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# EU REFORMS AND THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT

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A theoretical analysis of the German parliamentary parties' view on EU reforms



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## Abstract

On September 24. 2017, the German parliamentary election took place and two parties that were not in the Bundestag in the previous period rose over the required level of five percent point needed to earn seats in the parliament. The first of the two parties were the liberal party FDP that has been a permanent part of the Bundestag since 1949 and up until 2013 where they only received 4,8 percent points. The second party was the new Euro critical party AfD. At their first election in 2013, they did not receive enough votes to enter the Bundestag, but at their second election in 2017, they entered the parliament with 10,7 Percent points, thus becoming the fourth largest party.

Around the same time as the German election, the two presidents Macron and Juncker gave speeches, where they each talked about their visions for the future of the EU and came with their proposals of how to achieve these visions through reforms. These reforms were aimed at several policy areas. Additionally, the visions of both Macron and Juncker include the states of the EU to be closer integrated.

It is relevant to investigate this matter, because the German election is an example of how the European political situation has developed over the last few years. Ever more member states have seen an expansion of anti-EU and rightwing parties taking part in both their parliaments and governments as seen in Poland and the UK. This development stands in direct opposition to the vision of Macron and Junker. This conflict can make it hard to get any further European integration through. Furthermore, if the German parliamentary parties cannot agree on which way the EU should go, they could lose their position as one of the leading nations of the EU.

The research of this assignment is looking to answer the question of what the German parliamentary parties' views of the EU-reforms are, and how these can be explained using the adaptation theory. In order to answer the question, interviews with three of the six German parliamentary parties was conducted. Unfortunately, the remaining three parties did not have the time or the interest in taking part in an interview. Other sources of material are the party programs and manifesto. The empirical materials gathered are analyzed and categorized according to the adaptation theory. The adaptation theory categorizes the actions and views of the various parties by the right integrational theoretical paradigms. In this case, these paradigms are the neofunctionalist, federal and liberal intergovernmentalist paradigms.

Thus, the actions and the views of the parties can be categorized as following:

- i. The actions of the CDU/CSU can primarily be categorized as following the adaptation paradigms of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.
- ii. The actions of the SPD can primarily be categorized as following the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism.

- iii. The actions of the AfD can be categorized as following the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism.
- iv. The actions of FDP can primarily be categorized as following the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism.
- v. The actions of Die Linke can primarily be categorized as following the adaptation paradigm of federalism.
- vi. The actions of Die Grünen can primarily be categorized as following the adaptation paradigms of neofunctionalism and federalism.

## Abbreviation List

<u>AfD</u>	<u>Alternative für Deutschland</u>
<u>CDU</u>	<u>Christlich Demokratische Union</u>
<u>CEAS</u>	<u>Common European Asylum System</u>
<u>CFSP</u>	<u>Common Foreign and Security Policy</u>
<u>CO<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>Carbon Dioxide</u>
<u>CSDP</u>	<u>Common Security and Defense Policy</u>
<u>CSU</u>	<u>Christlich-Soziale Union</u>
<u>EC</u>	<u>European Commission</u>
<u>ECB</u>	<u>European Central Bank</u>
<u>ECJ</u>	<u>European Court of Justice</u>
<u>EEC</u>	<u>European Economic Community</u>
<u>EP</u>	<u>European Parliament</u>
<u>EPP</u>	<u>European Peoples Party</u>
<u>ESM</u>	<u>European Stability Mechanism</u>
<u>EU</u>	<u>European Union</u>
<u>EURATOM</u>	<u>European Atomic Energy Community</u>
<u>FDP</u>	<u>Freie Demokratische Partei</u>
<u>GDP</u>	<u>Gross domestic product</u>

<u>GDR</u>	<u>German Democratic Republic</u>
<u>LDPD</u>	<u>Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands</u>
<u>MFR</u>	<u>Manufacturers</u>
<u>NATO</u>	<u>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</u>
<u>NDP</u>	<u>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</u>
<u>NDPD</u>	<u>National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands</u>
<u>OSCE</u>	<u>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</u>
<u>PDS</u>	<u>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus</u>
<u>PESCO</u>	<u>Permanent Structured Cooperation</u>
<u>SED</u>	<u>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</u>
<u>SPD</u>	<u>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</u>
<u>UK</u>	<u>United Kingdoms</u>
<u>UNHCR</u>	<u>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</u>
<u>WASG</u>	<u>Wahlalternative Arbeit &amp; soziale Gerechtigkeit</u>
<u>ÖDP</u>	<u>Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei</u>

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## 1.0 Introduction

On September 24 2017, the German election for both government and parliament took place. After this election, some new parties joined the parliament. The German liberal party, the FDP, came back after their catastrophic election in 2013, where they scores less than the 5 % necessary to earn a seat in the parliament<sup>1</sup>. Another rather new party, the AfD, which is a rightwing party, scored 12,6 % at their second election, becoming the third largest party in the German parliament and thereby gained access to a rather large part of the chairs in the German parliament<sup>2</sup>. The AfD is, like many other European rightwing parties no fan of the European Union (EU). However, unlike many of the other parties like it in Europe, they do not wish to terminate the German membership in the EU. Nevertheless, they are keen on restricting or ending the Eurozone (AfD 2017: 14). After the election, a total of six parties are in the German parliament: CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Bündnis 90/Die Grüne and Die Linke.

While many rightwing parties like the AfD are gaining support all across Europe, the French Prime Minister, Emmanuel Macron, and the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, have been working on their vision of a common Europe. They both have a rather progressive vision of a more common and interdependent EU. Amongst other things, a more integrated Eurozone. The primary goal of the reforms proposed by Macron and Juncker is to further the integration into the EU and stand stronger in the global political scene. Macron and Juncker are looking to let the EU undergo a number of reforms in order to get closer to their vision.

Because Germany is the largest country and has the largest economy of the EU, Germany plays an important role in the political development of the EU, and has e.g. taken the leading role on several occasions, e.g. the euro crisis in Greece (Schneider et al. 2018). However, the opinion of the German people is split towards the EU, which can be seen in the results of the latest election for parliament. Because of these factors of the composition of the new German parliament and the German role in the EU, the investigation of how the various parties in the German parliament reacts to the vision of the future EU that Macron and Juncker has laid out and why these are their views.

This subject is relevant right now, because the German election is a keen example of the European political development over the last few years, where more and more countries have seen an expansion of anti-EU and rightwing parties taken part in both parliaments and even governments like in Poland and of cause the Brexit. This development however, is in direct opposition to the vision of Macron and Juncker. This conflict can make it hard to actually get through with any further European integration. Furthermore, if the German

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<sup>1</sup> [ARD](#)

<sup>2</sup> [Bundeswahlleiter](#)



parliamentary parties cannot agree on which way the EU has to go, they could lose their position of one of the main leading nations of the EU.

Since the German election of parliament, the new German government is being forged at the time of writing, the political scene has been primarily evolving around this, and the parliamentary situation has been overlooked for a while. Furthermore, the plans for the future EU is still a vision and not reality, however, it is very relevant in which direction the EU is moving. Therefore, this assignment will try to fill a gap in the academic literature on this matter.

In order to get around all of the above, the following research question has been formulated:

What are the German parliamentary parties' views on the EU-reforms, and how can these be explained using the adaptation theory?

In an attempt to answer the research question, this assignment will be set up as a comparative case study of the various German parliamentary parties and their political views. Followed by how these would like to influence the EU-policy of Germany and what they think of the plans of the EU-reforms. Finally, these factors will sought to be explained through a theoretical perspective of integration.

Furthermore, the method of investigation will include text analysis in order to insure a thorough analysis and discussion of both background and the investigation itself. As for the theory for the analysis and discussion, not only one will be used, but several. However, they are all integrational theories in order to explore the connection between German parliamentary parties and the EU-reforms. The main approach is to analyze the actions of the party with the adaptation theory in order to pin the right theoretical paradigm to these actions. The theoretical paradigms that will be considered are from the three biggest integrational theories, neofunctionalism, federalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.

## 2.0 Method

In this section, the method and case design will be laid out, along with a short introduction of the theory used and described more in depth later on. Furthermore, this section includes subsections on the structure of this assignment to create an overview for the reader, along with limitations of the material and the research, in order to the focus the topic and go in depth with a smaller, yet more precise, examination. Additionally, there is a subsection on the sources used for the research. Here the steps taken and what to take into consideration when choosing the data.

## 2.1 Case design

Before focusing on the method, the attention will be on the research design. Research designs are dealing with the logical problem of the study, rather than the logistical part (De Vaus 2001: 9). The research design is unlike method, not a way of collecting data, but much more a logical arrangement of inquiry. It is meant to help you assure the right method of collecting data and of analyzing it (ibid.). In this case, the research design is a comparative case study of the German parties, what they think of the EU and its reforms, and how this can be explained by adaptation theories. This investigation is a comparison of the parties in the German parliament, their political visions and missions for the development of the EU.

Some of the things to be aware of before determining the method, is how to focus and clarify the research question. This means more than to just identify the topic of the research. It is not enough to think that you are interested in gaining some knowledge of the chosen topic. You have to determine what answers you need, and which questions you have to ask in order to get these answers (De Vaus 2001: 17).

In order to go in depth with the research of this, the following questions have to be asked and preferably answered along the way of the investigation. This will help the analysis along and assist with a more layered perspective and discussion.

- How do the parties see the role of Germany in the EU, and how will they use it?
- What are the different agendas of the parties concerning the EU?
- Which content does the parties' perception of entirety and their relation to their adaptation theories concerning Germany's EU-policy have?
- What general notions are these adaptation theories build on?

The method of data collection is interviews, analysis of documents and comparative analysis. Additionally, the empirical material of these collections of data, this study is a qualitative research, meaning the method used focuses on textual material and outcomes like academic papers, newspaper articles, and spoken content of the interviews, rather than numbers and quantitative measurements (Andersen et al. 2012: 37).

The text analysis will be used by gathering information from both verbal and written data, about how individuals, or in this case parties, of interest see and make sense of this particular situation. Text analysis is often a methodology used by researcher who wish to understand the views and motives of various cultures and subcultures. In this case, the different parties, with each their different political ideas and agendas can be seen as various groups of politically diverse people, with their own "world view" or political culture. Consequently, some of the data for the text analysis will come from literature about the various parties, party systems and their way of functioning.

As already mentioned, a comparative analysis method will be used for this study. This means, that the findings will be compared, analyzed and discussed accordingly. The purpose of the comparison of the parties

is to create an overview of the political agendas and the various EU-policies of the German parties. Furthermore, the comparative study will help find similarities as well as differences in the parties' EU-policies. A comparative analysis also provides the possibility to be able to look at more parties and thereby create a broader, yet also more in depth analysis of the political spectrum in Germany.

## 2.2 Structure

To best answer the research question mentioned in section 1, the first to do is find and outline an introduction to the topic of the study. Here the main points of investigation along with the motivation for the research is described. The second section is divided into several subsections. Firstly, the research design is laid out in order to know what you need to find answers to along the way of the study, to find the underlying reason of the research question. Furthermore, the research design is there to help know how to proceed in choosing and using the method of data collection and analyzation. In the same subsection, the methods chosen, along with the way they will be used are outlined. The main concepts of text analysis and comparative studies are portrayed in this subsection. Secondly, the structure of the paper is charted to create an overview of what to come. Thirdly, there is a description of the theories, which will be used for the analysis and discussion further down. Moreover, this subsection also entails an explanation as to why exactly these theories were chosen, and how they will help in analyzing the empirical data along with the main assumptions of the theories and what the term "adaptation theories" means. Fourthly, there is a subsection on the terms of being critical and aware when collecting the right data for the analysis. Here, the choices of the interviewees are also described. Lastly, in the method section, the limitations of the research are defined, in order to not stray from the subject of the study and stay focused on the research question. Proceeding from the method, the section of the overview takes over. This section is there to show the collected data for the analysis. The empirical data from the research is depicted in order to give an impression and some background knowledge of the subject before going into the analysis. In the section of analysis, the material from the former section will be analyzed, compared and discussed according to the theories and of cause each other in order to find similarities and differences. Finally, the conclusion picks up on the main findings of the research, analysis and discussions. Furthermore, some of the unanswered questions and questions for further research will be reflected upon. Finally yet importantly, the bibliography will list all of the sources used for the research.

## 2.3 Theory

The theories chosen for this investigation are integration theories, since the focus of the research is on the reforms of Junker and Macron, which aim to further European integration. The theories chosen have been

restricted to the three largest integrational theories, in order to limit the research and not end up with too broad an analysis. Furthermore, the theories will be used as so called adaptation theories, which work with the theoretical conceptual framework of the various integrational theories that the politicians, or in this case parties, form their EU-policies after. This means, the theoretical paradigms, which can explain the decisions of the politicians make and act out of (Schou 1980: 9)

However, first things first, the framework of the integration theories will be explained, starting with neofunctionalism.

### 2.3.1 Neofunctionalism

Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg first introduced Neofunctionalism, with one of the main principles being spillover (Pollack 2010: 17-18, Nugent 2010: 431). The theory has also been called the federal functionalism or the functional federalism. This is mainly because of the lack of success the federalists had explaining the early integrational process in the 1950s, which led to the combination of federalism and functionalism, the foundation of neofunctionalism (Kelstrup 2012: 187). The basic idea that regional political integration could gradually happen at a sectorial level. This sectorial integration would then spread to other areas under the right circumstances through spillover. Thus, continuously further regional political integration (ibid.).

Spillover can be put in two main categories, functional spillover, and political spillover. These two types of spillover were a part of the early neofunctionalism, and are the most important and used categories, which is why the focus will be on these two (Nugent 2010: 431).

Neofunctionalism was the most influential theory of integration in the 1950s-60s. It was the neofunctionalist strategy of integration, which laid the foundation for the European coal and steel community in 1951, as well as the EURATOM and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (Kelstrup 2012: 187). However, it is disputed whether a historical retrospect can confirm the effects of the spillover mechanism has been as the neofunctionalists had predicted (ibid.). However, not many can reject the fact that European integration has gone from integration in one sector to certain others, and thereby gradually and expansive furthered integration as neofunctionalism predicted (ibid.). One can argue, this is still happening and it is the reason why Macron and Juncker are looking to reform the EU by increasing integration further, which makes this theory as relevant as ever.

Initially, governments used functional spillover for decision-making within certain policy sectors. This kind of spillover works by extending into neighboring areas of policy, which are naturally connected (Pollack 2010: 18, Nugent 2010: 431). This means, that functional spillover would cause the integration of some policy areas to unintendedly and naturally promote further integration in several other areas. A particular point is that these functional connections do not just exist prior, but can be created by the actors. This kind of created

spillover is called deliberate spillover, since a connection from one section to another is deliberately created in order to further integration (Kelstrup 2012: 188).

