



# DENMARK AND REACTIONS TO BREXIT

Barbora Konečná (DIR)

30th of May 2018  
10th semester, Aalborg University

# Table of contents

ABSTRACT: .....	3
INTRODUCTION.....	5
RESEARCH QUESTION .....	6
LITERATURE REVIEW .....	8
METHODOLOGY .....	11
RESEARCH STRATEGY .....	12
<i>QUALITATIVE RESEARCH</i> .....	12
<i>INTERPRETIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM</i> .....	13
RESEARCH DESIGN .....	14
<i>SINGLE CASE STUDY DESIGN</i> .....	14
<i>CHOICE OF ACTORS</i> .....	15
DATA COLLECTION .....	16
THE CHOICE OF THEORY .....	17
THEORY .....	17
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM .....	18
<i>SUBSTANTIVE BARGAINS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE</i> .....	19
<i>NATIONAL PREFERENCES</i> .....	20
EUROSCEPTICISM.....	22
<i>CONTENT OF THE TERM EUROSCEPTICISM</i> .....	23
<i>CLASSIFICATION OF EUROSCEPTICISM</i> .....	23
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THEORIES .....	25
INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS.....	27
<i>HISTORY OF THE DANISH EU MEMBERSHIP AND MANIFESTATIONS OF</i> <i>EUROSCEPTICISM</i> .....	28
<i>THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN DENMARK</i> .....	29
ANALYSIS .....	30
<i>REACTIONS OF DANISH GOVERNMENT AND COALITION POLITICAL PARTIES TO BREXIT</i> .....	31
<i>REACTIONS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES TO BREXIT</i> .....	34
<i>REACTIONS OF BUSINESS CIRCLES TO BREXIT</i> .....	37
<i>REACTIONS OF ACTORS TO DIFFERENT PROBLEM AREAS</i> .....	40
<i>Denmark and the relation with the EU after Brexit</i> .....	41
<i>Brexit as an Economic Opportunity</i> .....	43
<i>IS EUROSCEPTICISM REFLECTED IN THE DISCOURSES OF THE ACTORS?</i> .....	46

DISCUSSION .....	49
CONCLUSION .....	51
BIBLIOGRAPHY: .....	54
BOOKS: .....	54
TEXTS: .....	55
INTERNET: .....	57

## ABSTRACT:

The subject of the thesis is the evaluation of discussions of political and social actors of Denmark in response to the outcome of the British referendum on the European Union. The end of the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union is a significant event for the Danish policy and the economy and will have huge consequences in the future. The aim of the thesis is to focus on this discussion and to create a list of preferences of individual actors, which the Danish government will promote as a national Danish interest in the further negotiations, whether at EU level or bilaterally with the United Kingdom.

For better orientation in the problem, the single case study on a case of Denmark has been chosen in order to sufficiently answer the following research question: *“What are the reactions of political and social actors of Denmark after Brexit and how are they reflected in the discussions about the national preferences?”* The method of empirical examination of the discourses of the relevant actors has been chosen. Individual performances are assessed from the point of view of Moravcsik's concept of liberal intergovernmentalism. Liberal intergovernmentalism clearly explains the three negotiation strategies, from the level of national bargaining among political and social actors, through government negotiations at EU level to delegation of powers to international institutions. As a secondary theory, theory of Euroscepticism within the typology by Catharina Sørensen, is used.

Individual statements are explored from the point of view of the Danish government, from the point of view of opposition parties and from the point of view of business circles. Another part of analysis is the evaluation of the statements in relation to the chosen problem areas. This paper discusses the views of relevant actors on the negotiations with the EU institutions on Brexit and the views on the EU budget after the end of the United Kingdom's membership in the EU. The statements in which is Brexit reflected as an economic opportunity for Denmark are interesting as well. The theory of Euroscepticism identifies whether there is reflected certain level of Euroscepticism in the explored discourses of actors and the degree of Euroscepticism is evaluated within the statements of political and social actors while they are formulating national interest in the discourses.

Overall, the Danish government, as well as the opposition parties and the business circles, are aware that EU membership is a top priority because it brings more advantages to be a member of the EU. The reasons are economic interests, employment and economic prosperity. These

statements are the considered to be a starting point that the Danish government will most likely be promoting at international level and are considered to be a Danish national interest.

Keywords: European Union, Denmark, national preferences, Brexit

## INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, different arrangement of countries within Europe was necessary in order to reduce further risks of future conflicts. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed and established the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter 'ECSC'). It symbolized the beginnings of the "common purpose" (European Parliament) and can be seen as the first step of the European integration. In the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community (hereafter 'EEC') and 'Euratom' were established. The treaties brought together six European countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The European Communities (hereafter 'EC') were established in order to unite Europe and it was a direct reaction to the events which happened on the continent. These actions can be seen as a first steps which led Europe to the European Union (hereafter 'EU') which is present but nowadays, the development of the cooperation within the EU is not linear and the EU is currently undergoing a major crisis, when United Kingdom (hereafter 'UK') has decided to leave the European Union (European Parliament; Pissarides 2017).

In the history, UK refused to participate in the EEC but in the end, it decided to apply to join the union because they have seen the success of the EEC. The first two applications were vetoed by the French President Charles de Gaulle in years 1961 and 1967 and the UK has become a member of EEC in 1973 after his death. The accession of the UK happened under the rule of a Conservative government and in 1974 the Prime Minister of UK, Harold Wilson, wanted to hold a referendum on membership. The referendum was in 1975 and the result was to remain in the EEC. However, this can be seen as the first attempt of Eurosceptic movement within the UK (Pissarides 2017).

The UK has never been one of the greatest advocates of integration, similarly as the Nordic states, including Denmark. Both, UK and Denmark has joined the EC in 1973 and have been presented by researchers as an "odd couple in EC/EU politics" (Larsen 1999, p. 451). EC/EU has been a discussed topic for both countries and the institutional settings have been controversial since 1984. Policy of both countries has been often outside the thinking of the European mainstream. They are similar when it comes to their conservative attitude which has prevented them from the rapid integration, and it has often complied with these smaller EU members. According to opinion polls, for example Eurobarometer, the results have always been that the British and Danish societies are the most sceptical towards membership and according to other statistics, British and Danish have been always the least who characterized themselves

within a European identity and they preferred to be characterized as British / Danish (Larsen 1999, p. 455). There have been referendums on membership in both countries and both countries have not been “naturally” active part of the development of the membership (Hix & Hagemann & Frantescu 2016; Larsen 1999). For example, since 1993, Denmark has four opt – outs within the main areas of the EU treaties and since then, two referenda on the opt – outs have been held (Danish Parliament; Rosamond 2016) and both countries have in common the opt – out on euro (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018). As for now, in general, the countries share similar interests within many problem areas. For example, both countries support free trade, single market and competitiveness. Moreover, both countries are net – contributors to the EU budget and they have tried to decrease it “*and reduce their contributions by gaining rebates*” (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018).

Some of the member states of the EU are concerned when it comes to limitation of national sovereignty and it is becoming more of the subject of disputes. One of the consequences of this conflict is Brexit (Möller & Pardijs 2017). The exit of an economically strong member from the EU brings with it a wide range of political, economic and social contexts. Following a referendum on EU membership on June 23, 2016, and after the British Parliament approved the results of the referendum, the process of UK leaving the EU is scheduled at 11 pm UK time on Friday 29 March, 2019. Brexit negotiations started on 19 June, 2017 – one year after the referendum. The UK and the EU have provisionally agreed on three issues on 8 December, 2017 – on how much the UK owes the EU, so - called “divorce bill”, what will happen to UK citizens when they live in other countries within the EU and what will happen to EU citizens who are living in the UK and lastly, what happens to the Northern Ireland border. The negotiations when it comes to the future relations between the UK and the EU are just starting. The UK and EU would like to define the further relations when it comes to trade, travel and security within six months from May 2018. It is clear that significant and unpredictable changes await the UK and the whole EU (Hunt & Wheeler 2018).

## RESEARCH QUESTION

In the introduction, the first attempts of the EU integration, the similarities between Denmark and UK and the current situation of the negotiations in regard to UK leaving the EU have been presented. It brings us to the main focus of the thesis where it will be based on how Brexit

influences internal discussion and certain attitudes towards the development of European integration in Denmark. It will be interesting to examine what kind of discussions are ongoing in a small, economically developed country that has never been one of its ideological advocates for a rapid European integration in its history. There are many texts in which the position and reactions of big states, for example of France or Germany after Brexit, are discussed and there are not many texts which are exploring the position of smaller states like Denmark for example (De Gruyter 2018; Larsen 1999). Denmark and the discussions of political and social actors on a national level will be examined in a situation where the formation of their national preferences is weakened and influenced by the loss of their strong ally - UK. The research question is mentioned below.

*What are the reactions of political and social actors of Denmark after Brexit and how are they reflected in the discussions about the national preferences?*

The main focus will be based on the reactions of the Danish political and social actors to the results of the British referendum in 2016 and during the negotiation on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, concretely in years 2016 - 2018. It will be based on the analysis of the discussions of the Danish government and coalition political parties, the opposition parties and the Danish business circles. It is supposed that each actor follows their own interests and strive for their greatest influence on decision - making. The identification and respecting of the main political stream within the individual EU member states is a prerequisite for finding a way for further direction for the EU member states. It is expected that the debate on the theme of Brexit will be wide and reactions will be contradictory. The purpose of the thesis is not to assess the correctness or misstatement of the individual actors' actions. It will be a success if there can be identified the main thoughts that can possibly shape the attitude and the formation of national preferences of Denmark within the context of their EU membership in the future. The research question will be addressed by the theories of liberal intergovernmentalism and Euroscepticism. It is supposed that these theories reflect current events in EU countries in the best way. Liberal intergovernmentalism will be used in order to explain the reflections of the formation of national preferences in the reactions and Euroscepticism will be used in regard if it is reflected in the discussions of actors and if it affects the formation of national preferences, both after Brexit.



## LITERATURE REVIEW

Referendum about UK's withdrawal from the EU have raised great interest from researchers across the whole Europe. The withdrawal of an important EU member is a unique political and economic event and its future impacts are unknown. A number of articles is dealing with the impact on the strength of the British economy after their exit. There are, however, a number of comments that analyse the impact of UK's alliance, especially on the Nordic countries. Many texts are discussing the approach of the EU to Brexit and within this context, there are differences in approaches from the different countries of the EU. Opinions on the topic are not consistent and there can be found negative and on the contrary, positive comments towards Brexit and the EU after Brexit.

The status of the Nordic countries after Brexit is discussed in article from Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, called "Nordic Europe after the Brexit Vote". In the article, its stated that three Nordic countries, at the same time members of the EU – Denmark, Finland and Sweden have received the news about Brexit very pragmatically and with regrets, sharing the same reaction as two members of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway and Iceland. According to authors, the countries will lose a powerful ally in the future because they share similar political and economic interests as the UK. For all five countries, UK is one of the most important trading partners and except from Finland, all Nordic countries are not inside the euro area, same as for the UK. On the other hand, in the text is mentioned the rise of the right – wing populist parties in the Nordic countries and their positive approach to Brexit because their approach towards the EU is negative. For example, Timo Soini, former leader of the Euro – sceptic Finns Party and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Finland, stated that there is obviously something wrong within the EU when an important country as UK wants to leave the EU. However, according to pools in Nordic countries, its pointed out that overall, the interest of their citizens on leaving the EU is small "Only 18% (Denmark) and 29% (Sweden) say that they would support Leave" (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 2).

In regard with the process of negotiations with the UK and the Nordic countries, "*Helsinki, Copenhagen and Stockholm immediately began to focus on defining and protecting their own interests*" (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 2). It is stated that the Nordic countries will probably adopt a pragmatic approach within the negotiations and one of their biggest priorities will be to try to limit the damages when it comes to their trade relationship with the UK. With reference to the text, assumption of these countries is that during the negotiations about the UK's withdrawal,

discussed issues will be mainly economic issues because economies of these countries are closely linked to UK. The minority governments of Denmark and Sweden will have more difficult role in negotiating their preferences because they have to respect the interests of increasing *“influential Eurosceptic and anti-EU movements”* (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 2).

Until now, Denmark has stayed between the two great allies, UK as a country with similar Eurosceptic opinions and Germany as a powerful neighbour of Denmark. On December 2015, there has been a referendum in Denmark, in which a conversion of full opt – out into a partial opt – out was rejected. Authors mention that *“with its current opt-outs in key pillars of EU policy and an increasingly Eurosceptic party landscape, Denmark thus appears to be drifting back to the EU periphery”* (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 3). There is a possibility that Denmark, a small member state of the EU, by losing its powerful ally, will be at *“a risk of becoming more marginalized”* (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 3), mainly within the euro area. At the same time, it is mentioned that Denmark and the other Nordic countries should support more their opinion on the organization of the EU. According to the text, some politicians see positives in Brexit, hoping that the influence of Nordic countries in the EU will increase. For this to happen, *“the Nordic countries would have to intensify and expand their cooperation within and outside the EU”* (Etzold & Opitz 2016, p. 4). Authors mention that will not be easy to push the interest of Nordic countries towards further implementation of EU legislation (Etzold & Opitz 2016).

In the future, Brexit will cause changes in the whole EU and will change the balance of power in the EU, thus many texts are exploring the areas where major changes could appear. In the text from Patel & Reh called *“Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System”*, are discussed the economic interest of the EU and the political interests of the EU, similar topics as in the article from Christopher Pissarides, called *“Brexit: Implications for Europe”*. He is mentioning mainly the economic implications of Brexit and discussing further direction of the EU integration after Brexit.

