Slobodan Milosevic's Propaganda Tour:

Mobilization across borders,
nationalism & the creation of the Other

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31st May 2018

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Abstract

The death of Yugoslavia's President for life Josip Broz Tito in 1980, created a power vacuum. This vacuum was soon going to be filled and abused for nationalistic purposes. Tito's goal to create a collective national identity among Yugoslavs, was in a short matter of time destroyed by nationalistic intellectuals turned politicians. In this dissertation, I will analyze how and why the anxious atmosphere among nations and nationals in former Yugoslavia happened, and why it developed into a genocide of the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina. As a result of nationalistic and chauvinistic propaganda by elite politicians; 'comrades', neighbors, friends and family turned against each other on the basis of their identity. I will further be focusing on the creation of the Serb population as an endangered ethnic group through Slobodan Milosevic and his regime's propaganda machinery, and how the identity paranoia created a mobilization between Serbs across borders. As I will demonstrate in the analysis, this narrative could only be possible by creating the Other. The Muslims in BiH became subjected to discrimination and dehumanization, which would in the early 1990's lead to ethnic cleansing and genocide on the basis of their identity.

Keywords: Social identity, Nationalism, Chauvinism, The Other, Propaganda, Genocide, Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Framing

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List of Abbreviations

SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SRB	Serbia
HHR	Croatia
BIH	Bosnia & Hercegovina
SKJ	League of Communists of Kosovo
ZKS	League of Communists of Slovenia
SDS BiH	Serb Democratic Party (Bosnia & Hercegovina)
HDZ BiH	Bosnian wing of Croatian Democratic Community
SDA	Muslim ethno-national Party for Democratic Action
SANU	Serbian Academy of Arts and Science
RTS	Serbian National Television
RS	Republica Srpska
FRJ	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

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Introduction

"Let that man be a Bosnian, Herzegovinian. Outside they don't call you by another name, except simply a Bosnian. Whether that be a Muslim (Bosniak), Serb or Croat. Everyone can be what they feel that they are, and no one has a right to force a nationality upon them".

Josip Broz Tito
1892 - 1980

Bosnia-Hercegovina was one of the six socialist republics that made up Former Socialist Federate Republic of Yugoslavia (Jugoslavija). Since Bosnia was the country with the highest percentage of ethnic diversity, it can be argued to have been the heart of the Communist country as it can be described to have been the miniature version of Yugoslavia.

Josip Broz Tito, can be said to have been the chief architect of Yugoslavia; he was the first Communist leader which defied Stalin and his Soviet hegemony, a revolutionary and a promoter of the policy of nonalignment between Communist East and Democratic West during the Cold War (Banac, 2018). After Tito's death in 1980, the long goal of establishing a collective group identity among the various ethnic groups was beginning to crumble. The national slogan of "Brotherhood and Unity" was starting to become a principle of the past as the rise of nationalism in the mid 1980's got a strong foothold in Serbia. The political landscape in Europe was changing fast. At the same time as the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 symbolized the Cold War's end, and all the positive indicators on Europe's future; the second bloodiest conflict in Europe after Second World War was slowly beginning do develop.

This dissertation will look at how the mobilization of a collective Serbian identity came about, and why the genocide in BiH took place in 1995. More specifically, I will be examining Slobodan Milosevic's rise as an elite politician, him and his regime's propaganda tour of Serbia and Montenegro, and the possible affects this had on Serbian collective identity across Serbian borders. As a consequence of this tour, it can be argued that the social construction and fear of the Other, the Muslim became created.

In 1992, the war erupted in BiH which is estimated to have killed over a hundred thousand people. On the basis of having a Bosnian Muslims identity, this 'ethnic group

became the main target due to nationalism and chauvinism. In the light of this, I am interested in finding out:

1.1   Research question

How did Slobodan Milosevic's propaganda tour affect Serbian mobilization in and across Serbian borders, and why did the Muslim population in Bosnia-Hercegovina become subjected to genocide?

1.2   Motivation

My motivation for writing about how Muslims became constructed as the Other, does have some correlation with the refugee 'crisis' in Europe in 2015, and how the political discourse on Muslim immigration in Norway (where I live) became highly securitized. As a first generation immigrant in Norway, I am highly interested in the political discourse of immigration in Norway. As I have previously written a project about this specific topic, I did find some correlations in the politicization of Muslims as the Other in both of the periods. As the refugee 'crisis' happened in 2015, so did the 20th mark of the war ending in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This would have been an interesting theme to explore more, since both of the topics deals with fear of the Other (Muslims) within a European context: one however, deals with 'export' of refugees due to the Otherness of this group, while the other deals with restrictive 'import' of this group.

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Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia can either be referred to describing Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1992) (SFRY) or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ) formed in 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro (which held its name up until 2003). It is most common to refer to SFRY when talking about Yugoslavia, if not otherwise remarked. The federal republic was made up by now 6 independent republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and one more just recently self declared country, Kosovo (Hamilton, 2008).

Of all the countries in Europe, SFRY was the least homogenous (Mønnesland, 2006). As the map under illustrates, also referred to as an ethnic map, you can see which ethnic groups resided in which republic and areas within in 1991.

Nationals could declare and identify him- or herself as a 'Yugoslav'. This usually happened when a child from a mixed marriage was born, or for political reasons. This was common and accepted. Although everybody was a Yugoslav in regards to their citizenship, nationality was however within Official Yugoslavian politics seen as something subjective. The subjective feeling of nationality can be described as feelings of belonging to one of the 'ethnic' groups based on common heritage. Regardless of which language was spoken or what your parents were, there was no need for justification in terms of the subjective feeling of belonging to one of these groups. Therefore, population census has varied from time to time (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 15).

2.1   Bosnian 'Muslim'

Ethnic structure of Yugoslavia 1991		%
In total	23.690.000	100
Serbs	8.526.800	36,0
Croats	4.524.100	19,1
Muslims	2.307.400	9,7
Albabians	2.172.600	9,2
Slovenians	1.750.800	7,4
Macedonians	1.371.800	5,8
Montenegrinians	579.023	2,4
Hungarians	426.866	1,8
Romanies	168.009	0,7
Turks	101.191	0,4
Slovaks	80.334	0,3
Romanians	54.954	0,2
Bulgarians	36.185	0,1
Vlahs	32.063	0,1
Rusyns	23.285	0,1
Czechs	19.625	0,1
Italians	15.132	0,1
Ukranians	12.813	0,1

(Mønnesland, 2006, p. 14).

In 1991, the population census looked like this. The term 'Muslim' represents Slavic speaking Muslims, it was used as an ethnic category and not a religious one. However, it was not until the Yugoslavian Constitution in 1974 introduced 'Muslim' in a national sense. Before this, Bosnian Muslims were either declared Ethnically Undecided Muslim/Yugoslav, Serb-Muslim or Croat-Muslim (Muehlenbeck, 2012, p. 184). Using Muslim as an ethnic label was however disputed, since it labeled this particular group of people under a religious category and not national as the others. Bosnian president Hamdija Pozderac stated at the time in regards to this change within the Constitution, that: "They don't permit Bosnianhood, but they offer Muslimhood. Let us accept their offer, although the wrong name, but with it we shall start the

process" (Spitka, 2016, p. 76). In 1993 this changed, the term 'Muslim' would be replaced with the term Bosniak (Dimitrovova, 2001, p. 97). Today however, depending on subjective feeling of nationality, saying one is Bosnian regardless of religious heritage can also be argued to have become a political statement in terms of resenting categorization and all its assumptions it follows.

2.2   Religion

When defining a nation, there are various factors which play important and different roles in laying down the foundation for that particular nation. In West-European thought, language holds the strongest foundation, this however, did not correlate with Yugoslavia; religion was more important (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 16). Bosnia-Hercegovina is the best example of this perception. Despite the majority of the different ethnic groups in Bosnia speaking the same language, they 'belong' to three different nations, because they belong to three different religions. This however is not on the basis of being religiously active within a certain religious community, but rather a sense of culture. Regardless of being religious or not, it is common to at least follow ceremonial religious practices through life, like for instance with the birth of a baby or a funeral. Another important factor to note, is first names. Names in the Balkans usually gives an indication to which religion that given person 'belongs' to, thus, also their cultural and the probability of their nationality (Mønnesland, 2006).

2.3   Languages in Bosnia-Hercegovina

In Bosnia, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs speak the same language with some altering distinctions at times. A better way to describe the difference is by saying that the language in itself is the same, but depending of what region you come from, you might have a dialect. SerboCroatian was the official language in Yugoslavia, but due to political reasons, the language 'Bosnian' (Bosanski) was not recognized as an official language until the Dayton Agreement[1] after the war ended in 1995 (Alexander, 2006, p. 409). This caused some problems for Bosnian Serbs and Croats since they did not recognize themselves as "Bosnians" speaking Bosnian (Greenberg, 2004). In Bosnia, the information on a milk carton for instance has its information in both Serbian (SRB), Croatian (HrV) and Bosnian (BiH). Example:

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[1] Dayton Accords, peace agreement reached on Nov. 21, 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, ending the war in Bosnia and outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Clinton, n.d.).

HrV: Mlijeko je zdravo i dobro za tijelo.

BiH: Mlijeko je zdravo i dobro za tijelo.

SRB: Mleko je dobro i zdravo za telo / Млеко је добро и здраво за тело.

Translated: Milk is good and healthy for the body.

This sentence in Croatian and Bosnian is the same, when written in Serbian with the Latin alphabet is alters a bit, but not significantly. The usage of all three languages can be found in Bosnia-Hercegovina on everything from food menus, contracts, signs etc. It is thus only used for political reasons. These political reasons can be argued to hold a strong important role for the people, because it represents each of the ethnic groups. Or as Greenberg (2004, p. 158) argues: "The complex language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is unwieldy for a country of four million, as the competition among the three standards becomes a marker of language apartheid, rather than language diversity".

2.4   Chronology of events

1300	Turkic tribe known as Ottomans forms small state in western Anatolia
1352	Ottomans invade Europe and begin to occupy Bulgaria.
1371	Ottomans defeat Serbs and their allies at Battle of Maritsa.
1389	Ottomans inflict second defeat on Serbs, now led by Prince Lazar, at the Battle of Kosovo, beginning slow conquest of Serbia.
1463	Ottomans almost complete conquest of Bosnia, executing last king of Bosnia, Stjepan Tomasevic in Jajce.[2]
1557	Most Serbans retained their Orthodox beliefs under Turkish rule, and the Serbian Orthodox church was of great importance as bearer of Serbian national traditions, especially after the patriarchy of Peć was restored in 1557.
1804 – 1835	The Serbian first and second revolt against the Turks which eventually led to some internal self-government.[3]
1876-1878	Austria occupies Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia throws off last vestiges of autonomy, becoming formally independent and receiving territory to the south.

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[2] 1300-1463 ("Timeline", 2010)
[3] 1557-1835 ("Serbias", 2017)

1908   Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, humiliating Serbia.[4]

1914   Gavrilo Princip assacinates Prinz Ferdinand.[5]

1918   Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed after World War I.

1929   Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia

1945   Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro and Serbia renames Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito.

1980   Tito dies.

1987   Senior Serbian Communist Party official Slobodan Milosevic visits Kosovo, tells Serbs protesting against alleged harassment by majority Albanian community that no-one would ever be allowed to beat them. The speech comes to be seen as a rallying cry for Serb nationalism.

1989   Slobodan Milosevic becomes President of Serbia.[6]

1990   Radovan Karadžić founded the Serb Democratic Party.

1991   Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia break away from Yugoslavia.

1992   Bosnia-Hercegovina Independence
Montenegro and Serbia form Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

1992-1995   War in Bosnia. Genocide in Srebrenica.

1995   Dayton accords brought end to the Bosnian war.

1997   Milosevic becomes FRY's third President.[7]

1998   War in Kosovo. NATO's ultimatum to Serbia.

1999   NATO launched air strikes. War ends in the Balkans.[8]

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[4] 1876-1908 (Timeline", 2010)
[5] 1918 (Brazier & Kirkhusmo, 2018)
[6] 1918-1989 ("Serbia", 2018)
[7] 1990-1997 (Mønnesland, 2006)
[8] 1998-1999 (Endresen, 2018)

3

Methodology

This dissertation sets out to analyze how the rise of Slobodan Milosevic came about, what implications his 'propaganda tour' had on the Serbian collective identity, and why the genocide of Bosnian Muslims took place in 1995.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how my data can be analyzed through the theories and concepts I have chosen to utilize. Although they are plentiful, I believe that each of them will bring something different to the table, in order to cope with the issues relating to the process leading up to the genocide in Bosnia-Hercegovina. I believe that it is fruitful to describe the dissertation as a skeleton, where the different 'bones', regardless of size, helps to make the whole body. Each 'bone' is just as important in order to get an overall perspective.

My analysis is to a certain extent build up within a chronological timespan in order to contextualize the demise of Yugoslavia. My point of departure is in 1986 when Milosevic went to Kosovo (as the Communist Party leader in Serbia), and ends in majority with the Bosnian declaration of Independence in 1992. This timeframe is the main framework; but I do however expand it a little. There are some historical information that goes beyond the main framework, as it is relevant for the wholeness of the dissertation to include some findings in the light of the actual war and some thoughts on the aftermath.

