



WHO IS CHARLIE?

Radicalization or "Retour de Stigma"

Deconstructing the Framework of "Charlie"

A Goffmanesque Gaze at the Vulnerability of "Social Reality"

"The persistence of a vision that does not recognize in the act of violence, the expression of despair, the need to make yourself noticed and the need for recognition"

(Robert Castel)

THESIS

CCG, 10th Semester

Tina Davidsen

FOREWORD

"Catharsis"

*"Emotional purgation through art or intellectual clarification
that results in renewal and restoration"*

Thank you for seeing me through my catharsis,

"M"...

I am deeply grateful for your patience and persistence,

"CSS"...

Your ways are impenetrable...

TABLE OF CONTENT

FOREWORD

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Research Topic.....	P. 1
1.1 Research Question.....	P. 5
1.2 Research literature review; a journey into the unexpected	P. 7

2. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN

2. Method.....	P. 9
2.1 The “reflexive” researcher.....	P. 11
2.2 The deductive approach.....	P. 11
2.3 Research Design; Roadmap of Research	P. 13

3. METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS

3. The Depth of concepts.....	P. 15
3.1 Goffman’s Theory of Stigma.....	P. 16
3.2 Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition.....	P. 17
3.3 “Retour de Stigma”	P. 20
3.4 “Suicide sublimé”	P. 21
3.5 “Enlightenment arrogance”	P. 22
3.6 “Ontological Security.....	P. 24

4. THEORY

4. Theory of Human Consciousness.....	P. 27
4.1 Constructivism revisited: Goffmanian Structural Functionalism.....	P. 28
4.2 Subject.Structure Interdependency.....	P. 30
4.3 Frame Theory; Framework of Cultures of Meaning.....	P. 31

5. BACKGROUND

5. In and Out of Frame.....	P. 36
5.1. Charlie Hebdo, the Symbol.....	P. 37

5.2 “On a tué Charlie Hebdo!”.....	P. 38
5.3 From Charlie Hebdo to “Je suis Charlie”.....	P. 39
5.4 “See me”: “Banlieue”, “Place” of Suffering.....	P. 41
5.5 Young angry Muslim man from the banlieue.....	P. 43

6. EMPIRICS AS STEPPING STONE

6. Discourse to “hang my hat on”.....	P. 44
6.1 Introduction material for stigmatization frame.....	P. 45
6.2 Material for Enlightenment arrogance in radicalization frame.....	P. 46

7. ANALYSIS: HYPOTHESIS

7. Resuming the Roadmap of Research.....	P. 48
7.1. Constructing the “Stigmatization” Frame.....	P. 49
7.2 Stigma of the”banlieue”; “Place”of Suffering.....	P. 51
7.3 The need for recognition as the driving force.....	P. 52

8. ANALYSIS: DISCUSSION

8. Reconstructing the “Radicalization” Frame.....	P. 55
8.1 A view from the Enlightenment arrogant.....	P. 56
8.2 The need for ontological security.....	P. 56
8.3 The “See” and “Place” of Radicalization and Stigmatization (RQ).....	P. 58

9. CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE & SOCIETY

9. “Armed with knowledge”, epistemology, ontology and axiology of “Charlie”.....	P. 61
9.1. Philosophizing on theory: Subjectivity and objectivity in the use of theory.....	P. 63
9.2 Who is Charlie.....	P. 64

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ATTACHMENT: “LAS MENINAS” (VELÀZQUEZ, 1656)

INTRODUCTION

1. Research Topic

”Allah Akbar! On a tué Charlie Hebdo!”

Allah is great and we have killed Charlie Hebdo.

French satirical cult magazine Charlie Hebdo with its journalist and cartoon drawers seeing themselves as the rightful disciples of Voltaire in their fight against religious fanaticism and for tolerance between religions, in 2005 had republished the Mohamed drawings of the prophet with a bomb in his turban from the Danish newspaper, Jyllandsposten, which had initiated the “Mohamed crisis (“Les dessins par lesquels le scandale est arrive”, Courrierinternational.com, February 7, 2007). The magazine had been living with death threats ever since, but mainly from Islamic religious fanatics in the Middle East, but with the years gone by, Muslims in France had hitherto shown a more shoulder shrugging attitude.

But somehow the voices from the Middle East had reached into French society, recruiting soldiers for their religious fanaticism and had managed to turn “Charlie Hebdo” into the personification of the ultimate enemy. Finally, “Charlie Hebdo” was annihilated in the name of Allah by two young men from the French ”banlieue”, not from the Middle East, two young men with other cultural roots and with Muslim background, but two young Frenchmen.

”Je Suis Charlie!”

Indeed, suddenly the entire world had become “Charlie” as reactions to this attack by “radicalized terrorists”, an external enemy, were spectacularly emotional and strong. As a reaction against this “radicalized terrorism” on European values, former French President, Francois Hollande organized what became the biggest public manifestation in France ever seen, the “Marche Républicaine” to honor the slain “Charlies” with more than 3.7 million people in the streets of Paris and with the world’s State leaders, all proclaiming, “Je suis Charlie” (“Marche Républicaine: une ampleur ‘sans précédent’”, Libération.fr, January 11, 2015).

What an extraordinary “collective effervescence” around a name, “Charlie”, a name that suddenly became the symbol, it seemed, of those who had innocently fallen victims of an enemy that had

chosen them, solely on the basis of his hatred against "European values". From an attack on freedom of press, the right to publish drawings of the prophet, the incident soon became an attack on "European values" and "European democratic society" that was "the birth of a new Europe of fraternity", according to French Member of the European Parliament, Alain Lamassoure (Barbière, euractiv.fr, January 13, 2015).

And what an amount of implicit knowledge and common agreement on what the attack signified, which puzzled me and sparked numerous questions.

"But they are Charlie too", was my immediate thought as I saw the incident in a completely different light after 20 years of my own "fieldwork" when I lived in France from 1990 until 2010, thus being able to call myself bi-cultural, French-Danish. Bi-culturality changes your gaze both on your own culture and on the culture you adopt or which adopts you, it provides you with a sort of ocular gift, where you see the respective cultures through the lens of an objective subjectivity, close to the concept of reflexivity.

Indeed, throughout my twenty years of deep immersion into French society and culture, I had seen this coming and thought, "it was bound to happen". French sociologist, Robert Castel (2007) had written an almost premonitory book (*La Discrimination Négative*) about these young Frenchmen from the "banlieue" with roots in an Arab culture and with Muslim background and the dangers of the growing stigmatization and exclusion of these "modern times vagabonds and misfits".

I was revolted by the screaming hypocrisy of seeing or framing this as "radicalization" and "terrorism" by "terrorists" as I see it as an obvious "retour de stigmate", the result of decades of stigmatization. Remembering back to the Paris riots in 2005, one phrase stood out in flames of fire in my head; "each crisis is bigger, harsher and deeper, more revealing of the failure of our integration model" (Smith, New York Times, 2005). The phrase was pronounced by the then mayor of Evry, one of the most troubled "banlieue" in France, former Prime, Manuel Valls.

After the Charlie Hebdo attack, then as Prime Minister Valls stated that, "a territorial, social, ethnic apartheid has spread across our country ("Manuel Valls: Il existe un Apartheid", LePoint.com, January 20, 2015).

Thus, I was puzzled by the strong focus on "radicalization" and by the "obstinate refusal to recognize in the act of violence, the expression of despair" (Castel, 2007). Indeed, I do not "see" "terrorists", I "see" "victims of misrecognition", I "see" the act as "reactive", a reaction to the

injuries caused by “spoiled identity” (Goffman, 1963), caused by stigmatization. Consequently, I did not see “a terrorist act”, but a “suicide sublimé”, a sublimated suicide, killing the feeling of injustice without even “seeing” that you kill innocent people, ending your suffering in a spectacular event, refusing to die alone in the grey ghetto.

Sadly, the attack on innocent civilians by enemies from within spread like a steepfire as ”Charlie” became, ”Je suis Paris”, ”Je suis Brussels” and many other European cities. The dominant frame persisted in seeing this new phenomenon as “radicalization” and “terrorism” by “terrorists”. An external enemy had declared war on European values and no one seemed to take any responsibility in creating the Frankenstein monster, although evidence might very well show the contrary.

“Je suis Charlie” had become a symbol and a statement, you could either join the group of “Charlie” and thus show your belonging to “European values” or you could be “the external enemy, not “one of us”. By stating, “Je suis Charlie”, you were “washing your hands” from any kind of responsibility in the attack and positioning yourself as “the victim”.

“Who is Charlie”, I suddenly wondered.

Who is Charlie to the perpetrators, who shout, they have “killed Charlie Hebdo” as if the magazine was a person. Do they see Charlie the same way, Muslims living in Arab cultures see him. Who is Charlie to those who claim, “Je suis Charlie”. The entire world stated their being Charlie but most of them have never read the magazine, have never been to France and may not even be clear on what we call, “European values”.

At this point, I realized that Charlie is much more than a case study of Muslims in France. Behind Charlie lies one of the most important challenges of our times, the place of Islam in Europe. This is the equivalent to Gunnar Myrdal’s “American Dilemma” on race relations in America and what he ironically calls “the Negro problem” (Myrdal, 1944), Europe’s dilemma being whether we can live up to the creed of “unity in diversity” and to our Enlightenment ideals of Libert ,  galit , Fraternit .

Have Muslims become Europe’s “Negro problem”...

But digging even deeper, asking “who is Charlie”, why do we see this as radicalization and not as stigmatization could actually become a broader questioning on epistemology, ontology and axiology.

By further looking at Charlie, my reflections changed direction and concentrated into a philosophy of sociology, research and knowledge. If you look at Charlie as a picture in a frame with its multitude of different ways of "seeing", it becomes possible to draw parallels to the labyrinth of visual fields in Foucault's famous analysis of the Velázquez painting, "Las Meninas" (1656) in his introduction to, "Les Mots et les choses" (Foucault, 1966, see attached document). Foucault makes use of the painting of the many different gazes in multiple directions and through mirrors and representation to show how, "l'invisibilité profonde" (ibid, p. 31), the profound invisibility is always present, no matter where you place your gaze. The same parallels can be drawn to Erving Goffman's epical work on the vulnerability of social reality, *Frame Analysis* (1974; 1986) where the labyrinth of visual fields is symbolized by the labyrinth of frames within frames.

The question of "seeing" is essential to the epistemological issues within research. Where we look for knowledge, what we choose to see and what we choose to keep out of our visual field when we seek the building stones for the production of knowledge or when we do reality appraisal. How close to theology is sociology when research is carried out within a constructivist frame, where the researcher builds his argument on reading between the lines and thus asks us to believe in things, we cannot see. As Kieran Flanagan (2007) writes in his highly interesting and provocative book, "Sociology in Theology" in which he compares the notions of "reflexivity" and "belief", "to see selectively means that some things are not seen" (Flanagan, 2007, p. 54). This is "the dilemmas of reflexivity" (ibid, p. 55), Flanagan argues and it is true that a fragile balance between blindsight (more or less voluntary) that imprisons you in a particular framework and "seeing through the veil", which can offer an "ocular emancipation" (ibid, p. 54). "Ocular emancipation" is a central element in French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu's work. Indeed, Bourdieu would argue that sociology should be turned into a weapon for the "misérables" in society in order for them to improve their situation or at least to revolt against it (Bourdieu as quoted by Fasfalis, 2012).

The researcher is powerful in his ability to "see" and to "shift the mundane into a paradigm that refocuses disciplinary sensibilities (Flanagan, 2007, p. 55), Flanagan writes. I extend the argument by adding that the power to change disciplinary sensibilities implies the power to shape society, as politicians tend to use research selectively to fit their policies. That brings in the question of the role of the researcher, which I consider relevant especially when dealing with highly sensible societal questions that challenge our normative framework like the one, I deal with in this thesis, the management of diversity in an intercultural world, which is based on values and belief more than on cold facts. Should the researcher be an activist-researcher like French philosopher, Michèl Foucault

who also fought politically for a redefinition of how we “see” homosexuality? During the course of history, homosexuality has changed from being “seen” as a “crime” to being “seen” as a “pathology” and then to being “seen” as a “sexual orientation”. Indeed, “framing” or “seeing” are able to “freeze” the frame, but as illustrated by the issue of same sex relations, frames are written in the sand....

We use knowledge to “frame” (Goffman, 1974) social reality, depending on how and what we “see” as social actors and as researchers and since we do not all “see” alike, we can easily understand how fragile and vulnerable social reality is to misinterpretation. Both the human eye and the sociological gaze must constantly be aware of the fact that what we “see” is selective and that something is always excluded from our visual field. How the, do we select the “in and out of frame”, in the social world and in research.

A closer look at “Charlie” illustrates how “multiple realities” exist (Schutz, 1945) and how knowledge is used selectively to fit a certain reality, we find acceptable, according to our beliefs and values. As Schutz argues, “all interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experiences of it” (Schutz, 1945, p. 533). And so it is also with the production of knowledge, based on the researcher’s pre-existing “stock of knowledge”. This is the danger of the “hamster wheel of knowledge production”, running around in the same circle, in this thesis, being stuck in the framework of “radicalization”. Of course, this “deep perspectivism” applies to my own research in this thesis, where I endeavor not to see the “stigmatization framework” as the “absolute truth” but as a plausible alternative reality. My aim is to be able to combine theory and philosophy by challenging conventional thinking about how to “see” social reality and how to “see” the philosophy of science.

This is a path I shall follow in my investigations throughout my work in this thesis, perhaps in a somewhat unusual way.

1.1. Research Question

Indeed, in this thesis, I shall endeavor to join a deeper reflection on epistemology, sociology and research with a philosophical-analytical analysis and questioning of how and why we frame reality in a particular way and why we exclude other possible realities, evolving around the “Charlie-problematic” of “radicalization” or “stigmatization”.

Who is Charlie;

Why do we see "radicalization" and not "stigmatization"?

And as a sub-question:

What does Charlie tell us about epistemology, ontology and axiology?

In asking my research question, I am inspired by another great French philosopher, Pierre Bourdieu. When asked about the purpose of his collective work on the marginalized and weak in French society, *La Misère du Monde* (Bourdieu, 1993), Bourdieu explained how the opus was meant as a tool (un livre-outil) for us to change the social world. That which the social world has made, the social world can undo, when "armé de ce savoir", Bourdieu argued (Fournier, scienceshumaines.com, September 1, 1993). In English, you "possess knowledge", in French, you are, "armé de savoir", "armed with knowledge."

Thus, introducing the hypothesis that a "silent frame" exists and that "Charlie" is a matter of "stigmatization" I am able to discuss it against the dominant frame, "radicalization" and as a "sub-research question", in my discussion, I shall reflect over the following question, inspired by Bourdieu;

"How do we use the knowledge we are "armed with" as social actors and as researchers".

My aim in this thesis is to show how another social reality exists and the purpose is to do a philosophical-theoretical analysis discussion of how and why we choose certain frames and to do a critical analysis of what I call "see", how social actors "see" social reality and how researchers "see" epistemologically.

If Charlie is not a matter of radicalization, then the focus on security measures and coming down hard on Muslims will never solve the problem. And if this is a matter of stigmatization, then what we need is a socio-psychological set of solutions, focusing on integrating Muslims better and learning to accept them as French, not as members of a religion. That is not what we are currently doing and the question is why. If this is a question of stigmatization, what will it take to make a paradigm shift and what is the place of morality in a paradigm shift, where are the moral voices that

can bring on change? Ultimately, the thesis challenges the way we "see" social reality and hopefully, my work can inspire some philosophical thought about the sociological gaze.

If you look at "Charlie" in a broader perspective, you as one of Europe's most important challenges; the mental acceptance of Islam and Muslims as compatible with European values. This thesis is my contribution to the paradigm shift I believe Europe needs if we are to hope for a harmonious future together, where Europe lives up to its creed and accept that interculturalism must replace nationalism (and already has too some extent).

Before unfolding my research design for this thesis, I shall develop on the literature review that took me on a journey in an unexpected direction as I searched for a design that would fit my wish to make this thesis highly theoretical and with a philosophical twist.

1.2. Research literature review, a journey into the unexpected.

The research design of this thesis is the result of a literature review that started with the original intent to do a comparative frame analysis and a case study of Charlie Hebdo.

From the outset, I began to look into the construction of the frame analytic method, derived from Goffman's original work (1974; 1986), which I should soon discover had been reduced into a very small bouillon, considering the epic dimension and true dimension of his work that revealed itself to me unexpectedly.

I started with reading some of Rein and Schön's earlier work in a book by Carole Weiss (1977) on public policy making. In a chapter by the same name, Rein and Schön reflect on the proper way to "frame" problems as they compare "framing" to "naming" and explain how these two concepts, "mediate the transition from disaggregated worries and scattered perceptions of situations toward the cognitive experience of meaning and the work of creative problem solving" (Rein; Schön, in Weiss, 1977, p. 239). Both sociologists developed on the concepts of frame analysis (Rein & Schön, 1994) always as a means for framing policy planning. Benford and Snow (2000) treat frame analysis as a tool for understanding "the relationship between framing processes and the operation of social movements" (Schön & Rein, 2000, p. 612), from conceptualization of causes for fight and planning actions for the fight. Verloo (2005) makes use of frame analysis in her study on gender equality where framing can become a weapon of change by way of "strategical framing", which is "a process of linking a feminist goal to some major goal of an organization that should engage, or is

engaged in gender mainstreaming” (Verloo, 2005, p. 17). Equal use of frames is made by Triandafyllidou (1998), who applies frame analysis as an element of discourse analysis and explains how the method, “has the merit of offering a social and cultural perspective in the study of public policy planning” (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 16). The frame analytic model concentrated around the question of policy making and social movements, which did not satisfy my need for a more philosophical use of frames as I understand them.

From my furtive gaze at the original work on frames by Goffman, I began to see a discrepancy between the richness of his insights and the way it had been reduced into a method for analysis. It seemed to me there was more to frames than a methodological tool, I see frames as a picture of human consciousness and so I decided to go back to the roots to find out more about frames. I turned my attention closer to Frame Analysis (Goffman, 1974; 1986) and ended up reading the entire book. I had entered the goffmanian universe and the result is the particular research design of this thesis, which you might say is truly goffmanesque.

