

# The rise of right-wing populism:

Populism in Denmark and the US

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## Abstract

In the recent years support for right-wing populism have increased across Western Europe and the US. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the reason behind the rise of populism through a comparative study of the cases Denmark and the US. The theoretical framework developed in the thesis defines populism as a thin-centred ideology that adopts features from other thick-centred ideologies and its surrounding environment. Populism would often emerge in times of crisis. Populists put the people in centre of their narrative and often have hostile attitude towards the elites and the political establishment. (Taggart 2000) (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014) To examine the explanations behind the rise of populism a set of hypotheses were developed using the deductive reasoning. The two hypothesis deducted from the theoretical framework were: 1. *Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics* and 2. *Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis*. The two hypotheses were tested through a secondary analysis of the two cases using quantitative and qualitative data. The analysis confirmed the claims made in the first hypothesis in both cases. Hence, the result of the secondary analysis showed that one of the explanations behind the rise of right-wing populism could be an increased level of dissatisfaction towards the elite among the people. The analysis of the second hypothesis disconfirmed the claim that populism was normal in times of crisis. The analysis showed that within the context of Denmark the claims of the hypothesis are confirmed. However, in the context of the US the claims of the hypothesis are disconfirmed. However, the analysis showed that the crisis could be an external trigger behind the increased level of dissatisfaction in both countries, which lead to the rise in populism. The crisis could therefore explain the reason behind why the level of dissatisfaction increased in both cases almost simultaneously. The findings in the analysis show that the current rise in right-wing populism can be explained by the increased dissatisfaction towards the elite, or representative politics, and that the financial crisis could be the external trigger that ignited the increased level of dissatisfaction among the people.

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## 1. Introduction

The Western political scene has in recent years been witnessing a rise of different populist parties and politicians. Many of these have gained a lot of attention and followers from the public. The term populism has been very popular in the media to describe parties or politicians that disrupt the norms of conventional politics. They have gained more influence and changed the political agenda in many European countries, and some are engaged in coalitions with the established parties. (Judis 2016) (Baggini 2016)

In European parliamentary elections, the populists' average share of the votes has doubled since the 1960s from approximately 5.1% to 13.2% of the votes. Furthermore, they have tripled their share of the seats in parliaments from 3.8% to 12.8%. This increased share of votes is taken on expense of the centre parties. (Inglehart & Norris 2016)

The number of right-wing populist with xenophobic, protectionist, anti-elite and anti-immigrant agendas has surly raised in the last decades. They have gained enormous popularity, support and followers with their political-incorrect approach. This rise has been seen across the Western world, especially in the EU and the US. Yet, the rise and popularity of right-wing parties often comes as a chock to the media and the established politicians. (BBC 2016) Right-wing parties have also gained power and considerable political influence in several European countries where they have taken the reins of government or increased their political influence and popularity. (Bröning 2016)

Even in three of the most influential countries in Europe, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, has the right-wing parties gained enormous popularity and support. (Bröning 2016) However, the rise of right-wing parties is not only visible in their increased share of the votes, but also in their ability to gain substantial influence with a limited number of seats in parliament. (Inglehart & Norris 2016) This could indicate that the nationalist right-wing parties and politicians are on the rise in many Western democracies. (Judis 2016) However, many of these parties are often referred to as populists with no substantial political program that only focus on single cases or problems in the society. Populism has truly been the buzzword of the last couple of years and the populist parties has enjoyed increased support. The term has been used numerous times by the media and established politicians to describe many of the new unconventional right-and left wing contenders.

The rise of nationalist right-wing populist parties is well documented and is seen across many Western democracies. But why do we see this rise in right wing populism, and how can we explain this rise? Exactly this is what this thesis seeks to investigate and further explore. It could be interesting to examine the explanations behind the rise, and to see if there is a common denominator behind it. To elaborate on the above-mentioned issue, the following thesis statement has been formulated, and is presented in the next chapter.

## 2. Thesis statement

Based on the introduction, the focus of this thesis will be on the rise of populism with a comparative focus on the cases Denmark and the US.

### *How can we explain the current rise in right-wing populism?*

A series of sub-questions are formulated in order to narrow the scope of the thesis and to specify the aim of the analysis. These sub questions are formed to guide the analysis and shape the structure of the thesis. Furthermore, they work as support for the main thesis statement.

- *How do we define populism?*
- *What is the explanations behind the rise of right-wing populist parties/politicians in the US and Denmark?*

### 2.1 Motivation and documentation of the problem

As mention in the introduction, the rise of right-wing populism is well documented with a rise in the share of the votes from approximately 5.1% to 13.2% across Europe. In Denmark, the right-wing populist party, Danish Peoples Party (DF), has increased their share of the votes from 12.3% in 2011 to 21.1% in 2015. (Judis 2016) In the US, the right-wing populist Donald Trump won the presidential election in 2016 by winning the Electoral College with 304 votes against Hillary Clintons 227. (New York Times 2017) This indicates that there is evidence supporting the rise of populism in both Denmark and the US. The public demand for parties or leaders with a right-wing agenda and with a new take on politics is visible across Europe and the US. Many new parties have emerged in recent decades and gained influence in national politics. (Judis 2016) This increase triggers

the interesting questions: why is the demand for these parties rising and what are the explanations behind the demand? These questions shows that the field of interest in this thesis is very relevant because the populists have disrupted the political scene and their increased support could therefore potentially have enormous influence on the society.

Studies on the phenomenon show that many scholars still disagree on the definition of populism. Furthermore, is it a field of study that are very relevant to examine because many people, media and politicians are surprised by the increased rise of populist parties and their growing support. (Judis 2016) Hence, the motivation behind this thesis is to investigate why we are seeing an increased support for right-wing populism in Denmark and the US at the same time. The motivation is based on an interest in explaining what generates this rise and to see if the theory of populism can help deduct the causes.

Populism has become an important part of the political discussion in recent years. Yet, many scholars still struggle to identify the specific characteristics of the populists and to pinpoint the exact causes behind the rise in populism. As Paul Taggart (2000:2) argues: “*Populism is a difficult, slippery concept. [...] it is profoundly difficult to construct a generalized description, let alone a universal and comprehensive definition, of populism as an idea or as a political movement*”. However, the term *populism* is truly the buzzword of this decade and the media are not afraid to label politicians as populists. This shows that the field of interest, in this thesis, is very contemporary and that determining some of the causes behind the rise could contribute to the field. Hence, the motivation behind this study is to characterize populism and examine the explanations behind it.

## 2.2 Definition and delimitation of problem

The main topic and focus of this paper is populism and examine explanations behind the rise of right-wing populists in the US and Denmark. It is not the aim of the thesis to make an in-depth analysis of populist parties and their strategy, but rather to identify the explanations and causes behind the rise in the two cases selected. Hence, the intension is to examine why the demand for populist leaders has increased and to see if it is possible to determine these explanations through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the voters concerns and preferences in the two countries. Furthermore, it is interesting to examine if

there are any common explanations when studying populism in a large country with high social inequality versus a small country where the social inequality is fairly small.

The thesis statement is limited to right-wing populism since the interest of this analysis is to examine the rise of right-wing populist parties and not left-wing parties. I am aware that populism is not limited to only right-wing politicians and parties. However, this analysis and the selection of theory will be focused on right-wing populism. The reason for the selection of right-wing populism is based on the fact that right-wing populism is more prominent in Northern Europe and the US compared to left-wing populism. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) The time frame of the thesis is from 2004 to present-day. Therefore, the analysis does not touch upon parties, politicians and leaders from before 2006. This time frame is chosen because the aim of this thesis is to investigate contemporary populism.

## 2.3 Definition of terms

### **Right wing populism**

Populists often adopt features from other ideologies, which means right-wing populism is term used to specify the political standpoint and the ideologies they have adopted.

A right-wing populist adopts features from ideologies of the right, like nationalism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and nativism. These ideologies are sometimes combined with xenophobia, racism and a form of anti-multiculturalism. Hence, the reason they are labelled right-wing populists stems from the political values and ideas they have adopted from other ideologies. (Mudde 2010) Right-wing populists often have a very intolerant or sometime a hostile attitude towards non-native members of the society, like migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, illegal immigrant and guest workers. This xenophobic rhetoric is often also combined with a nationalistic and protectionist agenda. However, it could be problematic to differentiate between right- and left-wing populism due to the fact that populists often combine ideologies. This means that a populist could have a very xenophobic and nationalistic agenda combined with socialist economic policies, like protecting social security. (Inglehart & Norris 2016)

However, in this thesis, right-wing populists are characterized as those who put a strong emphasis on nationalism, nativism and have a xenophobic rhetoric. I would argue that the right-wing populists often emphasize their values than their economic policies. Hence, what separates the right wing populists from other populists is their intolerant attitude towards non-native members of the society and their strong commitment to nationalistic values.

### 3. Methodology

In this section, the methodology of the paper will be presented. Firstly, the structure of the thesis will be presented to explain how the research will be conducted. This will be followed by a presentation of the two selected cases and a description of the empirical data. Lastly, the methods used in the thesis will be presented.

#### 3.1 Structure of the thesis

The thesis will consist of a comparative case study of the reasons behind the rise of populism in Denmark and the US. The first chapter presents the introduction including thesis statement, delimitations of the problem, and definitions of term. Second chapter introduces the methodology of the thesis. This chapter consists of the case selection, data selection and the methods of the thesis, which are a comparative case study and a deductive reasoning.

In the third chapter, the theoretical framework of the paper is presented. The theoretical framework is based upon a collective definition of populism from the work of different scholars who has theorised the subject. This theoretical framework will be used in the analysis to identify the characteristic of populism in the two cases and to formulate hypotheses to deduct the explanation for the rise of populism.

The fourth chapter of the thesis consists of the analysis. The two cases, Denmark and the US, are analysed separately to identify the explanations behind the rise of populism by using a deductive reasoning. The first part of the analysis will focus on the context of the country, a definition of the political situation, and the populists that the analysis will focus on. This is followed by an in-depth quantitative secondary analysis of two hypotheses,



based on the theoretical framework, to identify the explanations behind the rise. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the findings in the two cases to see if there is a common denominator between the cases and to deduct reasons for the rise.

Lastly, the fifth chapter of the thesis will present the conclusion of the findings.

### 3.2 Case Selection

The design chosen for this analysis is a comparative case study. The comparative case study is the study of two or more contrasting cases at the same time. This method is used to better understand the social phenomenon studied and to compare and contrast the finding in the two cases.(Bryman 2012) The cases selected for study in this thesis are Denmark and the US. The reason for choosing these two cases is to make a cross-cultural analysis of populism in the two countries, to investigate the explanations behind the rise of populism, and to see if there is a common denominator between them. The idea behind choosing a comparative case design is to dismiss alternative explanations for the phenomenon and to support the findings. (Andersen, Binderkrantz & Hansen 2012)

The selection of these two cases is based upon the fact that both countries have experienced a rise in populism in recent years. (Judis 2016) Furthermore, both countries are free democracies and everyone is entitled to vote freely, have freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the right to assembly. (Nye 2013)(Thomsen 2010) Hence, in this thesis populism will be analysed within the context of liberal democracies. It is important to define in which context you analyse populism because the phenomenon is closely linked to the context it is analysed within. Therefore, the thesis follows the method used by Mudde & Kaltwasser (2017), who also position populism within the context of liberal democracies. They argue that populism is often closely linked to the liberal democracy more than it is to other forms of democracy. Rise in populism would not be possible to study if the two cases did not reflect the will of the people and if the people did not have the right to vote. Furthermore, it is important that the cases chosen have free press and Internet so it is possible to collect data and information freely without State bias. Both countries are free democracies, which make them easier to compare and contrast. The two cases are further described in the context analysis.

The populists chosen as the variables for measuring the rise in populism are DF and Donald Trump. I am aware of the fact that I as a scholar already have a predetermined idea about whom I consider a populist. To completely determine whether a politician is a populist or not would demand a full analysis based on the theory of populism. However, since the aim of this thesis is to determine why we see a rise in populism a full analysis will not be made. Hence, the selection of populists is based on other scholar's characterisation of the politicians.

### 3.3 Data selection

The data used in the analysis consists of different surveys, voter statistics, news media outputs and official government statistics. Most of the data collected are quantitative data from other researchers, which is supplemented by some qualitative data. Therefore, the analysis will be a secondary analysis since no new data is gathered, like interviews or questionnaires. The advantage of using secondary data is that there are large amounts of quantitative data collected by scholars and state institutions for statistical purposes, which may be useful for specific analysis or deductive tests. Furthermore, the secondary analysis of data is not as time consuming and costly as collecting new data on the same phenomenon and the result may not differ. Another advantage of a secondary analysis is that the data often are of an extremely high quality because the sampling procedures and data collection have been done thoroughly by highly experienced researchers. (Bryman 2012) By using secondary data, like data from the European Social Survey (ESS), Danmarks Statistisk, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the World Bank, the researcher gets the possibility of analysing data over time and to identify trends such as changes in behaviour or shifting opinions. Furthermore, working with extensive data sets or national surveys gives the researcher the possibility of making subgroup analysis. This means that by using large samples the researcher gets the opportunity to identify quite sizeable subgroups to the analysis, such as specific voter tendencies in different regions or to locate behaviour changes in different groups. The secondary analysis of data also gives the researcher the opportunity of making a cross-culture study because it is possible to access data from different countries and compare this data. In addition, by using other researchers data new interpretations of the same data could be created because the

researchers secondary analysis may interpret the result in a different way or use it for another topic than originally intended. (Bryman 2012)

The limitations of the secondary analysis are not considerably, but some are worth mentioning. One is the lack of familiarity with- and the complexity of data. Since the researcher did not collect the data self, it might take some time to fully understand all the variables. Another limitation of secondary analysis is that the researcher has no control over the data quality. Therefore, the researcher should never take the data for granted and have to be cautious when using it. Lastly, the secondary analysis has, in some cases, the limitation of lacking a key variable, because the data used is collected from another researchers work. (Bryman 2012) Most of the empirical data used for the secondary analysis are quantitative data and is collected from primary sources and some from second hand sources. Primary sources generate the data themselves whereas second hand sources use data from primary sources. (Elklit & Jensen 2012)

In the case of Denmark, most of the data used is collected from the European Social Survey (ESS) and Danmarks Statistik. This is supplemented with data from Eurobarometer, Eurostat and some second hand sources. Most of the data collected from these sources are quantitative data, which makes it possible to conduct a longitudinal analysis, to identify specific voter tendencies, or to locate behaviour changes in different groups. The data also makes it possible to make a quantitative analysis of the reasons behind the rise of right-wing populism. It is worth mentioning that the data collected was free and accessible for the public and made for non-commercial purposes. The quantitative data collected from the European Social Survey (ESS) is used to highlight the voter tendencies and preferences. This data are collected from their online analysis tool and consists of results from their European Social Survey Round. The data collected on election result, demographics and economic stats are from Danmarks Statistik. The source is an official government portal where the data is free and accessible to the public. Hence, it was easy to find suitable data for the analysis of the Danish case. The data used from these two abovementioned sources are used to make a secondary analysis to examine the reason behind the rise of right-wing populism.

Conversely, the amount of accessible data was more limited in the US case. Much of the data collected for this analysis consists of second hand sources made for other analysis. These second hand sources are used because it was difficult to gain access to primary sources. The problem is that much of the statistics and surveys made in the US are made for commercial purposes or with profit in mind. This means that much of the data are not accessible because it is made for official government purposes or hidden behind a pay wall. Another problem is that no official government statistics on the election published yet. In order to conduct the analysis and collect the needed data other sources were used. This data will be used to make a secondary qualitative analysis of the case, using documents from second hand documents. The term documents covers a wide range of different sources that can be used as empirical data in an analysis, such as personal documents, mass-media output, virtual outputs and official documents from the state or a private source. This type of empirical data can be used in the analysis when conducting qualitative research. These types of documents are often not produced at the request of a social researcher and therefore not specifically made for the purpose of research and often considered second hand sources. The sources are often available for everyone and often preserved in original condition. This makes documents as a source very accessible, easy to assemble and analyse. However, it is important, when using documents as empirical data, to be critical and aware of the quality of the documents. (Bryman 2012) All the documents used in this thesis will be assessed to insure the reliability of the selected sources.

Some of the statistics are collected from official government sources like the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and some data are collected from accessible surveys made by Gallup. Hence, it is worth mentioning that the data used to make the analysis are collected from second hand sources that only have limited data on different subjects. Another problem that is important to highlight is that data on 2016 presidential election is quite limited, which makes it difficult to find specific data. Therefore, the amount of data on Trump voters is relatively small, and data on the voters' values and preferences are thus difficult to find. This could potentially make it challenging to pinpoint the reason behind the rise of populism in the US and make a quantitative analysis. Yet, it is still possible to find sufficient data on the subject, and I would argue that the data from the second hand

sources make it possible to make a qualitative analysis of the case. Consequently, the analysis will therefore be more qualitative due to the insufficient amount and level of access of quantitative data on the subject. This is also the reason why the variables chosen in the two different cases are not 100 percent similar, but the data chosen still is arguably close enough to make comparisons.

### 3.4 Method

The methods used in the thesis will be presented in this section. The methods used in this analysis are a comparative case study and deductive reasoning.

#### 3.4.1 Case study – Comparative case study

The method design of this thesis will be a comparative case study. The aim of this thesis is to make a comparative study of the two cases, Denmark and the US, to understand why we are seeing a rise of right-wing populism.

