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Master's Thesis

# Controlling migration from Africa

A case study analysing the European Union's Partnership Framework with third countries

Paula Pihlava  
31 May 2017



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A case study analysing the European Union's Partnership Framework with  
third countries

Paula Pihlava  
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Master's Programme in Culture, Communication  
and Globalisation

Master's Thesis



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Supervisor: Abdulkadir Osman Farah

## Abstract

Europe has received an unprecedented amount of migrants in the past two years, particularly due to the prolonged conflict in Syria but also because of armed conflicts or terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in countries like Cameroon, Niger and Libya have caused people to be displaced. This thesis studies how the European Union has responded particularly to the increased amount of arriving migrants from Africa. The EU adopted in June 2016 a new Partnership Framework with third countries, also known as the Migration Compact. Before it was endorsed, the Compact received strong criticism from over 100 non-governmental organisations for possibly causing human rights violations and for representing a re-orientation of the EU's development aid towards stopping migration. This thesis analyses what possible issues can occur when the EU is providing development aid for third countries to manage migration from Africa. As the amount of arriving migrants through the Central Mediterranean route has increased, it is necessary to analyse what direction the EU is taking in its migration management actions.

The thesis is a case study of the Migration Compact and analyses its progress in five priority countries of the Compact: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The analysis is based on a qualitative content analysis of 45 EU documents and six statements from various institutions related to the Compact. To demonstrate solutions for possible issues, four experts from different organisations were also interviewed.

The analysis demonstrated that so far there has been little progress made in the five countries regarding the Compact's short-term objectives. A particular issue is the Compact making development aid conditional on how well the third countries cooperate within the short-term actions. This does not indicate of an equal partnership between the EU and the African countries. The five countries are pushed to stop migration flows by strengthening border control which creates tension between African countries. Hence, the EU is moving the pressure of managing migration from Europe to Africa. To remove the tension and provide an equally planned and implemented approach, and to make the Compact more effective, the EU should give a stronger role for the African countries, particularly for the lower levels of governance and the regional organisations in the countries.

In overall, this thesis complements the studies made of the EU migration policies by providing a view of the still little analysed Partnership Framework and hence demonstrating the direction the EU is taking in its current migration policies.

*Keywords: Partnership Framework with third countries, Migration Compact, European Union, development aid, migration management, migration-development nexus, Africa, refugee crisis*

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## List of abbreviations

AEDH	European Association for the defence of Human Rights, also known as L'Association Européenne pour la défense des Droits de l'Homme
AU	African Union
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECRE	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
EDF	European Development Fund
EMLO	European Migration Liaison Officer
EPAM	European NGO Platform on Asylum and Migration
ERASMUS	European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, nowadays known as Erasmus+
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund, also referred as EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FIDH	Worldwide Movement for Human Rights
Frontex	The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, before known as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GDP	Gross domestic product
IOM	International Organisation for Migration, also known as the UN Migration Agency



IS	Islamic State
JVAP	Joint Valletta Action Plan
Migration Compact	European Union's Partnership Framework with third countries
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SOM	Senior Officials' Meeting
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, also known as UN Refugee Agency

## Introduction

Due to ongoing and prolonged crises in the Middle East and Africa, Europe has received an unprecedented amount of refugees and migrants in the past two years. Since 2015, almost 1.5 million people have arrived to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea which is the greatest movement of people Europe has faced since the Second World War. (European Commission, 2016a) This thesis focuses on how the European Union (EU) has responded to the amount of arrived people and events that have followed from it, predominantly known as Europe's refugee crisis. The thesis will also use 'refugee crisis' when referred to the topic because it is a common term used in media and political discourse. The term has received criticism for presenting the topic as 'crisis' from the Western point of view and hence creating a sense of imminence even though worse crises are occurring in different parts of the world (King, 2016; Baxter, 2015). However, when occurring in the thesis, the term is used as a neutral and objective expression of the topic.

The most significant factor for causing people to flee to Europe has been the prolonged conflict in Syria that has lasted over six years and caused more than 12 million Syrians to be displaced from their homes. Besides Syria, people in countries like Cameroon, Iraq, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia have been forced to leave their homes because of conflicts created by terrorist groups like Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. Being displaced for a long time, a record-breaking amount of people tried to enter Europe in 2015 by crossing the Mediterranean from the eastern coast of Turkey to Greece and from there travelling across the Balkan route in most of the cases to Sweden or Germany (Reuters, 2016).

As the literature shows, solutions to asylum and refugee migration are often constructed by interests of the Global North, even though they are primarily manifested in the Global South (e.g. Andersson, 2014; Johnson, 2014). Therefore, the solutions are often linked to regulating and controlling. In the EU, migration management is moving towards convergence, and significant amount of EU aid is focused on promoting stability and tackling root causes of migration. (Feldman, 2011; Bowling, 2013; European Commission, 2016d)

Despite of previous migration management funding, the sudden amount of arrivals led the EU to adopt the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 which stated the first actions to be taken, such as saving lives in the Mediterranean and targeting criminal smuggling networks (European Commission, 2015a). Despite the Agenda focuses also on relocation of asylum seekers, some of the EU Member States has refused to accept them. Instead, several countries in the Balkans and East Europe reacted to the refugee crisis by building fences to stop asylum seekers entering their territory, hence forcing people to find new routes to enter Europe and increasing pressure in Greece, Italy and Spain (Reuters, 2016). This has led to significant tension between the European countries on how to handle the amounts of arrivals.

To remove the incentive to seek irregular routes to the EU and at the same time to end the irregular migration from Turkey and to fight against the people's smugglers business, the EU signed an agreement with Turkey. Implemented in March 2016, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement caused the amount of arrivals to decrease notably. All migrants that arrived illegally to Greece from Turkey as of 20 March were returned to Turkey. Everyone who did not apply for asylum in Greece or had no right for international protection was returned immediately. For every Syrian who was returned to Turkey, another Syrian was resettled in the EU. (European Commission, 2016b) The EU has been mainly satisfied with the agreement stating that even though every country is different, the agreement's elements "can inspire cooperation

with other key third countries” (European Commission, 2016c). On the other hand, the agreement has received criticism since its implementation, and several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have stated that it is violating human rights of the refugees and migrants. For example returning asylum seekers to Turkey as a “safe third country” is contradictory to international law, as Turkey might not ensure sufficient protection (European Council, 2016a). The agreement was criticised also for possibly creating new more dangerous migratory routes to Europe.

As the amount of arriving people decreased in Greece in 2016, number of arrivals increased notably in Italy after the EU-Turkey Agreement was implemented (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] , 2016). Most of the people arriving to Italy (data from 30 April 2017) come from Africa: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco and Mali (UNHCR, 2017). They are mainly considered as economic migrants (European Council, 2016b; Italian non-paper, 2016) who are escaping poverty.

Following the EU-Turkey Agreement and to respond to the increased amount of African migrants, the European Commission published communication of a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration on 7 June 2016. Also known as the Migration Compact, it was adopted on 28 June 2016 by the European Council. The Migration Compact's aim is to reflect both, the EU's and its partners' interests in preventing illegal migration and people's smugglers business by focusing on short- and long-term objectives. The EU's purpose is to create 16 tailor-made country packages, 'compacts', with origin and transit migration countries. (European Commission, 2016c; European Council, 2016b)

Before the Migration Compact was adopted, the EU received strong criticism from over 100 NGOs urging the European Council to reject the proposal. The NGOs stated that by implementing the approach, the EU would make deterrence and return the main objectives of its relationship with third countries. There were three issues that received the most criticism: the Compact causing human rights violations, representing a re-orientation of the EU's development aid towards stopping migration, and being inspired by the EU-Turkey Agreement. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles [ECRE], 2016; Amnesty International, 2016)

The criticism from the NGOs indicates that the EU is using development aid to manage migration from the compact countries. Poverty eradication should not be subordinated to foreign policy interests which, the NGOs argue, is happening within the Migration Compact. The EU's aim to provide aid for third countries to manage migration with short-term actions is in contradiction to the main purpose of development aid, eradicating poverty through long-term actions. As the Migration Compact is a new framework, and the EU might be willing to create more compacts with third countries, it is important to study the possible issues and contradictions this might create. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the following research questions:

*What are the possible issues or contradictions of the EU directing development aid to short-term actions to manage migration from Africa? What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions?*

The EU is the world's biggest development funding provider, and significant part of the funding goes to African countries (European Commission, 2016d). However, the current refugee crisis has made the Union to create new policies and direct more funding to migration management. As the migrants and refugees are still arriving to Europe and only changing ways to enter the continent, it is interesting and necessary to analyse what direction the EU is taking in its migration management actions.

The thesis is a case study of the Migration Compact and analyses it through the objectives and actions implemented in the five priority countries of the Compact: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The

research is conducted through qualitative content analysis concentrating on various EU's documents of the Compact, and supported by statements from certain institutions. The analysis will include interviews from experts from different NGOs which will demonstrate what kind of contradictions the Migration Compact might have and what could be the solutions for migration management in the five African countries. The analysis is based on two macro-theories of migration process and literature published by scholars about migration management, EU's development aid, and the nexus between them.

## European Union's approaches and processes on migration

After hundreds of African migrants tried to enter the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Morocco in 2005, African migration became permanently part of the EU's external policies. In December 2005, the European Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration which priority actions focus mainly on Africa and the Mediterranean. It presented a shift from security-driven discourse to mobility and development-oriented discourse that was considered more attractive to third countries. The Global Approach's purpose is to strengthen partnerships between origin, transit and destination countries by managing legal migration, preventing illegal migration, and promoting relation between migration and development. Kabbanji argues that the Global Approach advocates the migration-development nexus which is why the nexus is so prominent in the EU external policies nowadays. (Kabbanji, 2013)

In November 2011, the European Commission presented a renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) which represents the common framework for the EU's external migration and asylum policy, and defines how the EU conducts policy dialogues and cooperation with third countries. The Commission called for a more efficient approach, and highlighted mobility of third country nationals to be essential for improving it. It stated also that GAMM should be incorporated in the EU's overall foreign policy framework, including development cooperation. (European Commission, 2017b; European Commission, 2011) The Global Approach has received criticism for lacking transparency and having predominance of home affairs and security actors. Hence, it does not truly present a renewed approach to migration policy, instead is shaped with a strong incentive-based conditionality. (Carrera, Parkin & den Hertog, 2012)

Loosely gathered under the GAMM, the EU runs dialogues at bilateral, regional and continental level with Africa on migration and mobility. On continental level the cooperation is done with the African Union (AU). Regional level dialogues are built around the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, the former launched in 2006 with Western and Central African countries, and the latter in 2014 with East African countries. Both of the Processes enhance cooperation on migration and aim to identify common priorities between the participant countries. The Khartoum Process concentrates particularly on addressing trafficking and smuggling of migrants. On bilateral level, the EU has established Mobility Partnership, tailor-made dialogue and cooperation with various partner countries. (European Commission, 2017b; European Commission, 2017c; European Commission, 2015b)

To respond to the refugee crisis, the EU adopted the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015. Following criticism for not receiving an equal amount of migrants compared to the pressure of thousands of people being displaced, the EU established the Agenda to create a more European approach, a common European migration policy combining internal and external policies. (European Commission, 2015a) The Agenda's purpose is to provide Member States with tools to manage migration in medium and long term (European Commission, 2017a). The Agenda includes also short term priorities. Some of the immediate actions taken were increasing funding of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and creating so-called hotspots in Greece and Italy, centres where migrants and refugees were registered and their asylum applications processed. (European Commission, 2017a; Statewatch, 2015) When the Commission proposed the Agenda, many Member States reacted to it at first with caution. Though, the Agenda presents a good basis for needed action: proposals for border control, asylum regime, legal migration, irregular migration, and integration. (Vimont, 2016)

