside of the box, when it comes to the theoretical perspective. In the sense of thinking outside the box can bring other aspects forth, which can be useful when addressing the inter-organizational relations in the field of IR theory. This project will take use of neoclassical realism. In order to understand why this is, it is relevant to look at the research question itself.

The research question raises the question of why the PESCO articles have been activated by the EU member states. The PESCO articles fall under Title V Section 2 in the Treaty of the European Union concerning provisions on security and defence (European Union 2012). NATO describes itself, as “NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.” (NATO n.d.). The research question indicates a theme concerning foreign, security, and defence policies. Furthermore, the research question also focuses on the EU Member States, who share a cross-organizational membership with NATO, thus tying the two organizations together. In addition to this, the relationship between the two organizations is important because inter-organizational cooperation would and will not happen if there are no conflicts (Biermann and Koops 2017: 20). And as the EU and NATO have created a formal link

through the Berlin Plus Agreement, there is formal cooperation between the organizations, as well as conflict.

#### **2.4.1 Alternative Approaches to Theory**

This section will take into account some of the alternative theories, which could have been applied to this project. Mentioned in the above section, there is no specific IR theory to inter-organizational relations. Thus, other IR theories will be visited to estimate, what these alternative IR theories can offer. In addition hereto, it could be argued that alternative theories could be a way, may be even a better way, of answering the research question. Such alternative theories could e.g. be integration theories. As there exist a multitude of different theories, this section is sought to be short and precise, as it could easily turn into a theoretical discussion on inter-organizational relations.

European integration theories are a helpful theoretical tool to understand how the EU has developed and will develop in the future (Hatton 2011: 1). In this case, it can be argued that activating articles in the TEU, whereby enhancing cooperation in the EU can be viewed as a development and furthering of European integration. From the neo-functionalist concept of spillover to the liberal intergovernmentalist emphasis on the importance of member state bargaining power (ibid.), both have the possibility to be utilized because there is talk about a process of development in the EU. However, neither of these integration theories takes into consideration the aspect of NATO and the EU-NATO relations, which are an important factor in the field of foreign, security, and defence policies both for the EU as well as the cross-organizational member states. Using integration theories would therefore be too Eurocentric.

#### **2.5 Delimitations and Scope**

For a project on this magnitude, it is important to underline the delimitations/scopes, which are encountered in this thesis. The reason is to make the reader fully aware of what cannot be done and why. This is important if other scholars were to test the findings in the project by repeating it. Furthermore, by explicating the scopes of the project will help the research process by focusing on what is and is not important, thus marking the boundaries of what the thesis entails.

First of all, as we have experienced in the presentation of the multilevel framework of the analysis, each of the different level presents a lot of different empirical data, which could be relevant for each of the different levels. This fact will certainly create a sizable analysis, as it will be

important to hold true to the analytical framework while balancing different source material as well as staying objective, yet still manage to fit everything within the given page limit. Given this restraint, and the fact that each level proposes important (and different) possibilities for the analysis, the investigator has to focus. This can e.g. be seen in the first level concerning the international system, in which it was stated that changes in the international structure do not solemnly mean structural changes, but this can also indicate normative changes, thus as an investigator it is a good idea to research not only major changes in the international power constellation, crisis, or international structures, but also research emerging new ideas, norms, concepts, doctrines, or practices (Koops 2017: 195). As will be evident in the analytical part, there is a lack of focus relating to the international system of ideas, norms, concepts, and so on. There are three reasons for such choice: (1) simply because of how much space it would take up to include both non-normative as well as normative changes of the international system; (2) relating to data collection in section 2.3.3, it was made clear that the theoretical pre-understandings should play a role in the collection of data and it was established in section 2.4 that the theory in this project is neoclassical realism. Thus, as students of international relations, it can be deduced that the realist does not correlate to normative notions easily, which is why the normative changes in the international system has not been accounted for; and (3) Biermann and Koops (2017: 8-9) distinguish between material and immaterial relations when it comes to organizations of any kind. By this is meant the difference between material/tangible and symbolic/intangible resources. Thus, if the resource exchange between the EU and NATO is tangible: it is worth analyzing. If it is intangible: it has not been considered. This relates to all of the levels in the analysis, which is why some empirical data has and some has not been discussed in the analysis.

Secondly, the framework also proposes that it would be ideal to use participant observations or interviews with key persons operating in these forums to gain a good insight in the daily functions (Koops 2017: 207). This, however, has unfortunately not been possible for this project due to time and unavailability, but would most likely have brought important insights to this level of the analysis, a factor worth noticing.

Thirdly, a question can arise about the timeframe concerning which events are relevant to include in the analysis. Yes, the analytical framework points us in the direction of where to search for data, yet it does not say anything about the timeframe and the point of departure. It is therefore up to the investigator to decide from where to start. In this case, it is sought to stay as present as

possible. As the PESCO articles were invoked in late 2017, this will be out point of departure. However, as different crises are ongoing and are usually not short, it will make sense to include ongoing crises, as they can be important for the analysis. But, open crises before 2002 will not be included because it was the first formal agreement between the EU and NATO (Howorth 2014: 132).

## **2.6 Concept of International Organization**

As it is evident from the title as well as the research question, the main focus of this thesis will be on the EU and NATO as being international organizations. As this is the case, it is important to explicate how and why these are perceived as being as such. The reason both the EU and NATO are regarded as IOs comes from the classification as presented by Clive Archer (2015: 32): “[t]he definition of an international organization as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members [...] from at least two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership”. In this regard, both the EU and NATO can be viewed as such.

## **2.7 Structure of the Project**

Having introduced the reader to the thesis and outlined the methodological considerations, the thesis will now continue as follows: the next section will introduce the theoretical framework of the thesis, which will be utilized in the discussion. Secondly, the current framework of cooperation between the EU and NATO will be presented together with the PESCO articles, which will provide the reader with a basic understanding of organizational relationship works and what the PESCO articles entail. Thirdly, the analysis of the inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO will be completed. After this analysis, a discussion with basis in the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism will be done. Lastly, a conclusion will be put forth, which will provide an answer to the research question.

## **3.0 Theory**

As mentioned above, this thesis sets off in the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism has its roots in the in the theoretical school of realism (as evident from the name) or rather the political theory of realism. This section seeks to present the theory of



neoclassical realism, which is applied late on in the discussion. Following the presentation of neoclassical realism, the operationalization of the core tenants of neoclassical realism to this project will be explicated in order to thoroughly explain how the theory is in fact applied. The section will end with a critique of the neoclassical realist theory as to gain a bit of theoretical perspective of the boundaries of neoclassical realism.

### **3.1 Theoretical Framework of Neoclassical Realism**

The neoclassical realist framework seeks to combine the best elements from classical realism as well as elements from neorealism (Jackson and Sørensen 2013: 89). From the theoretical framework of classical realism it specifically draws from the importance of foreign policy and leadership, whereas it acknowledges how the neorealist framework puts emphasis on the significance of the structure of the international system (ibid.). The neoclassical realist framework departs from these approaches by leaning against some liberalist arguments (ibid.). In this sense, Jackson and Sørensen claims that “[n]eoclassical realists focus on explaining what goes on in terms of the pressure of international structure on the one hand and the decisions made by state leaders on the other” (ibid: 87).

Gideon Rose, who coined the term neoclassical realism, reasons that this is a strand of realism because the theory underlines that a state’s foreign policy is firstly driven by its place in in the international system with emphasis on its relative power capabilities (Rose 1998: 146), but neoclassical realism further reasons that power capabilities on foreign policy must be indirect because the international system must be seen through variables at the unit level (ibid.). As a consequence, neoclassical realism does not assume that there exist such a direct link between material power capabilities and state’s foreign policies, but the foreign policy behavior of states are also influenced by three factors: (1) the political leaders of a state form the foreign policy according to their perception of the international system, which leads to the fact that over the short to medium term of a state’s foreign policy may or may not examine the objective material power trends as closely or continuously as possible; (2) leaders and the political elite do not (usually) have free rein when it comes to the natural resources and the allocation thereof, thus states that could be compared regarding power capabilities, but with different structures internally, might not act the same way in foreign policy and vice versa; and (3) as the international system might form the silhouettes of the general direction of a state’s foreign policy, the influence of the international system is often more

apparent from afar, which means that the structure of the international system do not force a state to choose one certain foreign policy, rather the international system and its structure limits the array of foreign policies to choose from (ibid.: 147).

As a consequence of the neoclassical view on foreign policy, it therefore challenges other realist views on explaining foreign policy outcomes. Firstly, Rose (1998: 148-149) and neoclassical realism challenges Innenpolitik theories and their notion that internal factors dominates the outcome of foreign policy of a state, because of how Innenpolitik as a theory of explaining foreign policy outcomes is purely concentrated on the unit/state, yet these Innenpolitik theories have problems explaining how states with similar internal systems do not necessarily respond alike when it comes to foreign policy. Secondly, offensive realism, which sees the international environment through a Hobbesian pair of glasses, reasons that foreign policy is conducted only in relation to the international system, thus all units behave similar no matter the internal structure of such states (ibid.: 149). This stands in diametrical opposition of that of Innenpolitik theories and neoclassical realism therefore reasons that some units do act differently, yet they are still a part of the same international system (ibid.). Lastly, defensive realism, which is more benign in its view of the international system and states can afford to be more relaxed when it comes to the pursuit of security, but when a threat occur states would try to balance against them to deter the aggressor (ibid.). Neoclassical realists would challenge the defensive realism mainly because it is a first-order systemic argument, and thus there seem little reason for actual behavior of a state invoked by the international system, and therefore defensive realists draws ad-hoc from internal factors of the units (ibid.: 151). See the Table below for a simplified overview.

