Trump and DACA on Collision Course:

A Study of Argumentative Strategies

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Abstract

The following study examines President Donald Trump's argumentative strategies in the discussion of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. In this study, Trump's speeches, as well as his personal Twitter account, are the sources the arguments that will be investigated throughout the analysis. Borne out of four separate theories, a theoretical framework has been produced for the sake of this study, and this frame for analysis has proven to be exceedingly beneficial for this type of argumentative analysis. Thus, this study seeks to uncover how Trump uses his arguments to promote his political agenda and attempts to explain the results through theoretical concepts.

Trump promised, before his presidential election, that he would terminate the DACA program, however, when he became president, he backtracked that promise. For an unknown reason, Trump converted his political standpoint to a more pro-DACA stance and decided to allow the program to continue, however, only if a bipartisan agreement, which included funding for a border wall between Mexico and the United States, was made. This required bipartisan agreement between the Republicans and the Democrats, who tend to notoriously disagree on migration issues. Thus, such a bipartisan deal was not obtainable, and DACA recipients faced uncertainties as Trump then moved to terminate the program. Due to the failure to reach a bipartisan agreement, Trump's initial promise to terminate the DACA program was fulfilled, however, the road to the termination was far from straight.

This study uncovers how Trump's general political position towards DACA fluctuated through the DACA discussion, and how these fluctuations affected his arguments. As President, Trump believed he had the political right to terminate the DACA program, leaving DACA recipients to fend for themselves in the deportation fights, however, as the political opposition in the US thought otherwise, the DACA discussion became longer and more complex than Trump might have hoped for.

Throughout the process of trying to reach a bipartisan agreement, Trump made an overwhelming amount of public statements on his personal Twitter account. These statements contain a number of self-contradictory elements that will be analyzed in this study. This analysis will then be furthered into a discussion of the truth behind Trump's statements in order to view them in a broader political context.

Keywords: DACA, Trump, Dreamers, Migration, Persuasion, Argumentation

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Introduction

""This is not amnesty," Obama said. "This is not immunity. This is not a path to citizenship. It's not a permanent fix. This is a temporary stopgap measure."" (as cited in "Undocumented Immigrants", 2012).

  In June 2012, President Barack Obama made the statement quoted above, as he initiated the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) act, providing young illegal immigrants, or so-called 'Dreamers', protection from deportation ("Undocumented Immigrants", 2012). The DACA act created amnesty for young immigrants, who had entered the United States as minors on an involuntary basis, provided that they fulfilled a list of demands, including clean criminal records, entrance to the US prior to their 16th birthday, and so forth ("DACA", n.d.). DACA permits last for a two-year period and are then eligible for renewal ("DACA", n.d.), and have provided young immigrants of the US safety since the installment of the act in 2012. However, since the 2016 presidential election, in which President Donald Trump won the American vote, the DACA program has been up for debate, creating uncertainty for the future of about 690.000 Dreamers (Nakamura, 2017).

  In his presidential announcement speech in 2015, President Trump stated: "I will immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration, immediately" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015). Disregarding Trump excessive use of the word 'immediately', these words provoked fear among the Dreamers, who remained in the US because of the DACA program. Suddenly, with the installment of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2017, came fear and uncertainty about the future for a lot of people. However, Trump seemed to put a damper on his own statement, as he addressed DACA again after the election, in which he won presidency. Here, he showed empathy for Dreamers that was both unprecedented and out of previously displayed character for him, as he stated:

> We're going to work something out that's going to make people happy and proud. They got brought here at a very young age, they've worked here, they've gone to school here. Some were good students. Some have wonderful jobs. And they're in never-never land because they don't know what's going to happen. (as cited in Joshi, 2017)

Admittedly, even more confusion seemed to surround Trump and his position on DACA, as he seemed quite unsure of his own opinion. Indeed, confusion lingered on, as Trump had been quoted to say that DACA was "a very, very difficult subject" (Remarks by President, 2017), and that he wished to "deal with DACA with heart" at a February 2017

press conference (Remarks by President, 2017). What such statements mean and what President Donald Trump's political stance on DACA is, will be uncovered in this study, as we dive into an examination of how Trump attempts to get his political will across. In this study, we will scrutinize the statements and opinions of the president, in an attempt to uncover what his goal is for the DACA program and how he tries to get the American public to support that goal.

In order to make such an uncovering, this study seeks to illuminate Trump's ways of influencing American citizens through his political discourse by posing the following problem formulation:

How does President Donald Trump attempt to argue in favor of his political claims relating to the termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program? How do framing processes affect the production of arguments and what potential effect could this have on the persuasion of listeners?

Here, this study will analyze how it is relevant to look at Trump's political discourse through the ideas of a framing theory, as well as how such framing can be part of argumentative and persuasive strategies. Thus, this study will begin by providing insight to the process of this study, through a thorough methodological section, in which both initial ideas, data collection, methodological implications, and so forth, will be outlined. The study will then begin outlining relevant theoretical concepts that will define the terminologies used throughout the analysis. Subsequently, an account of the most important details of the events on DACA through 2016-2017 will be provided, in order to contextualize what this study attempts to analyze, as well as pinpoint the timeline of Trump's statements. Here, several paradoxes will present themselves, as Trump makes contradicting statements about his stance on DACA and Dreamers throughout 2016-2017. The analysis of this study will be furthered into a brief account of existing research in similar fields, in lieu of enough published academic material to produce a traditional literature review. Subsequently, this study will feature a short discussion, in which Trump's statements from the analysis are reviewed in a broader political context. Finally, this study will end in a conclusion, which enlightens how this study has been able to produce a viable answer for the posed problem formulation.

Methodology

The following study has been conducted as a qualitative analysis of President Donald Trump's argumentative strategies in relation to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

(DACA) program. My initial interest for the DACA program sparked in 2017, when YouTube influencer David Dobrik publicly announced that he, as a young child, had come to the US from Slovakia, and had since held a DACA grant, allowing him to stay in the United States (Weiss, 2017). His situation turned out to be representative of many others', who, just like him, came to the US as minors. As the interest for the subject of DACA grew, Twitter became a great source for following the progress of the DACA discussion, as both Trump, DACA recipients and American citizens tended to take to the platform to express opinions. For example, aforementioned YouTube influencer David Dobrik tweeted on September of 2017, "I paid $400,000 in taxes last year and all I got was a free trip back to Slovakia #DefendDACA" (Appendix B). This tweet underlined a dissonance with the priorities of deportation, as a valuable member of American society is subject to deportation. This represents an issue, which had already been addressed in 2012 by then-President Barack Obama, as he argued that "[what] we can do is to prioritize enforcement, since there are limited enforcement resources, and say we're not going to go chasing after this young man or anybody else who's been acting responsibly and would otherwise qualify for legal status if the DREAM Act passed" (as cited in Greenberg, 2018). This dissonance and seemingly incoherent ways President Donald Trump prioritizes the DACA program and the people influenced by it, created a wonder within me, which caused a need to follow the progress closely. BBC notifications, Twitter notifications and daily upkeep with several news outlets with the keywords 'DACA' and 'Dreamers' through September 2017 until March 2018, made it possible to gather the material to conduct this study.

Data Collection

The collection of data for the analysis of this study has been found mainly on Twitter. Because discussions about DACA is an ongoing process, and politicians are not finished with the discussions of the future of the DACA receivers, the research period for the study ended mid-March 2018, in order to produce this study by the end of May 2018. Thus, no information posted later than that will be included in this study. Trump's Twitter feed has arguably been the source for many of the statements used in the analysis of this study, however, in order to keep the dataset as relevant as possible, only tweets mentioning the word 'DACA' have been included. These are all available in Appendix A and have all been posted between late December 2017 and early March 2018. Additionally, claim #1 of this study features arguments made by Trump in his presidential announcement speech in 2015, prior to the data collection period of this study, however, this is also part of the dataset of this study.

By gathering Trump's Twitter posts as well as other public statements made by him, revolving around DACA, the dataset of this analysis became rather clear. The tweets are arguably reliable firsthand information, as they come directly from Trump and into the public media. Thus, there are no filtering units that alter or distort Trump's claims or opinions. Therefore, these have been rendered a prominent element in Trump's persuasive strategies. Statements in speeches can be more filtered and may reflect a more politically correct approach to persuasion than what Trump usually engages in.

Additional information has been found on several websites for news outlets, including, LA Times, PolitiFact, CNN, ABC News, USA Today, New York Times, and US News & World Report. The news outlets range from mid- to left-leaning on the American political spectrum, USA today being the news outlet closest to the center (Los Angeles Times, 2017; PolitiFact, 2017; CNN, 2018; ABC News, 2017; USA TODAY, 2017; New York Times, 2017; U.S. News & World Report). The political orientation of sources may be considered a political bias, however, this will be addressed later in this methodology section, as a methodological consideration. Additionally, a scholarly article by Cebulko and Silver (2016) '*Navigating DACA in hospitable and hostile states: State responses and access to membership in the wake of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals*', has been a valuable asset in this study, as it has provided a more contemporary context of DACA, than would have been possible only through the use of the theories accounted for below.

The analysis of the argumentative strategies used by President Donald Trump has been found rather challenging, as his overall political rhetoric tended to fluctuate and change over time. Therefore, it was found necessary to investigate Trump's discourse through the theoretical perspective of more than one scholar. Thus, the process of finding the right theories to enlighten Trump's rhetoric was both complex and time-consuming. Many theories were taken into consideration, but only a few were found to shed light on the more detailed processes of argumentation I desired to investigate. Several theories regarding mass media, which arguably would provide great insight into the how the platform Trump uses so avidly, namely Twitter, were taken into consideration. As an example, Sears, D. O., & Kosterman's (1994) theory '*Mass Media and Political Persuasion*' was considered, however, the theory was dropped, as it was found to focus too much on specific case studies, which did not suit the context of this study and did not sufficiently provide this study with illuminating concepts for analysis.

Similarly, theories dealing with citizenship, migration, and deportation were taken into consideration, in order to investigate the actual consequences DACA recipients might

suffer, in the event the program was terminated. Here, Ethan Blue's (2015) *'Strange passages: carceral mobility and the liminal in the catastrophic history of American deportation',* Rainer Bauböck's (2003) '*Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism'* and Alexander Aleinikoff's (1986) '*Theories of Loss of Citizenshi*p' were taken into consideration but were all found to stray too much from the initial purpose of the study, namely the investigation of Trump's argumentative strategies.

The search for properly enlightening theories was decidedly broad, but the funnel narrowed, as more argumentation and persuasion-oriented theories became the interest. As Trump's tweets were more thoroughly attended to, it surfaced that the framing of opponents and DACA recipients plays a large role in his discourse. Therefore, it was found necessary to include a theory which shed light on framing processes. Here, Schneider and Ingram's (1993) '*Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy'* was chosen, as it had previously proven useful in a similar study of argumentative statements (Motzfeldt, Strøm, Nguyen, & Maarouf, 2015).

The theories used in this study, which enlighten persuasion processes, were each found to lack the ability to shed light on certain areas of the processes. As some focused too much on the sender side of arguments, others tended to focus more on the cognitive processes on the receiving side of arguments. Others merely focused on the production of arguments and how they were structured. Here, it was found that no complete theory would enlighten Trump's full argumentative strategy, its purposes and its effects, and so, a combination of several theories was necessary. In efforts to make such a combination, the search for theories that could be combined to fulfill my analytical goals of began. Lau, Smith, and Fiske's (1991) '*Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and Political Persuasion'* provided several points for analysis of the purposefully persuasive elements of argumentation that exist on the sender-side of arguments, while Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) *'Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion'* provided an outline for categorizing arguments and their effectiveness. Lastly, O'keefe's (2004) '*Trends and Prospects in Persuasion Theory and Research'* was found to provide this study with a greater insight into the cognitive processes on the receiving end of arguments, as well as a more in-depth understanding of how political attitudes are held. Combined, these theories construct the frame for analysis for this study, and this framework will be further elaborated in the following section on data processing.

Data Processing

As earlier mentioned, the dataset of this study consists mostly of President Donald Trump's tweets mentioning DACA in the period December 2017 until March 2018. Through these 42 tweets, along with Trump's public speeches, six prominent claims were found to be argued for. Therefore, the dataset of this analysis was separated by colors, in order to clearly state, which tweets argue for which claims. It is notable that some Twitter arguments relate to more than one claim, and that some tweets may not fit into one of the six claims. The division of tweets into color categories has added transparency to the analysis, as it provides a clear outline of how I think the arguments Trump makes promotes particular claims. This division is available in Appendix A. Not every tweet in the dataset belongs to a claim, but when reading the dataset in Appendix A in its entirety, certain patterns and argument types are detectable. Therefore, as Trump mentions DACA in all the tweets in Appendix A, they provide a clearer outline of Trump's general attitude towards DACA and have thus been rendered important to include. However, a claim may have a large number of Twitter arguments, and thus, some tweets have been chosen to feature in the analysis. Thus, some parts of the dataset of this study have played more prominent roles than others.

The data processing through the analysis of this study has been fairly systematized. This has been done through consistency of analytical elements, such as quotes. All quotes are directly cited, including spelling mistakes, grammar mistakes, incorrect use of capitalized letters, and typos, which are seemingly prominent in Trump's tweets. I am aware that many quotes should include an indication of such mistakes by adding [*sic*], however, as it was found that imperfect linguistic abilities are prominent through all Trump's tweets, it was rendered an overall methodological choice, to not include [*sic*] in every quote. The quotes used in this study are clearly outlined by quotation marks, in order to separate Trump's words from mine. However, some analyses have required re-referrals of certain parts of quotes, and these have been marked by square brackets.

As this study utilized a number of theories, which all included many concepts, I chose to produce a more tangible overview of how and where the different theoretical concepts are present in argumentation processes. In other words, I set out to make a clear structure of the frame for analysis, in order to provide the most proficient analysis. All theoretical concepts from Schneider and Ingram (1993), Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) and O'keefe (2004) were written out and placed in categories that suited their function, and the end product allowed for a more clear and manageable analysis, which is illustrated as the 'Table of Concepts' on page 15 of this study. This model is the product of overlapping and

complex theories that are able to work together in synergy and create a more in-depth analysis. By creating this synergy, it was found that the concepts of the theories, when combined, are able to construct a new perspective on argumentative processes, which ranges from the production of arguments, the definition of target groups to the receiver's cognitive processes through decision-making. All theoretical concepts are written in italics in the study, in order to clearly outline when concepts are used. It is perhaps also beneficial for the reading of this study to sometimes look back at the 'Table of Concepts' (see p. 15) in order to maintain an overview of where in the argumentation process the analysis takes place.

The dataset has been taken through the frame of analysis, and for each claim that has been analyzed, some arguments have been chosen to represent the overall strategy of analysis. Instead of forcing each argument through all steps of the Table of Concepts (see p. 15), the analysis of each individual argument has been based on the concepts that had the most interesting analytical elements for that particular argument.

Throughout the analysis process, searches on the internet, mainly Google, were made in order to gather information of each of the claims analyzed. Throughout this process, it was discovered that almost all of the claims of this study had a large number of articles disputing their truth. Here, the idea of a contrastive analytical discussion formed, as it was found interesting, and to some extent necessary, to include viewpoints of the opposition.

In order to portray the findings of the analysis in a broader political context, a discussion of the truths of Trump's claims and the opposition's objections was produced. Here, the news outlet PolitiFact played a large role. PolitiFact arguably attempts to keep an objective viewpoint on political matters and sets out to uncover whether claims are true or false. Additional information has been found through a large number of internet articles published by news outlets such as the LA Times, CNN, ABC News, USA Today, New York Times, and US News & World Report. The findings of the discussion provided a more nuanced perspective on President Donald Trump's argumentative strategies and point to the conclusion that arguments do not necessitate truth, as long as they are produced proficiently.

Methodological Considerations

Throughout this study, the objective has remained to uncover President Donald Trump's argumentative strategies in the political discourse of DACA. This has been done through four theories, which combined provide a frame for analysis, which encompasses all aspects and steps of argumentation. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) and Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theories used in this study may be related more to media analysis than argumentative

analysis, however, as both theories provide concepts that enlighten argumentative tools, it has been a conscious methodological decision to include them. Thereby, the theories used in this study are fit to aim at argumentative analyses and are used within a social constructivist perspective. Social constructionism realizes the connection between culture and context and allows for an analysis that sees connections between society and the knowledge of members of society (Kim, 2011). In this study, the investigation of DACA has uncovered a great deal of information that is available to all people in American societies. Thereby, a social constructionist approach allows this study to look at arguments of DACA as the knowledge that is spewed into the public eye and investigate how that knowledge constructs citizens' understanding of the DACA situation. Such an understanding arguably requires an ontological stance affected by constructionism, as arguments and their reception are largely influenced by how they are constructed, and that such constructions may change over time. It is also arguable that this study bears impressions of empirical realism, as it sets out to produce the 'perfect' way to analyze and study arguments. As empirical realism aims to find "the perfect correspondence between reality and the terms used to describe it" (Klausen, 2016, p. 12), this epistemological stance influences this study, as the 'Table of Concepts' (see p. 15) is a direct attempt to find the perfect method to investigate and study the phenomenon of DACA.

