The Babel Tower of European Identity
A study of the use of collective EU identity constructs by EU state leaders in their articulation of visions for the future of the EU collaboration

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“It's like everyone tells a story about themselves inside their own head. Always. All the time. That story makes you what you are. We build ourselves out of that story.”

— Patrick Rothfuss, The Name of the Wind
Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to uncover how collective EU identity is constructed and framed by state leaders in their articulation of visions for the future of the EU cooperation. The nature of the EU is changing after Great Britain is leaving the Union. Thus, the thesis sets out to understand how state leaders frame the EU as a collective identity shared by all European. Because the EU is argued to be changing and because the way forward for the EU have been of concern to many state leaders since Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked, the identity construction will be analyzed in terms of visions for the future of the EU. The analysis is exclusively focused on EU identity and identification with the European Union and not with a broader identification with Europe as a continent. This is done to ensure the focus on where on identification with the Union and where the EU should develop in the future. For this reason, the data analyzed are comprised of speeches by four state leaders; French President Emmanuel Macron, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Mark Rutte from The Netherlands and Swedish Prime Minister Stephan Löfven. To be able to uncover how they construct collective EU identity, the speeches were analyzed using Critical Framing Analysis to learn which areas they highlighted in their speeches in relation to the future of the EU and how they argued for the importance of these areas. Afterwards, these areas were discussed in terms of Eder’s concept of collective identity and Anderson’s concept of imagined communities to translate these frames into collective identity constructs. The results reveal that the state leaders use very different constructs of what identity describe the EU. Thus, Rutte construct a version of the EU as a governance level based on economic cooperation to deliver prosperity, security and stability for the European populations. For this reason, Rutte argues that EU policy areas should be limited to areas where the EU can deliver on this promise. Löfven construct an EU with a shared past of war and conflict, a past we must unite to be able to overcome in the future, but he does not either believe in closer EU cooperation in the future. Macron construct an EU identity which is similar to a national identity. In this sense, the all Europeans enjoy a common cultural heritage of great thinkers, artists and pioneers, though he speaks of closer integration and a closer cooperation in the future. Orbán is less interested in speaking about where the EU is heading in the future. Instead, he focuses his attention on constructing the EU as a Christian community where the EU will interfere less in domestic affairs on how to deal with immigration issues. In addition to these constructs, there is a lot of talk about member states taking their responsibilities and living up to obligations by Rutte and Löfven. However, these talks are dividing Europe into A-team members and B-team members, where the A-team has formed an exclusive club for those who live up to the responsibilities. One of the B-team members is Orbán who argues that he is not being listened to in the EU and his alternative approach to handling the migration crisis is not welcomed. The A-team members do not listen to B-team members and their arguments for wanting to different things for the EU, thus, the A-team is legitimizing the opinions of the B-team. The EU
need to overcome these divisions if it wants to find the glue, the identity, that unites the EU and not risk more members leaving the Union in the future.

Keywords: Europe, the EU, identity, constructs, framing, the future of the EU, Rutte, Löfven, Macron, Orbán
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1.0 Introduction

“The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.” (Schuman Declaration 1950 in European Union 2018)

These are the words of the Schuman Declaration which ultimately led to the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, pooling the production of coal and steel under the High Authority of six European states. Words which quite clearly demonstrate the geopolitical situation Europe faced after WWII. Fear of the outbreak of a third world war was profound. Peace was essential to the European continent.

The originator behind the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the French businessman and government official Jean Monnet. He believed that the key to peace and prosperity in Europe was the establishment of a European Union which ensured the reconciliation of France and Germany. In order to achieve this idea, it was necessary to create lasting political institutions which purpose was to advance Europe’s collective interests and not solely national interests. Monnet believed that it was more important to achieve this grand cooperation in a few industrial sectors instead of a grand plan to include all sectors (van Oudenaren 2004: 29-31). Thus, the Community was centered on coal and steel, raw materials that are essential in war-making, which ultimately made war between the two grand nations "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible." (Schuman Declaration 1950 in European Union 2018) Monnet eventually convinced Schuman and other state leaders to move the European cooperation to a supranational plan and above the limited intergovernmental cooperation in OEEC (van Oudenaren 2004: 29-31).

Six countries, France, West Germany, Benelux and Italy signed the agreement in 1951 to what had become the ECSC, the institutions which have developed and increased in political scope and size to what we today know as the European Union. Ensuring peace has always been the heart of the European Union (EU). The common expression “Never again” illustrate how important it was to the European governments and populations to ensure that Europe would never again witness a war as bloody and dreadful than the World Wars had been.

The blueprint of the EU as a successful peace project came in 2012 when the Union received the Nobel Peace Prize and manifested the EU as a peace facilitator in the minds of citizens across the world. The EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "for over six decades (having, red) contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe" (Nobel Prize 2014)
Six European leaders did not show up at the award, signaling to the rest of Europe that they did not agree with the award (Lauritzen 2012). The member states who abstained from the awards where the now soon to be ex-EU member state Great Britain and other, newer EU members, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Sweden also abstained, but because they were occupied elsewhere (Lauritzen 2012). These states have all expressed dissatisfaction with the EU (Daily News Hungary 2017) and hesitation towards more EU integration with Brexit being the prime example of this hesitation. The fact that the states who abstained are not among the founding members of the European Union makes me wonder: is there different understandings to whom the EU are and how the cooperation of the EU should be? Except for Great Britain and Sweden all these states were consumed by communism and Soviet control after WWII. Thus, they have faced a different situation in the post-WWII years than other EU member states. Does this affect what they expect from the EU and their reasons to participate in the cooperation? And ultimately, is these different understandings and expectations reflected in the articulation of visions for the future of the EU?

Delanty argues: “the idea of Europe is a historical projection.” (Delanty 1995: 3) and “every age reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity.” (Delanty 1995: 1) Thus new members in the Union means adding new meanings to the EU in the form of new historical contexts. In other words, inviting new members into the Union means inviting new national cultures and identities into the EU, which ultimately means reshaping the EU’s identity. Or, as Pellerin-Carlin argues:

“‘being European’ is a matter of culture. A culture is a set of external norms and ideas formed by history that shape one’s vision of the world... The European culture can also be understood as a political culture, a set of visions related to how a society can and should be organized.” (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 76; Simmel 1997)

In this way, he argues that a shared history is essential to share a political culture. Thus, if we do not have shared history, norms and ideas, we do not perceive the world in similar ways. In this way, our culture or identity shape how we perceive the social world and what we expect from the social world. Subsequently, this means that states who have entered the European Union at different stages, might not share the same “EU history” and therefore there exist different visions of the nature of the European Union and what the EU should be. Pellerin-Carlin further argues:

“Last but not least identities matter. An identity is the sense of belonging to a same community. Hence an identity can be a cultural identity, based on shared values, shared history, etc. Such cultural identity is necessary, but not sufficient, for the emergence of a political identity.” Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 75)

Or as Eder argues, collective identities are “series of events in texts, songs and images which some people recognize as being part of their particular we, i.e. as a collective identity.” (Eder 2009: 432) In this sense, a
shared identity with a particular “we” is the glue that holds a community together. Surely, when we have a diverse amount of states, who all have different national histories and different norms and values, it can be difficult for a political or collective identity in the EU to emerge. This might explain why different states want different things from the Union and why the EU means different things to different people.

1.1 Problem formulation

Brexit has renewed the discussion about what the EU is and what we want from the EU cooperation. How should the EU be after Great Britain leaves the Union. Should it cut budgets and focus on the remaining members or should it expand in size and budget? Questions which are all related to identity. This should be understood in the sense that EU identity is about who the EU is (Wendt 1994: 385), and who the EU is, is affected by who is member of the Union. Thus, the EU faces a new period in its lifespan. The EU narrative is being retold; the EU is no longer an institution which a state is member of as an end result. The EU is now an institution which can be resigned if it does not live up to the expectations of the peoples. Thus, the EU is now a means to an end; whatever that end may be. In this sense, it is very likely that the European leaders will now be held accountable for their actions in the EU, more so than ever before. Therefore, this thesis seeks to gain an understanding of how different member states give meaning to the EU cooperation, i.e. how do they give meaning to the glue that holds the Union together, i.e. what is the EU, who is the EU. Therefore, my problem statement sounds:

**How is EU identity constructed and framed by European state leaders’ articulation in their visions for the future of the EU?**

The thesis will focus on how European identity is constructed by European leaders with an emphasis on how the member state frame the foundation of the cooperation and their visions for the future. The thesis is focused on speeches held after Great Britain activated Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and on speeches which focuses on where the EU is heading after Brexit; hence the future of the EU. The speeches will be from different state leaders who are all members of the European Union. Different member states with different entries into the Union, geographical locations and governments with different ideological backgrounds are chosen. They will presumably have different views for the future of the EU and construct EU identity differently. They have different national histories and therefore they might have different visions for the future of the EU (Anderson 1991: 204). Thus, they have varying interests in relation to the EU and thereby presumably different ways of framing these interests. Thus, the thesis is interested in how EU identity is reflected in the frames and constructs of state leaders’ visions for the future EU cooperation.
1.2 Literature review: Why even study European identity?
When setting out to analyze European identity, there are many different approaches to European identity, mostly because there is a wide array of ways to define and analyze shared identities.

The study of European identity peaked in the nineties and noughties with the biggest contributors to this field conducted their research in the era of the aftermath of the Cold War (Howe 1995; Smith 1992; Davies 1996; Neumann 1999; Delanty 1995; Delanty 2003; Delanty 2005; Kostakopoulou 2001; Laffan 2004; Cederman 2001; Schlesinger 2001; Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany opened up for a new discussion on European political integration. These changes sparked debate on ‘the nature of European unity’ and introduced the social constructivist approach of European identity to the field of European integration (Cederman 2001). However, these studies are all rather old and the international environment has changed since. Even the EU’s environment has changed, hence the EU’s challenges have changed accordingly. Today, the EU faces what is often called the EU’s identity crisis, the legitimacy crisis, expanding borders to the East and a renewed Euroscepticism, rising nationalism in a clear response to an economic crisis and the refugee crisis, which many do not feel have been dealt with sufficiently by the EU or by national governments. Crises, which have altogether renewed the debate on what we want from the EU but also the question of national and European identities. Or what Schlesinger describes as a: "collective identity crises, which are vertical and lateral and occur at sub-state, state and EU levels." (Schlesinger 2001: 92)

Thus, in many ways, it makes sense to research the possibility of a European identity. However, studies have shown that it is possible for several identities to exist at once; that the individual can feel both their national identity and a sense of belonging to Europe (Jenkin 2008: 17). But whether one such European identity exists or what characterizes it, is a question that has not been reconciled. One might argue that issues with methodology may be the reason why this question is still debated and left somewhat unanswered. In fact, Favell argues:

“The problem is that these versions of the ‘sociological’ in political science – what Katzenstein bluntly describes as ‘rummaging in the graveyard of sociological studies’ – offer a wholly arcane version of what a ‘sociological’ approach to politics might in fact be.” (Favell 2005: 1110)

Favell offers his critique of the sociological and social constructivist approach to the study of identity, arguing that the approach has contributed nothing to the field except approaches. Additionally, Brubaker and Cooper have argued that the concept of identity should be discarded altogether as the concept lacks a clear definition (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 1). Favell takes this point even further by arguing that scholars search for
something which does not occur naturally when searching for a European identity; indeed, the concept of European identity is an academic construct (Favell 2005: 1111-1112)

Favell does have a point. Although I do not completely agree with his critique, there is a point worth considering when searching for a European identity that may only exist as an academic approach. In relation to this thesis, the focus on how EU identity is constructed by actors who actually is a part of the EU-decision making process, but also represent the nation-state, is a different contribution to the field of European identity. The decision makers of the European Council, who are also the state leaders may experience the EU in different terms than the public do, therefore what the politicians feel towards the EU may not be the same as the public feel. However, the public does vote for the politicians and leaders with whom they trust to represent them in their national democracies, therefore we need to include the visionaries, the leaders and the creators for/of the EU into the research mix. Because, as Pedersen puts it:

“It may well be that the nation is an imagined community as argued by sociologists – but who is then doing the imagining? Europeans can be defined as either the elite (political or economic) or as the broader public. In my view European identity has to be studied from both perspectives.” (Pedersen 2008: 20)

There have already been extensive contributions to the study of the public (Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005; Davies 1996; Delanty 2005; Howe 1995; Kostakoulou 2001; Neumann 1999). Therefore, this thesis does not seek to add to these contributions of the broader public, but rather focus on the political elite. As Pedersen argues, both perspectives are important, however, there is a gap within the field of European identity among the political elite to be filled. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the focus will only be on the political elite, excluding the economic elite and the public. Thus, focusing on the political elite of state leaders, i.e. presidents or prime ministers, means not exploiting the European identity of the citizens. This focus cannot, therefore, answer the question if the European citizens feel a sense of belonging to the EU, but exclusively how European state leaders try to construct a collective identity among Europeans in a setting of shared history, norms and values.

Favell argues that identity theories cannot actually measure a shared identity, rather it can measure “knowledge of the EU, participation in the EU, opinions about the EU, perceptions of the EU, etc.” (Favell 2005: 1113) Thus, this thesis does not try to measure a potential shared European identity, rather, it focuses on how identity is constructed in visions of the future of the EU.
2.0 Methodology
In the following sections, the ontological and epistemological considerations of the thesis will be dealt with before we dig into a closer examination of my state-centric approach and the difficulties that arise when studying the political elite. Afterward, we take a closer look at the data selected and how it was selected.

2.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations
The ontological position of this thesis is manifested within the philosophical paradigm of social constructivism. According to Bryman, constructivism promotes an understanding of human knowledge as social construction (Bryman 2016: 28-30). Constructivism is closely linked to the epistemology of interpretivism and fundamentally disregard positivist claims of complete objectivism and rationalism. Thus, social constructivists reject the positivist understanding of knowledge as an unchanging reality “out there”. Instead, constructivists recognize the social world as being constructed, not given. Social constructivists distinguish between the material world or the physical existence and the social importance human ascribe to these phenomena (Zehfuss 2002: 3). Therefore, social phenomena are not only present when social interaction occurs but is continually in a state of change.

In other words, there is no fundamental truth of the social world, which is constantly being renegotiated. This potentially means that there are as many constructs of the social world as there are people, meaning there are multiple ways actors understanding and speak of the world and how it functions. It further means that the frames or constructs are competing with one another. This explains why the EU means different things to different people and people have different understandings of what the EU is. Thus, different frames and different social world understandings can explain different views and arguments of visions for the future of the EU.

Additionally, this thesis follows a Wendtian interpretation of social constructivism in International Relations and agrees with his critique of realists and liberals shared commitment to rationality. Wendt argues:

“Like all social theories, rational choice directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating identities and interests of agents as exogenously given and focusing on how the behavior of agents generates outcomes.” (Wendt 1992: 391-392).

Thus, Wendt criticizes the positivist focus on behaviorism in social sciences and emphasizes that identities and interest are not as given as this ontological position prescribe (Holm 2011: 37-39). What actually construe the social world is not observable through behavior as positivism prescribe. Therefore, Wendt suggests that one devout some attention to uncovering the identities which define how state actors behave in international settings like the EU (Wendt 1992). In a constructivist ontological position, he argues that “international
politics is constructed is made, not given, because identities and interests are constructed and supported by intersubjective practice” (Zehfuss 2002: 12). Thus, according to Wendt, people act on the basis of meaning, meaning which cannot be found in an objective world but is constructed and developed in interaction with others (Wendt 1992: 396-397). This further implies that behavior is influenced by intersubjective structures (social interaction), rather than by objective standards posed in a material world (ibid). He further emphasizes the importance of identity and how it influences behavior:

“It is collective meaning that constitutes the structures which organize our actions. Actors acquire identities – relative stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self – by participating in such collective meanings.” (Wendt 1992: 397)

Thus, in this ontological understanding of social constructivism and Wendt’s extensive focus on how identities shape behavior and ultimately how we make sense of the world around us, the theoretical focus on framing analysis and identities make sense for uncovering how state actors speak of the future of the EU. Identity matter for how we understand the world around us as identity reflect the way we behave, we, therefore, need to uncover the stories that constitute the European state leader's collective identity, and consequently what way is the way forward for the EU.

Where my approach differs from Wendt is in the fact that Wendt puts no emphasis on the way language constitute the social world (Zehfuss 2002: 48-49). Quite the contrary, critical framing analysis is devoted to uncovering how language constitutes the social world and how frames influence the way we perceive this social world (Entman 1993). I, therefore, subscribe to an approach which is highly focused on language and dismisses Wendt’s lacking focus on the power of language. In consequence, following a constructivist ontology, partly Wendtian, paired with framing analysis, we can uncover different identity narratives, meaning we can understand different constructions of the social world and how identities influence (or influence others too) how we make sense of the world around us. Following a social constructivist ontology entails me to uncover the interplay with different frames or different identity constructions and how these constructs give meaning to a potential collective EU identity; what are the battlefields and where the constructs are contested.

In line with social constructivism is the epistemology of interpretivism. They both grew out of a critique of the way social sciences were being subject to the same methodological approach as was used in natural sciences, because: “the subject matter of the social sciences – people and their institutions – is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences.” (Bryman 2016: 26) Where positivism entails an entirely value-free examination of data, interpretivism stands for respecting the variations between individuals (Bryman 2016: 26). Or, as Collins argues; interpretivists reject the objective notion that “meaning resides within the
world independently of consciousness.” (Collins 2010: 38) In an interpretivist understanding, knowledge cannot be value-free and cannot be completely objective, instead, knowledge means different things to different people because people give different meanings to objects. Instead of trying to explain (as the positivists argue), researchers embedded in social sciences should concern themselves with *Verstehen* their data, as prescribed by Marx Weber (Crotty 1998: 67). *Verstehen* is the very nature of this thesis; it aims at understanding the social phenomenon on EU cooperation and identity. What is the glue that holds such diverse countries together? What narratives are constructed in order to hold this community together? What strategic considerations lie behind these narratives? Thus, interpretivism is essential for this thesis; we need to understand the EU identity in depth to truly grasp what visions for the future of the EU are constructed among EU state leaders.