Theory	Views of International System	View of Units	Causal Logic
<b>Innenpolitik theories</b>	Unimportant	Highly differentiated	Internal factors → Foreign policy
<b>Defensive realism</b>	Occasionally important; anarchy's implications variable	Highly differentiated	Systemic incentive or Internal factors → Foreign policy
<b>Neoclassical realism</b>	Important; anarchy is	Differentiated	Systemic incentive →

	murky		Internal factors → Foreign policy
<b>Offensive Realism</b>	Very important; anarchy is Hobbesian	Undifferentiated	Systemic incentives → Foreign policy

(Source: Rose 1998: 154).

Having broadly established the tenants of neoclassical realism and how the theory departs from other strands within the realist umbrella, Rose (1998: 157-165) reasons that there are two intervening factors in conducting foreign policy outcomes. The first intervening factor revolves around the decision-maker's perceptions of the current international environment and the distribution of power among competing units, thus it is through the decision-maker the international environment should be filtered (ibid.: 157). This means that the international system and distribution of power can only change a state's foreign policy if the international system can influence the decision-maker of a state and thereby change his/hers understanding of the country's situation (ibid.: 158). The second intervening factor in neoclassical realism concerns strength of the state's internal apparatus in relation to the surrounding society (ibid.: 161). This relates to the fact that national leader may not have the power over all of the state's natural resources, thus neoclassical realism brings the analysis of a certain foreign policy outcome closer to the real world because neoclassical realism incorporates the redistribution of state resources to action-taking in the international system, thereby not abandoning realist concepts (ibid.: 161-162).

### 3.1.1 Neoclassical Realism and Balancing of Power

Randall L. Schweller in his journal article *Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing* states that balancing in the neoclassical realist paradigm is "[b]alancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of allies to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition." (2010: 166). In this sense, balancing only exist if there has been some kind of political subjugation either of one's own territory or that of one's interests abroad (ibid.), but this does not only mean fighting back but balancing against another state is simply the act of protecting oneself in the long-term by possible aggressive states, thus gaining more bargaining leverage with that aggressive state (ibid.: 166-167).

There are different ways for a state to balance against potential aggressive states. Schweller (2010: 167-168) has identified four categories of such balancing: (1) the first form of balancing is appropriate balancing. This type of balancing happens when another state is truly aggressive and there is a need to counterbalance the military balance of the aggressive state, thus appropriate balancing happens when the intentions of an aggressive state are correctly perceived and responded to (ibid.: 167); (2) the second type of balancing is the overbalancing (sometimes also referred to as inappropriate balancing), which happens when a state misperceives another state's intentions and thereby starts an expensive military build-up, eventually leading to other states replicating such an arms spiral in order to secure their own survival against the state enhancing its absolute military power (ibid.); (3) the third type of balancing is nonbalancing, which can take different forms such as: buck-passing; bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, or distancing. If a state choose nonbalancing as their approach toward a potential aggressive state in the international system, they themselves do not have to pay the cost of a military upgrade of their own by letting others do so (ibid.); and (4) the last type of balancing is the underbalancing, which happens when states simply do not responds at all to a potential aggressive state, or does so inefficiently. This will eventually lead to war, which could have been avoided or at least could have been less costly in the long run. Underbalancing is, like overbalancing, also a state misperception of another state, in this case one would assume the state is benign and not aggressive (ibid.: 168).

### 3.1.2 Critique of Neoclassical Realism

According to Brian Rathbun (2008) the critique of neoclassical realism revolves around the fact that the strand of neoclassical realism departs from the other realist theories by having integrated domestic politics in the theoretical framework and are therefore criticized by explaining away abnormalities post hoc in regard to neorealism (Rathbun 2008: 295).

That being said, the sharpest criticism of neoclassical realism comes from Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik in their article *Is Anybody Still a Realist?* from 1999 (ibid.: 298). Legro and Moravcsik claim that by incorporating the domestic variables as well as the ideational variables into a realist theoretical framework the theory of neoclassical realism does not portray what should be a healthy theoretical paradigm, as the domestic and ideational variables rightfully belong to the liberal and epistemic paradigm (ibid.). They reasons that there are two criteria of having a healthy paradigm when it comes to the establishment of theories, and that is: distinctiveness and coherence

(ibid.), and based on the notion that a theory should be both distinctive as well as have an established coherence in its theoretical framework, Legro and Moravcsik claims that this is not the case in the neoclassical realism (ibid. 299).

### **3.2 The Operationalization of Neoclassical Realism**

The main reason for this choice is that neoclassical realism takes into account both the current situation in the international system as well as the internal aspects when exploring foreign policy outcomes.

As the objective of this project is to understand the current state of the relationship between NATO and the EU and thereby discuss why almost all of the member states of the EU though it necessary to enhance EU military capabilities by invoking the PESCO articles, utilizing a theory, which incorporates the structure of the international system as well as the internal variables, it is believed to be beneficial to formulate an answer to the research question. Furthermore, the framework of inter-organizational multilevel analysis will also look at both the current structure of the international system as well as incorporating other levels relating to member states and key individuals, it seems to be a logical extension of the analysis exactly because both the multilevel framework analysis and the theory of draws from the same empirical foundation.

Although there exists a logical connection between the multilevel framework analysis and the theoretical foundation of the discussion, it can be questioned whether it is possible connect the dots between the EU-NATO relationship to the invocation of the PESCO articles. The reason why it is beneficial first to look at the EU-NATO relationship is that it may provide with some indications of which level point more in the direction of organizational rivalry between the two organizations. These indications can be helpful in the discussion and understanding of why member states of both EU and NATO have chosen to further enhance the European pillar of defence by activating the PESCO articles.

To be more specific, relating to the actual operationalization of neoclassical realism, the theory concerns the explanation of why the EU member states chose a certain type of foreign policy and what type of balancing is going on. For this argument neoclassical realism will help us theoretically discuss and understand the activation of the PESCO articles in relation to these notions of balancing. On such assumptions, the neoclassical realist theory will be held up against and in

accordance with the analysis presented in chapter five as well as the analysis to further discuss the cooperation/rivalry inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO.

#### **4.0 Current EU-NATO Cooperation and the PESCO Articles**

As this thesis will examine inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO, it would make great sense to highlight how and under which institutional premises the EU and NATO currently cooperate. Furthermore, the same can be said concerning the PESCO articles – basically, what does the activation of Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU entail? This section will therefore provide the reader with background information vital for the following sections.

#### **4.1 EU-NATO Cooperation**

The framework agreement between the EU and NATO is set out in what is known as the Berlin Plus Agreement from 2003. The agreement has seven major parts in which entails agreements on topics such as: (1) an EU-NATO security agreement; (2) EU access to NATO planning capabilities for EU led Crisis Management Operations (CMO); (3) the possibility for EU to borrow NATO assets for CMOs; (4) Procedures for NATO assets and capabilities when these where to be recalled/monitored/released/returned (European Parliament n.d.).

This means that the two organizations work together under the frameworks set out in the agreement, which also includes meetings on a regular basis as well as cooperating in the field of counter terrorism and of the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, to mention a few (North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>05</sup> 2018).

#### **4.2 The PESCO Articles**

The PESCO articles were invoked in late 2017 and include two components: specific projects and binding commitments (Fiott et al. 2017: 8). The activation of PESCO has been argued to be a reaction to the ongoing conflict in Libya and Syria, the outcome of the Brexit referendum, and the election of President Trump (ibid.: 20) – a wake up call for the Europeans to be more serious about their own security and defence.

In the notification to the Council and HR/VP from the member states it was stated that “PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and it’s citizens. PESCO also provides a crucial political



framework for all member states to improve their respective military assets and defence capabilities through well-coordinated initiatives and concrete projects based on more binding commitments” (ibid.: 21). This tells us that the willingly participating member states have accepted this legal framework and if a member state should not fulfill its obligations towards the PESCO obligations, there will be legal repercussions. Furthermore, the notifications also indicates, what the PESCO framework will produce: “PESCO will be output oriented and should enable tangible progress on the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, collaborative capability development goals and the availability of deployable defence capabilities for combined missions and operations acknowledging the single set of forces principle” (ibid.: 22). This tells us that the EU will eventually be able to deploy military personnel in military operations, which is much like what NATO is currently doing, and as Fiott et al. put it: “If the European states are ultimately not better able to do military operations through PESCO, then, the argument goes, why bother?” (ibid.: 29).