This study consists of a wide range of information from Twitter, speeches, and articles. However, as Trump's bias towards DACA is part of his argumentation, it seems legitimate to count this form of bias as beneficial to the analysis. However, the study may be affected, to some extent, by author bias, as my own liberal values may affect the analysis and discussion of this study. This is, for example evident, as, despite efforts to keep as objective as possible, most of the articles used in this study are published by news outlets that are positioned mid to left on the American political spectrum. However, it is notable that news outlets have been used mainly in the discussion of this study, in which the opposition's claims have been featured. As the opposition's statements are likely featured more on leftist news outlets, this too plays a part in the reason for deciding to allow such political bias in the data material.

The execution of this study has aimed towards objectivity that avoids speculations about the future, as the future of DACA was still undetermined at the time of data collection for this study. A solution remained to be found for the hundreds of thousands of Dreamers by the end of the data collection period and in order to disallow that speculations of the future

color any parts of this study, the intake of information on DACA has been limited after mid-March 2018.

Methodological Limitations

It was found in this study, that due to the fact that the discussions on DACA are a current event, no academic research has been published yet. This limited the study, as it would have benefitted from more theoretical viewpoints from scholars that included DACA in academic research. Only one scholarly article was deemed current and useful enough to be included in this study, namely Cebulko and Silver's (2016) '*Navigating DACA in hospitable and hostile states: State responses and access to membership in the wake of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals*'. This academic article dives into details of how DACA recipients receive differentiating benefits, depending on the states in which they reside. However, the article fails to investigate the termination of the program and has thus been rendered only partly useful. As a consequence of the lack of published academic material on the subject of DACA, this study does not feature a traditional literature review. Instead, I have chosen to include other examples of analyses of Trump's argumentations.

An additional methodological limitation was found in the fact that all theories used in this study have been produced before the introduction of Web 2.0. Web 2.0 is defined as "the current state of online technology as it compares to the early days of the Web, characterized by greater user interactivity and collaboration (…), network connectivity and enhanced communication channels" (Rouse, 2015). Users of the internet now have a much greater opportunity to interact with each other, including public officials. Due to the theories' publication prior to the introduction of Web 2.0, these do not include considerations of how receivers of arguments may respond to the sender of arguments directly, through online platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. This may have limited the analysis, as the inclusion of receivers' ability to respond to senders in real-time, might have affected the data set.

Theories

This study will employ concepts from a range of theorists, which relate to framing processes, argumentation, and persuasion. Therefore, the following section will be dedicated towards an account of the theories and concepts that will be employed throughout this particular study. Firstly, Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory '*Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy'* will be outlined, in order to provide tools for analysis that will aid the scrutinizing of political statements, tweets, speeches and

other forms of public communication. Here, it is specifically interesting to look to President Donald Trump's public statements as well as his framing of those who are in office and those who are in opposition, as well as Dreamers. Then, Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theory *'Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion'* will be outlined, in order to provide the analysis with tools that are helpful in the endeavor to investigate, how such framing can be part of argumentative strategies. Through the tools of Cobb and Kuklinski (1997), it is enlightened how different types of arguments have different kinds of effects on an audience, and how the strength of an argument is one of the keys to persuasion. As an extension of Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theory, an excerpt of O'Keefe's (2004) theory *'Trends and Prospects in Persuasion Theory and Research'* will be outlined, in order to investigate how persuasion is not only reliant on good argumentation but also timely argumentation. A persuader needs to consider the state of mind of his/her audience, in order to direct the most effective argumentation towards them. In all cases, the target's preexisting attitudes and the *strength* thereof determine how and if they are persuadable to change their attitudes and opinions. Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) agree with the notion that preexisting attitudes determine voters' behavior through decision-making. Consequently, their theory is outlined, in order to provide aspects of the cognitive processes voters go through and how public officials must take such processes into account when making policy proposals.

The four theories accounted for in this section all relate to argumentation, and provide tools for analysis, which will be employed in this study. Each theory has provided a number of analytical concepts, which enlighten different parts of the argumentation process. In order to contextualize the four theories and make them more easily applicable to this top-down analysis, the concepts of the theories have been inserted in the table below.

Figure 1: Table of Concepts:

PROCESSES OF SENDERS			PROCESSES OF RECEIVERS			ATTITUDE GOALS	
Methods of argumentation	Types of arguments	Classification of receivers	Determiners of attitudes	Characteristics of attitudes	Process of attitude change	For senders	For receivers
● Heuristic route to persuasion	● Easy-Pro	● Evaluative dimensions	● Chronically accessible constructs	● Valence	● Pre-contemplation stage	● Behavioral change	● Loss/risk aversion
● Systematic route to persuasion	● Hard-Pro	● Eligibility criteria	● Schemata	● Extremity	⇩		
	● Easy-Con			● Strength	● Contemplation stage		
● Policy tools	● Hard-Con	● Advantage groups	● Descriptive norms		⇩		
● Policy rationales	● Easy arguments	● Contender groups	● Subjective norms		● Preparation stage		
	● Hard arguments	● Dependent groups	● Self-efficacy		⇩		
		● Deviant groups			● Action stage		
					⇩		
					● Maintenance stage		

● Schneider and Ingram (1993)	● Cobb and Kuklinski (1997)	● O'Keefe (2004)	● Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991)

This table has been produced to provide a frame of analysis, but also functions as a point of reference when reading this study, as it illustrates where in the argumentation process different concepts fit.

The concepts found in the theories listed above will be combined in a deductive analysis of how framing, argumentation, and persuasion are carried out in the political debate on DACA and Dreamers in the United States.

Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy (1997)

By employing Schneider and Ingram's (1993) *theory 'Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy'*, this study will seek to uncover ways in which President Donald Trump uses framing methods in his ways of speaking of different groups of people. This will be carried out specifically in relation to the ways in which Trump speaks of recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, the so-called Dreamers. Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory is particularly useful in this study, as it provides tools to investigate why groups of people differ in their social and political advantages (p. 334). Such advantages can be reinforced and curbed by political power, through the framing tools, which Schneider and Ingram (1993) highlight in this particular theory. Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory is a generic positivistic US-based study, which

aims to provide analytical tools for social constructions of target populations in any society. The study is not carried out through any particular case, but on a general level, and thus aims to be generically applicable in other studies. The study is arguably positivistic as concepts are believed to create specific outcomes, which all play a role in the social construction of target populations. Furthermore, it is arguable that this theory resides under the grand theory of epistemological realism as it recognizes the importance of individual attitudes, attributes, and opinions.

Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory involves the uncovering of social constructions and provides tools that aid the analysis of how social constructions are made. Social constructions are defined as stereotypical assumptions that are related to specific groups of people, and are constructed by, for example, culture, politics, literature, religion, history and so forth (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). In this study, it is interesting to employ the tools of Schneider and Ingram (1993), in order to explore how Trump may use specific forms of conceptualizations of certain target groups, in order to influence the decision-making processes of those who have opinions on the DACA program. Such conceptualizations may thus be used in order to produce a change in people's political behavior, such as voting. Schneider and Ingram (1993) refers to this as '*behavioral change*' and argue that such goals give testament to the fact that policy always is purposeful and goal-oriented (p. 335). In this study, I will attempt to uncover the tools used to frame DACA recipients or Dreamers in a certain way, in order to produce a *behavioral change* in the American political scene and make those who are unsupportive of Trump convert to support him. Policies are able to construct the boundaries for specific target populations, as they outline their *eligibility criteria*, and shape the public's impression of them. Such *eligibility criteria* produce social constructions of target populations, which refer to "(1) the recognition of the shared characteristics that distinguish a target population as socially meaningful, and (2) the attribution of specific, valence-oriented values, symbol, and images to the characteristics." (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335).

Social constructions. Schneider and Ingram (1993) differentiate between two types of social constructions, namely positive and negative. These constructions rely on descriptive terms, which Schneider and Ingram (1993) refer to as *evaluative* dimensions, which can be used in the discursive portrayal of specific groups (p. 335). Positive constructions consist of images, to which we have 'good' connotations. These include *evaluative dimensions* such as "deserving", "honest", "intelligent", and so forth (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Naturally, negative social constructions are opposite positive social constructions, and consist

of images to which we have 'bad' connotations. Such *evaluative dimensions* include "stupid", "dishonest", "selfish", and so forth (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Through this type of language, policies and politicians are able to use *evaluative dimensions* to impose social constructions and ideas on the people, and thereby have an influence on the opinions and thus the political behavior of voters. Thereby, policy employs social constructions to produce *behavioral change*.

      According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), social constructions are often a source of conflict and contention, as opposing political figures portray groups differently (p. 335). Here, they offer an example, in which people with a below poverty level income can be portrayed as both disadvantaged people, whose poverty status is to no fault of their own, thereby providing them with a type of victimization, or as lazy people, who are benefitting from the hard work of their fellow citizens (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Arguably, not all target populations have social constructions, and are thus not denominated with either positive or negative attributes (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Schneider and Ingram (1993) refer to the example of automobile drivers, who are in fact a target population, but do not have any particular social construction (p. 335). There are thus no positive or negative *evaluative dimensions* connected to this group. The same example could be made of cellphone owners or Facebook users. They, too, construct certain target populations, but members of these populations do not have enough common features to pertain to any specific social construction. Subgroups of the aforementioned target populations may have more specific social constructions. This includes for example drunk drivers, who arguably carry negative connotations (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335).

      In the words of Schneider and Ingram (1993), all social constructions "are matters for empirical analysis" (p. 335). All data which contains expressions of or towards specific target populations may be considered data for such empirical analysis. In this study, data will be found in a range of speeches and tweets, made by Trump, in order to illustrate how he frames DACA recipients or Dreamers.

      Political motivation and division of target populations. Elected officials' use of social constructions is motivated by two main elements: (1) the fact that social constructions may aid them to produce public policies, which can prove helpful towards their reelection and (2) that they will help them address problems that are widely known throughout the public (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). In the question of reelection, social constructions help public officials to impose policies on specific target populations, by anticipating the reactions of the general public on whether or not such policies are fair to this

target population (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 335). Thereby, public officials can generate specific outcomes or reactions in the general public. In this study, it is relevant to scrutinize how public officials generate reactions from the general public regarding the fairness of possible restrictions or termination of the DACA program. Furthermore, it is relevant to investigate whether or not the general public feels that it is fair for DACA recipients or Dreamers to be either beneficiaries or losers of specific policies, because, according to Schneider and Ingram (1993), it is not only the reactions of the target population that is important to public officials but also the approval or disapproval of the general public (p. 335).

Figure 2: The classification of social constructions:

FIGURE 1

Social Constructions and Political Power: Types of Target Populations

	Constructions	
	Positive	**Negative**
Strong	*Advantaged* The elderly Business Veterans Scientists	*Contenders* The rich Big unions Minorities Cultural elites Moral majority
Weak	*Dependents* Children Mothers Disabled	*Deviants* Criminals Drug addicts Communists Flag burners Gangs

Power (vertical axis label)

(Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336)

As illustrated in Figure 1 above, Schneider and Ingram (1993) propose four different types of target populations in the matter of social constructions and power. Firstly, they outline the *advantage groups*. These are constructed as powerful parts of society, such as the more wealthy and respected groups and are generally positively constructed (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Secondly, the group of *contenders* consist of those who are powerful but negatively constructed (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Here, Schneider and Ingram (1993) refer to the rich but not necessarily deserving members of society. Thirdly, the *dependents* of society, namely those who may be considered as politically weak, such as

mothers, children and the disabled, are generally positively constructed (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Lastly, the groups of the *deviants*, who are the outcasts of society, such as criminals, drug users and the like are constructed as both weak and negative (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336).

According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), public officials often provide the powerful and positively constructed groups, namely the *advantage groups*, with beneficiary policies and construct them as 'deserving' (p. 336). This is caused by the fact that the powerful and positive groups will react positively to such policies, and are thus unlikely to contest them, while the remaining parts of society will accept beneficiary policies on the *advantage groups*, as they generally view them as deserving as well (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Conversely, public officials will often tend to impose punishing policies on groups that are considered *deviants*, as this will often be accepted by the general public, because the group is both weak and undeserving of benefits (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Therefore, public officials have no fear that this groups will produce any electoral retaliation, as they do not generally have the public support or political power to do so (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336).

Social constructions can change over time and move specific groups around within the confines of Figure 1 (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Also, groups can overlap in social constructions, as public officials are aware that target groups can be described to fit specific social constructions (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). This is for example possible through public officials' choice of *evaluative dimensions* when addressing or speaking of a specific target group. Thereby, it is possible for public officials to frame specific target groups to their own advantage. This may be considered part of public official's policy agendas (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). An example of overlapping social constructions is provided, as Schneider and Ingram (1993) state: "Some view minorities as oppressed populations and argue for policies appropriate to dependent people, whereas others portray minorities as powerful special interests and not deserving of government aid". Here it is clear that groups can be portrayed in different ways, and it may thus be necessary to divide such a group into smaller target populations, in order to produce a clearer perspective on where they fit into the spectrum of Figure 1. Social constructions may be so universally accepted that they are hard or impossible to change, while others are subject to contention, as they may involve unfair stereotypes (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336).

Political considerations and allocation of burdens and benefits. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), public officials have to take into account the populations'

acceptance of their policies (p. 336). Thus, it is necessary that policy proposals have logical connections to public values, in order for the different target populations to accept them (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Especially acceptance from *advantaged* and *contender groups* have value since these groups hold political power and will be able to create opposition to public policies if disagreement occurs. Thereby, public officials are subject to pressure from the public (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 336). Here*, advantage* and *contender groups* are more likely to be attributed beneficial policy, whereas *dependent* and *deviant* groups are more likely to receive a far less beneficial policy. This distributions of benefits and burdens aid public officials in their policy proposals, as they gain support in both cases (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 337). When *advantage groups* receive benefits, they are unlikely to contest such policies, and those who may protest, i.e. the *deviants* and *dependent* groups, do not have the political power to effectively intervene (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 337). Conversely, allocating burdening policies on for example *deviant groups* will be supported by *advantage groups*, as the *deviant groups* appear deserving of such policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 337). In this study, it will be examined if and how the Trump administration frames DACA recipients or Dreamers as negatively constructed target populations, and how that may aid them to impose burdening policies on the target population. Furthermore, the study will investigate the other side of the spectrum, to see if others that are pro-DACA have other ways of framing the target population.

According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), it is much easier for powerful target populations to get their political and societal issues on legislative agendas, than it is for weaker target populations (p. 337). This implies that public officials, in general, have more interest in listening to those who hold powerful votes, as they are great assets as well as great opponents if they choose not to adhere to their wishes. "Advantaged groups have the capacity and resources to shape their own constructions and to combat attempts that would portray them negatively" (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 337). Therefore, *advantage groups* will often be the target of beneficial policies, even if others may be more deserving. Furthermore, *deviant* groups tend to be oversubscribed to burdening policies, as they have little or no control over the political agenda (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 337).

Policy tools. Schneider and Ingram (1993) outline the concept of *policy tools* (p. 338). This concept entails the different parts of policies, that are designated to motivate target populations to comply with a specific policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 338). For example, powerful and positively constructed target groups are often subject to beneficial policies, through tools, which aid them on multiple levels, often on a voluntary basis and

without monetary costs (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). This includes entitlements, technical assistance, training, and so on (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). Members of positively constructed groups will be encouraged to utilize such offers, in order to produce political payoffs for public officials. Conversely, if an *advantage group* is subject to burdening policies, other tools will likely come into play (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that "[sanctions] and force are not likely to be used in connection with powerful, positively viewed groups" (p. 339). Instead, tools of self-regulation are preferred, in order to produce a feeling of personal will to aid society in the *advantage group* (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). An example of this could be reduction of pollution or presorting of waste. However, if such tools prove ineffective, public officials may resort to "standards and charges" (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). While that may annoy members of the *advantage groups*, this solution merely discourages certain behaviors, rather than forces them to stop. Thereby, burdening policies can be inflicted on *advantage groups* through softer and less rigid *policy tools* than may be chosen for less powerful target populations.

Policy tools for *dependent groups* vary from those used on *advantage groups*, as benefits such as subsidies often will be offered, however, proof that such subsidies are necessary must be provided. *Policy tools* can that aid *dependent groups* are thus available, but do not actively seek out those who are eligible to receive such benefits. Instead, it requires those who are eligible for subsidies to seek out agencies themselves. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), some symbolic tools are often used for *dependent groups* (p. 339). *Dependent groups* are thus not encouraged to seek out their own solutions for their issues and will most likely not be politically powerful enough to do so. Additionally, authority is used as a *policy tool* on *dependent groups* (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). As *dependent* groups are not considered self-reliant, it is possible to impose statements that either grant or restrict permission for specific actions, without interference from the target populations.

For *deviant groups*, it is expected that more coercive tools are dominant (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). They are more extreme than those used on *advantage, contender* or *dependent groups*, and tools applied to this group may involve sanctions and force, or in the worst cases, even punishments such as incarceration or death penalties (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). *Deviants* will be affected by higher authorities and will be discouraged from assemblies, such as gang rallies. Even when beneficial policies are granted to *deviant groups*, for example, rehabilitation programs, *policy tools* are permeated by authority that

attempts to change the people, rather than focus on the societal structures that are the roots of the problems (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). Failure to comply with authoritative regulations will often involve further punishments for members of *deviant* target populations (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). In general, it seems that Schneider and Ingram (1993) believe that, on a general level, public officials are unwilling to and uninterested in spending money on the target populations that are politically powerless, as there is little to no merits in aiding them.