According to neofunctionalism, political spillover happens when supranational actors create more pressure in order to further the integration in cooperation with subnational actors (Kelstrup 2012: 188, Pollack 2010: 18, Nugent 2010: 431). The sub-national actor, who are already working as a part of an integrated section of the supranational, would theoretically come to appreciate the pros of the integration, and thus shift its loyalty from national to supranational, thereby working towards additional integration. The neofunctionalist paradigm would in such a case predict the sectorial integration to be self-sustainable and lead to the creation of new political entities, most likely at the center of the location of the supranational organization (ibid.). Meaning, the supra- and subnational elites seek to create a transnational solution and thereby create political pressure towards further integration.

A different element of neofunctionalism is the fact that, contrary to intergovernmentalism, it ascribes rather much meaning to supranational institutions (Kelstrup 2012: 188). In regards to the European integrational process, the neofunctionalists were particularly concerned with the European Commission (EC) as an organ, which could drive the integration forward. The argument for a better way for the states of negotiating in an international system with a third party as the EC, was that the sovereign states usually have a lowest common denominator, as every state has the right to veto, which can block an agreement. However, in a system with a competent third party the negotiation process would change, since this third party would become a mediator who can steer the negotiations towards a compromise acceptable for all parties involved (ibid.).

Neofunctionalism has been subject of various phases throughout the years. The early neofunctionalists worked with functional and political spillover and assumed that integration an expansive logic for furthering the cooperation among states (Kelstrup 2012: 189). Later on neofunctionalists interpreted the spillover mechanism as something dependent on the leadership qualities of the actors involved in the integrational process (ibid.). At the beginning, the emphasis was on the leadership of the EC, whilst it over time shifted to several involved actors such as leaders of states and other politicians. Thus, the later neofunctionalist theory developed into being more inclusive with strategic actors (ibid.). Furthermore, terms like spillback and spill-around were incorporated into the theory. Terms that do not mean taking a step towards further integration as much as away from it (ibid.). Arne Niemann (2006) made yet another development of the theory. This development of the theory changed the categorization of spillover (Nugent 2010: 432). He changed the categorization from two into five, with the classifications being functional, political, social, cultivated and exogenous (ibid.). However, as previously mentioned in this subsection, functional and political spillover are the types mostly used and they will therefore be the once used here as well. Nevertheless, this does not mean that only be the early stages of neofunctionalism will be looked to for answering the research question.

Since the later developments of the theory include leaders of states and other politicians into consideration, which fits this research very well.

Neofunctionalism has been criticized in its different forms because of a number of things. Particularly for undervaluing the government-determined framework in which supranational actors operate. Moreover, it has been accused of not paying enough attention to the resistance of the member states towards some aspects of the integrational process and the unwillingness of integration when it comes to high politics (Nugent 2010: 432, Kelstrup 2012: 189-190). The theory was on a low when the empty chair crisis happened in 1965, as the French president at the time, Charles de Gaulle, opposed the proposal from the EC to increase the use of qualified majority voting (Cini 2016: 67, Phinnemore 2016: 17). Neofunctionalism was unable to explain the spillback of European integration, which was a result of strong member state opinion against this kind of integration (ibid.).

### 2.3.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism originates from the classical intergovernmentalism, which in turn originated from theories of international relations like realism and neorealism, who both see the states as the main actors in an international system as one of their core principles. This meaning, that the international system of anarchy has no higher nor more important actor than the states (Cini 2016: 66, Pollack 2010: 19, Nugent 2010: 433). Accordingly, the states will only ever further integration or cooperate on matters of international politics, if they themselves benefits from this (ibid.). The interests of the states change according to their position of power in the international system, thus their interests seem to be linked to their own survival and thereby seeing the problems of others as less important, even though they may very well be part of the same group (ibid.). This furthermore means that the states will be more disinclined to cooperate with others when talking about “high politics”, one of which is security and defense politics (Kelstrup et al. 2012: 192).

Intergovernmentalism is a theory of integration used to describe and analyze the process of European integration and why member states of the EU act in a certain manor when it comes to cooperating amongst themselves (Cini 2016: 66, Kelstrup et al. 2012: 193, Pollack 2010: 19). Though the theory is in the group of integrational theories and explains the process of European integration, intergovernmentalists calls it European cooperation rather than integration, which is a clear sign of what the sovereignty of the states mean for them (Cini 2016: 67).

In the 1960's Stanley Hoffmann developed the intergovernmentalist theory in order to explain the events of European integration from a point of view contrary to the neofunctionalist, which was failing to explain the negative version of spillover, or rather “spillback” (Cini 2016: 66-68, Jensen 2016: 54). The neofunctionalist concept of spillover will, according to Hoffmann, not successfully nor automatically take place in the

international system, since the states are the main actors and these are obstinate, not obsolete (Hoffmann 1966: 863, Pollack 2010: 19). This means, the states decide themselves if and when some manner of international cooperation should take place, when taking the national preferences of the states into consideration (Cini 2016: 67).

Preceding the cooperation of the EU, every state would see to it that their own benefits and costs of the particular case of cooperation would be protected, along with a result with their national preferences (ibid.). Moreover, as also mentioned earlier in this subsection, states are more willing to cooperate when it comes to low politics like certain areas within the economic field, and more reluctant when it comes to high politic matters (Hoffmann 1966: 882). This is because the states would not have to give up any sovereignty nor would they need to go through any larger political transformations when cooperating within the specter of low politics as opposed to high politic areas. Hoffmann acknowledges the fact, that the line between states and international organizations have become unclear, and that the integration does not only have states as large players, but also organizations. However, Hoffmann insists that the states are still indisputably the ultimate authority (Hoffmann 1966: 911).

The concept of states being the main actors is, as mentioned earlier, one of the core principals of the intergovernmentalists, and is based on the notion of the sovereignty of the states (Cini 2016: 67, Pollack 2010: 19). The term sovereignty has a number of meanings, where some are understood the decision-makers of the state's capability to make decisions without involving external actors or as a states right to hold and exercise authority (Cini 2016: 67). Thus, intergovernmentalists argues that states will never give up their sovereignty completely; consequently, the integration would primarily be based on combining the sovereignty from state- to supranational level (ibid.). Alternatively, cooperation could include the entrustment of sovereignty (ibid.). Hix and Høyland mention the delegation of power from the national governments to a supranational institution such as the European court of Justice, where member states entrust competencies and functions to the institution in question (Hix & Høyland 2011: 16). According to them, the states will only entrust power to such institutions when the interests of the government of the state would be promoted and thereby achieve the goals of the state through a different organization or institution (ibid.). This again points to the notion that states as the supreme actors only delegate power after bearing the costs and benefits of doing so in mind (ibid.). Consequently, the supranational institutions are used as agents or tools by the member states to fulfill their interests while working on a more sufficient cooperation within the supranational institution aligned with the states' views, thereby proving the states as the main actors when it comes to integration or international cooperation (Cini 2016: 68).

The above-described concept is called the principal-agent framework. This framework is about the principal holding the executive power and deciding on delegating some of it to an agent in order to achieve a goal.

When this happens, agents may still have their own interests and preferences of policy, therefore they probably want to influence the policy process in a certain direction (Hix & Høyland 2011: 23-24). However, would the agents develop their own agenda and influence the process too much, the states would likely find a different way of achieving their interests and thereby leaving out the agent in order to secure their own sovereignty, which means the power would still be with the states (Cini 2016: 69).

However, Hoffmann's version of intergovernmentalism has been focus of some critics because certain kinds of political integration has been taking place even though Hoffmann argued it would not. An example of this is the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU. Though the CFSP is not a heavily integrated part of the EU, according to Hoffmann, it should never have been an area of consideration for cooperation in the first place (Cini 2016: 69). Furthermore, intergovernmentalism has been subjected to criticism for not taking the complexity of European integration into consideration (Cini 2016: 70), although Hoffmann did admit to the borderline between state and institution being somewhat unclear, the European integration is much more complex than that.

The criticism of the theory has amongst others been the reason for developments of intergovernmentalism. Andrew Moravcsik, as probably one of the more noticeable scholars, built on the intergovernmentalist ideas of Hoffmann and developed liberal intergovernmentalism (Cini 2016: 73, Nugent 2010: 433). Moravcsik argues that integration is primarily driven by the ambition to create economic advantages for the state and not merely by the unwillingness to give up sovereignty, thereby only cooperating on a low policy level (Moravcsik 1998: 5). Moreover, according to Moravcsik there is no hierarchy of interests, since they are depending on the consequences of the subject at matter, which is contrary to Hoffmann's high and low policy areas (Moravcsik 1998: 6). Both versions of the theory has the same fundamental assumption that the states are the main actors and the integration is dependent on their interests and preferences.

However, the theory chosen for this assignment is liberal intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik, since this focuses on several interest points, including the economic goals of a state and what is of value to the state. Furthermore, because liberal intergovernmentalists believe the interests of a state can change according to the situation and not dependent on high or low politics when it comes to the willingness of integrating in the EU.



### 2.3.3 Federalism

Dosenrode (2010: 10):

“The name *federation* is derived from Latin *foedus* meaning pact, alliance, covenant an arrangement entered into voluntarily and implying a degree of mutual trust and duration.”

Federalism is particularly concerned with the creation of supranational institutions or federal institution. Like functionalism, federalism is both an integration theory as well as a normative integration strategy (Kelstrup 2012: 185, Dosenrode 2010: 11). As theory, federalism is strongly connected with the part of political theory that concerns federal political systems. It aims to analyze and thereby explain why federations are constructed (ibid.). As strategy, it is concerned with the promotion of political initiatives that create supranational structures, both globally or regional like the EU. However, it does not only include the process of creating a federation, but also the structure of a federation (ibid.).

The main idea of federalism is that populations as well as leaders of states are supposed to acknowledge the importance of common solutions across states. Accordingly, the leaders of states would work towards the creation of a common and collected authority, which then would have to be controlled by a federal political organization (Kelstrup 2012: 185). One could argue, that this theoretical scenario sounds quite like the creation of the European coal and steel community in 1951, in order to strengthen the European relationship and economy. The federal structure are supposed to both secure the common interests as well as a certain amount of autonomy for the parties involved. However, this type of federal construction leaves it unclear what kind of motivation the leaders of the states have in order to create such a federal construct and thereby give up part of their sovereignty (ibid.). This is one of the points that that have been subject for criticism. It can be argued, that this kind of integration or cooperation would only occur if the need was crucial and the result would benefit the states that gave up sovereignty in a way that could never happen without this action. This argumentation is very much like the intergovernmental argument, which says that states will only give up sovereignty if absolutely necessary, and if the outcome benefits the state more than the inconvenience of giving up said sovereignty.

A response from the federalists to this criticism above is that the leaders of state are under pressure due to globalization and might have and might have been through such large crisis that a transfer of authority to a federation seems like the best possible solution (Kelstrup 2012: 185). A different response to the criticism is that the demand for instant sovereignty transfer will not happen. Instead, the authority will be handed over to the institutions gradually over several smaller steps (ibid.). This gradual transfer of sovereignty sounds a lot like neofunctionalism and the spillover mechanisms. Furthermore, there can also be drawn parallels to the EU. Firstly, because Europe was in a crisis after the Second World War and the growing globalization has

put several European states under both political and economic pressure, which is why the signal of a strong and common European alliance that stands together on the global scene has been discussed and used as argument several times in the EU. Secondly, it can be argued that the gradual surrender of state sovereignty to the EU is what has been happening over the course of time and that the EU is becoming a federation instead of a union.

When applying the federal model to the EU multiple factors align with traits of federalism, some of which will now be laid out (Nugent 2010: 423-424).

- I. In the EU, power is divided between central decision-making institutions and the states governing authorities.
- II. The nature of this division in the treaties of the EU and the ECJ is the supreme authority when it comes to disputes over the division.
- III. Both the national and the supranational level have authority and important responsibilities for public policy.
- IV. The EU has a number of treaties, which collect the member states under common legislative and juridical accords.

However, not every structural trait falls into a federalist category. Some aspects of the EU are clearly not compatible with the federal model, which suggests that the EU does not entirely embrace the traits of the federal model, but is still not completely removed from it (ibid.).

- I. Even though the power is divided, some tasks are heavily reliant on the member states if they are to be implemented. Particularly, when it comes to unanimity ruling in the council about e.g. foreign and defense policy.
- II. Furthermore, the balance of policy is still leaning towards the member states. This is especially true when it comes to policies involving heavy public disbursements.
- III. Some of the more traditional policy spheres of the federal system, which are usually the responsibility of a central authority, are in the EU primarily the responsibility of the member states.
- IV. Finally yet importantly, the central EU authorities are not permitted nor has the ability to use legislative violence in EU terrain.

#### 2.3.4 Adaptation Theories

As mentioned in the introduction to the theoretical section, this will be the subsection working with adaptation theory. The theoretical framework will primarily follow that of Tove Lise Schou. Schou mainly follows the notions provided by James Rosenau 1970. However, she also make developments for some of

these ideas. According to Rosenau (1970), the adaptation policy of state trying to balance off internal needs and external demands through active participation in international organizations is one that seeks to adapt to these demands. However, at the same time make every effort in order to safeguard internal interests so the essential societal structures can be upheld in limits acceptable to a majority of the population of the state (Schou 1992: 329-330). It is an important factor of seeing the task of the foreign policy decision-makers as balancing the internal needs and the external demands as something that might be contradictory (Rosenau 1984: 288).

It is this balancing of internal and external and how to adapt to these that works with the theoretical conceptual framework of the various integrational theories that the politicians, or in this case parties, form their EU-policies after. The way the foreign policy decision-makers choose to tackle the balance between the two is the various integrational theory frameworks comes in. According to Schou (1980: 9) the theoretical paradigms, which can explain the decisions of the politicians, make and act out of, is what makes out the adaptation theory.

An example of this is when the decision-maker of the state choses to integrate further in a field, where some integration has already happened. Alternatively, a similar or related policy area is part of international cooperation; the additional policy area would only be natural to integrate into the cooperation in order to service both the external pressure and the internal needs. This is an example of the adaptation theory working with the neofunctionalist paradigm and spillover in order to explain why the decision-maker acts the way he does.

However, would the decision-makers choose not to integrate because it would not balance the cost-benefit in the favor of the state, or because it would mean the state would have to surrender parts of their sovereignty, this would fall under the paradigms of the intergovernmentalist adaptation theory.

Moreover, the adaptation theory would look to the federalist paradigm when it comes to explaining the action of a decision-maker, who has the main focus of creating supranational institutions in order to comply with both external pressure and internal needs.

Even though the adaptation theory is meant to look at the decision-makers, in this assignment it will be used to analyze the parties in the German parliament. I am aware, that the not all of the parties are in the German government and therefore are not part of the countries decision-making authority per say, they still see themselves as the guardians of the German internal societal structures and the interests of the German people. The adaptation theory focus on the actors as well as their actions. The adaptation theory is a tool to categorize the actions of the party to the right theoretical paradigms of the right theories, in this case integration theories. Thus, making the adaptation theory both a theory and method of analyzation.