## **5.0 The EU-NATO Relationship**

This chapter focuses on analyzing the inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO. The analysis will be a multilevel framework analysis as presented by Koops (2017: 189). All of the different levels will all contribute to the estimations of how the overall EU-NATO relationship looks like, in other words, if the two organizations are generally cooperative or rivals. That being said, the analysis does not only provide us with a definite answer of cooperation or rivalry, but as the analysis is a multilevel framework, one can also imagine that the outcome of the analysis most likely does not point 100% to either cooperation or rivalry. Thus, the analysis will also let us know where and to which degree in the different levels where the inter-organizational relationship are prone to be more cooperative in nature or reflect that of rivalry. This will all be summed up in the last section of this chapter.

### **5.1 International System Level**

The international system is in a stage of disarray, which means that the geopolitical situation as was established with the end of the Cold War back in the early 1990’s might be more or less volatile to transgressions of the established international law. In this aspect, this section seeks to present the most recent violation of international law, namely the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. To this extent the post-annexation reactions and responses from both the EU

and NATO will be analyzed in order to determine whether or not this event has pushed for inter-organizational cooperation or rivalry between the EU and NATO.

### **5.1.1 Russia's Annexation of Crimea**

The Ukrainian conflict has yet to be resolved and it is therefore interesting to dive deeper into this case, as we will see how it affects the international system as well as how it correlates to the realist assumption of the international system being anarchic. It is argued, that the Ukrainian conflict that started in November 2013 was actually ignited 10 years prior to the Euromaidan demonstrations, the reason for this was the Orange Revolution where the people of Ukraine showed their discontent toward the Ukrainian democratic system, and this eventually led to the election of the pro-Western leader Victor Yushchenko in 2005 (Freedomhouse01 n.d.). After winning the election Yushchenko started to reach out to the EU and the West, which led to the creation of an association agreement with the EU and later negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (European External Action Service n.d.). In 2010, Victor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician, won the election. Contrary to the recommendations of the Ukrainian Parliament, the association agreement was not signed (Freedomhouse02 n.d.). It was the suspension of the association agreement with the EU that led to the demonstrations in November 2013 on the central square in Kyiv, and when these demonstrations became more violent, Yanukovych fled to Russia and took charge of the government (ibid.). As the Ukrainian government was somewhat dismantled, a Crimean secessionist group supported by Russia gained territory and eventually declared independence from Ukraine, which led to the Russian accession of Crimea in March 2014 (Hilpold 2015: 244). Furthermore, as Yanukovych – according to Russia – was removed illegally and the government was in disarray, Russia also used this opportunity to annex Crimea (Mearsheimer 2014: 77). And in addition hereto, Russia had also been giving citizenship to a lot of people living in Crimea (Bebler 2015: 36). According to Russian law, if there are Russian people, living outside the Russian boarder, whose livelihood are threatened, Russia has the responsibility to protect these citizens as Vladimir Putin stated in the parliamentary session (The Washington Post 2014). Additionally, the fact that Russia has responsibility to protect its citizens abroad if they are claiming to be dangerously oppressed do create an opportunity for Russia to intervene in another country, as has been seen before (Wilson and Popescu 2009: 322).

### 5.1.1.1 United Nation's View of the Annexation and the Premise of Anarchy

As noted by Sasse (2017) the Russian annexation was a clear violation of international law, but then who has the possibility to uphold these laws? Coming from a realist background neoclassical realism holds true the neorealist believe of the international system being anarchic. Although there is no structure in the international system thus no overarching authority to enforce laws upon sovereign states (Waltz 1979: 88), this does not mean that sovereign states does not sometimes interact and make alliances with each other, especially if their security is at risk, but such alliances would still be depended on the willingness of the states involved in such a construction (ibid.: 166).

If we turn our heads to the United Nations (UN), which – if any – could be considered an organization putting structure to the international system, they state that they actually can take action “on the issues confronting humanity in the 21st century, such as peace and security, climate change, sustainable development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian and health emergencies, gender equality, governance, food production, and more.” (United Nations01 n.d.). The UN is an IO due to the fact that the organization has a Charter by which all its members must adhere to. In cases where there has been some form of violation such as peace and security, it is to be decided by the UN Security Council, who has the main responsibility to uphold and maintain international peace and security (United Nations02 n.d.). The Security Council has the sole decision-making authority in the UN relating to i.e. the deployment of forces, but furthermore the decisions taken by the UN Security Council should be accepted and implemented by the members of the UN (ibid.). The response to the Russian annexation of Crimea by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was a non-binding resolution (A/RES/68/262) adopted on 27 March 2014 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine stating that the referendum held in Crimea and Sevastopol regarding autonomy was not authorized by Ukraine, thus the referendum should not be considered as valid (Security Council Report02 2014). A draft resolution (S/2014/189), regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as stating that states or organizations should not do anything to alter the status of Crimea on the basis of the invalid referendum on autonomy, was sought adopted by the UN Security Council, but was vetoed (Security Council Report01 2014). The fact that no legally binding resolution was adopted to protect the status of Crimea it could be annexed by Russia, but as Russia is one of the five permanent members<sup>2</sup> of the UN Security Council (United Nations03 n.d.)

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<sup>2</sup> Other members include China, France, The United States of America, and United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (United Nations03 n.d.).

thus possessing the right to veto (United Nations<sup>04</sup> n.d.), it should come to no surprise that the resolution fell through, and it can be argued that the Russian position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council puts Russia in a favorable position regarding any intervention against itself.

Furthermore, it is clearly stated in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” (United Nations<sup>05</sup> n.d.) an article which undoubtedly has been violated by the Russian annexation of Crimea, but there are seemingly not an IO that can forcefully revoke this annexation even though the article clearly underlines the fact that no country can take another country’s territory. Along the of Waltz regarding his view of the international system, it can be argued that the international system is in fact anarchic as there has yet to be found a solution to this predicament, thus such IOs are only as strong as the members make them (Waltz 1979: 88).

To this extend, it can be argued that the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea can be seen as a major event in the international system as the annexation is a violation of the standard interpretation of the UN Charter concerning states and their territorial integrity. Therefore, with the current international system unable to impose the laws of the UN Charter or unable to force Russia to return Crimea to its previous state, the current structure can be seen as changing, as it thus establishes a new precedence of inaction when it comes to the violation of Article 2(4) concerning territorial integrity. In this sense, it can be argued that the norm of non-territorial intervention established in Article 2(4) in the UN Charter has changed with this event.

#### **5.1.1.2 The EU and NATO’s Response to the Annexation**

According to Koops (2017: 195) this normative change in the international structure has the possibility to create both opportunities as well as constraints for IOs. To dive deeper into the interaction between IOs relating to the first level of the international system, such an event as presented, a crisis could either foster cooperation if a major crises require more than one actor, or rivalry if the crisis require IOs to focus on the same tasks.

The action of the annexation has been and still is condemned by the EU as well as NATO (European External Action Service<sup>01</sup> 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>01</sup> 2018) and both organizations have been active in restoring the peace and order in the Ukrainian society. As Ukraine is not a member of either NATO or the EU they do not possess the possibility to invoke the NATO

Article 5 concerning collective defence (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949), nor do they have the possibility to invoke either Article 42(7) TEU (European Union 2012) concerning mutual defence or Article 222 TFEU (European Union 2008) concerning the solidarity clause. Therefore, they have no mandate to call upon allies in order to forcefully take back the Crimea region, which is also why we have not seen a war break out between NATO/EU member states on the one hand and Russia on the other – though the situation in Luhansk and Donetsk are not actually getting better and fighting is still ongoing, but this remains as fighting between separatists and non-separatists groups (de Waal 2018).

To this extend, it can be questioned what the two IOs do in order to provide and establish security in Ukraine. The Council of the European Union adopted a decision on 22 July 2014 establishing a European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP). EUAM is a non-executive civilian mission meaning that the EU through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is acting as a mentor and advisor to the Ukrainian governments and bodies to create a conceptual framework for the planning and implementation of reforms concerning security services regarding the rule of law as well as restructuring such security services (ibid.). Although there is mention of the security sector, this does not mean that the EU is working in the field of i.e. the army, the navy etc., but the EU is only focusing on the civilian component, meaning law-enforcement agencies such as national police, state border guard service, and national anti-corruption bureau, thus underlining no military component (EUAM Ukraine01 n.d.). The EUAM Ukraine has five different priorities: (1) human-resource management, which ensures the right people are deployed to the different agencies, yet still on an advisory level, meaning that it is the staff of these agencies who are responsible for the implementation; (2) criminal investigation, where the mission is helping to strengthen the Ukrainian authorities to combat organized crime and corruption; (3) public order, which relates to maintaining peace in the civil society, meaning education of the police officers regarding citizen's right to assemble and the upholding of human rights; (4) community policing is advising and trying to establish trust between the authorities and the citizens through interaction and dialogue, and (5) delineation of competencies relates to the division of power in the security sector agencies, thus the EUAM Ukraine mission is advising how to establish a division of labor and responsibilities (EUAM Ukraine02 n.d.). In addition, the EUAM Ukraine has identified some crosscutting issues such as, human rights and gender, good governance, and anti-corruption, which are issues touching

all of their priorities (ibid.) To sum up the EU response concerns the civil security component of Ukraine in a solemnly advisory position.