Gerring (2004: 342) defines a case study as *“an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”*. A standard case study consists of comprehensive and thorough analysis of a single case. Case studies aim to analyse particular issues within the borders of a specific country, environment or situation. A case study deals with the complexity and specific nature of the case in question. The term unit in a case study is very broad and many different things can be selected as the unit of study. The important thing is that we specify the unit or units we want to assemble the information from. Hence, case studies are the study of a specific unit of interest. (de Vaus 2001)

However, within this thesis, a comparative case design is used as the method. Comparative case design allows a deeper understanding of the issue that the thesis revolves around. The comparative design is a study of two different cases, which in this thesis are Denmark and the US, using almost identical methods. The idea of the design is to use the logic of comparison to gain a better understanding of the issue in the analysis. When comparing two or more cases by observe the similarities and differences, it is possible to better understand the social phenomena because you examine the same issue in two different cases. Furthermore, it is also possible to gain a deeper understanding of

the social reality in different national contexts. Comparative case design could also improve theory building because the scholar is forced to examine the problem from different angles. (Bryman 2012) Dickovick & Eastwood (2016: 14) describes the comparative method as a *“method that reaches its conclusions about cause and effect through structured and systemic comparing and contrasting of cases”*. They further argue that *“if we compare or contrast two or more cases in order to make a causal argument, we will be looking for similarities and differences between the cases”* (ibid.:15). This means that in order for a conclusion to be made, the researcher needs to analyse the cases in relation to each other systematically and structured. If this is done, the conclusions will show the differences and similarities, and it will be the researchers job to look for variation between the cases of study.

The analysis of the two cases will be conducted separately followed by a comparative analysis of the findings in the two cases. This is done to show the differences and similarities and to look for variation between the cases of study. The aim of the comparative analysis is to show a possible link between the two cases that could serve as an explanation for the rise of populism by looking at it different angles and in different circumstances. Furthermore, it makes it easier to see if the rise of populism is context based or if its possible to deduct a common denominator behind the rise.

### 3.4.2 Deductive reasoning

Deductive reasoning implies working from an existing theory and then testing if the claims of the can be confirmed. The method of deductive reasoning is used to transform elements from the theory in to hypotheses. The hypotheses are then systematically tested through different analysis of data. This follows the logic of the comparative method where cases are systematically examined to deduct the reason behind the rise or to establish a link. After the analysis, it would then either confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. (Klemmesen, Andersen, & Hansen 2012) The aim of using this method is to deduct the reason behind the rise of populism. I would argue that the best way to locate some of the reasons behind the rise of populism is to conduct a focused analysis of claims made in the theory. Hence, the deductive method is used to test the theories and locate the reason behind the rise. The reason for using this approach is that, when using the comparative

case study the scholar may already have a predetermined idea of what the differences and similarities may or may not be. These predetermined thoughts could, combined with the theory, be formulated into hypotheses, which are tested and thus confirmed or disconfirmed. (Klemmesen, Andersen, & Hansen, 2012).

The analysis will therefore be conducted on the bases of deductive reasoning. The deduction begins with an expected pattern that is tested against the observations. If the result of the test shows that the hypothesis is true, then it is right to conclude that the theory can be generalized to other similar cases. If the hypothesis is disconfirmed the claims of the theory could then be argued to be incorrect. (de Vaus 2001) Consequently, deductive reasoning is chosen to narrow the scope of the analysis and to deduce reasons behind the rise of populism using the theory.

### 3.5 Research criteria

The three most prominent criteria for assessing the quality of the social research are, 1) replication, 2) reliability, and 3) validity. (Bryman 2012)

#### **Replication**

Replication refers to the idea that other scholars could replicate the research conducted if they use the same steps presented in the original research. In order for the research to be replicable the scholar must be very clear about the sources that have been used and the steps taken to reach the conclusions. Other scholars will not be able to replicate the study if the scholar does not fill these requirements. Hence, it is important for the scholar to highlight the procedure of the research and to openly present the how the study is conducted otherwise replication would not be possible. However, it is important to notice that all research would be somewhat context specific, because different researchers might look for different things according to the context. (Bryman 2012) In this thesis this have been made visible through a clear presentation of the steps taken (structure of the paper) and which literature used (list of references) to reach the conclusions. Furthermore, the methodology of the paper also presents how the research is conducted. Hence, it could be argued that the thesis is considered replicable. I am aware of the fact that the context and

my worldview as a scholar could have influenced the finding in the thesis, even though the research is done as objectively as possible.

## **Reliability**

Reliability focuses on whether the results of the research are repeatable. Or in other words, reliability is about the level of confidence in the way the data gathered could be repeated without producing different results. Reliability could also be seen as credibility, which includes the fact that the researcher has to highlight how the research was carried out to eliminate serious inconsistencies. If the study were not consistent the measure would then be considered unreliable. Hence, reliability focuses on the degree of consistency in the research and if it is repeatable. (Brymann 2012) In this thesis the reliability could be considered high, because most of the data used are quantitative data from surveys and official statistics. This makes it easy for other scholars to repeat the research and get the same results if this is done at another time. The thesis aims to insure a high level of reliability in the research by being as explicit and transparent as possible when processing the data.

## **Validity**

The last research criteria are validity, which focuses on the measurement of the data. Validity is arguably one of the most important parts of the research criteria. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from the research. The validity is closely linked with reliability, because if the measurement is not reliable the conclusions could then not be valid. Hence, validity focuses on if the measurement of the concept really is measuring the concept. Or in other words, is the researcher actually answering the problem presented in the thesis statement when making the conclusion. This is also referred to as measurement validity. The external validity focuses on whether the result of the research can be generalized beyond the context of the specific research. It would be possible to generalize the findings in the research to the population if the external validity is high. (Brymann 2012) There would be an explicit focus on pinpointing the objective of the thesis statement in order to maintain a high level of validity throughout the thesis. It could be argued that there is a high level of external validity, because the



quantitative data used represents large part of the population. This means that the data used could arguably show that there is a tendency within the population. However, the conclusion of the thesis can only be generalized in the context the research is done within.

## 4. Theoretical framework

In this section, the theoretical framework of the paper will be presented. The framework will consist of other scholar's definitions and classifications of populism. The focus of the framework is to define populism and identify the explanations behind the rise of populism. These explanations will be used to create a set of hypothesis to examine the reasons behind the rise. The theories chosen for this framework mainly consist of the definitions from the ideational approach and Paul Taggart's (2000) theory of the heartland. The claims of these theories are supported by other scholars. The main points of the theories will be presented in short with additional focus on the theories focusing on the reasons behind the rise. However, focus will also be added to the definition of populism since it is important to understand the phenomenon in order to explain the reason behind the rise.

### 4.1 Theoretical framework

Populism has truly disrupted established politics the last decade. Nevertheless, populism is a tricky phenomenon to identify or define. Scholars have argued the term for many years, and no universal accepted theory about the definition of it or reasons behind the rise have been developed. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017)

Populism is defined as a thin-centred ideology that adopts features from other thick-centred ideologies. When defining populism context is essential because the populist often adopts features from its surrounding environment. Populists put the people in centre of their narrative and often have hostile attitude towards the elites and the political establishment. They promote a direct form of democracy and will often rely on a charismatic leader. (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014) However, other scholars argue that populism is only a tool used to gain political power. They argue that populism easily could be a political strategy rather than a thin-centred ideology. (Moffitt 2016) This approach to populism could be useful when analysing the political agenda and strategy of

the populist parties. However, this will not be included in the theoretical framework since it is not the purpose of this thesis to examine the parties and their strategy. Other scholars that have defined populism worth mentioning are Margaret Canovans (1981) and her definition of populism and Laclaus (1977) approach. In relation to rise of populism, Inglehart & Norris (2016) are worth mentioning. They claim the rise stems from a cultural backlash. However, this explanation is not investigated in this thesis due to the limited scope.

### **The people**

*"The people"* is often placed in the centre of the populist definition of democracy and they view them as sovereign, pure, virtuous and homogeneous. The people according to populists often represent the backbone of society and the silent majority that create the basis of the good society. Many populists have the ability to frame the term *the people* in a way that appeals to different communities and articulate their demands. Consequently, creating a feeling of shared identity between different groups and thus establishing support for a common cause. The term *the people* is a construction with a lot of flexibility and different meanings. There are three main distinctions of the term *the people*: the people as the sovereign (the people as the definitive source of political power), the common people (class concept), and as the nation (a national community). Populists often create different narratives, such as "giving the government back to the people" or "them against us. It attempts to unite a silent and angry majority by mobilizing them against a defined enemy, like the cultural elite or the establishment. This anti-elitist attitude is often linked with the critique of the institutions such as big organizations, political parties and bureaucracies, who are accused of corruption or of misrepresenting the people. This critique creates a strong link between the populist leaders and "the common people". (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017)

### **The elite**

*"The elite"* is defined as the ruling class who believes that they have a monopoly on power, property, politics and culture compared to the people. They believe that the common people are dangerous, vulgar, and dishonest. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) The elite is

always linked to the people, and the populists use morality in the distinction between the elite and the people using terms like “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people”. Populists do not only criticize the political establishment but also the economic elite, the media elite and the cultural elite. All these groups are described by populists, as one homogeneous corrupt group that works against the general will of the people. The struggle between the people and elite is always linked with populism.

The elite are identified on the basis of a broad variety of criteria. The elite are for example defined on the basis of power. The people give the politicians power by electing them but they can also take the power away. It is then the political elites job to insure that they represent the mandate given to them by the people. This distinction includes most people in leading positions within politics, the media, the arts and the economy. However, this distinction obviously excludes the populists and those that are sympathetic towards the populists. The populists often defend a post-class world arguing that class division are artificially created to undermine the people and keep the elite in power. Right-wing populists sometimes relate the battle between the people and the elite to economic power. They argue that the political elite are supporting the economic elite by putting “special interests” above the general will of the people, and that this is the explanation for their “lack” of political success. This hostile attitude is used as a powerful tool for the populists to pinpoint failures of the political elite, and to capture the dissatisfaction and anger of the people. Xenophobic populists often define the people in ethnic terms, excluding the aliens (i.e. minorities, refugees and immigrants). (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017)

The populists will see it as an opportunity to rise when the elite are neglecting the general will of the people. By doing so the populists become the voice of the people because they are defending the principles of popular sovereignty with the aim of empowering groups that do not feel represented by the political establishment. A rise in populism could be explained by a general feeling in the society that the politicians are favouring the special interest of economic elite, or immigrant or refugees over those of the native people. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) This could be argued to be an explanation for the why populist are gaining support within the population because the populist are trying to

capture the growing dissatisfaction towards the elite. Hence, a rise in dissatisfaction with the elite could lead to a rise in populism, according to the theory.

### **The general will**

“The general will” is the third core concept of populism according to the ideational approach. Populist actors and constituencies use this notion to promote a political system that supports the general will of the people. The populists’ monist and moral distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite reinforces the idea that general will exists. Many populists share the critique of representative government by employing the notion of general will. Hence, many populists often support the implementation of direct democratic mechanisms, such as plebiscites and referenda. Furthermore, populists often also support institutional mechanisms that are helpful to cultivate a direct relationship between the populist leader and their constituencies. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017)

### **The heartland**

Another key feature of populism is the notion of “the heartland”. Populists often tend to put a lot of emphasis on the notion of the heartland and tend to identify themselves with an idealised national vision of the chosen people and locate them in an idealised landscape. In this vision, the lines are very strictly divided between “them” and “us” and emphasis is put on the chosen people. Populists tend to do so as a way of excluding elements they see as alien, debased or corrupted. This is done to emphasise their connection to the heartland. The heartland is a construction derived from the populist notion of the people that embodies it, and is often an idealized vision of the past. They use the rhetoric of the people to evoke a sense of connection between the heartland and the people. The populists’ emphasis is on the people and that they are an undifferentiated mass. The people of the heartland are seen as a single unity of shared values and beliefs. However, according to the notion of the heartland, the people are often seen as the majority of the nation, which leads to the exclusion of the minorities. Therefore, the populists can use the notion of the heartland to divide the people in two groups: those of the heartland (majority) and them (minorities, elites, aliens etc.). The populists often use the notion of the heartland as justification for the exclusion of those who are demonized in their eyes. Populism has a

tendency to have very explicit rhetoric about the exclusion of certain groups and labelling them as not being part of the “real people”. Populist use the notion of the heartland to connect with the people and their values, and at the same time demonize groups they view as extreme or marginal. Hence, populist use of the notion of the heartland can be seen as a form of ethnocentrism. Populism will therefore often exclude a series of social groups they do not consider to be part of the heartland. (Taggart 2000) Populist will use nationalism when it is an expression of the values of the heartland. This is also the reason for the inward-looking nature of populism. The populist’s focus is often directed towards strong national values and symbols. Values or ideas, such as internationalism and cosmopolitanism, are heavily criticised or degraded by populists. This is also why populists have a tendency to prefer isolationism and insularity as the answer to concerns outside the heartland. Many populists use nationalist and isolationist rhetoric when addressing the fears and concerns facing the heartland. This is the same reason why many populists are very critical towards globalization and fears the consequences of it. (Ibid.)

The rhetoric of the heartland can be a very strong tool to mobilize the masses. Populism will therefore, for the same reason, invoke itself politically at times in the name of the people. However, the term only occurs in times of difficulty when a strong nation is necessary. This will eventually stir the populists into political action. They will often appeal to what they describe as the “common man” by telling romanticized stories of their importance to the society. The concept of the heartland allows us to understand the different manifestations of populism. It allows the different forms of populism to construct its own version of the heartland to fit with the agenda and concerns of the nation and its people. (Ibid.) Hence, the heartland could be seen as the opposite of an ideology. An ideology often promotes an ideal society and what we should work towards, whereas the heartland focus is backwards. The populist attempts to construct an idea of what have been lost by the present by using the notion of the heartland. Therefore, ideologies often use the rational thought and appeals to the common sense. Populism appeals to people’s feelings that may not necessarily be rational or the reasonable way forward. (Ibid.)

### **The thin-centeredness of populism**

Another important feature is the thin-centeredness of populism. Populism rarely occurs on its own; it often adopts attributes from other ideologies such as the radical right, nativism, nationalism, socialism or liberalism. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) Populism can be defined as a thin-centred ideology with limited structure that adopts features from other ideological position and adapting to the context. Unlike thick-centred ideologies, populism is not a normative set of ideas about the nature of society and how to organize it. Populism relies on other ideologies to gain support for their political agenda because it cannot offer comprehensive nor complex answers to the political questions generated by modern society. The populist actors often form their political agenda based on the current issues concerning the broader public or concepts from other ideologies. Hence, populism has the ability to adapt to the political climate by taking different shapes depending on the will of the people and the current political climate. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) Taggart (2000) refers to this characterization of populism as an ideology with an “empty heart” with no key values. Populism does not have the same core to it as the thick-centred ideologies. It often attaches itself to these other ideas as a way for it to fill the space of its empty heart. Therefore, populism is a tool used as an adjective to differentiate ones political ideology. Populism uses the ideas and the values of the thick-centred ideologies to formulate its political position. (Taggart 2000)

### **The context of populism**

Context is essential in the understanding of populism because it can influence the ideological position of the populist actor and influence their political agenda. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) Populism is often seen as a chameleon that adopts its colours to fit the context of the environment surrounding it. Populist often adjusts their narrative, or political agenda to fit the concerns and fears facing the heartland. This context is then combined with features from thick-centred ideologies to formulate a political standpoint. Therefore, the populist political agenda is always partially constructed by the environment surrounding it. Populism constructs its narratives, symbols and myths from its surroundings as a way to connect with the heartland. (Taggart 2000) Hence, populism

adopts its ideas and values from other ideologies, its surroundings and from the values of the heartland. The specific agenda can be persuasive in a specific moment with the right political climate. However, the adaptation of more substantial ideas or concepts from other ideologies is important for the endurance of the populist actor. (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017)

### **Times of crisis**

One of the characteristics of populism is that it often emerges in times of crisis. Populists are shaken out of their reluctance and in to politics when there is a crisis facing the heartland or the country. A crisis will shake the populists out of their holes and into an active defence of the heartland or the people affected by it. The problem with this is that the crisis may be one in the imagination of the populists or a crisis that cannot be sustained, like a political, financial, migration or economic crisis in the true sense of the word. These crises will fuel the populists' political fire and increase the demand for alternative political action. Populism could be viewed as something that comes out of a larger process of transition, which creates a sense of crisis among at least one social group. Hence, a crisis would ignite at public demand for political change, which could lead to an increased support for populists. Therefore, the theory states that a crisis will often ignite a rise in populist support. (Taggart 2000) Some scholars argue that a crisis will potentially set the stage for the populists to emerge and capitalise on the situation by criticising the elite for lack of reaction towards the crisis or not stabilising the situation. In times of crisis, the populists get the opportunity to emerge on to the political scene by appealing to the people who are affected. A crisis creates a scenario where the populists get an opportunity to sweep in and provide the people with alternative solutions to fix the problem. However, it could also be argued that rise of populism is just a reaction to the increasing dissatisfaction towards the elite, or establish politician for not fixing the situation, and that crisis is just an external trigger for the rise. (Moffitt 2016) Yet, it is still argued that populism is strongly linked with the crisis and that populism needs a crisis in order to emerge. Laclau (1977) is a strong supporter of the link between crisis and populism. He argues that populism cannot emerge without a crisis. For populist a crisis is a necessary precondition for the emergence of populism. (Laclau 1977) It could therefore be deduced

that populism will emerge in times of crisis, and that a crisis could increase the populist support. This argument could serve as an indicator for why we are seeing a rise in populism and is worth further examining.