I began to reflect on how we use theories and discovered the importance of studying them in a Foucauldian archeological way (Foucault, 1969), going back to the roots of the theory, digging deeper and looking into the person behind the theory and the period of time, when it was written. In my theory section, I shall develop these thoughts and their theoretical, methodological and epistemological implications in my chapters on theory and method.

I sensed a strong parallel to French philosophy, although Goffman came from the Chicago School with a strong focus on fieldwork and French sociology was much more theoretical and literary. The French connection was confirmed as I dived further into the matter and discovered the friendship and disciplinary complicity between Goffman and Bourdieu. Bourdieu published Goffman’s works at his famous and highly selective publishing house, Les Éditions de Minuit and French sociologist, Robert Castel wrote a famous presentation of Goffman’s asylums (Castel, 1968).

Similar to the way Bourdieu (1984) established a sociology of culture you might say that Goffman created a sociology of cultures of meaning. His Frame Analysis appears to me as an art book of Human consciousness.

Both sociologists share the use of concepts as more than simple labels but as analytical tools, carrying with them a theoretical underpinning. Bourdieu thrills and dazzles in his analysis of the priest in *Language and Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu, 1991), where he refers to the Sartrean notion of lying “by declaring that things are good absolutely when they are good for him” (ibid, p. 210), comparing the priest to the politician, who uses the same “sacred lie” when he “calls his own will

‘nation’ or ‘people’ (ibid, p. 210). The bourdieusque “lie” comes close to the goffmanesque “framing”, yet another similarity in the poetic irony of words.

Goffmanesque concepts come close to works of art in his ability to invent words that are extremely useful as analytical tools, “ironic reflexive normalisms” as Ian Hacking calls them in an article, describing the link between Goffman and Foucault in their research (Hacking, 2004, p. 297).

Bourdieu’s concept of “symbolic power” is an example of how words can open up worlds, the same way Goffman’s “keying”, “frame fabrication”, primary framework” (Goffman 1974; 1986) have created an entire universe of meaning making and human consciousness.

The shape of my research design is a mirror of the journey into literature for my thesis. I felt led by an invisible hand, or rather by Erving Goffman’s hand in an unexpected direction and the scope of my topic went from a simple case study to a deeper philosophical-analytical reflection on epistemology, sociology and research, still within the same initial topic. I find it interesting and exciting to combine a thesis topic with a critical assessment on research and knowledge in a broader perspective as the thesis is the conclusion of the learning process, which enables this kind of reflection.

It remains for me to unfold my map and I shall begin in the following section by an outline of my method and research design.

2. RESEARCH DESIGN/ METHOD

2. Method

My alternative frame analysis will start with a presentation of what I call goffmanian cynical sociology and the sociology of human consciousness, based on his Frame Analysis (1974; 1986), which offers a functional explanation of how people select their frames, how they accept to see social reality. I draw on the entire Goffman opus though as I include elements from his work on the world as an absurd theater and humans like actors, staging their identity (Goffman, 1959) as well as his study of total institutions and their foucauldian silent power (Goffman, 1961). Along with these functional-cognitive explanations of peoples’ reality appraisal, I introduce the notion of “subject-structure interdependency”, which I argue work together as partners in crime in the construction of reality. This interdependency challenges the traditional split between subject and structure in the

level of analysis, which forces you to choose an angle. The genius of Goffman is to be able to propose a way of combining both levels, which I shall explain in my theory section.

For the psychological explanation of these choices, I present the theory of Stigma, I have developed from Goffman's book of the same name (Goffman, 1963), which is a manual of how stigmatization can spoil a person's identity. Again, in my search for literature on stigmatization, I turned to Goffman, whose sociological gaze has affected me deeply and I am not the only one. Likewise attracted to the goffmanesque gaze, Flanagan describes it as a "reference to imagined populations of the stigmatized, the grotesque, manipulative salesmen, devious lunatics and others", which is the world of Goffman. Goffman described the world of the stigmatized in a way that "touched them deeply", Gamson writes, citing Lofland, who had seen how "these people recognized themselves and others and saw that Goffman was articulating some of the most fundamental and painful of human social experiences" (Lofland as quoted by Gamson, 1985, p. 605). This depth of "seeing" is what I get from Goffman and shall endeavor to apply to this thesis.

Since I intend to build a hypothesis, based on the assumption that the "radicalized terrorists" actually suffer from stigmatization and act against misrecognition, I add elements from Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, which in its Hegelian part is very helpful as argumentation for my hypothesis.

These theories will support my goffmanesque concepts that I shall employ as my analytical tools to explain the different frames, thus replacing the traditional frame analysis method. My aim with using this alternative frame analysis is to make use of framing both as theory and as method and to extract from frames the philosophical dimension, I perceive in them.

I introduce the concepts of, "retour de stigma" and "suicide sublime" to sustain the frame of stigmatization and I present the concept of "enlightenment arrogance" and support it by my operationalization of the term, "ontological security" to explain the radicalization frame.

Although the thesis is predominantly theoretical and situated, "before discourse" as I call it, I shall make some use of texts (discourse) in order to make my hypothesis plausible and add as much validity as possible. The silent frame indeed does exist and is not simply the product of my interpretation and my own imprisonment in a normative framework. I hang my hat on reports from the Council of Europe that have been sending out warning signs during the last decades about the dangers of stigmatization of Muslims in Europe. I use the previously mentioned book by Robert Castel (2007), *La Discrimination Négative*, which was also a monumental warning sign of what was

then “but” a problem with criminality by the young Muslims from the “banlieue”, which has now turned into a problem with “radicalization”. Lastly, I shall mention the voices of a few researchers and politicians who have shown sensibility to the stigmatization frame, but whose voices have remained silent and have not been able to challenge the dominant discourse notably.

The radicalization frame, will be also be supported by a collection of textual empirics but will be explained mainly by theory.

I challenge traditional epistemology by giving predominant weight to theory as empirical evidence in order to avoid what I call “the hamster wheel of knowledge production”, where we look for knowledge within the same normative framework, only changing the way we look at this framework. We look at “radicalization” in numerous ways, from multiple angles, we invent new concepts and find new reasons for the “process of radicalization”, but we are imprisoned in the framework of “radicalization”, the hamster wheel of knowledge.

2.1. The “reflexive” researcher

I agree with Bourdieu that, “through the exercise of the sociological gaze, an ocular emancipation can be realized” (Bourdieu as cited by Flanagan, 2007, p. 54). At the same time, I am also deeply aware of the fact that by directing your gaze at a particular point of focus, you direct you gaze away from other points. A possible way of dealing with the dilemma of “seeing” is to conduct your study within a reflexive framework, which equally according to Bourdieu carries the promise of ocular emancipation (ibid, p. 54). Reflexivity of course is deeply subjective and places a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the researcher for “it also produces a (tacit) self-interested ignorance or illiteracy” (Schirato and Webb as quoted by Flanagan, 2007, p. 54). But all research is selective and research results are a matter of perspective in the end.

My wish is not to assert my view or to affirm my vision but send out tentative propositions for understanding social reality and that is why I choose a deductive approach in my work.

2.2. The deductive approach

By a deductive approach, where I conduct my research “with reference to hypotheses and ideas inferred from theory” (Bryman, 2012, p. 711), I hope to be able to introduce a new perspective, to add new knowledge by the strong emphasis on the way I operationalize and view theory.

Deduction is especially useful in dealing with a topic like the one, I have chosen for this thesis, which is heavily dependent on beliefs and values and thus brings together a multitude of cultural frameworks, based on peoples’ beliefs.

Departing from theory and introducing a hypothesis is a way of “cutting through” and retrieving a particular framework that the researcher wishes to bring into light, thereby tempting to introduce a new paradigm in the end. The deductive approach places the researcher in the role of an “activist researcher” with a proactive attitude and an implicit wish to do research as a means to “change the world. I do not mean to imply that inductive research, creating theory from observation of the social world is a “passive” stance and without inductive research, we would have no theories to fight with as activist researchers. It is simply a matter of where you wish to serve science. I choose the activist camp.

I believe in the revolutionary element of research as a means to subvert dominant discourse, in this thesis that of “radicalization” and “terrorism”, which might one day be seen as “retour de stigma” and “suicide sublime”, the same way slavery or Apartheid went from being acceptable and normative to being a shameful memory in the history of mankind. Norms are floating and can be challenged but the weight of the normative framework is gigantic and the question is how and who can lift the weight. I hope to be able to provide some possible directions for answers to this question in my thesis.

The need to resist dominant discourse and challenge norms by critical thinking and philosophical reflection is a result of my twenty years in France and my four years of university studies at the Université de Nice. Indeed, in France it is almost a part of human nature to argue and the intellectual and the philosopher enjoy a prominent position in the official societal discourse. Hence, rather than looking into discourse for my philosophical analysis/discussion, I am concerned with the epistemological richness of what comes “before discourse”. Before discourse is a kind of fieldwork into the mind, into the unspoken words, the subject-structure relationship that creates social reality, much like the Foucauldian sense of power, which is a mutual enabling relationship, not a dominant-dominated relation. “Before discourse”, actors select a framework which becomes the dominant frame, the “truth” and thus imposing a particular “before discourse” becomes what Foucault calls, “a battle for truth” (Foucault, as quoted by Gordon, 1980, p. 132). The “battle for truth” according to Foucault is the battle for “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are

separated” (ibid, 132). Theory can tell what discourse never will, it might serve to prove a hypothetical discourse in the mind of people that will never be printed out. In regards to my hypothesis in this thesis, that radicalization may be stigmatization, the hypothetical discourse in the mind of people may be, “I refuse to see Muslims as fellow citizens, I just don’t like Muslims”, which creates the mental wall, I believe is one of the clues for understanding why it seems so difficult for Europe to properly integrate Muslims as “French”, “Belgian”, “Dane” without mentioning their religion. Somehow you might say that “before discourse” uses theory to print out what the mind has not yet spoken out and might never do.

2.3 Research design; The Roadmap of Research.


To sum up, I now move to the explanation of my methodological tools in my presentation of goffmanesque concepts, followed by my theory section.

As I have explained, this thesis is not a case study in the traditional sense, rather, I use the case of “Charlie” to reflect on the topic in a broader sense, lifting it above considerations on the religion of Islam, the wars in Syria, the rise of Islamic State and a multitude of other perspectives, one might choose within the Charlie problematic. My aim is to do a study in human consciousness in the construction of frames and to combine it with a philosophical reflection on how we produce knowledge, where we look for knowledge and what we do with our knowledge.

Consequently, my background section will not be extensive as it will merely serve to explain how I get from Charlie Hebdo to “Charlie” and to explain the notion of “banlieue” and “ghetto” and to clarify what is meant by the “ghetto youth”, essential for my hypothesis and the operationalization of my goffmanesque concepts of “retour de stigma” and “suicide sublime”.

The section on textual material is equally less weighing in the overall design of the thesis, but it serves as an important canvas for weaving together my hypothesis as it adds validity to my claim and sheds an important new light on the dominant frame by its pure existence. It allows for me to ask, “if we are armed with knowledge, the why have we not used it”. Thus, I shall do a short introduction of material and then move on to my philosophical-analytical discussion of the comparative frames and end up with a conclusion where I look at some possible solutions and/or possible ways for understanding how we can bring on change.

I have constructed a model of my research design for a clearer overall view and hopefully, it can serve as the general roadmap for the thesis.



3. METHODOLOGICAL TOOLS

3. The depth of concepts.

As I mentioned in my introduction, Goffman uses concepts in a similar way to Bourdieu, turning them into an analytical tool, carrying entire universes of meaning.

There is a sort of Foucauldian perspectivism in Goffman’s endeavors to avoid labelling or categorizing without having explained in detailed nuances, the depth of his concepts. There is a risk of ending up in an endless “Old MacDonald had a farm” refrain, he warns in *Frame Analysis* (Goffman, 1974, p.11). Rather than labels, Goffman’s choice of words become “ironic reflexive nominalisms” (Hacking, 2004, p. 297).

There is a poetry and a devilish irony in Goffman’s way of writing and choice of words, which contrasts with the cynicism of his arguments, making the message more powerful and pertinent. An example is the title of his famous work on total institutions, *Asylums*, (Goffman, 1961), which subtitled, *Essay on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (my emphasis). You have to stop and wonder about the term, “inmate”, which is a thought provoking word that tells a great deal about Goffman’s attitude towards total institutions.

The goffmanesque conceptualization resembles what Rostaing called “parataxis” in his description of Freud’s way of writing, “the construction of arguments by means of repetition, juxtaposition, antithesis and elaborations”, (Rostaing as cited by Atkinson, 1989, p. 63). In his article on “Goffman’s Poetry (ibid), Atkinson describes Goffman as “the great exponent of sociological irony” (ibid, p. 68).

“Appeals to the imagination are a methodological necessity”, Flanagan writes, as they provide an analytical accentuation” in the sense of Webers “ideal types” (Flanagan, 2007, p. 10).

But concepts also serve as tools for imposing a view and thereby possess an intrinsic political dimension as is also the case in this thesis, where I tend to “impose” the view that radicalization is a matter of stigmatization and thus indirectly try to redirect politics in a socio-psychological direction with an emphasis on better integration and inclusion. Concepts are a way of classifying the social world and social experience, which Bourdieu describes as a “power of imposing a vision of the social world through principles of division, which when they are imposed on an entire group, constitute meaning” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 220).

Thus, Goffmanesque concepts are much more than a creative linguistic invention that is useful as the analytical tool, which I shall use in this thesis. These concepts are at the same time methodological tools and theoretical building blocks in my overall theoretical scaffold for my philosophical-analytical discussion.

3.1. Goffman’s “Theory of Stigma”

As I explain in the theory chapter, Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1974;1986) provides me with the functional explanation of social reality construction. In his small essay, *Stigma* (1963), I first looked for some clues to explain the psychological propensities of our functionalist behavior. Reading *Stigma* was no less than a revelation, as I see the essay as a theory of stigma with a human insight without parallel. Goffman describes with an astonishingly sharp, deep and penetrating sociological gaze the conditions of the stigmatized and the stigmatizers as a kind of absurd theater, where actors walk on a thin line in order not to disturb the implicit rituals of handling stigma, especially for the stigmatizers to be able to hide their stigmatization.

What I call “theory of stigma” is my own interpretation of Goffman’s work, which I use as a “theory” for explaining the concepts of “retour de stigma” and “suicide sublime”. As I mentioned earlier, Gamson (1985) perfectly describes the depth of Goffman’s gaze on stigma. The stigma theory is extremely useful in understanding how it feels to live in a constant state of stigmatized, which in a Goffmanian sense is like “living on a socio-psychological frontier” (Barker as quoted by Goffman, 1963, p. 24, footnote). Moreover, with his usual ironic and poetic functionalist style, Goffman perfectly describes the hypocrisy of stigmatizers, who in the Durkheimian ritualistic sense, are able to hide behind a multitude of norm, rules and conventions. The link to Durkheim is evident in all of Goffman’s work in his use of “Durkheimian imagery” (Chriss, 1993, p. 472). It is precisely these everyday rituals that enables stigmatizers and stigmatized to coexist without disturbing social order and avoid violence and revolt. By explaining this fragile ritual balancing on a thin line, it becomes clear how dangerous, violating the rituals can become. If one part breaks the ritual code and refuses to play along and accept the silent stigma, social order can be seriously disturbed. This is what we see, when Muslims no longer accept the silent stigma of “native Europeans”, who impose the ritual code of “assimilation” that keep Muslims in a kind of second range citizens.

“We normals” (Goffman, 1963, p. 15) as Goffman ironically writes in his way of using words in a surprising and sometimes rude manner in order to make us think closer about our own hypocrisy. Different kinds of stigma are treated, the one I use in this thesis is that, which Goffman calls “the stigma of race, nation and religion”, which as he provokingly continues, “can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family” (ibid, p. 14). At the time when Goffman wrote Stigma, the stigmatized race was “the negro” and it is not an overstatement to say that for many people at that period, being a “negro” was indeed an illness. I see an obvious link to our period and many peoples’ attitude towards Muslims.

At the time, it was the “negro ghetto” but the similarities are striking when Goffman explains how, ethnic and racial ghettos constitute a haven of self-defense and a place where the individual deviator can openly take the line that he is at least as good as anyone else” (ibid, p. 172). This “haven of self-defense” is at the same time a place of deep suffering and frustration as is “jihadism”, which likewise becomes a “place where you are as good as anyone else”, (and even better) and a means to end your suffering for the young angry Muslim.

Goffman introduces the term, “identity norm” (ibid, p. 154) to explain one of these societal conventions that act like norms and that can “breed deviations as well as conformance”. If a person is not able to uphold this identity norm, he might choose to “alienate himself from the community which upholds the norm or refrain from developing an attachment to the society in the first place” (ibid) which can be of a “high cost” for society then. The relevance of the argument in this thesis is whether the identity norm is normative or selective. If stigmatization is the problem we are dealing with, then you might ask whether you can speak of an “identity norm denial”, what some in France call, “deni d’identité”, the denial to recognize Muslims within a positive identity and as simply “French”. Further ahead in this thesis, I shall pursue and develop this line of thought, which evolves around the question of formal and actualized citizenship as possible clues for understanding part of the problematic of my topic. As Goffman so rightfully states, the normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives” (ibid, p. 163-164).

3.2. Axel Honneth: Theory of Recognition

Similar to my goffmanian theory of stigma, I introduce the Honneth theory of recognition, or rather his developments on Hegel’s theory or philosophy on the notion of recognition, as the theoretical

scaffold behind my concepts of "retour de stigma" and "suicide sublime". The main methodological tool for the purpose of this thesis are my goffmanesque concepts, I describe their deeper meaning by way of these theories but I take from these theories what I need to tailor my concepts so it fits the research design for my thesis topic.

In his original work, "The struggle for recognition; The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts" (Honneth 1995), the word "moral" is of crucial importance for my use of Honneth's work in this thesis.

The Honneth 1995 theory is based on Hegel's Jena Lectures and the focus is recognition as an ontological human need and a sort of basic moral obligation. My interest in Honneth's work on recognition is the combined, sociological, philosophical and psychological considerations he introduces around the concept. For the purpose of my concepts of "retour de stigma" and "suicide sublime", Honneth's deeper reflections on the effects on humans of misrecognition, or as Honneth calls it of "disrespect" are essential as a means to build validity behind my hypothesis, that "radicalization" is in fact the result of misrecognition.

