

## Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between terrorist attacks committed by Islamic fundamentalists and their impact on attitudes to Refugees within the United Kingdom. In this work it was hoped that the question of the degree to which terrorism has directly affected refugees trying to enter Great Britain.

The paper explored ideas such as risk, othering, globalisation and moral panics by looking at current literature surrounding the subject matter. Drawing on the work of others in the field, and reports on public attitudes, the author was able to draw some conclusions. It was found that current attitudes to refugees are based on an underlying concern in the public's mind around the economic and cultural impact that migrant communities are having on the country.

The report also found evidence of a disparity between the facts around refugees and the way this is presented by the media and the political establishments. This has led to a growing fear of refugees which has been reflected in increases in hate crime directed towards migrants. It was also established that the language with which refugees are described is often vague with refugees and legal migrants being pooled together during much of the discussion.

Based on the research, it was recommended that a more clear and precise language was necessary when discussing these different groups and more of the positive aspects of migration into the country. In the field of how terrorism has impacted upon this, no clear conclusions were drawn but it was noted that an increase in violent crime and Great Britain's exit from the European Union may have been influenced by the public's concern for its safety.

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## Introduction

According to recent figures from the UNHCR, As of 2017, there are currently 65.6million displaced people in the world, of these, 17% or 11million are located within Europe. Numbers not seen since the height of the second world war when millions of predominantly jewish citizens fled Germany and Poland to escape the ethnic cleansing that was occurring there by the Nazi forces. Today, around 29,000 people are forced to flee their home everyday as a result of persecution, endangerment to their life and conflict and they are fleeing en mass predominantly from Syria into Turkey where around 2.9million refugees are being housed. The reason so many refugees are unable to leave turkey to join families or find safety elsewhere is as a result that Turkey is not part of the European Union and thus not part of its agreement of free movement between european union nationals.

In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union of which it it had been a key member of for over 40 years, one of the key reasons cited for them leaving was that Britain was unhappy with one of the core principles of the union, that of the free movement and the acceptance of refugees into the country. Some argued that high levels of migration were leading to social unrest and tension in the country and that terrorism is one way in which this had manifested itself. This thesis aims to explore this argument and assess some of its more prominent points to see whether there is any validity to these outcries.

This thesis will answer these questions in the following ways, we will begin by looking at some of the more abstract political ideas of terrorism and migration within Great Britain and further afield in europe. We will then look at the process of radicalisation of terrorists within the UK in the hope of understanding some of the reasons why an individual may commit terrorist attacks before finally looking at people's attitudes to fear of violence from refugees and ask if this is feeding into broader ideas of identity.

## **Problem Statement**

For over a decade, there has been a growing discord among some people within Great Britain that migrant values and British values are not compatible with one another and the idea that any society could be multi-cultural is a utopian ideal and no longer fit for purpose. They argue that the increasing amount of terrorist attacks within the United Kingdom support this argument and all migration from non-indigenous people should be heavily monitored and stopped.

On the other side of this argument are those who believe that it is only through understanding and learning about other cultures that we can try and limit the number of terrorist attacks happening and create a more peaceful society. They believe that stopping migrants and refugees from entering the United Kingdom is harmful to more people than is necessary. This growing tension between different ideas has led to a rapid growth in identity politics becoming a centrepiece of the political landscape in Great Britain.

## **Question Formulation**

Research Question: To what degree has terrorism impacted upon the treatment of refugees and migrants living in Great Britain and how is this related to broader ideas about identity?

WQ1: How have attitudes to migration and refugees within Great Britain been reflected at a broader geo-political level?

WQ2: How have changing attitudes to migration been reflected within local migrant communities.

WQ3: What have been the consequences of the way in which migrants are treated within the United Kingdom?

## **Objective**

The aim of this research is to gain an insight into the myriad of ways in which recent terror attacks in Great Britain have impacted upon refugees and migrants communities living there and to expand upon knowledge of how terrorism is shaping the lives of these communities and the effect it is having on these groups identity within Britain.

## **Limitations**

It is not within the scope of this research paper to propose a way of ideal way of approaching this complex question. Whilst some recommendations are suggested at the end of chapters, they are simply the writer's personal proposals that I have arrived at during my research. It is my hope to further explore some of these recommendations in the future to assess their worthiness and potential validity as solutions.

It should also be noted beforehand that the writer absolutely condemns in the strongest possible terms, terrorism and all acts of violence committed by individuals of any creed and that in writing about terrorism it is hoped that we might better understand some of the reasons that may motivate an individual to commit these acts. This understanding however is not a justification for these heinous crimes and that without speaking directly to those involved we might not ever fully understand their reasoning.

## Research Design

For this thesis, I will be using a predominantly exploratory research method. This method is often used in cases where a problem or idea needs to be further examined before any firm conclusions can be drawn. In a more concrete manner, I hope to review existing data and information on the relationship between terror and refugees before drawing any conclusions. I will also be using a theoretical lens with which to undertake my discourse analysis, by this I mean that i will use theory to guide my research and act as a lens regarding what I am looking at and draw conclusions and make assumptions based on personal theoretical knowledge.

My primary knowledge will come from existing work on the subject area and data sources will be the use of other peer reviewed journals that already exist on the subjects which will allow me to understand broad concepts and themes by looking at others work. Official reports will also play a large part of my work when I am mining for statistics, by not going out and undertaking my own research, i will of course be relying on data that is not my own, however I hope to use reputable sources and draw all conclusions by balancing the reports with other research. Finally, i will be using newspaper article for some subjects within the thesis, the reasons for this are twofold, firstly, newspapers and the media tend to either reflect public opinion or reflect onto the public their opinion, both of which are valuable insights into popular discourse. Secondly, newspaper articles tend to be more recent than journal articles and are a better gauge of public sentiment, certainly during my research many well regarded polls were undertaken by newspapers so their value should not be discounted, however, as with official reports, conclusions should be drawn with caution.

## Theoretical Framework

In this chapter we will be discussing some of the theories which we will use as a framework in our analysis, whilst there will also be other theories used throughout the analysis, where they will be explained more thoroughly,, these are the most prominent.

Late modernity, according to Giddens, differs from postmodernity in three key aspects; the first, is the separation of time and space where we have seen social relations move from a localised scale to a global scale and spatial awareness has turned problems of the world, such as climate change, into local issues. The second aspect of 'high modernity' is what Giddens calls 'disembedding mechanisms', these systems are made up of 'symbolic tokens' which is the idea of there being something local which is understood and has a standard value which can be traded on a global scale, and 'expert systems' which is the notion that certain groups within the world possess the technical knowledge that gives the group relative security that other collectives may not be able to access and are thus more at risk. Together, these mechanisms are known as 'abstract systems'. The final difference is the idea of 'institutional reflexivity' which Giddens (1991: 20) tells us is built of the concept of trust. As the world becomes more interconnected, we are subject to new 'abstract systems' and integrating with these new systems requires trust as the impact this new knowledge has on a local scale can generate change and in some cases, exclusion.

In his 1992 book "Risk Society" Ulrich Beck outlines the ideas of risk and what it entails in modern society. He argued that a by product on the 'institutional reflexivity' which Giddens discussed was that no longer did a society simply occupy a time or space, it now played a part in shaping and controlling the world around it for good or bad, this of course, required modern society to begin a process of 'risk management' so that there was a reduction in the harm associated with disbanding past traditions and the opening itself up to new ways and means. A result of this change, has been the threat to the ontological security of much of the population, where tradition forms of identity were fixed and solid, modernity signals a process of change and a constant state of flux.

Jock Young referred to this 'flux' as the "vertigo of late modernity" which is the idea that the standard of living of which you are accustomed to, could, at any moment and without warning, be ripped from your hands and your lifestyle would be thrown into disarray which,

by extension, would threaten any ideas you may have of your own identity. Sufferers of this 'vertigo' will feel the need to defend their lifestyle at all costs and this fear will materialise in the personality traits that individuals may exhibit such as pious following of the rules which may border on the obsessive compulsive, a mistrust of those who threaten the moral boundaries, such as law breakers, and more often than not a response to criminal behaviour which will be dealt in a vindictive and punitive manner disproportionate to what society has deemed suitable.

Howard Becker (1963) referred to those who were a threat to the 'ontological security' of a population as 'outsiders', those who exhibited deviant behaviour that did not conform with the rules and norms which most people found to be 'typical'. Of course, what constitutes as normal or not varies greatly depending on class, ethnicity, occupation or religion so when we talk about norms, what we are generally talking about is the dominant group within society imposing its values upon the general population whom it is assumed must agree on some level or else there would be constant conflict and transgressions. For the large majority of a nation, muslims feature prominently in the public conscience of who they deem to be outsiders, they are usually held as responsible for much of the deviant and antisocial behaviour which occurs in society which is seen as a threat to the social order of things.