There is a high risk that Brexit will cause a spill over effect and the Eurosceptic member countries *“might treat a generous deal as an invitation to press their own countries’ special status and/or exit. Politically, the EU should therefore avoid the precedent of easy withdrawal”* (Patel & Reh 2016, p. 2). In the text is mentioned that the Eurosceptic members, including Austria, Denmark and Poland, might gain strength for further bargaining by this action and France and Germany might put emphasis on the political issues over economic circumstances. There can appear a major change in the voting system within the EU. For now, there are two blocs – the Southern protectionist bloc (including France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and

Cyprus) and the Northern liberal bloc (including the UK, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and the Baltics). Without the UK, the weight of the liberal block would drop whilst the power of the protectionist bloc would increase. In the text, it is assumed that in case there will not be any changes in states' positions, it is possible that the EU might become less open without the UK. Brexit will also make changes in the European Parliament's party ideological composition and scene. It is mentioned that nearly 60 percent of the UK's 73 members of Parliament are currently on the side with centre - right and Eurosceptic groups, where Denmark is as well. After the withdrawal of UK, the left side will strengthen. It is assumed, that Brexit will strengthen Germany's position, displace alliances and it can strengthen or weaken smaller states. Smaller states might be afraid that Germany will gain too much power. When it comes to the main voting allies of the UK, they are Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. On the contrary, Germany is the country with the least same votes as the UK. According to the text, the worst case of Brexit would be if the rising Eurosceptic parties in countries like Denmark, Austria and Sweden, inspire themselves with the UK and hold their own referenda on the withdrawal from the EU. This might weaken the EU and lead to disintegration (Patel & Reh 2016).

On the other hand, in the text from Pissarides, he states that Brexit could be used as an opportunity to make reformations in the EU and benefit its members because for now, some of the actual institutional arrangements within the Eurozone are not beneficial for few member countries. He is more critical towards the EU and says that without further reforms, it can lead to other member states leaving the EU. He mentions that the reforms should be made within issues like *“political decision – making, fiscal and banking integration, and immigration policy”* (Pissarides 2017, p. 13). To be concrete, for example banking union is not complete and there is a need to of reformation. *“One aspect that needs reform is the lack of a true banking union. As of now, the banking union of member countries is incomplete”* (Pissarides 2017, p. 12). He states that the reform would not be possible with UK in the EU and that it is not surprising that UK has decided to leave EU as the first country because the relationship between UK and the EU has been complicated since the very beginning. Its mentioned that *“many decisions in the EU are reached in undemocratic ways”* (Pissarides 2017, p. 12) and that the EU should not blame only UK for their decision.

Another opinion at the organization of relations between the EU members after Brexit is offered by Caroline de Gruyter in the text called *“There is life for the EU after Brexit”*. She mentions that in other articles, it is usually discussed how Brexit will affect big states like France and

Germany and their possible future approach towards Brexit but she reminds that Brexit will mean re - establishing relations among smaller countries as well and that the small member states do not have enough attention in discussions. She also mentions that smaller countries will have to look for ways to stay in the centre of events. In particular, countries that have similar national preferences *“will have to rely more on coalition building, with a broader roster of partners, post-Brexit”* (De Gruyter 2018). EU representatives believe that political issues may unlock some of the disputed issues and that this is good opportunity to make necessary changes within the EU which have not been made yet. *“Brexit means losing capacity, because a large and influential country is leaving”* (De Gruyter 2018) but on the other hand, it is mentioned that Brexit can offer a capacity to act and leads to an improvement of the EU. She also mentions that northern allies, including the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, will lose approximately “12 percent of their voting power in Brussels without the UK, and southern states will gain prominence” (De Gruyter 2018) and it can be expected that politicians who have been sceptical about the EU so far will be forced to rethink their attitudes. *“Take Denmark, for example—if Copenhagen needs more partners in order to remain politically effective in Brussels, those partners will, of course, demand Danish support for their own political agendas in return”* (De Gruyter 2018). It is clear from the article that the development of EU countries' cooperation can happen in different ways and small EU member states, including Denmark, will be forced to look for new ways to promote their national preferences (De Gruyter 2018).

## METHODOLOGY

Part called 'methodology' will include the approach which will help to answer the research question. In this part, the qualitative research method which is relevant for the research, will be described. The chapter will include a paragraph about interpretivism, as for the epistemology part and constructivism, in regard to ontology, as the fundamental methodological approach within the qualitative research method. Furthermore, it will include a paragraph about the research design where the single case study design will be explained. The actors which have been chosen for the analysis will be presented in the part called “choice of actors”. Then, it will include a part about data collection and the method of analysis where the discourse theory and method will be explained. The last part will explain the choice of theory.

## RESEARCH STRATEGY

Research strategy is “*a general orientation to the conduct of social research*” (Bryman 2016, p. 32). Relevant for this project, the qualitative research will be used. For this research, emphasizing words is the most important.

## QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

The qualitative research is a research strategy which puts emphasis on the words, rather than on numbers. It places emphasis on the generation of theories and on the relation between theory and research. It refuses the norms of the natural scientific model and emphasises how individuals represent their social world. It is based on techniques which aim to describe and decode phrases of meaning within the existing phenomena in the social world and social reality (Carson et al. 2001). Furthermore, it sees social reality as continually changing “*property of individual's creation*” (Bryman 2016, p. 33) and is focusing mainly on the human elements. Qualitative research includes different research methods, for example participant observation, qualitative interviewing, language - based approaches which are discourse analysis and conversation analysis and last but not least the collection and analysis of texts and documents (Bryman 2016, p. 377 – 378).

The most important features in qualitative research are trustworthiness and authenticity in order to establish and evaluate the qualitative research. Trustworthiness consist from four criteria: credibility, where the findings must be credible; transferability, where the research should include a ‘thick description’ which can provide thoughts that there is a possibility of “*transferability of findings to other milieux*” (Bryman 2016, p. 384). The next is dependability, where is important to have “*complete records of all phases of the research process*” (Bryman 2016, p. 384) and finally, confirmability, where there must be clear that the researcher “*has acted in a good faith*” (Bryman 2016, p. 384) and that the researcher did not influence the conduct of the research and its findings (Bryman 2016).

## INTERPRETIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

Regarding to the qualitative research, the epistemological position of interpretivism will be used. Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, its origin, process and subject. It basically means “*what is known to be true*” (research-methodology.net) and what people understand to be knowledge. Within the epistemological position, interpretivism is in contrast with positivism. It focuses on subjective meanings and social actions and on certain details of situations, subjective meanings and motivation for these actions (research-methodology.net). The main purpose is to understand the social world which is based on the interpretation that comes from its participants. Interpretivist methodologies aim to “*achieve substantive meaning and understanding of how and why questions in relation to the phenomena under investigation*” (Carson et al. 2001, p. 67). The opinion here is that the main subject of the social sciences, which includes people and their institutions, is basically different from the subject of the natural science. Because of this, there is a need for a different approach of research procedure for the study of the social world. It must consider the disparateness of humans against the natural order. The main difference in the natural sciences and the social sciences is that “*the social reality has a meaning for a human beings and therefore a human action is meaningful*” (Bryman 2016, p. 27) It means that people are giving a meaning to their actions and to actions of other people. It is important for the social scientists to obtain access to the common – sense thinking of the people and in this regard to explain the human actions and the social world from their point of view. The research focuses on being concrete and specific and it concentrates itself on understanding and interpretation. Interpretivism methodologies are aiming to construct a theory as a result of the empirical comprehension so the theoretical part of the research must be carefully chosen and considered (Bryman 2016, p. 27, 375; Carson et al. 2001, p. 63).

Following the epistemological position, constructivism as the ontological consideration has been used. Ontology is basically a study of being and real knowledge. The main concern is whether the social subjects should be considered as objective subjects which have reality and the reality is outside the social actors, or whether they should be considered as social constructions which are based on observations and actions of social actors (Bryman 2016; research-methodology.net). Constructivism denotes that “*social phenomena are not only produced through social interaction but are in a constant state of revision*” (Bryman 2016, p. 29). Constructivism is explaining how knowledge is produced and this is explained by the social relations between individual actors. Human meanings are explained as frameworks which are

constructed by people and are not reflecting the reality. Within constructivism, the language is important. The reality, world and the culture is reflected by the language and people are actively helping to create and construct it through interaction and how they talk about it and write it. The social order and the reality are in a constant state of creation and continuous reconstruction. (Morgan; Bryman 2016, p. 29, 30). Constructionism describes that the categories which are people using so they can fully understand the world, are in reality social products. The meanings can differ by the time and place and the social world and its categories are not external but are constituted in and through interaction (Bryman 2016, p. 30).

## RESEARCH DESIGN

Specific research question which is deducted from the theoretical interests, will guide the research design and the collection of data. According to the research question, the reactions of political and social actors of Denmark and the formation of their national preferences after Brexit is known will be examined. The single case of Denmark has been chosen, in order to make more intensive research and broader analysis on a larger sample (Bryman 2016; Gerring 2007).

### *SINGLE CASE STUDY DESIGN*

In general, the case study can consist from more cases which is called multiple case study. Nevertheless, in this kind of study, the analysis cannot be broad and intensive. Thus, the basic case study of a single case has been chosen in order successfully answer the research question. The case study is aiming for a detailed and more complex analysis of a single and unique case, where the uniqueness of the case can be linked with certain location, such as organization or community or to be more concrete, it can be nation – state, revolution, person, election or political party observed in time or in a certain time span (Gerring 2004; Willis 2014). However, location itself is not the main object of an analysis but can provide a broader perspective when it comes to the collection of data and the most important is the sample from which the data for the analysis were collected. Case study is often used in the qualitative methods, often based on the observation and interviewing while leading to the detailed analysis of a single case (Bryman 2016). The advantages of single case study are that it can provide particularities of individual cases and empirically – rich description of specific phenomena and specific case. As for the

limitations of the single case study, authors often criticise that the single case study can include freer form of research which might lead to the absence of systematic procedures. Another limitation can be concerns within the reliability and replicability of different forms of single case study analysis, however, this is often associated with the critique of qualitative research methods in general (Willis 2014). The design of the single case in regard with the thesis is the critical case. Critical case “*is testing well - formulated theory*” (Yin 1994) Within the theory, there has been specified certain propositions as well as the circumstances within which the propositions should be true. The single case can be used to explain whether the theory’s propositions are “*correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant*” (Yin 1994).

### *CHOICE OF ACTORS*

The aim of the thesis is to analyse the reactions of the Danish government and the coalition political parties, opposition parties and the business circles after Brexit is known. The qualitative data will be provided by political and social actors. The political actors include policy makers who have an impact on the formation and execution of policies which effect society (Wolfsfeld 2015). They will include the Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen. In this regard, the official statements which are used from the official homepage of the Prime Minister’s Office, are direct translations from Danish to English. They will represent the reactions of the government and coalition parties. The reactions of opposition parties are represented by the actors from the populist and Eurosceptic party, Danish People’s Party, namely it will be Erik Høgh-Sørensen, a Danish People's Party's parliament member; President of the Danish People's Party, Kristian Thulesen Dahl and Søren Espersen - Danish People's Party foreign affairs spokesperson, followed by reaction from the political spokesperson from the Red – Green Alliance, Perille Skipper as from the furthest left party in the Danish Parliament (Deloy 2015). Social actors are considered to be those who are capable of influencing preferences. They will include actors representing the business circles and the discussed statements will be from Frank Oland, chief economist group for the Danish Agriculture and Food Council; the agriculture advocacy organization Landbrug og Fødevarer (L & F) and Geert Laier Christensen, deputy-director at the Danish Chamber of Commerce. In regard with reactions to different problem areas, this part will include actors from previous parts but moreover, it will include statements from more political and social actors, namely the Danish



Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen and Minister of Finance, Kristian Jensen. The next actors will be Brian Mikkelsen, Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs and Morten Østergaard, leader of the Social Liberal Party. Furthermore, other actors will be represented by Ulrik Nørgaard, director of the Danish Bankers Association (Finansrådet) and Steen Nielsen, chief of labour policy.

The relevant statements are from 2016 until now, after the UK's results of the referendum on the withdrawal from the EU have been known. They actors have been chosen since they are the most relevant actors in order to sufficiently answer the research question and provide the best illustration of the reactions of Denmark towards Brexit within the chosen areas of research. The actors are considered to obtain certain level of influence on the formation of national preferences. From the nature of their position, they enter the national debate and represent interests of a certain groups.

## DATA COLLECTION

Qualitative data will provide better understanding of the reactions of the Danish political representation to Brexit. Qualitative data will include the collection of speeches and direct quotations of statements from the Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, retrieved from the official homepage of the Prime Minister's Office. Then, other statements are retrieved from the internet newspapers, for example British online newspapers Independent and Reuters followed by The Local and CPH Post Online which is newspaper providing Danish news in English nationally and internationally, followed by the international website called Sputnik International. The sources are considered to be current, authentic and accurate since there are used direct quotations of the actors. The sources will be from the years 2016 until now since the referendum on Brexit took a place and became relevant. There is a limitation which can affect the collection of data and it is that the collected texts are only texts in English which might limit the work significantly and there need to be considered the audience in the internet newspapers since it is for the English speakers. The purpose of the thesis is to identify and analyse the reactions on Brexit in Denmark and their impact on the formation of national preferences. The purpose of the thesis is not to assess the correctness or misstatement of the individual actors' actions. Thus, the research will be successful if there can identified the main thoughts and opinions that shape the attitude and reflect the national preferences of Denmark after the referendum on Brexit.

## THE CHOICE OF THEORY

In order to successfully answer the research question and explain the Denmark's reactions towards Brexit, liberal intergovernmentalism and Euroscepticism have been chosen. Liberal intergovernmentalism consists from three steps – the formation of national preferences, substantive bargaining and institutional choice in relation with the international cooperation (Wiener & Diez 2009). The thesis will explore the first step of the liberal intergovernmentalism and explore how the national preferences and interests are being discussed in Denmark after Brexit has been known. As mentioned in the literature review, UK is important trading partner for Denmark, thus it can be said that liberal intergovernmentalism is relevant theory because the state leaders will have to be able to respond to new opportunities and constraints coming from the loss of an economic partner and ally. Liberal intergovernmentalism describes the process of shaping national preferences and their application at international level and it is believed that this theory can explain the principle of the statements of the relevant actors. Euroscepticism has been chosen since the UK and Denmark are known to share similar conservative attitude which has prevented them from further integration. These two countries have always been the most sceptical towards the integration and both countries share opt – outs (Larsen 1999; Moravcsik 1993). The chosen typology of Euroscepticism from Sørensen allows to include individual statements into the context.