NATO reacted to the illegal annexation by agreeing to strengthen existing programs on defence education, professional development, security sector governance, but NATO furthermore agreed to establish six<sup>3</sup> Trust Funds (North Atlantic Treaty Organization01 2018). These six Trust Funds promoting security and defence sector reforms and capability development lies within NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (CAP), which was endorsed at the Warsaw Summit on 8-9 July 2016 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization01 2016) and includes: (1) Trust Fund on Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) is to reorganize and modernize Ukraine's C4 structure in order to streamline the C4 sectors with that of NATO as well as to help Ukraine provide for its own security and defence; (2) Trust Fund on logistic and standardization aims to help the Ukrainian armed forces and other military sectors including the national guard and the state border service in reforming its logistical and standardization system; (3) Trust Fund on cyber defence focuses on the development of defensive technical capabilities regarding cyber threats; (4) Trust Fund on medical rehabilitation focuses on the possibilities for personnel in the security and defence sector to be send to the appropriate care; (5) Trust Fund on military career transition helps Ukraine in developing resettlement of military personnel after they leave (North Atlantic Treaty Organization01 2018); and (6) Trust Fund on counter-improvised explosive devises, explosive ordnance disposal and demining, which helps Ukraine develop the right instruments concerning the demining of specific areas (North Atlantic Treaty organization01 2016). These six Trust Funds are all an attempt for Ukraine, in cooperation with NATO, to make reforms in the area of security and defence with an overall goal to strengthen the democratic and civilian control of the armed forces of Ukraine as well as the security institutions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization01 2018). Furthermore, NATO is also providing assistance concerning the strengthening of good governance as well as providing assistance in the fight against corruption (ibid.).

### **5.1.2 Cooperation or Rivalry?**

NATO is trying to assist Ukraine with its security and defence reforms, but contrary to that of the EU there seem to be a division of labor as the EU with its EUAM Ukraine mission is only focused

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<sup>3</sup> NATO initially agreed upon establishing five Trust Funds, but an additional Trust Fund followed in 2016 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization01 2018).

on the civilian part of the reform, whereas NATO with the CAP is more focused on the actual security and defence such as the army and other defence forces and other armed forces. Thus it can be argued that there seems to have been some degree of coordination between the EU and NATO regarding the different types of support and assistance Ukraine has and is receiving from the two organizations. But on the other hand, there are three components to the contrary. Firstly, the legislative text from the Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine states in Article 2 that the "... mission shall mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies in the elaboration of renewed security strategies and in the consequent implementation of relevant comprehensive and cohesive reform efforts" (Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP), whereas the objectives of CAP state "[w]e have launched additional efforts to support the reform and transformation of the security and defence sectors ...." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014). Regarding the framing of words, both organizations are focusing on themes such as 'reforms', 'security', and 'support' or 'advise', as being the main goals for both of the organizations. But as stated above, it seems as though there still exists a dividing line between the work field of both organizations, where the EU is mainly focused on the civilian part and NATO is concerned with the part of the reforms concerning the armed forces – in other words, the military aspect.

This brings us to the second component of the contrary. As explicated above, the EUAM Ukraine mission focuses on the civilian component such as law-enforcement, national police, state border guard, national anti-corruption bureau, but also on the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (EUAM01 n.d.). Focusing on advising on such aspects of the Ukrainian government as well as on the anti-corruption bureau does not stray far from what can be viewed as 'good governance', which – both good governance and the fight against corruption – are also under the umbrella framework of NATO's CAP for Ukraine, as they state "NATO also provides tailored assistance to strengthen good governance and fight against corruption" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014). Thus, it can be argued that even though there seem to be some kind of work divisions between the EU and NATO and the different work they do in Ukraine, there still seem to be some kind of area transgression. But as corruption usually does not remain to only one branch of the government, both organizations should focus on these aspects as to create fertile grounds for the execution of such 'good governance'. But additionally, both organizations do actually explicitly mention the Ukrainian border guards, which can possess one to wonder to which degree do both NATO and the



EU work in the assisting/supporting of border guards, and does this mean that such a shared focus would lead to a clash between the organizations?

Third and lastly, when looking at the Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP, in Article 16(4) on the consistency of the Union's response and coordination it states "[i]n addition, systematic cooperation, coordination and complementarities with activities of other relevant international partners, in particular Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), should be sought in order to ensure effective action", whereas the NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué from 2016 has in its entirety two paragraphs on the NATO-Ukrainian cooperation, Paragraph 117 and Paragraph 118, none of which mention the cooperation with other international actors such as the EU or the OSCE (North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>02</sup> 2016). But the Wales Summit Declaration from 4 September 2014, which entails six paragraphs on the NATO-Ukraine cooperation and it states that "[w]e also welcome the decision by the EU to launch a Common Security and Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and the rule of law." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014), thereby acknowledging the fact that the EUAM Ukraine mission works in the framework of the civilian security sector, but neither this declaration mentions cross-organizational cooperation.

To put in other words, there are clear indications on some kind of cooperation between the two organizations, especially regarding the division of labor in the reformation of the Ukrainian security sector post-annexation of Crimea although official texts from both organizations do not explicitly mention an agreed upon division of labor in this regard. Of course, some of the points regarding i.e. anti-corruption as well as 'good governance' are the same, but would be deemed cross-sector issues and should be dealt with accordingly. The more dire point regarding the division of labor between the EU and NATO comes into question regarding the supporting of border guards, as it seems both organizations play a role in this regard (EUAM Ukraine<sup>01</sup> n.d.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>01</sup> 2016). But even though there seems to be some sort of double focus on the border guard situation, the interpretation of whether or not the Russian violation of international law has caused the two organizations to either focus on the same tasks or whether this has caused them to work together, it seems as there has been a more general tendency towards cooperation in this regard.

## 5.2 Member State Level

This section will revolve around the states and member states of both NATO and the EU. It is not to investigate all of the member states in both organizations mainly due to the fact that such an extensive investigation might not contribute to the overall objective of the project as a large amount of the data will be superfluous regarding this analysis, but also due to the restrictive parameters of the project itself. To this extent, this section will seek to analyze whether or not there is evidence of member states of the EU and/or NATO who are actively trying to either promote cooperation between the two organizations or if there are member states deliberately trying to keep the two organizations apart from each other and maybe even promoting one organization over the other.

### 5.2.1 Cross- vs. Non Cross-Organizational Membership States

One can categorize the members of these institutions as either non cross-organizational membership states, meaning the states that are only members of one of the organizations, and cross-organizational membership states, meaning the states that are members of the EU as well as NATO. These can be seen in the figure below:



(Source: Varwick 2017: 127)<sup>4</sup>

What is interesting to look at in regard to the non cross-organizational membership states are how two (or more) sovereign states with different organizational memberships interact with one another or how their relationship is. What is interesting to look at concerning the cross-organizational membership states are how these states can either foster inter-organizational cooperation, block inter-organizational cooperation, or simply leave one organization out of the foreign policy equation if such opportunity should arise.

#### **5.2.1.1 Non Cross-Organizational Membership States**

Regarding the non cross-organizational membership states, one could imagine that interaction between the states from the different organizational camps would be seemingly constructive and the states would thus engage in cooperation. This would mostly be due to the fact that both organizations share the Western values associated with norms such as democracy and the rule of law, but they also face the same security threats and challenges (Aghniashvili 2016: 68). But such cooperation is not always as simple as it would seem. This is especially evident in the case of the Turkish-Cyprus relationship (Howorth: 2014: 130; Varwick 2017: 130; Delreux and Keukeleire 2014: 176). It would therefore be interesting to investigate this aspect of such and asymmetric organizational membership, as Turkey is a member of NATO but not the EU, whereas Cyprus is a member of the EU but not a member of NATO, which can also be seen in the figure above.

The reason for this ‘bad apple’ in the relationship between Turkey on the one hand and Cyprus on the other basically has its roots in the division of the island of Cyprus, which is divided between Turkey and Cyprus (Aghniashvili 2016: 74). When Cyprus became a member state of the EU, Turkey became more concerned with the development of the EU’s military capabilities because of two reasons: (1) Turkey could be excluded from the general security architecture of the European continent; and (2) Turkey would essentially be left outside the decision making, as they would not be allowed participation in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), thus Turkey would not be

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<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the UK has not been counted as a EU member because they are formally leaving the EU in 2019, thus they do not have a particular interest at the moment concerning European cooperation. Furthermore, Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018), which is the figure presented above is slightly different from the one presented by Varwick (2014: 127).

able to influence the security measures in their neighborhood, which were not the case with the Western European Union (WEU) (ibid.). These Turkish concerns led to difficulties on coming to an agreement regarding the Berlin Plus agreement establishing a formal basis of a strategic partnership between the two organizations (Howorth 2014: 132). The strategic partnership eventually came into being in 2002, which open the possibility for EU to make use of NATO assets as well as capabilities when conducting operations outside NATO frameworks (Delreux and Keukeleire 2014: 176).

As evident, this agreement allowed for institutional cooperation between the two organizations (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2002). But even though such a formal institutional relations has been established, this mechanism has only been activated with the CSDP's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is argued is due to political agreements between Cyprus and Turkey (Howorth 2014: 132). The reason for this is that when Cyprus became a member of the EU what can be described as a 'veto game' started, in which Cyprus – as a EU member – blocked Turkey's involvement in the European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as hindering the Turkish EU membership aspirations, whereas Turkey vetoed sharing NATO intelligence with the EU (Aghniashvili 2016: 74-75). In this sense, it is argued that the NATO-EU relationship has experienced somewhat of 'hostage situation' (Howorth 2014: 130), thus putting some restraints on the organizations to cooperate.