In this study, it will be scrutinized how concepts of *policy tools* are detectable in policy proposals regarding Dreamers. The type of *policy tools* used will aid the investigation in uncovering, which social construction(s) Dreamers are considered part of.

Policy rationales. In this study, the framing of specific target populations plays a role in an argumentative strategy. For such arguments to be legitimized, it is necessary for public officials to provide rationales for their proposed policies. Here, it will be investigated how the current administration rationalizes their proposed policies on Dreamers, and what these rationalizations indicate about which social constructions they deem Dreamers to be a part of. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), *policy rationales* legitimize "policy goals, the choice of target populations, and policy tools" (p. 339). The rationales used to convince powerful groups of a certain policy proposal will often relate to instrumental goals with economic elements as well as national security (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 339). This counts for the distribution of both benefits and burdens. The *policy rationales* used to convince powerless groups are vastly different and will rely more on justice elements than instrumental elements (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 340). Here, the distribution of opportunities and personal safety may be used as convincing elements for *dependent groups*, while the belief that *deviant groups* respond best to punishment policies will further and legitimize even more punishing policies on the target population (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 340).

Figure 3: Priority of issues of target populations:

TABLE 1

Policy Design Impacts on Different Target Populations

TYPES OF IMPACTS	TYPES OF TARGET POPULATIONS			
	ADVANTAGED	CONTENDERS	DEPENDENTS	DEVIANTS
Messages				
Personal	good, intelligent	controversial	helpless, needy	bad
"Your" problems are	important public problems	in conflict with others' interests	the responsibility of the private sector	your own personal responsibility
Government should treat you	with respect	with fear or caution	with pity	with disrespect or hate
Orientations				
Toward government	supportive	suspicious, vigilant	disinterested passive	angry, oppressed
Toward own interests	coincide with the public interest	conflictive with others	private responsibility	personal responsibility
Toward other's claims on government	not legitimate	competitive rivals	more important	simply privileges
Toward political game	open, fair, winnable	involving raw use of power and crooked	hierarchical and elitist	abusive of power and fixed
Participation				
Mobilization potential				
for conventional forms (voting, interest groups)	high	moderate	low	low
for disruptive forms (strikes, riots)	low	moderate	low	moderate
for private provisions of services	high	moderate	low	low
Citizen–agency interaction	agency outreach	targets subvert implementation	client-initiated contacts	avoidance

(Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 341)

Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that the combination of *policy tools*, political agendas and *policy rationales* are able to communicate messages to target populations of what they can expect from their government, depending on which social construction they belong to (p. 340). This also entails messages of whether or not the public officials would deem issues of a particular target population important or legitimate enough to address or spend time and resources on. Thus, *policy tools*, political agendas, and *policy rationales* exerted in for example media and political coverage contain messages of the statuses of target populations and their claim to political attention (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 340). An illustration of how public officials value the issues of different target populations is provided in Schneider and Ingram's table above.

The flux of social constructions and policy. Social constructions are in no way rigid and will always remain in flux (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 342). They are manipulated by all members of society, including politicians and the media, not to mention the target populations themselves (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 342). New groups are constantly formed, while others lose importance, and thus, constant corrections in the distribution of benefits to target populations continue (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 342). Additionally,

target populations may grow to realize that government is ineffective in their policies and is not addressing the important issues of society, and thereby, public officials have to shift their policies to adhere to the citizens (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 342). Assumedly, *advantage groups* have the ability to force governments to action, if they find that policies are ineffective, unfair or lacking in *policy rationale,* as they hold the power to create opposition, while the voiced dissatisfaction of powerless target populations is more easily ignored. In this study, it will be investigated if and why any target groups in the American society are calling out the current government in their policy proposals towards Dreamers. However, according to Schneider and Ingram (1993), such an outburst would have to come from an advantaged target population, in order for the government to listen.

Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion (1997)

In order to strengthen the analysis of this study, the results found through Schneider and Ingram's (1993) framing theory, will be furthered into an analysis of how such framing measures are part of argumentative strategies. Thus, the following section will outline the concepts of an excerpt of from Cobbs and Kuklinski's (1997) theory *'Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion'*, that are relevant in this particular investigation.

Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theory is a US-based positivistic study of different types of arguments and their results, conducted as a specific macro-level study of NAFTA and health care in the US. The findings of this study are thus related specifically to NAFTA and therefore this study aims to only include the theoretical concepts of the theory, that can be generically applicable.

Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) argue that political persuasion relies on argument. Herein lies two dimensions that need attention: 1) is the argument pro or con the policy in question and 2) is the argument easily understood or not (p. 88). From these two dimensions, Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) outline four types of arguments: "*hard-pro, hard-con, easy-pro and easy-con*" (p. 88). This particular theory aids the investigation of this study, as it hypothesizes that con-arguments are more persuasive than pro-arguments (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 93). Thus, it is relevant in relation to Trump's initial arguments against the DACA program.

The discipline of persuasion. Persuasion is an essential part of politics, as public officials over and over again propose policies, which they then have to convince the people to support (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 88). A strong persuasion can lead to members of the general public spreading the persuasion to their acquaintances and convincing them to

participate in the initiative (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 88). Influence on citizens has always been an essential part of successful politics, and today, this is even truer due to, "electronic media that political elites can and do so use to shape mass attitudes" (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 89). President Donald Trump's use of online media is beyond what any previous president of the United States has engaged in, and so, the scrutinizing of his use of social media becomes a vital part of the investigation of his argumentative strategies. Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theory was created in relation to argumentation strategies in general, and not specifically to suit Trump's avid use of Twitter. Thus, it is possible that this theory may lack conceptual understanding of how arguments are produced and received on online interactive platforms.

Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) point out that public consensus on policies becomes divided when elites have contradicting opinions. In this day of technology, the public is subject to massive amounts of argumentative data, from both those who are in office and those who are in opposition. This political competition often arises from one party proposing an initiative, while another party is fighting for citizens to reject such an initiative (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 90). Arguments for and against policies are often rhetorical in nature, and such rhetorical arguments can then be considered either correct or incorrect by the public (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 90).

Loss and risk aversion. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) outline the concept of *risk- and loss aversion*, in order to pinpoint people's values and motivations in political debates (91). They argue that avoiding losses is more important to people than personal gains (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 91). The argument that people are more focused on *risk- and loss aversion* than potential gains, provides deeper insight to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) concepts of burdens and benefits of target populations. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) expand Schneider and Ingram's (1993) outline of burdens and benefits by suggesting that all target populations are most likely more focused on avoiding burdens, through *risk- and loss aversion*, than they are on obtaining potential benefits (p. 91). The negative prospects thus have greater weight than potential positive personal outcomes. In the same spirit, Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) argue that negative impressions are stronger and more lasting than positive impressions (p. 91). Thus, if a member of society dislikes a public official, he/she is unlikely to suddenly turn around and like said public official. In contrast, it is much more likely that a member of society would move from liking a public official to disliking said public official. Thereby, Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) reassert the argument that con-arguments or negative arguments are stronger, "[because] negative information is less common than positive, it

stands out" (p. 91). Additionally, citizens will most likely reject change in policies if it entails uncertainties of what is to come post-change (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 92).

Hard and easy arguments. A subset of Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) four arguments types is the distinction between *easy arguments* and *hard arguments* (p. 94). These concepts rely of course on individuals' ability to understand arguments through their existing knowledge and thus "the degree of "hardness" of an argument can vary across individuals (…)" (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 94). This in itself does not pose an issue but requires researchers to be attentive towards differences on individual levels. Additionally, researchers must be aware that people often use their subjective feelings as objective information. *Easy arguments* are straightforward, short and simple. They tend to be more effective than *hard arguments*, as they tend to focus on the consequences that will occur if a policy is adopted (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 94). Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) exemplify an *easy argument* as "[if] X is adopted, Y will be the consequence" (p. 93). *Easy arguments* thus tend to leave out any explanation of why they are true. They are short, simple and ready to adopt into the prior beliefs of those who are listening. *Hard arguments* are directly opposite *easy arguments* and consist of an extra element, which often elongates statements. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) exemplify *hard arguments* as "[because] X and Y conditions exist, Z will occur" (p. 93). Arguably, there is more depth to *hard arguments*, which demands listeners to engage in more mental work, in order to comprehend them. *Hard arguments* may seem to have more authority than *easy arguments*, but the acceptance of an argument requires that the receiver understands it. The result of this is that *hard arguments* tend to be less effective than *easy arguments* (Cobb and Kuklinski, 1997, p. 93). Overall, Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theory suggests that *easy-con* arguments are the strongest and most utilized in politics, especially on the Republican side of the American political spectrum (p. 93)

Trends and Prospects in Persuasion Theory and Research (2004)

O'Keefe's (2004) 'Trends and Prospects in Persuasion Theory and Research' provides a deeper understanding of how people are persuaded by arguments. As we have previously seen in Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theoretical outline how arguments can be able to convince listeners of whatever the source of the argument is promoting, O'Keefe (2004) provides deeper explanations of how and why such convincing is possible (p. 32). Like Cobb and Kuklinski (1997), O'Keefe (2004) distinguishes arguments by either positive or negative *valence,* however, he provides an additional point of measurement involving the *strength* of attitudes among listeners (p. 32). He argues that persuasive communication relies

on the *strength* with which an attitude is held and that the *strength* of an argument determines if an individual is likely to sway in his/her attitude (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32). Strong attitudes will arguably be more persistent and less likely to sway than weak ones. However, two attitudes with the same *valence* may differ in *strength*, thus making one more easily persuaded to support an opposing *valence* (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32). O'Keefe (2004) exemplifies thusly:

> Two persons might have attitudes toward a particular political candidate that were equally positive (say, with a rating of 6 on a scale of 1 to 7) but differed in *strength*: Pat's positive attitude is weakly held, liable to fluctuate from moment to moment, not very resistant to persuasion, and not very strongly connected to behavior, whereas Chris's (equally positive) attitude is more strongly held, more stable over time, less likely to be altered by counterpersuasion, and more likely to be expressed in corresponding behavior (such as voting for the candidate, working in the candidate's campaign, and so on). (p. 32-33)

Additionally, O'Keefe (2004) argues that the *extremity* of an attitude plays a role in the persuasion equation, as some attitudes are held to an extreme (p. 32). Such an attitude may not prove changeable to the opposite, and thus, it may be more realistic to aim at changing the *extremity* of the attitude. This may involve persuading an individual with an extremely negative attitude towards a specific public official or policy proposal, to an only slightly negative attitude (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32). Likewise, it may be in the interest of public officials to aim at persuading those with positive attitudes towards them, to have extremely positive attitudes (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32).

Thereby, O'Keefe (2004) outlines three concepts of attitude properties, namely *valence, strength,* and *extremity* (p. 32-33). Persuasion is thus not only found in the arguments that seek to convince individuals to support public officials, but also in the arguments that seek to anchor existing attitudes more firmly, in order to up the *extremity* or *strength* to which an attitude is held. The stronger an attitude is, the more likely the holder of the attitude is to express corresponding behavior that promotes a specific public official's claim or campaign. An individual with a weakly held attitude may not even bother to vote, making his or her support or opposition obsolete.

Considerations of mental states. O'Keefe (2004) argues that attitudes are not the only mental states, which persuaders should take into consideration (p. 33). Here, he argues that normative considerations, or the beliefs of what most people do or think, play a role as well. He argues that what people believe about *descriptive norms*, determine how they

themselves behave. Here, O'Keefe (2004) exemplifies his point, as he highlights the excessiveness of student's alcohol and drug use, and points to the fact that most students believe such behavior is acceptable, due to the vast number of students that partake. Additionally, *subjective norms*, or the belief about what those important to you expect or desire from you, play a role in the way people act. Persuaders may thus benefit from convincing a smoker that his beloved family members all want him to stop smoking, in order for him to make the decision to stop.

Self-efficacy, or the perceived idea of one's abilities, is also a factor, which persuaders may want to take into consideration (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 33). Sometimes, an individual's failure to comply or perform in a certain way is not caused by negative attitudes, but rather by "a perceived inability to perform the action successfully" (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 33). Linking this to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) illustration of politically weak social constructions, it becomes clear that those, who believe or are taught to believe that they are powerless will act as if they are powerless. Such a link is relevant, as O'Keefe (2004) argues that persuasion theories cannot and should not stand alone, as they will rarely provide the adequate amount of detail (p. 35). Therefore, we may consider that those, who are Dreamers or DACA recipients may be part of a target group, in which the social construction dictates that their efforts are useless and are thus discouraged from trying. In other words, their *self-efficacy* is low and needs to be elevated, in order for them to have confidence in their own abilities. The *self-efficacy* concept thus requires persuaders to convince individuals of a specific level of *self-efficacy* (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 33). An example of this is model behavior, in which an individual with low *self-efficacy* observes a peer performing a task, and thereby is convinced that he/she will be able to perform the task as well (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 33-34). In some cases, it may also be in the persuader's interest to convince a group or individual that they are incapable of a specific task, in order to lower their *self-efficacy*. The persuasion methods outlined in O'Keefe's (2004) theory, are, as he describes it "only means to an end" (p. 34). Almost all efforts in persuading an audience aim towards behavioral outcomes (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 34). Behavioral outcomes can be exemplified in public support, campaign work, spreading of the word or voting, and are comparable to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) concept of *behavioral change*.

Persuasion processes and stages of change. O'Keefe (2004) argues that persuaders must consider that changes in attitudes happen in specific stages and that in some stages, people are more susceptible to change than in others (p. 35). In the *pre-contemplation stage*, a person is not even considering changing an attitude or behavior of theirs, whereas, in the

contemplation stage, he/she has or is giving thought to such changes (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 35). In the *preparation stage,* the individual is ready to change and may or may not have started planning for the change to happen, in order to reach the *action stage*, in which the change actually takes place (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32). Lastly, if such changes stick, and the person continues to uphold the attitude or behavior to which he/she has succumbed, he/she is in a *maintenance stage* (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 32). Public officials or persuaders will have an ideal target behavior in mind, and in order to work towards that goal, it is in their interest to move people from the *precontemplation stage* to the *contemplation stage*, in order for them to proceed through the remaining stages (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 35). Similarly, persuaders will try to help those in the *preparation stage* put their plans to action (O'Keefe, 2004, p. 35).

Political Beliefs, Policy Interpretations, and Political Persuasion (1991)

Lau, Smith, and Fiske's (1991) take on persuasion theory provides deeper detail to the cognitive aspects of decision making, and is a positivistic study conducted through two experiments of how cognitive processes are part of political decision-making. They provide additional aspects and views on how public officials manipulate voters' opinions on policy proposals (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 644). The success of such manipulation is, however, dependent on the existing *schemata* of political beliefs of voters (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 644). Therefore, public officials must take into consideration the pre-existing knowledge and opinions of voters, in order to produce the most successful manipulations (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 644). Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) provide tools with which it is possible to analyze how public officials can think about their voters' cognitive processes.

Dimensions of judgment. Public officials may use a wide range of tactics in order to produce specific interpretations of policies among voters, however, the most prominent one is the way in which they choose to present and formulate the interpretations of a specific policy proposal (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 645). "An "interpretation" consists of a set of arguments about the consequences of a policy proposal" (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 645). Public officials will often provide competing interpretations when proposing a policy, but only highlight specific consequences (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 645). Thereby, they are able to provide voters with the information that speaks mostly in favor of their policy proposal, and thus, convince voters to agree with it.

Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) take into account, how people usually tend to think about the world as well as their existing memories, in order to pinpoint where people are most likely to agree with policy proposals (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 646). Here, Lau,

Smith, and Fiske (1991) arguably hold a perspective of voters "as cognitively limited decision makers, with very small spans of active memory and narrowly focused attention, whose information processing can be quite selective" (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 646). They argue that the selectivity of voters is determined by pre-existing knowledge (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 646). Knowledge structures are based on experience and are referred to as *schemata* (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 646). *Schemata* help voters to know how to process and take in new information as well as remember how previous information was interpreted (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 646). Thus, *schemata* can be thought of as the cognitive scaffolding of voters, and thus, *schemata* naturally differ between individuals (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 647). Such differences are largely available due to differences in *chronically accessible constructs* (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 647). *Chronically accessible constructs* are argued by Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) to be held by all people in regards to politics (p. 647). Whether it is constructs about people, issues or specific parties, such *chronically accessible political constructs* make voters more prone to employ specific types on information, when making their decisions (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 647).

     Routes to persuasion. Generally, cognitive misers, or those who do not tend to seek out all information in their decision-making processes, tend to rely on their pre-existing knowledge, no matter how limited that may be (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 647-648). Thus, a policy proposal that fits the basic conditions of the political *schemata* of a cognitive miser, will often be accepted without any further investigation (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). The interpretations of such a policy are thereby accepted because they do not produce any negative implications (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). Arguably, such cognitive misers are led by how they feel about policy proposals. Drawing on Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theoretical outline, which states that "people routinely use their feelings as information" (p. 94), this may not be limited to those who Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) call cognitive misers (p. 647). This knowledge on the methods of how people think and make decisions about policy interpretations is called the *heuristic route to persuasion* and allows public officials information on how to best influence their audience (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648).