Honneth makes use of some very strong and powerful words in order to explain the damage that lack of recognition can cause, anchoring his arguments in psychological studies on the personal after-effects of torture or rape, studies on victims of slavery or cultural-societal misrecognition that provoke the feeling of disrespect. The feeling of disrespect from lack of recognition can result in "psychological death", social death" and in the case of cultural-societal lack of recognition, can work on humans like an illness, provoking "scars" and "injuries" (Honneth, 1995, p. 135).

In the case of social misrecognition, Honneth argues, it "endangers the identity of human beings, just as infection with a disease endangers their physical life (ibid, p.135). This is an important point for the purpose of my hypothesis that if the "radicalized" are instead suffering from lack of recognition and thus are infected with an illness, this would make plausible the argument that their act of violence is a treatment of this illness, as it redeems by "killing the feeling of injustice".

Importantly though, Honneth's 1995 theory cannot stand alone in my opinion, there is an "after the Honneth-Fraser debate" (Fraser, Honneth 2003), which is crucial both for the use of the theory in this thesis both also for the use of the theory in societal matters. In this political-philosophical exchange on "Redistribution or Recognition", Fraser and Honneth discuss the notion of recognition in different terms. For Nancy Fraser, recognition is but one side of social justice and humans struggle for recognition through their struggle for redistribution, which she calls a "perspectivist-dualist" approach as opposed to Honneth's monistic approach (Fraser, 2003, p. 212).

Yet, it is precisely this monistic approach, where Honneth sees only the struggle for recognition as a moral quest, an intrinsic need, which corresponds to my own reading of the concept. For Honneth, distribution is but a derivative of redistribution and is above all a matter of moral psychology, not of political theory. The distinction is essential for my hypothesis, for it must be emphasized that in my hypothesis, about "radicalization" being a struggle against misrecognition, redistribution or material resources would not be the solution, only part of the solution. The overall solution would be a socio-psychological response in the shape of moral recognition.

I particularly make use of Honneth's developments on the psychological ramifications of recognition in the revised version of his theory (2014), where he rejects the "hobbesian notion of intersubjective hostility" (ibid, p. 220), based on Freud's theory of drives. Honneth tries to save intersubjectivity from the bad reputation of an innate drive for aggression and hostility towards others, which would remove responsibility from the shoulders of this "other".

Building his argument on object relations theory and explaining the relation between mother, "primary caretaker" and child, Honneth explains how "aggressive tendencies as reactive efforts to cope with failures and injuries that have their source in social relationships" (ibid, p. 221). This is an important distinction for my understanding of intersubjective relations in this thesis and for understanding my concepts of "retour de stigma" and "suicide sublime", which I argue derive precisely from these "injuries", that society as the symbol of the "primary caretaker" has caused by lack of recognition. This viewing of society as "the mother" or primary caretaker allows me to develop the argument that the "radicalized" suffer from emotional neglect from the "parent", the lack of fundamental mutual recognition. As Honneth maintains, the childhood need for fusion and recognition and the fear of separation from the primary caretaker is something we carry along with us as adults. The need for recognition compels us "to strive for those fractured forms of intersubjectivity that take on the form of mutual recognition between mature subjects (ibid, p. 229). If this be true, the radicalization frame could better be understood in terms of a reaction to the lack of recognition and the injuries from neglect by the "mother society".

To complete the understanding of recognition, I use in this thesis, I draw attention to the revised version of the theory in Honneth's, (2014), "The I in We", where there is an important shift in the much stronger focus on the intersubjective character of recognition. The theory now takes a Hegelian turn and Honneth acknowledges Hegel's argument that recognition implies, "the reciprocal limitation of one's own, egocentric desires for the benefit of the other" (Honneth, 2014, p. 17).

This means that recognizing the other “costs”, it presupposes that human nature is altruistic and that there should be a normative understanding of who deserve recognition.

Honneth explores Hegel’s insistence on the moral character of recognition in his work on *Disrespect* (2007) and describes how the lack of recognition can lead to “moral injury” (ibid, p. 134). Hegel’s claim that intersubjective acknowledgement is close to a moral duty, which if denied becomes a “moral injustice” that will cause a “mental shock” (ibid, p. 134). Moral justice is a sort of universal right to equal recognition, recognition of equal “moral accountability” and recognition of being “a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community” (ibid, p. 139).

This might be a clue for explaining both frames in this thesis if I can build a plausible hypothesis that this is “stigmatization”, not “radicalization”. In terms of radicalization, we do not have any responsibility and cannot be accused of having done any moral injustice. If indeed what we see is stigmatization, we would need to perform a kind of introspection and consider our lack of respect for the moral duty of equal recognition.

3.3. “Retour de Stigma”

French sociologist, Robert Castel was a theorist of social suffering in the vein of Bourdieu, concentrating his writings on the marginalized in French society, not only as a descriptive endeavor but as a cry of justice with a political underpinning. Like Bourdieu, Castel was formed in the philosophical tradition and like Goffman and Bourdieu made use of conceptualization as analytical tool. Castel’s meeting with Bourdieu shifted his interest from the psychological study of mental alienation to the sociological study of social alienation (Maugier, 2012).

In his major opus, *Discrimination negative* (Castel, 2007), Castel described the dangers of the rising stigmatization of young Muslims from the French banlieu, where riots broke out in 2005, comparing them to latter days vagabonds. Young people from the banlieux become scapegoats for the underlying social problems within society and are seen as “the dangerous class”. This kind of ghettoization of a particular group creates a feeling of injustice, a kind of apathy and hopelessness, that drives them towards a criminal defense mechanism, where they retire from society and “return the stigma” (Castel, 2007, p. 808) by vindicating their belonging to the stigmatized group and by turning against their fellow citizens. I derive my concept of “retour de stigma” from this explanation, which Castel wrote about the high rate of criminality among the ghetto youth, the same

group that have now gained access to another means of expressing their despair in the shape of the jihadist cause.

As French police Commissioner, Pierre N’Gahane, responsible for the preventive measures against “radicalization” stated in his report,

“This has nothing to do with religion. Most of the young men, we call “radicalized” share a common situation of personal failure and disruption with the surrounding society and are in search of a new identity. They could have chosen any other path; drugs, a sect, the army or even suicide” (Seelow, *Le Monde*, March 26, 2015).

The Commissioner’s analysis of the clearly shows the link to the following concept, I use as a result of the “retour de stigma”, the “suicide sublime”

3.4. “Suicide Sublimé”

Behind this concept there is my puzzlement or rather my observation of the questions we do not ask ourselves, while they seem relevant to ask. Do we really believe that these young men, we call “radicalized” kill in the name of Islam and see themselves as soldiers in a foreign army? Though they all have Muslim background, none of them were known by their surroundings as strict religious observers. Born in European societies, far from the traditional Muslim societies, why do we not ask how they come to turn against us, when they have all the pleasures of a free and democratic society? The question is, do they feel they can enjoy these pleasures at an equal level with non-Muslim citizens or is it exactly the feeling of inequality, they express? In his book, Castel (2007) describes how the feeling of having no future and of experiencing social decline inflicts a kind of “deficit de citoyenneté” (ibid, p. 808), a deficit of citizenship.

And most importantly, why are they willing to die as soldiers for a foreign army and how can this army reach into our societies and recruit?

French psychologist, Fehti Benslama who has written a book on radicalization offers her observations from her fifteen years of social work in the banlieue of Saint Denis, one of the most sensible ghettos in France, describing the depressive state of many of these young men with Muslim background. These young men are deeply depressed and suffer from hopelessness and a suicidal state of mind that is relieved by the promise of dying for a “noble cause” that they come to see in jihadism. In a pernicious way, becoming a soldier of Islam becomes the treatment of their

symptoms and if we ignore that fact, we “run the risk of producing cannon fodder for jihadists at an industrial level” Benslama argues (Laffeter, lesInrocks.com, May 15, 2015).

The argument is perfectly in line with Honneth, who explains how “the feeling of disrespect from lack of recognition can result in “psychological death”, social death” and in the case of cultural-societal lack of recognition, can work on humans like an illness, provoking “scars” and “injuries” (Honneth, 1995, p. 135).

Accepting to die for a cause, they refuse to die anonymous in the corner of a grey ghetto with the claustrophobic feeling of injustice, which society cannot relieve. Sublimating their suicide, they become blinded to the fact that they are killing innocent civilians they can only see the victory in killing their feeling of injustice.

3.5. “Enlightenment Arrogance”

At this point, it might be necessary to clarify how I generalize the term, Europe because within European societies countries differ widely and there have not been attacks in all European cities. I generalize and operationalize “Europe” as the symbol for a culture that differs from the culture in the Middle East for example, meaning Europe in the broadest sense possible. And since the thesis is about exploring human consciousness and its possible role in creating a societal problem, I generalize the use of “banlieue” and “the angry young men from the banlieue” as the symbols of a group (Muslims), Europe seems to have difficulties in accepting as “Europeans”. My hypothesis is that what is expressed in all these violent acts, whether it be in London, Germany, Brussels, Denmark is the expression of despair and frustration over lack of recognition, not something related to the particular features of these societies, like the colonial past or the participation in war abroad. At least these are not paths, I follow and explore in this thesis.

In the constant focus on “European values” and “European free and democratic societies” we pride ourselves in the heritage from the Enlightenment, that of Libert ,  galit  and Fraternit . We consider ourselves free from ideology and consider our model of society as one based on scientific knowledge, not on dubious beliefs in a religion. Secularism is our ultimate religion as we place our trust in democracy and seem to consider ideology-based societies as primitive. The European Union lives by the motto of “Unity in Diversity” and Europe’s moral voice, the Council of Europe in

Strasbourg published the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue under the motto, "Living together as equals in dignity" ("White Paper", coe.int, 2008).

As Adorno and Horkheimer stated in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1945; 1997), "Enlightenment is totalitarian" (ibid, p. 4) we rely on the sole promise of knowledge for understanding social reality, which gives knowledge a God-like power and replaces belief by reflexivity.

How well do we live up to the creed and how well are we actually managing diversity in an intercultural world? Indeed, it seems difficult for many to accept or even to "see" Muslims as "Europeans".

Danish writer, Carsten Jensen describes how Europeans live in what you might call a "myth of innocence" as he states in an interview on the possible reasons for "radicalized terrorism" in Europe that, "we are not innocent victims" (Friis Wang, Information, December 8, 2015) but victims of our own hypocrisy as we see things solely from our own European perspective, unable or unwilling to admit to see things from other peoples' (Muslims) perspective.

The Enlightenment arrogance is a way of seeing Europe as a the absolute normative societal model and Europeans as exemplary "democratic citizens", respecting universal values of freedom, liberty and equality, free from ideology and based on knowledge.

Fatali Moghaddam proposes a highly interesting analysis on how to obtain "actualized democracy", introducing a model for "the psychological characteristics of the "democratic citizen" (Moghaddam, 2016, p. 13), which could very well apply to the "Enlightenment arrogant" and serve to question, how well they live up to the criteria. Amongst these criteria, "seeking to understand those who are different from us" and "learning from those who are different" by avoiding ethnocentrism, which according to Moghaddam "are tendencies learned in the context of dictatorial systems, and democratic societies require a different set of psychological skills" (ibid, p. 14).

Enlightenment arrogance is an obstinate imprisonment in a normative framework that does not admit Muslims as "citizens" and persists in seeing them as a religion. It is possible that this refusal lies in our fear that integrating and internalizing Muslims as Europeans might mean a fundamental change of our safe world and of our identity.

This leads me to the concept of "ontological security", which I wish to develop in terms of two different axis, "anxiety" and "identity". The twofold use of the concept serves to display how ontological security has implications for the agency of actors in both frames and how their needs are thus deeply intertwined, yet play against each other. I rely mainly on already established theory but

will tend to make the concept more "my own" by explaining, how I operationalize it for the purpose of this thesis.

3.6. "Ontological Security"

In its deeper essence, the concept of ontological security is strongly related to "identity" and comes close to a basic feature of human nature. Giddens (1991) describes the concept from a psychological perspective as an emotional-cognitive element of human nature and describes how we achieve the sense of ontological security in our early infant stage through the "loving attentions of early caretakers" (ibid, p. 38). The parallel to Honneth's description of the need for recognition, described earlier in an earlier section, is obvious and crucial in explaining how both concepts are deeply rooted within us and therefore become some of our main motivations for agency and valuations. Giddens understanding of ontological security comes close to Honneth's view of recognition as an element depending on well-functioning intersubjective relations. Our need for ontological security stems from the childhood fear of being abandoned and is thus connected with a feeling of anxiety that we carry with us into adulthood. As Giddens states, "the hostilities provoked by anxiety in the infant can most easily be understood as reactions to the pain of helplessness" (ibid, p. 46). It is the same kind of "helplessness", I see expressed in the violent act of the "radicalized". Ontological security, as Giddens states, is necessary for a person's psychological well-being.

More than the helplessness over the fear of loss, Shutz describes the concept of "fundamental anxiety" as "I know I shall die and I fear to die" (Shutz, 1945, p. 544). Helplessness over the fear of loss and the fear of dying goes to show just how deeply important the need for ontological security is for humans and thus their intrinsic value in our motives for agency

Interestingly, Giddens (1991) refers to Goffman when he explains how humans rely on intersubjective relations to assure the mutual need for ontological security by way of "rituals of trust" in our day-to-day relations. "A person encountering another on the street shows by a controlled glance that the other is worthy of respect", Giddens writes to describe one of these ritual, "the face" and "the gaze" being the tools for ensuring ontological security (ibid, np. 47).

My hypothesis is that "the radicalized" are denied these rituals and thus become victims of a silent stigmatization that can only be observed in what I have called, "before discourse". How can you produce discourse out of a lacking gaze and face and yet, it is this very lack, that stabs like a knife

when experienced in the day-to-day relations, which I argue is the case for many of the “radicalized” (“stigmatized”).

Developing the concept of ontological security around the “identity” axis is motivated by my intention to investigate the relation between “stigmatizers”’ fear of and antagonism against “the Muslim” as a fear of losing their ontological security in terms of “identity.

Catarina Kinnvall (2004) pursues Giddens’ line of thought but adds an identity-centered dimension in terms of belonging to a nation or a region or a people. Kinnvall quotes Sigel, who argued that, “there exists in humans a powerful drive to maintain the sense of one’s identity, a sense of continuity that allays fear of changing too fast or being changed against one’s will by outside forces” (Sigel as quoted by Kinnvall, 2004, p. 747). Kinnvall links the need for ontological security to the need for what she calls “an identity signifier”, where belonging to a nation or a religion provides you with the sense of ontological security in times of radical change or in times of uncertainty. An crucial point for the purpose of my hypothesis, is Kinnvall’s argument, that the need for ontological security always implies an “other” in the process and that, “increasing ontological security for one person or group by means of nationalist and religious myths and traumas is thus likely to decrease security for those not included in the nationalist and/or religious discourse” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 763). Within the framework of this thesis, this is what I label the “ontological security dilemma”, where the Enlightenment arrogant and the “radicalized” can only find a peaceful way of co-existence if they are willing to place more trust in each other, if Europeans are willing to accept Muslims as “Europeans” without fear of this loss of ontological security.

Seeing ontological security in terms of identity and the fear of identity loss or identity alteration makes it possible to link the concept with that of “suicide sublime” as the result of misrecognition. As Taylor states,

“Identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *misrecognition* of others, and so a person or group can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back a confining or contemptible picture of themselves. Non recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of impression, imprisoning some in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor, 1994, p. 25).

This statement perfectly captures my idea of what has brought the "radicalized" to turn against those who misrecognize them as the result of the harm inflicted by decades of misrecognition, which has grown in them like a cancer.

The aim of my hypothetical claim though is not to "accuse" the Enlightenment arrogant, which would not be constructive. Rather, I attempt to investigate, why they stigmatize, for the solution to the problem lies within the motivations of others for the behavior that might need to be altered. It is by working on peoples' motivations for agency that you can bring on change. Therefore I introduce the term "identity preservation", which I borrow from Tariq Modood (2014), who explains how some majority groups feel they have a claim to identity preservation through "seniority" or "history" (p. 309). Minority groups thus deserve less right to preserve their cultural identity and must respect the privilege of the majority group as to whose cultural beliefs come first. Clearly, the Enlightenment arrogant seemingly believe that they should possess this privilege to identity preservation and that Muslims should let go of their cultural identity and assimilate, when the possible solution would be to share the privilege and try to make both identities co-exist.

While I have now explained my goffmanesque concepts and the way I operationalize them for my conceptual analysis, which replaces the traditional frame analytic method, I shall move on to my theory section, equally "alternative" since I build on traditional theory but join in with my own development of a goffmanesque "theory of human consciousness". Indeed, as I have explained in my methodology section, I have turned away from the traditional use of Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974; 1986) as a methodological model for frame analysis, led by the invisible hand of Goffman into his world of what I call goffmanian cynical sociology.

Reading Goffman's Frame Analysis became a revelation to me as I was overwhelmed by the sharpness and depth of his sociological gaze. I kept going further and further into the labyrinth of the goffmanian world, guided by the feeling that I could find something exceptional in his kind of sociology. The goffmanian sociology offers a sociological gaze that is perfectly suited for topics like mine, concerned with human consciousness and the values we hold, for this gaze has the ability to cut through hypocrisy and display the lack of morality, which I shall develop further in the following section.

4. THEORY

4. A Theory of Human Consciousness

Goffman's sociological gaze has the ability to see human nature in its naked truth. You get the impression that you can smell the bad breath and stink of sweat of humans, when reading Goffman. If you read his Frame Analysis (1974; 1986), you get the functional explanation of "how people snore" (p.14), how they frame reality behind a veil of deep hypocrisy and immorally correct behavior.

If you then turn to Stigma (1963), you are offered a gaze into the socio-psychological explanations, underlying the way people frame reality and why people "snore".

Running through the writings of Goffman is the idea that human nature is but a construct, held up by a patchwork of moral rules. He leaves little hope for those who seek faith in the beauty and noble state of human nature;

Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without" (Goffman, 1959, p. 45).

Goffman's gaze is almost too human and as Flanagan (2007) writes, "in seeking the very last detail to fulfill the ambitions of a perfect sociology that assembled all that analytically mattered, there is a worry, that what emerged was no man" (p. 156). Like Foucault who was accused of having killed the subject, Goffman could be accused of having killed the human.