## THEORY

In the following part, the theoretical framework for the project will be explained. The main theory of the thesis will liberal intergovernmentalism and its main concepts and the secondary theory will be Euroscepticism. The idea of liberal intergovernmentalism is that countries chose to integrate because of certain advantages and small states, for example Denmark, are acting in the same way as the big states and their interests and actions are as important for the integration process as are the interests and actions of the big states (Wiener & Diez 2009).

## LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

Liberal intergovernmentalism has its basis in social science theory and it is aiming to “*modernize integration theory by drawing on general political science theory*”. (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 67). It draws on the traditional knowledge about the European integration, especially neofunctionalism but from an ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’ as well. It explains integration as a product of growing economic interdependence and it can be summed up as “*a liberal theory of how economic interdependence influences national interests*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 474). Liberal intergovernmentalism (hereafter ‘LI’) is putting the knowledge into more united context. In comparison with traditional knowledge of European integration, LI is specifying the reasons of the behaviour of certain actors, states and leaders and helps to predict specific behaviour from their interaction. The relationship between state and society has important influence on state’s behaviour in world politics (Wiener & Diez 2009). It is a theory which aims to interpret how the regional evolution has evolved and it is basically a framework, connection of many theories and factors into one logical approach which is explaining the path of integration over time. It is stated that LI rejects a sole cause explanation and is emphasizing that at least three theories aligned in a multistage model should explain integration. LI is “*multi – causal but remains simple*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 68) and is based on the assumption that integration cannot be explained by only one factor. The propositions of LI aim to simplify EU politics and emphasizing the necessary factors.

LI has two basic concepts about politics. First concept is that states are having a role of actors. In regard to this, the EU can be examined by seeing states as the critical actors within “*a context of anarchy*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 68). States are reaching their goals through “*integovernmental negotiation and bargaining*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 68), instead of through making political decisions coming from certain authorities. One of the regimes for policy co – ordination is the EC. National security is not seen here as a main motivation of the states and the state identities and preferences are not united and the international institutions are not negligible. LI is recognizing the present fact about institutions, including the EU, that the member states are having the exquisite “*decision - making power and political legitimacy*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 68).

The second concept is that the states are rational. States as actors are estimating the alternative results of actions and choosing the one which can maximize their benefits. There is an agreement within which the international institutions cooperate and are established. It can be

said that it is a “*collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 68). The main factors for forming national preferences are the costs and benefits of economic interdependence (Moravcsik 1993, p. 480) and states chose to come together and create common institutions. The choice of working together on the international level can be explained as a framework with three phases. The first one is defining the preferences of the states which are influenced by the “*the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 517) or by certain commercial advantages. Second phase is based on the bargaining power of the states and the outcomes of this bargaining and third phase creates institutions in order to provide security to the outcomes. LI is combination of more theories of integration. It is liberal theory for the formation of the national preferences, a bargaining theory for the negotiations and a functional theory for the institutionalization. The thesis is based on the first phase, national preferences which will be described in the end of the LI part. Before that, substantive bargains and institutional choice as second and third phases of LI will be described briefly (Wiener & Diez 2009).

#### *SUBSTANTIVE BARGAINS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE*

States are aiming to reach benefits and to fulfil their national preferences within cooperation but at the same time, they have to make a decision on how the benefits will be divided among the states. There can appear conflicts within the collective and individual interests of the states and though bargaining can appear within this context. According to LI within the EU context, an important factor is the “*asymmetrical interdependence*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 71) which is unequal partition of benefits of concrete agreements. Some actors do not need special and specific agreements and they can threaten other actors by not wanting to cooperate with them. They can force the “weaker” actors to make concessions and since they have greater information about the preferences of other states, they can “*manipulate the outcome to their advantage*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 71). The negotiations depend on the “*bargaining power of actors*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 71). According to Moravcsik, actors who have gained the most when it comes to the economic interest, were also compromising the most. On the other hand, the actors who gained the least were using more power and were more demanding when it comes to their conditions. (Wiener & Diez 2009).

The last phase of LI draws from 'neoliberal institutionalism' and international institutions play an important role when it comes to solid international cooperation. LI is often offering statements which usually belong to the neofunctionalist theory. It says that states are delegating competences to supranational organizations on purpose and there is pressure on governments to simplify economic cooperation through institutionalization in order to increase the efficiency of inter-state negotiations and to contribute to reaching consensus on issues that are in line with their national position. Those organizations are able to act against the preferences of the governments and institutions and are able to include unwanted consequences which are under "*conditions of uncertainty*" (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 72). However, institutions are able to reduce the transaction costs for further negotiations on concrete issues and they are able to provide important information which can reduce the uncertainty of the states when it comes to preferences and behaviour of other states. In the end, it helps to reach collectively better outcome. By transferring their sovereignty to international institutions, governments eliminate problems from the different influence of internal politics (Wiener & Diez 2009).

### *NATIONAL PREFERENCES*

National preferences are the first phase of LI where the state has a role of a single actor and in general, it unites the national preferences of the state into a comprehensive national attitude. States are primarily governed by their national preferences and state priorities are determined by politicians who are in charge of the national governments. It assumes that the states are rational but on the other hand, the preferences of the states are not fixed. The means by which national preferences can be achieved changes over time and the preferences changes from state to state as well because countries vary in location, size, mineral wealth, economic maturity, population literacy, etc. Things which were working a few years ago may not be able to work today because of the changing dynamics within the states and the importance of governments as agents of national producers is growing. Thus, Moravcsik sees European integration as a series of rational elections of state leaders who respond to the opportunities and constraints arising from the economic interests of powerful domestic subjects, the relative power of the state and the role of transnational institutions (Rosamond 2000, p. 131-144; Moravcsik 1993, p. 483; Wiener & Diez 2009).

According to Moravcsik, in regard to the European integration, economic interests were a key force in creating unified national interests. The preferences emerged from conflicts on a

domestic level in specific fractions. States followed integration because they wanted to ensure certain advantages, for example commercial advantages. Moravcsik stated that geopolitical interests played an important role in the European integration as well, stating that “*geopolitics and ideology had an important secondary impact*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 70). National preferences of the states are being formulated, while it is being assumed that even in small states, economic interests are a key force in creating unified national interests. National interests are products of interest group preference within the state. Interest groups include business unions and associations that transfer their interest in economic prosperity through state and political parties to public space. Basically, “*groups articulate preferences, governments aggregate them*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 483). The relation between society and the government is supposed to be “*one of the principal - agents, societal principals delegate power to (or otherwise constrain) governmental agents*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 483). The main interest of governments is to remain in the office and in democratic societies, it requires support from the “*voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 483). Their opinions and views are transferred through internal institutions and practices of political representation and within this process, national interests which states bring to negotiations on an international level, emerge. It can be assumed that national preferences are generated from certain conflicts which are happening on the grounds of the state. Thus, understanding the specific domestic societal interests is the main factor for the analysis of the strategic interaction between states (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 78; Moravcsik 1993).

From a long - term point of view, there are only two natural national interests. They are security and prosperity. Security is a foreign policy and an internal political dimension. There is a need to secure the borders against a possible external attacker, while ensuring national stability. Prosperity is a relative category and can be seen more as a change in time than an absolute value (Moravcsik 1993).

LI is a theory which works in a best way when social priorities are well defined and specific. LI is interpreting that national interests, which concentrate on specific issues in regard to interdependence, should have better results if the “*societal pressures*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 76) on national governments are certain and well organized. The pressures “*reflect not only the expected magnitude of gains and losses, but also the uncertainty and risk involved*” (Moravcsik 1993, p. 487). On the contrary, national interests are not well predictable the more uncertain and diverse is a policy of the state and the more uncertain are the results of a choice. According to LI, “*the variance of outcomes should be correlated with the underlying*

*uncertainty in the circumstances being analysed*” (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 76). According to the text, the costs and benefits are distributed differently in different policy areas. Within the EU, national interests are most predictable in agriculture and trade, in case economy is constant. On the other hand, national interests are less predictable in economic areas like monetary policy because *“economic knowledge is more uncertain and the distribution of costs and benefits more diffuse”* (Wiener & Diez 2009, p. 76, 77; Moravcsik 1993)

## EUROSCEPTICISM

Euroscepticism has been chosen in order to explore, whether or not and possibly to which extend are the national preferences in reactions in Denmark influenced by Euroscepticism after Brexit and whether the Euroscepticism is put aside when there can be certain advantages coming from the European integration.

Euroscepticism is not ideology in the style of great ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism. It has no consistent thesis and does not try to describe and explain a coherent system. The term ‘Euroscepticism’ does not have a detailed definition and it is more about a series of ideas that determine the boundaries in which Eurosceptic attitudes are placed and moving. The term ‘sceptic’ *“denotes a member of one of the ancient Greek schools of philosophy, or more specifically that of Pyrrho, who believed that real knowledge of things is impossible”* (Euractiv 2015). Generally, the term Euroscepticism *“has been employed as a generic label that defines a negative point of view towards the European Union”* (Forster 2002, p. 1 – 2) and Eurosceptic are citizens or politicians who are sceptical and critical towards the union. They say that it takes away power from their national government and it is a threat to their national sovereignty (Euractiv 2015).

There does not exist a unified definition of Euroscepticism because its manifestations and forms are different in each country. The rejection of the EU is based on different national traditions, history of countries and the position of the state in Europe. For example, British Euroscepticism can be expressed in other way and Eurosceptic parties have different power there than in Scandinavia and has different political power for example in France as it has different power in Denmark, which is a representative of a small sovereign state. Taking an example of France, Euroscepticism here is coming more from certain detachment rather than from huge contradictions. Comparing it with the case of the UK, UK has never been the biggest supporters

of integration in the history (Euractiv 2015; Larsen 1999). Lastly, Euroscepticism is a response to the development of EU integration. It will not have much room for existence without certain progress in integration (Sørensen 2008).

### *CONTENT OF THE TERM EUROSCEPTICISM*

Difficulties in defining the goals of Euroscepticism are sometimes replaced by negative definition. There are circumstances which Euroscepticism rejects. They conclude:

- a) Criticism of the EU for failing to defend the national interests of a particular state. Although, it is obvious that the EU cannot, by its definition, defend only one national interest,
- b) the criticism of some particular common policies promoted by the EU,
- c) resistance to the EU enlargement, which is often linked to efforts to protect the national labour market,
- d) criticism of undemocratic decision - making, where in some cases it is possible to reach an EU decision by outvoting some members (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2003).

Euroscepticism can be used either as a basic ideological tool or as a tactical tool. Paul Taggart and A. Szcerbiak conducted a research on Eurosceptic parties in Europe. They divided political parties into ideological supporters and tactical advocates. Political parties whose ideology is Euroscepticism are convinced that integration is dangerous, and in politics, they are trying to either try to step out of the EU or slow down integration. Another political parties use the ideas of Euroscepticism rather as a tactical instrument, or as a tool for making the voters more interested. There are more areas of domestic politics which are influenced by the EU decisions and political parties are forced to respond. It is important whether the party is in opposition or in the government, what is its position in the party spectrum, etc. These parties are willing to adjust their sceptical position according to certain situations (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2003).

### *CLASSIFICATION OF EUROSCEPTICISM*

Taggart and Szcerbiak classified Euroscepticism to hard and soft Euroscepticism. In general, in hard Euroscepticism, *“there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership”* (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002. p. 7). In general, political party rejects the



integration process as a whole, or is very negatively defining itself in a relation to what has been achieved so far in European integration and there can be proposals of withdrawal of their “own” country from the EU, or very extensive transfer of competences from the transnational level to the level of the national states (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002).

Soft Euroscepticism “*is where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU*” (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002. p. 7). There is not a fundamental resistance to a European integration project, but rather a negative reaction and a negative rhetoric of a political party to one of the outcomes of European integration and it is basically a “*scepticism about the way European integration is currently developing*” (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002, p. 7). These, who support the current form of the EU integration and are against any further integration, are considered as soft Eurosceptic as well (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2002).

Another classification of Euroscepticism was made by Catharina Sørensen, retrieved from the source “Sørensen 2008”. Her classification builds on the previous authors. In her classification, she does not refer to the opinions of political parties, but mainly to the public opinion and to the opinions of the population. Furthermore, she develops the classification of hard and soft Euroscepticism in such way that she looks at them from the point of view of the economical utility, from the point of view of influence on national sovereignty, from the point of view of the possibility of promoting democracy (ideology) and from a social point of view (Sørensen 2008).

Features of the four types within the soft Euroscepticism with a broader description:

Economic Euroscepticism has purely economic character and it draws from the question, whether citizens of a concrete country perceive or do not perceive economic benefits resulting from European cooperation. Within the soft Euroscepticism, there is dissatisfaction “*with the output from the EU*” (Sørensen 2008, p. 87).

Sovereignty – based Euroscepticism shows that citizens agree with the undeniable economic benefits of integration, nevertheless, they say that the national states should continue to be the cornerstone of European cooperation. They are against any shifting of sovereignty to transnational level and strengthening the powers of multinational EU institutions. There is scepticism towards developments which would lead to a closer union (Sørensen 2008).

Democratic Euroscepticism - Citizens point to democratic deficit of the functioning of the EU. They feel that their voice is not being heard on the European level and they are critical to the

current scheme of the EU. For example, they demand to strengthen the role of the European Parliament, or the emergence of other, directly elected institutions, which would have greater legitimacy for citizens (Sørensen 2008).

Social Euroscepticism - this type of Euroscepticism has de facto a political nature. Citizens compare the political - economic model which Europe promotes, with the model to which they are used to from their nation states, or which they prefer. There are two fundamental traditions – social vs liberal. The main feature is that it criticizes the EU's ideological orientation and that it includes "*too little social Europe*" (Sørensen 2008, p. 87). In general, soft version is a weakening of rejecting reasons (Sørensen 2008).

Sørensen also specifies Hard Euroscepticism for all four types. Its proponents completely reject the EU in all the features, that have been listed in soft variants, because of the economic loss of integration, due to threatening the national integrity, due to undemocratic principles of EU decision - making or because of disagreement with the ideology of integration. Overall, integration is unacceptable to them (Sørensen 2008).