## 2.4 Sources

When choosing the empirical data, it is important to consider the sources. Both primary sources as well as secondary sources will be used as part of the empirical data, which form the base of the analysis. The primary sources are documents, which are not composed out of several other sources, but comes directly from one author or source. Secondary sources are constructed from multiple other sources and textual fragments and passages, while also referring to other mostly primary sources. An example of this are journals, scholarly books and news articles, which often collect data by interviewing people and writing the article on the knowledge gain from this (Elklit and Jensen 2012: 125-126). Furthermore, it is crucial to be aware about the origin of the chosen empirical data. It is important to be conscious about this, in order to know the motivation of the author for saying or writing as he or she does, and be able to see through any subjectivity. An example of such could be an economic or political motive to write or publish certain things (Elklit and Jensen 2012: 125).

Some of the primary sources for the empirical data are interviews conducted with individuals directly linked to the German parliamentary parties, spokespersons and/or front figures from the various party groups or more specifically from the parties EU-tasked groups. I have chosen these people in order to receive a clear and direct answer of what the parties think and what their vision of a future EU is. By conducting my own interviews rather than finding similar interviews online or in newspapers, I will be able to get the uncut version of the answers and not the secondary material, where journalists have already altered and cut the interviews to fit their articles, stories and/or the political view of the newspaper. However, newspaper articles will also be put to use as a source for empirical data. As mentioned before, it is crucial to be critical towards these sources, and know the background for the article. One of the subjects by which newspaper articles will be a source of material, is the empirical data for the EU reforms of Junker and Macron. This is because this material is harder to gain access to. The interviews, which will be conducted, are with people located in and around Berlin. This means that the access to these people as primary sources is much better than to e.g. Junker and Macron in Brussels.

Furthermore, the political party programs will be used as empirical background data for the text analysis. It can be discussed, whether or not these programs are primary sources, since they come directly from the parties, yet have been put together through discussions within the party itself, which tend to push it more towards being secondary sources, because they do not have one sole author. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind, that these party programs are used for the parties own gain members and votes, while positioning them in a positive way. Thus, the parties will show what they believe most electorates will see and agree with, and most likely not their more controversial views.

## 2.5 Limitations

In order to focus the investigation, I have chosen to only look at the parties that are represented in the German parliament. There were 34 different parties country wide for the election on September 24<sup>th</sup> 2017. In order to earn a seat in the parliament, a party must gain at least 5% of the votes in the election. Which means all of the smaller parties in Germany like the Piratenpartei, NDP, and ÖDP etc. will not be taken into consideration. These parties are so small, that even though many of them have an opinion about the matter, they would lean to some of the larger parties in the Bundestag. Furthermore, many of the smaller parties in Germany are so called protest parties, who fight for mainly one thing, e.g. the Tierschutzpartei who has the fight against animal abuse and testing on the top of their program. Many of these parties do not concern themselves with many of the other political questions, which are very relevant. This means, that they would not know or be very diverse within the party on other things than their main cause. The larger parties, which are in the parliament, have a broader party program and even though these can also have a wide range in opinions within the party, they usually have a somewhat common line of political views on the larger political questions.

Additionally, the investigation is limited to the reforms of the EU, rather than e.g. the Eurozone, migration, membership discussions etc. Furthermore, it will only the once Macron and Junker have proposed. In order to only include the most relevant information and views of the German parties and the latest reform proposals from Macron and Juncker a time frame will be set. The time frame will include dated limits for the empirical data, which means they will not include material from before May 2017 as the election campaigns for the German election started and the reform proposals in question had not yet been uttered. It has been taken into consideration, that the reforms can seem less specific than e.g. the migration crisis and the reaction of the German parties to this matter. However, the reforms that Junker and Macron are propositioning are very timely and it is therefore possible to look into an eventual shift in the German EU politics. Furthermore, the reforms are still quite specific, since the focus will be on only the reforms from September 2017.

When looking at the reforms, it gives the impression that a change in the leading positions of the EU is going on. This is because, as mentioned earlier, Germany has been a front-runner and very pro EU for a long time. Now it seems like France is slowly taking over this position, even though they had Front National as a big representative of the anti-EU scene in France quite some time before the German AfD became a larger party, who are not as anti-EU as Front National.

### 3.0 Overview

The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the events leading up to this investigation, along with giving a some background knowledge about the reforms French president Emmanuel Macron and European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker have proposed 1 September of 2017. Furthermore, this section will give the reader some insight into the various parties seated in the German Bundestag after the German election of Parliament in September 2017, mainly focusing on the parties EU agendas.

#### 3.1 Two visions, one direction

In September of 2017, the president of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, and the French president, Emmanuel Macron laid out their suggestions to the development of the EU. This happened in two speeches, one held by each. The 13<sup>th</sup> of September, Juncker held his speech where he outlined his suggestions for the work program and legislation of the Commission for the near future, whilst setting the scene for his vision for the future of the entirety of the EU (EC 2017: 2). Macron held his speech on September 27. Here he outlined not only his vision of the future of the EU, but also his visions for the role of France in this future union. The speech falls into line with his pro-European election campaign back in spring 2017 (ibid.).

Some of the topics talked about were trade both internal and external, climate, energy and sustainable development, digital, innovation and industrial policy, security and justice, Schengen, Enlargement, migration and Africa, defense, and the EURO (EC 2017).

Now the similarities and differences of the two visions put forward in the above-mentioned speeches will be laid out.

When talking about trade, climate, energy and sustainable development, there are significant similarities in the visions of Macron and Juncker. Both of them wish to focus on common set of new standard agreements, transparency and mutuality. However, Macron emphasizes that the new trade agreement should not be build based on old rules (EC 2017: 3). Furthermore, they both feel it necessary to protect strategic interests of the EU; however, they are not fully aligned on how this is supposed to happen. Macron suggests to also making institutional changes by establishing a European trade prosecutor, who would be the protector of these strategic interests, while Juncker wishes for a new EU framework for investment screenings instead (ibid.). Also with Climate Macron has additional proposals. They both wish to see Europe as the leader in the fight against climate change and be the frontrunner when it comes to an efficient and fair environmental transition. Furthermore, they wish to minimize carbon emissions in the transport sector and set a fixed minimum carbon price within the EU and a carbon tax at the import borders of the EU. Macron additionally advocated that a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU should be made, and that it ought to have a stronger emphasis on food safety and greening (ibid.).

By the theme digital, innovation and industrial policy, both Macron and Juncker express their wishes to see Europe as frontrunner of innovation and digital champion. However, they also both stress the dangers of cyberattacks as well as the importance of a strong defense against this kind of attacks (EC 2017: 4). Both talk about furthering the European technological model of both data protection and the combination of innovation and regulation. Juncker calls for a new strategy for industrial policy, which should be based on innovation, digitization and decarbonization. Furthermore, he would like to move to qualified majority voting when making decisions on fair taxation for digital industries. Macron on the other hand, would like to define taxation norms by regulating the major platforms and protecting digital copyrights. Moreover, his new taxation would also involve the taxation of digital companies by a tax on value creation (ibid.). Yet they also speak of reforming the set of rules the EU already has. Juncker wants new rules that protect personal data, cultural diversity and the intellectual properties of people, while Macron talks of creating a new agency on cybersecurity (ibid.).

In the field of security and justice, Juncker utters the concern that the EU has to be stronger in the fight against terrorism and he wants to create the means needed to act fast on cross-border terrorist threats. One of the ways he will make this a reality is by boosting Europol's Counter-Terrorism Centre, and giving the new European Public Prosecutor (EPP) the task of prosecuting these terroristic cross-border crimes. President Macron backs up the latter, as he also wishes to extend the competences of the EPP in order to fight terrorism and organized crime (ibid.). Additionally, Macron proposes to create a European Intelligence Academy in order to tighten the bonds between the member states when fighting terrorism. Accordingly, President Macron would like to see the creation of new international institutions in the EU, while President Juncker would merely like to boost the once already created (ibid.).

When it comes to defense, both Macron and Juncker talk about the EU as becoming a "fully-fledged" defense union, e.g. with the development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EC 2017: 7). However, Macron would like this to become reality by the beginning of the next decade, and is thereby a bit more ambitious than Juncker, who has set the date for 2025. Furthermore, the French president would like to integrate the member states in this project as much as possible by making it possible for the national member state armies to include citizens from other member states and have a common defense budget (ibid.).

The two presidents also spoke about the Schengen and the enlargement of the EU. Although Macron did not explicitly mention the Schengen in his speech, he did talk about gradually to establish a European border police force. Juncker on the other hand, wanted to proceed to open the free movement area to Bulgaria and Romania, as well as letting Croatia become a full member as soon as it fulfills all of the criteria for the Schengen (EC 2017: 5). Prior to his speech, Macron visited Romania in August 2017, where he also expressed

his intentions of letting Romania into the Schengen. When it comes to the enlargement of the EU, both are looking at the Balkan countries, however, with the difference that Juncker only talks about Western Balkan, namely Serbia and Montenegro, whereas Macron does not seem to limit the enlargement to only those two states (ibid.). Furthermore, President Juncker wishes to exterminate the negotiations of Turkey's membership in the EU in the near future, due to rule of law, justice and fundamental rights issues in the country. However, he would like to make it clear to the Turkish people that the hand of the EU will continuously be extended towards them (ibid.).

Migration is currently a much-discussed theme, and far from everyone agree on the subject, not even people within the same party. However, in the speeches of Macron and Juncker there are significant similarities. Both want to reform the Dublin system, strengthen the external borders of the EU as well as creating legal ways for migration to the EU (EC 2017: 6). Furthermore, Juncker would like to improve the conditions of the migrants in Libya and increase the return policy. Macron proposes dealing with migration through a European-African Partnership on the matter. On the course for the EU's Africa policy, they both seem to have similar intentions. They both insist on further investment in Africa, the way of doing so however varies. President Juncker wishes the member states to show more solidarity and investing in the EU-Africa Trust Fund, while President Macron recommends a new tax on European economic transactions to financial development aid (ibid.).

Just as migration, the Euro has also been a much-discussed topic throughout the EU. Although the discussions of the currency has calmed over the last couple of years, Macron and Juncker still have plans to further this form of payment. They both strive to make the Euro the only currency used in the entirety of the EU (EC 2017: 9). Macron wants a separate euro budget, which shall be financed through European taxes. However, Juncker would like a euro area budget, which is lined up with the overall EU budget and where the parliament of this euro area should be the European Parliament (EP) (ibid.). What they both agree on is the need of a kind of European Minister of Economy and Finance. Yet, Macron would like the new minister to receive a broader mandate, which would require a change of treaty (ibid.).

As seen above, there is a high degree of overlapping factors in both visions and the initiatives proposed in order to make them happen. Juncker is presenting a "roadmap for a more united, stronger and more democratic union", while Macron resonances this with "a sovereign, more united and democratic Europe" (EC 2017: 2).

As for the differences in the two visions of Macron and Juncker, they primarily lay in their method of achieving a stronger integrated EU. The proposals of Juncker can all be put into action based on the Lisbon treaty, thus be implemented without any major issues if accepted after the policy making process of the EU. Some of the proposals of Macron however, would need a change of the treaty and are therefore more far-reaching



reforms and more time-consuming to make happen (ibid.). Furthermore, this would also require much more work for every institution of the EU including the member states, as a new treaty would first have to be accepted by every member state.

### 3.2 The German parties

After the election on September 24, there are seven parties in the Bundestag. These are CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Die LINKE and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Beside these seven, there are many parties in Germany, some of which are present in the EP. However, the smaller parties will not be looked at in this assignment. As mentioned in the introduction and the limitations, the focus will be on the parties, who are in the German parliament, the Bundestag. In the subsections under this section, the various parties of the Bundestag will be introduced with a short section of background knowledge about the party and its history, and an explanation of the political views, where some of the main points from the interviews for this assignment will be included.

#### 3.2.1 CDU/CSU

The largest party in Germany is a union of two sister parties, the CDU and the southern based CSU. The CDU was founded in 1950 as a conjunction of the Christian-center-right groups, a period in time, where many parties were regrouping in both West- and East Germany. Since Konrad Adenauer embedded the policy of the CDU/CSU in West Germany, they have been a constant influence on the key decisions on internal and external policy-making of the government (Decker 2018b, CDU 2018). Until the mid-1960s, they constantly had the majority of the votes. Their line of policy is defined by conservatism, liberalism and Christian-socialism. However, the modernization of these principles are often at the center of the discussion whenever the identity of the party has to be talked over (ibid.). One of the main reasons for this is the CSU in southern Germany, which is more conservative than the CDU.

In 2000, Angela Merkel became the new leader of the party and started with the process of modernizing the party, which led to the election of Merkel to head of government in 2005 for the first time. At the following two elections for government, the CDU/CSU has managed to keep the majority of the voters and has therefore been able to stay the strongest party in Germany under Merkel (Decker 2018b). Even with the governmental power, Merkel has continued the process of modernization parallel to several tries to change the political discourse of some of the main principles of the party. Under Angela Merkel as head of government, the tendency of a communicative and leading political top has been strengthened (ibid.).

On an organizational level, the CDU/CSU has taken a strong position of federalism and pluralism, which is e.g. shown in their governmental policy. However, they also have a need for strong leadership and concentration within this policy area. The CDU/CSU in total has the highest number of members in Germany, far more than

the second largest party, the SPD. This is the case, even though the number of members has gone back since the reunion of East- and West Germany (ibid.).

The CDU/CSU does not see a well-functioning Germany without the EU (Gross 01:00, CDU/CSU 2017: 6). However, they also see themselves as one of the leading countries in the EU even though it is not about power, yet about showing the way for the EU. Of course in cooperation with other member states like France (Gross 02:24, 03:40).

When it comes to the proposed reforms of the EU from the presidents Macron and Juncker, the CDU/CSU is fundamentally for the proposals of Macron, and have welcomed many of them (Gross 08:37). Amongst other because of the dynamics, which are created and the signal they send (Gross 08:45). On the other hand Juncker seems to have become somewhat out dated and not as relevant anymore (Gross 09:26). Just like Macron and Juncker, they are underlining the fact that cooperation in the EU is crucial and, according to the CDU/CSU, not talked about enough (Gross 10:06, CDU/CSU 2017: 55).

Generally, the party is positive about the proposed reforms as just mentioned. However, they do not follow the line laid out by Macron when it comes to the plan about the economic government union, as they have a different opinion and wants the member states to take individual responsibility (Gross 10:31-10:58). The willingness to reform the economic and monetary union is present in the CDU/CSU. The steps of how and when are not coherent with those of President Macron (Gross 11:10). The party wants the nation states to first and foremost get the national economy under control, since the EU cannot hand out money or financial charity without any compensatory measurements (Gross 11:22, CDU/CSU 2017: 57).

