Transforming the "*Ghetto*"

Strategic Planning in Distressed Social Housing Estates

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Abstract:
Distressed social housing estates – or ghettos – are currently a hot political topic in Denmark. This master's thesis examines the implications of municipalities' increased use of strategic planning to improve conditions in distressed social housing estates in Denmark. The effects on the municipalities' role as planning authority and the role of the social housing organizations are also examined in relation to strategic planning. The thesis is based on a case study of the fund Realdania's *By i Balance* project's current collaboration with Høje-Taastrup Municipality and three social housing organizations in that municipality. Through interviews, observations of meetings, site analyses and document analyses, the authors describe the formulation process of a strategic development plan for three distressed social housing estates. The process is then analyzed and explained using Patsy Healey's theories about *strategisation* and its four steps, as well as other theoretical concepts. Findings from the case study include that *framings* and narratives are created in order to integrate the distressed social housing estates with the rest of the city. Based on its findings, the thesis includes a list of condensed recommendations for future use of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates. The thesis concludes that strategic planning holds promise for transforming distressed social housing estates as it can lead to ambitious transformations plans although the management and coordination of subsequent projects and actors can be a challenge. Municipal urban planners and social housing organizations alike must possess skills in network governance in order to foster the necessary collaboration between the municipality, social housing organizations and other strategic partners.

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GLOSSARY

(annual) general assembly *beboermøde, generalforsamling*

commission *idriftsætte/overdrage byggeri*

coordinated social measures *boligsocial helhedsplan*

distressed social housing estate *udsat boligområde*

housing estate *boligområde*

housing section *boligafdeling*

refurbishment project *fysisk helhedsplan*

residential/tenants' democracy *beboerdemokrati*

social housing organization *almen boligforening / -organisation / -selskab*

section board *afdelingsbestyrelse*

The National Building Fund *Landsbyggefonden*

1. INTRODUCTION

The following introduction will first present the field of research: Distressed social housing estates in Denmark. Secondly, the current debate in the media will be outlined since a new ghetto package has been presented and adopted during the spring of 2018. Thirdly, a brief presentation of the case in Høje-Taastrup will then lead to the problem formulation.

In this thesis, we will use the term *distressed social housing estates* as a translation of the Danish "*udsatte boligområder*". The term ghetto has often been used by successive governments, by the media and in everyday language, but since this word is politically loaded, can carry significant connotations and may be stigmatizing for the residents in these areas, we have chosen not to use it (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). Furthermore, *udsatte boligområder* covers more social housing estates where a strategic planning approach could be applicable.

1.1 Distressed social housing estates in the contemporary public debate

> "Around the country, there are parallel societies. A lot of people with same problems are clumped together. This creates a negative spiral. A counter-culture. (...) Holes have been knocked in the map of Denmark. This worries me deeply. Because the ghettos also send tentacles out into the streets where criminal gangs create insecurity" (Statsministeriet 2018, own translation).

For more than 30 years, distressed social housing estates have been a hot topic in the Danish public debate (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). The above quote from the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen's 2018 new year's speech represents one side of the debate. Throughout the speech, the Prime Minister used the word "ghetto" four times, "parallel society" five times and mentioned twice the "holes in the map of Denmark" indicating how the Prime Minister framed this topic with the distressed social housing estates regarded as a liability.

On March 1, 2018, the government presented a proposal for a legislative package concerning distressed social housing estates and ghettos at a press event in Mjølnerparken, a housing estate on the government's ghetto list, with attendance from eight of the 22 ministers in the cabinet (Andersen 2018). The package is extensive with 22 main devices divided into five themes: Demolition and transformation of distressed social housing estates, more precise control over who lives in the distressed social housing estates, more policing and harsher punishments, more sanctions in relation to the raising and education of children, and naming three national "ghetto representatives" to

Figure 1: The legislative package proposal "Ét Danmark uden parallelsamfund" (Regeringen 2018, a).

supervise and control the process of implementing the legislative package in the distressed social housing estates, as well as annual summits concerning "parallel societies" (Regeringen 2018, a).

In May 2018, the various elements of the legislative package were passed (Regeringen 2018, b), and its ramifications for the social housing sector have become clear. The social housing estates that have been on the government's ghetto list for the four last consecutive years, "the roughest ghetto areas", have six months to complete a development plan and have it approved by the Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing. The development plan must include concrete proposals for how to reduce the share of social family housing to a maximum of 40 percent (ibid.). This currently has most of the housing estates scrambling to decide whether to heavily densify, to tear down or sell 60 percent of their homes or split and reclassify family flats as student or senior housing. The Prime Minister seems keen to tear down buildings:

> *"We must set a new target to dismantle the ghettos completely. Some places by breaking up the concrete. Tearing down buildings. Spreading the residents and rehousing them in several areas."* (Statsministeriet 2018, own translation).

Jesper Christensen, Copenhagen Mayor of Children and Youth Affairs and life-long resident of Tingbjerg, a social housing estate on the government's ghetto list, does not agree:

> *"But I do not think that we should tear down homes at a time when there is such a great need for affordable homes in a city like Copenhagen"* (Christensen 2018).

Still, a consensus seems to be forming on 'selective demolition' being a part of a sensible solution in combination with other measures (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). Others emphasize the need for social measures (Vesselbo 2018). After all, the topic is social housing and that entails that some residents bring along social issues when they move in. Throughout the past three decades, there have been many social programmes in many of the social housing estates (Bjørn 2008). Some take the fact that there are still issues and challenges to mean that these programmes have not worked, while others point out the large number of residents that have been lifted out of their social problems and put "back on track" towards education and employment. However, as residents who have, for instance, succeeded in returning to the job market leave the housing estate "from the top of the pile" and move somewhere more attractive, they may be replaced by new residents "at the bottom of the pile" who are referred to the housing estate because of their social problems. They join the existing residents who have not had the resources to move somewhere else. This is part of the vicious circle that keeps the social housing estates unattractive.

The long line of social programmes in social housing estates have been accompanied by many physical refurbishments. Previous physical measures have meet critique for not changing the overall physical challenges that most distressed social housing estates face, but merely has fixed construction damages (Holek, Mortensen & Bjørn 2008). Learnings from previous social and physical measures shows how initiatives that cross different aspects such as refurbishments, social, educational and employment and create connections with the surrounding city are the most successful (Realdania 2016, a).

1.2 'By i Balance'

The philanthropic fund *Realdania* has initiated a project called '*By i Balance*'[1] to find the forces of change in distressed social housing estates, that builds on the learnings mentioned above. The aim of their project is to collect knowledge and create networks that can change existing areas from isolated enclaves to integrated neighbourhoods with a more mixed population (Realdania 2016, b).

Realdania has allocated DKK 75m to develop strategic development plans and innovative physical projects for areas in three Danish municipalities: Værebro Park in Gladsaxe, Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager in Høje-Taastrup and Stengårdsvej in Esbjerg. In each case, Realdania is creating partnerships between themselves, the local municipality and the social housing organizations, where the actors commit to developing the strategic plans and then realizing them through various initiatives. The cases should make specific changes in the areas and provide knowledge of how to change distressed social housing estates (Realdania 2016, a).

Realdania's approach to launching strategic development plans for the distressed social housing estates in Høje-Taastrup, Gladsaxe and Esbjerg, appears to be following a trend in contemporary urban planning (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). The idea of urban planning has moved from being a technical and rational discipline towards strategic planning and envisioning in more open and collaborative processes (Friedmann 2008). Strategic urban planning can bring about new political goals in specific urban areas by introducing new ways of governing (Healey 2007; Albrechts 2004), just as Realdania's partnerships with municipalities and social housing organizations will.

This thesis will investigate the strategic development plan for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager in Høje-Taastrup as a case study of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates. As this part of Realdania's project is covering three social housing estates with three social housing organizations and five individual housing sections, it is a very complex case. At the same time, successful interventions can make a significant difference, as the estates combined cover a huge area.

Høje-Taastrup is an outer suburb located in Greater Copenhagen's West End along one of the major infrastructure routes from the capital heading west towards Funen and Jutland and south towards Germany, see figure 2. Each of the three social housing estates have around 1,000 flats and in total hold a population of 6,578 as of 1 January 2017 (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2017). All three social housing estates are on the government's ghetto list, while Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård are additionally classified as two of the "roughest ghettos" (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). This means that the areas are among those social housing estates that attract a lot of attention in the contemporary public debate.

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[1] *'By i Balance' means 'City in Balance' or 'A balanced city'. The Danish name will be used in the rest of the thesis, as the English translation does not resonate with the Danish planning term of balance.*

Figure 2: Høje-Taastrup's location in Denmark (Bureauet Bjørn et al. 2017)

1.3 Problem formulation

As presented in the previous sections, there is currently much debate and political focus on distressed social housing estates in Denmark. Simultaneously, strategic planning constitutes a new departure within the professional field of urban planning in distressed social housing estates. Based on Realdania's *By i Balance* project, the problem formulation runs as follows:

> *What are the implications of municipalities' increased use of strategic planning to improve conditions in distressed social housing estates? How does this affect their role as planning authority and the role of the social housing organizations?*

The problem formulation will be answered based on a case study of the *By i Balance* project in Høje-Taastrup that aims to physically transform three distressed social housing estates and their surroundings. As the strategy in Høje-Taastrup is being developed simultaneously to this thesis, the investigated implications of strategic planning will focus on the process of formulating a strategy and what it means for the actors involved. Since nothing has been realized yet, the actual physical and social implications of the planning approach on the distressed social housing estates cannot be assessed.

2. THEORY

As Realdania's project *By i Balance* in Høje-Taastrup aims to develop strategic plans in distressed social housing estates, it looks like a strategic planning view will also be employed in Høje-Taastrup Municipality. As the following chapter will account for, strategic urban planning has mainly been applied to wider urban regions, making the application of strategic planning in smaller contexts and in distressed social housing estates in particular a new approach and a new field of research. In light of these developments, the thesis applies strategic planning as the main theoretical framework.

The problem formulation contains a question about the implications of using strategic planning. The case study object in Høje-Taastrup is still in the process of formulating their strategy. For these two reasons, we have searched for theories that describe the strategy-making process. Patsy Healey (2007) provides such an insight through the process of *strategisation*, describing how to think strategic and how strategies come about. Regarding how the municipality and the social housing organizations are affected by the use of strategic planning, emerging theories about network governance will be combined with strategic planning. Network governance can explain how dynamics in the collaboration between actors occur.

2.1 Strategic planning

Before going into details about Healey's concepts of *strategisation*, the background and history behind strategic planning will be explained to understand its context. Strategy as a concept originates from the military, while *strategic planning* comes from the private business sector, where companies want to plan ahead in uncertain times (Albrechts 2004). In urban planning, strategic spatial planning slowly emerged as a mean to address regional crisis situations in the 1960s-70s (Bafarasat 2014), and strategic planning has since then generally been considered as a tool for regional planning (Healey 2007).

During the 1960-70s, traditional comprehensive or 'modern' urban planning dominated. In modernism, planning was thought of as a technical and rational discipline built on science (Allmendinger 2009). Extensive housing schemes were developed all over Europe, providing millions of homes but facing criticism for physical and social issues (Albrechts 2004). In the 1980s, postmodern ideas emerged that severely criticized modernist urban planning. The postmodern covered many different ideas beyond the criticism about physical and social issues, as the dominant scientific planning knowledge was challenged (Allmendinger 2009). Cities were challenged by globalization and its very complex consequences. State-led planning approaches were also seen as an obstacle to new developments (Hansen 2012). Simultaneously, neoliberalism was emerging as an ideal in planning, based on the conviction that the best planning approach would be one where the primary role of authorities in planning is to accommodate private developers and their wishes. This ideology and planning approach rejected any long-term plans and strategies and instead took on one project at a time (Albrechts 2004). The redevelopment of London Docklands in the 1980s is one of the clearest examples of such an approach (Edwards 2013). Copenhagen's central waterfront Kalvebod Brygge is comparable in a Danish context, as the City of Copenhagen convinced private investors to invest in the area while imposing very few requirements on the development, even though the Danish society is more regulated (Bisgaard 2010).

With the changes in planning that took place in the 1980s, public-private partnerships were introduced as a more selective approach to interventions and a project-minded planning practice. With less state influence, concerns were raised about uncontrolled developments, environmental issues and the need for a planning approach that benefits everyone involved and not just the developers. From a combination of the planning practices and the new concerns, a *strategic spatial planning* turn emerged in the 1990s (Albrechts 2004). In Denmark, several cities started to formulate their own urban policies and strategies beyond the planning system's limited view on land use. Planning had to be multidisciplinary with the aim of creating local growth. The trend of local authorities pursuing their own unique opportunities for urban development was reinforced by the Danish structural reform of 2007 that abolished the counties and placed more planning authority at the municipal level (Hansen 2012).

Since the strategic planning turn emerged in the 1990s, the planning approach has developed in different directions, including: Securing efficient policy-making procedures by making strategies into signposts for development; creating alternatives and tackling existing conflicts between actors; and formulating transformative strategies in which actors undergo culture-changing activities (Bafarasat 2014). The next sections will cover how strategic planning has been theorized from these different ideas of implementing strategic planning.

Selectivity

Louis Albrechts (2004), a well-renowned author on strategic planning, argues that strategic planning entails a set of concepts, tools and procedures that must be tailored to the specific situation. Particularly important is the concept of *'selectivity'*, as a limited number of key issues must be the focus of strategies, as the means available to challenge or solve problems are limited. In other words, strategic planning must be about issues that really matter. Other elements of strategic planning include:

- Determination of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)
- Studying external forces and trends
- Gathering of key stakeholders (public and private)
- Broad and diverse involvement
- Development of a long-term vision – respecting the multiple levels, power and uncertainties
- Design of plan-making structures
- Building of new ideas
- Focusing on decisions, actions, results, implementation (Albrechts 2004).

Albrechts further argues that strategic planning focuses on a specific 'place', a geographical territory. Place-specific planning interventions are of great importance, caused by growing local identity and political focus. In specific places, different economic, social and environmental agendas are present, creating a basis for multilevel governance, leading to new arenas being built to accommodate change (Albrechts 2004). Albrecht's work on strategic planning is of great importance, and is recognized as one of the first attempts at theorizing strategic urban planning.

Strategic thinking

Albrecht's theory has been developed from his slightly rational approach of selecting issues that matter based on analysis to encompassing and acknowledging 'urban complexity' as a main feature, particularly by British planning professor Patsy Healey. According to Healey (2007), dealing with urban complexity involves continuous strategic thinking, and simply having a strategic plan is not sufficient.

Healey (2007) argues that strategic planning is born from an understanding of the urban territory as complex mixtures of nodes, networks, places and flows. These notions describe how elements in the city are related to each other, with socially constructed conceptions of places of particularly importance. Urban planners have generally struggled to grasp these dynamics of cities, as they are complex, leading to insufficient solutions in the past. Therefore, a new way of governing is necessary with more focus on partnerships, multi-level governance and 'place-effects', such as health and education's effect on places (Healey 2007). Planners should understand the conceptions and the qualities of the place, the dynamics of the place and its relation to other places. Thinking strategically is not the same as having a formulated strategy, but is according to Healey (2007) more of a 'state of mind', where planners have to continuously interpret and reassess events and actions.

From this position planning authorities can formulate strategic plans. Healey calls this to 'strategise', which is about:

> *"the drawing out of a sense of potentialities and possibilities from multiple unfolding relations, within which to set actions that will intervene in these unfolding relations in the hope of furthering particular objectives and qualities"* (Healey 2007 pp. 29-30).

Strategies are highly political issues that often do not follow normal procedures when they are developed. The procedures are affected by the fact that strategic thinking is moving to key alliances and actors apart from urban planners. A formulated strategy is also a way of 'seeing': "*Strategies are selective constructions, 'sense-making' devices, created from a mass of material*" (Healey 2007, p. 185). To create sense, strategies appear as framing discourses in which a certain narrative is told.

How to 'strategise' is in other words how strategies come about in the process of *strategisation*, which is a key theoretical tool to explain the implications of strategic planning in the case of Høje-Taastrup. Healey (2007) provides such an insight into a strategisation process, which will be outlined in the next section.

Strategisation

It is important to recognise how spatial planning processes actually combine different agendas and select key issues for intervention between actors, and thus how interventions will be shaped. Healey (2007) presents four dimensions of strategy-formation processes: filtering of ideas, focusing and framing of strategies, generation of mobilising force, and generation of transformative force. Taken together, the four dimensions can explain how the different agendas and key issues interplay.

Filtering

Understanding cities as relational and full of complex networks leaves planners with a difficult task of filtering the initiatives and measures that make sense in the local context. Many issues and stakeholders struggle for attention, but any strategy should sort among them. Even though many urban strategies are often referred to as 'comprehensive' or 'holistic', they do usually filter a strategic orientation by including or excluding issues. The process of filtering is then similar to Albrecht's (2004) notion of selectivity.

A filtering process can be analysed through four questions:

- *"When in a strategy-formation process does issue filtering occur? (a potential throughout)*
- *Where does it occur – in what institutional site/arenas?*
- *How does such filtering take place and through what practices and mediums?*
- *Who is filtered in and who excluded through such processes?"* (Healey 2007, p. 188).

Focusing and framing

After the process of filtering different issues, the details still have to be identified. Constructing the details and hereby framing the strategy requires concepts or principles for action that respond to the mass of signals and challenges filtered in the previous element. The concepts can arrive in multiple ways, from more traditional assessments to creative discoveries. It may sound like a traditional plan, but the strategic approach is different in that strategies are considered as creating new frames of meanings, a new sense that creates synthesis between functions and challenges. It is also integrative and attractive for a wide range of actors, which is why framing a strategy can potentially be a very powerful governance instrument (Healey 2007). Focusing and framing is characterised by:

- *"Challenging a well-established frame in a direct discourse struggle [...].*
- *Evolving an established frame by continual adjustment, co-alignment and re-consolidation [...].*
- *Creating conditions in which strategic framing work can eventually develop [...].*
- *Discovering strategies through 'recognising' emergent conditions"* (Healey 2007, p. 191).

Generating mobilising force

Healey argues that strategy formation is an institutionally complex task, as it happens in a governance landscape where ideas, issues and tensions come from several positions. Strategies will be 'invented' by several actors, but might not get recognised and will then fall apart. Therefore, strategies should be positioned so as to give meaning in the context, in order to gather force behind them. They are not just abstract floating concepts, but positioned in critical governance arenas (Healey 2007). To create mobilising force, several issues must be considered. Embodying a strategy in a formal document and by a skilled planning team can provide legitimacy that strengthens a strategy. Since the 1980s, the tendency of forming coalitions and public-private partnerships have also affected strategic planning, as strategies can mobilise more actors than the public authority. Generating mobilising force thus involves collecting intellectual and political forces through which a strategy is recognised and positioned, widening the opportunity for action (ibid.). The generation of mobilising force is characterised by:

- *"Statutory duty – for example, to have a strategy or a strategic plan.*
- *Intellectual and imaginative power – of skilled planners, for example.*
- *The forces of economic interest – of land and property developers and major industrialists, for example, driven by capitalist logic.*
- *Advocacy coalitions and networks – around urban qualities.*
- *Strategic actors and leaders – individuals, groups and an established governance capacity."* (Healey 2007, p. 193).

Generating transformative force

While interlinked policy narratives and discourses can be succeeded by mobilising force, strategies only fully succeed when they influence subsequent events. They will not influence events in linear processes from strategies to specific physical projects, but through a reshaping of positions between actors and will challenge established routines and practices. Consequently, successful strategies shape practices more than the actual content of decisions. A strategy with a strong transformative power has the ability to carry core ideas from one governance arena to another, and might even create new arenas along the way. They become most powerful if they are embedded in legal practices. A critical task for strategic planners in generating transformative force, and therefore creating a substantial difference, is to map the current governance terrain in terms of actors, arenas and networks (Healey 2007).

Healey (2007) stresses that the dimensions do not play out in a linear fashion, but happen when opportunities appear. I.e., ideas might gain transformative force before being finally focused, if a strategy is formulated at the same time as other initiatives are initiated.

The outlined *strategisation* process describes how strategies are made and provide a frame for analyzing the development of the strategy in the case of Høje-Taastrup.

As strategies offer a framework of principles with visions and directions for future actions, it is not only the actual strategic plan that will have significant effects in shaping development. If a strategy takes careful attention to the institutions and accumulates power to enrol other actors, then they can truly be more successful by offering a 'discursive frame' for further work (Healey 2007). In other words, a strategy will be powerful only if its core ideas are maintained and used in subsequent projects, and it does not end up in a filing cabinet.

In subsequent projects, such as when the social housing organizations have to refurbish their estates, other actors than in the strategisation process will often be involved. Therefore it is crucial for a strategy to "*pass through arenas that offer institutional space in which many parties learn what it means to 'see' the issues of concern to them in new ways*" (Healey 2007 p. 198). A strategisation process can therefore turn into a learning process, and if a collective sense is recognised, the strategy becomes truly embedded in actions that shape urban development (Healey 2007). Ensuring that strategies are embedded in the involved actors and future actions is connected to *network governance*. This will be further elaborated in section 2.2. Before laying out a theoretical framework for network governance, Healey provides some analytical tools to assess strategies.

Elements of strategies

Healey (2007) argues that the content of urban strategies varies a great deal. Many early strategies focused merely on physical structures or land use, thus leaning against the traditional modern planning paradigm. As a part of securing efficient policy-making, strategies can also entail goals that reflects core values. More open-minded principles and visions to inspire future development are other elements that a strategy can entail (Healey 2007). These four categories are presented in table 1 below. While the first three columns sums up what the categories entail, the last one called 'Illustrated by' will be employed in the analyses chapters 6-8, as it can illustrate what the strategies in Høje-Taastrup entail.

Strategy as...	Underpinned by...	Expressed through...	Illustrated by...
Physical structure	Morphological analysis	Plans as maps and designs	
Orienting goals	Socio-spatial analysis to identify threats to goals	Policy statements about programmes of action to achieve goals	
A framework of principles	Systematic technical and interactive search procedures to reduce uncertainty	Framing concepts, projects and programmes; policy criteria	
An inspirational vision	Interactive processes to imagine futures and mobilise attention	Metaphors, storylines and manifestos	

Table 1: What strategies can entail and mean (Healey 2007, p. 180). The column titled 'Illustrated by' is left empty, as it will be filled out during chapter 6-8.

In the strategic development plan currently being developed in Høje-Taastrup, are the consultants also presenting a set of principles. The principles can also be about physical interventions, so they are categorized as physical structures in this thesis. The terms used in Høje-Taastrup is in that sense not equal to our use of terms.

To sum up what characterizes strategic planning, table 2 below presents an overview:

> **Characteristics of strategic planning:**
> - Selectivity of issues that really matter
> - Recognition of 'urban complexity'
> - Thinking city-wide with connections across plot boundaries
> - Formulation of narratives
> - *Strategisation* or strategy-formulation: filtering – focusing and framing – generating mobilizing force – generating transformative force
> - *Sets direction for future actions*
> - Elements of a strategy: physical changes – orienting goals – a framework of principles – an inspirational vision

Table 2: The main features that characterize strategic planning.

The theories about strategic planning sees planning from the point of view of the professional planner. That makes the municipality, as the local planning authority, the central actor in the theoretical framework. This means that the perspective of the social housing organizations will follow after the municipal urban planners.

2.2 Network governance

As a result of economic cuts, a growing distrust of politicians and the need for more innovative solutions in the public sector, local authorities are changing their way of governing (Engberg & Larsen 2010). Urban planning is increasingly characterized by *network governance*, as more actors are involved in different arenas and networks in the emerging strategic planning approach:

> *"Planning is increasingly exercised in a fragmented governance system consisting of numerous policy networks that stretch across public and private boundaries (horizontal governance) and across levels of public decision making (vertical governance)"* (Sehested 2009, p. 247).

In Denmark, public and private actors, especially major interest organizations, have interacted in government matters for a long time, creating a tradition for some degree of governance (Sehested 2009). Committing to a governance approach to public administration implies recognizing the complexity of policy implementation and management. Here, the processes between different actors are the centre of attention, as policies are formed through multiple networks. Independent actors engage in policy production, which gives a number of advantages for better policy formulations; flexibility and adaptability, channelling of local knowledge, deliberation and dialogue etc. (Engberg & Larsen 2010). New governance networks are created, whereas management or steering of the participants in such networks are of great importance to ensure trust. The term '*meta-governance*' has emerged as an attempt to steer governance networks, through influencing the conditions under which they operate (Sørensen & Torfing 2005). It is an indirect form of securing coordination and integration between networks of actors and ultimately between policies. Traditional governmental tools such as

regulation, rules, control and hierarchical orders can be set aside if meta-governance is applied correctly (Sehested 2009). These techniques require that the planner take on specific roles as a *hybrid planner* to manage the networks of different projects and actors. To manage the networks, the hybrid planner is a meta-governor, where coordination, dialogue and communication are increasingly important (ibid.).

Adding to the theoretical framework of Healey's strategisation process, a distinction between governance interactions can be used to explain the implications of municipalities' increased use of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates.

Governance interactions

According to Engberg and Larsen (2010), who conducted a research about the City of Copenhagen's approach with distressed social housing estates, two main interactions for a local authority exist when planning interventions are to be set out; (1) the interaction between the local government including its planners and the local neighbourhood with multiple actors and citizens, and (2) inside the local government itself where communication between departments is a key task (Engberg & Larsen 2010).

To start with the local government itself (2), experience shows how the traditional division of labour between different sector departments creates difficulties for area-based interventions with problems such as silo mentality and a lack of cross-sector coordination. A shift seems to be occurring in Denmark, as municipalities are increasingly aware of such difficulties, partly reinforced by the large-scale urban regeneration programmes run since the 1980s (Engberg & Larsen 2010). Stronger coordination, foci and goals are unifying the public sector, where a horizontal awareness between departments is a key contributor. Even though steps have been made in the right direction, every governance structure still has its dilemmas and power balances (Engberg & Larsen 2010).

In interaction with actors outside the local government (1), network governance is particularly evident during strategisation processes. Healey (2007) argues that in strategisation processes, dialogue loops between different systems and develops in patterns that cannot be fully predicted, as strategic thinking involves continuously reassessing possibilities and actions. In other words, strategy-making contains a degree of 'self-organisation', as actors *"interact with each other on the basis of their own local organizing principles"* (Engberg & Larsen 2010, p. 553).

Local actors such as social housing organizations have their own organizational structures and values that planners should be aware of. They certainly add to the complexity of governance efforts, but according to Engberg & Larsen (2010), coherence and alignment can be achieved through local interaction if meta-governance is applied. It is necessary to influence and manipulate (in a positive sense) actions and outputs from different actors, e.g., by collecting, combining and processing knowledge. Governance networks evolve constantly, which means that actors may come and go during the processes, as the involved actors are independent and somehow semi-autonomous (Engberg & Larsen 2010).

Strategy-making clearly challenges conventional administrative practices within the 'silos' and distinctions between sectors, as area-based perspectives are likely to clash with traditional sector logics.

Further conflicts can appear as different interests occur simultaneously, often enhanced by staff conflicts, damaging the key alliances behind strategic planning (ibid.).

The perspective of network governance clearly show the complexity and dynamics between actors when they engage in strategic planning. The two governance interactions for local authorities, i.e., the external one and the internal one, are of particular importance, as it can explain how network governance has been applied in the case of Høje-Taastrup. The interaction of the municipality and the social housing organizations will explain the coordination and division of roles between them, thus contributing to answer the problem formulation about how their roles are affected.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

The following chapter will present the research design and the methodologies used in this thesis. The chapter describes how the choices are connected to the field of research and the coming analysis of the problem formulation. To that end, the chapter will explain how the findings have been accumulated and how they have been constructed.

3.1 Research design

The research design takes its point of departure in the problem formulation, which sets the stage for an investigation of the implications of the use of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates and of how the role of municipalities and social housing organizations are affected by such a planning approach. By exploring the implications of the strategic approach, the analysis will explain the effects and consequences for planning in distressed social housing estates (de Vaus 2001).

As described in section 1.2, we use a case study approach to answer the problem formulation, and choose Realdania's project *By i Balance* in Høje-Taastrup Municipality as the case. The case is relevant for the problem formulation because Høje-Taastrup Municipality, with the support of Realdania, is applying a strategic planning approach. The case study as a research design can provide detailed insights into the dynamics between the actors involved: The municipality and the social housing organizations. The case study also offers the opportunity of gaining unique knowledge and a deep understanding of the field of research (Flyvbjerg 2012).

It is important to note that the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup is being developed concurrently with the writing of this thesis. This presents the opportunity to explore how such a spatial strategy evolves. It also limits the research, however, as a full assessment of the implications of their strategic approach cannot be made until all the measures are completed in 2040, which is the timescale of the strategy in Høje-Taastrup (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017). Strategic planning very much about thinking strategically; about understanding the conception of places and qualities whilst positioning places in relation to other places and dynamics in society (Healey 2007). The exercise of thinking strategically is happening when the strategy is being developed, so it is very much within the process of strategy formulation (*strategisation*) that the related implications will be investigated.

To fully understand the case of Høje-Taastrup and its three different distressed social housing estates, a descriptive research design will be applied at first. The description will entail an analysis of the actual *places*, i.e., the distressed social housing estates, of how the strategy evolves and of how ideas are developed in the housing estates. This research design enables the thesis to present the story of what is happening during the strategy formulation, which is necessary before answering what the implications of the strategic planning are: "*before asking 'Why?' we must be sure about the facts and dimensions of the phenomenon*" (de Vaus 2001, p. 2).

A thorough description can naturally lead to explanatory research (de Vaus 2001). To answer the problem formulation, it is crucial to explain why the strategies evolve in certain ways and how the roles of the municipality and the social housing organizations are affected. The explanations will be about the

ongoing strategisation process in the case study in order to explore the implications of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates.