On the contrary, Goffman's cynical sociology shows us the depth of human nature in a way that provokes epistemological, ontological and axiological reflections to the surface. Personally, Goffman's cynical sociology has made me reflect on the place of morality in research and the role of the researcher in trying to "awake people from their sleep", trying to work on human consciousness to change paradigms. That brings me back to the question of the role of the researcher in promoting societal change with the knowledge, she or he produces, the knowledge we are "armed with". Should the researcher take on a more active stance when he observes this immorality and hypocrisy in his research or is his role simply to send this knowledge out to the world as a weapon for others to do the fighting?

Goffman brilliantly describes the heavy weight of human hypocrisy in altering social reality, stating that "he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p.14).

Eliot Friedson (1983) sees Goffman as a "moralist" and his work as "a contribution to human consciousness" (p. 361). Despite the employment of Durkheimian rituals in his work, Goffman does not write in defense of society, but "in defense of the self against society (ibid, p. 362). This is particularly evident in *Stigma* (1963), but a crucial point is the fact that it is the stigmatized, the weak, the deviant, the people unable to maintain the "identity norms", I described in my method chapter, that Goffman defends. This is what makes Goffman's gaze so perfectly fitted for my thesis, where the two frames can tell a great deal, I hope, about human consciousness.

From the theory of human consciousness, I now move on to the overall theory of my thesis and the level of analysis hereafter.

4.1. Constructivism revisited; Goffman's structural functionalism

The theoretical ramifications for this thesis should be obvious from the beginning; the title tells. The ontology of my research here is constructivist, a stance that admits how, "social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors (Bryman, 2012, p. 33).

Asking, "who is Charlie", looking at the "vulnerability of social reality" and introducing a hypothesis all is a matter of constructivist perspective. Constructivism reads between the lines, sees beneath the surface, understands the unspoken and looks for answers in peoples' belief and values. The very word "construction", refers to a standpoint where the researcher sees social reality as a construct and considers these beliefs and values as the building blocks of knowledge.

As Bourdieu puts it, "all interests are particular historical constructions but interests are universal" (Bourdieu, in Wacquant, 1989, p. 41-42). The important question is whether it be possible to single out some of these "universal interests" as the main driving forces behind agency, as I tend to do, when I concentrate my analysis around my goffmanesque concepts. The interests, I have singled out are the need for recognition and ontological security.

But within the constructivist matrix, the important question is to decide the level of analysis you choose to conduct your research. Does structure, (society and institutions) come first and shape social actors' beliefs and values or is it the other way around. In other words, do we look at the

"situation", ritual interaction or do we look at the "frame", the social structure (Gonos, 1977, p. 854). The way I see it, Goffman offers a bridge between culture and cultures of meaning.

Goffman himself provides the answer in what I see as his claim to a mutual relationship between subject and structure;

Presumably, a 'definition of the situation' is almost always to be found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not *create* this definition, even though their society can be said to do so; ordinarily, all they do is to assess correctly what the situation ought to be for the, and then act accordingly" (Goffman, 1974, p. 1-2).

The particularity of Goffman's kind of constructivism is the combination of these levels of analysis into a kind of "partners in crime relationship" between social actors and society. In one of his rare interviews, Goffman explains how, even if social organization is the central reality, you still have to ask yourself, "what is it about individuals, what is it we have to assume about individuals so that they can be used, or be usable socially" (Goffman as quoted by Verhoeven, 1980, p. 322).

What I assume about individuals in this thesis is that they need mutual recognition and ontological security and how structure/society can provide this need for some (the enlightenment arrogant), while denying it to others "the stigmatized". Calling himself "a structural functionalist", Goffman explains how he differs from traditional social constructivism, where society is socially constructed (Bryman, 2012), in his belief that the individual does much of the construction herself or himself. Indeed, according to Goffman, the individual "comes to a world already in some sense or other, established" (Verhoeven, 1980, p. 323).

Goffman combines "l'analyse de l'ordre social" (the analysis of social order) and "l'analyse de l'action social" (the analysis of social action) (Demazière, 1991, p. 285). French sociologist Didier Demazière seems to see the same genius in Goffman in his ability to combine the micro- and macro level of analysis and explains how social order is sustained by social action. By way of "ajustements intersubjectifs" (intersubjective adjustments), rather than by "des contraintes interiorisées" (by internalized constraints) (ibid, p. 286).

This line of thought is important for the hypothesis of this thesis, that "radicalization" is in fact "stigmatization", as it is precisely this partners in crime subject-structure interdependency, I explore as a possible clue for understanding, how one frame is dominant and the other is silent.

In the following, I shall be more precise about my operationalization of this constructivist theoretical concept, I have excavated from Goffman's work.

4.2. The Subject-Structure Interdependency.

In a tribute to Erving Goffman after his death, French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu described Goffman as "the discoverer of the infinitely small" (Bourdieu 1983), describing how "Goffman's achievement was that he introduced sociology to the infinitely small, to the things which the object-less theoreticians and concept-less observers were incapable of seeing" (p. 112). Precisely this ability to "see", this particular sociological gaze is what I appreciate in Goffman's work and how I define the notion of "before discourse". It is as if Goffman had a particular ocular power and was able to combine micro- and macrosociology by looking at the infinitely small everyday rituals that construct the whole.

Goffman himself underplayed the importance of this infinitely small, the micro-subject level of sociology, stating in his monumental work, *Frame Analysis* (Goffman 1974; 1986), "I make no claim whatsoever to be talking about the core matters of sociology-social organization and social structure (p. 12). Yet, when you get to learn the goffmanesque way of thinking and building arguments, you come to understand how he uses anti-statements as statements. Thus, while stating a hierarchical relationship between structure and subject, where the former "is first" and the latter "comes second", it is likely and what I argue, that Goffman placed subject and structure at the same level in a sort of subject-structure interdependency.

At least, this subject-structure interdependency is a path, I shall follow in my analysis and to describe it, I would like to refer to Foucault's explanation of the term, "énoncé", the element of discourse, "before discourse" in his "Archéologie du savoir" (1969). Foucault describes the term "énoncé" as "le grain à la surface d'un tissu dont il est l'élément constituant" (p. 106-107), the infinitely small grain on the surface of a tissue, but still an element in the construction of the tissue. In the same way, the small rituals and day-to-day interactions at the subject level, that Goffman so brilliantly observed, despite being infinitely small are still elements in the societal structure. I believe, the small things at the micro level can tell us important things at the structure level, which I shall investigate further in my analysis.

The infinitely small is what most sociologists call symbolic interactionism but in his very own cynical way, Goffman refused to be fenced in within a particular school and rejects the label in the above mentioned interview, calling the label "reductionist" (Verhoeven, 1980, p. 317). In the interview, Goffman offers a reflection on symbolic interactionism, explaining how the archeology

of the concept is to be found in the particular trend that emerged in the seventies for sociologists to “classify themselves” in order to “make a club of their profession” (ibid, p. 328).

Goffman does though make use of the rituals and everyday interaction in his work, inspired by Durkheim as he explains in the Verhoeven interview (1980). Goffman’s use of “Durkheimian imagery”, according to Chriss (1993), “helps drive the sociological frame into the fine details of everyday life (MacCannell as quoted by Chriss, 1993, p. 472).

The infinitely small thus becomes useful in describing the overarching whole.

I would like to add a dimension to my constructivist, subject-structure level of analysis model by introducing what I have called Goffman’s “theory of human consciousness”. Rather than a theory in its own existence, it is a theoretical twist to my main theory, derived from my reflexive attitude towards sociology throughout this thesis. “Reflexivity not only entails self-awareness but also recognition of the place of the sociologist in what is constituted as sociological”, Flanagan writes (2007, p. 5). My reflexive stance runs through the entire thesis, from my reflections over method to theory and in the selection of my background material for the thesis, which I will explain further in the background section.

In the following, I explain the journey from frame analysis as method to a theory of human consciousness and I define the particular goffmanian sociological gaze, so suitable for the purpose of my thesis.

4.3. Frame Theory; a Framework of cultures of meaning

Reading Goffman’s Frame Analysis, I explained how I was somehow led by an invisible hand into an in-depth research of Goffman’s entire work and how this search made me decide not to do a traditional frame analysis but to develop a theory departing from this major goffmanian opus. I started reading research articles on Goffman’s work in order to find it, if others had seen the light in Goffman and thus began a journey into the goffmanian universe.

Most often, dealings with Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1974; 1986) evolve around his inspiration from Gregory Bateson’s study of animals at play, from which he created the central concept, “the key” (p. 43). From that point, Goffman developed a range of technical terms, like “fabrication”, “frame break”, “frame fantasy” and a wide variety of other tools for individuals to “frame” social reality, thus showing how vulnerable “reality” is due to the risk of misinterpretation or voluntary

misrepresentation. The book generally serves as a model for frame analysis, the methodological tool, I described in my method section.

It seemed to me though, that this almost six hundred pages long major opus of Goffman could tell us so much more. In its deeply cynical and cold functionalist description of how we humans stage ourselves and reality, I sensed a gaze that could pierce through human hypocrisy and immoral behavior in a way that could very well explain why the world at some points is so unjust and cruel. As Bennet Berger writes in the foreword to the 1986 edition of *Frame Analysis*;

“Under Goffman’s lens, we see a micropolitics as grimly cold and as cheerfully staged as international diplomacy. That may be why Goffman’s work -*Frame Analysis*-shows us a model for linking microsociology to macrosociology” (xviii).

Indeed, Goffman explains how human hypocrisy allow us to hide our real intentions behind a seemingly morally correct veil, how we are able to “appeal to signs of innocence, to indicators of innocuousness (...) to disguise or cover our threat” (Goffman, 1986; p. 486). To believe that the life on an individual has a structure and a core of his own is a “cultural lore” (p. 557), Goffman claims as he compares the individual to the character of a playwright. “If in fact personalities and lives are characterizable, popular lore may support wrong characterization or at best focus on small, arbitrary selection of the actual possibilities” (p. 557).

My reading of the term “frame” is not merely the cultural framework of experience but to a high extent also the frames of human nature that seem highly inhuman in Goffman’s gaze. Our tendency to frame reality, according to how we wish to frame ourselves, according to our beliefs is what I get from Goffman in this thesis. As I wrote previously, it is the bridging between culture and cultures of meaning. This reading of “framing” relates the concept to the concept of power, the power of those who are able to impose a frame but also the power in the possibility of framing but also the power in the fact that framing is so closely related to human nature and their cultures of meaning.

According to Goffman;

“Every definition of the situation, every continued application of a wonted frame, seems to presuppose and bank on an array of motivational forces, and through extreme measures any such balance

seems to be disruptable. To be able to alter this balance sharply at will is to exert power" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p.447).

I see an obvious linkage between Foucault and Goffman, where the Foucauldian notion of power as "régime of truth" (Foucault, as quoted by Gordon, 1980, p. 131) is similar to the Goffmanian notion of frames and framework. As Foucault stated, "each society has its régime of truth, (...): that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true (ibid, p. 131). Thus, framing can be said to be a power that produces knowledge, but a "keyed" and "fabricated" kind of knowledge in many cases by social actors who are motivated by dubious or distorted (self-interested) beliefs. Reality appraisal is not objective but based on, "what the situation ought to be" for us (p.2) and on our "subjective involvement" (p. 11) in that situation. We judge reality according to our cultural stereotypes, but as Goffman importantly states, these stereotypes are but a matter of perspective. Robert Jervis describes beliefs as a cognitive-emotive relationship where actors judge reality, "combining how they see the evidence and what their values and desires lead them to think should and must be true (Jervis, 2006, p. 642).

Goffman introduces the term "bracketing" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p. 7) which complements framing as a means for social actors to make sense of social reality within the framework of their beliefs. The term stems from Schutz who explains bracketing as a kind of "phenomenological *epoché*", where people "put in brackets the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him" (Shutz, 1945, p. 546).

The Goffmanian structural functionalism resides in this bridging between culture (society) and culture of meaning (of social actors) as "what people understand to be the organization of their experience, they buttress, and perforce, self-fulfillingly". But these understandings are part of the constitution of social structure as "social life takes up and freezes into itself the understandings we have of it" (p. 563).

The term, "primary framework" (p. 21) is what I see as the dominant frame, depending on our culture of meaning, our beliefs and values, which Goffman cynically tell us are not altruistic but highly egoistic. We humans pattern our reality appraisal on the primary framework and this is an extremely important point to consider. Indeed, if the primary framework is something close to a normative framework and is constituted out of our culture of meaning, our beliefs and values and again, these values and beliefs can be deeply hypocritical and thus immoral. The cold truth is that

"everyday life is but an adumbration of a pattern or model that is itself a typification of quite uncertain realm status", Goffman argues (p. 562).

Instead of Primary Framework, I introduce the concept of "before discourse" as a level of analysis that comes "before" the micro, macro and meso levels. Thus social actors, before they select a frame and a discourse (a framework of culture of meaning), they make choices about "see" and "place" at the "before discourse" level. Consequently, before we look into discourse to try to interpret what social actors think, what motivates them, we need to ask what they "see" before discourse and how they think about "place". Rather than "pattern or reality appraisal on something, we "see" social actors and social structure in a particular way and these choices create a chain reaction on the frame and discourse that constitute the framework of cultures of meaning.

The "before discourse" concept, the choices we make about "see" and "place" shall become clearer as I unfold it in my analysis where I shall unfold it further, taking it from abstract to concrete.

It is the "subject-structure-interdependency" concept, I have introduced that enables us to justify the frame and discourse we have selected, thus making it the dominant frame, which we shall also see in the analysis.

It may be that the "radicalization frame" is patterned on a morally incorrect primary framework, because the "norms" we build on, the choices we make about "see" and "place" at the "before discourse" level are based on our own beliefs and values and we might "believe" for example, that "the radicalized" do not deserve our recognition because we "see" them as "the external enemy" the "aggressive" and we do not "see" them as "an enemy who is one of us" and as "depressive". We connect "the radicalized" with a "place in the Middle East and not to a "place within our own societies, the "banlieue".

Being able to impose a frame is similar to power and all it takes to "misframe", Goffman argues, is "intent, immorality and resources" (Goffman 1974; 1986, p. 445). Goffman describes those who hold this power as The frameworks I deal with in this thesis are what Goffman calls "social frameworks", necessary for understanding human agency, but extremely vulnerable, because human agency can be "coaxed, flattered, affronted and threatened (p. 22). Human nature and social reality in a goffmanian reading come resemble a hypocritical absurd theater and as he declared, "the world is like a stage" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p. 124). Humans are "concerned with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression of (...) their immoral behavior" (Goffman, 1959, p. 251). "Framing" is the tool for that engineering and the frame is the stage (the social reality or social structure), frame business is all about "the social process" as Goffman argues (Goffman, 1981, p.

68). This social process is what I call the subject-structure interdependency, in Goffman's words, the process where "social structure (...) is affected by how we manage ourselves and are managed during episodes of face-to-face interaction" (ibid, p. 68).

The real power then resides in being able to know how you can work on peoples' beliefs and values in order to make them see a frame differently, as with the stigmatization frame in this thesis. By insisting on the hypocrisy and cynicism of human nature, what Goffman does is show us, how much power would be needed to change a frame, because you need to be able to change an entire cultural framework of meaning to do so. This is what I am curious to explore in this thesis where I use my goffmanesque concepts as the tissue of culture of meaning.

To resume, my theoretical scaffold to my research is an overall goffmanian constructivism, called structural functionalism, combined with the sub-theory of human consciousness and the subject-structure interdependency as a specific explanation for my level of analysis, which combines the micro- and the macro level. Importantly, the "before discourse" level of analysis differs radically from what Faist (ed. By Martinello & Rath, 2012) has called the "meso-level" of analysis (p. 60), which for example in immigrant research on why people move or move back, he defines as the relational between groups that pattern decision-making and is situated in between structure (macro) and the individual (micro).

Rather than "meso-level", I use the "before discourse" level of analysis and the subject-structure interdependency, which is a level "before" interaction between micro and macro level and which is explained predominantly by theory. I believe that the "meso-level" in the Faistian sense cannot tell us the entire "truth" about relational processes due to the hypocrisy and vulnerability of both social actors and social structure in their way of "framing" themselves and social reality and "selecting" the frame that fits their beliefs. Since this thesis is deeply goffmanesque, my underlying assumptions about human nature and society are Machiavellian and follow Goffman's claim that "the world is a stage" and "the individual is a stage performer" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p. 124). The "before discourse" is a combination of philosophy and theory designed to fit my research design in its deliberately philosophical-theoretical dimension, an important dimension of my research project. Theory serves to dig out the element I call "before discourse". Some background is necessary though as well as a small sample of empirical material in text form and before I begin answering my research and explore how the "radicalization frame" might be a "stigmatization frame" and develop

my philosophical-analytical discussion, I will provide this background and empirical material in the two following sections.

5. BACKGROUND

5. In and Out of Frame

Conducting a research project, writing a thesis implies that you “look” for answers, by “looking” at social actors in the social world.

Thus, research is all about “seeing”.

But the social world is a kaleidoscope, an immense patchwork of constituting bits and pieces, not a still picture or a painting in a frame and so the researcher must decide where he looks to find answers, she or he is deemed to “see selectively”.

And social actors are many and act at different levels in different settings, forcing the researcher to select who he “looks at”, who he “sees” when searching for answers.

Lastly, you cannot “see” what social actors think and read their mind as you cannot “see” what they feel and look into their hearts and soul, the “unseen”.

These are the dilemmas of epistemology and the sociological gaze; where do you look for knowledge, what and who do you look and where do you believe you can “see” the unseen.

Truly, research is all about “seeing”.

My selection of background material for the conduct of my study is deeply affected by these considerations. In French, “looking at something” translates by, “poser son regard” and “putting down your luggage” translates by “poser ses bagages”. The word “poser” means placing something somewhere and thus when you plan your research design and select your material, you decide where to “put down” or “place” your sociological gaze. The sociological gaze is your “ocular luggage” for conducting your study, the places you look for answers and the objects you decide to look at.

Place and gaze are essential elements in a research study, which I have endeavored to show in an alternative manner by my selection of background material.

For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen to “look at” two main elements, evolving around the question of place and gaze, the notion of “banlieue” and those we call, “radicalized”, the angry young men with Muslim background.