As it can be argued, the 'climax' of nationalism and chauvinism in Bosnia-Hercegovina reached it's peak with the downfall of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1990's. Rhetoric's in this period became critical indicators in terms of what was going to happened in the years to come. This including persecution, ethnic cleansing, organized rape and genocide of the Muslim population in BiH.

As my research question is somewhat broad, and the process leading up to the persecutions of Bosnian Muslims between 1992-1995 can be analyzed through various theoretical frames and analytical levels, I want to highlight that I will be looking at the process prior to the war in terms of mobilization based on 'ethnic' groups through a micro/meso level. Due to Milosevic's propaganda tour, my hypothesis is that he managed to influence other political actors across borders who then also took advantage of the rise of nationalism Milosevic and his regime orchestrated. The rise of nationalism and the usage of

propaganda by intellectuals turned politicians, I believe is one of the reasons behind the mobilization of Serbs across borders, and also one of the factors which helps to explain why ethnic cleansing of Muslims in BiH took place. By looking at specific events, speeches and statements from various political elites in the context of the demise of Yugoslavia (with focus on Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina), I will be analyzing how the management of collective identity and the fear for its survival managed to create the hostile atmosphere that arguable can be said was one of the root causes for the war in BiH.

3.1   Collection of Data

The collection of my data consists mostly of qualitative findings such as speeches, statements, and government documents. I have to some extent used some statistics, which can thus be categorized as quantitative data. The quantitative data consists mainly of population census statistics to show the various sizes of ethnic groups. These numbers however, was somewhat ambiguous in former Yugoslavia, because nationality was seen as something personal. Regardless of what your parents were, an individual had the opportunity to construct its own nationality in terms of being able to state whatever nationality based on subjective sense of belonging. As a consequence, the numbers within the censuses has varied from year to year (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 15). I will however for the sake to get an overview, use one census that shows the ethnic group structure in 1991, one year before the killings in BiH started.

The findings in this dissertation is therefore utilizing the mixed methods model. Some of the primary findings are caught on tape. The primary sources will be used as material supporting my hypotheses that the political elite managed to construct a fear of the other through the propaganda machinery This led to an identity paranoia, which further can be argued to have made the bonds between the 'victims' stronger. At the same time as bonds within same ethnic groups became stronger and mobilization occurred, it also created the distance needed between different ethnic groups in order to legitimate warfare.

Although I will analyze it through secondary sources where the data is translated, I will at times reference some videos in a footnote in order to provide the reader with the possibility to get a more visual picture if wanted.

Most of the speeches and statements are originally in Serbian, but I have however found translated versions of the findings I have chosen to analyze. Although I could have translated some of it myself due to my linguistic knowledge in Bosnian, I decided to use other authors translations for the sake of accuracy. I am stronger orally then written, and this could have affected my translations. I have however used my language proficiency to read through

some of my my data in the original language. The translated speeches and statements are therefor a conciseness choice of what I believe are closest to the non-translated. In addition, some of my secondary sources are in Norwegian, I have translated these to English due to my linguistic proficiency in both of the languages.

Further, I have also used secondary sources such as academic journals, news articles, government reports and books. These secondary sources will explore the various consequences the demise of Yugoslavia had on particular the Serbs and the Muslim population prior to the war. I realize that some of the secondary sources might be bias including my own analysis of the qualitative findings. One has to however conclude that analyzing qualitative findings are impossible to avoid completely. Due to the nature of trying to give something meaning, biases become unavoidable.

3.2   Theories

In order to answer my research question, I have chosen to look at various concepts within the social identity theory by Richard Jenkins (2008). This will allow me to analyze the various social constructions of *ethnic identity* in former Yugoslavia. The importance of social identity in this dissertation derives from the possible explanation that one of the root causes of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina can be explained by looking at the different identity constructions, which then was used as a tool to *categorize* the different groups. The various identities made up *identity groups*, which shared some similarities and some differences.

During Yugoslavia, the emphasis of similarities was promoted, whereas promotion of differences (in terms of nationalism) was not tolerated (Ritter, 2012/3). After Tito's death however, the differences became highly politicized and as a consequence *in- and out groups* emerged. Categorization is usually based on stereotyping and prejudice, and I will be utilizing this concept as one of the factors which contributed in the creation of the *Other,* as well as how the political discourse regarding Yugoslavia's future went from having nationalistic undertones, to *chauvinistic.*

The new political voices from 1986 and up until the war, did not speak for the Yugoslav people as one group, which resulted in anxiety and separation of what was once a proud nation of 'Unity and Brotherhood' (the national slogan for upkeep of peace and solidarity). Nationalism, propaganda and declarations of independence from Yugoslavia were all significant markers of what was about to happened in the beginning of the 1990's.

The 'body of theory' will provide a basic set of tools that deals with my research question. It will shape and provide the necessary understanding of the core issues that led to rise of nationalism and persecution and genocide of Bosnian Muslims between 1992-1995.

The term identity today has many definitions and meanings, it all comes down to *how* you want to use the term and for what purpose. Since the term identity plays an important role when dealing with nationalism and ethnic conflict within comparative politics (Fearon, 1999, p. 1), I will be using the term identity in order to try to explain and analyze how construction of various identities led to a collective national rise within the republics and how identity became a 'death sentence' for many Bosnian Muslims during the course of the war as a consequence. Furthermore, I will use the Framing theory by Sophie Lecheler and Claes H. D. Vreese's (2012) in order to show how the media which became controlled by Milosevic and his regime after 1986 contributed to spread *propaganda* and how this propaganda managed to cultivate discrimination and mobilize masses. To support my arguments regarding how Framing and Propaganda worked as tools to mobilize masses, I have also chosen to use *Cultivation theory,* because it deals with the notion that many people through media exposure might get a 'Mean World Syndrome'. The frame which was put forward by Milosevic and his regime can be argued to have wanted this exact outcome. By media consumers believing that the world is meaner than it is, mobilization of the masses becomes easier.

Another important concept to include here is '*imaged community'* by Benedict Anderson (2006). This concept deals with the fact that belonging to a specific group in terms of nation or ethnicity for example, are imagined because identity is socially constructed. As I will demonstrate and challenge in my dissertation, group identity in former Yugoslavia is very much based on subjective feelings of belonging to a group based on a shared belief of having a common mythology. This common mythology became used as a propaganda tool in order to construct the narrative regarding natural ownership of BiH, as well as socially constructing the various ethnic groups as either heroes or 'fallen' heroes. I will elaborate more on this later.

3.3   Limitations

My biggest challenge in this dissertation was not what to write *about,* but rather what to leave *out*. Although this war has been given various names, such as the Balkan war, civil war, Yugoslav war and Bosnian war, one might confuse it with a war fought between two sides. This is however not precise. It was a war fought between and within nations, and many generalizations has been made about who fought each other. Due to the complex construction of ethnic and national identity in the former Yugoslavia, it is however hard not to make

generalizations when writing about the different groups prior and during the war. I want to highlight the importance of this, because I do generalize the groups by writing 'Serbs', 'Muslims', 'Bosniaks' etc. This is not to say that it includes *all* people identifying with the various groups. Nevertheless, one needs to identity the groups for the sake of the analysis, and therefor I do use these categories as means to analyze my research question.

Another limitation, is the lack of analysis of the other countries participation in the war. Although the research question does give a certain perspective on my focus, it is important to note that it was not only Serb aggression and propaganda which constructed the Muslims in Bosnia as the Other. Croatian nationalism and propaganda regarding Muslims can be argued to also have had a great impact on what was to become ethnic cleansing of Muslims. I have however not chosen to put too much focus on Croatian aggression in Bosnia-Hercegovina. I do however mention it in the context of explaining the peculiar position Bosnian Muslims had as an 'ethnic' group, and how their identity was seen as socially constructed and not 'real' compared to the other groups. Further, I want to highlight the fact that it was not only Muslims who were persecuted and killed. There were civilian causalities on all sides, including many minorities like for instance romaine's.

My intention is not to get an overall overview of what happened prior to the war on all sides, but rather to show how on a micro level Milosevic and his regime during their propaganda 'tour' managed to raise a collective Serbian identity across border, and how this effected the Muslim population. Further, I believe that this is only one out of many ways to interpret my findings.

4
Body of theory

4.1   Social identity

Jenkins writes that: "identity is the human capacity, rooted in language – to know 'who's who' (and hence 'what's what') This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on" (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). Following this logic, it involves a multi dimensional classification of the human worlds and our place in it as individuals and as members of collectivities (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, identity is not a 'thing', but rather a process of *identification,* it is not something one beholds, but something one does (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). Identity does not determine or predict an individual behavior, but it can to some extent be said that our behavior towards other people comes down to how we classify them (or them us) (Jenkins, 2008, p. 6). This form of classification is organized hierarchically; this can result into identification and motives having a correlation when somebody gets identifies as 'something' or someone, and as a consequence gets treated according to the given classification (Jenkins, 2008, p. 6).

4. 2.   Concepts within social identity

4.2.1   *Ethnic identity*

Ethnicity can be defined as: "The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition" ("Ethnicity", n.d.). Following this definition, most people in the Balkans are part of the same ethnic and linguistic group, Southern Slavs (Boose, 2002, p. 76). According to ethno-nationalist mythology, ethnic groups have existed for millennia, they have always also wanted a country for their own; this is called the "primordaliast" theory of ethnicity (Kaufman, 2001, p. 4). Primordial, meaning: "Existing at or from the beginning of time" (Primordial, n.d.). A debate regarding ethnicity being primordial has led the discourse of ethnicity to question if ethnicity is either unchanging or situational (and as a consequence can be manipulated depending on the circumstances) (Jenkins, 2008, p. 87). Categorization makes distinguishing various ethnicities possible. This similarities and differences, or group identities, makes up collectives of 'us' and 'them', and

they can be enormously consequential according to Jenkins (2008, p. 87).

There are five key traits that ethnic groups share according to Anthony Smith: 1. group name, 2. A believed common descent, 3. Common historical memories, 4. Elements of shared culture (such as language or religion), and 5. Attachment (even if only historical or sentimental to a specific territory) (as cited in Kaufman, 2001, p. 16). These elements are interlinked by a myth-symbol complex, and as I will later demonstrate, these complex traits that ethnic groups share, can be used within the propaganda 'machinery'.

4.2.2 *Group identity*

When thinking about groups, there is a notion that ethnic groups are clearly bounded and homogenous, that they share a group identity. Jenkins argues however, that this is not *real,* what is real is their sense of a shared 'groupness' of their group membership. Every 'group' is made up by individuals, therefor, ethnicity, for Jenkins (2008, p. 8-9), is a cognitive point of view for individuals in the way they see the world.

Identity is not something one has in terms of that it determines an individual's actions and behavior, it is something individuals do. Therefore, identity does not, and cannot, make people do anything: Group membership and identity are likely to have some part to play, but they cannot be said to *determine* anything" (Jenkins, 2008, p. 9). In other words, the feelings of groupness are to somewhat extent real, but illusory; ethnic group beliefs of 'groupness' has historically created problems and conflicts and still creates contemporary problems (Jenkins, 2008, p. 11).

4.2.3 *In- and out groups*

These various distinctions we make about ourselves and others makes social categorization possible, it has also led to creation of 'in' (us)- and 'out' (them) groups according to Henri Tajfel and John Turner (as cited in McLeod, 2008). These groups get created from wanting to feel pride and self-esteem; it gives people a sense of social identity and a sense of belonging (McLeod, 2008). When members of an in-group try to find negative elements of another group, they enhance their own self-esteem; where out-groups become the opposition of themselves; the out-group becomes socially constructed as different, as an 'alien', as 'the other' (McLeod, 2008). This categorization is usually based on stereotyping and prejudice, the differences between groups are usually exaggerated. Especially in times of uprising conflict between groups, narrative is usually made about the enemy or out-group. Tafjel and

Turner states (as cited in McLeod, 2008) that there are three mental processes which are involved when classification between "us" and "them" takes place, they are:

1. *Social categorization* deals with how categorization of people and objects helps individuals understand their social environment. By assigning people to a category, implicit information regarding that group of people is easier to understand. In addition, people also find things out about themselves by knowing which categories they belong do. For instance, defining appropriate behavior by reference to the norms of groups we belong to.

2. *Social identification* deals with how people adopt the identity of the group they have categorized themselves with belonging to. This usually makes people conform to the norms of the group. In addition, there will be an emotional significance to the identification with the group, where self-esteem is bound up with that group membership.

3. *Social comparison* happens when people have categorized themselves as part of a group. After the membership is set, comparison between "us" versus "them" happens. This process is critical in order to understand prejudice, because comparison can lead to rivalry, where competition and hostility between groups can result in an identity competition.

All these three processes lead up to the creation and mentalities attached to in- and out groups, and they can in some cases become highly chauvinistic.