## The Migration Compact

The Partnership Framework with third countries was established under the European Agenda on Migration. Besides the previous approaches and bilateral agreements, the Framework was founded to further strengthen the EU's relation with third countries (Johnson, 2014). It is based on the idea that development and neighbourhood policies can improve capacity-building, including border control, asylum and reintegration efforts, in the countries of origin. Also known as the Migration Compact, it should provide safe and lasting possibilities for refugees and migrants to stay close to their home. The Compact's purpose is to support the countries of origin and transit migration, and at the same time produce concrete results in decreasing the flow of irregular migrants arriving to Europe. The Compact aims to lay foundations for long-lasting cooperation with third countries in migration and mobility policies. (European Commission, 2016c)

Adopted by the European Council on 28 June 2016, the Compact has long- and short-term objectives. The latter one includes saving lives in the Mediterranean, increasing the rate of returns to countries of origin and transit, and enabling migrants and refugees to stay close to home, hence avoid taking dangerous journeys. These objectives are fulfilled by

- working with key partners to improve the legislative and institutional framework for migration,
- giving concrete assistance for capacity building on border and migration management, including providing protection for refugees,
- increasing rates of return and readmission with a preference to voluntary return and a focus on reintegration, and by
- stemming the irregular flows while offering legal migration channels, including increased resettlement. (European Commission, 2016c)

The Commission states addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement as the Compact's long-term objective. This is done by addressing political, social, economic and environmental factors that generate root causes. The objective is supported with various policy elements such as development aid, trade, mobility, energy, and security. In its communication, the Commission notes that when bringing together migration and development policies, it needs to be ensured that development assistance helps manage migration more efficiently and also incentivises the third countries to effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. However, no conditionality is added to humanitarian aid. The Commission states that

“positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return.” (European Commission, 2016c)

Migration Compact's actions are implemented through 16 tailor-made country packages, 'compacts', with origin and transit migration countries. These countries include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The first compacts were chosen to be implemented with five priority countries: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The four West African countries are key regions of irregular migration, and have had dialogue with the EU also previously on migration issues. Ethiopia hosts over 750,000 displaced persons and is a key country of both, origin and transit migration towards Europe. (European Commission, 2016c)

## Funding of the Migration Compact objectives

The Migration Compact is funded with a mix of short-term resources and long-term financial instruments. In short-term, the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa is strengthened with one billion Euros, consisting of 500 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) Reserve and 500 million requested from the Member States. Money from already existing financial instruments, such as the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, is directed for the Framework. The Commission has noted that development aid of the EU and the Member States should be more targeted than now and hence recommends the States to reorient their bilateral financial assistance towards common goals. All together, almost eight billion Euros are made available for the short-term objectives of the compacts over 2016–2020. (European Commission, 2016c)

The EUTF for Africa was launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015 by European and African partners. Its purpose is to combine resources from different donors in order to enable a quick, flexible, and collective EU response to support African countries. The EUTF for Africa aims to help foster stability in the regions to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and displacement, and to contribute to better migration management. (European Commission, 2017n)

To fund the long-term objectives, the Commission has noted that greater role should be given to private investors. Therefore, the Commission proposed together with the Migration Compact to establish External Investment Plan, which would mobilise and support private investors to contribute to the Compact. It sets out details for a new External Investment Fund. The Fund is supported with 3.1 billion Euros from the Commission, collected from the EDF, the African Investment Facility, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the Development Cooperation Instrument, until 2020. The sum is meant to trigger additional public and private investment up to 31 billion Euros. The Commission has called on the Member States and other partners to match the total EU contributions which could bring the total amount of additional investment close to 62 billion Euros. (European Commission, 2016c; European Commission, 2016e)

## Defining development and migration

Migration is not a new phenomenon. Instead, people around the world have always been on the move looking for new opportunities and work, escaping poverty and conflicts. Mass migration has had significant effects on industrialisation, formation of states, and economics. However as Castles and Miller (2009) state, migration has become more global phenomenon as people are able to move more freely to all directions. Therefore, migration is more pervasive and socioeconomically and politically significant than ever before. Never before have political leaders paid this much attention to migration concerns as they have become a vital part of domestic and international policies. (Castles & Miller, 2009)

The dominant literature in migration studies approaches the phenomenon often from two perspectives: migration-development nexus and migration-security nexus. As several migration scholars show, since the beginning of 2000s, Europe's migration policies have been centralised around so-called 'migration and development mantra', the idea that migration supports development. Despite increasing securitisation, migration to Europe has been encouraged by politicians and officials. (E.g. Castles & Miller, 2009; Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Castles, 2009; Kapur, 2004) However, this literature review demonstrates how the mantra has turned around in the past couple years and argues that the EU is directing development aid to manage migration with increasing securitisation measures. The review is divided into four parts: (1) explaining the concepts of development and development aid, (2) describing EU's development aid and migration policies, (3) demonstrating the nexus between development and migration, and how it has developed up till today, and finally (4) showing how the nexus had led to Migration Compact, and summarising the criticism the Compact has received.

## The concepts of development and development aid

Oliver Bakewell (2008) argues that links between migration and development will stay flawed as long as the concept of development is not reconceptualised for a mobile world. Mobility is an inherent aspect of human development which should be the premise for future policy-making in the migration-development field (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). Before coming back to Bakewell's argument at the end of the review, the concepts of development and development aid need to be explained. 'Development' has in practise many potential meanings that depend on the context the term is used. However, common for all these meanings is the notion of enhancement, meaning increase of value, desirability or quality of certain issues. (Knippers Black, 1999) Framed by a notion of good life, the goal of development is to improve quality of life. The goal has evolved from improvements of gross domestic product (GDP) and income to notions of general well-being of an individual. (Bakewell, 2008)

According to Knippers Black (1999), there is a tendency to measure development in monetary terms. However, a growing number of development scholars have argued that material product is a wrong way to measure development and instead, development should be evaluated through socioeconomic change that also nurtures, liberates and energises people suffering from poverty (Knippers Black, 1999). Hence, linking development to general GDP growth has been questioned by ideas of human development, human security and development as capability, freedom or autonomy (Castles, 2009; Sen, 1999; Rodney, 1973). Measuring development in monetary terms is related to the way development is treated, as a top-down process. How development is defined and development aid applied is done in control by major donors in centres of established power, mainly in northern countries. (Castles, 2009; Knippers Black, 1999)



The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines development aid under its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as monetary flows that are provided by official agencies, such as state and local governments. Each transaction is meant to promote economic development and welfare of a developing country. (OECD, 2016) William Easterly writes about bipolarity of aid: it can be seen as a vital way of improving developing countries or not having any effects at all. Expectations of future aid mixed with frustration about existing aid cause muddle opinions about what development aid should do, can do and will do. (Easterly, 2008) For having a large gap between donor promises and actions, development aid tends to be variable. Uncertainty of the amount of received development aid undermines aid effectiveness in countries where the aid is necessary and therefore increases frustration about development aid's effectiveness. (Chuhan-Pole & Fitzpatrick, 2008) Hence, the current aid system is not working well, and donors need to improve practices in aid delivery (Easterly, 2008; Chuhan-Pole & Fitzpatrick, 2008).

According to Easterly (2008), use of development aid is mainly guided by central planning. 'Planners' set out a predetermined goal and a big plan to achieve the goal which is supported by resources and a large administrative apparatus. Easterly argues that this approach does not often work because planners decide the nature of development aid already in advance, and do not have enough information about individual problems. As another option, Easterly presents an alternative philosophy of development aid, 'searchers' who he sees are more capable in ending poverty than planners. Searchers explore solutions by trial and error, and based on received feedback, expand the solutions that work. Searchers hope to find answers to individual problems of the world's poor whereas planners see eradicating poverty as a grand international effort at collective action. Easterly admits that all human activities involve some planning but argues that directing development aid only through planning leads often to failure of goals. (Easterly, 2008)

### The EU on development and migration

Migration from third countries has been included in the EU policymaking for a relative short time. Mainly drawn by the nation states, since the 90s also the EU's role implementing migration policies has grown (Boswell & Geddes, 2011). As migration to Europe increased in the beginning of 2000s, tension between the EU Member States increased which explains why migration issues are often still managed at bilateral level (de Haas, 2008). Europe faces diverse migration which makes creating policies challenging. Also, perception of migrants varies as cheap migrant labour is welcomed and necessary for the economy in many parts of Europe, and at the same time, there is public resistance to southern migrants. (Boswell & Geddes, 2011) However, increasing amount of arriving migrants and ultimately the refugee crisis has demonstrated the limits exclusive national approaches have and hence demanded more unified action (Vimont, 2016).

The EU Treaty framework sets up the Union's regulations for mobility and migration. It was only after adopting the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 that migration from outside Europe was included in the EU's main legal and political framework. In 2009, it was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty that further developed common migration policies, as they had become central part of the EU's actions, and also clarified the EU's concept of development coordination. (Europe External Policy Advisors, 2013a; Boswell & Geddes, 2011) The first legal basis of development coordination was introduced already in 1992 in the Maastricht Treaty, amended later by the Lisbon Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty stated that the objective of development coordination was "to fight against poverty in developing countries, to enhance the social and sustainable development of developing countries and to further the integration of developing countries into the world economy". In the Article 208 in the Lisbon Treaty, the concept is defined as "development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty". (Europe External Policy Advisors, 2013b)

## Migration-development nexus and how it has developed over time

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, many African countries gained their independence which caused the states to be concerned about urban growth and migration to cities from the countryside. As certain states implemented discriminating laws to control permanent urban settlement and to maintain traditional African ways of life, the Global North directed development aid to rural areas of Africa to enable people to stay in their villages. Bakewell (2008) notes that even though reducing migration from urban areas was not the only reason for sending aid, the development initiatives had an underlying desire to control migration and frame it negatively. This demonstrates how development practises in Africa have been connected to migration management since their early roots. (Bakewell, 2008) According to Bakewell, controlling urban migration in Africa is based on 'sedentary bias' which permeates development practises nowadays too. There is a common belief within European politicians and officials that the normal state for people in Africa is to be sedentary. This justifies development initiatives as they will improve living conditions and hence enable people to stay home. (Castles, 2009; Bakewell, 2008)

Framing migration mainly as a negative phenomenon continued throughout the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. However in the 50s and 60s, labour migration was important part of modernisation, and labour export was hoped to improve economic development at countries of origin. (Castles, 2009) Belief that migration spurs development was spread widely in the Global North (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). Though as Castles (2009) notes, in many cases economic benefits stayed small which is why perception of migration stayed negative up till the late 90s. Some scholars argue that causality of migration and development was the opposite, underdevelopment spurring migration and migration causing underdevelopment due to brain drain (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009). As the world globalised rapidly in the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, besides finance, trade and cultural products, also movement of people became more international. Migration became globalised with more and more countries being affected by the movement of people. Globalisation also expanded reasons to migrate, and nowadays most countries do not have only one type of migration. Instead, states are facing labour migration, refugees, and permanent settlement at the same time. (Castles & Miller, 2009)

At the same time as South-North movement increased, migrants from developing countries were perceived as a problem or even a threat. This dilemma forced politicians and officials to change their perception of migration to more positive, and led to a major conceptual shift and new surge of interest in connecting migration and development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Castles, 2009; Bakewell, 2008; Newland, 2007) Newland sees that the interest in migration's impact to development started in the late 90s and developed to an organised international debate during the following ten years (Newland, 2007). The change of opinion led policy-makers to emphasise all the possible benefits of international migration to the countries of origin, and highlight migration as a solution for economic development (Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009; Castles & Delgado Wise, 2007). Migration discourse and the dilemma around it were reduced to a simplistic migration-development 'mantra' (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Kapur, 2004) summarised here by Glick Schiller and Faist (2009):

1. Migrants will transfer both, financial and social remittances,
2. brain drain will gradually be replaced by brain gain,
3. temporary and circular migration will stimulate development,
4. migrant diasporas will become development agents besides individual migrants, and
5. economic development will eventually reduce emigration, although there will be an increase in the short and middle term.