## OPERATIONALIZATION OF THEORIES

As a theoretical basis of the work, liberal intergovernmentalism and Euroscepticism within the framework of Catharina Sørensen has been chosen. The theories have been chosen on the assumption that both have the same basis - a liberal point of view on the world, and that their view can clearly explain political action on a national and international level.

The fundamental actors within the liberal point of view, as one of the basic theoretical approaches in international relations, are social actors and groups formed by them, both at the level of society and at the level of the state. Liberalism also assumes that the nature of international relations is changing. International relations are undergoing a transformation and within it, relations between states are evolving. Assessing the development of these relationships is not a simple task. It is necessary to do a systematic classification of the problem and evaluation of its parts. The chosen theories will be implemented as follows (Moravcsik 1998).

Liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that international decision - making takes place on three levels. In the first phase, national preferences are formulated, the second is the substantive

bargaining by the government at EU level, and in the third stage, international institutions to which some national competencies are transferred, are established (Moravcsik 1993). Relevant for the thesis, the first level, the formulation of the national preferences will be examined. The official reports of the negotiating team do not fully allow the identification of Denmark's position on the issue and there has been no international institutionalization of the problematic of Brexit for now. The main actors of the first phase are political and social actors, i. e. political parties that present the interests of citizens and business circles. This phase takes place within the framework of domestic political negotiations. Interest groups, i. e. business associations and unions, promote mainly their economic interests. The task of the state is to unite the preferences of domestic interest groups into a consistent national stance that satisfies most actors on the domestic political and economic scene.

The reaction of actors to Brexit can be observed from several perspectives. Relevant for the thesis, reactions immediately after the announcement of the outcome of the British referendum and the reactions with a certain time span will be examined. The result of the referendum on Brexit was surprising and the immediate response of politicians is a good illustration of how actors are thinking about the issue of leaving UK from the EU. What will be examined as well is, whether the attitude of politicians evolves or varies within time period. If a change of opinions within time period is detected, the motivation for this change will be explored. It will be explored whether the opinion on Britain as a long - term political and business partners is changing, and how much is discussed the Danish referendum on leaving the EU.

In order to identify the national preferences, reactions of relevant actors will be divided into parts. After every part with the reactions, there will be a table with an overview of priorities of actors with three main views. Dividing the analysis into sub - questions will provide better analysis of the problem and understand its structure. This division will allow to find out which questions are more emphasized and which questions are neglected. Moravcsik's concept of national interest will be used. According to him, it is possible to discuss national interest from an economic and geopolitical point of view. The geopolitical view includes both foreign policy issues and national security issues (Moravcsik 1998).

An internationally political view:

It will be explored how the relationship with the EU and with UK as a political ally is developing and what are the opinions when it comes to negotiations of a treaty on the UK's

withdrawal from the EU. Furthermore, the idea of Danish politicians on political cooperation with UK after Brexit will be explored.

#### Economic View:

It will be assessed how is perceived Brexit as an economic problem for the Danish economy, what economic consequences are expected and what measures are proposed by the government. Furthermore, reactions of the Danish business circles for which UK is an important trading partner will be evaluated and the extent to which the Danish social actors consider Brexit as an economic opportunity will be examined.

#### Security point of view:

This part will examine the emphasis which is placed on external security, i. e. on the fear of an external enemy and on internal security, particularly on immigrants.

After, it will be explored whether or not and possibly to which extend is the national interest, which is formed by the interaction of Danish actors, influenced by the Eurosceptic vision on the European integration. Even a slight of doubt or disagreement with the EU as a whole or with the individual areas of European integration will be considered as Euroscepticism. The approach from Catharina Sørensen has been chosen as the theoretical basis for classifying Euroscepticism (Sørensen 2004).

The degree of Euroscepticism will be evaluated within the statements of political and social actors while they are formulating national interest. It will be distinguished whether Euroscepticism is part of the Danish national character or whether Euroscepticism is triggered by some EU decisions and whether the formation of national preferences is influenced by Euroscepticism. The evaluation will be made on the basis of the analysis of individual statements. The assessment of Euroscepticism within the Danish political scene, and in particular, its division into individual types, will allow to accurately formulate the basic characteristics of Danish interest with the EU and UK in relation to Brexit.

## INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS

Introduction to analysis will be divided into two parts because in regard with the second chosen theory, Euroscepticism, it is important to explore the history of Denmark in the EU and trace if there have been any Eurosceptic attempts in the past or not. Then, it is necessary to make a

basic orientation among the Danish political parties which will provide broader knowledge which will be needed in order to understand the events on the political scene after the British referendum. The factors which define preferences of the parties and their relevance to integration within the EU need to be described.

### *HISTORY OF THE DANISH EU MEMBERSHIP AND MANIFESTATIONS OF EUROSCEPTICISM*

Following the World War II, Denmark preferred cooperation with the northern countries instead of close economic and political cooperation with the Western Europe. The reason why they were not interested in joining the newly established ECSC in the 1950s was the economic dependency on the agricultural sector and strong economic and historical ties to the other Scandinavian states as well as to the UK. In the 1950s, however, the Danish economy experienced serious structural problems and a difficult transition from primary agricultural production to industry. Economic problems and political dependence on the main export partner (UK) led Denmark to repeatedly submit<sup>1</sup> and subsequently protest the withdrawal of applications for membership of the European Communities in the 1960s (Larsen 1999).

Denmark entered ECSC in October 1973, after successful negotiations and referendum. It has joined ECSC together with UK and Ireland. Throughout the accession negotiations and throughout the Cold War, Denmark has a typical sceptical attitude towards further integration. The second typical feature is a full cooperation with UK. The reasons for this close cooperation were both economic reasons and, above all, the fear of a loss of their national sovereignty (CVCE.eu 2016; Larsen 1999).

The changes in the attitudes of the main Danish political parties when it comes to integration did not take place until the late 1980s. The need for further European cooperation gradually became more up to date and the political elites considered it necessary. European cooperation was seen as an effective means of promoting national interests and gaining international influence. The loss of sovereignty, which is associated with integration, has been considered less significant at that time. The economic benefit of EU membership was considered as a priority (Larsen 1999, p. 457 - 462).

---

<sup>1</sup> Denmark expressed interest in membership in 1961 for the first time. De Gaulle's veto in 1963 and in 1967 prevented the entry of Great Britain, which led Denmark to an immediate end to the negotiations. The opening of accession talks did not end until 1972 (Pissarides 2017).

In the early 1990s, there were discussions on the version of the Maastricht Treaty within the EU member states. The proposal included a number of federal elements, such as the introduction of the single currency, cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs, or the establishment of a common foreign and security policy. Denmark did not agree with these restrictive conditions, nevertheless, they were included in the text of the treaty (Adler-Nissen 2014).

The proposed text of the Maastricht Treaty was approved in 1992 by Members of the Folketing. According to the Danish Constitution, it was followed by a referendum which was held on 2<sup>nd</sup> June, 1992 and should approve the approved treaty. It was a great surprise for politicians and for the whole EU that the treaty was denied by Danish citizens. Therefore, ratification of the contract was rejected. The rejection of the EU Treaty within the Danish referendum has triggered political activity on both, the Danish political scene and at the EU level. On 30<sup>th</sup> October 1992, Denmark submitted to the member states (Edinburgh summit 12/1992) the final text entitled "Denmark in Europe". Then, on the basis of the submitted text, Denmark was later granted derogations from the EU Treaty, referred to as opt-outs (Miles 1996).

The treaty, which contained exemptions from obligations for Denmark, was eventually approved in the second referendum held on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1993 (Miles 1996). The Edinburgh Agreement also stipulated that any future revision of the exceptions must always be the subject of a referendum. Exceptions consist of the abolition of the obligation to participate in the common defence policy, furthermore, the exception within the cooperation in the field of Justice and Home affairs, the exception from the obligation to adopt a common currency (EURO) and the exception of the definition of the EU citizenship (Hansen 2002).

### *THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SCENE IN DENMARK*

Parliamentary elections in 2015 has changed the political situation of Denmark. Next to the powerful political parties, Dansk Folkeparti, which is significantly anti - European, was the second strongest. Following these parliamentary elections, the Liberals' minority government, supported by the Liberal Alliance, the Conservatives and the Danish People's Party ruled. In November 2016, this government has been replaced by the coalition government of the Denmark's Liberal Party, the Liberal Alliance and the Conservatives. The Danish People's Party was in opposition (Deutsche Welle 2016). Parties are careful when it comes to their

criticism of the EU. Instead, they are trying to highlight economic advantages. At the same time, they claim that Danish national interest take precedence over interests of the EU (Wivel 2014).

The Denmark's Liberal Party (19,5%)<sup>2</sup>, the Liberal Alliance (7,5%) and the People's Conservatives Party (3,4%) are conservative parties, center-right, who understand the advantage of Denmark's membership in the EU. The Danish People's Party (21,1%) with its program belong to the Eurosceptic populist parties. Right-wing populist party highlights national interests and the protection of the population against the negative effects of globalization and integration. It criticizes the EU for the loss of national sovereignty in terms of migration. The Danish Social Democrats (26,3%) is a typical Social Democratic party. Similar to it is the Socialist People's Party (4,2%) with an emphasis on environmental issues. Unity List - Red-Green Alliance (7,8%) is coming from the communist ideology and it prioritises worker's rights and the environment. The Danish Social-Liberal Party (4,6%) is once again left party (Deloy 2015; The Danish Parliament 2015).

Within the context of the party system of the Nordic countries, it was possible to talk about the so-called Scandinavian five-party model for a long time. It has consisted of Communist parties, Social Democrats, Agrarians, Liberals and Conservatives. When it comes to the attitude to the European integration, conservatives, social democrats and liberals have been in favour to the European integration. On the other hand, the central (former agrarian) parties, the post-communist, the far-right, and the Greens were sceptical about the EU (Raunio 2007, p. 193). Following the success of the Greens and the far right-wing populist parties, this model has changed (Aylott et al., 2013, p. 153). The left-wing parties are increasingly supporting the European integration and on the contrary, the right-wing parties become more sceptical ones (Deloy 2015).

## ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to create a "inventory" of the preferences reflected in discussions of political and social actors. From these preferences, depending on the strength of the actors, the national preferences will be formulated. It can be expected that these national preferences

---

<sup>2</sup> The figures in brackets indicate the percentage of votes obtained in the 2015 parliamentary elections (Deloy 2015).

will be promoted in the near future by the Danish Government on international level on variety of occasions.

To identify the national interest after Denmark has learned about Brexit will be explored from two levels within the reactions of actors. The first level will examine the reaction of political and social actors to Brexit. Actors include the government, respectively political parties that form a government coalition; opposition political parties, and business interest groups. The immediate reaction to the published results of Brexit, but also the position that actors take over time will be explored. The second part of identification of national interest that will be analysed are the opinions of political and social actors on chosen areas of problems. The interest will be on which topics are being emphasized in discussions, how they are solved and whether there are different opinions of actors. The evaluation of individual thematic sections will be done from an international political, economic and security point of view which has been described in the previous chapter called "Operationalization of theories". This will allow to evaluate preferences social and political actors in the concept of Moravcsik's model.

Moravcsik's model discusses national interest from a geopolitical point of view and from an economic point of view where he explores whether economic or political factors determine state policies. To remind, geopolitical interpretation puts security issues on the top of the hierarchy of national interests. Geopolitical interests include a fear of losing national sovereignty. So fear of disturbing territorial integrity, whether militarily or ideologically. Economic interests emphasize profits and losses from mutual trade or capital flows or fiscal redistribution (Moravcsik 1998).

#### *REACTIONS OF DANISH GOVERNMENT AND COALITION POLITICAL PARTIES TO BREXIT*

The result of the British referendum about leaving the EU was unexpected in Denmark. In the previous years, Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, was a great advocate of the EU reforms proposed by David Cameron in the European Council in Brussels before the vote on Brexit. For example, Ben Rosamond writes: "*David Cameron is not without allies amongst his fellow heads of government meeting at the European Council in Brussels, but it would be hard to find a staunch supporter of the UK's negotiating position than Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the Prime Minister of Denmark* " (Rosamond 2016). Immediately after the announcement of the results of the British referendum on 24 June 2016, Prime Minister Rasmussen (Venstre) issued



the following statement on the election result in Great Britain. He stated that the British referendum is a sovereign decision of UK and Denmark rationally respects it. "*We must respect the choice made by the majority of the British population*" (Rasmussen 2016). Simultaneously, he expressed that he regrets the outcome of the referendum and in the next sentence, he follows up on a political - economic topic when he says: "*At the same time, I strongly regret the outcome - both for Europe and for Denmark*" (Rasmussen 2016). Britain is historically a close ally for Denmark in both the political and the economic spheres. This was in the past as well as in the context of the accession of Denmark and the UK to the EU in 1973. Denmark's political views were always very similar to the UK, therefore it is understandable that the Danish government is striving to keep the UK close to the EU (Larsen 1999). "*It is my hope that Great Britain wants to retain close relations with the EU*" (Rasmussen 2016) said Rasmussen. It is in interest of Denmark that UK has the best possible relation to the EU after they leave because it would be positive for Denmark as well. According to LI, states are behaving rationally while defining their preferences. Their preferences are influenced by "*the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence*" (Moravcsik 1993, p. 517). In this regard, mainly economic relations between the UK and EU will be important for Denmark.

In another sentence, Rasmussen declares that Denmark is considering itself as a member of the EU and that membership gives Denmark greater opportunities to influence the situation. "*The result of the British referendum does not in any way change the fact that Denmark belongs to the EU. The EU is Denmark's best opportunity to influence the world around us. We can do some things better on our own, but we are stronger together*" (Rasmussen 2016). Denmark is aware of their sovereignty but they are also aware, that the EU membership brings them more benefits. Denmark's geopolitical orientation to the EU is quite natural. As a small developed state, which is largely dependent on international trade, it needs a stable market and strong partners. The economic justification is clearly confirmed by the sentence: "*Denmark and the Danish economy are heavily dependent on the European community*" (Rasmussen 2016). Rasmussen sees no other future for Denmark than as part of the EU, meaning in good or bad times. "*The EU is the best way to have a say in this world we belong to, in good times and in bad times*" (Sputnik International 2016), said Rasmussen to the Danish newspaper Berlingske, emphasizing that Danish economy is deeply dependant on the EU and it is stronger with the EU than if Denmark would be outside of the EU. The issue of the referendum on Denmark leaving the EU rally Rasmussen clearly denies. "*We belong to the EU and I am not operating on [the*

*belief] that we should have a referendum on that basic question”* (Samuels 2016). The benefits of economic interdependence form the national preferences in this case.

