

## Abstract

This Master's thesis takes its point of departure in the election of Donald J. Trump as president of the United States on November 8<sup>th</sup> 2016. In my thesis I set out to investigate the political approach, style and rhetoric of Trump in relation to the concept of populism in a contemporary and historical context. Moreover, how Trump relates to earlier movements of populism and nativism within the US and, thereby, if his political approach can be depicted as entirely new in the context of US history.

This task was undertaken by analysing five separate speeches conducted by Trump over his campaign for the presidential election, using the concept of framing and based on theory of framing, which was deemed relevant. Following, and based on my analysis of the speeches, I expounded frames structured and portrayed by Trump. To answer how Trump inscribes himself in relation to populism I took my stance in the theories on the concept by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser as well as Ruth Wodak. When expounding the frames I related Trump's approach, style and rhetoric to the theories on populism in order to see if there was a connection.

Moreover, the historical aspects of populism and nativism within the US was investigated, described and analysed in relation to Trump. The focus here, was on Trump in relation to the Know Nothing Movement and the People's Party, both political movements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the present movement, the Tea Party.

I found that Trump falls well within the concept of populism, most enlightened by his anti-elite approach as well as his call for unity among "the people" and his conception of himself as a speaker and representative of "the people". Besides Trump also portrays an anti-other approach towards Latino and Middle Eastern immigrants/refugees, which, according to Ruth Wodak, is a typical trait of recent populist stances within Europe.

In a historical context, Trump showed several similarities with the earlier populist/nativist movements of the US. Nevertheless, I concluded that he does differentiate himself from both the Know Nothing movement and the People's Party as well as the Tea Party. Thus, making him a representative of an unseen kind of populism within the US.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

Within the last 10 years or so, the concept *populism* has become a political buzzword among social scientist, journalists and to some degree the public opinion. Even though it might seem as a new phenomenon to most people the concept of populism shares a long historical background, and has often been contested and a subject of vivid discussion. Notwithstanding that populism, within recent years, has been most evident in Europe, it appeared yet again in the consciousness of US citizens with the election of Donald Trump as president and also brought back memories of populist and nativist movements in US history.

This prompts me to articulate a problem formulation being exactly:

*How does Donald Trump's rhetoric, political approach, appeals and style inscribe itself in the populist phenomenon historically and contemporarily? How does his political style and position relate to the earlier populist and nativist movements of the US? Is Trump's populism entirely new in the US context?*

In "Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis" Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Cas Mudde, 2012) offer a brief historical overview of populism in Europe and the Americas. The first example of what is to be understood as populism was late 19<sup>th</sup> century populism by the Populist Party in the US (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 10) and the Narodniki in Russia. These two movements were quite different in the sense that while the Populist Party was a mass movement of farmers seeking fundamental change in the political system, the Russian Narodniki were middle-class intellectuals in the Tsarist Russia who supported and believed in a romanticised view of the peasant life (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 3).

However, historically, populism also indirectly reflects the developments which took place in yet another part of the world. In the 1930's the Great Depression led to an uprising of populist movements and feelings in the Latin Americas and particularly in Argentina and Brazil, as the two most classic examples. These ante-litteram populist politicians appealed to *the people* instead of *the working class* thereby being able to unify different social groups and classes notwithstanding their belonging (Cas Mudde, 2012, pp. 3-4).

Prior to the People's Party in the US the Know Nothing movement arose and impacted American politics intensely in the 1850s. Where the People's Party enacted an anti-establishment attitude the Know Nothing's opposed against the influx of European Catholic immigrants (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 6). Thus, portraying an anti-other approach, and eventually becoming a symbol of US nativism.

In “The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Means” (Wodak, The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean, 2015) Ruth Wodak digs deeper into more recent examples of populism and more specifically right-wing populist parties within Europe. Wodak refers to the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) as the first example of what developed into a new political prototype of populist appeals within Europe in relation to populist ideology, rhetoric and style. A political agenda that, as in the case of the Austrian FPÖ, often entails the use of racism, xenophobia, exclusion and anti-elitism/anti-establishment positions (Wodak, The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean, 2015, p. 2).

With this thesis I aim to research and analyse whether or not Trump shares a resemblance with both contemporary populist movements and historical cases within the US of the concept. As well as to reach some sort of conceptual clarity of how Trump can be depicted and understood in relation to approach, rhetoric and style as well as in a historical context. Hence, seeking to answer the aforementioned problem formulation.

## Chapter 2: Method

In the following chapter, I will describe the epistemological and ontological stance of this thesis, as well as the chosen research method, ending with a description of limitations and data collections.

### 2.1: Interpretivism

The thesis is based on the epistemological stance of interpretivism. Contrary to the epistemological stance of positivism, interpretivism allows me to comprehend the subjective meaning of social actors. Importantly, it enables me as a researcher to differentiate between social actors (Bryman, 2012, p. 28).

This makes it possible to investigate the relationship between Trump and his audiences, how these perceive and understand statements made by Trump. Since interpretivism undertakes a position where people are perceived as complex and individual actors that are all unique, it enables me, as a researcher, to interpret if Trump differed from the typical as a political figure.

When reading the analysis material it entails an understanding of the world as being socially constructed. Hence, making it imperative to comprehend how individual actors experience and express their reality.

### 2.2: Constructionism

Closely linked to the epistemological stance of interpretivism is the ontological stance of constructionism applied in this thesis. It remains the point that the world should be considered a

social construction and that social phenomena and interactions are in constant state of change or alteration (Bryman, 2012, p. 33). Thus, including me as a researcher, making it important to stress and consider that my findings during this thesis are, as well, constructions of the social world. This means that the versions I depict are not definitive, but a certain version of social reality, which is based on the way I interpret and go about the chosen data (Bryman, 2012, p. 33).

Additionally, constructionism proposes that the categories, that people employ in order to help them understand the natural and social world, are in fact social products. The categories are not determined or grounded in its essences. Instead their substance and meaning is raised through interactions. These categories will then vary in time and place depending on the social interaction, which will provide them with meaning; such an example could be language (Bryman, 2012, p. 34). This is especially relevant in relation to the thesis focus on populism. How are underlying categories of “the people” and “the others” constructed in social interactions? Constructionism will dictate that categories like “the people” and “the others”, among others, will vary in meaning depending on the social interaction.

### 2.3: Qualitative research

Thoroughly connected to the stance of interpretivism and constructionism is the approach of qualitative research. A connection, which is evident in the point that qualitative research constitutes itself by emphasising words rather than the quantification of data. Some concerns of this approach are relevant to all authors doing qualitative research including myself (Bryman, 2012, p. 399). The first of these concerns or preoccupations is one’s ability to see through the eyes of the one or the people being studied.

An underlying premise of most qualitative research is that the subject matter of the social science, including people and their social world, differs from subjects in natural sciences like gases and metals. People and subjects of social science attain meaning to their environment and reflect on their social world; subjects of natural science do not. Thus, making it necessary to interpret the social world through the eyes of the people subject of research.

The second preoccupation revolves around the description and emphasis on context within qualitative research. When communicating the results of their work, qualitative researchers are compelled to offer a great deal of descriptive detail compared to quantitative researchers. However, they do not only focus on description, but also on explanation of material, context and the behaviour of subjects being studied. Hence, qualitative research will often entail extensive information about the social world that is investigated (Bryman, 2012, p. 401).

The next and third preoccupation is the emphasis on process. A tendency of qualitative research is to focus on process, which is often depicted in its concern to show events and patterns unfold over time. The process is a sequence of individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time in context. This leads to the point that qualitative research often carries a strong sense of change and flux (Bryman, 2012, p. 402).

The fourth and final preoccupation concerns the issue of a flexible and limited structure, which is closely linked the point of seeing through the eyes of the people being studied. It is argued that within qualitative research one needs limited structure. If a structured method of data collection was employed, then it is also necessary to make certain decision about what can be discovered about the social reality. Thus, limiting the researcher's ability to adopt the worldview of the people being studied. Therefore, a more unstructured approach is ideal in order to enhance the opportunity for the researcher to reveal perspectives of the subject being studied. This unstructured approach also facilitates flexibility, which allows the researcher to change course during the study as the data is being collected (Bryman, 2012, pp. 403-404).

Even though qualitative research offers many positive attributes and suits this thesis ideally, it is still an approach, which is the target of some criticism.

Quantative researcher would often criticise qualitative researcher for being too subjective. By this, the critics mean that the findings of qualitative research often depend too strongly on the somewhat unsystematic views about what is significant and important. Since qualitative research nearly always begin are fairly open-ended and entails a gradual narrowing down for problems, the reader are given few clues to why one area was chosen for analysis while another was left unattended, if this is not addressed in the research (Bryman, 2012, p. 405).

That qualitative research is too subjective, one out of four main arguments of critique, which also entails difficulties in replication of results, problems of generalization and a lack of transparency. The difficulties met in relation to qualitative research being too subjective, are very similar to next point of criticism. Its ability to be replicated. One's again it is, in large part, due to the lack of structure within qualitative research as well as its reliance on the researcher's own ingenuity. Since there are almost non-standard procedure that one should follow and in extent what is observed and heard and what the researcher chooses to focus on is a personal matter. Therefore, it is close to impossible to conduct a true replication of a specific study (Bryman, 2012, p. 405). Problems and criticism relating to generalisations are based on a scope of analysis, which is too restraint. In other words, the findings will often be too narrow and not display enough repetitions of the result.

However, it is important to note that one should look for the quality in the research and on that be able to make generalisations (Bryman, 2012, p. 406).

The last point of criticism is based on a lack of transparency. In quantitative research, the researchers thoroughly detail their sampling and the findings they achieve. This is not the case within qualitative research where it can be difficult to account what the researcher actually did (Bryman, 2012, p. 406).

#### 2.4: Data collection, why and limitations.

The analysis of Trump's rhetoric, style and positions is based on his electoral campaign speeches, which are limited to five different and most relevant speeches from Trump's presidential campaign in 2016. The speeches chosen are from events held over two and a half months between August 20 and November 2<sup>nd</sup>. Six days before the election day. Two of the speeches were held by Trump in states, which in the 2012 presidential election were won by Republican candidate Mitt Romney, these are Mississippi and North Carolina. The other two were held in two states won by Barack Obama in 2012, Virginia, Maine and Florida (Times, 2012). The selection of these speeches is motivated by the attempt to analyse and frame Trump's position over a relatively extensive time frame and at the same time to secure a representation of both Republican and Democratic voting states. This also allows to consider differences and similarities between the speeches held at different points and places in time in both "red" and "blue" federal states. Of course, it will prove difficult to establish if these or other factors influence any possible change but it might provide some explanation.

It is apparent for most people that Trump's way of communicating has proven quite different from what has been witnessed within US politics before. His use of social media and especially Twitter has often laid the ground for debate, criticism and disagreement. Therefore it would also be fair to argue that when trying to establish whether we can perceive Trump as a populist and using framing analysis to this it would make sense to encounter his Twitter account.

There are two reasons why I have chosen not to consider social media in my analysis: Firstly, for time issues. The extensive amount of tweets, which Trump has posted throughout his campaign makes it extremely time consuming to investigate and analyse them. Secondly, a general lack of substance, context and coherence in his statements and quick remarks on Twitter. Limiting strikes to 140 signs is not something very helpful to the accurate researcher. Thus, the chosen material based on more comprehensive and coherent speeches, addressing the crowd, seem to offer a better insight into Trump's political positioning and style.



Trump's approach and seriousness in the presidential election campaign is also why this has been chosen over his campaign material for the Republican candidacy. In spite of his "unpolitical" approach in the material I have chosen, he displays more of "statesmen" and acting much less "outrageous" than both on Twitter and when campaigning for the Republican candidacy. Political suggestions are put forth and not just offensive remarks, which only aims to secure attention. This makes the material more apt for analysis.

### Chapter 3: Populism as theoretical framework

This section focuses primarily on introducing and understanding the concept of populism at the light of the ample scholarly literature that in the last decades has proliferated on this field. By referring mainly to the work of Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Cas Mudde, 2012) as of Ruth Wodak (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourse Mean*, 2015). The aim is to understand how they perceive and define the concept of populism and how their findings and approaches can be used to reflect upon the US populism lately represented by President Donald Trump.

Mudde and Kaltwasser for instance (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9) offer a well-sourced and rather specific definition of populism. In their view, the concept is often too broadly defined and can therefore give rise to conflicts with other political ideologies. Contrarily, Ruth Wodak (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourse Mean*, 2015) has a different approach and compared to Mudde and Kaltwasser argues for several indicators of right-wing populism. These scholarly disagreements will be elaborated in the following, but it is my opinion that both approaches can be relevant to for use in this project in relation to how we can perceive Trump. Even though Wodak's indicators of populism are almost completely discarded by Mudde and Kaltwasser, her material and theory are well founded and her approach can serve as a way to test Trump's as a populist. As mentioned by both Mudde and Kaltwasser as Wodak, several of her indicators to populism is shared by other scholars. These indicator and their relevance to Trump will be elaborated in the following section focussing only on Wodak's "The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Means".

Besides, Arjun Appadurai's essay "Fear of Small Numbers" (Appadurai, 2006) is applied shortly to support some of the notions made by Wodak. Wodak's focus on "us" and "them" between different ethnic groups is further elaborated by Appadurai and can help us understand why nationalists and in

extent right-wing populist parties gain support and can establish themselves with an anti-immigration approach.

### 3.1: In search of a minimal definition

In ‘Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis’ Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Cas Mudde, 2012) aim at giving a definition of populism, a term they find to have been stretched and misused both in academic discussion and more broadly. They do not wish (and find it impossible) to discuss all definitions, instead they focus on three historical manifestations of populism - populism as a movement, as a political style and as a discourse. Then using these to provide a minimal definition of populism (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 3).

Discussing populism Mudde and Kaltwasser examine three aspects, which they find influential and critical in relation to populism both in Europe and the Americas (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 4). One of these notions is populism as a political movement, where Mudde and Kaltwasser turns to the work of Martin Lipset, *The Political man* (1960). Lipset argues in the book that the rise of populism in Latin America in the 1930s should be perceived as an occurrence similar to the rise of fascism in Europe, since both represent the rise of extremist mass movement (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 5).

However, the two movements differ on one crucial area: they represented different social classes, the lower classes in Latin America and the middle-classes in Europe. This conception follows the earlier work by scholar Gino Germani (1978) that defined populism as a multi-class movement structured around a strong leader (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 5).

Seeing populist’s politicians as representatives of different social classes seems to align with Trump when looking at income. Regardless of a sometimes, stereotypic portrayal of the people who voted for him, there was a high degree of diversion in relation to income when looking at an exit poll conducted by CNN (CNN, 2016). Among the US citizens, earning between 50.000-200.000 dollars the majority voted for Trump as well did the majority of the 6 % of the population earning more than 250.000 dollars. On the other hand the poll also shows that on parameters other than income like race, age and gender that there is a clear “profile” of his typical voters, being male, white and older than 45 years (CNN, 2016).

Mudde and Kaltwasser also note that populism often aligns different classes, appealing to the homogeneous community of ‘The People’. The use of the term “the people” is a means for populists to claim they and only they represent different groups and that this group shares a common idea: That the elites (political, intellectual) are corrupted and do not serve the good of the majority (Cas

Mudde, 2012, p. 5). As mentioned, another theoretical notion that fits well with Trump's criticism of Hillary Clinton and her assumed relationship with big corporations. In the analysis, it will be interesting to investigate this anti-elite approach, did Trump fully slide into this role, and could be seen as an attempt to establish himself as a "common-man"?

On the other hand, the notion that populist parties gain support from different social groups are criticised by several scholars (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 5). Arguing that this is also evident within mass politics, with many cases of European parties capable of attracting different social groups, often the social democratic parties, which might succeed with this, are not perceived as populist (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 5).

The second historical manifestation, which Mudde and Kaltwasser aims to investigate, defines populism as a political style characterised by a link between voters and the political leader(s). Often the leader builds this connection on *laissez-faire* like and simple-solution appeal to "the people" and tries to distance himself from 'typical' politicians (Cas Mudde, 2012, pp. 5-6). As an illustration of this, Peter Mair (2002: 84) defines populism as "a means of linking an increasingly undifferentiated and depoliticized electorate with a largely neutral and non-partisan system of governance." (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6). Trump is in this sense an example of this, with no experience as a politician, and the fact that he used his inexperience as a positive asset. Arguing that the US needed a president, which was not a "typical" politician.