I could have chosen to look at a myriad of other elements but firstly, I am limited by the scope of this thesis and secondly, as I have explained, I have “selectively selected” where I place my gaze so

as to best be able to answer my research question, why we “see” radicalization and not stigmatization. My aim is to look into human consciousness in a socio-psychological way and is not political. I deliberately turn my gaze away from questions pertaining to political matters like the war in Syria, press freedom and freedom of speech, religion and numerous other places, one could have chosen to look at, concerning Charlie. Also, I do not refer to the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, although some have called Charlie, Europe’s 9/11”. A clear distinction needs to be drawn between the two kinds of “terrorism”, since there is no similar “banlieue” and “angry young men from the banlieue” problematic in the case of the US 9/11 terrorist attacks. At least, the way I see it within the scope of this thesis, where I challenge the fact that “Charlie” is a matter of Islamist radicalized terrorism in the and investigate the possibility of it being the expression of despair. To begin with, I shall provide a short lineout of the attack at Charlie Hebdo and about the magazine and show how I get from Charlie Hebdo to “Charlie” and then move on to the selected background material.

5.1. Charlie Hebdo, the Symbol

This thesis is not about the magazine Charlie Hebdo and does not carry any judgement about the publication of the Mohamed drawings or about freedom of press. The purpose with this section about the magazine is to explain, why the magazine was attacked and what the magazine symbolizes for the attackers, why “Charlie Hebdo” was seen as an enemy.

Charlie Hebdo is what you might call, part of the living room furniture in France. Disciples of Voltaire, symbol of the fight against religious fanaticism and free speech, the journalists and cartoonists are also deep red leftist critics of any dominant and abusive powers and very much also political powers (Malouf, rfi.fr January 8, 2015).

The magazine proudly defends the French notion of “laïcité”, the 1905 French law on the strict separation between church and state (La Loi de sèparation, histoire-pour-tous.fr) and thus naturally showed solidarity with Danish newspaper, Jyllandsposten by reproducing the so-called, Mohammed drawings in 2006, the “caricature” drawing by Danish journalist, Kurt Westergarard of the prophet with a bomb in his turban, which sparked the Mohammed crisis in Denmark and send dead threats from the Arab world Muslim communities over the head of the Danish newspaper (Truc, lemonde.fr January 7, 2015)

November 2, 2011, Charlie Hebdo titles its first page, “Charia Hebdo” and puts “Mohamed” in the place of editor in chief for the day in honor of the election of the Islamist party in Tunisia. All was

done in the spirit of criticizing all forms of extremism with a good laugh on the lip. Yet, the same day, the magazine was set on fire by a Molotov cocktail and voices from the Arab world declared war on the magazine. Charlie Hebdo had become the public enemy number one in the Arab world and all though in France, some Muslims expressed strong antagonism towards Charlie Hebdo it was in the traditional Muslim communities that anger came closer to a declaration of war.

Six years later, the declared enemy was hit, not by foreign soldiers from the Arab world but by what you might call, “one of us”, two Frenchmen?!...

5.2. “On a tué Charlie Hebdo!”

January 7, 2015, two young men, heavily armed enter the main office of French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo and kill 12 people. Among the victims are four of France’s most well-known and beloved cartoonists, “the historical members of the magazine”, Charb, Cabu, Wolinsky and Tignous. After the killing, in the street outside the offices, the two men raise their arms in victory with their weapons pointing towards the sky and shout, “Allahou Akbar, on a tué Charlie Hebdo”. In the name of the prophet, we have killed Charlie Hebdo (Attaque contre Charlie Hebdo: le récit, lemonde.fr January 8, 2015).

Choc and horror in France and soon in the entire world over what everybody called, “a horrible islamist terrorist attack” (Attentat á Charlie Hebdo: le Monde entier, leparisien.fr January 7, 2015). The attackers had left their identity papers in the abandoned car and therefore quickly became known as, “les frères Kouachi”, two brothers, (32 and 34) born and raised in France (Attentat contre Charlie Hebdo, lemonde.fr January 8, 2015).

The following days would turn into a manhunt when police started to track down the two brothers which ended in a double hostage situation, when an acquaintance of the Kouachi brothers, Amédy Koulibaly took a group of people hostage in a Jewish Supermarket and the two brothers hit in a factory, where they took two people hostage. The Charlie Hebdo attacks ended with 17 people killed as well as the three perpetrators (La biographie des dix-sept victims, liberation.fr January 10, 2015).

January 14, Al Qaïda took responsibility for the killing at Charlie Hebdo and investigations showed how the two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi were under surveillance as possible “radicalized Islamist terrorists”, had a long criminal background in French prison and had been to Al-Qaïda training camps in the Middle East (Attentats de Charlie Hebdo europe1.fr January 9, 2015).

As I wrote earlier, the two brothers were born and raised in Paris, France in a family with Muslim background, but a French family. Still, the brothers were never mentioned as “two Frenchmen” but as “two radicalized terrorists” (Ce que l’On Sait, lemonde.fr January 9, 2015) as if their life had begun in prison, not at birth in French society

That was what puzzled me and somehow annoyed me and left me with a feeling that we did not “look” in the right direction. I kept wondering why we did not “see” the two brothers as “French” instead of seeing them as “radicalized terrorists” and look at, how they had become “radicalized”.

As I saw it, two Frenchmen had turned against “one of them”, their own fellow citizens and had decided to fight the cause of foreign army, far away from Paris in the Middle East.

Obviously, a majority did not see things this way as “Charlie Hebdo” soon became, “Je suis Charlie”.

5.3. From Charlie Hebdo to “Je suis Charlie”

“Je suis Charlie” the entire world seemed to pronounce with one voice soon after the attack.

Then French President, Francois Holland organized “La Marche Républicaine” and invited 47 state leaders to walk the streets of Paris that had become the symbol of “European values”, Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité (Marche Républicaine, libération.fr January 11, 2015)

“Charlie” became the slogan for all those who proclaimed, they were fighting for press freedom and against terrorism and a week after, 4 million people marched through the streets of Paris and the slogan, that had gone viral, “Je suis Charlie”, written on cards, cheeks, fronts, statues, walls and everywhere, you could write. The slogan had started as a simple tweet from French Joachim Ronchin, who had written the name “Charlie” with the same font as on the cover of the Charlie Hebdo magazine (Cassely, slate.fr January 7, 2016). Ronchin is a graphical designer and declares that he only wished to express solidarity with Charlie Hebdo and did not mean to impose an agenda. It seemed he did, though.

Those calling themselves “Charlie” declared their resistance to the dark forces from what was called, “Le monde Arabe” (Marche Républicaine, libération.fr, January 8 2015), the Arab world and the radical Islamism of the Middle.

But the Middle East is not the “10. Arrondissement”, the part of town in Paris, where the attackers were born and raised”, I thought. True, in the Middle East there are dark forces and radical Islamism and it is where Al-Qaïda has its roots. It is in “le monde arabe”, not in French or European societies, the foreign army sits.

Again, I was puzzled by this lack of distinction between the Arab world and the traditional Muslim communities and the European societies. The important question, it seemed to me, was how has this foreign army far away on another continent, in the Middle East managed to recruit soldiers within our own communities here in France and Europe, I wondered.

Sadly, “Charlie” became the “prélude” to a wave of “radicalized Islamist terrorism” in Europe and focus was on the radical Islamism in the Arab world and most people, especially the political right-wing tried to link terror to being “immigrant, “most of the “terrorists” were nationals”(Sénécat lemonde.fr, 2017 February 14).

Common to all attacks was that the attackers either had grown up, had live or had ties to the “banlieue”, the sensible, peripheral suburbs in the European cities, like Saint Denis in Paris, France or Molenbeek in Brussels Belgium (Werly, letemps.ch November 18 2015).

And common for all reactions was that focus was on Al-Qaïda and radicalized Islamism in the Arab world, not on our own communities in Europe and that the phenomenon, we witnessed was an attack against European values. The closest you could come when searching for some sort of link to Europe was the term, “European jihadist” (Devecchio, lefigaro.fr March 23, 2017).

Why not “see” these “European jihadists”, soldiers in a holy war, as “the stigmatized”, children of our own societies, fighting against misrecognition, from not “being seen”.

“We have killed Charlie Hebdo” might as well be, “see me and see my frustration and suffering”. Introducing my hypothesis on “stigmatization” instead of “radicalization”, I try to make plausible this way of “seeing Charlie.

This brings me back to my reflections on “place” and “gaze”, which I shall develop around the notion of “banlieue” and the “radicalized terrorists” that we refuse to “see” as French or Europeans but who are, the enemy from within and from the “banlieue”.

All though I look at the French “banlieue”, I stress the point that this thesis is concerned with how human consciousness “sees” selectively and how humans “select” the place, they place their gaze when evaluating social reality. This is not a case study of French society but a study that studies the case of human consciousness, cultures of meaning, the vulnerability of social reality and uses the case of Charlie as a kind of “moderatum generalization” (Williams as quoted by Bryman, 2012, p. 406). This kind of generalization uses a particular case as a point of departure as the researcher believes this case can serve as a pattern for broader studies. You might say, I am attempting to “lift my gaze” and see “Charlie” more like a philosophical-analytical case for studying social reality, rather than like a case study in itself.

Consequently, the “banlieue” also serves a symbolic function that goes beyond the mere definition of a geographical place, which I shall explain next.

5.4. The “Banlieue”, “Place” of suffering“.

If you look at the epistemology of the French word for suburb, “banlieue”, you will find the French word, “lieu”, meaning “place”.

“Place” is a term along with the verbum “to see” or “look at” that I use throughout the conduct of this study. This particular operationalization of “place” and “gaze” came to me the same way I conceived my research design; as if led by an invisible hand in an unexpected direction. In the process of working with the material for my thesis, I kept returning to the notions of “seeing” and “places we see or look at” or “places we do not see or look at”. This constant return to “seeing” and “place” shaped my analysis and runs like a red thread through the entire thesis. “Seeing” and “place” perfectly resume the considerations from my introduction about “seeing” Charlie the same way, Foucault sees the Vélasquez, Las Meninas painting, which I called a labyrinth of visual fields, making it difficult to find a “place” where you “see” best.

Thus “banlieue” is not only a place in a geographical sense, but also a mental place and a place for epistemological considerations. I operationalize “banlieue” as a “ghetto”, a term which is generally avoided in France by politicians who do not wish to stir up the fire. French sociologist, Loïc Wacquant describes the ghetto with the following four characteristics; Le stigmata (ghettoized citizens are considered ‘different’ and ‘dangerous’, constraint, territorial confinement and institutional parallelism’ (Wacquant as quoted by Molénat, alternatives-economiques.fr January 30, 2015).

The banlieue or suburbs like Saint Denis, Paris or Molenbeek, Brussels are places, situated at the periphery of cities and populated by people at the periphery of society, many of which have Muslim background. These places are often labelled, sensible or dangerous “cités” (small village community) and associated with term, “cites dortoir”, sleeping or sleeping room village communities, referring to the lack of dynamism involvement in broader society due to the high level of unemployment and rate of criminality (Veillard-Baron, Avril 5 2006). “Sleeping” is a very suited term for the banlieue, for despite decades of government policies, aimed at better inclusion of these “ghettoes” and millions spent on urban planning, education, job creation and other “plans pour les banlieux” (Boëton, lacroix.fr February 13 2017). Yet, in France, the grey ghetto still exists and the water in the swamp is still rotten.

For decades, you have heard about the suffering in the banlieue, especially by the young Muslims who feel excluded from the broader community both because of their identity as “banlieusards”, people from the banlieue and as Muslims. Robert Castel (2007) strikingly describes the grey ghetto and the suffering in the aforementioned book, *la Discrimination Négative* and media has been describing “la souffrance des banlieues” and the dullness of life in the grey and dirty ghetto of the young Muslim banlieusards (Ketfi, liberation.fr/bondyblog.fr, April 30, 2010) for decades. Still, the banlieue is still a sleeping swamp and has now turned into a “terreau du terrorisme”, a breeding place for terrorism and a “place of recruitment for jihadism by foreign soldiers from the Middle East (Khosrokhavar, scienceshumaines.com, November 23, 2015).

In 2002, what you call a “livre choc”, “Les Territoires perdus de la République” (Brenner, 2002) appeared in France and provoked the same effect as the Danish TV2 documentary, “Moskeerne bag sløret” (Dam, dfi.dk March 8, 2016). “Revealing” how Muslims from the banlieue “hate Jews” and cause fear among teachers in the banlieue schools in history teaching on the Holocaust stirred a popular revolt against these “dangerous young Muslims” in a way that was out of proportion and with the book, based on dubious and seemingly biased “facts”. This kind of anti-Muslim from the banlieue-propaganda can be commonly observed in France (and in Europe) with the example of prominent intellectuals, taking a stance against these “outcasts”. In France, French writer, Jewish Eric Zemmour, who declared in an interview on public television, that “the French Army should reconquer the banlieues, these lost territories, with help from the Israelian Army (Eric Zemmour: l’Armée, francais.rt.com September 2016).

Indeed, the banlieue is a “place” that a lot of people “see” but at the same time, a place that a lot of people look away from, which relates to my two frames. If you accept to “see” the suffering in the banlieue, it could make plausible the “stigmatization frame”. If you choose to look away and not “see” the suffering in the banlieue, it “justifies the “radicalization frame”.

And if you choose to look towards the Arab world and the traditional Muslim communities as the “place” for understanding social reality, it helps maintain the radicalization frame as radicalized Islamist terror.

If on the contrary, you turn your gaze to the banlieue as the “place” to look for an explanation, it enables the stigmatization frame and the concepts of “retour de stigma” and “suicide sublime”.

The “banlieue” thus becomes a symbol for both a geographical “place” but also a mental “place” in the sense that those that are “seen” as radicalized terrorists are connected to the “banlieue” even if they do not live there but only have links to people in these areas. The “banlieue” in its symbolic

function goes beyond the territorial space and enters the mental sphere when we see it as this “terreau du terrorisme”, this breeding ground for terrorism” and those we negatively connect to this “place” drag the banlieue along with them as a place of suffering, both mental and territorial.

5.3. “See me”; Young angry Muslim man from the “banlieue”

Thus, “on a tué Charlie Hebdo”, we have killed Charlie Hebdo is seen as an expression of hatred from “them” against “us” and the two attackers are associated with the banlieue, not as a “place” of suffering but as this “terreau du terrorisme” (Khosrokhavar, scienceshumaines.com, November 23, 2015).

The two attackers thus also become a symbol of those we chose to “see” as “that kind of young angry men with Muslim background” that we are likely to find in this “terreau”, in the “banlieue. Sad twist of irony, the day of the Charlie Hebdo killing, the journalists and cartoonist were having a meeting precisely about the problems with the young angry Muslim men from the banlieue. One of the killed cartoonists, the well-known and beloved extreme leftist humanist, Tignous had lived all his life in the Saint Denis banlieue and was extremely sensible to the sufferings of what he termed, “these voluntary jihadists from our own banlieues”, which he saw as the “latter-day misérables” (Lancon, nybooks.com January 21, 2015).

The Kouachi brothers who attacked Charlie Hebdo share the same profile with most of the other “radicalized terrorists” in the following wave of attacks in France and Belgium. They were nationals, not foreign soldiers from the Middle East, although when people say, “Je suis Charlie” you get the impression they form a resistance group against foreign occupation.

Indeed, most attackers were nationals and most of them either came from or had strong ties to the banlieue. In France, out of 27 cases of attacks related to terrorism, only seven attackers were not French, most attackers are born French in France (Sénécat, lemonde.fr, February 14, 2017).

Looking back on their live story, as in the Kouachi case, you find a history of small scale criminality, “loosers”, smoking hash and without a job, lost souls who become “radicalized” in prison and have been under surveillance by the police for years due to their relation with Islamist radical groups (Chichizola, lefigaro.fr January 8, 2015). The younger Kouachi brother was one of these “loosers” according to the lawyer, Vincent Ollivier who defended his case back in 2005, when he was accused of belonging to a group of Islamic terrorists, the Buttes Chaumont group and the lawyer describes how he, saw a frightened and frustrated young man with French citizenship and Muslim background from a family with roots in Algeria. “He didn’t know what to do with his life

and from one day to the other he met these radical Islamists, who made him feel important” (Chichizola, lefigaro.fr January 8, 2015).

Survivor of the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and close friend to Tignous, Phillippe Lancon tells how his friend kept insisting on the poor treatment of the Muslim “banlieusards” and persisted in asking himself, “just what the French state had actually done to avoid these furious monsters” (Tignous as quoted by Lancon, nybooks.com, January 21, 2015).

On January 7, 2015, Tignous along with seven colleagues from Charlie Hebdo was killed by two of these “furious monsters”.

Introducing the hypothesis of a stigmatization frame in this thesis implies that I go along with the perspective of Tignous and investigate the theory of the two attackers at Charlie as this furious monster, an enemy from within, an alien (or alienated) , our Frankenstein monster.

Asking if Charlie is radicalization or stigmatization comes down to asking who created these “furious monsters”, the fanatic Islamists in the Middle East or the enlightenment arrogant...

To sum up, you might ask whether these young men expressed sympathy for the devil or apathy...

6. EMPIRICS AS STEPPING STONE

6. Discourse to “hang my hat on”

I have stressed the use of theory as my main empirical material and how I wish to make my thesis mainly theoretical in the sense that I look at theory, rather than looking into discourse to find my possible answers.

Nevertheless, I will make limited use of discourse material but only as introduction material for the stigmatization frame to add validity to the hypothesis that such a reading would be possible in the first place. I include this material in order to show in discourse, where I see “stigmatization” and the “silent frame” so as to add validity to my proposition. Thus, I will have something to start from when I build the hypothesis, an introduction material. This material is something to “hang my hat on” in the first place when introducing my hypothesis but it will not serve as material for a traditional constructionist discourse analysis (Bryman, 2012, p. 529) but merely as an example of the “knowledge we are armed with” but that I advance, we have not used.

I include a small body of discourse material that shows the “radicalization frame” and the statements or acts, concerning “European values” that have inspired my concept of “Enlightenment arrogance”. Again, this material only serves to add validity to my Enlightenment arrogance concept

in the sense that the material will show that I have something to build my concept from, not that everybody would call this discourse enlightenment arrogance but that at least the discourse on European values exists.