Denmark expresses its dissatisfaction with some of the negative statements that have emerged among EU members in recent years. Rasmussen has concerns over the spread of Euroscepticism and encourages EU officials to take this seriously. *“The outcome of the last three referenda in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark calls for reflection. They reflect a scepticism which is widespread in other European countries too”* (Rasmussen 2016). At the same time, he indicates which circumstances may be the cause of Eurosceptic moods. In particular, it is too much intervention of the EU into the domestic questions of states and it is negatively perceived in a number of member states (Möller & Pardijs 2017). On the contrary with the previous quotations, he criticizes certain attempts of the EU. *“The EU must focus its attention on the major issues which matter to our citizens and leave other issues which member states can handle better on their own aside“* (Rasmussen 2016). The issue of national sovereignty is a traditional Danish subject since the history and the Danish government often talks about it (Larsen, 1999). In accordance with the Danish tradition of sovereignty, politicians call for the EU integration to be slower. States must remain sovereign over national affairs. Rasmussen said in a speech to a Danish Parliament (Folketing). *“We need the EU. That's why it's not important to get lost in new grand integration projects. But, instead, focus our efforts on what really matters. Growth and jobs. Migration. Strengthen the external borders. Security”* (Rasmussen 2017). There are elements of liberal intergovernmentalism when he says that Denmark needs the EU because it can be deducted that it brings them advantages but on the other hand, Rasmussen does not want the country get lost in the integration processes and projects and says that Denmark has to keep certain level of sovereignty. It is not for ideological reasons, but for tactical reasons.

Growth and labour is a requirement for economic prosperity, which is in the interest of national actors (Investopedia). The second day after the referendum set up a ministerial task force to analyse all impacts on Denmark (Hobolt 2016). Economic issues, especially export of goods and services and employment, are considered to be of the most important in the context of Brexit. They are stated as the main argument for maintaining the membership of Denmark in the EU. In this context, Prime Minister Rasmussen said: *“The Single Market. Danish companies have unrestricted access to 500 million consumers”* (Rasmussen 2017). An important requirement is to ensure the security of the country. Security is now understood as securing borders against illegal immigration in connection with migratory waves and protection against

criminality in connection with the arrival of migrants to the country (De Gruyter 2018). In terms of interest of an international security, Denmark is focusing on military cooperation within NATO. Security is a natural national interest and the states are protecting their borders against possible external attackers but also, ensuring national stability at the same time (Moravcsik 1993). Retrieved from the Danish government's New Foreign and Security Policy Strategy for years 2018 and 2019, *"The government will continue to assign high priority to security policy-related cooperation with the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, including through the planned contribution to NATO's enhanced forward presence in the Baltic countries"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017). Military cooperation within the European structures is not planned, which results from opt - out exceptions to the EU membership (The Danish Parliament). It should be added that the government's attitude towards UK leaving the EU and the preservation of the membership of Denmark in the EU is stable and does not change over the long term.

#### Overview of the priorities of the Danish government and coalition political parties

<b>From an internationally political view:</b>	Denmark wants to maintain good political relations with UK and UK is the geopolitical key ally of Denmark. At the same time Denmark wants to maintain good relations with the EU. EU membership strengthens Danish position in international politics.
<b>From an economic point of view:</b>	Denmark is aware that, as a small country with an export economy, needs a large stable market and a good trading bargaining position, which has Denmark because it is a member of the EU.
<b>From a security point of view:</b>	The government considers migration as the security risk. Therefore, it addresses the issue of internal security. External security will be solved by the cooperation with NATO. The government plans to cooperate with the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea.

#### *REACTIONS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES TO BREXIT*

The opposition parties did not share a common position on the outcome of the referendum. The attitude of the Danish Prime Minister to Brexit was criticized especially by the Danish People's

Party (hereafter 'DPP'), which is considered as a Eurosceptic party, as described above. Immediately after the announcement of the results of the referendum, several party members called on Rasmussen either to set a date for a referendum about the future of Denmark in the EU or to resign as a Prime Minister. This initiative was led by Erik Høgh-Sørensen, a Danish People's Party's parliament member. His initiative was based on a public opinion poll conducted by pollster Epinion<sup>3</sup> in 2016, according to which 34 % voters who voted for the Venstre, Liberal Party of Denmark, would agree to vote for making a referendum on leaving the EU in case the UK leaves. He stated: *"If Løkke refuses to listen to the majority of Danish voters who want direct democracy and a referendum on the EU, then he isn't a worthy prime minister"* (Sputnik International 2016a). In the end, it turned out to be a sudden statement that did not find wider support from political parties or the public.

At the same time, president of DPP, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, has chosen a cautious and pragmatic approach. He emphasized that British citizens voted courageously. As the party leader, Dahl told in interview for the Danish Radio in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum: *"This will probably take a few years, and I believe that Denmark should see to that Britain gets the best possible deal"* (Sputnik International 2016a). He said that it will not be easy time for Britain, but he expressed the belief that the British voters made a right decision. As for the referendum on Denmark leaving the EU, he expressed himself very cautiously. He emphasized that it is too early to organize a vote on the EU and this should be realized only after there are obvious positive outcomes regarding to exit from the EU. *"After that, it will be quite natural to ask the Danes whether they want to follow the way of the British"* (Sputnik International 2016). He postponed the Danish referendum on leaving the EU until it will be clear that Britain has made the right decision. The DPP realized that the benefit of the exit from the EU depends on the UK's agreement with the EU on the terms of withdrawal. It is clear that the actors from the opposition parties would make concessions in such areas when they would be sure that it can bring them certain advantages. Therefore, it can be deducted that the reasons for the referendum are tactical and not bounded by any further ideology.

DPP continued to talk carefully about leaving the EU. At a meeting with Nigel Farage, former UKIP leader, on December 2016, Søren Espersen, the party's foreign affairs spokesman, stated that his party would decide according to the outcome of the Brexit process whether or not to support Danish exit from the EU. Again, it can be assumed that the motivation to hold a

---

<sup>3</sup> (Electograph 2016)

referendum is not ideological. The motivation is only an interest in finding a more favourable economic position for Danish citizens, which is in line with the concept of liberal intergovernmentalism and he also said that the citizens should be informed about potential disadvantages of leaving the EU. He also stated that *"It's a question of time before Denmark leaves the EU"* (The Local 2016a). The party is considering Brexit more as an experiment which must be closely monitored. It can be deducted that the opposition parties do not intend to step out of the EU at all costs and it is obvious that main national interest is economic prosperity and it means more than the interest of national sovereignty.

The left - wing political party, The Red - Green Alliance, expressed rather hesitant approach to Brexit. DPP's political opponent congratulated British people for their decision to leave the EU and expressed the conviction that the outcome of the referendum strengthens democracy. At the same time, they suggested that a debate on the EU's withdrawal should be launched in Denmark when the Red-Green Alliance member, Pernille Skipper, expressed the following about holding a referendum in Denmark within one year after they have learned about Brexit: *"this would give enough time for both investigating possibilities left within the EU and hold a thorough debate in Denmark "* (Sputnik International 2016b). The party wanted a referendum after careful consideration of all the circumstances but in the end, there was no further interest in the referendum from more sides.

From analysis of the statements it is clear that the opposition political parties have been discussing the Brexit but only on the surface and other parties were not discussing it further in the relevant press in English. There has been registered only one Reuters press release on the opinion of another party, the Social Democrats who support Denmark's membership in the EU and did not call for a referendum after Brexit has been known. *"A spokesman for the biggest opposition party, the Social Democrats, holding 47 seats in parliament, told the same broadcaster that it was in Denmark's clear interest to remain within the EU"* (Reuters Staff 2016).

### Overview of opposition political parties' priorities

<b>From an internationally political view:</b>	Opposition political parties demand to maintain good political relations with UK.
<b>From an economic point of view:</b>	Relevant opposition parties criticize the EU. However, the advantage of leaving the EU is compared with economic impacts. If UK leaves the EU with a good deal, then they want to offer residents a referendum on leaving the EU. Otherwise, they would not suggest the referendum.
<b>From a security point of view:</b>	The issue of security risks has not been registered in the statements of politicians from the opposition.

### *REACTIONS OF BUSINESS CIRCLES TO BREXIT*

Danish economy is significantly oriented to export and in general, effective economy requires a large market (Investopedia). Therefore, Denmark s a small country has to export its products abroad, and EU membership brings the Danish economy and citizens a big advantage. Total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the year 2016 was 306.9 billion US dollars. Total exports of goods amounted to 94.35 billion US dollars. This means that 31% of the produced goods are exported across the country (globalEDGE 2016). Denmark's largest trading partner is Germany and Sweden. Britain's export share is 7% (5.65 billion US dollars). Industrial production, chemicals and agricultural products play an important role in the export structure (globalEDGE 2016).

## Danish exports to the UK

1	Machinery	\$808.7 million
2	Electronic equipment	\$767.7 million
3	Meat	\$446.9 million
4	Other food preparations	\$382.6 million
5	Dairy, eggs, honey	\$243.5 million
6	Meat, seafood preparations	\$238.8 million

(Source of the table: Worldsrichestcountries.com)

Business unions and large businesses are worried that UK's withdrawal from the EU is a significant threat to Danish business. For this reason, they are urging the government to push for measures which would help to protect the Danish economy. The business unions and associations are the interest groups and they have the role of social actors in the thesis. The interest groups produce certain preferences and they transfer their interests, in regard with the economic prosperity, through state and political parties to public space. As Moravcsik mentioned: "*groups articulate preferences, governments aggregate them*" (Moravcsik 1993, p. 483).

After the announcement of the results of the referendum in 2016, the exchange rate of the British currency has fallen significantly (Wiebnerg 2016). As a result, Danish exports "*fell 10.5 percent in August to 2.75 billion kroner down from July when they fell 4 percent*" (cphpost.dk 2016a). The opinion of entrepreneurs is that after the negotiations on the UK's withdrawal from the EU, there will be devaluation of the British pound and that the Danish exports will decrease due to relatively high price. Frank Oland, chief economist group for the Danish Agriculture and Food Council, said: "*If the exit isn't handled properly, our exports to Britain could fall significantly*" (cphpost.dk 2016a). From the point of view of economic advantages, he says that "*It's important that we keep Britain as close to the single market as possible*" (cphpost.dk 2016a). It is not clear what will be the final trade agreement between the EU and the UK, but the Prime Minister of UK, Theresa May said "*Brexit means Brexit*" (Cowburn 2016), preferring a complete unification of relations with the EU which would not be a good solution for Denmark. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, the main factors for forming national preferences are costs and benefits of economic interdependence (Moravcsik 1993). Business unions and entrepreneurs as the interest groups, draw the government's attention to the fact that Danish

prosperity is based on the use of the huge EU market and that the UK's withdrawal from the market will be an economic problem and the UK's withdrawal from the EU can seriously harm the Danish economy.

Similar concerns about trade restrictions have been expressed by the agriculture advocacy organization Landbrug og Fødevarer (L & F). The organization stated: *"In the coming months we risk being hit by a great uncertainty that could impact growth negatively. The greatest worry, however, is the risk of administrative burdens and a toll wall that could negatively influence Danish exports to the UK in the long run"* (cphpost.dk 2016c). Entrepreneurs demand that the government ensures a balanced agreement about UK leaving the EU which is in their own interest. This agreement must ensure fair trade conditions between UK and Denmark, respectively the EU. The Danish Chamber of Commerce reported that Danish exports to the UK are currently employing 53,000 Danish workers. There is concern that if there is no good agreement with the UK, these places will be jeopardized. At the same time, the Danish Chamber of Commerce fears the competition from cheap British products. *"For us, it is important to ensure that our businesses will continue to have access to the UK market and that they will not be met with unfair competition from British products on the home market,"* said Geert Laier Christensen, deputy-director at the Danish Chamber of Commerce (cphpost.dk 2017). According to LI, the prospect of concluding further international agreements will depend almost entirely on the organization of interests because international agreements require that the interests of dominant domestic groups in the countries come together and then, government can bargain certain agreements on the next level (Moravcsik 1993).

Denmark is a maritime country and one of the major seafood producers (Eurofish International Organisation). So far, fishermen have been fishing without restrictions in British Marine waters. Britain wants to limit this free access after they leave the EU. If the access to British waters will be limited one day, the Danish fishing lobby will require the government to take a firm stance on UK fish sales on the EU market (Jensen 2017). In addition to political pressure, arguments based on the Danish historical right to fish in UK waters have also emerged (Sputnik International 2017). When it comes to creation of national interests, it focuses on the effect of the relationship between the state and society. Groups express their interests and governments collect them. It is not easy to demonstrate the power of business lobbying on government's decision-making but the fact that business unions are commonly called "lobbying" suggests that the groups have certain bargaining power. An example of the influence of lobbying in the field of fisheries can be used the speculation of the press about linking government ministers to so -



called 'quota kings'. It is suspected there that ministers allocate fishing quotas in the interest of a few industrial fishing companies (The Local 2018a). There are 193 associations and other organizations in Denmark that promote their business interests at the level of the EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission). The LobbyFact.eu web platform provides an overview of these lobbying organizations. It is very likely that these organizations are promoting their interests at international level as well as among Danish politicians (LobbyFacts.eu). It can be deducted that the organizations are influencing the government and the formation of national preferences but there is not a direct proof of it.

Table: Selection of Danish lobbying of associations and organizations

Danish Electric Vehicle Alliance (DEA)
Danish Energy / Dansk Energi (DE)
Danish Wind Turbine Owners' Association (DV)
Danish District Heating Association/Dansk Fjernvarme (DDHA)
Danish Transport and Logistics Association (DTL)

(Source: LobbyFacts.eu, own choice)

#### Overview of priorities of the business circles

<b>From an internationally political view:</b>	Entrepreneurs demand that the government ensure a balanced exit agreement within the EU negotiation with UK. This agreement must ensure fair trade conditions between UK and Denmark, respectively EU.
<b>From an economic point of view:</b>	Among entrepreneurs, there is concern that Brexit will bring economic losses and may result in higher unemployment.
<b>From a security point of view:</b>	The issue of security risks has not been registered in the statements of entrepreneurs.