Frequent critique addressed to this understanding of populism as communication and style is that it is simply too broad. An example could be the concept of demagoguery, which is more or less unified with the concept populism (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6). If this kind of political behaviour can be labelled as populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that almost every politician, especially in campaign periods, can fall under this category. Thus, becoming more a catchword than an analytic concept (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6).

"In other words, neither the use of spin doctors and surveys, nor the development of pragmatic positions and the avoidance of partisan conflicts is specific to populism" (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6).

The third and final approach to populism, which Mudde and Kaltwasser refers to, is the theory developed by Ernesto Laclau. To Laclau populism should be understood as a particular political logic. Not a result of an alliance with a particular social class. He maintains that this logic is characterised by a divergence between people and a confrontation to the hegemony dividing the social into two main groups, which can be characterised as "the elite" and "the people" (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6). This cleavage is bound in three steps. First, the very different demands from the

two groups. Secondly how the creation of an enemy, in this case the elite/establishment, can form a collective identity. Finally the political “leader” who becomes a representation for “the people” (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6). This might be relatable to Trump. Did he show an ability to understand the demand of “the people” and establish himself as a representative for them. For one, will the analyse show if was able to connect with the specific audience of the different speeches? Mudde and Kaltwasser criticise Laclau on the difficulties with doing empirical analysis on populism, when defined like this and when he chooses to equate populism with politics (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 6).

Hence, their criticism that “Either populism is something omnipresent, or anything that is not populist cannot be considered political” (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 7). On the one hand, this makes Laclau’s theory on populism extremely abstract and on the other hand also empirically very imprecise, thereby losing its ability to be analysed (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 7)

In an attempt to reach conceptual precision and transparency and thereby foster grounded knowledge when studying populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser ask the question: “How do we reach a minimal definition of populism?” (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 8). An aspect that Mudde and Kaltwasser consider to be recognised by most scholars which have worked with populism is the confrontation between “the elite/establishment” and “the people” (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9). As the authors stress there is a tendency that within all manifestations of populism there are a scepticism towards (powerful) minorities, which are perceived as a threat to ‘the general will of the common people’ (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 8)

Mudde and Kaltwasser draws on earlier work by Mudde, where he had defined populism as such:

*“a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”* (Cas Mudde, 2007, s.23).

Thus, populism should be considered as a type of politics based on *moral* and the dissimilarity between “the elite” and “the people” is based on morals and/or ethical issues like a simplified opposition of good vs. bad. Hence, not on situational or structural dissimilarities like power relations, ethnicity, economic background and so forth. This seems to be following the anti-establishment line that Trump often emphasises in his speeches. As the analysis part in chapter six will show Trump’s criticism towards Clinton, Washington and the big cooperation’s/big capital can

be assumed as part of his populist take on these issues and his attempt to appeal to the common people. However, not only criticising “the elite”, but also minorities like Mexicans and Muslims. Does Trump’s criticism follow Mudde and Kaltwasser minimal definition? To what extent and in what context does Trump pursue to make it about “good” vs “bad”, or where he more focused on subjects like ethnicity and cultural values?

The fact that it is the populist themselves who establish who “the people” and who “the elite” are and the meaning of them, also by electing themselves as the only representors of the people means that both categories lacks substance and is referred to as ‘empty signifiers’ by Mudde and Kaltwasser (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9).

Thus, for Mudde and Kaltwasser populism is mainly a thin-centred ideology with three core concepts: the people, the elite and the general will, and two direct opposites: elitism and pluralism (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9).

Mudde and Kaltwasser concede that, since populism is a thin-centred ideology with a narrow range of political concepts it can be attached to other ideologies like socialism and liberalism and thin ideologies like nationalism (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9). The flexibility of the ideology should not bring focus away from what is true populism and be confused with other ideologies (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9). Mudde and Kaltwasser do acknowledge that their minimal definition separates itself by not considering mobilisation and strong leadership. Even though they do recognise connection between a charismatic leader, direct communication and so, they do not necessarily see it as a constitutive element of populism (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 9). Mudde and Kaltwasser do not wish to downplay the role of the leader in populism, since they are a crucially part of understanding populism. However, they also argue that if we focus only on the allegedly charismatic leader, as the creator of any political development, our understanding of the phenomenon becomes one-dimensional. We forget the receiver, the voters, and what brings them to support the populist ideology (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 10). An important note I believe, especially moving on to the work of Wodak, who broaden the term populism. I agree that it is crucially to have the receiver and voters in mind when analysing Donald Trump’s speech, something that framing analysis provides the opportunity to do.

### 3.2: The power of the politics of fear

In Ruth Wodaks “The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Means” (2015) Wodak offers a very time-relevant and informative empirically based analysis of newer populist movements and parties, predominately of the European area. Where Mudde and Kaltwasser focus on populism without limiting it to a certain political course or ideology, Wodak explicitly refers

only to right-wing populism. This does not mean as she realises populism only with a tendency towards typical right-wing attitudes. Instead she argue that populist parties cut across the political “line” and come off as supporting sometimes classical left-wing opinions as right-wing (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, p. 20).

The right-wing conception is evident in how Wodak argues that populist define different social groups. According to Wodak, it is not only “the people” vs “the elite”, but “the people” vs “the others”, which in this case are often based on dissimilarities in culture, religion or ethnicity (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, p. 21). Wodak describes right-wing populism as presenting itself as safeguarding the interests of “[...] an imagined homogenous people inside a nation state” (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, p. 47). As described earlier Donald Trump has shown both an anti-elite and an anti-others style. I hope to uncover if it was his aim to establish himself as a guardian of a certain group of people that he constructs as the ‘real Americans’?

When unfolding the ethno-nationalistic part of populism, Wodak argues that there is a focus on strategies of appealing to unity, cohesion and national sameness (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourse Mean*, 2015, s. 54). Cultural homogeneity is considered a given in “the peoples” society. The populists perceive themselves as part of a national homogenous society and “the others” are a threat to this sameness. Thus, establishing a line between people from other nations or ethnic minorities and “the people” and unavoidable excluding “the others”.

Wodak also emphasis the tendency to arrogance among right-wing populists, since they often picture their ethnicity as superior and will focus on the distinctiveness and excellence of their own nation state. Often this conception of superiority is pointed out and exaggerated when compared to other nations and ethnic minorities (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, pp. 54-55). Did Trump portray the US and the American people as superior to other nations and their habitants? This can be another indicator of whether or not he fits the description of a populist more in the sense of playing with fear, as underlined by Wodak.

In extension, Wodak finds right-wing populist to be able to say almost whatever they want without any real consequences. She calls it “The right-wing populist perpetuum mobile”. Wodak has witnessed several episodes where right-wing populist politicians have said something outrageous, discriminatory, and/or directly racist, in many cases being offensive towards certain ethnic or minority groups. Often these episodes has no real consequences, and the person behind such statement, will explain himself by saying he did not know it would be offensive or come up with

some half-excuse. In most cases it is soon forgotten (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, pp. 19-20).

To some extent, Wodak agrees with Mudde and Kaltwasser on their definition of populism, but she does seek to go broader and provides numerous points to define populism and populist politicians. She witnesses a charismatic leader to be important and a typical reference point to populism. Besides, she believes that their success very much depends on their performance in the media, both typical media like press and television, but also social media. In extent, Wodak argues that leading populist politicians employ “frontstage performance” techniques and often adapt to the specific setting. They shift from presenting themselves as a saviour of “the people” in a Robin Hood-like role that seeks the common good. However, in the next instance they will portray themselves as rich and famous in a celebrity-like attitude, notwithstanding the contradictions (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, pp. 21-22). Another parameter, which might be evident with Trump taking into account his former role as reality star and experience in handling the media.

Ruth Wodak also notes that populists often come forth as anti-intellectual, distancing themselves from a “typical politician” and appeal to common sense. Rejecting complicated explanations and solutions (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, p. 22). Donald Trump managed to become known for his “say it as it is” approach, which could be taken as a way to use his lack of knowledge strategically. The analysis will hopefully clarify if Trump took on this anti-intellectual attitude and more or less condemned the “typical” communication style of politicians.

Even though Wodak sees recent populist movements to be very much focused on “the other” as a stranger from abroad, she still recognises that populists often will depict the elite as an evil as well. Referencing to the work of the Austrian scholar Anton Pelinka (2013) Wodak refers to two enemies, two “others” in the populist discourse. The elite is frequently accused of providing the “abroad enemy” access to the populist’s nation state, and on the same note to be responsible for globalisation (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, p. 4).

In relation, Wodak makes a notion on one of her key aspects of how she perceives populists: that they would often try to use fear as a way of justifying their politics and to gain support. A typical example is the validation of immigration restrictions as a security measure, which was highly evident in relation to the cold war and 9/11 bombings in New York. (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear:*

What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 2015, p. 5). The relevance Wodak notes in this stance is also evident in her title for the book: “Politics of Fear”. (Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 2015, p. 5)

More recent indication of this populist focus on fear and crisis is their tendency to act against globalisation and mobilisation. According to Wodak populist becomes the go-to parties for losers of a changing labour market, youth unemployment and neo-liberal politics. Where left-wing socialist parties earlier would attract this voter-group, today it is the right-wing populist parties (Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 2015, pp. 6-7)

In relation to this, and to round off populism I will use a quote by Betz, also used by Wodak in this book.

“Their [the elites] inability to restore the sense of security and prosperity, which steady material and social advances in the post war period had led their citizens to expect from their leaders, has become a major cause of voter alienation and cynicism. [...] It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety and disaffection that the rise and success of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation” (Betz H.-G. , 1994, s. 41)

Betz follows on Wodak’s note of right-wing populism as an answer for the “common-people”. In addition, it can bring some regard of clarity over why populism is growing in large part of the western world.

Wodak brings attentions to the right wing populists focus on the distinction between people from other nations or ethnic minorities. In this context, I will apply the work of Arjun Appadurai “The fear of Small Numbers” (Appadurai, 2006), which adds to this approach. Appadurai digs deeper into the terms “majority” and “minority” and the conflicts that might occur between them, than Wodak chooses to do.

### 3.3: Elaborating on the notion of “us” and “them”

Appadurai makes the notion that besides the focus on majority and minority, many ethno-nationalist seeks to establish a fear of “the weak” (Appadurai, 2006, s. 51). A creation of collective identities is shaped and this often ends with an “us” and “them” approach. Thus, Appadurai makes the note that the “us” or “we” are a social construction that essentially requires the extension of others in order to preserve (Appadurai, 2006, s. 51).

Appadurai defines the “we” as a predatory identity, which at times target “them”, “them” often being a social group with a common history and some sort of resemblance with the “we”, but



always weaker, since they represent a minority. “Them/the weak” is then framed as presenting a threat towards the majority. Hence, making it ‘necessary’ for the threatened group to mobilise and defend itself. (Appadurai, 2006, s. 51-52). A dramatic example of this was Nazi Germany, where a focus on purity became evident and the Nazis established these ethno racial terms. In order to secure complete national ethos, violence was necessary (Appadurai, 2006, s. 53-55).

A predatory identity rising to power can also happen without the use of violence. A political party can achieve it through democracy and thereby enact policies, which secure the identity of their nationalistic right-wing understanding of their nation state. As depicted by Wodak, often these parties will create a framework of fear where the majority should fear the minorities’ ability to abolish their nation state and how they know it today (Appadurai, 2006, s. 57-58).

Appadurai’s theory can help to explain Trump attitude towards certain minority groups within the US and towards ethnic and religious groups outside US. Moreover, how he can use the creation of fear for his own winning.

#### Chapter 4: Framing as approach for analysis

Investigating Trump, his speeches and the developments and conditions that made him into the US President, producing a comprehensive analysis and extensive results necessitates a solid ground for analysis. Framing analysis (Entman, 1993, s. 52) offers a way to understand what is communicated and the problems behind certain messages and narratives. Framing goes beyond the immediate text and communication by Trump’s campaign speeches and makes it possible to investigate why Donald Trump in his electoral speeches would formulate certain statements and opinions in the way he did.

What lays behind the concept of framing will be elaborated in the following section, but pending Entman provides a precise and descriptive account: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient (highlighting)” (Entman, 1993, s. 52). Framing as a concept is at times compared to critical discourse analysis, but divert itself by not focusing on social problems like racism and identity and not necessitating fieldwork to be conducted. Just to mention a few differences (Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2004, s. 187-188).

The aim of the framing analysis is to look behind what Trumps says, what information he chooses to highlight/salient and what is left out when addressing different issue. Thereby retrieving insight into the rhetoric, style and approach of Trump. In order to achieve this the following section will present some of the relevant approaches within the scholarly literature in the field of framing

analysis and the definitions and approaches these have developed in relation to framing. The scholars work on framing rooted within different disciplinary backgrounds, but all offer relevant and important insights that are useful in the analysis of how to ‘frame’ Trump’s speeches and rhetoric.

Moreover, during the following section, I have attempted to show coherency between the theory and Trump’s approach, style and rhetoric by listing several examples of this. These examples will be further elaborated on and provided with sources documenting their eligibility in the analysis.

#### 4.1: Constructing opinions

In “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm” Robert M. Entman (Entman, 1993) observes that *framing* or *frame* as a concept is scattered. Entman points to the fact that nowhere can one find a general statement or explanation of how framing can be used or how framing contributes to influencing people’s thought and communication. Nonetheless, Entman acknowledges that the concept of framing often depicts the power of communication and how the communicated message tends to affect individuals and the public opinion. Entman experiences that the concept is often used in human and social sciences, with the earlier and significant example of Goffman (1974) and Gamson (1992). Framing is conceptually used also outside the scholarly research, but also in this case it continues to be rather open-endedly defined (Entman, 1993, s. 51-52).

With this book, Entman seeks: “to identify and make explicit common tendencies among the various uses of the terms and to suggest a more precise and universal understanding of them” (Entman, 1993, s. 52) .

The circumstance that Entman emphasises framing as a tool that can be used to communicatively affect people/voters makes it relevant to analyse how Trump managed to use framing in his advantage. As Entman describes, framing is a practise where the ‘communicator’ selects and puts salience on certain information. Since this selection is subjective, the information that is salient only portray a perceived reality (Entman, 1993, s. 52). In other words, often the communicator strives to stimulate his particular problem definition, a casual understanding and/or a moral assessment of a certain issue to strengthen his position and arguments.

The thesis will pursue to show how Trump enacted this approach and highlighted information, which enforced his (perceived) understanding of reality in relation to several issues.

Not common for all framing, but more often than not, a frame also attempts to define and determine a specific problem, which can be based on cultural values and on the way the problem conflict with

these values and morals. Moreover, the frame seeks to identify the cause behind the problem: who is to blame according to the problem? How to solve the problem? Then offering solutions and predicting the effects of these (Entman, 1993, s. 52). An aspect that as well that can be related to Trump is his slogan "Make America Great Again", which constitutes and indirectly refers to a problem: America is no longer great.

As the analyse will show Trump would often depict "the establishment" and in extent Clinton as the root to Americas problems, calling "the people" to unite and elect him president. Thus, establishing himself as the solution.

Entman references that in the communication process a frame has at least four locations: 1) the communicator, 2) the text, 3) the receiver, 4) the culture. Entman believes that frames already affect the commutators belief system, thus influencing how he/she chooses to frame a certain issue.

The next location, the text, encloses frames, which as mentioned above will be influenced by a *perceived* reality. These frames can be manifested by certain keywords or also by the silencing of them, by stereotyped images, by sources of information or sentences that confirms the point/subject. An example is the topic of immigration: how is this framed? Is the focus on the many jobs that immigrants fulfil and the cultural nuance that they give to the receiving country? Alternatively, is the focus on the jobs migrants allegedly steal from the native population and their unfair entitlement to health care and other social benefits?

Regarding the receiver, the frames that end up affecting the receiver may or may not represent the frames in the text and the intensions of the communicator. The receiver can misunderstand something or might have an opinion forehand, which will affect how he/she perceives the text and frames brought forth by the communicator.

Culture in this case represents frames most often invoked within the discourse and thinking of a specific social group. These established frames can be an advantage for politicians, since they can use these to gain political force. Referring to Trump's criticism of big cooperation's moving overseas meaning Americans losing their jobs. Using a concern and anger already present among certain voters to establish his position towards them.

In the above mentioned four locations framing is as mentioned earlier a matter of selecting and highlighting elements to construct an argument evolving an explicit problem. (Entman, 1993, s. 52-53)

Entman references goes on to define the meaning of the word salience: "It means making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences" (Entman, 1993, s. 53).

An increase in salience should enhance the likelihood of the receivers to consider and remember the information sent by the communicator. To make something salient can be done indirectly or like Trump has often done, directly. As an example, his criticism of the Latinos is relevant, which he blatantly called rapists and criminals (News, 2016). A very un-nuanced way of framing someone as *bad*.