Similar to the way I use material, concerning the stigmatization frame, this material serves as a starting point for my philosophical-analytical discussion of why we “see “radicalization and not “stigmatization” and not as empirics for a discourse analysis.

To resume, this part of my empirical material does not serve as evidence in this research project but as elements from which I can depart when I conduct my research

6.1 Introduction material for the Stigmatization Frame

Speaking after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the mayor of Evry, Manuel Valls referred to the 2005 Paris ghetto suburb riots that “left scars that are still here” and led to the current state of division in France, he said. In 2005, Valls was mayor of the town of Evry, where unrest was at its highest and already then, he had warned against the growing segregation of Muslim communities, especially in the “banlieue” from French society in general; “each crisis is bigger, harsher and deeper, more revealing of the failure of our integration model” (Smith, New York Times, November 5, 2005).

Based on these events, Robert Castel (2007) published his “livre-choc”, *La Discrimination Négative*”, a lions roar about the frustration in the banlieue and his claim that the young Muslims from the banlieue, “like the vagabond and the proletarian suffer heavily from stigmatization (ibid, p. 806).

The same year, a 256 pages report from the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, “Jeunesse dans les quartiers populaires: Guide á la reflexion méthodologique sur les politiques” (europeanCouncil.fr, February 2007) was sent out to all member states of the EU after an in-depth study of the “banlieue” with guidelines for better inclusion of the young marginalized. The report makes numerous references to the Castel book and likewise point to the state of social suffering in the banlieue. Focus is on the need for recognition of young people from the “banlieue” in search of a positive identity and stresses the need for socio-psychological policies in order to avoid the dangers of such marginalization. The report explains how, logically these young people in search of an identity that society cannot offer (...) will try to (re)build and construct an identity by their own means and invent their own way to be recognized and socially integrated (ibid p. 33).

The report emphasizes the negative representation of the “banlieue” as a ghetto and the “ordinary racism” and stereotyping of Muslims from the banlieue as “Arabs” (ibid, p. 37) despite the fact that they are born in France and are French. This alienation and feeling of not belonging to society explains the high abstention vote at elections, seventy percent do not participate in elections (ibid, p. 31).

The frustrated youth from the banlieue was also the object of a large study by US Home Office appointed Special Commissioner for Europe on the question of European Muslims, Farah Pandith, who travelled around Europe after the Danish Mohamed crisis in 2006 to investigate “what it means to be Muslim in Europe” and elaborates on her findings after the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Media Conference Call, Council on Foreign Relations January 9, 2015). Between 2007 and 2009, Pandith travelled throughout Europe to talk to young Muslims and explains how she “saw firsthand” how most young Muslims suffer for a severe “identity crisis” (ibid, p. 5). Pandith warned about the need for a counter narrative to extremists who otherwise easily can thrive on this frustration and use these young people as “cannon fodder” (ibid, p. 22).

After the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok argued that the problem with “radicalized terror” is a European question and warns about focusing on repressive measures, arguing that, “overall is the question of isolation of these people within the societies of the EU, within the Muslim societies (“MEP Elmar Brok Highlighting isolation”, euranetplus-inside.eu, January 19, 2015).

This material is just a small limited sample of discourse that allows me to show that for decades, there has been voices pointing to the dangers of stigmatizing or ignoring the suffering and frustration of young Muslims at the margin of society which I call the silent frame. It merely serves to show that I have something to hang my hat on when I advance the hypothesis of a stigmatization frame from evidence that does not only exist in my mind, but also in discourse.

Thus, I can proceed with the introduction of my hypothesis, based on some sort of validity and explain, how what happened at Charlie Hebdo and the following terrorist attacks by marginalized nationals with Muslim background leads me to advance the hypothesis of a stigmatization frame that has remained the “silent frame”.

6.2 Material for Enlightenment Arrogance in Radicalization Frame

Reactions to the attack on Charlie Hebdo were strongly emotional and the attack was problematized as an attack on European values.

In a joint statement from the European Interior Ministers, invited to Paris by the French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, the ministers stated;

We reaffirm our unfailing attachment to the freedom of expression, to human rights, to pluralism, to democracy and to the rule of law. (...) By attacking Charlie Hebdo (...) the terrorists set out to tear down these universal values”

(“Paris Attacks: Joint Statement”, uk.ambafrance.org, January 11, 2015).

The Ministers emphasized the need for “detecting radicalization at an early stage” and declare their determination to not let terrorists “sow hatred, fear and division in our communities”.

President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker stated that the attack on Charlie Hebdo was “an intolerable and barbaric act which concerns us all as human beings and Europeans” (“Statement by President Juncker”, europa.eu January 7, 2015).

European Council President, Donald Tusk expressed his deep shock at this “brutal attack against our fundamental values, against freedom of expression which is a pillar of our democracy. He went on to explain how “the fight against terrorism must continue unabated” (“Statement by Donald Tusk”, ec.europa.eu January 7, 2015).

At the above mentioned Paris Interior Minister meeting with Cazeneuve, Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos held a speech in which he stated that Europe must come together against “those who reject our way of life and who hate our democracy” (“Discours du Commissaire”, European Commission press release, europa.eu January 11, 2015). The Commissioner finished the speech, proclaiming that “Charlie is not dead. Europe is Charlie”.

High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini at a summit on violent extremism after the attack at Charlie Hebdo and “Krudttønden” in Denmark, stated that, “Europe will not give up its values” and guaranteed that extremism would not be allowed to “use our diversities against us” (“Speech by High Representative”, eeas.europa.eu February 19, 2015). “Diversity is our strength, diversity is who we are. Diversity is what scares them”, Mogherini pursued.

The Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy of the Council of Europe send out a statement after Charlie Hebdo, stating that the attacks were “attacks against the very values of democracy and freedom in general” (Doc 13684, assembly.coe.int January 27, 2015).

Lecturer at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht, Piotr Kaczynski stated that “the shooting at Charlie Hebdo was a war attack not only on France, but on fundamental

European values and freedom of speech. It could happen elsewhere" (Kaczynski, euractiv.com January 13, 2015). Kaczynski continued, stating that, "there is no room in European societies for violent extremism. Democracy is a system where all views are welcome and can be debated and exchanged, but peacefully. Violence is excluded" (ibid).

I base my concept of Enlightenment arrogance on this discourse, which is but a small sample of similar discourse from officials, centered on the attack on European values and use this discourse material to show how the radicalization is the dominant discourse and how official voices see "radicalization" and "terrorists" and do not "see" "stigmatization" and vulnerable young Muslim men from the banlieue, suffering from misrecognition.

7. ANALYSIS: HYPOTHESIS

7. Resuming the Roadmap of Research

I have now explained all the parts of my thesis and how I shall proceed, I have presented the skeleton of inquiry and now I shall breed life into the beast. Before I proceed, I should like to draw attention back to page 14 of this thesis where I present a graphic model for my research design, useful as the roadmap of research for what follows.

To resume, I shall begin with the building of my hypothesis that "Charlie" or what in the dominant discourse is seen as "radicalized terrorism" might also be "seen" as the result of "retour de stigma", decades of stigmatization of young men with Muslim background from the "banlieue" or associated with the symbolic value of the banlieue. I use my Goffmanesque concepts of "retour de stigma" and "suicide sublime", supported by Honneth's theory of recognition and Goffman's theory of Stigma as the analytical tool for my investigation and conduct my investigation within the theoretical ramifications of Goffmanian Frame Theory which is what I get from his Frame Analysis (1974; 1986) as I have found it more useful and enriching as theory rather than as the method of traditional frame analysis.

I have decided to use Goffman's work on Frame Analysis in an alternative way and not as a method, the traditional frame analysis and use framing as a theory to explain the functional mechanisms of the subject-structure interdependency that lie behind the way social reality is "seen". For the socio-psychological explanations, I turn to what I called Goffman's theory of human consciousness, a cynical sociological deep gaze into human nature, particular to Goffman.

Next, I shall use the same procedure in order to deconstruct the radicalization frame this time introducing the concept of “enlightenment arrogance”, supported by the notion of ontological security.

At the heart of my work lies the philosophical-analytical discussion of why we see radicalization and not stigma, which will lead me to a discussion of what we do with the knowledge, we are “armed with”.

I conclude by some further philosophical reflections on research as I wish to contribute with some thought about research and the role of the researcher as a knowledge producer and thus as a provider for building stones in the construction of social reality.

7. Constructing the “Stigmatization” frame

Throughout the intellectual journey on processing material for this thesis, I constantly returned to the notion of “seeing” and “place”. How do we “see” social reality, what do we chose to “see” and what do we look away from. Where is the “place” to look for knowledge about social reality and where do we “place” social actors in our reality appraisal.

I have introduced the term “before discourse” which in a sense is a level of analysis before the micro, macro and meso levels. Indeed, “before discourse” is a combination of “see” and “place” meaning that at this level of analysis, we look at the choices people make about social actors and societal structure both mentally and geographically “before” they interact; “what”, “how”, “where” “who” they “see” before they judge reality. But “see” is also connected with “looking away”, in our reality appraisal, we do an ocular selection of what we “see” and what we choose to look away from. This selection and questioning about “seeing” is important “before” we look for meaning in discourse because once discourse is “uttered” and “out there” in text or action at the subject level or in institutionalization at the structure level, social actors (and the researcher) have already made choices about “see” and “place”.

When judging the “reality” of Charlie, when we “see” it as “radicalized terrorism” by “terrorists”, we have already implicitly made decisions on “place”, both geographically and mentally about the attackers. We have made the choice not to connect the attackers to the “banlieue” as “place” but to the dark forces in the Middle East, in the Arab world. Thus, when we “look away” from the banlieue and “see” the Arab world, we are able to “look away” from the banlieue as a place of suffering which excludes the discourse of social suffering that would make it plausible to “see” Charlie as a result of this suffering in the banlieue.

This connects “before discourse” to my use of frames as a theory in my particular reading of Goffman’s *Frame Analysis* (1974; 1986) where I see frames the way Foucault sees “discourse” (Foucault, 1969). Indeed, I see a link between Goffman and Foucault in the sense that both are concerned with a certain kind of structuralism that tries to separate subjectivity from either discourse in Foucault’s case or from different cultures of meaning, (framework) in Goffman’s case. Indeed, Foucault (1969) explains in the *Archeology of Knowledge* how he separates the subject from discourse in order to be able to observe “la diversité des discours” (ibid, p.261), the diversity of discourses. Foucault sees discourse the way Goffman sees frames, as small universes of cultures of meaning. In much the same way, Goffman separates the subject from “frames” that are the mental framework of discourse.

Thus social actors select a frame, the way they select a discourse and they do that by making choices about “see” and “place” at the “before discourse” level. Consequently, before we look into discourse to try to interpret what social actors think, what motivates them, we need to ask what they “see” before discourse and how they think about “place”.

It is the “subject-structure-interdependency” concept, I have introduced that enables us to uphold the frame and discourse we have selected, thus making it the dominant frame.

If Structure (society and institutions) “see” radicalization and “terrorism” by using those words and if structure builds its frame around “radicalization” and “terrorism”, it constructs the frame and discourse of insecurity, threat, danger and structural institutions like “religion”, “police”, and prison (where the “terrorists become “radicalized”), then subject (social actors) are able to explain their actions and views in terms of fear, protection against an external enemy, antagonism against a “violent” religion and thus to see themselves as the victims. Moreover, the lack of moral considerations in structural arrangements like “citizenship” makes it possible for subject to reject the argument that there is suffering and marginalization in the banlieue because “they are part of society, they enjoy citizenship”. Structure does not nuance between formal and actualized citizenship and does not ask of subject to do “moral justice” in the Hegelian sense to the people from the banlieue. Moral justice, Honneth (2007) explains is Hegel’s claim that intersubjective acknowledgement is close to a moral duty, which if denied becomes a “moral injustice” that will cause a “mental shock” or a “moral injury” (ibid, p. 134). Such a moral duty does not exist in the subject-structure dependency of our society which is why, subject-structure work together like partners in crime in enabling each other to reject any responsibility in the “Charlie” problematic.

If I am able to build the hypothesis of a stigmatization frame, it would imply that structure “sees” institutions like psychology, stigmatization, marginalization, “moral justice-actualized citizenship” and the banlieue as the main “place” to look for the disease. This choice of frame and discourse would place an element of responsibility on the shoulders of both structure and subject. That would be the case in the hypothesis I advance where I look at the banlieue of suffering as “place”.

7.2. Stigma of the “Banlieu”: “Place” of Suffering

To be able to build my hypothesis, I have made my choices about “see” and “place” as I “see” the attackers in connection to the banlieue as “place” and thus place them within our own societies, not in the Arab world. I “see” the banlieue as a place of suffering and thus, I am able to select a discourse or a frame where the way I “see” and the “place” I look will have implications for my entire discourse or frame, in other words for the entire cultural framework of meanings that follows where everything is connected as in a chain reaction. .

Indeed, both mentally and geographically, I have made my choices about “see” and “place” before I introduce my hypothesis of reading “Charlie” as the result of “stigmatization.

When I connect the attackers to the banlieue as “place and “see” the banlieue as a place of suffering, it allows me to “see” the attackers as vulnerable and depressive instead of hateful and aggressive and the entire frame and the frame/discourse chain reaction begins.

If I “see” the banlieue as “place” and associate it to a place of suffering, the geographical implication is that the problem thus becomes situated within our own societies and we would thus have to look at ourselves and ask why “one of our own” attacks us.

If the attackers are vulnerable and depressive, I am able to “see” them as victims, not as aggressors.

If the attackers are victims, I may ask, who hurt them, who made them vulnerable.

In order to “see” stigmatization instead of radicalization, I chose to “see” the silent frame I have shown in my empirical section and to “see” that there is suffering in the banlieue among the young angry Muslim men, who feel frustrated and marginalized.

From the perspective of a “before discourse” evolving around the banlieue as “place”, geographically as “place of suffering” mentally, thus seeing the attackers as vulnerable victims, the frame and discourse of Charlie as an enemy from afar, two aggressive terrorists filled with hatred against “us”, appears deeply distorted and could then be seen as a misinterpretation of social reality.

If as I do in this hypothesis, I “see” two depressive young men filled with despair and desperate for recognition, crying, “we have killed the feeling of injustice”, the radicalization frame would be like a patient coming to the doctor with a headache and the doctor focusing on the patient’s foot. And indeed, reality appraisal can be seen as social actors being the doctor who diagnoses societal problems (or illnesses) and tries to find the right medicine to cure the illness. If we misjudge reality, then we will be proscribing the wrong medicine, which in the case of “Charlie” would imply that if we see radicalization and see security measures and prevention as the medicine, but the illness is stigmatization and socio-psychological measures are the right medicine, then the illness will not be cured.

In short, I see the violent act as an expression of despair, the need to make yourself noticed and the need for recognition” (Castel, 2007, p. 806).

7.3. The need for recognition as driving force

In order to “see” stigmatization instead of radicalization, I chose to “see” the silent frame I have shown in my empirical section and to “see” that there is suffering in the banlieue among the young angry Muslim men, who feel frustrated and marginalized.

In order to explain how stigmatization can lead to this attack, I need to make some hypothetical assumptions about a quasi-normative basic human need, the need for recognition. Moreover, I must assume that recognition is intersubjective and that we need others in order to feel recognized. I look to Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition (Honneth 1995) as a support for that claim and make use of some of his other work on recognition to unfold the argument. I add further strength to Honneth’s theory by introducing my goffmanian theory of stigma, which serves to describe the world in which the stigmatized live and I draw on my own goffmanian theory of human consciousness to explain the rituals that allow us to hide stigmatization behind an immoral veil.

Following my research design, I employ my goffmanesque concepts of “retour de stigma” and “suicide sublime” as my methodological tool in order to construct my argument and explain what motivates the action of those we call “radicalized”, based on the need for recognition. -the lack of recognition “endangers the identity of human beings, just as infection with a disease endangers their physical life (Honneth 1995, p.135).

As Honneth argues, “the feeling of disrespect from lack of recognition can result in “psychological death”, social death” and in the case of cultural-societal lack of recognition, can work on humans like an illness, provoking “scars” and “injuries” (Honneth, 1995, p. 135).

Building his argument on object relations theory and explaining the relation between mother, "primary caretaker" and child, Honneth explains how "aggressive tendencies are reactive efforts to cope with failures and injuries that have their source in social relationships" (Honneth 2014, p. 221). I have presented the concept of "ontological security" as a tool for explaining drives in both frames. In the stigmatization frame, I use Giddens' (1991) understanding of ontological security which resembles Honneth's view of recognition as an element depending on well-functioning intersubjective relations. Like the need for recognition, the need for ontological security takes its origin in early childhood where we experience the fear of being abandoned and thus associate it with a feeling of anxiety that we carry with us into adulthood. As Giddens states, "the hostilities provoked by anxiety in the infant can most easily be understood as reactions to the pain of helplessness" (Giddens, 1991, p. 46). Ontological security, as Giddens states, is necessary for a person's psychological well-being.

It is by seeing society as the "mother" and the attackers as "society's children" that I am able to justify my claim that society has caused harm by "neglected care and attention" towards these "children". Neglect from not "seeing" them and not seeing the "place they live in, the banlieue as a place of suffering. I relate the suffering of the banlieue to the "helplessness" of a child that society (the mother) has abandoned, thus provoking some sort of psychological disorder in the minds of the "stigmatized".

By looking away geographically, not seeing the banlieue and not "seeing" them as in recognizing or acknowledging them as "French", we induce harm and injury within them that grows like a cancer. As Honneth maintains, the childhood need for fusion and recognition and the fear of separation from the primary caretaker is something we carry along with us as adults. The need for recognition compels us "to strive for those fractured forms of intersubjectivity that take on the form of mutual recognition between mature subjects (Honneth 2014, p. 229).

The banlieue then becomes both a geographical and a mental "socio-psychological frontier" (Barker as quoted by Goffman, 1963, p. 24, footnote) for the "stigmatized, a place where they live at the margin of society but at the same time also a place where they can feel like "one of us". Indeed as Goffman argues, "ethnic and racial ghettos constitute a haven of self-defense and a place where the individual deviator can openly take the line that he is at least as good as anyone else"

The concept of "retour de stigma" is useful in explaining the link between the violent act and the marginalization and suffering in the banlieue that becomes a kind of ghetto for the stigmatized.