#### *REACTIONS OF ACTORS TO DIFFERENT PROBLEM AREAS*

From the analytical point of view, it is important to monitor how are political and social actors assessing the different areas of problems that are related to the UK's withdrawal.

### *Denmark and the relation with the EU after Brexit*

The Danish political scene responded with a certain regret but overall respected UK's decision to the exit from the EU and expressed an interest in taking part while negotiating good conditions for the UK. Foreign affairs spokesperson for DPP, Søren Espersen, said, *"We would really like to influence those discussions so that Britain gets as good a deal as possible. The UK should not be punished for what it's done. We should help them along the way"* (The Local 2016a). At the same time, politicians are ready to defend the interests of their country. Smaller economies, such as Denmark, Ireland or Netherlands realize that UK's withdrawal from the EU can have a huge economic impact. *"Our countries are potentially among the countries which will be most affected by the Brexit"* (The Local 2017a), said Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen at a joint press conference in The Hague. The reason is the great economic interdependence between Denmark and Britain, based on the liberalized market (Confederation of Danish Industry 2017). In regard with liberal intergovernmentalism, economic issues are prioritized. Danish national interest when it comes for the economic prosperity, is reflected at the international level as an active participation in the EU negotiations on the agreement with the UK. Denmark recognizes that an agreement on terms of withdrawal of UK from the EU cannot be asymmetrical. It must be equally "disadvantageous" for both, the UK and the EU. Rasmussen pointed out that Britain cannot gain a competitive advantage at the expense of EU members when negotiating. *"We need to be extremely careful that the side that is leaving doesn't get particular competitive advantages on its way out"* (cphpost.dk 2016b). The requirement is that the contract with UK is neither too favourable nor too disadvantageous. In both cases, Denmark would suffer economic losses. *"We all want a peaceful divorce, but in this situation only one side wants to part ways, so then we need to protect our own interests"* (cphpost.dk 2016b) said Rasmussen. According to liberal intergovernmentalism, Denmark is ready to protect their own economic interests in negotiations within the EU as well as in bilateral negotiations with UK. Similarly, the Danish Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen stated that: *"The main priority of the government in the coming negotiations will be to promote Danish interests, not least for Danish businesses and citizens. The government will therefore focus on aspects including ensuring Danish businesses do not lose access to the British market, and that British businesses are not given unfair competitive advantages in the EU. A potential agreement must have the right balance between rights and obligations"* (The Local 2017b). In case the agreement's asymmetry is in favour of the EU or in favour of UK, the Danish economic interests would be harmed. In case the EU negotiates poor conditions for itself, Britain will have an economic

advantage over Denmark. If the conditions are bad for UK, there would be a devaluation of Britain's currency and the Denmark's export to Britain will be threatened. Thus, there is present demand that Denmark actively participates in negotiations on an agreement with UK (Hunt & Wheeler 2018).

The Danish government is also developing a great deal of activity in connection with the preparation of the EU budget for the years 2021 - 2027. Britain contributed 18.6 million pounds to the EU budget for year 2017. After counting payments from European funds, net public sector contributions to the EU budget account were 8.9 million pounds. This amount served as EU Public sector receipts from the EU budget and the Union budget is now losing this amount. The solution can be to increase the EU's budget by increasing individual countries' contribution or budget cuts (gov.uk 2018; VOXeurop.eu 2018). *"Denmark belongs to the handful of countries refusing to contribute more to the EU budget in the wake of Brexit – a group that also includes Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden"* (VOXeurop.eu 2018). Denmark does not want to pay more to the European budget. Kristian Jensen, Minister of Finance, said: *"And I don't think we should pay one more krone than we do now"* (The Local 2017c) and Rasmussen thinks, that when UK leaves the EU, it would mean that the EU is smaller, thus the contribution should be smaller as well (The Local 2018b). In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark has developed a strategy called 'Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017 – 2018' and within this document, in the chapter called 'Brexit and the Future of the EU' is stated that: *"The government will intensify cooperation with other budget restrictive EU Member States, thereby ensuring that the EU's financial framework and annual budgets reflect the new economic situation in an EU of 27 Member States"* (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017, p. 19). It is deducted that Denmark's position after UK leaves the EU will be significantly weaker. It is clear that the government will have to look for new allies to push for such a modification of the EU budget which will ensure that the Danish contribution is minimized. These countries will certainly include Austria and The Netherlands, possibly other Central European countries (Patel & Reh 2016). In connection with addressing other issues beyond Brexit, it can be expected that new power coalitions within the EU will emerge, replacing the former political union of Denmark and the UK.

### Overview of priorities while negotiating with the EU after Brexit

<b>From an internationally political view:</b>	Denmark will actively participate in negotiating an agreement between the UK and the EU. It is in the interest of Denmark to negotiate a neutral agreement that does not favour neither the UK nor the EU.
<b>From an economic point of view:</b>	The main requirement is to avoid economic losses. Both the direct losses from business activity and indirectly, as part of the preparation of the new EU budget for the years 2021-2027, which will no longer involve UK's financial contribution.
<b>From a security point of view:</b>	The issue of security risks has not been registered in the statements.

### *Brexit as an Economic Opportunity*

Withdrawal of the UK from the EU is not just a political and economic problem but on the contrary, Denmark sees Brexit as a unique opportunity for an economic growth as well. It offers the opportunity to gain in their territory these institutions and companies that cannot stay in London or other British cities after Brexit. These are the headquarters of the major EU institutions, the financial sector, companies that trade with EU countries. To make this “move”, it is necessary to create good conditions. *“Brexit means a new window of opportunity that we ought to look into, because there is a lot of potential. We should therefore resume dialogue with the political parties”* (The Local 2016b), said Finansrådet's director Ulrik Nørgaard to Jyllands-Posten. *“We can attract a certain amount of their asset management because we are strong in that area. But it will be an uphill struggle unless we remove the tax wall”* (The Local 2016b). In particular, he means that creating new tax rules that will be more favourable to foreign capital. Denmark is now interested in international banks and other financial institutions based in London. The “arrival” of foreign institutions will create a large number of jobs for lawyers, accountants, IT specialists and for all service staff (Confederation of Danish Industry 2017). According to LI and formation of national preferences, Denmark is acting rationally and its shaping the preferences according to the changing dynamics of events. In this regard, it can be deducted that the preferences are not fixed and are changing over time and the state will have to adapt and adapt its means for forming and achieving the preferences.

Economic growth in Denmark creates a large deficit of skilled workers (Confederation of Danish Industry 2017). The Danish government offers EU citizens working in England to come to Denmark and to offer them welfare. *“We can use a lot of the EU citizens currently working in the UK”* (Levring 2017), said Steen Nielsen, chief of labour policy at the Copenhagen-based confederation said in a phone interview. It is based on the fact that workers in Britain are not sure about their future. *“It’s very relevant to look closer at those who don’t know what their future will look like in the UK”* (Levring 2017). Denmark sense the opportunity to offer good conditions to international business companies for which it will be difficult to be in London in a situation where UK will not be part of the EU. These companies include for example Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, State Street and BlackRock. These companies will look for premises for their headquarters, and Denmark may be one of the potential candidates (Jones 2017). At a meeting with technological firms in London, Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs Brian Mikkelsen said: *“We are going to make it cheaper and easier to be in Denmark.” “We would like to be the northern European hub for the financial sector”* (Jones 2017). From the point of view of liberal intergovernmentalism, it can be said that economic issues have a high priority and in the statements from political and social actors, the main topic is economy and always certain benefits. To support economic growth and to create good conditions for business, the government has taken concrete measures. They have also agreed with the opposition parties on these measures. *“The Danish Government has landed a political agreement with the Danish People’s Party and the Danish Social-Liberal Party”* (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017a). The Danish Government has decided that *“14,7 billion DKK will be allocated to strengthen Danish businesses through a range of initiatives that will increase investments, strengthen the focus on digitalization and life science and expand the tax scheme for foreign researchers”* (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017a). Tax reductions for some imported products also come into consideration (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017a).

Creating conditions for foreign investors is becoming a topic for small Danish political parties. Foreign investors feel that Danish EU membership is unclear and are afraid to make new investments. The Social Liberal Party and the groups around it proposed that seven political parties should make a parliamentary agreement about remaining in the EU: *“We suggest that the seven parties in parliament which would all like Danish membership of the EU to continue once and for all state that there will be no Danish vote on our EU membership”* (The Local 2017d) said Morten Østergaard, leader of the Social Liberal Party. The parties would include

the Danish Social Liberal Party, The Alternative and the Socialist Left Party and they hope to make a deal with Liberal Party, the Liberal Alliance, and Conservative People's Party, and Social Democrats, while all of them are supporting remaining with the EU. Such an agreement would certainly reassure foreign investors and at the same time block developing the past efforts of DPP to declare a referendum on Denmark leaving the EU. However, any referendum has not happened yet and for now, there are not any further and relevant discussions about this topic (The Local 2017d).

With Brexit, Denmark is losing strong financial partner. Denmark is not part of the euro zone and is considering joining the EU's banking union. It has already postponed a decision whether or not to join the banking union in 2015 until number of areas concerning the functioning of the banking union will be clarified (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018). Since then, there have happened events such as Brexit or increased interest for locating financial activities in Denmark. Therefore, Denmark is now open to consider joining the banking union and also thinks that part of the financial activities could be provided through Danish banks (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018; Reuters Staff 2017a). *"The government finds it is the right time to launch a thorough review in order to make a final decision on Danish participation in the Banking union in the autumn 2019"* (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017b), said The Minister of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, Brian Mikkelsen. The entry into the banking union is a sensitive decision for Denmark. It would mean giving up part of the competences when it comes to making decisions within the banking sector. Participating in the banking union would be a step towards closer integration for a country that has been an EU member since 1973 but has four opt – outs from EU policies, to be concrete Common security and defence policy, Citizenship of the European Union, Area of freedom, security and justice and the Economic and monetary union (The Danish Parliament).

### Overview of priorities from the point of view of economic opportunities

<b>From an internationally political view:</b>	Denmark is presented on an international level as a stable modern country that is ready to offer foreign institutions an excellent political, economic and legal environment.
<b>From an economic point of view:</b>	Brexit is seen as a unique opportunity that can stimulate the domestic economy.
<b>From a security point of view:</b>	The discussion of security risks has not been registered in the statements.

### *IS EUROSCEPTICISM REFLECTED IN THE DISCOURSES OF THE ACTORS?*

The definition of national preferences is also closely related to the determination of the degree of scepticism towards the EU integration. For the future direction of the country, it is important to know whether the national preferences which have been identified will be promoted within the EU project or whether the political situation is aiming towards leaving the EU. Euroscepticism will be divided into individual segments and as already mentioned in the theory section, the typology by Catharina Sørensen will be used in order to analyse the degree of Euroscepticism. In the following analysis, the most commonly found statements by Danish actors will be assigned to each type of Euroscepticism. For the analysis, the statements and quotes that are mentioned in the previous chapter will be used. Only "strong" statements will be evaluated and the value of Euroscepticism will be attributed to them on the basis of subjective evaluation of the statements.

### **Economic Euroscepticism**

All Danish political and social actors consider economic issues to be extremely important for the future of their country. Discussion on economic issues is at the forefront. In many interviews, Prime Minister Rasmussen pointed out that Denmark is economically dependent on the EU (Rasmussen 2016). Economic aspect is also preferred by opposition parties. Their interest in holding a referendum on Denmark's withdrawal from the EU is confronted with concerns about economic impacts. There are obvious tactical reasons for remaining in the EU.

Denmark sees economic benefits within the EU cooperation, thus the advantage of Denmark's membership in the EU is fully confirmed (Sputnik International 2016a).

Certain reservations have been obvious when it comes to the Danish actors and topics about the EU's budgetary policy. After UK leaves the EU, the European budget revenue will be lower, without the British contribution. Prime Minister Rasmussen and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark stated that Denmark's contribution to the common budget should not increase. This statement raises some doubt as to the economic or expedient use of budgetary resources. At the same time, this statement did not sound as categorical NO. It can be understood as a notice of bargaining position for other EU members. Economic Euroscepticism in statements by Danish political and social actors has been hardly registered, there is not any obvious dissatisfaction with the performance of the EU, therefore its level is minimal and according to Sørensen, in comparison with other EU member states, it has been rarely higher than the EU average (Sørensen 2008).

### **Sovereignty – based Euroscepticism**

Maintaining national sovereignty is a traditional theme of Nordic politics. Actors often want to know the exact boundary between which issues are in the competence of the state and which are in the EU's competence which can be seen in the explored statements, as can be seen in the example of Denmark and its four opt – outs (Danish Parliament; Etzold & Opitz 2016). Prime Minister Rasmussen considers the EU as an important platform to promote Danish national interests in the world. From his statements, he agrees that Denmark is stronger with the EU. At the same time, however, he claims that the EU cannot regulate and cover all the problems. He claims that there are issues that the states themselves will solve more effectively and that the state must not lose itself in the integration projects (Rasmussen 2016; Rasmussen 2017).

The same demands are made in connection with Brexit. For Denmark, it is extremely important to sign a fair agreement with the UK. Danish Government considers the protection of the interest of Danish citizens and the Danish business sector as a priority. All actors demand that the government is active during the Brexit negotiations.

However, the requirement of maintaining sovereignty is not absolute. The Danish government has decided to start a debate on the entry of Denmark into the banking union in the EU. It is well known that the members of the banking union transfer a large part of the competencies of



the national banking sector to the EU and it would mean that Denmark would have to shift part of their sovereignty to the transnational level and it would mean that it would give certain power to the relevant EU institutions (Sørensen 2008). The motivation for this step would be again economic and tactical.