Entman makes the argument that a way of creating more salient information is by repetition or by connecting it with typical cultural values, which is Trumps approach in the example above.

However, an information or sentence just mentioned ones could become highly salient if this fits within the current values, opinions and culture, known as schemata, of the receivers' belief system. At the same time, this also makes some ideas difficult to make salient, if it does not fit schemata of the audience. Emphasising that framing is an interaction between text and receiver. This interaction was a key factor for Trump. Since he often portrayed issues so the focus was on how the specific issue or problem affects you.

Entman also references that the information or argument, which is left out of a frame is just as important as is what a frame contains or what have been chosen to make salient. Thus, stating the obviously that receivers opinion are bound to be affected if they get their information about one interpretation and lack alternative data and information. Exclusion can in many cases be as significant as inclusion in framing (Entman, 1993, s. 54).

Even though Entman focus is on journalistic framing, he also reference to the significance of framing in politics, which he describes as a way of showing and/or gaining political power. Entman often finds it to be a battle between different politicians and journalists to "win" the news frame and thereby lead audience to a certain reaction and opinion (Entman, 1993, s. 55).

A method often seen by Trump, with his focus on "America are losing or wining" "I am the best" and so. This strategy leads us to the next theoretical aspect.

#### 4.2: From political content to political persona

In "The framing of politics as strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key concepts" by Toril Aalberg, Jesper Strömbäck and Claes H. de Vreese (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011) the authors focus on generic frames. Meaning frames, which "typically describe structural aspects and features of news that can apply across different topics or issues" (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 164). Compared to Robert Entman, the authors of this book focus almost exclusively on framing in relation to politics: how this has changed, how political framing

differs, how it can be defined and how it might affect audience.

Aalberg et al. choose to focus only on generic frames regularly defined as game or strategy frame (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 164). The authors refer for example to the work “Out Of Order” by Patterson (1993) that depicts how American campaign news has changed across time and how this has also influenced politics. Patterson research goes back to the 1960s and claims that journalist used to focus on the content of the politicians’ communication and what was actually said. Contrarily today, news is based more on the tactics and motives of the communicator or in this case the political candidate, being Trump.

Several studies on the matter argues that the strategical game frame, as Aalberg et al. describes it, is now manifested in the mainstream news coverage of US politics. In the analysis part, I will argue that Trump has adapted this strategy with his approach towards the candidate at opposition Hillary Clinton. He would describe her as having a personal agenda, which benefits her and her “insider friends” and not the common good for America.

Patterson (1993) sees a link between new press coverage and the change in the degree of professionalism in political campaigning and communication. Where politicians has focused increasingly on a refined and more thorough campaign strategy and the reaction by the press has then been to uncover these strategies. This is an interesting point, since it would be fair to point out that Trump does not represent well-thought communication strategies completely as shown by his Twitter account, which he uses, as a frequent tool to bring forth opinions and messages that do not seem to be strategically well thought-thru.

Aalberg et al. also emphasise that mainstream press by doing this maintain their role as ‘unpolitical’ through a focus on political game instead of content, thereby manage to keep a stance of objectivity. Aalberg et al. also mention polling as a reflection of this, which are used as an instrument to produce news story being both objective and with a sense of scientific credibility (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 164) .

When considering the effects of strategic framing Alberg et al. (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 165) find that most research conducted on the area, illustrate that this “new” type of framing effects democracy in a negative manner. The argument is that when the press lacks focus on fundamental content and shifts attention towards strategy and character, political information and commitment is challenged. Instead, political cynicism is enhanced because the politicians focus on self-interest instead of the common good is made salient and information and knowledge about political position is repressed (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 165-166).

Thus, when the actual political content is brought forth, audience and voters might not register it due to the media's focus on politicians' self-interest led motives and agenda, which distracts audience from substance. Merely because voters have adapted the strategic game frame, meaning the focus on the political person and his/hers self-interest not the political content, which affect their interpretation and evaluation of political behaviour and campaigning (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 165-166).

Following this notion, it would making it quite easy for Trump to adapt this tactic. Focusing on Clinton's personal motives and self-interest, since this is what mainstream press themselves wishes to focus on and it is the "news" the voters are used to and expect to hear.

This leads the authors to argue that the strategic frame reduces voters' political knowledge, thereby leading to negative impacts on democracy (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 165).

Aalberg et al. relates to studies arguing that strategic game frame could lead to a massive disengagement by citizens in politics, mainly due to the portrayal of "the politician" as an insider, part of the elite, only looking for their self-interest. Hence, the above mentioned political cynicism (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 166). I will use this approach in my analysis to see if Trump achieved to adapt this strategy, presenting himself as an "anti-politician" and Hillary Clinton as the insider. While at the same time opting for a disengagement towards the "typical politicians".

Nonetheless, there are other scholars who disagree with Aalberg et al. belief that the strategic game framing is (only) negative (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 166). The interpretation that politics purely becomes more interesting with this frame should drive more people to getting involved, particularly through opinion polls (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 166).

This academic disagreement leads to Aalberg et al. emphasising that some scholars argue that the strategic game frame should be split into two – the *strategy frame* and the *game frame*. One of these scholars is Claes H De Vreese (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 167). He emphasises that when the game frame involves a use of language related to war, conflicts and sports, it becomes very much about winning or losing. This explain the increasing focus on opinion polls and election outcomes since from these results it becomes rather clear who is winning and who is losing. The strategic frame should be understood, as earlier described, as a way to focus on strategies and tactics of a certain politician or party, personality, style, motives and the like. When the press uses the strategic frame towards politicians it resemblance something like; the aim for the politician is not to deal with political issues, but to secure votes (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2011, s. 169-170).

This notion is important to emphasise for this project and the analysis of Trump's use of framing,

where he makes abundant use of an approach based on conflicts, oppositions and on winning or losing the war. Also in relation to the above mentioned “say it like it is”, he will often set up a problem or a losing situation and how he can fix this problem and thereby bring America back on the winning track. This will be very interesting to investigate in the analysis.

#### 4.3: To successfully establish a frame

In “Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization” by David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, the authors, like Allberg et al, explains how frames might be distinctive, referencing to what they describe as a diagnostic frame or a prognostic frame. Besides, Snow and Benford covers an aspect not sought after by the two above projects. They wish to investigate why some framing efforts constitute themselves and mobilise people while others fail to attract any attention. Snow and Benford will identify, and elaborate on four factors, which should affect the mobilising potency of a movement framing efforts (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 198-199).

The authors of this book argue that generating a frame means that a group or a person striving to establish a specific frame has three main tasks to perform in order to establish itself among its target audience (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 199).

1) To diagnose an aspect of social life or an event as a problem that needs amendment. 2) Suggesting a solution to the problem and specify what needs to be done. 3) Calling to action, for people to mobilise against this problem (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 199). These processes define the first factor and thereby the robustness of the frame.

As described earlier by Robert Entman (see here page 18) the construction of the problem identification is indicative of the communicator’s frame building. This was also a typical approach by Donald Trump, often criticising other politicians or decisions made in the past and then empathising he would do it differently. He would fix all the “bad” politics made in the past.

As mentioned Snow and Benford describes two types of framing: a) diagnostic framing and b) prognostic framing. Diagnostic framing involves frames which seeks to identify a problem and at the same time place responsibility for that problem (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 200). Whereas prognostic framing also arrives from a problem, here the emphasis is on suggesting a solution to the problem as well as identifying strategies, tactics and aims to overcome it (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 201). Often there will be a connection between the two since they are interrelated (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 201) and I do expect to find both cases evident when going through Trumps campaigning and how he used framing.

Snow and Benford moves on to what they define as motivational framing, which can be related to the aforementioned task of calling to action. As the authors note, the audience agreement with the problem identification or solution to a problem that occurs in diagnostic and prognostic framing, does not necessarily lead to corrective action (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 201-202).

Snow and Benford also reference to the lack of control that the communicator has over the success of his/her frames. There are several external factors that will affect whether or not the frame will get support and achieve what the communicator wishes (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 205). The authors refers to the structure of the larger belief system or ideology the communicator seeks to align with. If the framing is relevant to the audience or not.

Snow and Benford points to three components that can help us understand if a frame fits within the belief system.

1) Centrality. The frame the communicator is trying to promote is that of low or high hierarchical salience in the belief system. In other words, is it central or not. 2) The focus is on range. If a framing is only linked to one core belief or value within the audience they are trying to reach, that would be a low range. 3) Interrelatedness, how the frames relates to the typical norms of the belief system (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 205).

To sum up and in relation to Trump, it is crucial to be aware of what is important to the people you are talking to - how should Trump frame a certain topic in order to gain the support and votes he is aiming for. To consider this matter when doing the framing analysis is highly relevant, since it can help us explain why he succeed.

Snow and Benford continues in the same path with what they denote as phenomenological constraints, again with three factors that will influence the frame.

1) Empirical credibility, which ask the question if the frame can be verified? Are there events or statistics that can give reliability to the frame (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 208).

2) Experimental commensurability. Does the frame manage to provide solutions to problems actually experienced by the audience that the communicator is trying to reach? On the other hand, are the frame to abstract and not in relation to its audience? Is there coherence between the frames put forth by the communicator or is there not? (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 208).

3) Narrative fidelity, a bit more abstract than the two others, but it relates to cultural narration. If the frame fits within the cultural narrative, it could be stories and myths that are part of one's cultural heritage. This can affect how the frame is brought forth and how the audience receive the frame (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 210).



I believe that the first point, empirical credibility is crucial when discussing and analysing Trump, since he was often accused and caught giving false statements. Did he manage to frame issues or “win” frames by lying? Besides, the second parameter, experimental commensurability. Before doing the analysis, it seems that Trumps succeed to connect with his audience and often say what they would like to hear. Another aspect, which will be interesting to analyse.

The work by Robert Entman, Aalberg et al. and Snow and Benford enables me with a thorough understanding of how framing can shape communication and how it can be enacted in different means. I will very briefly relate to work of Jim A. Kuypers in “Doing News Framing Analysis, Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives”. Kuypers manage to clarify a methodological aspect of doing framing analysis, where he employs an inductive approach. Through analysis, the data, which can be text or oral communication, is examined for themes that reside within the news narrative. It is then the task of the researcher to determine how these themes are framed (Kuypers, 2010, s. 298). This will also be the case in this project, a search for themes within Trump’s campaign speeches and then I will establish which frames are manifested in the certain themes. As Kuypers states: “The real strength of rhetorical framing studies is that they allow the researcher to move from a more descriptive notion of framing research to a fully critical and interpretive endeavour.” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 308).

## Chapter 5: Historical overview of political movements in US

Before moving on to the analysis in chapter six this chapter aims at providing a historical background on populist and nativists movements in the US. This should be used as a platform for the discussion in chapter 8 and in extension to fully answer the problem formulation.

Whether the Trump ‘phenomenon’ can also find some explanations in earlier populist movements like the Know Nothings and the People’s Party and critically reflect upon the ‘novelty’ of the Trump phenomenon. Moreover, to witness and discuss the resemblance between Trump and these earlier movements. When considered thru historical lenses the main aim here is to gain some conceptual and societal clarity over the standing of the recent political buzzword: populism. Thus, it should be clear how we according to Mudde, Kaltwasser and Wodak understands populism: Fundamentally a political agenda uniting “the people” against the corrupted elite and/or against an enemy from abroad.

Besides, this section offers a new concept, which we have yet to clarify: nativism. Nativism is in US history often associated with the Know-Nothing movement of the 1840s and 1850s. Even though it

is a concept of its own, it is closely linked to populism and can as well be a relevant historical reference when trying to categorise Trump's political positions and style. Before we look into nativism in the US and the Know Nothing movement, I will once again refer to the work of Cas Mudde (Mudde, 2011) and to his definition of nativism, in order to gain some conceptual clearness over the phenomenon.

“Nativism entails a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, i.e. an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native (or ‘alien’) elements, whether persons or ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde, 2011, s. 12)

### 5.1: Nativism in the US

In “The Party Of Fear” (Bennett, 1988) David H. Bennett provides a thorough and descriptive account of nativism within the US, the creation of the Know Nothings, the time up to their creation and on their eruption. The following section takes its position in Bennett's work, but also utilizes the recent work by Hans-Georg Betz in “Nativism Across Time and Space” (Betz H. G., 2017) to provide further credentials, insights and knowledge about the Know Nothing's and US nativism.

The nativist movement and finally the emergence of the Know Nothings and the American party in the 1850s was in the making for years, with fierce tension between natives and immigrants.

Already in the 1830's the Whig party arose with Henry Clay as one of its most prominent members, who warned against the flood of Irish and other Catholic immigrants entering the US (Bennett, 1988, p. 51).

The attitude towards immigrant was by many extremely negative, for one, a newspaper in Brooklyn described the Irish immigrants as cattle and that they will fill the American towns with filth and disease (Bennett, 1988, p. 55).

Throughout the 1830's and early 1840s the influx of Catholic European immigrants and the confrontations between immigrants and natives inclined. There were several episodes of violence with fist and knife fights between Protestants and Catholics (Bennett, 1988, p. 56). In addition, both sides participated in riots, which went violent as well and for a period in 1844, the city of Philadelphia turned into a warzone and for weeks native Protestants and immigrant Catholics fought each other (Bennett, 1988, pp. 56--58).

If the native Americans had been troubled and threatened by the European immigration in the 1830s

and earlier 40s, it was nothing compared how many who was about to arrive at their shores.

Between 1847 and 1854, 2.75 million people from Europe came to the US looking for a better future (Bennett, 1988, p. 62).

The massive influx greatly influenced American politics and as will be described Native Americans gathered in groups and formed alliances throughout the east coast. Their concern was that the immigrants posed several threats, they were not Protestants, they were drunks and criminals, they would steal real Americans jobs their Catholic faith meant a dangerous loyalty to the pope. All this will be illustrated in the following section leading to the creation of the Know Nothings and a short notice on their vast disruption.

#### 5.1.1: The Know Nothing movement

In December 1844 in New York City, 13 men, met under the name American Brotherhood, which shortly after was changed to Order of United Americans (OUA). One of these men, Thomas R Whitney later explained that a set of principles was quickly established and the main purpose of the group was manifested. “Our efforts must be to release our country from the thralldom of foreign domination” (Bennett, 1988, p. 105).

Several anti-immigrant (anti-alien) groups appeared in the 1840’s and many of them disappeared again, being replaced by new secret societies like OUA, which continued to be active after the fall of political parties carrying the name Native American (Bennett, 1988, p. 105).

Another example of these nativist fraternities was the Order of United American Mechanics (OUAM) in Philadelphia, which focus was the crisis in employment for “real” Americans. The group aimed to help each other financially, in finding work, and to support only business owned by native Americans.

They called for an end to the “unequal foreign competition” and warned that honest American workers would suffer by cheap alien labour. The groups was not alone and in the eastern cities of the US, many people were involved in nativist activities, one newspaper claimed 48.000 thousand people in New York and 42.000 people in Philadelphia. (Bennett, 1988, p. 106). The most popular fraternity remained to be OUA with 21 chapters in New York alone by 1848 and within 10 years of its birth, they spread to 13 states and included more than 50.000 members (Bennett, 1988, p. 106). The threat that the natives felt the immigrants posed upon the labour market was a general feeling throughout the 1850’s and one congressman suggested a tax on immigrant labour. This fear was very much ungrounded, since the immigrants did not replace the native and stole their jobs. The immigrants took the worst and low-paying jobs. They actually attributed to the industrial

progression and helped to raise the relative social and economic status of many native workers (Bennett, 1988, p. 79).

This did not change the fact that nativist still saw the mass immigration as a threat to depreciate American workers only benefitting capitalist, and that the lack of skills and high degree of unemployment among the immigrants would negatively affect the US (Bennett, 1988, p. 83).

The OUA and the OUAM differed on one point: workers and people without relation to the political establishment created the OUAM, on the other hand the OUA was founded by men “on the margins of the establishment” (Bennett, 1988, p. 107). One was the brother of the New York major and another the brother of a governor and son of a prominent judge. At the time, the OUA was the most influential nativist movement, not due to charismatic leaders or national figures, but because of their connections and intensive support (Bennett, 1988, p. 107).

When the OUA had meetings in was advertised in the press and the chapters provided official directories for membership. Nevertheless, the fraternity was a secret society, where rituals and procedures were guarded with much care, and this created a sense of togetherness within the OUA (Bennett, 1988, pp. 107-108)

The rhetoric of the nativist movement was imprinted with self-pity, anger, nationalism and pride. Besides being accused of stealing natives’ jobs, the immigrants were also portrayed as drunks and criminals. Being a threat to the “proper” order of true Americans, and the natives were asked to see them as a danger to society (Bennett, 1988, p. 53).