### **Institutions of representative politics**

Populists are often very critical towards the institutions of representative politics. Institutions are both objects of criticism and a way for populist to mobilize support. They are often very hostile towards representative politics and criticise the establishment. Populists often have a very ambivalent attitude towards the institutions, like those of the state, financial institutions, bureaucracy and universities. Populism fundamentally distrusts the people of institutions and believes they are not serving the interest of the people. (Shils 1956) Populists are often most comfortable when they are in a side-line position where they can criticise the political establishment. Many populists seeks to avoid habitual political involvement and is not interested in becoming involved in the messiness of establish politics. However, they will get involved in politics when they view the circumstances to be extreme or in times of crisis. Populists deliberately try to translate the plain talking and simplicity of ordinary people in to structures that are direct and simple. To avoid being tangled in to the web of established politics, many populists often advocate a more direct and simple political agenda and a transformation of the political system. However, this strong critical position towards institutions is very self-limiting for the populists and the reason for it being a short-lived phenomenon. The critique of the institutions is the driving force for populists. However, the populists will inevitably need to use the same institutions if they become part of representative politics. Populists are forced to become what they dislike when they become too popular or successful. (Taggart 2000)

Populism has a fundamental ambivalent relationship with politics, especially representative politics. Populist often has a negative and demoting view on the established political landscape. Populism will often reject the current political consensus and believe that the will of the "common man" is not prioritised. They believe politics is messy, debased and at times even corrupted. This could lead to a dissatisfaction among the



people, and shift their political foundation, which could lead to a rise in support for political outsiders or populist. Hence, populism can be seen as a negative reaction to representative politics. (Taggart 2000) This could again potentially be an explanation for the rise of populism, or be used in the analysis as an indicator for why we are seeing a rise in populism. Therefore, the theories put a lot of focus on the dilemma between the elite and the people. It could be argued that populism will emerge when there is an increased dissatisfaction towards the elite, or representative politics.

### **Direct democracy**

Populists often support direct democracy and popular sovereignty. They will, if necessary, over-ride minority right, constitutional checks-and-balances, elite expertise and conventional practices in order to reach their goals. Populists often adopt a governing style and rhetorical language that challenges the elite, neutrality, authority and the expertise of traditional establishment elites. (Inglehart & Norris 2016) Direct democracy is sometimes portrayed as a synonym for populism. This is a way for them to connect and have direct contact with the people. Populists believe that direct democracy is a way to take some of the power away from the elite and give it back to the people. This is one of the reasons direct democracy is a very popular political tool among the populists, and away for them to avoid the dilemmas that are created by representative political institutions. (Canovan 1981) The directness of populism is one of the reasons why populists often favour a charismatic leader. The nature of the charismatic leadership is to replace the rules and institutions with the will of the charismatic leader. This reflects their desire to reduce the complexity of the institutions and to embody the populist faith in the leaderships itself. (Taggart 2000)

### **Populists as leaders, politicians or parties**

Another factor to be aware of when studying populism is that most studies mainly focused on populists as leaders, politicians or parties. A populist is often identified as a political actor or someone who has the ability to influence the masses and shift the focus of the political agenda. A populist often rises as a non-established political actor who is dissatisfied with the current political climate and then enters politics in times of crisis.

Hence, a populist can be an ordinary citizen who enters politics because of their concerns or dissatisfaction with the current political establishment. (Taggart 2000) They are first considered to be populist when they enter politics or display the features linked with the characteristics of populism.

## 4.2 Hypothesis

The theories presented above help define populism and pinpoint the characteristics of the populist politicians. From the theories, it can be deduced that one of the reasons behind the rise in populist support stems from a growing dissatisfaction among the people towards the elite or representative politics. It could also be deduced that populism will rise in times of crisis.

In order to narrow the scope of the analysis two hypotheses have been developed. The hypotheses are based on explanations from the theoretical framework and are developed as a tool to test the claims of the theories. This is in accordance with the deductive reasoning where the claims of the theory are tested by formulating a set of hypothesis. The hypotheses will work as guidelines for the analysis. If the claims of the hypotheses are confirmed in both cases it could be safe to conclude the tendency that these reasons are part of the explanation behind the rise of populism. However, if the hypotheses only are confirmed in one of the cases it is not possible to confirm the explanations, but could instead indicate that the context of the single case influences the result. The two hypotheses of this thesis are the following:

1. Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.
2. Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis.

## 5. Analysis

In this section, the analysis of the thesis will be presented. The analysis is divided in to two different analyses: Denmark and the US. The two cases are divided in to a context analysis followed by the main analysis of the hypotheses. Afterwards, the results of the two cases are compared and contrasted.

### 5.1 Context analysis of the case of Denmark

#### 5.1.1 Demographics and political system

Denmark is a relatively small country in the Northern part of Europe with 5.7 million citizens. The demographic of the country is also very harmonized with 86.96% of the population having Danish origin and 10.03% are immigrants. (See appendix 1&2) Denmark is a liberal democracy with free and open elections, and everyone over 18 years old can vote freely. In Denmark individual- and political rights, like freedom of speech, freedom to form political parties, human rights and right to assembly, are respected. Furthermore, it is important to notice that Denmark has free press and Internet. (Jensen 2012)

Denmark is categorised as a social democracy that supports social and economic interventions to encourage social justice within the framework of a capitalist economy. Denmark is a representative democracy with a strong welfare state that is committed to using measures for the redistribution of the income. The Danish welfare system is formed on the principles of the social democratic model. (Thomsen 2010)(Esping-Andersen 1990)

The Danish democratic model can be categorised as a majoritarian democracy or a constitutional monarchy. The Queen is the official head of State, but have no real political power. (Jensen 2012) A majoritarian democracy is a form of government in which the majority rules. This means that politics in Denmark take place within the framework of a parliamentary representative democracy, where the politicians elected reflects the will of the people and how they voted. The government would often reflect the will of the majority of the population. In Denmark, the majority has the political power because the parliament can accept the laws formulated by the government when there is a majority. (Dworkin 1996)

Denmark has a parliamentary structure with one parliament that consist of 179 seats. Approximately, every four years a general election is held where the party or parties that can collect a minimum of 90 seats may formulate a government. Here it is important to notice that no single party has ever collected 90 seats alone. This means that in order to collect the 90 seats parties have to form correlations to gain the government power. Hence, the Danish political system is a multiparty system where the 90 seats can be won by a correlation of many different parties. This means that the government in Denmark often is a minority government that needs support from other parties. The parliament in Denmark is therefore unofficially divided in to two blocks: *red-* and *blue block*. (Jensen 2012) This system also makes it easier for new parties to emerge and gain influence. A new party can run for national election if they manage to collect around 20.000 voter signatures. (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet 2017) This makes it easier for populist parties to emerge and run for elections.

Another important factor is how long a government are allowed to sit in office. In Denmark, an election period is four years, however there is no limit to how long a person can bee in the parliament. In principle, a politician can retain a seat in parliament for as long as they are re-elected. This also means that a Prime minister can retain his position for an unlimited time, as long as his block retains the 90 seats. (Jensen 2012)

Lastly, another important factor to notice, when analysing Danish politics and its system, is their membership in the European Union (EU). Denmark has been a member of EU since 1973, but they are not part of the Eurozone because they have an opt-out. This has some effect on the Danish political system and policy making because Denmark are in certain cases oblige to follow decision and directives from EU. Denmark is still a sovereign country with its own laws and governing power. However, Denmark has still given up some sovereignty due to its EU membership, and can be subject to some supranational decision from the EU institutions. Denmark has due to its membership accepted the free movement of goods, services, capital, labour and people. This could potentially change, or emend certain national laws, which could have an effect on jobs or businesses. (Kelstrup et al. 2012)

All the above-mentioned factors are important to take in to consideration when analysing the explanations behind the rise of populism. The context of the country is important in populism according to the theories and could have an effect on the result that are found.

### 5.1.2 Populists in Denmark

In order to analyse a rise in populism in Denmark, it is important to determine who are characterised as populists because the aim of this thesis is to explain the rise, but also to set a variable that can be measured through electoral results. Populism in Denmark is often linked with the parties and not politicians. It is also easier to analyse the rise in populism by using the parties as the indicator behind the rise, due to the fact that most election data are on the parties. This is not to say that politicians cannot be populists, but in Denmark the populists are characterised through their affiliation to a populist party because in Denmark the parties are more influential than the individual politician. The politicians are members of a party and follow the party agenda. (Jensen 2012) Therefore, a variable in the analysis is the parties who are considered populists. It is also important to mention that the parties selected to be the variable for the rise are right-wing populists.

The Danish populists that this thesis will focus on and use as the indicator for the rise, is the Danish Peoples Party (DF). DF is chosen because they are widely mentioned and characterised as populists in both literature by other scholars and the media. Inglehart and Norris's (2016) comprehensive study of populism in Europe categorise DF as a populist party by scoring 84.3 on their 100-point scale (parties above 80 are considered populists). Taggart (2000), Mudde (2000) and Judis (2016) also label DF as a populist party and they also categorise them as a right-wing party or extreme right-wing. This is mainly due to DFs extreme focus on strict immigration policies, which is often of highest priority on their political agenda. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that DF is considered a populist party when looking at other scholars work. I would also argue that DF is a populist party because their political agenda often follows the definitions from the theories. One main argument in the definition of populism is that populist parties often have a very value based and narrow political agenda. This fact is evident when looking through the parties principle program, which is short and very specific. They do not have a long and comprehensive party program like other more ideology-based parties. (Dansk

Folkeparti 2002) Another area where DF follows the definitions from the theory is in their strong connection to Danish values and history or the heartland (following Taggart's (2000) analogy). Danish culture, language and faith are an important part of their political agenda. Hence, taking a kind of ownership on protecting the Danish values and traditions. (Ibid.) Another fact that supports the definition of DF being a populist party is the fact that they do not have a clear ideological standpoint. They adapt elements from different ideologies, like socialist economic policies combined with nationalism. They believe in a strong public sector and strict immigration policies. (Dansk Folkeparti 2002) This empty hearted thin-centred nature of their ideology follows the definitions of the theory and supports the categorization of DF being a populist party. I would argue that they are a right-wing party, due to the fact that strict immigration and elements of nationalism is on the top of their political agenda.

Therefore, I would categorise DF as a populist right-wing party and they will serve as one of the variables to measure the rise of populism in Denmark. However, the aim of this thesis is to determine the explanations behind the rise and it is therefore important to analyse it in combination with other variables. Hence, DF will then serve as the dependent variable in the equation, since a rise in populism is dependent on other factors.

## 5.2 Analysis of populism in Denmark

In this section, the analysis of populism in Denmark will be presented. The analysis will focus on the explanation behind the rise of populism. In order to determine the explanations behind the rise a set of hypothesis is created based on the theories. These hypotheses are designed to narrow the scope and focus the analysis.

### 5.2.1 Hypothesis: Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.


The first hypothesis tested is: *Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.*

In order to analyse if there is a correlation between the rise of populism and dissatisfaction with the elite, one must first look at the rise of the populist parties and compare it with

surveys on peoples trust in politicians or dissatisfaction towards representative politics. A rise in both could suggest that there is a correlation. Hence, a rise in the dissatisfaction would lead to rise in populism.

The first parameter that will be investigated is the rise in populism. As mentioned in the context analysis, the variable used to measure the rise will be the DF. Data from Danmarks Statistik show that DF has increased their shares of the votes in the Danish Parliamentary elections in recent years. Figure 1 shows the election result for DF from 2007-2015.

**Figure 1**




Source: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statestik. See appendix 3 for raw data.

Figure 1 shows that DF has in recent years experienced a rise in their shares of the votes. From 2007 to 2015 the numbers of votes rose from 13.86% of the votes to 21.1%. This shows that DF has increased their share of the votes with 7.24 percentage points in just eight years. Therefore, when using DF as the variable for the rise, the data clearly shows that there has been a rise in populism in Denmark or an increased support for populist parties. However, this data do not explain the reason behind the rise, it only establishes that the rise is visible. In order to explain the rise, the data on dissatisfaction towards the political elite or representative politics will be examined. The dissatisfaction will be measured with three different variables: trust in politicians, dissatisfaction with government and trust in national parliament. These three will serve as indicators for the dissatisfaction towards the political elite or representative politics.

When examine the development on the trust in the politicians, it is also visible that this has shifted in a negative direction in recent years.

**Figure 2<sup>1</sup>**



Source: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from European Social Survey (ESS). See appendix 4 for raw data.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of those distrusting the politicians has increased in recent years from 22.57% of the people in 2006 to 38.96% in 2014. Consequently, a rise of 16.39 percentage points among those distrusting the politicians in Denmark from 2006 to 2014. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that this shows that there is an increase in the distrust of the politicians. Yet, the data still shows that the majority of the respondents still tend to trust the politicians. However, the increased distrust in the politicians is supported by the data from the Eurobarometer survey. This survey asked the people if they “tend to trust” or “tend not to trust” the political parties. This data shows an increased number of people tending not to trust the political parties in Denmark. The data shows that 46.53% did not trust the political parties in 2006. This number increased to 63.58% in 2016. This is a growth of 17.05 percentage points in ten years. This shows that almost 2/3 of people distrusted the political parties in 2016. (European Commission 2016) (See appendix 5)


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<sup>1</sup> The data in the figure is collected from ESS from a questioner about the trust in politicians. The people where asked to determine their trust in the politicians from 0-10, 0 being no trust at all and 10 was complete trust. I have chosen the to ad the people answering 0-4 as those who distrust the politicians and in order to categorize the percentage of those distrusting the politicians. I argue that the one who answered generally distrusted the politicians, due to the fact that they where under the middle of the scale.



Hence, the data from Eurobarometer survey supports the data from ESS showing that the tendency in recent years has been an increased distrust in the politicians and political parties. However, in order to verify that there is a correlation between the rise of populism and the dissatisfaction towards representative politics or the elite, data on the dissatisfaction of the DF voters have to be analysed. Figure 3 shows the data on the dissatisfaction among DF voters compared with the national average.

**Figure 3<sup>2</sup>**



Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from European Social Survey (ESS). See appendix 4,6 & 7 for raw data.


Figure 3 shows the dissatisfaction towards representative politics in three categories among the DF voters compared with the national average. The data shows that among the DF voters the general dissatisfaction towards representative politics is quite high, where minimum half of its voters tend to be dissatisfied. Therefore, it could be argued that DF voters generally are more dissatisfied with representative politics than others. The data also suggest that people that are dissatisfied with representative politics often would vote for DF. It is worth mentioning that not all DF voters are dissatisfied with representative

<sup>2</sup> Figure 3 shows the correlation between people who voted for DF and their attitude towards representative politics, compared with the national average. The figure is based on ESS7 (2014) data. It shows the percentage of dissatisfaction towards representative politics from the people who voted for DF and national average.

politics or the elite. However, the data still shows that a large number of DF voters are dissatisfied.

The data from figure 3 indicates that there is a link between the people who vote for DF and the dissatisfaction with representative politics or the elite. In order to verify the link further, the data is explored. Figure 4 shows the national average of dissatisfaction towards the national parliament and the distrust in government.

**Figure 4<sup>3</sup>**



Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from European Social Survey (ESS). See appendix 6 for raw data.


Figure 4 shows that the distrust in parliament has gradually increased in recent years, supporting the tendencies from figure 2 that people distrust politicians. The distrust has risen from 15.36% in 2006 to 26.22% in 2014. This is an increased level of distrust in government by 10.86 percentage points in just eight years. Hence, the tendency in Denmark in recent years indicates a negative development in the trust towards representative politics. When looking at the data on the dissatisfaction towards national

<sup>3</sup> The method used in figure 4 is the same as in figure 2, and the data is collected from ESS. This was also a questioner rating from 0-10, with 0 equal of no trust at all, or extremely dissatisfied. I again chose the people answering 0-4 to measure the dissatisfaction, or distrust.

government, the tendency is also visible, yet not as clear as the two other data sets. This shows that from 2006 to 2014 the dissatisfaction towards the national government has increased by 9.48 percentage points. However, figure 4 also shows that the dissatisfaction peaked in 2010 with 46.94% of the people being dissatisfied with the government. This is worth taking in to consideration because it actually implies that the dissatisfaction has decreased in the last four years.

To further support the claims of the hypothesis, it would be valid to look at second hand sources on the subject. The annual report from Radius on the credibility of different professions shows that the Danish politicians are ranked in the bottom on the list. The Danish politicians scored a 2.06 in 2016 on a 5-point scale. This means that the Danish politician is categorised as having “low” credibility in the report. (Radius 2016) The findings in this report support the tendency from the analysis above, showing that people in Denmark generally are dissatisfied with the representative politics. This becomes very evident when looking at the finding in the report and development in the credibility of the politicians.

**Figure 5<sup>4</sup>**



Source: (Radius 2016)

<sup>4</sup> In the survey the participants are asked to rate the different profession from 1-5, 5 being “very high” credibility and 1 being “very low” credibility.

Figure 5 shows that the credibility of the politicians has decreased in the last eight years from 2,56 to 2,06. This tendency indicates that there is a direct link between the variables from the ESS surveys and this report. It supports the argument that there is a general dissatisfaction with the representative politics in Denmark and that this dissatisfaction has increased in recent years. It is also interesting to see that in 2015 the credibility of the politicians was at its lowest point with a score of only 1,92.