The dual use of descriptive and explanatory research design dictates how research and knowledge have been accumulated throughout the thesis. Much focus has been on collecting empirical data about the areas, previous initiatives and the currently evolving strategy. In parallel, we have studied the theory of strategic planning to create a basis for explaining the observed dynamics of *strategisation*. The thorough description of what actually is going on equipped the analysis to go in depth by applying the theoretical framework.

Before accounting for how the research design has been turned into several methodologies for gathering empirical data, we take a step back in the next section to consider perspectives of theory of science. This will help connect the field of research with the chosen theories accounted for in chapter 2 by establishing a frame for understanding the field of research.

3.2 Theory of science

As Patsy Healey's view of strategic planning and strategisation processes constitutes the theoretical framework for this thesis, her understanding of the world influences our scientific research. Healey (2007) generally sees urban areas as highly complex entities and argues that planning is relational, in a sense that multiple relations, nodes and places make up a mixture that combined generate the urban area. She further describes her view of the world as follows:

> *"(...) the reality of the world is always perceived by we humans in imperfect ways, structured by our limited perceptual capacity and the histories and positions from which we are perceiving. Cluttered with prior conceptions and imperfect sensibilities, we arrive at interpretations of the world out there, interpretations relevant to some purposes we have and tested by discussion with others as well as by encounters with the physical world. So we socially construct interpretations of what is going on, in interaction with others."* (Healey 2007, p. x).

The quote shows that Patsy Healey considers understanding of places as cognitive and mental understandings. By saying that humans socially construct interpretations, strategic planning leans towards *social constructivism*. This particular theory of science emphasizes that no complete truth exists, but that truth is constructed by historic and societal understandings. In that sense, the truth is perspectival and cannot be discovered. Instead, a fight about 'the truth' is always going between actors, where one can define how to look at or categorize social and physical phenomena (Pedersen 2012).

A social constructivist view enables this thesis to examine how the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup is formed and by whom. Strategic planning is also about creating framing discourses and telling narratives about places, which very much is a socially constructed reality. On this point, there is a strong connection between Healey's view on strategic planning and social constructivism.

3.3 Methodology

As the thesis focuses on how narratives are framed in strategisation processes, and how roles of different actors are affected by such processes, the thesis is based on social science. In order to describe and explain the dynamics of the case study and the actual distressed social housing estates, mainly qualitative methods have been applied. Empirical data was collected through document analysis, interviews, observations and a site analysis. This will be further explained in the coming sections. The methods were chosen to investigate how the filtering, framing, generation of mobilising force and generation of transformative force took place in the case study. The findings will then be used to explain the implication on the strategy-making process.

Document analysis

An important source of knowledge for this thesis is the variety of written documents about the case in Høje-Taastrup. First of all, the *By i Balance* project will result in a strategic development plan for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager in Høje-Taastrup. In dialogue with the municipality and the team of consultants who are conducting the strategic development plan, we have had access to various drafts of the strategy. As the strategy is not finished, published or politically adopted as thesis is being written, is it not possible to reference the drafts of the strategy. Nevertheless, the drafts have provided valuable insight and a basis for interviews. Different analysis documents and the programme describing the *By i Balance* project have also been available, even though they are not yet published.

Municipal plans and policies about distressed social housing estates and urban development are another important type of written documents used in the thesis. Framing discourses and narratives in such documents have been analysed in detail.

To describe the three areas in Høje-Taastrup Municipality, historical documents, news articles and plans have been used. We have gained access to them through electronic archives and from the social housing organizations. The so-called 'snowball method' has been used to find references between previous initiatives that could link to different documents (Lynggaard 2010).

Lastly, state of the art research about transformations of distressed social housing estates has been used to conceptualize the field of research and to assess the strategy in Høje-Taastrup.

Four types of documents have been analysed:

- Drafts of the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup, though partially confidential
- Municipal plans and policies
- Historical documents and articles about the social housing estates
- State of the art research about transformations of distressed social housing estates

One of the authors of the thesis works part-time in Domea.dk, one of the social housing organizations in the case. Through this job, we have had privileged access to some documents. The same type of documents have been pursued from the other social housing organizations.

During our research and document analysis, it became clear that more historical data is available about Taastrupgaard than about Gadehavegård and Charlotteager. Negative and positive developments in Taastrupgaard over the years have been reported more eagerly by the media, meaning that the debate surrounding Taastrupgaard and the various renovations are documented better than for the two other estates. Our document analysis reflects this disparity in information levels.

Interviews

As some of the key written material about the strategy in Høje-Taastrup is confidential, interviews have played a key role in collecting empirical data. Interviews were chosen as a method because the thesis seeks knowledge about how the strategies evolve, what it means for the involved actors and physical places, and to explain why the strategies have evolved in certain ways. In other words, several underlying dynamics and relations determine how a strategisation process pans out, which highlights how complex strategic planning is. To unfold the complex relations and dynamics in social interactions, interviews are a very useful method, as the interviewees' perspectives can be understood (Kvale 2007).

All the interviews have been conducted in a semi-structured form with a prepared interview guide, but with the possibility of addressing other issues should the interviewee open them up. The interview guide in general includes questions about:

- Characteristics of the specific social housing estate, both social and physical
- The vision and strategy about the areas' coming development
- Values, roles and organization of the actors

A number of interviews were set up. At an early stage two interviews were undertaken to gain knowledge about the field of research and Høje-Taastrup. One was with professor Claus Bech-Danielsen from the Danish Building Research Institute (SBi), who recently published a book about transforming ghettos with Marie Stender as co-author. Another interview was conducted with Christian Kierkegaard, a former head of construction in Domea.dk, as he was involved in the beginning of the *By i Balance* project and held contact with Realdania. This interview had the character of an informal talk for inspiration, has not been transcribed, and is not referred to in the thesis. These two interviews gave an overview and an initial insight into the subject and the case.

After discovering about the governance structure in Høje-Taastrup with an article 17, subarticle 4 committee and a programme steering group and after having participated in such meetings (see more in the next section about observations), interviews were set up among key actors and individuals involved in the governance structure. The interviews mainly involved project staff from the different organizations, and not managing directors or politicians, in order to get in contact with those who are deeply engaged in the formulation of the strategies. The exception was two interviews with politicians from the social housing organizations. The full list of interviewees are as follows:

- Rune Fløe Bæklund (Head of Task force) and Philip Arnhild (Development Adviser), Høje-Taastrup Municipality. Task force for distressed social housing estates.
- Björn Emil Härtel Jensen (Head of projects), Realdania.
- Claus Bjørton (Client Manager), KAB. In charge of AKB Taastrup and Taastrupgaard.

- Mette Mogensen (Project Development Manager) and Julie Jettesdatter Skoven (Adviser for coordinated social measures), Domea.dk.
- Hanne Nørgaard (Head of Construction) and Lisbeth Engelbrecht (Adviser for coordinated social measures), VIBO.
- Niels Bjørn, Bureauet Niels Bjørn. Head of the consultant team (*Team Niels Bjørn*) formulating the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup.
- Filip Zibrandtsen, Urban Creators. Member of Team Niels Bjørn.
- Pia von Benzon, resident and member of the section board in Gadehavegård, DFB.
- Kaya Durmaz, resident and chair of the section board in Charlotteager, VIBO.

With a few key persons, a second round of interviews were conducted to answer questions that emerged while conducting the analysis and during the evolution of the strategic development plan. These were Rune Fløe Bæklund and Philip Arnhild from Høje-Taastrup Municipality and the head of the consultant team Niels Bjørn. All of the listed interviews have provided detailed knowledge, thus providing a pivotal basis for the analysis.

All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed to ensure accountability. The interviews were conducted in Danish and all transcriptions are therefore in Danish and can be found in the appendix. Due to strategic planning being a highly political activity and to the fact that the strategy has not been politically adopted as of the deadline of this thesis, the research somewhat is sensitive. All quotes have therefore been checked and approved by the interviewees before publishing this thesis, meaning that some quotes have been altered slightly.

Observations

In dialogue with Høje-Taastrup Municipality, with Team Niels Bjørn and through direct contact with Domea.dk, we have been allowed to observe three meetings in the programme steering group with the municipality, the social housing organizations and Realdania between March and May 2018. At these meetings, the team of consultants presented the strategic development plan and the plan was discussed between the actors. Observing such meetings gives a unique opportunity to study phenomena that play out in the real world (Raudaskoski 2010).

As stated earlier, strategic planning is a highly political activity and the discussions in these meetings have pointed in many different directions. Therefore, it was agreed that this thesis will not reference the meetings directly. It limits the use of participating and observing what is going on, but has still provided key insights to the ongoing process. Learnings and issues from the meetings were also used in subsequent interviews, e.g. to follow statements.

Through the part-time job in Domea.dk, one of the authors has also participated in steering group meetings regarding the coming physical refurbishment of Gadehavegård. Participating in these meetings have allowed us to use the minutes taken at these meetings, which could otherwise be hard to access.

Site analysis

As part of the descriptive research design, a site analysis be undertaken in all three distressed social housing estates. The site analysis will be based on Kiib & Marling's (1996) method for structural analysis, which considers the built structure, the green structure and the infrastructure. The method mainly focuses on the physical and functional features of places, but will be combined with a characterization of the residential composition from statistics and interviews. It is not a complete or thorough site analysis, as this is not the main scope of this thesis. Rather, it is an analysis with a selective focus on what really matters and differentiates the areas and how this is connected to the strategy.

3.4 Structure of the thesis

The following section will explain the structure of the thesis and how the different arguments are connected between the chapters. A graphical overview is found in figure 3.

Figure 3: Structure of the thesis. The blue boxes cover the frame of the thesis, they grey boxes are the problem formulation and conclusion connected to each other, and the yellow boxes are the analysis of the case.

The first chapter is an introduction to the field of research and the contemporary debate in the media about distressed social housing estates in Denmark. The introduction leads to the problem formulation. Next, chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework with strategic planning and Healey's (2007) concept of *strategisation* as the overall frame. New governance theories will also be included, as they will be used

to analyze how the roles of municipalities and social housing organizations are changing. Chapter 3, the current chapter, details the research design and completes the frame of the thesis, as all choices for the case study and research are argued for in chapter 1-3.

Following this, the analysis of the case will be presented. Chapter 4 will begin by describing the Danish social housing sector and several underlying conditions and trends. The case of the *By i Balance* project in Høje-Taastrup will then be contextualized by describing the history of Høje-Taastrup, how the municipality's policies about distressed social housing estates have developed over time and how the *By i Balance* project began. Following chapter 5, three separate area-based analytical chapters about Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager will follow, with previous initiatives in the past, the current state of the estates and the strategy for the future to be analyzed. In chapters 5-8, thorough descriptions will constitute the main content, with interviews and written documents being put to use. Following the analysis of the three cases, a discussion in chapter 9 will follow up on the learnings from the three cases. Much of the essence of the problem formulation about the implications of strategic planning and how the actors' roles are affected will be discussed in this chapter. In that sense, the discussion will lead to Chapter 10, where a conclusion to the thesis is given by answering the problem formulation.

4. THE DANISH SOCIAL HOUSING SECTOR

As the designated distressed neighbourhoods in Denmark are all social housing estates, it is important to understand how the Danish social housing sector is organised and what kind of initiatives to transform distressed social housing estates are in place already.

This chapter will take a look at the social housing sector in Denmark, including the historical background, statistics and the structure of the sector. It will then provide a walkthrough of the physical and social issues that face the sector and present the current debate on discourse surrounding distressed social housing estates and what the effect is of being labeled a "ghetto". The chapter will then present the current state of the art within the discipline of transforming distressed social housing estates.

4.1 Review of the sector

979,770 people or ⅙ of the Danish population live in social housing (Landsbyggefonden 2017, a), which indicates that the sector has a substantial size. There are around 550,000 social housing homes, which is ⅕ of all homes in Denmark (ibid.). Social housing is organised as self-owned non-profit social housing organizations, strictly regulated by law and subsidised by the local municipality. Figure 4 provides an overview of the sector's structure. With about 700 housing organizations and 8,000 housing sections (*boligafdelinger* in Danish) of different sizes (Scanlon & Vestergaard 2007), only a small part of the housing sections are on the ghetto list and deemed as distressed.


Figure 4: The Danish social housing sector's structure (own production, based on Engberg (2000)).

Many of the housing estates, which can consist of more than one section, were built during the economic boom in the 1960s-70s, when the welfare state was developed and the Social Democrats lead the political scene (Scanlon & Vestergaard 2007). From 1960 to 1979, 600,000 homes (of all kinds)

were built in Denmark, and in 2008, these homes still constituted 37 % of the total Danish housing stock (Bjørn 2008). Around 200,000 out of the 600,000 homes were built as social housing with the purpose of providing adequate universal access housing (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017), which means the rent is regulated to stay within the reach of low-income residents (Engberg 2000).

The concept of social housing in Denmark was born out of a Social Democratic context and boomed during the formative years of the Danish welfare state (the 1960s and 1970s). Democratic principles were a priority from the beginning and continues to be an important part of how the social housing sector are governed. With a system of residential democracy, the social housing sector has a strong tenants' participation tradition, as all important decisions has to be decided either by the section board (*'afdelingsbestyrelsen'*) or at the annual general assembly (*'beboermødet'*) (Engberg 2000).

Rent must balance the expenditure of the estate's construction and building maintenance. After the mortgage is paid down, normally after 30 years, the rent is kept at the same level, but channeled to the National Building Fund (*Landsbyggefonden* in Danish), who finances continuous refurbishments of social housing (ibid.).

4.2 Characteristics of the social housing estates of the 1960s and 1970s

The following sections will provide a characterization of the social housing estates from the 1960s-70s by providing a historical walkthrough of how the estates and policies have developed. An overview is given on the timeline in figure 5 below.

1960-79	Construction boom. 200,000 social housing homes, many in large housing estates.
1976	White book on housing policy: Warning about social issues in social housing estates.
1980s	Extensive construction damages found. Many estates were refurbished.
1985	The 'Winther' committee: social housing estates suffering from correlating problems ("samspilsramte").
1990	Discourse emerges about 'malfunctioning areas'.
1993	'Byudvalget's first social measures.
1990s	Discourse emerges about 'ghettos'.

Figure 5: Timeline concerning the development in terminology about distressed social housing estates (own production).

As mentioned above, the majority of the Danish social housing estates were built during the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s as the building sector became industrialized. The vision of industrialized construction was created by modernist architects and engineers. The traditional inner cities were overcrowded and the housing conditions were very poor as seen on figure 6.

Figure 6: Left: Courtyard in Smedegade, Nørrebro (Gregers Nielsen), Copenhagen before the slum clearance. Right: Brøndby Strand development under construction (Forstadsmuseet nd.).

New homes were to have more space and direct access to green areas, while being affordable for everyone as exemplified in the Brøndby Strand development (figure 6). A lot of functional and good homes were constructed, and many still remain attractive today (Bech-Danielsen 2008). The National Building Fund was formed in 1967 to support construction of new homes (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

Most of the newly constructed social housing estates were built in the suburbs, where green open spaces, separation of traffic, supermarkets, schools, kindergartens and other public amenities were co-located. It was a dream for many people to move out of the inner cities, and for the traditional working class family, the estates would provide relaxing environments after a long day at work. The estates were given names such as Brøndby Strand Parkerne, Skovparken and Bispehaven, containing 'park', 'forest' or 'garden' in the name, underlining the qualities of the green landscapes (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

The social housing estates built during the 1960s and 1970s were at first a great success, solving issues with lack of housing while being very popular. But during the 1970s, issues slowly emerged. Growing prosperity and tax advantages made single-family houses more attractive, making large apartments in the social housing estates relatively more expensive to live in. With the possibility of buying their own home, families largely rejected the social housing estates (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

At the same time the traditional family values and patterns were changing, enhanced by the youth revolution in 1968, were the safe suburban life in particular was questioned. High-density/low rise housing estates were built instead with an increased focus on communities. As a separate trend, increased individualism emerged, creating new architectural ideals where an individual could express himself (Bech-Danielsen 2008). New postmodern architectural ideals emerged from the United States, criticizing the modernist social housing estates. Mies van der Rohe's famous quote "less is more" was transformed by American architect Robert Venturi to "less is a bore" (Goldberger 1971). In Denmark, the criticism was very much aimed towards the monotonous and similar housing blocks, which harmed the reputation of the social housing sector. As families bought their own homes, a negative spiral was

created during the 1970s (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017). In 1976 a white book on housing policy, released by the Danish labour movement warned that the social housing estates were developing into homes for citizens at the bottom of the social ladder (ibid.).

In the 1980s, the social housing estates faced new challenges, as extensive construction damages became evident. Prefabricated structures, new building techniques and materials were used for the first time during the 1960s-70s. In other words, it was an enormous experiment. A lot of damages were seen especially in the concrete structures and the flat roofs, leading to rainwater leaks (Bech-Danielsen et al. 2011). The construction damages lead to numerous very expensive refurbishment projects during the 1980s. Concurrently, the architects challenged the aesthetics of the monotonous housing blocks by adding pitched roofs because "*a proper house needs a proper roof*" (Bech-Danielsen 2008, p. 97, own translation). Pastel coloured façades, pavilions in the outdoor areas and art on the gables characterize the refurbishments from that period (see examples on figure 7). The style has been criticized for being overly-festive and for not really changing the physical issues in the estates' structure. A few visible variations in the façades have not changed the scale of the estates. The new façade materials were not very durable, requiring a new round of refurbishments later (ibid.). With the growing need for refurbishments, the mandate of The National Building Fund was changed to support refurbishment projects, while the state would support the construction of new homes.

Figure 7. Postmodernist boarding of the Frydenlund social housing estate in Aarhus, Denmark (Photo: Left: Fælles om Frydenlund, n.d. Right: Rasmus Laursen 2008)

In 1985 the Winther report was published, confirming the warning from 1976 that the social housing sector had moved from providing quality homes for everyone to accumulating the weakest groups of the society. Crucially, the report concluded that the issues were not caused by any one reason, but the social housing estates were suffering from 'correlating social, economic and physical problems' ("*samspilsramte boligområder*" in Danish) (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017). An example of this is the municipal *right to assign* ("*anvisningsret*" in Danish) with which municipalities can assign homes to people in need, such as welfare recipients. On the one hand, it provided a purpose for social housing. On the other hand, it led to the population in the social housing estates being poorer and having a higher prevalence of social problems than the population as a whole. Danish housing policy realized that a more focused effort was needed in the social housing estates from the 1960s-70s (ibid.).

Around 1990, enhanced by the learnings from the Winther report, an increased awareness about socially disadvantaged groups emerged. The estates were called 'malfunctioning areas' ("*problemramte*

boligområder"), where the concentration of ethnic minorities and the failure of integration policies were becoming obvious. Mayors in the western parts of the Greater Copenhagen region were particularly loud in the political debate, and in 1993 a town committee ("*byudvalget"*) was formed by the national government. A more holistic approach to the issues in social housing estates were to set out where physical refurbishments should be combined with reductions of rent-levels and social measures concerning integration and crime (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017). Coordinated social measures in the social housing sector were born, and when evaluating the measures, the committee found that the residents actually enjoyed living in their area and that the areas were not only about social issues. The areas contained resources, and by employing a holistic approach containing physical, economic and social measures, social housing estates could achieve positive changes (Munk 1999).

The initiatives also focused on increased collaboration between the housing organizations and the local municipality, where the authorities' initiatives should be better incorporated in the housing estates (ibid.).

Figure 8. Bispehaven social housing estate in Aarhus before and after the 2004-2007 refurbishment. (Photo: Bech-Danielsen et al. 2014)

The 1990s demonstrated the necessity of social initiatives. Physical refurbishments continued with more funds being made available through The National Building Fund, but the refurbishments were criticised for not changing the physical structures and the scale, just like in the 1980s (see figure 8 for an example from Bispehaven in Aarhus). Meanwhile, the political discourse had changed; social housing estates with physical and social issues were referred to as 'ghettos' (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

Today, distressed social housing estates all over Denmark exhibit symptoms similar to those described above. In 2008, architects from Denmark and abroad participated in a series of workshops about the physical and architectural problems plaguing three distressed social housing estates in Denmark. They came up with nine statements that apply to all areas of this kind in Denmark:

1. "*The area shuts out the outside world.*
2. *The area has no centre and no hierarchy.*
3. *The architecture has no identity.*
4. *The area has a bad image.*
5. *There is poor coherence between the outside and the inside.*

6. *The dwellings are similar and cannot be adapted to the individual resident.*

7. *The buildings lack architectural treatment.*

8. *There is a lack of functions and destinations.*

9. *Costly renovations occur on the wrong basis.*" (Holek, Mortensen & Bjørn 2008, p. 102-103, own translation)

The last statement – costly renovations occur on the wrong basis – stands out from the rest in that it does not directly have anything to do with the architecture or the physical layout of the areas in question. Instead it is concerned with the procedural context surrounding the history of refurbishments. It points to the fact that countless renovations have taken place over the years and decades and yet none of them seem to have solved the problems. The statement claims that the renovations have taken the form of a superficial varnish to camouflage the original modernist architecture that quickly fell out of fashion. The problem was not just one of fashion, however, and the problems persisted, now in pastel colours and with postmodernist architectural flourishes. Holek, Mortensen & Bjørn (2008) claim that in order to avoid costly renovations that fail to solve the problem, refurbishment projects must consider the functions, the building types and the broader urban space to actually make a difference.

Before we return to the topic of solving the problems of the distressed social housing estates, the next section will investigate the discourse surrounding them further, and discuss whether the use of the term 'ghetto' is appropriate.

4.3 'Ghettos' and the discourse surrounding distressed social housing estates

As the state of affairs in social housing estates grew harsher, so did the vocabulary used to describe them. From the 1990s onwards, the estates began to be referred to as 'ghettos'. In 1994, the government also presented what was to be the first of six ghetto legislation packages since then. Around the turn of the millennium, ethnic minorities became a hot political issue, and the debate about distressed social housing estates also began to focus on the ethnicity of residents in social housing estates, which were generally much more diverse than Danish society as a whole. This change in the discourse brought with it the widespread use of the word "ghetto".

In 2000, the centre-left government introduced an "Action Plan against Ghetto-ization", and in 2004 the centre-right government (that had taken office in 2001) launched a "Strategy against Ghetto-ization" (Ritzau 2018). This strategy included a new programme committee ("*Programbestyrelsen*" in Danish) with representatives from the social housing sector, the business sector and municipalities. The committee was to keep track on the social housing estates as well as the implementation of the strategy. In 2008, the committee released 15 recommendations for dealing with social housing estates (Programbestyrelsen 2008).

At this point, The Ministry of Welfare was publishing a list annually of distressed social housing estates, with 20 estates represented, in which the municipality had the right to refuse to house residents on various kinds of welfare. This was the list that later came to be known as 'the ghetto list' (Holek &

Bjørn 2008). In 2010, yet another ghetto plan was released, introducing the possibility of "strategic demolition", an end to the assigning of homes in ghetto areas to refugees and the possibility of giving priority to applicants with resources such as those that are employed or in school instead of prioritizing people in dire need (Regeringen 2010). It was also the start of the actual "ghetto list". According to Bech-Danielsen & Christensen (2017), the ghetto list helped kick-start the adoption urban strategic approaches to the problem of distressed social housing estates.

This brings us to 2018, which has so far brought the Prime Minister's New Year's speech and the latest ghetto package dealing with "parallel societies". The presentation and subsequent adoption of this legislative package have led to a flurry of public debate in the media about distressed social housing estates and ghettos. In a count done by Danish relief agency Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke, the word "ghetto" was mentioned 5,595 times in Danish media in January and February of 2018 alone, up from 4,733 times in all of 2017, 2,902 times in 2009 and 744 times in 2000 (Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke 2018).

To get an idea of what the Prime Minister calls ghettos, it is worth looking at the Danish government's ghetto list, published annually since 2010. The criteria for inclusion on the list have changed several times. With the latest ghetto package, the list has five criteria for social housing estates of 1,000 residents or more:

1. The share of 18-64-year-olds with no connection to the labour market or the educational system exceeds 40 percent, measured as an average of the previous two years.
2. The share of residents aged 30-59 years that only have basic training (including unspecified training) exceeds 60 percent of all residents in that age bracket.
3. The average gross income for taxpayers aged 15-64 years in the estate, excluding students, is less than 55 percent of the average gross income for the same group in the region.
4. The share of residents aged 18 years or more convicted for violating the penal code, the firearms act or drug laws constitutes at least three times the national average during the previous two years (2.20 percent as of 2018).
5. The share of immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries exceeds 50 percent (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018).

If a social housing estate meets two of criteria 1-4, they are defined as distressed social housing estates ("*udsatte boligområder*"). There are currently 55 of those housing estates. If a social housing estate meet two of criteria 1-4 and criteria 5, they are defined as ghettos ("*ghettoområder*"). There are currently are 30 of those housing estates. 16 of the ghettos are additionally defined as the "roughest ghettos" ("*de hårdeste ghettoer*"), as they have been defined as ghettos the last four years in a row (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). The three categories can be seen on the map on figure 9 below.

It is worth noting that the government's ghetto list only considers social housing estates. Thus, it does not concern itself with distressed neighbourhoods in areas with condominiums or private rental units, should they exist.

- De 16 hårdeste ghettoområder
- Ghettoområder
- Udsatte boligområder

Figure 9. Distribution of distressed social housing estates, ghettos and the roughest ghettos according to the 2018 ghetto list (Regeringen 2018, a).

Are there any ghettos in Denmark?

Not everyone agrees what the problem is with these distressed social housing estates, or that they should even be called ghettos. Danish housing researcher Troels Schultz Larsen explains:

> *"It is true that they house a lot of people from the bottom of the social hierarchy, but that does not mean that there are ghettos in Denmark. For this reason, the stigmatization of the social housing estates is self-perpetuating". Why are Vollsmose and Mjølnerparken not ghettos? "It is nonsense from a scientific point of view (...) The Danish housing estates are much more diverse and in no way parallel societies as such."* (Reiter & Jensen 2017, own translation).

Schultz Larsen builds on the French-American sociologist Loïc Wacquant, who undertook field studies in black ghettos in Chicago's South Side and compared them with the poor housing estates in the banlieue suburbs of Paris, see figure 10.

Figure 10. Left: Stateway Gardens High-rise Housing Project Photo: Tom Clark. Right: La Courneuve in Paris' banlieue suburbs. Photo: Agnes Dherbyes.

According to Wacquant's definition, a ghetto is "*a geographically defined area in which people with a specific background live, work and typically develop parallel institutions so the area becomes a small, delimited society in itself*" (Hertz 2013, own translation). An important part of this definition is that the residents are not allowed to move out, which leads Wacquant to conclude that there are no ghettos in the Western world today:

> "Today, the vulnerable areas consist of very diverse ethnic groupings and people are free to move away, if they can afford it. Therefore, it serves no purpose to label an area as a ghetto when it isn't a ghetto. The only effect it has is that the area becomes stigmatized and pointed out as the source of problems that are actually often more about unemployment, poor housing conditions or crime" (Loïc Wacquant, in Hertz (2013), own translation).

Drawing on Wacquant's work, Schultz Larsen (2012) assesses distressed social housing estates in Denmark. Even though American ghettos and distressed social housing estates in Denmark share a status at the bottom of the respective housing hierarchies, they are different in terms of historical, social, political and structural measures. For this reason, and because they have even less in common with the Jewish ghettos in Europe during the Second World War and before, Schultz Larsen argues that it is not appropriate to use the term "ghettos" and instead prefers "neglected housing estates" (*forsømte boligområder*) (Schultz Larsen 2012).

It would appear there is not even a consensus on whether ghettos and parallel societies exist in Denmark. In February 2018 (shortly before the government launched the Ghetto Legislative Package), the Danish Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior published an analysis on "Parallel Societies in Denmark" (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet 2018, a). According to the definition in the analysis,

> "A parallel society is physically or mentally isolated and follows its own set of norms and rules without any significant contact with the Danish society and with no wish to become a part of the Danish society. It challenges the cohesion of the Danish society, built up and developed through generations through association activities, common training and education institutions, good neighbourliness and cooperation with colleagues in the workplace, among other things." (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet 2018, a, own translation).

According to the analysis, 28,000 families, or 74,000 individuals, are feared to be living in parallel societies (ibid.). If these numbers are to be believed, there are massive social issues to be tackled. In addition to this, and according to Programme Director at Realdania Astrid Bruus Thomsen, the largest Danish cities are currently experiencing an urbanization that brings with it prosperity and social advances (Frich 2018). However, the increasing prosperity is not evenly distributed and as central neighbourhoods are becoming more attractive, affordable homes are increasingly found in peripheral neighbourhoods, leading to spatial inequality within the cities. This economic segregation and the resulting social segregation mean that social issues are accumulated in the neighbourhoods that offer affordable rents (ibid.). On the other hand, crime levels are falling in the social housing estates, and the percentage of young people that complete high school has increased from 22 percent to 38 percent (ibid.).

Many figures are thrown around in the course of this public debate and it makes a huge difference for the discourse which statistics are figured and how they are presented. For instance, although there is a larger share of residents with a criminal record in social housing estates than in Denmark as a whole (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet 2018, a), the vast majority of residents do not have a criminal record. Rather, it appears that the residents of social housing estates are subject to stigmatization.

Nonetheless, politicians are determined to do something about this perceived problem.

4.4 Current initiatives in distressed social housing estates

As the historical walkthrough in chapter 4.2 showed, a lot of initiatives have been applied since the mass-construction of social housing estates in the 1960s and 1970s. The following section introduces the contemporary initiatives in the Danish social housing sector that deal with distressed housing estates. The initiatives include both physical and social measures, while more radical and urban strategic solutions are emerging.

Physical refurbishments and their organization

As previously mentioned, many of the estates built in the 1960s and 1970s have suffered from construction damages, worn out buildings, which is why the social housing sector has had an increasing focus on refurbishments through The National Building Fund (Bech-Danielsen et al. 2011). Physical refurbishments have generally focused on repairing building damages, making apartments more accessible for the elderly, while architectural improvements such as new façades, new gables, balconies, etc. are also among the typical initiatives (Bech-Danielsen et al. 2011).