The OUA at the same time took great pride in the US as a major country, bigger than Europe, with immense agriculture as an impressive mining industry. They acknowledged that the success of their great nation owed thanks to people of many lands, but “It is unquestionable that the American family is essentially of the Anglo-Saxon branch of the Teutonic race” (Bennett, 1988, p. 108). A crucial part of the hatred that the nativist felt towards the immigrants/aliens, was the fact that they were catholic. They perceived the Catholic Church as perverted, undemocratic and un-American. Meaning that the immigrants’ religion in itself posed a threat to the natives and America (Bennett, 1988, pp. 85-86).

In the spring of 1850 in New York, the ‘Order of the Star’ by Spangled Banner (OSSB) was established. At first, it was as any other of the many “patriotic” groups of the US, with only 36 members, but by 1852, it began to gain momentum and became the greatest achievement of Native American history (Bennett, 1988, p. 110).

It attracted the attention of the OUA members and many joined the OSSB, and the opportunity to

start a political party with roots in nativist policy as the one advocated by OUA seemed possible. Networks of secret local councils were established and recruited new members. The demands to becoming a member was as in many other nativist groups: one had to be a man, at least 21 years old and a believer in God (Protestant) (Bennett, 1988, pp. 110-111).

Even though OBBS was inspired by OUA, it diverted by being strictly political, the local councils being an evidence of this. The ones who held office in these were regarded as second degree members. They followed the oath "to work for the removal of aliens and Catholics from all positions of authority and to deny them jobs and profits in private business or public office" (Bennett, 1988, p. 111).

First and foremost the order was devoted to secrecy. Some members feared that the immigrants would "punish" them, by boycotting their business if they know their where in the organisation. Others feared that old parties would try to crush OSSB, and these old parties were pictured as being closed and never consulting the people (Bennett, 1988, p. 111).

The nativist remained to picture themselves as protectors of "real" Americans, and called that their only concern was to attack those who threaten our liberty and American principles (Bennett, 1988, pp. 111-112).

The dedication to secrecy led to the name of "know nothing". When ask about the activities of the organisation, members were instructed to say they knew nothing. A journalist of the New York Tribune was the first to label the groups as the Know Nothings in 1853, the name become widespread and this marked the change from fraternity to political establishment and the order was about to become the American party (Bennett, 1988, p. 112).

The fall of the Whig party in 1852, led the way for the Know Nothings and even though former Whig members captured the Know Nothings councils through New York State, it meant that the Know Nothing established the structure of a political party. The election in 1854 showed the immense appeal of the Know Nothings and the fraternity rose as the American party. Know Nothing merchandise like candy and tea was marketed as Know Nothing/nativist literature was becoming widespread. However, those in the heart of the political organisation still took great pride in the secrecy of the movement (Bennett, 1988, pp. 112-115).

In spite of the movements success it was threaten by social upheaval and the politics of disunion (Bennett, 1988, p. 116). In addition, already in late 1856, after much disturbance the movement was more or less disintegrated (Bennett, 1988, p. 152).

The Know Nothings and the different nativist groups which laid the ground for the Know Nothings very much fit Cas Mudde definition of nativism. The natives depicted the immigrants as a threat to their known society, both in relation to the labour market as well as cultural values. They wanted to keep them out and the ones, which were already in the US, away from political and financial power. We know that Trumps has expresses concern towards undocumented Mexicans in the US, allegedly stealing “Americans” jobs and posing a cultural threat as well. Evident in the slogan “America first!”, but can his approach and political style be characterised as nativism? The analysis and discussion will aim to clarify this question.

## 5.2: The People’s Party

In “Nativism across time and space”, Hans-Georg Betz seeks to investigate three historical examples of nativism. One of this where the American political party the People’s Party, which has been known for being an early example of populism in the US. I will use his work to utilise the approach and conduct of the People’ Party.

A populist movement started to take place in typical farmlands in the South as well as Midwest of the US where farmer organisations like the Grange and the Farmers’ Alliance called for cooperation and an increase in farmers leverage towards banks and railroads. This lead to the formation of the People’s Party founded in 1891, which quickly gained momentum in numerous states such as Kansas and Colorado. Never the less, the party fell abruptly and collapsed already in 1896 when William Jennings Bryan lost the presidential election. It did not change the fact that the party in spite of its short lifespan heavily affected American politics (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 8).

As Betz note, this was a time of crucial socio-economic change in the US, which became known as “The Glided Age”. A time where the country witnessed a swift growth in industrialisation and technological innovation composed with an immense expansion of cooperate power and a revolution within transportation and communication, which lead to further globalisation.

This was also a time, which lead to greater inequality where the rich got richer and only the luckiest of the middle-class benefited as well, whereas most of the American people struggled. The economic change and dislocation lead to extensive anxieties and dislike, but most strongly among farmers (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 10).

A particular aspect put pressure on American farmers. The integration of the international grain market, which meant new competition for markets such as Russia, Argentina, Canada and British India and brought down international prices on agricultural commodity (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 10).

Experiencing an economic collapse and thereby declining living standards the farmers movement was fuelled with anger and frustration towards big cooperations, big banks and their collusion with the political establishment. A leading populist orator from Kansas noted in 1891 that this was no longer “A government of the people, by the people and for the people”, but one “Of Wall Street, By Wall Street and for Wall Street” (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 10). Contrary to the Know Nothings the People’s Party did not find their main enemy or target to be immigrants, but instead to be capitalism.

The People’s Party praised “real workers” like farmers, labours and small businessmen while doubting the legitimacy of “non-producers” such as bankers, railroad magnets, commodity brokers and so on. They wished to take back economic and political control and power from the monopolists to the real producers of wealth, thereby allowing them to regain control over their lives (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 11).

The political distemper, which were very evident in the 1880s and 1890s, sparked a reappearance of nativism. Tales of the evils of Catholicism provoked new anxieties, which in the end lead to the creation of the American Protective Association (APA) in 1887. The APA was primarily an anti-Catholic movement where members pledge never to vote for a Catholic in public office, never to hire a Catholic if a protestant was available and never to join them on strike.

The movement never grew anywhere near as big as Know Nothing, but maintained to influence the Republican Party significantly in the Midwest (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 11).

As Betz, points out the nativist approach by the APA would have fitted well with the agenda of the People’s Party. However, the party, with a few exceptions, did what they could to counteract the nativism of APA. (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 12). Leading populists would condemn the APA, which they believed were only created in order to distract the public from the economic problems affecting the country while “preventing all producers uniting against a common enemy”. The enemy should here be perceived as capitalism / the monopolist (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 12).

At one aspect, the populists did show some signs of nativism, which were directed against the British. They saw the American capitalist as “cohorts of the tyranny of British gold” and claimed that Wall Street was controlled by the British. Thus making American farmers under their control as well.

Populists demonised the British in ways close to the anti-Catholic approach of the Know Nothings, and one populist author blamed the British of "waging a war cruel and unrelentless against the liberties, and even the lives, of our toiling yeomanry, their wives and helpless little ones." (Betz H.

G., 2017, p. 13). A key concern was that British investors were buying up American land. The response to this by the populist reflected one important aspect, which was also enacted by the Know Nothings. That the destiny of a nation should be in the hands of the native-born (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 13).

It is important to note that even though the populist and the People's Party in some instances took on a nativist approach this was not essential to their mobilisation. As mentioned the populists' main target was the financial and industrial plutocracy, which they believed profited from the hard labour of ordinary farmers. As well as blaming them for the British influence on the American economy. In other words: Their anti-elite approach maintained to be their most important stance.

### 5.3: The Tea Party

Moving on I will attract my focus on the movement known as the Tea Party. As the research will show the movement and its supporters has close ties to the Republican Party, but maintains to divert itself from the party. Turning my attention from political movements in 19<sup>th</sup> century to the Tea Party, which saw its first gathering in 2009 can seem unusual. However, I have chosen to include the movement to this chapter, since as the analysis will show, it shares closeness to the concept of populism and can help to answer the question of Trump's populist approach compared to other present political movements within the US.

For this section I have used the theories of Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol and John Coggins in "The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism" (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggins, 2011) as well as Nella Van Dyke and David S. Meyer in "Understanding the Tea Party Movement" (Dyke & Meyer, 2014). The Tea Party have not undergone much scholarly research, but I hope that the two sources will necessitate sufficient insight on the movement.

In November 2008 American Conservatism and the Republican Party was in a downfall (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggins, 2011, p. 25). Democratic candidate Barack Obama was elected president on the basis of a progressive agenda and the Democratic Party won majority in House and Senate as well. Obama was never popular among Republicans and his financial policy as well as government spending, was a leading force behind the creation of the Tea Party. Republicans and later on supporters of the Tea Party Movement, strongly opposed The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and, which was labelled as, Obama Care. On that line, the Tea Party movement became known for wanting less government, less government spending, lower taxes and a free market (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggins, 2011, pp. 25-26).



In 2009 CNBC reporter Rick Santelli gave a highly critical rant towards Obama and his plan to give financial aid to the big banks threaten by bankruptcy. Santelli invited all capitalist to a Tea Party in Chicago. The video of him went widespread and received a lot of attention and from this the movement started and got its name.

Small protests occurred on February 27 in about a dozen cities around the US, but in the months to come, similar events grew larger and larger. The demonstrations peaked at the April's Tax Day and later in September when tens of thousands Tea Party protesters marched on Washington.

By 2010, The Tea Party had developed into a somewhat powerful force, and several of self-declared Tea Party activists exercised noteworthy influence in numerous of the 2010 electoral races, both in the Republican Primaries and in the general election contest in November (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, pp. 25-26).

In the process of trying to identify whom the Tea Party activist are and extent of the movement, Williamson et. All turn their attention to several polls, which show that the majority of the respondents have negative concerns regarding the movement and many are unaware of its existence. Thus, Williamson et. al argue (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p. 27) that the Tea Party supporters are a minority and that the media might exaggerate their position at times. On the same note the authors points to a comprehensive pole by The CBS News and The New York Times in April 2010. It showed that only one out of five that claim to be Tea Party supporter actually donated money or attended a TP event, indicating that the real supporters of the Tea Party, is not so sizeable (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p. 27).

The authors as well stick to nationwide surveys, which depicts the Tea Party supporters as being older, white and middleclass people. 55-60 % are men, up until 90 % white and 70-75 % are more than 45 years old. As often seen with this demographic group, income level tends to exceed typical Americans (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p. 27). In relation to ideology, the majority of Tea Party supporters are often depicted as conservative Republicans. A survey by Gallup in 2010 confirms this categorisation, when it showed that 62 % of Tea Partiers saw themselves as conservative Republican. Moreover, another poll found that 75 % of Tea Party supporters are Republican or lean Republican (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, pp. 27-28).

The work by Scher and Berlet in "Understanding the Tea Party Movement" (Dyke & Meyer, 2014) paints a broader picture of the diversity among the people supporting the Tea Party. Firstly, Scher and Berlet found six distinctive ideologies promoted by the movement and the people supporting it: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism, the Christian Right, white racism, patriot movement ideology

and conspiracy theories (Dyke & Meyer, 2014, s. 8). Scher and Berlot see the Tea Party movement as primarily consisting of middle-class people, but besides this particular trait there is a high degree of divergence between, which of the above ideologies the members support. Aligning with the work of Williamson et al. Scher and Berlot found that some represent a traditional Republican fiscal conservatism promoting an anti-government approach, seeing the state as a threat to the free market and damaging business. Others stick to Christian Conservative viewpoints, which argue for restrictions on matters like gay and lesbian rights, and felt that the Republican Party are not upholding its conservative principles. Scher and Berlot also witnessed racism among Tea Party members opposing diversity and immigration often depicting a scapegoat or enemy, which could be black people or Muslims (Dyke & Meyer, 2014, s. 8).

Regardless of consisting mainly of Republicans the Tea Party does not follow guidance of the Republican Party or have organisational ties to the Republicans. The Tea Party is instead organised around local networks and national organisations providing resources, as conservative media who help to bring forth the opinions and Tea Partyism. (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, p. 28) Grass root movements have been important in establishing the Tea Party, where social media and internet forums are used to set up contact and constitute different local groups. Williamson et. All refers to a website called MeetUp, which purpose is to bring people together. In an investigation conducted by the Washington Post, they found 650 Tea Party groups on MeetUp. Despite, the importance of the grass root movement, Williamson et. All argues that the movement might be smaller than the impression mainstream media gives. Instead, they bring focus to the network of well-founded national advocacy organisations, which have been promoting the Tea Party brand. Two organisations, which have provided financial support to and promoted the movement is the Tea Party Express (TPE) and the Tea Party Patriots (TPP). The TPE is a project run by the Republican action committee known as “Our Country Deserves Better”, which have provided hundred thousands of dollars to conservative and Tea Party supported candidates. Moreover, the organisation provided big money to the Republican primaries as well. The TPP on the other hand has had stronger ties to the grassroots activism and the organisation carries the motto “Fiscal responsibility, Limited Government, Free Market”. Principles, which seems to align with the general values of the Tea Party.

Williamson et. All reference that the two is just a small portion of the larger organisations, which are linked to the Tea Party, and they reflect over how many Tea Party supporters are aware of the

affect the big-money organisation has on the movement (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, pp. 28-29).

In "Understanding the Tea Party Movement" Tina Fetner and Brayden G. King (Dyke & Meyer, 2014) like Williamson et al. also reflects on the notion that the Tea Party on the outskirts represents a grass-root movement, but continues to be influenced by wealthy donors and organisations trying to benefit from the Tea Party success. Fetner and King brings attention to an episode in 2010 where the organisation the Tea Party Nation hosted an event for Tea Party supporters, but where criticised for overcharging participants and paying Sarah Palin 100.000 dollars to act as key-note speaker. This led many Tea Party supporters to distance themselves from the Tea Party Nation, highlighting some of the difficulties that exist within or close to the movement.

In their analysis of the Tea Party Williamson et al. choose to dig deeper into the Greater Boston Tea Party (GBTP), which they, due to the liberal environment in Massachusetts, expected to differ from the rest of the Tea Party movement. However, their anticipation were incorrect and GBTP showed to resemble the common Tea Party very much. Typical for the movement, 97 % of the members were white, 57 % male and 83 % over the age of forty-six. Likewise the GBTP members showed to follow the same conservative news station as the majority of the Tea Party, Fox News. A vast part of the respondents has had earlier experience with political activism, which again is a typical trait of the Tea Party movement. In Massachusetts as in rest of the country, the main concern among Tea Party supporters are government intervention in the private market as well as the amount of government spending. Close to nine out of ten in the GBTP rated "Deficits and Spending" as a very important aspect for the movement to address, once again emphasising that the Tea Party supporters opt for low state intervention, lower taxes and austerity policies.

However, when it comes to financial policies Williamson et al. found in their research that how Tea Partiers interpretive government spending differs and might be more complex than what ones first impression would let you think. The authors found that Tea Party members in general had a firm opinion about who deserves personal benefits like Social Security and Medicare. Tea Partiers differentiate between those who work, thereby being entitled to social spending, and the ones who do not work, making them unentitled. The research by Williamson et al. also found that many of the Tea Party members sharing this belief, had a relative or friend, which were receiving some sort of social aid. It seems that the majority of the Tea Partiers do not disagree with all government spending; they just feel that they are paying taxes to support people who do not deserve it (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, pp. 32-33).

Williamson et. All claim that there seems to be an underlying blame of especially young people and illegal immigrants, when talking about “the people who do not work”. That the Tea Party supporters see these two groups as a threat to the American society, since they do not retain the same work ethic as themselves. And nationally 80 % of Tea Party supporters see immigrations as a very serious problem, compared to “only” 60 % of Americans overall (Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011, pp. 33-34). This notions links well with the founding of Scher and Berlot that Tea Party supporters often see “outside” groups like Muslims or illegal immigrants as a threat to the US (Dyke & Meyer, 2014, s. 8).

## Chapter 6: Analysing Trump’s speeches

Conducting the analysis of the five campaign speeches by Donald Trump I have thoroughly gone through, described and analysed all speeches separately utilizing Kuypers inductive approach. As Kuypers (Kuypers, 2010, s. 298) suggest I have set up no frames prior to analysis, but looked for and analysed themes in each speech and based on that expounded frames. Thus, meaning that the frames will occur in chapter seven and not here, where the sole aim is to create a platform for expounding frames. Moreover, it is also in chapter seven that I will present the theories on populism in relation to Trump, not during the analysis of the speeches where only the theory on framing is enacted. When expounding the frames I will see how Trump’s approach, style and rhetoric correlates with the theory of Mudde and Kaltwasser, Wodak and Appadurai.