Another second hand source, that supports the data on the people's general dissatisfaction towards representative politics in Denmark, is the survey done by Epinion for DR News in 2016 on political alienation. This survey shows that 51% of the people have had the feeling of political alienation in 2016. The survey also shows that the older generation were more dissatisfied with the politicians where almost 70% of the people over 56 years have had the feeling of political alienation in 2016. The younger generation were more satisfied with the politicians; only 22% of the people in the age group 18-34 had experienced political alienation in 2016. However, the difference between the age groups does not say anything about the correlations between the rise in populism and dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics, it only serves as an indicator for the people dissatisfied. The participants in the survey also answered what they were most dissatisfied about and the reason behind their feeling political alienation. This showed that people were most dissatisfied with the politicians not keeping their political promises and that politicians only had their own interest in hand. 10% also believed that the politicians were far from the reality of the citizens. (Larsen 2016)

## **Discussion**

The results show that populist support in Denmark has increased since 2007 when looking at the data from figure 1. The data shows that DF has increased their share of votes by 7.24 percentage points in just eight years. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that there has been a rise in right-wing populism in Denmark. The data from figure 2 shows that the level of distrust in the politicians have increased by 16.39 percentage points from 2006 to 2014 in Denmark. The increased distrust in politicians is supported by the data from the Eurobarometer survey. It shows that the level of distrust has increased by 17.05 percentage points in ten years. Hence, the level of distrust towards the politicians in Denmark has

increased in recent years. However, it is important to mention that the DF representatives are also considered to be part of the representative politics. When this data is compared, the results show that in the period from 2006 to 2014 the dissatisfaction towards the representative politics have increased, and in the period from 2007 to 2015 the populist support has also increased. It could be argued that this evidence shows that there is a simultaneous development between the rise of populism and increased dissatisfaction with politicians. However, this parallel development in the two variables is not evidence of a correlation, or that the increase in one is the reason for the rise in the other. It only shows that both variables have increased simultaneously.


However, the evidence of the correlation between rise in populism and increased dissatisfaction towards representative politics become quite clear when looking at the data from figure 3. The data shows that the people who voted for DF also were more dissatisfied with the elite or representative politics. It shows that the percentage of people who were dissatisfied with the political elite were higher among DF voters compared to the national average. The data shows that minimum half of its voters tend to be dissatisfied and 61.27% were dissatisfied with the national government. These numbers indicate that there is a correlation between how people vote and their dissatisfaction with elite or representative politics. It shows that the people who vote for populist parties in Denmark also are among those most dissatisfied with representative politics or the elite. Therefore, it could be argued that there is a correlation between the two variables. It also indicates that even though the DF representatives also are considered to be part of the representative politics the voters who are most dissatisfied still tend to favour them.

Hence, the data from figure 3 supports the claims of the hypothesis, which state a rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics. It is worth mentioning that the dissatisfaction among DF voters is not 100%, which means that not all people that vote for DF are dissatisfied with representative politics. However, the data still show a strong tendency among DF voters, which suggest a correlation. The correlation is further supported when looking at the tendency in figure 4. The figure shows the development in the level of distrust in parliament and the dissatisfaction with national government. The tendency in these two variables follows the

one in figure 2 that dissatisfaction has increased in recent years. The level of distrust has increased by 10.86 percentage points and dissatisfaction with 9.48 percentage points in just eight years. Hence, this development further supports the argument that the level of dissatisfaction have increased and that there is a link between rise of populism and dissatisfaction with the elite.

However, figure 4 also shows that the dissatisfaction peaked in 2010 with 46.94% in the variable *the people who are dissatisfied with the government*. This is worth taking in to consideration because it actually shows that the dissatisfaction has decreased in the last four years. Therefore, if the analysis only measured this variable in the last four years the result would then disprove the hypothesis. A factor that could explain why this variable has decrease in the last four years could be the fact that Denmark were in a financial crisis that peaked around 2009-2010. The crisis increased unemployment and decreased GDP growth rates. (Henriksen 2013) I would argue that it is plausible that the financial crisis could be the reason behind the peak in 2010 because the government had to make difficult decisions to stabilize the economy, which could increase the level of dissatisfaction. This crisis could then lead to a sense of political crisis. (Moffitt 2016) Hence, this could be an explanation behind the peak in 2010 and why it decreased when the economy stabilized. Hence, when looking at this variable more isolated, the data actually rejects the hypothesis because when the dissatisfaction was at its highest the support for DF actually decreased by 42.806 votes.

However, when looking at the tendency from 2006-2014, the data clearly shows that there still is an increased dissatisfaction in the public towards the government. This small, yet visible, increase supports the data from figure 4 and indicates that there is a simultaneous development in the rise in populism and peoples attitude towards representative politics over time. It shows that the dissatisfaction has increased from 2006 to 2014 and that DF has gain voters in the same period. Therefore, it could be argued that this evidence supports the hypothesis and show there is a correlation. This also becomes visible when looking at the growth of all the variables from the 2007-2015.

Figure 6<sup>5</sup>

Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from European Social Survey (ESS) and Danmarks Statistik. See appendix 3,4 and 6 for raw data.

Figure 6 clearly indicates that there is a simultaneous development between growth of dissatisfaction and distrust and the rise of populism when looking at the data over a period of eight-years. The distrust and dissatisfaction numbers are from the year before the election. It makes sense to look at the distrust and dissatisfaction numbers the year before the election because it shows the public opinion leading up to the election. The numbers the year before the election are the most measurable because the rise in populism can be connected to the public attitude before an election rather than the attitude after. The tendency displayed in figure 6 shows that there is a link between the two factors rise in populism and dissatisfaction towards the political elite or representative politics. This tendency could be argued to support the claims of the link and validate the finding in figure 3. The findings from the second hand sources further supports the tendency of the increased dissatisfaction towards the representative politics or elite. The finding from the Radius report, figure 5, shows that the credibility of the politicians was at its lowest point in 2015. This was the same year DF increased their share of the votes by 8.78 percentage points from 12.32% to 21.1% of the votes. This supports the correlation because it

<sup>5</sup> Note: the distrust and dissatisfaction numbers is from 2006 and 2014, and election results are from 2007 and 2015. The European Social Survey is only conducted every two years. Hence, the numbers from 2006 and 2014 are used as the closes indicators of the link between dissatisfaction and rise in populism, and show the public opinion the year before the election.

establishes a link between the dissatisfaction toward the representative politics and the rise in populism. Hence, it could be argued, based on the findings in the analysis, that the dissatisfactions toward the representative politics could be an explanation for the rise of populism. Another second hand source that supports the link and gives an indications of the reason behind the dissatisfaction is the survey done by Epinion for DR News. It shows that people were most dissatisfied with the politicians not keeping their political promises and that politicians only had their own interest in hand. These answers follows the theories, which claim the elite often are to occupied with their own interest and that that the will of the "common" man is not prioritised according to the populists. Hence, these answers do to some degree support the claims of the theory. However, the survey data for making this claim is still not that strong and it cannot give a clear answer for the factor that lead to the dissatisfaction. It only gives an indication that the claims of the theory are valid. The data from the surveys supports the claims that the population is generally dissatisfied with the representative politics, and it strengthens the signs of the correlation between the rise of populism and increased dissatisfaction established in the other findings. This combined with the data from figure 3 serves as evidence that many of the dissatisfied voters shifted towards DF.

To conclude, the evidence in the data clearly shows that there is a link between an increase of dissatisfaction towards elites, or representative politics and the rise of populism. Most of the data shows that the tendency in recent years is a general growth in dissatisfaction towards representative politics and it could be argued that this growth is the explanation for the rise in populist support. Hence, the data do not discard the hypothesis. It shows a valid correlation between the rise of populism and the dissatisfaction towards representative politics. Especially when looking at the data from figure 3, which shows that the level of dissatisfaction is higher among DF voters compared to the national average. I would argue that all the data suggest that there is a link between the two variables. Therefore, it could be argued that an increase in the dissatisfaction towards representative politics could be an explanation for the rise of populism in Denmark. Hence, the data verifies the hypothesis and show a correlation between increased



dissatisfaction and the rise of populism in Denmark. Therefore, I would argue that the data confirms the hypothesis.

### 5.2.2 Hypothesis: *Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis.*

In order to analyse if there is a correlation between the rise of populism and crisis, one must first establish what a crisis is, and then what type of crises is to be investigated, before analysing the possible link between the two. However, in order to establish the link between the two, the rise of populism have to be visible. This is already established in figure 1.

According to the theories, a crisis would often be linked to the rise of populism. It states that populism is a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis. The theories categorise a crisis as one in the imagination of the populist or a crisis that cannot be sustained, like a political, financial, migration or economic crisis in the true sense of the word. (Taggart 2000) Since it is hard to find data on an imaginary crisis, this analysis will focus on a real crisis. The data measured will focus on the financial crisis the hit the world around 2008. When the crisis is documented additional data will be added to the analysis, like unemployment rate, regions that are most effected by the crisis, GDP, numbers of DF voters in the different regions and the national budget.


This crisis is also quite relevant due to the fact that the financial crisis affected both Denmark and the US, which makes it easier to compare the result from the analysis in both cases. The financial crisis also follows many of the claims in the theory. The theory states that populist often fear the consequences of globalisation and free trade and that they often advocate for isolationism. Hence, the populist advocate for policies to limit globalisation and voice their fears of the consequences of the globalised world. (Taggart 2000) This could be the reason for the rise of populism in times of crisis, especially when the crisis is a consequence of an external factor that affects the national level. However, this factor could be argued to apply to both left – and right wing populist. Therefore, it is interesting to see if the financial crisis affected the rise of right-wing populism.

The global financial crisis in 2008 was a result of a financial and banking crisis that hit the US in 2007. The crisis started in the American banking and financial sector as a

consequence of great losses in the real estate market. (Hansen et al. 2011) The American financial and banking crisis quickly spread across the world and became a global economic crisis. The global financial crisis lead to severe economic problems in many western countries, like decline in GDP and world trade, deficit in national budgets and increasing unemployment rates. (Henriksen 2013) The Financial crisis also hit Denmark in the summer of 2008. Denmark is an open economy that promotes free trade. The Danish economy strongly relies on export and import of goods, which accounts for a large part of the collective economy. Hence, in times of global crisis the Danish economy will naturally be affected by it. (Ibid.) The crisis especially hit the Danish financial and banking sector, where many banks were struggling with increased lending deficit. The Danish banks had trouble covering this deficit due to declining trust from foreign lenders and decreasing real estate prices. This led to government intervention as a precaution to stabilize the market. The Danish stock market was also severely affected by the global financial crisis where stock prizes dropped in 2008-2009. This meant that that Danish shareholder experienced great losses in stocks and investment. The unstable stock- and financial market meant that the banks were more reluctant to lend people and companies money, because many people had used their stocks as insurance for the loans. This meant that the financial market froze, which effected companies who relied on capital from the banks to maintain their production. This started a downward spiral with decrease in consumption and investment. This led to rising unemployment rates as a consequence of the decrease in demand. The increase in unemployment meant that the state increased their expenses, social/unemployment benefits, and decreased in their income taxes. This had a negative effect on the national budget and GDP. (Ibid.) Hence, the global financial crisis had a huge effect on Denmark with increased national deficit, decrease in GDP, increased unemployment, falling stock- and real estate prizes, and decrease in international trade. This shows that Denmark has been in a time of crisis since 2008 and it is therefore possible to investigate a link between crisis and rise in populism. However, even though the crisis is declining, Denmark is still struggling with the effects of it both in terms of GDP, unemployment and deficit in national budgets.

Looking at the development of the economic growth in Denmark (GDP), the data clearly shows that Denmark experienced negative growth rates following the financial crisis. In Denmark an annual growth rate of 2% means that the economy is stable, below this is signs of depression. (Henriksen 2013)

**Figure 7**




Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, see appendix 8

Figure 7 clearly shows that Denmark have experienced a negative shift in their economy following the Financial crisis in 2008. This figure supports the claim that Denmark is a time of crisis due to the effects of the global financial crisis. The figure shows that before the crisis Denmark were above the 2% mark and was actually in times of economic boom with a growth rate of 3,9% in GDP. However, the figure also shows that Denmark was severely affected by the crisis with hitting negative growth rates in 2008 and 2009. The crisis peaked in 2009 with a negative growth rate of -4,9%. The economic crisis stabilized in 2014 after ups and downs in the period 2010-2013. However, the figure also shows that Denmark has since the crisis not been able to cross the 2% mark since the start of the crisis,

which means that Denmark arguably still is in a crisis even though the situation has stabilized. The economic crisis becomes even more visible when unemployment rates are included.

**Figure 8<sup>6</sup>**



Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, see appendix 9.

The data in figure 8 shows that the Danish unemployment rate has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis. Unemployment has increased by 2.8 percentage points since the beginning of the crisis in 2008. This supports the argument that Denmark is still in the aftermaths of the crisis and struggling with relatively high unemployment rates. Looking at the rate from the registered unemployed<sup>7</sup>, the tendency is the same with an increase of 1.6 percentage points from 2008 to 2016 (see appendix 10). The GDP and unemployment statistics show that the crisis may have peaked but Denmark is still economically affected by the crisis. This is also visible when looking at the national budget (see appendix 11). Denmark had a relative stable surplus on the national budget in the years before the crisis. However, Denmark has in recent years experienced a deficit in the

<sup>6</sup> Figure 8 shows the Danish AKU-unemployment rate in percentage. AKU-unemployment is a sample-based interview survey, highlighting the population's connection to the labour market. The sample size is around 40.000 people. This technique of measuring the labour force follows the guidelines from EU and the data is sent to Eurostat, and is the Danish contribution to Labour Force Survey (LFS). This survey data is selected, because it follows international standards, which makes it easier to compare with other unemployment stats from other countries.

<sup>7</sup> Registered unemployed show the number of people registered at jobcentres, unemployment incurrence funds (A-kasser), peoples receiving social benefits, and people under education. Hence, this statistics do not take people over 64, or those who are not register into consideration.

national budget as a consequence of the crisis. This deficit can be explained by increased unemployment and lower demand for goods, this increases the state expenses on unemployment benefits and that decreases the tax income. However, even though the data shows that Denmark was affected by the crisis, it is worth mentioning that other countries where more severely hit. Denmark is a relative stable economy, which meant that they were able to cope with the effects of the crisis, unlike other European countries where the economy got ruined. (Henriksen 2013)

In order to establish a correlation between rise of right-wing populism and the crisis it is necessary to look at the regions in the country mostly affected by the crisis and compare it with their political preferences. To do so, the ten municipalities with the highest unemployment rate are compared with DF's voting result from the elections. I will examine the unemployment rate in the different municipalities at the time of the election in 2015 and compare it with the development in the election results from 2007-2015. Hence, the idea is to show how the support of right-wing populism developed from the start of the crisis to the recent election. The result will be limited to the ten municipalities with the highest unemployment rate.

**Figure 9<sup>8</sup>**


Top -10	Municipality	Unemployment rate in %, 2015
1	Ishøj	8,7
2	Læsø	7,2
3	Albertslund	6,6
4	Lolland	6,5
5	Høje-Taastrup	6,4
6	Brøndby	6,1
7	Odense	6,1
8	Aalborg	5,9
9	Slagelse	5,9
10	Bornholm	5,7

Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, see appendix 12

Figure 9 shows the ten municipalities with the highest unemployment rate in Denmark in 2015, the same year as the election. This year is chosen because it gives the closest indicator of the economic situation in the country in the year of the election. The unemployment rate in these municipalities was all above the national average of 4.5% in 2015 (see appendix 12). The municipality with the highest unemployment rate, Ishøj, was 4.2 percentage points above the national average. Hence, this figure shows the regions of Denmark that were most affected by the global financial crisis. However, the interesting thing to investigate is if these municipalities also have experienced a rise in right-wing populism since the beginning of the crisis in 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Figure 9 shows the ten municipalities with the highest unemployment rate in Denmark. The unemployment rate is in registered unemployment, not AKU. This is chosen because it was not possible to find AKU unemployment rate for the different municipalities. Hence, the numbers might have been a bit different if it was in AKU. For full list of unemployment rate in all municipalities see appendix 12.

Figure 10



Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, see appendix 13

Figure 10 shows the development of DF's share of the votes from the 2007 to the 2015 election in the municipalities with the highest unemployment rate. The results show that DF has experienced a substantial rise in their share of the votes in all the municipalities in that period. With some municipalities experiencing a rise in populism of more than nine percentage points. Hence, this development follows the national tendency where populist support has risen in the same period. Furthermore, this tendency is further supported by the data on the economic situation in Denmark, which show that Denmark is in a crisis, not just in the different municipalities. In the same period, right-wing populist support has also increased.

## Discussion

The data presented in the analysis of the hypothesis shows that Denmark was affected by the financial crisis in 2008. GDP, National budget and unemployment rates experienced negative result as a consequence of the crisis. Especially unemployment rates went up in the last eight years, with a rise of 2.8 percentage points from 2008 to 2016. Unemployment is a good variable when measuring the effect of the crisis and to link with the rise of populism. Because, it shows that the economy is in bad shape when unemployment is high. Furthermore, effects are more direct on the people who experience loss of job, which

also could lead to change in values or voting habits. In the period from 2007 to 2015 right-wing populist (DF) gained massive support, becoming the second largest party in Denmark. In the same period Denmark was hit by the financial crisis, which affected GDP, national budget and unemployment rates as shown in figure 7 and 8. This suggests that there is a simultaneous development between the crisis and rise of populism in that period. However, it is interesting to notice that when the crisis was at its peak from 2009-2012 the right-wing populist, DF, did not increase their share of the votes. Actually they went from 13.9% of the votes to 12.3% in the 2011 election. However, it is still worth mentioning that when looking at the development of right-wing populism from the beginning of the financial crisis until now, the evidence shows that there is a parallel link between the two. Hence, when looking at the development of both factors in the period from 2007-2015 the results show that there is a parallel tendency between crisis and rise in populism.