The main reason for the change of perception of migration was the growth of migrant remittances as they had become a significant source for external development finance in developing countries. Kapur examines growing external resource flows to developing countries, and their complex economic and political effects. He states that remittances were the new 'mantra' as the money sent home is believed to promote local and national development. (Kapur, 2004) Another reason for the new interest in migration and development was the increased amount of southern migrants. As migration to Europe could not be prevented, the EU tightened migration management which required collaboration with the South. Cooperation was only possible if it brought benefits also for the southern countries. This led to connecting migration and development aid, providing a way for the EU and Member States to manage migration and at same time, secure cooperation with the South. (Castles & Delgado Wise, 2007)

The migration-development mantra was driven by governments and international agencies from the North, and concerns or opinions of the South were taken into account only occasionally. The South was seen only as a partner for implementation as the policies set by the North were supposed to benefit it. (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012; Glick Schiller & Faist, 2009; Castles & Delgado Wise, 2007) During the 80s and 90s, migration was framed negatively primarily for economic reasons, southern migrants increasing burden in already weakened welfare states of the North. After the terrorist attacks in Europe and USA in 2001, 2004 and 2005, the negative image was reframed by national security (Johnson, 2014). Migration-security nexus became more present also in the EU. Linking migration and security continued throughout the 90s but as Dauvergne (2007) argues, the terrorist attacks in 2001 cleared away opposition to even stricter provisions to control migration in the name of national security. As migration has increased notably in the past five years, also migration management has become more and more security-driven in the EU. It is demonstrated in prevention and containment, and implemented with solutions emphasising return, deportations or tightened border control (Johnson, 2014). According to Nyberg Sørensen (2012), when in the migration-development mantra 'development' was reduced to an instrument of migration policy, in the migration-security nexus 'security' refers to keeping unwanted migrants out of Europe. She explores the connection between migration, development and security through an analysis of discursive constructions in the migration-development and the migration-security nexuses. To understand the constructions and policy outcomes done based on them, Nyberg Sørensen studies the nexuses from migration industries' perspective.

### Opposing conceptualisation to migration-development nexus

The migration-development connection supports the dominant development paradigm, economic development (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). The underlying reason to create the mantra is a common belief that promoting economic development in the South will eventually reduce migration to the North (Castles, 2009; Bakewell, 2008). This is based on the belief that poverty is the main reason to emigrate (Kabbanji, 2013). Even though the migration-development nexus has got new notions over time, it still has the 'sedentary bias'. However, there is an opposing conceptualisation arguing that economic development in the South will not necessarily reduce migration, and that current perception of migration should be redefined. Bakewell (2008) notes that evidence shows people will move even in larger extent when they become wealthier and get more opportunities to move. There is also a fundamental difference on how migration is seen in Europe and Africa. For Africans, migration is a natural phenomenon, a significant way of receiving money to the home country through remittances, and an important way to escape unemployment and insecurity. (Vimont, 2016) Castles argues that to understand migration phenomenon, it should be analysed in a framework that links global relationships of economic and political power with

national and local experiences of coping with social transformation. Also methodological innovations should be drawn from several disciplines. According to him, human mobility should be understood as a normal part of social transformation. (Castles, 2009) De Haan also notes that migration policies should not be based on a perception that people are sedentary and immobile. Building on literature of sustainable livelihoods, he argues that migration should be understood as part of people's strategies to enhance their livelihoods. (de Haan, 2000). Moreover, increased control of migration has only caused people to look for new ways to enter Europe which has caused illegal border crossings to increase. By managing borders, EU and Member States have produced more illegal immigration, creating an 'illegality industry'. (Johnson, 2014; Andersson, 2014; Gabrielli, 2012)

### Responses to the Migration Compact

Migration Compact is the latest example of the EU externalising and securitising migration policies. Before the European Council adopted the new framework, more than 100 NGOs urged the Council to reject it. The NGOs accused the Compact of being a blueprint of the EU-Turkey Agreement, directing development aid to migration management, and violating several human rights (ECRE, 2016). The NGOs were concerned about the direction the EU is taking in its foreign policy. However, Anja Palm (2016) argues that the EU's external migration policies have long been based on externalisation of migration control and conditionality when creating agreements with third countries. Despite the Migration Compact presents some steps forward in creating mutually beneficial framework, Palm sees it "business as usual", supporting the EU's securitisation and externalisation actions. (Palm, 2016) Many of the NGOs claimed that Migration Compact has conditionalities which Palm also agrees with. Positive and negative incentives in development are bound to how the third countries will cooperate regarding readmission agreements and migration management (Palm, 2016). Pierre Vimont opposes the approach and calls for solidarity stating that if focusing only on returns and readmissions, the EU will not be able to create true collaboration due to a lack of trust. The third countries need incentives and actions that will benefit them as well. (Vimont, 2016)

Despite of the criticism, Palm sees that the Compact has brought some new needed approaches in the EU's migration policies. The Compact aims to create a single framework for agreements with third countries to improve coordination. It presents a shift from Euro-centric policy approach to a multifocal viewpoint on migration that also reflects interests of the third countries. However, as the Compact was created in pressure during the refugee crisis, Palm notes that there is a risk that the compacts implemented with the third countries are not objective and hence fail cooperation in the long term. (Palm, 2016)

### Conclusive remarks of the literature review

As the literature review explains how the EU defines development and migration, and how the dominant agenda has connected these concepts, it demonstrates that there are issues and contradictions in the EU's current migration and development agenda, one of them being EU directing development aid to manage migration from Africa.

Like Bakewell's statement presented in the beginning, this thesis also argues that freedom of movement should be considered as development, and development aid's purpose should be to provide premises that enable people to do decisions freely, also when it comes to mobility. Mobility itself should be noted as an inherent aspect of human development, also in the EU policies. Migration is a way to improve quality of life, and should be emphasised more often as a positive effect for people's livelihoods (de Haan, 2000). However, as the nexuses are constructed by the North, the thesis argues that the EU policies ignore the fact that economic development in the South might not reduce migration to Europe. Moreover, the thesis

argues that the EU is guiding its development aid through predetermined goals as a 'planner' and hence is likely to fail to understand individual reasons of why people are mobile. The EU's migration management actions have been directed to whole countries or certain regions in a country. As the Migration Compact has been implemented so far in this way, the thesis makes an assumption that the Compact is likely to ignore individual reasons for migration.

The EU has perceived migration as a mean to develop third countries, with remittances eventually enabling people to stay at home in the country of origin. However, Nyberg Sørensen (2012) notes that nowadays more prominent migration-security nexus is likely to reduce the amount of remittances and hence weaken the migration-development nexus. Therefore, Nyberg Sørensen believes that the mantra might turn around back to development curtailing migration approach. This thesis argues that this has already happened in the EU policies, as the Union has implemented new ways of migration management, such as the EU-Turkey Agreement and the Migration Compact. In these approaches, the EU is sending development aid to third countries to control migration. Using development aid to migration management is contradictory already as itself due to the definition of development aid (Europe External Policy Advisors, 2013b) but as the EU's development aid is directed to various short-term actions in the Migration Compact, there is an uncertainty of truly bilateral and long term cooperation between the EU and the African countries.

## Theoretical approach

International migration is studied often in two separate bodies of social scientific investigation. Either the research focuses on determinants, processes and patterns of migration or on how migrants become incorporated into receiving societies, the first focusing on individual and group patterns of migration, and the latter one on institutional frames. Though, it can be argued that the distinction does not provide a full understanding of migratory process. (Castles & Miller, 2009) This chapter presents two theories that explain the process of migration, what drives people to migrate to the Global North and where migration stems from. Segmented labour market theory and world systems theory do not explain micro-level decision processes, instead focus on forces that operate on higher levels. The former explains migration through structural requirements of industrial economies, and the latter argues migration to be a natural consequence of capitalist market penetration to third countries. (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor, 1998)

### Segmented (dual) market labour theory

Segmented, or also known as dual, market labour theory is one of the economic theories of migration. It shows the importance of institutional factors in causing labour market segmentation. (Castles & Miller, 2009) It has a macro-institutional focus on migrant labour, and does not explain individual reasons for migration. Segmented labour market theory is based on Michael J. Piore's studies on migrant labour and industrial societies. According to Piore (1979), a theory explaining migration between developed and less developed regions needs to recognise four characteristics of migration process. The first is the type of work positions that migrants hold. Jobs are usually unskilled, low-paid and inferior by their social status. Also, working conditions may be unpleasant, and the job itself rarely has a chance of advancement toward a better-paying position. The second is the factor that initiates migrants to fill these jobs. Migrants become aware of the positions because of active recruitment done by employers in the developed region. Hence, it is the employers and the type of jobs that are central in creating migration. The third characteristic of the process is inexhaustible supply of labour. Even though an old flow of migrants would be cut off, it is easy for employers in Europe to initiate a new one. The last, fourth characteristic is persistence of migration processes. Despite of various attempts, once migration is initiated, it is very difficult to halt. (Piore, 1979) World systems theory, presented later, explains reasons for why migration as a phenomenon is complicated to stop.

However, the characteristics of migration process do not explain what creates the demand for migrant labour or why migrants choose to take these positions despite of their low quality. According to the segmented labour market theory, instead of push factors in regions of origin, migration is caused by pull factors in the receiving regions. There is a build-in demand for cheap and flexible labour that stems from three basic characteristics of industrial economies: structural inflation, social constraints on motivation, and economic dualism. (Piore, 1979) Structural inflation refers to common understanding of wages, how they not only reflect conditions of supply but also give status and prestige. Wages reflect social status and have rigid notions of how occupational status and pay correlate. Informal social expectations and formal institutional mechanisms, such as union contracts, ensure that wages correspond to the hierarchy of status people perceive. Hence, employers cannot simply raise wages when trying to attract people for unskilled jobs at the bottom of the hierarchy. This would upset socially defined perception of how occupational status and wage should correlate. When increasing wages, they should be raised proportionately throughout the job hierarchy. As this would become too expensive for the employers, they tend to recruit

migrant workers who are more willing to accept low-paid jobs than native workers. (Massey, 2001 & 1999) Hence, they avoid wage increases and at same time create demand for migrant labour.

Another reason for the demand of cheap and flexible labour is social constraints of motivation within occupational hierarchies. As wages reflect status, people do not work only to generate income but also to build up social status. However, in unskilled, low-paid jobs there is rarely an avenue for upward mobility which causes problems on how to motivate people to accept these jobs. Moreover, the bottom of the labour market cannot be eliminated because this would only create a new bottom, hence there will always be motivational problems within labour market. Migrants fill up the demand as they perceive bottom-level jobs only as a way to earn money, with no implications for status or prestige. The difference between living standards in developed and developing societies causes low wages in developed regions to appear generous for migrant workers. Work might not reflect a status for a migrant as he does not view himself as part of the receiving society, being still connected to the home community where foreign labour carries notable honour and prestige, this explaining why migrants are willing to take low quality jobs. (Massey, 2001 & 1999)

Economic dualism is the third characteristic that creates demand for low-paid labour. It is demonstrated in division to capital and labour, the former being a fixed factor of production and latter a variable factor that can be released as demand falls. Owners of capital bear the costs of its unemployment whereas in labour, it is the workers who bear the costs of their own unemployment. Therefore, capital-intensive methods are used to meet the basic demand and labour-intensive methods to respond to seasonal need. The dualism creates a distinction in the work force. Workers in the capital-intensive sector have stable, skilled jobs with the best equipment. The jobs require considerable knowledge, and hence employers are forced to invest in training of their workers. Because of the costs, workers in capital-intensive sector become expensive to let go, thereby part of the capital. Labour-intensive sector workers fill the unstable jobs, and due to the nature of the job, can be laid off at any time. As the work is usually unskilled, the employers do not have to invest in the workers, which is why firing people has only little costs. The unstable condition makes it difficult to attract native workers because of the motivational issues demonstrated above. In this case migrants are again a solution to fill the shortfall in demand within the labour-intensive sector. (Massey, 2001)

Portes and Bach (1985) used the segmented labour market theory while analysing how Cuban immigrants were incorporated into the United States. They found evidence of a third sector that has features of both high- and low-paid labour markets but like dual segmented labour market, it also yields a structural demand for migrant labour. The third sector is similar to low-paid labour sector in its character of low-status jobs and unpleasant working conditions. However, it also provides migrants economic returns to education and experience which is characteristic to the high-paid sector. (Massey, 1999; Portes & Bach, 1985) Gordon (1995) has studied migration labour and migrational behaviour in the United Kingdom (UK) through the segmented labour market theory. Despite his empirical focus is on examining ways how segmentation conditions labour mobility, Gordon notes that relationship between labour market structuring and spatial mobility processes should be seen as interactive (Gordon, 1995).