When it comes to having one currency in the entire EU, the CDU/CSU mention that since there is an obligation of eventually getting the Euro it is a matter of when the time is right. The Euro-zone does not have to be extended at every price. The countries have to be ready for the Euro, especially when it comes to their economy (Gross 15:28, CDU/CSU 2017: 57). The Euro-zone budget is also somewhat controversial. The CDU/CSU are following the plan of Macron, however, only to a certain extent. The limit of the budget should not be as high as the French president proposes according to the party (Gross 17:26).

On the subject of environment, the CDU/CSU wants to show the world that wealth and environmental protection are not mutually exclusive. They wish to do so in companion with the EU and the Paris agreement (CDU/CSU 2017: 6). However, the proposed CO<sub>2</sub> taxation of Macron are not one of the ways to go forward according to the CDU/CSU, mainly because Germany unlike France do not focus on atomic power and therefore has a disadvantage. The CO<sub>2</sub> taxation would in Germany mean that the companies would be the once paying in the end, which would have bad consequences for the German economy (Gross 13:25, 13:42).

The CDU/CSU support the proposal of the European Defense Union and Fund, and consider themselves convinced members of the NATO. However, they also believe the EU has to be self-sufficient when it comes

to defense if it wishes to survive permanently (CDU/CSU 2017: 56). In a press release by Florian Hahn June 4 2018, he said, the clarification of a European intervention force is fully supported by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. According to him, the chancellor was right to call for involvement in PESCO (Hahn 2018). Concerning migration, the CDU/CSU have had their internal fights in the spring and summer of 2018. However, in their governmental program, they stand together on this matter. Here the CDU/CSU mention that Europe must effectively protect its external borders against illegal migration, strengthen the Frontex border agency and complete the European asylum system (CDU/CSU 2017: 56). This shall e.g. happen through agreements based on the model of the EU-Turkey Agreement with other countries in the region and in northern Africa. They will hereby prevent thousands of refugees from being trafficked by conscienceless smugglers through half of Africa before drowning in the Mediterranean. According to the party, Europe has a shared responsibility for refugees who are persecuted or in great need and thus entitled to protection and it is essential for them that all European states have to fulfill their responsibilities (ibid.).

The CDU/CSU wants the EU to implement a European entry and exit registration system as soon as possible in order to know who and how many people of third country nationality are in Europe and in order to harder for terrorists and smugglers to do their jobs. They are of the opinion that the EU urgently needs a better exchange of information between the security authorities of its member states, because Islamist terrorism and organized crime are without borders (CDU / CSU 2017: 56-57).

Finally yet importantly, the CDU/CSU wants a close and special cooperation serves both the people of Europe and Turkey, which means as strong a cooperation between the two as possible, as well as close strategic cooperation on foreign and security issues (CDU/CSU 2017: 58). Nonetheless, the party reject the possibility of full membership of Turkey because it does not fulfill the conditions for accession. They mention that they are very concerned with the developments in Turkey in regards to the rule of law, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of the press (CDU / CSU 2017: 58).

The party is generally for the possibility of more integration in the EU, the question is however still as to how this integration shall happen (Gross 16:08). All has not yet been discussed fully because there are some risks that has to be minimized before they will involve them (Gross 16:32).

### 3.2.2 SPD

With its 150-year-old history the SPD is the oldest still existing party in Germany. As the environment and class party for the working class, the party was denied access to taking part in the governance of state up until the end of the reign of the emperor of Germany. During the time of the Weimar Republic, the SPD was the part of the government multiple times, and even led it from time to time (Decker 2018e).

At the end of the First World War, a large part of the party separated from the SPD. This separated part would later be the foundation of the German communist party. After the Second World War, the SPD and the communist party were forced to merge in East Germany. Meanwhile in West Germany, the communist party was banned, which therefore left SPD as the only representatives of the political left wing with political influence up until the start of the 1980s (Decker 2018e).

In 1959, the party changed their ideology and agenda from mainly following Marxism to their so-called Godesberger Program, which opened them up to be a more mainstream party. From 1966 to 1982, they managed to become part of the government, first as a smaller partner to CDU/CSU, then in 1969 first with Willy Brandt and later Helmut Schmidt as head of government in coalition with the FDP. In the late 1960s, the SPD gained a large number of members, who was ideologically further to the left than many of the previous members, which resulted in internal problems (ibid.). Since the 1990s, the number of members has gone back, thus the leading part of the party is trying to this by reforming the organizational level, which shall make the possibility for participation of the members better and open the party for non-members (ibid.)

As an organization, the SPD has transformed into a party with needs of a professional constituent party, however without leaving the main formation of a member-based caucus behind. Internally the party has a strong tradition of pluralism, which is shown by the way that the top of the party is limited and that there is a high amount of voting between the various levels of the party (ibid.).

At the time of the election on September 24 2017, the leader of the party and head of government candidate was the well-known EU politician Martin Schultz. Right after he renounced his candidacy the SPD went up in the polls. However, after some time the polls went back to the same as before the announcement and the SPD actually ended with a much worse election result than the year before. This made Martin Schultz step back and leave the spot for his successor.

The SPD see Germany a stable country, while also being an anchor of stability for Europe. That is what the party wants to be in the future as well. However, as socialists and social democrats they are aware that Europe can only be led collectively and that no one can claim that, everyone else is following him. Regardless of the size of the various member states of the EU: Everyone is equal. Germany has a special shared responsibility with France for the cohesion of the EU and the unification of Europe (SPD 2017: 95). However, only in the equal cooperation with all member states can the EU create what no country can no longer achieve as individual nation states. In a world, where Asia, Latin America and Africa are growing, future generations growing up in Europe will only have a voice if it is a common one. Europe is therefore not a loss, but a gain of sovereignty that the single nation-states no longer have, according to the SPD (ibid.).

On the subject of defense policy, they wish to work more closely together and advance the integration of member state forces as part of a comprehensive, preventive EU security and defense policy embedded in

international law. The member states of the European Union offer a great opportunity to become more efficient, resourceful and cost-effective through more cooperation, including in defense spending. Together with the EU members, they want to agree on the establishment of a European Defense Union, which must be subject to democratic and constitutional control. The permanent cooperation provided for in the Lisbon treaty is an important step and already makes it possible to take concrete measures of closer cooperation and division of labor on the way to a European army. Such a union is a complementary effort to NATO, not its competition. NATO is and will remain a pillar of the transatlantic partnership. It is indispensable for peace and security in a time of new international uncertainties and challenges, according to the SPD (2017: 99-100). The party wants to fight the causes of people fleeing on-site, secure the external borders of Europe and distribute the refugees in Europe in solidarity (SPD 2017: 74). Furthermore, they believe that cooperation and agreements with third countries will create opportunities to stem illegal migration to Europe and Germany (SPD 2017: 75).

On the matter of the Euro, the SPD is convinced that a coordinated economic policy is needed in Europe. Their goal is to become better at aligning the economic developments of the Member States of the EU, and overcome excessive imbalances. For this, they need a better and more effective integration of economic policy in perspective with the establishment of an economic government for the euro area. The European Economic Government is to be composed of the members of the Commission, with responsibility under the political leadership of a European Minister of Economy and Finance. The economic government and its members must be legitimized and controlled, in particular by the European Parliament. To this end, a structure should be created within the framework of the European Parliament, which assumes the role of a Euro-zone parliament (SPD 2017: 98).

The SPD sees all of the Western Balkan countries as having a perspective of accession in the EU. The party supports their rapprochement towards the EU and pays particular attention to the developments of democracy and the rule of law. When it comes to Turkey, the challenge is particularly difficult. The SPD believes Turkey to be an important partner in many areas. However, they are very concerned about the current developments in Turkey and strongly condemn the mass arrests of journalists and opposition figures and the restrictions on fundamental rights such as the freedom of the media and science. The actions of the Turkish government are in conflict with the values of democracy and the rule of law, which are fundamental to the European community of values (SPD 2017: 100). According to the SPD, the truth is that neither Turkey nor the European Union are ready to join the European Union in the near future. However, the accession negotiations are the only continuous discussion format of the European Union with Turkey. Isolation of Turkey is not in the interest of the EU. Strengthening the democratic forces in Turkey is in their particular interest. They therefore support and facilitate travel for representatives of civil society, Turkish-German

companies, the sciences and the arts as well as for journalists. However, if the Turkish government keeps to its confrontational course, it will remove Turkey ever further from Europe. Should Turkey introduce the death penalty, it will openly oppose membership of the European Union, which would put an end to the negotiations (ibid.).

The SPD is committed to better European development cooperation, which realizes a clear division of responsibilities between the EU and the member states (SPD 2017: 110). They want a European social union that aligns its policies with people's needs, ensures minimum social standards and effectively prevents wage and social dumping. On a European level, they want to preserve the principle that there must be effective social protection systems in all the member states. Their main objective is to strengthen fundamental social rights through a social progress protocol anchored in European primary law. The SPD wants to make it clear that social rights are coequal to the fundamental economic freedoms of the internal market (SPD 2017: 96-97).

### 3.2.3 AfD

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is the youngest party in the German parliament. Just five months before the government election in 2013, the party had their official foundation day. Here a temporary agenda of the party was put together and within the following few weeks the party had a full structure everywhere in Germany. After the election, the AfD was present in 158 out of 299 electoral districts all over the country, yet failed to enter the parliament, as they only had 4,7 % of the votes and the required percentage is 5 (Decker 2018a).

However, because the structuring of the party was so quick, it is speculated that the actual day of the foundation of the AfD was back in 2010. More exactly the day when Angela Merkel first disclosed that common financial help for Greece would be the last option to consider, and later in the afternoon voted for the aid-kit at an EU meeting (Niedermayer 2015: 177). As a reaction to the lack of alternative, which was used as an explanation for the voting of Merkel, the name of the AfD was created. The party wanted to show the people of Germany that there was an alternative to the European financial aid politic contrary to what the German government had used as an excuse for their actions (Decker 2018a).

In the fall of 2010 Bernd Lucke, a professor from Hamburg, initiated the "plenary of economy", where academics with equal political views and were against the financial aid policy of the EU could meet and discuss the matter. One of the things this group of academics argued about was the lack of influence that experts, especially economists, had on the policy making of the country. Thus, they demanded that decisions about fundamental questions and questions about sovereignty should be decided according to the "approval of the citizens" (ibid.).

The euro crisis is perceived as the cause of damage to democracy, the rule of law, the separation of powers, the social market economy and the European idea itself by the party. Consequently, the AfD is not anti-EU as much as they are against the institutionalization of a common currency of the EU (AfD 2016: 16). Thus, the campaign for the Bundestag election and the election for the EP were strongly dominated by the issues of the Euro crisis and their protest against the economic policy of the EU. However, after not getting over the 5% border to the Bundestag, they changed their priority list to include matters like family, education, energy and immigration policies as well as the problem of border crime, which resulted in the AfD being elected into the state parliament in a large number of the federal states (Decker 2018a).

In their policy program of 2016, the AfD called for the asylum law in the constitutional Law to be replaced by an institutional guarantee. Additionally, they demanded that recognition procedures to only be carried out in the regions of origin of asylum seekers. Their political guidelines contained repeated references to the western culture. This is different from their manifesto, where a ban on foreign financing of Islamic mosques, a ban on full-scale veiling, the closing of Koran schools, as well as a general legitimization of criticism of Islam are demanded (Decker 2018a).

Similar to the sharp rejection of "gender mainstreaming", which supposedly aims at the elimination of gender identities, this was already contained in the Political Guidelines. However, the clear connection to the question of migration: "More children instead of mass immigration" has been added later (AfD 2016: 41).

Even though the election program opens with the "failed euro", which leads to a transfer union that is no longer affordable for Germany and hence must be discontinued, but purely quantitative, the focus of the program has shifted to refugee, asylum and Islam policy (Decker 2018a).

According to the AfD, they stand for the freedom and self-determination of European nations. This means that all nations have the right to organize in sovereign states. As such, they can enter into international legal relations and pursue common interests as a community of states (AfD 2017: 7). Even if the AfD is not anti-European, they still want the German people to vote on the British model on the whereabouts of Germany in the euro area and possibly the EU (AfD 2017: 8).

The creation of an EU army or the use of German forces for foreign interests is rejected by the AfD. A de-escalation in relation to Russia is a prerequisite for a lasting peace in Europe according to the party. They believe it is in the German interest to integrate Russia into a security overall structure without disregarding its own interests and that of their Allies (AfD 2017: 18-19).

The AfD wish to close the borders immediately in order to put an instant end to unregulated mass immigration into Germany and its social systems by predominantly unemployed asylum seekers (AfD 2017: 29). They demand national sovereignty in every form of immigration and reject the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). European cooperation should focus on securing the European external borders.

Asylum applications must therefore be submitted outside Europe. Wherever European law prevents these premises, it must be changed or cancelled. The AfD is committed to avoid economic reasons for refuge, even if this could initially bring disadvantages for the Western economy. By increasing UNHCR funds for refugee centers in regions close to their homeland and cultures, refugees should be offered safe shelter (AfD 2017: 30). The AfD wants the European border protection agency, Frontex, and the German Armed Forces have to end their tugboat relief services in the Mediterranean and bring all refugee boats back to their starting point instead of transporting the passengers to Europe. Where this is neither legally nor possible, they are to be transferred without exception to non-European reception centers according to the Australian model. They demand strict controls at the German border crossing as well as the guarding by integrated security systems, which may include fences (ibid.).

On the matter of the Euro, the AfD says that the basis of the euro was no liability for the debts of other countries and no public debt over 60 percent of the respective GDP. These rules have been crossed. Therefore, Germany has to cancel the transfer union and leave the euro area (AfD 2017: 14). The party sees the euro as a misconstruction for an economic area with economies of different performance. After eighteen years of tension, the common currency can only be maintained through permanent and largely German liability assumptions. This is no basis for the prosperous development of the economies of the euro countries. The consequence is a permanently high unemployment in the south of Europe. Youth unemployment is over 40% in Spain and Greece, over 35% in Italy and over 25% in France. The people of Europe will not accept this development without complaint and rightly rebel against the political elites, according to the AfD (ibid.).

When it comes to the relations with Turkey, the party believes they are taken aback and need to be redesigned. Turkey does not culturally belong to Europe. The current political developments are cause for concern and show that Turkey has moved further away from Europe and the Western community of values. The AfD wishes to see Turkey's membership in NATO ended, the Bundeswehr removed from Incirlik in Turkey and all direct and indirect cash benefits granted to Turkey under international, multilateral and bilateral agreements stopped immediately. The AfD also rejects Turkey's accession to the EU and calls for the immediate end of all accession negotiations (AfD 2017: 19). They strongly reject Turkey's accession to the EU as well as easier visa access or even visa free travels for Turkish citizens. Privileges for Turkish nationals based on long overdue contracts, e.g. Health co-insurance of parents in the social security agreement, has to be terminated according to the AfD. Thus, the entire EU agreement with Turkey dating back to 1963 should be terminated (AfD 2017: 29).