     If voters become aware of more than one interpretation of a proposal and those interpretations conflict, public officials' persuasive success will depend on the extent to which their interpretation fits with the preexisting political views of voters (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). In such a case, voters will go through a more demanding cognitive

process, in order to weigh information of interpretations against each other (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). This *systematic route to persuasion* does not only require more of the voters but also allows voters to decide against some public officials in order to adhere to others (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). Thereby, the possibility of failure to persuade a voter is increased, in comparison to the *heuristic route to persuasion*.

Similarly to Cobb and Kuklinski (1997), Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) argue that the way voters deal with situations, in which they must make decisions or take a stand, rely on how well they understand different interpretations or arguments (p. 94; p. 648-649). Such understanding is largely based on the scaffolding of their basic political *schemata* and to those who have the interpretations of a specific policy proposal *chronically accessible*, the message will be easier understood (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 649). Thereby, if a public official is able to limit voters' knowledge to only one interpretation of a policy proposal, said public official will have the ability to manipulate the audience to his/her advantage. Such policy interpretations must, however, always remain within conventional acceptability. Conversely, when an interpretation of a specific policy proposal does not suit any of a voter's *chronically accessible constructs* it will be more difficult to understand the message and thus also the relevance of their beliefs in relation to it (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648).

A Brief Account of the To-ing and Fro-ing of DACA

The following section will provide a brief account of former President Barack Obama's DACA program of 2012, as well as the implications the program has faced since Donald Trump won presidency in 2016. Firstly, an outline of DACA will be made, in which I will touch upon the purpose of the program, its benefits, as well as its requirements for recipients. Then, I will go into a more detailed chronological description of the remarks that have been made by President Donald Trump on his personal Twitter-account. Examples from Twitter will be drawn into an overview of the DACA discussion and its progressions through the latter half of 2017 as well as the beginning of 2018, in order to contextualize the statements made by Donald Trump and provide the knowledge base for the analytical investigations of this study.

DACA

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was initiated in 2012 by President Barack Obama (Dickerson, 2018). Obama introduced the program to provide safety from deportation for those, who came to the United States (US) as minors (Dickerson, 2018). In colloquial language, DACA recipients may be referred to as Dreamers, named after

a 2001 legislation, the Dream Act, which shared characteristics with the DACA program, but never became law (Dickerson, 2018). The Dream Act would have included a path to US citizenship for its recipients, which DACA does not.

According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, n.d.), the DACA program demands that applicants meet the following list of requirements:

1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012;

2. Came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday;

3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, up to the present time;

4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making your request for consideration of deferred action with USCIS;

5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012;

6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, have obtained a general education development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and

7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety. (USCIS, n.d)

Seemingly, eligibility for the DACA program is limited due to the abovementioned requirements, as its application is impossible if one fails to meet as little as one of them. Thus, the DACA program provides protection from deportation for some, but far from all who came to the US as minors. DACA is a stopgap measure that provides DACA recipients safety, however, it does not provide a direct pathway to citizenship (Dickerson, 2018). DACA recipients must still go through the standard application process of citizenship. Therefore, many rely on the DACA program in order to remain in the US. Some say the number of DACA recipients is as high as 800,000 (Dickerson, 2018), but the number has been quite contested in the media and said to be as low as 690,000 (Nakamura, 2017). Nevertheless, DACA statuses only last for two years at a time, and recipients must make sure to re-apply before the expiration of their last DACA grant (Dickerson, 2018), making the application process almost constant. Dreamers come from all over the world. Mainly from Mexico, but some were born in Asia, the Caribbean and Central and South America, etc. (Dickerson, 2018).

DACA comes with benefits, which allow recipients to live their lives almost as if they were US citizens. Dreamers are allowed to work, go to school, and in some states, drive (Dickerson, 2018; Cebulko and Silver, 2016, p. 1554). Furthermore, some states consider Dreamers eligible for in-state tuition, loans, and other forms of monetary aid, as well as state-subsidized health care (Dickerson, 2018; Cebulko and Silver, 2016, p. 1554). Because of the DACA work permit, many Dreamers obtain health care services, through their employment health insurance (Dickerson, 2018). Additionally, some Dreamers are able to work to pay for school and thereby pursue higher education (Dickerson, 2018). DACA recipients are, however, not able to vote in US elections (Cebulko and Silver, 2016, p. 1556).

The Desolation of DACA – What Does Trump Want?

In his 2015 Presidential Announcement Speech, Trump vowed that he would terminate Obama's executive order on immigration, referring to DACA, if he became the presidentelect ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015). As the results of the election proved that Donald Trump was indeed the new President of the United States, and despite his sudden post-election warmup to DACA in February 2017, in which he wished to "deal with DACA with heart" (Remarks by President, 2017), he ordered the termination of DACA in September of 2017 (Shear and Davis, 2017). Trump urged Congress to figure out a replacement solution for DACA within six months, after which he would begin the phasing out process of the DACA protections (Shear and Davis, 2017). In March 2017, public officials stated that the young adults, who received DACA benefits, would become eligible for deportation due to the termination of the program (Shear and Davis, 2017).

The announcement of the termination of DACA sparked nationwide protests, and several people were arrested in relation to the demonstrations (Keneally, 2017). In Washington D.C. approximately 250 protesters walked from the White House to the Department of Justice carrying signs that said "Defend Dreamers" while chanting "Up, up with education; down, down with deportation" and "Shame on you, Donald Trump" (as cited in Rosenblatt, 2017).

On September 6th, one day after the public announcement of the termination of DACA, 15 state lawyers had already filed lawsuits against President Donald Trump, arguing that termination of DACA would mean that federal authorities had backtracked their promise to protect young registered immigrants (Savage, 2017). The lawsuit was led by Democrat states New York and Washington State, and backed by "Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode

Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and the District of Columbia" (Savage, 2017).
California Attorney Gen. Xavier Becerra later filed a separate lawsuit against Trump,
claiming that the state of California would be especially harmed, as it is home to about a
quarter of the 800,000 Dreamers of the US (McGreevy, 2017).

In January 2018, the Trump administration let Congress know what the President
wished to see in an immigration bill, leaving Congress till March 2018 to find a solution plan
and replacement for DACA. Trump himself tweeted on February 13th, 2018: "Negotiations
on DACA have begun. Republicans want to make a deal and Democrats say they want to
make a deal. Wouldn't it be great if we could finally, after so many years, solve the DACA
puzzle. This will be our last chance, there will never be another opportunity! March 5th"
(Appendix A, tweet 30). Before March 5th, Trump wanted to see a pathway to citizenship for
Dreamers, but only if one demand was met: The opposition's agreement to fund the border
wall between the US and Mexico (He, 2018). This was supported by Trump's own Twitter
post on December 29th, 2017, which can be found in Appendix A of the study. Appendix A
provides a chronological order of all President Donald Trump's mentions of DACA on
Twitter from late December 2017 to early March 2018, and each tweet is numbered for future
reference. In this particular tweet, Trump writes: "The Democrats have been told, and fully
understand, that there can be no DACA without the desperately needed WALL at the
Southern Border and an END to the horrible Chain Migration & ridiculous Lottery System of
Immigration etc. We must protect our Country at all cost!" (Appendix A, tweet 1). One
source argues that the Trump administration wanted an 18 billion dollar wall (Levy, 2018),
while another states they wanted a 25 billion dollar wall (He, 2018). Nevertheless, the
situation was clear, no DACA without funding for the wall. Trump underlined the need for
the border wall again a few days later, as he twitter-mentioned "(…) the desperately needed
Wall (…)" (Appendix A, tweet 3). 'The Wall' is mentioned numerous times through Trump's
twitter feed, as he repeatedly reinforces the importance of the wall as a national security
measure, which is a prerequisite for the continued existence of the DACA program. This is
exemplified for example in his tweet on January 10th, 2018, in which he states "As I made
very clear today, our country needs the security of the Wall on the Southern Border, which
must be part of any DACA approval" (Appendix A, tweet 5). Generally, throughout 2017, the
Democrats seemed opposed to the building of the wall as well as termination of DACA, and
Democratic Senator Schumer firmly rejected all of Trump's demands of an immigration bill,
arguing that Trump took advantage of Dreamers in an attempt to tear apart the legal
immigration system of the US (He, 2018).

For or Against DACA

In January 2018, Trump tweeted that "The current system is unsafe & unfair to the great people of our country – time for change!" (Levy, 2018), referring to the dangers in relation to chain migration and the so-called visa-lottery, to which the DACA program has been compared, in the endeavor to promote border security in the shape of the border wall (Levy, 2018). However, such a pairing seems to directly counter Trump's previous statement that "the DACA situation is a very, very — it's a very difficult thing for me. Because, you know, I love these kids" (Remarks by President, 2017). Additionally, Trump's Twitter-posts point to a direction that suggests that the fault for DACA's termination lies with the Democrats rather than with Trump's own administration. On January 28th, 2018, he tweeted: "I have offered DACA a wonderful deal, including a doubling in the number of recipients & a twelve year pathway to citizenship, for two reasons: (1) Because the Republicans want to fix a long time terrible problem. (2) To show that Democrats do not want to solve DACA, only use it" (Appendix A, tweet 22). Additionally, on February 16th, 2018, Trump tweeted: "Cannot believe how BADLY DACA recipients have been treated by the Democrats…totally abandoned! Republicans are still working hard." (Appendix A, tweet 34). In these tweets Trump identifies as a DACA promoter, countering the fact that his administration is the root to the discussion of DACA's termination.

Trump's overall strategy to terminate DACA also directly counters former President Obama's mission to protect young immigrants. In September 2017, Obama responded to the political climate on Facebook stating that "Whatever concerns or complaints Americans may have about immigration in general, we shouldn't threaten the future of this group of young people who are here through no fault of their own, who pose no threat, who are not taking away anything from the rest of us," (Shear and Davis, 2017). Generally, Trump seems to counter former President Obama's opinions, and argues that DACA was an issue wrongly and illegally created by Obama, as he stated in his presidential announcement speech in 2015, that he would "immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration (…)" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015). On March 6th, 2018, one day after the DACA deadline fell, President Trump tweeted the following: "Federal Judge in Maryland has just ruled that "President Trump has the right to end DACA." President Obama had 8 years to fix this problem, and didn't. I am waiting for the Dems, they are running for the hills!" (Appendix A, tweet 42). Besides suggesting that Obama had failed to fix the [problem], referring to DACA, Trump also insinuates that the

Democrats refused to be present in the discussion about DACA. Furthermore, Trump argues that he, according to a Federal Judge in Maryland, has the right as President of the United States to terminate the DACA program.

However, it does not seem that all federal judges are on the same page as Donald Trump, in regard to the DACA program, its recipients, termination, and policy in general. In January 2018, a California federal judge, Judge William Alsup of the Federal District Court of San Francisco decided to issue an injunction on a nationwide basis, requiring the Trump administration to resume the DACA program (Shear, 2018). The judge argued that while legal challenges on the decision to terminate DACA were unfolding, the program should remain in effect (Shear, 2018). This particular judge voiced an opinion of fairness regarding the government's rejection of applications from those who had not previously submitted applications for DACA, as well as fairness in rejecting DACA recipients from reentering the US if they left the country (Shear, 2018). However, Judge William Alsup remained firmly set on the fact that the government should allow previous DACA recipients to renew their status (Shear, 2018).

About a month later, in early February, a federal judge, Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis of the Federal District Court in Brooklyn, decided to issue a second injunction, ordering Trump to keep DACA in effect (Feuer, 2018). As the political fight over DACA intensified, this second nationwide injunction was even more fuel to an already roaring fire. Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis' injunction echoed that of Judge William Alsup, but added more reasons for keeping DACA around, exemplifying the harms termination would cause both Dreamers and others (Feuer, 2018). Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis stated that since the decision to terminate the program, over 100 recipients a day had lost their DACA status, and thereby their protection from deportation (Feuer, 2018). He argued, that this number could increase to more than 1400 a day after March 5th, 2018, the date that the DACA program was officially set to terminate (Feuer, 2018). Every single one of the hundreds of thousands of DACA recipients would then be vulnerable to deportation and loss of benefits such as healthcare (Feuer, 2018). Such a loss would impose unnecessary burdens on public hospitals as well as the immigrants, and thereby, the healthcare system would too suffer from the termination of DACA (Feuer, 2018). Judge G. Garaufis additionally exemplified how employers of the US would lose capable employees as DACA recipients lose the right to work or are deported, resulting in economic impacts, which could include a loss of tax revenue reaching up to 800 million dollars (Feuer, 2018). The termination of DACA would, according to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis, cause hundreds of thousands of Dreamers to be separated from their families

(Feuer, 2018). Such social consequences are arguably profound and in the opinion of Judge Garaufis, they exemplify President Donald Trump's anti-Latino tendencies, which he calls "recurrent and vicious" (as cited in Feuer, 2018).

DACA as of March 2018

In mid-February 2018, the US Senate rejected President Donald Trump's strict solution for immigration as well as two more, however less strict, bipartisan solutions (Nowicki and González, 2018). Senator Jeff Flake charged an attempt to reach a bipartisan solution that would give DACA recipients a pathway to citizenship and thus save them from potential deportation (Nowicki and González, 2018). Senator Flake's solution would provide 7.6 billion dollars to the border-security program over a three-year period, in exchange for the revival of the DACA program (Nowicki and González, 2018). These attempts to reach a deal on DACA made by Democrat Senators counter Trump's statements regarding the Democrats' involvement, or lack thereof, in the discussion on DACA.

Several other senators, namely Senator John Thune of South Dakota, Senator, Jerry Moran of Kansas and Senator Rob Portman of Ohio had expressed support for supporting the border-wall with the 25 billion dollars Trump wanted, in order to pass DACA as law, in order to enshrine the program and make it less susceptible to contention (Nowicki and González, 2018). However, these suggestions for immigration plans, along with several others, all failed in the Senate, and a lasting solution was not found prior to March 5th, 2018 (Nowicki and González, 2018). Thus, hundreds of thousands of Dreamers remain in a more than uncertain state and will lose their protection from deportation within the near future (Nowicki and González, 2018).

The failure to provide a new immigration plan that would pass Senate sparked slandering Twitter-comments about Democrats from President Donald Trump's personal Twitter-account. He wrote, "cannot believe how BADLY DACA recipients have been treated by the Democrats" (as cited in He, 2018), referring to the inability to provide a sustainable and passable solution. Trump argued that the failure to do so reflected badly on Democrats and that they have not prioritized finding a proper solution for DACA. However, President Trump was the one who initiated the termination of the program, subjecting many to potential deportation.

As of March 5[th,] 2018, there is yet to be made a deal on DACA, and time has now run out (Rogin and Khan, 2018). New DACA applications are not accepted and the White House

still firmly claims that DACA is and was unlawful to begin with and allowed mass immigration to the US (Rogin and Khan, 2018). Thus, thousands of Dreamers "are left in limbo and in the sights of Trump's deportation machine" (as cited in Rogin and Khan, 2018). Supreme Court has declined to intervene in the DACA discussion until the issue is considered by the lower courts (Rogin and Khan, 2018). Thereby, the process is slowed down even further, to the dismay of many, including President Trump who, "tried to get it moved quickly because we'd like to help DACA" (as cited in Rogin and Khan, 2018). As of March 2018, President Donald Trump and his administration still believe that they will prevail in the appeals court as well as, if necessary, Supreme Court (Rogin and Khan, 2018).

The Claims of Trump

        The reading of Trump's tweets about DACA has revealed a number of claims, for which he argues. By reading the tweets in Appendix A it becomes apparent that Trump routinely uses his Twitter account to argue for his claims and express himself about his politics. The following is a list of overall claims that have been found in Appendix A and will be used in the analysis. The claims below consist of the most penetrating arguments about Trump's own truths, which he attempts to get across to his receivers, and all claims feature one example of a supporting argument. In Appendix A, all claims have a number of supporting arguments, that have been marked by colors, in order to add transparency to the analysis of the dataset.

Claim 1: DACA is and was an illegal initiative

Example: "I will immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration, immediately" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015).

Claim 2: Democrats do not care about DACA

Example: "For those of you who are still interested, the Democrats have totally forgotten about DACA. Not a lot of interest on this subject from them."

Claim 3: Democrats are to blame for the termination of DACA

Example: "I don't believe the Democrats really want to see a deal on DACA. They are all talk and no action. This is the time but, day by day, they are blowing the one great opportunity they have. Too bad!"

Claim 4: Republicans do care about DACA

Example: Negotiations on DACA have begun. Republicans want to make a deal and Democrats say they want to make a deal. Wouldn't it be great if we could finally, after so

many years, solve the DACA puzzle. This will be our last chance, there will never be another opportunity! March 5th"

Claim 5: The border wall is necessary if DACA is to remain

Example: "The Democrats have been told, and fully understand, that there can be no DACA without the desperately needed WALL at the Southern Border and an END to the horrible Chain Migration & ridiculous Lottery System of Immigration etc. We must protect our Country at all cost!"

Claim 6: DACA is a problem similar to mass immigration and visa lottery

Example: "Polling shows nearly 7 in 10 Americans support an immigration reform package that includes DACA, fully secures the border, ends chain migration & cancels the visa lottery. If D's oppose this deal, they aren't serious about DACA-they just want open borders."