### Criticism to segmented labour market theory

The segmented labour market theory does not state or deny that workers make rational, self-interested decisions like microeconomic theories predict. Instead, it demonstrates how structural demand for bottom-level workers and limited native supply of such workers has created an underlying demand for migrants in developed countries. (Massey, 1999) Hence, the theory is most criticised for ignoring individual reasons and



motives of migration which on the other hand are acknowledged for example in the neo-classical microeconomic and new economics of labour migration theories. The former sees migration caused by geographical imbalance between demand and supply of labour. Individuals choose to migrate when they believe that migration will bring them positive net return. The latter theory states that migration decisions are not only made by individuals, but within larger units of interrelated people like families or households, and that people act collectively to maximize expected income. (Massey, 2001)

### World systems theory

The world systems theory stems from historical-structural theory that emerged in the 50s as an opposite response to functionalist theories of social change. Instead of stating that countries develop economically through various stages of modernisation and industrialisation, historical-structural theorists argued that poor developing countries were trapped in disadvantaged position because of unequal geopolitical structure. According to the theory, when global capitalism expands, it reinforces sedimentary economic order and perpetuates already existing inequalities. (Massey, et al., 1998) The historical-structural theory provided an alternative approach of international migration to economic theories of migration. Instead of concentrating on voluntary migrations of individuals, historical-structural theory has focus on mass recruitment of migrant labour. (Castles & Miller, 2009)

Historical-structural theory became highly popular during the 60s and 70s when theorists became interested in reasons behind boom and bust of certain nation states. Global capitalism was claimed to cause underdevelopment of third countries or force them into dependency by structural conditions that were defined by developed capitalist countries. This approach of the historical-structural theory became known as dependency theory. Highlighting the fundamental problems facing developing countries, the dependency theory focuses on national level and particularly on study of the periphery. (Massey, et al., 1998; So, 1990)

World systems theory emerged in the mid-70s as a follow-up of both theories presented above. Stemming particularly from the dependency theory, it also drew on the historiography of the French Annales School and its long-time leader Fernand Braudel who sought to develop a global history that concentrates on totality of the field of social forces (So, 1990). World systems theory's leading exponent Immanuel Wallerstein found that many activities of the capitalist world economy could not be explained through the dependency theory. This led Wallerstein to develop a new world system perspective by doing a comprehensive analysis of capitalist system's global expansion from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards. At the centre of the theory is the division of countries into core, semi-periphery and periphery nations. This was done by classifying countries based on how dependent they are on dominant capitalist countries, termed as core nations in the theory. Peripheral nations are the ones with most dependency, whereas despite being dependant on core nations, semi-peripheral nations are somewhat wealthier and more independent in the global market. (Massey, et al., 1998) However, the world systems theory does not focus on national level, instead unit of analysis is a 'world system'. This means focusing on relational characteristics of nations instead of attributive characteristics, and seeing hierarchies as groups within a world economy instead of within a state. (So, 1990)

Wallerstein's aim was to reconstruct historical processes that were behind unequal political and economic structures by comparing regions with each other within the same time periods but also in earlier and later instances (Chase-Dunn, 2012). He focused on the mechanisms of how non-capitalist, peripheral regions were incorporated into the global market economy controlled by the core nations. The theory argues that



penetration of multinational companies into peripheral nations accelerated rural change which then led to poverty, displacement of workers, and rapid urbanisation. Moreover, the core nations tend to determine and control the ways how peripheral nations advance to the semi-periphery, or in rare occasions all the way to the core. (Patterson, 2009; Castles & Miller, 2009; So, 1990)

### World systems theory and international migration

In the beginning, neither the world systems theory nor the dependency theory had interest in international migration. Despite of increasing migration from developing countries in the 60s, it was only in the mid-70s following the economic recession that historical-structural theorists started to understand that international migration is not temporary and that it is linked to structural changes formed when a nation enters the global market place. International migration was not anymore explained only as an individual or household decision, instead as a structural consequence following expansion of markets within a global political hierarchy. (Massey, et al., 1998)

The expansion of markets was created by capitalist firms from developed regions as they entered developing regions with a desire of higher profits and greater wealth. To achieve that, the firms looked for new land, raw materials, labour, and consumer markets. Based on the historical-structural theory and the expansion of markets, the world systems theory argues that penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist societies has created a mobile population that is likely to migrate. International migration emerges because of disruptions and dislocations that occur when global market economy, or in general capitalism, expands. (Massey, et al., 1998)

When capitalist firms consolidate landholdings, mechanise production, introduce cash crops, and use fertilisers and insecticides, it destroys traditional ways of agriculture. Local agrarian workers are driven out of local markets and become mobile labour force. Moreover, extraction of raw materials for global market requires industrial methods that rely on local paid labour. Receiving wages changes traditional forms of economic organisation that have been based on norms of reciprocity and fixed role relations. New labour markets become based on new conceptions of individualism, private gain, and social change which then cause geographic mobility of labour in developing regions. In addition, some companies establish factories that take advantage of low wage rates. Employing locals strengthens labour markets in the developing country but tends to divide workforce as there is a particular demand for female labour. Besides limiting work opportunities for men, factory work is often poorly paid. All in all, when a capital firm enters a developing region, it undermines the local economy by producing goods that compete with locally made products, by feminising workforce and hence discriminating men, and by socialising women for modern consumption and industrial work which however will not provide a lifetime income that would meet the needs of private gain. These changes cause local people to become socially and economically uprooted, and hence prone to migrate. (Massey, 2001; Massey, et al., 1998)

Besides the above mentioned reasons, expansion of market familiarises people from developing countries with various goods and new ways of working, and creates material and ideological links to the places from where the capitalist firms originate. Transportation and communication are examples of material links that promote people to migrate. Various transportation means are built to ship goods and raw materials, and to deliver machinery. These means end up facilitating also movement of people by reducing travelling costs. Besides, to secure established infrastructure and factories, developed countries build military bases which then result in creating social and political connections between local population and people from the developed countries. Soldiers might get local spouses who would then later apply for a residence in

developed countries. Military bases and operations involve hiring local people, this creating personal relationships, political debts, and moral obligations that could lead to allowing immigrant visas when the military departs the developing country. Also while working in the military or foreign factories, local people become familiar with a new language and culture. Ideological links are created that many developing countries have already due to colonisation. Cultural links are longstanding and strong incentive to migrate to developed region. Moreover, the links are reinforced by mass communication and advertising directed from core countries like USA, France and UK. (Massey, et al., 1998)

Based on the links and needs of developed regions explained above, the world systems theory argues that international migration is a natural consequence of expanding global markets. Opposite to micro-level decision models like the neoclassical microeconomic theory, world systems theory states that international migration has little to do with wage rates or employment differentials. Instead, migration follows when global markets are created with the support of current political structure of global economy. According to the world systems theory, to manage migration, developed countries' governments would need to regulate overseas investment activities of corporations and control international flows of capital and goods. However, this might cause trade disputes, economic recession, and antagonise multinational firms, which is why such policies are unlikely to be implemented. (Massey, et al., 1998)

### Criticism to world systems theory

All the theories based on the historical-structural approach have received criticism for being too one-sided to analyse contemporary migrations. As the theories emphasise economic and social structure, and see interest of capital determining everything, they lack attention to human agency and individual actions. (Castles & Miller, 2009) Like the segmented labour market theory, the world systems theory is criticised for ignoring individual reasons for migration. Wallerstein (2004) demonstrates four different approaches that lay criticism on world systems theory. The positivists find the theory too generalised and insufficient in qualitative data. The orthodox Marxists see the theory to stress insufficiently class analysis. The state autonomists criticise world systems theory for eradicating boundary between state and businesses that, according to autonomists, respond to different rules and pressures and hence cannot be joined into one analytic sphere. Common for all the three approaches is that they consider state as a unit of analysis. The fourth approach criticising world systems theory, culturalists, claim that the theory emphasises too much economy and not enough culture. In summary, world systems theory receives most criticism for what it proclaims as its perspective. (Wallerstein, 2004)

### Conclusive remarks of the theories

Both of the theories present reasons for migration from macro-perspective. They were chosen for the thesis because they demonstrate that despite individual motives might guide people to stay home, these motives are also affected by incentives built in the capitalist structures that cause people to migrate to the Global North. This thesis complements the explained theories by arguing that migration is a natural phenomenon that will occur not only because of capitalist structures but also because of globalisation and natural development of third countries. Even though the analysis is not built on microeconomic theories, the thesis does not argue that individual motivations should be ignored or that they matter less than structural incentives as reasons creating migration. Macroeconomic theories were chosen to demonstrate that migration as a phenomenon is not only been defined but also partly created by the Global North. How migration is perceived and treated nowadays is, like the literature review demonstrates, determined by the North. At the same time, the current agenda does not recognise that migration has been created by the

North. As the thesis focuses on analysing the EU's actions, not migrants' motives or actions, macroeconomic theories provide better basis to build an analysis than microeconomic theories.

On the basis of the literature review and the theories, this thesis argues that migration from Africa to the EU will continue unless the EU is willing to create truly equal compacts based on information that acknowledges individual motives, and as long as the EU and its Member States maintain a demand for low-paid, unskilled migrant labour. Reasons for migration lie partly behind divided world systems and in their divided labour markets. Moreover, the division is perpetuated and supported with policies and actions of the core nations. As the migration-development nexus can contribute to national development through the remittances sent by the migrants, the opposite nexus of development curtailing migration can promote national development through the aid sent to third countries. However, both actions, as they are emphasised from the North, can also reinforce entrenched dominance of capitalist countries, the core. This then leads to more divided world systems where individuals of the periphery are still prone to migrate.

Based on the theories and the EU's migration management actions so far, the thesis makes an assumption that the EU is ignoring underlying reasons of migration in the Migration Compact as international migration is largely demand-based and stems from the links created by the Global North. As there is not much research done yet of the Migration Compact, this thesis contributes to overall studies of EU migration policies and particularly to analyses of the Migration Compact, as the latest EU policy framework, which are so far done mainly by various NGOs. Besides, it complements the studies of migration-development nexus by claiming that the nexus has turned around again and hence providing a new approach to the topic.

## Research methodology

The analysis in this thesis is conducted through a descriptive case study analysis. Case study design was chosen for the thesis because it allows researchers to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events and hence to study complex social phenomena. (Yin, 2009) EU's migration and development policies are intricate processes. This is not only demonstrated in how they are formed, but also how they are received by various institutions and nation-states. Another reason for choosing case study is because it allows analysing several cases at the same time and using multiple sources of data, such as interviews, documents and observations (Rose, Spinks & Canhoto, 2015). The Migration Compact is the main case analysed in this thesis. Besides, the analysis concentrates on five sub-cases, the compacts made with the five priority countries: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The thesis does not provide a detailed comparison of the sub-cases due to lack of data as there are only three progress reports published of each country during the time the thesis was conducted. However, it makes an overall comparison of the countries' progress made so far within the Migration Compact.

The case study design has its limitations. It is argued to lack rigor as the analysis might not be systematic or might have selection bias, meaning that choice of cases biases the findings of the research which leads to excluding cases that contradict favoured theory. Another common concern is that case study is not generalisable. A third issue is that it tends to take too long time and results in massive documents. (Rose, Spinks & Canhoto, 2015; Yin, 2009) To avoid these issues in the thesis, only data that is related directly to the Compact and the five priority countries was chosen for the analysis. The data can be argued to be holistic as all the EU documents published of the Compact and all founded NGO statements of the Compact's progress were included in the analysis. This was done also to not have selection bias, and hence to ensure reliability of the research. The five sub-cases were chosen because they are the priority countries set by the EU and thus have the most actions implemented so far within the Migration Compact. Regarding generalisation, arguments in the thesis can have a broader application as the EU might plan more compacts with other third countries. Hence, the thesis can be argued to be externally valid as the results can be generalised in sense that they demonstrate what the agenda in the EU external migration policies is now and what direction the EU is likely to take in the future policies.