The National Building Fund is a key actor in relation to physical refurbishment projects in the Danish social housing sector. They provide funding through loans with very low interest rates, which make it possible for social housing organizations to extensively refurbish a section without significantly raising the rent (Landsbyggefonden nd.). The fund requires comprehensive technical evidence about the building's structural condition to see which damages exist. From such a technical analysis, a social housing organization can apply for funding through four strictly regulated categories:

- Re-establishment of worn out building components; façades, gables, roofs etc.
- Environment improvements of the outdoor areas
- Joining of flats to create more variation between the flats on offer
- Better accessibility for disabled and elderly residents (Landsbyggefonden 2016).

The content of physical refurbishment projects varies a lot from one housing estate to another determined by the local needs, but the process and the actors involved are very similar from project to project as it is regulated by law.

The social housing organization and the general assembly have superior power and can reject or approve a project. A steering committee with representatives from most actors takes the principal decisions. Consultants head the steering committee and take charge of the process and provide technical knowledge and solutions. Task force groups can be set up to take more detailed decisions and can include residents. The municipality works together with the social housing organization, handles the necessary applications and provides financial security (AlmenNet 2013).

Coordinated social measures

Coordinates social measures (*boligsociale helhedsplaner* in Danish) are also supported by The National Building Fund, but while physical refurbishment projects may take place in any estate that needs it, coordinates social measures are only aimed towards distressed social housing estates. Physical refurbishments and coordinate social measures are always run in separate processes. The housing organization has to commit to the measures together with the municipality, and can in addition work together with the police, volunteers and other organizations. Between the actors, coordinated social measures must be formulated and approved by the municipality before the National Building Fund provides funding (Landsbyggefonden nd.).

The increase in the number of coordinates social measures spring from the increasing attention to social issues in distressed social housing estates described in chapter 4.2. Coordinated social measures are generally aimed towards securing better opportunities for residents to get an education, get a job and generally be integrated in society. Research have shown how residents in distressed social housing estates generally have less of such opportunities, resulting in poor cohesion between these estates and the rest of the society (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

The nature of the measures are often individual-oriented, meaning that they offer resources for helping individual residents through initiatives such as advising and network-building, and may address individual residents that cause problems. The measures cover issues such as safety, crime prevention, employment, education and parental responsibility (Frederiksen et al. 2016). By supporting individuals in the distressed estates, the expectation is that such initiatives will benefit the whole area in the long run. Learnings from the most recent coordinated social measures show how some of the individuals who have gained from the initiatives are moving away from the distressed housing estates, thus leaving the social issues behind them. If that is the case, the area will not gain the benefits in the long run after all (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017).

Radical and urban strategic solutions

The traditional approach of physical refurbishment projects have been criticised for not addressing the real architectural and urban planning issues. Questions remain as to why social issues accumulate in specific forms of architecture (Holek & Bjørn 2008). In a 2006 report describing the experiences from 24 Danish municipalities' efforts in distressed social housing estates, planners complained that they were not successful in turning around the negative development in such areas. Several coordinated social measures had been initiated and some had evidently managed to slow down the vicious spiral of social issues, although it had not been reversed. The planners were in the belief that: *"If we did not do the initiatives, what would the development then look like?"* (Engberg 2006, p. 9).

In 2008, the *Programbestyrelsen* programme committee, introduced in section 4.3, concluded that more radical and long-term physical and social changes were needed. As part of the conclusion, the committee stated that the municipalities and the housing organizations play a key role, and have to collaborate better (Programbestyrelsen 2008). A project called *Bogliv i Balance* ('residential life in balance') by Realdania nuanced the analysis of distressed social housing estates and concluded how distressed social housing estates still face issues despite many attempts to solve them. Many social housing organizations and municipalities are willing to change the situation, but the tools do not seem to be sufficient. There is no quick fix to create a more positive development in distressed social housing estates and it requires a threefold focus;

1. Long-term national effort to tackle poverty and segregation on the housing market
2. Integration of distressed social housing estates mentally, infrastructurally and functionally
3. Greater variation of dwellings to keep resourceful residents in the area (Carlberg et al. 2016).

It is partially in light of these learnings that The Prime Minister suggested demolition of distressed social housing estates in his New Year's speech (Statsministeriet 2018). Tearing down the concrete blocks is a much more radical solution than previous physical refurbishment projects, and it has instantly sparked debate about whether it is the right tool. The housing organizations Brabrand Boligforening and AAB have, for instance, argued that demolition in distressed social housing estates may not be the right solution. From their experience, solutions should include better control of who is moving in to the area and construction of owner-occupied dwellings (Jensen 2018). The debate between the government's policies and the social housing sector clearly shows how different new and more radical tools and initiatives are perceived in distressed social housing estates. These kinds of tools are also called urban strategic solutions by Claus Bech-Danielsen and Marie Stender (2017).

In their book, they present a state of the art tool box with 12 initiatives that can help transform a distressed social housing estate:

- Diffuse boundaries; adapt physical barriers (e.g. large housing blocks) or natural barriers (e.g. embankments)
- Traffic connections; new roads and paths, public transport
- Mixed functions; retail, public institutions, culture, jobs
- Attractions; cultural, sport or leisure facilities, interesting urban spaces

- Mixed tenure and types of dwellings; densification, merging of flats, sale of flats
- Refurbishment of buildings and architectural upgrades; repair building damages, better qualities inside the dwellings
- Demolition; complete or partial
- The edge between private and public; private gardens, visual contact between dwellings and outdoor areas
- Outdoor areas; specific functions, divide large areas, more variation
- Image; name change, branding, media, events open for all citizens
- New communities; personal contact, facilities for groups, open facilities for neighbours
- Connection between physical and social initiatives; involvement of tenants, local communities with new facilities, temporary experiments (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017).

The tool box is primarily about physical initiatives, and the authors emphasise how it should not be perceived as a final recipe, and has to be adjusted to the specific case (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). Some of the tools focus on knitting the distressed social housing estate together with the rest of the city by breaking down barriers, which is key to creating urban strategic solutions. Other tools focus on creating a more mixed residential make-up or more traditional refurbishment measures that make the dwellings more attractive.

Based on Danish and international cases, the book concludes that it is possible to transform an area from being distressed to becoming more attractive by combining the right tools for the specific case (ibid.). On the other hand, it is more dubious how much such initiatives actually change the residents' life and prosperity. This perspective will be further discussed in chapter 9.

4.5 Semi-conclusion

In this chapter, we introduced the social housing sector. Since one sixth of Danes live in social housing, changes and problems within the sector has an impact on many people. Of the thousands of housing sections, only a fraction is on the government's ghetto list.

However, much of the social housing built in the 1960s and 1970s has been facing problems almost from the beginning, and the chapter chronicled the many attempts over the decades at rectifying defects in the construction and architecture of the estates. Various studies, reports and expert committees have taken a stab at the problems, and although none of them have completely solved the problem, it would appear that they have added to the accumulated knowledge of the field, as the measures applied have become progressively more ambitious and radical.

The terminology has changed, too. The chapter examined the changes over the years in the language used. Today, the prevalent word used in Danish for distressed social housing estates is "ghetto", not least because of its use in official government communication. Finally, the chapter provided a look at the current state of the art concerning physical refurbishments, social initiatives and the latest batch of urban strategic planning measures. In the following chapter, we will look at Høje-Taastrup Municipality, their past and current plans and the *By i Balance* project in particular.

5. CONTEXTUALIZING HØJE-TAASTRUP AND BY I BALANCE

Høje-Taastrup is a suburb and municipality in the western part of the Greater Copenhagen region. This chapter will present an historical overview of Høje-Taastrup in order to understand the urban context of the three distressed social housing estates examined in this thesis. In addition, Høje-Taastrup Municipality's work with Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlottekvarteret will be presented, as their approach has changed a lot through the years. The latest effort is a strategic development plan through Realdania's campaign *By i Balance*, which will be outlined as well.

5.1 The history of Høje-Taastrup

The municipality of Høje-Taastrup contains three main towns: the centrally located Høje-Taastrup, Taastrup in the east and Hedehusene further to the west as seen on the map in figure 11. The municipality also contains several small villages that are not relevant for this thesis.

Figure 11: Map of Høje-Taastrup Municipality with Hedehusene, Høje-Taastrup and Taastrup. The distressed social housing estates are highlighted (own production based on Styrelsen for Dataforsyning og Effektivisering 2018).

While there is an old village called Høje-Taastrup in the periphery of the current town, the current Høje-Taastrup is one of the suburbs planned during the 1960s when an unprecedented need for

housing and a booming economy resulted in the construction of Copenhagen's western suburbs. Together with Lyngby and Hundige, Høje-Taastrup was mentioned as a new regional centre in the regional plan of 1963. A new central train station with intercity train and S-train connections, a shopping mall and a city with 80,000 citizens and 80,000 jobs were to be constructed (Faber 2018). The planners were inspired by American cities with large boulevards and skyscrapers set to dominate, as seen on the master plan in figure 12. The development had to be lead by public investments, and it was even proposed that the government could move to Høje-Taastrup (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, b).

Figure 12: Drawing of the master plan for Høje-Taastrup from 1968 (Faber 2018).

The mall was named City2, clearly signalling the level of the ambitions for Høje-Taastrup. It was supposed to be well integrated with the coming central station. The decision about the station nevertheless dragged out, leading to the investors constructing City2 in 1975 on a greenfield site closer to Taastrup (Ingeniøren 1995). Two years later, the state finally decided to build the new central station, also opening for new development around the station. The new neighbourhood around the station was developed according to completely different architectural ideals, more like a traditional Danish market

town with mixed housing and business. Despite the best intentions, the neighbourhood never got successful, maybe caused by City2 attracting customers by car instead (ibid.).

Generally, the grand visions formulated in the 1960s were never fulfilled and decisions dragged out leading to a variety of isolated 'islands' of city with different functions, as seen on figure 13 (Faber 2018; Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, b).

Figure 13. Map: Concept map of the division between the neighbourhoods. (*Bycentrum* = city centre in Danish). (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, b). Photos from Høje-Taastrup town centre: Separated traffic infrastructure lies unused, while vacant lots puncture the city structure.

New urban development plans

The obvious spatial concerns in Høje-Taastrup have lead the municipality to initiate several plans for new urban development. They are based on the existing strengths, as the towns are generally well connected to the rest of the region and the country, while there is plenty of nature nearby. For the three major towns in the municipality, an overall strategy has been formulated in Høje-Taastrup's municipal plan for 2014-2026:

- Taastrup: a classic town with a railway station (*stationsby*) with culture, urban life and green spaces
- Høje-Taastrup: a regional centre for shopping, business and creative industries economy
- Hedehusene: a provincial town with a railway station and cultural heritage. Innovative urban development and an interesting place to live close to green surroundings (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014).

The overall strategy indicates *focusing and framing* of the urban development in Høje-Taastrup Municipality, according to Healey's (2007) terminology. The framing is aimed at the entire towns and not directly at the distressed social housing estates, but it nevertheless sets a direction for the overall urban development. The strategy for development (*'Udviklingsstrategi'*) in Høje-Taastrup Municipality in 2016-2028 aims to attract new citizens in order to create economic growth. It is to succeed by offering new housing opportunities and by creating a better image in attractive urban areas with a variety of activities (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, c). In other words, the municipality is opening up for significantly transforming the current towns and their spatial and social characteristics, which in turn will affect Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager. The overall strategy is clearly evident in the development of Høje-Taastrup C, Nærheden and Nordic Water Universe. These developments will be presented below.

Høje-Taastrup C is the name of the coming development between the City2 shopping mall and the neighbourhood by the train station, see figure 14. Today, the area is dominated by Blekinge Boulevard, laid out according to the modernist vision from the 1960s, but will be transformed into a proper urban area that connects the divided town of Høje-Taastrup. According to the plans, a park and new housing opportunities in a safe environment with modern urban spaces will transform the area from being a boulevard to being a city (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, b), creating a clear *framing* of Høje-Taastrup C. An urban development company has been set up between the municipality, City2's owner and a landowner to realize the plan (Faber 2018). The

Figure 14. Master Plan for Høje-Taastrup C (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a).

municipality has even decided to build a new town hall in the area as the present one is worn out, clearly stating their ambitions for the area (Egerup 2017). All in all, the narrative about Høje-Taastrup C signals a rejuvenation of Høje-Taastrup from the divided city to a modern city.

Nærheden is framed as "*the suburb of the future*" (Nærheden P/S 2015) and is located in Hedehusene. In partnership with Realdania, the municipality is currently developing the area with the first residents having moved in during March 2018 (Nærheden P/S 2018). The framing about Nærheden is convenience and the proximity (Nærheden means 'the proximity' in Danish) to transportation,

shopping, leisure and nature. It is possible to reach Copenhagen Central Station in 20 minutes by train, and with a planned "green loop" pathway system, it will be easy to get around. A new modern school will be constructed, so families have every function for daily life close by. The ambition is to attract well-resourced families and people that want to engage themselves in the neighbourhood (Nærheden P/S 2015).

Figure 15: Artist's rendering of Nærheden (Nærheden P/S 2015).

Nordic Water Universe is a project containing the world's fifth largest water park, hotels, restaurants and various amusements. According to Høje-Taastrup Municipality, it will provide 3,000 jobs and attract tourists and Danish families from the whole country to Høje-Taastrup with its location just north of Roskildevej (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, a).

These three projects are significant in scale and will presumably – when fully developed – have a huge impact on the municipality, if all goes according to plan. The cities will be transformed, and new residents and visitors will be attracted in order to create economic growth. The effects of these projects on the distressed social housing estates will be further analyzed in chapter 6-8.

The following section will cover the municipality's overall policies about distressed social housing estates. An understanding of those policies, along with the history of Høje-Taastrup accounted for above, create a basis for analyzing Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager.

5.2 Policies for distressed social housing estates in Høje-Taastrup

Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager were built as part of the development of Høje-Taastrup. The three housing estates will be further assessed separately in chapter 6-8, with each of their own contexts and histories. In general, since the 1980s the three social housing estates have faced some of the same physical and social issues as described in chapter 4.2. This was partially due to the municipality's placement of people with social problems during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Taastrupgaard. As the previous major Anders Bak (1986-2005) acknowledged:

> *"It was for the ease of things that homeless people or people with other social problems were assigned to Tåstrupgård. Mostly because there were always vacant apartments there [Tåstrupgård], and people could practically come in straight off the street"* (quoted in Christensen and Elkjaer, 2000, translated by Schultz Larsen 2013).

This lead the municipality to initiate several projects. Høje-Taastrup Municipality initiated their first social initiatives through *Byudvalget* in 1993-94 and later through the state-funded *Byer for Alle* ('Cities for Everyone') programme in 2000-03 (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017). Both focused mainly on employment, establishing a so called 'job express'. In the municipal plan from 2000, the social housing estates are "*areas characterized by marginalized sections of the population with great social issues*" (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2000, p. 55, own translation). The issues are perceived as being internal, inside the housing estates themselves. The housing estates were assessed to be in a negative spiral, leading to the importance of the social initiatives (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2000).

In the municipal plan from 2006, the municipality has increased its focus on creating good connections between different functions in the towns, with the aim of strengthening the areas close to the train stations. The municipal plan stated that not only the areas close to the stations, but the entire towns had to function better as a whole. To this end, the municipality initiated urban renewal programmes around the Selsmose lake close to Taastrupgaard with a focus on cultural institutions and for Charlottekvarteret with a focus on recreational activities (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2006). From these urban renewal projects, the focus evidently shifted from the internal issues of the residents inside the housing estates to the connections between the housing estates and the rest of the city. This approach has gained more focus ever since (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). This change of focus indicates a step towards thinking strategically about the distressed social housing estates.

The first of the social initiatives in the 1990s and early 2000s were followed by coordinated social measures from 2008 funded by The National Building Fund. These are still running (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). In 2010, the municipal plan stated that the coordinated social measures had to be strengthened. With the ambition of making Høje-Taastrup a good place to live, focus was aimed at strengthening the coordinated social measures to integrate the distressed social housing estates with the rest of the city (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2010).

'New Focus'

Høje-Taastrup Municipality's policies about distressed social housing estates have moved from seeing the social issues as an internal issue to seeing them as an issue relevant from a broader urban perspective. Following this shift, the municipality engaged a new policy programme called '*Nyt fokus på udsatte boligområder*' ('New focus on distressed social housing estates' or 'New Focus' in short) that sets out five initiatives:

1. Urban transformation: to integrate the housing estates with the rest of the city
2. Neighbourhood profiles: to ensure the estates are part of a neighbourhood with its own identity and attractions
3. An active housing policy: to ensure a reasonable mix of tenures and more mixed neighbourhoods

4. Family initiatives: to help vulnerable families and collaborate better across the public sectors
5. Institutions and schools: to offer a high quality of education and ensure that families with many resources do not opt out of the public schools (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2018).

New Focus' five initiatives are also a *framing* of future actions, as they have been *filtered* in as the interventions in the distressed social housing estates. It is a framing that will affect future projects that involve the municipality's efforts as well as the social housing organizations as it sets an agenda and a direction. According to Philip Arnhild and Rune Bæklund (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund), the policy programme was the municipality's first attempt at thinking strategically about the distressed social housing estates. In that sense, the framing will also set a direction for the rest of the strategy-formulation. The programme was formulated inside the municipality itself, as they had to align their stance within their organization on distressed social housing estates (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). As all the departments were involved in creating the policy programme, it is a clear attempt to practice *meta-governance* inside the municipality itself (Engberg & Larsen 2010). New Focus provides horizontal foci and goals that unify the local authority.

A cross-sectorial task force for distressed neighbourhoods has been set up in Høje-Taastrup Municipality, handling all the contact with the social housing organizations. The task force's work contains everything from urban development, culture and handling the coordinated social measures, securing coordination between different initiatives in Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). The task force was even expanded with a development adviser in 2017 that focuses on strategic planning and the *By i Balance* project. By hiring extra manpower, Høje-Taastrup acquired *intellectual power* and *generated mobilising force* to carry out strategic planning, in Healey's (2007) terms. The urban planners in the task force are therefore similar to what Sehested (2009) calls network managers, as they coordinate dialogue between a number of projects and actors. Greater responsibility is certainly given to the municipality's task force. For the social housing organizations, the task force can create a direct contact to influential professionals in the municipality's administration. On the other hand, the contact is very dependent on individuals and personal relationships, as the task force only has five employees.

Following the release of the New Focus programme in January 2016, the municipality has engaged in collaborations with the housing organizations and formed a so-called article 17, subarticle 4 committee[2], with politicians from the city council and the social housing sections (VIBO, AKB Taastrup and DFB) (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2018). The committee has to find solutions together and unite their influence strategically and practically. Ranking under the committee is a programme steering group with managers and key project staff from the municipality and the social housing organizations' administrations (VIBO, KAB and Domea.dk), which is in turn served by the project secretariat consisting of project staff from all the actors. The governance structure is represented in figure 16 below:

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[2] An article 17, subarticle 4 committee can be set up by any municipality to handle a specific task set by the city council. The city council can decide the members and rules of the committee (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet, no. 2 2018, b).

Figure 16: The organizational set-up formed in accordance to 'New Focus'.

With the 17-4 committee and the programme steering group, Høje-Taastrup Municipality has created an organizational structure where better coordination can be exercised. As both the municipality and the social housing organizations are represented, the municipality has created *network governance* structures between itself and actors from the local neighbourhood (Engberg & Larsen 2010). The close collaboration with the social housing organizations have also *generated mobilising power* to the strategic planning. With politicians and executives involved, an advocacy coalition is formed, as Healey (2007) calls it. The members may not agree about everything, but a shared understanding can still be developed.

From perceiving social issues in distressed social housing estates as being confined to those estates, Høje-Taastrup Municipality has changed their approach radically since the turn of the millennium. With the 'New Focus' policy programme, the municipality has generated *mobilising power* by setting up an internal task force, created a 17-4 committee and a programme steering group. Høje-Taastrup Municipality is now thinking more strategically and with 'New Focus' has set a direction for further strategy formulation as specific initiatives are framed, while new ways of collaborating are formed between the municipality and the social housing organizations.

5.3 The *By i Balance* project in Høje-Taastrup

In the beginning of 2016, Realdania[3] contacted Høje-Taastrup Municipality to collaborate on distressed social housing estates. Realdania's initial contact was based on 'New Focus' and the plan for Taastrupgaard that includes the demolition of eight blocks and building a new school on the site. The municipality's strategic plans had caught the attention of Realdania and the municipality was invited to participate in *By i balance* (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund).

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[3] Realdania is an association formed in 2000 that funds development in the built environment to create quality of life for everyone. They have a philanthropic department and a department that invests in urban development to secure a financial return (Realdania nd., a)

Realdania had a preliminary project before *By i Balance* called *Boligliv i Balance*, as described in section 4.4, were experiences from the last 30 years' initiatives in distressed social housing estates were collected (Carlberg et al. 2016). Emphasis was given to applying a strategic planning approach, to securing flexibility and to robustness when planning in distressed social housing estates (Kvorning 2016). Realdania also emphasises the importance of combining urban planning with initiatives of social, education and employment measures (Realdania nd., b). When engaging in *By i Balance*, Høje-Taastrup Municipality and the social housing organizations have to formulate a strategic development plan that can combine traditional refurbishment projects, coordinated social measures and the municipal welfare. This means that public institutions (schools etc.) and the local businesses have to be integrated in new ways (Realdania 2016, a), very much like the concepts of *network governance*.

Høje-Taastrup Municipality acquired *intellectual power* from Realdania because Realdania had gained knowledge through *Boligliv i Balance*, and generally have skilled professionals employed. The *By i Balance* campaign requires the municipality in question to develop a strategic development plan, constituting a *statutory duty* to actually formulate a strategy. The involvement of Realdania generally meant that Høje-Taastrup *generated mobilising force* for their strategic planning in the distressed social housing estates.

The *By i Balance* campaign is engaged in several ways, and besides Høje-Taastrup, the same kind of strategic development plan is being developed in Esbjerg and Gladsaxe municipalities, so Realdania has three cases to collect experiences from. An expert group is formed to share knowledge and experience between the three case municipalities, while a committee for change (*'forandringsudvalg'*) is formed to affect the regulatory framework (Realdania 2016, a). These groups are a result of Realdania's collective impact approach, which means that they try to affect the conditions for a positive impact in distressed social housing estates in several ways (App.: Härtel Jensen). It can also be seen as a way of generating *transformative force*, where legal rules and existing knowledge of key actors are challenged (Healey 2007). The organizational set-up of *By i Balance* is seen on figure 17 below.


Figure 17: Organizational set-up of *By i Balance*. Høje-Taastrup is just one of three cases.

Start-up of *By i Balance* in Høje-Taastrup

In February 2017, a programme for the strategic development plan was formulated in a collaboration between Høje-Taastrup Municipality, the three social housing organizations VIBO, AKB Taastrup/KAB and DFB/Domea.dk, as well as Realdania. The programme describes the aim of the plan as:

> *"It is the ambition of the strategic development plan to get a common picture of the future which creates ownership, excitement and a desire to collaborate. The strategic development plan creates long-term goals and creates a basis for decisions, investments and policy towards 2040."* (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017, p. 13, own translation).

Furthermore, the programme describes how the municipality and the social housing organizations have already initiated several projects, such as Høje-Taastrup C, Nærheden and Nordic Water Universe as described in section 5.1. According to the programme, the strategic plan should unite the current forces and create a long-term, ambitious and holistic approach to permanently transform the distressed housing estates socially, functionally and mentally. At the same time, the plan is to capture regional and societal trends as a basis for collective development for the whole municipality towards 2040 (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017). Through these means, the plan should fulfill a vision of developing Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlottekvarteret from isolated enclaves with a skewed residential mix into well-functioning neighbourhoods (ibid.):

> *"The vision is that Høje-Taastrup Municipality in 2040 is known for its including neighbourhoods and a strong and visionary educational and entrepreneurial environment that attracts new residents and businesses and hereby secures the municipality a robust and sustainable future."* (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017, p. 10, own translation).

The vision presents a *framing*, as its emphasis is on educational and entrepreneurial environments to attract new residents and hereby strengthen the municipality's tax base. The programme was formulated between Realdania, the municipality and all three social housing organizations. Representatives from VIBO and Domea.dk indicate that the municipality was leading the contact with Realdania as they had the most knowledge and insight into the strategic approach at that time (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Accordingly, it is no surprise how the framing focuses on securing a robust future for the municipality.

The programme also describes what the strategic development plan – the strategy – should entail and contribute to. Local qualities and potentials should form a foundation for transforming the distressed social housing estates, and already initiated projects should be integrated. Regional and broader trends seen in society should also support the strategy to create long-lasting positive development. A set of specific measures are also set out concerning:

1. *Social development*: How the residents in the distressed social housing estates can benefit from businesses and educational offers in the municipality,
2. *Physical transformations*: How Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager appear in 2040, integrated in their neighbourhoods,
3. *Safety and image*: How to create local pride, better neighbourhoods and more happiness in the housing estates,

4. *Collaborations and alliances*: How to ensure economic, political and local support among the municipality, social housing organizations, citizens, local businesses, potential investors, public institutions and associations (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017).

In that sense, the programme quite clearly expresses what the strategy for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager should entail. A *filtering* of how to intervene in the distressed social housing estates is presented. Since the programme describes that the areas are dynamic because several actors and projects are involved in their development (Høje-Taastrup Kommune et al. 2017), the complexity of planning is acknowledged, much like Healey's (2007) understanding of strategic thinking.

After the programme was set up, it was put out to tender (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). In June 2017, a team of external consultants lead by The Bureau Niels Bjørn was chosen to compile the strategic development plan. The team has several different competences, ranging from architects to consultants who work with strategies more broadly in the public sector (Realdania 2017). The head of the consultant team has previously worked with Kildeparken in Aalborg, Gellerupparken in Aarhus and Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen, as some of the first examples of distressed social housing estates where more radical physical solutions have been applied (Bjørn 2016). By hiring the consultants, the local actors *generated mobilising force* as the consultants provide expertise that the local actors do not possess themselves (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Healey (2007) describes how the statutory duty, in this case Realdania's requirement to produce a strategic development plan, gives legitimacy to hiring consultants to produce the strategy.

5.4 Semi-conclusion

The urban areas in Høje-Taastrup where the distressed social housing estates are located were planned in the 1960s and 1970s, and generally suffer from a lack of connections and integration. New urban development projects and the handling of the distressed social housing estates are now trying to address these issues. With the formulation of 'New Focus', the municipality has initiated a new way of thinking that is more strategic. Initiatives have to be coordinated better across sectors, and the housing estates have to be integrated with the rest of the city, which can be described as a *framing* for further strategy-making. Through a municipal task force, a 17-4 committee and a programme steering group *new network governance* structures have been set up that generate *mobilising power* to form a strategy. Based on New Focus, Realdania contacted Høje-Taastrup Municipality, starting a more formalised process of formulating a strategic development plan for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager. With Realdania and a team of consultants, more knowledge and a requirement to produce an explicit strategy has generated *mobilising power*. As the municipality was the front runner with regards to the early contact with Realdania, their interests might have dominated the early *framing* of foci and goals in the *By i Balance* programme. Nevertheless, Realdania's involvement and the start-up of *By i Balance* initiated a *strategisation* process.

6. TAASTRUPGAARD

The following chapter will provide an analysis of the implications of strategic planning in Taastrupgaard, based on the strategy-making process currently underway. At first will a historic walkthrough of Taastrupgaard from its construction be outlined, as several projects have tried to improve Taastrupgaard. Following that will a site analysis describe the estate of today, before the strategy for the future development will be investigated.

Taastrupgaard:

- Commissioned in 1972
- 79,157 m^2
- 915 flats (studios to five-bedroom flats)
- 2,658 residents
- 50 nationalities represented
- Social housing organization: AKB Taastrup
- Administration: KAB
 (AKB Taastrup 2014; Landsbyggefonden 2018).

Figure 18: Aerial photo of Taastrupgaard with the long housing block to the north at the top of the picture (Apple Maps 2018) and a view in between the buildings.

6.1 Taastrupgaard in the past

1972	Taastrupgaard commissioned
1981	Renovation: building damages repaired
1990	Refurbishment: pitched roofs and colured façades
1993	Social initiatives initiated
2005	Refurbishment: parking decks removed
2008	Coordinated social measures begins

Figure 19. Timeline of important events in the history of Taastrupgaard.

Taastrupgaard was commissioned in 1972 by the social housing organization AKB Taastrup. As such, it is the oldest of the three social housing estates examined in this thesis. Testimony of problems with Taastrupgaard goes back to before the construction was finished. During the early 1960s, the optimism surrounding Høje-Taastrup as the new centre of the capital knew few limits. AKB had bought 80 hectares of farmland with the intention of erecting Taastrupgaard there (Christiansen & Elkjær 2000). The mayor at the time, however, would rather have single-family homes on that lot, and Taastrupgaard was relegated to the long and narrow lot that it occupies today – about a third of the area of the intended plot. AKB maintained their plans for almost 1000 flats, even with the vastly reduced area at their disposal, which meant that the estate turned out extraordinarily dense, especially compared to other social housing estates of the time, which figure 18 indicates on the previous page.

A promotional leaflet from before 1972 tells about Taastrupgaard as a modern housing estate, where families could live in good conditions and where people are in the centre of attention. Large flats and several functions would allow people to not just live in Taastrupgaard but to enjoy life (AKB nd., a). During the design and planning phase, a number of cutbacks were made to the construction quality and the functions. For instance, a community centre with a day nursery, two kindergartens, a youth recreation centre, shops, 24 homes for senior citizens, therapy rooms, offices, a residents' hotel, a restaurant and a conference room for 300 people was scrapped because it was too expensive. In its place came a watered-down version with one shop, one youth recreation centre, one thrift shop and ball rooms (Christiansen & Elkjær 2000).