Lastly, according to the AfD, the high level of German social benefits attracts numerous immigrants from other EU member states as well as third countries. In doing so, freedom of movement in the EU and asylum law are abused in order to gain access to the social system. We want to put a stop to this abuse. Thus, social



benefits should only be granted to foreign nationals from other EU member states if they have previously been employed in Germany for four years under insurance cover and consequently were able to cover their own subsistence by themselves (AfD 2017: 29).

### 3.2.4 FDP

Liberalism, on whose tradition the Free Democratic Party (FDP) is build and relies, has its roots in the Age of Enlightenment and is the oldest of modern political movements. Nevertheless, the FDP is a political re-establishment of the post-war period. In December 1948, the FDP finally emerged as a union of the state associations of all liberal parties in the Western occupation zones (Oppelland 2017).

With the reestablishment also came the traditional division of liberalism into a national-liberal and a more liberal-democratic party, which had shaped the liberalism in both the German Empire as well as in the Weimar Republic. The establishment of a single united liberal party only overcame the thought of a divided liberal political world formally. Within the party, there continued to be a national-liberal wing and a left-liberal wing, which dominated in different state associations. Regardless of such ideological differences, the FDP as a whole understood itself as a bourgeois, non-socialist party (ibid.).

With regard to socio-political issues concerning the relationship between church and state, the liberal group voted alongside the SPD. However, as a market-oriented party, the FDP voted with the Union parties on economic policy issues. This helped each of the two camps gain a majority due to the FDP. The role of the often-decisive party between the two people's parties remained that of the FDP until the 1980s (ibid.).

When forming a government after the first general election in 1949, the FDP decided to support a bourgeois coalition with CDU / CSU and the FDP under Konrad Adenauer. In return for the support, the leader of the FDP, Theodor Heuss, received the position of the Federal President (ibid.). However, for the entry into the social-liberal coalition (1969-1982) the FDP paid a high price, because the national-liberal wing left the party within a few years. Unfortunately, this did not mean the end of the wing dispute for the FDP, for soon a new inner-party dualism solidified between the civil-right-left-liberal and the liberal-market wing (ibid.).

At the end of the long period of economic growth and the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979, off which the liberal-marked wing of the FDP benefited from. This because to them, the Minister of Economic Affairs (1977-1984) and later party leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff (1988-1993) and the social-liberal coalition were responsible for the two oil crisis. Over the period of Kohl's term in office, the FDP became ever more of a coalition partner for the union (ibid.).

After the reunification of East and West Germany, the FDP had a big boost, due to merging as one of the first parties, with their eastern counterparts, the Confederation of Free Democrats. Which in turn developed from the combination of the reformed East German "block parties" LDPD and NDPD along with other smaller

parties during the peaceful revolution, which brought the party numerous new members. Additionally, Genscher proved himself as an attractive polling locomotive in the new federal states. Thus, the FDP had a respectable result in the general election in 1990 with 11.0 percent of the vote (12.9 percent in East Germany) (ibid.).

In the general election in 2013, the FDP then lost almost ten percentage points and failed to pass the five percent hurdle with only 4,8%. After 64-year uninterrupted parliamentary membership and more government participation than any other party, the FDP did not make the leap back into the Bundestag. Shortly after the election, there was a fundamental renewal of the party leadership. Christian Lindner was elected head of the party in December 2013. He had previously been Secretary General of the Federal Party from 2009 to 2011 and since the state election of 2012 Group Chairman in North Rhine-Westphalia (Oppelland 2017).

European politics has always been an important matter in the FDP, and it is completely clear to them that Germany is closely linked with Europe, which is also giving the state its strength. Namely in the European cooperation (Haury 00:34, FDP 2017: 108). This is the reason why the FDP find it important to maintain the EU. Especially, in times like these when conflicting powers are at work. The FDP is convinced that Europe should remain a continent of freedom and human rights. Which is why they insist that the European Union increases its ability to act and strengthens its assertiveness (Haury 00:59, FDP 2017: 99). Germany, along with France and other countries who are in the EU whole-heartedly are trying to make this a reality and strive to push the EU forward (Haury 01:26).

When it comes to the by Macron and Juncker proposed reforms of the EU, especially two project are sending the right signals according to the FDP. These are PESCO and the European public prosecution's office (Haury 03:04). The FDP believe the security and defense policy offers many possibilities for further integration, even if only for the effectivity of it (Haury 05:46). Simply because of the potential of advantages from a common strategic culture from a project like PESCO is very interesting to the party. Should this at some point in time lead towards a common European army within the frames of NATO, they would support this as well (Haury 06:00, FDP 2017: 111). Which is why the FDP are working toward more integration in this area despite the German parliamentary reservation (Haury 07:50, FDP 2017: 116).

However, when it comes to economic and monetary integration the FDP are more cautious. They do not wish a Euro-zone budget, since they believe it will push the member states further apart then contribute with anything positive (Haury 08:50). As an alternative they support the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), where the national parliaments of the member states have the last word (Haury 09:15, FDP 2017: 124). The FDP generally support the notion of the nation states have to take responsibility for their own actions, particularly when it comes to economic and monetary policy they expect the states to take responsibility and

not expect a steady money flow from Brussels (Haury 09:34). The FDP is not categorically denying integration in this area, but in order for them to support this kind of actions they want reforms to minimize debt and issues in the banking industry (Haury 10:01, FDP 2017: 124).

On the subject of common foreign policy, the FDP would be very happy to see further integration. They want to strengthen the high representative, the foreign service of the EU and foreign policy decisions made with qualified majority (Haury 10:33, FDP 2017: 110).

Furthermore, the party supports a common European asylum system and believes this is the only way to manage this properly (Haury 11:19). Additionally, if states outside of Europe take on a special responsibility in receiving refugees, such as Lebanon or Jordan, they want to support these states in the creation of special economic zones to the situation of refugees improve in addition to greatly increased financial contributions for the establishment and operation of their school and health care systems. It aims to simplify investment from the EU and to eliminate trade barriers for exports into the EU (FDP 2017: 107). The countries in the EU also need to take responsibility and allow the refugees according to the quotes. However, the FDP are willing to let some countries pay in order to receive less, yet it is a tough question to answer (Haury 12:45).

When it comes to the enlargement policy of the EU, the FDP wants to terminate the negotiations with Turkey, since they do not feel like they can endorse this with the regime Turkey is under at the moment (Haury 13:40, FDP 2017: 102). When it come to the possible enlargement to the Balkans, they are more willing to accept them into the EU, however not yet. There are several countries in that region who has made great progress, yet many still have issues with especially rule of law (Haury 14:52). The FDP positions itself where they think the states in this area still need a few more improvements before they will consider starting a dialog with them about entering the EU (Haury 15:23). Yet the FDP also urges to remember that these states are individual states and the negotiations do not need to be started all at once, but when the individual country is ready (Haury 18:18).

Finally, when it comes to the protection of the environment the FDP wants to strengthen EU emissions trading by expanding to other sectors like traffic and housing efficiency, thus preparing for future cooperation with other international emissions trading systems (Haury 22:07, FDP 2017: 137). The MFR Plastic taxation is not popular with the FDP, since they believe other measurements would be more efficient (Haury 23:03). The party consider the issue to be solved in the more southern countries, which do not have the same level of recycling effectivity as in northern Europe (Haury 23:25).

### 3.2.5 Die LINKE

The party, Die LINKE, emerged from the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Party Work & Social Justice - The Electoral Alternative (WASG). The former was founded after the reunion of West and East Germany in 1989/90, as a successor to the SED in the former GDR. Until the beginning of the all-German Die LINKE, the PDS was an East German regional party whose success was mainly nourished by the growing dissatisfaction of the new German citizens with the transformation of the system. Thereby the PDS developed to a people's party in the east, which was not easily bypassed in the government formation. After labor union and SPD, members in the former West German states had decided to protest against the policy of the government to found the party WASG in 2005, a window of opportunity was created for the western expansion of the PDS. In 2007, they formally sealed reestablishment of an all-German Left Party ended. This new party was then given the name Die LINKE (Decker 2018d)<sup>3</sup>.

This new party was driven forward by former chairman of the SPD, Oskar Lafontaine, who together with Lothar Bisky took over the leadership of the party. Under their direction, the party managed to increase its share of votes in the general election of 2009 to 8,3 percent in the former West German states (ibid.).

Just like every other party, Die LINKE has different camps within the party fighting for control over the political direction of the party. The already in the PDS fuming conflict between the so-called reformers and orthodox was further fueled by the majority fundamental opposition forces from the west German regional associations. Personnel clashes at the top of the party left the public the impression of a primarily self-employed party, which ensured their cohesion, was only through formula compromises between rival currents (ibid.).

The contentious disputes over the issue amongst other things ignited the question of how far capitalism can and must be overcome as a "system". Furthermore, the attitude towards the SED past and the GDR regime and of the party's peace policy positions and the party's peace policy positions, which are foreign and European Obligations of the Federal Republic collided. However, the strategic pros and cons of possible government participation at the federal level and the development of the relationship with the SPD overshadow many of these issues (ibid.).

According to Die Linke the role of Germany in the EU is very one sided, strategic one when it comes to guiding the development of the EU, yet not in a viable way. Whether economic nor political (Jokisch 03:54, Die Linke 2017: 8). With this Die Linke is seeing Germany as the gravedigger of European integration, at least with the

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<sup>3</sup> [Die Linke Geschichte](#)

direction the current government is going (Jokisch 04:10). If the EU should be reformed and saved the code lies with Germany according Die Linke (Jokisch 04:20).

Die Linke view President Macron as an ally in the progression of the EU and the party is positive towards his proposals despite them having different political views and thoughts about many of the themes (Jokisch 07:18, 10:49). The public discourse of Macron concerning communication and dialog with the population of the member states Die Linke are very supportive about, and do not believe that what the German government is doing when they send high ranking party member to talk to school classes is a proper dialog (Jokisch 11:00).

Die Linke are against the formation of PESCO and any form of armament (Jokisch 12:18), and do not want to risk a cheap form of nationalism that will force its own interests through (Jokisch 13:48). Die Linke pursues the long-term goal of a Germany and a Europe without armies and a world without wars (Die Linke 2017: 101). The development of a defense or military union, the creation of a European army and other militarization projects do not lead to greater security for the people of Europe, according to Die Linke. Only militarily safeguard corporate interests. Thus, they want to end the militarization of the EU. They believe security can only be achieved with a consistent peace policy and the promotion of global justice instead of location competition (Die Linke 2017: 107).

The opinions are split in Die Linke when it comes to a number of themes, including some of those subject to Macron and Juncker's visions of reforms. Some of these themes are digitalization and taxation competence of the EU. The plastic taxations are disputed within the party, yet they are supporting the financial transaction taxation (Jokisch 15:00, 15:15). On the question of migration, Die Linke are still split. Some believe they should support Merkel and the EU, while other refuse to do so (Jokisch 17:23). Die Linke do not wish to focus on migration, as they believe there are more important themes, which needs to be discussed. However, they are simultaneously aware that to not comment on the subject is not the way to go either (Jokisch 21:09). In order to give an impression of how the party was feeling about migration and refugees, the interviewee, René Jokisch, quoted a book he was reading: To strive for better conditions is a human right (22:18). Nonetheless, the majority of the party are convinced that it is not necessary to change the direction of the current course (Jokisch 19:49).

On the subject of the enlargement of the EU, Die Linke are concerned that if the Balkan countries would be allowed to join the EU as they are today, it would destroy the labor market and it would be economically problematic. On the other hand, EU is a common European integration project where you cannot exclude people, especially not when the majority of the citizens in the country would like to join (Jokisch 24:25). They do not wish to exclude a certain group of people if the democratic rule of law is present and the Copenhagen criteria are lived up to. In such a case the economic criteria are of no concern to Die Linke (Jokisch 24:57).

Furthermore, the party does want to continue the negotiations with Turkey yet not bring any new aspects into the discussion or intensify it, but only focus on rule of law and juridical issues (Jokisch 25:51, Die Linke 2017: 100). To terminate the dialog between Turkey and the EU could give the Erdogan the possibility to make EU and Germany the bad guys for leaving his country behind (Jokisch 26:00).

Die Linke find a Euro-zone budget problematic as it would be connected to a further parliamentary chamber, which the party finds ill-advised (Jokisch 27:14). The reason for this is that the Euro is at some point obligatory for every member state without opt-outs, yet not all states will be ready at the same time. Thus, the structure with an additional parliamentary chamber would be excluding and make it more difficult for newcomers (Jokisch 27:37). However, a Euro-zone budget as a way of creating new investment opportunities is something Die Linke sees as a positive prospect, although they would rather see a common investment program financed by the European Central Bank (ECB) (Jokisch 27:52). When it comes to implementing the Euro as the only common currency of the EU Die Linke are not positive towards it, as it would become a coercive, which would lead to crisis (Jokisch 28:17). According to Die Linke, the Euro is flawed and does not work properly as it is. Furthermore, if the Euro has to undergo reforms it is not an issue about the technicalities as much as political questions (Jokisch 32:10).

On a different subject, Die Linke have always criticized the missing streamlining of directives in labor law. They believe it is very revealing when Poland and Hungary say they have a competitive advantage because of lower wages on-site. When it has come this far, it is a step in the right direction for a social Europe with common European labor rights (Jokisch 34:40). In speeches, Die Linke have for several years used the phrase; Europe will be social, or it will not be (Jokisch 35:29). Meaning the EU cannot exist if it is not social. Die Linke believe, if the hope can be created, that the EU can create a social security it would be a wonderful thing. However, they are not convinced the plans of weather Macron nor Juncker are the way to that vision (Jokisch 36:04).

Die Linke are more than willing to accept a working process of integration, where a new treaty must be written. They do not believe that changing some things in the current treaty or rewriting it is sufficient enough, since they would like to get rid of any neoliberal aspects (Jokisch 38:04). Consequently, Die Linke are for further integration in the EU if the integration goes in the right direction, according to them (Jokisch 39:21).

### 3.2.6 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, or just Die Grüne, are the most successful new formations of a party in the history of the Federal Republic. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen are the most successful new formations of a party in the history of the Federal Republic. Since the 1980s, they have been able to establish themselves as the fourth

force in the party system alongside CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP. In the 1990s, they succeeded to replace the FDP as the third largest party, and have been in several coalition constellations since 1985 (Decker 2018c, Die Grünen 2018).

Die Grüne are a product of the new social Movements, which formed in the 1970s as a protest against growing environmental degradation, the use of nuclear energy, and nuclear armaments. Additional roots come from the student movement and the GDR civil rights movement. Since the mid-1970s, many states have produced green and so-called colorful lists. These joint forces in 1979 to the voter group "Other Political Association DIE GRÜNEN" before the European elections. Medio January 1980, they became the nationwide party "Die Grünen". In 1993, Die Grünen united with the East German Bündnis 90 and have since officially called themselves "Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen" (ibid.).