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Analysis

</div>

The following analysis will scrutinize the claims of President Donald Trump, which have been presented and described in the account of this study. For each of the six individual claims of this analysis, there will be a subset of statements, which Trump has made in order to support his claim. These supportive statements or arguments will then be furthered into an analysis of both Trump's political discourse in relation to the framing of target populations as well as an analysis that uncovers the rhetoric he utilizes in his argumentation strategies. In order to clarify the analysis of Trump's statements, each statement is clearly marked with quotation marks. When referring to tweets, each tweet will be numbered and easy to find in Appendix A. Additionally, when analysis rerefers to a specific segment of a statement, such as a single word or a phrase, these will be marked by square brackets. Throughout the analysis, the concepts accounted for in the theory section will be avidly employed. Therefore, it may be beneficial to rerefer to the 'Table of Concepts' (see p. 15) along to way. In order to clearly outline where concepts are being used, all concepts will be featured in italics.

Claim #1: DACA Is and Was an Illegal Initiative

President Donald Trump has twice stated that Obama's DACA initiative was illegal. Firstly, in his 2015 presidential announcement speech, Trump stated the following: "I will immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration, immediately" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015), and secondly in January 2018, when he argued that "President Obama, when he signed the executive order, actually said he

doesn't have the right to do this (…) You have to go through Congress. Whether he does or whether he doesn't, let's assume he doesn't. He said it" (Greenberg, 2018). Ignoring Trump's obviously imprecise grammatical language, Trump's claim arguably was that Obama's DACA initiative was somehow illegal, and the following part of the analysis will investigate how Trump supported this claim.

In the quote "I will immediately terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration, immediately" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015), Trump merely mentioned that Obama's DACA program was illegal, without diving into further detail of how and why such illegality was present. The statement focused on the fact that Trump was going to terminate the program, which was legitimized by the notion that it was illegal. Whether or not it was correct that DACA is and was illegal was not discussed in Trump's statement, and the statement did not invite to such discussion. This quote demonstrates what Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) have named an *easy argument*. The argument is easily understood and reflects only two variables that the listener must remember take into account: the illegality of the DACA program and its termination. Here, it is helpful to look to Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) equation for easy arguments, as they illustrate how Y is often a consequence of X. In this instance, the X represents the illegality of DACA and Y represents the termination of the program. Thereby, because X exists, Y will be the consequence, or in other words: because DACA was illegal, it had to be terminated. To determine the type of argument Trump used in this instance even further, Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) distinguish between *pro* and *con* arguments. Here, it is evident that Trump was opposed to the DACA program, as the words [illegal] and [terminate] reflected a negative stance, and thus his rhetoric pointed towards opposition to DACA, which he wished to persuade his listeners to agree with. Because of this negative rhetoric against DACA, the argument used by Donald Trump can be classified as *easy-con*, in accordance with Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) theoretical framework. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) argue in their study of political arguments and political persuasion, that *easy-con* arguments tend to be the most pervasive type of argument that one can use, at least in an American political context. *Easy-con* arguments tend not to elicit the aspect of 'why', as is also the case with this particular argument. Trump did not offer details as to why DACA was illegal, because the statement that it was illegal required minimal cognitive processing for his listeners to understand that this naturally meant it had to be terminated.

The interpretation that DACA was illegal and thus had to be terminated reflects a limited, not very nuanced view of the program. As listeners were not offered any information about why they should believe DACA was illegal but were simply told that this was the truth, it might be assumed that those who supported Trump in his claim were either in complete agreement or had not heard any arguments against the truth of the claim. If agreement was present, it might be because it 'felt right' to those who were listening. The idea of terminating a policy that was illegal thus seemed like the logical course of action to listeners who did not hear contrasting information. Therefore, the limitation of information might, in this case, have been effective, because it spoke to the more logical side of the listeners. The feeling of rightfulness in terminating a program that was illegal could thus be installed in listeners through Trump's *easy-con* argument, by employing the concept Lau, Smith, and, Fiske (1991) have named a *heuristic route to persuasion*. Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) argue that feelings often lead people as if they were indisputable information (p. 94). Lau, Smith, and, Fiske (1991) expand on this, by arguing that this is the case, certainly, with those whom they call cognitive misers, a negatively loaded term, which refers to those who seek to avoid spending cognitive energy on, for instance, political research. In order to avoid the assumption that the majority of Trump's audience consists of cognitive misers, let us adhere to Cobb and Kuklinski's claim that people generally tend to use their feelings as information (p. 94). Thus, Trump was able to install a feeling of rightfulness in his listeners, as he adhered to the most logical course of action, when a policy is illegal, namely termination. Thereby, Trump's cause to terminate the DACA program was supported by the use of the word [illegal], with little regard for the factual truth of the claim.

The *heuristic route to persuasion* was additionally present, as Trump spoke to the rationale of his voters. Schneider and Ingram (1993) define the concept of *policy rationales*, which attempt to legitimize the use of specific *policy tools*. The termination of the DACA program was arguably a policy tool, which provided burdens to DACA recipients. However, this *policy tool* was legitimized, again, by the use of the word or *evaluative dimension* [illegal]. As the word [illegal] is synonymous with something forbidden, most people's idea of the *descriptive norm* would tell them to abstain from it. The *descriptive norm* would arguably tell listeners that most other people would be against something, which is deemed illegal, and therefore they should be too. Thus, logical thought processes would arguably conclude that illegal policies should be

terminated. Thereby, Trump used illegality as a *policy rationale* that supports the *policy tool* of termination.

Arguably, Trump did not open up to a discussion about DACA, as his claim was presented in a speech, which, naturally, is a monologue and a one-way form of communication. Thereby, Trump merely provided his claim in an assertive manner, enforced twice by the use of the word [immediately], which reflected urgency, and did not invite people to dive into further investigation or inquiry. However, in the event that listeners became aware of more interpretations of DACA, a more complicated thought process would have been required of the listener, as he/she had to decide which interpretation best suited his/her preexisting political views (Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991, p. 648). If so, voters might require more convincing information than provided by Trump in this argument, in order for Trump to persuade his audience effectively, and engage in a more *systematic route to persuasion*. Such persuasion may benefit from more elaborate types of arguments, such as *hard arguments*, which contain more information than the *easy-con* arguments Trump used to support this particular claim. In the absence of more convincing arguments that provide more detail, Trump might lose the support of audience members whose *chronically accessible constructs* caused them to respond more to *hard-con* or *hard-pro* arguments, as personal *chronically accessible constructs* determine what kind of information an individual responds the most to. Additionally, Lau, Smith, and Fiske's (1991) concept of individual *schemata* of listeners would also affect the way in which they received the message of Trump's *easy-con* argument. *Schemata* refer to the scaffolding of knowledge of individuals and allow them to remember how information has been processed in the past, and thereby guide the processing of information in the future. Thus, those who have been opposed to Trump's claims in the past are likely to revisit such opposition, whereas an individual who has supported Trump's claims in the past will be more prone to agree with his claims again. The positive or negative *valence* that listeners pertain to will naturally depend on both the *strength* and the *extremity* of their existing attitudes. Thus, an individual who has supported Trump's campaign from day one will likely have a rather extreme and positive *valence*, with a lot of *strength* behind it. He/she is unlikely to shift in attitude. However, an individual with a positive *valence* of Trump, that is not extreme and is weakly held, may be more prone to disagree with his claim and thereby shift in his/her attitude. This may spark a process of attitude change, which is illustrated through O'Keefe's (2004) five stages in the 'Table of Concepts' on page 15. Negative to positive attitude changes

would be desirable for Trump, especially in those who did not have a past record of support for him.

However, attitude changes, which move Trump supporters towards opposition are, naturally, less desirable, but nevertheless also a possibility. Trump's *easy-con* argument of the illegality of the DACA program spoke to the logical side of his listeners and might have attempted to 1) give the positive *valence* of those who already supported him more *strength* and 2) spark an attitude change (see 'Table of Concepts' p. 15) in those who did not previously show support for Trump. The process of attitude change could, in turn, result in *behavioral changes*, that makes listeners show their support for Trump by voting for him.

In January 2018, President Donald Trump revisited his claim that Obama's DACA program was illegal. This time, he provided a bit more detail as to why DACA was illegal, as he stated the following: "President Obama, when he signed the executive order, actually said he doesn't have the right to do this (…) You have to go through Congress. Whether he does or whether he doesn't, let's assume he doesn't. He said it" (Greenberg, 2018). Again, Trump pushed the claim that the DACA program was somehow illegal, but he used his argument to provide some information on why the DACA program was illegal, arguing that Obama went beyond his rights as President of the US when he initiated the program. Let us disregard any questions of the truthfulness of this, and instead investigate how Trump used the argument to support his claim in order to uncover his argumentation strategies.

The claim continued to be that the DACA initiative was illegal, but Trump no longer had a strict agenda to terminate the program. Rather than that, Trump used his argument to support his claim of illegality. He did this by providing a variable of reason. If we look to Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) example of a *hard argument*, they tend to involve more variables than easy arguments. If an easy argument includes an X and Y variable, as in Y is a consequence of X, a *hard argument* may include an X, Y, and Z variable, as in Y is the consequence of X because of Z. Here, we have a reasoning-variable, which is that Obama evidently stated himself that DACA was beyond his power. Let us call that variable Z. Then, we are able to point to the illegality of DACA as variable X. However, in this argument, Trump did not mention the termination of DACA or any other consequential factor, which would arguably have been the variable Y, and thus, this cannot be categorized as what Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) would call a *hard argument*. Rather than calling this particular statement a *hard argument*, it is relevant to

think of it as an *easy argument* with variables that lean more towards a *hard argument*. Instead of X and Y, in which Y is a consequence of X, we have X and Z, in which Z is the reason for X.

In 2018, Trump held on to the claim from 2015, that the DACA initiative was illegal, but he changed his *policy rationale* and *policy tools* along the way. As established in the analysis of the argument from 2015, Trump used the *policy rationale* of illegality to legitimize the *policy tool* to terminate DACA. However, as Trump arguably faced difficulties to terminate the program with both opposition and Congress, as described in the account section of this study, his goal morphed from termination of the program to the desire to find a solution on which opposition, the White House, and Congress could agree. Although he reasserted his claim in 2018, he backtracked on his promise to "terminate President Obama's illegal executive order on immigration, immediately" ("Donald Trump's Presidential", 2015) in order to re-aim his focus to a more agreeable solution for all parties. Arguably, such a bipartisan solution has been long underway but has not successfully been produced (Rogin and Khan, 2018).

Claim #2: Democrats Do Not Care about Solving DACA

President Donald Trump is an avid social media user, and his Twitter page is home to a wide range of statements that support his political agenda. Terry Collins, a journalist from the online review- and news outlet C-NET, wrote an article in January 2018, titled "Trump's itchy Twitter thumbs have redefined politics" (2018), which detailed how Trump utilized the platform. According to the article "two-thirds of Americans now get some of their news from social media", and "Trump (…) relies on the platform more than ever to say what's on his mind, often firing off tweetstorms in the predawn hours" (Collins, 2018). Trump's Twitter account thus provides him with a platform on which he can reach a large number of people and where he is able to easily make official presidential statements (Collins, 2018). Tweets are character restricted, and thereby many statements come out in headline form and are difficult to ignore (Collins, 2018). Trump's Twitter provides him a platform on which he can make claims and provide arguments for them and spew them directly out to the public. Let us now dive into a second DACA claim from President Trump, in order to continue the analysis of his strategies of argumentation.

Trump used his Twitter account throughout January, February and March 2018 to underline that the Democratic Party did not care about solving DACA. He did this through a large number of tweets, some of which will be analyzed in this section of the analysis. On January 2nd, 2018, Trump tweeted the following: "Democrats are doing nothing for DACA – just interested in politics. DACA activists and Hispanics will go hard against Dems, will start "falling in love" with Republicans and their President. We are about Results" (Appendix A, tweet 2). In the first part of this tweet, Trump arguably attempted to vilify his political opposition, the [Democrats] or the [Dems], by arguing that they were not doing anything to fix DACA. Additionally, Trump argued that the Democrats were [just interested in politics], suggesting that they cared more about their own political agenda than the wellbeing of DACA recipients. Such accusations were arguably a means to gain credibility and support for the Republican party, by compromising the integrity of the Democratic Party. Furthermore, Trump continued his argument by predicting that those who were against him, would be supporting him in the future.

This argument can be categorized as an *easy argument*, as it is constructed by only two variables. If Y is the reason for X, then the [Democrats are doing nothing for DACA] because they are [just interested in politics]. Such an *easy argument* would be easy for an audience to understand and incorporate into their own cognitive process. A Trump supporter would arguably readily accept such a statement because it already would be part of his/her *chronically accessible construct* to trust this particular politician, and perhaps also to question the integrity of the Democrats. Furthermore, a Trump supporter would have previous memories or *schemata* of positive *valence* and support for Trump, which might guide them to support him again, as their memories tell them that they are on his side. Conversely, an audience member that is supportive of the Democratic Party would not have the same *chronically accessible constructs* and would likely reject the argument as false. A predisposition to negative *valence* for Trump might cause some voters to naturally reject his Twitter argument, however, such rejection depends on the *strength* of their attitude. According to O'Keefe (2004), the *strength* of an attitude determines how easily a member of an audience can be swayed. Thus, some audience members may have a positive attitude towards the Democrats that is weakly held, and so Trump's Twitter arguments may be able to sway their positively held attitude towards Democrats towards a negative attitude. Thereby, compromising the legitimacy of the opposition may lead to a gain in support for Trump and his administration. In the second part of the tweet, in which Trump stated that "DACA

activists and Hispanics will go hard against Dems, will start "falling in love" with Republicans and their President. We are about Results." (Appendix A, tweet 2) he predicted an attitude change within two specific target populations, namely [DACA activists] and [Hispanics]. These target populations represent a broad spectrum of people, whom Trump believed he could and would bring to support him in the future. [DACA activists] are arguably all those whose attitudes towards DACA are affected with positive *valence* as well as a lot of *strength*. Members of this target population are likely American citizens who feel compassion for DACA recipients, and since Trump argued that he would be able to sway their opinion to support him, they had to naturally be against him at this point in time. Thus, it is highly likely that [DACA activists] are supportive of the Democrats. [DACA activists] are arguably part of an *advantage group*, as they are politically powerful, but their rights are not inflicted by DACA or the termination hereof. [DACA activists] are thereby an *advantage group,* which acts out of compassion, to benefit those who are less fortunate. It is arguable that such an *advantage group* takes action, as they have a stronger belief in their own *self-efficacy* than that of the DACA recipients themselves. [DACA activists] as an *advantage group* may arguably believe that they are able to put more pressure on politicians to make changes, than DACA-recipients would have. Thereby, *self-efficacy* is a determiner for the actions of the *advantage group*.

The second target population mentioned by Trump in this Twitter argument is the [Hispanics]. The definition of this group is unclear, as it can consist of both Hispanic DACA recipients, Hispanics with citizenship and voting rights and Hispanics with other forms of legal statuses. However, Trump's previous disposition towards Hispanics is well known to hold negative *valence*, and such *valence* is likely to be known by most of his audience. A journalist from CNN has gathered examples of derogatory racial comments made by President Donald Trump, which were brought to much attention in the media. Here, a direct Trump quote reads: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best," as well as "[they're] sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (Simon, 2018). Trump caused outrage among critics and fellow Americans with his racially charged language, which is unlikely to be soon forgotten (Finnegan and Barabak, 2018, January 12). With this previous Trump commentary in mind, it is arguable that Trump thought of [Hispanics] as a *deviant group*, a more negatively constructed target population. If so, the endeavor to

gain the support of [Hispanics] might not be of as great importance as that of the *advantaged groups*, as *deviant groups*, by Schneider and Ingram's (1993) definition, hold very little to no political power.