The analysis in the thesis is descriptive for the reason that it aims to describe what the possible issues and contradictions in the Migration Compact are, and also the solutions for them. An explanatory analysis is unnecessary as the literature review and chosen theories already demonstrate why there are prospective contradictions. These are for example increasing migration control despite there being a demand for migrant labour at the same time, or the EU directing development aid to short-term actions despite of its own definition for development aid stating that the main aim being eradicating poverty. Therefore, the analysis stems from situations that have underlying contradictions, and aims to resolve and clarify what the possible contradictions or issues are.

Moreover, the thesis is of a deductive nature as the analysis and categories in the methodology are built on the theories explained in the chapter above and the main concepts presented in the literature review. The theories and the literature review both present perceptions that the Global North, including the EU, has on the concepts of migration and development. As the perceptions are connected to actions within policies, these concepts define the categories in the methodology and hence guide the analysis of the thesis.

Social research is defined by its epistemological and ontological considerations. The latter one refers to what we study, what the nature of the social entities studied in the research is. The ontological position of this thesis is social constructionism which means that social phenomena and categories are created through social constructions instead of being entities that have a reality external to social actors. Moreover, they are in constant state of revision. (Bryman, 2012) This thesis is based on constructionism because, as the literature review demonstrates, migration and development are socially constructed phenomena. They have a certain reality that persists and defines people's perspectives but that is still not an inanimate reality (Becker, 1982). Epistemology refers to what is regarded as acceptable knowledge, and the consideration applied in this thesis is post-modernism. Post-modernists see that there is no objective reality, and that it is hardly possible to arrive at a definitive version of any reality. Instead, knowledge of any reality is actively created by people. (Bryman, 2012) Post-modernism connects to the research objective of the thesis as Migration Compact and actions within it are constructed by the EU, as well as the public documents about it, and hence, it is important to study them.

## Research method

The purpose of the thesis is to analyse what kind of possible issues or contradictions the Migration Compact might have, particularly within its short-term actions, by analysing how the EU and institution documents present the actions and objectives of the Compact. Therefore, the research is based on qualitative content analysis. Qualitative analysis has emphasis on the type of words and the content itself instead of quantification when collecting the data of various documents (Bryman, 2012) which is why it was chosen for the thesis. Content analysis, technique for making conclusions by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969), was chosen as the research method because it allows to study meanings, themes, contexts and intentions in communication (Prasad, 2008). As the thesis focuses mainly on public EU documents, those being the main information channel the general public can learn about the Migration Compact, content analysis was considered the best method for analysis. In general, content analysis is used in migration studies to analyse how media depicts migrants or the refugee crisis (see e.g. Allen, 2016; Berry, Garcia-Blanco & Moore, 2015) or to study certain policy documents and their preparation (see e.g. Bond, 2016; Wolff, 2014). Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore (2015) used content analysis to be able to capture range of actors, themes, explanations and arguments that appear in newspapers, whereas Allen (2016) used the method to identify specific aspects of news articles, this demonstrating how broad and also specific issues the content analysis can be used for. Though, there is potential bias when choosing which articles fit under certain categories (Allen, 2016).

To analyse the documents from the EU and the institutions systematically, four categories were created based on the theories and the literature review. To avoid bias when choosing which parts of the texts fit under the certain categories, also sub-questions were created to bring into focus what the categories refer to:

1. Depiction and perception of migrants
  - How migrants are presented within the Migration Compact progress
  - Are migrants' needs or living situation acknowledged within the Compact and if so how
  - Are migrants depicted as beneficiaries of the Compact and if so how
2. Depiction and perception of the European Union
  - How is the EU presented within the Migration Compact progress
  - What is the perception the documents give of the EU
  - Is the EU depicted as beneficiary of the Compact and if so how

### 3. Actions

- What actions are planned and done within each progress report
- How are short-term and long-term actions depicted, what they include and what is the emphasis given for them
- What are the background and justifications given for the actions

### 4. Development and development aid

- How development and development aid are depicted
- How development aid is used within the Compact
- In what way development is been referred in the Migration Compact

The analysis is done by collecting information, connotations and themes of the texts through the categories and their sub-questions. These observations are then analysed together to find if there are possible issues or contradictions in the way the EU is using development aid to manage migration from Africa. In the analysis of the institutions' documents, the action category includes observations made of what the documents say about the Migration Compact's actions.

## Qualitative interviews

In addition to the content analysis, four individual, qualitative interviews were conducted to add more specific content to the analysis about the possible contradictions the Migration Compact might have and particularly about solutions to the contradictions. In qualitative interviewing, the interest is in the interviewee's point of view, whereas quantitative interview reflects more the researcher's concerns. Besides, qualitative interviewing tends to be flexible, moving to the direction the interviewee takes. Hence, qualitative interview can provide in-depth and detailed answers. (Bryman, 2012) However, to gain interviews that can be summarised together and compared to each other, all the interviews were semi-structured based on the same interview guide (see Appendix p. 69). Thus, the topics discussed are similar with each interviewee but the order can change, and the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply (Bryman, 2012).

Individual interviews, instead of group interviews, were conducted to present separate opinions of people who are part of different types of institutions that have different connections to the refugee crisis and the Migration Compact. Besides, interviewing one person at a time gives the interviewee more space and time to answer, and also for the interviewer to present follow up questions to receive more detailed answers. The interviewees represent three different kinds of institutions and approaches to the refugee crisis and the Migration Compact: official institutions that collaborate with the EU and nation-states within migration management and development, official institutions that see the EU's migration policies from more critical point of view, and social movements or community organisations established by activists and migrants themselves to inform general public and politicians about issues related to migration. The three types of institutions were chosen to receive information from all aspects of migration policies and to avoid having too one sided, EU critical or supportive, interviewees. As the thesis aims to describe contradictions and solutions to Migration Compact, emphasis was put on interviewees who represent the receiving or collaborating part of the Compact, not the planner or implementer which in this case is the EU. Hence, the interviewees can tell how the compacts are affecting the priority countries and how they see development aid should be used. Also, as the documents analysed in the content analysis are most from the EU and represent the Union's point of view, it is important to compare their content to other actors' perspectives.

The interviewees are Policy Advisor Solveig Als from the Danish Refugee Council, Member of MigrEurop Filippo Furri, Member of MigrEurop and researcher for Statewatch Yasha Maccanico, and Member of Flüchtlingsrat Hamburg and Afrique-Europe-Interact Conni Gunsser. Danish Refugee Council is a humanitarian relief organisation implementing a broad range of activities related to for example protection, food security and income generation in conflict affected areas. MigrEurop is a European and African network of activist and researchers whose aim is to promote against detention of foreigners. Afrique-Europe-Interact is a transnationally organised network that consists of grassroots activists mainly from Mali, Togo, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, many of them self-organised refugees, migrants and people who were deported.

The content analysis and the interviews were conducted during April-May 2017. Transcriptions of the interviews can be found at Appendix p. 70.

## Sample

The content analysis' main data is various online documents from the EU of the Migration Compact. Moreover, to include data that evaluates the EU's actions regarding the Migration Compact, documents from various institutions engaged with migration and development are also added in the sample. Hence, the sample aims to be objective by presenting implementers' (the EU) and assessors' (the institutions) perspectives. Most of the documents included in the sample are press releases or statements. Besides those, some of the documents are announcements, fact sheets, news pieces, and full communications. This is because as mentioned earlier in the methodology, all the EU documents depicting progress within the Migration Compact are included in the analysis which is why the sample can be argued to be reliable. Sampling was done in the same pattern in all the websites (explained in the next paragraph) to minimise errors and biases and hence to have a reliable sample that anyone else could collect as well. All the document types represent the EU's and the institutions' daily communication channels within their external communication, the ways they inform general public regularly. As the content analysis focuses on daily communication, that despite of being published frequently, is informative and detailed, publications and social media were left out of the sample. In addition, all documents are published online in English as the thesis focuses on content that can be read by an audience as wide as possible. Because the Compact is still a new framework, there are little scholarly analyses or data of it. Therefore, the main sample in the thesis is all the public Migration Compact documents.

As the Commission is the executive of the EU, it is also responsible for setting out migration management plans. Therefore, most of the documents included in the sample are from the Commission and mainly from their press release database. In the Commission's press release search (European Commission, 2017d), search results can be arranged by date. Hence, all the appeared links were scanned through starting from 30 April 2017 until 7 June 2016, and the ones related to the Migration Compact were added to the sample. Besides, documents were also searched by using Commission's general search (European Commission, 2017e), European Union's general search (European Union, 2017), European Council's press release and statement databank (European Council, 2017), and European Parliament's news search (European Parliament, 2017) in their websites. As most of the documents were found through the Commission's press release database, the other four search engines were used to find additional documents. In the European Union's and Commission's general search engines there are no possibilities to order the links unlike in the other websites. However, a tag 'last year' was used to limit the search results for the time period Migration Compact has been in operation. To find related articles in all the websites, following terms were used in the search: 'Migration Compact', 'Partnership Framework', 'migration', and 'migration management'. Besides

these key words, also terms 'Ethiopia', 'Mali', 'Niger', 'Nigeria', and 'Senegal' were used to find content of the five priority countries.

Regarding the time period, the search was conducted in all the websites for documents published between 7 June 2016 and 30 April 2017. The first date is when the Migration Compact was announced and when the first EU documents were published of it. The sample collection was not continued from the end of April further due to time constraints as the thesis is handed in at the end of May 2017. The time period covers almost one year and includes three phases of published progress reports from the EU. Hence, it can be argued that data within this period shows already progress within the five countries and the EU's direction within its migration policies. All together the sample from the EU includes 45 documents.

As mentioned earlier, documents from various institutions were added to the sample to provide objective analysis of the actions within the Migration Compact. Statements, press releases and news pieces were chosen from institutions that are working with migration and development issues, for example cooperating with nation-states or the United Nations (UN), or advocating and providing information about the refugee crisis. Hence, they are likely to take a stand on migration policies and thus aim to influence the EU. The analysis of the documents provides an overall picture of how certain organisations see the Migration Compact and does not aim to give an in-depth explanation. The organisations whose statements were included to the sample are Danish Refugee Council which is on the premises of several African countries helping migrants and refugees, Concord which is a European confederation of relief and development NGOs aiming to positively influence European development policies, Platforma which is a pan-European network of local and regional governments working on development cooperation, Statewatch that is a voluntary group of academics and researchers providing information of civil liberties and various fields of the state, European Association for the defence of Human Rights which gathers together leagues and associations defending human rights in the EU countries, and Afronline that disseminates information from various African independent and non-profit media.

The documents were chosen within a time period when the Compact was already in operation because, as the EU documents depict the progress within almost one year, the institutions' documents needed to depict the same progress but from their perspective. Thereby, the chosen documents are published between September and December 2016. Search for the institution documents were done first in websites of the biggest and most influential NGOs related to migration, such as Amnesty International, UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Red Cross, Refugee Council, European NGO Platform on Asylum and Migration (EPAM), ECRE, Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH), and Concord. Used terms for the search were 'Migration Compact' and 'Partnership Framework with third countries'. After that, an extensive search was made in Google and LexisNexis Academic search engine using the same terms. All together, the sample includes six documents from various NGOs (see the list in Appendix p. 68).



## Analysis

The analysis is structured in a way that findings and observations in each of the categories of the methodology are presented individually. Then, the analysis of the institution documents is explained and compared to the EU documents. Finally, the qualitative interviews are presented by reflecting them on all the documents analysed in the thesis.