In the 1980s, the development of the new party was accompanied by severe fighting over what political direction it should take. The conservative-bourgeois representatives, who were one of the founding groups, already turned their backs on Die Grünen at the beginning of the 1980s. At the center of the disputes was the question of a possible participation in government, which was principally aimed at by the moderately left-wing "real politicians", yet categorically rejected by the radical left-wing "fundamentalists". By 1991, the real political line succeeded, which resulted in a large part of the fundamentalist forces leaving Die Grünen (ibid.). In their party program, the de-radicalization expressed itself in the fact that the Greens refrained from system-hostile positions. They accepted parliamentary democracy unconditionally and no longer strove to overcome the capitalist or market-based order, but rather focused their energy on ecological reforms. Die Grünen were now promoting renewable energies, nuclear phase-out, agricultural change and restricting the tax system. These concepts were developed for the purpose of leading the government to action and at the same time caused the other parties to open up for environmental protection goals. Contrary to their pacifist tradition, Die Grünen later agreed to foreign missions of the Bundeswehr (Decker 2018c, Die Grünen 2018). A programmatic challenge for the party is the changing composition of its electorate. On the one hand, the voters who already gave Die Grünen their votes thirty years ago and who have remained loyal are now a days living under predominantly privileged conditions, which may cause them to deterred by a left political position when it comes to social and economic policies. On the other hand, Die Grünen continue to achieve above-average results in the group of young voters (Decker 2018c).

With the separation of office and mandate and the principle of dual leadership, the party still has some unique features preserved. Whether these can be reconciled with the needs of political leadership is evaluated differently. The ideological currents that characterized the inner life of Die Grünen in the 1980s have lost much of their significance. Fundamentalist positions are barely represented today. Which is one of

the reasons the party is characterized by a comparatively high degree of personnel and content-related unity (ibid.).

A strong, democratic and reformed EU is exactly what Die Grünen need in a world of uncertainty. They want to align Germany's Euro and European policies more solidly, so Germany can help unify and strengthen the EU. The party sees themselves as being the European party for Germany and stand up to nationalist and right wing populist to create a better Europe for all its citizens. The European Union is, according to Die Grünen, the best example of how supranational partnership and cooperation can work for the benefit of all. Moreover, it provides hope for a more peaceful, a solidary, a better world is possible (Die Grünen 2017: 67). Die Grünen are opposed to a fatal paradigm shift in redistributing civilian funds from the EU budget for military or defense purposes, as well as abusing the Investment Bank and the Instrument for Stability and Peace for military purposes. As an alternative, they want to develop the CFSP, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the European External Action Service further. The EU should actively contribute to a global peace order within the framework of the United Nations and to the creation of a pan-European system of co-operative security, starting from the OSCE (Die Grünen 2017: 75).

On the matter of migration, Die Grünen are convinced that the wrong policy of the EU-Turkey deal should not be a blueprint for new agreements with states in Africa and the Middle East. However, European governments are seeking to conclude a number of other such agreements, thus close their borders well ahead of Europe in Africa and the Middle East. Die Grünen reject the de facto outsourcing of the European external borders through migration partnerships with states in which human and refugee rights are not respected, as well as the reallocation of development funds for human rights problematic border protection projects. They wish to take back illegal repatriation agreements because of incompatibility with a humanitarian and modern asylum policy (Die Grünen 2017: 104).

The French President Macron called for an end to austerity and a major European investment plan, which Die Grünen consider to have been the right move. They support this course and together with the EU institutions, wishes to vigorously strive towards necessary reforms in the Euro area and the EU as a whole (Die Grünen 2017: 69). The course of these reforms are however unclear for the party.

When it comes to the enlargement policy of the EU and the negotiation with Turkey, Die Grünen supports putting them on ice, which is already in progress. However, breaking them down completely would send the wrong message to the pro-European and democratic forces in Turkey. For a democratic and cosmopolitan Turkey, the doors to the EU must remain open (Die Grünen 2017: 76-77). The enlargement policy of the EU is a success story for the part, as they see it as standing for peace and stability in Europe. The accession of each country, however, must continue to be made conditional on progress in the accession process and the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. They want to integrate all the countries of the Western Balkans into



the EU without changing their borders, and make the promise of accession credible by means of in-depth cooperation with as many social players in the Western Balkans as possible (Die Grünen 2017: 76).

As environment being one of the main cases of the party, they have a clear direction to take on this subject. They demand that EU emissions trading must be reformed so that the emission of greenhouse gases once again costs real money. For this, surplus CO<sub>2</sub> certificates must be permanently deleted and the cost-free allocation of certificates terminated (Die Grünen 2017: 34). In addition to the national climate goals, the European objectives must also be adapted to the Paris climate change agreements. For all 27 states of the EU, a CO<sub>2</sub> reduction of at least 95 percent must be mandatory by 2050 compared to 1990 (Die Grünen 2017: 35). Simple but effective rules such as a debt brake for banks, an EU-wide minimum corporate tax rate and a well-functioning carbon-trading scheme are further important levers for fair competition. They want to be able to regulate sectors and markets more efficiently with very powerful individual companies, so that individuals cannot increase their profits at the expense of consumers, the environment, personal rights or taxpayers nor exploit an advantage of abuse (Die Grünen 2017: 225-226).

Finally, Die Grünen want to put a social progress clause in the Lisbon treaty. Furthermore, they are committed to minimum standards in the area of social protection and the labor market. They argue for the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same workplace for all workers. It is important to the party to better protect the cross-border free movement of workers in social terms so that they do not fall through a grid of nationally fragmented social systems. Additionally, they want to strengthen economic governance through the European Semester. They wish to achieve a wage development that will enable a greater external balance in the long term, as recommended by the EU Commission and the trade unions demanded. Lastly, they do not want unfair competition from European countries by the reduce wages in some areas. As a target on this subject, the party is committed to the introduction of European unemployment insurance (Die Grünen 2017: 73).

## 4.0 Analysis/Discussion

This section will be an analysis and discussion of the collected data according to the research question. Firstly, the actions of the parties will be analyzed and categorized by theoretical paradigms, according to the analyzing strategy laid out in subsection 2.3.4. Starting with the CDU/CSU and proceeding with the other parties. Secondly, the results of the analysis will be discussed. Lastly, this section will also include reflections over the method and theories.

## 4.1 CDU/CSU

The primary adaptation theory paradigms of the CDU/CSU are liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. There are aspects of both approaches in their actions and reactions to the reforms proposed by Macron and Juncker.

When it comes to climate, Germany has already chosen to support the Paris agreements and the CDU/CSU are supportive of this matter. They believe the threats towards the environment has to be tackled by all. However, the party does not look at the proposal of Macron about the CO<sub>2</sub> taxation kindly. Here the CDU/CSU wants to protect the German industries and economy, which is a clear sign of liberal intergovernmentalism. As mentioned in subsection 2.3.2, integration is primarily driven by the ambition to create economic advantages for the state, which can also be turned around and used as an argument that the CDU/CSU do not want to integrate on this area of environment policy, because they wish to protect the economy of the state. This argument for liberal intergovernmentalism also doubles as an argument against both neofunctionalism and federalism, because spillover cannot happen when the state blocks for further integration in a certain area, which is the case with the environmental policy of the CDU/CSU. Furthermore, a federalist approach would be open towards a common taxation, which is not the case here.

In relation to migration however, the actions of the CDU/CSU are somewhat mixed and can be interpreted to follow the paradigms of liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and federalism. Liberal intergovernmentalism because its paradigm does not forbid further integration in the EU, yet mainly uses the argument of economic advantages as motivation for such. When it comes to integrating on the subject of migration, one could argue that should integration not follow in this area of policy, it may be even more expensive for Germany to receive refugees and migrants. Furthermore, the state is the main actor in the liberal intergovernmental paradigm, which in this case can be used to argue both for and against the theory. The argument for the theory, is that there may be looked at a common way to distribute the migrants that arrive in Europe, yet how the member state choses to deal with them is up to them, which is a sign of upholding the sovereignty of the country. On the other hand, the sovereignty of the state is partially taken away with e.g. a migration quote that every member state has to welcome. As an argument for neofunctionalism, is the CDU/CSU urging the EU to implement better communication between the member states, which means the integration in this area is necessary because of former integration on the subjects of common border, security and justice policies. Federalism on the other hand is expressed in the way the party argues for the implementation of a European entry and exit registration. The idea of a European registration system rather than a state based one, implies the states are so integrated already, that it makes more sense having an all European registration system. Nonetheless, when it comes to migration, the adaptation theory paradigm that shines through is neofunctionalism, because the integration in this area has

been bound to happen due to the spillover effect, gradually integrating more border associated policy areas over time. I started by breaking down the internal border, which meant the need for a common outer border, which again led to a common responsibility for the outer border etc. Furthermore, the CDU/CSU had an internal dispute whether or not to solve the question about migration in Germany or on a European level. So far, the majority of the party looks at the solution as being on a European level, since the opposing proposal from Seehofer would have meant the internal borders would have to be rebuilt, which would be a violation against free movement within the EU.

In continuation of migration, the CDU/CSU wish to work closely with Turkey on such matters. However, the party reject the possibility of full membership of Turkey in the EU, mainly because of the violations by the regime in regards to the rule of law, in particular freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Here the actions of the party are coherent with the paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism, as the party does want to work with Turkey when it comes to a number of matters that Germany can eventually benefit of off economically. However, they do not wish to let Turkey integrate with the EU, where Germany is deeply integrated. This is mainly because the violations mentioned above, which are of high priority the CDU/CSU, which is one of the paradigms of liberal intergovernmentalism. Usually the state does not want to integrate on matters that are of high importance to them, however, this argument can also be turned around and explain that Germany does not want another state to integrate in the EU if this state is violating matters of high importance to them.

When it comes to the common European defense, the CDU/CSU takes a neofunctionalist approach, as they are willing to integrate further in this area, supports the involvement of Germany in PESCO, and believe the EU should be self-sufficient when it comes to defense if it wishes to survive permanently. This is a clear example of spillover resulting in further integration, even in areas that might not have been thought of originally. Furthermore, it also has fragments of the federalist paradigm, since the EU will seem like one rather than a number of states working together in NATO gatherings and missions. However, it is important to remember that a common European army has not yet been planned, though the CDU/CSU would support this as well.

Finally, the party mainly takes a liberal intergovernmentalist approach with their Euro-zone policy. They do believe in the notion of the Euro as a common currency of the EU. However, they do not wish to extend the Euro-zone at any price. The countries have to be ready for the Euro, especially when it comes to their economy. If countries joining the Euro-zone would not be economically ready, a new Euro crisis could happen. The CDU/CSU wants to protect their own country and economy by not letting economic instable EU member states join the Euro-zone. However, when it comes to creating a Euro-zone budget they do support the plans of Macron to some extent, which would mean further integration. It can be argued that this

integration is the result of spillover. Nevertheless, the party is still somewhat protective of the German economy, since they do not wish quite as large of a budget as the French president.

Altogether, the adaptation paradigms primarily followed by the CDU/CSU are the liberal intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist.

#### 4.2 SPD

The SPD is a great advocate for the EU and European integration. However, to a certain extend.

When it comes to the enlargement policy of the SPD, unlike the CDU/CSU, they do not wish to terminate the negotiation with Turkey right away. However, they also do not see Turkey becoming a member state in the EU in the near future. They strongly oppose to condemn the mass arrests of journalists and opposition figures and the restrictions on fundamental rights such as the freedom of the media and science, which are basic rights in Germany and the EU. As mentioned in the analysis of the CDU/CSU, these violations are of high priority the SPD, thus the paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism matches the actions of the party. However, the SPD will first terminate the negotiations if Turkey should introduce the death penalty. Until then the party is willing to continue the negotiations of a Turkish membership in the EU. On the matter of Western Balkan, the SPD is open towards accession in the EU as these countries are moving toward democracy and the development of rule of law. Unlike Turkey, the western Balkan states appear to share multiple values with the SPD and the EU, which according to the argument just used against Turkey, will here support a start of negotiations with Western Balkan countries. Furthermore, should the EU enlarge, thus including West Balkan, the actions of the SPD would match a neofunctionalist paradigm according to adaptation theory. This is because the integration of other former Yugoslavian states would eventually happen due to spillover.

On the matter of Migration, the SPD talks about distributing refugees in solidarity, which requires a certain integration in this area. However, only to a certain degree. The SPD wants to distribute the refugees between them, which means the states have their sovereignty to the extent that they are individual states, yet still have to receive a number of refugees decided by the majority of all the member states. This means, that federalism is not in action at this point, since the SPD would not talk about distribution among several states. Nonetheless, the neofunctionalist paradigm matches in the way the SPD sees Germany and the EU integrating in a policy area, where spillover has caused it to become relevant.

When it comes to the common defense of the EU, the approach of the SPD is a mixture of both liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and federalism. They argue that the establishment of a European defense union will be more cost-efficient, which is here one of the motivators for the integration on the subject. This is clearly a liberal intergovernmentalist approach of actions. At the same time, they want this

defense union to be subject to democratic and constitutional control, thus taking federal actions by constitutionalize the integration and submitting a part of the member states sovereignty to the EU. Furthermore, the SPD talks about taking steps towards a common European army sometime in the future. Finally, the neofunctionalist paradigm of spillover is present as well, since there already are some integration on the subject of a common defense policy of the EU, and this will be an extension of this.

As a socialist party, the SPD not only cares about the social standards of the German people, but the entire European population. Thus, the party wants to create a social union where every member state has to focus on people's needs, ensures minimum social standards and effectively prevents wage and social dumping. According to the adaptation theory, the actions of the SPD on this matter follows the neofunctionalist paradigm. Mainly, because the need for common social standards have developed with the free movement of labor, which is a classic example of functional spillover. Furthermore, there are aspects of federalism, as they envision these social rights to be ensured through a social progress protocol anchored in European primary law.

Finally, the SPD is convinced that a coordinated economic policy is needed in Europe. For this, they need a better and more effective integration of economic policy in perspective with the establishment of an economic government for the Euro-zone. This argument can be seen as both liberal intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist. On the one hand, the economic motivation of the integration is clear, as the SPD wants a stable Euro-zone and thereby Euro, which could prevent or soften a new Euro crisis. On the other hand, when having a Euro-zone, it seems natural that the spillover effect would include further integration in this area over time. However, since the SPD furthermore wishes to establish an economic government for the Euro-zone would go against the liberal intergovernmental paradigm to some extent, because the member states would have to give up part of their sovereignty. Although it according to the SPD would secure a more stable Euro-zone, it could also become an expense for Germany if one or more of the other member states would fall back economically. Furthermore, the idea of an economic government and that this shall be legitimized and controlled by the European Parliament is a federal approach, as the creation of federal structures would be required.

Altogether, the adaptation paradigm primarily followed by the SPD is the neofunctionalist. However, the liberal intergovernmental and federal approaches were present as well.