The dream of persuading the middle class to settle in Taastrupgaard fell to the ground, just as many other contemporary social housing estates, as increasing prosperity and favourable credit facilities meant that it was now an option for large parts of the middle class to buy their own house. This meant that there were many empty flats, and the municipal social services department used the opportunity to send people with social problems, immigrants and the unemployed to Taastrupgaard.

As early as 1981, as a result of the many corners cut during the design and construction phases, the first renovations took place: The roofs and balconies were leaking and the window frames were rotting. In 1983, more than 10 percent of the flats were empty (Christiansen & Elkjær 2000). In a leaflet published sometime between 1982 and 1986, the Taastrupgaard section board acknowledges the construction defects and reasons that this had led to some residents moving out. But the defects had all been dealt with, and the number of immigrants and refugees living in the estate have been exaggerated, and that they cause no more problems than the ethnic Danish residents (AKB n.d., b). In 1984, just 12 years after Taastrupgaard was inaugurated, the problems facing the social housing estate prompted a member of the Høje-Taastrup city council to propose tearing down the entire long block of the estate, but it did not happen at that time (Politiken 1984).

By 1990, the next renovation had been carried out – this one also trying to meet some of the criticism of the estate's architecture. In the 1990 makeover, pitched roofs were built on top of the flat roofs, colours were added to the façades and about half of the underground parking facilities between the buildings were removed because they felt unsafe and were leaking rainwater (see figures 20 and 21). Also included was the construction of a community centre building on the parking lot north of the estate (Christiansen & Elkjær 2000).

Figure 20. Looking west with the long block on the left, before (circa 1983) and after (February 2018) the parking floor was removed (Left: AKB n.d., b; right: own production)


Figure 21. Looking north through the long block, before (circa 1983) and after (February 2018) the parking floor was removed (Left: AKB n.d., b; right: own production).

In 1999, there were plans once again to demolish the long block, although this time only partially (Møller 1999, Christiansen & Elkjær 2000). 80 flats and 17 youth apartments were to be removed,

leaving four separate buildings instead of one long building. The idea came from the social housing organization AKB and had the support of the municipality as well as the national Minister for Cities and Housing (Møller 1999). Nevertheless was the plan not approved by the residents, and was replaced by a slightly less ambitious plan that did not include any demolition, but did include the removal of the last underground parking as well as the beautification of the exterior of buildings and of the public areas finished in 2005. Issues with leaks and perceived insecurity from the underground parking was eliminated (Bjørn 2018), but since the "ground floor" on which pedestrians walk was lowered by one storey, the buildings seem taller. According to Claus Bjørton, client manager at KAB, the removal of the parking floor was a big mistake since it has made the estate seem even denser than it already was. In his words, "*They took a development that was born in sin and they made it even more misanthropic*" (App. Bjørton).

Also, the rooms in the new ground floor, which used to be in the basement, cannot be used for habitation. This leads to empty ground floors and a lack of "eyes on the street", again increasing the feeling of insecurity. The removal of the parking decks brought with it a major remodeling of the public areas in the estate, including a new east-west main street for pedestrians along the south side of the long block to the north and new public squares within the estate. In 2015, solar panels were installed on the roofs of many of the buildings and some of the playgrounds in the estate were remodelled (App. Bjørton).

Additionally to all the physical renovations, have coordinated social measures been ongoing since 2008. The first social initiatives began in 1993 by focusing on employment as described in chapter 5. Since The National Building Fund started to support social measures in 2008, have 4-year plans followed each other continuously. The current coordinated social measures focuses on crime prevention, education, employment, parent's responsibility, safety and well-being (AKB Taastrup & Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016), so a wide range of activities are engaged.

6.2 Taastrupgaard today

This section will examine Taastrupgaard as it appears today. Using site analysis and statistics, it will provide a characterization of the estate as well as of KAB, the social housing organization that manages Taastrupgaard. The site analysis draws inspiration from Hans Kiib and Gitte Marling's paper on structural analysis (Kiib & Marling 1996).

Site analysis

Taastrupgaard is situated north of the westbound railway line and of a railway depot used to maintain the S-trains, as seen on figure 22 below. The railway has four tracks all the way between Copenhagen and Roskilde and sees heavy traffic with all kinds of trains (S-trains, regional trains, intercity trains and freight trains). As such, the railway along with the depot constitutes a wide and impenetrable barrier between the areas lying to the north and the south of the railway.

Figure 22. Bird's view of Taastrupgaard from the south. The railway depot is visible in the bottom of the picture (Apple Maps 2018).

Seen on the map on figure 23, are Taastrup railway station 0.5-1 kilometre to the east and Høje-Taastrup railway station 1-1.5 kilometre to the southwest. West of the estate, Taastrupgaard is bordered by Hveen Boulevard, a four-lane road with a wide, fenced median. On the other side of the road is the Gadehavegård estate, but the two areas are clearly divided by the road. North of Taastrupgaard's almost 600 metre-long housing block, once billed as being Denmark's longest building, an equally long parking lot stretches out in the shade cast by the building. North of the parking lot lie Taastrupgaardsvej and an industrial estate housing companies such as an electronics big-box store, a lorry dealership and a bread factory. IKEA is also located further north of Roskildevej. To the east is probably Taastrupgaard's softest boundary, in that the estate neighbours the Selsmoseskolen school and a couple of child care institutions. Further east is Taastrup Theatre, the Taastrup Have condominium estate, playing fields connected to the school and the Selsmose Lake, which all can be found on the map below.

Figure 23. Map showing Taastrupgaard and surroundings (own production, Styrelsen for Dataforsyning og Effektivisering 2018).

Zooming in a bit closer, the Taastrupgaard of today is a combination of the estate as it was when it was commissioned in 1972 and of the many renovations and "beautification" efforts undertaken over the years. On one hand, the appearance of the buildings have changed considerably. The pitched roofs and the off-white colour combine to give the buildings a completely different architectural expression than the one they were built with (see figures 20 and 21). However has the basic layout of the estate not changed much, with all of the original buildings still in place. This includes the scale (Møller 1999) and the density (App. Bjørton). The scale of Taastrupgaard is typical of many social housing estates built in the 1960s and 1970s and is usually a result of the massive need for housing. The high density of Taastrupgaard caused by the before-mentioned substitution of plots, however, is quite atypical since part of the objective of all the new social housing estates was to provide more space and light for the inner-city working class.

Today, Taastrupgaard appears with some greenery, although mainly to the west, south and east of the estate. To the west, a hedge of large trees shields the estate from the wide Hveen Boulevard. To the south, a strip of greenery between the estate's buildings and the railway depot contain an east-west bike-pedestrian path, trees and lawns (see figure 24). That said, all the greenery is not particular inviting with regards to people sitting down and taking a break, and small hills along the path south of Taastrupgaard were even built with construction waste (App. Bjørton). The missing green qualities are actually quite unusual for similar social housing estates from the 1960s-70s (Bech-Danielsen 2008).

Motorists enter Taastrupgaard from the north from Taastrupgaardsvej and can park by an oblong parking lot stretching all along the almost-600 metre building, only broken in two by the community house in the middle of the parking lot. The ground floor of the long housing block primarily houses parking garages, so to actually enter the building, one has to climb a flight of stairs (or use an elevator) to access an access balcony (see figure 24).

Figure 24. Left: East-west paths south of Taastrupgaard. Right: Looking west along the north side of the long block: Taastrupgaard's immense parking lot in the shadow cast by the immense building (own

A community house and small square from the 2005 refurbishment in front of the long building creates a centre and a sense of hierarchy in Taastrupgaard, as a passage under the building was also opened up (see figure 25).

Figure 25. Aerial photo of Taastrupgaard looking south with the community house and the reception plaza in the centre (Bing Maps 2018).

Once inside the estate, the density of the buildings is immediately obvious. As mentioned and as criticized by Claus Bjørton (App. Bjørton), the density leaves little room for green recreational areas between the buildings and may also create a claustrophobic feeling. On the other hand, density is something that is often sought after in modernist housing estates with their deserted wide lawns. In Taastrupgaard, the public area next to each building is easily taken in from the windows and balconies, and the buildings are no taller than the four to five storeys that Jan Gehl recommends for visual and

verbal communication to be possible between ground floor and apartment (Gehl 2010). In this regard, the level of density in Taastrupgaard appear to have more in common with turn-of-the-century tenement blocks in central Copenhagen – or even popular terraces such as *Kartoffelrækkerne* – than it does with other modernist housing estates.

Figure 26. Taastrupgaard's density has benefits as well as drawbacks (own production).

Residential composition

Looking at the residential composition in Taastrupgaard, statistics from the Government's new list of ghettos released in May 2018 (see table 4) make Taastrupgaard one of the 'roughest ghettos' in Denmark. The share of people with non-Western background, with only elementary school as their education and with a low average income compared to the rest of the country are the criteria were Taastrupgaard falls short. Particularly noteworthy is the high percentage of residents with only elementary school as their education. Furthermore, Taastrupgaard is the most populous social housing estate of the three examined in this thesis. About ⅓ of the residents are less than 18 years old and there are 2.9 persons per household (Danmarks Statistik 2015, a), meaning that a lot of children live in Taastrupgaard.

Residents +1,000	Unemployed > 40%	Non-Western background > 50%	Convicted > 2,2%	Only elementary school > 60%	Average income < 55%
2,698	30.3 %	66.6 %	2.1 %	83.4 %	51.2 %

Table 4: Residential statistics about Taastrupgaard from the Government's new list of ghettos (Transport, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018).

Claus Bjørton describes how many of the people with non-Western background are the third generation in their family who lives in Taastrupgaard and are Danish citizens just as their parents. So even though a lot of people in Taastrupgaard might look a bit different than some other Danes, many of the successful stories about residents who goes to university etc. are among this group of people with non-Western background. Furthermore, is it a lifestyle and an active option for this group to live in Taastrupgaard. Even though many positive stories exist, problems still persist and according to Claus

Bjørton, many of the ethnic Danish residents are the really poor ones and are placed in Taastrupgaard by the authorities (App. Bjørton).

KAB and AKB Taastrup

KAB, formed in 1920 as *Københavns Almindelige Boligselskab* ("Normal Residential Corporation of Copenhagen"), is a non-profit company that today manages around 50,000 social housing homes in Greater Copenhagen. Similarly, AKB, formed in 1913 as *Arbejdernes Kooperative Byggeforening* ("The Workers' Cooperative Building Association"), is an association with a number of social housing homes in Greater Copenhagen. In 2013, the two companies merged under the name KAB (KAB n.d.). KAB does not own any homes, but manages them for a number of social housing organizations that own the buildings. One of these organizations is AKB Taastrup, a local organization of from the ole AKB association, with Taastrupgaard as their primary social housing estate.

As the largest administrative organization in Denmark, KAB has a distinctly developmental approach and is attempting to strengthen its focus on urban strategic policies (KAB n.d., App. Bjørton). The size of the organization and the steady flow of new housing being constructed means that knowhow can accumulate in KAB in ways that smaller social housing organizations do not have the capacity to handle. According to Claus Bjørton was KAB not always like this, as KAB for many years simply providing a sufficient amount of housing to fill the ever-increasing need (App. Bjørton). Several social housing organizations are currently changing as more is being expected of social housing organizations, such as the capability to work across plot and organizational boundaries (App. Bjørton). While KAB's size and capacity enables them to think and act strategically, it also means that the administration may be further removed from the residents and their representatives in the section board.

How the characteristics of KAB influence the strategy for Taastrupgaard in the future, will, among with an in-depth analysis of the entire strategy-making process about Taastrupgaard, follow in the coming sections. The analysis will be built on Patsy Healey's (2007) process of *strategisation*.

6.3 The Culture City

In November 2015, the Selsmoseskolen School burned partially down, as melting snow caused the electrical systems to short-circuit. The school was worn out and badly needed an extensive refurbishment (Rimer 2017). In the administration of KAB, the burning of the school was a wake-up call. Prior, Taastrupgaard had not been considered an important housing estate with regards to major changes, but employees from KAB came up with the idea of building a new school in the middle of Taastrupgaard and then tearing down a few of the housing blocks. Through KAB's managing director, the idea reached the mayor of Høje-Taastrup Municipality Michael Ziegler and he fully backed the idea. The timing of the idea was good as the municipality was about to receive a substantial sum of insurance money, which would enable more radical ideas (App. Bjørton).

KAB further developed their idea, where more housing blocks could be torn down to make space for a park, a nursing home, a water sports area in Selsmose lake and a bicycle/pedestrian bridge across the railway (see figure 27).

Figure 27. KAB's original, more ambitious plan for the Taastrupgaard transformation (Petersen 2018).

Eventually, these ideas were shelved, among other reasons because it would be expensive to tear down more housing blocks (App. Bjørton). So in dialogue with The National Building Fund regarding the economy, the ideas were *filtered* out by KAB. Eight blocks with 185 flats were to be torn down and the school was to be rebuilt in its place. That was the core strategy chosen right after the fire. The decision was taken long before Realdania entered the collaboration and the strategic development plan was initiated in 2017.

The proposed changes in Taastrupgaard needed approval by the tenants, so KAB and the municipality started to prepare the project further, and in December 2016, they succeeded in getting a majority of the residents to vote in favour of the plan that included demolition. Crucially, both actors were very much in sync with each other about the idea (App. Bjørn, a). As a part of preparing and developing the project further, Høje-Taastrup Municipality proposed a vision about the neighbourhood that surrounds and includes Taastrupgaard as 'the Culture City' (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a). The vision was presented in their policy 'New Focus' in January 2016 and is a clear attempt at creating a *framing* of Taastrupgaard. The area is meant to give opportunities for creative activity and one signal in this direction is to name the neighbourhood after the late dramatist Kjeld Abell. Culture has previously been a municipal focal point for this area. The 2005-2012 urban renewal programme for Taastrupgaard and the surrounding areas carried the title *KulturRingen* ("The Culture Ring"). The programme included a renovation and a new façade for the theatre, as well as an expansion of the Selsmose Lake to accommodate cloudbursts and transform the lake into a "blue park" with small man-made islets linked by bridges (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2011, a). The Culture City could be said to follow the direction set by that urban renewal programme.

Healey (2007) describes how a framing is often born through systematic assessments. Even though Høje-Taastrup Municipality's approach might be a bit more pragmatic, they still base the vision on the nearby cultural institutions as local resources (such as the theatre) and previous initiatives (such as the

previous urban renewal programme). A selective focus about culture was thus clearly chosen to frame Taastrupgaard and its surrounding neighbourhood.

According to the lead consultant developing the strategic development plan, Niels Bjørn, the Culture City profile was also the most authentic and strongest of the three profiles, in that it appears to have the strongest foundation in actual physical features and institutions rather than being based on speculations on what might come (App. Bjørn, a). The consultants' own analysis showed the same potentials about culture as the previous urban renewal programme had identified (Urban Creators 2017), so it seems like there is consensus about that frame.

A 'children and culture house'

The vision about the cultural city also entails a new *framing* of the new school in Taastrupgaard. The school is not only supposed to become a school, but a community centre called a 'children and culture house'. The house is to contain the primary school and several art schools and activities open for everyone. By focusing on creativity as a learning profile for the children and culture house, the ambition is to strengthen the educational sector in the municipality as well. By inserting additional functions to the building besides the school, the hope is to attract people from outside the area – to make it an attraction (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017, Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, b).

Furthermore, the area is to be better connected to Taastrup's city centre by densifying and building new dwellings towards the Selsmose Lake and the train station as seen on figure 28 below. The children and culture house and new houses are meant to kick-start the development that creates the Culture City as a natural part of Taastrup city (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a).

Figure 28: Illustration of the children and culture house ("nyt børnekulturhus" on the map) and new dwellings ("nye boligtyper" on the map) (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, b)

The estate currently presents itself without any proper front side. People arriving by car are met by the monumental wall of flats facing Taastrupgaardsvej, casting its shadow over the vast parking lot. This façade does not appear welcoming. People arriving on foot or on bicycle from Taastrup railway station will pass Selsmosen Lake, Selsmoseskolen school and reach a corner of Taastrupgaard that does not

feel like any kind of main entrance, either. The pending demolition of eight blocks and subsequent erection of the new school and children and culture house will create a new *centre* for the estate, giving it a hierarchy of places. This will likely become a new *front side*, equivalent to Healey's *front regions* (Healey 2007, p. 209).

As evident in figure 28, the middle and eastern end of the estate will become a central node with attractions and good connections to the rest of the town while the western end will remain relatively untouched by the demolitions. This part of the estate may remain a *back side* and may not be able to collect all the potential benefits of the transformation of Taastrupgaard. There is a clear attention towards southeast with the Selsmose Lake and Taastrup town centre. It is in that direction that the connections are to be established, where the eight blocks will be replaced by the children and culture house and where new dwellings will be constructed.

In addition to creating better connections between Taastrupgaard and Taastrup town centre, Høje-Taastrup Municipality argues that new dwellings by the Selsmose Lake will open the opportunity for more variation in tenancies and residents. The dwellings will be privately owned townhouses resulting in a more socially mixed residential composition in the neighbourhood, which will also be reflected in the composition of pupils in the classroom (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, b). As Bech-Danielsen & Stender (2017) argue, this measure has the potential to attract new, well-resourced residents, to retain present residents and to generate a basis for more services and businesses in the area (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). From this argumentation, another part of the emerging framing discourse is evident: that a social mix of residents is possible and that it will lift the neighbourhood.

Even though the municipality aims to build the houses as soon as possible, uncertainties remain. KAB has to tear down the eight blocks before the children and culture house can be constructed. The old Selsmoseskole school cannot be demolished until the school has been built, and the development of new dwellings cannot start until the old school is gone. In other words, a lot of time will pass by in which the housing market can change and reduce the potential of attracting developers. How the housing market will develop is very difficult if not impossible to predict, but a robust strategy should take such scenarios into account (Healey 2007). According to Rune Bæklund, the municipality also has doubts as to whether the strategy contains enough scenarios or rather whether it will be able to accommodate the wide range of possible scenarios (App. Bæklund).

Despite possible uncertainties about constructing many new homes, the emphasis given to Taastrupgaard's transformation remains strong. KAB and the municipality had already taken important steps before the actual strategic development plan was drawn up. This seems to be an important reason for the strength of the vision. As Filip Zibrandtsen from the group of consultants explains, a strong vision is the foundation of a strategy. If a common understanding is reached and approved by the city council, which New Focus was, the basis for a strong strategy is formed (App. Zibrandtsen).

6.4 A new high street proposed

With plans for the children and culture house and densification around Selsmose Lake in place, the consultants conducting the strategic development plan began to elaborate on the plans. An important principle of the strategy for Taastrupgaard proposed by the consultants is a new urban life high street (*'bylivsstrøg'* in Danish), connecting Taastrup railway station, the theatre and the children and culture house. In that sense, the high street will connect the central points of attraction in the area and create a hierarchy among the streets with the urban life high street as the most important street, at least for pedestrians and cyclists (App. Bjørn, a). This hierarchy of streets will address one common grievance among modernist social housing estates: the monotony that can be construed as a result of the egalitarian ideals under which they were built.

Regardless, this is another physical initiative that is *framed* by the focus on urban life. The concept of constructing a high street is not meant as an attempt at building a traditional high street full of retailers and small shops, as shopping is increasingly moving online. The consultants have assessed that retail shopping will not have great prospects in the future (Urban Creators 2017), so it is important that the high street connects the cultural institutions, also to fulfill the vision about the cultural city. On the other hand restaurants and coffee shops may be a possibility, as they are growing more and more popular (Bjørn 2018). The framing of the high street as full of urban life is reminiscent of that of traditional small towns, larger cities and truly urban areas. Nevertheless, KAB and their residential democracy are very positive about the idea of creating a high street that connects Taastrupgaard with the rest of the city (App. Bjørton). As Bech-Danielsen & Stender (2017) note, however, it is important to *"Be realist in the assessment of how much "urban life" can be generated in the area"* (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017, p. 174, own translation).

To truly think strategically and find strategic solutions, is it important to consider beyond the single initiatives and find the right connections (App. Arnhild & Bæklund). The question is really what cultural environment should be created surrounding Taastrupgaard. As Filip Zibrandtsen puts it:

> *"Demolition in itself is not enough. If you try to integrate the children's culture house the way they're doing now, it won't make much of a difference. You have to think, 'How do you open up and create cohesion and open ground floors and how do you concentrate life to make people go there?' A house alone does nothing. You have to have the linkages and the connections in order, too. And the partnerships."* (App. Zibrandtsen, own translation).

To that end, the consultants have proposed the establishment of a stand-up comedy academy as part of the cultural identity and high street and as a means to realize the strategy. The academy could become a driver to create something new and different to the area and could possibly result in new businesses that focus on films, digital media, writing, stage-building etc. (App. Zibrandtsen). The idea about the academy has been discussed a lot as it is very specific and not at all strategic, according to one of the members of the consultant team (App. Zibrandtsen). It is also a very different and daring idea as Claus Bjørton describes it:

> *"Especially the idea of a national stand-up school is really bold in my opinion, because you would not expect it in such an area. I would have expected something about graffiti or skateboards, really prejudiced"* (App. Bjørton, own translation).

While the proposed stand-up comedy academy is provoking the actors somewhat, it seems they support the idea and want to follow it through. By specifically planning for a stand-up comedy academy, the consultants have selected and *filtered* the type of institutions that will form the cultural environment in Taastrupgaard rather than leaving some margin as to exactly what will form the backbone of the urban life high street.

The challenge can then be to realize the idea. The consultants highlight how partnerships and new ways of collaborating with different actors are necessary to fulfill the high street and the cultural city. The leading role might fall between the municipality and the social housing organization, because who has the resources to conduct such a project? Perhaps a new steering group, like a traditional Danish urban renewal programme, should be set up to create partnerships with businesses and get the academy up and running (App. Bjørn; App. Zibrandtsen). In Healey's terminology, it is a question of *generating mobilising force*, where coalition-building might be a way of gathering key actors. In Høje-Taastrup Municipality the 17-4 committee and the programme steering group formed through 'New Focus' have created a basis for strategic leadership. But when it comes to realizing the actual concepts of the strategy, the question remains who should lead the way to establishing the high street and attracting cultural institutions and how it should be done.

6.5 Refurbishing the remaining Taastrupgaard

In addition to turning the neighbourhood into the Culture City, densifying the area and building a new children and cultural centre, a physical transformation of Taastrupgaard is a key component of the overall strategy. One element is tearing down the eight housing blocks as described above, another is to extensively refurbish the remaining Taastrupgaard. In 2016, when KAB and Høje-Taastrup Municipality decided to pursue the idea of tearing down 185 flats and constructing the new school in its place, the next step was to convince the tenants. The residential democracy has the final say and a majority vote had to be reached at a general assembly. For the purpose, a so-called *security package* was agreed upon between the mayor and the local section board in Taastrupgaard. The package includes promises about zero rent increases, construction of a similar number of replacement dwellings and that the land sale value will benefit Taastrupgaard. The overall refurbishment initiatives were also agreed upon as better insulation, new façades and reconstruction of 40 flats to elderly-friendly status (AKB Taastrup 2016).

Unfortunately, many of the promises from the security package are not easy to fulfill. First of all tearing down 8 blocks will eventually mean that some of the tenants are forced out of Taastrupgaard. Rehousing measures are in place, so residents in the affected apartments can move to another apartment should it become available. Additionally, KAB is constructing 185 new homes at other locations in the municipality as a replacement for tearing the same number down. According to Claus Bjørton, these homes are modern and of good quality, but that makes the rent level significantly higher

at around DKK 10,000 a month, meaning that the demand is quite low among existing residents of Taastrupgaard (App. Bjørton).

The 185 flats that are to be demolished only constitute about 20 % of the flats in Taastrupgaard. To reach a share of 40 % social housing family homes before 2030, as the latest ghetto package dictates (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018), the estate would have to tear down another 352 flats (Rosener 2018). This would be an even more radical measure than the 185 currently selected for demolition. As Bech-Danielsen & Stender (2017) note, the dwelling units that planners and politicians plan to demolish are the homes of people who attach memories, identity and friendships to them. The interference by the national government also puts more pressure on AKB Taastrup in the middle of realizing their already quite ambitious strategy.

Healey asks the question "*Whose viewpoint and whose perceived and lived space is being privileged?*" (Healey 2007, p. 210). In this case, it seems clear that the viewpoint is not that of the residents that are being rehoused. Their lived space will be not be privileged, but rather torn down. By imagining Taastrupgaard as 'the Culture City', it is very clear that the strategy is aimed at people different than the current residents with low education levels and income. In 'New Focus', Høje-Taastrup Municipality argues how the presence of the creative sector is an important precondition for economic growth and how cities with a large creative class are performing better. Therefore the creative class must be attracted and met with a rich cultural environment (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a).

Regarding the economic promises of zero rent rise and how the land sale should benefit Taastrupgaard, several challenges face AKB Taastrup. The refurbishment will be financially supported by The National Building Fund, but the setup is highly complex. First of all, The National Building Fund will pay for the demolition of the eight housing blocks worth DKK 30 m, but those housing blocks also have a debt of DKK 200 m in total from previous refurbishment initiatives. So money from the land sale will go to The National Building Fund, since they are already spending such a large amount of money. The refurbishment of the remaining blocks will add another DKK 500 m or more, which means the fund will not accept the promise of no rent increases. It means that the rent will rise, but hopefully as little as possible (App. Bjørton). As a result, the security package regarding zero rent increases and the land sale benefits will not be possible to fulfill. A final reaction from the tenants to these conditions is still pending.

Further complications have been discovered in Taastrupgaard, namely that it is heated by a single-string district heating system. The heating is only plugged into the estate at a single point; exactly in one of the housing blocks that will be torn down. It means that the entire heating system will have to be redesigned, which is an extra expenditure of approximately DKK 80 m leaving questions about the wisdom of the decision to tear down exactly those housing blocks (App. Bjørton).

Even though Danish social housing organizations have an extraordinary possibility of funding extensive refurbishment projects through the National Building Fund (Bech-Danielsen & Christensen 2017), it is clear how the funds are still limited in Taastrupgaard. Healey (2007) describes how economic interests are a key component of generating mobilising power. Her view is focused on actors driven by capitalist logic, which The National Building Fund is not, but they nevertheless provide a financial capacity that enables Taastrupgaard to be refurbished. Without the fund a key concept of the

strategy would not be possible and the remaining parts of Taastrupgaard would be further worn down and become unattractive. The collaboration with The National Building Fund and their will to financially support AKB Taastrup means that mobilising force is generated.

6.6 Semi-conclusion: The strategy for Taastrupgaard

Even though the final strategic development plan is still being formulated and more details can be added, it seems there is a selective focus on transforming the existing Taastrupgaard, building a new children and culture house, densifying the area towards Selsmose lake and creating a urban life high street. With decisions about tearing down eight housing blocks and building the new children and culture house already taken before the *By i Balance* project started in Høje-Taastrup, parts of the strategy was already in place before the strategic development plan. These may be some of the reasons that the strategy for Taastrupgaard seems clearer and more well-rooted in comparison to Gadehavegård and Charlotteager (see the following chapters 7 and 8). Another reason why the strategy is the most developed can be linked to KAB as a social housing organization with a distinctive development approach. KAB has actively been seeking new ideas and started the ideas about moving the burnt down school into their estate, while the tenants were persuaded to vote for the coming transformations.

Table 5 provides an overview of what the strategy for Taastrupgaard entails and means, by simplifying Healey's (2007) categorization of strategies. Taastrupgaard's strategy is summarized by listing the content under 'illustrated by':

Strategy as...	Illustrated by...
Physical structure	• 8 housing blocks to be torn down • A new children and culture house • Areas designated for urban densification
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Kjeld Abells Kvarter" • An urban life high street • A distinctive cultural environment; e.g., a stand-up comedy academy
An inspirational vision	• "The Culture City"

Table 5: The strategy of Taastrupgaard mainly considers physical structures and provides a framework of principles. Based on Healey (2007).

In the strategy, it seems that less emphasis is put on formulating actual goals for the development of Taastrupgaard. Accordingly, there is little evidence of what Healey considers 'Orienting goals'.

7. GADEHAVEGÅRD

The present chapter will provide a presentation and analysis of the implications of strategic planning in Gadehavegård, similarly to the investigation of Taastrupgaard in the previous chapter. Gadehavegård is set to undergo radical transformations according to the strategic development plan and other existing plans. First, we will give an account of Gadehavegård's history. Then follows a presentation of Gadehavegård today, including a structural analysis. Finally, an analysis of how the myriads of initiatives interplay.

Gadehavegård:
- Commissioned in 1977 and 1982
- 72,000 m^2
- 19 housing blocks
- 986 flats (308 studio flats)
- 2,133 residents
- Social housing organization: DFB
- Administration: Domea.dk (Landsbyggefonden 2018).

Figure 29. Overview of Gadehavegård (Apple Maps 2018) and view of Gadehavegård from a hill within the estate.

7.1 Gadehavegård in the past

Less historical material is available about Gadehavegård from its beginning compared to what is available about Taastrupgaard, which limits the story about the historical background. Unlike Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård has not appeared much in the media (DFB/Domea.dk & Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2008).

Gadehavegård has Gadehavegård was built in stages between 1977 and 1981 (COWI 2017), making it the second oldest of the three social housing estates examined.

Figure 30. Original Gadehavegård farm in 1960-1965 and aerial photo from 1985 with Hveen Boulevard in the foreground, Gadevang in the centre and Gadehavegård on the right (Byhistorisk Samling og Arkiv i Høje-Taastrup Kommune n.d.)

Gadehavegård was constructed on former farmland and named after the farm that used to be there (see figure 30) (Gadehavegård 2018). Along with the condominiums in Gadevang (see figure 30) just south of the social housing estate, Gadehavegård is one the very few components of the original, ambitious plans for Høje-Taastrup that were actually constructed (see section 5.1).