The overall argument in the second part of Trump's tweet from January 2nd, 2018, speaks in favor of Trump's ability to convince his naysayers to support his politics. This implies that Trump believed he was able to spark an attitude change, in which he would move parts of his opposition through O'Keefe's (2004) five steps of attitude change (see 'Table of Concepts', p. 15). Here, Trump would have to move his opposition from a *precontemplation stage*, in which they are in no way considering changing their attitude to a *contemplation stage*, in which they are thinking about changing attitudes. From there, his opposition is required to go through a *preparation stage*, to plan how and what changes are going to happen, in order to reach the *action stage*, where the change actually takes place. Then, Trump would have moved such a group from opposition to support, and it would be his job to keep their support as they reach the *maintenance stage*, in which they uphold their new attitudes, rather than change them. If such a process is successfully initiated in the opposition, it might result in *behavioral changes* that are in favor of Trump and his political agenda. Generating *behavioral changes* that result in support is arguably the goal of senders of arguments in general (see 'Table of Concepts', p. 15)

On January 13th, 2018, Trump revisited his claim that the Democrats did not care about solving DACA, by arguing that "The Democrats are all talk and no action. They are doing nothing to fix DACA. Great opportunity missed. Too bad!" (Appendix A, tweet 12). In this tweet, Trump reasserted his claim, again by arguing that the Democrats were [doing nothing to fix DACA]. He called them out for missing a [great opportunity], most likely referring to the policy proposals for a bipartisan agreement made by the Republicans, which were rejected by the Democrats. Naturally, the inability to come to bipartisan agreements resulted in no action on DACA. However, Trump cleverly neglected to mention that the Republicans turned down several of the Democrats' policy proposals as well. This was, however, evident in a tweet from January 12th, in which Trump tweeted the following:

> The so-called bipartisan DACA deal presented yesterday to myself and a group of Republican Senators and Congressmen was a big step backwards. Wall was not properly funded, Chain & Lottery were made worse and USA would be forced to take large numbers of people from high crime [because] of the Democrats not

being interested in like and safety, DACA has now taken a big step backwards. The Dems will threaten to "shutdown", but what they are really doing is shutting down our military, at a time we need it most. Get smart, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!. (Appendix A, tweet 8 & 9)

By neglecting to mention that the failure to reach a bipartisan agreement was caused by rejection of policy proposals from both sides of the political spectrum, Trump was able to insinuate that the Democrats alone were at fault for the failure to reach an agreement and blame them for being disinterested in the matter. Furthermore, Trump used several tweets to pinpoint how the desolation of DACA was solely at the fault of the Democrats, and that they mistreated DACA recipients through their unwillingness to agree to the bipartisan agreements proposed by the Republicans. Such vilification is exemplified in a tweet from February 16th, 2018, in which Trump stated: "Cannot believe how BADLY DACA recipients have been treated by the Democrats...totally abandoned! Republicans are still working hard." (Appendix A, tweet 34). Here, Trump reasserted the Democrats' disinterest in DACA and the fact that Republicans were still motivated to find a solution. The vilification of the Democrats was accentuated further by the exclamation [Too bad!], which underlines the severity of the Democrats' alleged disinterest in solving DACA. Such a tweet might cause receivers to prefer to support those who represent action towards solving DACA, which in this case is Trump and the Republicans.

The notion that Republicans were more motivated to find a solution for DACA than the Democrats was exemplified in several tweets by President Donald Trump. For example in this tweet from February 10th, in which he stated: "Republicans want to fix DACA far more than the Democrats do. The Dems had all three branches of government back in 2008-2011, and they decided not to do anything about DACA. They only want to use it as a campaign issue. Vote Republican! (Appendix A, tweet 29). The decision to support those who are acting towards solutions might be caused by a tendency to seek to avoid risk-taking, according to Cobb and Kuklinski (1997, p. 91). Risk, in this instance, may be present as several hundred thousand people are risking deportation if DACA policies are not agreed upon. *Risk aversion* may thus be present if citizens seek to avoid such a risk. Usual supporters of the Democratic Party might thus have been convinced to support the Republicans if they were convinced that the Democrats were not interested in solving DACA, whereas the Republicans were. Additionally, *risk aversion* might also be present, as some might support Republicans in the belief that they were pushing harder than Democrats for a solution on DACA, in order to prevent the so-called 'visa-lottery'

and 'chain migration' from continuing, as the intake of foreigners might cause Americans to fear for their own safety and welfare.

Trump's claim that the Democrats did not care about solving DACA was heavily argued for on his Twitter account. Through the first few months of 2018, Trump posted several arguments suggesting the Democrats' ignorance and disinterest in DACA. Such arguments were mainly present in the forms of what Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) call *easy arguments*. This was, for instance, evident in a tweet from January 14th, in which Trump stated: "DACA is probably dead because the Democrats don't really want it, they just want to talk and take desperately needed money away from our Military." (Appendix A, tweet 14), as well as in a tweet from Fox News' Twitter page, which Trump retweeted on his own page, stating "President @realDonaldTrump on DACA: "I'm the one that's pushing DACA and the Democrats are nowhere to be found" (Appendix A, tweet 39). In both of these tweets, there were only two variables present. In the first example, Trump argued that DACA was dead. Let us call that variable X. He then went on to argue that DACA was dead because the Democrats did not want it. Let us call that variable Y. Thereby, the argument was constructed as X is a consequence of Y, and can thereby be categorized as an *easy argument*. The second argument was constructed a bit differently, as Trump used the tweet not only to pinpoint the disinterest of the Democrats, but also to pinpoint the interest he himself took in the matter. Thereby, the argument was based less on causality between two factors and more on two factors that co-exist. Variable X was that he, Trump himself, was the one who took an actual interest in DACA, while variable Y was that the Democrats took no interest in the matter, however, there was no obvious causality or other links between these two factors, and thus, this argument arguably had two goals: 1) the glorification of Trump and his political agenda and 2) the vilification of the Democrats and their lack of political agenda regarding DACA.

Trump's overall argumentation towards the claim that the Democrats did not care about the DACA program tended to be loaded with negative connotations. Generally, as Trump attempted to vilify the Democrats, he used language that was arguably negative. In tweet 14 and 39 mentioned above, Trump's descriptions of the Democrats pointed towards disinterest and indifference from the Democrats, as he argued [they just want to talk] and are [nowhere to be found]. The negativity towards the Democrats was accentuated even further as Trump argued that they wanted to [take desperately needed money away from our Military]. Here, the words [desperately needed] functioned as intensifiers, which served the purpose of underlining the fact that the Democrats wanted

to take something away from Americans. Because of the derogatory language that is exemplified in tweet 14 and 39, along with several other examples in Appendix A, it is more than assumable that Trump was against the Democrats and their politics in general. Therefore, the argumentation strategy used by Trump in many of his Twitter posts are arguably influenced by a large amount of *easy-con* arguments. This tallies with Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) hypothesis, which suggests that *easy-con* arguments are the strongest and most utilized in politics, especially on the Republican side of the American political spectrum (p. 91).

On February 1st, Trump tweeted the following: "March 5th is rapidly approaching and the Democrats are doing nothing about DACA. They Resist, Blame, Complain and Obstruct (…) " (Appendix A, tweet 24). Here, Trump arguably reasserted the claim that the Democrats did not care about DACA, however, he did so in a particular manner, as he used capital letters to emphasize certain words. Again, in the endeavor to vilify the Democrats and pinpoint their disinterest in actually doing something about DACA, Trump argued that they [Resist, Blame, Complain and Obstruct], most likely referring to the process of finding a bipartisan agreement. These particular words reflect not only disinterest from the Democratic side, but also resistance to come to an agreement. These words thus helped Trump create a rhetoric about the Democrats that was inflicted with negative *valence*. Such negative representation might have appealed to Trump's audience in a convincing manner, persuading them to view the Democrats and their politics accordingly. Capital letters were thus used as a discursive tool to create emphasis on the words Trump wanted his listeners to focus on, in order to support his overall *con-arguments* of the Democrats and their political interest in DACA.

Claim #3: Democrats are to Blame for the Termination of DACA

As it may be evident in parts of the analysis above, Trump uses his Twitter-account to engage in a blame-game concerning DACA. In his attempt to vilify the Democrats even further, Trump attempted to persuade his audience to believe that the Democrats were to blame for the termination of DACA. This is exemplified in a tweet from February 2nd, 2018, in which Trump stated: "The Democrats just aren't calling about DACA. Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer have to get moving fast, or they'll disappoint you again. We have a great chance to make a deal or, blame the Dems! March 5th is coming up fast." (Appendix A, tweet 25). Here, Trump blatantly stated that people

should blame the Democrats for the termination of DACA, as their unwillingness to come to a bipartisan agreement was the reason the program would end. Trump pinpointed his self-made deadline, March 5th, 2018, as the cutoff point before which the Democrats had to have come to agree with the Republicans, otherwise, the DACA program would be terminated. The termination of DACA came as a consequence of the inability to come to a bipartisan agreement and was used as a *policy tool* to either come to an agreement, under which policy is acceptable for both sides of the political spectrum, or as a tool to provide burdens to the target population, which consists of DACA recipients. The legitimization of such *policy rationale* is outlined in the analysis of Claim #1.

In tweet 25, there were several statements, which Trump outlined in order to blame the Democrats for the termination of DACA (Appendix A). Such statements might attempt to employ a *systematic route to persuasion*, by claiming over and over again how the Democrats were to blame for the termination of DACA until it became more convincing to listeners than the arguments from other public officials. This, however, demands that those who received and read President Donald Trump's tweets were aware of interpretations from both Democrats and Republicans. If receivers were not aware of more interpretations of the DACA issue than what was presented by Trump, a more *heuristic route to persuasion* might have been present. Both Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) and Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) argue that more or less all people routinely use their feelings as information (p. 94; p. 647). In this particular tweet from February 2nd, Trump was able to appeal to the feelings of his audience as he engaged in a more *heuristic route to persuasion*. Trump emphasized how the Democrats would [disappoint you again]. The lack of specificity in the word [you] allowed all readers to feel spoken to and feel that they were subject to the disappointment of which Trump speaks. The word [disappoint] reflected a naturally negative feeling, which people would like to avoid. Here, it is also relevant to draw on Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) concept of *risk aversion*, as the word [disappoint] may naturally lead people away from those who can potentially invoke such a feeling in them. Thereby, Trump was able to use negative discourse as a tool that might have caused people to turn against the Democrats, in the name of *risk aversion*, because they did not, by any means, desire to be disappointed.

On February 1st, Trump tweeted "Heading to beautiful West Virginia to be with great members of the Republican Party. Will be planning Infrastructure and discussing Immigration and DACA, not easy when we have no support from the Democrats. NOT

ONE DEM VOTED FOR OUR TAX BILL! Need more Republicans in '18" (Appendix A, tweet 23). This tweet was an additional example of how the Democrats were to blame for the termination of DACA, however, a more indirect example than the one provided above. Here, Trump argued that the Democrats were to blame for the lack of progress in the discussion on DACA, because they refused to support the government, which, Trump argued, tried to reach a solution. As Trump proceeded to exemplify the Democrats' unwillingness to cooperate, by stating that [NOT ONE DEM VOTED FOR OUR TAX BILL!], in all capital letters, a discursive pattern becomes apparent. In the analysis of Claim #2, it was found that Trump used capital lettering to emphasize words on which he wanted his receivers to focus and attribute a heightened amount of importance. Evidently, the use of capital lettering to provide emphasis is a tool which Trump uses frequently. In tweet 23, Trump used capital letters again to emphasize the severity of his statement, and even furthered such emphasis by ending the sentence with an exclamation mark. It is possible that the use of both capital letters and exclamation marks was an attempt to underline the Democrats' alleged resistance towards reaching a bipartisan agreement, and thereby vilify them in a way, which made American citizens view them with negative *valence*. Additionally, the use of such written language might seek to provide Trump supporters' positive attitudes more *strength* or *extremity* or, conversely, provide their negative attitudes towards the Democrats with more *strength* or *extremity*. Thus, such language did not only seek to persuade those who were against Trump to support him, but also to intensify the *strength* and *extremity* of the positive attitudes of those who already supported his politics.

On January 12th, Trump revisited the claim that the Democrats were at fault for the termination of DACA. He did so in the following two-part tweet:

The so-called bipartisan DACA deal presented yesterday to myself and a group of Republican Senators and Congressmen was a big step backwards. Wall was not properly funded, Chain & Lottery were made worse and USA would be forced to take large numbers of people from high crime [because] of the Democrats not being interested in life and safety, DACA has now taken a big step backwards. The Dems will threaten to "shutdown", but what they are really doing is shutting down our military, at a time we need it most. Get smart, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! (Appendix A, tweet 8 & 9).

Here, Trump suggested that rather than pushing for an agreement on DACA, the Democrats were deliberately slowing down the process. Trump argued that the

Democrats' suggestion for a bipartisan agreement was [a big step backwards] as it did not fulfill the demands made by the Republicans. Thereby, by their failure to produce an agreeable policy suggestion, the Democrats were to blame for the failure to reach a bipartisan agreement. Trump used his tweet to argue that the Democrats were disinterested in [life and safety]. [Life and safety] are two areas that are logically important to everyone, and thus it would be part of a logical *policy rationale* to direct policy towards those areas. However, as Trump pinpointed the Democrats' disregard for [life and safety], he attempted to spark a natural disagreement between their policies and the American people. Arguably, both employers of *systematic and heuristic routes to persuasion* would conclude that [life and safety] are imperative matters to prioritize, and thus they would disagree with those who did not uphold such priorities.

Trump additionally argued that the policy suggestion made by the Democrats would force the US to take in large amounts of people from countries of [high crime]. As Trump failed to specify which countries he spoke of, it was up to the individual receiver to decide which countries they believe these undesirables came from. By arguing that a consequence of the Democrats' policy suggestion allowed intake from places of [high crime], Trump accomplished two things: 1) He made it seem as if the Democrats were uninterested in the safety of the American country and people. 2) He framed those who come in America as parts of a *deviant group* within Schneider and Ingram's (1993) definition of social constructions. Because of this broad categorization of those who enter the US, Trump framed immigrants negatively, and as he argued that the Democrats wanted to take in more and more of those negatively framed people, and did not care for the [life and safety] of the Americans, the Democrats were vilified even further.

Claim #4: Republicans Do Care about DACA

On the 28th of January, 2018, Trump Tweeted: "I have offered DACA a wonderful deal, including a doubling in the number of recipients & a twelve year pathway to citizenship, for two reasons: (1) Because the Republicans want to fix a long time terrible problem. (2) To show that Democrats do not want to solve DACA, only use it!" (Appendix A, tweet 22). Here, Trump attempted to outline the political goals of the Democrats and the Republicans, in order to frame the Democrats as 'dishonest' in their political agenda. Trump outlined his argument clearly by using numbers in parentheses to indicate where each statement began. Furthermore, he ended his sentence by

exclaiming that the Democrats were not interested in solving DACA [only use it]. Here, he openly vilified the Democrats for being dishonest about their political agenda, suggesting that DACA was a pawn in their political game more than it was an area of interest.

Tweet 22 created a clear distinction between 'them' and 'us'. Them being the Democrats and 'us' being the Republicans. This division of the parties exudes a clear outline of whose side people should be on and suggests that Trump aimed to persuade those of other opinions to begin the process of attitude change, which is outlined in the 'Table of Concepts' on page 15. Trump clearly distanced himself from 'them', the Democrats, as their politics were portrayed as dishonest and poor at prioritizing political matters. The 'us'-side, the Republicans, were portrayed as the 'good guys', who really seemed as though they were motivated to fix DACA. Additionally, Trump pinpointed his own solution (which was rejected by the Democrats as a bipartisan agreement) as a [wonderful deal, including a doubling in the number of recipients & a twelve year pathway to citizenship].

It is arguably difficult to argue with Trump's claim that the Republicans really were motivated to find a solution for DACA, when he began by calling his proposal a [wonderful deal] and proceeded to lay out factors that did, in fact, sound like a [wonderful deal] for DACA recipients, namely a pathway to citizenship and an increase in DACA recipients. Trump's argument that the Republicans really wanted to solve the issues with DACA was thus not only supported by the *evaluative dimension* of [wonderful deal], but also by elements of his own policy proposal for a bipartisan agreement. Trump mentioned DACA as [a long time terrible problem], emphasizing the severity of the issue, and hereby also the necessity to find a solution. As Trump described himself and his party as the side that wanted to find such a solution, it is natural that listeners would find him and the Republicans more appealing than the Democrats.

As an extension of the analysis above, the following tweet used largely the same argumentative tools as the one above but employed them a little differently. On February 10th, 2018, Trump tweeted the following: "Republicans want to fix DACA far more than the Democrats do. The Dems had all three branches of government back in 2008-2011, and they decided not to do anything about DACA. They only want to use it as a campaign issue. Vote Republican!" (Appendix A, tweet 29). As this analysis seeks to investigate how Trump argued for his claim that Republicans did care about DACA, it is

necessary to look into how he built his arguments. In this particular case, Trump criticized the Democrats for not caring about DACA, in order to accentuate how much the Republicans did care about DACA. By doing so, the argument consisted of two major elements: 1) Democrats did not care about DACA. 2) Republicans did care about DACA. By putting forward these two simple factors, Trump was able to convey the idea that Republicans were the best candidates, as it would be part of most people's *chronically accessible constructs* that a representative should care about such policies as DACA. As this would seem natural to most individuals, Trump was able to end his sentence confidently, by exclaiming [Vote Republican!]. Lesser informed individuals would accept statements as truth, as long as they are marginally acceptable, according to Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991, p. 649). In this particular case, Trump laid out a situation, in which he only provided the representation of the two parties, which would further his own agenda, in a way that was acceptable to those who are not well informed on political matters.

Therefore, Trump purposely neglected to mention any Democratic efforts on DACA and chose to portray them as non-caring, an arguably negative characteristic for any political party. To portray the Democrats as non-caring was arguably part of an argumentative strategy, which used specific negative *evaluative dimensions* in the effort to frame and discredit opponents. As Trump argued that the Democrats did not care about DACA and [only want to use it as a campaign issue], Trump not only criticized the Democrats but also deliberately attempted to hint at them manipulating their audience to believe they have different priorities than they do in reality. The uncovering of the truth of such matters is not the goal of this analysis, and thus, it will be dealt with no further at this point in the study.

By building his argument on claims about carelessness and manipulation by the Democrats, Trump arguably used strategic language that contained *evaluative dimensions* to describe his opposition. However, *evaluative dimensions* were also used to portray Trump and his own Republican Party in a more positive light. As he argued that [Republicans want to fix DACA far more than the Democrats do], he laid out his claim, and supported it with an intensifier that was found in the words [far more]. This description of his own efforts and motivation to fix DACA in comparison to the Democrats', implied that the Republican party was the most suitable candidate, as it has already been established that most people's *chronically accessible constructs* would tell them that a representative should care about such policies. Thereby, Trump used

evaluative dimensions as a tool to defame his opposition as well as elevate his own political goals.