### 2.2 State-centric approach to identity

As has already been clarified, this study does not try to establish if a European identity exists among the citizens of the European continent. The literature review in this thesis has stressed the difficulties of studying such an identity among citizens. Research has developed that such an identity can exist, but the outcome of such an identity is more blurred. The aim, therefore, shifts from focusing on civil society to how European identity is constructed top-down. Consequently, there are constraints by researching "up" in the field, i.e. studying the elite, as there are by researching "down", i.e. the civic society (Desmond 2004: 262).

As already brushed upon, this thesis follows the social constructivist standpoint of Alexander Wendt and his argument that identity matters in the formation of state interests. His argument is an answer to Kenneth Waltz statement that international relations are trans-historically given. Instead, as already mentioned, Wendt argues that international relations are socially constructed. However, Wendt agrees with Waltz’ state-centric approach to International Relations (Zehfuss 2002: 14). For that reason, this thesis subsequently adopts a state-centric approach to EU identity, meaning that the focus will be on the meaning makers of EU international relations; the state leaders of European nations. In addition, state leaders are the foundation of the European Council and are the ones outlining the political direction and political agenda of the EU (European Council 2017). Thus, state leaders have a big say in domestic affairs and in the guidelines of the EU policies. Analyzing the political elite does, however, pose certain constraints which will be dealt with in the following section.

#### 2.2.1 Studying the political elite

The first challenge that presents itself when studying the political elite is one of accessibility (Elklit and Jensen 2012: 132). Politicians, and especially those who are heads of state, are busy people. It is difficult to even receive their attention, yet even more complicated to arrange a meeting to interview them. Elklit and Jensen
even stress that one should not ‘bother’ politicians unless is it strictly possible (2012: 132). For this reason, the source of my data will be comprised of documents, not individual interviews.

Another constraint is the fact that one cannot be certain that politicians always speak honestly. Kaare Strøm emphasizes three different categories which can explain the motives for politicians’ behavior. The first motive, vote-seeking, is the quest for more votes at the next election, the second, policy-seeking, is the motive of having one’s political agenda accomplished, and the last, office-seeking, is concerned with gaining access to the benefits of being part of the government (Strøm 1990). Research still needs to be conducted on Strøm’s theory to test its validity (Skjæveland 2014; Elklit and Jensen 2012: 128-129). However, although we cannot be certain of the motives behind politicians’ words, we can analyze what they say and how they frame different issues, meaning that we can hopefully arrive at a conclusion of what they express and the construct the EU identity in relation to their arguments.

Another point to be made is that the EU is often described as a project made by the elite. (Pedersen 2008: 23; Best et al. 2012: 2). An elitism which is the product of deliberate decisions made by the founders of the Union, who in the light of Nazism and Fascism feared a new rise of populism (Pedersen 2008: 23). Additionally, he argues:

“We know from the literature on nation-building and cultural communities that state elites play a crucial role in diffusing and reproducing ideas about a common national identity. Therefore the ideas of the EU elite are obviously of considerable interest.” (Pedersen 2008: 23)

The equivalent to how elites reproduce ideas of national identity at national level is subsequently interesting for this thesis. It, therefore, makes good sense to focus on the European elite, i.e. state leaders of Europe. Subsequently, Best et al. argues in their study of the European elite using integration theories that they pursue an elite-centered approach:

“…because the contractual nature of European unification as a sequel and system of treaties puts elites in a pivotal role. They are the consignors, architects, and contractors involved in the metaphorical building of the European ‘Tower of Babylon’”. (Best et al 2012: 4)

They continue:

“…elites has a major impact on the formation and reproduction of political and social institutions: a fragmented elite structure is most likely connected to serious disruptions in the reproduction of social and political order, whereas a unified elite structure is associated with a more stable social structure and the smoother operation of institutions.” (Best et al. 2012: 5)
This does not mean that the elite-centered approach is the only approach, however, the extensive amount of research conducted on the European identity of the civil society makes room in academia for a pursuit of the political elite of the European Union. As Pedersen argues, the elite influence the public opinion to a certain extent, and because the elite is the founders of the Union, it makes sense for this thesis to explore how this elite speak of their common project.

However, studying the elite also implies that this thesis cannot answer how the public feels a collective European identity, but solely the niche part of the political elite which is selected for this thesis. Thus, we need to distinguish between the public and the elite, but we also need to distinguish between the continent of Europe and the EU.

2.2.2 Europe or the EU?

It should also be noted that there are differences between studying European identity and “EU” identity. Whereas the first is concerned with the identification with the European continent and its values and culture, the latter is concerned with identification with the EU as an entity. Consequently, one could feel attached to the European culture, but not feel the same identification with the European Union and vice versa (Risse 2004: 271). Or, as Bruter argues, the concepts of ‘European identity’ and ‘Europe’ have no common definition among individuals (Bruter 2003: 1155). Bruter also stresses his critique of the studies of European identity as "when two individuals claim to "feel European," they might mean totally different things in terms of both the intensity of the feeling they describe and the imagined political community they refer to." (Bruter 2003: 1154)

We cannot be sure that we measure the same thing when we ask people if they feel European (or even if we ask people if they feel Danish or Dutch): “Too often either the wrong questions are being asked, or the questions are too broad. When people say they feel they belong to Europe, they may mean many different things.” (Pedersen 2008: 21) To sum up, ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’ give different connotations, and therefore there are immense differences between studying European identity and the identity of the EU. On the other hand, Laffan argues that the concepts of EU identity and European identity can be used interchangeably (Laffan 2004). This denotes that the meaning of the EU fills the meaning of Europe; thus, the two concepts have become each other’s synonyms. Or, described differently; the identity of the EU implies institutional construction of European identity (Delanty 2005). However, if the construction of identity implies a feeling of ‘Europeanness’ or ‘being a European’ then the two concepts are not the same; being European is not the same as being a citizen of a EU member states (Risse 2004: 252) Thus, we need to distinguish between the identity of the EU and the identity of Europe.
This ultimately means that the subject of this thesis is not the peoples of the EU, but the state leaders who are part of the EU social world in the sense that they are part of the political process in the European Council while also representing their nation.

2.3 Research design
As reflected in the very open-ended problem formulation, the thesis follows an inductive approach. Generally speaking, inductive research makes use of data to generate ideas or hypotheses (Bryman 2016: 21), while deductive research starts with a general hypothesis and is more concerned with verifying or falsifying these hypotheses. In other words, deductive research is concerned with testing hypotheses (Bryman 2016: 21-23). In contrast, inductive studies make room for a more exploratory exploration of a field or topic, hence an open examination of the data collected through observation of the social reality. Thus, inductive reasoning is based on learning and understanding from what can be observed. “In its idealized form, inductive research involved the search for patterns from observation and the development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through a series of hypothesis.” (Bernard 2011: 7) Thus, the aim is to explore the different identity frames and constructs by the state leaders through observations, i.e. through their own arguments. We cannot know what kind of identity the different state leaders subscribe to or if they subscribe to one at all, but we can observe and interpret based on the observations, how they frame this EU identity in their articulation of the future of the EU. The aim is, therefore, to arrive at an understanding of how EU identity is framed and constructed. In this sense, theory is used to help important points in the data to stand out, not to test if the theories can be verified or falsified.

In addition, the data chosen for this study are of qualitative nature, meaning the data is comprised of documents and therefore non-numeric data (Lamont 2015: 78). Hence, the primary data for this thesis is speeches held by European state leaders. Secondary data which are used to give further meaning to the analysis of the primary data are online newspaper articles and articles of the Lisbon Treaty. Document-based research is found to be the most common strategy used in qualitative research (Lamont 2015: 80), thus a smaller selection of data will enable me to gain a deeper understanding of the use of frames in speeches on the future of the EU by EU state leaders, than a quantitative research approach with a larger selection would provide. Consequently, the aim of this research is not to quantify but to understand how the selected state leaders frame EU identity in the articulation of their visions for the future EU.

2.4 Data selection
The empirical data chosen to comprise the data of this thesis are speeches from five different EU state leaders and include Emmanuel Macron from France, Viktor Orbán from Hungry, Mark Rutte from The Netherlands and Stephan Löfven from Sweden. These member states have been chosen to grasp the dichotomy between
newer EU-members and the founding members of the Union; the North vs. South dichotomy, the West vs. East dichotomy and the political spectrum, ranging from social democratic to conservative Christian democratic. It has not been possible to fulfill the North vs. South dichotomy due to a data shortage. The ideological standpoint of each head of state and the country’s entry into the Union and geographical position is outlined in table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1 Ideology and Entry into the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Christian democratic</td>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry into the EU</td>
<td>January 1 1958</td>
<td>May 1 2004</td>
<td>January 1 1995</td>
<td>January 1 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical position</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>Northern Europe/Scandinavia</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the aim of the data selection was to include both new vs. old members, north vs. south Europe and West vs. Eastern Europe, it has not been possible to completely live up to this aim. For instance, it has not been possible to fulfill the north/south dichotomy, as no speeches on the future of Europe were available from southern European countries, e.g. Spain, Italy or Greece. The most Eastern parts of Europe has subsequently been quiet on the matter of the Europe Union; thus, Central European state Hungary has been chosen instead. Additionally, Great Britain has been chosen since Britain is leaving the Union, and do therefore not have a say in how the European cooperation should unfold in the future.

Speeches have been chosen as the optimal document type for this analysis to ensure that all information and all analysis was made of the direct source in question. This means that the speeches analyzed aims at not containing any “noise” from any outside sources, who may have motives for changing the text or the translation. In addition, speeches have been chosen as the data for this thesis due to the constraints of accessing the political elite (Elklit and Jensen 2012: 132) and because speeches have the ability to change the minds of its audience. As John F. Kennedy’s speechwriter Theodore Sorensen has expressed, a speech: “can ignite a fire, change men’s minds, open their eyes, alter their votes, bring hope to their lives, and, in all these ways, change the world.” (Sorensen in Vilade 2010). This means that speeches have a performative role in shaping certain narratives the speaker wants to highlight above other narratives with the goal of persuading the audience that this narrative is the truth (Eder 2009). Therefore, speeches are an interesting set of data because they do not represent an objective truth but the visions and wishes of the speaker.
Although the speeches are all translations, which means that some meanings may be lost in translation (Árosi-Márdirosz 2014), all speeches have been searched for and found at the primary source of the speeches (Lamont 2015: 80); on the member states’ official government websites. Hopefully, this ensures that the translations have been conducted by professionals to ensure the best possible translation. The speeches have been found by searching on the government websites using the search words “the future of Europe”. These words have been chosen to ensure that the speeches are revolved around the topic of the future of Europe, but also to ensure that all speeches have the same topic in mind.

In addition to the distinctions described above, there have also been conducted a systematic selection of the distinct speeches. Speeches which focused on Brexit was excluded from the empirical data, to ensure that the speeches did not focus primarily on Brexit and what would happen in case Britain left the EU. Therefore, speeches have selected that was held after Great Britain activated Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in March 2017. Consequently, speeches with too much attention devoted to Brexit and the consequences of Brexit were left out of the data selection. These speeches were left out to ensure that the speeches focused on Europe after Brexit.

Speeches are always held in a certain context with certain audiences, therefore they are also held with a certain goal in mind and does not always reflect an objective reality but the hopes and ideals for the future (Bryman 2016: 394; 560). Therefore, the setting of the speeches will be part of the analysis. Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the current state of the European Union and the international environment also influences how these state leaders speak of the Union. Thus, the context and the audience to which the speeches have been held are an important part of the analysis.

2.4.1 Data overview
In the table presented below, the chosen data will be presented. The data will be presented with information on the country in current speaking, i.e. the name of the head of state, the title of the speech, the date the speech was held and the reference used throughout this paper.
Table 2.2 Data overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Head of state</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Emmanuel Macron</td>
<td>Initiative Europe, Sorbonne, France</td>
<td>September 26 2017</td>
<td>Macron 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Mark Rutte</td>
<td>Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe, at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin</td>
<td>March 2 2018</td>
<td>Rutte 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 28th Bályányos Summer Open University and Student Camp</td>
<td>July 22 2017</td>
<td>Orbán 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Stefan Löfven</td>
<td>Our Europe – our shared responsibility, at Uppsala University</td>
<td>October 26 2017</td>
<td>Löfven 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5 Structure of analysis
The analysis will be focused on exploring the collective identity of the EU as narratives in the speeches by the state leaders of four different EU member states. Thus, the analysis will focus subsequently on the frames and the constructions of a collective EU identity.

Each speech will be analyzed in accordance with the framing model proposed by Verloo (2005) and table 3.1, focusing on diagnosis, prognosis, attributes of causality and the call for action. All speeches will be analyzed independently first by use of Critical Framing Analysis and subsequently in relation to the theory of collective identity as proposed by Eder (2009) and the theory of imagined communities by Anderson (1991). Each analysis will start with a brief examination of the context and setting in which the individual speech was held.

In addition, to fully grasp the different levels of each speech, different aspects of each speech will be coded in terms of subjects related to the problem formulation. The themes which will be coded are (1) assessments of identity, both in terms of collective EU identity and national identity, (2) frames related to the foundation of the EU, and (3) generally interesting points, i.e. unexpected formulations or points which generally refers to the EU cooperation. These codes are chosen in order to make more sense of the text and in order for me to better understand how the different elements relate to one another and thereby better grasp the different frames.
3.0 Theory
Since the beginning of the European Union, the study of an identity which could be shared by all member states and all its citizens have received a great deal of attention. Many attempts have been made to answer why European does/does not share a common identity and what this identity is to be comprised of, yet, the subject still receives a lot of attention Howe 1995; Smith 1992; Davies 1996; Neumann 1999; Delanty 2003; Delanty 2005; Kostakopoulou 2001; Laffan 2004; Cederman 2001; Schlesinger 2001; Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005)

Quite critically of the study of European identity, Smith asks: "If “Europe” and "European" signify something more than the sum total of the populations and cultures that happen to inhabit a conventionally demarcated geographical space, what exactly are those characteristics and qualities that distinguish Europe from anything or anyone else?" (Smith 1992: 68) Let us explore what others have found to European identity before we explore how this issue could otherwise be answered.

3.1 Does a ‘European’ identity exist?
Identities can be understood as social constructions. This implies that one can participate in several communities and share several identities with different people. In fact, Jenkin argues that we all have multiple identities (Jenkins 2008: 17). Castano and Yzerbyt further found that feeling a strong sense of national identity does not preclude the sense of belonging to a European identity (Castano and Yzerbyt 1997). Identity is not a zero-sum game where having one identity excludes other identities. This implies that context matter. We define and categorize groups differently depending on the larger comparative context (Haslam et al. 1995). I.e. we might identify Europe or the EU differently if we are to describe it in relation to Russia. We might also ascribe the EU new attributes after Brexit than we did previously.

Although having established that several identities can exist simultaneously and a European identity does not outmatch the national identity, there is still much debate as to whether a European identity can truly thrive. Among the skeptics is Anthony Smith, a theorist of nationality and nationalism. He does not believe it is possible for the EU to attain anything similarly to nationality. He writes:

“There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification there is no European equivalent of national or religious community…” (Smith 1992: 73)

Quite contrary, Howe (1995) argues that the EU needs community building measures to create a sense of European political community and European identity. These measures could include common passports, European citizenships instead of national citizenships and stronger political institutions at EU level. He further
argues that this development of tighter political structures and identity underpins cultural development in the EU: "Slowly but surely beliefs about community will start to adjust to the political and legal infrastructure if that infrastructure protects a prosperous and peaceful community." (Howe 1995: 37-42) In this regard, the introduction of the common European currency, the Euro, is a big step towards a European identity if you compare European identity with national identity.

Davies takes this argument even farther and argues that we need a unified "Eurohistory" (Davies 1996: 43). Today, school books are written with a national focus and does not include the shared, constructed history of Europe, but what is significant for the nation-state. Thus, there is little hope for a "Eurohistory" as long as a standardized Europeanization of the public-school system prevails. Additionally, Delanty argues that it does not make sense to discuss European identity as a replacement of the national identity but rather as the idea of collective identity in the context of major social and political transformation (Delanty 2003: 76). In his view, identity has a narrative dimension where identity is defined as the stories people tell to ensure the continuity of the identity's existence. These stories express the performative and public aspects of identity (Delanty 2003: 76-77).

In this sense, there is good reason to focus on the shared narratives of Europe and on what Davies calls 'Eurohistory' as Delanty argues: "To varying degrees, all nations in Europe contains elements of a European identity, which is not an identity that exists beyond or outside national identities." (Delanty 2003: 79) European identity does not contest national identity but is a compliment. Hence, it can be argued that it does not make sense to analyze a European identity as a static concept that overrules the national identities or other personal identities.

3.2 Essentialist and constructivist approaches to identity

In terms of identity, there is quite a lot of disagreement on the nature of identity formation in the literature, and there are several theories within the field. These include social identity theory (Tjafel and Turner 1979), political identity theory (Cerutti 2003) and collective theory (Delanty 2003; Delanty 2005; Eder 2009), but this is by no mean an exhaustive list. In general, to make sense of the wide array of concepts of identity formation, there are two approaches to define identity; the essentialist approach and the constructivist approach.

Hofstede, who to many is a very controversial culture theorist, and who is criticized by many for being essentialist in his understanding of culture and collective identity. He states that culture is the "software of the mind" that individual acquire through their childhood and in school (Hofstede 1980 in Søderberg and Holden 2002: 108). Culture is, therefore, something that members of a community (e.g. a nation) 'have'; something homogeneous and static. The 'sharedness' and the homogeneity of this definition of culture should be emphasized; all members of a given community share the same culture. Culture and collective
identity are not synonymous concepts, however, a collective identity (identification with a group) is necessary to consider culture in the terms outlined by Hofstede. Following both Hofstede's and Smith's concepts of culture and identity, it consequently does not make sense to speak of a European identity. European does not consist of a homogeneous community with one shared culture or identity, but multiple and sometimes contradicting national identities (Smith 1992: 73). Subsequently, in this essentialist understanding, collective identity is understood as quite inflexible and as something which is given and fixed. Collective identities cannot be changed or moved simply because they are bound to territory, ethnicity and blood relations (Smith 1992; Søderberg and Holden 2002). Thus, in Smiths view, a European identity is not just contesting the national identity, it is utopic because Europe lacks the glue that ties a nation together.