1977-1982	Gadehavegård commissioned
1999-2000	Extensive refurbishment with pitched roofs
2008	Coordinated social measures begins
2015	Passive house refurbishment of block no. 9

Figure 31. Timeline of important events in the history of Gadehavegård.

In 1999-2000 Gadehavegård was extensively refurbished with pitched roofs replacing the previous flat roofs, new bathrooms, façade upgrades, a new community house, playgrounds and decorations on

gables and entrances (App.: von Benzon). Some necessary repairs were made, but some residents find many of the solutions ugly (ibid.).

Figure 32. Gadehavegård as it presents itself after the 1999-2000 refurbishment (own production).

In addition to the structural issues with the buildings, Gadehavegård has been plagued by social problems for many years. In 2008, the unemployment rate in Gadehavegård was twice that of the municipality as a whole, well-resourced residents moved out as soon as they could only to be replaced by more disadvantaged residents, and the share of residents on welfare was among the highest in the municipality (DFB/Domea.dk & Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2008).

As a response to these problems, coordinated social measures have been running in Gadehavegård for a number of years. On a national level, the coordinated social measures have had potential, uninterrupted funding available since 2006 and can last a maximum of four years. In Gadehavegård, two sets of coordinated social measures ran under the title *"Mennesker Mødes i Gadehavegård"* ("People Meet in Gadehavegård") from 2008 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2014, while two sets of coordinated social measures ran under the title *"Det spirer i Gadehavegård"* ("Gadehavegård is Sprouting") from 2014 to 2017 and from 2018 to 2021 (App.: von Benzon).

Among other things, the measures have focused on creating conditions for people to meet each other as a catalyst for social changes. According to the 2008 application for funding for the coordinated social measures, the spontaneous and planned meetings between the residents were missing, caused by the fragmented urban structure of Høje-Taastrup (DFB/Domea.dk & Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2008). The local project office handling the initiatives is unfortunately placed in the far corner of one of the large parking lots, almost hidden away from the rest of the estate, hindering the potential benefit of having a visible marker of the transformation of the estate (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Had it been given a more central location within the estate, it could have acted as a trailblazer. This is important because it would demonstrate to residents as well as other people passing through the area that changes were happening.

In 2012, Gadehavegård was included on the government's ghetto list for the first time, as crime rates had been rising. The inclusion on the ghetto list sparkled local debate in Høje-Taastrup Municipality. Local politician Lars Prier (member of the town council for the Danish People's Party) even suggested

that the housing estate should be torn down (Dagbladet Roskilde 2012, a). The stamp as a ghetto also underlined for the greater public as well as Gadehavegård's residents that more changes were needed in the future. Shortly thereafter, the housing estate's section board started to work on changing the estate's image by branding it 'Denmark's most beautiful ghetto', acknowledging the issues, but determined to change the area (Dagbladet Roskilde 2012, b). This was a clear framing of Gadehavegård by the section board to try to emphasize its strengths in the face of negative press.

In early 2013, a story about Gadehavegård was released that challenged the section board's efforts. The social housing estate was deemed the most insecure housing estate in Denmark by the National Police in a report that compared the number of actual police reports in the area as well as the perceived level of security to other distressed social housing estates and the country as a whole (Rigspolitiet 2013). The factors examined were *personal safety*, *theft and burglary* and *wanton behaviour*.

This thesis once again made it clear that that there were issues in Gadehavegård – primarily with the perceived security – but the desire for changing Gadehavegård still had to materialise. A catalogue of ideas about the local environment, including safety, traffic, green spaces and activities was developed by a consultancy and a landscaping company in collaboration with the section board. The catalogue was published through the Danish social housing sector's knowledge sharing network AlmenNet (COWI & GHB Landskabsarkitekter 2013). The fact that it was published through this channel indicates the ambitions of thinking innovatively about Gadehavegård's future. The municipality contributed with an urban renewal programme in 2014 sponsored by the national government. The programme focused on the spaces and connections in the broader neighbourhood surrounding Gadehavegård, where the open space just south of Gadehavegård was to be transformed to a more attractive green area (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014, b). A festival for the neighbourhood was also set up, where volunteers from Gadehavegård and the nearby condominium estates all contribute to the common celebration on a yearly basis (App.: von Benzon).

In 2014, block number 9 (out of 19 in total) was chosen for an innovative passive house refurbishment[4]. It was possible to reach the passive house standard by insulating the façades and the roof, covering the balconies, installing photovoltaic panels on the the roof and a new ventilation system. The refurbished flats have a significantly lower energy consumption which offsets the increased rent, so the tenants do not pay much more in total (Energi & Miljø et al. 2014).

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[4] Passive houses are houses that (on average) produce as much energy as they consume (Feist, Schnieders, Dorer & Haas 2005).

Figure 33. Block number 9 in Gadehavegård has been refurbished to passive house standard (own production).

The colourful facades seen in figure 33 are quite expressive and the style has been debated. Unfortunately, magnesium oxide (MgO) wallboards, which humidify easily, were used in the construction. This construction material has since proved to be very problematic, as it tends to rot. As a result of this, the refurbishment has not been accepted by DFB/Domea.dk and has not yet been commissioned even though the refurbishment has been completed for several years. Legal actions are underway. No one was aware of the issue when they were installed (App.: Mogensen & Skoven), but it has lead to frustration among the residents (App.: von Benzon). It was proposed that the same solution could have been applied to all of the blocks but due to the construction issues, this will not happen. Furthermore, the passive house refurbishment did not address the flats or the structure as such, which means that the refurbished block is similar to the rest of Gadehavegård, even though it has been refreshed.

7.2 Gadehavegård today

Building on the previous section's presentation of Gadehavegård's history and of the various projects undertaken in the area over the years, the following section will examine how Gadehavegård appears today. The approach is similar to the one used in the chapter about Taastrupgaard, using a site analysis and a characterization of the residents and of the social housing organization DFB/Domea.dk.

Site analysis

Gadehavegård is very much like the surrounding town of Høje-Taastrup with regards to its structure. As can be seen in the map in figure 34, the estate's residential blocks are structured in straight lines and are sharply divided from the rest of the city by large roads. The large roads even encircle Gadehavegård in layers. Furthest away from the estate, Hveen Boulevard clearly divides Gadehavegård from Taastrupgaard to the east, while Roskildevej isolates Gadehavegård towards the north and Halland Boulevard towards the west. Closer to the housing estate are Øtoftegårdsvej (north, see the photo in figure 35) and Gadehavegårdsvej (east and south). All the large roads mean that many people drive their car in Høje-Taastrup, but no one comes through Gadehavegård if they do not have business there (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014, b). From Øtoftegårdsvej, three large parking lots are the natural

entrance for residents arriving by car (see figure 35). In short, physical features isolate Gadehavegård and its residents.

Figure 34. Map showing Gadehavegård and its surroundings (own production, Styrelsen for Dataforsyning og Effektivisering 2018).

Figure 35. Øtoftegårdsvej with Gadehavegård on the left. One of Gadehavegård's three parking lots with the community house in the background on the right (own production).

Based on our own site analysis and on the physical analysis undertaken by the consultant team, the many small paths inside the housing estate are not logical or inviting, creating unsafe environments without identities (Bureauet Niels Bjørn 2017 et al.). The residential blocks are also very similar to each other, without many architectural details and appearing very neutral (ibid.). It is only block number 9, which went through the passive house refurbishment, that looks different from the rest (ibid.). Several

of the outdoor areas close by and in between the blocks are well-proportioned and part of the reason for the residents' view of Gadehavegård as 'Denmark's most beautiful ghetto' (App.: von Benzon). A technical analysis of the buildings in Gadehavegård shows numerous damages in the façades, windows and basements. Even some of the solutions from the 1999-2000 refurbishment on the roof and balconies seem to be damaged already. Inside the flats, mould fungus has been found several places, highlighting the need for extensive refurbishment of Gadehavegård (COWI 2017).

Figure 36. Paths leading through Gadehavegård go past window-less gables, but also past the well-proportioned outdoor areas (own production).

Zooming out again and examining the functions surrounding Gadehavegård, Høje-Taastrup railway station is approximately 500 metres away from the nearest corner of Gadehavegård. Direct connections from the train station to Copenhagen, Copenhagen airport and the rest of the country provide Gadehavegård with a central location on the national railway network (Bureauet Niels Bjørn 2017 et al.). Dating from the same period and similar in structure to Gadehavegård are the condominium blocks found south and west of Gadehavegård: Gadevang from 1972 and Olufsborg from 1973-75. Both of them are separated from Gadehavegård by a road and a fence, respectively, which isolates Gadehavegård further. Hallandsparken (west of Olufsborg) and Margetheparken (north of the railway station) were built in the late 1970s and 1980s, respectively, and are lower townhouses. There are a few knowledge institutions nearby with a school, a high school, the vocational school NEXT and The Danish Technological Institute (DTI) north of Roskildevej (see the map in figure 34). Across Roskildevej, more businesses are located, such as the Danish Tax Administration (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014, b).

In addition to the outdoor areas inside Gadehavegård, there is a green area just south of the social housing estate, which is set to be developed into a proper park for the neighbourhood (App.: von Benzon). Further north lies the recreational area around the *Hakkemosen* lake, which is poorly connected to the residential area (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014, b).

Residential composition

Turning the attention to the residents in Gadehavegård, the housing area is regarded as one of the 'roughest ghettos' by the Danish Government, just like neighbouring Taastrupgaard. All five criteria on the ghetto list exceed the set limits. By this measure, Gadehavegård even exceeds Taastrupgaard which only exceeds three of the five criteria. Nationally, only Gadehavegård and Mjølnerparken in

Copenhagen exceed all five criteria (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). Especially the share of residents with only elementary school sticks out as seen in the table in table 6, even though it seems like it is slowly changing with younger generations having more education (Landsbyggefonden 2017, b). For the other criteria, Gadehavegård is marginally close to the limits set by the Government, where only decimals decide Gadehavegård's fate as a 'ghetto'.

Residents +1,000	Unemployed > 40%	Non-Western background > 50%	Convicted > 2,2%	Only elementary school > 60%	Average income < 55%
2,133	41.4 %	56.4 %	2.3 %	73.6 %	54.9 %

Table 6. Residential statistics about Gadehavegård from the Government's May 2018 list of ghettos. All five criteria exceed the the set limits (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018).

Not seen from these statistics is that a lot of single people live on their own in Gadehavegård, primarily in the large share of studio flats. The studio flats are of varying size, but the smallest ones are only 27 m². These small apartments see a quite high turnover. In the rest of Gadehavegård, many residents stay for a very long time, some residents having lived there for upwards of 40 years and with four generations of the same family living in the estate (App.: von Benzon). The rate of moving out is 10.9 % per year compared to 13.4 % for the entire social housing sector (Landsbyggefonden 2017, b). This may indicate that the residents are happy with their home, although it could also indicate a lack of resources (financial or otherwise) required to move. In other places, that trend would be seen as a strength for a housing estate, according to Julie Skoven and Mette Mogensen (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Many residents are engaged in activities or associations and volunteer when events are arranged. In that sense the residents do not need to stay by themselves, but have plenty of social offers (App.: von Benzon).

Still, many of Gadehavegård's residents are unemployed, have a low average income and a low level of education (see table 6). According to resident of Gadehavegård and member of the section board Pia von Benzon, the ghetto stamp is very problematic and can be stigmatizing. As she puts it: "*That not earning enough money is a criteria for being a bad person – that is in my world a distorted view of human nature*" (App.: von Benzon, own translation).

The social housing organization

Gadehavegård is a part of DFB (*Danske Funktionærers Boligselskab*) which was founded in 1954 by labour unions from the financial sector. DFB has 2,389 dwellings spread across the Greater Copenhagen region, with Gadehavegård and Charlottegården (in Charlotteager, Hedehusene) as their two largest housing sections. DFB used to have their own administration but is now a part of Domea.dk (Domea.dk nd., a).

Domea.dk is a rather new administration, the result of the 2005 merger of two organizations. As Domea.dk manages about 50,000 flats nationwide, it is approximately as large as KAB. Their values are based on '*providing adequate housing for everyone*' (Domea.dk nd., b), much like the social housing sector in general. They stand out in their values by having a commercial business approach to their organization

and they directly call their housing organizations 'customers', even though it still is a non-profit organization. The commercial business approach means that a lot of attention is given to optimization of the administration and daily maintenance procedures. Domea.dk is currently constructing and refurbishing a lot of new homes with projects worth a total of DKK 12 bn (Domea.dk nd., b).

When questioned whether Domea.dk is an urban developer, that is, whether they assume responsibility for parts of the city as a whole beyond the limits of their plots, representatives from the administration relate how disagreements occur. Some argue that it is not their job to do strategic urban development, while the construction department definitely thinks about the rest of the city when constructing: "*otherwise we write off the opportunity of making the buildings and homes better*" (App.: Mogensen & Skoven, own translation).

As part of their approach of seeing the social housing organizations as customers and as part of their focus on lean management, Domea.dk has until recently not been involved in strategic urban development, and as a result of this, has not pushed their customers in this direction. This has, from time to time, led Høje-Taastrup Municipality to initiate a dialogue with the residential politicians from DFB before challenging the professionals from Domea.dk. This creates a different relation than the one between Høje-Taastrup Municipality and KAB, for instance. Lately, however, Domea.dk has recruited new staff that is more aware of strategic planning, so they have strengthened themselves along the process (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund).

Analogously to chapter 6 about Taastrupgaard, the coming sections will look at the future of Gadehavegård as it may unfold based on the strategies laid out. As recounted in this chapter so far, there have been several plans for the transformation of Gadehavegård, which will all have an influence on the future.

7.3 'The Knowledge City'

In the 'New Focus' policy programme, Høje-Taastrup Municipality formulated a vision about Gadehavegård as the 'The Knowledge City', similar to the vision of Taastrupgaard as the Culture City (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a).

This idea was hinted at in an urban renewal programme from 2014 (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014), with a mention of the numerous educational and academic institutions located in close proximity to Gadehavegård. The institutions include a primary and secondary school, a high school, a vocational school and the Danish Technological Institute, as presented in section 7.2 (see the map in figure 34).

In 2017, the vision was developed by COBE Architects on the municipality's initiative as "The Knowledge City. Vision Plan for Gregersen's Neighbourhood" (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c). The vision calls for strengthening the knowledge-based institutions present in the area and for an effort to attract new institutions. A new neighbourhood park, realignment of roads, transformation of Gadehavegård and densification is part of the vision, as seen on figure 37 (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c).

Figure 37. Overview of the planned changes in the knowledge city vision. Changes include densification, re-alignment of Øtoftegårdsvej and Gadehavegårdsvej roads, a new community centre, new paths and a new neighbourhood park (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c).

An increased concentration of students would allow Gadehavegård to become a neighbourhood full of young people dedicated to educating themselves, with a young vibe reminiscent of the urban neighbourhoods of larger cities that is currently in vogue with young people. The hope expressed in the Knowledge City vision is also to be able to retain some of the young people that currently do study in the area, but who largely leave the municipality after high school for further training in larger cities. In order to strengthen the young and urban profile of the area, a startup and business incubator environment is also envisioned along with the campus environment (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c).

The knowledge city vision is part of an effort to offer alternative narratives to the negative stories that are commonly connected to Gadehavegård. With educational institutions and students in focus, Gadehavegård is *framed*, to use Healey's (2007) terminology, to attract residents that value knowledge and education.

This plan to attract new residents is arguably a wish to break with the current residential composition who, according to the statistics, has less education than the Danish population at large (see table 6). This is directly reflected in the 'New Focus' programme, which seeks to *"attract well-resourced residents to the area"* (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c). Healey (2007) asks whose viewpoint is reflected in strategies, and it is clear that the municipality wants to attract other citizens through the framing of the

knowledge city. This could have consequences for the current residents of Gadehavegård if they are forced out in the future development.

Acknowledging that the name Gadehavegård in itself has acquired negative connotations in the ears of some, the municipality decided that a new name was needed. Furthermore, since part of the perceived problem is that Gadehavegård is physically isolated from the surrounding areas, the municipality felt the need to underline the existence of a neighbourhood that includes Gadehavegård but is not limited to it. As such, the vision about the knowledge city entails naming the neighbourhood *Gregersens Kvarter* (Gregersen's Neighbourhood), named after Gunnar Gregersen, founder of the Danish Technological Institute (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a). This new name can be considered a verbal reflection of the intentions to physically and mentally sew the social housing estate together with the surrounding areas.

There are several examples in Denmark and abroad of distressed social housing estates changing their name in efforts to improve their image. Bech-Danielsen & Stender (2017) argue that changing the name can have an effect in conjunction with significant transformations. As such, a new name is a communicative tool for telling a new narrative about Gadehavegård. The municipality's idea of changing the name challenges the social housing organization to accept the proposed new name and to convince the residents to use the name. Since the name is proposed even before the transformation has started and is coming as a top-down initiative from the authorities, it might be hard to actually get public support.

A questionable framing?

It is an open question whether the strategy for a knowledge city is a realistic one. As pointed out by Pia von Benzon, member of the section board in Gadehavegård, it seems ironic that the local library was closed in March 2017 (Taastrup.nu 2017):

> *"First it was up by Høje-Taastrup Station, then it moved into the town hall and then it moved into the [Gadehaveskolen, eds.] school and now it is completely closed. And it was used a lot by the young people who are home a lot and can't sit at home and study. And they would go sit there and study. The library didn't loan that many books, but it was really used a lot. But they shut that down, and now they call it a knowledge city. That's really logical!"* (App.: von Benzon, own translation).

The seemingly paradoxical closure of the library two months after the launch of the Knowledge City vision may be explained by a lack of communication between different municipal departments, i.e., silo mentality, although this was exactly what 'New Focus' was meant to counter. There is also the possibility that the municipality was aware of the contradiction inherent in closing the library, but chose to do it as a result of financial prioritization between municipal tasks. This would reflect that the municipality does not have the resources to fund all the services that it would like to.

There have also been talks about the vocational school NEXT closing their department in Høje-Taastrup, which would leave even less substance to the knowledge city (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Representatives from Domea.dk have also questioned how much basis there is for calling it the knowledge city (ibid.). The concerns and questions voiced by several of the interviewees about the

framing of Gadehavegård indicate that it may be a hard task for the municipality to find a narrative that appears authentic (App.: von Benzon, App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

Domea.dk as a social housing administrative organization has traditionally been very attentive to its customers, i.e., DFB in the case of Gadehavegård. As mentioned in section 7.2, they have in the past tended to focus on providing efficient core services to the client and less on strategic urban development. Perhaps for this reason, Domea.dk did not develop a vision or strategy as KAB did in Taastrupgaard, so the municipality had to take on more of a leading role to launch the strategisation process (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). It nevertheless creates a risk when a vision is formulated without including the social housing organization, as it may miss the necessary backing to succeed.

7.4 Densification

As part of the knowledge city vision, considerable densification is planned for the area around the coming neighbourhood park in order to diversify the building stock from its current monotonous appearance (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c). The proposed densification could take place on Gadehavegård's parking lots to the north, around Gadevang and on the town hall site that will be available once the town hall has been relocated (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, b). Currently, nothing has been finalized with regards to the placement of new buildings, but the vision plan for the Knowledge City contains an outline of the densification featured in figure 38 below, in which the black shapes represent new buildings.


Figure 38. Suggested densification in Gregersen's Neighbourhood: All the black shapes represent new buildings. Gadehavegård is towards the top-right corner, including the buildings forming crosses (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c).

Encompassing the whole neighbourhood and crossing current plots of land, the proposed densification is an example of strategic thinking. The vision acknowledges that Gadehavegård must become an integrated part of the surrounding town and that that will only happen if the neighbourhood is treated as a whole (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c).

This does, however, mean that the realization of the vision relies on the commitment and participation of several individual actors. For instance, what will happen if the owners' association in Gadevang decides that they are not interested in densification on their parking lots? Mette Mogensen from Domea.dk adds how several struggles could occur when the whole neighbourhood is to be densified. Not every plot in the area can attract a supermarket or cohabiting senior citizens, so they have to agree between the plot owners how to share and develop the area together. Dealing with the residential democracy is another issue:

> *"There will be a myriad of struggles for influence (...) It is a really difficult exercise. Just to get the section board on board and let them give away influence. You will get plenty of influence, but also give away some direct influence"* (App.: Mogensen & Skoven, own translation).

It seems like Domea.dk are backing the idea of densifying on their plot in Gadehavegård, but it will not become very attractive if they are the only ones actually realizing it. Some kind of partnership between DFB, the local homeowners' associations and the municipality have to be established (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). The need for involving several partners in order to realize the vision evokes Healey's concept of generating mobilizing force (2007). Those who wish to drive the vision forwards (i.e., the municipality and the social housing organization, Domea.dk) need to engage other actors; to mobilize their force. Those actors could include Realdania and private developers and they could be organized in a development corporation. One potential challenge to the mobilization of force is that each actor has their own "jurisdictions" or, rather, spheres of influence that influence how much they can mobilize. Nevertheless Domea.dk and the municipality will be challenged further to collaborate with other actors. The residential democracy in particular may lose direct influence as hinted at in the above quote.

A housing exploratorium

Apart from creating new networks between actors, another issue is the often unpredictable real estate and construction market. In order for to densification to come to fruition, there needs to be commercial interest in constructing new homes in and around Gadehavegård. Talks with investors by Domea.dk have shown that there is interest, spurred on by the current economic upturn and by how private investors have entered Gellerupparken in Aarhus (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Filip Zibrandtsen (App.) from the team of consultants hired in the *By i Balance* project nonetheless explains how difficult it was to attract investors to build on the appropriate terms in Aarhus. The consultants have, based on the learnings from Aarhus and on the passive house renovation of block 9 in Gadehavegård, developed a principle for the densification as a so-called housing exploratorium (*boligeksperimentarium* in Danish). New techniques in construction, new styles of architecture and perhaps new configurations of living together can be tested (App.: Bjørn, a). By opening the possibility of building differently, private investors can perhaps be attracted (App.: Zibrandtsen). In Healey's (2007) terms, the housing exploratorium is a *framing* of the proposed densification as a selling narrative to

provide the neighbourhood with something unique. The idea was tested among the project secretariat and has gained substantial support from the municipality and Domea.dk (App.: Bjørn, a). For examples of experimentation and variety in architecture, see figure 39.

Figure 39. The Bo01 development in Malmö's Västra Hamnen (left) was built as part of a housing exhibition (photo: Susanne Nilsson). In the Rosenhøj social housing estate in Aarhus (right), targeted demolition was combined with the construction of new homes (own production).

Even though the idea has support, there are hurdles to overcome. In order to realize the housing exploratorium, special exemptions to the building code may be necessary. This would require the municipality as the local constructing authority to gain permission from national authorities to do so. Considering the strict Danish building code, such a permission may prove to be hard to obtain. Another principle of the housing exploratorium is to establish partnerships with external actors, such as IKEA or The Danish Architecture Centre to create something unique (App.: Zibrandtsen). These proposals are very interesting according to Rune Bæklund, but it is very uncertain whether those actors would want to engage in such partnerships (App.: Bæklund). Establishing such partnerships will demand of the municipal planners that they engage with the market and persuade companies to realize the housing exploratorium (Sehested 2009). The willingness of private actors or other organizations are equally important to engage in urban development in new ways, which shows how far-reaching strategic planning needs to be.

Densification in Gadehavegård

With the framing of the densification around Gadehavegård in place, Domea.dk and DFB have started to concretize the densification plan on Gadehavegård's lot together with the consultants that are also in charge of the upcoming refurbishment project supported by The National Building Fund. The plans entails densification on the parking lots as envisioned by Høje-Taastrup Municipality and COBE and to remove the bank of earth that currently runs between Roskildevej and Øtoftegårdsvej north of Gadehavegård and build new housing on the site (Skov 2018). This could help open up the area towards the outside and attract new people to the estate. Such a solution could create a new front for Gadehavegård, and is a typical urban strategic solution of 'diffusing boundaries' in distressed social housing estates, according to Bech-Danielsen and Stender (2017). The bank of earth currently acts as a visual and noise barrier between Gadehavegård and busy Roskildevej, but this role would presumably be filled by the new houses.

Figure 40. Two of the potential densification sites in Gadehavegård. Bank of earth between Øtoftegårdsvej and Roskildevej on the left and a view of the parking lot from the bank of earth to the right (own production).

While Domea.dk and DFB may develop their physical refurbishment project with densification in adherence with the neighbourhood-wide strategy, this will only affect Gadehavegård's land since they have no jurisdiction on the neighbouring areas. For the strategic approach – which includes working across plot boundaries – to be effective, the coordination with other land owners and partnerships with external actors is paramount so Gadehavegård does not end up being the only area densified.

7.5 Refurbishing Gadehavegård

An important element of the strategy in Gadehavegård is the upcoming refurbishment project supported by The National Building Fund. Talks about an extensive refurbishment have been ongoing since 2012 (see section 7.1) and is being planned as of June 2018. Various ideas are debated in a steering group involving representatives from the section board. According to section board member Pia von Benzon, the refurbishment project will probably deal with new façades (including better insulation), new windows and perhaps elevators to improve the accessibility in some buildings (App.: von Benzon). With several building damages in the buildings (COWI 2017), there is basis for financial support from The National Building Fund. However, while the steering group was in the middle of preparing the refurbishment project, a major governmental intervention occurred.

With the government's passing of the ghetto legislative package on 9 May 2018, DFB/Domea.dk is under pressure to produce a development plan within six months outlining how Gadehavegård can reduce the share of social housing family homes to a maximum of 40 % before 2030 (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). Six months is a very short time span compared to how long it usually takes to prepare refurbishment projects (App.: von Benzon), and as such, the new ghetto package is a major disruption to the work currently going on in Gadehavegård with the upcoming physical refurbishment project. Since Gadehavegård currently consists of 100 % social housing family homes, drastic measures will be needed in order to reach the 40 % target. The catalogue of devices mentioned in the legislative package include: densification through construction of privately owned housing, cooperative housing (*andelsboliger* in Danish) or private rental housing; conversion of family

homes to senior or youth housing; sale of social housing family homes; targeted demolition; and attracting businesses and municipal jobs (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). Pia von Benzon, member of the section board comments just before the ghetto package was passed:

> *"We are very much opposed to having to tear anything down. Because it is Gadehavegård's identity how we look. (...) We believe that we can quite easily improve the area even if we keep our blocks. So we are very opposed to it. We have compromised a little, as you have heard, that we agree to tearing down a little. But if that ghetto plan passes, we will actually be reduced down to 40 %. Then it's either demolition or a lot of densification. And in that case we believe that it will be way too dense, there won't be the open space that we want, there won't be all the green areas that we use to heighten our profile."* (App.: von Benzon).

In a recent article on the consequences for Gadehavegård, Domea.dk expresses how rehousing can become a major issue if a large share of the flats have to be demolished (Holst 2018). It may not be possible to find suitable rehousing offers in Høje-Taastrup which means that the residents will be forced out and away from their friends and families (ibid.). Julie Skoven from Domea.dk adds how they managed to rehouse the residents in Taastrupgaard in two years, but if Gadehavegård is to follow, it will be very difficult, as even more people must be offered a home within the municipality (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Demolishing buildings may break down the scale and open up Gadehavegård (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017), but it will also put pressure on the social housing organization to rehouse tenants fairly, who in turn are in danger of being forced out.

The disruption caused by the government's actions could be seen as an example of *generation of transformative force*, using the power given to the government through the *electoral mandate* (Healy 2007). In other words, the government uses the power they are entrusted with by the voters to set up new laws that are supposed to make sure that change is pushed through in the relevant social housing estates.

With the 40 % target challenging Gadehavegård, various measures to bring down the number of social housing family homes are being discussed within the section board and Domea.dk. At first, demolition was categorically rejected by the section board, but through a series of meetings in the steering group, the section board is now practically forced to accept partial demolition of select stairways and their respective flats to make space for new streets and paths, even if they are not enthusiastic about the idea (App.: von Benzon). In combining densification, merging of studio flats and conversion of family homes to youth and senior homes, a plan is being developed. As the tenants have to be students to qualify for a youth home or be elderly with accessibility needs to qualify for a senior home, the municipality is in doubt as to how large the demand for these types of homes will be, so further investigations have to be made (Skov 2018). Finally, Gadehavegård has been granted DKK 70m from the National Building Fund's Infrastructure Pool for rerouting of the streets (sbs rådgivning 2015), which makes it possible for Gadehavegård to actually make some viable solutions in their coming development.

Many of the discussions taking place during the steering group meetings amount to what Healey calls *filtering* (Healey 2007). A multitude of ideas are put on the table and many are filtered out through discussion, as knowledge is exchanged between the consultants, the section board, Domea.dk and the municipality. The actors offer various inputs to the ideas based legal and financial feasibility,

architectural know-how and opinions. The National Building Fund also has a major say in what gets filtered in or out, as their funding is a prerequisite for the refurbishment project. All this filtering takes time, and the process of trimming, adjusting and finishing the refurbishment project is a lengthy one.

7.6 A multitude of plans

As mentioned in chapter 5 and accounted for above, a plethora of plans surround Gadehavegård. There are plans involving the estate itself, plans for its immediate surroundings and plans for adjacent neighbourhoods. Healey (2007) asks *"How is it positioned in relation to other spaces and places?"*. An answer to this question will be outlined in the following section.

Outside the estate's plot, Høje-Taastrup Municipality has plans to transform the cone-shaped strip of park south of the estate into a "neighbourhood park", as expressed in the Knowledge City vision plan (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, c) and in their urban renewal programme (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2014, b). A new community house for the entire neighbourhood will replace the current community house that is just for Gadehavegård residents. The neighbourhood park and the transformation of Gadehavegård seem to play along well, but could be antithetical to infrastructure proposals to route streets through Gadehavegård and down to Gadehavegårdsvej (see the map in figure 34).