In order to gain the absolute best insight into Trump’s speeches I have done a comprehensive inspection through both reading the text and watching the video material. I have analysed the different topics that Trump focussed on during his speeches in the same order as he went through them. One of the challenges, which I met during the analysis, was Trump inability or lack of wish to concentrate solely on a specific topic at a time. He would at times jump from one topic, which could be Hillary Clinton’s relationship to Wall Street to a new and different topic like Middle-Eastern refugees and then back again, more or less within the same sentence. This tested my ability to persist a clear structure in the analysis. Moreover, as I describe in the analysis, this also meant that Trump at times manages to connect subjects like crime and terrorism to Latino and Muslim immigrants, begging the questions whether or not that was his intention to begin with.

In the analysis, I will try to set up sub-headlines as descriptive as possible to define the different themes. However, there will be cases where a text following a sub-headline, which could be “the people vs Clinton and the establishment”, entails notions on a very different topic, due to the above-

mentioned tendency by Trump.

Three key themes which was evident in all speeches and have been named as the following. 1) “the people vs Clinton and the establishment” 2) “threatening immigration and the troubles with non-natives” and 3) “jobs the American worker first”, which will also be the name of the sub-headlines. It is also important to note Trump’s almost obsessive focus on Clinton, whom he manage to blame for everything that is wrong with the US and as I will demonstrate most of his statements revolve around a criticism of Clinton.

To describe and analyse what Trump made salient and how he framed the different themes I will draw on the theory of all the scholars I have presented under the framing section. However, I will not directly state when, just to mention an example, diagnostic framing is evident. It is hopefully clear when this is the case. Moreover, all speeches will entail a short recap to depict examples of when the different theories on framing appears.

In relation to Entman’s four locations, the focus will be on the text, communicator and culture, but also to touch upon the receiver and how the audience seems to receive and process Trump’s messages. As Entman explains, framing is an interaction between communicator and receiver (Entman, 1993, s. 52-53). A notion also emphasised by Snow and Benford, who argue that the frame has to align with the audience. Snow and Benford focus on centrality, range and interrelates. The frame should be central to the audience, it should provide range in the sense that the frame should correspond with several core values of the audience and it should relate to the typical norms of the audience belief system (Snow & Benford, 1988, s. 205).

When establishing how Trump framed certain issues and what might drove him to use the approach he did, I find Aalberg et al. theory on game and strategic frame quite relevant. Trump’s focus on Clinton could indicate that he adapted the mass-media style of strategic framing by focusing on her relationship to the establishment and how her own interest and motives controlled her political agenda. I pursue in the analysis to show if this was the case or not.

Besides, I will also look into when he uses diagnostic or prognostic framing. When framing an issue did he mainly just cast blame or did he also focussed on suggesting solutions?

Lastly, I will also aim to point out information or knowledge that Trump chooses to leave out when trying to establish a frame. As Entman notes, the unsaid can be just as crucial as is what is made salient, when establishing a frame (Entman, 1993, s. 54).

## 6.1: Trump in Virginia

Trump starts his speech with a type of introduction by first urging people to vote on November 8<sup>th</sup> (election day), before he states in a short, but descriptive and very firm manner, problems in America and some of the solutions he offers. He declared: “We are going to take our country back” (Appendix 1. P, 1) that the government will once again listen to *the people* instead of lobbyists and ‘special interest’. He promises to restore the economy, make factories come back, especially in Virginia. He asserts to enact immigration laws and secure trade deals, which are good for the American worker (Appendix 1. Pp, 1-2).

All this is within the first few minutes of the speech, before he moves on to go deeper into his first real subject, Hillary Clinton.

### 6.1.1: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

He starts off by calling her a cooperate defender of a failed system, before characterising her as “an insider fighting only for herself and the other insiders”, he then refers to himself as an “outsider” fighting for you (the audience) (Appendix 1. P, 2). Being an outsider, he means that he is no politician, declaring he is funding his own campaign without any donors or lobbyists, which seems to be appreciated by the voters and a cause for applause and cheering.

Unmistakably, he is portraying Clinton in an extremely negative manner, where her political experience is presented as a problem. Accordingly, making her part of some elite, which only object is to secure their own interest, and not the *American people*. Were Trump on the other hand only promises to focus on the *American people*. And, continuously, he stresses that he will not let you (the audience) down and that he is “their” voice. He thereby also represents himself as the solution to their problems (Appendix 1. Pp, 2-4).

He refers to the *American people*, a group that he does not define very sufficiently, but occasionally refers to as workers and as the forgotten men and women, whom he promises to represent and to give a voice (Appendix 1. P, 4).

“It will be a government of, by and for *the people*” (Appendix 1. P 4). Putting him in the same box as his voters, he is a part of *the people*. The fact that he is an extremely wealthy man and a former reality-star is apparently not relevant. He portrays his background as a positive thing, the fact that he is not a politician and has no political experience is a good thing, since this can only mean that he is not a part of the perceived elite.

Throughout the speech, Trump spends a lot of time criticising and presenting Clinton in an extremely negative manner. He goes on to tell about all the money she has made while she let the

American military suffer, like she was supposed to pay for the military herself. He also calls the Clinton Foundation “phony”, before he moves on to mention her illegal private e-mail account and makes assumptions about what might have been on there (Appendix 1. Pp, 8-9).

As earlier, he tries to present her as an “elitist”, as a rich person that only focus on own interest and not the good of the country. He even goes as far as calling her a criminal, doing all he can to damage her persona, which brings the audience to start chanting: “lock her up”.

Before moving on, he rounds up the subject by stating that: “A Trump administration will end the government corruption once and for all, no one will be above the law” (Appendix 1. Pp, 9-10).

#### 6.1.2: Jobs and the American worker first

The other subject he refers to, mainly regard jobs, and specifically how jobs within the industry of coal and steel mining have disappeared, and also how Clinton, according to him, wants to put coal miners and steel workers out of business (Appendix 1. Pp, 10-11). The problem Trump presents, is a lack of jobs, and it seems he tries to establish environmental regulations as the creator of the problem, at the same time linking Obama and Clinton to these regulation.

“Clintons anti-energy is a massive tax one the poor it is also a massive tax on the people of Virginia” (Appendix 1. P, 11). Here Trump also tries to portray the politics by Obama and Clinton not only as a threat to jobs, but also a financial burden for *the people*.

Moreover, it seems that Trump tries to depict Clinton as stupid, or not in line with reality. “We are talking clean coal, beautiful clean coal; these reserves are located in Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Illinois” (Appendix 1. P, 11). He further states that Clinton’s policies will crush the coal exporting of Virginia and refers to the importance of the industry and how many jobs that are within it. He calls it the “Obama/Clinton war on the American worker” (Appendix 1. P, 13). Leading him to his explanation of the “energy revolution”, which his administration will enact, lifting regulations and thereby making business possible again. Without further explanation of their strategy, he goes on to highlight all the political changes he will enact and the jobs it will create (Appendix 1. Pp, 13-14).

Trump makes a good effort of trying to reach his audience by focusing on industries important for the state of Virginia making his content very relevant to the audience. However, he does choose to leave several important issues out or simply ignore them. His statement about “clean and beautiful coal” can be difficult to explain. It seems that he is trying to avert from the immense criticism of coal as an energy-resource due to its effect on the climate (SourceWatch, u.d.).

Trump focuses on jobs and an essential point is his statement: “soon you won’t have any jobs”

(Appendix 1. P, 12). It leaves you with the impression that the only jobs there are, in the state of Virginia, are in coal and steel mining, and that new technology or new sources of energy will bring no new jobs either.

Trump moves on with a focus on the agriculture and farming industry. “Hillary Clinton supports every last job-killing Obama regulation and wants to go much, much further” (Appendix 1. P, 15). He is also highly critical of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which he sees as destructive and promises to reform. Making it pro farming and pro energy (Appendix 1. P, 17).

Trump once again in a very shallow manner explains how he will improve the condition for farming, again mainly by cutting regulation and lowering taxes. “We are going to produce like never before, saving money for the consumers all the way” (Appendix 1. P, 18).

Trump then briefly touches upon the issue of trade deals. “We are losing so badly to other countries our jobs are gone, everything’s gone” (Appendix 1. P, 18). He promises that this will change with a Trump administration and there will be no more one-sided trade deals “where we open our markets, but they close their markets” (Appendix 1. P, 19).

#### 6.1.3: Troubling immigrations and problems with non-natives.

Trump then moves on to the topic of law enforcement, referring to trouble with illegal immigration in Virginia (Appendix 1. Pp 19-22). Following with the statement “Don’t worry we are gonna build the wall”, which leads to massive applause among the audience and chanting, “build the wall” (Appendix 1. P, 23). Trump states it will be easy to build the wall and that he is not joking about it: “This is a movement and movements don’t joke” (Appendix 1. P, 23). He continues his focus on immigration, appealing very much to the feeling of fear, describing the immigrants as unknown: “It’s getting worse now as thousands of recent border crossings are being relocated in the state of Virginia and you don’t know who they are” (Appendix 1. P, 23).

Trump sees immigration as a problem for the US, and once again he seeks to manifest a connection between this problem and Clinton, by stating that she has no clue who is entering the country. As what can only be depicted as a suggestion for a possible solution he states that “we” have to be smart, though and vigilant, otherwise “we are not gonna have a country anymore folks” (Appendix 1. P, 24). He equals immigration to an eruption of the US.

In the same note, he compares immigration with gang members, saying that the gangs are trying to recruit through the borders and that many gang members are illegal immigrants (Appendix 1. P, 24).



Trump then moves on to talk about the African-American and Hispanic community, explaining that unlike Clinton he actually sees them like people, whereas she only focuses on their votes. He promises them better conditions for their children in relation to creating businesses and attending good schools (Appendix 1. Pp, 24-26).

Once again he draws attention to the topic of illegal immigration, arguing that Clinton's amnesty plan will secure Social Security and jobs benefits for illegal immigrants, at the expense of taxpayers. Moreover, he states that Clinton's plan would bring 620.000 refugees to the US. "From Syria, not going to know who they are and where they come from, could be the great Trojan horse of all time" (Appendix 1. P, 27). Once again he depicts immigrants as something unknown, and in this case also like a possible threat, the Trojan Horse being a symbol of a sneak attack.

Trump does not miss the chance to attack Clinton yet another time "she would rather provide a job to a refugee living overseas than a young unemployed young African-American" (Appendix 1. P, 27).

Followed by "A Trump administration will put America workers first, Americanism not globalism will be our credo" (Appendix 1. Pp 27-28).

He then finishes the speech with further calls for uniting America, saying he will win and urges people to vote.

#### 6.1.4: Recap

Within the first subject that Trump addresses, Clinton, the establishment and the people, there is signs that Trump, to some extent, has adapted the strategy frame presented by Aalberg et al. His focus is not on Hillary Clinton's political stances and achievements or lack thereof, but solely on her own agenda, motives and relationship to the "special interest".

In relation to the next topic on jobs and the American worker, Trump facilitates Entman notion on the receiver (audience) and Snow and Benford on centrality, range and interrelatedness. Trump manages to frame a subject very relevant to his audience and speak directly of industries with presence in Virginia. Bringing attention to a challenge, which might have effected some of the audience personally.

In regards to the topic of immigrations and the threat that Trump perceives from this, I will refer to Snow and Benford's arguments on diagnostic and prognostic framing. When Trump makes the troubles he sees with immigration salient and offers his solution to these, which is to build a wall between the US and Mexico that will fall under the category of a prognostic frame. Nevertheless, I will argue that it can be subjective, whether or not a suggestion to a solution can be considered a

general solution or not. In addition, that in this case it is more than fair to criticise Trump's solution, since it is an immense and expensive task to build such a wall, which might offer political challenges as well.

## 6.2: Trump in Mississippi

The campaign rally in Mississippi differentiates itself from the others by having a quest speaker, Nigel Farage. A well-known politician from the United Kingdom and one of the key advocates for Britain leaving the European Union (Brexit) (BBC, <http://www.bbc.com>, 2016). I will follow up on that shortly, but the focus remains on Trump.

### 6.2.1: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

After being introduced, Trump spends about the next 12 minutes, until he gives the word to Farage, to talk about several different topics, linking them to the UK and how they were able to retain independence (Appendix 2. Pp, 2-8).

He compliments the people of Mississippi for their energy and states that, that is what is needed to rebuild the country. Moreover, that this is their chance to “to break free from the bitter failures of the past” (Appendix 2. P, 2). Like in the first speech, Trump stresses that this is the chance to remove the special interest and create a government “Of, by and for the people” and that no one will be left behind (Appendix 2. P, 2).

He shortly touches upon the topic of “radical Islamic terrorism”, stating that the Obama and Clinton administration has “sacrificed our safety and undermined our freedom and independence” (Appendix 2. P, 3). He mixes it with the issue of jobs, and how he believes they have moved to other countries and that open borders increase the job competition as well. Then referring to Britain and how they voted for independence, declaring, “which we are looking to do also folks” (Appendix 2. P, 3).

Trump focuses on how Britain by Brexit was able to move away from large cooperations and media who believe in a world without borders, and now is able to once again control immigration and their economy. He accuses media, celebrities and ‘big donors’ of trying to scare the public into voting ‘no’ for Brexit and saying that the same thing is happening in the US. Arguing that there are people benefitting from the ‘rigged system’ saying that the system cannot be changed (Appendix 2. P, 4). He goes on to criticising Clinton for not believing in Brexit when he did and states that she will “surrender America to globalism” (Appendix 2. P, 5). Trump to say about Clinton that she wants open borders and trade deals, which benefits foreign governments, and she wants a government that ignores the will of the people. “She wants to sell out American security for the Clinton foundation

for a big fat pile of cash” (Appendix 2. P, 6). He follows up on this by making references to Clinton’s, apparently close, relationship to special interests and lobbyists, hinting that she cares more about getting money through the Clinton foundation than doing good for America. Like in the first speech, Trump states that Clinton would rather give a job to an overseas immigrant than an American veteran or an unemployed African-American or Hispanic. He states that the focus of a public official should be on the citizens of the country. He pledges to make America his focus and that he will fight to secure that jobs stay in America instead of moving to countries like Mexico (Appendix 2. Pp, 6-8)

Trump then introduces Nigel Farage who speaks for around 5 minutes. Since it is not Nigel Farage who is the person of interest in this project, there will be no analysis of what he says. He does however, offer some interesting points and, similar to Trump, he remains very critical of, what he refers to as; the establishment, and continues Trump’s criticism of Obama and Clinton.

Obviously, in these first 12 minutes of his speech Trump chooses to depict and talk about several different issues, immigration, jobs, free trade and globalism. It seems his aim is to portray the Obama/Clinton administration and what he calls special interest and lobbyist, as the creator of the problems he sees involving the aforementioned subject. In extension, he might seek to present, what I choose to refer to as the elite, thinking here of Obama, Clinton, special interests and lobbyists, as the creator or background of all these problems. Like in the first speech, there can be no doubt that one of Trump’s main objects is to demonise Clinton and portray her as elitist, out of touch with her voters, stupid and not focussing on US’s interests and its people.

He argues that America needs to do the same as Britain did with Brexit, since the US is not part of the EU or any other political or economic union; it is quite difficult to interpret what he actually means. As I perceive it, he tries to develop into a question of breaking free of the elite and what he understands as unfair and bad trade deals. Trump speaks of Brexit as only positive and does not say anything about the expected complications, expected loss in growth and the warnings of Brexit by prominent world leaders (Reuters, 2016).

#### 6.2.2: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump continues after Farage small speech, to state that “it is time to recapture OUR destiny” that the government and media has lost touch with “the people”, that Americans has lost their children to illegal immigration, that the government tries to help the illegal immigrants not the American citizens. He argues that living standards has worsened over the years and wages have gone down. He blames Obamacare for this and states that people now have to hold two jobs and are working

harder and making less money than they used to. He promises to change it, bringing jobs, improving security and focusing on Americans (Appendix 2. Pp, 14-15).

Again, he focuses on immigration, arguing that Clinton's radical immigration plan and open borders has lowered the wages and will "kill the jobs of lawful American residents" (Appendix 2. P, 16).

Another of the many examples of his attempt to depict Clinton as un-American and a bad leader, which he follows up with his next argument.

