

Human Rights of Refugees in Uganda:

THE CRRF NORM TRANSLATED IN REHOPE

JOAKIM ANDER RIMMER LOMELIN OSUNA PEDERSEN



Abstract

The CRRF is a UN created framework that works with giving refugees dignity and self-reliance in the implementing state. ReHoPE is a Ugandan UNHCR strategy working that works off one of the “pillars” of the CRRF. This project considers, using norm translation, appropriation and contestation, to what extent CRRF norms on human rights for refugees are translated in ReHoPE. Using intersectionality and participant observation, along with secondary data, gives a better understanding of human rights on the ground, compared to the CRRF and ReHoPE policies. This project sees the lack of application language for the CRRF, as well fragmented use of the CRRF in ReHoPE. Even though both policies see human rights as a core activity, the translation from CRRF to ReHoPE will be viewed from different aspects and with different limitations. To conclude that ReHoPE is an applicable part of the CRRF in Uganda, but misses out on the real problem with lack of human rights in the refugee hosting-communities.

Table of Content

Abbreviation	3
Introduction.....	4
Method	6
Intersectionality:.....	8
Intersectionality Discussion:.....	11
Theory	13
Norm Translation, Appropriation, Contestation.	13
Discussion:.....	15
What are the norms about in the CRRF?	16
The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants	16
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework - CRRF	17
The CRRF in Praxis	21
What are the norms about in ReHoPE?	22
Refugee and Host Population Empowerment – ReHoPE	22
ReHoPE Discussion	26
What are the practices related to the implementation of CRRF in Uganda?	28
Uganda – A Heaven for Refugees.	28
Conflicts in West-Nile	37
Corruption as a Culture.....	40
Repatriation	41
One small area, in a big country	42
Camp Commandants of Refugee Settlements.....	43
Are the Norms in the CRRF Translated, Appropriated and/or Contested in ReHoPE and Practices on the ground?	46
Conclusion:	49
References	51

Abbreviation

CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DFA	District Farmers Association
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GoU	Government of Uganda
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NURI	Northern Uganda Resilience Initiative
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
ReHoPE	Refugee and Host Population Empowerment
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program

Introduction

The “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” was accepted by all member states of the United Nations in September of 2016. From this declaration the “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework” – CRRF – emerged. Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia have all agreed to apply the framework. The “Refugee and Host Population Empowerment” – ReHoPE – is a UN Uganda created, UNHCR Uganda lead, policy working with empowering both the refugees and the hosting communities in Uganda. In this project we will only focus on Uganda, specifically Rhino Camp Settlement in West-Nile and specifically only South Sudanese refugees and their host-communities. West-Nile has a total of four settlements – Rhino Camp (along with the Imvepi Extension) in Arua district, Bidi Bidi in Yumbe District, Palorinya in Moyo District and Adjumani in Adjumani District – which comprise of 944.259 refugees, of whom most are from South Sudan, of the 1.395.146 refugees in all of Uganda¹. Uganda has had a rich history of welcoming refugees from neighboring countries and given them shelter as well as basic needs to survive and become a part of the Ugandan economy. When their home countries were no longer in crisis, or even if they still were, refugees have had the freedom to return to their country, and always welcomed back if need be.

In South Sudan a civil war is currently raging through the country, displacing or killing its population. Over a million South Sudanese people have sought refuge in Uganda, most of them in West-Nile, as that is the part of Uganda that is closest to South Sudan.

During my internship period in West-Nile working for a Danida program called the Northern Uganda Resilience Initiative – NURI – pilot project, I got to experience first-hand the life of the refugees, the hosting communities – known as nationals locally – as well as work done by National and International NGO programs, as well as the local government in West-Nile. Although I interned with the NURI pilot project, already there I could see that interpretations of official documents from the programs head office in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, were interpreted differently in West-Nile, or in the field. During that same period, I was exposed to many aspects of refugee and host-communities as an implementing partner of the NURI pilot project was the Danish Refugee Council – DRC – whom the NURI pilot project Arua office in West-Nile shared offices with. Through my

¹ Can be seen in Appendix 1.

exposure to the DRC I was also introduced to the CRRF and ReHoPE. Through my time in West-Nile and experiences with NURI pilot project, I wondered if the interpretation of documents in the field would be similar with the CRRF and its interpretation in the field by national and international NGO's, local authorities and the national population. Therefore, my problem formulation is:

To what extent are norms about the Human Rights of Refugees and Migrants, especially as these concern gender and related categories, in the CRRF translated in the Uganda Refugee Policy Document “Refugee and Host Population Empowerment - ReHoPE” and the practices of UNHCR?

To answer the problem formulation, my research questions will be:

- a) What are the norms about in the CRRF?**
- b) What are the norms about in ReHoPE?**
- c) What are the practices related to the implementation of CRRF in Uganda?**
- d) Are the Norms in the CRRF Translated, Appropriated and/or Contested in ReHoPE and Practices on the ground?**

Using research questions, a), b), and c), this project will be able to answer research question d) to finally answer this projects problem formulation.

Method

To answer this projects problem formulation, we will first and foremost be looking at the “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” as well as its annex 1, “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework” and “Refugee and Host Population Empowerment – ReHoPE”. By using these policies, we will be able to see whether ReHoPE translated the norms of the CRRF about human rights and have the same understanding.

The empirical data will be made up of my own participant observations and field interviews, as well as secondary data, which will in certain instances affirm my findings. Participant Observation is defined as:

‘Participant Observation is a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning both the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and culture.’ (Bernard, R. H., & Gravlee, C. C. ,2014).

This form of research involves informal interviews and direct observation and is qualitative data. Participant Observation is normally done over an extended period, ranging from months to years (Bernard, R. H., & Gravlee, C. C. ,2014). In my case it was a period of four and a half months.

From here, by using the theory and Intersectionality we will hopefully be able to answer the projects problem formulation. Norm translation, appropriation, and contestation will show if there is a difference of the interpretation and/or understanding of both the CRRF and ReHoPE in West-Nile, while Intersectionality will give depth to these finding by looking at the different identities of both refugees and nationals and how they are treated. If, in the field, refugees and nationals are equal or different when looking at human rights and how they are treated.

There is limitation to my participant observations, as mentioned in the introduction, I was doing an internship with the Danida program NURI pilot project for a period of four and a half months in the West-Nile Region in the North-Western part of Uganda. Although my participant observation was during an extended period of time, and they involved mostly informal interviews and direct observation, I had daily interactions within the NURI pilot project, and my time was not dedicated, per se, to becoming part of the refugees or nationals of West-Nile. I spent large amounts of time every

day with both refugees and nationals in the Rhino Camp Settlement and got to learn about their life routines and culture, but the information I was given was mostly what I was told by them, which can be viewed as biased, as I will go into further detail below. I relied heavily on my observations, that I then later used to ask for further information about a matter.

During my internship I noticed something disturbing. During the first two weeks of my stay they had planned meetings and field visits for me to part take in. But it wasn't until after that that I noticed that things were very different. Meetings were "set-up" to show the best parts of programs, and to show the positive progress being made. This had something to do with my skin color. "Mzungus" or "Mungos" as they called white people, were normally seen as an authority figure when they worked with programs or NGO's. It took some time for me to explain to them that I held no authority in the program because I was an Intern of the program. Once the local employees of the DRC and NURI pilot project understood this, there were very few "set-up" meeting I had to attend, only if there was a prominent visit from the Danish Embassy or from the headquarters of the program from Kampala. It also helped that I joined field excursions spontaneously, instead of having planned a trip to the field where all saw "set-up". This is also a limitation to my informal interviews, as some could have been prepared. In comparison to many of the prominent visitors we had during my time in West-Nile, my extended stay and having time to observe my surrounding, gave me a better understanding of the happenings around me. What would have made my data collected even better was if I spoke the local tribe language, as well as "Jubarabic" – a version of Arabic found in South Sudan, the name Juba comes from the South Sudanese capital.

It is also important to note that in this project we will only be looking at refugees in West-Nile, specifically South Sudanese refugees. In David Kigozi's (2017) article "The Reality Behind Uganda's Refugee Model" he explains that it is fashionable to view Uganda in a very positive light when it comes to refugee hosting nations, and that this positive coverage of Uganda comes from "Refugee Economics" by Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan and Naohiko Omata which focuses on refugees in Kampala and Nakivale and Kyangwali refugee settlements in the south west Uganda. Kigozi (2017) explains that the method and findings are sound, but that this research only involves one fifth of the refugee population in Uganda and is misleading in giving the impression that '*refugees in Uganda are better off than they actually are*' (Kigozi, D, 2017).

Intersectionality:

Intersectionality is a study of gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability and age, that do not operate as one unit, but as mutually exclusive identities, as they instead work together to shape complex social inequalities. (Collins, Patricia Hill 2015). Collins argues that intersectionality is a very complex theory as many variations of intersectionality exist, both across scholarly interdisciplinary fields and outside the academic field, as social inequalities can be found within any field. *‘Teachers, social workers, parents, policy advocates, university support staff, community organizers, clergy, lawyers, graduate students, nurses, and other practitioners find themselves upholding and challenging social inequalities.’* (Collins, Patricia Hill 2015). Collins (2015) suggests that because intersectionality lies in the relationship between power and social inequality, that it can create a broad-based project. Collins (2015) refers to three interdependent areas within intersectionality:

‘(a) intersectionality as a field of study, e.g., its history, themes, boundaries, debates, and direction;

(b) intersectionality as an analytical strategy, e.g., how intersectional frameworks provide new angles of vision on social institutions, practices, social problems, and other social phenomena associated with social inequality; and

(c) intersectionality as critical praxis, e.g., how social actors use intersectionality for social justice projects.’ (Collins, Patricia Hill 2015)

From these three this project can use part (a) and (b). Part (a) will help us understand the history of intersectionality, its boundaries and the direction of the theory within this project. Part (b) will help us analyze the data collected. As of this project, part (c) will not be used, but because of the data collected, instances of critical praxis of intersectionality might appear.

Origin of Intersectionality

Intersectionality is rooted in Black feminism and Critical Race Theory within the USA. Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the term to show the disregard of Black women within antidiscrimination law as well as feminism, antiracist theory and politics (Carbado, D. W., et al., 2013). This essentially means although women and Blacks are demanded to be employed to diversify businesses employees, those employed are normally White women and Black men. This does not exactly include Black

women as these two identities are separated. Crenshaws argument in both “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” and “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.” is exactly that, that these two identities should not be seen as separate but should indeed be mutually exclusive, that these two identities could, and should, intersect. (Carbado, D. W., et al., 2013).

Intersectionality Broadened

From “Demarginalizing” and “Mapping” the definition of the term Intersectionality was broadened by both scholars and activists, ranging from social issues, power dynamics, legal and political systems within the USA and later beyond. This meant that Intersectionality has traveled as a theory, both beyond the border of the USA as well as to other fields of study. This also means that Intersectionality’s definition has changed, or varieties of the theory had been created, giving to understand that the theory is still a work-in-progress as the theory is implemented or used in various other fields and geographical locations (Carbado, D. W., et al., 2013). This also means that having Intersectionality, the theory, using Black Women be the “standard” to generalize a theory about power and marginalization was no longer adequate as the theory had now taken different shapes. Through the travels of Intersectionality, and new actors of different background – gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation - taking up the theory, it has moved to engross a still widening range of experiences and structures of power. Yuval-Davis (2016) further demonstrates this point:

‘Unlike many feminists, especially black feminists, who focus on intersectional analysis as specific to black and ethnic minorities women or, at least, to marginalized people, I see intersectionality as the most valid approach to analyse social stratification as a whole’ (Yuval-Davis, N., 2016).