#### 4.3 AfD

Already when talking about the all-round relationship of the EU and the AfD, they mention their demand for freedom and self-determination of European nations, which is strongly referring to the sovereignty the member states have distributed to the EU and that the party wants to restore to the member states.

Furthermore, they say they want to pursue common interests as a community of states. These agendas are a clear sign of the liberal intergovernmentalist paradigm in the actions of the party. The sovereignty of the state is one of the main notions of liberal intergovernmentalism, as the states are the main actors. Furthermore, the AfD says they only want to cooperate when it comes to common interests, which is also an important factor of liberal intergovernmentalism, as it argues that cooperation will only happen when common interests exist and the priority is coherent.

When it comes to Turkey, the AfD uses the argument of the lack of common values like the CDU/CSU and the SPD. These values are yet again of high priority and because these are not met in Turkey, the AfD goes further than the former two parties go, and sees Turkey excluded not only from the EU but also from NATO. Furthermore, they want to terminate any form of financial aid to Turkey like the health co-insurance of parents in the social security agreement, and terminate visa free travels for Turkish citizens. As this is an economic motivated restriction, the liberal intergovernmentalist adaptation paradigm also follows this action.

On the matter of migration, the AfD is not seeking to use a common European solution but wants to close the national borders and thereby enforcing the sovereignty of the country. They demand national sovereignty in every form of immigration and reject the CEAS, which is a clear indicator for the liberal intergovernmentalist paradigm. However, the AfD does speak of taking actions in a direction that does not match this adaptation paradigm at first glance, as they are committed to avoid economic reasons for refuge, even if this could initially bring disadvantages for the Western economy. Nonetheless, the prevention of migration to the EU and more importantly Germany is highly prioritized by the party, which makes it match the other argument of liberal intergovernmentalism of acting from a list priorities. This is also, why they are willing to increase UNHCR funds for refugee centers in regions close to the homeland of the refugees.

When it comes to integrating on the subject of common defense policy, the AfD again pushes against it. Their argument against this form of integration and the creation of a common European military force is their priority of de-escalation in relation to Russia is a prerequisite for a lasting peace in Europe. They argue that it is in the German interest to integrate Russia into a security overall structure without disregarding its own interests and that of their Allies.

Additionally, the AfD is convinced that Germany's high level of social benefits attracts numerous immigrants from other EU member states as well as third countries, who are looking to exploit the German welfare state. Thus, Germany is paying for non-German citizens, which will eventually weaken the country's economics. Again, these actions heavily align with the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism, as the economic motivator is in focus.

When it comes to the matter that started the party, the Euro, the AfD is once again working away from not only further integration, but also the Euro altogether. Their main argument is the expenses Germany has had and will continue to have in the future in relation with the Euro. Furthermore, they argue that Germany is the carrier of the monetary union as the other member states have a very high youth unemployment rate, which weakens their economy, which causes Germany to help these countries. The AfD wants to use German money on Germany and the German people. This is their main argument for not integrating further and pushing away from this area. The economic concept is once more a strong indicator of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach of the AfD.

Altogether, the adaptation paradigm primarily followed by the AfD is clearly the liberal intergovernmentalist, as they do not wish any further integration, mainly resting this decision on arguments of prioritized values, interests and economic disadvantages. However, liberal intergovernmentalism does not necessarily work against every form of integration, yet the AfD does. Which means, a different adaptation paradigm may suit the actions of the AfD even better.

#### 4.4 FDP

The FDP follows the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism when it comes to environmental policy. They are against the plastic taxation of the EU and believe the issue lies elsewhere. They think the primary problem is with the southern European states, who do not have the same high quality recycling system as northern Europe, and encourage the member states to take control and responsibility for their own littering. This focus on states as the main actors is central for the liberal intergovernmental paradigm. Furthermore, the reluctance against the plastic taxation is both a sign of the FDP not being willing to give up sovereignty as well as the unwillingness of spending money on a matter that is not a priority to them.

On the matter of EU enlargement policy, once more the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism and the argument of common values are at play. The FDP will not endorse the regime Turkey is under at the time of writing. However, when it comes to the Balkans, they are more willing to consider them as part of the EU. Nevertheless, these countries still have to straighten out the issues they have with the rule of law, which is of high importance the FDP. Additionally, the liberal intergovernmental adaptation paradigm includes looking at states as the main actors, which is one of the reasons why the FDP wants to look at the states of the Balkan area individually.

When it comes to migration in Europe, the FDP supports a common European asylum system and believes this is the only way to manage this properly, which matches the neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm as the migration policy is caused by spillover by several other integrated areas of the EU, e.g. the common outer border and open inner borders. Nevertheless, the party talks about the member states of the EU taking

responsibility and allow the refugees according to the quotes, which again focuses on the states as the main actors, following the liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Yet, the economic aspect of the quoting system, which the FDP proposes follows the same theoretical adaptation paradigm as well, since the states can pay for not taking in as many refugees as the quotes prescribe. On the same note, they are willing to offer financial aid to states outside the EU if they take responsibility for a large part of the refugees. Here the economic and priority arguments of liberal intergovernmentalism can be used slightly different, as the theoretical paradigm supports the idea of investing in something if the priorities are high. However, this argument does not seem like a question of further integration in the EU at first glance, it still involves the union, as the financial support shall not come from Germany but the EU, which would then again mean integration in this area.

Regarding a common European defense policy, the FDP is supportive towards the additional integration required. The PESCO project and the signal it sends is of high priority to the party, which makes them willing to invest sovereignty in it, which matches the paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism. However, when the FDP argues that they believe the security and defense policy offers many possibilities for further integration, it has a strong association towards the spillover effect and the neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm. Additionally, the party is supporting the idea of further integration on the matter of common foreign policy altogether, which is again a sign of a neofunctionalist approach. On the other hand, strengthening the high representative could be seen as furthering a European institution, which would mean the approach of the FDP was here the federal adaptation paradigm.

Finally, the FDP is more cautious with integration, when it comes to economic and monetary matters, which in its own has a strong notion of the liberal intergovernmentalist adaptation paradigm. Following this paradigm, they propose an alternative to the Euro-zone budget where the national parliaments of the member states have the last word. This proposal sets the member states as the main actors, which matches the liberal intergovernmental paradigm. On this matter, the FDP again look to the member states to take responsibility for their actions in economic and monetary matters, which again positions the states as the main actors. However, they do not categorically denying integration in this area, but in order for them to support this kind of actions; they want reforms to minimize debt and issues in the banking industry. This takes us back to the economic motivation factor of the liberal intergovernmentalist adaptation paradigm. Altogether, the FDP has a primarily liberal intergovernmentalist approach of adaptation. Although the theoretical paradigm is the same as that of the AfD, the way of their actions are very different. The FDP also includes aspects of neofunctionalism and small aspects of federalism in their actions.



## 4.5 DIE LINKE

Although Die Linke is a socialist party, they tend to use several liberal intergovernmentalist arguments in their adaptation approaches as seen in the analysis below. As an example of this, Die Linke are concerned that if the Balkan countries would be allowed to join the EU as they are today, it would destroy the labor market and it would be economically problematic. This means the economic aspect the eventual integration in this area puts a stop for the progress, which is part of the liberal intergovernmental paradigm as the integration should be economically beneficial for the states involved. However, the party does not center the member states economic situation, but the EU labor market as a whole, which matches the federal adaptation paradigm. When it comes to the argument about rule of law, which is a high priority value for Die Linke and a question for both the Balkan states and Turkey, they will not accept any integration until the demands on this area are met. The adaptation paradigm is here the liberal intergovernmentalist about not wanting to let a state integrate if they do not match the values that are already central in the EU or the member states. However, the party additionally says the economic criteria are second to the Copenhagen criteria, as it is more important to live up to them as the economic principles.

On the matter of migration, there is no common course for the party. However, the majority does agree on the current course of the EU about a common solution and policy is the right path to take. Since it is no common opinion of the party, it is hard to categorize it. However, if looking at it as the only opinion, one can argue, that the adaptation paradigm that follows these actions is both neofunctionalist and federalist. Neofunctionalist because the current developments in this area are acting on the effects of spillover. However, the federal aspect of the actions of Die Linke is the mentioning of the EU as the primary institution. The party does not focus on the member states like e.g. the FDP.

On the matter of a common defense policy in the EU, Die Linke are strictly against any form of military institutions or projects. They value a peaceful solution to security and defense issues, which implies the adaptation paradigm that is at work here is the liberal intergovernmentalist. However, when the party talks about their vision of achieving security through peace policy and the promotion of global justice, the approach does not focus on states, but on a European and global ranging policy and promotion. This matches the adaptation approach of neofunctionalism, where a European peace policy would lead to the promotion of not only European justice, but also globally through the concept of spillover.

When it comes to the social development and integration of the EU, the party is far more willing to follow the proposals of Macron than on the matter of defense. They have been wishing for a streamlining of directives in labor law for a long time according to themselves. A reason for this is the socialist background of the party, which makes the fight against social inequality a priority of theirs. However, another reason is to terminate the competitive advantage because of lower wages on-site than member states like Poland and

Hungary make use off. The value and economic based motivation matches the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalist. Even more so, as the party put a certain amount of focus on the member states that have these low-wages advantages. However, the vision of a labor law for the entire EU is related to the federal adaptation paradigm. Furthermore, Die Linke sees this integration as a step in the right direction towards a social Europe with common European labor rights. This vision of the party is strongly associated with the neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm, as the actions they plan to take will need to happen gradually and thereby happen through spillover.

Finally, on the matter of the Euro and a Euro-zone budget Die Linke find the currency flawed, which influence their willingness to integrate on this area. However, they are still against the construction of a further parliamentary chamber, and somewhat focused on the member states and their capability to enter the Euro-zone. These arguments follow the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism, by pointing out the economic aspect of the reluctance of the integration as well as focusing on the member states. Nevertheless, this could again be the social ideology of the party. The party thereby does not want to make it harder for state that might already struggle. As they also argue that an additional parliamentary chamber would be excluding and make it more difficult for newcomers. The following supports this notion, as Die Linke are not opposed to a Euro-zone budget as a way of creating new investment opportunities. They would however, rather see a common investment program financed by the ECB, in addition to reforming the Euro. This approach seem to follow the neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm, as the spillover will not only integrate different areas, the ECB and the Euro-zone budget, but also improve what over time has shown its flaws.

Altogether, Die Linke uses a mixture of several adaptation paradigms in different areas, where they are more or less willing to integrate further. However, in the interview René Jokisch said, that if the general election in September in Germany had provided the country with a government consisting of the SPD, Die Linke and Die Grünen, they would not look to the internal policy areas of Germany, but concentrate on reconstructing the EU through a new treaty (04:37). This would then be the framework for the German internal policies. The adaptation paradigm of this vision is strongly federal, as it is the common institutions that are in focus and set the frame of the state policy.

#### 4.6 DIE GRÜNEN

As the eco-friendly party of Germany, Die Grünen value any actions taken by both Germany and the EU to support the environment. They therefore demand a CO<sub>2</sub> reduction of at least 95 percent must be mandatory by 2050 compared to 1990 for all the EU member states. Furthermore, they want the entire environment policy area of the EU to adapt to the Paris climate change agreements. The adaptation paradigm here is the neofunctionalist, as the party wishes to see the integration spread from one area of the environmental policy

to involve the entirety of it. Furthermore, they do not focus on the states, as they are convinced that the solution can only be provided as in unity.

On the matter of European enlargement, the party support putting the negotiations on ice but not completely breaking them off. The actions of the Turkish regime oppose to the values of Die Grünen and the EU, which makes the actions of the party coherent with the paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism. As such, the party does not want another state to integrate in the EU if this state is violating matters of high importance to them. This also matches their views that if Turkey becomes democratic and develop the rule of law the doors to the EU must remain open. Nonetheless, they have a positive attitude towards the enlargement policy, and sees it as a tool to uphold the stability and peace in Europe. Yet, the liberal intergovernmentalist approach does not change when talking about the states of the Western Balkan area. Here Die Grünen want state based integration.

When it comes to migration, the party is looking for agreements on an EU level, and not looking to single states to take responsibility, which is an indicator for a federal adaptation paradigm. They are circling EU institutions and talking about European governments as a unit and not states on their own.

Die Grünen are not opposed to further integration on the subject of the CSDP. However, they do not support the redistributing civilian funds from the EU budget for military or defense purposes, nor the use of Investment Banks and the Instruments for Stability and Peace for military purposes. Just as with the approach towards the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, this is a question of value and prioritizing. The party values the social development of the union more than the military and defense area, to which we will return shortly. This means, the adaptation paradigm at work in this situation is that of liberal intergovernmentalism. Furthermore, the economic motivation, or rather lack thereof is present in the same argumentation of the party. However, the party do want to extend the integration on the matters of the CFSP, the CSDP and the European External Action Service, which means spillover effect will take its course. Additional here to, the party looks to the EU to also extend these areas to contribute to a global peace order within the framework of the United Nations and to the creation of a pan-European system of co-operative security. This approach follows the neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm, as the main drive of these actions is the spillover effect contributing to further integration.

On the matter of the social policy of the EU, the party want to put a social progress clause in the Lisbon treaty, which follows the federal adaptation paradigm as it looks to common agreements and treaties to connect the states. Further support of this paradigm comes in the form of Die Grünen wanting to strengthen economic governance through the European Semester and including the EU commission on social matters, which strengthen the governance of the EU rather than the member states, including the introduction of European unemployment insurance. However, the protection of the European workers social terms are a

product of spillover from wanting to protect the cross-border free movement of said workers. Another area subjected to spillover is their argument for equal pay for equal work in the same workplace. All of these arguments follow the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism.

Finally, Die Grünen support Macron neofunctionalist adaptation paradigm of ending austerity and call for a major European investment plan and integrate further in this area to strengthen the Euro-zone. However, they again look to the EU institutions for the necessary reform of the Euro policy area, which is a federal adaptation approach.

Altogether, the adaptation paradigms primarily followed by Die Grünen is a mixture the neofunctionalist and federal. However, the liberal intergovernmental approach is present as well.

#### 4.7 Discussion

When looking at the research design, it can be discussed whether or not the right questions have been asked and if they have been answered properly. In order to determine the relevance of the research, part of the research design could have been whether or not the German parliamentary parties have any say in Germanys' support of the proposed reform of Macron and Juncker, and what say Germany have when it comes to making these reforms an eventual reality. However, these questions were chosen not to include, as they determine the relevance when it comes to the actual implementation of these reforms, and not only the idea of the reforms. Should the reforms be reality and not just ideas for the development of the EU, these questions would be a necessity in the research design of that research.