He believes that the open borders put American lives at risk and refers to the killing of a young American girl by an illegal immigrant (Barbash, 2016). Once again criticising Clinton for focusing only on separated families that choose to come here illegally, not the American families that get separated due to illegal immigration (Appendix 2. P, 16).

By stating that they "choose" to come to the US, Trump manages to portray it exactly as a choice, that they could just stay, wherever they come from, and live a good life. Not that people might feel forced to come to the US. On the same note, by repeatedly describing immigrants as "job stealers" and 'criminals', Trump manages to, in a very direct way, portray these people as negative. There is no focus on the possible positive aspects they bring to the American labour market or the cultural nuances and diversion they bring as well.

He moves on to mention Clinton's 'plan' to bring in 620.000 refugees within her first term. Without mentioning specific countries, he clearly tries to demonise the nations who are likely to send refugees: "a large number of whom come from countries where women and gays are horribly brutalized which will weaken our tolerant way of life" (Appendix 2. P, 17). He goes on to say that, *they* do not share *our* values. He seeks very much to create a distance between his audience and refugees in general and portray them as a threat to America as his audience knows it today.

By skipping from talking about illegal immigrants to refugees almost in the same sentence, he manages to create a link between them. Thereby putting refugees of war and personal persecution in the same box as the illegal immigrants who killed a young American girl.

As in the first speech, he clearly sees immigrants and refugees as a big problem, which he blames Clinton for and posing him as the solution, making it quite clear who is the bad one and who is the good one.

### 6.2.3: Jobs and the American worker first

Trump moves abruptly from this to statements that he will create millions and millions of jobs, cut taxes, reduce regulations, fix the trade deals, unleash American energy and repeal and replace Obamacare.

He continues with a focus on jobs “I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created believe me” (Appendix 2. P, 18). Also stating that jobs and companies are being stolen from ‘us’ and that manufacturing is down. Jobs seem to be a key aspect for Trump and once again he criticises trade deals, this time specifically NAFTA. It seems that he sees these deals and an open economy as the driver of the lack of jobs he believes America is experiencing. Precisely he states that after NAFTA was enacted the US has lost 40 % of its manufacturing jobs and he promises to bring them back (Appendix 2. P, 19). To blame only free trade for the loss of manufacturing jobs seems to me as a simplification. As shown by a study at Ball University 88 % of the jobs lost in manufacturing between 2006-2013 was “stolen” by automation and robots. Manufacturing grew by more than 17 % in the same period, but the factories simply do not need the same amount of people to produce as they used to (Lehmacher, 2016). This key aspect is completely ignored by Trump.

#### 6.2.4: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump then returns to the subject of immigration and blames Obama and Clinton for the crisis in the Middle East and especially the threat that ISIS poses. Likewise, he focuses on the financial consequences and the refugee crisis, which threatens Europe and according to him the US. As seen before he seeks to alienate refugees, in the same words as in the first speech. That “we” do not know what kind of people Hillary is allowing to pour into our country (Appendix 2. P, 26). He takes it further by not only alienating refugees, but also linking them directly to terrorism: “At the same time ISIS is trying to infiltrate refugee flows into Europe and definitely folks definitely I've been very good at predicting definitely into the United States” (Appendix 2. P, 26), a statement, which leads to massive support among the audience.

He finishes his critique of Obama and Clinton in relation to the Middle East to almost shout out “this is the legacy of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton: death, destruction, terrorism and weakness” (Appendix 2. P, 28).

Trump’s main suggestion, to solve the problems in the Middle East, to destroy ISIS, which he pledges to do, as he sends them a message as well, promising to find and destroy them “we will win” (Appendix 2. P, 28). He manages, if not to equal, but to connect Islam with terrorism by calling it a war against an ideology against “hateful radical Islam” and promises to promote American values, culture and America’s system of government.

He then rounds off his speech by stressing how he will create jobs, re-establish a healthy economy, and so on, in a tone similar to the first speech, and well depicted in this quote: “This is our moment

to show the whole world that America is back bigger and better and stronger than ever before. I am asking for your vote so I can be your champion in the White House” (Appendix 2. P, 30).

#### 6.2.5: Recap

Trump, yet again enacts his adaption of the strategy frame in topic one, even more directly than in the first speech, when talking about the first topic “the people vs Clinton and the establishment”. He states that Obama, Clinton and the special interests are all making money of the “rigged system” and goes as far as to state that Clinton is willing to trade American security for money to her own foundation. A very evident example that Trump has adapted the notion by Aalberg et al. that journalist will focus on politician’s agendas and motives instead of political content. It is apparent that Trump, as a politician, enacts this approach and it seems to be his main tactic when discussing and criticising Clinton and the establishment.

In the next topic of “threatening immigration and the troubles of the non-natives” Trump primarily enacts the notion of diagnostic framing, since his main purpose is to blame the Obama/Clinton administration for these issues and troubles. He does not suggest a direct solution, but it seems that the underlying answer to the question of immigration is to close the borders.

With Trump’s last topic “jobs and the American worker first” he does not speak of industries within Mississippi as he did in the first speech about Virginia, nevertheless I will argue that he manages to relate to his audience. It will always be crucial for a country and its people that they have a strong and solid labour market, but Trump manages to frame it as the US is losing that base. And, by arguing that, American companies, selling products in the US, should also use American labour, Trump manages to speak to the common logic and values of his audience.

### 6.3: Trump in North Carolina

Trump’s speech in North Carolina on the 20<sup>th</sup> of September does not differ much from the first two speeches. His main issues of focus are once again Clinton, ISIS that the US is losing jobs, is threatened by globalism, open borders and refugees, as well as “losing” due to current trade deals. However, the speech does stand out in the way that Trump uses a long time talking about the “special interest”. This is his main focus of the first 15 minutes of the speech, where he is more descriptive about who he sees as the special interest, Clinton’s relationship to them and the perceived threat they pose.

#### 6.3.1: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

He moves on to promise he will win the election for “the people”, and in the same notion says “we have to and we don’t have any choice replace a very failed and very corrupt establishment”

(Appendix 3. Pp, 1-2). By saying “we” Trump aligns himself with what he referred to as “the people”, clearly in an attempt to establish himself as “a common man”, as equal to his voters. Like in earlier cases, he once again tries to illustrate the differences between him and Clinton.

He states that Clinton represents the insiders, which he characterises as donors to politicians, big banks, multinational cooperation’s and “everybody getting rich of a rigged system” (Appendix 3. P, 2). He states that these people, whom Clinton represents, has squeezed the middle-class and that she favours globalism and “the special interest”, whereas Trump promises to be a president of the US, not of the world.

He elaborates on his criticism of the “special interest” by stating that they seek to “run our government and our lives” (Appendix 3. P, 3). It seems that Trump, even more than in the earlier speeches, aims to demonize the special interest/insiders/elite/establishment and to make them come forth as something to fear.

Trump defines his campaign as a movement, and he stresses the importance and ability of this movement to put an end to the rigged system.

He goes on to accuse the insiders for the poor trade deals, which he believes has robbed North Carolina of jobs and made the insiders rich. Throughout, he manages to connect Clinton to this group and stresses that she is backed financially by these people (Appendix 3. Pp, 3-4).

He portrays himself as a victim of this group and seeks to alienate himself from what he then refers to as “that special interest gravy train” (Appendix 3. P, 6).

Trump continues down this line for the next several minutes. Throughout, he is calling for “us” or “we” to align against Clinton and the special interest, to once again create a government for “the people” and to secure America’s future. (Appendix 3. Pp, 5-12).

#### 6.3.2: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump moves on to a new subject, refugees and the threat he believes they pose to America. Just before he goes on to talk about how Clinton will accept thousands of refugees and the troubles this will bring, in the same sentence, he mentions ISIS. As in speech two, he once again tries to create a connection between terrorism and Islam and, in this case, also Syrian refugees (Appendix 3. P, 13).

#### 6.3.3: Jobs and the American worker first

He very briefly touches upon the issue of refugees, abruptly, moving on to talking about the menace of open borders and trade deals (Appendix 3. Pp, 12-15).

He mentions how Ford Motors are planning to move one of their company divisions to Mexico and



calls the trade deal NAFTA a disaster for the country and North Carolina. Yet, he blames “the special interest”, and promises that the corrupt politicians will no longer take our business (Appendix 3. Pp, 15-16). Once again, he enacts the questions of “us” and “them”, which in this case, taking the whole speech so far into consideration, seems to be the American middle-class vs the elite. Himself representing the middle-class and Clinton representing the elite.

He brings attention to another example of an American company moving a plant to Mexico and then goes on to present his solution to the problem. To enact a 35 % tax on products produced in Mexico and imported back to the US (Appendix 3. Pp, 17-19). A strategy he seems to see as bulletproof, “they’re not going to move folks” (Appendix 3. P, 21).

He moves on stating that “the fact is you have companies right now where you work that are negotiating to move out of North Carolina” (Appendix 3. P, 22). Clearly trying to enact the feeling of fear and insecurity among his audience. Additionally, he argues that the politicians are doing nothing about it, since it benefits their big donors and special interest. Trump simply tries to depict current politicians, with an emphasis on Clinton, as corrupt (Appendix 3. Pp, 22-23).

He continues on the subject, and as earlier, very much makes it into a battle between USA vs Mexico and China, a battle he believes the US is losing. He argues that states like Ohio and Michigan are “getting killed” while the car industry are moving to Mexico and that the US has a massive debt to both China and Mexico (Appendix 3. Pp, 23-25). And as earlier he presents himself as the solution to this “I will be the greatest jobs president that god ever created” (Appendix 3. P, 26).

#### 6.3.4: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump then moves back to the issue of open borders. He criticizes Clinton for supporting open borders, saying “she don’t have a clue”, and once again mentioning Syrian refugees and in general people from the Middle-East as somebody to look out for (Appendix 3. Pp, 26-28).

“We have no idea they are coming in from the Middle-East, we have no idea who they are” (Appendix 3. P, 28). He continues with the subject of open borders, referring to the alleged problems in Germany and France. As earlier in this speech, he tries to evoke the feeling of fear in his audience by stating that if the US do not close its borders; “Folks we are not going to have country left” (Appendix 3. P, 30).

This notion and “mood” that he seems to be aiming to set is followed up by the quite unusual and somewhat bizarre quote of a song called The Snake by Wilson. A song which tells the story of a kind woman who takes in a wounded snake, which after recovering then bites and kills her. Clearly



a metaphor for the threat that immigrants and refugees pose to America, which Trump foresees could end in a destruction of America (Appendix 3. Pp, 29-33). How destruction in this case should be understood is hard to depict, but it seems to be in both financial and cultural matters.

Trump moves into his finishing points. Saying he will repeal and replace Obamacare, promote Supreme Court judges who believe in the constitution, secure second Amendment rights and create a better future for the African-American community. Moreover, he once again discusses NAFTA and how bad the current trade deals are for the US, and that he will change this, emphasising he still believes in free trade (Appendix 3. Pp, 34-39).

### 6.3.5: Recap

Trump initiates this speech with the subject of “the people vs Clinton and the establishment” and how they seek to control “the people”. This which takes up a lot of his time in this speech. Yet again he depicts the notion of the strategy frame, by constantly referring to the motives and tactics of the “special interest” and Hillary Clinton. Moreover, he also poses a solution to the problem, by calling for people to replace the corrupted establishment. Thus, enacting a prognostic frame, by arguing that the establishment represents a problem and the solution is to replace them, understood that the voters should replace them with him, Trump.

Trump notion on the topic of “threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives” yet again revolves around fear and his attempt to portray both Latino immigrants and Muslim refugees as criminals or terrorists. To put a new aspect to this theme it could be argued that Trump also here tries to frame this issue in relation to Snow and Benford’s notion of empirical credibility and experimental commensurability. Obviously, it would be irrational to say that because the US takes in Muslim refugees they are bound to be victims of terrorism. In that stance Trump’s framing approach is not credible, but in regard to 9/11 as the most vivid example where the US experienced terrorism with a connection to Islam. It could make the fear of terror rooted and linked to Islam and Muslims, which facilitates that Trump can build this frame of refugees as crooked and potential terrorist instead of victims of war and persecution.

In the last topic where Trump mainly focus on companies moving overseas, and as in the speech in Virginia he talks about how it is happening in the audience’s home-state, North Carolina. This time he also suggests a solution to the problem, which is to tax the American companies producing outside of the US, when they wish to sell their products into the US. A prognostic framing approach of how Trump perceives the themes ‘free trade’ and ‘the American worker’. The problem is

companies are moving to countries where labour is cheap, he then wishes to use taxation with the aim being them moving production back to the States.

#### 6.4: Trump in Maine

Trump first enters and starts speaking in the seventeenth minute. Up until then other Republican figures give small speeches.

Trump spends the first minutes of the speech listing different issues and matters he strives to change if he is elected president, very much in line with the subjects he had dealt with in the first three speeches.

He stresses that he will create jobs and put an end to the terrible trade deals. Jobs and trade deal, based on the third and this speech, seems to be more and more important for Trump. Moreover, he promises to stop illegal immigration, reduce crime, cut tax, lift registration on energy and to repeal and replace Obamacare (Appendix 4. Pp, 15-16).

##### 6.4.1: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

He moves attention to Clinton referring to her as “crooked Hillary”. He states that he will end government corruption and in the same sentence says: “Hillary speaks in secret to Goldman Sachs” (Appendix 4. P, 17). Once again aiming to connect Clinton to corruption and “the special interest”. He refers to Wikileaks and Clinton’s case with her deleted e-mails, calling her a fraud, accusing her of lying under oath and for “colluding” with the Department of State and Justice. Eventually calling it a rigged election and stating that Clinton should be in prison (Appendix 4. Pp, 18-19).

Trump brings attention to the issue of open borders and how Clinton supports it. His criticism of her attitude and the consequences of open borders seems to be even harsher than earlier. He states that open borders mean: “Foreign countries can cheat us out of millions of jobs and trillions and trillions of dollars. By open borders see means totally unlimited immigration pouring into our country” (Appendix 4. P 20). As in the earlier speeches he refers to the dangers of globalism that Clinton supports and once again seems to enact a self-developed, and quite shallow, analysis of open borders and free trade. He shows no reflection of the possible positive attributes, but aims to equal globalism, understood as open borders and international trade deals, with danger and erosion. Depicted clearly in his next quote: “This is it, we’re going to either win or we’re going to have a whole different country and it’s never going to come back” (Appendix 4. P, 21).

Another example of his eager to establish himself as a “common man” and equal to his voters in the fight against the tyranny of Clinton and her special interest.

#### 6.4.2: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump then moves on to another favoured subject in relation to open borders, the issue of Middle-Eastern immigrants. “Hillary’s plan includes an open border with the Middle-East meaning generations of radicalism within our shores” (Appendix 4. P, 21). He goes on to mention “Islamic terrorism and again, accusing Clinton for being, more or less, responsible for ISIS.

His criticism of Clinton, as mentioned above, is fiercer in this speech. Going as far as to state: “It’ll be four more years of an incompetent president” (If Clinton is elected) (Appendix 4. P, 22).

He continues with the subject and, as previously, Trump aims to create a connection between refugees and immigrants from the Middle-East and terrorism. “She (Clinton) wants us to follow the path of France and Germany and import terrorism directly into the United States” (Appendix 4. P, 24). He assures the audience that the amount of immigrants Clinton wishes to bring into the US will bring many problems and he pledges to “Keep radical Islamic terrorist the hell out of this country” (Appendix 4. P, 24). Leading the audience to applaud and chant “USA” repeatedly.

He vows to put “America first” and move on to assure that he will build the wall at the Mexican border to keep out illegal immigrants, and stresses that Mexico will pay for the wall (Appendix 4. P, 24).

He moves on to describe the case of an illegal immigrant who had already been deported, but was still in the US and both had committed rape. Once again this element of danger is connected to Clinton: “Clinton allowed thousands and thousands of criminal aliens to be released because their home countries wouldn’t take them” (Appendix 4. P, 26). Probably the most vivid example of Trumps attempt to create a distance between Americans and immigrants, not even depicting them as people, but in this case, as aliens. Moreover, he continues to say that their home countries are smart not to take them back, but we (USA) are stupid. Another clear strategy by Trump, simply to depict the US and its current politicians as naive and stupid. He goes on to use the word “alien” again when describing another committing a crime and continues to blame Clinton for the influx of criminals and drugs into the US (Appendix 4. P, 26 -28).