Tripp (2016) argues that intersectionality is primarily about the relation of power. That Intersectionality explores systems of power and oppression based on various identities that are interrelated and should not be understood individually from one another. Meaning that one cannot pull apart identities to try to understand only one of them. *‘People have multiple identities that intersect and coproduce one another, depending on social experiences’* (Tripp, A. M. 2016). This can also mean that people who are privileged in one power might be marginalized in another, and that

everyone has a different perception and worldview. These different perceptions are based on the individual's experiences of privilege and disadvantage (Tripp, A. M. 2016).

Paulson (2016) has used Intersectionality to explore indigenous people of Bolivia. Through her observations she noted that Intersectionality should also be used to look at "whiteness" and the male role in different social groups whom have different access to power and resources (Paulson, S., 2016). Paulson (2016) argues that racialization and racism is commonly recognized as discrimination against groups whom are non-white. Paulson (2016) also argues that Intersectionality, as introduced by Crenshaw, adapted this concept to include gender as well, to demonstrate the unique conditions of discrimination and/or oppression such individuals/groups suffer. From this argument, Paulson (2016) makes us aware of the privilege of white women and/or the benefits of masculinity of an indigenous man. Giving a further depth to the category of "men" and that their sexual orientation, race and socioeconomic and other identities can create different conditions of masculinity and not just the overall understanding of "men" as the oppressor (Paulson, S., 2016). This could give an inside to both national and refugee men and their role in their communities as well as could compare their different status, if they are different.

Tomlinson (2015) argues that Intersectionality is a strong tool for realizing human rights as it works with power and oppression, as mentioned above. Tomlinson (2015) maintains that Intersectionality is a good method to identify multiple aspects of one's social identity, but that something still lacks:

'While it is important to understand how these social identities function together, the focus on identity politics often comes at the cost of overshadowing (or ignoring) the more transformative aims of intersectionality, which is the deconstruction and dismantling of systems of power and oppression.' (Tomlinson, Y., 2015)

Tomlinson (2015) argues that one cannot talk about identity without looking at the different identities of intersectionality – race, gender, class, ableism. Tomlinson (2015) also argues that any realization of human rights without an intersectional understanding of oppression will be flawed from the beginning (Tomlinson, Y., 2015). Tomlinson (2015) tells us that there are identities of one self that we cannot control and that *'...have historical and contemporary meanings that confront me constantly, and operate without my permission or acknowledgement of them.'* (Tomlinson, Y., 2015). This means that people will interpret others identity based on those identities that they can see and that we cannot control, e.g. race, gender, social class – seen through clothes, cellphone, etc – and age

(Tomlinson, Y., 2015). Tomlinson (2015) tells us that these identities are – most probably – “managed” through laws and institutions, probably without one’s knowledge of it. *‘This is why it is critically important that we elevate and privilege people’s experiences of discrimination and oppression because they reveal a key dimension of the violence of oppression.’* (Tomlinson, Y., 2015). We could call these identities ‘public identities’. Private identities are those others cannot see, sexuality, politics, social class, title. These are identities that others cannot observe, but we must reveal to others. No matter if the identities are public or private, one can still be privileged or oppressed by them, either in public or private spheres (Tomlinson, Y., 2015).

Tomlinson (2015) argues that “solidarity” *‘...one that is rooted in alliance building, must be grounded in a politics and practice of intersectionality’* (Tomlinson, Y., 2015) and that is not just a signature, a hashtag or a salutation on our social media. She argues that “true” solidarity is when we understand the forces impacting the people and their political situations and that we want to work with them to help them achieve a realization of Human Rights (Tomlinson, Y., 2015). The example Tomlinson (2015) gives is Charlie Hebdo massacre versus a Boko Haram attack in Nigeria where hundreds were killed. Although Intersectionality purpose is to look at power and oppression, it does feel that she is contradicting herself. Her arguments are based on one’s own identities, but her example seems to be too far reaching. Although the fact that the Boko Haram attack was not mentioned, and few stood against it in the Western World, in comparison to the Charlie Hebdo Massacre where millions turned to the streets, is sad. The fact remains that, through the view of Intersectionality, Parisians and other groups of identities such as westerners, would be able to better understand and have solidarity towards the victims of Charlie Hebdo Massacre because it affected people that they can identify with and the attack was near to them, geographically.

Most of the theorists of Intersectionality mentioned above, have to some extent talked about “History”, e.g. African Americans in USA having oppression rooted in the history of slavery (Tomlinson, Y., 2015). Collins (2015) says that history is strongly associated with Intersectionality as well. The role of History in intersectionality is major, it can tell one the origin of oppression or power of groups of people, or in this case, identities. History will be able to give us an understanding of why some identities are in power and why other identities are oppressed.

Intersectionality Discussion:

Intersectionality gives a better understanding of those identities oppressed by powers but must also recognize that there are areas that some people cannot understand, because of the lack of that identity

under oppression. I, as man will never really understand the struggle of women in a day to day basis, through reading about Intersectionality I have learned a lot, but I will never truly be able to understand their struggle. Or in that case the struggle of other men whom are non-white. As a White I will never understand the struggle of Blacks or any other race, as I will never experience those same oppressions, I can try to understand, and probably will to a certain point, but if I never experience it, I will never truly understand it. As a hetero, I will never understand the struggles of homosexuals or transgenders, I can do my best, but again, will never truly understand the oppression that they experience. For that reason, I must conclude here, that I can only focus on public identities or those identities I can see myself and previous knowledge of oppressed identities in this project and try to understand identities that I do not possess to my best ability. Which can be brought back to Collins (2015) of casting a self-reflexive eye on intersectionality, where she argues that self-reflexivity is an aspect to ‘...*produce a loose set of guiding assumptions or guiding themes.*’ (Collins, P. H. 2015). Meaning that these limitations will play a part in the data in my analysis.

History will have a role in this project, as the history of West-Nile in the last 30 years has changed a lot, from “the lost region” to becoming a central role in South Sudanese refugee’s response. History beyond this could also be significant but going too far back might derail the focus of the project.

The whole meaning of Intersectionality is that one should not differentiate between identities, that one cannot take one away. In this project I will do my best to incorporate all aspects of people’s identities but will limit the exploration of some identities because of lack of space or even knowledge. This does not comply with the Theory fully but will be necessary to be able to answer the problem formulation. One such example would be the struggle of sexuality. I have already argued that I would not look into an identity such as sexuality above, but it doesn’t diminish the struggle in Uganda for sexuality rights. On the other side of the spectrum is religion. Throughout the time I lived in Uganda and my internship in West-Nile I never saw or experienced any problems when it came to religion. With 45.1% as protestants, 39.3% Roman Catholics, 13.7% Muslims, 1.6% as others and 0.2% have none (IndexMundi (2), 2018). Prayer before and after large meetings in Uganda is a custom, having one person attending saying the prayer. Throughout all the meetings I attended it didn’t matter whom prayed – Protestant, Muslim or Catholic – they all felt blessed, and many felt very uncomfortable if the prayer had not been done.

Shown above are various areas of Intersectionality. All these areas, to different degrees, will be relevant to the project and will be able to give a better understanding of the answer to the problem

formulation. Most relevant to this project is the exploration of Human Rights that Tomlinson (2015) examines both violations or lacks as well as looking at the limitations of the policies and/or other relevant entities.

Although Intersectionality is rooted in the study of race, class and gender, gender will not be the main focus of this project. Aspects of gender will of course be incorporated in the project but will have a bigger focus on class and race. The reason for this is because of gender norms in Uganda. As a man, women did not wish to speak with me, and if I had the possibility there would always be a man present that would answer my questions instead. This is of course a limitation, but never the less, through the help of female co-workers during my internship in Uganda I did get information.

Theory

Norm Translation, Appropriation, Contestation.

Norms are typically established at global level creating global norms. These global norms are standards of expected behavior telling implementors how it is expected should be conducted and important for societies to flourish. This being said, global norms often fail to diffuse local situations (Martinsson, J, 2011). Meaning that many initiatives are good at giving norms on global agendas, but that few actually make any change on the ground because of different challenges in culture and political economy, that were not looked at or considered when the global norm was created (Martinsson, J. 2011).

Norm diffusion literature has changed since it's "first wave" as Zwingel (2017) says in "Women's rights norms as content-in-motion and incomplete practice" from 2017. Here she argues that the "first wave" of norm diffusion created norms in intergovernmental settings, and from this created models to impact beyond the global (Zwingel, S. 2017). This meant that:

'In doing so, this body of literature produced a new understanding of transnational relations and the actor constellations that build connections between international and domestic contexts.' (Zwingel, S. 2017)

Zwingel (2017) also argues that this "first wave" also blocked out several dimensions, one of them the multi-directional spread of norms, meaning that international norms were sent from the core to then be received by domestic ends. This is where the "second wave" comes in, which aimed to move

this focus. Looking at the assumed recipient of the '*international norms and their strategies of norm translation, appropriation, and contestation*' (Zwingel, J. 2017)

Norm Contestation explores how actor's interpretation of a norm's logic of appropriateness, by the logic of practicality and contestedness, may effect the relationship between norm enforcers and norm users (Jose, B. 2017). Norm contestation has the tendency to '*...focus on behavioral variation in instances where actors have not yet subscribed to a norm or intentionally violate it to further material interests.*' (Jose, B. 2017). Norm Contestation does not seek to explain actors' behavior, but rather examine actors understanding pertaining to a norm, and how actors may differently interpret those norms (Jose, B. 2017). In this project actors should be seen as the UNHCR, national and international NGO's and national and local government entities.

Norm appropriation is understood as the process of taking some of the ideology, or the norm, and the local social attributes of the place in which they are in and creating their own understanding of the norm. (Madsen, D, H. 2018) This means that the people affected by the norm take part of it and mix it in with their own understanding of the norm concept and create a localized understanding of the norm.

Norm translation is seen as a two-way process. This means that the process is not only influenced from global to local, but also from local to global (Madsen, D, H. 2018 & Zwingel, J. 2017). This means that norms travel from one context to another, where all stages are interrelated – from global to local (Zwingel, J. 2017). This means that there is both a "trickle-up" and a "trickle-down" effect when it comes to norm translation (Madsen, D, H. 2018). Also, norm translation:

'...identifies transnational networks as important actors and argues for a much more complex understanding of processes of norm translation with a focus on context and processes of appropriation of norms at different levels opening up for bottom-up perspectives.' (Madsen, D, H. 2018).

Zwingel (2018) argues that for this to happen the state in question must be the first actor, so as to take responsibility for the implementation of the treaty – or in this case policies – which was established under international law – in this case the UN. But also, that NGO's within the state – both national and international – are important in creating a connection between the local needs and the international standards (Zwingel, J. 2017). Zwingel (2017) also argues that '*...it is helpful to be aware of two interlinked dynamics, namely the translation of concepts on the one hand, and the translation of concepts into norm-consistent practice on the other.*' (Zwingel, J. 2017). She then argues that even

though they should both be ongoing processes, the latter should be expected incomplete in principle, because there is no tool to determine if a norm is fully realized.

Discussion:

By using norm translation, appropriation, and contestation – along with Intersectionality – to give a better understanding of human rights that has been implemented by the two policies and whether they are kept on the ground. This way we will be able to answer the problem formulation by understanding the norms of human rights in both policies and how they compare, as well as being given examples of how these human rights are upheld on the ground. I do not believe that this project will be more inclined to one of the three, but that by comparing the policies with each other, and with the data collected, we will find traces of norm translation, appropriation and contestation. The CRRF is different from ReHoPE in that CRRF focuses on a partnership – at the beginning stages – with the Ugandan government, and as can be seen in the theory it says that the state should be the first actor that interprets a norm. One could argue that ReHoPE is the interpretation of UNHCR Uganda of the CRRF. We will get further into this when we come to answer the fourth research question.

What are the norms about in the CRRF?