4.2.4 *Categorization*

As a way of categorizing one self as a part of a group you also need to categorize others. One could say that it is just as easy to categorize one self in terms of what attributes one does not behold or share in comparison to other groups one does *not* identify with. Therefore, similarities and differences play an important part of identification and establishing identity: "The sameness of objects, as in A1 is identical to A2 but not to B1". (Jenkins, 2008, p. 17). This comparison between 'respected parties/subjects' pave the way for categorization. Categorization is central to both conflict and conflict avoidance strategies, this in many cases makes being member of a group very real, because it can clearly have consequences. (Jenkins, 2008, p. 12).

4.3   Nationalism & Chauvinism

The term identity has been debated in many various fields, like I wrote earlier, it all depends on how you want to use the term. As Jenkins (2008, p. 28) write, the term has also been used to understand resurgence of nationalism and ethnic politics. Ethnic nationalism is a modern ideology, and it was only in the twentieth century that people started to adopt various identities based on nationality, before that, identities were much more local (Kafuman, 2001, p. 5). Nationalism can be said to be a belief that one's own group should be politically autonomous, it is the belief that one's own nation should take its rightful place among the nations of the world (Kafuman, 2001, p. 16).

Benedict Anderson argues that nation, nationality and nationalism are difficult terms to define, he did however analyze how nationalism creates a sense of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 2006, p. 3). In the case for the Balkans; the various countries have been under various rules. Looking at the timeline, Bosnia has been under many foreign rulers, the same with Serbia. Therefor, a possible 'imagined community' of what it entails to be a Serbian, Bosnian or Croatian for instance, falls down to a socially constructed identity (community) where people who identify with this group shares similar mythology. Anderson argues: "It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion"; the nation becomes therefore an imagined political community (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). According to Kaufman (2001, p. 16), there are seven rules of nationalism which can be argued to define the core issued relating to nationalism, they are:

1. If an area was ours for 500 years and yours for 50 years, it should belong to us - you are merely occupiers.

2. If an area was yours for 500 years and ours for 50 years, it should belong to us - borders must not be changed.

3. If an area belonged to us 500 years ago but never since then, it should belong to us - it is the Cradle of our Nation.

4. If a majority of our people live there, it must belong to us-they must enjoy the right of self-determination.

5. If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us-they must be protected against your oppression.

6. All of the above rules apply to us but not to you.

7. Our dream of greatness is Historical Necessity, yours is Fascism.

Following these seven rules, and Andersons understanding of imaginary communities, together it can contribute to produce and reproduce imaginary in- and out groups, and since nationalism has its root in fear and hatred of the Other, it can lead to racism (Anderson, 2006, p. 141).

Chauvinism however, is the belief that one's own group is better than others, and therefor has the right to dominate or displace them (Kafuman, 2001, p. 16). Kaufman argues that there is a need to understand the terms *myth* and *symbol* when dealing with ethnicity and nationalism: "(…) a myth is "a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning. The truth or falsity of the myth is irrelevant; its purpose is to help a person understand what a set of events means to him or her" (Kafuman, 2001, p. 16). Further, chauvinism produces hostility, where the creation of the enemy becomes created. The difference between nationalism and chauvinism can be understood by saying that nationalists may seek equality for their group without being chauvinistic, whereas chauvinists are content with their groups or nations status as the 'older brother'. Extreme nationalists do however tend to be chauvinists, and as a consequence; hostile towards nationalists of other groups (Kafuman, 2001, p. 16). When chauvinists are challenged, they will label the challenger as the enemy, or as the Other. Because of the group's sense of being the rightful dominators (because they are better), being dominated is not an option. If there is an ethnic conflict on the rise, chauvinistic attitudes can be highly consequential.

4.4   Genocide and Othering

The process of Othering can happen in various contexts. It can be a process which becomes initiated by an encounter between civilizations that has never previously had contact (Gabriel, 2012). When Columbus 'discovered' the New World, indigenous people were killed, tortured and enslaved due to the process of Othering: This process, can however take place between groups that have lived together for centuries (Gabriel, 2012). Author Slavenka Drakulic expressed in her book "Balkan express" that:

> I understand now that nothing but" otherness" killed Jews, and it began with naming them, by reducing them to the other. Then everything became possible. Even the worst atrocities like concentration camps or the slaughtering of civilians in Croatia or Bosnia. (Drakulic, 1993, p. 144-145)

Scholar Holslag (2015, p. 96) argues that Othering is a key element within the genocidal process. When a dominant culture group faces various political and economic crisis, it looks

inward to establish a new sense of 'Self' by inventing an 'Other' (Holslag, 2015, p. 96). Here, images become created, and the Other gets dissected from the main culture and as a consequence can be severed (Holslag, 2015, p. 96). Therefore, one has to understand genocide as an act which derives from a feeling of inferiority rather than superiority; these Others becomes a threat that has to be cleansed and purified (Holslag, 2015, p. 96-97). Only by a purification process, 'new identities' can emerge. These new identities and the sense of internal threat, are however, culturally and socially created myths (Holslag, 2015, p. 97). Holslag calls this the *sociale imaginaire*: a complex network of ideas, imagery, values and symbols (Holslag, 2015, p. 97). Although the act of killings has not started during the construction of the Other, the genocidal process has started. According to Gregory H. Stanton (1998; 2003), President of Genocide Watch, there are ten steps of the genocide process. They are:

1. **Classification**
   All cultures have categories to distinguish people into "us and them" by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide.

2. **Symbolization**
   We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people "Jews" or "Gypsies", or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups.

3. **Discrimination**
   A dominant group uses law, custom, and political power to deny the rights of other groups. Discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion should be outlawed.

4. **Dehumanization**
   Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. Denial of the humanity of others is the step that permits killing with impunity.

5. **Organization**
   Genocide is always collective because it derives its impetus from group identification. Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.)

6. **Polarization**
   Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda.

7. **Preparation**

Preparation for genocide includes identification. Lists of victims are drawn up. Houses are marked. Maps are made. Individuals are forced to carry ID cards identifying their ethnic or religious group. Identification greatly speeds the slaughter.

8. **Persecution**
Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Sometimes they are even segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved.

9. **Extermination**
It is considered extermination, rather than murder, because the victims are not considered human. Killing is described by euphemisms of purification: "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.

10. **Denial**
Every genocide is followed by denial. The mass graves are dug up and hidden. The historical records are burned, or closed to historians. Even during the genocide, those committing the crimes dismiss reports as propaganda.

Article II under the 1948 U.N *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* states that: "In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". They are:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

4.5 Framing theory

Within Sophie Lecheler and Claes H. d. Vreese's framing theory (2012, p. 185), they highlight that a growing number of studies within mass communization studies sought out to understand how and under which conditions news can affect public opinion. The cultivation theory can possibly have an explanation or give some insight to my dissertation in the sense that news can play an important factor into re-shaping already 'installed' perceptions on the world. Framing theory looks at how the media affects peoples understanding of politics, and how individuals 'judgments' and decisions becomes suggested from a top-bottom approach; without the public necessarily not being aware of how they are personally affected by the 'frame' that has been set out (Lecheler & Vreese, 2012, p. 186).

Various 'frames' within the political discourse can be used by looking at how elites attempt to affect support for or rejection of an issue by emphasizing on either positive or negative aspects of a given issue (Lecheler & Vreese, 2012, p. 187). According to Fairhurst (2005, p. 168) Framing can be defined as:

> The ability to shape the meaning of a subject, to judge its character and significance. To hold the frame of a subject is to choose one particular meaning (or set of meanings) over another. When we share our frames with others (the process of framing), we manage meaning because we assert that our interpretations should be taken as real over other possible interpretations.

Media conveyers have the ability to create and apply various persistent frames, this give them the possible control of the number of alternative information and news that are available to the audience as they are constructing their social reality (Gorp, 2007, p. 62) Therefore, an individual's perception of the world and society they live in can be framed by the frame. By claiming certain situations as real, as often journalists do, the audience's feelings towards a reported situation might have negative consequences (Goffman, 1986, p. 1). One could say that politicians and journalists are a part of the elite which makes up the frame, because they are conveying information about various situations and issues that needs to be addressed. Frames are a central part of a culture, and journalists like other people, are effected by the specific culture they identify with. The cultural organized set of beliefs, myths, stereotypes, values and norms can therefore enable journalists to make the audience see the world through the frame applied *by* the journalist (concisely or subconsciously) (Gorp, 2007).

4.6   Cultivation theory

Cultivation theory, or cultivation hypothesis, is based on the assumption that mass media, especially television, influences the viewers' perception and idea of everyday life ("Cultivation", n.d.). By watching a lot of television, the audience becomes more affected by the various messages the media is choosing to represent and therefor the viewer's perception of the world becomes more real and valid (Davie, 2010). Since heavy viewers becomes more exposed to violence through the intake of television and media, they can become affected by the 'Mean World Syndrome', that is, the belief that the world is a far more dangerous place then it really is (Davie, 2010).

This theory suggests that the attitudes viewers get formed through media intake are to some extent based on already based perceptions, norms and attitudes in the present society they live in. It does not change attitudes and opinions; it only reinforces them ("Cultivation",

n.d.). In other words; their latent attitudes only become reinforced as a consequence, and their belief becomes further strengthened about how the 'real world' really is ("Cultivation", n.d.). The basis for this theory focuses on how television affects heavy television viewers in the long term. Although many people would not categorize themselves as heavy viewers, some might not be aware to which extent they absorb media. Thus, a person who might believe he or she is a moderate viewer, is in fact, a heavy viewer ("Cultivation", n.d.). Many theorists within this persuasion tend to focus on television violence, others studies do however cover other affects of television and media, such as; demographics, cultural representations, political attitudes among many others ("Cultivation", n.d.).

An individual's perception of the world lies in the given culture the person is from. When a frame becomes constructed by the political elite, a consequence might be that the individual sees the world through that cultural frame. There are various concepts within the cultivation theory, to name some: 1. The symbolic environment, 2. Story telling, and 3. The symbolic function of television (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23).

The symbolic environment tells us something about how human beings are the only creatures who live in a world beyond the threats and satisfactions of our immediate environment, most of our knowledge are handed down to us through a variety of stories, and not through personal experiences (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23). According to Goerge Gerbner, founder of the cultivation theory, there are three types of *story telling*: 1. *How things work*: These are fictional stories that reveal the invisible dynamics of human life. They further build in a fantasy that we call reality. 2. *How things are:* These are stories of the news; they confirm the visions, rules, goals of a particular society. They also elaborate upon reality, such as legends of the past. 3. *What to do*: These are stories of value and choice, such as laws and religion. These three types of stories together constitute culture, which is increasingly disseminated by television" (Gerbner n.d; Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23).

The last concept, *the symbolic function of the TV*, can best be described by thinking about the TV as an essential information source surrounding the world; it informs individuals as well as masses about basic facts about life, society, people and authority (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23). Regardless of a news report being real or fictional, it gives an indication on what values and morals are acceptable in a given society (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23). Individuals who watches a lot TV, may therefor be subjected to mental images about the given society and the dangers outside it, as well as population characteristics, values and various cultural standards (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23).

The media might present untruthful information, distorted stereotypes as well as misguided positive images. If the viewer has little means for comparing what is presented, a plausible consequence can be that the individuals perception on the 'real' world might become bias and distorted (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23). This theory further emphasizes on the fact that media and television does not reflect what is happening in the world outside; but rather constructs an artificial world where certain events and issues gets attention (based on the interest of the people who control the media) (Mosharafa, 2015, p. 23). This way of representing certain issues and framing them, in the hopes of cultivating opinions, can also be understood as propaganda.

4.7   Propaganda

Brosse (2008) argues that propaganda can be defined as activities designed to shape opinion so that people share certain political and social ideas, or support various policies, governments and representatives. Further, propaganda seeks to influence various fundamental attitudes of individuals and therefore it becomes "(…) an attempt to influence the opinion and behavior of society in such a way that people adopt an opinion and specific behavior (Brosse, 2003, p. 8). O'Shaughnessy (2004, p. 4) argues that the force of propaganda is also the forcibility of the utopian vision. In other words, utopian visions have an underlying presence within the propaganda machinery. When propaganda is used, it is usually trying to hit an emotional nerve in order to appeal to its audience. A 'rational' propaganda is thus harder to carry out, because appealing on emotions (which are not rational at large) creates a stronger foothold in a shorter timespan. Propagandists exploit in many aspects certain emotions such as anger and fear, and by playing on this emotions, the individual as a rational decision maker can fast be turned into the opposition; someone who makes decisions based on emotions rather than rationality (O'Shaughnessy, 2004).

There are usually three distinctive features that becomes used as a tool within the propaganda machinery, they are: 1. Symbolism, 2. Rhetoric and 3. Myth. When these three become abused and manipulated from the elite to its targeted audience, effective propaganda might become the consequence (O'Shaughnessy, 2004).

The political and social impact of rhetoric is critical; as human's resonance can be affected by 'good' rhetoric. Rhetoric can not only persuade various meanings that people hold, but it can also actively create it (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 5). Rhetoric is often defined as "the art of language" (Jones, 2016), therefor, language strategies become used as a tool to

persuade how people think. When something or someone, like for instances a narrative about the Other becomes repeated regularly, people might start believing it.