Claim #5: The Border Wall is Necessary if DACA is to Remain

President Donald Trump firmly claimed several times on his Twitter account that the DACA program is impossible to maintain if there is no agreement on the wall he wants to build at the Mexican border. As it has been accounted for previously in this study (see p. 34), Trump was adamant that a border wall was imperative to the safety and security of the United States. However, he neglected to go into further detail in any of his Twitter arguments as to why such a wall was connected to DACA. On Twitter, Trump stated on December 29th, 2017: "The Democrats have been told, and fully understand, that there can be no DACA without the desperately needed WALL at the Southern Border and an END to the horrible Chain Migration & ridiculous Lottery System of Immigration etc. We must protect our Country at all cost!" **(**Appendix A, tweet 1). In this tweet, Trump clearly demonstrated his opinion on DACA's relation to the border wall but did so without making any clear connections between DACA and the border wall, omitting all reasoning for why one necessitates the other. By omitting more detailed information, Trump avoided producing what Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) define a *hard argument*. He made a clear statement, that was easily understood by listeners as it had a limited number of argumentative variables to consider and could thus be classified as an *easy argument*.

Trump made certain linguistic efforts to highlight his claim, evidently by starting specific words with capital letters and writing others fully in capital letters. Initially, this study set out to take into account that such linguistic markers could arguably be used as intensifiers, to purposefully attract more attention to specific words, but also could be caused by Trump's general lack of grammatical and linguistic abilities. However, for the sake of this analysis, and in order to stay true to the goal of the investigation, namely the argumentative tools, which Trump uses, these capital letters will be treated as purely purposeful.

The word [END], was written in all capital letters, which suggests that Trump wanted a clear emphasis on this particular word. The word [END] was constructed as a positive thing, as it was used to describe the termination of negative things. This includes [Chain Migration] and the so-called [Lottery System of Immigration]. These words were not grammatically required to be written with a capital first letter, but such a linguistic tool was

used to 1) intensify the seriousness of the matter and 2) to create clarity that this particular word described a particular phenomenon. Such clarification made it easier to point to the areas as negative, as the areas were delimited and thereby easier to comprehend.

Additionally, Trump used the modifying *evaluative dimensions* [horrible] and [ridiculous], in order to spell out that these phenomena were negatively constructed. Such *evaluative dimensions* paint a clear picture of how Trump felt about the Democrat's political stance against the border wall, as the Republicans clearly demonstrated a desire to make the wall in order to control the intake of foreigners. By using these *evaluative dimensions*, Trump was able to create a discourse, which contained an underlying idea of what one was supposed to believe. Arguably, it would be part of most individuals' *descriptive norms* to be against that which is [horrible] and [ridiculous]. Thereby, the use of these words might have influenced what people thought the norm was, and thereby persuade them to follow suit.

The argument in tweet 1 is indicative of a type of negotiation between the Democrats and the Republicans, to reach a compromise between their vastly different goals. The Democrats were pro-DACA, and against the border wall, and the Republican were strongly for the border wall. Trump seemed to use DACA as a form of leverage in the negotiation of a bipartisan agreement, as the Republicans were willing to let the Democrats have DACA if they agreed to fund the border wall. However, by suggesting that the wall was [needed] in relation to DACA, Trump might use in his negotiation strategy, the argument that those who receive DACA were a security and safety issue for the United States. Thereby, it is arguable that Trump considered DACA recipients to be part of a *deviant group*, within Schneider and Ingram's (1993) social constructions, and thereby tended to frame them through such a negative social construction, which the US should want to keep outside the border. Thereby, Trump defined this *deviant group* from one single *eligibility criteria*, namely their common denominator, which was their reception of DACA. As DACA was most likely considered a benefit, it seems contradictive, according to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory, to provide such beneficial policies to a negatively constructed target population. Furthermore, for such a beneficial policy to be rewarded to those who were naturally deemed 'undeserving' of benefits, might be considered as problematic, as it might keep more deserving target populations from receiving benefits. As Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that positively constructed target populations, such as *advantage groups* and *dependent groups*, are more deserving of benefits, it may seem odd when benefits are distributed among negatively constructed target populations, such as *deviant groups* or *contender groups*.

Claim #6: DACA is a Problem Comparable to Mass Immigration and Visa Lottery and These Issues Should be Solved Simultaneously

On January 9th, President Donald Trump tweeted: "Thanks to all of the Republican and Democratic lawmakers for today's very productive meeting on immigration reform. There was strong agreement to negotiate a bill that deals with border security, chain migration, lottery and DACA" (Appendix A, tweet 4). In this tweet, Trump asserted that [border security], [chain migration], visa [lottery] and [DACA] should be solved under the same bill and argued that there was an overall consensus between Democratic and Republican lawmakers, that such a bill should be negotiated. By listing issues that needed to be solved under the same reform, Trump suggested that DACA somehow had a correlation with [border security], [chain migration] and visa [lottery]. The linguistic outcome of Trump's listing was that the correlation between DACA and these other issues almost became natural and comprehensible to most individuals. Thereby, Trump did not have to defend his statement that such issues should be solved under the same reform. Trump thus lumped together DACA with issues that were related to national security, possibly in an effort to suggest that DACA somehow also posed a national security issue. By arguing that both Democratic and Republican lawmakers found it important to produce a common reform for [border security], [chain migration], visa [lottery] and [DACA], Trump legitimized his claim. He did so, as most American citizens were aware of the disagreements between the Republicans and Democrats on a wide spectrum of political matters, and thus, agreement to treat such issues commonly, must have indicated the seriousness of the matter as well as correctness to act in such a manner. In order to intensify the strength of the agreement between Democratic and Republican lawmakers, Trump used the modifying *evaluative dimension* [strong]. By using such an *evaluative dimension*, Trump indicated both the seriousness of the matter and the motivation to come to a common solution. Here, it is possible that Trump argued against claim #2, in which he stated that the Democrats did not care about DACA and were not interested in finding a solution for DACA, as he clearly stated in tweet 4 that both Democrats and Republicans were motivated to find a bipartisan solution.

By claiming that DACA should be dealt with alongside [border security], [chain migration], and visa [lottery], Trump suggested that DACA recipients were somehow relatable to the illegal immigrants that are connected with [border security], [chain

migration], and visa [lottery]. This bracketing of the groups caused DACA recipients to be negatively represented in Trump's political rhetoric. It is arguable that illegal immigrants, which are often associated with [border security], [chain migration], and visa [lottery], were associated with DACA as well, due to Trump's rhetoric, and such a negative framing technique might result in thoughts of DACA as part of a *deviant group*, within Schneider and Ingram's (1993) social constructions. Such a *deviant group* is naturally negatively constructed and is undesirable in any society. However, an additional factor, which may add to Trump supporters' opposition to DACA is arguably found in the possibility of any bipartisan agreement that included a path to citizenship for this *deviant group*. It is arguably possible that some DACA recipients would become American citizens under such a reform and end up a burden to the American society. Some might be unable to work and in need of government support, and thereby transform from members of a *deviant group* to members of a *dependent group*, which is not negatively constructed but carries elements that burden the society. The *advantage group*, in this case, the American citizens would, according to Schneider and Ingram (1993, p. 336), find it undesirable for their government to distribute such benefits to 'deviant-to-dependent-converters', as they arguably would believe that they, as *advantage groups*, were more deserving of such benefits. Arguably, some might also believe that *dependent groups* of American origin are more deserving of benefits than DACA recipients. Here, it is necessary to draw on Cobb and Kuklinski's (1997) concept of *risk aversion*, in order to shed light on why Americans may choose to support Trump because of claim #6.

American citizens, whether they were part of the *advantage group*, *contender group*, or *dependent group*, might focus on the risks that were connected to DACA. Arguably, people often focus on negative elements rather than positive elements, and, according to Cobb and Kuklinski (1997), will do what they can to avoid risking anything. Such *risk aversion* is present, if American *advantage group* members choose to support Trump, in order to avoid risking any losses that might be connected to DACA and the bipartisan agreement, whether it is more sparsity in the benefits the *advantage group* will receive in the future, an increase in illegal immigration or any other matter, which may inconvenience them.

On January 12th, 2018, Trump made a two-part tweet, which supported claim #6 further, as he stated:

The so-called bipartisan DACA deal presented yesterday to myself and a group of Republican Senators and Congressmen was a big step backwards. Wall was not properly funded, Chain & Lottery were made worse and USA would be forced to take large numbers of people from high crime [because] of the Democrats not being interested in like and safety, DACA has now taken a big step backwards. The Dems will threaten to "shutdown", but what they are really doing is shutting down our military, at a time we need it most. Get smart, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!. (Appendix A, tweet 8 & 9)

In this tweet, the negotiations on [Chain & Lottery] and [DACA] were represented as a type of tipping scale. Trump argued that in order to make [Chain & Lottery] and DACA better, the wall had to be properly funded. If both elements were not dealt with, the scales would tip, and nothing would be done on either side. Trump essentially broke down the contents of the bipartisan solution, which he desired to make, and blamed the Democrats for not properly upholding their end of the scale. As Trump blamed the Democrats for causing a [big step backwards] in the negotiations of a bipartisan agreement, he arguably asserted that the border wall was a requirement for any progress for [Chain & Lottery] and [DACA]. This was not a suggestion on Trump's part, but an assertion. Trump hereby created a steady affirmation of how things were supposed to be, without complicating the matter any further by adding variables of reason or consequence, describing why it was necessary to treat these issues simultaneously.

It is clear in tweet 8 and 9, that Trump was not satisfied with the bipartisan agreement suggested by the Democrats. Trump clearly illustrated his dissatisfaction by mentioning the Democrats' suggestion for a bipartisan agreement as [the so-called bipartisan DACA deal]. Here, Trump uses the *evaluative dimension* [so-called] in a fairly passive-aggressive and demeaning manner, which suggested that he did not believe the Democrats' suggestion was worthy of such a denomination at all. The description of the Democrats' suggestion for a DACA deal was thus negatively constructed, and discredited the efforts made by the Democratic Party on DACA.

In tweet 8 and 9, Trump referred to chain migration and visa lottery, or the US Green Card Lottery (US-Immigration.com, 2018) as [Chain & Lottery]. The abbreviation for the concepts might be explained by Twitter's character limitation, however, Trump's decision to capitalize the first letters of each word seems as intentional, as it was described in claim #5 in the analysis of tweet 1 (see p. 55-56). The capital letters function as intensifiers of the importance of the words but may also function as an eye-

catching method. Furthermore, capital letters may be part of an attempt to better frame the concepts that Trump refers to. It is possible that Trump used capital letters in order for his audience to better understand the concepts that he refers to, by clearly outlining where they are present in his Tweets. Thereby, Trump clearly represented and delimited concepts, in order to ensure better understanding among his receivers. As a contrast to tweet 8 and 9, Trump tweeted on February 6th, 2018: "Polling shows nearly 7 in 10 Americans support an immigration reform package that includes DACA, fully secures the border, ends chain migration & cancels the visa lottery. If D's oppose this deal, they aren't serious about DACA-they just want open borders." (Appendix A, tweet 27). Here, Trump omitted the capital letters and referred to the elements of discussion as [border], [chain migration] and [visa lottery] and [DACA]. Again, Trump used a linguistic tool of listing, in order to present the issues as cohesive. It is rather interesting that Trump omits the capital first letters in this particular tweet, as it could be caused by forgetfulness, general inconsistency in his method of description, or be completely purposeful. In the event that the omitting of capital first letters is fully intentional, it might be that Trump was attempting to downplay the seriousness of the issues of which he speaks, due to the time at which he posted this tweet. February 6th, 2018, the date this tweet was posted, was almost a full month closer to the DACA deadline than tweet 8 and 9, which were posted on January 12th, 2018. Perhaps Trumps' sudden lack of intensity was connected to a weakening desire to come to a bipartisan agreement. Perhaps it was caused by the fact that the process was long and slow, and it was hard to keep up the same spirit for such a long period of time. While this can only be speculation, the more analytical thoughts one can make about this particular tweet include that Trump fully intended for people to think of DACA in relation to mass immigration and the visa lottery. He attempted to ensure such a relation by naturally listing the issues one by one. This lumping together of issues could perhaps cause those to whom it is part of a *subjective norm* to be against [chain migration] and [visa lottery], to consider it part of their *subjective norm* to be against DACA as well, as these issues were intentionally put in the same category by Trump.

Throughout the analysis of this study, it has become clear that President Donald Trump tends to be rather inconsistent with his claims. It is quite an extensive turnaround to go from claim #1, in which Trump claimed that the DACA program was illegal and that he wanted to terminative it immediately, to claims #2, #3 and #4, in which he argued that the Democrats were to blame for the termination of DACA and were, in fact, nowhere to be found on the discussion of the program and that the Republicans were, in fact, the prominent

advocates for the program. Furthermore, in claim #5 and #6, it is evident that Trump is generally inconsistent with the ways in which he presents issues on his Twitter page, shifting between lower case letters, first letter capitalization and fully capitalized words. Trump's argumentation strategy is rather flustered and unapparent, which causes him to seem inconsistent in his opinions on DACA. This is due to the roller-coaster of opinions Trump took Americans and DACA recipients through, as he started out by determining the termination of DACA, then shifted to become an advocate for DACA, only to end up in the same place he started, because a bipartisan agreement was not reached by March 5th, 2018. It is possible that DACA was a pawn in Trumps political game of chess and functioned as a negotiation element, which served the purpose of helping him reach his ultimate goals, namely 1) initiating *behavioral changes* in his receivers in order to gain more support from the public and 2) gaining funding for the border wall.

Existing Research in Similar Fields

Due to the lack of published academic material on DACA related issues, this study found that a satisfactory literature review would be unobtainable. Therefore, this section of the study aims to review similar studies of Trump's argumentation strategies in other contexts than DACA. While there generally is a lack of academic information on Trump's argumentation regarding DACA, the unacademic world of information can be accused of no such lack. A constantly increasing number of articles on Trump's official arguments floods the internet, and several journalists and other authors claim to have uncovered Trump's exact strategies of argumentation. As an example of this, two writers on a website called Upworthy.com, published an article in 2016 under the headline "*Arguing is easy; persuasion is hard: what Donald Trump teaches us about debate*". Here, the authors go into an analysis of flawed or untrue argument made by President Donald Trump, criticizing the notion that Trump should be trustworthy because he "tells it like it is" (Molloy and Eisenberg, 2016). They outline several theoretical concepts within argumentation and illustrate how such forms of argumentation are used by Trump. The approach is generally positivistic in this publication, as the authors believe that specific theoretical concepts generate specific outcomes, and their article does not detail how some cases may deviate from the norm. Thus, these theories treat the analysis of Trump's argumentation as a form of science. The article concludes that Trump generally uses 'bad' arguments and emphasizes how critical thinking leads to the best decisions. The article poses some issues, in so far as it appears to be affected by relatively high author bias. The authors do in no way attempt to cover up the fact that they

are opposed to Trump's argumentation strategies and, as a reader, one is bound to feel the overall subjective anti-Trump message in the article.

As mentioned above, there is no lack in unacademic material on Trump argumentation forms, as news outlets often publish articles about this matter, however, for the sake of this study, let us now dive into a more academic dimension. As of April 2018, only two academic or scholarly articles were found, investigating the argumentation strategies of President Donald Trump.

In 2018, Jason A. Edwards' published the scholarly article "Make America Great Again: Donald Trump and Redefining the U.S. Role in the World". Here, Edwards attempts to uncover Trump's political rhetoric when debating America's role in the world. The rhetorical analysis performed by Edwards (2018) bears similarities with the rhetorical analysis of this study, as it keeps a steady focus on Trump and his statements, however, Edwards' study retains a focus on America's role in the world, whereas this study focuses on DACA. Edwards argues that Trump generally uses a rhetoric that is critical of the politics of others. Trump emphasizes the previous government's lack of proficiency by denoting them to chaos and instability, in order to promote himself and his desire to bring the US back to stability, in other words, "Make America Great Again" (Edwards, 2018). As Edwards' (2018) study invokes critical thinking among readers, there seem to be some inconsistencies, or at least lacks, in his description of his dataset. Edwards' analysis is based on a wide range of arguments, excerpts, and statements made by Trump, however, the study fails to describe clearly where and how these utterings were made, which results in a lack of general context for the reader. Generally, and specifically after the introduction of Web 2.0, the information on the fora Trump's utterings are in, makes a great analytical difference. Twitter posts, interviews, speeches, announcements, meetings, and so on, tend to have different objectives, which play a role in the argumentation outcomes and thereby also the analysis thereof.