However, this claim becomes quite visible when the unemployment rate in the ten municipalities is compared with the voting results. The link between the two becomes evident when comparing the unemployment data from figure 9 with the rise of right-wing populism in figure 10. The results in figure 10 shows that there is a correlation between unemployment and the rise of right-wing populism. Hence, it could be argued that when unemployment is high people will turn to right-wing populist parties. The result of this analysis shows that there is a correlation between high unemployment and rise in populism. In the period from the beginning of the crisis to the recent election the support for right-wing populism has risen in all ten municipalities. The rise has been quite substantial in all ten of the municipalities with a growth of up to 10 percentage points in some of them. This supports the claims of the hypotheses and show that there is a correlation between the two. This claim is supported by the result on the national level. It can therefore be argued that the hypothesis is confirmed when comparing the result from the national level and those of the ten municipalities. Both of them show that from the beginning of the crisis to the latest election the tendency has been that populism rise when there is a crisis. This logic follows the claims of the hypotheses, that populism rise in times of crisis. This tendency is also visible in the period from 2007-2015 where right-wing



populism has risen by 8.78 percentage points and the Danish unemployment rate has increased by 2,5 percentage points combined with decreasing economic growth rate and national deficit. This shows that there is a possible link between the rise of populism and the crisis. The data shows that there is a parallel tendency where populist support increases when the economy is bad or in crisis. Therefore, I would argue that the hypothesis can be confirmed and that there is a correlation between rise of populism and crisis based on the analysis. Hence, it would be fair to assume that a crisis could lead to a rise in right-wing populism in Denmark.

## 5.3 Context analysis of the case of the US

### 5.3.1 Demographics and political system

The US is a large country in Northern America with an estimated population of 323,127,513 million citizens. (Census Bureau 2016) The US' demographic is a bit more composed than the Danish with many different cultures and races. The US is sometimes referred to as the "melting pot" due to its more heterogeneous composition. However, this is not to say that the US is a multi-cultural nation, but rather a nation with a collective culture that is composed of many different cultures. (Nye 2013) 77.1% of the inhabitants are considered white and of those 17.6% is Hispanic, 13.3% are African Americans, 5.6% is Asian and 1.2% is Native Americans. (Census Bureau 2016).

The US is a liberal democracy where individual- and political rights, like freedom of speech, freedom to form political parties, human rights and right to assembly, are respected. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the US has free press and Internet. (Nye 2013) They also have free and open elections, and everyone over 18 years old can in principle vote freely. However, the voting procedure in the US is a bit different from the Danish. In the US the voters have to register in order to have the right to vote. The fact that it is harder to vote is also visible in the turn out, were only an average of 55-60% vote at precedential election whereas in Denmark it is 85%. (Mørk 2016)

The US is categorised as a neo-liberal democracy. They believe in a strong commitment to individual liberty, and the pursuit of happiness through free markets and limited state

intervention. The American political system is more decentralized and has a strong commitment to the free market. (Ritzer & Dean 2015)

The American democratic model can be categorised as a constitutional democracy or a federal republic. The constitutional democracy aims at collective decisions that treat all members of the community with equal rights and respect. The focus of a constitutional democracy is to enhancing the equality of all citizens. This system is built upon a strong constitution, a clear division of power and influential courts. These institutions are very central in this system and are to assure the protection of all citizens, through checks and balances. The courts have more power in this system, and they have the right to turn down laws if they violate human rights or are unconstitutional. (Dworkin 1996)

The American system is a republic or federation where the power is divided in to three levels: local, state and federal. All three levels have their own areas of power and influence. Most of the issues that touch the lives of the citizens directly are controlled at the state and local level. This means that legislation could be very different from state to state. The federal level or national government deals with issues that concern the whole nation. Hence, the states have a lot of autonomy and self-determination over legislation, which make the states quite independent. The national government serves more as a supranational institution that deals with international matters, defence and matters concerning the nation as a whole. In other words, the states are united by the national government. The American national government also has a very clear division of power. The power is divided in to three branches: the legislative branch, executive branch and the judicial branch. These three branches where established in the constitution and are to assure no branch of government become to powerful. This was done through a system of checks and balances in which each part of government could exercise some control over the other parts. The legislative branch is the Congress, which consist of the Senate and the House of Representatives. They have the power of purse and impeachment, they can override the president's veto and they have to approve treaties. The executive branch is the President, his Vice President and his Cabinet. The President has the power to veto, can issue executive orders and is Commander-in-Chief. The last branch is the judicial branch, which consist of all the national and local courts including the Supreme Court. The courts

have the power to declare laws or precedential actions unconstitutional and insure that the rights of the people are respected. Hence, this division of power, the checks and balances, insures that no branch of government become too powerful. (Nye 2013)

The presidential system differs from that of the parliamentary system. In the presidential system the voters directly votes for the candidate they want to be the head of state and a president is only allowed to sit in office for eight years. Hence, the American system is build on a more candidate focused election, where the candidates, not the parties, run for office both in Congress and the position of head of state. (Nye 2013) This also means that the numbers of dominant parties are not as big in the US and is often categorised as a two party system. The two dominant parties in the US system are the Democrats and the Republicans. These two parties have more or less monopoly on the seats in Congress and for the presidency, meaning that most politicians elected are either Democrats or Republicans. The parties are very important in the election; they support, endorse and help the candidates get elected for office. However, it is still the candidates that are up for election. This means that in the US system the candidates play a more dominant role. In the US, it is the voters who choose the candidates. Even though the parties have no constitutional power in the elections, and everyone who fills the criteria's can run for office, the parties still have some de facto power. Because a candidate that are indorsed by the party have a bigger chance to win the elections, due to the support he will get from the party. The candidates that run for office are chosen at the primaries. This is a kind of pre-election where the most popular candidate is chosen to run for office. (Sunesen 2007)

### 5.3.2 Populists in the US

As mentioned, populism in the US is often linked with the candidates and not parties. The candidates run there own campaign and the voters elect candidates not parties. Of course the candidates are affiliated with a party, which is an important factor that gives the voters an indicator of the candidates political standpoint. However, the reason that the candidates are chosen as the variable, for measuring the rise, is because there is a huge difference between the political standpoints of the different candidates. This was visible in the 2016 precedential elections where many of the top figures in the Republican Party openly disagreeing with the candidate Donald Trump. The Republican Party top strongly

disagreed with Trump on issues like immigration, international trade, abortion, foreign policy and social services. (Swift 2017) This is a good example of why the candidates are chosen as the indicator for the rise of populism in the US and not the parties. It shows that the candidates and parties could have a very different political standpoint on key issues, and why a candidate could be considered a populist, while the party is not.

The candidate that this thesis will focus on and use as the indicator for the rise of populism will be the Republican President Donald Trump. Donald Trump is chosen because he is widely mentioned and characterised as a right-wing populists in both literature by other scholars and the media. The Media has not been shy of labelling him as a populist. The magazine Politico (Lind 2016) describes Donald Trump as “the perfect populist”. Judis (2016), Müller (2016), Inglehart and Norris (2016), and Moffitt (2016) all put Donald Trump in the populist category. Populist Scholar Cass Mudde describes him as a right-wing populist in the magazine The Atlantic. He said: *“Donald Trump the politician today is a populist radical-right politician.”* (Friedman 2017) Even though Mudde describes Donald Trump as a inconsistent populist, Trump still expresses some of the features linked with populism, like consistently opposing elites, demonstrating a nativist attitude toward immigrants, and exhibiting some “authoritarian streaks.” (Friedman 2017) Hence, there is sufficient support by prominent scholars in the field of populism for the claim that Donald Trump is considered a populist. I would therefore argue that it would be valid to label Donald Trump as a populist, and use him as an indicator for the rise of populism in the US. Furthermore, Trumps political agenda and narrative often are in line with the definitions from the theories. One of the main arguments in Taggart (2000) is that populist tend to put a strong emphasis on the “heartland” and the traditional values of the society. This is the reason nationalism is a strong tool to evoke the people of the nation. These characterisations were very visible in Donald Trumps presidential campaign was he repeatedly referred to “make America great again”. (Inglehart and Norris 2016) He also displayed a deep resentment towards representative politics, or the political elite in Washington. He sold him self as an outsider who was not part of the establishment in Washington, which also follows the idea of populist often having an ambivalent relationship with the political elite. (Fields 2016)

His policies and campaign promises also follows definitions from the heartland and had a protectionist agenda. The theory claims that populists often is very critical towards globalization and fears the consequences of it. This is why many populist advocate for isolationism or in some cases protectionism. (Taggart 2000) This have been very visible in his presidential campaign where he advocated for bringing manufacturing jobs back to America, withdrawing from international trade agreements and impose tariffs on products from China and Mexico. Hence, his inward-looking policies and anti-globalisation view support the fact that he could be labelled a populist. (Qiu 2016) Another fact that supports the definition of Donald Trump being a populist is the fact that he does not have a clear ideological standpoint. He adopts elements from different ideologies, like nationalism and protectionism. He believes in a strong immigration policy, rejecting immigrant from different Muslim countries, and building a wall. He also wants to cut taxes and leaving social benefits as it is. (ibid.)

As mentioned earlier, Cas Mudde did also label Donald Trump as an radical right-wing populist due to his very anti-immigrant policies and harsh rhetoric towards Muslims. Therefore, I would categorise Donald Trump as a right-wing populist and he will serve as the variable to measure the rise of populism in the US through his election results. As already stated, the aim of this thesis is to determine the explanations behind the rise and it is therefore important to analyse it in combination with other variables. Hence, Donald Trump will serve as the dependent variable in the equation because a rise in populism is dependent on other factors.

## 5.4 Analysis of populism in the US

In this section the analysis of populism in the US will be presented. The analysis will focus on the explanation behind the rise of populism. In order to determine the factors behind the rise a set of hypothesis is created, based on the theories. These hypotheses are designed to narrow the scope and focus the analysis.

#### 5.4.1 Hypothesis: Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.

The first hypothesis tested is: *Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.*

In order to analyse if there is a correlation between the rise of populism and dissatisfaction with the elite, the same measures used in the analysis of the case of Denmark are adopted. The first parameter that will be investigated is the rise of populism in the US. As mentioned in the context analysis the variable used to measure the rise will be Donald Trump. The rise of populism in the US is not as easy to establish quantitative as it is in Denmark. This is because of the difference in political systems and for how long a president is allowed to sit. Hence, in the US the winner takes it all and since Donald Trump never had won a nomination to run for President before it is not possible to see a rise over time. Donald Trump tried to run for the office in 2000 as a candidate for the Reform Party. However, his bid for the nomination as the party's candidate ended quite quickly. Trump withdrew his candidacy in March 2000 conceding to far right candidate Pat Buchanan. (Helmore 2017) Hence, Donald Trump has never previously won a nomination to become President and it is therefore not possible to see a quantitative development in his support over time. However, it is still possible to document the rise qualitative and argue that his win is a clear sign of a rise in populism.

On June 16. 2015 Donald Trump officially announced his precedential bid to run for the 2016 election as the Republican candidate. In his announcement speech he displayed early sign of populist discourse that follows the characteristics displayed in the theory. He was criticising the political elite and representative politics. (DelReal 2015) Hence, the signs of him being considered a populist were present from the start of his campaign and the first indicators of the rise in populism. In the bid to become the presidential candidate for the Republican Party Donald Trump was up against a series of other candidates also running for the Republican nomination, like Ted Cruz, John Kasich and Marco Rubio. Amongst the Republican candidates Donald Trump was the only one that is considered a populist. Donald Trump won the nomination in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries. He


gained 1441 out of 2472 delegates in the hard total, and 1725 after the uncommitted had cast their votes. Ted Cruz came in second with just 551 of the hard total. Trump gained 44.95% (14,015,993 votes) of the national popular vote in the primaries with Ted Cruz gaining 25.08%, John Kasich 13.76% and Marco Rubio 11.27% of the votes. (Berg-Andersson 2016) Hence, Trumps win in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries could be argued to be the first indicators of the rise in populism in the US. The result shows there has been a rise in populism within the Republican Party. This rise is evident since Donald Trump is the only candidate categorized as a populist and that no other populist candidate has won the nomination as Republican presidential nominee in contemporary election. The previous nominees include George W. Bush (2000 & 2004), John McCain (2008) and Mitt Romney (2012). (Nye 2013, 97) This shows that the rise in populism is evident and that around 45% of the Republican voters have shifted towards a more populist leader. Hence, this could be argued to be the first indicator of the rise of populism in the US, since the Republican Party and its voters elected Donald Trump as their nominee for the 2016 presidential elections. Roughly put, populism rose by 44.95 percentage points from the previous Republican presidential primaries. However, this only shows a rise of populism within the Republican Party in order to determine the rise in the US it is necessary to look at the national presidential election.

The evidence of the rise in populism became even clearer after the 2016 presidential election. Donald Trump won the election beating the Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. He won the Electoral College with 304 votes compared to Hillary Clintons 227 votes. However, it is worth mentioning that Donald Trump did not win the popular vote, but won because he gained the most Electoral votes. Clinton won the popular vote, gaining 48% of the national votes compared to Trumps 45.9%. (The New York Times 2017) Trumps victory shows that the US has experienced a rise in populism in recent years. It could therefore be argued that the result of the election serves as evidence for the rise of populism in the US, since no recent Presidents have been labelled a populist. The result shows a national shift among voters towards populism and it could be argued that populism in the US has risen by 45.9 percentage points since the previous election. This argument follows the logic that no populist politician has received any votes, or been

nominated, in the years leading up to the 2016 presidential election. In the 2012 presidential election Barack Obama (D) gained 50.5% of the votes and Mitt Romney (R) 48%, both of them are not categorized as populist. (Nye 2013) However, with the election of Donald Trump it could be argued that populism has increased by 45.9 percentage points, since the election in 2012. It could therefore be argued that the US has experienced a rise in populism, following the 2016 election, when looking at development in the election results. Hence, the election result clearly shows that there has been a rise in populism in the US when using Donald Trump as the variable for the rise. However, this data do not explain the reason behind the rise, it only establishes the rise. In order to explain the rise data on dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics will be examined.

The dissatisfaction will be measured with different variables, like trust in politicians and government. These variables will serve as indicators for the dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics. Looking at the developments, in the data on the trust in the politicians/political leaders it is also visible that this has shifted in a negative direction in recent years. This is visible in the figure below.




**Figure 11<sup>9</sup>**

Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from Gallup. Raw data: (Jones & Saad 2016)

Figure 11 shows, the percentage of the people distrusting the politician in the US. The data shows that since 2009 the level of distrust has increased. From 2009 to 2016 the level of distrust have increased by 7 percentage points. It is worth noticing that distrust level peaked in 2016, which is the same years as the Republican primaries and presidential election. This is also the same year the rise of populism was registered. Hence, this shows that there is a parallel link between the two variables.

In the US the power is divided in to three branches – the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch. These are all important in the American system. However, since the analysis focuses on Donald Trump and the rise of populism on national level data investigated will be on the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch is the part of the government that is headed by the president.

<sup>9</sup> The numbers in figure 11 is from Gallup. They surveyed on peoples trust in people holding or running for office and were made in September 2016. The numbers in the figure shows the people how answers either: "Not very much" and "none at all". The percentage for those who answered in these category where added together to show the percentage of people distrusting the politicians. Note: the 2012 result are not included because the where not in the raw data set.

**Figure 12**<sup>10</sup>

Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from Gallup. Raw data: (Gallup 2017)

The numbers in figure 12 show the level of distrust in the Executive Branch of government. The data shows that the level of distrust has increased in recent years. From 2009 to 2016 the level of distrust have increased by 11 percentage points. This shows that since 2009, the year after Obama became president, the level of distrust in the president and his administration has increased. This follows the tendency in the level of distrust in politicians presented in figure 11. Hence, the general tendency, since 2009, is that public level of distrust in government and politicians has risen. It is worth noticing that the level of distrust peaked in 2014 and the level have decreased a bit since then. However, when looking at the development in the level of distrust, over time, the data suggests that there has been a rise. This could suggest that the dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics have increased the recent years.

## Discussion

The rise of populism is quite visible in the US and the election of right-wing populist Donald Trump is evidence of the recent rise in populism. The development in populism in the US is harder to show then in the case of Denmark, because Donald Trump, or any

<sup>10</sup> The numbers in figure 12 is from Gallup. They surveyed on peoples trust in the Executive Branch of government and were made in September. The numbers in the figure shows the people how answers either: "Not very much " and " none at all". The percentage for those who answered in these category where added together to show the percentage of people distrusting the politicians.

other populist, have not been nominated to run for office in recent years. This makes it harder to prove the rise has happened over a period of time and why it is hard to detect a development before 2015. Hence, the result shows that populism has risen since 2015. However, it is not possible to make a quantitative argument for the rise of populism in the US. Yet, when categorising Trump as a populist and comparing it with the results in the primaries and the election the evidence of the rise become quite clear. The fact that the people of the US have elected a president who is considered a right-wing populist supports the claim that there is a rise.

When comparing the variables representing the dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics with the rise in populism the result shows that there is a simultaneous development between the two. The data shows that from 2009 to 2016 the development in the distrust in politicians and in the executive branch has increased. The level of distrust in the politicians has increased by 7 percentage points from 2009-2016. The level of distrust in the Executive Branch has increased by 11 percentage points in the same period. Hence, the result shows that the level of dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics has increased since 2009. It could be argued that in the same period the support of right-wing populism also have increased. The election of Trump shows that right-wing populism is on the rise in the US. The comparison of the variables shows that there is a link between the rise of populism and the dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics. However, the data do not show a clear correlation between the two variables, only that they have both increased since 2009. Hence, this does not verify the claims of the hypothesis it only shows simultaneous development between the two.