Propaganda can not however exist without the myths that rhetoric articulates – and myth can be defined as the sound of a culture's dialogue with itself, where key values of a society is expressed through story telling: "We see myths as critical to society's integration and sustenance, and to destroy a society's myth is to destroy society" (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 5). The impact myths can have on an audience is huge, since myths are based within a historical timeframe of a nation, it can be argued that many cultural roots and sense of collective belonging holds a place within that particular myth that is being told. Myths can therefore hold a strong emotional place within a nation and its populations consciousness. Political actors may as a consequence use myth within the propaganda machinery in order to further their cause in hopes for mobilization of the masses.

To demonstrate an example on how myths can operate within a nation, one could look at the myth that the US constitution enshrines the right to bear arms. Albeit it does not directly constitute this, it has nevertheless been one of the key arguments when debating gun control in the United States (O'Shaughnessy, 2004). Another important aspect to myths can be found in how people view their own history. History and myths might sometimes become blurred in the sense that we do not view history objectively, but through the prism of its own self-presentation (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 6).

Various political actors throughout the world have taken usage of the propaganda machinery in order to create a certain frame. Although much of the information handed down from the top might not be true, it can nevertheless be believed by the audience as a consequence of how the information is presented and translated. When the past is mythologized, it can have significant consequence for the present (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 6). Mythology usually contains a lot of symbols, and symbols holds a great deal of power. It can be said that usage of symbols is in some form a short cut within the propaganda machinery: "As a pre-literate form of meaning, symbols can communicate with those for whom the act of reading is a chore" (O'Shaughnessy, 2004). Therefore, usage of symbols can be highly successful because it can reach many people in a short matter of time, it is also a cheap form of gaining recognition, and it is capable of endless duplications (O'Shaughnessy, 2004, p 6). In Kaufman words (2001, p. 16): it can be used as emotionally charged short cuts which references various myths.

5

Analysis part 1

5.1   Analysis strategy

This analysis can be said to be divided into two parts. The first part deals with the rise of nationalism in Serbia, whereas the second part deals with Serb nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina (and its consequences). The first part looks into the rise of Slobodan Milosevic's career within politics. I have chosen to call this the 'propaganda tour', as he toured around Serbia and Montenegro in order to create a collective Serbian identity within and outside Serbian borders. As I will later demonstrate in the analysis, with every mass rally he and his regime went on during this tour, massive crowds showed up to show their support in what was to be coined 'The meetings of truths'. These meetings were used as a propaganda tool by the political elite, because they were portrayed as a collective and democratic rise from the bottom. This period has thus been called the 'Anti bureaucratic revolution'. Ironically, these rallies were however organized, planned and financed from the top, making it what I have called the propaganda tour. Yugoslavia was thus entering a new political era after Tito's death. The essence of Milosevic's propaganda tour can best be described by quoting the famous African-American poet Gill Scott-Heron (1970); Democracy, liberty and justice became revolutionary code names (…) for nationalism and chauvinism. What I mean by this, can be seen in the context of these tours as I will analyze in this section.

I will also include cases of political propaganda. These cases were part of the propaganda machinery in order to create the narrative about the Serbs population as the victims. The feeling of fear towards one one's group identity, can be argued to have created a stronger sense of collective identity. This arguably were one of the factors which led to the mobilization of the Serb population within Serbian borders as well as across. All of the mentioned factors will be argued to have created the anxious atmosphere which led to the various republics breaking away from SFRY.

The second part of the analysis will include BiH's call for independence, and as a consequence, the uprise of nationalism that spread from Serbia to BiH. This section will further include the creation of the Serb Democratic Party as an opposition to a possible BiH independence as well as the establishment of Republica Srpska (RS). Much like in Serbia,

there were various Serb intellectuals who turned politicians. These politicians were in the front of constructing the Muslims in BiH as the enemy. Arguably, the verbal discourse laid the foundation for the dehumanization of the Muslim population and as a consequence paved the way for the 'victims' to feel the need to arm themselves with weaponry. Further, I will mention one of the genocidal strategies, mass rape. Even though I will not be going too much into this issue, it does however highlight the belief regarding ethnic group identity in BiH by the aggressors (which can be argued to be relevant to this dissertation). At last, I also will include some numbers and thoughts on the aftermath of the war.

5.2 After Tito

As scholar Sabrina P. Ramet (2002, p. 4) states, the story of Yugoslavia is a story of failed political cooperation. The author of the book "Balkan Babel" has an interesting comparison of what Yugoslavia wanted to be and how it all ended; she compares the nation's journey to the Biblical story of the rise and fall of the Babylon tower. This comparison symbolizes how a group of people at one point lived peacefully together, but when trying to reach for 'heaven' as the Babylon's did - God gave the people different languages so cooperation became impossible. This Biblical story can in some symbolical way be translated to what happened in Yugoslavia. Under Tito's hand, everyone cooperated and spoke the same language in terms of political agreement, but after the death of Tito, Yugoslavs started to speak different political languages.

Tito spent the last years if his life to ensure equalized form of federalism among the six republics in Yugoslavia, including two autonomous provinces in Serbia; Kosovo and Vojvodina (Worthington, 2015). Any sign of nationalism during Tito's 35 long year rule from any of the six republics was not tolerated. The importance of having a political balance between the countries was crucial in order to control and keep Yugoslavia as a united nation. This laid the foundation for the important Yugoslav motto "Brotherhood and unity". This motto appeared in many official documents, songs and stories, and its purpose was to promote inter-ethnic peace, unity and stability (Mesic, 2004 p. 246). Since Serbia throughout history had been seen as the 'strongest' state, a common perception during Yugoslavia was that Serbia had been put on the side line; "a weaker Serbia meant a stronger Yugoslavia" (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 241; Ritter, 2012/3, p. 26). The attempt of creating "symmetric feudalism" was however viewed by many Serbs as a way to diminish their power (Worthington, 2015). This view might have hold some truth. By having some sort of balance between the republics, the chance of Serbia gaining political hegemony was difficult

with provinces like Kosovo and Vojvodina in Serbia being virtually autonomous (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 241).

Following Tito's death, the power vacuum can be said to have opened the door to debates regarding oppression from the regime, and all the issues people could not freely express during his lifetime. For many historians, it is commonly debated if Tito's death only slowed down the inevitable process of conflict, or if he might have laid the foundations for them (Worthington, 2015).

5.3 Secret Serbian grievances leaked

On September 24th, 1986, a secret document written by 16 Serbian intellectuals and signed by 216 was leaked by the Serbian newspaper Vjeernje Novosti (Morus, 2007, p. 143). This document was drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science (SANU). The secret document contained a heavy body of narratives and discourses regarding present issues Serbia was facing as a republic in Yugoslavia, as well as a long list of Serbian grievances against their treatment within the Federation (Morus, 2007, p. 143; MacDonald, 2002, p. 65). One of the biggest concerns the Memorandum focused on was the 1974 Constitution, and how it put an end to Serbia's control over two of its former provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. This disrupted much of Serbia's power and prestige as the biggest nation in terms of size of territory and population (MacDonald, 2002). The Memorandum also warned about a potential genocide in Kosovo where the Serb population was a minority. Extreme measures had to be taken to prevent this from happening. One of the top securitized issues was the need for expanding Serbian territory; according the Memorandum, the consequence of not fulfilling this would be enormous (Morus, 2007, p. 143).

As previously mentioned, the death of Tito led the various groups in Yugoslavia to start speaking different political languages. It can be argued that the Memorandum had a big impact on this political shift. Even though this document can not be held accountable as the sole reason for the uprise of extreme nationalism, it did however launch a new destructive vocabulary into the public discourse (Morus, 2007, p. 143).

With the leak of the Memorandum, it can be argued that the rise of a reawakened Serbian national consciousness was awakened, and with that, a new collective national identity was on the rise. This was created through various historical narratives about the Yugoslav-Serbs as the victims throughout history, and how the past held all the answers to the present problems Serbs were facing in Yugoslavia (Morus, 2007, p. 143). As a way of socially constructing Serbs as the present oppressed victims, a scapegoat was needed in order

to make sense of the various issues that were occurring: "By proving that the the Other had been the aggressor throughout history, one could prove that history was repeating itself (…)" (MacDonald, 2002, p. 7).

With the modern politically driven usage of propaganda used by various politicians claiming ancient victimization and land-ownership, one can start to unravel the justification of the use of violence which would later turn into ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Hercegovina. (Morus, 2007). This leak can be argued to have been one of the micro factors which contributed to the reconstitution of a Serbian primary identity as the natural owners of much of the land in BiH, as well as the victims through history, but also as the heroes throughout history.

It can be argued that the Memorandum became one of the lead guiding documents which many politicians took usage of to claim political legitimacy. As Ramet (2002) states, the leak of the Memorandum was like opening Pandora's box of nationalism. The Memorandum also articulated the need for Serbs across borders within Yugoslavia to assert themselves collectively (MacDonald, 2002, p 65). This rise of national collective identity, would soon have a leader; one of the politicians who saw the use of this document as a profitable propaganda tool in order to fuel nationalism, was Slobodan Milosevic (Morus, 2007, p. 143).

5.4   Milosevic goes to Kosovo

"Long live brotherhood and unity in Yugoslavia!" (Percy, 1995, 4:52).

Although nationalism was managed to be kept buried some time after Tito's death, an ethnic tension was brewing in Kosovo in April 1987, which resulted in a hostile demonstration. This protest can be said to have symbolized the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia, because it laid the foundation for political nationalism in the years to come.

As a means to solve the ethnic tension that was brewing in Kosovo, the Serb Communist Party Leader Milosevic, was sent by Serbia's President Ivan Stambolic to act as a peacemaker (Percy, 1995). Only two years prior to this conflict, Slobodan Milosevic was an 'unknown' name within Serbian politics, but as a result of the ethnic tension in Kosovo, everyone knew this man by the end of 1987 (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 243).

The ethnic tension in Kosovo was between local Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. The root of the conflict can be found in the Serbs feeling of oppression as a minority in a virtually

autonomous state which used to belong to Serbia. While Milosevic was being diplomatic and trying to give a speech on the issues, an unknown man shouted: "We Serbs here have waited since Tito's days. The Communist Party has done nothing for us. Nothing!" (Percy, 1995, 4:36). This man was not alone with the feeling of disaffection with Milosevic's attempt to solve the ethnic tension by giving a monolog, the Serbs wanted a dialog (Percy, 1995). Therefore, a meeting the following Friday was set up. Milosevic was going to meet the demands of the Serb minority in Kosovo, and as a consequence, he had already violated the most important guiding principle of Tito's Yugoslavia (Percy, 1995). Since there is a high probability that narratives become created about out-groups in times of ethnic conflicts, one can argue that Milosevic's agreement on meeting the Serbs in Kosovo where he would listen to their grievances was also the beginning of constructing and placing Serbs in the in-group.

This meeting that took place 24th of April was attended by Milosevic himself and Azem Vllasi, President of Kosovo and leader of the Communist party in Kosovo. As Vllasi later pointed out, the meeting had a poisonous atmosphere and it consisted mainly of Serb nationalists showing and expressing their discontent with their neighbors, the Kosovo Albanians (Percy, 1995). Vllasi's statement about the atmosphere can clearly be linked to an out-group's position where they often get excluded and discriminated against. Kosovo Albanians were portrayed and categorized as the enemy, and the establishment of the Serbs as the victims managed to get a strong foothold which would become one of the leading narratives before the war.

Further, this meeting would be the start of Serbia's aspirations as a nation to right all the wrongs that was done in the past, and take control over the nations future by becoming their own authors in terms of Serbian history in the years to come. Tito was gone, and so was the will to remain 'oppressed'. Since a nation, compared to a person, has no clear identifiable birth, a possible death of a nation is never natural nor 'real' (Anderson, 2006, p. 205). Kosovo in the mind of Milosevic and other intellectuals, was therefore theirs to take back. This ethnic conflict would soon turn out to become one of the first indicators on how history and national myths would be used as strategic propaganda tools in the process of creating the Other.

5.5   Nationalism and the propaganda war

"No one will beat you again". Milosevic

At the same time as the meeting was being held, a riot between the Kosovo police and Serbs was happening. Although Milosevic was being diplomatic during the meeting, a sharp turn

within his rhetoric happened when a group of angry Serb demonstrators from the streets entered the meeting hall. Milosevic stated:

> This is your land, your houses, your fields and gardens, your memories. Surely, you will not leave your land, because life is difficult on it, because you are oppressed by injustice and humiliations. It was never characteristic of the spirit of the Serb and Montenegrin nations to halt in the face of obstacles, to demobilise when they ought to be fighting, to be demoralised when they find it hard going. You should remain here for the sake of your ancestors and of your descendants. (Pavkovic, 2000, p. 104)

This statement became a highly nationalistic response to the angry demonstrators entering the meeting room. Milosevic was appealing to the Kosovo Serbs who sat in the room by referring to their ancestors and their primordial ethnic identity. By constantly referring to what was 'theirs', he is prompting the Kosovo Serbs to mobilize and unite against the injustice and humiliations, or in other words, the Kosovo Albanians.