Stanley Cohen famously wrote that "Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person, or group of person emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media..." (2002: 2) Cohen and Becker appear to be arguing the same thing, that there exists a group that poses a threat to societal norms and values, Cohen sees 'folk devils' as being labelled as deviant, then once typecast, their actions are interpreted through the role in which they have been assigned. The problem with this situation is twofold; firstly more often than not, those doing the labelling are middle or upper class 'moral entrepreneurs' and those being stigmatized are young working class muslims. Secondly, it only takes a minor incident to turn a folk devil into a moral panic which traditionally only occur once a risk has been clearly identified and the threat it poses



distorted and blown out of proportion. In recent times the most likely way this will happen is through the mass media and the way it reports information as so called 'facts'.

How the mass media portrays crime and terrorism in the late modern society is as much a contributing factors to criminal behaviour as the deviant themselves. Whether it is the glorification, denunciation or simple reporting of criminal behaviour, the media is always there to interpret these actions and present them in a stylised manner to the voyeuristic general public who eagerly lap it up and ask for more as if it were a commodity. Hewitt (1995)

Nowhere is this more prominent than in the presentation of muslims; whether they are fictional creations in films and television or reporting of muslims. They have become a strawman of those challenging the moral fabric that makes up british society and if migrants are continuously allowed unchecked access to Great Britain this could cause drastic irreversible change. We will now go on to present some contextualisation for the current refugee situation in Great Britain.

## Contextualisation

### Timeline of Terror Attacks in the United Kingdom

Terrorism can be generally described as any premeditated act in which the purpose is to inflict harm on the civilian population of a country to create an atmosphere of fear and threat that's purpose is to create a great deal of physical and sometimes psychological damage, the purpose of which can be for political, monetary , religious or ideological reasons.

The United Kingdom is no stranger to terrorism, as far back as the 1600's; Guy Fawkes tried to blow up the houses of parliament when King James 1<sup>st</sup> began passing laws that were detrimental to the wellbeing of the catholic population. More recently, Britain's biggest problem between the 1970's and the early 2000's was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who launched a campaign to get the British out of Northern Ireland was one of the longest and bloodiest in UK history.

Since 2005, nearly all terrorist acts on British soil have been committed by islamist extremists, below is a summary of these attacks;

**July 7th 2005** - During the morning rush hour four suicide bombers targeted commuters on their way to work when they detonated four bombs, one was used on a double decker bus and three were detonated on London's Underground transport system. The total fatalities for this incident was 52 and marked the first suicide bombing to occur on mainland british soil.

**June 30th 2007** - A 4x4 vehicle was loaded with propellants and driven into Glasgow international Airport where it was set on fire, whilst no civilians died, one of the two perpetrators did later die of burns whilst receiving medical treatment.

**May 22nd 2008** - A small bomb was detonated in a cafe in Exeter by a supposed Islamist extremist, there was only one injury.

**April 29th 2013** - For two months a Ukrainian student known as Pavlo Lapshyn, living in Birmingham committed a number of crimes around the area in the hopes of starting a race war. Firstly, he stabbed to death Mohammed Saleem a resident of Birmingham. On the 21st and 28th of June he attempted to blow up mosques in the towns of Walsall and Wolverhampton using a homemade bombs but both failed to injure anyone. Finally on the 12 July shortly before his capture he detonated a nail bomb outside of a mosque in Tipton where again nobody was injured.

**May 22nd 2013** - Off duty soldier Lee Rigby was brutally killed when two british men ran him down in a car and used bladed weapons to hack and butcher the unarmed soldier in the middle of the street. Their motivation was to repay the british army for the deaths of muslims overseas.

**December 5th 2015** - Muhyadin Mire attacked and seriously injured three people with a knife at a tube station in London in response to Britains ongoing involvement in the Syrian conflict.

**June 16th 2016** - A member of parliament, Jo Cox, was shot and killed whilst attending a local constituency meeting. The attacker, Thomas Mair was said to be part of a neo-nazi group National Action and shortly after were placed on the banned groups list by the British government.

**March 22nd 2017** - In an act of terrorism, a 52 year old british man, Khalid Masood motivated by Islamic Extremism, drove his car onto the pavement on westminster bridge killing five and injuring many others.

**May 22nd 2017** - During the concert of popstar Ariana Grande, Salmen Abedi committed a suicide bombing attack at the Manchester Arena killing 22 people and injuring hundreds more. Most of the victims were children with the youngest being just eight years old. The attacks were said to be motivated by ongoing british involvement in Syria.

**June 3rd 2017** - Three men wearing fake bomb vests drove a rented van into pedestrians on London Bridge critically injuring many people. Following the van crashing into a market, the assailants then left the vehicle and stabbed a number of others. The total fatalities for the

incident stood at 8 people. The three men were part of a banned extremist group al-Muhajiroun and supposedly were radicalised by watching videos on you tube.

**June 19th 2017** - A van was driven into a crowd near Finsbury Park Mosque, injuring eight and killing one person. The perpetrator was a Darren Osborne from Cardiff was racially motivated in his attacks and was quoted as shouting that he wanted to kill all Muslims. The attack has been treated as a terrorist incident and investigations are ongoing.

**September 15th** - A makeshift bomb was detonated on a train at the Parsons Green tube station in London, whilst the bomb failed to detonate properly and only caused a loud bang and blinding flash, it still managed to injure around 30 people. Although ISIS initially took responsibility for the attack, police later showed that the attacker probably operating alone and that the attacker was an 18 year old refugee who had previously been referred to a government anti-extremist programme.

## **Causes and patterns of migration in Great Britain and Europe**

One of the largest drivers and impacts of migration over the past 30 years, and to some extent supported by formation of the European Union is the concept of globalisation. But what defines globalisation? Dunne *et al* , discuss six core indicators of globalisation . These are; 1) Cross-border flows of people, goods, investment and information. 2) Interdependence between states. 3) Trans-national processes of political deliberation and decision making. 4) Development of institutions charged with responsibility for fashioning genuinely global public policy. 5) Development of world systems whose dynamic is not simply the product of the states whom comprise it. 6) The proliferation of problems to which global solutions are required. (2013: 294)

The impact of this interconnectedness has been the necessary formation of global supra organisations such as the United Nations as a way of formalising the interactions between countries and nations. Alongside the United Nations we have also seen the a number of trans-national organisations concerned with more specific areas such as the World Health Organisation and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. These organisations play an important role in creating and opening up cross country dialogue about global issues that transcend borders such as conflict, droughts, disease outbreaks and famine.

Of these, conflict remains the most common reason for families to flee their home and seek refuge elsewhere, the conflict in Syria is responsible for around 12million forcibly displaced people, the highest amount ever since since previous record holder Afghanistan was surpassed, where around 4 million refugees continue to be displaced to this day, and Somalia, where continuing political discord continues to uproot people, roughly 1.5million people so far in the decade long violence there. (UNHCR, 2016:03)

Aside from the main drivers of conflict and persecution, we have also seen a growing number of refugees entering Europe as a result of climate change and food insecurity, countries such as Sudan and South Sudan continue to displace millions every year in the

hope of finding food as a result of droughts and famine. However, the link between environmental disasters and migration is not always obvious or 'common sense', Individuals adapt in different ways to different situations and migration is usually the last resort after many other factors.

According to a paper published by Boano, C & Morris, T. (2008) It appears that there are four paths, in particular, by which environmental change may affect migration either directly or, more likely, in combination with other factors: 1. Intensification of natural disasters, such as hurricanes and cyclones that destroy housing and livelihoods and require people to relocate for shorter or longer periods; 2. Increased warming and drought that affects agricultural production, reducing people's livelihoods and access to clean water; 3. Rising sea levels that render coastal areas uninhabitable; and 4. Competition over natural resources that may lead to conflict, which in turn precipitates displacement.

Environmental refugees are not covered by the Article one of the UN Convention on refugees which states in article one that defines a refugee as "A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion..." (UNHCR, 2008: 2) This is a critical point as article one entirely on the idea that an individual is only a refugee if they have a fear of being persecuted, and as such refugees who do not fit with that definition, are not covered by the act. The reason that climate refugees were brought up is that in discussing them, we highlight the importance of power in defining refugees. As Hammar wrote concerning article one;

"...it privileged and prioritized refugees as a category of forced migrants that was to make invisible a much wider range of others affected by, and implicated in, processes of displacement. For example, it excluded recognition of forms of physical dislocation or forced (re) settlement generated not by wars or persecution but primarily by the political-economic interests of states or private corporations", Hammar (2014: 5).

By defining refugees, the convention has set a very narrow idea of who constitutes as a refugee and who does not and relates back to the way in which states are able to impact and control migrant flows and their movement. This also represents the who signatories of

the convention are responsible for and who they are not which draws a firm line in the sand over concepts of accountability at a trans-national level.