It should be noted that the term essentialism is often used by constructivist as denoting something negative: “most people who use essentialism use it as a slur word, intending to put down the opposition.” (Hacking 1999: 17 in Phillips 2010: 47). Although my thesis follows a constructivist ontological approach, it does not make sense to follow an essentialist ontology if one wants to explore European identity, because essentialists simply argue that such an identity cannot exist. Hence, Europeans are not a homogeneous group, therefore we cannot speak of a single, common identity (Smith 1992). Or, argued differently, an essentialist examination of European identity would give a static interpretation of European identity. Instead, constructivists give the opportunity for more fluid understandings of identity as something constructed and negotiated, which is in line with the aim of this thesis.

One of the inventors of the constructivist approach to identity and national identity are Benedict Anderson with his conceptualization of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991). He argues that a nation (or, one could strengthen the concept to include communities like the EU) is defined as a socially constructed community, which is imagined by the people who believe they are part of this community (Anderson 1991: 6-7). This means that identities are not static, but are being invented and re-invented constantly by the members of the community. Generally, the constructivist logic of identity emphasizes the construction (and reconstruction) of the social world and how norms, rules and values shape this social world. Thus, identities are not 'given' as essentialists argue, rather the "outcome of complex systems mediated through difference" (Kostakopoulou 2001: 11). Ultimately, this means that communities and collective identities are constructed by its participants and are better understood as feelings rather than something which define reality. Thus, the creation of a collective identity is a ‘social construction of reality’.

3.3 Conceptualizing identity
So far, the term identity and collective identity have been used loosely without offering a precise definition of what identity is and especially what identity is when it is shared by several individuals in a community or
a social group. We have established that identity can be understood within two opposing paradigms, but it is difficult to conceptualize European identity without digging into some of the wide arrays of definitions of identity.

According to Wendt, identity is the identification of “who I am” (Wendt 1994: 385), and serve as a symbolic meaning to one's life by enhancing their feeling of belonging. Moreover, identity is used as a tool for categorizing as it involves a feeling of distinctiveness (Kostakopolou 2001: 11). It defines the ‘Self’ from the ‘Other’, or put differently; it distinguishes the ‘in-group’ from the ‘out-group’. It defines relationships between individuals and between groups. Castano and Yzerbyt found that groups always displayed in-group favoritism in relation to an outgroup; people always perceive and describe their own group more favorably than other groups (Castano and Yzerbyt 1997: 5). Additionally, Simon and Brown found that minority groups feel a stronger sense of group identity than majority groups (Simon and Brown 1987). This means that groups are formed in a way of demonstrating and embodying a sense of belonging, or as Neuman describe identity as “giving them an ontological status and by discussing the ways in which they are constituted and maintain themselves – the construction and continuity of them.” (Neumann 1999: 139)

This kind of group identity/collective identity differs from what is termed personal identity. Personal identity is defined as one’s personal characteristics derived from one’s perception of oneself (Bruter 2005: 9-11). Social identity derives from a shared identity and feeling of belonging to a pre-existing group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity can therefore only theorize shared identity in the sense of pre-existing groups and are therefore not completely suitable for the study of European or EU identity, because the EU can be argued to be a new kind of group, and is therefore by definition not a pre-existent group. Pre-existing groups are identification with religious groups (being Christian or Muslim), relationships (being a mother or husband), political affiliation (being liberal or conservative) and job affiliating (being a student or a dentist). Personal identity theory is likewise not applicable to the study of European identity as it does not encompass shared identity but only the identity of the individual (Bruter 2005: 9-11). But what about political identity? The EU is often described as a political institution; thus, political identity could have relevance for the study of European identity. Although, Cerutti define political identity as: “the set of social and political values and principles that we recognize as ours, or in the sharing of which we feel like ‘us’, like a political group or entity” (Cerutti 2003: 27). Or as Anderson argues, the feeling of community needs to extend beyond the feeling of group-affiliation that political parties provoke (Anderson 1991: 144) Thus, the concept is most often used in territorial context of the local party or the nation and does not apply to supranational political institutions like the EU. In addition, it does not grasp how politicians influence civilians through their constructs of European identity. Political identity entails that there is something which defines ‘us' from ‘them', hence it is
more suitable for an analysis of how ‘us' Europeans are distinguished and make sense of our world in relation to ‘them' non-Europeans. This leaves us with the last identity term; collective identity. Delanty describes collective identity as a "we-feeling", a collective consciousness belonging and strong group attachments (Delanty 2005: 129). This means that people have a sense of belonging to a community. It does not have to be a small community where everyone knows every member of the community (Anderson 1991: 6-7), rather it is large-scale communities who share an identity with its own norms, values and principles (Delanty 2005: 129). This concept of identity fits better with the study of European identity because the EU is a bigger community than a political community as described by Cerutti (Cerutti 2003). In addition, Eder argues: “Collective identity can equally [also nations, red] refer to cities, to regions, or to groups such as political parties or even social movements.” (Eder 2009: 428), meaning the concept of collective identity is better suited for encompassing European identity as the concept simply applies to more kinds of communities. Therefore, for this thesis, the concept of collective identity will be used from hereon.

3.4 Collective identity as stories
As already established, collective identity is concerned with a feeling of ‘we’ and a feeling of belonging to a specific community (Delanty 2005:129). But how does this translate into a working theory applicable for analysis?

Klaus Eder offers a suggestion to how to make sense of collective identity in his article A Theory of Collective Identity (2009). Eder defines collective identities as “narrative constructions which permit the control of the boundaries of a network of actors.” (Eder 2009: 427) Thus, collective identity is narratives told by members of a community to define ‘we’ from others. Or, as he describes: “an identity allows them to be recognized as something particular vis-à-vis others.” (Eder 2009: 428) Neumann further describes the concept of collective identity as giving people "an ontological status and by discussing the ways in which they are constituted and maintain themselves – the construction and continuity of them." (Neumann 1999: 139) This applies to both individuals and groups, and make these capable of positioning themselves relative to other persons and groups by giving these relations a meaning in a fixed time, thus, “an identity guarantee being a person (or a group, red.) in the flux of time.” (Eder 2009: 428)

This identity construction of a group has a narrative structure (Eder 2009: 42), and are comprised of the stories we tell about ourselves as a group. Identities “can be seen as the stories people tell about themselves in order to give continuity to their existence. Such narratives are the basis of memory and express the performative and public aspect of identity.” (Delanty 2003: 76-77) Identity is therefore not only the stories we remember and continuously tell about ourselves, they are also used performatively to show others, who we are in our community. This does not mean that in order for a community to enjoy a feeling of collective
identity, there is only one story about a community, rather, there are several and they influence each other. This implies that a collective identity is a symbolic form through which a world of social relations is mirrored (Eder 2009: 430). Thus, collective identity is situational and can vary from social setting and over time. Eder further stresses that in order for communities to enjoy a collective identity, they need to have something in common other than the mere co-presence of the other members. They need something to bind them together, such as a common factor which obliges people to accept that social norms are imposed upon them (Eder 2009: 430-431). Therefore, a community needs a glue to hold it together, narratives which people share emphatically with each other. These are, according to Eder, the building blocks of identities; “they are stories that combine a series of event in texts, song and images which some people recognize as being part of their particular we.” (Eder 2009: 432), and they go beyond the simple set of values, goals, territory and people (Delanty 2003: 76).

However, as narratives are contested and there are several narratives which define a collective identity, the narratives therefore also tell different versions of a collective identity (Eder 2009: 433). This means that the way a community understand who ‘we’ are, depends on the narrative told. If the narrative focuses on the EU as being based on a shared hope for a future without war, then the way we perceive ourselves is shaped in accordance with this story. If the purpose of the community – the EU community does not deliver on being a security community, then people will not feel part of this community, they will disregard this identity as being their own. Similarly, if the EU is perceived as a community which strives at economic prosperity and it does not deliver on this promise, e.g. in the face of an economic crisis, then the members of this community disregard this collective identity and ultimately the community as well.

In the same instance, Foucault speaks of ‘regimes of truth’, which means that each society have their own discourses of society that function as truth (Foucault 1977: 13) In other words, each society or community have their own understandings of the social world that is so fundamental to this particular community that they become eternal truths. Hence, these ‘truths’ are not being questioned, they are taken for granted because they are such an integrated part of the life of the community. This implies that if the same stories of the EU are told over and over again, the story is no longer just a story of the community; it becomes the truth of the society. Thus, if the story which is told of the EU relates to peace, then the EU becomes a peace project. It further implies that the way we speak of the EU, or the story that we tell of the EU, have a self-fulfilling effect; the story of the EU becomes the EU. In a way, truth is the production and distribution of statements (Foucault 1977: 14), and if a story is told numerous times it becomes the truth of the EU identity. Furthermore, Lakoff argues that “When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame” (Lakoff 2004: 3). This means that the way we frame something, i.e. when speaking of something in a certain way, we think of it that way.
It does not matter if I state that I am not a crock, people will think of me as a crock because I evoked the picture of me as a crock in their minds. This means that when we articulate a certain issue, it is cognitively reproduced in our minds. Following Lakoff’s own example (and title of his book) don’t think of an elephant, everyone immediately thinks of an elephant, when asked not to think of an elephant. Thus, similarly to when we speak of a topic extensively enough, it becomes the truth, meaning the way we speak about something constitute how we think about them. This also means that if we want to change a frame, then we need to change how we talk about this issue being framed. Otherwise, we cannot think about it in different ways (Lakoff 2004: 3-5). A new frame needs to be distributed and repeated over and over again for the mental structure to adapt to the new way of speaking of an issue, thus, changing the way we perceive things is a task of persistence.

In the following section, I will dig into Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities and how it is relevant for the field of EU identity.

3.5 Defining the community

According to Benedict Anderson, communities are “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members [...] yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson 1991: 6). Members of the community may never meet each other face-to-face and never gain an exact knowledge of who their fellow members are. Thus, what binds them together is shared interests or a shared identity within the community. The community therefore only exists in relation to the stories, which are told and are shared among the members of the group.

Anderson further describes communities to be limited by the boundaries of other communities, thus, no community equals humankind (Anderson 1991: 7). This means that what defines a community is also defined by where the community ends and where other communities start. Or, as Castano and Yzerbyt write, there are boundaries which defined the in-group from the out-group (1997: 5). Wodak even emphasizes that defining an out-group negatively can be used as a means of creating a positive self-presentation of the in-group (Wodak 2001: 72-73). By drawing on ‘us’ and ‘them’-relations the in-group are presented as something positive by creating a negative presentation of them. Meaning that the nation can be defined positively by creating a bad representation of ‘them’, e.g. other nations, the EU or other member states. Thus, we are good, because they are bad and we are not like them. We feel good about ourselves because we are not like the others; the bad ones. This creates stronger identification with the in-group and a stronger cohesion between the members. In addition, the nation truly must enforce a strong feeling of us, as Anderson stresses that what distinguishes the nation from other group-affiliations is the sacrifice or willingness to die for one’s country. He argues:
“Dying for one’s country, which usually one does not choose, assumes a moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or perhaps even Amnesty International can not rival, for these are all bodies one can join or leave at easy will.” (Anderson 1991: 144)

In Anderson's understanding, the glue that holds together the nation is stronger than the glue which holds together political communities. Hence, the ties are stronger and build on a belief of the nation as the single greatest thing. Anderson further emphasizes that nations are communities in the sense that the nation should be conceived as a “deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991: 144). The emphasize on horizontal implies that everybody within the nation or community are to be considered equals; everybody is equal members of the community and it does not follow a hierarchical structure.

It should be noted that Anderson’s conceptualization of communities applies to the nation. Thus, stretching his theory to include the European Union implies that the Union and the nation have similar attributes. However, Anderson himself uses the concept to describe the Christian community (Anderson 1991: 42) which he argues precedes the nation-state and is by definition not a nation. Therefore, I see no hindrance in using the concept to describe the European Union community as being imagined by its members in similar terms as the nation-state. In fact, since the European community is bigger than all European nation states individually, and if a collective identity does exist among its members, it must certainly be imagined, as one cannot know all members in such an expanding community. Or, as Eder argues, if the nation and the individuals are the two poles of identity constructions, the emergence of a European identity which stretches beyond the two poles are very possible in constructivist ontology as identity constructions are not fixed. Instead, social relations can produce new forms of identity beyond the nation (Eder 2009: 429).

Anderson’s concept of imagined communities is truly interesting in the field of European identity and the subscription of the understanding of the EU identity because Anderson, as well as Eder, assume that collective identities must be narrated: identity (...) can not be ‘remembered,’ (it, red9 must be narrated.” (Anderson 1991: 204)

3.6 Analytical tool: analyzing stories as frames
We now have established that collective identity is constructed through shared narratives among the members of a community (Eder 2009) and that a community does not have to consist of direct social interactions to be a community; it can be imagined by the members over great distances and among many members (Anderson 1991). Thus, we need a systematic approach to grasp the different narratives. This can be done following the Critical Frame Analysis.

On frames, Goffman writes:
“I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of organization which govern events [...] and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify.” (Goffman 1974: 10-11)

This definition implies that frames are cognitive structures which define how we perceive reality. Similarly, Verloo argues: "[a] frame is an interpretation schema that structures the meaning of reality" (Verloo 2005: 19) and adds that frames are not descriptions of reality, rather they are constructs which give meaning to reality (Verloo 2005: 20). Meaning, frames are underlying structure that defines how we understand the social world and how we react towards them. This implies that frames are consciously constructed, and more precisely, they are unconsciously adopted when we interact with others, hence through communicative actions. Therefore, the concepts ‘frame’ and ‘constructs’ will covers different things in the remainder of the paper. A frame is a more concrete way of giving meaning to reality and a construct is the overall idea that shape a frame.

According to Entman: “the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicative text.” (Entman 1993: 51) Hence, framing is a way of analyzing the way a specific text influence the human consciousness by the transfer of information from a text to that consciousness (Entman 1993: 51-52). In other words, the text tells us something about the power relation between the sender of the message and the intended receiver in the sense that the sender influences the consciousness of the receiver. In this sense, frame analysis is very similar to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. This is evident as Fairclough writes: “particular discourses are contested, what is centrally contested is the power of these preconstructed semantic systems to generate particular visions of the world which may have the performative power to sustain or remake the world in their image” (Fairclough 2003:130). Thus, both critical discourse analysis and critical framing analysis devote their attention to uncovering the way texts influence others’ perception of a certain issue, and ultimately how this performative power contributes in making and shaping the social world accordingly. The two analytical tools are not synonymous in the sense that they differ in the methods of analyzing this performative role of frames or discourses. I do, however, share Fairclough and Entman's confidence in texts' ability to influence their receiver. Contrary, I do not follow Fairclough’s methodology and his focus on linguistic and grammatical analysis of discourses. The reason is that while discourses can shed some light on the overall ideas that exist and shape the social world, frames can be explained as the boundaries of how we think of the social world (Ferree and Merrill 2000 in Rolandsen Agustín 2012: 85). In other words, discourses are the wider context that frames are formulated within. Discourses are therefore more abstract and more difficult to grasp than frames. Or as Rolandsen Agustín argues: “Frames can, in other words, be seen as discursively determined and as a part of the wider discourse,
whereas discourses are the underlying logic frames are based on.” (my translation) (Rolandsen Agustín 2012: 85) Thus, there is a difference in levels, which also reflect the different focuses on what should be analyzed. Whereas discourses are concerned with power structures of discourses, e.g. how one discourse dominates another (Fairclough 2003), frames are the instrumental use of discourses to highlight certain aspects of the social world (Entman 1993: 52).

Consequently, frames are strategic, meaning they are also actively used to play on discourses to emphasis a version of the social world, and thereby provoke a certain feeling or reaction towards a subject. Rolandsen Agustín argues: “frames can be understood as ‘rhetorical tools’, which are used by strategic ‘norm entrepreneurs’, meaning individuals and actors, who are active in the formation of new norms and convincing ideas for the benefit of a given cause.” (my translation) (Payne 2001 in Rolandsen Agustín 2012: 87) Thus, frames can be used to give new meaning to causes, and frames can be used to frame EU identity in a way that makes a leader’s own political agenda stand as the best viable option. In this sense, frames can be used to highlight elements of EU identity which fall in line with one’s political agenda and it can leave out or even scam aspects which the speaker does not agree with. Or, as Entman emphasize:

“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” (original emphasis) (Entman 1993: 52)

Thus, frames highlight some parts of information about an issue and thereby elevating its salience. Salience, according to Entman is understood as “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful or memorable to audiences.” (Entman 1993: 53) Thus, increasing the salience of a piece of a communicative text enhances the probability that this information will be processed by the receiver in a fashion intended by the sender (Entman 1993: 53). This can be achieved in different ways like making pieces of text more salient by placement or repetition or by associating them with symbols which is culturally familiar to the receiver. The way such pieces of text are received depends on ones existing schemata; a concept which is closely linked to other concepts like categories, stereotypes etc., and it ultimately guides the individuals processing of information (ibid). Thereby, our identity and the way we, in general, understand the social world affect how we receive certain messages. This means that we might not always receive information in the way intended by the sender if the message is not tailored or framed in a way that fits our personal schemata. On the contrary, the way a communicative text is framed also determines how receivers understand and remember a certain issue and ultimately how they evaluate it and choose to act upon it (Entman 1993: 54; Lakoff 2004).
On the contrary, as already described, certain discourses can be become taken for granted eternal truth in a community (Foucault 1977), a similar thing is evident for frames. Entman too argues that if a frame is repeated extensively, they can become self-reinforcing (Entman 1993: 55) and he argues:

“Once a term is widely accepted, to use another is to risk that target audiences will perceive the communicator as lacking credibility – or will even fail to understand what the communicator is talking about.” (Entman 1993: 55)

Essentially, this means that frames can be quite difficult to eliminate once a framing has become widely accepted, or has even become a truth in a Foucauldian way of thinking. This further implies that once an idea of the EU has been accepted, it can be hard to turn this idea around or to introduce a contesting idea of the EU. E.g. if the EU is first understood alone as a cooperation to promote economic prosperity or alone as a cultural project, then this idea is very difficult to undermine. In a worst-case scenario, if I speak of the EU as a cultural project to an audience who strictly understand the EU as economically beneficial, they might now even understand what I am talking about. We simply do not speak of the same Union. This exemplifies the need for a study of how the EU identity is framed and how it is constructed because it has implications for all kinds of policy areas as well. If we do not subscribe to the same idea of what the EU should be used for, then it can be very difficult to agree on a way for the EU in the future. Thus, contesting identity concepts simply affect which policies are proposed and which ways for the future EU is suggested.