The CRRF is part of the “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” and therefore we must first look at the declaration, to better understand where the CRRF comes from and what its purpose is.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was adopted on the 19th of September of 2016 that addresses large movements of refugees and migrants on the world stage (United Nations, 2016). On the world stage there are 244 million migrants, most having moved without incidents. 65 million of these migrants were moved by force; of these, 21 million are refugees, 3 million are asylum seekers and around 40 million are internally displaced. Through the adoption of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development it was recognized made by migrants when included in sustainable development, but at the same time how forced displacement of present complex challenges (United Nations, 2016).

In the New York Declaration, the UN reaffirms the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reaffirming all human rights and that they will protect refugees and migrants irrespective of their status. Even though they might be governed by separate legal frameworks, they have the same worldwide human rights and freedoms (United Nations, 2016). The UN (2016) also stresses that refugees and migrants need to live in safety and with dignity. This includes the pledge of “no one left behind” from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and to make sure that specific needs of refugees and migrants be met, to uphold this statement. This in turn will give the refugees and migrants the possibility to contribute to the 2030 Agenda’s sustainable development efforts, in the state they are situated in.

‘Large movements of refugees and migrants have political, economic, social, developmental, humanitarian and human rights ramifications, which cross all borders.’ (United Nations, 2016). This calls for a global approach, because no one state can manage movements in such a scale on their own. This means that affected states, mostly developing, are suffering by receiving the large movements of migrants, which in turn affects their own social and economic cohesion and development (United Nations, 2016). The UN (2016) calls for greater international cooperation to assist refugee hosting countries and their communities. Many of the forcibly displaced refugees may have to stay in host countries as long-term refugees, making the strain on hosting countries larger, therefore the UN (2016) are determined to find long-termed and sustainable solutions. *‘Large movements of refugees*

and migrants must have comprehensive policy support, assistance and protection, consistent with States' obligations under international law.' (United Nations, 2016).

The UN (2016) says in the declaration that they are also determined to address the origins of these large movements, *'including through increased efforts aimed at early prevention of crisis situations based on preventive diplomacy.'* (United Nations, 2016). As well as looking into preventing and through peaceful resolutions of conflicts, humanitarian cooperation, development and promotion of international law (United Nations, 2016).

In the New York Declaration, the UN (2016) also declares that all people are born free and equal both in dignity and rights:

'...under international law prohibit discrimination of any kind on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.' (United Nations, 2016)

UN (2016) declares with regret that this is a great concern as xenophobia and racism has increased as a response to the refugees and migrants. The UN (2016) condemns any such discrimination or intolerance towards refugees and migrants as well as stereotypes that have been applied to them – such as religion or their belief. That the demonization of refugees and migrants works against them living lives equally and with dignity that of every human being should. *'We will take a range of steps to counter such attitudes and behaviour, in particular with regard to hate crimes, hate speech and racial violence.'* (United Nations, 2016). The UN (2016) will take step to counter such attitudes by creating personal contact between hosting communities and refugees and migrants to highlight the contributions refugees and migrants can bring. What could also be known as sensitization.

The UN (2016) also invites the private sector and civil society to become part of the multi-stakeholder alliance to help support efforts. These would also include refugee and migrant organizations.

Annex I in the New York Declaration contains the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework – CRRF – which outlines steps to achieve the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018.

Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework - CRRF

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is the framework the UN (2016) has set to act help in today's displacement of large scale refugees, both by international cooperation and responsibility sharing between both refugee hosting states and the rest of the world. The framework

is to be developed and initiated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – UNHCR – in close cooperation with the relevant states, which are the refugee hosting states and other members of UN as well as other UN entities (United Nations, 2016).

‘A comprehensive refugee response should involve a multi-stakeholder approach, including national and local authorities, international organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, regional coordination and partnership mechanisms, civil society partners, including faith-based organizations and academia, the private sector, media and the refugees themselves.’ (United Nations, 2016).

In the New York Resolution (2016) the UN gives four areas that make up the CRRF. Before these four areas are explored, the UN argues that the CRRF will be different from each country that it is implemented in, both because of the different nature of refugee movement as well as states.

Reception and Admission:

Refugee receiving states, remembering their national capacity as well as their international legal obligations, along with the UNHCR, International and National organizations, other partners, and the support of other states, are to ensure, to their best ability, to identify people whom need international protection as refugees (United Nations, 2016). This means that they are received in safe and dignified conditions and being able to identify persons of special needs such as: victims of trafficking, children – in need of protection e.g. if they arrive alone - and prevention of sexual-based and/or gender-based violence (United Nations, 2016). The last point is especially important as the UN (2016) also asks to: *‘Take account of the rights, specific needs, contributions and voices of women and girl refugees’* (United Nations, 2016).

Meet the refugees with essential needs, which would include providing the refugees with adequate drinking water, sanitation, shelter, food – nutrition – and health care, this includes psychosocial support to those in need. Each Refugee should be registered individually and be given documentation as fast as possible when they arrive to the country in which they seek asylum, as well as previous countries they have sought asylum. This should be done through biometric registration and photo identification. Hosting states will receive technical and financial support to be able to implement this from the UNHCR and other relevant partners (United Nations, 2016).

During registration, will also be the perfect opportunity for hosting states, to register whether the refugees have special needs or special protection needs. This would include:

‘...women at risk, children, especially unaccompanied children and children separated from their families, child-headed and single-parent households, victims of trafficking, victims of trauma and survivors of sexual violence, as well as refugees with disabilities and older persons’ (United Nations, 2016).

Hosting Countries should immediately register births of refugee children, as well as other changes in civil status such as marriage, divorce or death certificates (United Nations, 2016).

Put in measures to uphold and safeguard the human rights of refugees such as their security as well as legitimate security concerns of the host country (United Nations, 2016).

Support for Immediate and Ongoing Needs

The UN (2016) puts here a list of requirements for both multilateral donors and the private sector partners as well as the hosting states for how financial and other resources be given, and how they expect this financial aid and other resources to be used. E.g. For multilateral donors and private sector partners to cover the humanitarian needs identified, and for the hosting states to give fast, safe and unimpeded access to humanitarian assistance to refugees (United Nations, 2016).

Support for Host Countries and Communities

Here the hosting states, along with UNHCR and other relevant partners, are to implement a joint and impartial risk and/or impact assessment (United Nations, 2016). This is to be done before and after an influx of refugees so as to know what assistance is needed for the refugees, nationals – communities – and local authorities whom are affected by refugee presence (United Nations, 2016). Through this assessment, the UN (2016) Resolution asks that the CRRF also be incorporated, where appropriate, in the national developing planning. This is *‘... in order to strengthen the delivery of essential services and infrastructure for the benefit of host communities and refugees;’* (United Nations, 2016). This is to make sure that national communities in refugee areas do not feel that they are being “left behind” and only refugees get help, since in many developing hosting communities, many times have the same needs as the refugees.

Durable Solutions

The UN (2016), recognizes that currently there are no durable solutions for the many refugees around the world, and securing these durable solutions is one of the primary goals of international protection.

To be able to find these durable solutions, the UN (2016) makes it clear that a huge amount depends on a sustained international cooperation and support. Local solutions, resettlement and voluntary repatriation should be pursued as durable solutions (United Nations, 2016).

The UN (2016) reaffirms to create conditions that would lead to refugees return with dignity and safety to their countries. As well as to find the root cause of violence and conflict in their countries to help through political solutions, peaceful resettlement and assist in reconstruction efforts. To do this, states of origin would have to recognize that everyone has the right to leave or return to their country. The country of origin must respect to receive their nationals, which would be in a safe and secure manner, fully respecting the for international human rights. They will also have to provide identification and travel documents, as well as consider restitution of property (United Nations, 2016).

Host states, along with the UNHCR and other relevant partners would provide legal stay to those seeking international protection as refugees and understand that any decision on permanent settlement in any form is up to the hosting county (United Nations, 2016). They are also to make sure that refugees become self-reliant by creating opportunities for the refugees as well as giving them access to education, health care, services and labor markets without being discriminated both from the nationals and among the refugees. This also means empowering the refugees by making best use of their skills, so that they can better contribute to their own well-being as well as the communities'. Building human capital and self-reliance will be an essential step towards long-term solutions (United Nations, 2016).

States are encouraged to establish resettlement programs as soon as possible. Those states that already have resettlement programs are encouraged to increase the size of their program (United Nations, 2016).

The Way Forward

The UN (2016) commits to implement the CRRF and invites the UNHCR to engage with hosting states and all relevant stakeholders '*...with a view to evaluating the detailed practical application of the comprehensive refugee response framework and assessing the scope for refinement and further development.*' (United Nations, 2016). Essentially, getting all "lessons-learned" from organizations and other stakeholders and work with the CRRF from that starting point, to ease the burden on the host countries and to enhance the self-reliance of refugees.

The CRRF in Praxis

Plan International made a document of reflections called “Putting the CRRF into Practice” on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework based on their visits to both Tanzania and Uganda. The first concern spoken about in Plan International document looks at “Putting the CRRF’s policy language into Practical Terms”. They critique the CRRF for not being clear, and that NGO’s and other programs have trouble with knowing; what the CRRF actually is? What the implications are of the CRRF on the ground in refugee response? And, what is required to implement the CRRF? Plan International argue that there needs to be a clear and have a practical guide on how it should be put into praxis. That the policy language needs to be translated in to operational terms. They argue that a general operational guide would be a good starting point, ‘...*which can then be contextualized in each CRRF case study country to make it more concrete and specific.*’ (Plan International, 2017).


It should also be noted that the CRRF are guidelines, and not an international law. This means that, states can pick and choose what they want or what they can implement within the state from the CRRF. This can be noted in other CRRF implementing states such as Djibouti and Ethiopia, which recently started taking steps towards giving refugees access to education, legal help and health care, but not for example freedom of movement or access to work (Pedersen, J. 2017).

What are the norms about in ReHoPE?

Refugee and Host Population Empowerment – ReHoPE

ReHoPE is a United Nations Uganda created strategy and approach which works towards bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders to create a more effective programming. It specifically targets challenges within protection and social and economic development for both the refugees and the hosting communities. ReHoPE is supported by the Government of Uganda in integrating the refugees into the National Development Plan through the Settlement Transformation Agenda (STA), thus making them part of the development agenda of Uganda (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

The ReHoPE document calls ReHoPE a ‘... *transformative strategy and approach... a key building block of a comprehensive response to displacement in Uganda...*’ (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017), as well as a key component in the application of the CRRF, only set in the “third pillar” of the Ugandan CRRF model, focusing solely on resilience and self-reliance (As can be seen in Model 1 below).



Model 1. CRRF was made by UNHCR Uganda, Source: UNHCR Uganda Facebook Page.

The goal of ReHoPE is to bring together the diverse range of stakeholder in refugee and host community areas to create a harmonized and unified front to overcome fragmented programming. It is also a response to challenges of developing durable solutions for the refugees and hosting communities (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). The collaboration and participation of stakeholders in ReHoPE depends on the Ugandan government leadership.

‘Initiated by UNHCR, and championed by the UN and the World Bank, the ReHoPE initiative is designed as a collective humanitarian and development response to support the Government’s Settlement Transformation’ (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Which seeks to create a multi-year, multi-sectoral partnership between the Ugandan Government, UN, World Bank and Humanitarian and Development actors (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017) – such as the Danish Refugee Council and the NURI pilot project.