### **Analysis**

#### **WQ1: How have attitudes to migration and refugees within Great Britain been reflected at a broader geo-political level?**

We begin our analysis by looking at some of the broader issues facing refugees entering Britain. This section is mainly concerned with the political treatment and legislation regarding refugees and some of the recent developments in the area.

### **Hard Borders**

One of the more striking developments that have arisen in the ten years since large numbers of refugees have tried to enter Great Britain has been the wanton use of physical barriers to separate those who are and are not allowed to enter the United Kingdom. One of the core tenets of the EU is the idea enshrined in article 45 that citizens from all countries that are part of the European Union have a right to free movement so long as their movement complies with the Schengen Agreement. In reality though we have seen then, a growing interest and use by governments of increased formal security measures at borders such as fences, walls, surveillance and intelligence.

Whilst states have been primarily involved with implementing these measures, we have also seen "...the increasing involvement of contractual relations between states, on the one hand, and the IOM or private "security companies," on the other, all testify to the increasing importance of non-governmental actors in the regulation of migration." Xiang & Lindquist (2014: 134) along with the security companies we have also seen a rise in the number of NGOs and volunteer organisations who are assisting in the refugee crisis and providing humanitarian aid.

This mobilisation of outside actors is of some significance, it represents a shift away from the state's monopoly on security and also the ambivalence that states have towards the humanitarian needs of refugees. Instead, we have seen a rise in volunteer organisations that hope to fill the gap of the state. One area where this has been of particular concern is the rescuing of refugees from the Mediterranean Sea. According to Médecins Sans Frontières

/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) around 5,096 people went missing and are presumed to have drowned in the mediterranean sea during 2016, (MSF 2016: 04).

These people were refugees trying to cross from Africa or Turkey in the hope of reaching salvation but due to the poor quality of rafts and lack of safety equipment usually end up in trouble when their vessels reach open water. Frontex, the European Union's border and coastal protection agency has estimated that around 40% of all rescues of refugees at sea have been carried out by volunteer organisations such as Doctors without Borders and Sea Watch. (Frontex 2017) The remaining 60% of rescues are performed by either Libyan or Italian Coastguards, but even these are under increasing pressure to stop.

In 2017, desperate for help, the Italian government pleaded with other european countries to offer some assistance in the rescue and management of the tens of thousands of refugees arriving monthly. The other European countries declined to open their ports to the rescue boats, their reason, that the rescue boats were partaking in human smuggling and the trafficking of refugees.

There has also been a greater scrutiny placed on the Dublin Agreement, the agreement aims to "...determine rapidly the Member State responsible for an asylum claim and provides the transfer of an asylum seeker to that Member State." (UNHCR 2008) Usually, the member that that is responsible will be the initial state that the refugee first entered the European Union through. As a result of this, centrally located countries within europe, especially Great Britain, are more often than not, exempt from much of the Dublin agreement due to the fact that refugees need to travel through many european countries before they arrive.

As a result, european countries such as Greece and Italy are responsible for the vast majority of refugees that enter europe whilst countries on the border of europe, such as Turkey, are hosting nearly 2 million refugees alone. As of October 2017, the Dublin agreement is currently undergoing an assessment and possible changes to its structure and wording, how this will impact refugees is unclear but it is hoped that the idea of two countries alone bearing the burden is assessed.



## **Hard Policies**

We will now move on to discuss the changing political landscape in Great Britain where we have also seen an increase in changes being made to the rules and legislation surrounding refugees and their entrance into the United Kingdom. According to the Home Office the UK has, as of 2016 resettled 4,369 syrian refugees as a result of the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme. (2016: 04) However the total number of refugees being hosted in the United Kingdom is 119000 refugees which makes up less than 0.2% of the total refugees estimated to be worldwide. There has also been criticism to the asylum process within the UK with 55% of all cases being rejected and the refugees being returned to their country of origin.

Great Britain has also reneged on its commitment to what is known as the 'Dubs Agreement' which is concerned with child refugees. The agreement, which as an amendment to the Immigration Act required the British government to commit to taking in as much as 3000 unaccompanied child refugees who were in europe. (Home Office, 2016) However, after less than a year, and with only 350 minors being accepted, the agreement was withdrawn quietly.

The government at the time argued that they had done what was within the spirit of the agreement and that by keeping it in place for longer, they were incentivising young people to make dangerous journeys to the UK. However, others suggested that increasingly negative portrayal of the child refugees in newspapers such as the Telegraph (2016) may have influenced the government's decision to withdraw the agreement when they highlighted 'concerns' over proving the age of many of the refugees. As we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter, the media and its impact on refugees continues to be significant.

Elsewhere, we have also seen an impact in the area of money being spent on refugees and forced migrants. Certainly in the areas of what's being spent and more importantly, on where the money is being spent on we have seen a growing change since the 1970s. Whilst spending on refugees who enter the UK has stayed at broadly the same levels over the past

30 years, Britain is increasingly spending money on its foreign aid and development. According to recently published papers on foreign aid from the Home Office (2017) the government spends around £13 billion or 0.7% of GDP on foreign aid each year, which has risen dramatically from the 0.3% of the 1970s. (2017:13)

According to the paper this money is spent in the following ways, around 16% goes to short term humanitarian aid, or emergency relief, whilst the remaining goes to support long term development goals. The five main beneficiaries of the money are Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with the United Nations being the primary receiver of the money as a multilateral organisation. The idea that a greater proportion of money should be spent on overseas development aid arose out of the desire to reduce the burden of refugees on the local British economy. The idea was that by keeping refugees in their host countries or by hopefully investing in the countries to stop refugees being created in the first place that Great Britain could lower its responsibility to take in greater amounts of asylum seekers.

Another alarming policy change that was recently brought in by the Prime Minister Theresa May in 2017 was an amendment to the policy of refugees being given permanent status within the United Kingdom when she announced to her party at their annual conference that “We’ll introduce strengthened ‘safe return reviews’ – so when a refugee’s temporary stay of protection in the UK comes to an end, or if there is a clear improvement in the conditions of their own country, we will review their need for protection.” (Theresa May in The Guardian 2017)

This shift, critics argue, risks the idea that refugees are ever able to truly settle or integrate into the United Kingdom when the constant fear of being made to leave is hanging over their heads and that the change in policy does not reflect the fact that many refugees already want to return home, but only when it is safe to do so, instead, it creates a expensive and bureaucratic puzzle that is unnecessary at best, and damaging to the refugees at its worst. (The Independent. 2017)

## **Hard Attitudes**

We have also witnessed a growing concern from the general public about the need to have a tighter grasp on our border. The 2016 British Social Attitudes survey proves to be quite illuminating in this regard, with a wealth of data with which we can draw on. The report, which is made every year and survey thousands of British residents from a diverse number of backgrounds asks questions about issues and themes that have been relevant throughout the year and to date is one of the best gauges of public opinion on a wide variety of matters. For 2016 the report asked people about attitudes towards migration, and unsurprisingly, the results were interesting.

The report found that despite a significant increase in migration to the United Kingdom since 2002, attitudes towards migration have largely stayed the same, with more people supporting the idea that migrants have a positive economic impact which is around 4 points ahead in most polls,, however there has also been an increase in perceived negative impact upon culture that migrants bring, with people being more skeptical by around four points . There is also the long standing belief that migrants impact upon crime levels negatively, which while gradually changing, is still very much a pessimistic belief and not reflected in official crime data.

The report also shows that whilst attitudes to migrants have broadly stayed the same, there is now a much greater focus on being more selective with which migrants should be allowed to enter and which should leave, with a dramatic increase in the importance given to respecting cultural norms, such as being able to speak English which rose from 77% to 88% and a desire to commit to a British way of life which rose from 78% to 84%. (BSA 2016: 18) The report also re-enforced other data about the British EU referendum which shows a growing divide between young university graduates who overwhelmingly voted to remain a part of the EU and older uneducated school leavers who voted to leave the European Union, this point is one worth coming back to and one which we will discuss later on.

However, the previous data is only concerned with legal migration from within the EU, data on attitudes to refugees is a little harder to come by, but the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration decided to look at some of the trends towards refugees over the previous 30 years, unfortunately the report is only as recent as of 2013 so it doesn't quite represent the most up to date opinions on an ever evolving field, but it does give us some new ideas to understanding public attitudes to migration in the present day.

Firstly, the report suggests that quite a lot of public attitudes to refugees and migrants is based on both a poor use of language and and overly negative representation in the media, this was shown in one particular poll which said that refugees or migrants made up around 24% of the British population when in reality the number was much closer to 2%. (2013: 3) They cited an increasing confusion in the language used by respondents, where terms like 'asylum seeker' 'refugee' and 'migrant' were used interchangeably and without regard to their differences while in reality, the numbers of refugees makes up a tiny proportion of total migrant numbers and that attitudes to the groups varies widely depending on the language used.