When Milosevic stepped outside to witness the madness, he saw Serbs being forcefully beaten by the Albanian authority. This incident was caught on tape, and although the footage did not show how the Serbs had provoked the police by throwing big rocks (Percy, 1995, 12:50; Kaufman, 2001, p. 179), it did however show Milosevic standing up for the minority and directly speaking to the Serbs, saying: "No one will beat you again" (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 37). This video was sent on Serbian channels on replay showing the communist leader taking a turn within his political ideology and standing up for Serbs in a nationalistic manner (Kafuman, 2001). By replaying this particular incident, which was taken out of context, it can be argued to have been one of the first attempts by the media to construct a *frame* where the Serbs were the victims.

By Milosevic visiting Kosovo and addressing the proclaimed oppression of the Serbian population, he had broken the crucial principle of Tito's Yugoslavia; engaging with nationalism. The statement "No one will beat you again", can be agued to have been the first nationalistic remark on several levels. Although this statement did not seem to hold any underlying meaning other than what it openly sought out to state, it could however, in the context of ethnic tension in Kosovo, be argued to have been a symbolic nationalistic statement to all Serbs as a mythological message due to the Battle of Kosovo.[9]

As I will later demonstrate, subtle references to this battle as well as direct comparisons between the past and present emerges throughout various occasions in the light

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[9] See timeline

of Milosevic and his regime's propaganda 'tour' in Serbia up until the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

5.6   The propaganda tour

After Kosovo, other demonstrations and rallies were orchestrated. Although they seemed to appeared spontaneous, they were planned and financed by Milosevic and his party (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). During the summer and fall of 1988 the rallies continued, and the force driving the demonstrations was to tell the truth about the Serbs population oppression, as they were called "Meetings of truth" (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 58). One could almost describe this as a tour, with every meeting that was held, Milosevic and his selective band of supporters was standing on a stage and giving the 'audience' a show.

Milosevic understood that the Serbs' position as a minority in Kosovo with the already preset prejudices of Albanians could easily be politically exploited in regards to his propaganda war (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). On 9th of July, 50.000 Serbs from Kosovo were gathered in Novi Sad as a part of Milosevic's tour, and as this tour continued, the number of protesters increased: 10.000 people in Vojvodina 23rd July, 100.000 in Kraljevo 22th September, 100.000 in Titograd 7th October and 200.000 in Kragujevas 8th October (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244-245).

These rallies can be said to have really started the division and mobilization amongst different ethnic groups. Since the main theme of Milosevic's tour was Serbian grievances, one can argue that the rallies were contributing to the creation of the Other, as well as operating in a way which led the masses who attended the rallies and watched them on TV to feel a sense of collective togetherness. The mobilization that was taken place was not a mobilization in terms of democracy as it was presented to be, but mobilization for nationalism and chauvinism (Ritter, 2012/3).

During all these meetings, there were regular protesters who wore national costumes and carried national symbols which no one had publicly seen since WW2, old Serbian flags were used, pictures of old Serbian national heroes and Kings, and national romantic motives from the Battle of Kosovo (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). Many of the protesters were farmers, skilled workers, teachers and low-ranking communist officials, this made the rallies seem anti-elite, making it seem all the more 'real' (Ritter, 2012/3, p. 26). The nationalistic wave was further helped by the press; daily newspapers covered the rallies and exaggerated the numbers of protesters (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). This 'tour' can help to understand how the imaginary community amongst Serbs became created.

The rallies were used as a propaganda tool in order to show how the various demonstrations was a collective sign of democratic erection of the Serb people (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 246). With the usage of symbols as previously stated, it was easy to communicate the message from the rallies in a time efficient way for people who did not attend them. With the newspapers exaggerating the numbers and publishing pictures from the rallies, the usage of national symbols, flags, and pictures were used as a tool within the propaganda machinery where symbols were used as an emotionally charged short cut to reach people across time and space.

Many Serbs viewed Tito's slogan "Brotherhood and unity" as an enforced guiding principle which only suppressed them as an ethnic group. Milosevic was however able to give them back their national identity after 50 years; they were finally able to call themselves Serbs again, and reclaim what was theirs (Silber & Little, 1997). These so called "Meetings of truth" were by the media portrayed as a bottom up phenomenon, and has later been coined as the 'anti bureaucracy revolution'.

5.7   Meetings of all meetings

A transportation company set up by Milosevic and his regime was organizing the rallies as well as transporting people to them. This was especially the case with a significant meeting held in Belgrade 19th November 1988; Tens of thousands of workers were picked up from their various provincial factories to attend, and enterprises forced their employees to go together and attend the 'Meeting of all meetings' instead of going to work (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 63; Mertus, 1999, p. 178)

At the meeting, Milosevic gave a speech at the biggest rally in his political career so far. During his speech, he again brought up the importance of Kosovo, saying; "Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia" (Judah, 2008, p. 66). By constantly promoting Kosovo as one of the main Serbian grievances to the masses meeting up at the rallies, he was trying to provoke emotions in order to fuel collective nationalism.

By this time, Milosevic was in many aspects representing the Serb population by referring to the unifying Serbian national history. The constant usage of "we" and "people" can be argued to create a strong sense of the group identification among Serbs attending the meeting, which further reconstructs their belief of an imagined community, as well as their natural right to Kosovo. By constantly repeating the importance of Kosovo and placing it at the center of Serb identification, it became the number one issue to be dealt with. Although

Milosevic at the time only had mentioned the importance of reclaiming Kosovo due to Serb population being oppressed, the SANU Memorandum as previously mentioned had predicted a potential genocide of the Serbian population. This constructed identity threat was beginning to seem very much real. When an external enemy is created, regardless of that threat being real or not, group cohesion usually does become stronger (Kecmanovic, 1996, p. 36).

 Local press wrote that over one million people attended the meeting of all meetings, and as a consequence of Milosevic's speech, a phrase was coined by the Serbian poet Milovan Vitezovic: "The people have happened" (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 58). Milosevic had also expressed his thoughts on the matter of elite power, saying that bureaucrats were the worst enemy for the people; he claimed that the elite politicians were corrupt, useless, and self-absorbed people who only cared about their own privileges in the society. (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 246). This can to some extent be argued to have created a stronger authentic feeling of togetherness of the people, as it became portrayed by the media as something that was done *by* the people *for* the people. Milosevic was in this way seen as representative of the underground suppressed voices as it was presented in the newspapers and on TV. Therefore, Milosevic used this catch-phrase for awakening national identity of the Serbian people. Kecmanovic (1996, p. 7) argues that national identity indicates a membership of a 'people', and that a *uniqueness* of that group membership is most likely to emerge.

During Milosevic's propaganda tour, it can be argued that 'Serbness' became synonyms with democracy. This might help to explain how Milosevic gained so much public support. As Mertus (1999, p. 176) concludes, Milosevic promised something for everyone. This is perhaps why he was able to appeal to so many people, even those against his nationalistic methods. The massive support Milosevic got, can also be a consequence of Yugoslavia's economy being on the edge of collapsing. As we have seen throughout history, when a nation is struggling with bad economy, and the GPA is low, a charismatic leader can in a short matter time gather masses. In addition, when the Other becomes created, as the Muslims did, discriminative aggressiveness against 'strangers' makes the bond among group members stronger (Kecmanovic, 1996, p. 36).

During this time, many political actors had started to gain mistrust from their respected citizens due to economic downfall in Yugoslavia. The various mass rallies gave hope for the future, because they were portrayed as an anti bureaucratic movement. This gave it legitimacy that some sort of social change was on the way. Communist Party leader of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, saw however the consequences at the time where he stated: "By abolishing the autonomy of both provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, Serbia would directly control three-

out of-eight votes in the Federal Presidency" - in comparison with the other republics that had one vote each. That meant turning Yugoslavia into 'Serboslavia' (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 63). Out of all the republics in Yugoslavia, Montenegro was the only loyal country to have favored Serbia through history. This support in regards of taking back Vojvodina and Kosovo, meant that Milosevic could, and later did control half of the votes in the federation. This made him the most powerful political actor in Yugoslavia since Tito (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 63).

5.8 Milosevic Back to Kosovo: Mythology and nationalism

Only two years after the Kosovo incident, an enormous mass rally was organized to highlight the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (Sell, 2002). Milosevic, the organizer, was at the site where the battle had taken place hundreds of centuries ago. His speech made the defeat of Serbia by the Ottomans seem like a historically near present event; Milosevic stated:

> Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two world wars, they liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped other to liberate themselves. The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that at one time we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated. Six centuries later, again we are in battle and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet. (Kaufman, 2001, p. 181)

Milosevic's sheer presence at attendance at Gazimestan, memorial site for the Battle of Kosovo, as a key speaker at the anniversary, can be argued to have held a lot of symbolic and nationalistic layers. The memorial site, holds a deep historical and emotional meaning in the Serb national memory as it represents the invasion of the Ottomans, as well as the demise of Serbia's golden age as a former kingdom. Since Milosevic was already starting to become a national hero in Serbia due to his handling and support of Serbs in Kosovo two years earlier, it further gave him a stronger authentic position as the leader within the national movement given the circumstances. Since the Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans in the 1300th century, it can be argued that Milosevic was using this opportunity to rekindle the old battle as a symbolic element in hopes of further recharging the already ethnic tension that had taken place.

By promoting and comparing the old battle and new conflict, Milosevic was emphasizing the similarities between the Serbs who fought against the Turks back in the 1300th century, and the ones protesting for their Serbian nationality and its survival (Petrovic, 2000, p. 170). By emphasizing the similarity between the past and present, he was also underlying the possible outcome of what would happen if Serbs did not stand up for

themselves in a time where their identity was threatened. Becoming submerged by another ethnic group again, was not an option. The comparison can further be understood as a way to reshape already 'installed' perceptions and fears. As Milosevic's speech includes a form for story telling, it can be argued that he was trying to cultivate how people viewed their own social reality. By stating that armed battles were not excluded, he was implying that the world had become a dangerous place for Serb. The suggested categorization of the Serbs as the victims, can further help to understand how mobilization started to develop. When a group of people become subjected to this kind of propaganda, they might make irrational choices based on emotions and fear of the Other.[10]

At the memorial site where the speech took place, there is a monument designed by Aleksandar Deroko, a famous Serbian architect, professor as well as a former member of SANU ("Aleksandar", n.d.). On the monument, there is an inscription carved out which states the following:

> Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth
> And of Serb blood and heritage
> And comes not to the Battle of Kosovo,
> May he never have the progeny his heart desires!
> Neither son nor daughter
> May nothing grow that his hand sows!
> Neither dark wine nor white wheat
> And let him be cursed from all ages to all ages! (Knaus & Warrander, 2017, p. 153)

This inscription reflects the strong ties Serbs have with Kosovo, their national heritage and the importance of the memorial site. The strong national identity among Serbs throughout history became prior to the war advocated in the light of nationalism and propaganda. Regardless of birth within Serbian borders, a belief of shared togetherness despite geographical distances can be argued to have been one of the factors which contributed to the mobilization of Serbs across borders. In a time of ethnic tension, it can be argued that Milosevic understood how to use his position in terms of further creating a Serbian 'imagined community'. The speech at Gazimestan paved the way for further Serbian grievances, and arguably helped to create a stronger feeling of group identity. It portrayed Serbs as the heroes and victims through history.

When political agents, or the political elite raise ethnic grievances, stages rallies, debates, and make policy changes, they change and affect how people at large interpret who

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[10] Gazimestan speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4a5ct7vVcgk

they are, what their economic condition is and why, who to trust and fear, and which leaders to follow (Maksic, 2017, p. 4). Feelings of being part of a certain ethnic group, becomes thus stronger as the elites use categorization in order to create victims, heroes and scapegoats.

The 'meetings of truth' got a lot of media publicity, and with time, various newspapers chose to print 'horror stories' regarding Serbian oppression and discrimination in Kosovo; Serbian girls were being raped, houses were burned to the ground, Serbian children harassed on their way to school, orthodox churches destroyed and other similar stories regarding maltreatment of Serbs (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). Regardless of whether these horror stories were true or not, Milosevic arguably used and played on this emotional platform to hit Serbs' patriotic nerve for his political interests (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 244). When an imagined ethno-national community is perceived to be under threat, or the urge to revive an ethnic nation back to its golden age becomes securitized, people internalize or intensify the politically advocated ethnic understanding of themselves and the society they live in (Maksic, 2017, p. 4).