According to Verloo, frames need to be compared (Verloo 2005: 21), because they are first and foremost contested and because they are used strategically; meaning, if we only investigate one frame of EU identity, then it will not give us the whole picture of the construction of a supposed EU identity. Meaning, because frames are used strategically, they are also highly political. Frames do not reflect reality, they are constructions where language and argumentation are adjusted to a political context (Rolandsen Agustin 2012: 86). Therefore, we need to explore a wide array of frames in order to grasp how different European leaders strategically frame their version of EU identity and their visions for the future of the EU.

Entman emphasizes a simple way of analyzing frames. In his conceptualization, frames define a problem in terms of costs and benefits, which is often influenced by common cultural values, diagnose the causes of this particular problem, make moral judgments of the causal agents and their effect and suggest remedies, i.e. offer a solution to the problem (Entman 1993: 52). We can grasp these different frames by using Verloo’s tool: Critical Framing Analysis. It aims at analyzing who has a voice in defining a problem, who suggests courses of action to resolve the problem, and who is responsible for causing the problem (Verloo 2005: 22). Thus, with great inspiration of her tool, the table below offers a way to analyze these questions to uncover frames.
These are the questions which will be asked analyzing my chosen empirical data. The questions will give an in-depth understanding of how the different actors frame the EU identity and their perception of what the future of the EU should consist of. It will be done so to be able to compare the different frames and the different stories which exist on the EU’s future, and ultimately which identity constructs exist of the EU’s identity. It should be noted that with this analytical tool, and not every sentence contributes to the construction of a frame (Entman 1993: 52). Thus, the analysis will only focus on the parts of the analysis which is directly related to the framing of the EU identity.

Consequently, the frame analysis presented above will help to answer questions related to the problem formulation: How do the actors, the European state leaders frame EU identity and how are they using this frame to accentuate their political agenda and visions for the future of the EU? Which identity traits or constructs do the actors have in common in their speeches? Do they have a similar understanding of the EU identity and the EU cooperation, or are the identity constructs contested?

4.0 Analysis
In the following section the different speeches will be analyzed individually firstly in terms of Critical Framing Analysis and secondly in terms of collective EU identity. The speeches will be analyzed in order of entry into the EU, therefore, the first speech is Initiative for Europe by French president Emmanuel Macron.

4.1 Emmanuel Macron: Initiative for Europe
Initiative for Europe was the beginning of a series of speeches being held on the theme of ‘the future of the EU’. The speech triggered different reactions all over Europe with some of them being analyzed in this thesis. The speech was held at Sorbonne University, which is one of the oldest universities in Europe, created by Robert de Sorbon in 1257 (Britannica N/A). Thus, the speech took place in a public setting with the public as the main audience. Although, due to the extensive media coverage of the speech, the audience must include both the public in Europe and politicians and state leaders in other European countries.
4.1.1 Critical framing analysis of Macron

The speech, *Initiative for Europe* is a two-and-a-half-hour-long speech comprised of 26 pages of initiatives for a better and more sovereign Europe. This speech has high ambitions for European cooperation for the future to come. In the speech, Macron proposes six keys that are essential for a successful sovereign Europe. These include, stepping up the cooperation on defense (PESCO), protecting Europe’s borders and the creation of a common European asylum office and a closer partnership with Africa, an equitable ecological transition of the energy industry, a taxation system for digital technology, and national reforms to be able to live up common monetary obligations.

4.1.1.1 We need to talk about Europe

As already mentioned, this speech is filled with initiatives for the future of the EU. Accordingly, the speech is also characterized by a drive to improve Europe. This is evident from the first frame, where Macron radiates an ambition for speaking of the EU project: "I have come to talk to you about Europe […] I will not stop talking about it." (Macron 2017: 1) This is the sentence which initiates Macron’s speech. However, it is also the prognosis to a problem that Macron diagnose as ‘others’ not wanting to talk about Europe: “Already? Is it really necessary?”, others might say. Because for them it is never the right moment to talk about Europe.” (Macron 2017: 1) Thus, in the first lines of his speech, Macron points a critique toward fellow European leaders who are unwilling to speak about where they want EU to move in the future: “It is so much easier to never explain where we want to go, where we want to lead our people, and to remain with hidden arguments, because we have simply lost sight of the objective.” (Macron 2017: 1) Therefore, Macron’s points his attention towards a problem were his colleagues in Europe have stopped talking about Europe and their ambitions for Europe. This is essentially the diagnosis of this frame. The prognosis, as already brushed upon is a regime change which starts with Macron and this speech; speaking up about his visions for the future of the EU cooperation. According to Macron, the attribution of causality is that other leaders and politicians have grown too comfortable not speaking openly about their visions for the EU, instead, they have grown accustomed to explaining “that when there was a constraint, it was Europe’s fault!” (Macron 2017: 3). This implies that Europe’s state leaders have stopped talking about ambitions and instead used the EU as a scapegoat for bad political decisions. This has turned the EU into a system that nobody likes to talk about in positive terms because it has been talked about in negative terms for too long. And Macron argues further: “We have all therefore got used to not saying what we think, what we want, passing it off as tactics. Experience shows that this gets us nowhere.” (Macron 2017: 1) This argument serves as the call for action for this frame: the old ways do not work, it has not brought anything positive with it. Therefore, although implicitly stated, Macron wants his colleagues to turn to an alternative that will lead the EU forward, i.e. start
telling their visions for the future of the EU. In this way, Macron is a first mover to his prognosis or solution and he asks other EU leaders to follow him.

4.1.1.2 The idea of Europe
In the next frame, Macron describes the EU as an idea: "Europe [...] is an idea. An idea supported for many centuries by pioneers, optimists and visionaries, and it is always up to us to claim it for our own." (Macron 2017: 2) By this statement, he states that if we want to keep the idea of Europe (whatever that entails), then we must keep up with the visionaries, pioneers and optimists who have kept this idea alive up until now. If we do not want this idea to slip away from us or be claimed by others, we must live up to previous visionaries. He further this argument by stating: "It is our responsibility to bring it to life, make it ever better and stronger, to not stop at the form that historic circumstances have shaped it into. Because this form may change, but the idea remains, and its ambition must be ours." (Macron 2017: 2) The historic circumstances that Macron speak of are the founding ideas of the EU arisen after a long period of war on the European continent: “The idea rose from the ruins. The desire for fraternity was stronger than retribution and hate.” (Macron 2017: 2) This statement leads us to the diagnosis. Europe have a shared past filled with war and hatred among the European populations, and from this rose an idea of “living collectively” in Europe (Macron 2017: 2). However, this idea needs to be cherished and the idea is under pressure. Today, Europe is under pressure from the globalized world and “the ideas which offer themselves up as preferable solutions. These ideas have a name: nationalism, identitarianism, protectionism, isolationist sovereignty.” (Macron 2017: 3) Thus, the diagnosis is that these ideas of nationalism etc. threaten the very idea of Europe. If we want Europe as it has been shaped by previous pioneers, then we must counteract these threats.

In addition to this diagnosis, Macron speaks of an attribution of causality: "We have ignored their power for too long. For too long we were sure in our belief that the past would not come back [...] because we took it for granted and risked losing it from sight." (Macron 2017: 3) By this Macron states that Europe has turned their blind eye towards the idea that opposes the idea of Europe. We were too sure of our own survival and took for granted that these ideas could ever threaten Europe again: "Because we have forgotten that we must stay behind this ambition! Because we have forgotten to defend Europe!" (Macron 2017: 3) Thus, instead of defending European values and ideas, we have made room for the opposition to grow. And instead of defending European values, we have blamed Brussels when we faced constraints. Thus, the attribution of causality is very clear when Macron states: “And in doing so, forgetting that Brussels is us, always, at every moment!” (Macron 2017: 3). In other words, European leaders have let the opposition take control of how we speak of Europe and the EU project, and they have made room for this opposition to grow because we took the idea of Europe for granted; we forgot to defend it. Therefore, the prognosis is: “to defend our values and interests.” (Macron 2017: 4) The reason why Europe needs to defend its values and interest is very much
founded in the European identity, Macron argues: “Because what constructs and forges our profound
identity, this balance of values, this relation with freedom, human rights and justice cannot be found
anywhere on the planet.” (Macron 2017: 4) Thus, according to Macron, if Europe wants to uphold its
uniqueness, then we need to defend it instead of taking it for granted. We have a lot to be proud of, hence
the values that he mentions, so let us defend them. The call for action is very explicitly told: “It is up to us, to
you, to map out the route which ensures our future [...] Let us together have the audacity to create this
route.” (Macron 2017: 4) Thus, Macron calls on his colleagues in Europe, to unite to find the right path
forward for the EU.

4.1.1.3 Unity
As already seen with the call for action from the previous frame, finding a way forward for the EU in unity is
essential to Macron. In fact, Macron spends a great amount of space during his speech advocating for unity.
The diagnosis to this prognosis of unity is however not as explicitly told as the prognosis. However, when
Macron states: “We have to rediscover the ambition of a Europe which allowed us to turn our backs on war.”
(Macron 2017: 25), we receive a gist of what is the prime frame of this speech. To Macron, Europe is a peace
project. A peace, Macron very much see as being threatened: “But we are already seeing the beginnings once
again of what could destroy the peace we blissfully enjoy.” (Macron 2017: 25) Therefore, the diagnosis is that
the peace Europe enjoys because we united after the second world war instead of continuing a history of
wars, are threatened because Europe is not as united as it once were: “We must convince them (the
Europeans, red.) that the past 70 years did not simply happen by chance but were the fruit of an unyielding
determination anchored in sheer optimism.” (Macron 2017: 25) The attribution of causality is that Europeans
simply have forgotten the history that brought them together into the European Union:

“Today we know almost nothing any more about the destroyed towns and cities, the barbed wire which
divided, which was at the heart of Europe, the fathers, sisters, children whom people, with a lump in their
throats buried because of tragedy.” (Macron 2017: 25)

With this statement, Macron tries to paint a picture of the agony felt during the war. He draws on pathos
and the receivers can almost feel the lump in their throats themselves. The picture also emphasizes Macron’s
point that if we do not unite, if we instead divide like we were forced to with the Iron Curtain, then this agony
will become real. As already mentioned, unity is prognosis of this frame:

“The real issue here is unity. European unity – forged through Franco-German reconciliation and the
reunification of Eastern and Western Europe – is our greatest success and most precious asset. [...] If we lose
this unity, we risk falling back into our deadly divisions and destructive hegemony.” (Macron 2017: 14)
Again, Macron draws on the experiences of the previous war; a situation where Europe was divided into two zones, and differences between two of the biggest European countries tore Europe apart. The only prognosis, the answer to overcome these divisions are to unite, because that is the greatest accomplishment of Europe.

Thus, if Europe does not want to see a European “history that repeats itself.” (Macron 2017: 25), all Europeans must stand together to unite and take responsibility for the future peace of Europe. The call for action is therefore to all Europeans as Macron states: “you can choose to shoulder your responsibilities, everywhere, and want this Europe, taking every risk, each of us in our own country, because we must have this heartfelt commitment, because the scars which disfigured our Europe are our scars!” (Macron 2017: 25) In other words, we must not let us scare of the scars which have divided Europe previously. Macron appeals to every European to commit to Europe, the idea of Europe and the peace of Europe because it is everybody's responsibility to uphold what we cherish.

In the table below the different aspects of each frame is highlighted.

**Table 4.1 Frames, Macron**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>Attribution of causality</th>
<th>Prognosis</th>
<th>Call for action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We need to talk about Europe</td>
<td>European leaders have stopped talking about their ambitions for Europe</td>
<td>Europe’s leaders have grown too comfortable not speaking of their ambitions for Europe</td>
<td>Macron is speaking up and telling his ambitions for the future of Europe, others should do the same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The idea of Europe</td>
<td>Ideologies of nationalism etc. threatens the ‘idea of Europe’</td>
<td>We have ignored the powers of these ideologies for too long</td>
<td>We need to defend our non-nationalist ideas and values of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>The peace we have enjoyed in Europe is threatened because Europeans are no longer united as they once were</td>
<td>Europe has forgotten the history that brought them together</td>
<td>We must overcome our divisions and unite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.2 Collective identity: Macron

The first thing that springs to mind having analyzed the frames above is that Macron does not use the proper noun ‘the EU’, he uses the proper noun ‘Europe’. Though, what he calls the ‘idea of Europe’ is not the idea of Europe as a continent but the European people in relation to the EU. This is evident as the speech is filled with policy initiatives which can only be ratified via the European Union. However, what is interesting about this is that there might be a reason for this recalling the EU in a new name by using a different proper noun. As Lakoff writes, if you want to change the way people think about something, you must change the way you talk about them (Lakoff 2005: 3-5). Thus, the EU gives different connotations than Europe does, and other values are associated with the idea of Europe than the idea of the EU in the minds of the receivers. Macron even spells out his wish to change the way we think about the EU when he argues that "Europe had become a powerless bureaucracy." (Macron 2017: 3). This is not how Macron wants the receivers to think about Europe, instead, he tries to construct another version of the EU. He tries to construct the EU as something unique when he states: "what constructs and forges our profound identity, this balance of values, this relation with freedom, human rights and justice cannot be found anywhere on the planet." (Macron 2017: 4) Thus, this new Europe that Macron tries to create in the minds of the receivers, the Europeans, is a Europe defined by its values, freedom and its commitment to justice and human rights.

In similar terms, this rewriting of the EU also serves as a tool to constitute European identity as something distinctive. Because Macron constructs a version of the EU where he states that nothing similar can be found anywhere else on the planet (Macron 2017: 4), he tries to create a feeling of distinctiveness among the Europeans (Kostakopolou 2001: 11), whereby he tries to provoke a feeling of identity among the Europeans. This attempt to form a European distinctiveness continues when he adds: "In this place where pioneers, like those in Bologna, Montpellier, Oxford or Salamanca, believed in the power of learning, critical thinking and culture, I want us to be worthy of this grand design." (Macron 2017: 17) and "European sophistication is an ability to see all the many parts without which Europe would not be Europe. But it is also what makes Europeans, when they travel, more than just French, just Greek, just German or just Dutch. They are European because they have inside of them this universalism of Europe and its multilingualism." (Macron 2017: 17)

In other words, what distinguishes Europe from the rest of the world, is that despite all of the different nations it is comprised of, we still have a cultural bound of great knowledge and critical thinking. It is the diversity of Europe that makes us great and what makes us alike because we have this greatness in common. Thus, according to Macron, this is what makes us European.
This is what the EU collective identity is all about. This diversity and yet similarity in our minds that is the grand narrative of Europeans (Eder 2009). At least, this is the narrative Macron constructs of Europeans. In addition, the narrative that Macron’ construct in his speech is centered around a few, key values, he uses to describe the European community. These include democracy: "The first represents the values of democracy and the rule of law. They're non-negotiable" (Macron 2017: 21) and freedom, prosperity and peace: “Behind the Coal and Steel Community, or the Common Market, the project forged a promise of peace, prosperity and freedom” (Macron 2017: 2) These are what Macron describe as (some of) the values that are important to Europe, they are what the idea of Europe has been founded on. Thus, these are the values that are supposed to be the glue that binds the diverse EU members together. According to Eder, these are the common factor that makes the people accept social norms being imposed on them (Eder 2009: 430-431). However, just as much as these are the values that the EU institutions were based upon, it is also the values Europe have been fighting for in previous wars. One could, therefore, argue that Macron frames these values and ideas as being so strong, that people might actually be brought together to fight for these same rights. Or, as Anderson prescribes; the European is a community stronger than other group-affiliations because it is constituted of values that its members are willing to die for (Anderson 1991: 144). In this sense, it does not matter that the community is so large that it can only be imagined in the minds of its members because their shared history is such a strong bond. At least if we believe the constructs made by Macron.

Nonetheless, this bond is constructed to be founded in a shared history of having overcome a time of war with a time of peace and prosperity, because of unity of the European nations into the European Union. Thus, in Macron’s speech, Europe is constructed as being a community founded on shared story of having united. This is evident as Macron argues "It was the lucidity of the founding fathers to transform this age-old fight for European hegemony into fraternal cooperation or peaceful rivalries." (Macron 2017: 2) and "Monnet wanted to unite people. Sorbon called on people to live together in harmony. The goal remains the same. That is to what we must always return." (Macron 2017: 16). Thus, Macron devotes a lot of attention to the people who were the idea makers behind the European project, the ones who had great ambitions for what Europe could be instead of what it had been for a long period of conflict. As evident from the quotes, the reasons Macron picks out as their reasons for why the European project is so important is focused on overcoming past rivalries. Thus, the narrative of Europe that Macron speaks of is a community which has created its own peace.

Additionally, Macron writes that the Sisyphus of Europe is that: “Our political debates are always more complicated in Europe than in the rest of the world.” (Macron 2017: 18), and yet, Macron still believe in the strong bond of Europe: "despite not speaking the same language and having these unfamiliar and complex
differences, we decide to move forward together instead of letting those things drive us apart." (Macron 2017: 18) Macron is using this Sisyphus metaphor to highlight that it will be a never-ending struggle for Europe to agree on politically different issues; however, it is a struggle we must overcome because it will always be the same challenge. Thus, it is very clear that Macron believes in a strong European community with unity and the willingness to overcome differences is among the collective identity of Europe; it is what binds us together. One could even argue, that Macron advocates for an interpretation of the glue that holds the EU together are the diversity of members. In other words, the distinctiveness of Europe is its diversity (Kostakopolou 2001: 11). This is evident when Macron states: “This Europe, where every European recognizes their destiny in the figures adorning a Greek temple or in Mona Lisa’s smile, where they can feel European emotions in the writings of Musil or Proust [...] this Europe of landscapes and folkkores, this Europe of Erasmus, the continent’s preceptor” (Macron 2017: 16) Thus, in Europe you find many different cultural symbols and cultural heritages, and yet, according to Macron, we all feel this ‘European emotion’ when we are met with these cultural symbols. They show a cultural diversity; however, they are enjoyed by all Europeans, meaning Europeans are not as different as we sometimes believe. Consequently, despite differences, we always find back to each other. This is emphasized by appeals to the receivers feeling of being part of a particular we by provoking a we-feeling as Delanty prescribes (Delanty 2005: 129). The feeling of “we” is present several times during the speech, e.g.: “That is to what we must always return.” (Macron 2017: 16) and “we decide to move forward together instead of letting those things drive us apart [...] This is why we must trust in Europe, in what all of us have learned over the centuries, to find the path of this unity.” (Macron 2017: 18) In these statements, it becomes very apparent how much Macron frames or perhaps even believes himself, in the European project. We have let the threats of nationalism etc. drive us apart, but all that can put us back together again is a belief in diversity being an asset, not a liability.