The report also proposes three possible situations that can hold a strong influence over an individual's attitudes to refugees. The first proposes that there is a linear relationship in so much as the hostility directed towards immigrants increases in proportion with the number of immigrants within a community.. Secondly, the 'shock effect', whereby people are initially shocked by a change in local communities and the racial profile that makes them up, but overtime, this shock dissipates along with the hostility over time as individuals become 'used' to migrants.Finally they claim that there could be a tipping point in some communities where migration is tolerated to a certain point but once an imagined threshold has been crossed, intolerance and hostility rapidly increase. (2013: 13)

This final hypothesis could be seen as being reflected in the growing number of anti-immigration parties that make up the political landscape such as UKIP, Britain First and the English Defense League, who have at some time or another all been accused of being nationalistic and bigoted. The parties however claim to be shining a spotlight on the perceived difference that their members have regarding migration and the official position of the so called establishment in relation to policies on forced migration.

To summarise this section, we have shown that the British government, along with other European countries, has placed a renewed focus on control measures placed upon its borders. With a greater use of fences and surveillance, the country has tried to drastically control the flow of migrants through the use of non-state actors and legislation whilst also reducing the help directed at refugees in the Mediterranean.

The shift in legislation has also seen a removal of amendments that would help refugees relocate, such as the Dubs agreement and a relatively high proportion of asylum seekers' applications being declined. Alongside this, the British Government also hopes to reduce the number of long-term refugees within Britain by increasing spending in overseas development aid and also through the introduction of the five-year review. Both these measures are quite recent so how they affect migration flows in the long run remains to be seen.

Finally, we also discussed a changing of people's attitudes towards refugees with a far more strict set of guidelines as to what qualifies as a refugee and more focus being placed on migrants as a whole. Whilst attitudes to migrants have remained consistent over the previous decade, there has been a polarisation in opinions related to both the economic impact made by refugees, positive and negative, and their influence over the culture of British society, with more people wanting refugees to accept a 'British way of life'. This change of attitudes has also been reflected at the election polls with an increase in anti-immigration parties within British politics.

## **WQ2: How have changing attitudes to migration been reflected within local communities?**

### **Challenges of Integration**

The transition from immigrant to citizen is not an easy one. There are many challenges associated with the status of being a refugee or migrant. Depending on the status which you have, you may have access to different rights and means to integrate into society. The shift over the past two decades in Europe suggests that refugees are now seen as long term guests and not potential citizens as was highlighted by the shift in policy to the five year review that we discussed in the previous chapter.

Along with this shift, another issue has also arisen; the idea of whether newly located individuals are capable of integrating with local society. In the broadest possible terms, integration of one culture into another occurs when the new culture is said to enhance and improve the host culture, however, in a 2016 report by Dame Louise Casey on integration of Muslim communities in the United Kingdom, a number of startling discoveries were made such as around 50% of British citizens live in areas with very high migration and low levels of social cohesion (2016: 8) and that the cost of communities being poorly integrated costing the economy around £6 billion a year. (2016: 19). With this in mind the report underscores the importance of integration by going on and telling that;

“...where communities live separately, with fewer interactions between people from different backgrounds, mistrust, anxiety and prejudice grow. Conversely, social mixing and interactions between people from a wider range of backgrounds can have positive impacts; not just in reducing anxiety and prejudice, but also in enabling people to get on better in employment and social mobility.” (2016: 32)

Of course, there are also those within the communities that argue that what greater society is really demanding is assimilation, not integration, and that this lack of understanding of local practices is what drives fear and insecurity. Assimilation then is a process where the migrant communities, by adopting and integrating broader society's norms and values, becoming

indistinguishable from other parts and society, essentially being absorbed by the host culture. Writers such as Giles Fraser (The Guardian, 2016) also argue that when we talk about integration, we are talking about the occasional ability to put on ethnic dress, get down a christmas tree or enjoy some caribbean food but once all is said and done, the dominant hegemonic idea must be returned and adhered to as we return to our shared values.

While we have discussed culture, or reactions to crime, in relation to late modernity, it is perhaps prudent at this time that we also give some attention to the criminals themselves who may offer us an insight into some of the other symptoms associated with contemporary society. In "The Exclusive Society" (1999) Jock Young argues that one of the consequences of globalisation is that of it inducing and perpetuating social exclusion within a society. Unlike the 'golden age' of high employment, job security and stable relationships which offered individual's strong social bonds, feelings of certainty about their future and an attachment to their local community with a desire to understand the 'outsiders'; late modernity only accorded individuals economic and ontological insecurities and generated a predilection to exclude the deviants whom they felt threatened by.

During a discussion with Peter Dole, a Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) working on behalf of the South Wales Police (SWP) undertaking outreach work in muslim communities in Cardiff told me this when I asked about the importance of community and isolation;

"... one of the positive side effects of being on the street is that occasionally we will here something about a young individual who residents feel is at risk of becoming radicalised, either because they are loners or because they don't take part in many of the activities within the community, in most cases it's nothing but occasionally, we will need to do some person centred outreach work with particular individuals. I've found that following some of the recent terrorist incidents involving young muslims, my local community are usually more open and willing to tell me of anyone they are concerned about".

Peter's words bear some repeating as we have someone who is actively working in a muslim community in Cardiff which hosts around half of all Muslims in Wales he valued the importance of social bonds and community as a way to limit radicalisation among young people. Peter also told me of another issue that he has found on his regular patrol has been

a reported increase in verbal abuse directed at muslims on his patrol route, a trend he says doesn't seem to be abating.

One fact that cannot be ignored is the phenomenon of foreign fighters leaving the United Kingdom to head to Syria, where current data demonstrates that among these individuals who leave, they are most second or third generation immigrants that have few or no prior connections to Syria or Iraq. (Silverman, T, 2015) Whilst we will discuss the rise in foreign fighters in a chapter further on, it is interesting to note that the majority who leave tend to come from migrant communities, this suggests a low or weak attachment to their local communities which as we discussed earlier that this social exclusion can lead to deviant behaviour such as radicalisation.

### **The Increase in hate and violent crime**

According to official guidelines put forward by the Criminal Justice System and the Metropolitan Police, Hate crime is defined as 'any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic.' (Crown Prosecution Service, 2007) and "can include any group defined by race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origin, including countries within the UK, and Gypsy or Irish Travellers. It automatically includes a person who is targeted because they are an asylum seeker or refugee as this is intrinsically linked to their ethnicity and origins. Policy and legislation takes a 'human rights' approach and covers majority as well as

minority groups"(College of Policing, 2014). These definitions are important if we are to understand the ramifications of hate crime.

Media representations of muslims within the United Kingdom can be viewed as a backlash to the apparent loss of authority that the privileged classes felt and an attempt by moral guardians and government to regain some level of control over the 'outsiders'. Historically, crime is seen as the result of the deviance of an individual and it was the state's responsibility to punish a criminal using whatever means were deemed appropriate, however, over the course of the 1970's and 1980's a change started to occur, and crime



began to be seen as a social problem and as such should be dealt with in a social manner.

Instead of simply punishing an individual for being radicalised, suddenly this criminal act was seen as a failing of society to the person who committed the crime, and as such, questions were asked about what could be done to improve the quality of life for those most at risk of transgressions. Focus was instead placed on organisations outside of the criminal justice systems as a means of dealing with radicalisation, with an increase in the amount of non-custodial sentences that were being passed and an attitude of community solutions for community problems, great swathes of new, publicly funded bodies were created and the emphasis was placed on preventative policing. Muncie *et al* (2001) Due to recent developments however, we have begun to see a winding of the clocks back 30 years and a renewed emphasis on being politicians and law enforcement being 'tougher on crime' and an increasingly more punitive way of punishing those who break the law, download or read radical literature and disrupt the social order.

In his 2001 book, "The Culture of Control", David Garland argues that, while we have seen a return to the old rhetoric of 'law and order' these new measures of 'expressive punishment' have evolved to incorporate the requisite of late modernity in a number of ways; firstly, the idea that the sentences you are dealt for your crimes should be longer and served with only the very basic human rights being given to you is the preferred mentality of increasingly vindictive justice system.

Secondly, another point Garland (2001: 142) makes is that "...law and order has become more populist and politicised. Policy measures are constructed in ways that privilege public opinion over criminal justice experts and professional elites." We now see the politics of crime reduced to 'sound bites' with only the most prominent issues of disorder being discussed in bite-sized segments with none of the research, costing and projections being completed as is the way with other policies.