"Retour de stigma" is the result of a ghettoization of a particular group which "creates a feeling of

injustice, a kind of apathy and hopelessness, that drives them towards a criminal defense mechanism, where they retire from society and 'return the stigma' (Castel, 2007, p. 808). "Killing Charlie Hebdo" would then amount to killing the feeling of injustice from lack of recognition and stigmatization and the attackers act "by vindicating their belonging to the stigmatized group and by turning against their fellow citizens" (ibid, p. 808).

If we admit the Hegelian claim that moral justice is a sort of universal right to equal recognition, recognition of equal "moral accountability" and recognition of being "a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community" (Honneth, 2014, p. 139) we can admit that by stigmatizing and neglecting their need for recognition, we have done them moral injustice.

7.4. Spoiled identity; Killing the feeling of injustice

The banlieue also has a dual meaning in terms of identity for the stigmatized. In the title of Goffman's essay on Stigma (1963) the subtitle reads as follows; "notes on the management of spoiled identity". My hypothesis implies that the attackers suffer from such a spoiled identity. Goffman introduces the term, "identity norm" (1963, p. 154) to explain one of these societal conventions that act like norms and that can "breed deviations as well as conformance". If a person is not able to uphold this identity norm, he might choose to "alienate himself from the community which upholds the norm or refrain from developing an attachment to the society in the first place" (ibid p. 154). Within the stigmatization frame, the stigmatized are unable to maintain their identity norm as French, "one of us" and "of morally equal value for community" and must instead see themselves imprisoned in an identity as, "Muslims", "dangerous" and "hateful against society". This is what I have called, "le deni d'identité" where no matter what you do and how hard you knock your fists bloody at the door, society will not let you in. In a way, the stigmatized thus become a sort of integrated exiled. In my presentation of the "retour de stigma" concept, I quoted French Police Commissioner, Pierre N'Gahane, responsible for the preventive measures against "radicalization" who explained the violent act by explaining how "these young men "are in search of a new identity. They could have chosen any other path; drugs, a sect, the army or even suicide" (Le Monde, 2015).

Within the framework of my hypothesis, they chose suicide.

The concept of "suicide sublime" explains how these young men refuse to die in the corner of a grey ghetto and chose to die in a spectacular way as a means to kill injustice but also to relieve the

pain, caused by misrecognition. They are already in a state of "psychological death" (Honneth, 1995, p. 135) therefore as French psychologist, Fehti Benslama who studied the social suffering in the banlieue, "these young men are deeply depressed and suffer from hopelessness and a suicidal state of mind that is relieved by the promise of dying for a "noble cause" that they come to see in jihadism (lesInrocks.com May 5, 2015).

If we "see" radicalization" we "see" the attackers as coldhearted killers of innocent civilians, which of course they are in any case. But if we "see" stigmatization" we might be able to understand that the attackers do not "see" these innocent victims when they attack, they "see" their own apathy and suffering from the "disease" caused by misrecognition and as Benslama continues, "in a pernicious way, becoming a soldier of Islam becomes the treatment of their symptoms" (lesInrocks.com May 5, 2015).

On a tué Charlie Hebdo" can thus be "seen" as "we have killed the feeling of injustice and relieved the pain", depending on the choices we make on "see" and "place" at the "before discourse" level. I have now build my hypothesis of a stigmatization frame while intertwining it with some deeper reflections on epistemology, ontology and axiology in my emphasis on "see" and "place. For it is not only social actors who must make decisions on "see" and "place" at the "before discourse" level. Indeed, so too must the researcher when she or he decides where to look for knowledge and how to "see" what she or he looks at.

The interesting question now is, why do we "see" "radicalization" and not "stigmatization" which is what I shall endeavor to explain in the following section.

8. ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION

8. Deconstructing the "Radicalization" frame.

In order to conduct this investigation, I introduce the concept of "ontological security" and "Enlightenment arrogance" as the methodological tool for carving out the framework of the "radicalization" frame and discourse.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the two frames against one another, I shall shortly look into the decisions on "see" and "place" that lie behind the "before discourse" level of those who see "radicalization", many of which we have already seen in the previous section.

Next, in order to explain why we "radicalization" has become the dominant frame and why we "look away from" the "stigmatization frame, I make use of Goffman's theory of human consciousness and frames as in the Frame Theory, I have introduced and show how they unfold in the subject-structure interdependency.

8.1. "Je suis Charlie": A view from the "Enlightenment arrogant"

As I explain in my section on the concept of "Enlightenment arrogance", I generalize and operationalize "Europe" as the symbol for a culture that differs from the culture in the Middle East for example, meaning Europe in the broadest sense possible. I have presented a small body of discourse material to show how the discourse evolves around "our European values" and "European free and democratic societies". Within the "radicalization frame" we "see" the attack as an attack on Europe, not as in the "stigmatization" frame as a reaction to our misrecognition.

The "Enlightenment arrogance" concept is a way of seeing Europe as a the absolute normative societal model and Europeans as exemplary "democratic citizens", respecting universal values of freedom, liberty and equality, free from ideology and based on knowledge. As I explained in the section where I build my hypothesis of "stigmatization", if we "see" radicalization, we are free of any responsibility in the violent act and it is our "enlightenment arrogance" that drives us to "look away" from the banlieue and the suffering in the banlieue as a possible explanation for the waves of what we call "terror".

8.2. The need for ontological security in terms of identity.

When building my stigmatization frame, I assumed the need for recognition to be a quasi-normative basic human need. Within the radicalization frame, I use the concept of "ontological security to explain how social actors select their frames and discourse. In my section on the concept, I explain how I operationalize it in terms of "anxiety" in the stigmatization frame and in terms of "identity" for the "radicalization frame.

Developing the concept of ontological security around the "identity" axis is motivated by my claim that those who see "radicalization" and are blinded by their "enlightenment arrogance" have made their choices about "see" and "place" at the "before discourse level" based on the need for ontological security in terms of identity. If we "see" radicalized terrorists" and "Muslims" we "look away from" the attackers being nationals. Why are we unwilling or unable to see Muslims as

French or Europeans. A possible clue for an answer is Katarina Kinvalls explanation of ontological security as the need for a kind of identity preservation. Indeed, Kinvall quotes Sigel, who argued that, "there exists in humans a powerful drive to maintain the sense of one's identity, a sense of continuity that allays fear of changing too fast or being changed against one's will by outside forces" (Sigel as quoted by Kinvall, 2004, p. 747).

Those who "see" radicalization and see the Arab world and foreign dark forces as the "place" they connect to the attackers might possess a fear of and antagonism against "the Muslim" as a threat to their identity. All though millions of people with Muslim background have lived for decades in Europe as Europeans, it seems "seeing" and acknowledging Muslims as "Europeans" is still a mental challenge for many.

Kinvall links the need for ontological security to the need for what she calls "an identity signifier", where belonging to a nation or a religion provides you with the sense of ontological security in times of radical change or in times of uncertainty. If we "see" radicalization" it also implies that we do not make the necessary distinction between and thus, Muslims in Europe and Muslims in the Arab world within the traditional communities.

In the radicalization frame, "before discourse" we "see" religious fanaticism and obscurantism and we "look away from" the values of humanism, we pride ourselves in as the Enlightenment arrogant. Indeed, if we focus on "radicalization" and a "stigmatization" frame does exist, our way of "seeing" steers us away from the real problem, that of exclusion and lack of recognition.

If we proclaim, "Je suis Charlie" against those who have "killed Charlie", we "see" ourselves as a resistance group, concerned with the noble cause of defending our country against a foreign enemy. When we "see" the attackers as "radicalized terrorists" and an external enemy who attacks "us", we "look away from" the fact that the "enemy" is "one of us" and we avoid to ask the question, "how can a foreign army in the Middle East manage to reach into our own backyard and recruit soldiers that turn against "their own".

When we "see" the Middle East and violent radical Islamism as the "place" to look for explanations to the violent act, we "look away from" the fact that the attackers are nationals from our own banlieue. And if we see the banlieue as "place", we do not "see" it as a place of suffering but as a "terreau du terrorisme", a breeding ground for terrorism.

Similar to the way in which we make our choices at the "before discourse" level within the frame of stigmatization", we make our choices in the "radicalization" frame.

We shall now proceed to a discussion of the two frames against each other which will allow me to offer an explanation for why we see "radicalization" as the dominant frame and why "stigmatization" has remained a "silent frame.

As I ask in my research question, "why do we see "radicalization" and not "stigmatization"?"

8.3. The "see" and "place" of Radicalization and Stigmatization

Goffman brilliantly describes the heavy weight of human hypocrisy in altering social reality, stating that "he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep" (Goffman, 1986, p.14). I have introduced the goffmanian theory of human consciousness which is essential to the way I "see" social actors in this thesis. Underlying my interpretation of motivations and agency is a Goffmanian cynical sociological view of social actors and society as a Machiavellian staging of reality with social actors "seeing" reality the way it fits their scheme. As Goffman states,

Presumably, a 'definition of the situation' is almost always to be found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not *create* this definition, even though their society can be said to do so; ordinarily, all they do is to assess correctly what the situation ought to be for them and then act accordingly" (Goffman, 1974, p. 1-2).

As I have described in the section where I build the hypothesis of a "stigmatization" frame, the subject-structure interdependency enables us to justify the choices we make about "see" and "place" at the "before discourse" level and thus to select our discourse and frames. In a goffmanian reading the subject-structure interdependency is pernicious because we "see" situations, based on what they "ought to be for us", not on what they "are".

I would like to consider the discussion of the two frames on the basis of these assumptions about the hypocrisy and machiavellianism of social actors' reality appraisal. This is how I use frames as a theory in "seeing" my topic within the theoretical ramifications of the goffmanian theory of frames as the bridge between culture and cultures of meaning. Goffman argues that "every definition of the situation, every wonted frame, seems to presuppose and bank on an array of motivational forces" (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p.445). A goffmanesque gaze on social reality implies that peoples' motivations are most often immoral or hypocritical, based on self-interested calculation.

Indeed, Goffman explains how human hypocrisy allow us to hide our real intentions behind a seemingly morally correct veil, how we are able to "appeal to signs of innocence, to indicators of innocuousness (...) to disguise or cover our threat" (Goffman, 1986; p. 486).

Goffman compares the individual to the character of a playwright. "If in fact personalities and lives are characterizable, popular lore may support wrong characterization or at best focus on small, arbitrary selection of the actual possibilities" (p. 557).

With these considerations in mind I shall now move on to the "see" and "place" of the two frames. If we assume that human nature is not much concerned with morality and that social actors base their reality appraisal on self-interested calculation, we can assume that those who "see" radicalization are concerned with maintaining their ontological security in terms of identity. If they "see" the attackers as "terrorists", they "see" them as dangerous and evil as opposed to the "stigmatization" frame where we "see" the attackers as "vulnerable" and "victims".

If we look at the cost for social actors and society within both frames, we can imagine a line going from point a, starting with low cost and going to point b, low cost. Within the "radicalization" frame, the cost for social actors would be at the low end while at the high end for society. Indeed, if "Charlie" is problematized as a matter of radicalization, social actors would be the victims and thus carry no responsibility and so they would not have to change their behavior, they can continue to "look away from the banlieue as a place of suffering.

If on the contrary, "Charlie" is seen as a matter of stigmatization, it would imply that social actors carry a responsibility in the attack, that the attackers could be seen as victims of our own behavior, which we would then have to correct by changing the way we "see" the attackers.

If we "see" "Charlie" as a matter of stigmatization, we "see" the attackers as victims of our misrecognition and the chain reaction on discourse and frame would impose a different vocabulary.

We have seen how Honneth (1995) uses some very strong terms to describe the effects of misrecognition on humans, evolving around illness. In the case of social misrecognition, Honneth argues, it "endangers the identity of human beings, just as infection with a disease endangers their physical life (Honneth, 1995, p.135). The vocabulary would then evolve around "soft words" like, scarred soul, broken hearts, broken lives, hopelessness, hurt, fear, frustration, inner death.

And if we "see" society as the "mother" and admit Honneth's claim that recognition must be mutual and is intersubjective, then we can "see" society as the "mother" who has caused injury to her "child" and the framework and discourse would then evolve around socio-psychological solutions and look at the place of moral in our reality appraisal.

The dominant discourse of “radicalization” has created another chain reaction on discourse and frames with a vocabulary of “hard words” like, dangerous, evil, threat, enemy, hateful, anti-democratic. And if we “see” the attackers as “terrorists” it justifies security measures, preventive measures and focus on religion (Islam) at the structure level and at the subject level, it enables us to justify our mistrust, antagonism and fear of the “terrorists” and thus to continue the stigmatization, that might have led to the violent act in the first place.

I described in my chapter on ontological security how Kinvall’s (2004) interpretation of the term is essential for my understanding of why the dominant discourse is “radicalization”.

Kinvall’s argument, that the need for ontological security always implies an “other” in the process and that, “increasing ontological security for one person or group by means of nationalist and religious myths and traumas is thus likely to decrease security for those not included in the nationalist and/or religious discourse” (Kinvall, 2004, p. 763).

If Europeans feel threatened by “the Muslim” and by Islam, then the ontological security dilemma becomes obvious and the solution would imply that the enlightenment arrogant begin to “see” once and for all that Islam is compatible with European societies and that Muslims are Europeans.

The subject-structure interdependency enables the “radicalization” frame by using the discourse and frame vocabulary, supporting this frame and since Goffman tells us that “humans are concerned with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression of (...) their immoral behavior” (Goffman, 1959, p. 251), structure becomes the partner in crime for humans to hide behind this immoral veil.

Social reality is somehow played in a certain “key”, a musical mode, the “key” being the main concept from which to analyze, according to Goffman (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p. 43).

Thus, “Charlie” is played in the “radicalization key” by the subject-structure interdependency-orchestra.

When we look at the dominant discourse of “radicalization” it is essential to try and understand choices about “see” and “place” at the “before discourse” level that have shaped the dominant discourse. What I call the chain reaction on discourse and frame, is what I understand by a framing and frames, meaning the constitution of a framework of cultures of meaning that shapes an entire vocabulary and justifies the concepts we use based on this framework. Thus, frames is a way of conceptualizing “reality” and as Bourdieu states, “concepts are a way of classifying the social world and social experience” and concepts carry intrinsic, “the power of imposing a vision of the social

world through principles of division, which when they are imposed on an entire group, constitute meaning” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 220).

Discussing the two frames of “radicalization” and “stigmatization” against each other not only help us understand, why one frame is dominant and why we insist on “seeing” radicalization. Indeed, it also shows the weight of the framework of cultures of meaning and the “before discourse” in the dominant discourse of “radicalization” and thus how difficult it would be to lift our gaze towards the possible frame of “stigmatization.

I shall pursue this line of thought in my conclusion where I also unfold a philosophical-sociological discussion of my **sub-research question; how do we use the knowledge we are “armed with” as social actors and as researchers”**.

9. CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

9. “Armed with knowledge; Epistemology, ontology and axiology of Charlie

Armed with knowledge, we can alter the social world but “armed with that same knowledge” we can also use it as a weapon to defend the status quo of a dominant frame, like “radicalization” in this thesis.

The researcher must thus be extremely careful to avoid what I call the hamster wheel of knowledge in looking for knowledge within a particular framework without questioning the framework in itself. Researchers might invent new angles and perspectives on, how the “process of radicalization” takes place. Some might reflect on the need for Islam to create a moderate, European version of the religion. Others again may look into the role of prisons, the internet or the mosques in recruiting the future “radicalized”. What we forget is that all these questions are imprisoned in the framework of “radicalization” And while we focus on this framework, we add knowledge to maintain it and we move further away from the “stigmatization” frame. Therefore, we need to be careful of what we “see” at all levels of research, as soon as we label, we imprison and “freeze” a frame.

You might wish to turn to the attached picture of the painting by Velàzquez that I have mentioned in my introduction and that Foucault has analyzed in his, *Les Mots et les Choses*” 1969), the “Las Meninas painting. As I wrote in the introduction, the painting is a labyrinth of visual fields and I use it as a canvas for developing some thoughts about the epistemology and ontology of research.

Is he representing “the painter painting” or the “painter representing himself in the process of painting”? Is he representing the infant being portrayed or the infant looking at her parents while

being portrayed. Is he representing the king and queen in their role as "the parents" or as "the king and the queen"? The king and queen are represented in the painting through their reflection in a mirror and thus they become visible for those who observe the painting and for the painter in the process of painting while invisible for the painter who is represented in the painting who turns his back on the mirror but then sees the king and queen physically while they are invisible to those who observe the painting.

You almost become dizzy from trying to "see" what the painter and if we translate representation into "frames" and "see", it becomes possible to show the vulnerability of social "reality", for there are as manifold frames of reality as there are ways of seeing what the painter represents. In the case of research, these considerations can apply likewise to the epistemological and ontological considerations you make as a researcher. Where do we look to "see" social reality" and how do we "see" social reality.

And "armed with knowledge" who can them create change, when do we listen to moral voices and where are the moral voice that can create a disruption in the chain reaction on discourse and frames, created at the "before discourse" level.

A possible answer would be to look at the place of morality in the construction of social reality. We have seen how "humans are concerned with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression of (...) their immoral behavior" (Goffman, 1959, p. 251) and thus what we need to do is to unmask this "immoral behavior". As a researcher this implies the question of the role of the researcher in this unmasking. Should the researcher stay in the role of an observer of social reality and use the knowledge he produces as a contribution to our knowledge about society and social actors. Or should the researcher use his knowledge as an activist researcher and use the knowledge he produces as a weapon of knowledge to change the world. Not doing so, does the researcher then become a passive witness like a priest that takes confessions and has sworn the vow of silence?

If we lift our gaze from "Charlie" and the case of "radicalization" and "stigmatization", we could do the same study on issues like "migration" for example. Why do we "see" "migration" and "migrants" when we problematize those who cross the Mediterranean to reach the European continent when another possible frame could be "refugees fleeing social genocide" which would direct focus on the State leaders who are unable to provide the basic conditions for living a decent life to their citizens. It is all a matter of perspective.

Moral voices in society must speak louder if they are to unmask the hidden immoral behavior of social actors and "awaken people to their true interests" (Goffman, 1986, p. 14). And I do not

believe we can leave that task to social movements and humanitarian organizations alone because the unmasking demands more than a choir of small voices, it demands a gigantic lion roar.