The “we” always refer to the same we. The “we” or “our” is always all of the populations of the European Union; or the state leaders who represent them: “Because this is where our battle lies, our history, our identity, our horizon, what protects us and gives us a future.” (Macron 2017: 1) Thus, it is the same history for all of Europe, the horizon of all of Europe and we have all experienced the same history. There is no distinctions or divisions in Europe. Thus, Macron truly constructs a narrative of Europe as being united – everybody all together where nobody is left out. In this sense Macron speaks of Europe as a true community; they may not know each other; therefore, it is imagined (Anderson 1991). In this sense, the history shared by all of Europe is in the minds of every citizen and are present in the narratives Macron tells of Europe. I.e. a Europe which is united in a common future, because Europe is “what protects us” (Macron 2017: 1), perhaps from our shared pasts of battles and conflicts.
This might be because of the aim of the speech. A regime change that entails that all of Europe is with him in uniting Europe and fight back on isolationism, protectionism etc. This is the setting that Macron sets up his speech; "I have come to talk to you about Europe." (Macron 2017: 1), because we need to talk about Europe as an ambition to move forward, not to let us drift apart. In this sense, the context of the speech is a Europe that Macron believes is a Europe who is drifting apart because of differences and because we have looked inwards instead of wanting Europe: "In the end, it is the [...] people of Europe [...] who must want Europe." (Macron 2017: 18)

To sum up, Macron constructs a version of the EU as a community which has created its own peace through unity. It has a collective identity based on the strengths of cultural diversity but shared values of democracy and freedom etc. and a shared history of battles and conflicts. Differences which should be overcome so Europe can also be our future because the idea of Europe is what protects us from a violent past.

4.2 Mark Rutte: Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe
In his speech in March 2018 at Bertelsmann Foundation, Mark Rutte addresses some of the issues posed by Macron in his Initiative for Europe speech and delivers his proposes for the future of the EU. The speech is held in Berlin for the Bertelsmann Foundation, which provides analyzes and solutions to economic, political and social challenges impacting Europe and the United States (Bertelsmann Foundation (N/A). The speech was held the same day as the British Prime Minister Theresa May held a speech for the future of Britain, a Britain without the EU, and the speech serves as an opposite to her speech as he states: "You had a choice today. You could have listened to a speech in the U.K. about a future without Europe. Or a speech in Berlin by someone who believes in Europe and wants to talk about the best way to move forward with Europe" (Kroet 2018). Therefore, despite the setting of the speech, the speech is a direct address to the European populations.

4.2.1 Critical framing analysis of Rutte
This speech is concerned with the EU not turning into a federation, but still advocates for cooperation among EU member states. Rutte proposes nine concrete proposals: opening Europe’s services market, better cooperation on fighting cross-border fraud and abuses. The conversion of the European Stability Mechanism into an intergovernmental European Monetary Fund, the EMF, and creating a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. All countries should grant permission for military transport across borders, and the EU should create a new Common European Asylum System. We should reduce CO2 emission by 55 percent by 2030, having a smaller EU budget after the UK is leaving the Union, and link the EU budget to efforts to encourage member states to reform and modernize their economies.
4.2.1.1 The EU has changed character

In the first frame, Rutte addresses that the EU needs to find a path forward for its cooperation. He states: “We want to move forward within the European Union. And that’s only logical, because we and our neighbours are the EU.” (Rutte 2018: 1) The reason is that the EU has changed: “Brexit has underlined that EU membership is a conscious choice.” (Rutte 2018: 1) This is ultimately the diagnosis; the EU has changed character; the EU is no longer a club, that a member state is member of for all eternity. It is no longer just a membership which gives access to certain benefits, it is now also a "club" that one can leave if it does not live up to one’s expectations. Therefore, the state of the EU has changed and this is the reason why EU is in a position where it needs to move forward into new grounds; we need to discover the new identity of the EU.

The attribution of causality linked to the diagnosis; it is Brexit who have sparked this renewed debate on EU membership, or as Rutte argues: “This is a paradoxical result of Britain’s decision to leave the EU.” (Rutte 2018: 1)

The prognosis to this challenge becomes apparent when Rutte argues: "We want to move forward within the European Union [...] They – like us – are rooted in the principles of the free market and democracy. [...] In the EU we respect the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms." (Rutte 2018: 1) Thus, Rutte does not believe that leaving the EU is the right choice, because as he states, the Netherlands way forward is within the EU. Additionally, the EU is the right way forward – at least for the Netherlands – because the Netherlands have shared values of democracy, the free market etc. in common with the remaining EU member states (Rutte 2018: 1). Therefore, the prognosis is to stay within the EU with fellow-minded countries who share values. Besides the values already listed, Rutte advocates for these values: “In the EU the media are free, women and men are equal, and discrimination on the basis of orientation and religion is not allowed. The EU is a layer of governance that increases prosperity, provides protection and gives us a framework for dealing with geopolitical and global developments.” (Rutte 2018: 1)

Therefore, if other member states can mirror themselves in these values, they should commit to the EU as the Netherlands have done. Because, as Rutte argues: “a Frexit, Dexit or Nexit is not imminent” (Rutte 2018: 1). This means that membership of the EU is no longer a given if Britain could leave the EU, then every other could leave the Union, and we are faced with another member exit. Therefore, the call for action is for other member states to commit: “We are more aware than ever of the importance of unity among the 27. And this forces us to take a stand.” (Rutte 2018: 1)
4.2.1.2 The basic promise of the EU

The next frame is related to the previous frame as it too revolved around the future outset of the EU. Rutte argues:

“At its core, the original promise of Europe hasn’t changed in nearly 70 years: member states working together to bring each other to a higher level of prosperity, security and stability. There is just one key question: how can we deliver on that original promise and maintain it for future generations?” (Rutte 2018: 2)

From the above quote, the diagnosis is presented in the question; how can we deliver on the original promise of creating higher levels of prosperity, security and stability for the European populations? According to Rutte, what the EU should focus their attention on in the future is to deliver the promise that was already made 70 years ago. The reason is that this promise is the core of the EU, the basis that the EU was founded on and: This is how Europe should continue to operate: “by turning high ideals into practical action.” (Rutte 2018: 2) Thus, the EU should deliver on the ideas and promises it makes.

Therefore, Rutte argues that the EU members should work together in areas where the EU’s combined forces are the strongest: “We work together because it increases our prosperity – think of the single market and monetary union.” (Rutte 2018: 2) Thus, Rutte argues that the best move forward and the best way to deliver on prosperity is in the areas which deliver the most results; the economic area. This framing of the strength of the economic area translates into two proposals for the future of the EU; the conversion of the European Stability Mechanism into an intergovernmental Monetary Fund and the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Rutte 2018: 6-7), which should essentially help each member states to stronger national economies by working together in the EU.

However, this does not mean that he frames a future for the EU cooperation which becomes even closer, as he states: “The EU can fulfil its basic promise only if the individual member states are strong and able to maintain their own identity.” (Rutte 2018: 2) In fact, the prognosis to the diagnosis of delivering on the basic promise of prosperity is not more cooperation, contrary, it is strong individual states. The reason for this framing of strong individual states is that:

“The European Union is not, in my view, an unstoppable train speeding towards federalism. There always seems to be an element of the inevitable in the conversation about European cooperation. That we are heading for ever closer integration.” (Rutte 2018: 2)

Thus, a closer cooperation is not the answer to a prosperous Europe. In fact, Rutte frames the issue of a federal Europe as one that equals less individuality. Therefore, the attribution of causality is the inevitable discussion of federalism versus less cooperation and the argument that closer integration will solve the EU’s
problems. To sum up, the prognosis is not closer cooperation, it is status quo cooperation with strong individual states: “We need to nurture this individuality because it is the seedbed of new ideas, innovation and creativity.” (Rutte 2018: 2) This is the values that are needed to be able to deliver on the promise of prosperity because as Rutte argues, Europe did not become the most prosperous and democratic continent in the world by “compensating for each other’s weaknesses, but by pooling our assets and making each other stronger.” (Rutte 2018: 2) The call for action is, therefore: "We should be working towards a more perfect Union, not an ever closer one.” (Rutte 2018: 2)

4.2.1.3 A deal is a deal
The third frame is focused on some member states who do not live up to the agreements they are part of. This is evident when Rutte states: “This is why in the European Union we need to remember that a deal is a deal. For decades our cooperation has been based on the Treaty, our common foundation, and on our willingness to reach compromises, in the confidence we will all keep to the agreements we make.” (Rutte 2018: 2-3) Through this quote it is implicitly stated that not all members live up to a deal being a deal; otherwise, he would not address it in the speech. However, the quote also addresses why it is important to remember why a deal is a deal; this is how the EU is working. If some member does not live up to their agreements it “undermines Europe’s credibility and the people’s confidence.” (Rutte 2018: 3) Thus, the diagnosis is that some members do not live up to agreements.

The attribution of causality is evident when Rutte argues: “Agreements aimed at building prosperity, security and stability are repeated, reconfirmed and renewed over and over again. But then efforts to implement them are sometimes half-hearted at best.” (Rutte 2018: 3) In other words, the EU has made plenty of agreements that will ensure the people of Europe with prosperity etc., but these agreements are nothing more than empty words because they are not put to life. Thus, the attribution of causality is the number of agreements and promises that are never fulfilled into actual results.

The prognosis is to deliver on the promises made: “I am preaching results, so you would be right to expect me to deliver them.” (Rutte 2018: 3) Ultimately, this is what he wants from his fellow EU-members. He tries to set a good example by preaching to deliver on the promises he makes himself. His demand from the other states is implicitly given at several points during his speech, e.g. when he argues "I understand your concerns, but solidarity is a two-way street.” (Rutte 2018: 9) and “And practise what we preach.” (Rutte 2018: 10). Thus, he argues that if the EU are to remain strong in the future it needs to live up to the agreements and promises made. The EU is not an institution where you can choose some things and leave others; either you are in it or you are not. The reason for this appeal of practice what you preach is that this is necessary for a thriving Europe, and for the EU to live up to the promise of “Delivering more prosperity, more security, more
stability and strong rule of law.” (Rutte 2018: 4) Therefore, the call for action is for the EU members to live up to their obligations so that the EU can deliver on its promise. Or, as he argues: “Erode the single market and you erode the Union. That’s why it’s vital for countries to do what they’ve agreed. A deal is a deal.” (Rutte 2018: 11) Not living up to this standard, undermines the EU (Rutte 2019: 13), and if you undermine the EU there is no single market to deliver on the prosperity promise.

The different frames are summed up in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>Attribution of causality</th>
<th>Prognosis</th>
<th>Call for action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The EU has changed character</strong></td>
<td>The EU has changed character; the EU is now a club that can be left</td>
<td>Britain is leaving the Union</td>
<td>Stay in the EU like the Netherlands, because we are like-minded and have shared values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The basic promise of the EU</strong></td>
<td>How can we deliver on the basic promise of security, prosperity and stability?</td>
<td>The ongoing debate that a closer EU, a federal EU will solve EU’s problems</td>
<td>The EU can best deliver on prosperity through economic cooperation, which is best achieved with strong individual member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A deal is a deal</strong></td>
<td>Some members do not live up to their responsibilities and promises in the EU</td>
<td>Agreements and promises that are never brought to life</td>
<td>The EU is not a pick and choose-system and members should remember the foundation of the EU cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Collective identity: Rutte

As evident from the above framing analysis, there is a lot of issues in Rutte’s speech which is related to the notions of collective identity and community.

From the analysis, there is little doubt that Rutte is speaking of the EU as a community, meaning that he refers to the collectivity of the EU by using the pronouns “we” and “our” on several occasions (Rutte 2018). This indicates a feeling of a belonging to the EU community (Delanty 2005: 129) because it reflects that it is a project we share among us. This is evident when Rutte argues that if a supranational system like the EU is to function properly, the members need to remember how deals are struck. "This is why in the European
Union we need to remember that a deal is a deal. For decades our cooperation has been based on the Treaty, our common foundation, and on our willingness to reach compromises, in the confidence that we will all keep to the agreements we make.” (Rutte 2018: 2-3) Thus, in the EU, we have distinct customs; the willingness to compromise, but also having confidence in the agreements that are made. In other words, the cooperation is based on mutual trust. This is what distinguishes the EU from other international organization, and might be the reason why this organization owns a higher degree of integration than others. Thus, Rutte points out the distinctiveness of the Union and the cooperation in particular (Kostakopolou 2001: 11), this is what makes the EU function; a community based on trust.

However, some members do not live up to this trust, which is why he reminds some member states that "we need to remember that a deal is a deal" (Rutte 2018: 2-3). This is nonetheless a threat to the EU as an organization, because if some members do not live up to obligations, then the trust is gone, and the glue of the community is gone. In this sense, this particular “we” do not apply to all members, but the ones who do not live up to their agreements. Thus, the community is threatened because not everybody agrees to social norms that are imposed on them (Eder 2009: 430-431), thus, in this narrative, the EU lacks the glue that is necessary for members to oblige to agreements.

In addition, he speaks of the shared responsibilities that all member states should live up to. In this regard, he refers to the foundation of the EU and what foundation an institution like the EU as based upon; “our willingness to reach compromises” (Rutte 2018: 2). Thus, Rutte speaks of cooperation with high working ideals, because without a strong tradition of solidarity and responsibility, the EU would not work properly. In this regard, there is a small indication of a collective identity as based on a narrative of good working relations, i.e. of trust and responsibility. In this sense, the narrative that is constructed on the foundation of the EU is based on high working standards. A narrative that is used as the common denominator that should make member states live up to the obligations imposed on them by the EU (Eder 2009: 430-431). However, that there is a need to spell out this narrative, indicates that not all members do not believe in this narrative. According to Eder, this is perfectly normal as narratives are contested and several narratives exist on the same community (Eder 2009: 433). On the other hand, it explains why some members may not agree on what the EU is or why some members do not feel part of the “we” that Rutte constructs in his speech.

Included in the “we” that Rutte speaks of is a set of values, which define how this community work together. Explicitly, Rutte speaks of values of democracy, the rule of law, freedom, non-discrimination and gender equality and argues that these are rooted within the wheel of the cooperation; the free market (Rutte 2018: 1) However, the values that Rutte describes as being shared among EU member states are closely linked to the already Treaty-bound EU values as described in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 2 states:
"The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail." (The Lisbon Treaty N/A)

This can be understood as the collective identity he tries to construct is rooted in the Treaty, meaning the values are so fundamental that it is written into the EU’s DNA. Thus, the values become the social norm of the community, and therefore a strong narrative as it is related to the foundation of the cooperation (Eder 2009: 430-432). On the other hand, it also suggests that nothing binds the member states together except the Treaty. Thus, the EU collective identity is only what is already agreed upon, and nothing greater than the Treaty is constructed as something that holds European countries together. Therefore, Rutte constructs a version of the collective EU identity as something that is made of agreements and what binds the EU members together is agreements; not shared high culture, big thinkers etc. Thus, his approach is much more reactionary than Macron, because he does not want more EU, but keep the cooperation within the already existing framework.

Throughout the speech, it becomes quite apparent that Rutte constructs the identity of the EU as one of economic grandeur. The EU is a means to acquire economic prosperity through the single market and the monetary union (Rutte 2018: 2) The single market is the center of the cooperation, thus, Rutte constructs a narrative of the EU as an economically favorable system. In this narrative, it is very difficult to imagine the EU as a community, because if the EU is just a means to economic prosperity, then the EU is primarily concerned with fulfilling a need that is defined by economic interests, not a mutual feeling of belonging to a "we" (Delanty 2005: 129). In addition, Rutte clearly demarcates the limits of integration in the Union, when he advocates for strong identities of the individual member states: "The EU can fulfill its basic promise only if the individual member states are strong and able to maintain their own identity." (Rutte 2018: 2) Consequently, Rutte advocates for a version of the EU which focuses entirely on economic prosperity as agreed upon in the Treaties.

Put differently, an economic project does not replicate the nation-state in regard to the feeling of sacrifice for one’s country (Anderson 1991: 144), it mere seem like a group affiliation on the level of political parties or organization (Anderson 1991: 144). I.e. he advocates for strong nation-states (Rutte 2018: 2). In other words, to Rutte, the EU cooperation should not include more policy areas and there is nothing more the EU have in common than what has been agreed upon and what is bound in the Treaty. The strength of Europe is not a collective identity of shared songs, texts, images etc. (Eder 2009: 432) which binds together diverse countries, instead, it is strong individual identities that make Europe strong. In sum, although Rutte tries to
be the alternative to Theresa May’s visions the UK without the EU, Rutte is also much more toned-down alternative to Macrons lofty visions for the future of the EU with even closer cooperation. He is the middle ground between more EU and less EU and focuses on what makes each member state stronger individually by cooperating where the EU is strongest. In this sense, it becomes quite clear how this speech is used strategically to place his and The Netherlands alternative between two poles; May and Macron. He also tries to portray himself as the sensible one with the most realistic alternative to drastically different visions for the future of the European Union, as he argues: “Lofty visions do not create jobs or security. Nor does shouting from the ends of the political spectrum. Only hard work, Schritt für Schritt, produces results that benefit people in their daily lives.” (Rutte 2018: 11), Thus, this is the truth Rutte tries to construct about himself; he is the hardworking man, and therefore, he is the best alternative to May and Macron (Foucault 1977). The speech ultimately frames Rutte as the best alternative for the future of the EU, at least this is what the speech attempts.