The final feature of criminal justice in modern society is the privileged place afforded to the victim in way we have never before seen. No longer is terrorism and radicalisation tackled because of its social problems, now politicians are fighting crime for the individuals who have died in terrorist attacks, and are committed to preserving their memory, expressing

their anger and addressing their fears. This sanctification of the victims serves two purposes; it turns the casualty into a commodity which can be bought, exchanged or used as a way of 'purchasing' political brownie points while it also serves the purpose of twisting any objections to reactionary legislation in the name of public displays as if they are further attacks upon the victims themselves.

On the streets we have seen an increase in the number of nationalist, anti-immigration groups. These groups tend to have strong biases toward migrants and refugees and actively use online and offline mediums to demonstrate the ways in which they are a problem and how they should be dealt with. Before we digress further, it is worth exploring the way in which these groups form and become a hub for particular sentiments or ideas. According to The Five-Step Social Identity Model of the Development of Collective Hate by Reicher, Haslam, & Rath (2008) which is based in social identity theory, they suggest a number of ways in which individuals come to see themselves as part of a particular group or belief system.

The first stage they argue is *Identification* which involves the "creation of a cohesive in-group through shared social identification, which is the psychological basis of group action where group members behave in accordance with group beliefs, values and norms, and expect others to do the same". (2008: 1336)

This is followed by the second stage *Exclusion*, where specific groups of people are excluded from the group and discriminated against. Perceiving and defining the out-group as a physical or existential threat, "a danger to the existence of the in-group" constitutes the third stage, *Threat*. The fourth stage is termed *Unique Virtue* and involves depicting the ingroup as "uniquely virtuous" which, when contrasted with the "alien and threatening [out-group] actively facilitated and radicalized out-group hatred" (p. 1336).

The final stage, *Celebration*, represents the total destruction of the out-group (in perceived defense of the in group virtue) – "In this moral universe, those who kill have moral strength and those who don't are morally suspect" (p. 1337). (2010: 9-10) This model shows how people have a tendency to merge with other groups and absorb their values and identities, thus showing how social identity plays such an important role. This model is an important

one to note because, as we will see later, it can be applied equally to any group of extremists, not just protest groups.

### **Government Statistics on Hate Crime**

According to recently published government data, the number of crimes committed towards muslims and other ethnic minorities in Britain is on the rise whilst the data also shows some rather worrying trends. This report is one of the most important documents available in understanding hate crime in the United Kingdom, the data presented within comes from the Police themselves and whilst not all crime is going to be able to be recorded, especially due to the sensitive nature of the subject, it does give a good indication of overall trends.

The “2016/2017 Annual report on Hate Crime for England and Wales” O’Neill, A. (2017) tells us that in 2017 there were 80, 393 hate crimes recorded over the period, an increase of 29% from the previous year. Of the recorded data, the police have separated the data into five different strands, race, sexual orientation, religious, disability and transgender type crimes. Within the data then, it is possible for a crime to have been flagged up for one type of crime but may have also had a secondary motivating or aggravating factor such as when there is hostility to an individual's race and religion such as muslim migrants.

Over the past five years we have seen a general increase in racially motivated crimes in Britain with 35,944 crimes being recorded in 2012, 42,862 in 2015 and a surge up to the highest level recorded of 62,685 cases in 2017. Alongside this police have also recorded a 35% increase, 5,949 cases up from 4,400, in religiously motivated hate crimes between 2016 and 2017. Within the report, they also highlight trends and patterns of the crimes, one of the most startling is that there is a surge of racially or religiously motivated offences following terrorist attacks such as the one on Lee Rigby in 2013 or Westminster Bridge 2017.

Police do not provide exact victim profiles of those who reported the crime, but they do go on to say that taking into account aggravated and non-aggravated offences, there does seem to be a real spike in crimes after these attacks. one can deduce from their timing and news reports at the time that these hate crimes were targeted at muslim and minority groups. The police report does tell us however that the crimes committed upon these

individuals were more likely to be dealt with in court, reflecting their more serious nature, with 22% of the crimes relating to assault.

Police also witnessed a surge in racially and religiously motivated hate crime around the time of the British EU Referendum between April 2016 - July 2016. The police recorded an increase in racially and religiously motivated hate crime from 3,256 in April to a peak of 5,527 following the EU referendum results. The referendum itself is worthy of exploring later on so we will return to this subject later, suffice to say that real anxieties and fears around the time of the referendum have been really captured by criminal data sources.

Another, less obvious place we have also seen a rise is the online space, 2016/2017 saw the first time that the police have tried to capture and record some of the hate crime which takes place online, the police do note that it is experimental information collection at the time, but the results do bear some repeating and in fact are our only source of official statistics on the matter so whilst in their infancy are still important.

They noted that around two percent, or 1,067 of all hate crime committed had an online element to it, with race and religion both making up the majority of the crimes committed just like their offline counterparts. Race was said to be a contributing factor in 671 of these crimes, whilst religion was responsible for 132 of them. Another point worth noting is that 1% of all violence against a person that was recorded also had an online element associated with it, usually with the victim being harassed or threatened online before the physical assault. Again, it's worth repeating that this data is in its infancy and we should be careful not to draw too many conclusions from it, but going forward this is an area worth exploring.

### **Multiculturalism or mono-culturalism?**

One argument that consistently arose when researching the way in which conflict occurs between migrant communities and homogenous ones is the ideas of multiculturalism. Before people could travel, they needed to be settled in cultural centres, these centres did not exist until contact from the outside created boundaries and communities and established what was 'homogenous'. Traditional arguments claim that cultures have always existed within larger systems but have remained autonomous until outside contact, while

contemporary arguments argue that culture is created by the movement of people and increasing globalisation, by moving, people take with them and create culture which is seen as an object.

However, Ideas that before globalising, communities are 'pure' and 'untouched' may be naive, Culture is taken out of context, in museums, culture is displayed factually and without depth of meaning, removed from its settings it becomes objectified. Other cultures are interpreted and judged by our own standards, but this does not account for the personal identities of migrants to come through. Anthropologists begin to apply meaning to objects or cultures, for example, a tribal mask is representative of all of Papua New Guinea, a curry house is representative of all of India, we idealise these cultures and take them as homogenous.

One anthropologist, Jonathan Friedman in his 2002 paper 'From roots to routes: Tropes for Trippers' tackled the issue of multiculturalism in society, in this he tells us that borders are perhaps the most responsible for creation of culture, defining boundaries and civilizations by geography, thus the movements of migrants across transnational borders said to dissipate culture and when mixed with other 'cultures' creates a multicultural society. In western and developed cultures, multiculturalism has been seen as progressive and wanted, the decline of the nation and emergence of one world was desired but this grossly simplified issues and did not account for localised problems. When we call a society multi-cultural, we risk oversimplifying complex issues and romanticising some aspects of cultures whilst neglecting to acknowledge others. Essentially, we appropriate the bits of culture we like, usually the food in the United Kingdom, whilst casting aside the other less compatible elements.

This raises some interesting points,, we need to look at who is defining a culture or society as multicultural, in Great Britain we have seen many calls from politicians and the middle classes for everyone to embrace different cultures, however for these people, who often have access to and the ability to live trans-locally, are they able to enjoy the rewards of multi-culturalism with none of the drawbacks. Whilst some get to reap the benefits, others are left to face the consequences of migration in certain communities. These people, who

are on the sharp end of this mixing of cultures sometimes try to express some of these difficulties and challenges will oftentimes be called un-progressive or backwards.

Nowhere was this disconnect seen more than during the 2016 British EU referendum where according to data obtained by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) there were very clear delineations between different demographics and their voting patterns. According to their 2017 report on understanding why individuals voted leave, they break down the demographic of who voted leave into categories. To summarise, the report found that;

“The Leave victory was not about demographics alone, though it is clear that age, levels of education, income and newspaper readership are all related to the likelihood of voting Leave. Matters of identity were equally, if not more strongly associated with the Leave vote particularly feelings of national identity and sense of change in Britain over time, (Swales, K. 2017: 14)”

Delving a little deeper, whilst there was a trove of important data to be found within the report, some of the most striking information they found related to class. The report established that those with no formal education, or only secondary level made up 68% of the leave vote, they also found that leave voters typically lived in rented accommodation with around 63% living in either private or local council provided rental accommodation. The report also found that 66% of leave voters earned a monthly income of £1200 or less. This tied in with the statistic that 70% of leave voters were suffering financial hardship and were struggling to make ends meet.

Considering the above, it's no wonder that economic reasons made up 21% of the primary reason to vote leave with migratory issues coming in a close second with 20% of leave votes placing it as the primary reason. The report then, supports much of what was previously said regarding mobility playing a role in shaping British attitudes, those more affluent and able to enjoy the benefit of free movement are the ones most likely to have voted remain, whilst those who were economically disadvantaged were more likely to vote leave.