Imagined community is therefore shaped by the help of the capitalistic newspaper, where mass media and TV helps to shape a sense of belonging and national identity (Anderson, 2006). Propaganda and stigmatizing identity differences escalated in the late 1980's in the Serbian media; certain individuals used their political power in order to use the mass media as propaganda tools to further strengthen their cause (Brosse, 2003, p. 9). Usage and control over the media became a weapon to many of the politicians who came to power after Tito (Brosse, 2003, p. 9). Nenad Pejic, a former TV program controller in the early 1990's in Sarajevo, was one of the media professionals who witnessed the usage of the nationalist political propaganda, in retrospect he commented that: "Without the media, and especially without television, war in the former Yugoslavia is inconceivable" (Brosse, 2003, p. 5). This statement does correlate with the Cultivation theory, as Moshafara (2015, p. 32) argues: "TV can, through what it presents of stereotypical and national images of a group or people, create a mental image in the mind of the individual (view) about "the other"". It can be argued that the usage of media became a tool which paved the way for nationalism and chauvinistic attitudes to rise. The creation of the Other was not only created through speeches, but also through intense media battles of hateful propaganda which reported biased and untrue information (Brosse, 2003, p. 6-7).

5.9   Nationalism and Mass Media

After the Second World war, the common saying 'never again' was echoed trough especially Europe. The art of propaganda in the late 1930's and early 1940's made Jews became subjected to ethnic cleansing and Genocide. As time went by, many Europeans believed that the same atrocities would never happened again. And although the 1980's and 1990's in Europe can be described as a modern age, characteristics of nationalism and chauvinism like fear and hatred of the Other triumphed once again. The once again created narrative through the propaganda machinery about a targeted ethnic group, would again turn into a blood bath.

   In order to make sense of how nationalism and chauvinism could ever take such a strong foothold in the modern age, one must not forget that nationalism and nations also inspire love, often profoundly self-sacrificing love (Anderson, 2006, p. 141). This love however, was not allowed expression under Tito as he managed to repress nationalist bitterness by forbidding debates and publications about the past, present nor future (Ritter, 2012/3). The 1974 constitution stated that: "No one may use the freedoms, and rights [...] to disrupt the foundations of the socialist self-management, democratic order [...] violate the freedoms and rights of man [...] stir up national, racial or religious hatred or intolerance" (Somerville, 2012, p. 71). These laws were however not being upheld by the mass media nor many of the leading politicians as I have and will further demonstrate. The plot twist however, can be found in the mutually beneficial relationship between the nationalistic politicians (also the law-makers) and people within the media industry.

   Many intellectuals had during Tito's lifetime been silenced for having critical opinion on Serbia's position in Yugoslavia. This changed with Milosevic. As a consequence, a bond between the nationalistic intellectual voices and Milosevic grew stronger because they all gained something from the mutual admiration (Sell, 2002). Many of the critical intellectual voices of Serbia did not get the opportunity to get published. The Milosevic administration would give them a chance of letting their voices be heard. As Even Milovan Djilas, the most famous Communist dissidents in Yugoslavia stated in the newsweekly NIN: "Under Milosevic I got the possibility of publishing my books" (Sell, 2002). The control over the Serbian media let Milosevic therefore to uphold a powerful position where he could be the chief deciding who and what causes gets more attention on the TV, radio and newspapers.

   Lecheler and Vreese (2012) argues that the elite who holds the power in a given state, has the opportunity to create a frame from which within the audience gets its information and knowledge about present issues from. This affects the viewers of their social reality, because

the reality they are perhaps hearing or seeing might be based on a socially constructed and politically charged motives.

Being able to publish critical thoughts on Serbia's position and the future of the state was therefore in the highest interest of Serb nationalist intellectuals, who supplied the verbal ammunition for the ethnic warfare that Milosevic's Serbia waged against Yugoslavia's other republics: They filled pages of the Serbian media with articles on the ''blank spots'' in Serbian history that were ignored by the communists. Most of which involved accusations of injustice or mistreatment of Serbs by other ethnic groups (Sell, 2002, p. 111). The SANU Memorandum had set its mark on the future in terms of Serbian intellectuals and Serbian culture at large, and as a consequence, narratives and fear of the non-Serb often appeared in the popular press (Morus, 2007, p. 154).

5.10   Cases of Propaganda

By the 1990's, Serbian television had sent out a campaign where they accused Kosovo Albanians of "poisoning wells and slitting the throats of children"; The Serbian newspaper *Politika* often followed the accusations on TV with even more unverified horror stories of Serb oppression (Morus, 2007, p. 154). This was one of many fictive stories which got covered on TV and in popular newspapers. As a consequence, it can be argued that these stories set the 'frame' in order to create a socially constructed reality for Serbs. Their reality was portrayed as being victims of hate crimes. This propaganda can be argued to have fueled the ethnic hatred of the Other in order to mobilize Serbs across borders.

On 20th November 1991, a news broke out about a horrific crime that had taken place in Croatia against Serb civilians (Alic, 2018). According to a Serbian Reuters correspondent, who spoke in graphic detail; 41 Serbian children in the age between five and seven were massacred in a little village near a Croatian town called Vukovar. The correspondent who first told the story claimed that he saw at least 40 bodies of children in a school basement where the killing supposedly had happened (Brosse, 2003; Alic, 2018). The photos that were taken did however not show any signs of children, but dead adults (Somerville, 2012, p. 82).

The Serbian media broadcasted this alleged crime the same night, Serbian National Television (RTS) aired the report as an all-nigh program, including broadcasting in on the radio (Alic, 2018; Somerville, 2012). It was also on the front page of various newspapers the following day in Serbia (Brosse, 2003, p. 6-7). In addition, the broadcast included statements from several other witnesses, as well as an RTS journalist who questioned a young Croat held by Serb paramilitary forces, pressuring him to admit to the murders (Alic, 2018). Not long

after the alleged crime, it was confirmed that the information was false and witnesses changed their statements (Alic, 2018). The damage was however done. The substantial media coverage of this alleged crime had been aired, and consequently many Serbs joined the paramilitary groups (Alic, 2018).

Short after the alleged crime in Croatia, another report got aired on TV Belgrade by Risto Djogo, who was known as the voice of Radovan Karadzic's regime; according to the Serb patrol who was on location in Sarajevo; the besieged Muslims of Sarajevo were feeding Serbian children to the municipal zoo's starving animals (Video in footnote) [11] (Cigar, 1995; Bouris, 2007; Brosse, 2003). The fictitious piece of news was a Serb propaganda strategy in order to feed the perception of in- and out-group and us vs them. Although fictive, these stories can be said to be prime examples of how propaganda can be used as a way to shape opinions and mobilize masses as a reaction due to the fear of the Other. Despite the video linked in the footnote does not show any real footage of the alleged crime happening, the reporter did state: "The Muslim extremists have come up with the world's most horrible way of torturing people. Last night, they threw Serb children to the lions in the local Zoo" (Brosse, 2003). Despite no clear footage of the crime, it did however manage to fulfill its propaganda purpose.

According to scholar Erica Bouris (2007, p. 95), numerous interviews with Serb leaders, soldiers and civilian had the same scripted answer in regards to aggression towards Muslim: "Muslims want to annihilate Serbs" or "Muslims are raping and killing our children". Former General Secretary of European Stability Initiative (ESI) and journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer interviewed a Serbian soldier trying to figure out why he participated in rape and murder of Muslims. His reply can be seen as a direct consequence of the hate propaganda set out by the Serbian media, he stated:

> Yes, I believed it. I had been told that in Sarajevo terrible things are going on. That they have prisons and whorehouses. That they rape little girls from five to seven years. That they throw babies and women to the lions in the Sarajevo zoo. (Stiglmayer, 1994, p. 151)

Through interviews, Stiglmayer tried to examine the effect propaganda had on Serbian soldiers. She questioned this particular Serbian soldier if he really believed the propaganda

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[11] RTS Video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&hl=enGB&v=LzUqQxNb8qw&e+%28accessed%3A+18.01.2011%29.=

being sold, or if he had the ability to think for himself (Stiglmayer, 1994). In order to understand how many Serbs mobilized as a consequence of the propaganda machinery, one must not forget that propaganda machinery exploits emotions like anger and fear. This can make a rational individual take decisions based on emotions rather than rationality (O'Shaughnessy, 2004). As Kecmanociv (1996) states; nationalist manifestations aim in particular to recall injustice and crime committed by people of another nationality. Although these cases were based on fictive injustice, they did serve their propaganda purpose; mobilization of Serbs in the name of democracy and construction of the Muslim population as the Other, started to spread across borders.

6

Analysis Part 2

6.1   Bosniak: "The fallen hero"

Scholar Carmichael argues that in European thought and political practice Christian intolerance of other religions led to violence against and persecution of non Christian religious groups, especially Muslims and Jews (Carmichael, 2003, p. 3). Historically, Muslims in the Balkans were viewed as a kind of 'ethnic fifth column', leftover from a long gone past, something that could not be integrated into the future of national states. (Carmichael, 2003, p. 21).

As Jovan Cvijic, a well-known Serbian geographer and sociologist from the early 1900th stated; "Slav Muslims were traditionally seen by Orthodox Serbs as 'neither Serbs, nor Turks, neither water nor wine, but odious renegades' (Carmichael, 2003, p. 21). This was however only one of many descriptions of how Muslims in the Balkans were described throughout history, but as Charmichael (2003, p. 21) states, extreme nationalist ideas are highly pervasive because they are based on the essence of differences between groups of people. This Othering of a group of people was for the Muslims in the Balkans historically done regularly. Ever since the Ottomans came to the area, there has been an ongoing struggle to define who the Muslims are. On the contrary of Cvijic's descriptions where Slav Muslims are neither or, Bosnian Muslims have been subjected to the narrative of *actually* being either Serbian or Croatian. Muslim identity is hence not 'real', since it was just a consequence of the Ottomans invasion, and therefore it should not be taken seriously.

There have been various debates regarding Bosnia & Hercegovina in terms of righteous ownership of the land itself, but also regarding of the people inhabiting the country. The three main group of people living in the country Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. A consequence for the Muslim population in Bosnia, was not not having a greater 'Motherland' to get support from. Neighboring countries such as Serbia and Croatia have throughout history seen themselves as the rightful owners of BiH due to Serbian and Croatian population inside BiH borders (MacDonald, 2002).

It can be argued that both Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman (President of Croatia at the time) dreamed about expanding their homelands borders and viewed their dream as a natural

right due to the amount of 'ethnic' Serbs and Croats living outside their country of origin. Muslims in Bosnia was therefore seen as a primary threat to the creation of larger national states. In 1991, Milosevic and Tudjman carved up Bosnia on paper based on where most of Croats and Serbs were living: victimization and persecution throughout Balkan history was at the center of legitimating the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Armatta 2005; MacDonald, 2002, p. 220-2021).

Myths, nationalism and propaganda lead to imaginary communities being created across borders, where national identity and sense of belonging based on religious heritage became one of the most important factors in terms of who actually had the legal right to BiH. In the case of Bosnian Muslims, one could look at three specific themes that captures the narrative made up about the group:

1. Firstly, the idea of Muslims as either ethnic Croats or Serbs; and Muslims nationalism as invented or constructed;
2. Secondly, the notion that Bosnia-Hercegovina had historically been either Serbian or Croatian;
3. Thirdly, that claims to Muslim national identity and autonomy concealed an Islamic conspiracy to take over Europe. (MacDonald, 2002, p. 221)

I will not be going too much into the third theme, but there is an importance to mention the conspiracy since it was however a narrative made to make up the Other. As I wrote earlier in terms of the first and second narrative, there were two issues regarding BiH; the land, and the people. Bosnian Muslims were historically and logically not Muslims, the conversion to Islam was as we know a forced conversion as a consequence of Ottomans quest for expansion and power. Therefore, a Bosnian Muslim, was arguably prior the invasion either under the Orthodox or Catholic faith. One could therefore argue that the Muslim population became a part of the in- and out group at the same time because of the narrative. In other words, because of the Islamic conversion, Serbian and Croatians leaders both argued that Muslims were fallen members of their own nation group, but at the same time, a whole other distinctive group of people that did not belong anywhere (MacDonald, 2002, p. 222).

According to the process of Othering, identities becomes established through oppositions and vilification of the other (Gabriel, 2012), by constructing Serbian or identity through opposition of the fallen Muslim members, a creation of the 'real' and rightful member of BiH became constructed, thus, warfare legitimized. This creation of the Other, makes construction of the Muslim identity, although socially constructed, as the enemy, very real in its consequences as I will later demonstrate.

Another way to clarify the first theme, can be through saying that Bosnian Muslims was forced to abandoned their true identity after Ottoman invasion, therefore; Military leaders argued that they were simply 'liberating' parts of their ethnic homeland that had long been submerged under foreign rule, while 'freeing' Muslims from their artificial attachments (MacDonald, 2002, p. 222).

The 'naturalness' of Serbian territorial claims was supported over the artificial and socially constructed nature of the Muslim identity since the Muslims lacked a 'real' homogenous homeland (MacDonald, 2002). The myth of Muslim abandonment of their 'true' identity was used as a propaganda tool by representing Muslims as the historical falling heroes of both the Serbs and Croatian nations. With the fall of Yugoslavia, a golden opportunity became presented to right all the wrongs that had happened throughout history by eliminating 'fake' nationals and restoring rightful ownership of land to the 'true' and natural owners (MacDonald, 2002, p. 222).