In conclusion, the EU is framed as a community based on trust, responsibility and a norm of high working ideals. However, this trust is threatened by members who do not live up to their obligations, meaning the very idea of the EU is threatened. On the contrary, Rutte only highlights values of the EU that are presented in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, meaning the EU collective identity is nothing more than already agreed upon values.

4.3 Stefan Löfven: Our Europe – our shared responsibility
This speech by the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven took place in October 2017 and can be seen as another response to Macron’s speech in September 2017. Like Macron’s speech, this speech is held at Sweden’s oldest and proudest universities; Uppsala University and is held three weeks before the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth in Gothenburg. Thus, the setting is similar to Initiatives for Europe, and the audience can be argued to be the same; the public and the academia, although this speech did not receive the same media coverage.

4.3.1 Critical framing analysis of Löfven
As evident from the title of this speech by Löfven Our Europe – our shared responsibility, this speech is focused on what Europe have in common, both culturally and in terms of responsibilities. Löfven suggests that the future of the EU should be focused on issues where the EU brings added value. These issues include job and economy, a fair labor market, environment and climate, peace and security, migration and values shared by the member states.
4.3.1.1 Times are changing

The first frame of the speech sets the scene of for the remainder of the speech: “times are changing rapidly.” (Löfven 2017: 2) The EU has enjoyed a period of prosperity: “We have a European culture, recognised for its world-renowned composers and musicians, authors and artists. We enjoy a high standard of living. We are the world’s second-largest market.” (Löfven 2017: 1) But this situation is about to change because the world is changing (Löfven 2017: 2). Löfven lists a number of challenges from all over the world, including an inclining Chinese economy, the United States leaving the Paris agreement, and the threat from Russia. However, he also addresses internal difficulties: “At the same time, we are grappling with internal difficulties. In some EU countries, developments are at odds with our fundamental values.” (Löfven 2017: 2) and a set of internal challenges are listed: migration policy, the after-effects of the financial crisis and distrust in the EU institutions (Löfven 2017: 2). Evidently, the diagnosis is that the EU faces a lot of new challenges in a changing world both internally and externally.

The prognosis is explained by a story from the funeral of Helmut Kohl, where former president Clinton addresses why there are so many people present at Kohl’s funeral. According to Löfven, Clinton states: “Because all of us, sooner or later, will be in a coffin like that. And the only gift we can leave behind, is a better future for our children...” (Löfven 2017: 1). The way to achieve a better future with peace and freedom for the next generation is the EU, and he adds: “Helmut Kohl helped unite East and West Germany. He was part of laying the foundations for the successful and peaceful post-Cold War era. He said that Germany is his home country, but that Europe is our common future” (Löfven 2017: 1) Thus, in Löfven’s framing, the way to move forward for the EU is together in unity. However, Europe has forgotten the foundation of the Union. The member states need to overcome their internal differences to be able to cope with external challenges. Therefore, we need “to remember why the EU was founded.” (Löfven 2017: 2) And he argues that the goal the EU was founded to achieve was the wellbeing of its people: “The EU has had the wellbeing of its people as a goal, a single market as a means, and the rest of the world as partners.” (Löfven 2017: 2) Thus, the prognosis is that what we need to return to the founding goal of fulfilling this goal of ensuring the well-being of its people. This is best achieved in unity in Europe, because “The project – that is bigger than ourselves, that can guarantee our children a life in peace and freedom, that gives us opportunities we often take for granted – is the European Union.” (Löfven 2017: 1) In other words, it is the EU, which is the best solution to fulfill this basic goal of a better future for Europe and ensuring the peace of the European people.

The attribution of causality is the present discussion on where the EU should move in the future: “Thus no new major projects are needed right now. Amending the EU treaties would not solve any problems.” (Löfven 2017: 2) This is an indirect response to Macron and his visions for the future of the EU, which presumably requires an overhaul of the EU treaties. This is however not the solution Löfven advocates for, thus, he wants
to return to fulfilling the goal of the EU; ensuring the well-being of Europe's people. Instead of taking the EU for granted, we should use it actively to fulfill our goals, but also to survive the challenges the EU faces. Working collectively in the EU to fulfill this goal of a better future is the best solution, according to Löfven, which is why the call for action is: “we must focus on the key issues where the EU brings added value.” (Löfven 2017: 2)

4.3.1.2 The security of Europe is threatened
The second frame is resolved around peace: “We have enjoyed peace in our country for more than 200 years. We often take this peace for granted.” (Löfven 2017: 5) Sweden has enjoyed peace for a long time, however, Europa has a shared history with many wars:

“But anyone who has travelled in Europe has seen another story: military cemeteries in Normandy and Flanders Fields, Auschwitz, the Berlin Wall, and Picasso’s Guernica in Madrid. The EU is a peace project, a way to guarantee that the wars and abuses that dominated a large part of the previous century cannot happen again.” (Löfven 2017: 5)

In the quote, Löfven paints a picture of the entirety of Europe being affected by wars by referring to different geographical locations all over Europe. Thus, the wars are framed as affecting everyone; it is a history everyone in Europe share. According to Löfven, Europe cannot return to this violent past: “Nothing is more important for a government than guaranteeing the safety of its citizens.” (Löfven 2017: 5) However, as evident from the last frame, the world has changed, and it has also changed in relation to peace and security: “The security situation in our part of the world has now deteriorated.” (Löfven 2017:5) The diagnosis is therefore that EU faces a new security threat. Instead of trying to resolve these security threats nationally, we should overcome them together. Therefore, Löfven calls the European state leaders to action; if we want to ensure Europe a peaceful future, “the countries of Europe must take greater collective responsibility for European security.” (Löfven 2017: 5) The best way to deal with the security threat is to stand together and act together as suggested by Kohl; Europe is our common future, so Europe must be the answer to threats coming outside of the Union. “And when we act together, the EU is a strong foreign policy actor that takes global responsibility, with a broad view of security.” (Löfven 2017: 5) However, Löfven advocates for a solution where Europe must stand up and strengthen its military cooperation collectively. Therefore, the prognosis is for the EU member states to overcome past history of internal war and instead act collectively by enforcing hard power tools with a strong intergovernmental defense policy (Löfven 2017: 5). This is both in terms of stronger military cooperation, but also in relation to sanctions as used in relation to the annexation of Crimea (Löfven 2017: 5). Therefore, the attribution of causality is “Stable, prosperous and democratic countries in our neighbourhood lead to a more secure Europe.” (Löfven 2017: 5) Thus, in Löfven’s
perspective, Europe needs to strengthen hard power tools of sanctions and closer military cooperation to secure the peace of Europe, because security in the regions close to Europe is necessary for the security of Europe.

4.3.1.3 Responsibilities and obligations
The third frame is revolved around the lack of responsibility by some member states in dealing with the refugee crisis. Löfven states that among other obligations, we have a “with shared responsibility by the EU to receive our fellow human beings who are forced to flee.” (Löfven 2017: 6) Thus, the refugees should be treated just as well as the European citizens, which is evident from the word “fellow”, meaning all human being are equal and therefore should receive equal treatment. He further argues:

“I also find it deeply troubling that some Member States today no longer seem to share our fundamental values. […] We need to find better ways to ensure that everyone respects democracy and human rights, and follows the rule of law.” (Löfven 2017: 7)

Thus, the diagnosis is that not all members are living up to their obligations in dealing with the migration crisis. Indeed, Löfven argues, this goes against fundamental values. Values that shape how EU members are supposed to deal with issues like the migration crisis. Consequently, they are simply not living up to common values of the EU:

“What unites us as countries of Europe is more than just geography, history and economic cooperation. Our foundation is our common values, our way of life: freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. For countries aspiring to become members of our European community, these are the values that matter.” (Löfven 2017: 6-7)

The prognosis is for all member states to live up to their obligations: “Everyone must take their share of what is our joint responsibility.” (Löfven 2017: 6) How important this is to Löfven becomes evident when he suggests: “Belonging to a club and breaking its common rules must come at a price.” (Löfven 2017: 7) Löfven advocates so much for a joint solution for the shared migration crisis, that he is willing to sanction those who does not live up to obligations, because: “the EU (is not, red) a cash dispenser doling out money with no strings attached.” (Löfven 2017: 7) Thus, the attribution of causality is: “The EU is not a project where we can pick and choose among the rules and obligations that apply” (Löfven 2017: 7) and “Each country in the EU must stand up for the decisions we have taken together.” (Löfven 2017: 7), here Löfven truly speaks of the joint responsibility that all members should live up to. One cannot take some part of the EU and leave others behind; either you are in or you are not. The price for not living up to refugee obligations are clear: “Countries that do not take their responsibility for refugee reception should not have access to economic support from
the EU as they do today.” (Löfven 2017: 6) Again, Löfven wants to make use of the EU’s hard power tools and make use of economic sanctions. And the prognosis underlines his statement that every member state should live up to obligations; the EU is not a pick and choose project. Consequently, if values are not a strong pull factor, to live up to responsibilities, hard power tools should be a sufficient push factor.

Thus, the call for action is for all member states to stand up for the values and obligations of the EU, but also for the member states, to hold those accountable who do not live up to this promise. Meaning, Löfven calls for the member state who do live up to the fundamental values of the EU to stand up for the values against those who do not. In this sense, both the “violators” and the “silent watchers” are responsible for a situation where not every EU-country live up to its values and obligations towards finding viable solutions for the migration crisis.

The three frames are summed up in the figure below.

**Table 4.3 Frames, Löfven**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>Attribution of causality</th>
<th>Prognosis</th>
<th>Call for action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Times are changing</strong></td>
<td>The EU faces external and internal difficulties</td>
<td>The renewed debate on the future of the EU sparked by Macron</td>
<td>We need to return to working collectively in the EU to fulfill the goal of ensuring a better future for Europeans and overcome difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The security of Europe is threatened</strong></td>
<td>The security of Europe is threatened by the changing world order</td>
<td>Stable and prosperous neighborhoods lead to a more secure Europe</td>
<td>Working together on strengthening hard power tools of sanctions and stronger military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsibility and obligations</strong></td>
<td>Not every member state lives up to their obligations to handling the refugee crisis</td>
<td>The EU is not a pick and choose-project</td>
<td>Member states who do not take responsibility to tackle the refugee crisis should be stripped from economic support from the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2 Collective identity: Löfven

Through the analysis of the text, it becomes apparent that Löfven frames the EU as facing two kinds of challenges; internally though difficulties with some members living up to fundamental values and externally through a changing world order. To overcome these difficulties, Löfven tries to find a common ground which all member states can identify with; the values of democracy, equality, rule of law, etc. But also through cultural symbols: “We have a European culture, recognised for its world-renowned composers and musicians, authors and artists.” (Löfven 2017: 1) Cultural symbols which are essential in the creation of a collective identity (Eder 2009: 432). Additionally, Löfven strives to find a common factor that obliges the member states to oblige to the rules there are posed upon them (Eder 2009: 430-431). As evident from the text, the internal difficulties the EU faces is that some members do not live up to obligations and do not oblige to rules which have been imposed to them; thus, the common factor to bind the Union together is missing. Löfven is aware of this, and therefore he tries to infer this common factor by stating that member states enjoy shared values and shared, European, cultural symbols (Löfven 2017: 1). In terms of collective identity, this means that, according to Löfven, we need to return to our common ground, our shared values and cultural symbols which binds us to together, if we want the prosperity that follows with a membership in the EU.

If we are to believe Löfven’s framing, Löfven believes himself in a EU community as he says: “the EU has had the wellbeing of its people as a goal” (Löfven 2017: 2). Thus, the focus is on "its" and the singularity of people. There are only one people and the EU do have a people; the Europeans. This indicates of a strong feeling of community and a ‘we’ do exist in this framing (Delanty 2005: 129).

The juxtaposition between the in-group (the Europeans) and the out-group (the rest of the world) (Castano and Yzerbyt 1997: 5) becomes apparent when Löfven states: “The EU is our home market” (Löfven 2017: 2). The statement indicates that there is a strong ‘us’ or a strong ‘we’ presented by our shared home market. However, the framing of the institution the EU as the home market and not Europe as a continent as the home market it quite striking. Meaning, what we have in common is not (just) the continent of Europe, it is a EU home market. This suggests a strong feeling of safety by associating this market with ‘home’. Ultimately, Löfven tries to invoke a feeling of familiarity and safety in relation to the EU. Thus, this is a strong indicator of a community feeling, as these feelings are close to feelings associated with the nation-state (Anderson 1991). If one lives in a safe nation state without war and similar conflicts, the nation is also associated with home, safety and familiarity. In this sense, the in-group market is Europe, which is associated with safety, is in opposition to other markets which is characterized by insecurities: “we don’t need to look that far ahead to see global challenges.” (Löfven 2017: 2) Thus, even our economies are not safe against the challenges of the changing world order. Only in Europe are we safe. This is a strong juxtaposition because the world is still recovering from the last economic crisis. A crisis which has affected many European personally, thus, insecure
markets give strong connotations to a situation which have been personally uncomfortable to the receivers. Essentially, this means that strengthening the EU home market through the single market is a way of safeguarding against the return of this crisis: “Sweden must be a driving force behind continued efforts to tear down trade barriers so that we can all benefit from the free movement of goods and services.” (Löfven 2017: 2)

In addition, there is another distinction between an in-group and an out-group. The second one is between EU member states who, according to Löfven, live up to their responsibility and live up to the values fundamental to the EU. And the out-group, who are violating EU values (Löfven 2017: 7). Thus, Löfven adds to the divisions within the EU, in similar terms as Rutte. Although he does not name the violators, he is definitely shaming them: “Freedom of movement does not entitle some countries to shirk their responsibility for citizens who face discrimination or have no means of support.” (Löfven 2017: 7) And although his intention might be to bring us all together on the values shared in the EU, the outcome can become the complete opposite. If violators are constantly called out, they start feeling like an out-group and not being part of the “EU-family” and their position as outsider becomes what they are (Foucault 1977). If this is the case, then the appeal to make violators live up to their obligations have a counter-intuitive effect and the calling out has created an outsider and not gained the unity on EU values as was hoped.

On the other hand, Löfven frame the EU as strong community, where the (in-group) members have fundamental values in common. Indeed, some members have forgotten these values, which is why Löfven praises that all members remember the foundation of the EU if we are to stick together in a post-Brexit EU. The narrative that Löfven tells to make all members remember their collective EU identity is one that centers around Helmut Kohl’s accomplishments in the EU (Löfven 2017: 1). With reference to Kohl, Löfven tries to draw on positive feeling towards a well-known European leader and draw on memories of the past which the European people might enjoy with each other (Eder 2009: 432). Meaning, Kohl believed that the EU is bigger than ourselves and it is the means to ensure a safer future for the generations to come with freedom and peace, which Löfven also do:

“The path we must choose becomes clear if we think back to the words spoken at Helmut Kohl’s memorial. European cooperation is something bigger than ourselves, our terms of office and our fleeting careers. [...] Together – and only together – we can build a better Europe.” (Löfven 2017: 9)

Thus, Löfven frames the EU as a peace project that has not only given us peace but also many privileges. Ultimately, Löfven tries to create a glue to hold the collective identity of Europe together with reference to the shared violent past, but also with a reminder of what great, European thinkers can accomplish for Europe: uniting Europe.
As mentioned, this speech is held after the Macron *Initiative for Europe* speech. Löfven indirectly responds to the suggestions made by Macron in his speech by stating that no major projects are needed right now: “Rather, we must focus on the key issues where the EU brings added value. This makes us strong.” (Löfven 2017: 2). In other words, Löfven might agree on Macron’s vision for speaking of Europe again, but he does not agree on his ambitions for an overhaul of the EU treaties. Löfven, on the other hand, advocates for a version more similarly to Mark Rutte’s visions, which focuses on the areas they argue the EU can actually deliver on promises.

In conclusion, the EU collective identity Löfven creates is one of shared values of democracy, the rule of law, etc. But the identity goes beyond merely shared values; in Europe, we have shared culture of great composers, authors etc., However, in this construct, there is also a division between an in-group and an out-group between EU members; those who do not live up to obligations and those who do. In essence, he creates divisions which go against his goal of uniting Europe on shared values, cultural signs and history.

### 4.4 Viktor Orbán: Bálványos Summer Open University

The last speaker, Viktor Orbán held his speech at Bálványos Summer Open University in the mostly Hungarian populated Romanian city of Băile Tușnad. It has turned into a custom for Orbán to speak at the opening of these Summer Universities where he since 1990 has spoken every year except one. According to Pivarnyik, the Summer Open University “became an important vehicle for him to appeal to Hungarians in Romania and to deliver the themes of Fidesz’s agenda to the domestic audience.” (Pivarnyik 2017) Ultimately, this means that the audience of the speech is the Hungarian population, both those living within the Hungarian borders and those living abroad.

#### 4.4.1 Critical framing analysis of Orbán

The speech held in the summer of 2017 is focused on how a country can become a strong nation. According to Orbán, this entails that a nation can defend its culture and religion, can provide for itself by not living of monetary contributions from other states, being able to sustain itself biologically, making strong alliances, e.g. with the EU, NATO and Visegrád Four.