The overall aim of ReHoPE is to create a “bridge” between Humanitarian actors and Development Actors, which is seen, in the area of displacement/refugees, as blurry. It recognizes the Humanitarian response within the development framework but looks for a transition from Humanitarian to Development to be well-coordinated without undermining one or the other (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). Looking at new refugees to be “saved” by the humanitarian actors, but when that period is over ready for the development actors to take over. ReHoPE aims to combine both efforts to create a better value-for-money as well as an increased efficiency, sharing both investment and implementation plans making funding available over more years, thereby supporting refugees and host communities more effectively (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

ReHoPE has a 20-year time frame, which acknowledges the time required to create sustainable resilience to be created and strengthened. The document talks about a future detailed program design on the long-term concept which will be programmed in 5-year intervals. It will be done so to incorporate changes as well as learning-by-doing approach. The 20-year time frame will also allow children to grow up in the program, which is important both because of the demographic of the refugees but also because of the very young Ugandan population (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Objectives of ReHoPE

ReHoPE’s objective is to create a strong and resilient institutions that can ‘...*deliver appropriate, accessible, cost-effective, and affordable services...*’ (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017) to all the refugees and hosting communities so as to build resilience and self-reliance. This will all be done

under the leadership of the Uganda Government, to strengthen collaboration between government institutions, humanitarian actors, development actors, civil society, private sector and academia. This will improve social services, both in terms of quality, accessibility and efficiency; expand sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities; and addressing the increasing problem of deforestation and other environmental degradation in the refugee hosting areas (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Challenges for ReHoPE

ReHoPE acknowledges that the increasing number of refugees can have a major impact on host communities. They also recognize that host communities' needs are not, to the same extent, addressed in programs for refugees, which can lead to both resentment and conflict between the two groups. They also acknowledge that refugees that exceed the five-year food aid plan do not always receive the aid from development programs that they need to become self-reliant and resilient (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

ReHoPE argues that in some instances two systems can work with the same needs of refugees and host community in the same area at the same time, what they address as opposed each other, that should be working together instead, especially if one is humanitarian and the other is development. That the separation of humanitarian and development in such an instance can cause unnecessary duplication as well as wasted resources and reduced synergy. Thus, the current way of working is '*...fragmented, ineffective, and duplicate efforts.*' (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017) undermining the final product.

Response to the Challenges

ReHoPE argues that their outlined approach builds on '*... the experience of existing interventions and seeks to translate them into multi-stakeholder programming framework and tools.*' (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). The core elements of this being: to design both multi-year and multi-sectoral support for the refugees and host communities delivered by the Government; and, ensure that ministries, local government and communities are key partners in ReHoPE (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Principles of ReHoPE

ReHoPE has, what they call, nine core principles. We will shortly be introduced to each of the nine below. First principle is government is in the lead, this means that partners of ReHoPE actively support the Ugandan Government leadership. Second Principle, '*Following a rights-based approach*

that prioritizes equity, human rights, gender responsiveness, and women's empowerment' (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). Meaning that ReHoPE recognizes the different needs of women, men, boys and girls and should be specifically identified and addressed as such. Third, Engage and empower the community, placing them within a development context. Fourth, leverage comparative advantages, meaning agencies working together based on their comparative advantages. Fifth, building programs on existing program blocks and their best practices, meaning sharing and learning from experiences from different programs. Sixth, promote a harmonized, area-based approach, moving away from project-based approaches and collectively addressing the needs of refugees and host-communities. Seventh, harmonize the program tools, so to be able to adopt a common approach, so that one program can continue the work of another program, if needed – example, change from humanitarian actor to development actor. Eighth, build on the strengthen existing coordination structure and ninth; fill the evidence gap, meaning that stakeholder generate huge amounts of evidence, this should be shared between partners to avoid duplication and save expenses (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Implications

'ReHoPE requires a fundamental change in the way agencies operate.' (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). Meaning that the current way of working is too fragmented and inconsistent, which places a burden on the Government of Uganda and on the communities to deal with various implementing partners; which in turn weakens opportunities for efficiency and value-for-money. ReHoPE will therefore build on the existing synergies and develop through common programming tools (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

The Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of ReHoPE will, of course, be the refugee hosting areas – meaning both the refugees and the hosting communities population. ReHoPE will identify the most vulnerable persons of both, following the principles of equality and non-discrimination (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Geographic Areas of Intervention

ReHoPE acknowledges that each refugee-hosting district are different and have different geographical conditions. ReHoPE will be demand-driven, remaining flexible in order to cover new needs in hosting districts and areas. The current geographic areas of intervention under ReHoPE are; Northern Uganda (Adjumani, Arua, Koboko, Moyo, Yumbe and Lamwo); Southwest and Mid-West Uganda (Hoima, Isingiro, Kamwenge, Kiryandongo, and Kyegegwa) and Kampala. The principles,

mentioned above, objectives and approach will be the same in all areas (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

ReHoPE Road Map

Once there is an agreement on ReHoPE among the stakeholders the framework can be further formalized. ReHoPE has already prepared a preliminary road map, of course as mentioned above, this can be change depending on lessons-learned. The current road map consists of four areas, the preparation from 2016 to 2017. Phase One, from 2017 to 2020; Phase Two, 2021 to 2025 and Phase Three, 2026 to 2030. What these phases consist of can be seen below in Model 2 (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

Preparation

- i. Finalise ReHoPE strategy (2016).
- ii. Initial implementation under the UNDAF (2016)¹⁵.
- iii. Programme design phase (2016–17):
 - a. Develop Secretariat capacities to support ReHoPE implementation.
 - b. Prepare Phase One joint funding proposal.

Phase One (2017–20)

- i. Prepare a joint programming guidelines outlining guidelines and procedures for implementation of the phase one programme.
- ii. Prepare joint annual implementation plans based on gap and needs analyses.
- iii. Implement activities with robust knowledge management and systems strengthening functions.
- iv. Conduct independent review of Phase One which feeds into the design of Phase Two.

Phase Two (2021–25)

- i. Roll out the recommendations from review on Phase One, particularly on the coordination and financing modalities.
- ii. Prepare annual implementation plans at the district level and repeat Phase One processes.

Phase Three (2026–30)

- i. Consolidation of activities within national service-delivery mechanisms.

Model 2. ReHoPE Road Map; UNHCR & World Bank, 2017.

ReHoPE Discussion

It is important to understand that as of this project we will only be looking at some of the areas of intervention in Northern Uganda, specifically West-Nile. It is also important to note that ReHoPE puts itself only in the “third pillar” of the Ugandan CRRF. It is also important to note that ReHoPE is implemented by the UNHCR, whom are also those the UN chose/asks to run the CRRF. Although ReHoPE says it is part of the “third pillar” of the CRRF it doesn’t focus on the rest of the CRRF, which one could argue already is against one of the main focuses of ReHoPE, having all partners

working together under one strategy. If stakeholders work towards CRRF are they splitting their attention when working with ReHoPE as well?

ReHoPE and the CRRF both work towards the same goal, having the state in charge. Difference is that ReHoPE wants it from the beginning, while CRRF wants it to be done gradually and it be a partnership between the Ugandan government and the UNHCR.

It should also be noted that during my internship and interaction with various NGO's and programs and other entities – such the NURI pilot program and the Danish Embassy – I was informed that ReHoPE is the new “face” of a continually failing program by the UN office of Uganda, that they have been trying to implement for a long time; that the focus of most of the NGO's and programs is on the CRRF, as it gave a more holistic perspective of refugees and the refugee-hosting districts/communities. This understanding undermines ReHoPE, even though during my internship and few meetings with UNHCR, ReHoPE seemed to be very active in West-Nile.

What are the practices related to the implementation of CRRF in Uganda?

Uganda – A Heaven for Refugees.

Uganda was chosen as one of the pilot countries for the CRRF because of their high numbers of refugees, as well as a long history of hosting them. Uganda has a history of receiving refugees, going back to 1959 with an estimated 160,000 asylum seekers per year. Uganda receives refugees from its neighboring countries such as: South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo², Burundi, Somalia and Rwanda (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). As of January 1st 2018, Uganda has 1,395,146 refugees and asylum seekers, of these 1,037,898 are South Sudanese. 68% of the total number are in the West-Nile Area – Yumbe, Arua, Adjumani and Moyo Districts – as seen in Appendix 1. This project will be focusing on Arua District, because Rhino Camp Settlement is in this district, and is the area where I was in, Throughout the project we will also be looking at the other Districts, this is because I had an opportunity to visit them.

An important thing to understand is that Uganda, since it started receiving refugees in 1959, has not placed asylum seekers and refugees in camps, but have instead placed them in settlements which are shared with nationals in refugee hosting-communities (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). To try to integrate the refugees better, refugees are placed among and with nationals. This has of course also created problems, but through sensitization, both for the refugees and the nationals at all levels, tensions are slowly subsiding. There are five of settlements in West-Nile: Rhino Camp and Imvepi Settlement in Arua District, Adjumani Settlement in Adjumani District, Palorinya Settlement in Moyo District and Bidi Bidi Settlement in Yumbe District. As mentioned above, all these settlements will be mentioned throughout this project, but Rhino Camp will be the main focus.

Uganda gives refugees rights and land to live on and for agriculture. Refugees are given the freedom of movement, right to education, access to health care, right to work, as well as allocated plots for house-hold – 25x25 meters – and allocate a plot for agriculture – 30x30 meters in Rhino Camp Settlement (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). These different rights are shared with their hosting-communities and the nationals whom live there or surrounding host-communities – except for land allocation of any kind. Refugees have been given these rights to make them self-reliant and to maintain their dignity as human beings (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). Refugees in West-Nile are

² Democratic Republic of Congo will be referenced as Congo henceforth.

given documentation as soon as they arrive, they are taken to Reception Centers where they are biometrically registered. Time spent at Reception Centers for refugees depends on the influx of refugees, but the average is 3 days, where they are fed 3 warm meals a day which consist of local food – cassava, peanut sauce, maize, potatoes, etc (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). After refugees have been registered, the Office of the Prime Minister – OPM – places the refugees in a settlement and allocates them a house-hold plot. It is important to understand that the allocated land does not belong to refugees, nor does it belong to the OPM whom gave it to them. The land is gazetted from the local nationals, in return for having lend their land to the Government of Uganda – GoU – they are given “free” services such as better District Roads, health-centers and schools in the area. These services are the same that the refugees receive (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). The UNHCR gives them poles and tarp to build their shelters and other essential needs such as pots and pans. Most of the shelters built are temporary and in very poor conditions; although majority own their own homes, the standards are very low, as most of them live in poverty (UNHCR, 2017).

Freedom of movement means that once they have been registered they can move freely within the Ugandan borders, but they will only receive aid from NGO’s, WFP and other organizations if they stay in the settlement they have been placed in (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017).

The CRRF and ReHoPE incorporate the same rights for the refugees, freedom of movement, access to schooling and health-centers and the right to work, which is positive towards Uganda moving into implement the CRRF in their development and refugee politics. Allocation of land for their home and agriculture also helps the refugees gain dignity and maybe even become self-reliant.

During my time in West-Nile and Rhino Camp I learned that even though things look good on paper, there are areas of these rights given to the refugees, as well as the nationals, lacked. Freedom of Movement, as mentioned above, gives refugees the ability to travel where ever they want in Uganda, but most are limited because they will not receive aid if they move away from the settlement they have been placed in, even if they move to another settlement to be with their family. Their right to education only goes to primary school and no secondary – primary school is 7 years and secondary is 6 years, which gives access to university (Kavuma, R. M., 2010). In Uganda, primary school is normally free, although there are various costs that could make it hard for refugees as well as nationals to send their children to school, e.g. pen and paper, examination payment – is not part of the school, but must be paid through the school – and uniforms. Secondary is not free, even for the nationals, and is very costly.

The health centers in refugee hosting-communities are very basic. These health centers lack medicine and in some of them, they even lack doctors to treat them. Funding seemed to be the problem as well as getting doctors to travel to the health centers, as some of them are far out in the “bush”. I spoke to various refugees in Rhino Camp whom said that no matter their ailment, doctors or nurses will prescribe them Panadol, as they have no other medication available.

The allocation of house-hold plots is working without a hitch, the problem is the agricultural plots. None of the settlements I visited allocated plots for agriculture for the refugees, Camp Commandants – those in charge of the settlements – instead told me that refugees should seek to rent land straight from local landlords.