To the northwest of Gadehavegård (across Roskildevej), the municipality and private investors are planning the world's fifth-largest water park (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2017, b). This development, with its connected hotel facilities and expanded retail options, will most likely lead to an increase in traffic on the roads in the area, something that is not given much attention in the plans for Gadehavegård with their reduced road capacity and new homes facing Roskildevej. Similarly, the plans for Høje-Taastrup C, that primarily involve densification south of the railway but also involve connections stretching north of the railway (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a), are barely mentioned in plans relating to Gadehavegård. The same goes for the strategy that deals with the transformation of Taastrupgaard. These two social housing estates are only separated by a couple of wide roads and a supermarket and yet, there are no plans to integrate the two or improve the connections between them. This seems curious, considering the ambitions to be strategic on a town-level rather than just focusing on the individual housing estates.

There may be several explanations for the poor coherence between the plans, including how the projects evolve in different networks of actors and are anchored in different departments in the municipality. Also, subsequent teams of consultants develop plans after each other, which can create a knowledge gap. While the multitude of plans can potentially lift and change Høje-Taastrup city and Gadehavegård for the better, it demands more from the municipality and especially their urban planners to create some kind of cohesion. While Høje-Taastrup Municipality has aligned its stance on distressed social housing estates, alignment on the broader urban development seems to be problematic when looking at Gadehavegård.

7.7 Semi-conclusion: The strategy for Gadehavegård

The residents of Gadehavegård frame their home as 'Denmark's most beautiful ghetto', but issues still remain with large roads surrounding the housing estate, leaving it isolated from the rest of the city. Since its first appearance on the ghetto list in 2012, major transformation proposals have been discussed.

While the strategy for Gadehavegård's future is still being developed, the vision of 'The Knowledge City' that takes advantage of nearby educational institutions is presented. To realize the vision, Gadehavegård is set to undergo a physical transformation with a refurbishment project, partial demolition, new roads, densification and a neighbourhood park. To ensure the quality of the proposed physical changes, the area is *framed* as a housing exploratorium with possible partnerships with external actors, while a new name is to ensure a better image. 'The Knowledge City' vision has been lead by Høje-Taastrup Municipality, as DFB and Domea.dk have not been very proactive. Along with questions asked about the vision's credibility, less backing of the vision is evident compared to Taastrupgaard. Lately, the national government's ghetto package has also forced Gadehavegård to plan more radical measures, putting more pressure on the social housing organization.

Using a number of Patsy Healey's (2007) terms, table 7 below summarizes the intentions of the strategy for Gadehavegård, as it is listed in the column 'Illustrated by...'. Similarly to Taastrupgaard, 'orienting goals' are not in focus for Gadehavegård's strategy.

Strategy as...	Illustrated by...
Physical structure	• Targeted (partial) demolition • Densification with new homes • New routing of streets and paths • Refurbishment of buildings • Creation of a neighbourhood park
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Gregersens Kvarter" • The neighbourhood as a "housing exploratorium" • Proposed partnerships with IKEA or The Danish Architecture Centre
An inspirational vision	• "The Knowledge City"

Table 7. Summary of the strategy for Gadehavegård, with proposed physical structures and principles to realize the vision of "The Knowledge City". Based on Healey (2007).

8. CHARLOTTEAGER

Charlotteager consists of three different housing sections of which Domea.dk through DFB owns one and VIBO owns two. The organization of Charlotteager with two separate social housing organizations, its location in Hedehusene and the fact that the social housing estate is not on the list of the "roughest ghettos" distinguishes it from Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018).

The following chapter will examine Charlotteager as a distressed social housing estate just as the previous two areas were examined. Furthermore, the implications of the strategic planning in Charlotteager will be analyzed. The aerial photo in figure 41 shows what Charlotteager looks like today.

Charlotteager DFB:
- Commissioned in 1975
- 27,492 m^2
- 19 housing blocks
- 405 flats (studios to 3 bedroom flats)
- 1,747 residents (in all)
- Social housing organization: DFB
- Administration: Domea.dk (Landsbyggefonden 2018).

Charlotteager VIBO:
- Commissioned in 1979 and 1981
- 27,978 m^2
- 9 housing blocks
- 386 flats (studios to 3 bedroom flats)
- 1,747 residents (in all)
- Social housing organization: VIBO
- Administration: VIBO (Landsbyggefonden 2018).

Figure 41. Overview of Charlotteager. Domea.dk's estate is on the left with grey roofs; VIBO's estate is on the right with red roofs. The Charlotteskolen school is at the bottom of the photo (Apple Maps 2018).

8.1 Charlotteager in the past

Charlotteager's three social housing sections were constructed in three stages: Domea.dk's section through DFB was commissioned in 1975, VIBO's first section in 1979 and their second section in 1981 (Landsbyggefonden 2018).

All buildings have been refurbished some 10-15 years ago. This involved adding new façades, windows and making other technical improvements. Given that the refurbishments were made not so long ago, this means that it is currently not possible to gain financial support for further refurbishments from The National Building Fund (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). Recently, VIBO has created new flowerbeds and seatings just by their two sections, resulting in welcoming outdoor environments (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Durmaz).

Although these physical measures have generally been quite typical for refurbishments of social housing estates in Denmark, they nevertheless leave the area more neat-looking than many other distressed social housing estates. In the 1990s, efforts were made by members of the section boards and staff from the school and from the social housing organizations to create better outdoor areas around Charlotteager. The efforts included children from the school who co-evolved ideas about new playgrounds and activities. The efforts were a part of the first round of initiatives that Høje-Taastrup Municipality introduced to improve the quality of Charlotteager's recreational areas (Faurby 1997).

In 2007, the first coordinated social measures were initiated and the local project group worked towards the same approach. Several activities about playgrounds, street art, events etc. have been carried out where the residents have been involved in creating ideas and actually built many of the components, e.g., new benches. These activities have not only given the residents the possibility to work together, but also helped to create ownership for the common facilities and develop a strong sense of identity (Hagedorn & Madsen 2014). The local project group in the coordinated social measures also engaged in creating a new high-profile recreational outdoor area located between Charlotteager and the Charlotteskolen school called *"Råderum i Charlottekvarteret"* (could be translated as "Leeway in the Charlotte Neighbourhood"). The area consists of an open playground area with up-to-date playground equipment, e.g., a climbing tower as seen in the picture in figure 43.

Figure 43. Left: Overview of the new recreational outdoor area ("Råderum") between Charlotteager and the Charlotteskolen school (no author). Right: Mayor Michael Ziegler inaugurates the area in August, 2017 (Mennesker i Fokus 2017)

The vision behind the recreational outdoor area was to further strengthen the identity of Charlotteager and ensure that the area is an attractive place to live. By connecting the social housing estate to the school is it also possible to strengthen the experience of the neighbourhood for people from outside (Opland 2015; Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). The project has gained a lot attention as the mayor opened the new site and Realdania supported it financially. This made the residents very proud of the project (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). With the project, the social housing section boards, the school and the youth centre also collaborated better. According to one of the section board chairs, it is regarded as a great success (App.: Durmaz).

While the recreational outdoor area had focused on the nearby connections between the social housing estate and the school, an urban renewal programme has also been running in the area between Charlotteager and Hedehusene town centre. The programme describes how many of the old industries (tileworks, Rockwool, concrete factories etc.) have moved out of Hedehusene (Hagedorn & Madsen 2014). The urban renewal programme has attempted to emphasize Hedehusene's industrial history (see figure 44).

Figure 44. A meeting point-cum-bench made out of bricks from Hedehusene is one of the results of efforts to brand Charlotteager on its industrial history (own production).

Today the town is rebranding its identity through better connections and as an attractive suburb close to Copenhagen and Roskilde (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2011, b). In a sense, the municipality is creating a framing discourse, just as Healey (2007) describes. By working on the connections in the town, the urban renewal programme was a first step towards thinking strategically about Charlotteager.

8.2 Charlotteager today

The following section will present Charlotteager as of today with a site analysis, a characterization of the residents and a presentation of VIBO as a social housing organization. Charlotteager is also administered by Domea.dk. For a presentation of this organization, see section 7.2.

Figure 45. Left: Domea.dk's section with a path towards the town centre. Right: Domea.dk's section on the left and VIBO's section on the right (own production).

Site analysis

As laid out in chapter 5, Hedehusene is quite different from Høje-Taastrup and Taastrup, as it is a provincial town outside the S-train network. Hedehusene has a train station and a main street as a natural centre, while Hedeland is a high-quality recreational area in a former gravel pit (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2011, b). The industrial areas consists of several smaller entrepreneurial businesses and craftsmen. Charlotteager is disconnected from the rest of the city both in terms of connections and physical structures (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). It is clear from the map in figure 46 how, for instance, a cemetery creates distance between Charlotteager and the city centre.

Charlotteager was constructed later than Gadehavegård and Taastrupgaard which is reflected in the architecture of the buildings and in the layout of the estate. Even though the housing estate is rather large, it is structured in a less rational and modernistic way. The housing blocks are simply not as Brutalist or straight as Taastrupgaard, for instance. In VIBO's part of Charlotteager, some of the buildings are arranged in a horseshoe shape (see figure 41 and the map in figure 46), which is a clear break with the Modernist architecture of the 1960s, also referred to as "crane track architecture" because the layout of the developments were planned so the cranes assembling the building could move from the construction of one building to the next (Kjærgaard 2014). Still, the social housing estate is isolated by the road Charlotteager which creates a barrier around the area, compounded by large parking lots north of the dwellings. Towards the west, Charlotteager is also suffering from poor connections, even though a new path for pedestrians has tried to open the area up towards the town centre (see figure 45). The upgraded recreational outdoor area between the school and the dwellings has created good connections between the two, but further south, a road and the railway tracks clearly create a double boundary towards the development site of Nærheden (Bureauet Niels Bjørn et al. 2017).

Figure 46. Map highlighting Charlotteager's location in Hedehusene and important features in the surrounding area (own production, Styrelsen for Dataforsyning og Effektivisering 2018).

Zooming in on the social housing estate, there are clear differences between the western dwellings of Domea.dk and the eastern dwellings of VIBO: Domea.dk's buildings have pitched grey roofs, yellow bricks and protruding, covered balconies. VIBO's buildings have hipped red roofs, white or white and grey striped casing and integrated covered balconies. According to representatives from VIBO, their housing sections are more open and green, while the bay windows are very popular (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). In addition to that, the horseshoe-shaped blocks in VIBO's sections create more private areas and a more traditional suburban atmosphere (see the photos in figure 47). The horseshoe shape and bay windows also lend a different identity to the buildings. In Domea.dk's section, the blocks do not face each other, as the entrances are facing in different directions. This results in poor coherence between the dwellings and the outdoor areas. The blocks are also a bit more simple in their design without the same details as in VIBO's section, and the covered balconies are often used for storage (Bureauet Niels Bjørn et al. 2017). As a result of recent physical refurbishments, all of the buildings are in a decent state of repair.

Figure 47. Domea.dk's section to the left and VIBO's section to the right (own pictures).

All in all, Charlotteager has a number of physical issues, even though the estate appears more open and in a better state than Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård. The issues are particularly related to the connections to the rest of Hedehusene and how the structure and layout of the estate so clearly stand out in comparison to the rest of the town. It leaves "*Charlotteager as very much its own*" (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

As illustrated on the map in figure 46, Charlotteager's scale is quite large compared to the surrounding areas, which mainly consist of single-family homes. This makes it clear that Charlotteager is different from the rest of the town, and makes it harder to integrate the estate with the surroundings.

Residential composition

Statistically, Charlotteager is quite similar to many other distressed social housing estates, including Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, deemed as 'ghettos' by the Danish Government.

Charlotteager used to be on the ghetto list, but was removed in December 2017 because the percentage of residents that had been convicted of a crime in the previous two years fell from 2.8 per cent in 2014-2015 to 2.46 per cent in 2015-2014 (the cut-off was set at 2.7 per cent) (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2016; Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2017). In May 2018, when the National Parliament agreed upon the new package about parallel societies, the criteria about convicts was lowered to 2.2 per cent, which meant that Charlotteager is now back on the ghetto list, although not on the list of the roughest ghettos since it has not been on the ghetto list for the last four consecutive years (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018). This means that the estate will currently not be subjected to the requirement to come up with a strategy for lowering the share of social family housing to 40 per cent.

According to the chair of one of the VIBO section boards, Kaya Durmaz, the lower crime and unemployment rates was a result of a purposive effort from the coordinated social measures, where contact was established to the local businesses (App.: Durmaz). When Charlotteager was deleted from the ghetto list, they were even featured on TV as a successful story (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

The unemployment rate is still below the threshold, and the average income above the threshold, but Charlotteager meets the other three criteria (non-Western background, crime and education) and thus qualifies for the list. As seen in table 8, about 70 % of the residents in Charlotteager have elementary school as their only education, but it is nevertheless the lowest share of the three housing estates in Høje-Taastrup (i.e., Charlotteager has the highest level of education among the three estates). Furthermore, Charlotteager has the lowest number of residents and the highest average income compared to Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård. According to Lisbeth Engelbrecht from VIBO, Charlotteager can be categorized in the less dramatic end of the ghetto spectrum (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

Residents +1,000	Unemployed > 40%	Non-Western background > 50%	Convicted > 2,2%	Only elementary school > 60%	Average income < 55%
1,747	37.4 %	53.7 %	2.5 %	69.6 %	55.9 %

Table 8. Residential statistics about Charlotteager from the Government's new list of ghettos. The grey fields meet the criteria for inclusion on the list (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet 2018).

Between the three individual housing sections in Charlotteager, differences are evident particularly in average income levels. In DFB's section, the average annual income in 2014 was DKK 286,943, compared to DKK 348,007-355,992 in VIBO's two sections, while the average for the whole municipality was DKK 527,091 (Danmarks Statistik 2015, b).

Even though the statistics speak clearly of social issues among the residents, representatives from VIBO and VIBO section board chair Kaya Durmaz agree that the residents are a big strength in Charlotteager. There is a feeling of unity, where residents meet each other, especially among many of the senior citizens (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). Furthermore, Kaya Durmaz speaks about the different backgrounds and nationalities the residents have: "*I have never heard that he is from Iran etc. He is from Hedehusene. End of story*" (App.: Durmaz, own translation).

Most of the residents are happy about their home and think it is a nice area, even though it is classified as a ghetto (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). The area is characterized by a relatively low rate of moving out at 10.7 percent. This compares with 13.4 percent for the social housing sector in general and may be attributed to the residents' satisfaction with living in the estate, but could be attributed to limited financial resources for moving (Landsbyggefonden 2017, c).

The social housing organization

Since Domea.dk was presented in section 7.2, this section will focus on VIBO. With about 6,000 dwellings, VIBO is the smallest of the three social housing housing organizations examined in our study. VIBO has its own administration in contrast to AKB Taastrup and DFB, who are managed by KAB and Domea.dk, respectively. VIBO was created in 1974 and their dwellings are all located in the Greater Copenhagen region (VIBO nd.).

VIBO's values and visions are aimed towards administration of their dwellings, as they want to ensure good homes for their tenants based on the residential democracy. Concepts about inclusiveness, safety and quality form their values (VIBO nd.). Their managing director once said "*we are not urban developers*" (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard), possibly because it is a small organization that does not have the capacity to develop cities as such, or because they simply had not engaged in these kinds of projects yet. Projects like the new recreational outdoor area in Charlotteager have opened VIBO's minds towards thinking more about the importance of coherence in neighbourhoods if a social housing estate is to work well. Even though VIBO has started to consider more strategic-like solutions, representatives from their administration admit that they are still in a learning process, and still have to change their mind-set more than other social housing organizations. Their small size also limits their capacity to employ professionals with strategic competences within their organization (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). On the other hand, the small size of VIBO provides some advantages as the administration is closer to the politicians of the residential democracy. This means that they are able to act fast and initiate projects (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund).

After having described previous projects and presented Charlotteager as it appears today, the next section will look at the future of Charlotteager based on the strategy currently being prepared. The effects of the application of strategic planning will also be analyzed.

8.3 'The Entrepreneur City'

Høje-Taastrup Municipality's policy programme 'New Focus' formulated a vision for Charlotteager as well as for Gadehavegård and Taastrupgaard. For Charlotteager, the vision included an identity - or a *framing* to use Healey's (2007) teminology - as 'The Entrepreneur City' (*Iværksætterbyen* in Danish). The entrepreneurial spirit that is said to be characteristic of Charlotteager and perhaps of Hedehusene is evident in the many small businesses in the area, and in the "can-do spirit" of the community in the social housing estate (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a). Many of the small local businesses cooperated with the coordinated social measures. The New Focus programme also includes a new name for the neighbourhood of which Charlotteager is a part: *Hartmanns Kvarter* ("Hartmann's Neighbourhood"), named after the former manager at the tileworks that used to be a big employer in the town. The tileworks evolved into the concrete factory Spæncom which since 2006 maintains only an office presence in Hedehusene (Spæncom 2017). With this name, the programme attempts to tie the Charlotteager of today closer to the history of Hedehusene and to instill values of private initiative and entrepreneurship in the residents. Furthermore, the programme claims that Denmark is not only a knowledge society, as is often claimed by politicians and others, but also a production society. However, this status is considered threatened because of a lack of skilled labour in Denmark. The programme would seek to encourage more young people to train as skilled workers to remedy this deficit (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a).

According to VIBO, many of the coordinated social measures have been about entrepreneurial events, where young people learn to be innovative and for instance arrange a football tournament. Nevertheless, the interviewees from VIBO question the *framing* of 'the Entrepreneur City' and whether

entrepreneurs can be attracted to Hedehusene, which would have to compete with hip neighbourhoods in Copenhagen with plenty of coffee shops and young people (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

In parallel with the framings of Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, the framing of Charlotteager as "The Entrepreneur City" speaks to a certain kind of people who may not be the majority in Charlotteager.

Even though the coordinated social measures have aimed at developing an entrepreneurial spirit and several businesses exists nearby, the residents may not be traditional entrepreneurs per se. The framing speaks to another group's viewpoint, as Healey (2007) puts it.

8.4 The search for a credible framing

The scepticism about the framing of 'The Entrepreneur City' has prompted a search that has led to several alternative ideas. Not all of them have been successful or have had the support of the social housing organizations (VIBO and Domea.dk) and the section boards. These ideas will be presented below. As mentioned in section 8.1, a number of projects have taken place in Charlotteager in recent years. These include renovations of both Domea.dk's and VIBO's social housing sections as well as the new recreational outdoor area between the housing estate and the school. This means that – in contrast to Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård – there are currently no ongoing physical plans for Charlotteager that can function as a catalyst for the strategy. Representatives from Domea.dk state that the lack of major planned physical changes makes Charlotteager a difficult area to strategise and especially for the consultants producing the strategic development plan (App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

In comparison with Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, Charlotteager's location in Hedehusene lends it a different atmosphere, as it is more of a traditional small town, quite unlike the modernist architecture and road grid of Høje-Taastrup. Based on this quieter pace and small-town feeling, the team of consultants who are delivering the strategic development plan devised the idea of attracting senior citizens to the estate. According to the consultants' trend analysis conducted as part of the preparations for the strategic development plan, the share of citizens in Høje-Taastrup aged 75 or above will increase by almost 53 % from 2017 to 2025 (Urban Creators 2017). Simultaneously, there is large interest for shared living for senior citizens among this part of the population (Schulze & Mahncke 2016). This idea of Charlotteager as a senior citizen community was not popular, however, with VIBO (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard) although Domea.dk supported it (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). With VIBO being reluctant about the idea, a framing about senior citizens was *filtered* out. The consultants on the other hand have acknowledged that cohabiting senior citizens could be most interesting in DFB/Domea.dk's section, as a more extensive makeover is necessary in their part (App.: Bjørn, a), so the idea could perhaps still be realized in DFB's sections of Charlotteager.

Another idea presented by the consultants took advantage of Charlotteager's location at the edge of town and framed it as a food-producing neighbourhood. Charlotteager has a sizable population of Turkish-heritage senior citizens that hail from agricultural regions in Anatolia and that may give this idea some merit (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). The idea has been scaled down because the consultants do not believe that this "urban farming" initiative could break even financially, but rather

might justify itself by the community benefits that it would bring the residents (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Zibrandtsen; App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

One thing is to come up with a number of visions for identities, another is to prove that one of those identities can actually be implemented and be accepted. To implement a entrepreneurial environment or creating a successful urban farming project, partnerships with outside actors such as volunteer associations, private companies and employers are required. Whether the actors relevant for the respective visions would actually want to participate and cooperate remains an open question. This is basically a question of *generating mobilizing force*, Healey's (2007) term for getting partners on board with the vision. During the development of the strategic development plan the consultants have had preliminary talks with some actors, but no partnerships have been set up yet.

The search for a credible framing has dominated the strategisation process of Charlotteager, and a more open dialogue about the direction of the strategy has emerged. This means that the social housing organizations seem to have a bigger say than they would have had if the initial framing had been readily accepted. However, since both Domea.dk and VIBO are engaged, disagreements are apparent about e.g. senior citizens. Neither of those two social housing organizations have been as proactive as KAB when it comes to developing the strategy (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund). VIBO as a smaller organization does not have the same opportunities to be very strategic thinking (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard), while Domea.dk traditionally have not been very proactive in terms of strategic development (App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

Even though Domea.dk now seems to be investing more resources in the strategic development plan, the previous lack of involvement in the plan on the part of VIBO and Domea.dk may be part of the explanation why the vision for Charlotteager can seem less convincing than those for Gadehavegård and Taastrupgaard in particular, as noted in this and the previous section.

8.5 The proximity of Nærheden

Another plan that is also underway and which may have wide-reaching consequences for Charlotteager is that of neighbouring Nærheden. As described in chapter 5, Nærheden is framed as the suburb of the future and is currently the primary force of change in Hedehusene. Located in close proximity of Charlotteager, the consultants developing the strategic development plan acknowledge Nærheden's importance and the positive effects that it might have on Charlotteager. As such, another *framing* was proposed to hook Charlotteager on to the development south of the railway to integrate Charlotteager and Nærheden together (App.: Zibrandtsen). Many of the qualities that are being hailed by the promoters of Nærheden are equally present in Charlotteager: the vicinity of nature and recreational areas, the railway station with 20-minute train trips to central Copenhagen, the safe environment for children, the availability of amenities that make everyday life for families easier, the sense of community and urban gardens (Nærheden P/S n.d.). These values – framings – are currently selling houses in Nærheden with considerable success, but could all be used just as well to promote the social housing estate Charlotteager (App.: Zibrandtsen).

Figure 48. The current connections between Nærheden and Charlotteager are poor with a dark tunnel leading under the railway. Visible contact is hardly possible because of vegetation and because of the distance (own production).

The idea is that the influx of new residents in Nærheden, primarily from different societal strata than the residents in Charlotteager, will increase the overall attractiveness of the town. When parents in Nærheden divorce, they may suddenly need cheaper housing in the vicinity of the school and Charlotteager would be able to provide that through special rent criteria, which could be a way of linking Nærheden and Charlotteager. Interviewees from Domea.dk state that they are looking into this option. Furthermore, they see the connection to Nærheden as perhaps the best move for Charlotteager, since the new neighbourhood is set to become an attraction (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). The current connection is poor as seen on figure 48. VIBO, on the other hand, has been more cautious and reluctant to connect Charlotteager to Nærheden, maintaining that Charlotteager also needs its own identity. Filip Zibrandtsen from the consultant team acknowledges that the narrative about connecting Charlotteager to Nærheden has to be presented well to get support from the social housing organizations, something that the consultants could have done better through the process of developing the strategic development plan (App.: Zibrandtsen).

The discussions about Nærheden again show how difficult the search for a credible framing in Charlotteager has been. With two different social housing organizations, it can be difficult to get both on board with the same ideas.

The school

Another consequence of the Nærheden development is the decision taken by Høje-Taastrup town council to close the two existing schools in Hedehusene including the Charlotteskolen school in Charlotteager and bring together all the pupils in one new school in Nærheden. The closing and moving of the school in Charlotteager may have negative consequences in that Charlotteager loses an important everyday function that currently draws children and teachers into the area from the rest of the town. This attraction of people from the outside contributes to the integration of Charlotteager, and the shutting down of the school will likely be a loss for the neighhourhood. In many distressed social housing estates – Taastrupgaard among them – the construction of new schools is used as a tool to mix people and functions in otherwise monotonous areas (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). A

school is a function that attracts people dropping kids off and picking them up again everyday, and in Charlotteager one of the section chairs tells how the recreational outdoor area is swarming with children during recess, providing the southern part of Charlotteager with a lot of attention and urban life (see figure 49) (App.: Durmaz). In that regard, the decision to move the school out of Charlotteager is almost an unstrategic solution for the distressed social housing estate (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

The new school and the Nærheden development seems like objects of pride for the municipality. The partnership with Realdania has meant that Hedehusene and Høje-Taastrup Municipality is getting positive attention nationally. At the same time, the municipality is spending a large amount of money in Nærheden on infrastructure, the new school, and a sports centre, so the stakes are high (App.: Zibrandtsen). It could be argued that the success of Nærheden – and thus the economic sustainability – has been prioritized over the effort to secure the social sustainability of Charlotteager. In this way, Nærheden constitutes a competing framing for Charlotteager: The Charlotteskolen school, and Charlotteager with it, is being sacrificed to improve and promote Nærheden. Since Nærheden is entirely south part of the railway, the railway acts as a *boundary*, as Healey (2007) puts it, between the new development and Charlotteager.

Figure 49. The Charlotteskolen school with the new recreational outdoor area, doubling as a school yard (own production).

The closure of the school also poses the question of what becomes of the recently inaugurated recreational outdoor area funded by Realdania. Representatives from VIBO and Domea.dk argue how the decision to close the school seems wrong, since the outdoor area was made to connect the school and Charlotteager, and question whether Realdania knew about it when they sponsored the project (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Mogensen & Skoven). The 'New Focus' policy programme describes how the school could be used for workshops for young entrepreneurs with "makerspaces" and do-it-yourself facilities as well as offices and advising for entrepreneurs (Høje-Taastrup Kommune 2016, a). In that sense, the closing of the school could be a potential positive consequence of Nærheden for Charlotteager, if a new function could use the former school building. The consultants have elaborated on the idea of creating facilities for entrepreneurs, and one idea could be to open shops that could repair kitchens in Nærheden and Hedehusene in a trending circular economy way of thought (App.: Zibrandtsen).

Nevertheless, the school is not just a building ready to be remade into anything. Whether the building is to be used for workshops, offices or new homes, it will take a lot of financial resources and permissions to do so. So even though the ideas are good, the right need has to be fulfilled (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). From VIBO's perspective, the decision of what to use the school building for is a defining one. It is important that the building does not end up being empty for two years with boarded-up windows, as this would send an unfortunate message of disrepair and decay (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

The new school in Nærheden, envisioned with a "science" profile in partnership with LEGO (Nærheden P/S 2016), could also have positive consequences, drawing in children and their parents from Charlotteager to Nærheden. Social interactions crossing the railway would occur as children go to the same school and their parents will meet at parents' meetings etc. The new school could also become a kind of a community project for all of Hedehusene, as every child will go there (App.: Zibrandtsen). VIBO also expresses how they would like to collaborate with the municipality and the new school in some kind of solution to ensure that Charlotteager and the recreational outdoor area still remains attractive for children (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

Unlike Gadehavegård, the strategy for Charlotteager considers other urban development projects in Hedehusene to make connections and more coherence in the entire town. In that sense, wider strategic solutions are considered. But it is clear from the case of Charlotteager that connecting a distressed social housing estate to a prestigious urban development is not an easy task. They are clearly divided by the railway that creates a physical boundary that can be difficult to break down. The fact that the school is moving to Nærheden indicates that several non-physical solutions could become appropriate to ensure synergies between the areas, challenging the municipality to get their decisions aligned across departments, so Charlotteager is not left on its own. Since the present school is owned by the municipality, they are the ones who would have to invest in a reuse of the building. This would put pressure on their investment budgets as the new urban development in Nærheden is prioritized (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard).

8.6 Sale of social housing

As the only one of the three social housing organizations, VIBO is pursuing a sale of a part of their sections in Charlotteager. The idea originated within the VIBO office and was subsequently presented to the residents (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). Many of the residents were enthusiastic, even if they were not all interested in buying. The scheme is intended as a retention strategy for residents who have the means to buy a home but do not wish to move away from friends and family in the estate (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Bjørn, a). If possible, VIBO is planning to sell 120 flats and is currently negotiating with the residential democracy on how to execute the sale: Either selling entire housing blocks, or choosing the most attractive individual flats to put up for sale (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). Selling flats is a mean to secure mixed tenures, as seen in Park Hill in Sheffield, United Kingdom for instance, even though it has been criticised for its gentrification consequences (see figure 50) (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017).

Figure 50. After extensive refurbishment, many of the flats were sold in the Park Hill estate in Sheffield, United Kingdom (no author).

Some residents in Charlotteager struggle to see the sense in taking a mortgage to stay in their own home and then have to pay for maintenance themselves (App.: Durmaz). There are also many legal obstacles to be overcome, and the final decision to put flats up for sale has not yet been passed by the general assembly (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard; App.: Durmaz).

Domea.dk does not have any plans to sell any of their flats in Charlotteager. According to Mette Mogensen and Julie Skoven, Domea.dk does not have good experience with selling flats from social housing estates and believes that a physical transformation could lift the area instead, even though this is not currently being planned. Furthermore, since there are no empty flats, the interviewees question why they should sell flats in Charlotteager (App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

The two social housing organizations' different views on selling social housing homes once again highlight the difference between them and how they do not have the same stance on specific measures.

Figure 51. VIBO is contemplating putting some of their flats up for sale (own production).

As mentioned above, no physical transformation is planned for Charlotteager, even if the interviewees from Domea.dk would like to see one. The consultant team is, however, developing some principles for densification and for creating more diffuse boundaries (App.: Zibrandtsen), as the roads around Charlotteager isolate the estate from the rest of the city as explained in section 8.2. In addition, the accessibility on paths leading to the flats can be improved, while new types of dwellings could be created through merging flats vertically to create multi-storey town houses (ibid.). Several options are possible if a physical transformation and a refurbishment project supported by The National Building Fund were to happen in the future. Since Charlotteager was added to the ghetto list again, new possibilities for financing may open up.