## **Foreign Fighters, Domestic Terrorism and Risk**

Before proceeding we should clearly define what is meant when we discuss the concept of Terrorism. It is the subject of much debate and reconceptualising, but Aven, T., & Guikema, S. (2015) make what this writer deems to be the best approximate of what does and does not define terrorism. In their paper “On the Concept and Definition of Terrorism Risk” they define terrorism as “an act of violence or the threat of violence with the goal of inciting terror to achieve a stated or implicit political, religious, or ideological goal” (2015: 3).

That is in itself a pretty broad and standard definition, it is in their discussion about how these definitions are arrived at that they prove most illuminating. They tell us that traditional definitions of Terrorism seem to be based on a probability scale and does not account for the intersection between individual responses and organisational structures. With that in mind we proceed to discuss how governmental responses to terror and local terrorist attacks have become intertwined.

Before that however we should turn our attention to the notion of ‘risk’ and how this has been reconfigured over the past couple of decades to fit into the present day situation we find ourselves. Risk, or more specifically, risk management is the idea that by analysing a number of threats that would have a negative impact on society and then finding ways to either reduce or eliminate the ability of that threat through pre-emptive action, society is able to function a more predictable manner which while being good for the population, was also a far more reliable way of conducting business or running a government. (Sparks, 2000) Traditionally, this was an easy process to understand and maintain, threats were often localised events that were easily recognised and followed predictable patterns, and the chance of any risk being too unmanageable was unlikely. However, during the late 80’s and

early 90's society began to undergo a period of hyper globalisation which is still occurring today the nature of risk changed rapidly.

Suddenly society began to change rapidly; national economies began to get intertwined with other national economies, the ability to travel long distances easily and cheaply meant an increase in the numbers of people moving between borders, cultures and religions began to getting into conflict with one another as western ideologies were not seen as compatible with eastern philosophies, new information and knowledge became a daily occurrence happening to millions of people and rolling 24 hour news became a reality. This posed a whole new set of problems for risk management and Fischbacher & Smith (2009: 2) went some way in describing these problems by outlining five key challenges specific to identifying risks in this new world. The first point is that these new risks no longer had any borders or followed and locally agreed sets of rules, secondly is that new risks often lacked any prior evidence that would make them predictable to any great degree of accuracy, the third is that these risks are large enough to warrant concern in terms of the size of damage they are able to inflict both presently and repercussions further down the line, the fourth key component is their origins, nature and symptoms are an unknown quantity, so are difficult to define and predict and finally, as a result of these new unknown threats, new knowledge is constantly required so that the risks can be evaluated and dealt with.

But what does this mean for terrorism? For terrorism itself it means that as a result of this rapidly expanding globe in which we live, vulnerabilities in new emerging economies are quick and easy to be exploited for the purposes of causing havoc and mayhem and punishment for the culprits is difficult to obtain as these new 'borderless societies' mean that the movement of masses of people between nations happens on an enormous scale which makes it difficult to keep track of dangerous people or organisations. (Hughes, 1998) One of the other emerging issues of globalisation in terrorism has been the transformation of local problems into global issues and global problems into local issues, no longer is radicals ideologies incompatibility with western values a small scale problem of immigration, it is now an international battle of wills between two competing viewpoints with the conflicts taking place in local communities around the world.



For the agencies involved in stopping these gross acts of terrorism however, this new battle of nations means new approaches in tackling terrorism, for the police in the United Kingdom there has been a shift in how these issues are tackled. Petersson (2012: 5) claims that the most prominent way in which policing has changed as a result of the change in the nature of risk is the formation of a new strategy which we will discuss later on.

Of course, the increase in the number of individuals becoming radicalized at home does not account for the desire for some of these individuals to commit attacks whereby they are killed in the process of killing others, suicide bombers was the original term used but has now gone on to encompass any attack where an individual is unafraid to be killed. Before proceeding further, it's important to understand the significance and way in which we talk about suicide bombers, that is, can we talk about suicide bombers without completely condemning them at all times? To find an answer, we can look at the work done by Ghassan Hage on Palestinian suicide bombers. In his 2003 paper where he is coming to terms with talking about suicide bombers, the writer tells us that;

“In this phobic culture where everything is viewed as either threatening and in need of extermination or threatened and in need of protection, there is an invasion of the order of the border. From the borders of the self to the borders of the family, friendship, neighborhood, nation, and all the way to the borders of Western civilization, everything and everywhere is perceived as a border from which a potentially threatening other can leap.”  
(Hage, 2003: 86)

This is an important point that is being made, what Hage is implying is the idea that this has turned all discussion surrounding terrorist attacks into an them vs us paradox whereby the attackers are stripped of any logical reasoning. They are said to commit primitive, senseless violence upon society and Ideas of 'community' and 'nation' become more important than the individuals who constitute it. In most of the discourse surrounding the various attacks in Britain, at no point is an attempt to understand the reasoning behind these attacks made.

It seems as though, as was the case with the writer, that this in group vs out group mentality meant you were unable to discuss the reasons why an individual may commit an attack without condemning them in the most absolute way. It has become a case of trying to understand why must mean that you are trying to justify the why. It also opens up the

question of the legitimacy of violence and the way in which the state has a monopoly on violence whilst individuals are removed of agency.

### **Britain's involvement in Syria**

On the 3rd of December, 2015, the British parliament, then headed by prime minister David Cameron hosted an all day debate on whether Great Britain, along with the United States should join a coalition of countries that would perform airstrikes on Syria in the hope of helping to eliminate the threat that was coming from ISIS in Syria. The vote passed with a majority of MP's despite a strong consensus that Great Britain should not be involved and in January, Britain sent a number of planes and drones to Syria to begin the campaign.

Since then, we have seen a large number of strikes on the country committed by the allied forces, however in May 2017 it became clear that an increasing number of the strikes were harming innocent civilians with a record of 225 people, some 36 women and 44 children were also killed as a result of 'friendly fire' in this month alone, McKernan, B, (2017).

This killing of civilians cannot be overlooked for its importance in generating terrorism and violence within the United Kingdom and elsewhere. In a stabbing attack in July 2005 and during the shootings that took place at Notre Dame In Paris witnesses both claim they heard the attackers shout that 'This is for Syria' whilst committing their acts of terror. Dearden, L, (2017)

Then if we look at the Parsons Green Attack which while not fatal, did cause a large number of injuries, this was committed by an 18 year old orphan refugee from Iraq, another country which Britain was part of a coalition in and one in which more innocent civilians died. It not that this writer is suggesting that British overseas involvement and the reasons behind the

attacks are mutually exclusive, simply that this suggests then that Great Britain's, and other countries involvement in the coalition in Iraq and Syria does have far reaching implications.

When we fail to understand the consequences of the state's use of power and violence, nor do we criticise or discuss the arbitrariness in which it wields this power then we can say that the state has a monopoly on this. This is problematic because as we mentioned earlier, this unquestioning attitudes leads to a phobic fear where the state is using its best means to eliminate the threat of violence without us questioning why it is doing so. In not understanding the state's role in shaping radical attitudes and instead using a positivist individualistic explanation as to why individuals commit terror attacks we fail to understand the process of radicalisation and any hopes of stopping future radicalisation.

### **Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation**

An effective working definition of radicalisation is that it is a “social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology” (Horgan, 2009c, p. 152). In Great Britain, the number of young people exposed to and being radicalised is increasing, in the hope of stemming this tide the British Government turned to the work of Silber M and Bhatt A (2007) who were based in New York and their work on the radicalisation process. In their paper they highlighted the four phases of the radicalisation process; pre-radicalisation, self identification, indoctrination and jihadization which will now be briefly outlined.

The pre-radicalisation phase consists of understanding where in their life a person is before being exposed to radical material, this is often seen as the point of departure in most anti-radicalisation programmes but should be the primary focus for more successful treatment. The next step on the journey is self identification, at this stage, individuals open themselves up to alternative worldviews and attitudes usually following a situation whereby their identity and place of belonging is thrown into crisis.

During the third step of indoctrination, whilst the individual is receptive to new ideas, they usually find a common cause with other like minded individuals and is the point where their belief system intensifies to the point where they deduce that a set of conditions or

circumstances exists and it is their responsibility to assist in or support the cause. Finally, the individual reaches a point where they are ready for jihadization, unlike the previous steps that can take months or years, this step is usually taken in a matter of weeks. During this stage, an individual will accept it is their duty to participate in the cause and will become self described holy-warriors.

Now that we have an understanding of the way in which a young person can become radicalised, we may better understand the relationship between radical behaviour and some migrant communities. However, it must be stated that whilst this radicalisation process tends to refer to islamist extremism and that kind of radicalisation, the process of becoming a violent extremist can and does happen to many different groups and individuals from a variety of races and backgrounds, gangs, football hooligans and far right nationalists all to some extent believe that violence is a solution to their problems. It is not within the scope of this essay to go into these different types of radicalisation but the author felt it may be prudent to mention this before continuing.