He also mentions the problem of drug use in Maine, but illustrates the problem as unavoidable due to the open borders and the influx of drugs to America. It seems that he is trying to say: it is not your fault, it is Clinton’s and globalism’s fault, but I will build a wall towards Mexico and thereby fix the issue (Appendix 4. P, 27 -28).

#### 6.4.3: Jobs and the American worker first

Trump moves on to the familiar topic of what he calls a “job crisis”. Once again the emphasis on factories and jobs moving to Mexico and China and to blame for this is Obama, Bill and Hillary Clinton. “The state of Maine has lost nearly one in three manufacturing jobs since NAFTA signed by Bill Clinton and supported by crooked Hillary” (Appendix 4. P, 28).

Trump moves on with arguments for what needs to change and what he will do in order to create jobs and growth. This is, as very often is the case, combined with a constant criticism of Clinton, calling her and the Democrats’ politics “the greatest job theft in the history of the world” (Appendix 4. P, 29). Trump promises to renegotiate NAFTA and make tax reductions in order to bring jobs and production back to America. He argues that his biggest reduction is for the working and middle-class and refers to earlier presidents’ tax reduction and the growth this brought forth. He turns attention to Maine specifically and refers to a recent decision to make a large part of land in Maine into a national monument. Which he accuses of costing jobs as well and not being in line with the interest of the population in Maine and once again, he blames Clinton and Obama (Appendix 4. Pp, 29-32).

Trump moves into his typical “closing statements” of the speech, making some quite interesting remarks, which can indicate how he perceives himself and how he can be characterised. For one, he once again aims to portray “the special interest” in this case portrayed as “Washington” as a superpower evil, which fails the majority of its people. “On November 8<sup>th</sup> the arrogance of Washington DC will come face to face with the righteous verdict of the American voter”. (pointing to the audience) (Appendix 4. P, 35).

He very much tries to make it about America and “the people”. Recapturing the American dream, establishing a government for the people not for the donors – “Once again we’re going to have a government of, by and for the people” (Appendix 4. P, 38).

#### 6.4.4: Recap

Trump takes his departure with his favourable subject, Hillary Clinton and in extent the establishment and the relationship between them and “the people”. Yet again, the focus is on Clinton’s motives and he mentions how she “speaks with Goldman Sachs in secret”. However, in this case Trump also focuses on Clinton’s political content. He has mentioned earlier that he opposes her stance on open borders and free trade, a criticism that he expands in this speech and states that the US will not be the same if we follow Clinton’s politics.

In his next subject “threatening immigration and troubles with non-natives”, he continues to link

Clinton to these issues, in a manner that exceeds the earlier speeches. He also contributes to this with statements about a rising drug abuse in Maine, to open borders and claim that Clinton and globalism bear the fault of this. Another example of Trump's ability to connect to his audience and speaking about a manner, which is supposed to represent a unique concern.

In his next topic "jobs and the American worker first" Trump once again addresses his concern on free trade and the US labour market and this time poses to renegotiate NAFTA and cutting taxes as solutions to the problem. Thus, enacted the prognostic frame yet again.

## 6.5: Trump in Florida

Here in the last speech by Trump included in this thesis, just 6 days before election day, there are some clear differences compared to the other speeches. Just like the others, Trump focuses a lot on Clinton, but in this case, there are episodes where he gets more personal, indicating that she should have a poor health and so on. Moreover, he continually, and rather aggressively, tries to depict her as dishonoured and corrupted.

### 6.5.1: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

As he repeatedly stated in speech four, he also starts this speech by calling the political system "rigged" and then quickly moves into the topic of Clinton and her e-mail case. He accuses the Justice Department for following the political agendas of Clinton and states that: "It's one of the saddest things that has happened to our country" (Appendix 5. P, 3). He then mentions the progress and the great polls the Republican Party is showing, and also stresses the importance of voting, once again calling his campaign a movement, and argues: "This is the one chance we have it'll never happen again" (Appendix 5. P, 3).

He leads into a longer criticism of Obamacare, as usual connecting it to Clinton and her support to, what he sees as, a failed project (Appendix 5. Pp, 3-6). Then Trump returns to the topic of "crooked Hillary" calling her e-mail case "The biggest scandal since Watergate" (Appendix 5. P, 6). Once again arguing she is part of a rigged system, that she is corrupted, that she have been a danger to national security and that she was given questions in advance before debates. (Appendix 5. Pp, 6-9). Trump does not hesitate portray Hillary as physically weak either: "End of the debates folks she was exhausted" (Appendix 5. P, 9).

Trump returns to the topic of his own success and the polls showing he is winning. However, quickly returning to Clinton stating that if she becomes president it "Means ISIS that means high taxes, that means bad health care that means no border, without a border we don't have a country left" (Appendix 5. P, 11).

Throughout all five speeches that I have analysed for this project Trump is extremely critical of Clinton. Yet, it is clear he takes it to another level in this speech doing all he can to make her come forth as dishonest, weak and only with her own interest at heart. Connecting Clinton with corruption and insecurity.

Another new aspect in this speech compared to the others is that he also lays out a criticism of the media and journalists, which he describes as “Among the most dishonest people I’ve ever met” (Appendix 5. P, 13). He believes that this election campaign has proven a new low for journalism and they have shown no fairness in clearly trying to promote Clinton. He argues that if “we” have a great story it is always put out as bad as possible. He particularly criticises the New York Times and how they want “crooked Hillary” to be president. (Appendix 5. Pp, 14-15).

#### 6.5.2: Threatening immigrations and the troubles with non-natives

Trump moves into the subject of law and order, yet again connecting crime and a lack of safety to immigration. He tells the audience about a recent episode where two police officers got killed and goes on to describe statistics of a rise in crime and promise to keep America safe. (Appendix 5. Pp, 19-20). When saying this he also promises to keep the US safe from terrorism. He mentions Clinton’s plan to accept more Syrian refugees, and, in a very direct and quite radical way yet again, connects refugees with terrorism. “Her plan would mean generations of terrorism and extremism spreading in your schools and all throughout your communities” (Appendix 5. P, 20). An example of his more direct approach in this speech and his attempt to equal Clinton as president to uncertainty, fear and danger.

Trump shortly brings attention to, according to him, how big his audience is at campaign rallies compared to Clinton’s and accusing the media for not reporting it (Appendix 5. Pp, 22-23). He then moves on to the topic of the border. As earlier, he promises to build the wall at the Mexican border and states that he is the first president to receive public endorsement from the Border Patrol Office. He follows up with his often used “You don’t have a country anymore” in relation to Clinton’s plan of open borders (Appendix 5. P, 23). He continues down this path mentioning different cases of US citizens being killed by illegal immigrants and with several drastic statements, as: “A Trump administration will stop illegal immigration, deport all criminal aliens and save American lives” (Appendix 5. P, 25). Directly dehumanising immigrants and equals them with crime and killing. A comment, which leads to applause among the audience.

### 6.5.3: Jobs and the American worker first

Trump spends the last 8 to 10 minutes of his speech repeating several of his typical issues. He criticises the Obama/Clinton government for putting the US in a losing position. “We don’t win anymore” (Appendix 5. P, 28). Referring to jobs lost to China and Mexico. He calls for new leadership and promise to enact tax cuts, to eliminate job-killing regulations, rebuild the military, take care of their veterans, support law enforcement and secure the Second Amendment right (Appendix 5. P, 29).

### 6.5.4: The people vs Clinton and the establishment

Besides these typical traits, he uses the rest of his speaking time quite differently than in the earlier cases I have gone through. “I’m asking you to dream big, to push for ball change and believe in a movement powered by the people and by their love for this great country” (Appendix 5. P, 30). He very much tries to evoke a feeling of “togetherness”. That “we” shall align against the elite tyranny. Even though it has seemed impossible, change is there for the taking. “Stop believing in failed politicians and start believing in each other” (Appendix 5. P, 30). The future lies with the dreamers” (Appendix 5. P, 31). He goes on to criticise Clinton, arguing that she has not accomplished anything within 30 years in politics. He continues with the focus on the elite/special interest vs. the people, by asking “Americans who believe in truth and justice not money and power should rule the day” (Appendix 5. P, 31). He once again uses the phrase “We won’t have any country left” when referring to how Clinton’s politics will affect the US. He praises his own “movement” saying there has never been anything like it and that it represents all Americans. (Appendix 5. Pp, 31-32).

His remarks lead to applause among the audience and chanting “we want Trump”. He ends the speech encouraging people to vote and as he puts it: “We have to close the deal” (Appendix 5. P, 33).

### 6.5.5: Recap

Trump touched upon the same themes in this speech as in the earlier, in that way not making it much different. However, as I also state earlier he is more direct and brutal in his demonization of both Clinton and immigrants/refugees.

One of the most vivid examples is his comment: “A Trump administration will stop illegal immigration, deport all criminal aliens and save American lives” (Appendix 5. P, 25). This statement leads to applause among his audience, which could indicate that he, in relation to Entman’s theory of the four communication processes, manages to appeal to the receiver and some



of the frames already established within their culture: that immigrants pose a threat and the US is better off without them.

In addition, his ending, which I have also given the sub-headline “the people vs Clinton and the establishment” is interesting. It is quite different from the other speeches and it is probably a sign of how close the speech is to the election. This could pose as what Snow and Benford call a motivational frame: the problem is the current government, the solution is to elect Trump, which leads Trump to a call for unity in order to overcome this problem and replace the “crooked establishment” with him. A call for action seems to be his main aim here.

## Chapter 7: Expounding frames

Hillary Clinton is, if not the most, one of the most critical issues when looking into Trump’s speeches. Throughout the five speeches, Trump manages to carry out a thorough and extensive criticism of both her political abilities as well as persona.

Most of the matters, he chooses to discuss, somehow revolve around Clinton and his ability to constantly connect her to poor political decisions, the failed system and her own corruption is almost admirable.

However, I have chosen not to have a frame dedicated only to her. This might seem peculiar, but in order to separate the different issues Trump highlights, I believe it is better not to have a frame devoted to Clinton, and instead link her to the chosen frames when relevant. If I had chosen to dedicate a frame only to Clinton, that frame would, more or less, cover all the aspects and issues Trump focuses on. I find it to be better and more relevant to spread it out in order to achieve a greater understanding of Trump.

Clearly, the frame I have called “corrupted establishment” is closely linked to Clinton, since often Trump uses her as the most apparent example of this. On the other hand, so are the other frames. Hence, Trump in many occasions makes his statement based on a criticism of Clinton and connects her to most of the issues he perceives the US is experiencing.

Choosing not to have Clinton as a frame, I have, based on the above analysis, detected four frames: ‘Corrupt elite’, ‘the people (and their task to rebuild America)’, ‘trade and jobs’ and ‘disrupting immigration’. In the following section, I will elaborate upon the frames and apply the theories of Mudde, Kaltwasser, Wodak and Appadurai.



## 7.1: Corrupted elite

The anti-establishment approach conducted by Trump and the confrontation he believes exists between “the people” and “the elite” seems to capture what Mudde and Kaltwasser and their minimal definition depicts as the essence of populism.

Throughout his speeches, he refers to the two groups “the special interest” representing a rigged system and “the people” representing the common American. In extension, he repeatedly promises to create a government of, by and for the people. Opting to speak the general will of the people. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser populism is very much based on moral. The moral and ethical distinctions between “the elite” and “the people”. This has also proven to be evident in relation to Trump that showed no remorse in framing “the elite” in the most negative manner often using Clinton as an example. Making it obvious that “the elite” represents something negative and bad and that “the people” represent the righteous and are a victim of “the elite’s” lack of moral. A statement made early in his speech in Virginia, which refers to Clinton, very well represents his attempt to draw a line between the two groups. “An insider fighting only for herself and the other insiders” (Appendix 1. P, 2). In addition, his speech in Florida where his criticism of Clinton is intensified and states that if she becomes president it will lead to a higher threat of terror, a bad health care system, loss of jobs and so on.

“We don’t have a country no more” a line, which Trump would often repeat and where he actually aligns four more years of “the elite” and “crooked Hillary” as a certain eruption of the country. This approach displays Wodak’s notion that populists will often try to enact the concept of fear. To state that Clinton as president equals the end of the country is clearly an attempt to portray her as a hazard for the country and that the people should actually fear her.

The nickname “crooked Hillary” in itself shows very well how Trump aimed to portray “the elite” as something bad, a social group that might attained a powerful position, but in relation to moral and ethics are less than “the people”. As well illustrated in the following statement: “a Trump administration will end the government corruption once and for all, no one will be above the law” (Appendix 1. Pp, 9-10).

Mudde and Kaltwasser’s notion that the distinction between “the people” and “the elite” is based on moral and a questions of good vs bad, not on situational differences like power-relation (Cas Mudde, 2012, p. 8), is, as I recognise it, tested by Trump. It is not that Trump focuses directly on how there might be a crooked distribution or establishment of power between “the people” and “the special interest”. Nevertheless, I would argue he makes an underlying distinction between the two social groups, which is grounded in “the elite’s” power over “the people”. Very well depicted in

speech three where he states that the “special interest” seeks to: “Run our government and our lives” (Appendix 3. P, 3).

Since power distribution or relations are not a vital argument in Trump’s criticism of “the elite” I still believe he can be perceived as a populist according to the theories of Mudde and Kaltwasser. As mentioned, Trump’s approach very much fall in line with the minimal definition by the two researchers.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning the paradox that appears to exist when a man like Trump, who is well-known for being extremely wealthy, achieves to portray himself as a common-man as a man of “the people”. This can also help us realise how he tried to portray “the elite”. Even though he would mention that, “the special interest” would get rich of a rigged system. It was not money that was supposed to illustrate the distinction between “the elite” and “the people”. Trump concentrated on portraying this perceived “elite” as a corrupted group of people using each other’s influence to maintain power and to nurse each other’s “interest”. Thereby excluding himself from this group and at the same time managing to portray himself as a self-made man with ties to “the people”.

As I have touched upon the issue of “the people” and how Trump seems to witness this group and their relation to “the elite” I now move into further analysing the next frame.

## 7.2 The people (and their task to rebuild America)

Trump managed not only to portray him as the opposition to the failed establishment, he repeatedly aimed to call for unity among “the people” and how he and they together could change the course of the US. Especially evident in the ending of his last speech in Florida just six days before the election.

The ultimate solution to this would be to elect him as president, it was the task of the people to elect Trump president. Thus, making it up to the people to secure the future of America. Continually he referred to his own candidate for president and the support he received from “the people” as a movement and aimed to portray it as united mission to change “the system”. “We are going to take our country back” (Appendix 1. P, 1). An example of his way of saying, there is something wrong, *we* need to change it. On the same conception was his, often-made, pledge to create “a government of, by and for the people”. Trump also uses the appearance of Nigel Farage and the topic of Brexit in speech two too call for a united America: “it is time to recapture OUR destiny” (Appendix 2. Pp, 14-15). Since Trump has often been portrayed as having a big ego, and he still might have, it can be surprising to discover this call for “a united task”. Nevertheless, it is a very evident issue. Once again showcased in speech two: ”This is our moment to show the whole world that America is back

bigger and better and stronger than ever before. I 'am asking for your vote so I can be your champion in the White House" (Appendix 2. P, 30). This approach by Trump relates to Wodak's points that populists would often seek to create a feeling of unitedness against an "enemy" (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourse Mean*, 2015, s. 54).

Though, it is still important to mention that Trump pursues to portray himself as the "frontrunner" of this movement, which his promise "to be your champion in the White House" exemplifies.

Wodak makes the notion that populists would often depict themselves as the safe-guardian of "the people" (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, p. 47).

Presenting himself as "the peoples" champion and in more general terms his pledge to change the disastrous path that America is on, very much illustrates a candidate trying to establish himself as safe-guardian.

### 7.3 Trade and jobs

The next frame that I wish to discuss is the issue of *trade and jobs*. A frame, which is highly linked to the above mentioned frames of *the corrupt elite* and *The people (and their task to rebuild America)*. Trump main issues within this frame can be summed up in two quotes: "A Trump administration will put America workers first, Americanism not globalism will be our credo" (Appendix 1. Pp 27-28). And "the Obama/Clinton war on the American worker" (Appendix 1. P, 13).

Trump makes an effort throughout all speeches to frame globalism, which in his terminology seems to be a symbol of free trade and open borders as having an extremely negative impact on the American economy and as the reason for a decline in jobs. As showcased he is constantly seeking to depict Clinton and in some degree Obama as the face of globalism and thereby a failed economic approach.

He makes an attempt to simplify a complicated matter and make it an issue about winning or losing. He appeals to common sense when he talks about "beautiful clean energy" in Virginia and makes Clinton come off as stupid when she, according to Trump, favours the environment over jobs.