### Depiction and perception of migrants

Analysing how migrants are depicted and how they are perceived in the EU's Migration Compact documents is important for the thesis in the sense that it can demonstrate how the EU sees and presents migrants. This perception is connected to the way migrants are linked to the actions within the Migration Compact. Analysing the depiction can also indicate whether migrants or third country nationals in general are taken part in planning the Compact or not. First notion within this category is that migrants are depicted or referred in the documents less than 15 times, meaning referring them with a term 'migrant'. The reason for this is partly that they are sometimes referred as nationalities, such as Nigerians or Malians. However, the amount is low compared to the number of the EU documents analysed, and indicates that migrants themselves are less prominent than the actions towards them (over 300 notions) within the Migration Compact documents. When depicted in the documents, a few themes of them are repeated. Migrants are depicted vulnerable or as victims of smugglers, and them having to cross the Mediterranean is seen as a tragedy (European Commission, 2016c & 2016f). Hence, they are not given an active role in the documents, instead depicted as people suffering from the industry created around them. At the same time, smugglers and traffickers are emphasised as the criminals who "exploit the despair of people fleeing from poverty or conflicts" (European Commission, 2017f). By this depiction the documents give an impression of migrants as non-active decision-makers when they migrate from Africa. They are driven out because of various factors, such as "geopolitical and economic factors", "poverty, war and persecution", or "economic and security situation" (European Commission, 2016f; European Commission, 2016g; European Commission, 2017g). Georgiou and Zaborowski observed similar roles given for migrants in their research about media coverage of the refugee crisis. They noted that refugees and migrants were often spoken about as silent actors and victims, and were not given an opportunity to express themselves. Besides, only little information was given about their individual stories, about who these people actually are. (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017)

The documents do not acknowledge in any way voluntary migration or migration as a planned action. Migration is not an action done willingly, instead because certain issues force to do it. The analysis of the actions (presented later) shows that individual desires to migrate are not considered, even though the reports present numbers of the priority country nationals residing in Europe. The impression of forced migration is emphasised by stating that instead of leaving on a dangerous journey towards Europe, the Compact aims to "enable migrants and refugees to stay closer to home" (European Commission, 2017f) or helps them to "create a better future at home" (European Commission, 2016c). Hence, the home in the country of origin is depicted as the place where migrants want to be, this providing justification for the EU's actions within the Compact. In addition, it shows that the Migration Compact is built on the same belief of sedentary as previous EU migration policies, the idea that it is normal for African people to be static explained by Bakewell (2008) and Castles (2009). As presented in the literature review, several migration scholars argue that migration is a natural phenomenon stemming from various reasons, globalisation being

one of the dominant ones. Both of the theories presented in the thesis provide also several reasons why African people choose to migrate to Europe.

On the contrary to what the literature says, migrants or migration are not depicted directly negatively or positively in the EU documents. However, migration is framed as a phenomenon that needs to be controlled, this indicating of an underlying perception of migration as a negative issue. Migrants' needs or living situation is acknowledged in the documents vaguely but nevertheless noting that different circumstances in the priority countries need to be reflected in the compacts. The compacts are said to be "tailor-made" (European Commission, 2016h) and developed to "match the needs of partner countries" (European Commission, 2016e), though at the same time including the EU priorities too. Emphasising migrants' and their home countries' needs is notable particularly in the first documents when the Compact was announced. Needs like humanitarian assistance, economic sustainability, and targeting criminal networks are mentioned but they do not acknowledge different circumstances of the priority countries. Stating migrants as beneficiaries in the Compact is connected to the depiction of "tailor-made compacts" (European Commission, 2016h), as migration management needs to have mutually beneficial elements or reconcile priorities of both, the EU and the partner countries to deliver mutual benefit. Otherwise, the documents do not present migrants or the EU as distinct beneficiary in the Migration Compact.

In short, the EU documents have only few notions of migrants in which they are mainly depicted as victims. It can be argued that the first issue of the Migration Compact is that it fails to see people sedentary and builds its actions on this perception. The belief is in contradiction to what several migration scholars and macroeconomic theories have demonstrated.

### Depiction and perception of the European Union

How the EU is depicted in the Migration Compact documents is analysed because the observations can show what kind of a role the EU gives to itself, how it depicts itself during the progress, and does the depiction change during the progress. At first, it needs to be noted that as the analysed documents are from the various EU institutions, they are very likely to depict the EU in a positive light for natural reasons. Therefore, it is not surprising that especially the first documents from the establishment of the Compact emphasise the EU's previous efforts in migration management for example by stating that "hundreds of thousands of people have been rescued at the sea", or that the EU has already had "increased efforts" or "willingness to address specific migratory challenges" regarding saving migrants (European Commission, 2016c). This gives a perception of an active EU that has been consistently responding to various issues during the refugee crisis. Regarding the new Compact, the same perception is given by stating that "standing ready to provide greater support to those partner countries which make the greatest efforts, but without shying away from negative incentives, EU assistance and policies should be tailored to produce concrete results in stemming the flow of irregular migrants" (European Commission, 2016c). Also as it is more thoroughly explained in the analysis of the actions, each progress report states that "tangible" (European Commission, 2016j) or "concrete" (European Commission, 2016i) progress has been made within the compacts which supports the depiction of an active EU that provides results. In addition to depicting previous efforts of migration management, the first documents also mention the EU as the world's largest development and humanitarian aid donor (European Commission, 2016k). One of the annexes lists examples of major ongoing EU funded actions related to migration management and root causes of migration. The document gives background information for the Migration Compact but also functions as a demonstration of how active the EU is within the field of development and how much funding it is already giving to various countries.

Despite the Compact is stated as an EU's approach, the priority countries role is emphasised as an important partner in the compacts. The Compact is said to rethink how all the actors can jointly improve migration management, the whole framework's name stemming from this. All the progress report factsheets state that

“the key word of the new proposal is partnership. The objective is to develop win-win relationships with the European Union's partners to tackle the shared challenges of migration and development” (European Commission, 2016l).

The first progress report highlights the most the importance of partnership and the following reports bring it up regularly as well. The third countries are referred often as partners, or the actions as joint efforts. As mentioned above, 'mutual benefits' are repeated a few times as well. Against this background, the documents provide a positive perception of the EU and the Compact for supporting migration management actions that acknowledge both parties' aims. This gives an impression that the Compacts are created in partnership, jointly planned and built from the needs of the EU and also the third countries. Anja Palm notes the same in her analysis of the EU's external migration policies in 2016. Palm sees that the Compact has potential to challenges previous policies by taking a more multi-focal viewpoint representing also third countries' interests (Palm, 2016). The first progress report states that “a common understanding of the EU's and partner countries' interest is key” (European Commission, 2016h), thereby recognising that understanding third countries is needed to create any kind of compacts. Besides highlighting cooperation with the third countries, the documents also note about improving collaboration between the EU Member States and institutions as “the EU can achieve greater results only by speaking with a single voice” (European Commission, 2016c). Hence, the Compact acknowledges that there is a need for more united response in migration management.

In summary, the documents provide an active image of the EU, and a positive notion of the Compact in that sense that it emphasises partnership. Even though this kind of self-presentation is natural in the EU's own documents, it is important to note the difference to how the migrants are depicted in the same documents. The perception the documents provide is that the EU is the active one whereas migrants stay passive. Hence, the EU can change and affect the course of the refugee crisis. As migrants are made passive or victimised, it is easier for the EU to justify its actions and emphasise itself as an active party in the Compact.

## Actions

Analysis of the EU's actions is the core of the thesis and demonstrates what has been done so far and how well the actions have reflected the Union's objectives during the progress. It indicates which actions have been more prominent and how they have been received in the five priority countries. These observations lead to see whether or not there are contradictions in the Compact, and what these could be. Various actions are by far the most prominent topic depicted in the Migration Compact documents. Despite the analysis does not concentrate on quantitative indicators, the amounts of observed notions within each category demonstrate well what the main content of the EU documents is. The category 'action' has over 330 notions. As the reports present progress, it is natural that the content is mainly about actions. Though, this is still an important observation for the thesis, because it points out how little coverage migrants and the concept of development have received in the documents (altogether 22 notions).

The analysis of the actions was done in chronological order of the progress reports. The four phases of the progress, from the first communication in June 2016 to the third progress report published in March 2017, are analysed separately, though comparing the observations to the other progress reports. The overall

analysis of each phase includes also individual analyses of the priority countries' progresses, based on action and progress fact sheets published within each progress report. The EU's and the partner countries actions and plans within the Migration Compact are summarised in tables which demonstrate whether or not there is progress made between the phases.

### Establishment of the Migration Compact

As it is stated in the first Commission's communication of the Compact, "the ultimate aim of the Partnership Framework is a coherent and tailored engagement where the Union and its Member States act in a coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and leverage to reach comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with third countries to better manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human rights obligations" (European Commission, 2016c). The first report's emphasis is on explaining objectives and background of the Compact. Despite there is a whole chapter about "lessons learned" that depicts already given funding and examples of ongoing migration management actions, the report highlights need for new and coherent actions to control migration. The Migration Compact is aimed to strengthen EU's approach in relation with third countries and enhance internal coordination within the Union and the Member States (European Commission, 2016e). The need is rationalised by "unacceptable loss of life in the Mediterranean" and "unprecedented irregular migratory flows" (European Commission, 2016f). It can be argued that the report states ambitious objectives for the Compact as it is supposed to "tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement", "develop safe and sustainable reception capacities and provide lasting prospects close to home for refugees and their families in third countries", "create genuine prospects of resettlement to the EU", and to "respond to crises through immediate and measurable results, but also lay the foundations of an enhanced cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination" (European Commission, 2016c). In overall, the objectives are in line with previous and ongoing migration management actions of the EU. Hence, they make the Migration Compact seem repetitive as they are similar to other actions that have been implemented to control migration, for example within the Khartoum and Rabat Processes. Also Palm notes the same stating that in recent years many agreements have been made of migratory routes which have been mainly focused on joint operations and enhancement of migration control instruments (Palm, 2016). In general, all the actions in the first report and in the following documents are connected to migration management. However, what is new to some extent, compared to previous EU migration policies, is emphasis on partnerships, and division to long- and short-term objectives and actions.

The short-term objectives and actions are highlighted notably more in the first documents than the long-term objectives. They are presented first in all the documents, in much clearer and more specified way than the long-term ones. Overall short-term objectives in the Migration Compact are to save lives in the Mediterranean, to increase the rate of returns to countries of origin and transit, and to enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous journeys (European Commission, 2016c). Despite the first one is an important aim that needs prompt actions, the objectives follow the EU approach of reducing migration and considering people from the South sedentary, hence demonstrating an opposite approach to what migration scholars have called for (see e.g. Castles, 2009 and Bakewell, 2008). Moreover, return, readmission and reintegration of migrants are mentioned several times in the first documents, thus it is becoming more obvious that they are the key objectives of the Migration Compact.

The first short-term actions are all related to controlling migration, such as improving legislative framework for migration, capacity building for border management, and stemming irregular flows. The long-term actions are stated as "increase [EU's] efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced

displacement and to provide capacity building to the host communities and relevant institutions". This is done by addressing "political, social and economic factors" and in synergy with various policies like trade, development and energy (European Commission, 2016k & 2016c). However, the first documents do not specify what this actually means. It is notable how much less long-term objectives are depicted in the first documents. This already indicates that the stress is on short-term actions as even their funding is depicted better compared to the long-term financing. Prominent emphasis of short-term objectives gives an impression of hastiness within the actions which, according to Vimont, also shaped the EU's response when the refugee crisis started in 2015 (Vimont, 2016). Emphasis in short-term actions also indicates of imbalance in the planned actions. Though it needs to be noted that because the short-term objectives are seen urgent and as actions that, according to the EU, can be accomplished in a shorter period of time, might be partly the reason why they are emphasised. All in all, neither objectives nor actions stated in the first documents acknowledge people's individual needs in the priority countries. This supports the thesis' argument that the EU acts as a 'planner', with a predetermined goal and without enough information about individual problems of migrants (Easterly, 2008).

As imbalance between short- and long-term actions is the first issue noted, the second one is the EU mentioning incentives related to the expected efforts from the third countries. The document states that the EU is ready to provide greater support to partner countries that make great efforts but "without shying away from negative incentives" and that the objectives should be achieved "in terms of positive cooperation where possible but also the use of leverage where necessary" (European Commission, 2016c). This is in contradiction to the idea of partnership or that the compacts are created jointly with the third countries. It also indicates that the compacts are built on pressure and despite being "tailor-made", in reality, the emphasis would be more on EU's objectives.