8.7 Semi-conclusion: A strategy for Charlotteager

Charlotteager is the smallest and most recently constructed social housing estate of the three examined, and the physical and social issues are less evident here. The buildings have been refurbished not long ago, and a new recreational outdoor area has been established as a great success for the area. This means that no larger projects are planned, leaving the strategic planning to start more from scratch. It means that the narrative – or *framing* – for Charlotteager has been hard to pin down and as of June 2018, it is still not exactly clear what the narrative will consist of.

Høje-Taastrup Municipality has formulated a vision of 'The Entrepreneur City', based on previous social initiatives. Other narratives about senior citizens, food production and connecting Charlotteager to Nærheden have been discussed during the strategy formulation, but no framing has gained any widespread support. The strategy for Charlotteager seems to be the hardest to formulate, partly because both Domea.dk and VIBO are involved and have different stances on senior citizen communities and selling parts of their sections. The existence and the proximity of the Nærheden development project is seen by the consultants as the greatest asset Charlotteager currently has, and the social housing estate therefore has to "latch on" to the development of Nærheden and integrate with it. Even though the strategy for Charlotteager considers the urban development, it seems to pose a challenge to find solutions that can create coherence. This is exemplified by the school that is moving to Nærheden, potentially leaving an empty building in the distressed social housing estate.

Similarly to the semi-conclusions for Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, table 9 below summarizes the strategy for Charlotteager based on Healey's (2007) terms, as the strategy is listed in the column 'Illustrated by':

Strategy as...	Illustrated by...
Physical structure	• Reuse of school buildings; "makerspaces", businesses or new homes • Future physical transformation including densification
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Hartmanns Kvarter" • Connections to and coherence with Nærheden; narrative of an attractive suburb • Urban farming for the community • Sale of flats in VIBO's sections • Cohabiting senior citizens in DFB's section
An inspirational vision	• "The Entrepreneur City"

Table 9: Summary of the strategy for Charlotteager, with proposed physical structures and principles to fulfill the vision of "The Entrepreneur City". Based on Healey (2007).

9. DISCUSSING STRATEGISATION IN HØJE-TAASTRUP

Chapter 6-8 provided an analysis of the specific strategies for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager. This chapter will discuss the learnings from the three housing estates, the implications of the use of strategic planning and how the roles of the involved actors are affected. More specifically, the narratives of the strategies will be compared and characterized, explaining what the different elements of the strategy are aiming for. The narratives will cover the *framing* and the *filtering*, as Healey (2007) puts it. Furthermore, the anchorage of the strategy and changing roles will be used to discuss how *mobilising force* and *transformative force* is exercised. These topics will lead to a number of recommendations and a discussion about further perspectives.

9.1 Framings in Høje-Taastrup

All three area-based analyses of Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager have included a table to sum up the content of the strategies. All the three tables have been merged in table 10 below, creating a basis for comparing them. It is clear that they have some similarities between them, as a vision creates the foundation that a set of principles and physical transformations should fulfill. This section will explain the three categories in the rows below each estate in table 10 and how they are *framed* and *filtered* as they create the narratives of the future Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager.

Strategy as...	*Illustrated by...*
	TAASTRUPGAARD
Physical structure	• 8 housing blocks to be torn down • A new children and culture house • Areas designated for urban densification
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Kjeld Abells Kvarter" • An urban life high street • A distinctive cultural environment; e.g., a stand-up comedy academy
An inspirational vision	• "The Culture City"

GADEHAVEGÅRD

Physical structure	• Targeted (partial) demolition • Densification with new homes • New routing of streets and paths • Refurbishment of buildings • Creation of a neighbourhood park
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Gregersens Kvarter" • The neighbourhood as a "housing exploratorium" • Proposed partnerships with IKEA or The Danish Architecture Centre
An inspirational vision	• "The Knowledge City"

CHARLOTTEAGER

Physical structure	• Reuse of school buildings; "makerspaces", businesses or new homes • Future physical transformation including densification
A framework of principles	• Naming the neighbourhood "Hartmanns Kvarter" • Connections to and coherence with Nærheden; narrative of an attractive suburb • Urban farming for the community • Sale of flats in VIBO's sections • Cohabiting senior citizens in DFB's section
An inspirational vision	• "The Entrepreneur City"

Table 10: Summary of the strategies for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager. Based on Healey (2007).

Inspirational visions

As accounted for in chapter 5, the policy programme 'New Focus' by Høje-Taastrup set out a direction for the strategies in the distressed social housing estates. Visions for each area were framed as 'The Culture City', 'The Knowledge City' and 'The Entrepreneur City', respectively. The framing of the

visions for the three social housing estates in New Focus was done by Høje-Taastrup Municipality exclusively intentionally to gain intra-municipal coordination. As a result of the accumulation and concentration of know-how in individual municipal departments, horizontal segregation between departments is an issue in many Danish municipalities (Engberg & Larsen 2010). The framing from 'New Focus' was an example of meta-governance within the municipality itself and could be considered as an exercise that the municipality had to complete before involving external partners. Niels Bjørn explains:

> "So there's this pre-process of maybe– At least a couple of years or more where Høje-Taastrup Municipality trained itself and got up to speed in relation to becoming more strategic about the distressed areas. And New Focus is sort of the result of that. But at that point they were in a dialogue with their politicians and so on, and the social housing organizations weren't particularly involved in that process." (App.: Bjørn, a, own translation).

While Høje-Taastrup Municipality managed to train itself, as Niels Bjørn notes, and aligned their organization by setting an agenda and formulating strategies in the distressed social housing organizations, the viability of the visions has been questioned. As the social housing organizations were not involved in formulating the visions, it may be perceived by the organizations as the municipality trying to enter the estate's property, which is likely to cause a reaction. In Healey's (2007) terms, the municipality has also *filtered* out other possible visions, determining the direction on their own.

A possible alternative vision regards environmental sustainability. Kaya Durmaz, head of one of the section boards in Charlotteager, envisions Charlotteager as a "green town" and explains how he would like to install photovoltaic panels on the roofs so the estate could become self-sufficient with regards to electricity (App.: Durmaz). His idea was nevertheless put aside, as the municipality had set their framing of Charlotteager.

The questioned viability and the social housing organizations' reluctance to fully support the framing of the visions have been a general issue in the strategy-making process. 'The Culture City' in Taastrupgaard seems to be the strongest of the three, but questions remain about the other two as Niels Bjørn relates:

> "The Culture Neighbourhood felt authentic to us after having done our analysis whereas the other two felt less authentic. I mean, we simply had less basis to base them on. So that's why we've challenged those two the most. And asked directly, it turned out that that Entrepreneur Neighbourhood, that entrepreneur profile, the municipality themselves didn't think they had anything in particular to base that on, I mean, they knew it was feeble. Whereas the Knowledge Neighbourhood, at least there are some knowledge institutions. But does knowledge and the Knowledge Neighbourhood actually feel like something that's an identity that is meaningful for residents? That one is a little tricky, it may be more meaningful for businesses and educational institutions." (App. Bjørn, a, own translation).

All three visions are very ambitious and have very different profiles from the current characteristics of the distressed social housing estates. All of them speak to viewpoints of other people than the current residents, indicating how the municipality wants to attract other citizens. The visions further rely heavily on public amenities, private actors, businesses and the residents. The success of 'The Entrepreneur City', for instance, depends heavily on the residents having an entrepreneurial spirit. As

Claus Bech-Danielsen notes: "*One can only hope that they have a hold on the residents [...] and that it's from the bottom up. [...] If no residents seize it, it will be dead.*" (App. Bech-Danielsen, own translation). How to form partnerships with relevant actors will be discussed further in section 9.2 about the anchorage of the strategies.

It was one of the tasks of the strategic development plan to gather the municipality and the social housing organizations around the proposed visions. Relevant input was gathered to develop and concretize the visions, which is reflected in the *framework of principles*.

Framework of principles

The framework of principles was developed by the team of consultants responsible for developing the strategic development plan in close dialogue with the municipality and the social housing organizations. Looking at the principles, they have had different implications in the three housing estates. Overall, the aim of the framework of principles is to set out a basis for changes (App.: Zibrandtsen). For Taastrupgaard, the framing of the urban life high street with a distinctive cultural environment is a direct extension and elaboration of 'The Cultural City'. It is a means to fulfill the vision that specific projects should follow. For Gadehavegård, it is slightly different, because the framing of the housing exploratorium points in a slightly different direction than 'The Knowledge City'. As the vision also entailed densification in the neighbourhood, the framing of the experimental designs is a means to attain densification, and not directly to strengthen the knowledge institutions (App.: Bjørn, a). Knowledge can be accumulated around housing and construction matters (App.: Zibrandtsen), but the principle is still very open in terms of how to actually create a housing exploratorium and about which actors should be involved. In Charlotteager, different framings about cohabiting senior citizens, urban farming and connections to Nærheden have pointed in very different directions than what the 'Entrepreneur City' vision did. It is a reflection of the search for a credible framing in Charlotteager and of how two different social housing organizations needs to both support a framing, as for instance the senior citizen profile was rejected by VIBO.

In that sense, the elaboration of the visions into principles has proved to be a challenging process and have had mixed success in the three housing estates. The strong vision of 'The Culture City' in Taastrupgaard is reflected in the principles that are framed in direct extension of the vision, highlighting the importance of having a well-rooted vision. On the other hand, the discussions in Charlotteager signal that the municipality and the social housing organizations should be able to continually interpret possibilities and reassess actions, which encompass Healey's (2007) understanding of strategic thinking. If the entrepreneur framing of Charlotteager does not seem to be the right move, it is important for the municipality and the social housing organizations to be flexible and alter the framing as needed.

The elaborations of the framings between the consultants, the municipality and the social housing organizations have taken place in a vision workshop in the fall of 2017 with the participation of the 17-4 committee and in frequent meetings with the project secretariat. The consultants have presented their ideas and analyses, which have been commented on and elaborated in those fora (App.: Bjørn, a). On the other hand, the programme steering group, consisting of key project staff and managers, has not been involved to the same degree:

> *"And the programme steering group didn't participate that much. Of course, I think they should have participated more now. We assumed that the project secretariat would go back to their base of support and clear stuff with their managers, and it's very obvious to us now that they didn't really do that."* (App.: Bjørn, b, own translation).

Bjørn points out how important the programme steering group is in Høje-Taastrup, as discussions and their subsequent selections create a *filtering* of the chosen framings. Because strategies are highly political matters (Healey 2007), it is necessary to involve staff with decision-making capacity when framings are presented. Bjørn further explains how difficult it is to work with a large number of managers when not all of them attend the meetings, as it it hard for the consultants to know who could actually make decisions (App.: Bjørn, b).

Physical structures

A number of physical initiatives have been laid out in the strategies in Høje-Taastrup. They are primarily initiated by the social housing organizations, as both Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård are to undergo refurbishment projects supported by The National Building Fund. The physical transformations include radical and urban strategic solutions that change the overall physical structures, and are among the solutions that are currently in vogue in distressed social housing estates: demolition, densification with owner-occupied housing, new roads and new functions. For Gadehavegård and Taastrupgaard, the pending changes in the physical structures have opened the door for the strategies, as both the municipality and the social housing organizations were aware of coming radical transformations of the areas. The extent of the changes, e.g., how KAB could only afford to demolish eight housing blocks – they initially wanted to demolish more blocks – presents a *filtering* of the initiatives, and sets the conditions for how the framework of principles has been developed. The proposed physical changes are also elements of the strategies that will bring specific projects. It is important to note how they will evolve from the strategic level to the project specific level, and through residential involvement and in negotiations with The National Building Fund the projects will be specified.

In Charlotteager, the lack of major physical changes has actually contributed to the difficulties in *framing* the strategy. Based on the case of Høje-Taastrup, physical changes play a key component of strategies in distressed social housing estates. Naturally, major physical transformations constitute some very visible changes, which explains why they are often in focus (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2018).

With demolition on the agenda in Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, it is relevant to question the environmental sustainability of the strategies. This question, however, attracts little attention in Høje-Taastrup, besides from Kaya Durmaz' idea of a "green city" in Hedehusene (App.: Durmaz). Even though the need for a "green" transition to environmental sustainability and environmental issues such as global warming and poor air quality figure prominently in policy and industry alike, the absence of environmental sustainability in the Danish debate about distressed social housing estates is remarkable. The production of concrete emits considerable amounts of CO_2 (Turner & Collins 2013), so tearing down down large concrete buildings that have not yet reached the end of their structural life span and replacing them with new concrete buildings in roughly the same location can seem a questionable choice.

It seems that in the case of Høje-Taastrup, social and economic sustainability are prioritized in order to create more socially mixed neighbourhoods and attract citizens that will constitute a larger tax base.

9.2 Anchorage of the strategic development plan

Based on the framings developed in Høje-Taastrup, the strategic development plan was intended to be adopted politically by the city council and by the social housing organizations. The process of anchoring the strategies met several difficulties in the case of Høje-Taastrup, though. The content of the strategies for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager that outline physical transformations and a number of principles for the future transformation have more or less been finalized. But issues are evident when it comes to moving towards realization of the strategy, which will be discussed in the following. In other words, it is a question of *mobilising force* and of *transformative force.* Three issues seem to be present in the case of Høje-Taastrup when it comes to anchoring the strategic development plan: the purpose of the strategy, how to manage the network governance and finally how the next step should be taken from strategy to realization.

The purpose of the strategic development plan

Interviews with key actors in Høje-Taastrup show uncertainties about how the actors perceive the purpose of the strategy. Representatives from VIBO express their concern as: "*what it (the strategy, eds.) should be able to do swings back and forth. In the latest meeting it was signalled that it should be able to do everything in the world*" (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard, own translation). In contrast, the head of the municipal task force believes that:

> *"There is great consensus about what the strategy should be able to do between Høje-Taastrup Municipality's executive board and us who work with it. There is great consensus between us and Realdania. And there is great consensus between us in the municipality and the social housing organizations."* (App.: Bæklund, own translation).

These contradictory statements indicate that the actors do not perceive the purpose of the strategy similarly, an issue that has also come to the attention of Realdania according to their Head of Projects (App.: Härtel Jensen). The uncertainties seem to be about who the target group and the sender is, and what type of product the strategic development plan should be. According to Niels Bjørn, these considerations were not in place when the task of developing the strategic development plan was put out to tender, making it a very difficult task to bring everybody in line (App.: Bjørn, b).

The municipality is focusing on being able to anchor the strategic development plan in their political organisation. According to Arnhild and Bæklund (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund) from Høje-Taastrup Municipality, it is a very important asset of having a politically anchored plan to have some goals to work towards; that the city council, and in this case the social housing organizations as well, have specific goals to commit themselves to. Otherwise it is impossible to assess how far they are in the future:

> *"Both the municipality and the social housing organizations should be able to steer after this plan and integrate its policies and decisions. Therefore we have to know which goals it should lift. (...) Otherwise it will not become a steering tool and it will lose its ownership and political attachment. We must have something to tell us in in which direction we are moving"* (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund, own translation).

Having a politically anchored plan with clearly defined goals is what Healey (2007) calls *conventional practices*. This might resist new ways of working with policies and can hinder the *generation of transformative force*. From the municipality's point of view, the strategic development plan should be at a general level with visions, goals and principles, while specific plans will elaborate refurbishment projects, densification etc. (App.: Bæklund). As analyzed, the strategies for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager focus on physical structures, principles and visions, and not on the specific goals. A clash between the strategy and the municipality's conventional political practices seem evident. This concerns VIBO, as they see a difference between a plan and a strategy:

> *"One thing is, if it is a strategy for the area, but it is something different if it becomes a decision. It will be adopted in the city council, and what is it exactly that we (as a social housing organization) have agreed to and what have the other ones agreed to. (...) A strategy is more like 'we think we will go in this direction', e.g., 'we are aiming for our area to become a entrepreneurial area', but if it is a decision, then it has to be an entrepreneurial area until another decisions is made"* (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard, own translation).

It has been questioned by the municipality how to measure when 'The Culture City' in Taastrupgaard is achieved, or when the housing exploratorium is a reality. These are reasonable questions, but according to Niels Bjørn, it cannot simply be measured as, for instance, 300 new houses completed. Instead, the analytical work and the narratives created by the consultants should create something to focus attention for the professionals in the municipality and the housing organizations (App.: Bjørn, b).

Head of the consultant group Niels Bjørn admits that working with strategic planning in Høje-Taastrup perhaps contributes mostly to training the professionals of the social housing organizations in thinking in new ways. They have to act differently and acquire a new mind-set. Furthermore, the strategy can provide strong and authentic narratives that can create a basis for development and dictate a clear direction (App.: Bjørn, b). Strategic plans are usually of high complexity, and can be difficult to read. That is very much the case in Høje-Taastrup, according to Realdania's head of projects. This means that the principles will not be realized exactly as presented in the strategy (App.: Härtel Jensen). But a strategy also has to be understood by non-professionals to get political support and be anchored:

> *"The challenge is to formulate local change strategies that do not reduce complexity to a simple and reductionist format, but instead establish a relatively complex strategic agenda that connects the different rationalities at play"* (Engberg & Larsen 2010, p. 567).

The actors in Høje-Taastrup are showing some resistance with regards to adjusting the strategic development into their conventional political organizations, so the strategy ends up being more similar to a traditional policy document. It causes uncertainties about what the strategic development plan exactly should provide and entail and clearly shows what a significant challenge it can be to anchor strategies in political organizations. Important considerations have to be made at an early stage about who the sender and target group of a strategy are, but it can be challenging since strategic planning in

distressed social housing estates is a new practice that most municipalities and social housing organizations are not familiar with. In other words, managing the process of anchoring the strategy is all about managing network governance. The following section will look at this.

Managing network governance

Mayor Michael Ziegler's active engagement indicates that there is great political will concerning the existing governance structures in Høje-Taastrup arranged around the article 17, subarticle 4 committee. In that sense, Høje-Taastrup has very strong political leadership for working with distressed social housing areas (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund; App.: Härtel Jensen). As mentioned in chapter 5, the 17-4 committee is a clear example of network governance, which is a trend in Danish urban planning contexts (Engberg & Larsen 2010). The municipality has *generated mobilising force* by having skilled planners in the municipal task force and has created advocacy networks across the municipality and the social housing organizations.

Traditionally when handling social housing estates, the relationship between municipalities and social housing organizations is much simpler. The municipality controls and superintends, while the social housing organization has to solve the relevant task on their own. By having a political committee with representatives from both parties, the municipality and the social housing organizations are actually working together. This clearly sends a positive and ambitious signal to the social housing organizations (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). Considering the composition and workings of other 17-4 committees dealing with distressed social housing estates in Denmark, there are only two with a similar organizational composition, in Odense (Odense Kommune 2011) and Fredensborg (Fredensborg Kommune 2014), respectively.

The efforts by Høje-Taastrup Municipality clearly seem extraordinary, and in many ways, they have created a foundation for getting diverse groups to work together and anchor the strategic development plan. Even though the organizational structures in Høje-Taastrup seem to be adequate *"any governance system has its dilemmas and power balances"* (Engberg & Larsen 2010, p. 566).

Dilemmas are evident when it comes to the decision-making process of the strategies. The strategic development plan is meant to be agreed upon among the 17-4 committee and the programme steering group, which means that both politicians and managers from both the municipality and the social housing organizations have to agree on the strategy. With so many decision-makers, it is a challenge to get political support from everyone. It is a question of getting very diverse groups of actors to work together and get political support.

It has proved to be very difficult to get everyone on board for the proposed framings, exemplified by the lack of involvement of the programme steering group as described in section 9.1. All in all, it is not easy to bring such large organizations into agreement (App.: Bjørn, a). A great deal of communication between and inside the organizations is important, but also a very difficult task, to ensure that strategies are anchored (App.: Zibrandtsen). According to Niels Bjørn, the social housing organizations especially have moved a lot to start thinking more strategically and to get aligned during the process, but the consultants were not aware of how necessary this process was before being right in it (App.: Bjørn, b). Engberg & Larsen (2010) capture some of the challenges of collaborating in strategisation processes:

> *"Networks of actors are dynamic; coalitions form and disband, and as different ways of representing interests occur simultaneously, strategisation processes may become replete with conflict and antagonism "* (Engberg & Larsen p. 567).

Another issue regarding the decision-making process is how the residential democracy of the Danish social housing sector can be a hurdle that in the past has stopped ambitious projects, according to the conclusion of a former think tank. The think tank went as far as to suggest that decisions relating to urban strategic solutions in distressed social housing estates should be taken at the same level as local planning regulations, giving the municipality the final say (Tænketanken Byen 2025).

The difficulties in getting diverse groups to work together means that there is no guarantee that an organizational structure will work forever, according to Björn Emil Härtel Jensen from Realdania. A milestone like the strategic development plan is crucial, whereas ownership and support of the strategy can enhance the collaboration between the municipality and the social housing organizations (App.: Härtel Jensen).

From working closely with the municipality and social housing organizations in Høje-Taastrup, Niels Bjørn has gained some insight regarding their relationship. According to him, Høje-Taastrup Municipality seems to be saying: 'we have a good organizational structure that we do not need to change', while the social housing organizations seem to be saying 'we do not think the structure is that good' (App.: Bjørn, b). Even though VIBO praised the municipality's efforts for collaborations, there still seem to be points of contention.

To strengthen the existing structure around the 17-4 committee, the team of consultants have proposed three new area-based secretariats that can handle the development and future initiatives in the distressed social housing estates. Similar efforts have been introduced in Vollsmose in Odense and Gellerup in Aarhus, so learnings from these cases have been applied by the consultants. An argument for these secretariats are that neither municipalities nor social housing organizations have the right staff to carry out the strategy (App.: Bjørn, b). Present managers of the existing coordinated social measures could potentially contribute to engagement and anchoring locally, but close negotiations with the social housing organizations that manage these coordinated social measures have to be made so it fits their organization (App.: Bjørn, b).

In addition to suggesting organizational changes within the municipality and social housing organizations, the strategy has proposed partnerships with external actors, as a means to realizing the strategies. The following section will look into the process of moving from strategy to realization.

From strategy to realization

While the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup has been debated heavily among the actors involved, the plan is still to realize the proposed initiatives to transform the distressed social housing estates and to connect them to the rest of city (App.: Bæklund). External actors from IKEA to local associations or businesses are proposed to have a key role, if a distinctive cultural environment, a housing exploratorium or entrepreneurial makerspaces are to be realized. Creating such partnerships is a task that goes beyond the traditional tasks of the actors. Because of the municipality's satisfaction with the current organizational structure, there may be a risk of these partnerships falling through if no

one is able to create the necessary contact and get external actors onboard. For who should ensure that a national stand-up comedy academy will open in Taatrupgård, who will get IKEA on board in Gadehavegård, etc.? These questions remain unanswered.

Another hurdle is to connect the strategic development plan to the actual refurbishment projects in Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård that are being prepared while the strategic development plan is being formulated. According to Niels Bjørn, the consultants have held separate meetings with KAB about how they can bring the ideas from the strategic development plan into their refurbishment project, while contact has also been initiated with the consultants hired to conduct the refurbishment in Gadehavegård. The potential knowledge gap between the different consultancies nevertheless creates a risk, as other individuals have to carry out the ideas (App.: Bjørn, a). Niels Bjørn also acknowledges just how crucial the realization is:

> *"... the strategic development plan (...) has to work through other plans. It can point out how other plans should be carried out, how to organize them etc. It can point out some narratives, but if you have a disconnection to the following plans, then it will not make any difference."* (App.: Bjørn, a, own translation).

The question of connecting the strategy with subsequent plans and projects is a question of the travelling capacity of a strategy, to *generate transformative force*. The travelling capacity is defined as the ability to provide strategic orientation, and is a question of how powerful a strategy is (Healey 2007). The other plans that Niels Bjørn refer to reflect how the city of Høje-Taastrup is alive. Several projects are already finished or are being planned, as accounted for in chapter 6-8 for the three respective distressed social housing estates. The strategy can lift the quality in the coming projects or push them in slightly other directions as seen in Gadehavegård, where the densification in the vision for 'The Knowledge City' has evolved into the housing exploratorium (App.: Bæklund). It is a way of 'seeing' issues in new ways, which defines the capability of *generating transformative force*.

Nevertheless, KAB and Domea.dk express concerns about the coordination between all the plans, as they face the most extensive physical transformations in Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård. Claus Bjørton from KAB expresses how coordinating tasks between the strategic development plan, the refurbishment of Taastrupgaard, the master plan for Selsmose Lake, the municipality's children and youth policy and the coordinates social measures is very difficult already: "*There are several interfaces, but it is important that it is a chaotic process where everything is in play. It* will *go wrong in coordinating it*" (App.: Bjørton, own translation). The upcoming negotiations between different plot owners when densifying Gadehavegård is another example (App.: Mogensen & Skoven).

It is clear that realizing the strategy will require a lot attention and effort, given that there are many different actors and staff involved. The consultants conducting the strategic development plan and Realdania will soon be leaving Høje-Taastrup, and then the local actors will have to manage the implementation, a phenomenon seen before in strategisation processes, as actors come and go (Engberg & Larsen 2010). As actors leave, issues about financing the realization can also occur. Representatives from VIBO asks: "*Who is going to pay for the plan? We are a social housing organization and want to participate inside some limits, but we cannot do everything*" (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard, own translation).

The social housing organizations have the possibility of securing financing from The National Building Fund for refurbishments, but the municipal investment budget will also have to be co-coordinated along the way. In Høje-Taastrup, Nærheden has been highly prioritized with a new school, infrastructure and sport facilities to attract investors. An issue could occur as major investments are also needed in the distressed social housing estates (App.: Zibrandtsen). The strategies also have to be implemented in the municipal plans, but can quickly disappear if there is no political backing. It is a process that is happening continually among the actors and citizens in Høje-Taastrup (App.: Härtel Jensen). All in all, the realization of the strategy will be a very long process with risks of shifts in priorities and conditions. There are many unknown factors, and the areas will eventually develop in unpredictable ways.

To sum up the discussion about anchoring the strategic development plan, the purpose of the strategy, the question of managing the governance networks and the realization of the strategy have all been important issues in the case of Høje-Taastrup. The uncertainties and disagreements have lead to the decision that the consultants will be the sender of the strategic development plan, even though it was meant to be the municipality's and the social housing organizations' strategy. The strategic development plan will still be considered politically as an inspirational document and a set of principles to strengthen other plans (App.: Arnhild). Because of that decision, the strategy will perhaps lack *transformative force*, if the political backing is uncertain. Nevertheless, strategies can still reshape the practices of transforming the distressed social housing estates through the *seductive power* of the framings and narratives (Healey 2007).

The same kind of challenge emerged in the case of Værebro Park in Gladsaxe, another area included in Realdania's *By i Balance* campaign. This area is slightly further ahead in their process than Høje-Taastrup. The professionals that have worked with the strategic development plan in Gladsaxe have agreed upon the content, but they struggle with the political support. It has been decided to publish a more simple and politically-oriented version of the strategy, even though many details of the complexity then disappear. That process has clearly highlighted how challenging it can be to implement a strategy, making Realdania increasingly aware of the sensibility (App.: Härtel Jensen).

9.3 Changing roles

From the discussion of the anchorage of the strategic development plan in the case of Høje-Taastrup, it is clear how the main issues concern the collaboration and interaction between the municipality and the social housing organizations. The following section will follow up on this to assess where the *strategisation* processes leave the municipality and the social housing organizations. It will be investigated whether the roles of the actors are changing, providing key answers to the second question of the problem formulation regarding how the increased use of strategic planning affect the municipality's role as planning authority and the role of the social housing organizations.

Municipalities

Traditionally and as stipulated by law, municipalities are heavily involved in the operation of social housing in Denmark. However, they are primarily involved through co-financing, supervision and

inspection when it comes to development and refurbishment projects (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet, no. 1116 2017). As municipalities are co-financing or guaranteeing loans, they have an interest in refurbishment projects, but the task is largely left to the social housing organization to solve (AlmenNet 2013). If a distressed social housing estate is to undergo ambitious transformation processes as envisioned in Høje-Taastrup's strategic development plan, it is clear from the case of Høje-Taastrup that the municipality needs to do more than just supervise.

The consultants in Høje-Taastrup have experienced how the municipality has been the driving force from the start in formulating a strategy for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager (App.: Bjørn, a). The view is shared by VIBO who are commending the municipality for their engagement and how their task force is making a difference (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). From the case study, it is clear how important it is to have an active local authority that coordinates strategic planning. A municipality has a planning department that has the potential to drive strategic thinking forwards, and the task force in Høje-Taastrup is a very good example of strengthening that way of thought and integrating different departments of the administration. It is connected to their policy programme New Focus, and as analysed in chapter 5, that policy provided horizontal foci and and goals that unified the local authority. In relation to meta-governance tools that can ensure coordination between different networks of actors and the myriads of projects, that kind of ensuring a unified local authority is essential: *"the most powerful instrument is most likely the local government's own capacity to collect, combine and process knowledge through organisational learning"* (Engberg & Larsen 2010, p. 554).

The municipalities' active role is therefore absolutely essential and they have to play an increasingly central role when strategic planning is applied to distressed social housing estates. It means that new demands also are set out for the local authorities. Urban planners play a key role here. The necessity of having skilled planners and expert knowledge is highlighted by Healey (2007), but what does that entail? Sehested (2009) offers some considerations about the role of urban planners in a world where strategic planning and collaborations with an increasing number of actors is becoming the norm. The movement in planning practices overall means that planners must focus on three overall tasks:

- *"Collaboration and dialogue with many types of urban actors in different network organizations;*
- *Coordination and communication between the many projects and networks;*
- *Management and development work, e.g. network regulation and sparring about the political goals and visions*" (Sehested 2009, p. 252).