##### 4.4.1.1 The way forward for Hungary

The first frame that is represented in the speech is related to the Hungarian history of being subject to Soviet intervention in the post-WWII years, and their way back to be a strong nation. Orbán states: "at the beginning of the nineties, most people – not only in Hungary, but also across the whole of Central Europe – thought that full assimilation into the Western world was just opening up to us again.” (Orbán 2017: 1) He continues by referring back to the fall of the Iron Curtain when he states:
“Back then – 27 years, 28 years ago – we came together here, and we thought that we freedom fighters living on this side of the Iron Curtain could also have something valuable to say to a Europe which had by then been living in peace, freedom and prosperity for forty years.” (Orbán 2017: 1)

Thus, Orbán draws a picture of the hopes and dreams of Hungary and fellow Central European countries when they broke ties with the Soviet Union, and they applied for membership of the EU. He thought that assimilation was the right choice for Hungary and that Hungary would have something to contribute since his country has fought for freedom when the rest of Europe had lived in peace for 40 years. However, this dream was an illusion. This is not explicitly stated, but the next thing Orbán speaks of is of how the strengthening of the Visegrád Four is the best thing happening in the past 12 months:

“And if I were to name the most important event, the most important Hungarian and European event of the past year – the twelve months since our last meeting – I would say that it is the strengthening of the Visegrád Four.” (Orbán 2017: 1)

He thereby creates a juxtaposition between the hopes and wishes of being assimilated into Western Europe (and the EU) and the strengthening of the cooperation between four smaller Central European states. This juxtaposition also serves as the diagnosis and the prognosis of the first frame. The diagnosis is that Hungary wants to return to its former glory and to be recognized as such. 28 years ago, they thought that the way to achieve this was assimilation into the Western world. But they were wrong. Hungary was not recognized as a partner with something valuable to say. Instead, a stronger cooperation between Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia is the prognosis (Orbán 2017: 1)

The reason why Orban calls the Visegrád Four the most important event for Hungary, but also the entirety of Europe becomes quite apparent when Orbán argues: “we can also say that back in 2010 (...) we were forerunners of this approach, the new patriotic Western politics (Orbán 2017: 2) The “we” Orbán speaks of include Visegrád Four, who together with Hungary is ahead in offering a new, more patriotic way for Western politics. Hence, by calling himself a forerunner, he depicts himself as the way forward and the others – the rest of the Western world (i.e. Western Europe) is backward. Thus, the year 2010 was the year when Orbán became premiure minister. This ultimately means that this is the year marks when the solution for Hungary to achieve its goal of becoming a strong nation again arose. I.e. the solution came with the election of Orbán. The prognosis of cooperating more closely with other Central European countries like the Visegrád Four, started when Orbán came to power. Thus, in this frame, Orbán is the one who offered the way forward for Hungary and he is the one with the solution to the diagnosis. Since this speech is held for Hungarians, it becomes quite clear what Orbán want to achieve from this frame; he wants the voters to vote for him. Therefore, the call for action is for the Hungarian population to vote for him in the next election – which was
4.4.1.2 Migration crisis
The second frame is related to the occurring migration crisis. According to Orbán, the main question for the future of Europe is: “will Europe remain the continent of the Europeans? Will Hungary remain the country of the Hungarians? Will Germany remain the country of the Germans? (...) Who will live in Europe?” (Orbán 2017: 6) And he adds: “there’s no concrete, reliable information on the percentages of traditional indigenous Christians and the incoming Muslim communities living in Europe’s individual countries.” (Orbán 2017: 6) Thus, according to Orbán, the ones who threaten if Hungarians will be the country of Hungarians, are the ‘incoming’ Muslims. This statement is quite interesting, because it not only paints a picture of Muslims as a threat to the way of Europeans, it also states that all Europeans are Christian. Thus, this juxtaposition between indigenous Christians and incoming Muslims is not just about refugees or immigrants coming to Europe, it is very much about religion. Orbán further argues: “It’s obvious that the culture of migrants contrasts dramatically with European culture. Opposing ideologies and values cannot be simultaneously upheld, as they are mutually exclusive.” (Orbán 2017: 7) Ultimately, this means that according to Orbán, Muslim migrant culture is so different from the Christian, European culture that they clash. We cannot have both Muslim and Christian cultures in Europe, he argues. This leads us to the diagnosis of the frame; Muslims are not welcome in Europe. If we want (Christian) Europeans to inhabit Europe, then there is no room for Muslim migrants. This is especially evident when he states: “It’s only a question of time before one or the other prevails.” (Orbán 2017: 8) He further highlights how important it is for states to not allow any Muslim migrants into their countries by stating: “So, whether we like it or not, in terms of respect for life, optimism, commitment, the subordination of individual interests and ideals, today Muslim communities are stronger than Christian communities.” (Orbán 2017: 8) In other words, if we let Muslims into Europe, then Christian communities will cease to exist.

From this statement, it becomes obvious that integration is not the prognosis to the diagnosis, in fact, Orbán does not believe that successful integration exists: “In countering arguments for successful integration, we must also point out that if people with diverging goals find themselves in the same system or country, it won’t lead to integration, but to chaos.” (Orbán 2017: 7) This is a critique of the way other EU member state’s deal with immigration, which, according to Orbán, is a misunderstanding of what solidarity means.
“In European culture the end to be achieved is for the people born into that culture to live in peace, security, freedom and prosperity, in line with their own values and beliefs (...) we can never show solidarity with ideologies, peoples and ethnic groups which are committed to the goal of changing the very European culture (...) because that would lead to surrender.” (Orbán 2017: 8)

From this quote, we can derive that Orbán frames other European state leaders who believe migrants can be integrated into ‘European culture’ to be the attribution of causality to why Europe faces a migration crisis. As Orbán has already argued, Muslim culture and European Christian culture clashes, and because Muslim culture is stronger than European culture, Muslims will take over Europe. However, the reason why this is even a problem is that other European countries let Muslims into Europe. It is essential that Muslims are not let into Europe, according to Orbán, therefore European states who take in migrants, are the attribution of causality.

In essence, integration is not the answer to overcome Muslim migration, instead, we should defend Europe from Muslims: “Hungary has defended itself – and Europe at the same time – against the migrant flow and invasion.” (Orbán 2017: 8) Thus, the prognosis is to defend Europe from being invaded by Muslims. Hungary is doing so and the rest of Europe should follow. However, defending Hungary and Europe from migrants is expensive: “and this has cost us 260–270 billion forints. The EU has reimbursed a tiny fraction of this sum. I could also say that the EU shouldn’t speak of solidarity until they’ve paid the 250 billion forints that they owe us for defending Europe.” (Orbán 2017: 8) Again, according to Orbán the EU and other European leaders have misunderstood what solidarity means. Solidarity does not mean letting other peoples into Europe, it means providing peace and freedom etc. to the people living on the continent. In addition, it also means that the EU should show solidarity with Hungary who has defended Europe and essentially provided the peace and freedom which is the original promise of European culture (Orbán 2017: 8). Therefore, the call for action is for the EU to pay what they owe Hungary for defending European culture from the invading Muslims.

In the table below the two frames are summed up.
Table 4.4 Frames, Orbán

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnosis</th>
<th>Attribution of causality</th>
<th>Prognosis</th>
<th>Call for action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The way forward for Hungary</strong></td>
<td>Former Hungarian leaders were wrong when they thought Europe was the best way for Hungary to regain former glory</td>
<td>The transnational elite who think global cooperation is the way forward for Hungary</td>
<td>Closer cooperation with Central European countries, i.e. the Visegrád Four, is the way forward for Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration crisis</strong></td>
<td>Muslims are not welcome in Europe because their culture clashes with European culture</td>
<td>European countries who let Muslims into Europe because they think they can be integrated</td>
<td>Muslims should not be let into Europe, Hungary defends Europe from Muslim migrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.2 Collective identity: Orbán

The obvious interpretation of the frames presented above is that there is not much of a collective EU identity to be observed from the perspective of Orbán. However, digging at little deeper, we explore how much Orbán actually speaks of preserving the European culture (Orbán 2017: 8) In this sense, he does so by making stark contrasts between European culture and Muslim culture, by stating that the two cannot exist in the same country (or region) simultaneously because they are mutually exclusive (Orbán 2017: 7) This understanding of culture is very much in line with Hofstede’s essentialist conceptualization of culture; culture is the software of the mind and requires that all communities, e.g. nations are homogeneous (Søderberg and Holden 2002: 108). This way essentialist understanding can explain why Orbán does not believe in the co-existence of two different religions. Because two religions do not equal a homogeneous community, therefore, if we want to preserve our Christian community, we cannot accept Muslims migrants in Europe. On the other hand, who comprises Europe and Hungary are a homogeneous group to Orbán, because the fence that defends against Muslims, are defending not just defending Hungary, it is defending Europe: “Hungary has defended itself – and Europe at the same time” (Orbán 2017: 8). However, according to Orbán, what defines European culture and what comprises what we are (Wendt 1994: 385), are the Christian culture. This is apparent when Orbán juxtaposations the out-group, the Muslim migrants to the in-group, Christian
Europeans: “traditional indigenous Christians and the incoming Muslim communities” (Orbán 2017: 6)

Hence, the original habitants, the Christians are threatened by incoming Muslims.

This implies that the European identity is our religious heritage of Christianity. The narrative Orban constructs of Europe is held up with the picture of the enemy as Muslims threatening Christian values. The feeling of belonging to a community is emphasized when Orbán describes the enemy, the out-group in negative terms (Wodak 2001: 72-73). “the European people think it desirable for men and women to be equal, while for the Muslim community this idea is unacceptable, as in their culture the relationship between men and women is seen in terms of a hierarchical order.” (Orbán 2017: 7-8) Hereby, the in-group, the European culture is constructed as the one having the right values in terms of women’s rights by stating that men and women are not equal in Muslim culture. Thus, according to Wodak, this gives the in-group a feeling of belonging by creating a positive presentation of the self (Wodak 2001: 73). This creation of an out-group is strategically used to collect the audience around the essential value of the in-group community; the Christian belief.

In addition, Simon and Brown argue that minority groups feel a stronger sense of group identity than majority groups (Simon and Brown 1987). This is interesting in the light of the first frame from the above analysis. Because Orbán states that Central European countries came to the EU, because they thought they had something valuable to say to the rest of Europe. (Orbán 2017: 1) What lies implicitly in this statement is that they were wrong, Hungary and other Central European countries did not have a say to the rest of Europe, meaning the ideas of those freedom fighters were not appreciated. It further implies that these freedom fighters were ignored and their ideas are a minority to the rest of the European states. In addition, this explains why Orbán thinks that the most important thing that has happened in Europe in the past year is the strengthening of the Visegrád Four (Orbán 2017: 1). Orbán argues: “Here we have the enthusiastic Poles, the ever-cautious Czechs, the sober Slovaks and the romantic Hungarians; and yet we are able to speak the same language.” (Orbán 2017: 1) By the way Orbán describes the four countries, this is not a homogenous group as described by Hofstede Søderberg and Holden 2002: 108). In fact, he describes them as having each and their own characteristics, and yet they still speak with one voice. In contrast to the remainder of Europe, he categorizes Visegrád Four as something distinctive (Kostakopolou 2001: 11); they are different but they understand each other. This is further highlighted by the fact that Orbán frames Hungary (with Visegrád Four) as being the future of Europe (Orbán 2017: 14). This constellation offers a new way of tackling world politics; “the new patriotic Western politics” (Orbán 2017: 2). In this sense, Orbán writes a new narrative of the Central European nations; they no longer represent the old ways of the Western world, they represent the innovative, forward-looking alternative; the patriotic alternative.
However, Orbán states: “The third point in the Soros plan is that the migrants arriving on the continent will have to be distributed among the countries of Europe as part of a mandatory and permanent mechanism.” (Orbán 2017: 10) Thus, Orbán paints a picture of George Soros (and what Orbán call the Soros Empire) as having a plan to force migrants into Europe. According to Orbán, Soros has infiltrated the entire EU: “for Europe to be able to survive and remain the Europeans’ continent, the European Union must regain its sovereignty from the Soros Empire.” (Orbán 2017: 10) Thus, Orbán uses his number one ‘enemy’ (JTA 2018) to discredit the work of the EU. He is not only calling the EU corrupt, he also claims that the EU is an accomplice to George Soros. The goal is to unify his followers around something they all have in common; their common enemy, Soros and the EU who allegedly want more immigration, by planting an idea of the EU as being the enemy in the minds of his followers (Lakoff 2004). Thus, he is trying to spark the feeling of belonging to this presumed outsider/minority identity feeling that minority groups enjoy (Simon and Brown 1987). The fact that Soros is Jewish may highlight how big a threat Orbán believes Soros is to Hungary, because if Muslim communities pose a threat to the Christian, Hungarian way of life, then so might Jewish communities (Orbán 2017: 8). In other words, the EU’s solutions for the migration crisis is a threat to the Hungarian national identity. In this sense, there is a discrepancy between defending European Christian culture and the enemy picture Orbán paints of Europe being associated with Europe.

Thus, it is quite apparent that this speech is held to Orbán’s own population and the overall goal is to make voters vote for him in the following election. He wants his population to center around his visions for Hungary and show them that he has the answer to a stronger Hungary. He shows that he is a patriot fighting for Hungary and not for a EU who he feels has turned its back on him (Orbán 2017: 1-2). His speech, therefore, differs in its overall goal as this speech is not held as a performative act to show that Europe is united, as the other three speeches do (Delanty 2003: 76-77). In contrast, this speech is held to make the Hungarian population show how great Orbán has made Hungary and how he is the answer to a stronger Hungary in the future.

In sum, Orbán speaks of European collective identity as being held together by its Christian belief. This is reinforced by drawing a picture of Muslims being a threat to the continuity of the European identity. There is little talk of Hungary and Europe as being united with values beyond Christianity. On the other hand, he paints a picture of the EU as being in league with his number one Enemy, George Soros. However, this is presumably because of the overall goal of the speech; ensuring Orbán reelection in April 2018. In fact, Orbán frames himself as Europe’s savior because he is defending Europe against Muslim immigration.
5.0 Comparison and discussion

As evident from the analysis above, there are quite different views on where the EU should move in the future, different ambitions but also different frames and constructs of EU identity. For this chapter, it would be fruitful to dig further into the different identities constructed in frames by the speakers, how they relate to one another and where they are different. We start by comparing the different frames.

5.1 Frames comparison

In the table below the different frames are compared and summed up in themes which are all brushed upon by the different members. The table does not cover all frames, but exclusively frames which are used by more than one state leader.

**Table 5.1 Frames present in more than one speech**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Unity and peace</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>The EU faces new challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present in speeches by</td>
<td>Macron and Löfven</td>
<td>Löfven and Rutte</td>
<td>Macron, Löfven, Rutte and Orbán</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As evident from the table above, there are a few issues which are addressed by more than one state leader. Both Macron and Löfven make use of frames revolved around unity and peace; they both frame the EU as a peace project and they both argue that we should unite in the EU to be able to tackle the challenges Europe faces collectively. On another note, both Löfven and Rutte frames responsibility to be a central issue for the future of the EU. They both argue that some members do not take their responsibility and Löfven addresses for hard power tools to be used to make member states live up to their obligations. However, the last frame is used by all state leaders but addressed differently. To Orbán, what threatens the EU or Europe is Muslim immigration (Orbán 2017: 7-8), to Macron it is ideas of nationalism and isolationism (Macron 2017: 3). To Löfven it is a mix of external threats posed by other states, e.g. Russia, China and USA and internal difficulties with uniting and not living up to responsibilities (Löfven 2017: 1-2). Lastly, to Rutte, the frame is revolved around the changing nature of the EU after Great Britain is leaving the Union (Rutte 2018: 1). Thus, although they address the same issue, their framing of what poses as new challenges differs greatly. Before we dig into a discussion of why the speeches differ and how they differ in terms of identity frames and constructs, a brief discussion of analytical tool and theories are in order.

5.1.1 Theoretical discussion

It can be argued that the mix between Critical Framing Analysis and Eder’s concept of collective identity as stories paired with Anderson’s understanding of communities have been fruitful for the analysis. It has so in the sense that framing analysis has given me a greater understanding of how the state leaders communicate.
and argue for their views and visions for the future of the EU in a very concrete way. Similarly, it has provided me with the opportunity to understand how frames, which are not directly addressing the future of the EU, are indirectly related to the issue, as is the case with Orbán and his speech. Thus, treating identity as the stories we tell of our community have been fruitful as well. The data is comprised of speeches, meaning, the speeches is a way of telling stories of how one would want its’ receivers to understand a certain topic. In this instance, the theory of imagined communities has given me an understanding of how collective identities work within a community like the EU. You cannot have a collective identity without a community and in this way, Anderson’s theory has deepened my understanding of how the state leaders construct a collective EU identity.

5.2 Collective identity or shared political culture?
One of the first things that sprung to my mind after comparing the different frames in Table 5.1 is how little Macron and Rutte have in common in their speeches. They both address that EU faces new challenges but in different terms. Thus, the distinction between the two speeches might be found in their different understandings of what constitutes EU collective identity.

When Rutte argues that member states should remember that a deal is a deal, and values of democracy and the rule of law are the foundation of the European cooperation (Rutte 2018: 1), he is speaking of the EU as a political institution and of values that applies to an institution. Respect for the rule of law and human rights can be argued to be values that are essential for governments and other legislative institutions to respect. While at the same time also being principles which are not respected by all states throughout the world; i.e. not all states are democratic and not all states live up to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, these are values that states and governments can stand up for, people can fight for them, but they are not the people’s standards to live up to; it is the governments’ responsibilities. Rutte even argues himself: "The EU is a layer of governance that increases prosperity..." (Rutte 2018: 1) Additionally, when Rutte argues that if you erode the rule of law, you erode the single market and the EU (Rutte 2018: 11), this is what the EU is to Rutte; the EU does not have a common culture composed of great authors or big European thinkers. The EU is an instrument member states should use to deliver prosperity and security to their citizens. Consequently, Rutte’s EU is a political entity. In this sense, the identity of the EU as proposed by Rutte is better explained by Pellerin-Carlin’s concept of political culture: “European culture can also be understood as a political culture, a set of visions related to how a society can and should be organized.” (Pellerin-Carlin 2014: 76; Simmel 1997)

Thus, what Rutte speak of in his text is more related to a political culture that is enjoyed within the European Union; hence he argues that in the EU we respect the rule of law, democracy and human rights. This is the
way we organize our societies in Europe and these are the principles we must deliver to all Europeans. This
does not live up to Eder’s collective identity which focuses on narratives as texts, songs or images (Eder 2009:
432). At least, these items cannot be found in Rutte’s speech, hence there is no mentioning of songs or images
that all Europeans share, and this is where Rutte and Macron differ greatly.

As already evident from the analysis of Macron’s speech, Macron does speak of the texts that are enjoyed
by all European citizens and what he tries to frame as part of the European ‘we’ are cultural symbols of Mona
Lisa’s Smile (Macron 2017: 16) and pioneers from all over Europe (Macron 2017: 17). More notably is
Macron’s construct of the EU as sharing a collective identity when he mentions: "In 2024 the Ode to Joy will
ring out, and the European flag can proudly be flown alongside our national emblems." (Macron 2017: 21).
Here, Macron rank the European Union alongside the nation-state. He highlights the symbols of the EU which
are similar to the ones only nations traditionally enjoy; an anthem and a flag. One does not have to stretch
Anderson’s concept of imagined communities very far (Anderson 1991) because according to this identity
construct by Macron, the EU is a community in the same sense as the nation is a community.