The right to work that is given to the refugees is also a problem, and there are various problems in this areas that make it hard for refugees to find work in Uganda. First, refugees are not given proper instruction on how and what they need to apply for jobs in Uganda e.g. documentation of skills and other documentation needed by employers. After having lived in Uganda for four years, when it comes to requirement that one needs to fulfill, or documentation needed, Ugandans have a very specific procedure of informing you. They tell you one thing at a time, e.g. you can come back every day with the new requirement and then they tell you of the next one you need as well, instead of telling you all you need from the beginning. This practice has left refugees tired of the consistent waiting as well as transportation from the settlement to town, which is very expensive for refugees, an expense they cannot pay more than once. Another problem many of the refugee’s meet is lack of funding or not being able to take loans at banks, because of their refugee status (Murphy, John, 2017). I was informed by employees at the Danish Refugee Council – DRC – that banks will not give loans out to refugees because they have no collateral, as well as getting a permanent address from them is impossible, as they can move away or back to South Sudan, without paying their debt. In UNHCR’s “Livelihoods Socio-Economic Assessment” from 2017; it says is because of a lack of interaction with financial institutions but come to the same finding that financial institutions, such as banks, denies them credit because of the lack of acceptable security. Thus, affecting refugees negatively in being able to build sustainable livelihoods (UNHCR, 2017). John Murphy (2017), a journalist from BBC News talked to a South Sudanese refugee called Penina whom is an entrepreneur in Uganda with her own hairdressing salon in Imvepi Refugee settlement. She informs Murphy that *‘it’s not easy for the refugees to even get money’* (Murphy, John, 2017), and that payment from customers is normally beans and cooking oil, which she in turn sells at a local market to get money for the needs of her salon (Murphy, John, 2017). The lack of helping refugees apply for jobs as well as refugees not being able

to take loans from banks means that most of them are unemployed. In the same article, Murphy talks to a Ugandan business man named Abdul. Abdul does as many other Ugandan nationals do whom are near refugee settlements: purchase goods cheap from refugees and sell them in town for a profit. In Abdul's case, he buys and sells charcoal – which is used by both nationals and refugees as cooking fuel – buying charcoal cheap from refugees and selling it for a profit in town. *'Charcoal is very expensive in town. But, due to the conditions, they [refugees] sell it cheaply'* (Murphy, John, 2017) said Abdul. The goods the refugees sell is normally the rations they have been given by the WFP and UN, as these are the only goods they have. Abdul goes on to tell that the GoU doesn't "like" nationals profiting from the goods given by the UN, and as nationals the police may arrest them for doing so (Murphy, John, 2017). As mentioned, this is a very common practice, one that I myself observed local employees of the DRC doing. When asked why they do it I received two answers: one, it is cheaper than in town – Arua. Two, to help the refugees, giving them money to use as they see fit. The DRC employees purchased for own use. By investigating further into buying and reselling goods from refugees; I found that this practice was very profitable for those nationals who dared to do it. E.g. buying a kilo of maize in the refugee settlement would cost 400 Uganda Shillings, selling it in Arua Town market for 800 Uganda Shillings per kilo, and if they would grind the maize into flour, a kilo would sell for 1400 Uganda Shillings, giving them a 250% profit.³ As Abdul said, because of the conditions the refugees live in, nationals can easily buy goods at a low price (Murphy, John., 2017).

While in West-Nile, I found that South Sudanese refugees were commonly viewed as "lazy" by the nationals. After hearing it over and over, even I was sure that the refugees were lazy. This perspective was changed once I got a chance to speak with some refugees myself. The "lazy" identification of the refugees was because of their lack of work as they just staying home – as discussed above – constant sleeping during the day or playing cards in the shadow of a tree. Thus, giving people, both nationals and employees from organizations, the understanding that they were lazy, and were only waiting for their next food ration from WFP. These observations were, in themselves, correct but the reason was not. Refugees were not working because, as mentioned above, they had a very hard time finding jobs as well as had no money to start their own business because of lack of funds. Their constant sleeping was because of lack of food and water. Initially, refugees are given 12 kg of food per month per person in a house-hold by the WFP for the first year. Because of lack of international funding to the WFP, after the first-year rations are reduced to 6 kilos of food and 7.000 Uganda Shillings per head

³ On the 30/04/2018 one Danish Crown is equal to 601.9 Uganda Shillings (Currency app)

in a house-hold (Byaruhanga, C. 2017). On top of this, the before monthly rations from WFP has become scarcer, also because of the lack of international funding. It is estimated that refugees now receive their rations every month and a half, making lack of food even higher. They play cards to keep themselves occupied.

In addition to lack of food, water is also a scarce commodity in the settlements, both for the refugees and the nationals. During my internship in West-Nile I did not work with Water, Sanitation and Hygiene - WASH. But because I was myself affected by the lack of running water during a short period and saw how poorly I was prepared and how disabled I felt because of it, it became a side mission to investigate further during my stay. I contacted the DRC WASH-coordinator in Arua to get more information on the topic, and was informed refugees estimated water need per day per person was 15 to 20 liters, this water is to be used for cooking, washing, bathing and as drinking water. Trenchard (2017) found the same as can be seen in his article. The WASH coordinator also told me that water was a big problem in Rhino Camp, as well as in most of the other settlements. *‘There are no boreholes, and the few streams that flow through the area are often completely dry. When they're not, the water runs a deep chocolate brown’* (Trenchard, T. 2017). I heard very similar things while at a meeting with DRC Livelihoods⁴ in Rhino Camp. They spoke of a need long-term water systems/irrigation, since boreholes could not do the job because of bad soil composition – it being very sandy. Thus, the only alternative to provide water for the settlements is water trucking. A fleet of between 100 and 120 trucks, which can each contain up to 20.000 liters of water, drive every day back and forth from water plants to water containers of 10.000 liters, which are scattered throughout the settlements. In Rhino Camp there is a fleet of 30 tankers (Trenchard, T. 2017). Now, as Trenchard (2017) writes in his article, the trucks travel from water plants to the settlements two times a day. Each load/trip would be able to fill two containers in the field, meaning that a truck going twice a day would be able to fill four containers. That is not exactly the case, they are supposed to do so, but they don't.

⁴ DRC Livelihoods works with four active projects in Rhino Camp, WASH, Agriculture, Youth Skills and Micro enterprises – small businesses.



Picture taken by Joakim Rimmer Pedersen, 23/10/2017. Pictures of jerrycans in “queue” waiting for water.

I was informed that trucks tend to only arrive to each water container once a day, where they should at least arrive twice, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. The water trucking company is paid per trip from the water plant to the settlement, and they are paid in advance. The trend that has been observed by both the refugees that need the water and NGO's is that water trucks go fill one container, then drive half way back to the water plant from the settlement, and then go fill a second container. This way they can say they did two trips as asked but have only filled half the needed containers. The DRC WASH-coordinator in Arua told me that the estimated water refugees need in the settlement is 15 to 20 liters a day per person, but that currently it was estimated that refugees received 10 liters per day per person.

While out with the NURI pilot project delegation from Kampala, we got to speak with Vicky and Maurice, a refugee couple, in the Ofua Zone of Rhino Camp. In their house-hold they were three adults and eight children, the third adult was Vicky's sister whom arrived after Vicky and Maurice. She arrived with the eight children, where three of them were her own and the rest were family. Vicky and Maurice informed us that they both had had jobs in South Sudan, Maurice had been a driver and Vicky had been a clerical officer. They had both tried to get jobs both had gotten nothing, so they had nothing to do in the camp. Upon their arrival to Uganda, they felt welcomed, but when they arrived at their designated house-hold plot, there was no water points the first 2 weeks, meaning they had to go far to get water. Although the soil was very rocky, they had been able to plant some cassava on

their house-hold plot. A recurring problem they had was that they didn't have enough water, and had no soap, as well as a lack of food, as they had already been refugees for a year, they had been switched to six kilos of food and 7.000 Ugandan shillings per person. This cash was used for treating themselves and the children to soda and meat. Four of the children with them were old enough to attend primary school, the children complained of being 200 students with only three teachers, and that every day was a fight to attend, because of the lack of space.



Picture taken by Joakim Rimmer Pedersen, 23/10/2017. Picture of Maurice (right, behind standing Joseph Ebinu) and Vicky (left) speaking to NURI Pilot Project Danida Consultant Rilla Norslund and Joseph Ebinu.

In another field visit with the NURI pilot project we visited Rose and Benson in the Bidi Bidi settlement in Yumbe. They had 5 children, but their situation was quite different. Benson had been a carpenter in Kajo Keji, South Sudan, with his brothers and had brought his tools with him to Uganda. He and his brothers – whom lived nearby – made chairs to sell at the markets. Benson told us that he had been doing this since he arrived in Uganda to provide for his family. Since they had only been in Uganda for 9 months they were still receiving the 12 kilos of food from WFP. Benson and his family had not been offered agricultural land, but were very interested, even with the rumors of refugees being chased away from their agricultural land by the nationals. He was also concerned that people would steal crops from a future agricultural plot, since these plots can be up to five kilometers away from their house-hold plot. As we were speaking to Benson, Rose continued her work breaking rocks. Rose said that breaking rock is not profitable but since they had so much rock on their plot, they still saw an opportunity to make a little money for selling the broken rock. Both Rose and Benson agreed

that the language barrier between refugees and nationals was a problem, but that they had still been able to work with nationals.



Pictures taken by Joakim Rimmer Pedersen, 24/10/2017. First picture (left) of Rose breaking rocks. Second picture (right) of Benson and brothers making chairs.

From these two field visits we can observe both the importance of having a skill and food. Even though both Vicky and Maurice have skills they cannot use them because of the lack of job opportunities, while Benson has a skill that he can use anywhere. Most important is the food rations they receive from WFP. During our talk with Benson and Rose, they never complained of lack of food, compared to Vicky and Maurice. There could be various reasons for this, such as the fact that Benson has a skill that he could apply in Uganda and through that have money to purchase more food, but it can also be linked to the fact that Benson and his family still receive the 12 kilos of food from WFP in comparison to the six kilos Maurice and family receive. We can also argue that Maurice and family don't spend the money they are given on necessities instead use them on "luxury" products such as soda⁵.

After our field visit with Maurice and Rose we came about a UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund – field office in which Grace Dudu was placed. Grace herself was one of the "old" refugees from the Sudan civil war time. She informed us that refugees in Rhino Camp were not allowed to cut their own grass/straw for the roof of their homes, they were only allowed to buy it from nationals. Grace also informed us that, because most of the refugee housing did not have doors, theft was a common thing in the settlements. We were also informed that sexual gender-based violence happened

⁵ The smallest soda of 200 ml costs 900 Uganda Shillings.

a lot at night when women were going for water. Grace was also adamant that giving six kilos of food and 7.000 Uganda shillings was not a good idea, since there was not enough food till the end of the month or when food rations were resupplied by the WFP. Grace also informed us of the growing alcohol problem in the settlement among the men. Money given from WFP was used to buy alcohol, and if that was not enough they would steal their own house-hold food and sell it to be able to purchase alcohol. This misuse of alcohol also led to increased domestic violence as well as sexual assault. She continued by giving examples of refugees having no money, e.g. they could not afford to send their children to secondary school, as well as they lacked capital for starting businesses. We were informed that refugees wanted to start small businesses such as tailoring, hairdressing salons and carpentry. Grace said that DRC water trucking in Rhino Camp was good, but that it sadly wasn't enough.

With temporary housing in poor conditions, with starvation and malnutrition and a lack of water, one can ask if the refugees live with dignity or if they are self-reliant. The answer would surely be no, no one would be able to say that the refugee lives with access to Human Rights when not even their basic needs are fulfilled. "Maslow's Pyramid of Needs" is a perfect way of demonstrating this. The first step in the pyramid is the need of air, water, food, rest and health (Burton, N. 2017). Air is hard not to uphold, but water, food, rest and health are exactly the needs that are not fulfilled. Thus, both the CRRF and ReHoPE has failed in their focus, dignity and self-reliance. This does not mean that organizations, programs and the GoU are not working hard to treat these problems, to give the refugees a better life, and the tools they need to become self-reliant and regain dignity while in Uganda.