6.2   Bosnia-Hercegovina: No man's land

The Othering of Muslims through speeches and fictive stories which were aired on TV and printed in newspapers, can help to understand how imaginary communities became created in the light of nationalism. These various groups or communities would later voice their collective identity when the question of Bosnian independence was debated in the parliament in 1991. Based on my analysis so far, one can argue that the various ethnic groups became politically produced by a certain elite. The various ethnic identities became based on the political interests from actors in position to affect people (Maksic, 2017). Bosnia was however different than its neighboring countries, making it more fragile for conflict between groups in the heat of nationalism. The country can almost be described as a miniature version of Yugoslavia itself, due to its distinctive mix of different 'ethnic' groups. Author Ivo Andric, described it best in his Nobel prize winning novel "Bridge between East and West" where he wrote:

> Whoever spends a night in Sarajevo awake in his bed, can hear the voices of the Sarajevo night. The clock on the Catholic cathedral chimes heavily and assuredly: two in the morning. More than a minute passes (75 seconds to be exact, I counted) and only then does the clock from the Orthodox church strike with a somewhat weaker but penetrating sound, chiming out *its* two in the morning. A little later the clock tower at the Bey's Mosque sounds, with a muffled, distant voice, and it strikes eleven o'clock, eleven ghostly Turkish hours, according to the calculations of remote, alien ends of the earth! The Jews do not have their own bell to chime, but God alone knows what time it is for them, according to both Sephardic and Ashkenazy reckoning. So, even at night, while everything sleeps, in the chiming of the empty hours in the dead of the

night, that difference keeps vigil which divides these sleeping people who, when they are awake, rejoice and grieve, receive guests and fast according to four different hostile calendars, and send all their desires and prayers towards one sky in four different liturgical languages. And this different is always, sometimes visibly and openly, sometimes imperceptibly and covertly, similar to hatred, often completely identical to it. A man's thoughts on Bosnia's distinctive culture. (Hawkesworth, 1984, p. 96)

Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia all became independent in 1991, arguably as a consequence of Serbian nationalism. Now, only Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina was left in SFRY. Since the population in Montenegro was Christian orthodox in majority, they felt a stronger connection to Serbia than any of the other republics, thus, not declaring independence in this downfall period. BiH however, found themselves in a new and fragile situation due to the union resolution. In contrast to the three other countries gaining independence, Andric's passage above describes Bosnia's vulnerability at it best.

Bosnia, unlike many of its neighboring countries, had the highest mix of people with different religious heritage, making their possibility to depart from the remaining Yugoslavia more complex. The three choices that became evident, were: 1. Merging with Serbia and Montenegro in a 'third' Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable to the Muslims and Croats (since they knew how Milosevic treated his minorities), 2. Division; this choice would have been favorable for Serbia and Croatia, but unactable to the Muslims, or 3. Independence, as the most of the republics had chosen (Mønnesland, 2006, p. 287-288).

As the Serbs in Kosovo gained a lot of support from Serbs in Serbia, the Serbs in Bosnia was also starting to mobilize themselves during the political discourse of possible independence. The massive reawakening of Serbian primary identity started to cross borders, and despite distances, the yearning and connection for the 'homeland' (real or imagined), began to create distances between the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina during the downfall of Yugoslavia.

Early summer of 1990, Serbian Democratic Party (SDS BiH) emerged as a collective agent, it became a political homogenization and armed mobilization of Bosnia's ethnic Serbs (Maksic, 2017, p. 5). Although two other parties were created at the same time representing the other ethnic identity groups, SDA (Muslim ethno-national Party for Democratic Action) and (HDZ BiH) the Bosnian wing of Croatian Democratic Community, these two last parties were the only ones who wanted independence for Bosnia-Hercegovina (Maksic, 2017, p. 5). SDS on the other hand, wanted Bosnia to stay in what was left or Yugoslavia or simply wanting Bosnia divided into ethnic territories; "These positions were, the parties claimed, the

wills of their respective nations" (Maksic, 2017, p. 5). By having their own agenda, with both political and physical separation, SDS showed similar nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes among Serbs in Bosnia as it did with the Serbs in Kosovo.

One of lead political actors who contributed to the construction of the Other in BiH, was Radovan Karadzic. Karadzic was one of the founding members of the SDS BiH in 1990. He was also the party's President. As the President, he was the most powerful official in the party, thus, making him the leader in terms of the party's realizations of the goals they set out for themselves ("The Prosecutor", n.d.). Like Milosevic in Serbia, Karadzic organized many public meetings throughout the 1990's where thousands of Serbs attended each meeting (Morus, 2007, p 158). With his mentor, Jovan Raskovic, a former member of SANU, psychiatrist and university professor in Zagreb and Ljubljana, they instilled fear within the Bosnian Serb community by warning attendees that a genocide was going to happen amongst the Serbs by the fundamentalist Bosnian Muslims. These two men, as psychiatrists, used their authority in order to legitimize their proclaimed views on a dangerous Muslim mentality (Morus, 2007, p. 158). Karadzic, like many other Serbian leaders, viewed Muslims and Islam as an extreme danger that had to be eliminated, his role in this 'fight' was in world historic proportions (MacDonald, 2002, p. 234). On October 14th 1991, during a debate in the Bosnian Parliament regarding independence, Karadzic used this opportunity to express his thoughts on the matter, where he stated:

> Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war... How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Hercegovina? (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 78)

This statement from the SDS leader was hard to ignore. Leader of SDA, Alija Izetbegovic, responded to the horrendous threat by stating: "His manner and his messages perhaps explain why others also refuse to stay in such a Yugoslavia. Nobody wants the kind of Yugoslavia that Mr. Karadzic wants any more, no one except perhaps the Serbian people" (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 78). Four months after the debate in the Parliament, a referendum was held in February 1992 regarding Bosnia's future (Holm-Hansen, 2018). Many of the leading Serbian politicians encouraged Bosnian Serbs to boycott the referendum, Karadzic stated that it was a Serbian duty to boycott the referendum (Ramet, 2002, p. 206). Bosnian Independence and detachment from the two remaining republics in Yugoslavia won however by majority (Holm-Hansen, 2018). By this time, it was clear that the different ethnic groups did not share

the same goal for BiH's future. The collective group identity of Yugoslavs was beginning to be a thing of the past as the nationalist political elite emerged.

6.3   Identity in BiH: Similarities and differences

For many non-Balkan countries, racial ethnicity might be easier in general to identify, but in the Balkans, racial ethnicity is for the most part assumed to be synonymous with religious difference, or ethnic identity being synonymous with national boundaries (Boose, 2002, p. 76). In other words, being a 'Serb' for instance, entails belonging to the Orthodox faith, this is regardless if he or she are religiously active or if their ancestors have been. The same applies to 'Bosnian' Serbs, regardless if they and their ancestors have only geographically lived in Bosnia (Boose, 2002, p. 76). Therefore, Bosnian 'Serbs' living in Bosnia & Hercegovina call themselves Serbs and feel a connection to Serbia, the same goes to Bosnian Croats (Roman Catholics) and their sense of belonging to Croatia. When Bosnia declared and got international recognition as an independent country, many Bosnian Serbs loudly expressed discrimination and that the area they lived in should unite with Serbia; the reality however, was that "(…) all three of these peoples actually belong to exactly the same racial and linguistic group, southern Slavs. Logically speaking, the only difference among them is a strictly religious one (Boose, 2002, p. 76).

The Serbian epic culture was therefore a radical denial of its connection to the ones they wanted to ethnic cleanse, the extreme collective cultural denial, and struggle to retain or remain a racial purity/homogeneous group turned into a euphoric and nationalistic paranoia that only could be dealt with by ethnically cleansing a country where Serbs were living with non Serbs. Although this narrative was made, in reality, the victim (Bosniaks) were ancestrally identical to the aggressors and cleaners (Boose, 2002, p. 76).

Historically speaking, the same forced religious conversion that happened in the Balkans when Slavs had to choose between the sward or the Christian faith in the 700th century, can be compared the the Ottomans invasion in the late 1400th century. The only difference is that the ones who converted to Islam under the Ottomans were seen as "racial betrayal" and therefore the 'newly' concerted Muslim Slavs became "Turks", thus not *real'* Slavs (Boose, 2002).

6.4   Intellectuals turned politicians: Chauvinism and propaganda

Ever since the SANU Memorandum got leaked in 1986 (Silber & Little, 1997), much of the knowledge transfer from the elite to the audience was rooted in a document written by academic intellectuals, giving it legitimacy as the source which holds the truth. As Tito managed to repress nationalist hostilities by forbidding debates about the past (Ritter, 2012/3, p. 26), Milosevic was seen as a liberating hero for doing the opposite. By taking control over the mass media, Milosevic gave many intellectuals the opportunity to freely express themselves in a manner they would not have been able to do years prior to his political career.

Many of the intellectuals took advantage and contributed to Milosevic's nationalistic wave, these individuals would soon turn out to become leading politicians within the various republics. Three of the leading Bosnian-Serb intellectuals turned politicians in Bosnia-Hercegovina were; scientist Biljana Plavsic, psychiatrist Radovan Karadzic and lawyer Vojuslav Seslj.

Dr. Biljana Plavsic was a biologist specializing in genetics, with a well respected career as a professor at the University of Sarajevo (Morus, 2007, 156). Although described as an intellectual not being associated with nationalism until 1986, her rank within the political latter would soon escalate due to her participation in creation of the Other, Bosnian Muslims prior to the war. According to award winning journalist Tom Gjelten, Plavsic's rhetoric's within the public sphere, was used as doctrines by many of the Bosnian Serb nationalists (Morus, 2007, 156). Due to Plavsic's occupation as scientist, her statements, accusations and arguments regarding Muslims was perceived as legitimate facts due to her occupation. Her position against Muslims in Bosnia were however highly radical, but this did not stop her nor the trust the Serbs in BiH gave her when she became one out of two Vice-presidents of Republica Srpska (RS) under Karadzic. Like much of the Memorandum's narratives about Serbs as the victims throughout history, especially due to the 1974 Constitution, Plavsic targeted Muslims as the core reason for Serbia's subjugation (Morus, 2007). Taking a step further within the creation of the Other, which can not be described in any other way than highly chauvinistic, her views on Muslims a geneticist, were nothing short of racist and dehumanizing. Plavsic claimed that Muslims were:

> (…) descended from "genetically deformed" Serbs who converted to Islam and whose deformity was progressively worsened as it passed through subsequent generations: "And now, of course, with each successive generation this gene simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse, it simply expresses itself and dictates their style of thinking and behaving, which is rooted in their genes.... (Wilmer, 2002, p. 2012)

Calling Muslims genetically deformed Serbs is highly dehumanizing. Within the ten steps of genocide, stage 'dehumanization' suggests how classification and denial of others humanity is the step that permits killing people with impunity (Stanton, 1993). In regards to the statement about how each Muslim generation being worse than the ones before, she suggested that things would only get worse, and therefor implied that there needed to be some sort of intervention in order to protect Serbs. This is very similar to the Memorandum's argument about how a possible genocide of Serbs would take place in Kosovo if not stopped by extreme measurements. As Milosevic and his regime's propaganda tour had symbolized righting all the wrongs by creating and giving rebirth to a new collective Serbian identity, it can be argued that Plavsic was also hoping that her rhetoric's would lead Serbs in in the right path by confronting their enemy, and fulfilling Serbian rights in regards to the land where the 'genetically deformed Serbs' were living. In other words, the Serbs had to unite in order to take back their land, they had to cleanse the land of the Other; and only then, could the Serbs become pure again and regain their rightful place of strength and dignity in the world (Morus, 2007, p. 158). In addition, she demonized Muslims in the Serbian newspaper *Borba* in 1993, where she referred to the fundamentalist threat deeply rooted in the Muslim 'Race', she stated:

> Serbs in Bosnia, particularly in border areas, have developed a keen ability to sense danger to the whole nation and have developed a defense mechanism. In my family they used to say that Serbs in Bosnia were much better than Serbs in Serbia...and remember, this defense mechanism was not created through a short period of time; it takes decades, centuries.... I'm a biologist and I know: most capable of adapting and surviving are those species that live close to other species from whom they are endangered. (Wilmer, 2002, p. 2012)

In this statement, she used her position as a scientist to make clear that her observations were legitimate. She further utilized her expertise within the DNA-field to explain how Serbs living with or next to Muslims in Bosnia developed a sense of defense mechanism as a consequence of the Bosnian Muslims being a dangerous species. Again, Plavsic dehumanized this group of people and framed them as dangerous. Claiming that evolution equipped Serbs with heightened senses in order to locate danger, and thus making them biologically advanced to survival, is highly Othering. She further considered the Serb population across borders as people inborn with dignity, whereas Muslims as impulsive, sadistic, and inherently threatening (Morus, 2007, p. 157). The need for ethnic cleansing of the 'Islamicized' Serbs' in order to give 'real' Serbs a life in freedom, would according to Plavsic, only be a "natural phenomenon" (Mann, 2005, p. 389). These various qualities that Plavsic claimed that

Muslims inhabited on the basis of of their otherness and race, can surely be argued to have been nothing short of pure abuse her position as a biologist. She used her occupation and position to further her ideological and political cause in order to create a paranoia amongst the Serb population in BiH. Plavsic was on the basis of many of her statements and arguments regarding the Muslim 'race' spreading hateful propaganda.