These different tasks make up what Sehested calls the hybrid planner, as a number of skills are needed. It is very much about being open-minded and creating new governance networks by allowing more actors to join in, even though this is a difficult task. The fact that the three strategies in Høje-Taastrup include principles of creating partnerships with external actors such as the stand-up comedy academy or the housing exploratorium are examples of this. To further explain what the hybrid planner is about, Sehested (2009) presents four variations of roles:

1. The *'professional strategist'*: has a professional planning view and mostly engage in metagovernance activities about goal and vision formulation in a closed form of network governance. Architecture and communication skills are combined.

2. The *'manager'*: acts primarily in formalized governance networks and relates to the municipal politics. Insight in political and administrative procedures and general knowledge about urban issues are central.

3. The *'market planner'*: oriented towards economic and private actors regarding investments. Focuses on realizing projects and works in limited networks with key political, administrative and business actors.

4. The *'process planner'*: establishes democratic processes to create ownership of decisions. A large variety of networks should be established. Communicative, procedural and organizational skills are important to combine (Sehested 2009).

How to balance and reflect upon these different roles are very important, if the right development is to unfold. All four roles imply a great deal of 'network participation', as planners have to participate in projects to represent their values and ensure municipal influence. In other words, there is a lot of work "in the shadow" of the officially stated political goals and plans that takes up a lot of resources and time. Sehested argues that all the time spent on just participating results in less management and design of the networks. In particular, "*Narrative and discursive framing are significantly underused, and there is little attempt to employ more sophisticated forms of network and dialogue management and strategic use of network participation.*" (Sehested 2009, p. 261).

Here lie some of the issues seen in Høje-Taastrup when difficulties in anchoring the strategic development plan emerge. Narrative and discursive framing have been applied through New Focus, but the visions formulated by the municipality received mixed feedback as the social housing organizations were not involved in their formulation. Questions remain about how powerful The Culture City, The Knowledge City and The Entrepreneur City are as identities. Realdania and the consultants did broaden the network participation with extra resources, but it is still evident how difficult a process it has been to align all the semi-autonomous actors and the already ongoing projects.

All in all, the increased use of strategic planning in distressed social housing estate affects municipalities and urban planners in particular in very demanding ways. A hybrid of tasks must be managed to work "in the shadows" of specific projects, which requires many resources and may result in less network and dialogue management. Ultimately, it is very complex to coordinate strategies after initiating them. The involvement of Realdania in Høje-Taastrup did add resources, but it is still evident how difficult a process it is to coordinate. The following section will cover how strategic planning in distressed social housing organizations affects the other key actor: the social housing organizations.

Social housing organizations

According to Claus Bech-Danielsen, the social housing organizations should be aware of their own resources. They have access to financing through The National Building Fund to refurbish or demolish buildings and to make infrastructural changes. The amount of dwellings in distressed social housing estates is often so high that they can be considered whole neighbourhoods in their own right. In comparison, local houseowners' associations are often much smaller and cannot influence the city in the same way (App.: Bech-Danielsen). The critical mass that social housing organizations possess, combined with the emerging urban strategic solutions, means that the role of social housing

organizations should change towards becoming more active urban developers. Rune Bæklund and Philip Arnhild comments on these considerations:

> *"They cannot just consider refurbishing their facades, they have to relate to what is going on outside their plot. Their role will be very different in the long run. The strategy will influence their role in many years"* (App.: Arnhild & Bæklund, own translation).

It is interesting to see how the municipality is trying to pass on some responsibility to the social housing organizations in Høje-Taastrup during the *strategisation* process, even though they were left out of the formulation of the visions in 'New Focus'. Using Healey's terminology, the analysis shows that the close collaboration can generate mobilising power and transformative power. Ownership and support for the local solutions are in focus.

Representatives from VIBO explains how Høje-Taastrup Municipality is trying to get them on board and 'play along'. But this can create some difficulties, as too much responsibility might be placed upon the social housing organizations. Not every social housing organization has the resources to engage in strategic planning, and might for instance focus more on purely technical solutions when refurbishing (App.: Engelbrecht & Nørgaard). VIBO's considerations also reflect how different the social housing organizations are, and how many of them perhaps are in a process of realizing their potential, but still do not see themself as active urban developers as such. KAB on the other hand has been much more active and has provided many components of the strategy for Taastrugaard. This creates a completely different situation and is reflected in the strongest and most well-rooted strategy of the three in Høje-Taastrup. By contrast, Domea.dk and VIBO are more cautious and do not have the same experience with strategic planning. Domea.dk has, for instance, been challenged by the densification plans around Gadehavegård, as they have started to concretize the idea on their plot, but have yet to engage in negotiations with the neighbouring plot owners.

Similar differences between social housing organizations are seen in other cases. The two other municipalities engaged in Realdania's campaign *By i Balance,* Gladsaxe and Esbjerg, generally have smaller social housing organization involved. The organizations have not constructed any new homes for some time, so they do not have the staff to conduct development projects. By applying strategic development in these cases, Realdania and the municipality will have to challenge them more (App.: Härtel Jensen). If the particular social housing organization is rather small or not geared towards thinking strategically, the municipality's role will have to increase in scope in order to lift the ambitions when an estate has to be refurbished and transformed, according to Claus Bech-Danielsen (App.: Bech-Danielsen). The perhaps most prestigious and praised development of a distressed social housing estate in Denmark is Gellerupparken in Aarhus, run by *Brabrand Boligforening.* They are currently in the construction phase of an extensive transformation of the area that includes extensive refurbishment new infrastructure, businesses, new homes, partial demolitions (as seen on figure 52 below), while the municipality's technical department will move there as one of the key initiatives (Aarhus Kommune & Brabrand Boligforening 2007). The reason for the high level of ambition seems to be a combination of Brabrand Boligforening taking on the responsibility for the larger urban area (App.: Härtel Jensen) and the allocation of resources by Aarhus Municipality in terms of time and financing (App.: Bech-Danielsen).

Figure 52. Partial demolition in Gellerup to make way for new roads (own production)

With Brabrand Boligforening at the forefront, there have been signs for the last 5-10 years in Denmark of an overall movement among social housing organizations towards considering urban development at a larger scale (App.: Härtel Jensen). Projects like the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup also add to the movement, as more social housing organizations are being trained in the discipline of strategic planning. Looking at the conditions for this movement, it is almost remarkable how the will to engage in strategic planning is becoming apparent among some social housing organizations, as several legal obstacles and routines are pointing in another direction. First of all, The National Building Fund – a key actor that provides funding for the social housing sector – is a very bureaucratic institution. Only a very limited number of works qualify for funding, and a specific case might not qualify or the funding framework could steer the case in another direction than initially planned. An example is how Taastrupgaard cannot get funding for new façades because there are no building damages. Claus Bech-Danielsen explains how a report about the overall physical state is usually the opening move towards the fund, and only after making contact, more layers can be added (App.: Bech-Danielsen). Also, refurbishment projects in the social housing sector have traditionally had more of a technical and inside-the-plot character, which has influenced routines among practitioners.

Article 6 of the Danish Social Housing Act ("*Almenboligloven*") states the purpose of the sector: "*A social housing organization's core activity is to construct, rent, manage, maintain and modernize social housing*" (Transport-, Bygnings- og Boligministeriet, no. 1116 2017, own translation). As such, the purpose does not include anything about the surrounding areas of social housing estate, but is merely focused on the traditional technical and inside-the-plot mind set. Of course, it can be discussed what the term 'modernize' covers, and the new urban strategic approach seems to be connected to this. The coherence with the rest of the city is an increasingly important point that requires special attention. According to Realdania's head of projects, some social housing organizations still see themselves mainly as organizations that manage and operate social housing in a traditional sense, however (App.: Härtel Jensen). A last hurdle is the

optimization requirements of the social housing sector, as DKK 1.5 billion have to be saved before 2020 in operation and maintenance expenses (Trafik-, Bygge- og Boligstyrelsen 2018).

To sum up, the increased use of strategic planning in distressed social housing estates is demanding more of social housing organizations. They have to consider the surroundings much more and realize that they have an important role in urban development. A movement seems to be going towards social housing organizations as active urban developers, but the organizations are still very different from each other. Legal rules and practices in the social housing sector might hinder the movement, so there is scope for changing the conditions for strategic planning in distressed social housing organizations.

Realdania

In addition to the municipality and the social housing organizations, the case of Høje-Taastrup also involved Realdania and a team of consultants as extra ressources. By discussing their role, knowledge may be gained about how extra resources can be applied in other cases.

The involvement of Realdania and the consultants generated mobilising power and they pushed the strategisation process forward as the visions and narratives were developed. Realdania in particular facilitated the process and is trying to make the actors collaborate (App.: Härtel Jensen). Niels Bjørn, head of the consultant team, also expresses approval of Realdania's role, as they have added knowledge throughout the process, without acting as a commissioning party. On the other hand, the whole organization of *By i Balance* with two other municipalities and an expert group provides more complexity and more networks of actors (App.: Bjørn, a). Claus Bech-Danielsen adds that the name Realdania can attract a lot of attention, but in the end, the crucial funding for transforming distressed social housing estates will come from The National Building Fund. Nevertheless, extra resources from Realdania may mean that the ambitions are higher from the start:

> *"If you come to The National Building Fund with an extremely ambitious project, they will see that someone really wants to do something, which can mean that more money is available, and I do think when Realdania is involved and put in resources - both in terms of manpower and financial resources - it will lift the level of ambitions in a project like this"* (App.: Bech-Danielsen, own translation).

From experience in Høje-Taastrup it seems to have been very useful to have Realdania involved, as they have added resources to the strategisation process before most of the actual physical transformations will take place. While Realdania cannot make any decision on behalf of municipalities or social housing organizations, they can strengthen the process and add another layer of knowledge. In practice, the consultants have provided a lot of those extra resources with new ideas, creativity and by forming principles for the urban strategic solutions. As Mogensen and Skoven from Domea.dk express, it is important that the consultants provide competences that Domea.dk does not possess (App.: Mogensen & Skoven). Still, the consultants have also added complexity to the network governance since they do not have the insights into local routines and relations that are crucial to securing political and administrative anchorage. It requires even more of the urban planners to act as hybrid planners (Sehested 2009) to manage the network and the dialogue between all the involved actors.

9.4 Recommendations

Based on the discussion of learnings from Høje-Taastrup in the previous sections, a number of recommendations for strategic planning efforts in distressed social housing estates will be presented in the following. It is our intention that the recommendations can be transposed to cases outside Høje-Taastrup.

As strategic planning in distressed social housing estates is a very complex process that entails many aspects, the list of recommendations is not comprehensive, but provides a basis for further discussion beyond this thesis.

1. Establish a cross-organizational political committee, such as an article 17, subarticle 4 committee, to foster closer collaboration between the municipality and social housing organization(s).

2. If more than one distressed social housing estate is involved, the committee can work as a common forum for knowledge sharing and to set the overall directions, but strategies should then be formulated in individual fora for each area.

Purpose: The article 17, subarticle 4 committee in Høje-Taastrup has proved to be a very strong political set-up that connects the municipality and social housing organizations in new ways. Strong political backing will inspire better collaborations among professionals and foster better strategies. Nonetheless, it has proved difficult to have all three social housing organizations in Høje-Taastrup in the same forum when decisions about the strategies are to be made, as too many decision-makers are assembled in one room. It may be appropriate to move the decision-making capacity to smaller fora.

3. Create an area-based secretariat that works specifically with the realization of the strategy and is co-funded by the municipality and the social housing organization(s). The secretariat should refer directly to the decision-makers, like an article 17, subarticle 4 committee.

Purpose: Engaging in new partnerships and managing different projects and actors takes a lot more effort than municipalities and social housing organizations are used to. A secretariat could provide a platform from which to perform network governance. Project staff working with refurbishment projects, coordinated social measures etc. could also be physically present in the secretariat.

4. Urban planners, whether they are hired by the municipality or as project staff in an area-based secretariat, need a hybrid set of skills in architecture, planning, political and administrative procedures, communication, and knowledge of the private sector and of organizations.

Purpose: Formulating and realizing strategies in distressed social housing estates requires skilled planners, as they play a key role in facilitating collaboration and dialogue between actors and projects.

5. When formulating visions for distressed social housing estates, it is important to include the social housing organizations and other key actors such as volunteer associations, businesses or public institutions that are supposed to play a key role in the strategy. Binding partnerships can be a way to get social housing organizations and other key actors on board.

Purpose: Partnerships with social housing organizations and other key actors are important to securing ownership, political support and credibility. Ambitious strategies, such as the framings about the housing exploratorium, the stand-up comedy academy and the entrepreneur environment require the involvement of external actors before they can be realized. Partnerships with external actors are hitherto missing from Høje-Taastrup, which has led to questioned credibility. Actors should be involved at an early stage when visions should at least be open to being modified and reassessed.

6. Social housing organizations have to invest in strategic thinking by hiring staff with experience in this topic and by incorporating strategic thinking into their organizations. When thinking strategically, they should provide input to the strategies, but also be open to changing their course of direction.

Purpose: Social housing organizations play a key role in distressed social housing estates, so when applying strategic planning they need to be open to change. By providing input, they can improve the strategies.

7. Seize opportunities for adding resources to the strategy-making in the form of economic support as well as expertise.

Purpose: It is a time-consuming challenge to align large organizations through negotiations. Hiring consultants with expertise can speed up the process. Realdania's involvement in Høje-Taastrup has brought expert and financial resources to the table. Similar external support – whether from Realdania or from other public or private funds – could be sought to support strategic planning in other distressed social housing estates.

The recommendations above are proposals that may be used in relation to strategic planning in distressed social housing estates. Many different approaches may be appropriate, however, and they have to fit with the local organizational structures. A strategic approach should be adjusted to the physical and organizational context of the specific housing estate as well as the resources and practices of the municipality and of the social housing organization. The level of ambition that local policies and strategies aim for will also determine how to apply a strategic approach.

9.5 Further perspectives

This section will look at some topics that have not been covered in the thesis so far, such as underlying assumptions. The section will also look beyond the case to provide a perspectivation of the findings.

The current collection of initiatives to transform distressed social housing estates in Denmark are the latest in a long line of initiatives. According to process consultant at KAB Dea Maria Petersen, DKK 124m has been spent over the years on social measures in Taastrupgaard alone, excluding costs for the several physical refurbishments (Petersen 2018). Social housing organizations and municipalities are keen to avoid the mistakes of the past (App.: Bjørn, a), but run the risk of inventing new mistakes instead. According to Niels Bjørn, they are taking humans as the starting point this time, which should give the initiatives a better chance of succeeding than past initiatives (ibid.). Should they fail, however, the consequences could be wide-spread since there seem to be pronounced trends with regards to "ghetto measures" in contemporary planning in Denmark, i.e., the radical and urban strategic solutions presented in chapter 4. The trends include aesthetic preferences but also other physical and infrastructural measures such as selective demolition, rerouting of roads and bringing roads with cars through previously pedestrianized areas, adaptation of open spaces to increase security, and placing public amenities and attractions within the areas. Many of these measures recur in many recent transformations of distressed social housing estates in Denmark and abroad (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017). The trend to use these measures is relatively new, so many of them have not proved their worth over time. Nonetheless, it could seem that they are being copied in interventions all over the country and the risk is that they are being copied with little regard for the context that the relevant distressed area is in. Bech-Danielsen & Stender's (2017) toolbox of 12 measures that should be considered in relation to transformations of distressed social housing estates is for example no answer book:

> *"... it makes sense to look at them every time and see 'Is there something that we can use?', but they are not to be used in the same way everywhere, definitely. And it's easily, as you say, the risk that we kind of duplicate "so this is the way that we do it this decade" (...) And then in ten years we'll realize 'Well, that didn't help either' just like it didn't help a thing in the '80s, just like it didn't help a thing in the '90s and so on, and then we'll probably add a new layer of measures again."* (App.: Bech-Danielsen, own translation).

Physical bias

Although the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup contains organizational aspects, many of the proposed measures are physical by nature. This is also typical of many other contemporary transformation projects. This physical bias may have many reasons. Physical measures have the benefit of being visually noticeable and therefore attractive for politicians that like to be perceived as "getting things done" (App.: Bech-Danielsen). However, this also suggests the existence of a kind of physical determinism that has two implications. The first implication is that the physical layout of the distressed social housing estate is the reason – or at least part of the reason – for the social issues that the residents are experiencing. There seems to be at least a partial consensus that the problems with ghettos lie in the buildings and all that surrounds them: The architectural style, the aesthetic appearance, the construction materials, the monotony and the scale of the buildings as well as the vast green areas surrounding many of these areas (Bjørn 2008).

The second implication results from the first and dictates that since the residents' social problems are believed to be caused by architectural problems with buildings, the former can be solved by solving the latter – i.e., the social problems will disappear if we solve the buildings' physical problems. This physical determinism is evident in the government's discourse about distressed social housing estates (Statsministeriet 2018), in which the focus is on tearing down buildings in the belief that this and the subsequent dispersal of the residents will solve their problems. This belief is reflected in the suggested measures in the strategic development plan in Høje-Taastrup, in which the physical measures have a prominent position, even though there are also social measures suggested. Concerning the relation between physical and social measures and the actual effects of densifying and creating a social mix, Claus Bech-Danielsen says:

> *"I don't necessarily believe that you will save people from their social problems [...] You can try to solve the individual's problems and I don't think you can do that very well with physical measures, I mean it's social measures that are needed there. [...] But you can create a more natural cityscape if you manage to mix, to create a more mixed city, I'm sure of that. [...] The physical measures they're going to do in Taastrupgaard and elsewhere will have to be complemented by coordinated social measures [...] But it's rare they're connected well"* (App.: Bech-Danielsen, own translation).

Assumptions about the urban and social mix

The current crop of strategic transformations in Denmark also share a couple of other common traits: The assumptions that the urban is good, and that social mix is good. As to the former, Bech-Danielsen comments:

> *"[...] Now they want to create "city" in many of those areas, i.e., make it more urban. And they believe that this will be the salvation. In the '70's they wanted to make it more scenic and rural. There may be something about the urban that, this thing about more eyes on the street, this visual control, that makes sense. (...) suddenly now we're using the city as a picture of good that we have to sprinkle on these areas to make them safe and good and secure and so on."* (App.: Bech-Danielsen, own translation).

Bech-Danielsen seems worried that the current trend of trying to create urban environments with high density housing, street life, restaurants and so on even in far-flung suburbs like Høje-Taastrup and Hedehusene is merely a case of the pendulum swinging all the way back from when the suburbs and small towns were the ideal. The risk of the current trend is that we will end up designing all different kinds of localities to look the same, no matter if they are located in the centre of large cities or on the outskirts of medium-sized towns (App.: Bech-Danielsen). The demands of city dwellers to have access to fresh air and green areas may reinforce this trend, as industries leave city centres and the cities become greener.

A more immediate risk of the "urban-is-good assumption" is that it may be the assumption of a specific caste of technocrats made up of architects, urbanists and designers. By virtue of their professions, they carry a disproportionately large influence on the built environment. If they do not manage to listen to the people that actually live in and – in many cases – prefer the suburbs, we may end up with a large number of areas designed to fit the designers and architects rather than the suburbanites (App.: Bech-Danielsen).

The concept of social mix covers the belief that a more heterogeneous composition of residents will improve the social situation of said residents. The concept is also referred to as the neighbourhood effect, since the idea is that positive outcomes will result from having neighbours from a different societal stratus that do not have the same social issues as the original residents (Friedrichs, Galster & Musterd 2003). The effects of the concept are disputed, however, and research shows that the effect seems to be greater in North America than in Europe (ibid.). One of the ways to achieve social mix is to offer a varied mix of housing options within a neighbourhood, so that residents with different demographic characteristics will be attracted to the neighbourhood. Most distressed social housing estates only have one type of homes; social housing, that might not appeal to well-resourced individuals and families. Demolition or merging of flats to lower the number may result in residents with fewer resources being forced out, as they often will not be able to afford the increased rent of larger flats (Bech-Danielsen & Stender 2017).

When the poor are pushed out of their homes and neighbourhoods due to gentrification, the root problems are not solved. What is happening instead is the treatment of symptoms. Bech-Danielsen & Stender (2017) call this social engineering. This is arguably the case when decisions are made to paint a social housing estate to make it more attractive, even though a deeper-lying problem is arguably that the composition of residents is making the estate unattractive. However, moving those residents will just move the problem around, even if there are some indication that doing the opposite, i.e., concentrating residents with social problems, will reinforce the problems. The real solution to the root problem would be to solve the social problems of the residents such as unemployment, poverty, crime, low levels of education, social isolation and poor integration of immigrants.

10. CONCLUSION

The conclusion will provide an answer to the problem formulation:

- *What are the implications of municipalities' increased use of strategic planning to improve conditions in distressed social housing estates? How does this affect their role as planning authority and the role of the social housing organizations?*

Strategic planning provides a way of telling a narrative about distressed social housing estates and provides directions for transforming them, often in radical ways. To answer the problem formulation, we conducted a case study of distressed social housing estates in Høje-Taastrup, as Høje-Taastrup Municipality and three social housing organizations are developing a strategy for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager towards 2040. The strategy will be formulated in a strategic development plan supported by Realdania's campaign *By i Balance*, and has been developed concurrently with this thesis.

In January 2016 Høje-Taastrup Municipality released a policy programme called 'New Focus on distressed social housing estates', with the aim of having no housing estate represented on the Government's ghetto list by 2025. With strong support from mayor Michael Ziegler, the municipality aligned their own stance across municipal departments by setting out some overall initiatives including physical transformations, neighbourhood profiles and the integration of different social and educational policies. With 'New Focus', Høje-Taastrup Municipality set a direction for future plans and interventions, and by setting up a municipal task force to handle the distressed social housing estates, skilled planners were assigned to the task. In that regard, the municipality created a basis for *network governance* by creating horizontal foci and goals within their own organization.

Following 'New Focus', an article 17, subarticle 4 committee and a programme steering group were set up between the municipality and the social housing organizations, with politicians and managers from all parties represented. With these networks between the actors in place, coalitions were created to *generate mobilising force*, as Healey (2007) puts it. As municipalities traditionally merely superintend and control social housing organizations, the cross-organizational structure seems extraordinary, and has created a basis for strategic decisions. In that regard, the increased use of strategic planning in Høje-Taastrup has resulted in new forms of collaborations and in an attempt to perform *network governance* between the municipality and the social housing organizations.

Even though Høje-Taastrup Municipality and the social housing organizations have a good foundation for collaborating, dilemmas have emerged during the decision-making process of the strategic development plan. Both the 17-4 committee and the programme steering group – and both the municipality and the social housing organizations – have to agree on the strategy. It is a challenge to get everyone to work together and get support from everyone, since the strategies have to be communicated and translated through large organizations. Engberg & Larsen (2010) capture some of the challenges of collaborating in strategisation processes: "*Networks of actors are dynamic; coalitions form and disband, and as different ways of representing interests occur simultaneously, strategisation processes may become replete with conflict and antagonism* " (Engberg & Larsen p. 567).

A conflict have emerged as the strategic development plan needs to be anchored in the municipality's political organization, characterized by conventional practices. A lack of orienting goals in the strategy have been a central point of discussion in that regard. It has lead to uncertainties about the purpose of the strategy and what it should entail. Important decisions about who the sender and target group are have to be made, but it can be challenging since strategic planning in distressed social housing estates are a new practice that most municipalities and social housing organizations are not familiar with. In Høje-Taastrup, these discussions led to the decision that the strategic development plan will be considered as an inspiration document that sets out principles for future projects, but the sender of the report will be the consultants, and not the municipality and the social housing organizations.

Looking at the strategies being formulated for the distressed social housing estates, the neighbourhood profiles from 'New Focus' set a vision with Taastrupgaard as 'The Culture City', Gadehavegård as 'The Knowledge City' and Charlotteager as 'The Entrepreneur City'. The visions were formulated by Høje-Taastrup Municipality themself, as a part of creating internal foci. As the social housing organizations were not involved, the municipality conducted the *filtering* of what the vision should be about. Subsequently, the vision received mixed reactions from the social housing organizations. The viability of the visions has also been questioned, regarding how much substance there is in e.g. calling Charlotteager an entrepreneur city. Taastrupgaard's vision seems to have the most backing and with cultural institutions already located there, it seems to be viable, while the proposed densification in Gadehavegård as part of The Knowledge City has gained support as well. It is clear from the visions that Høje-Taastrup sets an agenda with these visions. As a result they try to attract new residents to mix the residential compositions in the areas and to increase their tax base.

In developing the strategies in Realdania's *By i Balance* project, a team of consultants have developed a framework of principles to *frame and focus* the visions and point in which directions the following projects should go. In Taastrupgaard, concepts about a new high street and a distinctive cultural environment (a stand-up comedy academy) were proposed as a direct extension of 'The Culture City'. Eight housing blocks of 185 flats will also be demolished as a radical physical transformation, making way for a new school that is *framed* as a children and culture house. With KAB's distinctive development approach, the social housing organization has helped develop the most well-rooted strategy of the three areas. Nevertheless, the coordination between all the projects will be very challenging, as demolition, a new school, refurbishing the remaining Taastrupgaard and densifying the area around Selsmose Lake will all take place.

In Gadehavegård, the proposed densification related to 'The Knowledge City' has been *framed* as a housing exploratorium with new architecture, building techniques and new ways of living. Knowledge can be accumulated around housing and construction matters to synchronize the housing exploratorium with the Knowledge City visions. The *framing* nevertheless relies heavily on partnerships with external actors and and is vulnerable to economic fluctuations, while the different plot owners have to collaborate closely to make it work.

The questioned vision about 'The Entrepreneur City' in Charlotteager has resulted in different principles pointing in slightly different directions, as *framings* about urban farming, cohabiting senior citizens, connections and integration with the nearby urban development project Nærheden all have

been considered. There has been a search for a credible framing, and since both Domea.dk and VIBO have housing sections in Charlotteager and traditionally have not been particularly proactive in terms of strategic development, it has proved difficult to get them both to support the principles. In addition, there are no physical transformations on the table, besides the school that will move to Nærheden. This may present possibilities for a new function in the area.

In Taastrupgaard and Gadehavegård, the upcoming radical physical transformations have played a pivotal part of the strategy. By applying so-called urban strategic solutions such as extensively refurbishing the housing estates, demolishing certain buildings, constructing a new school and new roads and connections, those plans have in many ways been the starting signal of Høje-Taastrup Municipality's strategic approach. The urban strategic solutions are very visible and in that way they appeal to decision-makers, but it can also create a kind of physical determinism with physical transformations as *the* solution. The social issues of low income, low education levels, unemployment and poor integration of immigrants will not be solved by physical measures. The concentration of such issues might be thinned out, but that means that the current residents will be forced out of their homes.

As the strategies for Taastrupgaard, Gadehavegård and Charlotteager contain a vision, a set of principles and physical transformations, the strategies will have significant implications on the housing estates. Several initiatives are proposed that cross the normal plot boundaries and cannot stand alone. It means that strategic planning requires a great deal of managing of different projects and of the involved actors to succeed. External actors have to be engaged in new ways, and in Høje-Taastrup, no such partnerships are in place at the moment. This leaves the realizations of the *framed* housing exploratorium, the stand-up comedy academy and the entrepreneur environment uncertain. In all, the realization of the strategy will be a very long process with risks of shifts in priorities and conditions. Many unknown factors exist, and eventually the areas will develop in unpredictable ways.

Turning attention to the second question of the problem formulation – how the roles of municipalities as planning authority and the social housing organizations are affected by strategic planning – both actors will face culture-changing activities. To start with the municipalities, their role is absolutely essential and they have to play an increasingly central role when strategic planning is applied to distressed social housing estates. New demands affect urban planners in particular, as a hybrid of different tasks must be managed 'in the shadows' of overall political goals, as they participate in a number of specific projects. It takes a lot of resources just to participate, leaving less time for managing the dialogue and networks of actors. To complete these tasks, urban planners need a variety of professional skills about architecture, communication, organizations, political procedures and the private market (Sehested 2009). With more responsibility on individual urban planners, a risk emerges, as the municipality's role gets very dependent on individuals. A change of the municipalities' responsibilities already seem to be happening along with an increased focus on governance and area-based interventions (Engberg & Larsen 2010), but seems to get even more explicit when strategic planning is applied to distressed social housing estates.

Strategic planning also demands more of social housing organizations. They have to consider the surroundings more than before and realize that they have an important role in urban development. With access to funding through The National Building Fund and with professional administrations,

they clearly have the potential to make a real difference. It is clear from the case study of Høje-Taastrup that social housing organizations are very different from each other in resources and strategic skills. This has to be considered before municipalities collaborate with them. It seems to be a trend that more social housing organizations are aware of their possibilities of being active urban developers, with Brabrand Boligforening in Aarhus a prime example. Most social housing organizations are nevertheless more focused on the daily operation. This means that strategic thinking can meet resistance. Legal rules, The National Building Fund's limited number of measures that can obtain financial support, and the normal practices of inside-the-plot-only refurbishments in the social housing sector might hinder some organizations' movement towards thinking strategically. Therefore, social housing organizations must be challenged and trained to think strategically in the process of applying strategic planning, while they also have to challenge themselves and perhaps hire staff with other competences.

The findings of the thesis have lead to a set of recommendations. The recommendations relate firstly to the collaboration between municipalities and social housing organizations, including different ways of structuring the collaboration and what skills are needed in urban planners and social housing organizations. Secondly, the advantage of having additional resources from external supporting partners (such as Realdania) may help the complicated process of aligning large organizations in strategic planning.

Overall, strategic planning in distressed social housing estates can produce very ambitious plans for transforming them. Through a framing of specific narratives, a number of projects to support framed transformations will take place. The management and coordination between the projects can be a challenge, and network governance is necessary to get large organizations to work together and agree on the extensive strategies. Municipalities have a very central role, and urban planners get more responsibility in managing the networks of projects and actors, while the social housing organizations need to be challenged and to engage more actively in the surrounding city's development.

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