However, when it comes to the research design included in this assignment, the question remains, whether or not the various parts of this design have been followed and answered. When starting with the first part, which questions the role of Germany in the EU according to the parties, this question was answered through both interviews and party programs. All of the parties see Germany as one of the strongest and leading member states. Some of the parties argued for Germany as the leading power of the EU, and Die Linke even believed all EU problems could only be solved in Germany. How the different parties would like to influence this role, however, was answered very differently. The AfD wants Germany to be removed from the EU and regain some of their sovereignty, while Die Linke wants Germany to take control and recreate the EU from the ground with a set of new treaties and agreements. However, not all the parties were as eager to change the direction of the EU and did not necessarily answer this part of the question. In the interviews, there could have been pushed more to gain an answer. However, not all parties were willing or could find the time to take part in interviews, which meant the answers had to be found elsewhere. This was not possible for some of the parties. If spending more time on the search for this information had been prioritized, the answer might have been found at some point, either in speeches, statements to the press or in an e-mail

correspondence with the parties. However, it might also be possible that the parties are satisfied with the direction of the EU and Germany as it is, and therefore did not consider this question at all.

The second part is about finding the agendas and the party programs of the various parties concerning the EU, in order to create an overview of how their vision of the EU are aligned with the proposals of Macron and Juncker. Since all of the party programs have been included in the empirical data of this assignment, it can be argued that this step has been answered. However, since the question includes the parts of the party programs concerning the EU it can be discussed if the programs include the right parts. Some of the parties have not taken a stance on several of the areas the proposed reforms are concerned with. Again, the parties that were questioned could have been asked to go more in depth with the policy areas that were not discussed as thoroughly in their party programs, and the data collection time could have been prioritized more. However, this prioritization could also have resulted in the assignment not being finished at the time of the deadline, or the de-prioritization of a different area.

The third part of the research design is about the parties' perception in entirety and their relation to their "adaptation theories" concerning Germany's EU-policy. This question has not been answered as it formulated in subsection 2.1. This is partially because the relation to the current German EU policy is not relevant for this project as such, only the parties EU policies and the visions of Macron and Juncker are relevant for this research. In addition, partially because it was chosen not to include due to restriction in time and pages, and the focus was therefore best kept on the parties instead of the country in order to keep the content of the assignment aligned with the research question and the rest of the research design. Thus, this part of the research design would be better fitted with a different approach. E.g. if this research was to be lifted to the state level rather than the party level. However, the culminated EU policy of the parties have been collected and analyzed according to the adaptation theory and its' theoretical paradigms. Furthermore, the parties EU policies were held against the proposed reforms of Macron and Juncker instead of the EU policy of the Germany government.

Lastly, the fourth part of the research design are to understand and define what these adaptation theories are composed of and how they can be used in this assignment. This part has been important to include, as it lays the foundation for the analysis. The choices of which theories from where the adaptation theory should take the paradigms will be discussed shortly.

When it comes to the method of data collection, it can be discussed whether the choice of conducting interviews was the right one to make. The interviews and the answers from these are a big part of the data used in the analysis. Furthermore, they gave the opportunity to ask about the policy areas that were not present in the party programs. Unfortunately, they also took a lot of time preparing for, and not all of the parties were willing or could find the time to take part in the interviews. Furthermore, not all the questions

asked in the interview were answered fully, which is partially the interviewers fault and partially the interviewees. The interviewees were not always willing to answer the questions and avoided answering directly on the question, which is one of the weaknesses of doing interviews. However, as an inexperienced interviewer you often notice the lack of actual answers when it is too late and the interview is over. One could argue the interviews might get better the more you do it. However, since only three interviews were conducted for this assignment, the developments of the interviewer is hard to analyze. Nonetheless, the interviewer should have asked further questions for elaboration during the interviews in order to receive the answers needed. One of the advantages I had when it came to the interviews was that I was in Berlin, where all the parties of the Bundestag have their offices. However, this also became a disadvantage over time, as I had to go back to Denmark at some point and thus could not set up a meeting as easily. Another question asked when doing the interviews with the parties, is whether the right people were interviewed. The preferred interviewees were the heads of the party groups working with EU policy in the Bundestag, however these people are very busy, which makes it difficult to get a meeting with them. The best results would have been if these people had the time to meet for the interview or could have done them over the phone. Some of the interviewees, who ended up doing the interviews, were academic employees who could only talk about the facts and only partially about the political views of the parties. This unfortunately lessened the quality of the interviews, yet it can be argued that these interviews are better than not receiving any at all. Only the interview with Die Linke, it was one of the political speakers and advisors of the party group working with their EU policy. He was not the first choice for the interview, but since he has the position that he does, he was more than capable to answer for the party and answer sufficiently.

When doing interviews, it was additionally considered making one with an employee of the Danish embassy in Berlin. This interview would have collected some of the background data of the political landscape of Germany. It could have been an additional source of data, which could have given a collected view of a lot of the background knowledge necessary for the research. However, because of various reasons like summer holiday, my departure from Berlin and focusing on the other interviews these interviews were chosen not to be included. Additionally, the interviews would not have counted as expert interviews, which was part of the discussion of whether to include these kind of interviews. Furthermore, the interviews at the embassy would be more relevant if the research was angled differently.

Other data collection methods used in the research have been observations, which have provided some background understanding of what the parties stand for and getting an overview over the political landscape of Germany. This method can however be flawed as observations are often objective and colored by your own previous notions, which can result in leaving out information needed to conclude the research, or to include too much information on a subject you find interesting or important yet is not for the research.

Additionally, various documents have been included in the data. This method can be an easy way of gathering information, yet it can also be an incomplete data source.

#### 4.7.1 Analysis

When it comes to the theories used for the analysis, the once chosen were the three biggest integration theories, liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and federalism. These theories look to explain the rate and ways of integration of the member states of the EU, which this assignment has also sought to do. However, when looking at the reluctance of the will of the AfD to integrate further into the EU, and paring this with the theoretical paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism seemed somewhat forced. At this point, the theories chosen were not sufficient in the analysis of the parties' action. A different theoretical paradigm might have been better at explaining the actions of the AfD. Maybe integration theories in general cannot explain the actions of this party. Perhaps it would be better to make use of theories of international relations, as realism focus on the state, its interests, and the search for power. Furthermore, the theory believes that cooperation with other states should only happen if the state has no other way of gaining power or solving an issue. However, theories of international relations do not focus on the integration process of states as the integration theories do. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether it was necessary to include the adaptation theory in order to analyze the actions of the parties, or if it was sufficient with the integration theories on their own. While the integration theories look at the way integration into the EU happens, explain the reasons for, and process of integration, the adaptation theory focus on the actors and their actions. The adaptation theory is a tool to categorize the actions of the party to the right theoretical paradigms of the right theories, in this case integration theories. Thus, making the adaptation theory both a theory and method of analyzation.

An additional challenge when working with the theories chosen appears when having to distinguish between the neofunctionalist and federalist theories. Liberal intergovernmentalism is easier to distinguish from the other two as it focuses on the states as the main actors if integration. Nonetheless, some of the actions of the parties are somewhere in between the two theories or more than one theory can explain the motivation behind the actions. One of the reason both federalism and neofunctionalism were included in this assignment, is that federalism focuses on the amount of trust the state, or in this case the parties, have to the federal institutions and the union these are the pillars of, while neofunctionalism looks at the way the integration develops from one area to another. One could argue, that the parties mainly following the neofunctionalist approach was gradually working their way towards trusting the EU and its institutions, while federalists on the other hand already trust them.

When following the adaptation theory as the analyzation method, the result of the analysis and categorization of the German parliamentary parties the following became the results:

- i. The actions of the CDU/CSU can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigms of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.
- ii. The actions of the SPD can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism. However, aspects of liberal intergovernmentalism can also be found in some of their actions related to the EU.
- iii. The AfD are different from the other parties, as they wish to undo the integration that has already taken place. However, since they focus on the sovereignty of the states the adaptation paradigm that can best explain their actions and views on the proposed reforms of the EU is the liberal intergovernmentalist paradigm.
- iv. The actions of the FDP can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism. However, the neofunctionalist paradigm is also present in the actions of the party, along with bits of federalism as well.
- v. The actions of Die Linke are a mixture of all three adaptation paradigms, with a surprising amount of liberal intergovernmentalism. However, when looking at their idea of rebuilding the EU and create internal German policy within this new frame is following the federalist adaptation paradigm.
- vi. The actions of Die Grünen primarily follow the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism and federalism. However, aspects of the liberal intergovernmentalist adaptation paradigm is also present in their views towards the proposed reforms.

When discussing these findings, it is worth noticing that many of the parties' actions and views towards the proposed reforms of Macron and Juncker cannot simply be explained by one of the adaptation paradigms. This might seem strange, but could have a simple explanation. When looking at e.g. Die Linke who is a socialist party derived from the old communist parties in both East and West Germany, it is rather curious that some of their views could be explained by a liberal theoretical paradigm. However, an explanation for this may be that the party has developed to fit in better with the liberal marked of Germany and Europe. Yet they reject the neoliberal aspects of the Lisbon treaty, consequently this conclusion can quickly be rejected. However, the party might look at the economic advantages and disadvantages of the Euro as a currency in order to protect the lower, economic instable classes of Germany and the EU. Furthermore, it can be argued that they want to protect those already in the EU and full Schengen members and stabilizing their situation before allowing new states to gain access and endangering the already instable economy. This notion would make the mixture of adaptation paradigms make more sense, as the use of integration theories can only take the



analysis part of the way when only looking at the actions and not the political background and ideologies of the parties.

#### 4.7.2 Research question

The question remaining is now if the research has been able to answer the research question and what might be missing in order to do so.

When breaking down the research question, the first part is about the German parliamentary parties' views on the proposed EU-reforms of president Macron and President Juncker. Some of the proposed reforms were removed from the assignment along the research, as it became clear that the parties have not reacted to every single proposal of the two presidents. This decision can have compromised a thorough answer to the first part of the research question. In order to really answer the research question, one could argue that everything that was proposed or talked about as a vision of Macron and Juncker should have been included. Otherwise, the information gathered would be only be partial and thus the analysis that followed would be incomplete. An incomplete analysis would then lead to the research question remaining unanswered. However, due to the lack of information and decisions made by the parties on some of these policy areas they were chosen not to be included nonetheless. This allowed for a more in depth research and analysis of the other policy areas and thus making sure the relevant subjects were included in the research. As an argument for the choice to exclude some of the proposed reforms, it is important as a researcher to know what is relevant for the assignment and what is not. Otherwise, the assignment will have too many unimportant information, which will only confuse and may lead one of the tracks. Consequently, it is better to choose the right and relevant information for the assignment and focus on these. This procedure would then let you answer the relevant parts of the subject of the research question.

The second part of the research question is how the views of the parties can be explained using the adaptation theory. When looking at this part of the research question, the first thing to determine is if the adaptation theory can explain the views and actions of the German parliamentary parties at all. Once this is determined, it can be discussed how. The adaptation theories can work with various theoretical paradigms. It looks at the actions of the parties and categorize these actions into the chosen paradigms of, in this case, integration theories. Whether the paradigms chosen are the right once we already discussed further up, in subsection 4.7. Nevertheless, the adaptation can explain the views of the German parliamentary parties by looking at their actions and statements. The theory then categorize them into different groups that match the theoretical paradigms of the integration theories. Thus, the adaptation theory can explain the actions and views of the parties by analyzing their actions and categorizing them. The results of this categorization is the results discussed in subsection 4.7.1.

## 5.0 Conclusion

The research question of the assignment is as follows:

What are the German parliamentary parties' views on the EU-reforms, and how can these be explained using the adaptation theory?

When it comes to the German parliamentary parties' views on the proposed EU-reforms of President Macron and President Juncker, all the parties except for the AfD are broadly for the steps suggested by the two presidents in order to further European integration. However, not a single party agreed with everything proposed. It varied what the parties agreed on, and additionally, there were internal disagreements in the parties. The AfD is consequently against any further integration into the EU and the proposals of Macron and Juncker. Furthermore, they are working towards less integration and more state sovereignty.

When following the adaptation theory as the analyzation method, the result of the analysis and categorization of the German parliamentary parties the following became the results:

- i. The actions of the CDU/CSU can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigms of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.
- ii. The actions of the SPD can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism. However, aspects of liberal intergovernmentalism can also be found in some of their actions related to the EU.
- iii. The AfD are different from the other parties, as they wish to undo the integration that has already taken place. However, since they focus on the sovereignty of the states the adaptation paradigm that can best explain their actions and views on the proposed reforms of the EU is the liberal intergovernmentalist paradigm.
- iv. The actions of the FDP can primarily be explained by the adaptation paradigm of liberal intergovernmentalism. However, the neofunctionalist paradigm is also present in the actions of the party, along with bits of federalism as well.
- v. The actions of Die Linke are a mixture of all three adaptation paradigms, with a surprising amount of liberal intergovernmentalism. However, when looking at their idea of rebuilding the EU and create internal German policy within this new frame is following the federalist adaptation paradigm.
- vi. The actions of Die Grünen primarily follow the adaptation paradigm of neofunctionalism and federalism. However, aspects of the liberal intergovernmentalist adaptation paradigm is also present in their views towards the proposed reforms.

When it comes to the method and the theories used to answer the research question, interviews and the answers from these are a big part of the data used in the analysis. Additionally, they gave the opportunity to

ask about the policy areas that were not mentioned in the party programs. However, the preparation of the interviews, the interviews themselves and analysis of them afterwards take a lot of time. Furthermore, not all of the parties were willing or could find the time to take part in the interviews. Unfortunately, not all answers were answered to the full extend. The main responsible of creating a good and useful interview lays with the interviewer. However, when the interviewer is inexperienced it can unfortunately result in not getting the full answers from people who might rather talk around the subject.

Other method of collecting data include observations, which have provided some background understanding of what the parties stand for and getting an overview over the political landscape of Germany. This method can however be flawed as observations are often objective and colored by your own previous notions, which can result in leaving out information needed to conclude the research, or to include too much information on a subject you find interesting or important yet is not for the research. Additionally, various documents have been included in the data. This method can be an easy way of gathering information, yet it can also be an incomplete data source.

As the method of analyzation, the adaptation theory was used. The adaptation theory is a tool to categorize the actions of the party to the right theoretical paradigms of the right theories, in this case integration theories. Thus, making the adaptation theory both a theory and method of analyzation. The paradigms used for the analyzation and categorization are European integration theories, more exactly federalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. However, a different theoretical paradigm might have been better at explaining the actions of the AfD. Maybe integration theories in general cannot explain the actions of this party. Perhaps it would be better to make use of theories of international relations, as realism focus on the state, its interests, and the search for power. Furthermore, the theory believes that cooperation with other states should only happen if the state has no other way of gaining power or solving an issue. However, theories of international relations do not focus on the integration process of states as the integration theories do.

Further research could include taking this research to a national level and looking at the plans of the German government instead of the parties. A relevant addition to this research would also be to research the various parties' possibilities to influence the reforms of the EU. Yet another opportunity for further research is to look at the ideologies of the parties, as the research and analysis showed it was adaptation theories and its paradigms were unable to determine of the actions and views of the parties were due to ideology or a different mindset on certain subjects.

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