In this sense, one can argue that some member states of either organization do try to keep the different organizations apart. This means that there is some evidence pointing toward a more rivalry between the organizations. However, the political disagreement between the two states with asymmetrical organizational membership does only portray the divergent interests between these two states.

#### **5.2.1.2 Cross-Organizational Membership States**

Of course, only blaming Turkey and Cyprus for the problems in coming to agreements regarding inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO is not fair and does not project the whole truth of the difficulties in cooperating across organizations. In this case, it is argued that the main reason for the cooperation difficulties is because "the traditional divide between Europeanists and Transatlanticists and how this leads to a decoupling in NATO. Therefore, even solving the Cyprus issue may not help overcoming the current impasse over NATO-EU cooperation" (Cebeci

2011: 103). Therefore, it is argued that the complications between Turkey and Cyprus are actually not the root of the problem, and if the Turkey-Cyprus dispute would be settled, there would still be a problem of cooperation between the two organizations, but the 'smokescreen' of the Turkey-Cyprus dispute would not be there, thus highlighting the Europeanist/Transatlanticist division as the cause of the struggling inter-organizational cooperation (Howorth 2014: 133).

To clarify, the divide between Europeanists and Transatlanticists related to the cross-organizational membership states of the two organizations and indicates that the member states hold a difference of opinion regarding which approach to take in regarding European security, meaning whether to focus on establishing a solemnly European defence and seek European security autonomy (Europeanists) or whether to give primacy to NATO as the provider of European security (Transatlanticists) (Cebeci 2011: 94). When referring to these two different perceptions of who should be the provider of European security each position have different supporters. France has for the most parts been the forerunner in pushing for a more Europeanist approach to European security, whereas the United Kingdom (UK) historically has been mostly drawn to the Transatlanticist camp when discussions European security due to its special bond with the USA (Longhurst and Miskimmon 2008: 80), of course together with Denmark, who has an opt-out regarding the CSDP, and thus not legally allowed at the discussion table when it comes to CSDP decisions, and this puts Denmark in the Transatlanticist camp, as it's the only means of establishing security under the framework of an IO (Cebeci 2011: 94). As we know, the UK held a referendum regarding the EU membership, in which it was decided that the UK should leave the EU, meaning that the UK is as of 29 March 2019 no longer a member of the EU and will thus be out of EU legislation (Reuters02 2018). This means that it will no longer be as interesting to look at the UK as a case, as they are not participating or joining more EU operations as they are still negotiating the post-Brexit deals and future relations with the EU.

An interesting case when it comes to the discussion of Europeanists vs. Transatlanticists is the question of Germany. Germany, unlike France and the UK, has been trying to take a middle stand in the Europeanist vs. Transatlanticist discussion in which Germany has been juggling three positions: (1) trying to be a committed NATO member as well as a reliable contributor to the organization; (2) seeking a greater role in the UN; and (3) commit itself to build autonomous European defence mechanisms (Pannier and Schmitt 2014: 272). In this sense, one can argue that Germany is balancing its relationship of the two camps of Europeanists and Transatlanticists, thus

arguably trying to build a bridge between the two organizations (ibid.: 273). Yet the balancing can be difficult for an economic power in the middle of Europe, which also plays a significant role in the diplomatic bilateral discussions regarding the difficult situation in Ukraine (Packer 2014). But even though Germany has had the same discourse in foreign policy regarding security and defence, this has not been without its diplomatic problems, such as in March 2011 where Germany refused to participate in the NATO intervention in Libya, or even before that its refusal to intervene in Iraq with the USA, a refusal also echoed by another major cross-organizational membership state of the EU and NATO – France (Pannier 2014: 273).

France is leaning more towards the Europeanist camp, or at least their position towards both NATO and the EU regarding security and defence policies has been less stable in comparison to that of Germany or the UK (ibid.: 274). Generally speaking, the French view of NATO has evolved from Gaullist perception, meaning wanting more independence from NATO and its members in the field of security and defence policies, to a more positive perception of NATO, where NATO is viewed as a key element in the French security policies (ibid.). In reference to the interventions above in the case of Germany, France did not consent to the intervention in Iraq in 2003, but in the case of Libya in the 2011 NATO military operation France was an active player, which showed the political will of France as well as its readiness for taking responsibility of maintaining peace in its and the EU's neighborhood (Aghniashvili 2016: 83; 85). To this extend, it is also argued that France partakes in a more active role when it comes to foreign affairs and security policies, namely because other EU member states have focused their foreign and security policies on different matters such as economic goals, thus more hesitant to follow France's pursuit in military interventions, which has led scholars to argue that France is a "leader that often has few followers" (Guéhenno 2014). Accordingly, if France were to push other EU member states to play a more significant role in terms of foreign, security and defence policies, it would necessitate some kind of action (ibid.). It can be argued that this was what France did in the wake of the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015, which left 130 dead (BBC 2015). Following the mass shooting, France chose to invoke, for the first time in history, Article 42(7) TEU – also known as the Mutual Defence Clause – which allows for France to request the assistance of other EU member states bilaterally in order to combat ISIL (Cîrlig 2015: 8). The reason why this choice is of interest is the fact that France could have chosen to invoke NATO's Article 5 concerning collective defence as the USA did following the 9/11 Terrorist attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017). The choice of not

invoking NATO's article 5 can be due to different reasons i.e.: France invoked Article 42(7) TEU because they wanted closer diplomatic ties with Russia and the Arab countries to work together in defeating ISIL, thus doing that through NATO could be a big 'no-no' regarding Russia; or it could be a political symbol for France's effort in enhancing EU's security and defence policies and push for a renaissance perception of the role of the EU in international affairs (Cîrlig 2015: 8).

### 5.2.2 Cooperation or Rivalry?

To determine whether or not members from the non cross- and the cross-organizational camps promote inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO or whether they deliberately try to keep the organizations apart i.e. by promoting one organization over the other can in this case be difficult to determine. We saw in the section 5.2.1.1 that the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus did probably not depict a typically fertile environment for inter-organizational cooperation, as they due to a 'veto-game' because of bilateral disputes deliberately hindered cooperation between the EU and NATO as the organizations consequently could not share intelligence, thus they were holding the could be cooperation hostage (Howorth 2014: 130). In this case, it can be strongly argued that both Turkey and Cyprus being were deliberately trying to keep the organization apart, which thus indicates a rivalry between the EU and NATO.

Regarding the cross-organizational membership states, we mainly focused on Germany on the one hand and France on the other. Germany has more or less consistently been trying to balance its relations with the EU on the one hand and the relations with NATO on the other in order to gap the bridge between the Europeanist and the Transatlanticist view of security, to the most extent fairly good, but in some cases the Berlin way of conducting foreign policy has been constricting of inter-organizational such as in Libya where they were against military intervention, thus there was no formal cooperation between the EU and NATO in this case as the Berlin Plus mechanism was not presented to NATO allowing the EU to make use of NATO capabilities (Aghniashvili 2016: 86). In the case of Libya, it can thus be argued that there is a primacy of national interests, which affects the nature of the mission and therefore it questions the EU member states' ability to come up with a unified position regarding possible military/civilian interventions (ibid.).

France has a more activist approach when it comes to military interventions where, unlike Germany, France pushed for military intervention in Libya proving its willingness of cooperation between NATO and the EU (ibid.). But as France, following the 13 November 2015 terrorist attack



activated Article 42(7) TEU when they could have activated NATO's Article 5 concerning collective defence, they literally promoted one organization above the other.

The question remains: does the member states, independent of their organizational affiliation, promote inter-organizational cooperation or do they promote rivalry between them? Yes and no. Generally speaking, there probably would not have been a framework for inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO in the first place had it not been for the member states wanting such mechanisms, as the Berlin Plus agreement, to exist – and this shows willingness of all the member states. But, the problem of the cooperation happens due to the divergence of national interests and national interests will get caught when conducting foreign policy with multiple member states with diverging foreign policy goals. As a consequence, large-scale security/defence operations with different actors will most likely be a zero-sum game if consensus is needed within an IO in order to carry the operation out in the first place. Thus, inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO is indeed wanted for the most parts, but complex to achieve – unless a common position on foreign policy is established.

### **5.3 The Individual Level**

When examining the individual level in the multilevel framework analysis the focus needs to be on key individuals and their relationship to each other (Koops 2017: 201). In order to figure out whether the relations of the key individuals reflect that of empathy or antipathy, the investigation will focus on what is said by these leaders and how other leaders receive it. The reason for this is that key individuals in such key positions will most likely not directly say or talk about relations – especially if they are not good, as this could have severe diplomatic repercussions

As mentioned in section 2.3.4.3 concerning the individual level in the multilevel framework analysis, this section will focus on the political leaders in the EU and NATO as well as the key individuals in the member states in those organizations. Therefore, the position of the organizational leaders will be presented next. Following this, the statements of leaders in non cross-organizational membership states – with emphasis on the American President. Lastly, the statements and reactions of key individuals in cross-organizational membership countries will be presented. With these positions it will be analyzed whether or not the individual level in the multilevel framework analysis points in the direction of cooperation or rivalry of the EU and NATO.