A 2017 academic study by Brian L. Ott deals more specifically with Trump's discourse on the Twitter platform. As this study's dataset mainly consists of Twitter posts, there are overlapping tendencies between it and Ott's (2017). Ott (2017) takes a more critical stance towards Twitter, as the author criticizes the platform for fostering incivility (p. 60). Ott (2017) points to findings similar to the results of my own study, as he argues that Twitter is riddled with negatively loaded language, depersonalization, and grammatical mistakes. This generally overlaps with this study's findings of Trump's use of Twitter, which tends to include poor linguistic expressions. Ott's (2017) analysis has a primary focus on the ways in which Twitter has developed new forms of communication through the years, and a

secondary focus on Trump's use of Twitter. Ott's study arguably uses Trump's Twitter as a prime example of how Twitter can be used to make uncivil statements. Ott's analysis makes similar statements to those of this study, as he argues that "people's opinions on Twitter are opinions, not news!". Ott (2017) takes a similar approach as this study, as he combines the theoretical knowledge of several scholars, to produce his empirical analysis.

My study aims to fill in a knowledge gap, as President Donald Trump's argumentation strategies regarding the DACA program appears to be academically unchartered territory. As the above review of similar literature on argumentation proves to have some implications, this study aimed to fill out such analytical deficiencies. This study thus aimed at avoiding author bias to any extent possible, in order to affect this study with less subjective opinion than demonstrated by Molloy and Eisenberg (2016). Furthermore, this study was produced with an intentionally clear and transparent dataset, with clear indications of the forum in which arguments were made. This was done in order to increase comprehension of argumentation in fora, specifically Twitter, as it was found that the lack of such information negatively affected the study by Edwards (2018).

Discussion

The analysis of this study focused exclusively on the argumentative elements in Trump's public statements and did not concern the truth of any of the claims investigated. Therefore, the discussion of the truth of some of the claims made by Trump could provide a more nuanced perspective on the DACA initiative. As the analysis of this study has revealed some inconsistencies in President Donald Trump's political standpoint on the DACA program, this study will now dive into a discussion of claims #1, #2, and #5, as these claims were found to be the most disputed throughout the research process. Website results would routinely include counter-arguments to these particular claims, and thus they have been chosen to be the subject of a discussion, which features more in-depth details on the broader political context for President Donald Trump's statements. Such a discussion becomes relevant, as the analysis revealed how Trump tends to frame issues and people in ways that support his own political agenda.

Claim #1: DACA Is and Was an Illegal Initiative

Initially, Trump claimed that he would terminate the DACA program (see claim #1, p. 35), on grounds that the initiative was illegal and unconstitutional ("Donald Trump's

Presidential", 2015). He later reemphasized this claim, by stating that former President Obama, the creator of the DACA program himself, had publicly stated that he was out of his political bounds when he initiated the program, as he did not have the right to do so (Greenberg, 2018). As Trump so prominently assured his receivers of claim #1, namely that DACA is and was an illegal initiative, it is interesting to discuss his claim in a context that is more inclusive of the viewpoints of the opposition.

Is DACA illegal? Well, it depends on whom you ask. Trump's position on the matter is quite clear, but others may not share the same opinion. In September of 2017, the news outlet Quartz Media brought an article, which argues that the issue of whether or not DACA is unconstitutional has never been solved (Merelli, 2017). Quoting law professor from Drexel University, Anil Kalhan, the article states that Trump's claim that DACA is illegal is more a reflection of his opinion than it is an actual fact (Merelli, 2017).

As a supporting argument to his claim that DACA was an illegal initiative, Trump stated that "President Obama, when he signed the executive order, actually said he doesn't have the right to do this (…) You have to go through Congress. Whether he does or whether he doesn't, let's assume he doesn't. He said it" (Greenberg, 2018). The fact-checking news outlet PolitiFact released an article in January 2018, investigating the truth of this particular argument. As Trump argued that Obama made such a statement at his signing of the DACA order, PolitiFact investigated the public statement made by Obama at that time, namely in his Rose Garden speech in 2012, in which he announced the initiative (Greenberg, 2018). According to PolitiFact, Obama did not state that he did not have the right to instate the act but underlined his presidential right to set priorities. More accurately, Obama stated: "In the absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken immigration system, what we've tried to do is focus our immigration enforcement resources in the right places. (…) This is not a path to citizenship. It's not a permanent fix. This is a temporary stopgap measure that lets us focus our resources wisely while giving a degree of relief and hope to talented, driven, patriotic young people" (as cited in Greenberg, 2018). In these quotes, there are no clear utterings that Obama did not have the right to initialize DACA. However, in 2011, Obama did state the following: "I just have to continue to say this notion that somehow I can just change the laws unilaterally is just not true. (…) What we can do is to prioritize enforcement, since there are limited enforcement resources, and say we're not going to go chasing after this young man or anybody else who's been acting responsibly and would otherwise qualify for legal status if the DREAM Act passed" (as cited in Greenberg, 2018). Here, Obama refers to the DREAM Act, the initial attempt to create a pathway to citizenship.

The DREAM Act was never put into effect, and thus the DACA act came as a new initiative, less beneficial to receivers. The quote from 2011, however, includes more notions that Obama realizes that he is not omnipotent and cannot make all decisions singlehandedly. However, this statement was made by Obama approximately a year before the initialization of the DACA act and does thus not count as something he said [when he signed the executive order]. Thereby, the truth of the claim that the DACA initiative is illegal is undetermined, and the claim that Obama stated himself that it was illegal is false.

Claim #2: Democrats Do Not Care about Solving DACA

As demonstrated in the analysis of this study, Trump firmly claimed that the Democrats did not care about DACA whatsoever (see p. 44). He claimed that the Democratic Party were, in fact, nowhere to be found on DACA, meaning that their presence in the discussions of the future of the initiative was nonexistent. However, during the research process of this study, several sources seemed to disagree with this statement.

On March 7th, PolitiFact published an article disputing Trump's claims of the Democrats' disinterest in DACA (Valverde, 2018). In the article, several Democratic efforts for DACA were accounted for, rendering Trump's claim less credible. An example of the Democrats' involvement in the efforts to reinvent the DACA policies is outlined as PolitiFact refers to the televised meeting from January 9th, 2018, where lawmakers from both the Republican and the Democratic Party met to discuss the future of DACA (Valverde, 2018). Here, Democratic Senator of California, Dianne Feinstein, suggested a clean DACA bill, in order to speed up the process of finding a solution (Valverde, 2018). This suggestion entailed a Democratic commitment to begin negotiations for a new immigration reform immediately afterwards (Valverde, 2018). However, Senator Dianne Feinstein's suggestion was rejected by Republican lawmakers, as they demanded that any reform included funding for the border wall and would not settle for a promise that this matter would be dealt with subsequently (Valverde, 2018).

Again, on January 11th, both Republican and Democratic lawmakers met to discuss and negotiate DACA, however, the process slowed even further after this meeting, as Democratic Senator of Illinois, Dick Durbin, argued that Trump had used some denigrating language about some countries (Valverde, 2018). Durbin allegedly stated that the language Trump used was "(…) hate-filled, vile, and racist" (as cited in Valverde, 2018) and thus DACA negotiations took a step backwards. Furthermore, two Senate bills made by

Democrats, and supported mostly by Democrats, were rejected by the Republicans and the Trump administration. Additionally, Trump opposed a deal reached by six senators – three from the Democratic Party and three from the Republican party. Trump called this bipartisan agreement "a big step backwards" (Appendix A, tweet 8). As Trump's claim that the Democrats were nowhere to be found on DACA was naturally unwanted by the Democratic Party, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, which consists of Democratic members, sent Trump a letter on February 28th, 2018, which included a list of several bipartisan agreements suggested by the Democrats and rejected by Trump (Valverde, 2018). Little did it help. Evidently, Trump did not acknowledge the Democratic efforts that had been made on DACA and tended to disregard them. However, it is clear that the Democrats have actually offered several suggestions for a bipartisan agreement, which even included funding for the border wall, which the party generally was against if it meant that a deal could be made for Dreamers (Valverde, 2018). All efforts have been turned down by Trump, and thus, a bipartisan agreement was not reached before Trump's self-declared DACA deadline, March 5th.

Proof that the Democrats were, in fact, participating in the negotiations for a bipartisan agreement on DACA is not hard to come by, and a quick google search will show that Democrats were more than ready to shut down the government over DACA and did, in fact, do so in January 2018 (Nilsen, 2018). Such a drastic decision reflects anything but Democratic indifference towards DACA and points towards a notion that Trump was purposely describing the Democrats as non-caring, in the media, in order to portray the Democrats negatively. As concluded by PolitiFact, in their investigation of Trump's claim #2, "Trump's tweet ignores Democratic and bipartisan efforts to find a solution. And it also downplays the president's own posturing that has impeded a deal" (Valverde, 2018).

Claim #5: The Border Wall is Necessary if DACA is to Remain

President Donald Trump's claim that any DACA deal would necessitate a border wall between the US and Mexico was found to be rather unexplained by the analysis of this study. As Trump did not go into detail in his public statements as to why he saw an element of necessity between DACA and the border wall, receivers were left to either believe the statement or not. However, it seems many disagree with the necessity of the wall in order to reach agreement on DACA, as exemplified above by Californian Senator, Dianne Feinstein's suggestion to create a clean DACA bill and subsequently begin negotiations for a new

immigration reform (Valverde, 2018). As mentioned, this suggestion was rejected, as it did not include funding for the wall, and the DACA negotiations were left as inconclusive as ever.

Several others have since publicly stated that the wall was, in fact, not a necessity, and "a monumental waste of taxpayers' money" (as cited in Valverde, 2018), according to Democratic Representative of Illinois, Luis Gutierrez. However, Gutierrez stated, like several others, that he would support the funding for the border wall if that was what it took to help Dreamers (Valverde, 2018). On January 26th, the news outlet the Washington Post published an article with a similar statement as that of Gutierrez', with the headline "We already have a wall. If it'll save DACA, just let Trump buy a new one" (Karabell, 2018). The article argues that a wall already exists between the US and Mexico, as the Secure Fence Act of 2006 initiated the building of a border fence along hundreds of miles of the border (Karabell, 2018). This Act was passed by the 2006 Republican Congress and signed by then-President George Bush, and supported by the then-senator Obama (Karabell, 2018). In fact, a portion of the wall was built and overseen by the Obama administration (Karabell, 2018). The building of this fence continued over the next many years and protected about 700 miles of the border through several different forms of barriers, including barbed wire, concrete obstacles, etc. (Karabell, 2018).

As the article from the Washington Post outlines how the US is already protected by a border wall, it seems odd, and arguably unnecessary, to initiate the building of an additional wall. Furthermore, the notion that a DACA deal must include funding for the border wall seems odd, as Trump's initial promise was that the wall would be paid for by Mexico (Karabell, 2018). Thereby, claim #5, stating that the border wall would be necessary for DACA to remain, seems like a ploy, which uses DACA as bait to make Democrats support the border wall, even though the wall is against the Democratic political conviction.

As some of President Donald Trump's claims found in the analysis of this study have been disputed to some degree in this discussion, it is assumable that the overall truths of his claims are, to some extent, questionable. Trump frames situations to fit his own politics, and, evidently, does not see an issue in portraying his opposition negatively through false claims, in order to support his own political agenda. However, these findings point towards a notion that political claims do not necessarily have to be truthful if the sender of the claim is proficient enough in his argumentation.

Conclusion

This study has attempted to enlighten the argumentative strategy of President Donald Trump and uncover what his political agenda is, regarding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Throughout the study, a combination of four main theories has been utilized to create a more thorough frame of analysis for Trump's argumentations. These included argumentative elements on both the sending and receiving side of arguments, as well as elements of discursive framing. The framing of particular target populations has been found to play a profound role in Trump's rhetoric, as part of his strategic argumentation.

Overall, Trump is widely inconsistent with his general attitude towards DACA. He states, prior to his presidential election, that he is fundamentally against DACA, but shifts to being pro-DACA, after he has been elected. He upholds his pre-election promise to terminate the program, however, he motions for a bipartisan agreement, in which DACA is to remain if the Democratic opposition agrees to fund a border wall to Mexico. However, as the Democrats are against the wall, no such deal was made, and Trump then blamed the termination of DACA on the Democrats.

Trump's argumentative strategy has been found to draw attention to the flaws of others, in order to keep his own image clean. He arguably frames the Democratic Party through vilification, by claiming that the Democrats are disinterested in DACA and that they are at fault for the termination of the program. Thereby, Trump downplays any Democratic efforts to make a bipartisan agreement that will fix DACA and is thus able to frame his own Republican Party as the pro-DACA party. Trump thereby uses framing tools to gain support from his receivers, by constructing himself and the Republican Party as the 'good guys', who want the best for everyone.

Trump purposely neglects to draw attention to the fact that he, initially, wanted to terminate the program, on the grounds that it was 'illegal'. He focuses a great deal on the alleged illegality of the DACA program in 2015 and uses this to invoke a feeling of rightfulness in his listeners, as the most logical response to illegality would, in this case, be termination. Thereby, Trump employs Lau, Smith, and Fiske's (1991) concept of a *heuristic route to persuasion*, as he relies on emotional connections between his audience and his political agenda. Additionally, Trump employs Schneider and Ingram's (1993) concept of *policy rationales* as a tool to invokes the rational thought in his audience, that illegal and thereby forbidden things, should be terminated.

It is arguable that the notion that a bipartisan agreement was unobtainable played in Trump's favor, as the termination of the DACA program was his original agenda. Thus, it is

possible that the entire DACA discussion was a 'roundabout' argumentation for the border wall Trump wants to build. Generally, Trump is an avid user of what Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) define *easy-con* arguments, specifically as he chooses to send out his statements on Twitter, which limits every post to 140 characters. Trump's overall goal of his argumentation may be to build the wall to Mexico, however, other argumentation goals are also prominent. Trump, as any politician would, aims to strengthen the attitudes of those who support him and convert the attitudes of those who oppose him. The natural goal for Trump is to generate voters, by producing a *behavioral change* in those who are against his political beliefs.

Trump generally frames DACA recipients as either a *deviant group* or a *dependent group*. Though Schneider and Ingram (1993) would argue that *dependent groups* are usually not considered a negatively constructed target group, this study has found that Trump and the Republican Party frames them as if they are. They do so, by insinuating that DACA recipients should not become citizens, as they may, in turn, become economic burdens to the society, because of any number of reasons, such as lack of linguistic abilities, physical disabilities or mental illness. Thereby, they are dependent on government subsidizing, however, they are not necessarily bad people, or criminals, and can thus not be determined a *deviant group*. However, Trump tends to also frame DACA recipients as fully *deviant groups*, as he refers to Mexicans, who make up the majority of DACA recipients, to bring crime and rape (Simon, 2018). This might invoke fearful feelings in the audience, which may cause American citizens to support Trump in order to avoid the risks DACA recipients might pose. This study deems such behavior an example of Cobbs and Kuklinski's (1997) *risk aversion*.

This study has found that Trump generally is a very poor writer, as his tweets are riddled with grammatical mistakes. However, in order to humor the analysis as well as the notion that Trump's linguistic choices are purposeful, this study has investigated his use of capitalized letters as an intentional argumentative means. Here, it was found that Trump generally uses capital letters to reflect seriousness and emphasize some words as more important than others. The scale seems to go from lower case letter, to the more important first-letter-capitalized words, to the all-important fully capitalized words, possibly followed by a number of either exclamation marks or dots.

Trump uses his language as a tool to persuade his audience that he is 'the good guy' in the DACA discussion. He tends to do so by using *evaluative dimensions* with positive or negative *valence*, depending on how they support him the best. He would, for example, call his own proposition for a bipartisan agreement a "wonderful deal" (tweet 22), the DACA

program a "long time terrible problem" and generally frames the Democrats as 'non-caring' and states that 'they only want to use DACA as a campaign issue'.

Trump arguably wants to treat DACA in the same bill as the green card lottery and chain migration, which he calls the "horrible Chain Migration & ridiculous Lottery System of Immigration". By arguing that such issues can be lumped together, he arguably frames DACA recipients as illegal immigrants, despite their DACA-statuses. Supporting this, Trump maintains that any immigration deal must include funding the border wall to Mexico. Thereby, DACA recipients are framed as part of a negatively constructed target population. Trump looks to the *advantage group*, namely the American citizens, to support him, and ensure that his political agenda is followed through.

Trump is, as mentioned earlier, inconstant in his attitude towards DACA, but also in his language revolving around all aspects of the DACA discussion. He states that Republicans and Democrats are all doing their utmost to ensure a bright future for DACA, but also that the Democrats are completely disinterested in DACA. He argues that the Democrats only want to use DACA as a campaign issue and that the Republicans are fighting the fight to keep DACA around. Meanwhile, he neglects to refer back to the time he promised to terminate DACA and stated that the program was illegal and does not mention the fact that the DACA deadline, March 5th, 2018, was completely his demand.

The 'Table of Concepts' (see p. 15) produced for this study has aided the analysis by providing a more tangible frame for analysis. Each of the theories was found to have too many shortcomings to be the backbone of a satisfactory analysis of argumentation and were thus combined to provide theoretical concepts for all aspects of the argumentation process. This theoretical outline has provided tools for analysis that are able to shed light on how argumentation does not always necessitate truth, as long as it is proficiently produced. The 'Table of Concepts' (see p. 15) may be useful in other cases of argumentation analyses; however, it may be found that the model may be insufficient in analyses that include more aspects of how receivers may reply to argumentation. As mentioned earlier in this study, the theories employed in this study, and thus also the concepts in the Table of Concepts (see p. 15), are developed prior to Web 2.0 and do thus not include considerations for how people may respond to argumentation, through online platforms.

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