### The first progress report

The first progress report was published in October 2016, three months after the European Council had adopted the Migration Compact. It states that during the first three months, priority has been on setting up new instruments to achieve the objectives. The report defines a compact for the first time as "political framework for continued and operational cooperation" and notes that it is not a solid agreement. Compact can give a basis for creating formal agreements like readmission agreements but "the compacts approach avoids the risk that concrete delivery is held up by technical negotiations for a fully-fledged formal agreement". (European Commission, 2016h) This allows the EU to mould the compacts based on current needs and the collaboration to be flexible. Responding to the criticism the Compact received after the first communication, the announcement of the first progress report notes that the EU-Turkey Agreement is not a blueprint for the compacts as the situations and mechanisms are very different with the priority countries (European Commission, 2016m).

All in all, the first progress report documents do not present a lot of specific results made in the first three months. The actions brought up are for example dialogues with partner countries, organising identification missions to EU countries, starting readmission negotiations, and deploying financial and technical assistance. As the first progress report states also, the pace of progress within the five priority countries is different which can be noted clearly already in the first progress report. It can be argued that depiction of progress is overall vague, most likely because there were not a lot of actions to report within the first three months. Despite of this, the first progress report does emphasise that the Compact "works", it has "tangible results", or it is a "success" (European Commission, 2016g). Regarding migration management actions and particularly return and readmission, the report states that "more concrete progress has been made in the

recent months than previously achieved over many years” (European Commission, 2016h). Compared to the other progress reports, the first one gives the most optimistic image of the Migration Compact’s progress. It does not present particular issues or obstacles like the following reports do. Like observed in the first communication published in June, also the first progress report has more emphasis on presenting short-term objectives and actions than the long-term ones. Often when the reports explain about long-term objectives, they refer to various projects funded by the EUTF for Africa. Hence, the focus is on money given for the long-term actions, though without concrete explanation of actual actions within the projects.

**Table 1 Niger - from June to October 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Establishment of coordination platform on migration, “Cadre de Concertation”</li> <li>• Establishment of agency to combat human trafficking</li> <li>• Finalising Action Plan to stop smuggling, decrease irregular migration, and to provide new economic opportunities</li> <li>• Action against migrants smuggling: 47 suspected smugglers arrested and 63 vehicles seized</li> <li>• Increased control towards migrants going to Libya or Algeria and campaigns to discourage people from migrating</li> <li>• Establishment of field office in Agadez to provide training in e.g. document forgery for civil security forces and prosecutors</li> <li>• Provision of equipment to authorities</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa projects on security, migration and border management, and support to the economy of Agadez</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Establishment of office to improve national risk analysis and information exchange</li> <li>• Full operational capacity in the Agadez field office</li> <li>• Support implementation of the Action Plan and the agency established to combat human trafficking</li> <li>• Continue delivery of training and equipment</li> <li>• Deployment of European Migration Liaison Officer (EMLO)</li> <li>• Provide alternative livelihood opportunities and increase funding for reintegration of returned migrants and host communities</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016n)

The first progress report depicts the partnership with Niger as the most successful one of the priority countries. The success is explained by referring to previous cooperation on migration, for example several high-level visits that were made already before the Compact was adopted and that led to a joint migration declaration. Table 1 shows the key actions of the EU and Niger done within the first three months. According to the report, increased control in migration from Niger has led to returning hundreds of migrants to Agadez or the IOM transit centre for voluntary return to their countries of origin. Despite the report states that it is too early to assess the progress in Niger, it notes that some of the actions might have led to decrease migration from Niger. Besides, voluntary returns have increased from 1,721 returns in 2015 to more than 3,020 in the first 8 months of 2016. (European Commission, 2016h) Table 1 demonstrates how in both, conducted and planned actions, short-term migration management actions are emphasised. In the progress report, short-term actions are presented more broadly whereas long-term actions and objectives are fairly vaguely mentioned as various EUTF for Africa funded projects. The report states that the EU has stepped up its support in addressing root causes of irregular migration for example through youth job creation but it is not clarified what this actually means. Next steps are all related to migration management, and regarding to long-term objectives, the plans are not clear.



**Table 2 Nigeria - from June to October 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A few high-level meetings</li> <li>• Points of contact in readmission and smuggling appointed</li> <li>• Identification missions planned for November 2016</li> <li>• Enhancing best practises for joint return operations</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa projects mobilised in migration management and addressing root causes of irregular migration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Progress on Readmission Agreement negotiations to conclude them</li> <li>• Improve cooperation in return and readmission through identification missions</li> <li>• Launch EU Cooperation Platform on migrant smuggling and deployment of EMLO</li> <li>• Increase initiatives in business cooperation and harness opportunities for legal migration channels and ERASMUS opportunities</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016o)

Compared to Niger, much less actions have been done in Nigeria within the first three months. From the actions presented in the Table 2, the progress report mentions particularly the Readmission Agreement negotiations that were planned to start in October 2016. Nigeria, like the following other three priority countries, has received much less space in the first progress report than Niger which is most likely due to lack of results so far. Short-term actions are emphasised in accomplished and planned actions with a little depiction given to the long-term actions. In addition, the EU support is presented as projects in migration management but not explained what kind of actions this refers to. Regarding long-term actions, the next steps only mention harnessing opportunities for legal migration channels without any further clarification of what the channels could be.

**Table 3 Senegal - from June to October 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Negotiations between Frontex and Senegalese authorities on improved working arrangements on returns</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa funded projects for creating jobs for youth adopted</li> <li>• Projects on migration management, facilitation of return, supporting of civil registration systems and creating economic and employment opportunities are in preparation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Strengthening of civil registries and biometrics, concluding working arrangements with Frontex, and deploying of EMLO</li> <li>• Identification missions scheduled for November 2016</li> <li>• Harness opportunities for legal migration channels and ERASMUS opportunities</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016p)

For Senegal, the first progress report mentions various visits and the negotiations between Frontex and Senegalese authorities as the actions conducted so far. However, these are the only issues presented which indicates that cooperation with Senegal has been slow and likely not at the level yet what the EU is aiming it to be. Long-term actions are presented as vaguely as in the case of Nigeria. Despite most of the projects are related to migration management, some projects to improve youth employment are adopted as well. The Table 3 presents the key plans for the next months. Besides them, other steps mentioned in the progress sheet document are stated as “continue the work on operational cooperation along the lines already agreed” or “cooperation on travel documents” (European Commission, 2016p). Even though it is

common for the Migration Compact documents to be ambiguous, in this case the explanations are very simplified and do not provide actual information of the EU's actions.

**Table 4 Mali - from June to October 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Focal point for migration issues appointed</li> <li>• Standard Operating Procedures being finalised to improve cooperation on identification and return</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa funding for border management</li> <li>• Projects on migration management, facilitation of return, supporting of civil registration systems and creating economic and employment opportunities are in preparation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Finalise agreement on Standard Operating Procedures and start implementation</li> <li>• Identification missions scheduled for November 2016</li> <li>• Strengthen Frontex and EUROPOL involvement on the ground and deploy EMLO</li> <li>• Harness opportunities for legal migration channels and ERASMUS opportunities</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016q)

There are not many results or actions presented of Mali in the first progress report. This could be due to the unstable situation in the country. Various armed groups present in Mali have caused a crisis that has lasted for over four years. The report also acknowledges this and states the crisis to “risk hampering the migration management efforts”. To help stabilising Mali, the EU is providing political, diplomatic and security support. (European Commission, 2016h) The main and almost only actions mentioned regarding Mali are preparation for an identification mission and finalising Standard Operating Procedures, both to support the objective of increasing returns of Malians from Europe. The progress report mentions approval of six projects besides the ones listed in Table 4 being in the pipeline. However, like with the other priority countries, the content or actions of these projects are not explained. Next steps planned for Mali are very similar to the ones planned for Nigeria and Senegal. Despite the compacts are tailor-made, the observations show that at least in the beginning of the progress, due to the same aims of return and readmission, the actions are almost the same in the priority countries.

**Table 5 Ethiopia - from June to October 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Contact point for identification and return issues appointed</li> <li>• Ethiopian government identified a majority of the cases submitted for return</li> <li>• Progress in supporting livelihood opportunities for refugees by providing 30,000 jobs through creation of two industrial parks (aim to provide in total of 100,000 jobs)</li> <li>• A number of EUTF for Africa projects approved</li> <li>• Preparation of projects on biometrics and reintegration ongoing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Finalise the procedure for the pending return cases</li> <li>• Establish a procedure for agreeing and implementing returns</li> <li>• Develop assistance for projects improving livelihood and job opportunities for refugees, and for strengthening civil registry and identity documents</li> <li>• Deploy EMLO</li> <li>• Harness opportunities for legal migration channels and ERASMUS opportunities</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016r)



The first progress document has the least results reported of Ethiopia, both in short- and long-term actions. The report notes as a positive development the identification of migrant cases that the EU had submitted earlier in 2016. Regarding other actions, the report states that “diplomatic efforts will continue to further enhance cooperation on several aspects of migration and particularly on returns where cooperation has yet to bear concrete results” (European Commission, 2016h). The ambiguous statement indicates that planned actions are kept unclear as well. Like in Mali’s case, the report acknowledges the difficult situation in Ethiopia as the country has had protests since autumn 2015 and declared a state of emergency in October 2016. Therefore, it is likely that planned actions within the Migration Compact proceed slowly. However, what is notable and differs from the other compact countries is Ethiopia’s and the EU’s plan to support refugees residing in the country by offering 30,000 jobs as one of the long-term objectives. This is positive development initiative particularly when in comparison to the migration management actions presented in the other countries’ next steps.

### The second progress report

The second progress report was published in December 2016. It notes that the main aim by the end of December was to demonstrate progress in cooperation with the five priority countries. Results were expected particularly in reducing irregular arrivals and increasing returns. Niger, being the most successful of the compacts, is emphasised in the beginning of the report stating for example that flows of migrants crossing the Sahara via Niger was at its lowest point, 1,500 crossings in November compared to 70,000 in May. Regarding long-term actions, the second progress report states that 64 programmes, worth approximately one billion Euros, were approved under the EUTF for Africa, and 1,165 mobility actions under the Erasmus+ framework were financed with the priority countries to strengthen legal and regular migration channels. (European Commission, 2016i & 2016s)

The second progress report has a more objective depiction of the overall progress than the first progress report. Despite it states that engagement with the priority countries has continued in intense pace and that there has been concrete progress, the report notes several issues that need improvement. It is the first one of the reports presenting issues that have not been successful yet when compared to the aims of the Compact. For example, by the end of December 2016, there had not been a decrease in the amount of arriving migrants to Europe. Despite the compacts’ actions have reduced transit flows in Africa, the report notes that arrivals from the priority countries via the Central Mediterranean route increased to almost 59,000 in 2016 out of a total of over 181,000 arrivals via this route. Hence, the report points a need for continuing and broadening the implementation of the Migration Compact. (European Commission, 2016i) This proves that, as argued earlier in the thesis, it is very likely that the EU will create more Partnership Frameworks with other third countries. Following the EU-Turkey Agreement and the five priority country compacts, a direction of externalising migration management and connecting it to development aid can be observed in the current EU policies. Also Palm argues for this noting in her analysis that European external migration policies continue to be characterised with externalization of migration control, conditionality in relations with third countries, securitization of borders, and absence of legal routes for asylum seekers (Palm, 2016). Despite the EU-Turkey Agreement would not be a blueprint for the compacts, as stated in the first progress report, the compacts with the five priority countries will most likely be used as blueprints for future compacts as their actions have been fairly similar so far despite of different economic and social situations.

Moreover, the report states that the potential of the Compact could be better exploited. First, there has not been success in linking other policies, like trade, energy and legal migration, to the compacts. Instead,

financial assistance has been the main instrument used in the implementation. The second progress report states that creating the linkages between different policies will be improved as it “can make the foundation for genuine partnerships with third countries” (European Commission, 2016i). However, as there has not been success in doing that during the first half a year, it indicates that conducting coherent long-sighted actions mixing various policies has not been in the top priority for the EU. This also supports the arguments made earlier that the Compact has a clear emphasis on short-term actions.