### **5.3.1 Key Individuals in NATO and the EU**

Key individuals in IOs rarely talk about national leaders or involve themselves too much in domestic politics because – from a realist point of view – the IOs only exist because of its member states, thus publicly hanging out specific national Heads of States to dry, is generally not best way of conducting diplomacy. Furthermore, neither NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg nor any of the key individuals in the EU such as: the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani; European Council President, Donald Tusk; or HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, have been vocal on critiquing each other's institutions, rather they have praised each other for sharing the same values and goals as well as having emphasized the importance of cooperation (North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>04</sup> 2018). This is especially the case regarding security and defence where there seems to be a mutual understanding between the key individuals in both organizations that cooperation is the best way forward when it comes to optimizing civilian and military capabilities in both organizations.

### **5.3.2 Key individuals in Non Cross-Organizational Member States**

When looking at the key individuals in non cross-organizational member states, it is difficult not to talk about President Trump, as he has been vocal about the NATO member states and their contribution to the alliance. During his presidential campaign, his rhetoric of NATO has been very tough for instance calling NATO “obsolete” (Herb 2017). This arguably spawned some uncertainty among the other NATO member states, which are dependent on the contractual security and defence mechanisms concerning the retention of NATO's Article 5 on collective defence (Demetriou 2016: 14). The uncertainty of whether or not the USA would hold to its agreements concerning collective defence, can be said to have caused greater concern in the Baltic region in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea, as the Baltic region has a large population of ethnic Russians, mostly in Estonia and Latvia, where it is estimated that 27 percent of people in Estonia who identifies as or speak Russian and around 30 percent in Latvia (Posener 2016). This refusal to explicitly assuring the other NATO member states to assert the USA's full commitment of Article 5 was also not done when the newly elected President Trump met with the other Heads of States for the first time on 25 May 2017 during the unveiling of the Berlin Wall monument at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, but the focus in his speech was – again – on the lack of the military spending of the other NATO member states (Smith 2017). President Trump has of course later

publicly committed to the collective defence article in a press conference on 9 June 2017 (White House03 2017) approximately two weeks after he met all of the other Heads of States in Brussels, and only when asked about it by a reporter. Thus, it is argued that he gets some credit for finally ensuring the USA's commitments to NATO's collective defence clause, but as it took President Trump almost six months to assure the USA's closest allies of its position on Article 5 and only when asked by a reporter at a press conference instead of in front of all of the Heads of States from the NATO membership countries does have some symbolic meanings (Gramer 2017). And of course, when President Trump tweets "We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military. Very bad for U.S. This will change" (Trump03 2017) only five days after the less successful NATO summit in Brussels probably does not help building diplomatic ties, not even if the country has been a close ally for over half a century.

### **5.3.3 Key Individuals in Cross-Organizational Member States**

After the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 25 May 2017, the G7 meeting took place on 26-27 May 2017 in Sicily, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a speech during the Tudering Fest in Munich stating that "[t]he era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent [...] That's what I experienced over the past several days" (Kranitschnig 2017). This does to some extent bare some undertone that Chancellor Merkel did not view both the NATO summit in Brussels and the following G7 meeting as successful. This statement was followed up with "[w]e Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands, of course in friendship with the United States, in friendship with Great Britain, with other neighbors wherever possible, also with Russia" (Barkin 2017), implying the need for European countries to take security and defence more serious in order to be more independent from previous security and defence arrangements. That being said, Germany and the rest of Europe do strongly still need the protection the USA can offer (Sauerbrey 2018) and the USA is for Germany an indispensable partner, even though Chancellor Merkel or President Trump do not see eye-to-eye on subjects such as climate or trade. To this extent Chancellor Merkel has made it clear that Germany and the USA are allies no matter who sits in the White House (Kranitschnig 2017) – and if Chancellor Merkel really would turn away from the USA, it most likely would not be in the settings of a beer tent. And even if the German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, might have a more negative view on the German-

American relationship, after the election of President Trump, stating that “The U.S.’s retreat [from its international role] is not due to the policies of only one president. It will not change fundamentally after the next elections” (Sheahan 2017), Germany and the USA in joint press conferences holds true to rhetoric of ‘allies’ and ‘friends’ (White House01 2017).

France and President Emmanuel Macron have had a different approach to the relationship with the USA and President Trump, where the Chancellor Merkel somewhat openly and confrontational to the ordeal, President Macron has been more embracing of President Trump (Kirchick 2018) i.e. inviting him and his wife, Melania Trump, to the celebration of Bastille Day, even if they have had contradictory views on the Paris Agreement (BBC 2017). Other than that, compared to Germany, the USA does not have as big as a trade deficit with France as it does with Germany and France does almost reach (1.8%) the 2 percent GDP on defence thus meeting the NATO goal (Rogers and Skolimowski 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization03 2018). This is also highlighted by the use of ‘oldest ally’ and ‘great relationship’ in the reason bilateral meeting with President Trump and President Macron (White House01 2018). But yet, it still remains to be seen whether President Macron’s different approach for establishing a relationship with President Trump will be helpful regarding cooperation, because as of now, President Trump has: (1) pulled out of the Paris agreement (White House02 2017); pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – also known as the Iran Deal (White House02 2018); and (3) moving the USA’s Israeli embassy to Jerusalem (White House04 2017). All of these three events were not in line with the view of France, Germany or the EU (Anderson 2018; European External Action Service02 2018; European External Action Service01 2017).

#### **5.3.4 Cooperation of Rivalry?**

What can then be said about the relationships between these core individuals and their relationship with each other? The first relationship we investigated was between the key individuals in NATO and the EU. Generally, due to their high ranking positions, they have to be as open as possible to diverging national interests, as the positions, which they fill out, are dependent on the willingness of the member states in each of the organizations. To this end, they seek to be as cooperative as possible.

Regarding the other key individuals, in this case President Trump, President Macron, and Chancellor Merkel, their relationships seem to take some hits. Without trying to sound partial,

President Trump does seem to have a different approach to foreign policy than what probably is the standard, by which is meant his means of communication more often than not bashing other allies such as “Nevertheless, Germany owes [...] vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!” (Trump01 2017; Trump02 2017), or “We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military. Very bad for U.S. This will change” (Trump03 2017). Furthermore, despite President Trumps’ strong stance of negotiation techniques regarding not only trade deals but any kind of deals. President Trump seems to be pulling the USA out of several international agreements.

All in all, as more member states are increasing their defence spending and President Trump has affirmed NATO’s Article 5 concerning collective defence, there seems to be an overall good relationship between the key individuals regarding security and defence cooperation, even though there has been and still exists some disagreement international agreements and trade deals.

#### **5.4 Bureaucratic and Inter-Institutional Levels**

The two last levels in the, the level of bureaucracy and the inter-institutional level has in this analysis been put together under one section. The reason for this is because of how closely related they are to each other (Koops 2017: 206). To this extent this last part of the analysis will focus on such the Joint Declaration signing in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 during the NATO Warsaw Summit and its following implementation. Furthermore, as the informal institutional channels play an increasingly important role in the inter-institutional level, in which interviews with personnel in these operating forums would be beneficial for the analysis, this part will be reliant on previous scholars investigating the everyday EU-NATO relations such as Nina Græger (2016; 2017) through practice approaches.

This will hopefully be sufficient for a valid estimation on whether or not there are a willingness or interest of the two IOs to cooperate together in joint problem solving or if there exists an inter-organizational community with strong institutionalization. If not this, then the finding can push us more in the direction of weak units dealing with partner IOs or is there generally a strong indication of anti-loyalty toward the partner IO?

#### 5.4.1 EU-NATO Joint Declaration

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, European Council President Tusk, and European Commission President Juncker signed on 8 July 2016 a joint declaration (European Council 2016). The Council later concluded the implementation of the joint declaration (European Council 2017) in which it states in its first paragraph

“[T]he Council welcomes the continued close and mutually reinforcing co-operation with NATO in areas of shared interest, both strategically and operationally, in crisis management in support of international peace and security as well as on defence capability development where requirements overlap. For the EU, the Implementation of the Joint Declaration remains a key political priority.” (ibid.).

From this it is easy to understand that the EU projects show a strong willingness for even further cooperation between the two organizations in the area of crisis management, in support of international peace and security as well as in defence capability development. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the full implementation of the joint declaration remains a key priority for the EU and together with that stated in paragraph two “The Council welcomes further progress made in the implementation of the common set of proposals (42 actions)” (ibid.), one has to have good argumentation skills if one does not think that such statements does not reflect a general interest of the EU to work together with NATO and seek a solution to problems related to security, defence and crisis management. In this sense, one could easily argue that The Council’s conclusion on the EU-NATO Joint Declaration does reflect that of cooperation. Yet this leads us to paragraph four in the Council conclusion, which states that

“The Council reaffirms that EU-NATO cooperation will continue to take place in the spirit of full openness and transparency, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations and in close cooperation with and full involvement of Member States. It is based on the principles of inclusiveness and reciprocity without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State.” (ibid.).