While in Uganda I found that some nationals see South Sudanese refugees as their "brothers". In Byaruhanga's (2017) article, she speaks to Ugandan farmer Issa Agub whom both lends land to refugees and nationals who need land. *'I gave this land because the refugees are already here. I don't see them as strangers I see them as brothers.'* (Byaruhanga, C. 2017). Agub was at the time of the interview helping 10 to 15 families by lending them land. On many of my trips to the settlements, especially in the northern part of West-Nile – Moyo and Yumbe – I heard Ugandans referencing the South Sudanese refugees as brothers. There are various reasons for this. While visiting the Moyo Districts Farmers Association – DFA – we were told that they refer to them as brothers because those refugees whom arrive to Moyo and Palorinya settlement are those north of the Ugandan border and these refugees come from the same tribe as they do in Moyo⁶. Another reason for this, something

⁶ In many countries of Africa, Tribes is more important than nationality. E.g Kenya Elections of 2007.

Byaruhanga also touches in her article, is because people of Uganda, especially Moyo, used to be refugees in South Sudan, being hosted until there was peace in Uganda (Byaruhanga, C. 2017). We were also informed that some of the South Sudanese refugees were returning refugees, as they were also hosted during the Sudan civil war. Thus, some refugees from back then stayed in Uganda, for various reasons, and new refugees also seek asylum with them. Sadly, this is not the case in every refugee hosting district.

Conflicts in West-Nile

During my time in West-Nile, I heard of many conflicts going on both within refugee settlements and outside of the settlements. We will be looking at three mayor conflicts, a) national protests in districts because of lack of jobs, b) damage to local environment, and c) refugees being discriminated and chased away. The first conflict was quite big and happened during my stay in Arua. In Yumbe district where the Bidi Bidi settlement is located, riots and protests emerged in Yumbe town because of the lack of jobs accessible to the local nationals. NGO's and GoU organizations were hiring their employees from all over Uganda, but very few of them hired anyone from Yumbe. This led to two weeks of rioting and violence in town. Local officials as well as the local national population demanded NGO's and GoU organizations for lists of their employees with their names and where they were from. Lists were posted on doors of people they wanted out of the District, so that a local could get the job instead. This conflict started when job openings were posted and Ugandans from across the country came by bus for "job interviews". A DRC local employee in Arua told me, "you don't come for a job interview with your mattress, that means you already got the job". This of course angered the local population of Yumbe, as they weren't even given a chance to apply. Another conflict like this was a demonstration in Moyo district, but this was because of bad roads. Central to this problem is the WFP and their rationing trucks, as they go to settlements they destroy the roads because of weight, leaving District road, which are already in bad condition, even worse off. Local government officials were attacked, and tires were burned. The conflict subsided once local officials promised to work on the roads.

The second mayor conflict, that continues to be a problem in settlement areas is the damage to the environment because of the high number of refugees. Mentioned above, firewood is the cooking fuel that both nationals and refugees use, some use the firewood directly others "cure" it into charcoal first. In a wood fuel assessment by Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO – it was estimated that deforestation in the Bidi Bidi settlement would be complete in 1 year, that even if they best case

scenario was achieved, that the local environment would last 3 years. The same estimate was made for other settlements (FAO & UNHCR, 2017). To achieve the best-case scenario, nationals as well as refugees would have to use fuel efficient stoves made from clay instead of their traditional three-stone-stove, increasing efficiency by 33% (FAO & UNCHR, 2017). This brings us to the third conflict, which is to some extent intertwined with the previous conflict. Because of the large use of firewood for cooking, deforestation is a major problem. This means that refugees have come to a point when they must wander further and further away from the settlements to fulfill the needs of firewood. This has led to nationals chasing away refugees, which Byaruhanga (2017) also briefly touches in her article. Those collecting firewood are normally women and girls, which has led to gender-based violence and sexual assault on women and girls. 85% of the South Sudanese refugee population is female (Murphy. J, 2017). Of these, 63.8% are heads of house-hold whom range from below 18 years of age to 45 and above (UNHCR, 2017). Gender-based violence was a continued problem, and still is, that was brought up very often. South Sudanese female refugees would either be scared to go out of their homes because of sexual assault or had already been sexually assaulted. I use the term females because the victims of sexual assault ranged from girls below the age of 18 to women. In I field meeting with the DRC in a DRC Help Desk office in the Rhino Camp Settlement, where refugees could bring their concerns and complaints, we were discussing what was acknowledged as an urgent problem or concern. The employee, a Ugandan man, there said that urgent concerns were immediately taken up, and that those urgent concerns normally was about land. The DRC Area Director from the main office in Arua took the binder of concerns and started looking through it, halfway through or so he stopped to read one in more detail. To understand the thought process of the employee he read it out loud as we all listened. This was a 17-year old girl whom was the head of her household with two younger brothers whom went to school. She feared going out to collect firewood because in the area she lived in many women had been victims of sexual assault – This field Office was around 100 meters away from where we met Grace Dudu, which I found out later the same day of this meeting. At that time that complaint/concern was 11 days old, and when the employee was asked what had been done about it, he said nothing, since it wasn't an urgent matter. The Area Manager baffled by the finding and by the explanation immediately contacted the employee's superior to make sure this would never happen again. After this I spoke to the Area Manager and he told me that DRC Help Desk are supposed to have the binder with complaints/concerns picked up every day, and the fact that binder had complaints from over 11 days,

was inexcusable. We went directly to the Rhino Camp settlement headquarters to make them aware of this, and have it corrected immediately.

Gender Based Violence is a big problem that many, if not most, organizations look to remove, and improve the rights of women. Many programs work with empowering women such as the DRC and the NURI⁷ pilot project where I spent my internship. In the NURI pilot project, it was important that women were just as big a part of the work as men, if not more. With a requirement of at least 50% of the working groups⁸ being comprised of women and 60% as youth – youth being 18 to 35 years of age (Pedersen, J. 2017). During the group formations of the working groups it was hard to make sure that the requirement for women was always met. When I asked a group leader – Project Manager Council (PMC) – why there were less women in their group? He answered by saying “if I cannot work one day, my wife will take over for me that day”. This was far from the point, since the idea was to empower women, not to continue an outdated tradition (Pedersen, J. 2017). Women in Uganda have always been treated as second-rate citizens, no matter their nationality. Although policies have been made both against Genital Mutilation and Domestic Violence they are still wide spread problems in Uganda (FIDH, 2012). Women are pressured to have more children, abused by their husband, and normally forced to stay at home, not being allowed to work, to take care of the children, husband, home as well as their crops. In Uganda refugee women are treated even worse. As mentioned above, refugee women are victims of domestic violence as well as sexual assault by nationals, on top of that, many refugee women and girls on their road to Uganda were most likely also sexually assaulted or observed as a loved one was. UNFPA is one of the mayor partners in this area, both in Integrated Sexual and Reproductive Health Services, which include family planning, maternal health and HIV that meet human rights standards, and Gender Equality by empowering women and girls as well as their reproductive rights (UNFPA, 2016).

Youth is a core interest for many NGO's and programs in Uganda and the GoU, both when it comes to refugee and national youth, to different extents. Uganda with an estimated population of 41.8 million, 69,39% are 24 years old and below (IndexMundi, 2018). UNFPA (2016) works with empowering youth and adolescent girls by increasing availability of sexual education and reproductive health. As mentioned above, the NURI pilot project works to empower youth of both

⁷ Northern Uganda Resilience Initiative

⁸ The NURI pilot project is part of a Danida program that works with both refugee and nationals in both Climate Smart Agriculture and Rural Infrastructure. Rural Infrastructure was done through Cash-for-Work where groups of 30 members would do 1 kilometer of Community Access Road.

genders to be part of their groups. DRC works with and is an implementing partners for UNFPA and NURI pilot project. The main problems are the laws surrounding working youth or the definition of child labor. Ugandan law does not allow children under the age of 18 to do hazardous work but can do light work from the age of 15 under the supervision of an adult – adult being 18 or above (WageIndicator, 2018). Light work implies work which is not harmful to the child's health, to their development, it should not harm their attendance at school and must not exceed 14 hours a week. Over time for children is prohibited and they cannot work at night between 19:00 and 07:00 (WageIndicator, 2018). The parameters of light work are not illustrated in comparison to what hazardous work is, which makes it hard to know what lines of work actually would qualify as light work. Hazardous work is seen as agricultural work, construction, mining, domestic services, entertainment and urban informal work (WageIndicator, 2018). This law leaves many youth – below the age of 18 – behind, as organizations and programs cannot help them, because most of the work organizations and programs can offer, is mostly centered in agricultural work and construction. On top of this, age restrictions within organizations and programs also limit youth. Mentioned above was the 17-year old girl whom was afraid of being sexually assaulted while looking for firewood in her area. On top of that problem, the DRC saw their hands tied in helping her get a vocation, because all they could offer was agricultural work or construction work. Both because of their own age-laws and Ugandan age laws there was nothing they could do. Contradicting these laws is cultural “chores” of youth at home, mentioned above was the role of the woman, stay at home, farm crops, get water, etc. Youth share these chores with the women, they work in their family fields, get water, and refugee children also help to construct their shelter. On top of that, school days in settlements are half days because of the high number of students, giving them more time doing their “chores” and less time in school learning. If one compares the Uganda child labor laws with the “chores” youth have at home, one could argue it is not work as they are chores, but one could also argue that the chores they have come under the hazardous work column.

Corruption as a Culture

Corruption in Uganda is one of the main problems for any organization or program which enters Uganda. Where the world average on the Corruption Perception Index is 43 out of a hundred, Uganda only scores a 26 – the higher the number the less corrupt the country (Transparency International, 2017). Common perception of corruption is that it is only found done on political platforms and in business throughout the world. This perception is not incorrect, but in Uganda and many countries like it, corruption is a daily thing that anyone can have a part in. Miriam-Webster defines corruption

as a “dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people”, in this case powerful people are exemplified as government officials or police officers (Miriam-Webster). This is included in this project because corruption is a big problem in Uganda, and both the CRRF and ReHoPE says the state will be the leader – ReHoPE faster than CRRF. A recent example of corruption that is still under investigation is the exaggerated numbers of refugees in Uganda, especially in the western part – This is probably also the reason why the latest numbers of refugees – as seen in Appendix 1 – are from January 1st, 2018. The Ugandan government has suspended four officials from the OPM for alleged mismanagement of funds for refugees. The investigation is being done into alleged collusion with staff from UNHCR and WFP to inflate and exaggerate refugee figures by creating fake names to swindle money. Millions of dollars in relief are believed to have been stole along with relief items meant for refugees. The EU, US and Britain threatened to withdraw funds because of this.

Although it is understandable why ReHoPE wants the Ugandan Government to be the leader, as each state must be seen as sovereign and should be a key part of such implementation. Taking the example above into consideration, I would argue that the CRRF takes a better approach, the end product will be the same as ReHoPE, but shared responsibility of funds used and shared leadership initially, gradually giving the Ugandan Government complete control, is the best-case scenario.