As a counter to domestic radicalisation and built upon the work of Silber M and Bhatt A (2007), in 2007 a new strategy was created called PREVENT with the aim to "...reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence." (2007: 08) Central to this strategy are the four mantras of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Each one of these mantras has had a specific effect on policing within the United Kingdom but at its core, the strategy aims to stop a terrorist attack before it has even occurred.

Mainly, it seeks to challenge the terrorist ideology so it has increased the information and laws available to the police who are tackling terrorism on a local level which has allowed them to take action against those groups who are radicalising people into their ideology, the public speakers who use public platforms to spout their radical views and those who condone such extremist behaviour. However, critics argue that the definition of what constitutes as terrorism is too broad and actually infringes on the rights of individuals free speech when these laws and powers are misused. Article 19 is one such group who believe that these powers are too restrictive and argue that the definition of terrorism can be used

to include legitimate gatherings or protests which, while being ideologically driven and can be intimidating, do not necessarily count as a terrorist gathering and as such sees these laws as repressive and disproportionate. (Article 19, 2016: 05)

Another criticism of PREVENT has been the idea that it simply means that a person may only display the attributes of someone who is not radicalised while still holding radical beliefs. As (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek, 2010. p.6) wrote, "A true (and successful) de-radicalization program should therefore produce a change in an individual's underlying beliefs, not simply a change in behaviour...behaviour can change while objectives remain constant." This distinction between de-radicalisation and disengagement from action is a clear and important distinction to be made as they represent two sides of very different coins.

However, the biggest criticism levelled at the PREVENT strategy is that as it has 'widened the net' to catch a greater number of individuals involved with terrorism and terrorist organisations within the United Kingdom, it has also narrowed down on who that net is targeting, specifically that of the Muslim population. In his book "Muslim Britain (2005)" Tahir Abbas outlines how the 'war on terror' became a 'crusade against Islam' and the negative effect this has had on many of the individuals living here in the United Kingdom is that many feel more isolated and victimised than ever before.

As a result of this discrimination, Muslims were three times more likely to be stopped and searched by police under the guise of counter terrorism and because of some incorrect media representations of the Islamic population in Great Britain; there has been a surge in anti – Islam sentiments in western societies. In one report (2015) the writer elaborated on how this increased hostility towards the Muslim population by the general public and the police has created alienation and resentment of authority in large parts of the Islamic communities in Britain, specifically concerning young Muslim men. This process of placing these men at the very fringes of society means that they pose the greatest risk of being converted to more dogmatic forms of Islam and may go on to create further problems for police in the United Kingdom.

Another way in which radicalised individuals are contributing to terrorist causes is by going abroad and becoming foreign fighters. At present there are an estimated 20,000 foreign

fighters in Iraq and Syria. A foreign fighter is usually a British citizen who after exposure to radical material will join ISIS in Syria or Iraq, at present around 700 people are said to have left the United Kingdom to join in combat abroad, the largest number since the conflict in Afghanistan during the 1980's. Neumann (2015).

In Tanya Silverman's excellent 2015 report into the need for community approaches to countering foreign fighters, she tells us that whilst there is no particular demographic associated with those who are likely to go abroad to fight, they do generally appear to be young, with an average age of 25 for males and 21 for females. She also explains that one of the key reasons that she found young people left to go fight abroad was the search for an identity and belonging that their local community isn't providing. To counter this she proposes that sometimes top down government approaches do not work because they fail to understand the complexities and problems that some local communities suffer from and that by working locally with the appropriate institutions some of these issues can be resolved through the use of local knowledge and skills.

So far we have shown the both the importance of integration within British society but also some of the risks associated with cultures being assimilated. We then discussed the rise in hate crime within the United Kingdom and how this has fed into a rise in extremism and radicalisation. Furthermore, we have learnt that the challenges facing the police in the United Kingdom today are vastly different to those posed over twenty years ago. No longer is terrorism seen as a local issue but is instead a global issue as a result of globalisation.

For the police the penalties for failing to stop a terrorist attack are far greater today than ever before due to the interconnectedness of the societies in which we live and the sheer numbers of people involved, as a result we have seen a change in the government policy and legislation towards dealing with this new threat, changes which have impacted on the rights and liberties of the citizens of Great Britain and have resulted in a type of risk management that focuses on eliminating the threat of terrorism rather than tackling the root causes which create the conditions necessary for extremism to flourish.

We have also learnt that in tackling terrorism, the police may inadvertently create a new problem for themselves as they continue to alienate and demonise large parts of the

Muslim Community in the United Kingdom and that as a byproduct of this, the threat of terrorism from abroad may be replaced with terrorism at home.

We have also seen how the media, which can be seen as a form of public control in the way that it sets itself out as the moral guardians of contemporary society, have turned this risk into a commodity which can be bought and sold on the open market. However, this commercialisation of crime has had the added consequences of creating a feeling of anxiety and fear among the general population. This dread has resulted in the agencies of social control, such as the police and government, becoming ever more narcissistic and vindictive in the ways in which they can maintain the social order and punish those who are seen to be a threat to its security.

### **WQ3: What have been the consequences of the way in which migrants are treated within the United Kingdom?**

#### **The Politics of Identity**

At this juncture, there is an important point to address and it is one that is fundamental in our way of understanding the relationship between terrorism and forced migration. That point is that the areas of religion, democracy and violence are interwoven in a somewhat complicated manner.

Core to the ideas of hate crime and terrorism committed by any group is the role that social identity plays in motivating individuals to either join or take part in these acts. Social identity is the idea that people derive a sense of purpose or idea of themselves through the belonging to or not being part of certain social groups. If a lack of belonging to a particular group occurs then individuals are more likely to become radicalised once they start to compare themselves to others and use their own biases to judge others. (Hogg, 1992; Oakes, 1987; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987; Turner, 1991)

At its simplest, contemporary social identity theory comprises three core processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison). People incorporate a social identity into their sense of self when they feel they belong to a group. Group membership is a

psychological state of self-categorisation . As a result of this self-categorisation there are changes in an individual's cognitions, emotions and behaviours.

This change is related to where they are placed at any given time on a continuum of social behaviour from interpersonal (unique individual A interacting with unique individual B) to intergroup (group X representative interacting with group Y representative). In other words, when a particular social identity is salient because of the given social context, a person thinks, feels and acts from a basis of social group membership, rather than from the perspective of their unique personal identity. (Halafoff & Wright-Neville, 2009, p. 108) (2010: 8)

Drawing on this then, how are we to now de-radicalise individuals where identity is so core to their beliefs? The Swedish "Exit" de-radicalisation program for right wing extremists is typical of a number of such programs across Europe and uses a five phase model, with a tailored program for each individual (Bjorgo, 2009; Froukje Demant, Wagenaar, & Donselaar, 2009). The first stage is *Motivation* in which the person is still in the group but having doubts. They have made contact with an external support person who has gone through the exit process themselves. This represents a gap in the dominance of the extremist group social identity.

The second stage is *Disengagement*, and is when the person decides to leave the group, but needs support to take action. It is chaotic, and from a social identity perspective, they are extremely vulnerable as they have expelled themselves from the primary (often only) group but yet to form new associations with other individuals or groups. The program offers support in the form of talking, financial or practical help moving away.

In the *Settlement* phase the break is complete and the person has somewhere to live, as well as financial stability. They are trying to establish a normal life, but often experience social isolation and loneliness. Although the person is generally free from violence, crime and hatred during the *Reflection* stage, it is a time when many experience emotional distress (anxiety, depression, sleep disturbance and substance abuse) as they reflect on their previous beliefs and behaviour.



Finally, the *Stabilisation* stage is characterized by normal life (work, study, family) but often with the fear that their past will ruin the future. At this stage they are no longer formally in the Exit program, but informal contact is maintained.

Essentially, the core ideas we have seen is that social identity plays a key role in radicalisation and as a result it can be used by the police and other deradicalisation groups to create successful and long lasting change in individuals with the long term hope of re-integrating them into society. We have discussed previously the rise in hate crime and violence, but it is important to note that not all hate crime is equal, it is disproportionately directed towards muslims and is rested on the belief that islam is incompatible with democracy.

### **Fear of Refugees**

In the hope of introducing some focus to such a broad field, I have chosen to focus on the terrorists themselves and many issues which make up their existence in present day society, the reason is that the terrorists not the acts of terror themselves, seem to be the moral high water mark, the mere existence of possible terrorists being part of our day to day lives is an affront to civilised society, and it is here that we find that fear and vindictiveness towards refugees manifest themselves most clearly.