This statement in the Council conclusion highlights the importance of the involvement and consequently the agreement of the member states, thus relying on the member states to be the active

driving element behind any action taken in order to cooperate inter-organizational. In this case, it still remains that formal cooperation between the EU and NATO regarding operations in the field such as crisis management would still only be possible through the Berlin Plus agreement, which has been called a ‘dead letter’ as the provisions of the agreement concerning the cooperative framework has only been activated twice: Operation Concordia (ended in September 2003); and EUFOR Operation Althea, which has been ongoing since 2004 (Järvenpää and Raik 2017: 6). In this sense: yes, both the EU and NATO seem to be interested in the cross-organizational cooperation, thereby also the member states – formally.

Thinking back to section 2.3.4.4, it was stated that “it is important to assess the capacity”, meaning the organizational capacity and the operational experience (Tarvares 2010: 17-18). From what is presented above, it can be argued that the EU and NATO do have the organizational capacity, such as the legal mandate, resources, and procedures to cooperate, but does it have the operational experience? Since the EU and NATO has been previously and still are cooperating under the framework of the Berlin Plus agreement, one can say ‘yes, but!’ and question whether two operations since the Berlin Plus Agreement was finalized in 2003 (European External Action Service 2016) really counts as comprehensive operational experience.

#### **5.4.2 Everyday EU-NATO Relations**

In the process of researching the inter-organizational relationship of the EU and NATO through a multilevel framework of analysis, it was unfortunately not possible to conduct interviews with individuals working in intermediary positions between the two organizations. This could have been essential concerning the inter-institutional level, as their view or the working processes relating to the different organizational communities could have provided an interesting viewpoint. However, as most of the literature of the EU-NATO cooperation has been focused on problems such as national agendas, it is argued by Græger that “there is inter-organizational action and innovation in the form of a range of new *informal* cooperation practices involving a range of agents” (Græger 2016: 479). With this, Græger focuses on the everyday informal practice in the work field between the EU and NATO – when cooperation is blocked, i.e. due to the Cyprus-Turkey conundrum, or when there are no political signals to guide by – through the application of practice theory (ibid.). Græger’s studies of the informal cooperation between the EU and NATO provide a good contribution to this section where the investigation falls short due to the lack of conducted interviews.



According to Græger, there are a lot of staff-to-staff cooperation, as the staff from the two different organizations often have informal contact such as over meals, on the phone, through mail, or just see each other for informal meetings, but the quality or frequency of these meeting usually depends on the personal relationship (ibid.: 484). As this practice of good relations across organizational works spheres, what is of importance in the many military liaisons as well as meeting points, which are created in the framework of the Berlin Plus Agreement and these are important for staff-to-staff cooperation (ibid.). Græger highlights specifically: The EU and NATO Military Committees; EU Military Staff and the NATO Permanent Liaison Team; or the EU-NATO Capability Group (ibid.: 484-485). Particular importance is put on the informal cooperation when the two organizations are conducting separate missions in the same area such as Afghanistan or the Gulf of Aden, which means that there has been an extended amount of cross-briefings (ibid.: 485).

Generally speaking, when it comes to the EU-NATO cooperation, Græger argues that the formal tool concerning inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO as established with the Berlin Plus Agreement is still a way of doing business with each other. However, the primary tool of cooperation, the Berlin Plus Agreement, has as mentioned, been called a 'dead letter', which is why the cooperation between the EU and NATO has been overtaken by political event, thus in its absence the staff in the center of the EU-NATO cooperation has engaged with each other on a more informal basis (ibid.: 495).

### **5.4.3 Cooperation or Rivalry?**

Compared to the other levels, the two levels of bureaucracy and the level of inter-institutional cooperation have an unambiguous stance on the question of whether or not the two organizations are more prone to cooperation or to rivalry. On the bureaucracy level, the more official and formal setting of the cooperation between the EU and NATO was looked at, with the new implementation of the joint declaration. This showed a huge tendency toward cooperation between the organizations, as they seem to have stressed that cooperation between the EU and NATO are of high interest to both and joint problem solving is the way forward. But, it should be noted, that the effectiveness of such cooperation still depends on the willingness of the member states.

Regarding the inter-institutional level it was not possible to conduct interviews with the personnel working with cooperative elements of the two organizations, thus the section relied heavily on the research conducted by Nina Græger (2016; 2017) due to her focus on exactly the

everyday interaction and cooperation on different levels in the cooperation between the EU and NATO. Her studies show that even though there formally has not happened much in the cooperation between the two organizations, mainly due to what she calls the “Cyprus issue” (Græger 2017: 341). The impasse in the inter-organizational cooperation has caused its personnel to move from the formal levels of cooperation to the more informal level of cooperation, thus it can be argued that though impasses in the cooperation have been met, its workers have still been able to enhance cooperation despite of the fact that some member states do little to enhance cross-organizational cooperation. To this extent, it can be argued that both the bureaucratic framework, even though it is not always effective, and the inter-institutional levels are pointing towards cooperation between the EU and NATO.

### **5.5 Summing Up the Inter-Organizational Relationship**

We started out in this chapter by looking at the international level, in which it was established that both the EU and NATO are conducting missions in Ukraine after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. The ways in which the EU and NATO have chosen their focus on their operations have been different. The EU has focused their EUAM Ukraine mission solemnly on the civilian aspect of the crisis by taking on an advisory role, whereas NATO’s CAP operation is more focused on the actual security and defence, yet still on an advisory role, such as advising the army and the defence forces, in order for them to come closer to the NATO standard or conducting military training and exercises. Furthermore, we also established that there has not been any formal agreement between the EU and NATO on these missions as the EU did not present NATO with the request of activating the Berlin Plus Agreement, thus formally establishing institutional cooperation between the two organizations in the case of Ukraine, therefore the two have been acting on their own devices. That being said, it seems unlikely that the two organizations have not been cooperating a bit. This unlikeliness is furthermore supported by what was unrevealed in the section concerning the inter-institutional level, where it was established that the formal ways of conducting cooperation have move to informal channels, thus cooperation to some degree have been present prior to each mission.

Regarding the member state level, it seemed more difficult to determine because there are some argument for and against such cooperation. Firstly, we looked at the Turkey-Cyprus problem and how it has led to the fact that the Berlin Plus Agreement has not been utilized ever since Cyprus

became a member of the EU. Furthermore, we also established that there are still some differences in the way the member states of the EU wants to conduct their foreign policy, such as the case in Libya where France was for a military intervention but Germany against, thus neither in this case there was a formal framework of cooperation between the EU and NATO. Lastly, we pointed to the fact that France in the wake of the terrorist attack on 13 November 2015 chose to invoke Article 42(7) TEU instead of NATO's Article 5 on collective defence, thus deliberately choosing one IO above another. In this case, it was argued that the EU needs to streamline its foreign policy in order to achieve constructive cooperation with NATO.

Cooperation or rivalry on the individual level was focused on the key individuals in the EU and NATO, President Trump, President Macron, and Chancellor Merkel. The findings in that part of the analysis showed that the leaders in the organizations seemed to have a strong and positive relationship with each other, but also because they often have stated the importance for the two organizations to work together. Interesting though, is how President Trump and his way of during international politics, one the one hand bashing old allies through Twitter communications and on the other hand praising their friendship at press conferences, as well as the fact that President Trump has pulled out of international agreements, which the other allies as well as the EU think positively of. Such things can influence relationships across the specter, but as the NATO's Article 5 has been confirmed and the defence spending of the NATO member states has been increasing, one would argue that the relationship are generally good.

Concerning the bureaucratic and the inter-institutional level, which are analyzed together, it was established that on the bureaucratic level, there are formal functions of cooperation through the Berlin Plus Agreement, yet the main inter-organizational cooperation does not go through the formal channel. On the contrary, the formal channels of cooperation and communication are moving towards the informal levels between the staff in the lower levels thereby avoiding challenges of blocking member states. In this light, there cooperation between the EU and NATO are strong, though not as evident.

Altogether, as for any partnerships, may it be inter-organizational, bilaterally, in companies, or even in marriages, there are always some hurdles to overcome in order for the cooperation to be fully efficient. The same goes for the inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Both of the IOs consist of member states, which do possess many of the same values and face the same crisis, but they also have some diverging interests in a globalized world. But the overall

assessment of the inter-organizational relationship does point more in the direction of two IOs that are interested in cooperation and joint problem solving.

## **6.0 Neoclassic Realist Discussion of the EU-NATO relationship and the PESCO Articles**

This section will provide a discussion of the EU-NATO relationship taking into account the recent activation of the PESCO articles. This will be done by firstly discussing the intervening variables as presented by Rose (1998: 157-165), and secondly the balancing concepts as presented by Schweller (2010: 166-168).

### **6.1 Neoclassical Realism and Intervening Variables**

As mentioned in section 3.1, neoclassical realism has two intervening variables: the decision-maker's perception of the international environment, and internal apparatus in relation to the surrounding society.