Therefore, me might wish to reconsider the role of the researcher and his or hers responsibility in altering the social world through the knowledge “we are armed with”.

9.2. Philosophizing on theory: Subjectivity and objectivity in the use of theory.

While theory is a “frozen image” with precise guidelines and rules, there can be important nuances in the way each individual researcher “sees” the theory. While scientific objectivity is what the researcher should aim at in conducting research, hers or his way of “seeing” the world shapes the way she or he “sees” epistemology and ontology.

Some people have a pragmatic disposition some are deeply emotional by nature. Some people have experienced deep suffering and might have gone through painful life crises while others might never have felt the harshness of life and have gone through life harmoniously. Do they “see” theory the same way, do they pick out the same elements in a theory and do some people “see” more or see deeper into a theory. And on the other side, if you conduct research around a topic like stigmatization and you have experienced the feeling of being stigmatized yourself, do you then understand better or are you biased and blinded by the lack of objectivity.

Having lived for twenty years in France, long enough to have internalized French culture and to become bi-lingual, French-Danish has certainly influenced my choice of topic but does that also mean that I lose my objectivity like the ethnographer who goes native or on the contrary does it add validity to my claims due to my special insights and my ability to read French thus broadening my choice of material for the study.

And concerning language does the ability to read books in the original language influence your research. It has in this thesis as I have employed the term “banlieue” instead of suburb which has been an essential part of my research design as the French word includes the word “lieue” for “place” that I use as a conceptual tool in my thesis.

These considerations serve to show the vulnerability of research and knowledge production which is also in a way a matter of perspective and choices about “see” and “place” at the before discourse” level.

9.3. “Who is “Charlie”

I have used the case of “Charlie” as a way to conduct a double inquiry into human consciousness and the vulnerability of social reality, asking why we see “radicalization and not “stigmatization” while at the same time reflecting deeper on epistemology, ontology and axiology.

I have tried to offer an alternative view on how to use theory, method and empirics by making my thesis mainly theoretical. My aim has been to challenge traditional research discipline by proposing an alternative way to reflect on epistemology and ontology, in the Foucauldian anti-disciplinary sense;

“If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinary” (Foucault as quoted by Rodriguez Garcia, 2008, p. 121).

I have tempted to question the dominant discourse of “radicalization” by introducing the hypothesis of “stigmatization” as a way to “see Charlie”. The stigmatization frame is a way of reflecting on the place of moral in the construction of social reality but my I borrow the words of the invisible hand that led me through this thesis, Erving Goffman’s hand;

“I can only suggest that he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep. And so I do not pretend here to provide a lullaby but to sneak in and watch the way people snore” (Goffman, 1974; 1986, p. 14).

In this thesis, I have “watched people snore” by asking;

“Who is Charlie”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adorno, TW (1903-1969) & Horkheimer, M (1997) *Dialectic of Enlightenment* London: Verso
(First edition 1945)
- Atkinson, p. (1989). Goffman's Poetics *Human Studies* vol. 12 (pp. 59-76) Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Netherlands.
- Attaque Contre Charlie Hebdo (2015, January 7) *Le Monde* Retrieved from
http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque-contre-charlie-hebdo/article/2015/01/08/ce-que-l-on-sait-sur-l-attentat-contre-charlie-hebdo_4551235_4550668.html
- Attentat à Charlie Hebdo: Le Monde Entier Sous le Choc (2015, January 7) *Le Parisien* Retrieved
from <http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentat-a-charlie-hebdo-les-capitales-etrangees-indignees-et-solidaires-07-01-2015-4426175.php>
- Attentat de Charlie Hebdo: Ces Notes Déclassifiées sur les Frères Kouachi qui ne dissent pas tout
(2015 January 8) *Europe1* Retrieved from <http://www.europe1.fr/societe/attentat-de-charlie-hebdo-ces-notes-declassifiees-sur-les-freres-kouachi-qui-ne-dissent-pas-tout-2945228>
- Barbière (2015, January 13) European Parliament remembers Paris terror victims *Euractiv*
Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/european-parliament-remembers-paris-terror-victims/>
- Benford, RD & Snow, DA (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment *Annual Review of Sociology* NO 26 (pp. 611-639).
- Boëton (2017 February 13) 1977-2017, Quarante Ans de "Plans pour les Ghettos" *La Croix*
Retrieved from <http://www.la-croix.com/France/Exclusion/1977-2017-quarante-plans-pour-banlieues-2017-02-13-1200824414>
- Bourdieu, P. (1983) Erving Goffman, Discoverer of the Infinitely Small *Theory, Culture and
Society* vol. 2 No. 1
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). Outline of a Sociological Theory of Art Perception in Bourdieu *The Field of
Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*. Columbia: University Press
- Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. J.B. Thompson, Ed. (G. Raymond & M.
Adamson, Trans) Cambridge: Polity Press
- Bourdieu, P & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* Cambridge: Polity Press
- Bourdieu, P. (1993) (Dir.) *La Misère du Monde* Paris: Seuil

- Brenner, E. (2002) *Les Territoires Perdus de la République. Antisémitisme, Racisme et Sexisme au Milieu Scolaire* Mille et Une Nuits
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*, 4th Edition.
Oxford: University Press
- Cassely (2016 January 7) “Je suis Charlie”, Anatomie d’un Symbole *Slate* Retrieved from <http://www.slate.fr/story/112387/je-suis-charlie-anatomie-symbole>
- Castel, R. (2007). *La Discrimination Négative. Citoyens ou Indigènes*
Seuil, La République des Idées.
- Ce que l’On Sait sur la Radicalisation des Frères Kouachi (2015, January 9) *Le Monde* Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/09/ce-que-l-on-sait-sur-la-radicalisation-des-freres-kouachi_4552422_3224.html
- Chichizola (2015 January 7) Chérif Kouachi, un ‘Apprenti Loser Radicalisé selon son ex-Avocat’ *Le Figaro* Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/01/08/01016-20150108ARTFIG00162-cherif-kouachi-un-apprenti-loser-radicalise-selon-son-ex-avocat.php>
- Chriss, JJ. (1993). Looking back on Goffman: The Excavation Continues *Human Studies* vol.16 (pp. 469-483) Kluwer Academic Studies, Netherlands.
- Council of Europe. (2008, June) White Paper of Intercultural Dialogue. “Living Together as Equals in Dignity *Ministers of Foreign Affairs 118th Ministerial Session* Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf
- Dam (206 March 8) Moskeerne Bag Sløret *Det Danske Filminstitut* Retrieved from <http://www.dfi.dk/Nyheder/FILMupdate/2016/Marts/Moskeerne-bag-sloeret.aspx>
- Demazière, D. (1991) Le Parler Frais d’Erving Goffman (Book Review by Demazière) *Revue Francaise de Sociologie*, vol. 32, No. 2 April-June (pp. 285-286).
- Devecchio (2017 March 23) Entre 2013 et 2016, L’Europe a été le Théâtre de 24 Attentats et de 64 Projets d’Attentats Retrieved from <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/2017/03/23/31003-20170323ARTFIG00305-entre-2013-et-2016-l-europe-a-ete-le-theatre-de-24-attentats-et-64-projets-d-attentats.php>
- Discours du Commissaire Dimitris Avramopoulos lors de la Réunion Ministérielle Internationale à Paris sur Charlie Hebdo, le 11 Janvier 2015 *European Commission Press Release Database* Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-3141_en.htm?locale=EN

Doc13684. Terrorist Attacks in Paris: Together for a Democratic Response (2015 January 27)

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Retrieved from

<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21444&lang=en>

Eric Zemmour: L'Armée Française va Reconquérir les Banlieues comme Israël l'a fait à Gaza

RT en Français Retrieved from <https://francais.rt.com/france/26038-eric-zemmour-armee-francaise-banlieues-israel-gaza>

Faist, T. (2009). The Crucial Meso-level. In M. Martiniello & J. Rath (Eds.), *Selected Studies in International Migration and immigration Incorporation* (pp. 59-90). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Fasfalis, D. (2012, February 3). Pierre Bourdieu; a thinker of emancipation *LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal* Retrieved from <http://links.org.au/node/2732>

Flanagan, K. (2007). *Sociology in Theology. Reflexivity and Belief.*

New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. (1966). *Les Mots et les Choses. Une Archéologie des Sciences Humaines.*

Éditions Gallimard

Foucault, M. (1969). *L'archéologie du Savoir.*

Éditions Gallimard.

Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*

C. Gordon ed. (C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham & K. Soper Trans) Oxford: Magdalen College

Fournier, M. (2002, February 2) La Misère du Monde *Sciences Humaines*

Retrieved from https://www.scienceshumaines.com/la-misere-du-monde_fr_14199.html

Fraser, N & Honneth, A. (2003). *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange.* (J. Golb, J. Ingram & C. Wilke, Trans) Verso, UK. (Original work published 2003)

Friedson, E. (1983). Celebrating Erving Goffman, 1983 *Contemporary Sociology* vol. 12 No. 4 July (pp. 359-362).

Friis Wang, L. (2015, December 8). Vi er ikke Terrorrens Uskyldige Ofre *Information*

Retrieved from <https://www.information.dk/indland/2015/12/terrorens-uskyldige-ofre>

Gamson, WA. (1985) Goffman's Legacy To Political Sociology *Theory and Society* September vol. 14 No 5 (pp. 605- 622).

Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goffman, E. (1959). *Interaction Ritual* Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company

Goffman, E. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* New York: Double Day Anchor

Goffman, E. (1961) *Asylum. Essays on the Social Situations of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*
York: Double Day Anchor

Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma; Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity.*

New Jersey, USA: Prentice-Hall Inc.

Goffman, E. (1968) *Asyles. Études sur la condition sociale des malades mentaux* (Liliane Lainé
Trans) Présentation de Robert Castel. Collection Le Sens Commun

Goffman, E. (1974; 1986) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*
Boston: Northeastern University Press edition.

Gonos, G. (1977). “Situation” Versus “Frame: The “Interactionist” and the “Structuralist” Analyses
of Everyday Life, *American Sociological Review* vol. 42, December (pp. 854-867).

Hacking, I. (2004) Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: Between Discourse in the
Abstract and Face-to Face *Interaction Economy and Society* vol. 33 No 3 August 3. (pp. 277-
302).

Honneth, A. (1995). *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*
(J. Anderson, Trans). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Honneth, A. (2007). *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory.* UK: Polity Press. .
(First published in Germany as *Der Andere der Gerechtigkeit.* Frankfurt am Main, 2000)

Honneth, A. (2014) *The I in We; Studies in the Theory of Recognition.*
Cambridge: Polity Press

Jervis, R. (2006). Understanding Beliefs *Political Psychology* vol. 27 No. 5 (pp. 641-663).

European Council. (2007). *Jeunesse dans les quartiers Populaires. Guide à la Réflexion*

Méthodologique sur les Politiques February, 2007 Editions du Conseil de l’Europe Retrieved
from http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/GUIDEJEUNESSE_FR.pdf

Kaczynski, P. (2015 January 13) The Attack on Charlie Hebdo was an Attack on Europe *Euractiv*
Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/interview/piotr-m-kaczy-ski-the-attack-on-charlie-hebdo-was-an-attack-on-europe/>

Ketfi (2010 April 30) La Souffrance Cachée des Garçons de Banlieue *Bondyblog at Libération*

Retrieved from <http://www.bondyblog.fr/201004300001/la-souffrance-cachee-des-garcons-de-banlieues/#.WYBem011LIU>

Khosrokhavar (2015 November 23) Les Terraux du Jihadisme Européen *Magazine Sciences*

Humaines Retrieved from https://www.scienceshumaines.com/les-terreaux-du-jihadisme-europeen_fr_35476.html

Kinvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism; Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security *Political Psychology* vol. 25 No5 (pp. 741-767).

La Biographie des Dix-Sept Victimes (2015, January 10) *Libération* Retrieved from

http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/01/10/dix-sept-victimes-en-trois-jours_1177836

Laffeter, A. (2016, May 15) Fahti Benslama: On Fabrique de la Chair á Jihad Industriellement

Les Inrocks Retrieved from <http://www.lesinrocks.com/2016/05/15/actualite/fethi-benslama-11827292/>

La Loi de Séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat *Histoires Pour Tous* Retrieved from

<http://www.histoire-pour-tous.fr/histoire-de-france/3403-la-loi-de-separation-des-eglises-et-de-letat-1905.html>

Lancon (2015 January 21) My ‘Charlie Hebdo’ *The New York Review of Books* Retrieved from

<http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/01/21/my-charlie-hebdo/>

Les Dessins par Lesquels le Scandale est Arrive (2007, February 7). *Courrier International*

Retrieved from <http://www.courrierinternational.com/node/1661165>

Malouf, (2015, January 8) “Charlie Hebdo: L’Histoire Unique d’un Journal Satirique *RFI*

Retrieved from <http://www.rfi.fr/france/20150108-charlie-hebdo-histoire-unique-journal-satirique>

Manuel Valls: Il existe un Apartheid “territorial, social, ethnique” en France (2015, January 20) *Le*

Point Retrieved from http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/valls-il-existe-un-apartheid-territorial-social-ethnique-en-france-20-01-2015-1898010_20.php

Marche Républicaine: une ampleur ‘sans precedent’ (2015, January 11). *Libération* Retrieved from

<http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/01/11/en-direct-la-place-de-la-republique-noire-de-monde1178277>

Maugier, R. (2013) Robert Castel (1933-2013) *Savoir/Agir* (pp.123-126) Retrieved from

<https://www.savoir-agir.org/IMG/pdf/SA23-Castel-Mauger.pdf>

- Media Conference Call: Farah Pandith on Violent Extremism (2015 January 9) (J. Masters Interviewer) Council on Foreign Relations
- Meer, N & Modood, T. (2012) How does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism *Journal of Intercultural Studies* vol. 33 No. 2 April 2012 (pp. 175-196).
- MEP Elmar Brok Highlighting Isolation of Islamic Fighters Within Societies of EU (2015 December 19) *Euranet Plus Central* (AUDIO) Retrieved from <https://soundcloud.com/euranet-plus-official/mep-elmar-brok-calling-for-comprehensive-strategy-to-fight-terrorism>
- Moghaddam, FM. (2016). The Road to Actualized Democracy. A Psychological Explanation *Working Paper for Fourth Annual Niels Bohr Lecture in Cultural Psychology AAU*
- Molénat (2015 January 30) Segregation. Les Banlieues Francaises sont-elles (vraiment) des ghettos *Alternatives Économiques* Retrieved from <https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/en-direct-de-la-recherche/les-banlieues-francaises-sont-elles-vraiment-des-ghettos-201501301815-00000718.html>
- Myrdal, G. (1944). *The American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (with the assistance of R. Sterne & A. Rose) New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers
- Paris Attacks: Joint Statement of the Ministers of Interior (2015 January 11) *Embassy of France in London homepage* Retrieved from <https://uk.ambafrance.org/Charlie-Hebdo-joint-statement-of>
- Rein, M & Schon, DA. (1977). Problem Setting in Policy Research In Weiss, C. (ed.), *Using Social Research in Public Policy Making* (pp. 235-251).
- Rodríguez Garcia, (J). (2001) Scientia Potestas Est-Knowledge is Power: Francis Bacon to Michel Foucault *Neohelocin* January
- Schon, DA & Rein, M. (1994) *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. New York: Basic Books.
- Schutz, A. (1945) On Multiple Realities *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 5, No. 4 (pp. 533-576)
- Seelow, S (2015, March 26) Les Nouveaux Chiffres de la Radicalization *Le Monde* Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2015/03/26/les-nouveaux-chiffres-de-la-radicalisation_4602011_1653578.html
- Sénécat (2017, February 14) "Tous les Terroristes sont Immigrés: l'Intox du Député Européen Fn,

Nicolas Bay *Le Monde* Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/02/14/tous-les-terroristes-sont-immigres-l-intox-du-depute-europeen-fn-nicolas-bay_5079530_4355770.html

Smith (2005, November 5) Immigrant Rioting Flares in France for Ninth Night *New York Times*

Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/05/world/europe/immigrant-rioting-flares-in-france-for-ninth-night.html>

Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Summit on Countering

Violent Extremism, (Washington, 2015 February 19) *European Union External Action (EEAS)* Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_fr/6105/Speech%20by%20High%20Representative/Vice-President%20Federica%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20Summit%20on%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremism,%20Washington,%2019%20February%202015

Statement by Donald Tusk, President of the European Council on the attacks against the Newspaper

Charlie Hebdo (2015 January 7) *European Union Digital Single Market* Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/statement-donald-tusk-president-european-council-attack-against-newspaper-charlie-hebdo>

Statement by President Juncker Following the attack on Charlie Hebdo Premises (2015 January 7)

European Commission Press Release Database Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-3002_en.htm

Taylor, C. (1994) The Politics of Recognition in *Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition* (A. Gutman ed.) Princeton: Princeton University Press

Triandafyllidou, A & Fotiou, A. (1998). Sustainability and Modernity in the European Union: A Frame Theory Approach to Policy-Making *Sociological Research Online* vol. 3 No 1

Retrieved from <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/1/2.html>

Truc (2015, January 7) En 2005: L’Affaire des Caricatures de Mahomet au Danemark et la

Solidarité de “Charlie Hebdo” Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque-contre-charlie-hebdo/article/2015/01/07/en-2005-l-affaire-des-caricatures-de-mahomet-au-danemark-et-la-solidarite-de-charlie-hebdo_4551135_4550668.html

Verhoeven, JC. (1980). An Interview with Erving Goffman *Interview, Friday, June 13, 1980,*

Philadelphia 2048 Ritterhouse Square

Veillard-Baron, H. La Banlieu au Risque de Définition *Géo Confluences* Retrieved from

<http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/doc/territ/FranceMut/FranceMutScient3.htm>

Verloo, M. (2005). Mainstreaming Gender Equality in Europe: A Critical Frame Analysis

Approach. The Greek Review of Social Research 117, B. (pp. 11-34).

Werly (2017 November 18) Saint-Denis et Molenbeek: les Deux Visages d’un même problème

Européen *Le Temps* Retrieved from <https://www.letemps.ch/monde/2015/11/18/saint-denis-molenbeek-deux-visages-un-meme-probleme-europeen>