Data on how the people, who are dissatisfied with the political elite, or representative politics, voted is needed in order to verify the correlation. Exit polls from Edison Research showed that more than three in five voters believed that the things in America had gotten *"seriously off on the wrong track."* Among the voters who believed this 69% voted for Trump and only 25% for Clinton. Trumps core voters also include the people who were angry about the way the federal government was functioning. (Page & Heath 2016) This supports the claims that dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics

could have lead to a rise in populism in the US. It shows that some of the Trump voters were dissatisfied with the government, and that he managed to capture some of the public anger towards the government elite in his campaign. When looking at Trumps anti-establishment rhetoric during his campaign the evidence of him playing on the public anger towards the representative politics become even clearer. (Lowry 2015) During his campaign Trump labelled himself as a “Washington out-sider” that would end the corruption and insider politics of Washington. He even said that he would “drain out the swamp in Washington” (Cohen 2017) He claimed that he would upend the elites, and serve as a president of the people who will stop the backdoor politics. During his campaign he often expressed his disgust with the lobbyist influencing politics, and that he was on the side of the little guy. (Fields 2016) He advocated that time for change has come and that movement, lead by him, would replace the failed and corrupt political establishment. He tried to capture the anger of the people who felt the government did not serve them. During his campaign, he said that he would be the voice of the people and insure that the government served the people, not the donors or the rich people. He vowed to end the special interest monopoly in Washington and give the government back to the people. (Usborne 2016) Political scholar Katherine Cramer also detected the dissatisfaction towards the elite, in the rural areas of America, in her studies. She discovered that that among the people she interviewed in Wisconsin that many of them feel a deep sense of bitterness towards the elite, and that the government are not treating them with the respect they deserve. Many of them feel that the politicians have neglected the heartland, and feel that their voices are not heard. Hence, her studies, in Wisconsin, show that people are becoming more dissatisfied with the elite. (Guo 2016)(Cramer 2016) This shows that Trump was aware of the increasing dissatisfaction amongst groups in the American society, and that he tried to capture their support during his campaign. This follows the ideas of the theory that populist often try to adopt to the political climate, and that they often label themselves as an outsider of the system. It could be argued that this narrative during the campaign supports the fact that people were dissatisfied and that this dissatisfaction lead to Trumps increased support, which eventually led to his victory. Hence, his narrative during the campaign supports the claims that the dissatisfaction with the political elite, or representative politics could be linked with the rise of populism. I

would therefore argue that the evidence of the link between the two variables is quite strong. However, the quantitative data do not show a clear correlation between the two variables. Yet, I would still argue that the data combined with data from the second hand sources shows that the link between the two variables is quite strong. Especially the data from Edison Research, which showed that most of the people dissatisfied favoured Trump. Hence, it could be argued that the increased dissatisfaction towards the political elite, or representative politics could be one of the explanations behind the rise of right-wing populism in the US. I would argue that the link between the two variables combined with the data from the second hand sources presents sufficient evidence to support the claim. Therefore, it can be argued that the hypothesis is confirmed and that one of the explanations behind the rise in right-wing populism in the US is the increased level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics.

#### 5.4.2 Hypothesis: *Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis.*

In this part the hypotheses: *rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis* will be analysed in order to see if there is a correlation between the rise of populism in the US and a crisis. This hypothesis follows the logic of the theory that claims that rise in populism is often linked to crisis. It states that populism is a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis. (Taggart 2000)

In this analysis the data measured will focus on the financial crisis the hit the world in 2008, like it did in the analysis of Denmark. This is chosen to see if there is a correlation between the rise of populism and crisis. However, in order to establish the link between the two the rise of populism and the crisis have to be visible. As mentioned above, the evidence has established that the US has experienced a rise in populism in recent years. It is necessary to document that the US was affected by the crisis in 2007. When the crisis is documented additional data will be added to the analysis like, unemployment rate, regions that are most effected by the crisis, GDP, numbers of Trump voters in the different regions compared with unemployment and the national budget. Hence, the variable for representing the crisis is the financial crisis. This is chosen as the variable in the analysis of both cases in order to insure that the result can be compared. Populist would often be very vocal on the consequences of the globalised World and highlight the external threats it

brings. They will often advocate for policies with a more inward-looking nature that protects the heartland. (Taggart 2000) Hence, the global financial crisis would be a suitable variable to look at when analysing the rise of populism and how it links with a crisis. This fear of globalization is already quite evident in Donald Trump's policy suggestions and the rhetoric he has used. In his campaign he promoted protectionist policies, like creating new jobs, keeping the wealth inside the US, and that it was necessary to put up trade barriers to protect the American economy. He argued, that free trade were responsible for the collapse of the American manufacturing industry. He also advocated for the withdrawal from international trade agreements, like TTP, TTIP and a renewal of the NAFTA agreement. He also tried to awaken the fear and anger in the people who lost their jobs due to outsourcing of factories. He was especially critical of China and how they have acted since joining the WTO. He claimed that since China has joined the WTO more than 50.000 factories have closed and that tens of millions of jobs were lost in the US. (Allen 2016) Hence, Donald Trump has been very vocal on the fears of globalisation and has tried to tap in to the fears and anger of those who were affected by the financial crisis. It could then be suggest that fears and anger of those who were affected by a crisis would turn to a populist leader.


The financial crisis started in the American banking and financial sector as a consequence of the great losses in the real estate market in 2007. The evidence of the crisis became very clear in 2008 when Americas fourth largest bank, Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt. Many argue that this was the trigger that started the financial crisis. (Henriksen 2013) The crisis started as a consequence of a bobble in the real estate market whit inflated housing prizes, low interest rates, and risky sup-prime loans given by the banks without any real financial insurance. However, when the real estate bobble busted in 2007 housing prizes started to plummet, which led to people not being able to pay their mortgages. This led to severe losses in the American banking and credit sector where several banks went bankrupt and some not able to pay their loans. This meant that the inter-banking market broke down and the banks became more reluctant to lend money. (Hansen et al. 2011) As a consequence of this was that the crisis quickly spread to other sectors of the American Economy, like the stock market, insurance sector and manufacturing industry. The stock

market plummeted in 2008-2009, which meant that American shareholder experienced great losses in stocks and investments. The unstable stock-, bank- and financial market meant that the banks were more reluctant to lend people and companies money. This meant that the financial market froze, which effected companies who relied on capital from the banks to maintain their production. This started a downward spiral with decrease in consumption and investment. This led to government intervention as a precaution to stabilize the market and insure further banks from going bankrupt. (Henriksen 2013)

The crisis quickly affected the American economy, with rising unemployment rates as a consequence of the decrease in demand. The increase in unemployment meant that the state increased their expenses and decreased their income. This had a negative effect on the national budget and GDP. Hence, the global financial crisis had a huge effect on the US with increased national deficit, decrease in GDP, increased unemployment, falling stock- and real estate prizes and decrease in international trade. (Ibid) This shows that the US has been in a time of crisis since 2008 and it is therefore possible to investigate a link between crisis and rise in populism. However, even though the crisis is declining the US is still struggling with the effects of it, both in terms of GDP, unemployment and deficit in national budgets.

Looking at the development of the economic growth, in GDP, the figure clearly shows that the US experienced negative growth rates following the financial crisis. An annual growth rate of 2% means that the economy is stable below this is signs of depression. (Henriksen 2013)

Figure 12



Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from the World Bank. See appendix 14 for raw data.


Figure 13 clearly shows that the US has experienced a negative shift in their economy following the financial crisis in 2007. This figure supports the claim that the US was in a state of crisis due to the effects in the financial and banking sector. The figure shows that the US, before the crisis, was above the 2% mark and was actually in times of a small economic boom. In the years leading up to the financial crisis the US had a growth rate in GDP above 2.5%. However, the figure also shows that the US was severely affected by the crisis hitting negative growth rates in 2008 and 2009. The crisis peaked in 2009 with a negative growth rate of -2.78%. The economy started to stabilize in 2010 but the effects of the crisis are still visible in 2016 with a growth rate of only 1.62%. The US has not been able to gain the same economic growth as they did in 2004-2005. The figure also shows that in 2016, the year of the election, the US was experiencing a small economic depression. When the growth rate is under 2% the economy is in depression, which could lead to unemployment due to lower production demand. (Henriksen 2013) Hence, it is worth to notice that the year of the election the annual GDP growth rate had fallen around 1 percentage point compared to the year before. When looking at the development of the US economy the effects of the financial crisis is quite visible. In the period from 2004 to



2016 the annual growth rate has fallen by 2.17 percentage points. This shows that the American economy has been affected by the crisis even though it has stabilized since the peak of the crisis in 2009. When looking at the effects of the crisis on the unemployment rate the evidence become even clearer.

Figure

14



Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from the World Bank. See appendix 15 for raw data.

Figure 14 shows that the unemployment rate has increased since the beginning of the crisis in 2007. The data supports the claims that the US was severely affected by the crisis, and that the unemployment rate followed the development of the crisis. With unemployment peaking in 2010 with a growth in the unemployment rate of 5 percentage points from 2007 to 2010. Hence, this data supports the claims that the US were in an economic crisis, as a consequence of the crisis in the banking and financial sector. However, the data also show that the unemployment rate has been falling since the peak of the crisis in 2010 and is now close to the level in the years before the crisis hit, only 0.3 percentage points higher. This suggest that the economic policies under the Obama administrations an actually has manage to stabilize the unemployment rate.

One of the industries that were affected by the financial crisis was manufacturing. This is one of the industries where the economic recovery has not gained much traction. The

effects of the financial crisis is interesting to examine, since this has been one of the industries Donald Trump put a lot of focus on in his campaign. During his campaign Trump tried to capture the fear and anger of those who lost their jobs in the industry and gain their support by promising policies that would create new jobs. (Allen 2016) The data on the employment in the manufacturing sector shows that since the beginning of the crisis the number of people employed has fallen. In 2006 the number of people employed in the sector were 14.2 million people, in 2016 that number had dropped to 12.3 million people. This means that 1.9 million people have lost their job in the manufacturing sector since the beginning of the financial crisis. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017a) This shows that the sector Donald Trump appeal to during his campaign has experienced a severe loss in jobs, as an effect of the financial crisis. This could be seen as an indicator of the reason behind the rise of populism in the US. However, in order to link the rise of right-wing populist with the crisis it is necessary to look at the states in the country that was mostly effected by the crisis and compare it with their political preferences to establish a correlation between economic crisis and rise in populism. In order to do so, the states with the highest unemployment rate, will be compared with the voting result from the election to see if the rise in unemployment are in correlation with the support for populists candidates. I will look at the unemployment rate in the different States at the time of the election in 2016, the year Donald Trump won the election. This methodology follows the same used in the analysis of Denmark. However, the focus will be on states instead of municipalities. Hence, the idea is to see if the effects of the financial crisis have also led to a rise in right-wing populism. The result will be limited to the thirteen states with the highest unemployment rate.


**Figure 14**

Rank	States	Unemployment rate in %, 2016
1	New Mexico	6,7
2	Alaska	6,6
3	Louisiana	6,1
4	West Virginia	6
4	District of Columbia	6
4	Alabama	6
7	Illinois	5,9
8	Mississippi	5,8
9	Nevada	5,7
10	Washington	5,4
10	Pennsylvania	5,4
10	Georgia	5,4
10	California	5,4

Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Raw data: (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017b)

Figure 14 shows the 13 States with the highest unemployment rate in the US in 2016. The unemployment rates in these states were all above the national average of 4.9% in 2016. The state with the highest unemployment rate, New Mexico, is 1.8 percentage points above the national average. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017b). Hence, this figure shows the states that still are the most affected by the financial crisis. However, in order to establish a link between unemployment and voting for Donald Trump the data from figure 14 have to be compared with the election results.

Figure 15



Sources: Jonas B. Gaarsted with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and The New York Times. Raw data: (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017b)(The New York Times 2017)

Figure 14 shows the election result in the states with the highest unemployment rate. Hence, the data follows the tendency in the rest of the country that the US has experienced a rise in populism in recent years. It could then be argued that all the states experienced a rise in populism, because the percentage of populist votes was at 0% in the 2012 election. However, this could be explained by the fact that Trump, or any other populist candidate, did not run for office in the previous election, or by the fact that people who normally tend to vote for a Republican candidate only had the opportunity of voting for Trump if they wanted a Republican president. It is also worth noticing that Trump did not win in all the 13 states. Hence, in order to verify the result in figure 14 it is necessary to look at the result from the Republican primaries in the states with the highest unemployment rate to see if there is a correlation between the support for Trump and the unemployment rate. The result of the primaries shows that Trump won the delegates in all the thirteen states. (Berg-Andersson 2016) This shows that right-wing populism gained support in the Republican primaries, which then spread to the 2016 elections. Hence, the rise of populism is quite visible in the US, however the sign of the crisis still thriving is not that clear. Only

the data on the numbers of manufacturing jobs shows that that this industry is still struggling as a consequence of the crisis. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017a)

## Discussion

The rise of populism is quite visible in the US, however the sign of the crisis still thriving is not that clear. The rise of populism was documented in the first analysis. The election of Donald Trump showed that a large number of the American people have shifted towards right-wing populism.

The data on the economic crisis in the US shows that the crisis peaked around 2009-2010. This suggests that the claim of the hypothesis due not hold, because the US did not see a rise in populism when the crisis peaked. When the crisis peaked the President of the United States was Obama (D), a man who is not considered a populist. The data suggests that Obama managed to stabilize the economy in his eight-year term. The unemployment rates are close to the rate before the crisis and annual growth of in GDP is more stable. Hence, the nationwide data show that the US is not in a crisis any longer. It could then be argued that the rise of populism is not linked to the crisis. The same result is evident when looking at the states with the highest unemployment rate. The data from figure 15 shows that Donald Trump won in Alaska, Louisiana, West Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and Georgia. Hence, he won in seven of the thirteen States with the highest unemployment. Hillary Clinton won in six of the thirteen states. However, it is worth noticing that in the District of Colombia, Illinois and California, Hillary Clinton won by a substantial marking. These are states that traditionally favour the Democrats. However, the data also shows that Pennsylvania tipped their votes towards Trump. This differs from last election where Obama (D) won the state. (New York Times 2012). Hence, this does not give a clear indicator of the link between high unemployment and rise of populism. However, the economy where still one of the major talking points in Trumps election campaign, often expressing his concerns for the state of the American economy. He tried to tap in to the fear and anger of those who felt left behind by the development of the economy, putting a lot of emphasis on the many jobs lost in the manufacturing sector. (Allen 2016) At the Republican National Convention in Cleveland this became even clearer

when he pledged to defend “*the laid-off factory workers and the communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals.*” He believed that these people have been forgotten in Washington’s attempt to stabilize the economy. (Bruns 2016) However, it is interesting to notice that most of Trump rhetoric during the campaign was not focused on the financial crisis but mostly on the concerns with the consequences of globalization.

This claim that the manufacturing industry was not at the same level as before the crisis is supported by the data on the numbers of manufacturing jobs in the US. The data shows that 1.9 million people have lost their job since the beginning of the crisis. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017a) Hence, this could be an explanation for the rise on populism in the US and the support for Trump. It could be argued that he has managed to tap in to the fear and anger of the people who feel left behind in the recent economic development and feel that the politicians in Washington is not taking their concerns serious. The demographics of the manufacturing sector often consist of the less educated part of the population, or people with no college education. (Long 2016) Hence, it could then be argued that Trump managed to tap in to the fear and concerns of the less educated part of the population. This argument becomes quite clear when looking at the election result and including the variable of no college education. The result shows that Trump gained more votes than Clinton in that part of the population. Trump gained 52% of the votes among the less educated part of the population, or 364 electoral votes. This is five percentage points above what he gained in the national election, or 59 electoral votes more. (Survey monkey 2016a) Hence, this shows that Trump gained the popular vote among the less educated part of the public. This data supports that claim that people in the manufacturing sector and the less educated tend to favour Trump. This does not show that there is a correlation between the rise of populism and the financial crisis in the US. It only shows that the people who favour Trump are among the less educated part of the population and that Trump has tried to play on the fear and anger of those who have lost their jobs as a consequence of the financial crisis. However, it is interesting to notice that the economy still is an important factor among the Trump voters. 58% of the voters who put the economy as their top issue favours Trump. (Survey monkey 2016b)

Hence, the data shows that there is no direct correlation between the rise of populism and the financial crisis. The data shows that the crisis peaked around 2009-2010 and has since then stabilized. The unemployment rate is around the same as it were before the crisis, and the States with the highest unemployment did not all favour Trump in the elections. The State with the highest unemployment rate actually favoured Clinton. The analysis of the unemployment rate, in the thirteen states, shows that Trump won in seven of the states. This suggests that there is a small link between the rise of populism and unemployment. However, the result does not show a conclusive link between the two. The only data that could argue to show a link between the rise of populism and the financial crisis is the development in the GDP. This shows that the US has not experienced the same GDP growth rates as before the crisis. The GDP growth rate is only at 1.62% in 2016, the year of the election, and that the rate has fallen around one percentage point from the year before. This could suggest that there could be a link between the rise of populism and the GDP growth rate. However, the data do not show that there is a link between the crisis and the rise of populism, because between 2010-2016 the GDP growth rate have stabilized. The data only show a parallel development between the declining GDP growth rate in 2016 and Trump winning the election. Hence, the data do not show a correlation between the rise of populism and the financial crisis and it could then be concluded that the claims of the hypothesis do not hold, and that in the US there is no visible correlation between the rise of populism and the crisis.

The analysis shows that different factors, which Trump also put an emphasis on during the campaign, like unemployment, loss of manufacturing jobs and the development of the economy under the Obama administration, could be part of the explanation for the rise. However, it could be argued that these factors have affected the shift in populist support, but the data does not show direct correlation between these factors and the rise of populism. It only shows a parallel link between them and that most people who see the economy as the top issue favoured Trump in the election.