Repatriation

Repatriation is mentioned in the CRRF as an important step, when the time comes. CRRF even talks about permanent integration of refugees if the hosting country allows it (United Nations, 2016). ReHoPE also speaks about repatriation and it says that ‘*...prospects for mass voluntary repatriation are considered slim, and most of the refugees who are currently in Uganda are considered to be at risk of becoming protracted*’ (UNHCR & World Bank, 2017). Which means that they expect the South Sudanese refugees stay to be drawn out, because of the continued conflict in South Sudan. While visiting a Reception Center in Rhino Camp, I spoke with DRC employee Amato Boroa – who has had vast experience with Reception Centers, as he ran one for a year – whom told me that repatriation of the refugee “would not happen in the near future”, that the South Sudanese refugee that are in Uganda should be seen as long-term refugees. While we spoke, women and their babies were waiting in line to have the babies biometrically registered. I asked Amato whether the babies, born in Uganda, would be registered as refugees in Uganda or as Ugandans? He told me it was impossible for refugees to become Ugandans, that if one’s parents had the refugee status so would their babies. Amato then told me that refugees had no option for permanent integration in Uganda.

Amato went on to tell me that once one is given the refugee status in Uganda, there are many things that one cannot have, most importantly, refugees cannot own land. They are allocated a plot for their home and a plot for agriculture, as mentioned above, but they do not own that land, even if they could afford to buy land, because of their refugee status they cannot own land in Uganda. This is exactly what the CRRF talks about when it comes to repatriation and permanent integration, it is up to the host country if it is a possibility. In Uganda, repatriation is the only way as a permanent integration is not an option, but it doesn't matter how long they stay, as long as they have the refugee status, they will be helped.

One small area, in a big country

Settlements must be as a minimum 50 kilometers from any border – in West-Nile that means Congo to the West and South Sudan to the North (Pedersen, J. 2017). As can be seen in Appendix 1, almost 950.000 South Sudanese refugees are in West-Nile in the Yumbe, Arua, Moyo and Adjumani districts. These numbers seem very high in one “small” area when these numbers don't even include the local population of those districts. Joseph Ebinu, Regional Coordinator for DAR and RALNUC⁹ Coordination Function in Arua, informed me that keeping the South Sudanese refugees close to their own border was the best option for both the refugees and Uganda. Although spreading out the refugees throughout Uganda would probably be more optimal for both refugees and hosting communities, GoU would not give funds for transportation of refugees to other areas, South Sudanese refugees would not be able to “go back” or easily become repatriated and keeping them all in one area makes it easier to have a better overview of what goes on. On top of these factors, another factor Joseph told me was that there are still areas of Uganda that are not as stable as West-Nile. He showed me, as can be seen in Appendix 1, that there are no settlements in the Eastern part of Uganda, because of internal conflicts. Joseph agreed with me that there was an over population in West-Nile now, and that this over population could also be a major factor in unemployment in the settlements, mostly for refugee, as mentioned above. Creating new settlements in other areas of Uganda would be able to better accommodate new arrivals, but because of internal conflicts and all the other points mentioned above, this is not a possibility. This does also mean that if there is a continued influx of refugees, any refugees from Congo or South Sudan, problems of over-population, deforestation, unemployment, and even starvation will grow accordingly.

⁹ Danida Programs in West-Nile and Acholi area, predecessors of NURI

Camp Commandants of Refugee Settlements

The role of a Camp Commandant within each settlement is to maintain an overview of the happenings in the settlement. It is to make sure that NGO's and programs do not overlap as well as maintain peace – this can be linked directly to ReHoPEs “Implications”. They should know the needs of the population of the settlement as well as be involved in every matter going on, even the smallest happenings. The Camp Commandant is appointed by the OPM, normally having a military background. Each settlement, as mentioned above, have their own Camp Commandant. During my internship I had various meetings with the Camp Commandant in Rhino Camp about agricultural plot allocation, which is an important aspect of the NURI pilot project. During a Coordination Function visit from Kampala we visited all the settlements in West-Nile – to see which settlements would become a part of NURI after the pilot project ended. During our visits we met with all the Camp Commandants, although we were investigating for the NURI project, the information we were given was wide, and gave an understanding of how high-ranking officials in West-Nile see the refugee situation.

Robert Baryamwesiga, Camp Commandant of Bidi Bidi Settlement meant that “Emergency is almost over” meaning that less refugees are entering Uganda, and that the settlement was now to go from an “emergency status” and should phase into sustainable development. This meant that focus should shift to infrastructure development e.g. water systems, schools, road construction. He also meant that there was great human potential in the settlement, meaning that the refugees should be put to work. Part of this same statement was that, he meant, refugees should no longer receive “hand-outs” from the WFP and should become self-reliant via agriculture. The Camp Commandant could say this with confidence because the OPM of Yumbe District was giving and had already given out agricultural plots to the refugees. While speaking with Benson and Rose, the refugee couple in Bidi Bidi, they told us that they had not received agricultural plots, and that they did not know anyone, not even their neighbors, whom had received a plot for agriculture. On top of this the Camp Commandant also meant that the people had become too dependent on WFP and other programs, and that was the reason that it was hard to get refugees to work. Baryamwesiga argued that psychosocial rehabilitation was needed for the refugees, so that they would be more able to work with livelihood programs. This was also argued because there had been a rising number of suicides in the settlement. Our meeting ended in Camp Commandant Baryamwesiga saying that both communities should be rebuilt, that both the refugees and nationals are in need of the same support, as the rising number of refugees also affected the lives of the nationals.

Camp Commandant Bashir Mawa of Palorinya settlement in Moyo District, was a very different kind of person, but as you will see, his situation was also different, at the time of the meeting. Bashir informed us that Palorinya was first opened in 1994, and after the refugees from that time repatriated, remaining refugees were moved to Adjumani Settlement. Palorinya had been reopened less than a year ago¹⁰, meaning the settlement was less than a year old. Bashir argued that livelihood is the core sector, but that there was still a lot to do, and the best source for further information was to contact other partners in Palorinya. Bashir meant that if rations were to be halved for the refugees, there would be an enormous food shortage in the settlement. Bashir meant that income generation should get more focus to stop this from happening. He further informed us that the number of refugees, which he estimated to 170.000, currently in Palorinya settlement was three times higher than in 1994. All though agricultural plots were there, they had not been given out yet, and some refugees had sought to rent land from nationals instead. To this he pointed out that refugees cannot own land in Uganda and that renting was their only way to acquire land.

The Camp Commandant of Adjumani was not as welcoming as the others. He assured us that the only way refugees would get agricultural plots was through renting land from landlords. He pointed out that DRC was already doing this and was having success. He also informed us that the refugees lived amongst themselves in pre-determined zones, and that these zones were further away from national communities, in comparison to other settlements where nationals and refugees live either near each other, or in the same community. Adjumani still had “old refugees” whom, even though still had refugee status, were better integrated. We could easily see the difference between old refugees and the new because of their houses – old refugees had brick houses, while the new still had temporary buildings. The visit to Adjumani settlement felt too planned, everyone we talked to, had been told what to say, and information gathered from Adjumani felt tampered with and in the end incorrect. Since we were only there for one day, we had no opportunity to gather information on our own.

In Rhino Camp we both met with Camp Commandant Hermitage and Deputy Camp Commandant Jonathan Matata. Matata was the person we met with most often during my stay in Uganda, as he was in charge of coordinating NGO’s and programs in Rhino Camp, informing the NURI pilot project’s Rural Infrastructure part on the wants and needs of the nationals and refugees when it came to construction of Community Access Roads. Camp Commandant Hermitage informed us that he wanted to ask any NGO’s or programs that worked with Community Access Roads to consider adding

¹⁰ Meeting was held on the 25/10/2017

gravel when finished, because of the sandy soil composition it didn't take much to destroy them. He also informed us of various problems in the infrastructure of Rhino camp, e.g. out of the 9 health centers in Rhino Camp, six of them were temporary. Most of the schools are temporary, lacking in school materials and "furniture". The only water in Rhino Camp came from the River Nile, and water trucking wasn't sustainable, imploring for a long-term investment in a sustainable water system. After many meetings with Camp Commandant Hermitage, where we were told that agricultural plots were on their way, on the last meeting with him we were informed that they were looking into alternative ways of giving agricultural plots. He argued that refugees that had already been allocated house-hold plots should seek to rent land from nationals, but that new arrivals would receive 50x50 meters instead of 25x25 meters, making the house-hold plot and agriculture plot one. That this change had already been made in the Imvepi extension settlement and was working very well.

Meeting with Local Councils¹¹ have had very similar results. They all speak of the same thing, going from the emergency to a development thought process. This would not be a problem, if the refugees on the ground were ready to change to a thought process of self-reliance and economic development. This project is not trying to say that Camp Commandants and Local Council don't understand what the refugees are going through, but instead that these high-ranking officers might be seeing that a continued hand-out of food rations will not help the refugees in the long-run. At the same time, refugees have problems with not receiving means of self-reliance because they don't receive agricultural plots, don't have access to jobs, and have continued lacks in basic needs. This can be viewed as these two parts being at different stages. The GoU and local authorities want to push for a better life for refugees, making them self-reliant and make them part of the Ugandan Development, while their intentions are good, the refugees lack the needs to become self-reliant and a part of the Uganda Development. One could say that if the GoU doesn't do their part for the refugees, the refugees will not be able to do their part in the long run.

¹¹ Local Councils are known as LCs. They go from LC1 all the way to LC5. LC1 represents the villages, LC2 represents a Parish, LC3 represents the Sub-County, LC4 represents the LC5 at County level, LC5 represents the District. Information provided by the Regional Coordinator for DAR and RALNUC Coordination Function in Arua, Joseph Ebinu

Are the Norms in the CRRF Translated, Appropriated and/or Contested in ReHoPE and Practices on the ground?

When it comes to whether the norms in the CRRF are translated, appropriated and/or contested in ReHoPE, I would argue that it is appropriated to a certain extent and because of this it is also translated. First, the CRRF was created as a guideline of what to do to help refugees in a hosting country. As the Plan International document states, the CRRF is in policy language and need to be translated into operational terms (Plan International, 2017). I would argue that this is what ReHoPE does. By taking the CRRF and appropriating it to Uganda, using both the norm of the CRRF as well as the local social attributes of Uganda and create their own understanding of the norm. This is not to say that ReHoPE removes part of the CRRF, but rather that it makes it fit better to the Ugandan social norm. This is where the norm translation comes in. ReHoPE states as well as shows in their road map, that the strategy of ReHoPE will change according to learning-by-doing approach and being reprogrammed after those findings. We are not talking global to local, rather national to local, adapting to problems locally, could change the norm on the national level. I would also argue that there are no norm contestations between the CRRF and ReHoPE. The only thing would be that ReHoPE is only one of five “pillars” in the CRRF. I wouldn’t call this contesting the CRRF, as the other “pillars” can be seen being fulfilled by the UNHCR and all other actors. I would argue that ReHoPE has taken the stance of only representing the “third pillar” because it was seen as the major problem by the UNHCR. This does not mean that all “pillars” in CRRF are not important, rather that there might be other policies or initiatives already targeting them. It should also not be forgotten the major scandal in Uganda currently revolving around inflated refugee population involving both NGO’s/programs and the OPM – which is both a local and national government entity. Even though this scandal involves few individuals, the organizations they belong to are involved, and this scandal therefore also gives norm contestation a foothold; as this would be an intentional violation of the norm to further material interests.

When it comes to practices on the ground, the answer to the third research questions shows norm translation, appropriation and contestation. I would argue, using Plan International again, that it is important to note that the CRRF is in policy language and needs to be translated into operational terms (Plan International, 2017). Because of this I would argue that actors in West-Nile have appropriated the norms of the CRRF, taking some of the ideology and applied local social attributes, as well as social attributes of the actors. Meaning that actors such as NGO’s might have entity norms

that they also have to follow, which from experience with both NURI and DRC also are appropriated to the Ugandan social attributes. NGO's and programs such as NURI and DRC have an approach known as lessons-learned – which can be seen as norm translation two-way process from entities to the local - where they adapt their program or how they work to what they have learned from previous work in the same sector or in the same geographical area. Thus, NGO's and programs both use norm translation and appropriation for the norms of the CRRF.