#### **6.1.1 First Intervening Variable**

Taking a look at the decision-maker's perception of the international environment, we established in the analysis that the international system was anarchic. This was due to the illegal annexation of Crimea, to which there was no overarching IO who possesses the means and authority to actually change the fact that Crimea has been annexed by Russia. As it was mentioned, if such a disruption of the international environment influences the decision-makers to change their understanding of the country's situation, it will indeed change how the individual view their foreign relation with that country. To this regard, it can be argued that the fact that Crimea has been annexed, proposes such a disruption in the international environment, which did actually create a changed view of Ukraine's situation by the decision-makers in the EU, as the agreement of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was not signed in the first place. The fact that the decision-makers in the EU viewed the annexation of Crimea, as a disruption of the international environment is also recognizable by the establishment of EUAM Ukraine, which was a direct response to the annexation, as discussed in previous sections. Furthermore, what was left out in section 5.1 concerning the international system level – but is a commonly know fact – is the sanctions, of which the EU put on Russia as a retaliation to the annexation (European External Action Service02 2017). Of course these sanctions toward Russia do not have anything to do with military capabilities, any type of European defence

mechanisms, nor were the sanctions relevant in the EU-NATO relationship, which is why the sanctions were excluded in the first place, but for the supportive role they have concerning how the annexation changed the view of EU member states, they feed into the first intervening variable of neoclassical realism nicely. Thus, for the decision-makers in the EU, it can be argued that the annexation of Crimea was a disruption of the international environment that has influenced the decision-makers in the EU, which in turn will push for a change in foreign policy of the EU member states – namely the activation of the PESCO articles.

Turning our heads toward NATO, the same argument can be drawn in this regard. As we already established, NATO reacted to the illegal annexation of Crimea by creating CAP, which was endorsed at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>01</sup> 2016). The apparent disruption of the international system has also affected the decision-makers in NATO – keeping in mind that there are 21 cross-organizational member states, this probably does not come as a surprise. However, as CAP was a reaction to the annexation it supports the fact decision-makers will change foreign policy if the disruption in the international environment changes their view of Ukraine's situation. Furthermore, another aspect of the decisions made in the Warsaw Summit was the creation of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) (North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>02</sup> 2016), this was also left out of the analysis, as the EFP is not connected to the EU, just like the EU sanctions is not directly connected with NATO. However, as the establishment of the EFP is also a response to the annexation, this further feeds into the fact that this was a disruption of the international environment, thus actions must be made.

### **6.1.2 Second Intervening Variable**

Regarding the internal apparatus of the EU. With the activation of the PESCO articles, the EU – now with a legal foundation – will soon be able to have deployable defence capabilities, as it was stated in section 4.2. Yet of course, this does not simply happen over night and might take some years before this becomes a reality. As previous stated in section 4.2 concerning the PESCO articles, activating these articles will provide a framework for the EU member states to improve their military assets based on legally binding commitments. With this in mind and the fact that no less than 25 EU (only without Denmark, Malta, and the UK) member states has fully committed to the enhancement of defence and military branch of the EU, it is save to say that the internal apparatus of the EU – or more precisely, its member states – is ready to redistribute its resources to

action-taking in the international system. Reiterating Rose from section 3.1, it would be the internal apparatus in relation to the surrounding society (Rose 1998: 161) and, as mentioned above, Russia's aggression towards Ukraine can be argued to have initiated a response of the EU member states to collectively redistribute their individual resources in order to take action or secure against the surrounding society outside of the EU. This collective action-taken or securement can be viewed as a form of balancing concept against the aggressive state, which disrupted the international environment.

## 6.2 Neoclassical Realist and the Balancing Concept

Stated by Schweller "[b]alancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of allies to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition." (2010: 166). As we discussed above, it seems that the EU member states have collectively agreed that there was a need to move in the direction of further enhancing EU military and defence capabilities. This keyword here is 'collectively', as this would not have made much of a difference, if only a few EU member states were to join. To this extend, it will be discussed which type of balancing corresponds to the activation of the PESCO articles.

If we start by looking at Schweller's fourth type of balancing, underbalancing, it can easily be argued that this is not the case in this situation. The main reason for this is simply that should underbalancing occur, there would be no response to an aggressive state, and as we have just established, the response has been plentiful totaling: EUAM Ukraine, EU sanctions, CAP, EFP, and now the activation of the PESCO articles.

The third type of balancing is nonbalancing. According to Schweller, nonbalancing takes different forms such as: buck-passing or bandwagoning (ibid.: 167). With regard to buck-passing, it can be argued that for the EU and its member states, buck-passing would have entailed a scenario where the main responsibility of balancing military might has been attributed to a non-EU member state. When it comes to the nonbalancing of bandwagoning, it is another case. Single handedly, each individual EU member states are not equal to that of Russia and, as is also apparent from the name, bandwagoning would make smaller states align with a stronger state in order to gain defensive benefits from the stronger state (ibid.). In this case, bandwagoning has already taken place because most of the EU member states are already bandwagoning with the USA through the

NATO alliance. To this extend, activating the PESCO articles would mean that it is an extra defence enhancement, thus more than 'just' bandwagoning.

This leaves us with either appropriate balancing or overbalancing. As mentioned previously, overbalancing will start an expensive military arms race because a state – or in this case, multiple states in an IO – has misperceived the intentions of another state, and appropriate balancing is when a states/states perceive(s) the intentions of another state correctly (ibid.). Therefore, it is interesting to discuss whether or not activating the PESCO articles is in fact a clever response to the aggressive behavior of Russia. As outlined, the activation of the PESCO articles is something more than just plain bandwagoning, but is it overbalancing? I would seem that by enhancing military capabilities through new gateways within the framework of the EU could actually be a form of overbalancing, because NATO and article 5 is still in place, thus the collective defence mechanisms would still hold true and enhancing military capabilities through other means would be redundant. However, as this was also the case prior to the annexation of Crimea, it can be argued that further enhancement would be needed. This argument also speaks to the fact that the relationship between the cross- and the non cross-organizational membership states currently seems to be a bit tense, as presented in the analysis. Thus, it can be argued that appropriate balancing is the case here.

## 7.0 Conclusion

The basic premise of this project was to understand why almost all of the EU member states found it necessary to activate what is known as the PESCO articles as such a high number of the EU member states share a cross-organizational membership with NATO. The PESCO articles will make it possible for the participating member states to further enhance the military and defence cooperation within the EU by creating a legally binding framework for the participating EU member states. From this perspective, it can and has been question whether or not the EU is trying to become a mutual defence alliance like that of NATO, thus dilute the importance of NATO.

In order to answer the this predicament, the project focused on the inter-organizational relationship between the EU and NATO, as the two organizations share a vast majority of its members, and because the two organizations somewhat and possibly can duplicate the functions of each other in the field of security and defence. In order to analyze the inter-organizational relationship between the two, the project made use of an inter-organizational multilevel framework of analysis as presented by Joachim A. Koops (2017). This multilevel analysis was helpful in



pinpointing the different levels of interaction between the EU and NATO in the respect of seeking out areas where potential rivalry was present.

Overall, the multilevel analysis provided us with an overview of the current relationship between the two organizations. In this regard, the analysis showed that there seems to be a general estimation that the relationship fosters cooperation. However, it is worth mentioning that at the second level, concerning the member state level, there seemed to be some tension, both between the cross- and non cross-organizational membership states. But as it seems now, the current state of the inter-organizational environment has pointed toward a co-operational spirit between the EU and NATO – at least to the best of their capabilities.

Therefore, it is not like the EU would want to increasingly depart from NATO in the sense that the EU, through the activation of the PESCO articles, would compete with the defence mechanism that is NATO. This is mainly because NATO is the strongest mutual defence organization with, of course, the US as the main contributor in terms of their national spending of GDP on defence. Furthermore, the member states of NATO are, no matter who is the Head of State at the moment, still allies, thus nothing good could possibly come from any kind of organizational dismantling. In this sense, the activation of PESCO is, and as it is now, a possible way for the cross-organizational member states to contribute even more to the collective defence mechanism in a more effective way.

As of the discussion, this also pointed towards the fact that the activation of PESCO is not a competitor to NATO prerogatives and the EU is not seeking to establish another defence union thus undermining the importance of NATO. The discussion showed us that the activation of the PESCO articles was in fact a necessity in regard to the concepts of balancing. Invoking these articles would be deemed as an appropriate balancing because by not invoking these articles the EU member states would not be doing enough to deter the aggressor to the east.

Therefore, the activation of the PESCO articles can be seen as subject to both statements: (1) as a consequence of the inter-organizational relationship depicting cooperation, activating the PESCO articles will eventually increase the effectiveness of the military spending in the cross-organizational member states, thereby, and by extension, an increased effectiveness of military spending in NATO; (2) the activation of PESCO will make it easier to agree on proposals concerning security and defence. This will mean that the actions of the willing EU member states can be agree upon faster and more effective.



All in all, the reasons why the member states of the EU have thought it necessary to activate Arts. 42(6) and 46 TEU, even though the vast majority share a cross-organizational membership with that of NATO is because it is a way for the EU member states to increase the European pillar of defence in NATO through improved effectiveness and cooperation thereby saving money, which in turn can be put toward other security and defence matters. Furthermore, it is needed to appropriately balancing the power of Russia. To put it another way: no, the EU is **not** riding two horses at once.

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