It is worth mentioning that this factor is not the only reason behind the rise of populism. It could be argued that a number of factors contributed to the rise, like the decline in GDP, loss of manufacturing jobs, development of the economy under the Obama administration.

All these factors show sign of having contributed to the rise of populism. Yet, they do not give a conclusive answer to the reason behind the rise they only show some of the factors that are part of the explanation. However, the analysis shows that the evidence presented does not support the claims in the hypothesis. It could then be argued that in the case of the US there were no evidence of a correlation between the rise of populism and the financial crisis. Hence, the hypothesis is disconfirmed in the case of the US.

## 5.5 Comparative analysis

In this section, the comparative analysis of the thesis is presented. The findings in the two cases are compared and contrasted to see if there are discrepancies between them. Furthermore, the idea of comparing the two cases is to see if it is possible to identify the explanations behind the rise and to see if the context has influenced the findings.

### Context

The amount of time politicians are allowed to sit in office is a context that differs in the two cases. In Denmark, a politician can in principle maintain his seat for an unlimited time as long as he is re-elected. This differs from the American system where a president is only allowed to sit for two terms. This context is very important to notice when analysing the development in the rise of populism over time. In the US, it is more difficult to see a quantitative development in the rise of populism due to the short time a president are in office and the limited numbers of elections. However, in Denmark, it is possible to make a more quantitative analysis because the politicians are able to sit in office for an unlimited period. In the Danish case, the rise was analysed quantitatively with data from different elections to identify the development, whereas in the US, the rise was analysed more qualitatively. In the US, it was not possible to show the development of the rise overtime because it was the first time Donald Trump ran for the presidency. This makes it harder to prove the rise has happened over a period of time and why it was hard to detect a development before 2015. However, both cases showed that there has been a rise in populism. Consequently, this context has influenced the way the rise of populism was identified in the two cases.



Another context that has influenced the analysis of the two cases was the difference in the representative politics in the two cases. In Denmark, representative politics are more focused on parties whereas in the US it is the politicians. In Denmark, the party set the political agenda and the politicians more or less follows the political direction set by the party. This is why populism in Denmark is connected to the party not the individual politicians. In the US, the party affiliation does not determine whether a politician is a populist or not. Hence, a candidate could be considered populist even though the party is not. This context has influenced how the populists were identified and which variable was chosen to detect the rise of populism in the analysis. Therefore, it is important to notice this context when analysing representative politics in Denmark and the US.

### **Dissatisfaction**

The first hypothesis that was tested was: *Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics.*

The result of the analysis showed that the conclusion was similar in both cases. The analysis showed, in both cases, that one of the explanations behind the rise of populism could be an increased level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics. Hence, the result indicated that the hypothesis could be confirmed in both cases.

In the case of Denmark, the analysis showed that there was a simultaneous development between the rise of populism and increased level of dissatisfaction. The correlation between the two variables is quite evident in figure 3. The figure indicated that the people who voted for DF were generally more dissatisfied with the elite or representative politics compared with the national average. This became even more evident when the data are compared with data from the other figures. This data showed that there has been a simultaneous development in both variables. Hence, in the case of Denmark, the result indicated that there is a correlation between increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics and a rise of populism.

In the case of the US, the data from the analysis indicated that there was a simultaneous development between the rise of populism and the level of dissatisfaction since the

previous election. The data from Edison Research (Page & Heath 2016) indicated that more than three in five voters believed that the things in America had gone "seriously off on the wrong track". Among the voters who believed this, 69% voted for Trump. Furthermore, Trumps core voters also include the people who were angry about the way the federal government was functioning. This suggests that there is a link between the people who where dissatisfied and the people who voted for Trump. This data is supported by the data presented in the analysis, which show that there is a simultaneous development between level of dissatisfaction and rise in populism since 2009. The anti-elite narrative Trump used during his campaign further supports this. Therefore, when looking at all the data, the result shows that there is a parallel link between the two variables, and it could be argued that there is a correlation between increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics and a rise of populism in the US.

However, it is worth noticing that the context of the two cases influenced how the results were found. In Denmark, the data clearly showed that there was a correlation between the two variables and the analysis was based on quantitative data. This was not the case in the US. In this case, the conclusion was based upon a combination of different data, like Trumps narrative during his campaign and claims from other scholars combined with quantitative data. It is interesting to notice that Trump, during his campaign, used a very anti-elite narrative. This context is important to notice because the two cases differ in this aspect. Donald Trump was not part of representative politics before he was elected whereas DF was already part of it in 2015 when they gained a substantial increase in votes. However, the data from the analysis show that DF voters were among those who were most dissatisfied with representative politics. An explanation for this could be the fact that DF have managed to remain in a side-line position and have never been part of the government, which means that they have not been tangled in to the messiness of governing. (Taggart 2000)

However, the conclusion was still the same in both cases even though the context and the data presented differed. Consequently, the result and the conclusions show that there is a correlation between increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics and a rise of populism in both cases. The evidence found in both cases then confirms the

claims made in the hypothesis, and it is therefore safe to conclude that this tendency could be part of the explanation behind the rise of populism. I would therefore argue that a rise of populism could be a consequence of an increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics among the people.

## Crisis

The second hypothesis that was tested was: *Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis.*

The result of the analysis of the two cases indicates that the conclusion differs. In the case of Denmark, the data shows that there is a correlation between the crisis and the rise in populism. This fact is quite evident when looking at the increased support for DF in the municipalities with the highest unemployment rate. The result shows that DF has increased their support in all ten municipalities. This data is further supported by the data showing a simultaneous development in the country between the variables. Hence, in Denmark there is sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis. However, this is not the case in the US where the data shows that populism did not rise when the crisis peaked. It shows that when the populists support increased the crisis had stabilized. The data only show a parallel development between the declining GDP growth rate in 2016 and Trump winning the election. The analysis showed that the 13 states with the highest unemployment rate did not all favour Trump, which further support the lack of a direct correlation between rise in populism and the financial crisis. The state with the highest unemployment rate actually favoured Clinton. The data presented on the increased unemployment in the manufacturing sector combined with Trumps economic/job narrative during the campaign suggest a possible link between Trumps win and the crisis. Even though most of Trumps economic rhetoric was focused on the concerns linked with globalization. However, the data and evidence was not sufficient to conclude a correlation between the rise of populism and the financial crisis. Therefore, in the case of the US, the analysis shows that the evidence presented does not support the claim in the hypothesis. Hence, the hypothesis is then disconfirmed in this case.

The results show that both cases were affected by the financial crisis, and both cases experienced an increase in the unemployment rate and decrease in the annual GDP

growth rate. However, the development of the crisis in the two cases is not similar. In Denmark, the effects of the crisis is still quite visible in 2016 with an unemployment rate of 6,3% or 2,8 percentage points higher than before the crisis. This differs from the case of the US where the unemployment rate is 4,9%, which is around the same level as before the crisis. The result from the analysis indicated that the American economy has stabilised since the beginning of the crisis. This could be one of the reasons that the conclusion of the analysis differs in the two cases.

The result from the analysis indicates that the conclusion in the two cases differs. In Denmark, the hypothesis is confirmed and in the US the hypothesis is disconfirmed. This suggests that it is not possible to make a universal generalisation about the claims of the hypothesis. The hypothesis is therefore disconfirmed because claim does not apply to both cases. However, it could instead indicate that the context of the single case influences the result. It could then be argued that context is very important when analysing the claims made in this hypothesis. Hence, the results show that the financial crisis could be an explanation behind the rise of populism within the context of Denmark. Yet, due to the context the financial crisis is not one of the explanations behind the rise of populism in the US.

### **The trigger**

The analysis of both cases shows that one of the explanations behind the rise of populism could be increased public dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics. The analysis also disconfirmed the claim that a rise in populism is normal in times of crisis. However, it is interesting to notice that both cases have seen a rise in populism almost simultaneously and that the level of dissatisfaction increased in the time leading up to this. This could suggest that there is an external trigger behind this explanation since dissatisfaction could be argued to be very contextual. I would therefore argue that the crisis could be the external trigger behind the increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics, which eventually lead to a rise in populism. Hence, the crisis could be seen as an external trigger that could set the stage for the populist to emerge. (Moffitt 2016) Laclau (1977) also argues that a crisis is a necessary precondition for populism and

that it cannot emerge without a crisis. I would argue, based on the findings in the analysis, that the crisis is not directly linked with the rise of populism but it could be the first step out of three. The crisis is the first step, increased dissatisfaction is the second step and the rise of populism is the third step. The data in both cases shows that when the financial crisis peaked around 2009-2010 the level of distrust and dissatisfaction also increased. Hence, this supports the claim that the crisis could be the trigger behind the increased dissatisfaction. However, not all the data shows that the level of dissatisfaction peaked at the same time as the peak of the crisis. It only shows that the level of distrust and dissatisfaction started to increase around 2010. It could then be argued that the economic crisis transformed into a crisis of faith in the politicians for not stabilizing the situation, which lead to the rise of populism. Therefore, an explanation behind the increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics could be the crisis. The result of the analysis showed that the crisis was not directly linked with the rise of populism. However, I would argue that the crisis could be indirectly linked with the rise of populism, and that the crisis could be the common factor that explains the increased level of dissatisfaction in both cases.

## 6. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine the explanations behind the current rise in right-wing populism. To do so a comparative study of the two cases, Denmark and the US, was chosen as the method of the analysis. The idea behind choosing this method was to use the logic of comparison to gain a better understanding of the issue in the analysis. Denmark and the US were chosen as the cases for the study because they had both experienced a rise in right-wing populism in recent years. An analysis of these two cases could then help identify the explanation behind the rise. The populists chosen as the variable to measure the rise of populism in the two cases was DF in Denmark and Donald Trump in the US. It can be concluded from the context analysis that the variables chosen as the indicators for the rise differs due to the context. In Denmark, the variable is the parties, and in the US the variable is the politicians.

The theoretical framework of the thesis was developed to define populism and to better understand the phenomenon of study. In the theoretical framework, populism is defined as a thin-centred ideology that adopts features from other thick-centred ideologies. Populism is not an ideology but rather a thin-centred, chameleon that adopts features from its surrounding environment. Populists put the people in centre of their narrative and often have hostile attitude towards the elites and the political establishment. Populism would often emerge in times of crisis, and they promote a direct form of democracy and will often rely on a charismatic leader. (Taggart 2000) (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014)

Using the deductive reasoning, the two hypotheses were constructed based on the theoretical framework. The hypotheses were formulated to pinpoint the explanations behind the rise of populism. The two hypothesis deduced from the theoretical framework were: *Rise in right-wing populism is a sign of the people's dissatisfaction with the elite or representative politics* and *Rise of populism is normal in times of a crisis*. The two hypotheses were used in the secondary analysis of the two cases. The secondary analysis of the two cases showed that both cases had experienced a rise in populism in recent years.

The results from the analysis of the first hypothesis showed that there is a correlation between increased dissatisfaction towards the elite, or representative politics and a rise of populism in both cases. The results showed that the level of dissatisfaction and populism had increased simultaneously in both cases. Hence, the claims of the hypothesis were confirmed in both cases. Therefore, it can be concluded that one of the explanations behind the rise in right-wing populism could be an increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics among the people. Consequently, the increased level of dissatisfaction could explain the current rise in right-wing populism.

The results from the analysis of the second hypothesis showed the conclusion in the two cases differed. In the US the hypothesis was disconfirmed and in Denmark the hypothesis was confirmed. Therefore, it can be concluded the claims of the second hypothesis are disconfirmed because the claim does not apply to both cases. It can only be concluded that within the context of Denmark the claims of the hypothesis are confirmed. However, in the context of the US the claims of the hypothesis are disconfirmed. Hence, it can be

concluded that it is not possible to make a universal generalisation about the claim that a rise in populism is normal in times of crisis.

However, the analysis showed that the crisis could be an external trigger behind the increased level of dissatisfaction in both countries, which lead to the rise in populism. The crisis could therefore explain the reason behind why the level of dissatisfaction increased in both cases almost simultaneously. Hence, the rise of populism is linked with the level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politic, and the crisis could be seen as the external trigger that started the hostile attitude.


To answer the thesis statement: *How can we explain the current rise in right-wing populism?* I can conclude that the findings in the analysis show that the current rise can be explained by the increased dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics. It can be concluded that there is a link between the rise in populism and the level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics. An increase in the level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics would lead to a rise in right-wing populism. It can also be concluded that the crisis is not directly linked with the rise of right-wing populism. However, it could be argued that the financial crisis is an external factor that affected the current rise in right-wing populism. I would argue that the financial crisis is important to understand the current rise of right-wing populism. Therefore, it can be concluded that an increase in the level of dissatisfaction towards the elite or representative politics is one of the explanations behind the current rise in right-wing populism, and that the crisis could be the external trigger that ignited the increased level of dissatisfaction among the people.

## 7. Appendix

### Appendix 1 – Ethnicities in Denmark

#### Folketal den 1. i kvartalet

Alder: I alt | Køn: I alt | Område: Hele landet | Tid: 2. kv. 2017 | Herkomst



Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved from:


[http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/Graphics/MakeGraph.asp?menu=y&maintable=FOLK1E&pxfile=2017624212533195202974FOLK1E.px&gr\\_type=5&PLanguage=0](http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/Graphics/MakeGraph.asp?menu=y&maintable=FOLK1E&pxfile=2017624212533195202974FOLK1E.px&gr_type=5&PLanguage=0)



## Appendix 2 – Male/female distribution in Denmark

### Folketal den 1. i kvartalet

Civilstand: I alt | Alder: I alt | Område: Hele landet | Tid: 2. kv. 2017 | Køn



Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved from:

[http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/Graphics/MakeGraph.asp?menu=y&maintable=FOLK1A&pxfile=2017624213158195202974FOLK1A.px&gr\\_type=5&PLanguage=0](http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/Graphics/MakeGraph.asp?menu=y&maintable=FOLK1A&pxfile=2017624213158195202974FOLK1A.px&gr_type=5&PLanguage=0)

### Appendix 3 – Danish Election 2007-2015

#### Raw Data:

<b>Folketingsvalg efter valgresultat og tid</b>			
<i>Enhed: antal</i>			
	<b>2007</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	881037	879615	924940
<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	177161	336698	161009
<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	359404	175047	118003
<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	450975	326192	147578
<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	97295	176585	265129
<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	30013	28070	29077
<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	479532	436726	741746
<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	908472	947725	685188
<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	74982	236860	274463
<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	168788
<b>I alt</b>	3458871	3543518	3515921

Source: Danmarks Statistik. (2017) *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 6.6.2017 from:

<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280>

**Appendix 4 – Distrust in Politicians – Raw data****ESS7-2014, ed.2.1**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	64	64	4,31
1	41	41	2,76
2	122	122	8,21
3	149	149	10,03
4	203	203	13,66
5	267	267	17,97
6	228	228	15,34
7	257	257	17,29
8	122	122	8,21
9	19	19	1,28
Complete trust	14	14	0,94
N=	1486	1486	100

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS6-2012, ed.2.3**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	33	33	2,02
1	32	32	1,96
2	103	103	6,32
3	183	183	11,22
4	169	169	10,36
5	351	351	21,52
6	308	308	18,88
7	263	263	16,13
8	138	138	8,46
9	40	40	2,45
Complete trust	11	11	0,67
N=	1631	1631	100

Source: European Social Survey (2012) *ESS6-2012*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS5-2010, ed.3.3**

## Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	48	48	3,10
1	35	35	2,26
2	79	79	5,10
3	154	154	9,95
4	211	211	13,63
5	367	367	23,71
6	272	272	17,57
7	259	259	16,73
8	94	94	6,07
9	22	22	1,42
Complete trust	7	7	0,45
N=	1548	1548	100

Source: European Social Survey (2010) *ESS5-2010*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS4-2008, ed.4.4**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	30	30	1,87
1	25	25	1,56
2	60	60	3,74
3	110	110	6,86
4	149	149	9,30
5	373	373	23,27
6	267	267	16,66
7	342	342	21,33
8	192	192	11,98
9	33	33	2,06
Complete trust	22	22	1,37
N=	1603	1603	100

Source: European Social Survey (2008) *ESS4-2008*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS3-2006, ed.3.6**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	35	35	2,36
1	16	16	1,08
2	51	51	3,45
3	111	111	7,50
4	121	121	8,18
5	337	337	22,77
6	286	286	19,32
7	296	296	20,00
8	161	161	10,88
9	52	52	3,51
Complete trust	14	14	0,95
N=	1480	1480	100,00

Source: European Social Survey (2006) *ESS3-2006*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

## Appendix 5 - European Commission - Eurobarometer - Raw Data

Question: *"would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? Political parties"*

Date	Tend to trust	Tend not to trust	DK - Don't know
27/03/06	0,489087302	0,465277778	0,045634921
06/09/06	0,408773679	0,511465603	0,079760718
22/09/07	0,401401401	0,537537538	0,061061061
25/03/08	0,500497512	0,466666667	0,032835821
01/10/08	0,543774319	0,424124514	0,032101167
01/06/09	0,58242843	0,383020731	0,034550839
05/05/10	0,488071571	0,489065606	0,022862823
11/11/10	0,312678742	0,629170639	0,05815062
05/11/11	0,348214286	0,618055556	0,033730159
12/05/12	0,425024826	0,547169811	0,027805362
03/11/12	0,360639361	0,608391608	0,030969031
10/05/13	0,36119403	0,618905473	0,019900498
02/11/13	0,332667333	0,638361638	0,028971029
31/05/14	0,408955224	0,553233831	0,037810945
08/11/14	0,338645418	0,60059761	0,060756972
16/05/15	0,37254902	0,556862745	0,070588235
07/11/15	0,323676324	0,595404595	0,080919081
21/05/16	0,297914598	0,596822244	0,105263158
03/11/16	0,292537313	0,635820896	0,071641791