In a summary, Denmark does not like to pass national competences to the EU level (The Danish Parliament). From the statements by Danish politicians is clear that there are areas that they want to govern by their own national rules. In case there is a decision to surrender parts of national sovereignty, then there must be a significant reason. According to Sørensen, Danish Euroscepticism seems to be based on the EU's impact on national identity and integrity, which is corresponding with the sovereignty based Euroscepticism. Danes are not sceptic towards the EU membership as such so it is not a question of any ideology but more based on an individual assessment of the consequences of sovereignty of new developments (Sørensen 2004). Sovereignty - based Euroscepticism is in the analysis considered as moderate. Its intensity may change over time depending on economic circumstances.

### **Democratic Euroscepticism**

The debate on democracy when it comes to the decision - making in the EU institutions have not been registered. Danish political and social actors appeal to the government to negotiate good conditions for Denmark but the debates do not indicate whether the EU's negotiating mechanisms make it possible to meet these requirements. The main discussed topic is with which states should Denmark connect in order to create sufficient voting power (the power of electoral votes), respectively coalition (alliance) of states with the same interests as Denmark but there are no complaints about the democratic functioning of the EU and there has not been registered any demands for strengthening any directly elected institutions in order for citizens to have a greater influence. From the review of social and political actors' reactions, Democratic Euroscepticism has emerged on a very small level, respectively is negligible (Sørensen 2008).

### **Social Euroscepticism**

In the statements from social actors have not been found any statement that would question the EU's ideological orientation. Denmark is a solid part of Western democracy with an emphasis on social aspects. It can be deducted that the ideological position of Denmark is in line with the

ideological position of the EU and it did not criticize that there is *“too little social Europe”* (Sørensen 2008, p. 87).

## DISCUSSION

Based on the analysis and according Moravcsik, national interests can be discussed from three point of views or areas; international political view, economic view and security view (1998). The frequency and meaning of reactions of the political and social actors towards the three areas of interest is taken into account, as well as is the political power of the actors who are promoting them and the social actors who have certain power to influence the preferences as well. Statements by the government and representatives of political parties include attitudes based primarily on economic interests. Government has always advocated the need to maintain the country's economic prosperity and hence, the interests of domestic actors. In particular, the Danish government presents mainly national economic interests at the international level, and undoubtedly acts in the interest of the domestic economic sector, which requires to secure the most favourable conditions for further economic development. From the available texts, it has not been fully demonstrated what kind of influencing force have the business circles to the Danish government and formation of preferences but there have been some speculations (The Local 2018a). However, from statements of politicians can be deduced that the concerns of the business sector are in their statements fully respected. Denmark's security policy focuses on internal security related to the protection of the state borders from illegal migration. This in accordance among all relevant actors. Denmark is a member of NATO and a debate on the military defence of the state is not being solved within the organs of the EU. The discussion of political and social actors on national security is not broad and is focusing only on internal security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017).

It can be summarized that the relationship of Denmark to UK as a major trading and political partner does not change. Brexit was accepted by the Danish government as an unpleasant circumstance that became a fact. There has not been expressed any explicit criticism of Britain's attitude in the statements from government. In this context, there can be seen a conflict between actors because the opposition parties explicitly praised this step with attempts to hold on a referendum on Denmark leaving the EU directly after they have learned about Brexit. It did not gain much support in the end and no new discussions have appeared by time. It was also not

required that Britain should be punished for its attitude with sanctions or by maximizing the cost of leaving the EU and Denmark demands the widest possible ties between UK and the EU. Such links will make it possible to continue to a large extent in both economic and political cooperation, for which Denmark, and in general all the Nordic countries, have been accustomed for many years. Denmark is aware that the negotiations of agreement between the EU and UK must be balanced to the maximum extent possible on both sides and it has been reflected in statements from the political and social actors as well. Any advantage, whether for Britain or the EU, would result in damaging Danish economic interests. Thus, the Danish government is increasing its diplomatic activity. The Danish government has a great economic and political interest in being able to actively participate in negotiating the conditions for UK's EU membership. Its aim is to reduce the economic impact for UK (The Local 2017b).

The withdrawal of UK from the EU can be seen in Denmark as an economic challenge. After the announcement of the results of the British referendum, the Danish government set up a ministerial commission to investigate all the consequences of Brexit. It is looking for potential risks, as well as business opportunities that are opening up. Part of the preparation for Brexit is to prepare projects that will attract foreign companies that will have to leave UK for various reasons after Brexit (Hobolt 2016). The government has agreed with the opposition parties, concretely DPP and the Danish Social-Liberal Party to take measures in order to create good terms for business organizations (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017a).

Denmark's relationship with the EU remains reserved in the area of sovereignty. Danish political parties are mostly aware that they cannot leave the EU for economic reasons. At the same time, however, they declare that there are issues that the Danes want to solve on their own at the national level, without EU's intervention. It is not possible to discover the causes of this type of Euroscepticism in this short research, however, the analysis has shown that the requirement for the national sovereignty is relative and depends on a particular economic or security situation. Decisions adopted on the basis of Euroscepticism (referred as opt - outs from the EU) have been confronted with real effects over time (The Danish Parliament). Danish Euroscepticism when it comes to sovereignty is dynamic and its intensity is changing. Democratic Euroscepticism is weak and actors do not question democracy in the EU. The discussion is about the need for strong bargaining efforts in order to maximize their own benefits. From the actors' statements is deducted that the level of Euroscepticism in Denmark is small and focuses primarily on sovereignty. Practically no Economic Euroscepticism from the statements have been registered. The level of scepticism towards the EU trade system is

negligible. Social actors see economic cooperation with the EU as a necessity and an advantage. There are small reservations about the EU budget, when Rasmussen said that in case the EU is smaller, the contribution of the countries should be smaller as well but its negligible (The Local 2018b). From the reactions made by the actors, it is concluded that the EU's ideological orientation is not the subject of discussion and when there is attempt of Euroscepticism, it is clearly for the tactical reasons. The organization of social order in the EU is fully in line with the relevant opinions of individual Danish actors.

A new situation will occur within the EU with Brexit and Brexit is significantly changing the EU's division of power. Even within the EU, some states are closer to each other, whether for historical reasons, because of similar size or because of the economic interdependence. Such a relationship exists for example between the members of Visegrad Four or between the Nordic countries- Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland (and non-EU members, Norway and Iceland) (Etzold & Opitz 2016). Nordic countries in general usually coordinated their policy with the UK and Denmark will lose one of its closest allies after Brexit. Denmark has voted most similarly with the UK in Council decisions. In order to secure a strong negotiating position in the future, Denmark will be forced to look for new alliances with other member countries with similar interest and will be forced to compromise and strengthen the existing relations in order to find a new way to promote its national interests. It is possible that this new power distribution will be the basis of Denmark's new relationship with the EU (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018)

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of the thesis was to evaluate the reactions of Danish political and social actors in connection with Brexit and answer this research question: *“What are the reactions of political and social actors of Denmark after Brexit and how are they reflected in the discussions about the national preferences?”* It was explored how actors reacted to a newly occurred situation, Brexit and what issues they consider as important. Based on the analysis of these reactions, the statements and the main formulated issues within them can be considered as a starting point that the Danish government will most likely be promoting at international level and can be considered as a Danish national interest.

It was expected that there will be enough texts and literature that will address the issue. It was supposed that UK's withdrawal from the EU is a major political and economic event for

Denmark and that it will be discussed among many political and social actors. Of course, the decision of the British voters has been commented by various actors, but there has not been found fundamentally opposing views. The main discussion on this topic was mostly in 2016, right after the announcement of the referendum's outcome. In the following years, the number of posts and comments in the internet newspapers and the discussions have dropped significantly.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism has been used to explore the topic, and as a secondary theory, the concept of Euroscepticism and its typology from Sørensen has been used. It is possible to confirm that both theories can be used and help to examine the chosen topic and have been relevant. Liberal intergovernmentalism has been a good choice with the assumption that the discussion of relevant actors on the national level is considered as basis for exploring the integration processes in Europe. Also the focus of this discussion on economic issues and geopolitical issues (which were interpreted as internationally political view and security point of view) is in line with ongoing processes. Euroscepticism as a supportive theory, divided into Economic, Sovereignty – based, Democratic and Social Euroscepticism, provided more detailed orientation and answered if there is any level of scepticism in the discourses of actors. It also allows to meet the information from the part of the analysis with reactions and to validate these conclusions.

To sum up, the withdrawal of UK from the EU was accepted by all relevant actors with an understanding, in line with Denmark's democratic tradition and in accordance with the friendly relations of Denmark and UK. But Denmark does not want to follow the example of UK and will not be preparing a referendum on leaving the EU any time soon. The Danish government, as well as the opposition parties and the business circles, are aware that EU membership is a top priority because it brings more advantages to be a member of the EU. The reasons are economic interests, employment and economic prosperity. It is in the interest of Denmark that the UK – EU agreement on EU membership is beneficial to both parties. In that case, it will also be advantageous for Denmark.

Denmark criticizes some of the issues that are referred to as "strengthening integration". The Danish opinion is that there are many issues that can be addressed at national level without EU control. Similarly, there is a sceptic demand for budgetary constraints while compiling the new EU budget. Both of these requirements for the preservation of sovereignty interconnect liberal intergovernmentalism with Euroscepticism and both the theories are mutually validated. The demand for a high degree of sovereignty is not absolute among Danish actors. There is

protection of their national interest and often certain degree of Euroscepticism but it is relative and can be changed when there is an economic advantage. An example is the Danish government's consideration of joining the banking union which would mean losing a degree of their sovereignty but it would bring economic advantages.

Despite some concerns about the consequences of Brexit, Danish actors see a new situation as a challenge to strengthen the position of the national economy. The government has adopted a number of fiscal measures, investing in business infrastructure, and ministers addressing foreign companies in order to present the benefits of business in Denmark. Denmark is losing a strong political and economic partner with Brexit and will have to adapt its negotiating tactics at the EU level. The government is generally urged for an active approach and for the search for new alliances in order to promote Danish interests.

It can be confirmed that labelling Denmark as Eurosceptic country is not completely correct. According to Eurobarometer, as mentioned in Sørensen's paper, polls show that Danish people are no more sceptical than is the European average, and in general, their level of scepticism is decreasing (Sørensen 2008). Political and social actors in Denmark regard the EU as a primarily economic project to allow liberalization of trade. In other areas of life, Danes do not feel the need to adopt new rules that will be prepared from the EU organs. When it comes to security issues, they are not much the subject of discussions. Denmark respects its commitments to NATO and solves military security over this structure. Internal security is related in particular to the recent migration crisis and is related to the strengthening of border surveillance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

### BOOKS:

- Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2014). *“Opting out of the European Union: diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration”*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Adler-Nissen 2014)
- Aylott, Nicholas & Blomgren, Magnus & Bergman, Torbjörn (2013). *“Political Parties in Multi-Level Politics: The Nordic Countries Compared”*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Aylott et. al 2013)
- Bryman, Alan (2016). *“Social Research Methods”*, Oxford University Press, 5th edition (Bryman 2016)
- Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C., and Gronhaug, K. (2001). *“Qualitative Marketing Research”*. London: Sage. (Carson et al. 2001)
- Forster, Anthony (2002). *“Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics”*. London: Routledge. (Forster 2002)
- Hansen, Lene (2002). *“Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe”*. In: Lene Hansen and Ole Waever, ed. *European integration and national identity the challenge of the Nordic states*. London: Routledge, s. 50–87.
- Miles, Lee (1996). *“The European Union and the Nordic countries”*. New York: Routledge. p. 79–98. ISBN 0-415-12423-9. (Miles 1996)
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *“The choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht”*. Digital printing. London: UCL Press. (Moravcsik 1998)
- Rosamond, Ben. (2000). *“Theories of European Integration”*. Houndmills: Palgrave. (Rosamod 2000)
- Yin, Robert K. (1994). *“Case study Research. Design and Methods.”* Applied Social Research Methods Series. Sage Publications. Volume S. (Yin 1994)
- Wiener, Antje & Diez, Thomas (2009). *“European integration theory”*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2nd ed. (Wiener & Diez 2009)

## TEXTS:

- Bertelsmann Stiftung (2015). “*Brexit – potential economic consequences if the UK exits the EU*”. Retrieved from:  
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d729/e7e6c2b8ad3944f0d8784e77c72740fd05db.pdf>  
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015)
- Conti, Nicolo (2003). “*Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case.*” Sussex European Institute. (Conti 2003)
- Deloy, Corinne (2015). “*General Election in Denmark. The populists become Denmark’s leading right-wing party*”. Foundation Robert Schuman. Retrieved from:  
<https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/oeo/oeo-1600-en.pdf> (Deloy 2015)
- Etzold, Tobias & Opitz, Christian (2016). “*Nordic Europe after the Brexit Vote. The Five Nordic Countries Are Reassessing Their Relations with the EU*”. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved from:  
[https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C42\\_etz\\_opt.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C42_etz_opt.pdf) (Etzold & Opitz 2016)
- Gerring, John (2004). “*What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?*”. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 98, No. 2. pp. 341-354. (Gerring 2007).
- gov.uk (2018). “*European Union Finances 2017: statement on the 2017 EU Budget and measures to counter fraud and financial mismanagement*”. Retrieved from:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/691017/EU\\_finances\\_2017\\_Cm9576\\_web.pdf#page=15](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691017/EU_finances_2017_Cm9576_web.pdf#page=15) (gov.uk 2018)
- Hix, Simon & Hageman, Sara & Frantescu, Doru (2016). “*Would Brexit Matter?*” Retrieved from: [http://60811b39eee4e42e277a-72b421883bb5b133f34e068afdd7cb11.r29.cf3.rackcdn.com/2016/04/VoteWatch-Report-2016\\_digital.pdf](http://60811b39eee4e42e277a-72b421883bb5b133f34e068afdd7cb11.r29.cf3.rackcdn.com/2016/04/VoteWatch-Report-2016_digital.pdf) (Hix et. al 2016)
- Hobolt, Sara B. (2016). “*The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent*”. Journal of European Public Policy. Retrieved from:  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785> (Hobolt 2016)