When looking at local government entities, I would argue that the norm of the CRRF changes compared to NGO's and programs. I would argue that here they use both norm contestation and norm appropriation. I would argue that one would initially see from the data that there is a norm appropriation equal to the previously mentioned ones. Norm contestation on the other hand, seems to be wide spread. I am not saying that these entities do not subscribe to the CRRF norm, nor that they are intentionally violating it, rather that there is some material interest that clouds their understanding of the CRRF. In the third research question we touched upon different conflicts in West-Nile, where local government entities and hosting-communities were dissatisfied with NGO's and programs, both because of not hiring locally and because they felt that the refugees were more important than them. Understanding their discontent is not hard, but I would also point out that probably most of the hosting-communities had no idea of what the CRRF is, therefore they had no idea of the bigger picture. One could argue that that fault lies with both NGO's and programs as well as local government entities, for not informing the local population. Another example in that same question are the Camp Commandants. We assume that they are informed of both CRRF and ReHoPE. Although parts of ReHoPE are being applied by the Camp Commandants, e.g. Deputy Camp Commandant Matata in Rhino Camp and his duties, from the data collected we can also see that Camp Commandants are to some extent against the 5-year plans of ReHoPE, e.g. wanting to remove ration “hand-outs” to push for creating a work force – or get to work by starvation. There could be various reasons for that behavior, be it biased towards refugees, seeing refugees as lazy, or higher officials than themselves pushing for fast progress, is unknown. But since ReHoPE is the Ugandan strategy – of the “third pillar” – of the CRRF, we must acknowledge that they are violating the norm of the CRRF by extension.

When it comes to Human Rights norm in the CRRF, I would argue that both ReHoPE and all entities on the ground are appropriating it. This is simply because Uganda has had a long history hosting refugees and asylum seekers. One could argue that the Human Rights that the CRRF addresses were already standard for Uganda when it came to refugees and asylum seekers. The main argument against

this would be if it has been implemented to the extend of the CRRF in West-Nile, which I would argue it has not. To this I would point to Kigozi (2017) and his article and add that the high influx of refugees – which might be lower than seen in Appendix 1, because of the scandal – in Uganda was not something Uganda and their refugee policies where prepared to handle. With an average of 160.000 refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda per year before the South Sudanese influx it is understandable that Uganda, as a third world country, did, and do, not have the necessary tools for an influx of around one million refugees. This is not to be seen as an excuse, but rather an explanation of why the norm of the CRRF could not be kept on the ground. Only through continued work, time and application of the CRRF, could it be possible for Uganda and the West-Nile to have a norm translation and appropriation of the CRRF.

Conclusion:

As the UNHCR is quite a big entity in Uganda, working on multiple platforms and areas in Uganda, both with refugees and non-refugees, I cannot answer to what extent the UNHCR take the norms of human rights of refugees and migrants as a whole. So, the conclusion, when talking about the UNHCR, will be limited to the UNHCR working with the ReHoPE strategy.

The norms about Human Rights of refugees and migrants in the CRRF is translated to a certain extent in ReHoPE and the UNHCR practices related to ReHoPE. First, the ReHoPE policy itself says that it is mainly under what it calls the “third pillar” of the CRRF out of five illustrated in Model 1. Already limiting itself, as the CRRF is vast, and in my opinion the first three “pillars” should be viewed as the core parts of the Human Rights of refugees and migrants, if not all of them.

ReHoPE has translated the norms of the CRRF in “pillar three” quite well, remembering that the CRRF are guidelines for an over all implementation of a CRRF that suits the implementing state. ReHoPE has done quite well in translating the CRRF policy language into an implementing language that can be used on the ground. ReHoPE even notes that it will adapt to changes as they come, not being stuck on a “one-way-road”.

The main objective of ReHoPE is to organize stakeholders to maximize inputs helping refugees and hosting-communities, while making it cost-efficient. Through organizing the stakeholders, and in future using the same tools for consistency, ReHoPEs goal is to make refugees self-reliant and resilient, as well as the hosting-communities. One could argue that by bringing humanitarian – first responders to crisis – and development, would include “pillars one and two” as these “pillars” would be part of the humanitarian organizations first response, but ReHoPE doesn’t go into detail on the humanitarian work, rather how to bring them all together under one. It should also be noted that the UNHCR Uganda are those whom post contracts and have programs and NGO’s bid on those contracts to do the work. Essentially this means that all programs and NGO’s whom bid for these contracts are competitors, this works against what ReHoPE’s plan is for collaboration between actors. Thus, to start implementing ReHoPE, UNHCR Uganda needs to change this, as this could a major factor for low efficiency and waste of funds.

ReHoPE says it is demand based, meaning that once refugees are there expansion will happen. This aspect is completely different from the guidelines of the CRRF, which wants implementing states to be prepared for more arrivals, to give them the best opportunity of a start of their new life.

ReHoPE is a strategy by UNHCR Uganda, and the UN asks the UNHCR to be the ones to implement the CRRF. Thus, one would ask why to have ReHoPE, which is a part of the CRRF instead of implementing a Uganda oriented version of the CRRF? Why only work on one part of the CRRF if they have access to use it all? To this we could also ask if there are different areas of the UNHCR whom work with the other “pillars” of CRRF? And why all these “pillars” are not brought under one large strategy, such as the CRRF? It would seem easier to grant refugees and hosting-communities self-reliance and dignity, if “pillars one and two” were worked on first. It would also create a better base for self-reliance and dignity if these two pillars are seen to first. Giving refugees basic needs, making sure they have land, water, food, and have access to health-centers, schools, and work, should be prioritized along with protection – to women and children and anyone else whom is deemed in need of it. I am sure that there are answers to these questions, and further investigation into these would maybe illuminate the full picture, but since this project only involves ReHoPE and the CRRF, these questions must remain unanswered.

The ReHoPE strategic plan does see the Human Rights norms of the CRRF but seems to focus more on the long-run of stakeholders working together to better the lives of refugees and hosting-communities, instead of focusing on the problems on the ground, and the lack of self-reliance and dignity of many refugees – and to some extent hosting-communities. Therefore, I would say that ReHoPE translates a part of the CRRF, but because of lack of focus on the whole of the CRRF it misses out on core problems, human rights of refugees and migrants being one. Although ReHoPE does talk about bettering human rights, it is mostly focused on how to create a bridge between humanitarian and development actors, then human rights in itself.

To better understand ReHoPE one should further investigate the different areas of UNHCR Uganda within the CRRF, to see if ReHoPE is only one part of a greater strategy that has emerged from the CRRF.

References

- Bernard, R. H., & Gravlee, C. C. (2014). Participant observation. In R. H. Bernard, & C. C. Gravlee (Eds.), *Handbook of methods in cultural anthropology* (2nd ed., pp. 238 - 276) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Burton, N. (17 September 2017). Our hierarchy of needs: True freedom is the luxury of the mind. find out why. Retrieved from <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hide-and-seek/201205/our-hierarchy-needs>
- Byaruhanga, C. (2017, 23 June 2017). Why a Ugandan farmer gave land to a refugee. *BBC News, Uganda* Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40365249>
- Carbado, D. W., Crenshaw, K. W., Mays, V. M., & Tomlinson, B. (2013). INTERSECTIONALITY: Mapping the movements of a theory. *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 10(2), 303-312. doi:10.1017/S1742058X13000349
- Collins, P. H. (2015). Intersectionality's definitional dilemmas. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 41(1), 1-20. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112142
- Dictionary.com. (2018). Participant observation. Retrieved from <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/participant-observation>
- FIDH. (2012). Women's rights in Uganda: Gaps between policy and practice. Retrieved from https://www.fidh.org/spip.php?page=spipdf&spipdf=spipdf_article&id_article=11404&nom_fichier=article_11404

- Gianvenuti, A., Ortmann, A., Kant, E., & D'Annuzio, R. (2017). *Rapid woodfuel assessment: 2017 baseline for Bidi Bidi settlement, Uganda*. ().FAO, UNHCR. Retrieved from <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7849e.pdf>
- IndexMundi. (2018). Uganda age structure. Retrieved from www.indexmundi.com/uganda/age_structure.html.
- IndexMundi (2). (2018). Uganda religions. Retrieved from <https://www.indexmundi.com/uganda/religions.html>
- Jose, B. (2017). Norm contestation: A theoretical framework. In SpringerBriefs in Political Science (Ed.), *Norm contestation: Insights into non-conformity with armed conflict norms* (pp. 21-46) Springer, Cham.
- Kavuma, R. M. (2010,). Explainer: The education system in Uganda. *The Guardian* Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/katine/2010/feb/08/education-system-explainer>
- Kigozi, D. (2017,). The reality behind Uganda's refugee model. *News Deeply* Retrieved from <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/05/30/the-reality-behind-ugandas-glowing-reputation>
- Madsen, D. H. (2018). 'Localising the global' – resolution 1325 as a tool for promoting women's rights and gender equality in Rwanda doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2017.11.011>
- Martinsson, J. (2011). *Global norms: Creation, diffusion, and limits*. (CommGAP Discussion Paper). Washington: The World Bank. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/26891>

- Miriam-Webster. (N/A). Corruption. Retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption>
- Murphy, J. (2017, 7 November 2017). How south Sudan refugees are boosting Uganda's economy. *Bbc* Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41887429?utm_source=Copy+of+Media+Review+for+November+7%2C+2017&utm_campaign=DMR_English_11082017&utm_medium=email
- Okirir, S. (2018,). 'They exaggerated figures': Ugandan aid officials suspended over alleged fraud. *The Guardian* Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/feb/08/they-exaggerated-figures-uganda-aid-officials-suspended-over-alleged-fraud>
- Paulson, S. (2016). Towards a broader scope and more critical frame for intersectional analysis; the palgrave handbook for gender and development., 395. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3
- Pedersen, J. (2017). NURI pilot project and the comprehensive refugee response framework. Retrieved from <https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/267987654/Final.pdf>
- Plan International. (2017). Putting the CRRF into practice. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/595e2b1c7/crrf-practice-general-issues-specific-considerations-tanzania-uganda.html>
- Tomlinson, Y. (11/02/2015). Intersectionality: A tool for realizing human rights. Retrieved from <https://www.newtactics.org/blog/intersectionality-tool-realizing-human-rights>
- Transparency International. (2017). Corruption perception index 2017. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017

- Trenchard, T. (2017, 3 April 2017). Trucking water to uganda's refugee camps. *BBC News*
Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/in-pictures-39351433>
- Tripp, A. M. (2016). Towards an ethics of care: Response to 'power, intersectionality and the politics of belonging'; the palgrave handbook of gender and development., 382. doi:DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3
- UNFPA. (2016). UNFPA Uganda. Retrieved from <https://www.unfpa.org/data/transparency-portal/unfpa-uganda>
- United Nations (2016). New York declaration for refugees and migrants, A/RES/71/1, Seventy-first Cong. (2016). doi:10.1093/ijrl/eev057 Retrieved from <https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article-abstract/28/4/704/2743484>
- UNHCR. (2017). *Livelihoods socio-economic assessment in the refugee hosting districts*. ().Reev Consulting International. Retrieved from ugandarefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/REFUGEE-LIVELIHOODS-SOCIO-ECONOMY-ASSESSMENT-FINAL-REPORT-MARCH-2017.pdf
- UNHCR & World Bank. (2017). *REHOPE - refugee and host population empowerment*. (). Uganda: UNHCR. Retrieved from <https://ugandarefugees.org/category/policy-and-management/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf/?r=48>
- WageIndicator. (2018). Minors and youth. Retrieved from <https://mywage.ug/home/labour-laws/fair-treatment/minors-and-youth>
- Yuval-Davis, N. (2016). Power, intersectionality and the politics of belonging; the palgrave handbook of gender and development., 369. doi:DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-38273-3

Zwingel, S. (2017). Women's rights norms as content-in-motion and incomplete practice. *Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal*, , 1-16. doi:10.1080/23802014.2017.1365625