Source: European Commission. (2016). *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion*. Retrieved 6.6.2017 from: <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/griidChart//themeKy/18/groupKy/85/countries/DK/savFiles/41,37,8,9,10,11,3,1,6,7,521,554,555,632,646,698,702,805/periodStart/032006/periodEnd/112016>



## Appendix 6 – Distrust in country's parliament & Dissatisfaction in government – Raw data

ESS3-2006, ed.3.6

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	48	48	3,25
1	44	44	2,97
2	73	73	4,94
3	142	142	9,60
4	137	137	9,26
5	178	178	12,04
6	159	159	10,75
7	253	253	17,11
8	275	275	18,59
9	117	117	7,91
Extremely satisfied	53	53	3,58
N=	1479	1479	100

Source: European Social Survey (2006) *ESS3-2006*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS4-2008, ed.4.4**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	53	53	3,37
1	61	61	3,87
2	94	94	5,97
3	154	154	9,78
4	153	153	9,71
5	202	202	12,83
6	214	214	13,59
7	277	277	17,59
8	258	258	16,38
9	80	80	5,08
Extremely satisfied	29	29	1,84
N=	1575	1575	100,00

Source: European Social Survey (2008) *ESS4-2008*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS5-2010, ed.3.3**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	74	74	4,82
1	77	77	5,02
2	148	148	9,65
3	206	206	13,43
4	215	215	14,02
5	259	259	16,88
6	182	182	11,86
7	209	209	13,62
8	119	119	7,76
9	33	33	2,15
Extremely satisfied	12	12	0,78
N=	1534	1534	100,00

Source: European Social Survey (2010) *ESS5-2010*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS6-2012, ed.2.3**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	72	72	4,46
1	69	69	4,28
2	119	119	7,38
3	204	204	12,65
4	225	225	13,95
5	285	285	17,67
6	245	245	15,19
7	197	197	12,21
8	145	145	8,99
9	36	36	2,23
Extremely satisfied	16	16	0,99
N=	1613	1613	100,00

Source: European Social Survey (2012) *ESS6-2012*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS7-2014, ed.2.1**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	60	60	4,07
1	40	40	2,71
2	96	96	6,50
3	198	198	13,41
4	189	189	12,80
5	252	252	17,07
6	214	214	14,50
7	229	229	15,51
8	147	147	9,96
9	36	36	2,44
Extremely satisfied	15	15	1,02
N=	1476	1476	100,00

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS3-2006, ed.3.6**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in country's parliament			
No trust at all	29	29	1,95
1	13	13	0,88
2	37	37	2,49
3	75	75	5,05
4	74	74	4,99
5	263	263	17,72
6	165	165	11,12
7	304	304	20,49
8	328	328	22,10
9	121	121	8,15
Complete trust	75	75	5,05
N=	1484	1484	100

Source: European Social Survey (2006) *ESS3-2006*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS4-2008, ed.4.4**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in country's parliament			
No trust at all	17	17	1,07
1	13	13	0,82
2	34	34	2,14
3	89	89	5,59
4	88	88	5,53
5	270	270	16,96
6	180	180	11,31
7	314	314	19,72
8	358	358	22,49
9	140	140	8,79
Complete trust	89	89	5,59
N=	1592	1592	100

Source: European Social Survey (2008) *ESS4-2008*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS5-2010, ed.3.3**

## Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %	
Trust in country's parliament				
No trust at all		33	33	2,13
1		20	20	1,29
2		54	54	3,49
3		131	131	8,46
4		141	141	9,11
5		301	301	19,44
6		210	210	13,57
7		274	274	17,70
8		246	246	15,89
9		89	89	5,75
Complete trust		49	49	3,17
N=		1548	1548	100

Source: European Social Survey (2010 *ESS5-2010*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>



**ESS6-2012, ed.2.3**

## Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	In %
Trust in country's parliament			
No trust at all	31	31	1,91
1	22	22	1,35
2	57	57	3,51
3	106	106	6,52
4	129	129	7,94
5	262	262	16,12
6	224	224	13,78
7	337	337	20,74
8	253	253	15,57
9	131	131	8,06
Complete trust	73	73	4,49
N=	1625	1625	100

Source: European Social Survey (2012) *ESS6-2012*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS7-2014, ed.2.1**

Raw numbers

Country	Denmark	Total	in %
Trust in country's parliament			
No trust at all	43	43	2,88
1	32	32	2,15
2	85	85	5,70
3	122	122	8,18
4	109	109	7,31
5	201	201	13,48
6	198	198	13,28
7	242	242	16,23
8	276	276	18,51
9	119	119	7,98
Complete trust	64	64	4,29
N=	1491	1491	100

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

## Appendix 7 – Dissatisfaction among DF voters - 2014

### Raw data:

ESS7-2014, ed.2.1

Raw numbers

Party voted for in last national election, Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti - Danish peoples party	Total	In %
Trust in politicians			
No trust at all	9	9	6,43
1	6	6	4,29
2	22	22	15,71
3	25	25	17,86
4	21	21	15,00
5	29	29	20,71
6	9	9	6,43
7	14	14	10,00
8	4	4	2,86
9	1	1	0,71
Complete trust	0	0	0,00
N=	140	140	100

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS7-2014, ed.2.1**

Raw numbers

Party voted for in last national election, Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti - Danish peoples party	Total	In %	
Trust in country's parliament				
No trust at all		9	9	6,34
	1	4	4	2,82
	2	20	20	14,08
	3	19	19	13,38
	4	19	19	13,38
	5	19	19	13,38
	6	13	13	9,15
	7	14	14	9,86
	8	14	14	9,86
	9	6	6	4,23
Complete trust		5	5	3,52
N=		142	142	100

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

**ESS7-2014, ed.2.1**

Raw numbers

Party voted for in last national election, Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti - Danish peoples party	Total	In %
How satisfied with the national government			
Extremely dissatisfied	13	13	9,15
1	7	7	4,93
2	20	20	14,08
3	25	25	17,61
4	22	22	15,49
5	28	28	19,72
6	11	11	7,75
7	12	12	8,45
8	3	3	2,11
9	0	0	0,00
Extremely satisfied	1	1	0,70
N=	142	142	100

Source: European Social Survey (2014) *ESS7-2014*. Retrieved 7.6.2017 from:  
<http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>

### Appendix 8 – Growth rate of Danish GDP, 2004-2016 in % - Raw data

Forsyningsbalance, Bruttonationalprodukt (BNP), beskæftigelse mv. efter prisenhed, transaktion og tid	
Enhed: -	
År	Realvækst i pct. i forhold til foregående periode
	<b>B.1*g Bruttonationalprodukt, BNP</b>
2004	2,7
2005	2,3
2006	3,9
2007	0,9
2008	-0,5
2009	-4,9
2010	1,9
2011	1,3
2012	0,2
2013	0,9
2014	1,7
2015	1,6
2016	1,7

Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 9.6.2017 from:

<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp>

**Appendix 9 - Danish unemployment rate from 2007-2016 - AKU Survey - Raw data**

Arbejdsmarkedstilknytning (procent) efter beskæftigelsesstatus og tid	
<i>Enhed: pct.</i>	
År	AKU-ledighedsprocent
2007	3,8
2008	3,5
2009	6,1
2010	7,6
2011	7,7
2012	7,7
2013	7,1
2014	6,8
2015	6,3
2016	6,3


Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 14.6.2017 from:  
<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/10316>

## Appendix 10 – Development in registered unemployment 2007-2016 – Raw data and figure

Fuldtidsledige i pct. af arbejdsstyrken efter område og tid	
Enhed: pct.	
År	Hele landet
2007	3,6
2008	2,6
2009	4,8
2010	6,1
2011	5,9
2012	6
2013	5,8
2014	5
2015	4,5
2016	4,2

Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 14.6.2017 from:

<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/10316>




Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, Raw data from above



## Appendix 11 – Danish National budget 2007-2016 – Raw data and figure

Offentlig forvaltning og service, udgifter og indtægter efter udgifter/indtægter og tid	
Enhed: mio. kr.	
År	2.19. Offentlig saldo=fordringserhvervelse, netto (2.17-1.17)
2005	78587
2006	83896
2007	87298
2008	57177
2009	-48188
2010	-49081
2011	-37967
2012	-66144
2013	-23844
2014	21078
2015	-35609
2016	-12890

Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 14.6.2017 from:  
<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280>



Source: Jonas Brandes Gaarsted with data from Danmarks Statistik, Raw data from above

## Appendix 12 – Ten municipalities with the highest unemployment rate in Denmark – Raw data

Fuldtidsledige i pct. af arbejdsstyrken efter område og tid

*Enhed: pct.*

	2015
København	5,5
Frederiksberg	4,8
Dragør	3
Tårnby	4,4
Albertslund	6,6
Ballerup	4,4
Brøndby	6,1
Gentofte	3,1
Gladsaxe	4,5
Glostrup	5,3
Herlev	4,5
Hvidovre	4,3
Høje-Taastrup	6,4
Ishøj	8,7
Lyngby-Taarbæk	3,1
Rødovre	5
Vallensbæk	4,2
Allerød	2,1
Egedal	2,7
Fredensborg	3,8
Frederikssund	3,9
Furesø	3,6
Gribskov	3,7
Halsnæs	4,4
Helsingør	4,5

Hillerød	3,2
Hørsholm	2,8
Rudersdal	2,8
Bornholm	5,7
Greve	3,7
Køge	4,1
Lejre	3
Roskilde	3,8
Solrød	3,1
Faxe	4,5
Guldborgsund	5,3
Holbæk	4
Kalundborg	4,6
Lolland	6,5
Næstved	5
Odsherred	5,3
Ringsted	4,1
Slagelse	5,9
Sorø	4,3
Stevns	4,2
Vordingborg	5,2
Assens	5
Faaborg-Midtfyn	4,6
Kerteminde	4,8
Langeland	5,5
Middelfart	3
Nordfyns	5
Nyborg	4,6
Odense	6,1
Svendborg	5,1

<b>Ærø</b>	4
<b>Billund</b>	3,2
<b>Esbjerg</b>	4,4
<b>Fanø</b>	4,3
<b>Fredericia</b>	5
<b>Haderslev</b>	4,3
<b>Kolding</b>	4,2
<b>Sønderborg</b>	4,4
<b>Tønder</b>	4
<b>Varde</b>	3
<b>Vejen</b>	3,5
<b>Vejle</b>	3,8
<b>Aabenraa</b>	4,7
<b>Favrskov</b>	3
<b>Hedensted</b>	3
<b>Horsens</b>	4,1
<b>Norddjurs</b>	4,3
<b>Odder</b>	3
<b>Randers</b>	4,7
<b>Samsø</b>	5,2
<b>Silkeborg</b>	4
<b>Skanderborg</b>	2,7
<b>Syddjurs</b>	3,5
<b>Aarhus</b>	4,5
<b>Herning</b>	3,8
<b>Holstebro</b>	3,3
<b>Ikast-Brande</b>	4,3
<b>Lemvig</b>	2,8
<b>Ringkøbing-Skjern</b>	3
<b>Skive</b>	3,3

<b>Struer</b>	4,2
<b>Viborg</b>	3,7
<b>Brønderslev</b>	4,5
<b>Frederikshavn</b>	5,2
<b>Hjørring</b>	4,9
<b>Jammerbugt</b>	4,6
<b>Læsø</b>	7,2
<b>Mariagerfjord</b>	4,5
<b>Morsø</b>	4
<b>Rebild</b>	3,5
<b>Thisted</b>	3,6
<b>Vesthimmerlands</b>	4,9
<b>Aalborg</b>	5,9

*Årsopgørelser af ledigheden følger kalenderårene, dvs. 1/1 til 31/12.*

Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved 14.6.2017 from:  
<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280>

## Appendix 13- DF voting result from the ten municipalities – Raw data

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Ishøj</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	3538	3530	3612
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	354	809	318
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	752	380	187
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	1526	1166	663
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	262	384	495
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	40	23	31
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	2177	1774	2845
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	1952	2176	1279
	<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	252	822	821
	<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	317
Stemmer i alt		10853	11064	10568

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Læsø</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	371	377	350
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	46	79	25
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	110	49	17
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	109	93	27
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	26	37	42
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	28	9	19
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	263	256	368
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	405	382	297

	Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne	19	63	67
	Å. Alternativet	0	0	35
Stemmer i alt		1377	1345	1247

## Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

*Enhed: antal*

		2007	2011	2015
Albertslund	A. Socialdemokratiet	4944	4823	4836
	B. Radikale Venstre	714	1433	638
	C. Det Konservative Folkeparti	1059	547	339
	F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti	3330	2148	1098
	I. Liberal Alliance	335	447	597
	K. Kristendemokraterne	58	43	63
	O. Dansk Folkeparti	2283	1984	3116
	V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	1958	2102	1274
	Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne	815	2077	2201
	Å. Alternativet	0	0	806
Stemmer i alt		15496	15604	14968

## Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

*Enhed: antal*

		2007	2011	2015
Lolland	A. Socialdemokratiet	7940	9279	9679
	B. Radikale Venstre	524	1255	365
	C. Det Konservative Folkeparti	1503	961	935
	F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti	8032	5440	1111
	I. Liberal Alliance	402	814	802
	K. Kristendemokraterne	76	92	80
	O. Dansk Folkeparti	5234	4544	7024

<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	7014	5802	4494
<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	362	1583	2019
<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	646
Stemmer i alt	31087	29770	27155

#### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Høje-Taastrup</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	7894	7728	7860
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	1169	2520	950
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	3209	1798	1345
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	3216	2240	1181
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	792	1150	1629
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	124	89	109
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	4635	4171	6919
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	6216	6667	4152
	<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	431	1607	1916
	<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	910
Stemmer i alt		27686	27970	26971

#### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Brøndby</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	6711	6455	6635
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	728	1463	610
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	1465	678	309
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	3005	2084	870
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	472	648	839
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	91	59	55



<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	<b>3737</b>	<b>3348</b>	<b>5013</b>
<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	<b>3293</b>	<b>3446</b>	<b>2117</b>
<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	<b>483</b>	<b>1569</b>	<b>1691</b>
<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>557</b>
Stemmer i alt	19985	19750	18696

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Odense</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	33157	35280	35434
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	6704	11993	5462
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	18066	7125	4505
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	18956	13555	6353
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	3162	5471	9727
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	519	492	579
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	<b>15778</b>	<b>13210</b>	<b>22542</b>
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	19255	25522	19000
	<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	2539	8686	12257
	<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	6398
Stemmer i alt		118136	121334	122257

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
<b>Aalborg</b>	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	40585	40358	40383
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	6090	11258	5702
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	16842	6893	2938
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	15652	12910	5172
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	2615	5906	10034

	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	975	845	1168
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	15502	13549	23294
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	25454	30368	27002
	<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	2116	7993	10470
	<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	5022
Stemmer i alt		125831	130080	131185

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
Slagelse	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	12633	12645	13197
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	1402	3009	1432
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	3682	1999	1151
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	5834	4780	1562
	<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	1166	2246	3052
	<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	182	171	182
	<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	9654	9038	13577
	<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	13335	12642	9298
	<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	654	2681	3253
	<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	1464
Stemmer i alt		48542	49211	48168

### Folketingsvalg efter område, valgresultat og tid

Enhed: antal

		2007	2011	2015
Bornholm	<b>A. Socialdemokratiet</b>	9875	9788	8661
	<b>B. Radikale Venstre</b>	617	1503	426
	<b>C. Det Konservative Folkeparti</b>	1682	579	440
	<b>F. SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti</b>	3301	2000	711

<b>I. Liberal Alliance</b>	615	508	1037
<b>K. Kristendemokraterne</b>	555	681	749
<b>O. Dansk Folkeparti</b>	3357	2965	5155
<b>V. Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti</b>	7341	7300	5253
<b>Ø. Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne</b>	537	1978	2170
<b>Å. Alternativet</b>	0	0	1295
Stemmer i alt	27880	27302	25897

Source: Danmarks Statistik. 2017. *Statistikbanken*. Retrieved from:  
<http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280>

**Appendix 14 – Development of US GDP growth rate – Raw Data**

Series Name	Series Code	Country Name	Country Code
GDP growth (annual %)	NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG	United States	USA

Year	GDP growth (annual %)
2004	3,78574
2005	3,34522
2006	2,66663
2007	1,77857
2008	-0,29162
2009	-2,77553
2010	2,53192
2011	1,60145
2012	2,22403
2013	1,67733
2014	2,37046
2015	2,59615
2016	1,61566

Data from database: World Development Indicators

Last Updated: 06/30/2017

Source: The World Bank (2017) *DataBank - World Development Indicators* Retrieved 5.6.2017 from World Bank:

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=USA#>

## Appendix 15 – Development of US unemployment rate, 2007-2016 – Raw Data

Series Name	Series Code	Country Name	Country Code
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)	SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS	United States	USA
Year	Unemployment rate in %		
2007	4,6		
2008	5,8		
2009	9,3		
2010	9,6		
2011	8,9		
2012	8,1		
2013	7,4		
2014	6,2		
2015	5,3		
2016	4,9		

Data from database: World Development Indicators

Last Updated: 06/30/2017

Source: The World Bank (2017) *DataBank - World Development Indicators* Retrieved 5.6.2017 from World Bank:

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS&country=USA#>

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