In contrast to Rutte, Macron does emphasize cultural symbols which he tries to construct as part of the
European ‘we’. In this sense, he goes beyond Rutte’s definition of the EU as a governance level to the symbols
of critical thinking, cultural treasures, the flag and the anthem of Europe that constitute the European
collective thinking. Thus, there are two different understandings to what Europe and the EU are; shared
cultural symbols as proposed by Macron and a level of governance as proposed by Rutte. The two state
leaders do not have the same ambitions for the future of the EU; the EU does not mean the same things to
them and therefore they express different identity versions.

In Macron’s speech there are plenty of references to the collective identity of Europe as posed by great
authors and thinkers, but none of this is present in Rutte’s speech. In this sense, Eder’s theory of collective
identity cannot grasp Rutte’s perception of the EU and what Rutte frames as being shared by all Europeans.
They agree on values of democracy etc. as being shared in the EU, but Rutte constructs the EU as having
shared purposes which must be dealt with collectively. He does not share Macron’s lofty visions for the EU.
Visions which rest on a construct of a collective identity comparable to the nation-state. Through these
arguments, it makes sense why Rutte does not share Macron’s visions for a closer, more united EU: "So let’s
get to work and put these joint commitments into a new cooperation treaty” (Macron 2017: 24), but a more
“perfect” Union (Rutte 2018: 2), because as Wendt argues; “It is collective meaning that constitute the
structures which organize our actions.” (Wendt 1992: 397), meaning that because Macron and Rutte give the
EU cooperation different meanings and gives the EU different attributes, they act differently in relation to
the EU. In this instance, they want the EU to move in different directions. Thereby, the different meanings
they give the EU entails different wants and wishes for the EU’s future and it explains why they do not have the same ambitions for the EU.

5.3 Responsibilities

Evident from Table 5.1, some state leaders call out on member states taking responsibility for the decisions they themselves agree to fulfill. Especially Rutte and Löfven are speaking of the need for every member state to take their responsibilities, thus, there must some member states who are actually not living up to their responsibilities. As Rutte states in relation to his proposal of a new European Asylum System: “A system in which responsibility can be shared more effectively among the member states if the influx of refugees increases sharply again.” (Rutte 2018: 9) and “The relocation of refugees across Europe remains a difficult issue, because not all countries are willing to do their share.” (Rutte 2018: 9) Hence, the migration crisis is a problem area where member states do not take their responsibility. This is backed by Löfven who states: “We have Member States that are refusing to shoulder their share of our joint responsibility for migration policy.” (Löfven 2017: 2) Thus, both are referring to member states who do not live up to their responsibilities, however, they do not name who is the ‘violators’. From the data, it could be deduced that one of these member states could be Hungary, because Orbán have a very different take on how the migration crisis should be solved by “putting an end to immigration, and everyone using their national competence to protect their borders.” (Orbán 2017: 10) It is clear that Orbán is concerned about the migration crisis and solving the crisis as well as Rutte and Löfven. However, his solution is very different than the one proposed by Rutte; immigrants should not be relocated in Europe, they should not be allowed access to Europe, instead, every nation in Europe should defend their borders from the immigrants. One could argue that this is simply a matter of opposing ideological opinions, and therefore, when some state leaders call out on other members to live up to their responsibilities, they create a situation with in-groups and out-groups.

When Rutte states that not all members are willing to take their share (Rutte 2018: 9), he is pointing fingers at those who do not take their share, meaning, he is creating a situation where he is painting a positive picture of the in-group, those who are taking their responsibility (Wodak 2001: 72-73). A group, he and the Netherlands is a part of because: “I am preaching results, so you would be right to expect me to deliver them.” (Rutte 2018: 3) A group which Löfven is also a part of as he argues that countries who do not take their responsibility for refugee reception should not have access to economic support for the EU. (Löfven 2017: 6) Thus, there is a clear distinction between us; the responsible ones and the others; those, who are not willing to share responsibilities but are willing to receive economic benefits from the EU. As already mentioned, Löfven advocates the use of hard power to make member states comply, but the mentioning of economic support in relation to responsibility highlights how some the in-group, the ‘we’ are responsible and
economically net contributors, while the out-group are the ones who are the net receivers are not living up to their responsibility. Hence, they receive but does not give anything in return.

However, making it an issue of responsibility is a way of eliminating the opposition’s say in the matter; their arguments for wanting to deal with the situation differently is taken away from them because they have been deemed irresponsibility. In this way, there is little room for interpretations of the issues of the migration crisis which does not fall in line with the one of the majority, meaning, the in-group is not acknowledging the opposition. They do not have a say, exactly like Orbán writes in his speech: The countries from the other side of the Iron Curtain did not have anything valuable to say to the rest of Europe (Orbán 2017: 1). Interestingly, it is the newest member from the data, whose voice is not welcomed suggesting that the newer members should just oblige to the rules which were established by the older members (Eder 2009). This is an indication that the EU is lacking pluralism in its democracy because it is not embracing the newer EU member Orbán and his beliefs. Older EU members like Rutte and Löfven are not listening to Orbán. And by arguing that hard power measures should be taken into consideration on those who do not live up to their responsibilities, could be argued to be a threat to the very essence of the EU democracy, because not all voices are welcomed. Meaning, being accepted into the EU club does not entail a new member to have the right to question the ‘old’ ways of the EU. Thus, being accepted means assimilation into the EU, not integration.

The goal might be to fight for the values, that both Rutte and Löfven states in their speeches, and thereby fighting for the identity of Europe; Europe is a continent which welcomes migrants, not a continent that build fences to keep immigrants out. Thus, there is a strong indicator of collective identity of the in-group, the old members who take responsibility, with their values of how to deal with things. It is not only a matter of dealing with migration crisis, it is a matter of who the EU are and how they deal with crises. In this sense, Rutte and Löfven advocates for a joint response while Orbán advocates for a more national response. I.e. Orbán does not want the EU to interfere in how he is solving immigration issue in Hungary, suggesting he wants less policy areas to be dealt with on EU-level.

5.4 Common values and the need for a collective identity
The last point from the analysis that I want to highlight and discuss is the values that the state leaders emphasize in their speeches. To Macron it is values of democracy, freedom, human rights, justice, fraternity, solidarity and the rule of law (Macron 2017: 4, 5, 10, 21) which is similar to the values Löfven highlights: “Our foundation is our common values, our way of life; freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” (Löfven 2017: 6-7) and Rutte who advocates for “principles of the free market and democracy. In the EU we respect the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (2018: 1) Thus, as already mentioned in the Rutte analysis (cf. section 4.2.2), these are the values which are described in
Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. On the one hand, this shows that these state leaders subscribe to a construct of the EU as founded on these values. Thus, as Delanty argues, these are the values that constitute the belonging to a collective EU identity (Delanty 2003: 76). But there is little evidence that combined, there is more than these values that constitute a collective identity. with Macron being the only one who frames the EU as having more in common. In fact, Macron states that “In 2024, the Ode to Joy will ring out, and the European flag can proudly be flown alongside our national emblems.” (Macron 2017: 21). Thus, besides Macron’s construct of the EU as being similar to a national community, there is little evidence in the construct of the EU being a community that enjoys an identity similar to the nation-state. In this interpretation, the EU is closer to a political community with a political identity.

On the other hand, these values are not presented in all speeches. We cannot deduce if Orbán does believe in these values as the other members, as they are not present in his speech. On the contrary, he advocates for a Hungary with a strong national identity and tries to convince his receivers that the EU is an accomplice to Soros (Orbán 2017), so at least in this data sample, Orbán does not share these values. However, it should be borne in mind that the audience of his speech is also different than the audience of the other speeches as his speech is more addressed to Hungarians than to the international community. As already brushed upon, this can be a reflection of there being an in-group within the EU that Orbán is not part of, meaning there is an A-team who shares some values and the B-team, who subscribe to other values. The consequence is undoubtedly that there are no unifying values which are shared by all the four state leaders of this data sample, although, a greater data sample might shed some light on this controversy.

Contrary, there might be a reason why these A-team state leaders mention these values which are described in Article 2, which is a response to Orbáns nationalism. Macron states that nationalism is the biggest threat towards the idea of Europe (Macron 2017: 3) and Löfven argues for economic sanctions on members who do not live up to obligations (Löfven 2017: 6). Although Löfven mentions hard power tools, these appeals to remember the founding values and the EU as the insurance of European peace might pose as the soft power tools, i.e. the diplomatic response to nationalism and to member states who chooses the national response instead of the joint response to common challenges. The not so diplomatic response would be an activation of Article 7, which the Parliament already advised for being activated against Hungary. However, this response demand unanimity in the European Council which complicate this sort of response to Article 2 violations (The Lisbon Treaty; Brzozowski 2018). In this way, there seems to be a need for these speeches. Nationalistic political parties have been on the rise and with Brexit, the very idea of Europe is being challenged. Thus, the EU seems to be in a position where it needs to legitimize itself. For example, as the organization that provided Europe with peace for 70 years and the organization which has made all of Europe...
more prosperous in the same period as it is done by Macron (2017) and Löfven (2017). Thus, these frames of common values, common responses and of shaming other members for not taking their responsibility, is member states trying to hold the EU together, because there is a fear that nationalism will take over and perhaps more member states will leave the Union. The frames and the construct of the EU as standing together is a strategic way of reinventing a glue holding the EU together. Thus, these speeches by Löfven, Macron and Rutte is not reflecting the truth of Europe, it is performative acts on how they want EU to be. They do not want every other member state to hold speeches like Orbán who is treating Europe as an enemy. They try to construct a picture in the minds of the Europeans where the EU is united – although there are certain differences in their approach with Rutte being the most reactionary and Macron the most ambitious – but the performance is the same; creating a new truth of the European Union (Forcault 1977; Lakoff 2004). In this sense, an EU identity is constructed in the mundane ways the state leaders speak of the EU, i.e. how they act or perform the EU through their speeches. Thus, the speeches do not represent the reality of the EU identity, but it is constructed repeatedly through time and through these speeches of the EU being united on common values. Meaning, this is the way Rutte, Löfven and Macron act the EU to be able to construct a new version of the EU in the minds of the European people.

5.5 Solidarity or exclusion?

However, this need for a new truth about Europe can fall into the trap of being one of exclusions instead of solidarity, as Delanty argues:

“Instead of identity being defined by a sense of belongingness and solidarity arising out of shared life-worlds, it becomes focused on opposition to an Other: the ‘We’ is defined not by reference to a framework of shared experiences, common goals and a collective horizon, but by the negation of the Other.” (Delanty 1995: 5)

With the extensive focus on other members’ ability to take responsibility for their actions in the EU, one might argue that this identity which Rutte, Löfven and Macron all try to create is an identity reflected in the negation of the Other; the member states who do not live up to responsibilities. On the other hand, the analysis reveal appeals to work on common goals and to work through a collective horizon. This is evident when Löfven and Macron both speak of the EU as a peace project (Löfven 2017: 1; Macron 2017: 25) and they both refer back to some of the grand old men of the EU; Kohl, Monnet and Schuman etc. (Löfven 2017: 1; Macron 2017: 16, 23) In this sense there is an attempt to make people understand the importance of the EU project through the glasses of a shared history; the greatest story of the EU; that it ensured the peace in Europe. This should be the horizon of the EU; we are peacemakers and this is what legitimizes the EU and its actions. However, this image is not optimal, because it does not apply to all members of the European Union. It does not apply to Hungary who were not saved by the EU or the ECSC. They still faced military presence
and differing interventions by the Soviet Union up until the fall of the Iron Curtain, and it can be argued that they have felt little of the peace-making abilities of the EU. Thus, it is difficult for any Hungarian to feel part of this identity construct. It does not appeal to them, because this have never been their truth of the EU. On the contrary, this identity construct is one of Western European design, so while it might work for Western Europe and Western European can reflect themselves in this narrative, it does not apply to Eastern or Central European members. Again, it highlights the difference between newer members and older members and Western Europe versus Eastern/Central Europe. So, what should be an identity construct to unite people on the importance of maintaining the EU cooperation, works completely counterintuitively. Not only are the Hungarians being told that they have not taken their responsibilities, they are also being excluded by the identity construct the Western European state leaders make of the EU. Thus, this reinforces the division between the A-team EU members and the B-team members. In this sense, the state leaders have themselves created a situation where the EU is divided on how to deal with certain issues (the migration crisis) and where there are little agreements to where the EU should move in the future. The EU is by its very nature based on solidarity and exclusions; solidarity with its members and exclusion of those who are not a member; states who do not reside within the continental Europe. The problem arises when these divisions and exclusions are allowed to thrive within the Union itself. And in this sense, the speeches fail to construct a cohesive EU identity. It raises the question if the EU can embrace such different realities of the EU identity and how the EU should overcome such differences internally in the Union. And just as important: what is the very nature of the EU? Is it a political community or an organization being closer to composition similar to a nation-state with its own national anthem and its own flag?

6.0 Conclusion
With this thesis, I tried to uncover how the state leaders are constructing the EU’s identity in their articulation of their visions for the future of the EU. The EU started out as a peace project by pooling coal and steel into a single market and thereby making war among the members impossible. But today, the EU faces a new truth; a member is leaving the Union and EU membership is no longer forever. Does this mean that member states are dissatisfied with the EU or the EU is not what member states expect it to be? Thus, the issue is related to identity, because who we are is reflected in our behavior. Therefore, I decided to explore: How is EU identity constructed and framed by European state leaders’ articulation in their visions for the future of the EU? To answer this, a frame analysis was conducted on four very different EU state leaders; French Emmanuel Macron, Hungarian Viktor Obán, Swedish Stephan Löfven and Rutte from the Netherlands. Afterwards, their framing of issues important to the future of the EU was analyzed in terms of collective
identity and imagined communities to gain a greater understanding of how identities were part of their strategic framing.

Before we dig into the results, we need to remember that who we are is reflected in what we are doing. Subsequently, the meaning we prescribe the EU entails where the EU is headed in the future. The meaning we prescribe the EU entails which policy issues we find important for the EU cooperation in the EU and the areas where each nation state is better off on its own. That not all EU member states prescribe the EU the same meaning is evident when we compare the frames from the analysis. To Macron the EU is an organization or an institution which have similar attributes to the nation-state; i.e. we have big thinkers, artists and writers who are part of our European, cultural treasure. We have a European anthem and we have the EU flag. But more importantly, we have a past of wars in common, a past we can only overcome by remembering and reinforcing our distinctive Europe cultural heritage of great arts, but also by remembering our unique identity of democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights. Löfven subscribes to many of the same values as Macron and he even agrees with Macron’s advocacy of a shared cultural heritage of great artists shared by all Europeans. But he does not share the same ambitions for an EU moving towards federalism and a state-like composition. Instead, the EU should focus on the areas where it can truly deliver. Rutte is not prepared or lofty ambitions for the future of the EU either. He also advocates for values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights etc., but his values do not go beyond the values described in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. And the last state leader, Orbán advocates for a Christian Europe where other religions are not welcome. They are a direct threat to the way of life of Europe. However, he argues that the EU is interfering too much in Hungary’s way of dealing with immigration, suggesting that he neither believes in closer EU cooperation. Thus, there is little agreement on where the EU should move in the future because there is little agreement to what attributes to prescribe the EU identity.

The Western European countries are closest to each other in their framing and it is only Orbán who prescribe the EU a Christian identity. However, where Macron constructs the EU as something similar to the nation-state, Rutte constructs the EU as a political community where member states work together to fulfill a common goal of prosperity, security and stability. In this regard is Löfven closer to Rutte’s perception than Macron, as he also advocates for an EU focused on policy areas where the EU is the strongest. Thus, this leaves us with a question of what is the actual nature of the EU identity; it is a level of governance and a political community? Or is it an organization that requires closer cooperation on the EU level and where we embrace our European heritage when watching Mona Lisa’s Smile?

But the disagreements to what the EU identity is and what to expect from the EU cooperation does not stop here. Because disagreement on the collective EU identity raises other issues which have consequences for
the EU cooperation. Because when state leaders like Rutte and Löfven speak of taking responsibility for one's actions in the EU and the lack of responsibility from some members, they create an A-team and a B-team. Those who live up to their responsibility and those who do not. The act is counterintuitive because both state leaders also speak of the need for Europe to stand together within the Union. Pointing fingers and trying to make member states comply with the values that define the EU does not go hand in hand, at least not if the goal is to make states remember why a united EU is important. Because the act only serves as a way to emphasize the divisions in the EU; those who agree to these values, and those who believe other values should be discussed. The divisions are quite striking because they also emphasize the gap between new member states and the old member states and the West vs the East. In other words, by stating which values are right and by pointing fingers at those who do not subscribe to these values, these B-team members (new, Eastern/Central European) do not feel that their values and views are welcomed. This is a serious problem for the pluralism of the EU democracy because if some voices are not being heard, because they do not reflect the right values, then it is not much of a democracy. Thus, another question is raised; can the EU embrace the newer EU members like Orbán who may want different things from the EU cooperation than the older members? Has the EU enlargement gone too far and have too diverging voices been integrated into the EU club?

It seems as if the state leaders are aware that the EU is facing a crossroad. The EU has changed in its very nature. The first EU member is leaving the Union and others can follow in the future. Thus, the EU is facing a legitimacy crisis; EU needs to make itself important to the citizens of Europe to ensure its survival in changing times. The state leaders know this. This is why it is even possible to analyze speeches focusing on the future of the EU. The world is changing, the member states agree on this, and therefore the debate on the EU identity is renewed. But with the construction of an A-team and a B-team, puts pressure on the idea of Europe because the EU does not live up to its own ideal of showing solidarity with its own members. It is also a problem in the sense that the EU cannot live up to its own values of democracy; if the EU cannot embrace all its members, then the EU truly needs to rediscover its identity. It raises the last question; can the entire EU agree on values which define the common, EU identity? Can the EU embrace all its members?
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7.1 Appendix