6.5   Islam as a legitimate threat

As many Serb nationalists view Bosnian Muslims as fallen heroes, or as 'Islamicized Serbs' as warlord Vojislav Seselj claimed, Muslim identity was seen as a major wrong that hat to be changed by the true heroes through history who had not been conquered in terms of their true identity: "Serbs were 'only' coming back to free their own ethnic brothers from centuries of misguided loyalty" (MacDonald, 2002, p. 226). Therefore, by either converting 'ethnic Serbs' from Islam to Orthodoxy or killing the once who refused, was seen as a descent opportunity for Muslims to abandon their constructed and oppressed identity and thereby could start to embrace their 'natural' ethnicity (MacDonald, 2002). Karadzic had through a domestic radio broadcast urged Bosnian Muslims to abandon Islam, where he resonated that the well education and sensible Muslims should once again return to Christianity and react against the fundamentalism and the introduction of militant Islam in Bosnia (MacDonald, 2002, p. 226). Karadzic had also stated that: "Serbs here are ready for war. If someone forces them to live as a national minority, they are ready for war" (Mann, 2005, p. 389). 'Liberation' of Bosnian Muslims was going to happened, and as Plavsic claimed, it would only be a 'natural phenomena.

The wave of nationalism turned into chauvinism was highly intellectual, the Memorandum was used a solid platform from which many people in various occupations used as a foundation in making 'their' case legitimate. Prior to the war, a lot of novels were also written which dealt with the issue of Islam and Bosnian Muslims. One of these was *The Ascension* by Bosnian Serb intellectual turned politician, Vojislav Lubarda in 1990. The novel took point of departure after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 by the Bosnian Serb student Gavrilo Princip. This novel, like many of the other nationalist arguments by the Serb elite, focused on the Serb nobility and heroism, always willing to fight for the sake of others. This was in contrast to the Other, the Muslims who only posed an internal threat.

Islam was seen as a legitimate threat, not only to Serbs living in Bosnia, but also as a threat to the rest of Europe according to many elite politicians (Cigar, 1995; MacDonald,

2002). Karadzic even went further by stating that because of the Muslims in Bosnia, the country would become the springboard for Muslims from other Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey; where Muslims from these countries would strategically use Bosnia as an entry ticket to take over Europe (Cigar, 1995, p. 100).

This hypothesis about Muslim potential dominance was further utilized in the propaganda machinery to showcase Serbian heroism throughout history, not only making them defenders in the South-East, but also defenders of Europe and its civilization: "Serbian leaders enjoyed portraying themselves as self-sacrificing warriors, waging war in Bosnia in order to defend the West against a new Ottoman invasion" (MacDonald, 2002, p. 234).

6.6   Preparation of 'self protection'

As rhetoric's was used by various politicians in order to install fear onto the Serbian population in BiH, so was the distribution of SALW (small arms and light weapons) by Serb radicals. Radicals abused the fear of the Other by distributing arms in order for the Serbs to protect themselves in case of the proclaimed genocide amongst Serbs would occur. Armed mobilization of the Serb population in BiH did not only happen due to civilians actively seeking SALW's for self protection as a consequence of the hateful propaganda. Many Bosnian Serbs were targeted by radicals on the streets who gave away SALW. However, trying to distribute guns versus people actually taking one are two different things. There are however many possible explanations to why civilian Serbs in Bosnia chose to take a gun if offered:

> (…) nationalism, the delight of owning a modern weapon, the feeling of power it conferred, fear of not being a good Serb or a real man if one refused. But having accepted a gun, one might find it difficult to refuse to use it. (Mann, 2005, p. 389)

A civilian Bosnian Serb in Sarajevo described his encounter with the distribution of guns, where he stated:

> I'm a pacifist basically. I knew there was going to be a war but I don't want to admit it to myself. Coming home from a cafe I was stopped by SDS people I knew… They said "We've all got to take up arms or we'll all disappear from here, it's 80% Muslim. We were much more afraid than they were. (Mann, 2005, p. 389)

As these radicals were distributing weapons based on who they knew were Serbs, they were organizing and preparing the Serb population. Organizing this kind of mobilization can be argued to encompass step 5. *Organization*, 6. *Polarization* and step 7. *Preparation* within the

ten steps of genocide process.

6.7   Ethnic cleansing and mythology

As I have analyzed; speeches, statements, nationalism and hateful propaganda managed to cross borders from Serbia into Bosnia-Hercegovina. The collective rise of national identity and mobilization would soon go from verbal discrimination to physical acts of violence. One way to look study and analyze ethnic cleansing is to look at the impact and consequences of nationalism. For the Balkans, it also means looking at the downfall of Yugoslavia, struggle for independence and sovereign power, and deconstruction of existing cultures and communities (Carmichael, 2003, p. 1). According to Hague Tribunal, ethnic cleansing can be described or defined as:

> A practice which means you act in such a way that, in a given territory, the members of a given ethnic group are eliminated, with the aim that the territory be 'ethnically pure', in other words that it would contain only members of the ethnic group that took the initiative of cleansing the territory. (Carmichael, 2003, p. 2)

One of cleansing strategies was systematic rape of Bosnian Muslim women in rape camps. The rape camps in Bosnia were planned by Serbs as an instrument of genocide design. This 'strategic' tool of genocide and ethnic cleansing, made rape become part of a long-term goal to undermine ethnic mixing between people which was encouraged under Tito where people started to refer themselves as Yugoslavs instead of Serbs, Croats and so forth (Boose, 2002, p. 74). One could argue that there was a need to reestablish the old and forgotten national identities. The collective identity as Yugoslavs was being replaced as a consequence of the categorization and creation of the Other.

The Serb army also forced civilian Bosnian Serbs to witnesses and participate in raping and murdering their Muslim friends with a strategic motive behind. It made the bonds between former friends impossible, thus wanting to live segregated, as well as making the Bosnian Serbs who observed these atrocities witnesses (making the risk of them reporting the various war crimes low) (Boose, 2002, p. 74). It can be argued that this was a strategic operation which would make sure that the separation between Serbs and Muslims would stay intact in the future, and that their former collective group identity as Yugoslavs would never return.

These brutally planned war crimes can also be seen as a consequence of the repetitive notion that the Serb nation was threatened in terms of their population, therefor mass rape and forced impregnation of Bosniak women was seen as a procreative benefit (Whisnant, 2017;

Boose, 2002). Becoming forcefully impregnated by "Serb seed" meant that they would consequently be carrying a "Serb baby". Allen (1996) compares the genocidal rape to what she coined 'biological warfare'. If rape in this context had biological motives, the baby would have been no less Muslim nor Serbian because of these groups identical ancestrally as previously mentioned. As Boose (2002, p. 75) argues: this fundamental irrationality defines the chief cultural fiction of the Balkans: the fiction of difference.

6.8   Pre Conclusion

The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina lasted from April 1992 to November 1995. It was the biggest armed conflict in Europe after Second World War. Conventional numbers hold that between 200,000 to 250,000 people perished during the course of the war (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010, p. 20). According to the UN prosecutor's office at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, the death statistics are 110,000, where 65% of these were Bosnian Muslims ("Bosnia War", 2007). The worst atrocity of the war was the massacre in Srebrenica, where 8,000 men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serb forces. In the attempt to categorize the Srebrenica massacre as a genocide, it was stated by the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) Appeals Chamber that:

> By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity. (United Nations, 2004)

In 2007 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the killings in Srebrenica was a genocide (Stabell, 2007). Serbia's National assembly however struggled to condemn the genocide three years later. Both Serbia's population and politicians were after the ruling deeply divided as to calling it a genocide ("Serbia fortsatt splittet", 2010). Many of the critics of the genocide is the former and last President of FRJ Vojislav Kostunica (2000-2003), (Carmichael, 2003, p, 108) as well as the first FRJ president Dobrica Cosic (1992-1993) ("Serbia fortsatt splittet", 2010).

As the ten step of the genocide process highlights: "Every genocide is followed by denial. The mass graves are dug up and hidden". The process of locating the various mass graves and identifying the victims has been an ongoing process after the genocide. In 1995, Bosnian Serb force undertook to hide traces of the crimes - by using tractors and backhoes,

mass graves were dug up in order to move the disinterred remains to various distant sites. U.S. intelligence did however locate many of the sites by using satellite photographs ("Srebrenica Massacre", 2017).

Although Serbia has been acquitted for the genocide by ICJ, the court ruled that Serbia had not done enough to prevent the genocide ("Serbia fortsatt splittet", 2010). Many has thus perhaps ruled out that Serbia was involved in the genocide and war because of this. Further, it perhaps also helps to understand why the term 'civil' war is still used many scholars when analyzing the war as well in discourses regarding this war. There is however a need to challenge and problematize the usage of the term 'civil war'. As Allen argues (1996, p. 9); when someone keeps persisting on calling the war and aggressions a 'civil' or 'ex-Yugoslavian' conflict, they are actually working against the successful jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which can prosecute or challenge states for war crimes in international conflicts.

Serbia's wish however, to become a member of the European Union (EU) led The European Commission in 2006 to increase pressure on Serbia in regards to capturing war crime inductees Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, saying that Serbia must choose between its "nationalist past and a European future" (Lobjakas, 2006). Both of the war criminals was after the pressure of EU captured, Karadzic in 2008, and Mladic in 2011 (Johansen, 2011). In addition, both of war criminals were living in Serbia under alias names. Mladic was captured not far from Serbia's capital, Belgrade, whereas Karadzic was living in Belgrade where he worked with alternative medicine: "He even lectured on videotape at local community centers, in an open and active life that would appear to be an extraordinary risk for one of the world's most wanted men" (Kulish & Bowley, 2008).

7

Conclusion

Milosevic and his regime managed through their propaganda tour in the late 1980's to construct Serbs as the 'heroes' and 'victims' through history. This arguably appeled to many Serbs in a time when Yugoslavia's social and economic situation was declining after the death of Tito. As a consequence, Serbian grievances was legitimized to becoming a public discourse in Serbia. Through speeches, Milosevic was able to reach Serbs patriotic nerve despite geographically distances. He and his regime managed to create a feeling of 'togetherness' by creating a distance between Serbs and other ethnic groups. This togetherness created a new 'in-group' in Yugoslavia, who saw themselves as the rightful owners of much of the territory that had been taken away from them in the past. Arguably, this was one of the main factors which created the imagine community amongst Serbs, and spread ethnic conflicts across borders.

As the Serbs in Kosovo wanted to be under Serbian rule again, so did the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, hence, the creation of Republica Srpska after BiH's declaration of independence. The pursuit of Serbs wanted to live under Serbian authority (because they felt any other authority would oppress them), all the other ethnic groups, especially Muslims, became constructed as the out-group and the Other.

As a mobilization strategy, Milosevic's control of the media gave a platform to nationalistic voices. The reality of a peaceful Yugoslav people living in harmony was erupted by nationalistic intellectuals who managed through Milosevic's monopoly on the media to create a frame which portrayed Serbs group identity and existence as endangered. The various fictive horror stories that were used within the propaganda machinery, managed to create an enemy and cultivate the way Serbs viewed their social world. As a consequence of the collective rise of Serbian identity due to the fear of the Muslim population, mobilization in BiH also started to develop. The distorted view of reality can be argued to have been one of the premises which 'legitimized' the warfare in BiH in the eyes of the aggressor.

Muslims were seen as a legitimate threat. Since Bosniaks were socially constructed by the propaganda machinery as being Islamicized Serbs; many 'real' Serbs saw themselves as

saviors of BiH. The Srebrenica genocide can be argued to have happened due to the Otherness that was socially constructed about this group.

As I have previously mentioned; Milosevic's propaganda tour and his control over the media can be *one* way to analyze how Serb mobilization across borders came about (and how this effected the warfare in terms of it developing into a genocide) - the bombing of the Serbian national TV station in Belgrade by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1999 can however indicate something else. Although the war in Bosnia ended in 1995, with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, it did however continue in Kosovo up until 1999. NATO's strategy to end the war was to destroy strategic infrastructure like highways and bridges in order to make transportation of military assistance from Belgrade difficult. Despite civilians never being the target, the bombing of Serbia's national TV building, can symbolize the power mass communication and propaganda had prior and during the war(s). Propaganda paved the way for nationalism and chauvinism to become integrated into peoples living rooms, which further cultivated and spread ethnic hatred. The TV station was therefore argued by NATO to have been a legitimate and strategic military target (Norton-Taylor, 1999).

Milosevic's Anti Bureaucracy revolution as it was framed, turned out to be quite the opposite. Although huge masses gathered voluntarily and by force, this wave of nationalism can be argued to have paved the way *for* a chauvinistic bureaucratic elite to come to power. The encourage hateful propaganda by many of the leading Serb politicians within and across Serbian borders, can thus be argued to have created the deadly atmosphere which developed into ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Muslims population in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

IV
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