According to Wodak a typical approach by populists and an attempt to establish themselves as "non-politician" and instead as a common-man rejecting complicated explanations and solutions. (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, p. 22)

Yet again Trump brings in play the notion of fear (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, p. 5), used by Trump to discard open borders and in general justify his anti-globalism approach. "We are losing so badly to other countries our jobs are gone,

everything's gone" (Appendix 1. P, 18). He is also using this approach when directly speaking about the citizens in the state that he is visiting. As an example here in North Carolina: "the fact is you have companies right now where you work that are negotiating to move out of North Carolina" (Appendix 3. P, 22).

In its core, this is yet another example of Trump framing an issue that in the end is supposed to equal Clinton as a threat to the US.

As argued by both Wodak and Bets, this anti-globalisation approach by populists is a resent tendency, which is thought to attract the people actually losing to a changing labour market and a neo-liberal economic stance. The question is whether Trump actually offers a political course, which can help these people. If we focus on the findings in the report from Ball University (Lehmacher, 2016) it could be argued that he is "blaming" the wrong enemy.

It does not seem that Trump is too worried, but on the other hand is confident he will secure progress for "the American worker" when he states: "I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created believe me" (Appendix 2. P, 18). Once again a statement that in relation to Wodak theory relates Trump to populism. Hence, he, as earlier, portrays himself as safeguarding the voters and as superior to the enemy/Clinton.

#### 7.4: Disrupting immigration

When moving into the next frame of *disrupting immigration* it is worth to point out what Wodak, inspired by Anton Pelinka, also mentions that right-wing populist often recognise two enemies. First the elite, which then leads the second enemy to evolve, the second enemy being immigrants. As described earlier Trump would repeatedly accuse the Obama/Clinton government for the problems with immigrations.

Trump would often when discussing the issue of immigration not distinguish between immigrants coming in from the Mexican border or refugees from the Middle East. As in speech one, where he makes the following statement about open borders in general: "we have got to be so smart so tough and so vigilant or we are not gonna have a country anymore folks" (Appendix 1. P, 24). Moreover, as I describe when analysing the speeches, he continually drew a connection between immigrants and crime as well as terrorism. I will try to separate the two groups and start with analysing how Trump framed the issue of what could be considered as Latin-American immigrants coming in through the Mexican border, afterwards moving on to the frame of Muslim/Middle Eastern immigrants/refugees.

Trump is frequently depicting this group as "the others" who the American people should fear. "It's

getting worse now as thousands of recent border crossings are being relocated in the state of Virginia and you don't know who they are" (Appendix 1. P, 23). A case where Trump portrays them as an unknown group and thereby dangerous group since there is no doubt that their access to America can only be a negative thing. This notion of fear is even more evident the numerous times where Trump tells the story of crimes committed by illegal or already deported immigrants. An example is evident in speech two where they are portrayed both as criminals and job stealers (Appendix 2. P, 16).

In addition, this establishing of Latin American immigrants, as something bad is relatable to Trump's description of globalism, where Mexico and China are perceived as the enemy. Something that he seems to connect to the open border issue: "Foreign countries can cheat us out of millions of jobs and trillions and trillions of dollars. By open borders she means totally unlimited immigration pouring into our country" (Appendix 4. P 20).

It can be difficult to understand this connection, since companies moving overseas and immigrants and refugees entering the US are two very different things. Thus, it fits with the theory of both Mudde and Wodak that populists would often discard complex solutions and instead adapt a simple-solution appeal. Trump might choose to equal the two in order to secure the creation of one enemy: Globalism, which both steal American jobs by allowing or making it to favourable for US companies to move overseas as well as letting in immigrants who steals jobs and pose a financial and security threat to the US. Since Trump, manage to frame globalism, in this case making Latin America and its people a symbol of it, as both presenting a threat to the safety of Americans, but also their ability to hold a job and make a living. His initiative to build a wall on the Mexican border becomes justified. Another examples of Trump's adaption of "politics of fear", as pointed out by Wodak as a trait of the populists (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, p. 5).

Even though Trump's portrayal and framing of Mexican immigrants are fierce I found his rhetoric on Muslim/Middle Eastern people and in some cases Syrian refugees to be much more radical and a prove off Wodak's notion of "the right-wing populist perpetuum mobile" (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, pp. 19-20). Evident in a quote like "Her plan would mean generations of terrorism and extremism spreading in your schools and all throughout your communities" (Appendix 5. P, 20). He equals Clinton's plan to take in 600.000 refugees with terrorism on American soil. Just one example out of many, often though not as direct: "Hillary's plan include an open border with the Middle-East meaning generations of radicalism within our

shores” (Appendix 4. P, 21). Even though he does not say terrorism directly, it seems that he aims to argue that radicalism equals or leads to terrorism.

There is little doubt that Trump when portraying Middle Eastern immigrants tries to establish them as an enemy, or as he describes them, a “Trojan horse” and that he likewise try to form a sense of fear among his audience. Wodak also emphasis the populists need to come forth as superior, which Trumps exemplifies with connecting both Latin American immigrants and Middle Eastern refugees to crime, job loss and terrorism. Troubles that the US would not experience if the country existed only of “Americans”. Hence, he indicate that they are something less and does not hold the same moral and cultural values in relation to work and social behaviour. Utilizing Wodak’s notion that populists will often portray themselves as superior to “the other” (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean*, 2015, pp. 54-55).

In relation to Appadurai’s theory of a majority who present the minority as a threat, this is very much the case here. Trump tries to establish, what can only be perceived as a weak group, people fleeing from war and personal persecution as a threat. In this case 600.000 people, a minority group that the American population of more than 300 million should fear. As Appadurai also note, the answer then becomes to “extinguish” them, understood in the way that the border should be closed, thereby not allowing “the problem” to make its appearance. Exactly as Appadurai argues, the argument by the majority is that the minority will simply abolish their country (Appadurai, 2006, s. 51-52). Witnessed in Trumps often mentioned remark “you will not have a country anymore” and this leads to the justification of his political solution - closing the borders.

## Chapter 8: Trump in a historical context

How does Trump fit in with earlier movements of populism and nativism within the US? The historical overview of the Know Nothing movement, the People’s Party and the Tea Party provided the thesis with an insight into the troubles and political concerns of their time. The analysis and the expounding of frames have brought a perception of Trump as a politician and his conduct during campaigning.

In this sections I will use the analysis and the frames to see if, when and how Trump assembles these earlier movements and where they might differ. Thus, pursuing to provide an answer to the question if Trump can be considered an entirely new thing in US politics.

### 8.1: Trump in relation to Know Nothing

Even though the Know Nothing's is considered to be the most vivid example of US nativism and my analysis on the other hand showed that Trump can be regarded a populist, there are clear resemblance between the two. This notion suits well with Betz argument that populism often entails some degree of nativism (Betz H. G., 2017, p. 1).

The nativist movement and the Know Nothings were mostly driven by a hostility towards incoming Catholic migrants from especially Ireland. Immigrants were perceived as a threat both in relation to the labour market and cultural values. The nativist believed they would steal "their" jobs by accepting lower payment and that their deviating moral would clash with the sociocultural order in the US. An attitude and concern often found in the rhetoric used by Trump. As I described through my analysis and under the frame *disrupting immigration* Trump observed and aimed to portray an threat from an outside enemy upon the US and its citizens.

A key aspect of the Know Nothings resentment towards the European immigration was religion. Native Americans believed that Catholics were somewhat socially corrupted and that the Catholic Church represented despotism making them a threat to American values and liberty. As Bennett depicts, the Catholics were portrayed as drunks and criminals and in some regard did not retain a higher status than cattle.

The same conception can be found within Trump's portrayal of Middle Eastern immigrants and refugees. Important to note though is the difference in rhetoric where Trump is not as direct as the language was in the time of the Know Nothing. Catholicism was directly linked with disruption of American values. Islam as a religion is not in the same way equalled to disruption, but when Trump speaks of Syrians and refugees in general it is implied that he is speaking of Muslims / Middle Eastern people. Moreover, as the Know Nothings, Trump did not hesitate to deviate and demonise this particular social/religious group.

Further, in both cases the notion of the Trojan Horse has been enacted. That the Catholics and now Muslims reminded the Know Nothings and today Trump of a possible deceiving surprise attack on the American people.

Equally, there has also been a call to unite in order to overcome the challenges that immigrants represent and like Trump, the Know Nothings saw themselves as protectors of the average American.

Trump share several similarities with the Know Nothing's and how nativism is understood, but a vivid difference between the two is Trump's vast anti-elite approach. The Know Nothings in its core was and anti-Catholic movement and party, whereas Trump, in the analysed material,

illustrates his anti-elite stance as the most important part of his rhetoric and political conduct. As I see it, his promise to stop illegal immigration and control immigration in general is second to his pledge to “drain the swamp” in Washington and disrupt the political establishment. As noted according to Betz, populism often entails a notion of nativism, which is portrayed in an anti-other approach. Trump’s approach, style and rhetoric supports this argument made by Betz. Nevertheless, it is evident that he cannot be witnessed merely as a nativist due to his anti-elite approach. I will refer to the earlier described theory by Kaltwasser and Mudde as well as Wodak and their argument that an anti-elite approach is a typical trait of a populist.

### 8.2: Trump in relation to the People’s Party

As Betz note, it is central to consider the time in which the People’s Party occurred. The US was going through a rapid change in the labour market driven by industrialisation and technological innovation, which meant change and insecurity for many American workers. As well as the farmers who were struggling due to the overseas competition.

These changes share some similarity with what have happened more recently within US economy and labour market. As the thesis have shown jobs in especially manufacturing (Lehmacher, 2016) has declined and Trump have repeatedly focussed on this issue during his campaign blaming the Obama/Clinton government and the devastating consequences of globalism. In both periods, the People’s Party and Trump have promised to stand up for the “workingman” and most of the blame has been put upon “the establishment”. Just as a populist orator did in 1891, Trump repeatedly pledge to establish “a government, of, by and for the people”. Evident with both the People’s Party and Trump the challenges of the workingman or farmer was thought to be caused by big banks, Wall Street and the political establishment.

One of the facets, which seems to differ about the People’s Party and Trump was how they portrayed the establishment/elite. As I have stressed Trump focused highly on linking Clinton to “the elite” making her a symbol of big cooperation’s, Wall Street and banks. Among the People’s Party the focus was not as much on one person, but more on big cooperation’s, big banks and the political establishment in general.

Moreover, on how the two described the abroad enemy, as a financial threat to the US there is once again resemblance. In the 19<sup>th</sup> hundreds the British was portrayed as this and today Trump seeks to blame China and Mexico. The reason why they see them as a threat is different, but both now and then, they seemed to agree that it is the establishment who have allowed this abroad enemy to occur.



Even though there were few examples of nativism among the People's Party members this, is still a key deviation among them and Trump. Their sole focus was on the "true enemy" and from what Betz argue it seems that the aim was to unite the workers and producers against the capitalist and elite, not against an abroad enemy.

### 8.3: Trump in relation to the Tea Party

What have defined the relationship between Trump and the Tea Party? In order to bring some sort of clarity over this I will reference to an article in The Washington Post, "How the tea party learned to love Donald Trump" by Elizabeth A (Yates, 2016). Yates a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, who research social movements and conservative politics.

Yates stresses that when Trump first ran for Republican candidate he was not at all popular among Tea Party supporters. Since, he had earlier expressed support for abortion rights and admired the new national health care system; he did not represent what was understood as conservative. A second critic of him was his attitude and language; he did not represent a typical "statesmen" (Yates, 2016).

However, on two points Trump showed to be very much in line with the typical traits of the Tea Party. His attitudes towards immigrants and how he perceived them as a threat to the US aligned with the thoughts of many Tea Partiers. As well as the theory of both Williamson et. All and Scher and Berlot, which found that some Tea Partiers would portray resentment towards certain ethnic minorities.

Yates experienced in her research that the Tea Party supporters could live with the fact that Trump was not "true" conservative, since he would be the only one how could "take down" the Republic establishment. A desire, which Yates found highly regarded and broadly shared within the Tea Party (Yates, 2016).

After Trump was elected as the Republican presidential candidate, most of the Tea Party activist turned to support him; after all, they saw him as a better solution than the socialist approach the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton represented (Yates, 2016).

However, based on the knowledge the thesis has provided on the Tea Party, can the party be regarded as either nativist or populist?

Since the Tea Party is not obsessed with a foreign enemy that needs to be separated from the natives, or see this a core issue, populism is the concept, which of the two come closest to defining the Tea Party. They share a belief in anti-establishment and there is a tendency to depict certain social groups as a threat to the US society. But can a movement, which main goals is less

government, less government spending, lower taxes and a free market be considered to speak for the general will of the people? As I see it, it is a movement, which simply shares a high regard for, what can be defined as, neoliberalism. Tacit in the terms that they pursue lower taxes, minimal government involvement and privatisation of all services as the answer to a healthy and growing economy (investopedia, n.d.). Moreover, their disagreement with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act indicates that Tea Party supporters believe very much that the market is self-regulating.

Even though Trump has called for lowering taxes (Appendix 4. Pp, 29-32) and share other sympathies with the Tea Party I find it hard to see a direct and obvious connection between the movement and him, and I do not in any way see him as an extension of the movement.

#### 8.4: Trump is like no other

Trump distinguish himself from both the Know Nothing and the People's Party by "taking on both enemies". Where the two parties stood for a revolt against either a perceived enemy from abroad or the establishment, Trump campaigned on his "sceptics" towards both.

Despite the obvious similarities with both of the earlier parties, the aspect of two opponents makes Trump different in a US context. Thus, immediately fitting well within the theory by Wodak on more recent examples of right-wing populist parties where certain European parties, which perceive a threat from both the abroad depicted as immigrants and inside the nation-state depicted as the elite (Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*, 2015, pp. 3-4).

Besides, Trump also distinguish himself in the way that he conduct himself and how he alone became a symbol of not just the Republican Party, but for his own "movement". Where the Know Nothing's were surrounded by secrecy and mystery Trump have done anything to stand out and gain as much attention as possible.

## 9. Conclusion

The thesis set out to investigate the following problem statement:

How does Donald Trump's rhetoric, political approach, appeals and style inscribe itself in the populist phenomenon historically and contemporarily? Also: How does his political style and position relate to the earlier populist and nativist movements of the US? Which prompt the question: Is Trump's populism entirely new in the US context?

In summary Donald Trump falls under the category of a populist, shows great resemblance with earlier populist/nativist movements in a US context, nevertheless managing to distinct himself.

Thus, becoming the representation of something unseen within the concept of populism in relation to the political history of the United States.

The most salient aspect of Trump approach, style and rhetoric was how he framed the elite/the establishment, with Hillary Clinton as a personification of something corrupted, only occupied with their own interests and separated from “the people”. His stance on the relationship between “the people” and “the elite” seemed to be a key concern for Trump in his attempt to achieve political character and identity, combined with a pledge to speak “the general will” of the people, especially evident with his promise to create jobs for the working American. Thus, Trump suits the minimal definition of Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser on populism. Ruth Wodak extent the understanding for populism and in this Trump also align with most of the traits Wodak connects with populism. He depicts himself as “saviour” of “the people”, he takes on an anti-intellectual approach and makes controversial arguments. Besides, Wodak notes that recent cases of populist parties within Europe often adapt an anti-other approach against a perceived enemy from abroad. This is also the case with Trump who framed Latino immigrants and Middle Eastern refugees as a threat to the US labour market, cultural values and safety. Moreover, Trump also evokes Wodak’s notion on how populist often seek to call for unitedness. His aim to unite “the people” against the elite and present the election and voting him in as president as a common task between him and “the people” highlights this conception.

Trump managed to constantly make Hillary Clinton a symbol of all the issues he depicted with US politics and the state of the country. And, the findings of this thesis leaves me with the impression that how he defined and portrayed Clinton was a crucial part of defining and promoting himself as a (non)politician.

Lastly, Trump showed a high degree of resemblance with the political movements and parties of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Know Nothing’s and the People’s Party, more than he did with the Tea Party. However, Trump does differentiate himself, primarily by taking both an anti-other and anti-elite approach, calling for a rebellion against both “enemies”.

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## 11. Appendix

Appendix 1: Donald Trump's campaign speech in Virginia 20/08/2016

Appendix 2: Donald Trump's campaign speech in Mississippi 24/08/2016

Appendix 3: Donald Trump's campaign speech in North Carolina 20/09/2016

Appendix 4: Donald Trump's campaign speech in Maine 15/10/2016

Appendix 5: Donald Trump's campaign speech in Florida 2/11/2016