- Keohane, Daniel (2017). “*Three’s company? France, Germany, the UK and European defence post-Brexit*”. Royal Institute. Retrieved from: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/Elcano-Three's%20Company,%20France,%20Germany,%20the%20UK%20and%20European%20Defense%20Post-Brexit.pdf> (Keohane 2017)
- Larsen, Henrik (1999). “*British and Danish Policies towards Europe in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach*.” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 454-484. (Larsen, 1999)
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). “*Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*”. Journal of Common Market Studies. Retrieved from: <http://www.eustudies.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Moravcsik-JCMS-1993.pdf> (Moravcsik 1993)
- Patel, Oliver & Reh, Christine (2016). “*Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System: UCL Constitution Unit Briefing Paper*.” The Constitution Unit. Retrieved from: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ei-publications/cu-briefing-two.pdf> (Patel & Reh 2016)
- Pissarides, Christopher (2017). “*Brexit: Implications for Europe*”. Cyprus Economic Policy Review. Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 3-13. Retrieved from: [http://www.ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/Pissarides\\_3-13.pdf](http://www.ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/Pissarides_3-13.pdf) (Pissarides 2017)
- Raunio, Tapio (2007). “*Softening but Persistent: Euroscepticism in the Nordic EU Countries*”. Acta Politica. (Raunio 2007)
- Sørensen, C. (2004). “*Danish and British popular Euroscepticism compared: A sceptical assessment of the concept?*”. Danish Foreign Policy. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. Retrieved from: <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/84583/1/DIIS2004-25.pdf> (Sørensen 2004)
- Sørensen, Catharina (2008). “*Danish Euroscepticism: Unique or Part of Broader Patterns?*”. Danish Foreign Policy. Yearbook 2008. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. p.85-113. Retrieved from: [http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/107162/DIIS\\_Yearbook\\_2008.pdf](http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/107162/DIIS_Yearbook_2008.pdf) (Sørensen 2008)
- Taggart, Paul & Szczerbiak, Aleks (2002). “*The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States*”. Sussex European Institute. (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002)

- Taggart, Paul & Szczerbiak, Aleks (2003). *“Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality”*. SEI Working Paper No 69. (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2003)
- Wivel, Anders. (2014). *“While the UK considers a ‘Brexit’, Danish Eurosceptics continue to be reluctantly pragmatic over EU membership”*. EUROPP. Retrieved from: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2014/12/03/while-the-uk-considers-a-brexit-danish-eurosceptics-continue-to-be-reluctantly-pragmatic-over-eu-membership/> (Wivel 2014)

## INTERNET:

- Confederation of Danish Industry (2017). *“Potential impact of Brexit. The perspective of Danish businesses”*. Retrieved from: <https://di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Europa/DI%20Brexit%20Paper.pdf> (Confederation of Danish Industry 2017)
- Cowburn, Ashley (2016). *“Theresa May says ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and there will be no attempt to remain inside EU”*. Independent. Retrieved from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-brexit-means-brexit-conservative-leadership-no-attempt-remain-inside-eu-leave-europe-a7130596.html> (Cowburn 2016)
- cphpost.dk (2016a). *“Danish exports to Britain tumbling after Brexit”*. Retrieved from: <http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-exports-to-britain-tumbling-after-brexit.html> (cphpost.dk 2016a)
- cphpost.dk (2016b). *“Danish PM warns against Britain getting a “competitive edge” following Brexit”*. Retrieved from: <http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-pm-warns-against-britain-getting-a-competitive-edge-following-brexit.html> (cphpost.dk 2016b)
- cphpostk.dk (2016c). *“What Brexit means for Denmark and for the expats”*. Retrieved from: <http://cphpost.dk/news/what-brexit-means-for-denmark-and-for-the-expats.html> (cphpost.dk 2016c)
- cphpost.dk (2017). *“Danish exports to Britain growing despite Brexit fears”*. Retrieved from: <http://cphpost.dk/news/business/danish-exports-to-britain-growing-despite-brexit-fears.html> (cphpost.dk 2017)

- CVCE.eu (2016). “*Denmark’s accession*”. Retrieved from: [https://www.cvce.eu/obj/denmark\\_s\\_accession-en-93a02713-333e-4599-9052-6eca6a924026.html](https://www.cvce.eu/obj/denmark_s_accession-en-93a02713-333e-4599-9052-6eca6a924026.html) (CVCE.eu 2016)
- De Gruyter, Caroline (2018). “*There Is Life for the EU After Brexit*”. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_there\\_is\\_life\\_for\\_the\\_eu\\_after\\_brexit#](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_there_is_life_for_the_eu_after_brexit#) (De Gruyter 2018)
- Deutsche Welle (2016). “*Denmark PM strikes deal to form new government*”. Retrieved from: <http://www.dw.com/en/denmark-pm-strikes-deal-to-form-new-government/a-36543082> (Deutsche Welle 2016)
- Electograph (2016). “*DENMARK, January 2016. Epinion poll*”. Retrieved from: <https://www.electograph.com/2016/01/denmark-january-2016-epinion-poll.html> (Electograph 2016)
- “*Epistemology*”. Research Methodology. Retrieved from: <https://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/epistemology/> (research-methodology.net)
- EURACTIV.com (2015). “*Euroscepticism: More than a British phenomenon*”. Retrieved from: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/mid-south/linksdossier/euroscepticism-more-than-a-british-phenomenon/> (EURACTIV.com 2015)
- EURACTIV.com with AFP and Reuters (2017). Retrieved from: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/merkel-backs-macrons-call-for-multi-speed-eu-small-eurozone-budget/> (EURACTIV.com 2017)
- Eurofish International Organisation. “*Overview of the Danish fisheries and aquaculture sector*”. Retrieved from: <http://www.eurofish.dk/denmark> (Eurofish International Organisation)
- European Commission. Public Opinion. Retrieved from: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm> (European Commission)
- European Parliament. “*Historical Development of European Integration*”. Retrieved from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/en/education/teachingresources/howeu-works/historicaldevelopment.html> (European Parliament)

- globalEDGE (2016). “*Denmark: Trade Statistics*”. Retrieved from: <https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/denmark/tradestats> (globalEDGE 2016)
- Hunt Alex & Brian, Wheeler (2018). “*Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU.*” BBC NEWS. Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887> . (Hunt & Wheeler 2018)
- Investopedia. “*Economic Efficiency*“. Retrieved from: [https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic\\_efficiency.asp](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic_efficiency.asp) (Investopedia)
- Jensen, Teis (2017). “*Danish fishermen could be hit hard by Brexit: research report*”. Reuters. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-denmark-fishing/danish-fishermen-could-be-hit-hard-by-brexit-research-report-idUSKBN1D81DB> (Jensen 2017)
- Jones, Huw (2017). “*Copenhagen joins battle to lure financial firms from London after Brexit*“. Retrieved from: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-denmark/copenhagen-joins-battle-to-lure-financial-firms-from-london-after-brexit-idUKKCN1C419B> (Jones 2017)
- Kelstrup, Jesper Dahl & Jensen, Mads Dagnis (2018). “*Brexit and Denmark’s commitment to the single market*“. The UK in a Changing Europe. Retrieved from: <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-denmarks-commitment-to-the-single-market/> (Kelstrup & Jensen 2018)
- Levring, Peter (2017). “*Brexit: Denmark tells EU nationals in UK to relocate to Scandinavia to help deal with labour shortage*“. Independent. Retrieved from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-denmark-labour-shortage-eu-nationals-workers-move-uk-scandinavia-european-union-a7993971.html> (Levring 2017)
- LobbyFacts.eu. Retrieved from: <https://lobbyfacts.eu/> (LobbyFacts.eu)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2017). “*New and uncertain world order sets the stage for Danish government’s new foreign and security policy strategy*“. Retrieved from: <http://um.dk/en/news/NewsDisplayPage/?newsID=0D9827F1-0ADB-443B-9741-CA265A1E4EBF> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017)
- Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs (2017a). “*New political agreement will strengthen Danish businesses*” Retrieved from: <https://em.dk/english/news/2017/11-13-agreement-will-strengthen-danish-businesses> (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017a)

- Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs (2017b). “*The Danish government launches review on Danish participation in EU Banking Union*“. Retrieved from: <https://em.dk/english/news/2017/07-04-banking-union> (Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 2017b).
- Möller, Almut & Pardijs, Dina (2017). *The Future Shape Of Europe: How The EU Can Bend Without Breaking*. European Council On Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: [http://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/the\\_future\\_shape\\_of\\_europe](http://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/the_future_shape_of_europe) (Möller & Pardijs 2017)
- Morgan, S. T. “*Epistemology and Ontology*”. Retrieved from: <http://www.stmorgan.co.uk/epistemology-and-ontology.html> (Morgan)
- Rasmussen, Lars. L. (2016). “*The Prime Minister’s statement regarding the election result in Great Britain*”. Statsministriet. Press Releases. Retrieved from: [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_14363.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_14363.html) (Rasmussen 2016)
- Rasmussen, Lars. L. (2017). “*Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s Opening Address to the Folketing (Danish Parliament) on 3 October 2017*”. Statsministriet. Speeches. Retrieved from: [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_14597.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_14597.html) (Rasmussen 2017)
- Reuters Staff (2016). “*Danish government-allied populists call for EU vote, PM rejects*”. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-denmark/danish-government-allied-populists-call-for-eu-vote-pm-rejects-idUSKCN0ZA1IS> (Reuters Staff 2016)
- Reuters Staff (2017a). “*Denmark to decide on EU’s banking union membership after Brexit*“. Retrieved from: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-eu-banking-union/denmark-to-decide-on-eus-banking-union-membership-after-brexit-idUKKBN19P146> (Reuters Staff 2017a)
- Reuters Staff (2017b). “*Danish central bank welcomes review of possible EU banking union membership*“. Retrieved from: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-eu-banking-cenbank/danish-central-bank-welcomes-review-of-possible-eu-banking-union-membership-idUKKBN19P1DX> (Reuters Staff 2017b)
- Reuters Staff (2017c). “*Denmark to make final decision on participation in EU’s banking union by 2019*“. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/denmark-eu-banking-union/denmark-to-make-final-decision-on-participation-in-eus-banking-union-by-2019-idUSL8N1JV13M> (Reuters Staff 2017c)

- Rosamond, Ben (2016). *“The UK’s EU Renegotiation: View from Denmark”*. European Futures. Retrieved from: <http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-2883> (Rosamond 2016)
- Samuels, Gabriel (2016). *“EU membership support surges in Denmark after Brexit vote”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-membership-support-surges-in-denmark-after-brexit-vote-a7120271.html> (Samuels 2016)
- Sputnik International (2016a). *“Denmark in Two Minds About EU Amid Brexit Chain”*. Retrieved from: <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606281042062165-denmark-brexit-eu-dissatisfaction/> (Sputnik International 2016a)
- Sputnik International (2016b). *“Danish Red-Green Alliance Proposes Referendum on Future in EU After Brexit”*. Retrieved from: <https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606241041902533-brexit-denmark-referendum/> (Sputnik International 2016b)
- Sputnik International (2017). *“Denmark to Challenge UK Plan to Regain Control Over Waters After Brexit – FM”* Retrieved from: <https://sputniknews.com/europe/201704181052735475-denmark-uk-brexit/> (Sputnik International 2017)
- The Danish Parliament (2015). *“Results of the Danish election”*. Retrieved from: [http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/news/2015/06/2015\\_eng\\_results](http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/news/2015/06/2015_eng_results) (The Danish Parliament 2015)
- The Danish Parliament. *“The Danish opt-outs from EU cooperation”*. EU information centre. Retrieved from: [http://english.eu.dk/en/denmark\\_eu/danishoptouts](http://english.eu.dk/en/denmark_eu/danishoptouts) (The Danish Parliament)
- The Local (2016a). *“Danish People's Party signals support for leaving EU”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20161201/danish-peoples-party-signals-it-may-support-leaving-eu> (The Local 2016a)
- The Local (2016b). *“Danish bankers eye Brexit cash-in”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20160630/danish-bankers-eye-brexit-cash-in> (The Local 2016b)
- The Local (2017a). *“Denmark 'potentially most affected' by Brexit: PM”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20170421/denmark-potentially-most-affected-by-brexit-pm> (The Local 2017a)



- The Local (2017b). *“Denmark to apply for relocated London EU agency: minister”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20170330/denmark-to-apply-for-relocated-london-eu-agency-minister> (The Local 2017b)
- The Local (2017c). *“Danish minister: ‘We will not pay more’ to EU after Brexit”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20170328/danish-minister-we-will-not-pay-more-to-eu-after-brexite> (The Local 2017c)
- The Local (2017d). *“Danish parties call for deal to block EU referendum”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20170227/danish-partys-call-for-deal-to-block-eu-referendum> (The Local 2017d)
- The Local (2018a). *“Danish PM Rasmussen denies wrongdoing in new hearing over fishing quotas”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20180131/danish-pm-rasmussen-denies-wrongdoing-in-new-hearing-over-fishing-quotas> (The Local 2018a)
- The Local (2018b). *“‘Smaller EU should mean a smaller budget’: Danish PM”*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thelocal.dk/20180503/smaller-eu-should-mean-a-smaller-budget-danish-pm> (The Local 2018b)
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2017). *“Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017 – 2018”*. Retrieved from: <http://um.dk/en/news/NewsDisplayPage/?newsID=0D9827F1-0ADB-443B-9741-CA265A1E4EBF> (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2017)
- VOXeurop.eu (2018). *“Denmark and the Post-Brexit EU budget: Denmark Digs in”*. Retrieved from: <http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/2018/denmark-and-post-brexit-eu-budget-5121849> (VOXeurop.eu 2018)
- Wienberg, Christian. (2016). *“Denmark Dumped \$750 Million in Kroner in Hours Following Brexit”*. Bloomberg. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-28/denmark-dumped-750-million-in-kroner-in-hours-following-brexite> (Wienberg 2016)
- Willis, Ben (2014). *“The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis”*. E – International Relations Students. Retrieved from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-single-case-study-analysis/> (Willis 2014)
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi (2015). *“Infocore Definitions, Political Actors”*. Infocore. Retrieved from: [http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def\\_Political\\_Actors.pdf](http://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def_Political_Actors.pdf) (Wolfsfeld 2015)

- Worldsrichestcountries.com. “*World’s richest countries*“. Retrieved from:  
[http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top\\_denmark\\_exports.html](http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_denmark_exports.html)  
(Worldsrichestcountries.com)