According to sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, the reason people fear refugees the most is because the refugees themselves represent what could happen to themselves. In an interview with Al Jazeera shortly before his passing, Bauman explained that "These people who are coming now are refugees not from people hungry, without bread and water. People who yesterday were proud of their homes, were proud of their position in society, were very often very well educated, very well-off and so on. But they are refugees now. Yesterday they were very powerful back in their country, like we are here today." Bauman, Z. Interview with Al Jazeera. 2016)

Bauman was of course building off his life's work on liquid modernity, which is the idea that in modern times, with such a rapidly changing political landscape and with globalisation causing minute changes on everyday things, we have no fixed points of reference as if the

ground beneath us is in constant flux,, this liquidity leads to doubt and fear about our own security, as such, we view refugees and migrants as an embodiment of that uncertainty so it is only natural for us to want to keep them away. It's a direct result of this fear, which Bauman argues means we are more likely to put trust and power in authorities to help manage the danger and has created more authoritarian governments as a result. (Bauman, Z. 2000)

Whilst it is still too early to draw conclusive opinions on the matter, it also appears, at least from initial research that the vote for the UK to leave the EU was highly influenced by a fear of migrants, at least according to a report done UK economic thinktank, Resolution Solution. In the report, they tested the hypothesis that the areas with the lowest wages and high levels of unemployment are also the areas with the highest levels of migration so were the most likely to vote to leave, the exact reason that many of the Leave the EU parties were telling people to vote. However the report found no correlation at all between migration and wage levels or any relation to strong local economies, simply put, the report argues, people voted to leave out of a fear of migrants, not based on actual data. (Bell, T. 2016)

If no real reason exists for an anti immigration sentiment within the UK then the public is said to be xenophobic, that is disproportionately biased against foreigners for no other reason than to fear the unknown. But what is causing this fear, to this we can point to the work of Stanley Cohen and his work on moral panics which he defined "...a moral panic as an episodic or periodic condition experienced when a group posing a threat to societal values or interests is demonized by the mass media and society's moral custodians." (Cohen, S. (1976: 35)

Certainly then, in the area of refugees what we have witnessed in Britain has been a constant and sustained presence of panic inducing rhetoric and the press and tabloids in relation to refugees, and alongside this we have seen a political class who have not vocalised any different sentiments to the mass press, thus making their statements indistinguishable from the mass media. In Greg Martins paper on Moral Panics about refugees there are many parallels that can be drawn between the Australian and British reaction to refugees. One such similarity is the way that fear of refugees may be mobilised

at key times such as during elections wider anxieties of social, economic and moral order become realised in the 'muslim other'. Martins, G. (2015: 308)

This 'muslim other' as some have noted, is represented by the global moral panic surrounding islamic fundamentalism and the way in regardless of nationality or religion, anyone with at least an appearance of middle eastern origin has been the target of much hostility over the past decade and constitutes a contemporary, transnational folk devil. Brown, & Brown, K. E. (2014). These writers during their study also found that islamophobia as we have mentioned here, also co-exists with other forms of persecution such as racism, violence and exclusion and is heavily tied up in the language used to talk about refugees and the way that refugees are becoming increasingly criminalised.

### **The Criminalisation of Refugees**

Whilst we have previously discussed the role of stop and search by the police, there are also other ways in which refugees and migrant communities have become criminalised. Traditionally, the understanding of crime has been taken from a deterministic positivist approach where the 'actor' in these crimes are said to be biologically different from us, their actions are in isolation from the context of their surroundings, and their behaviour is their own responsibility and it is society's duty to simply punish them when they do wrong. However, there is growing support for another branch of criminology, based on the ideas of some sociologists and post modern criminologists, cultural criminology sees crime as a social construct and that there is much to be learnt from looking at the relationship between social morality and criminal transgression especially in the area of Terrorism.

Over the past decade we have seen a growing criminalisation of refugees by governments both within and outside of europe. For many writers they have found that the way in which refugees are defined or legally supported has become a case of legal wrangling over words and terminology, which as Penschazadeh, A. noted in a paper on 'The Probability of Refugee Status';

"Determination of refugee status, therefore, is a process undertaken and assessed by each State in accordance with its resources, traditions, economic needs and prejudices. This

implies that any decision on refugee status is, essentially, political – and ultimately arbitrary.” Penchaszadeh, A. (2010: 02)

This has led to what some authors describe as a criminalisation of the vocabulary of refugee status whereby successive governments now require refugees to ‘prove’ their innocence (or legality) before accepting them. Governments have also begun to criminalise many of the actions that refugees undertake in an attempt to flee their countries, one example of this has been the way in which refugees who use boats or traffickers to escape are seen to be breaking international law on human trafficking despite it being enshrined in Article 31 of the convention, individuals who enter territories illegally, are seen as law breakers and their status as refugees is placed at risk. Morrison, A.(2001: 73)

On a local level, we have also witnessed how local migrant communities, in particular Muslim communities within Britain, have become increasingly policed. The reason for this heavier street presence is as a result of increasing focus on preventative policing instead of reactive police work, as Sandra Petersson in her article ‘In what ways has policing been reconfigured in response to recent international terrorism? Is that reconfiguration likely to be effective? notes; “Preemption, therefore, is more exhaustive than exterminating those posing a threat before harm is done; to adequately combat terrorism counterterrorism now entails preemption at the very idea behind terrorism by investigating its community, psychology, and motivation – most notably among non-violent radical Islamists” (2009: 2)

However, this pre-emptive policing in Britain has also led to feelings of mistrust and uncertainty within the Muslim community towards the British Police. One possible explanation has been the over representation of muslims in police stop and searches which under the now repealed section 43 of the Terrorism act (2000) allowed police officers to stop and search any person who they reasonable assume to be a terrorist. According to data published in 2013 of the 460 000 individuals who were stopped and searched, Middle Eastern and all other ethnic minorities combined made up over 56% of all stop and searches, a gross over representation considering they only make up 13% of the population. Allen, G & Dempsey, N. (2017: 08)

In this chapter then, we have seen the way that identity plays an important role in the politics of the everyday lives of many muslims living in Great Britain and that this identity

politics can be mobilised to enable police to better de-radicalise individuals. We have also seen in this chapter the way that the greater British public has become fearful of Muslims through the concepts of moral panics in Great Britain and the ways in which this has fed into the criminalisation of refugees. We will now move onto our final thoughts regarding this work.

## **Conclusion**

We can deduce from what we have seen, this that as a result of already existing tensions surrounding immigration into Great Britain, growing fear and worry about Islamist extremism and the impact of terrorism, coupled with strong anti-immigration attitudes, refugees have been almost excluded from British society. It seems that Muslims and refugees have become synonymous with terrorism, this has greatly impacted upon the intake and treatment of refugees within Great Britain.

I believe that the primary driver of much of the feelings of insecurity and anxiety surrounding refugees and migrants living within Great Britain is perpetuated by an ever growing disparity between the facts of refugees and migrants and the way they are presented in the mass media. Of course, it is easy to lay the blame at the foot of some big faceless newspaper or organisation, and I am reluctant to remove the public of agency or free thought, but as we have shown, the negative portrayal of migrants in the press does translate into the attitudes that guide politicians, whom it should also be noted, have failed to properly address voters concerns or to counter the constant negative barrage of stories directed towards refugees.

Before I began this Thesis, I had naturally assumed that as a result of recent terrorist acts within Britain that there would be a strong anti-Muslim stance among a majority of the population, however, economic concerns still remained of primary concern for much of the population over feelings of insecurity. Of course it is possible that 2017's slew of attacks

may yet to show up in polls and public opinion so these challenges may show up in research conducted in 2018. This field is rapidly changing and evolving one so what may hold true today, may not tomorrow.

Going into this, I also assumed that the concepts of racism would have been more important in forming the general public's attitudes towards migrants in my research, and whilst hate crimes and violence towards migrants does seem to have increased over the past decade, there does seem to be a general feeling among the citizens of Great Britain that their economic interests are of greater concern than an individual's race or religion.

To conclude, and to finally answer the question of how terrorism has impacted Refugees and Migrants living in Great Britain, the answer is, unfortunately, not as clear as this writer initially hoped. The problem stems from the way in which immigration is on its own being discussed within the United Kingdom. There seems to be much discussion about ideas of integration, and communities struggling to keep their cultural identity, and this, coupled with uncertain job prospects and a weak economy has led to a general xenophobia regarding all foreigners.

It seems that throughout the research, the terms migrant, refugee and asylum seeker were used interchangeably when discussing the issue, as such, the proportion of refugees in the UK was estimated to be higher which may lead to people assuming there was a greater problem than there actually was. I believe that this fear was driven by a lack of action by political class being able to vocalise the positive aspects surrounding refugees coming to the UK whilst continuing to reduce help and assistance to those who need it. It is my recommendation that a greater level of transparency and a more direct and frank discussion in public is needed so that people are better able to understand the debate better.

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