Second, the report notes about the importance of Member States’ support and calls for stepping it up. According to the report, identification missions have not succeeded or have not been carried out partly because the Member States themselves have been unable to take appropriate internal steps within the necessary timeframe. The report explains that

“part of the reason for the low level of returns lies in the EU itself. Only a fraction of migrants irregularly entering the EU from the five priority countries currently receive a return order. While this is partially explained by the possible asylum requests, it is clear that there are significant gaps that need to be addressed. In line with EU law, return decisions should be issued to all irregular migrants who do not have the right to stay on the EU territory.” (European Commission, 2016i)

According to the report, to be able to increase returns, the Member States should improve their administrative and implementation systems, and dedicate adequate resources to manage return processes. Besides, implementation of the Compact has shown a weakness in collection and sharing of data by Member States regarding returning of migrants. (European Commission, 2016i) Both of the previous reports note of the importance of unity between the EU and its Member States when planning and implementing migration management actions. The second progress report signals that there are issues in this. It is not surprising considering the tension increasing migration has already caused between European countries. De Haas notes that besides tension, a general unwillingness to give up national sovereignty in migration policies are the reasons why migration policies are still often done at the bilateral level (de Haas, 2008). However, demanding joint actions from the priority third countries is contradictory if the Member States cannot provide them either. Also, lacking unity might cause failing the objectives of the Migration Compact in the future if the Member States will not provide enough funding or solely have nation-state objectives and actions towards third countries. Collett states that strong bilateral national relationships besides competing policy priorities are the main reasons why the Member States and the EU institutions maintaining a unified position in migration policies is far from clear (Collett, 2016).

Building a coherent collaboration with third countries takes time, like the second progress report notes too. Therefore, the analysis does not argue whether the actions so far have been successful or not compared to the objectives laid out in the establishment report. However, the progress made by the end of December 2016 does show the centre of focus and the direction of the compacts. Hence, it is important to demonstrate what issues or actions the Compact is still lacking. The overall observation of the second progress report is that compared to the previous reports, it provides more objective depiction of the Migration Compact and shows also more balance between the short- and long-term actions, this presented in the next paragraphs.

**Table 6 Niger - from October to December 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Implementation of the short-term Action Plan against illegal migration</li> <li>• Action against smuggling: 95 vehicles seized, 102 smugglers sent to justice and 9 gendarmes arrested (between mid-July and end of October)</li> <li>• Flow of irregular migrants transiting Niger reduced</li> <li>• EMLO deployed in early 2017 and Frontex liaison officer deployed in 2017</li> <li>• 4,430 migrants redirected to IOM for repatriation to their home countries</li> <li>• Field office in Agadez operating close to full capacity, this will be reached in early 2017</li> <li>• Preparing EUTF projects on financial assistance for reintegration of returning migrants and host communities, providing economic alternatives</li> <li>• Short-term impact project for creating alternative income to replace migration industry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Continue implementing actions against smuggling and trafficking</li> <li>• Elaborate a medium- and long-term Action Plan focused on root causes and creation of economic alternatives</li> <li>• Monitor possible diversion of migration to other routes</li> <li>• Deploy Frontex liaison officer</li> <li>• Full deployment of EU staff in Agadez field office</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016t)

Niger continues being the priority country with the most progress made, the second progress report calling the results a “showcase of how the EU and its Member States can combine the various instruments and tools available in a comprehensive manner” (European Commission, 2016i). The report states that the actions have concentrated particularly on Agadez, stopping migrant smuggling and trafficking. Emphasis is put also on helping returning migrants by providing alternative economic opportunities. According to the report, the number of persons leaving Niger to cross the Sahara had fallen from over 70,000 in May to around 1,500 in November. (European Commission, 2016i) However after the report was published, IRIN, a news provider concentrated on crisis and emergency reporting, pointed out that the figures were wrong and instead of 1,500, around 11,600 people had migrated from Niger in November (IRIN, 2017). Despite of false figures, there have been concrete actions implemented in Niger, mainly related to the short-term objectives though. This can be observed by comparing the Tables 1 and 6. Almost all planned actions from October have been implemented or put forward by the end of December. The second progress report also presents more concrete plans for long-term actions than the previous reports, such as supporting self-employment to 1,400 Nigeriens in transit zones and improving skills of 6,000 young people to facilitate their insertion in the labour market. Notable important actions are also creating alternative income opportunities to replace migration industry in Niger and reinforcing data collection to analyse especially changing migration routes. (European Commission, 2016i) There is more balance in presenting short- and long-term actions than in the previous reports. Improving data collection and changing the firm migration industry based in Agadez indicate of a long-sighted planning, and also of acknowledging the need for fact based information of people’s movements.

**Table 7 Nigeria - from October to December 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Negotiations on a EU-Nigeria Readmission Agreement started in October 2016</li> <li>• Identification missions conducted to 3 European countries, 2 more planned till end of 2016</li> <li>• EU-Nigeria cooperation platform on migrant smuggling launched in October 2016</li> <li>• 3 EUTF for Africa projects approved in the field of resilience, three more in preparation to address return, reintegration and anti-radicalisation</li> <li>• EMLO deployed in early 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Conclude negotiations on Readmission Agreement</li> <li>• Foster good practises in returns also by addressing internal constraints</li> <li>• Develop initiatives to address root causes of migration and stimulate investments</li> <li>• Develop projects addressing trafficking and smuggling with the support of Europol and Frontex</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016u)

Despite the results achieved in Nigeria are not as successful as in Niger, there are concrete actions taken in place since the first progress report was published. Comparison of the Tables 2 and 7 shows that most the next steps have been put forward, most significant ones being the identification missions and finally started negotiations on the Readmission Agreement. The report states that there have been improvements in returning migrants but the rates are still relatively slow, partly because of constraints in the Member States. There are only few mentions of long-term actions as Nigeria is a small beneficiary in the EUTF for Africa. The next steps have a note on developing initiatives to address root causes and stimulating investments but what these actions contain is not explained. Hence, the emphasis is in short-term actions and particularly in actions related to returning migrants back to Nigeria. Overall, development of the third countries is very rarely, if almost at all, mentioned in the reports, only from a migration management aspect. Despite the term can be used in various contexts, connecting it only to migration management is to some extent in contradiction to how the goal of development is mainly understood, as general well-being of an individual (Bakewell, 2008).

**Table 8 Senegal - from October to December 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Continued negotiations between Frontex and Senegalese authorities on improved working arrangements on returns</li> <li>• Contact points in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior operational and EMLO deployed in early 2017</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa funded projects for creating jobs for youth</li> <li>• Projects on migration management, facilitation of reintegration, sensitisation of potential migrants, civil registry systems, and economic and employment opportunities are under development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Foster cooperation in returns and readmissions, including through dedicated mission to Member States</li> <li>• Step up cooperation in stopping smuggling and addressing root causes by swiftly implementing the EUTF for Africa projects</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016v)

By comparing the Tables 3 and 8, it can be observed that progress in Senegal was notably slow between October and December. Negotiations between local authorities and Frontex were still ongoing, and no identification missions had taken place despite they were planned to be done in November. Also the second progress report states that returns are not happening in the way the EU has been aiming for, and cooperation on identification and documentation has been lengthy and complicated (European Commission, 2016i). A possible reason for low results in returns might be the high amount of Senegalese legally residing in Europe. The report notes about this too. Though, it does not state that legal residents in Europe would be the reason for low return rates, instead that “the cooperation on returns needs to be considered in [this] context”. The statement does not clarify anything, and therefore the thesis argues that there is a contradiction between the planned actions and the reality of more than 230,000 Senegalese legally residing in the EU. Because every year a significant amount of Senegalese receive resident permits from European countries (due to family or work relations), this functions as a pull factor and causes stopping migration to be complicated. Many of the Senegalese are important labour force, and as the segmented labour market theory demonstrates, after creating a need for migrant labour, the flow of coming migrants is difficult to halt (Piore, 1979). Directing EU funding for stopping Senegalese to migrate to Europe is conflicting with the needs created by the EU and Europe themselves, and thus creates an issue for the Compact’s objectives.

**Table 9 Mali - from October to December 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Identification missions carried out to 5 Member States</li> <li>• Work related to return of people irregularly staying in the EU on the basis of the Standard Procedures. Missions carried out to this end</li> <li>• 3 EUTF for Africa funded projects expected to be approved, including biometric population registry, reintegration, awareness raising and youth employment</li> <li>• EMLO deployed in early 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Monitor and address the situation in terms of protection and displacement</li> <li>• Step up work with Mali on the transit dimension as a matter of priority</li> <li>• Strengthen return cooperation in terms of effective returns</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016w)

Besides Senegal, the report notes that cooperation with Mali was low between October and December because of issues in emergency travel documents and the unstable situation in the country. Quiminal notes that in Mali, migration is widely considered as the only way to escape precariousness caused by unemployment. Many people see Europe as a dream which is fostered for example by material culture and media. (Quiminal, 2012) Despite the second progress report states that over 100,000 Malians are regularly residing in Europe and around 6,000–8,000 new residence permits are delivered every year, it does not acknowledge the reasons behind this or note that this might be also a reason for slow progress in returns. Despite some identification missions were conducted, the rate of returns has stayed low (European Commission, 2016i). The next steps presented in the Table 9 are fairly vague as well. Almost all actions, also the long-term ones, are related to migration management.

**Table 10 Ethiopia - from October to December 2016**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• More various high-level meetings</li><li>• Technical dialogue continued, a workshop on readmission being prepared for the beginning of 2017 and EMLO deployed in early 2017</li><li>• Further programmes of job creation (also through support for the newly planned industrial parks) and establishment of unified identification and registration system in preparation</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• High-level visits</li><li>• Continue building on the initial steps taken in order to improve cooperation in the field of return and readmission</li><li>• Strengthen further support to Ethiopia as a country of transit and of destination of migrants and refugees</li></ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2016x)

Ethiopia's progress continued to be the lowest in the last months of 2016. The progress fact sheet's (depicted in the Table 10) only new action mentioned is continued technical dialogue. The progress report states nothing about the earlier submitted cases for return, neither of progress with creating jobs for refugees in the industrial parks. Like in Mali's case, the next steps for Ethiopia do not state any concrete actions. The political instability is one reason why the Compact's objectives have not proceeded. Despite the report acknowledges the difficult situation in Ethiopia, it only notes that "EU action should contribute to avoid a massive crisis in the region and the inevitable consequences it would have" (European Commission, 2016i).

Based on the observations of the two first progress reports, Mali and Ethiopia seem to lack results in cooperation due to the unstable situations the countries have. Against that background, it is not surprising that the Migration Compact's objectives are not proceeding in these countries. Moreover, it makes wonder why the EU started negotiating partnerships with countries that are under internal political turbulence, and where human rights violations are common because of the instability. This creates an issue for the Compact for not reaching its goals, and also might damage the EU's image for collaborating with countries that are accused of not respecting human rights which was one of the main concerns also for the over 100 NGOs who criticised the Compact before it was even adopted (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2016).

### The third progress report

The third progress report was published in the beginning of March 2017. It states the Migration Compact as an established EU approach to address irregular migration and its root causes within a broader cooperation with third countries. The report does not highlight the success or point out fails of the Migration Compact like the other two progress reports. Instead, it presents the Compact as part of broader EU approach in migration management where all actions are intertwined. It refers often to the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) which is closely linked to the Migration Compact. Following the first Valletta Summit on Migration held in November 2015, the second Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) was arranged in Malta in 8–9 February 2017 resulting in Joint Conclusions of the JVAP. It lists the next steps to take between the EU and African countries regarding migration, such as strengthening coherence between the different frameworks, and mobilising existing resources and financial instruments to implement the JVAP (Khartoum Process, 2017).

Following an informal Summit held in Malta on 3 February 2017 before the Valletta SOM, the third progress report presents the first steps of the Malta Declaration adopted at the meeting. It has similar objectives as the Migration Compact but is particularly concentrated on the EU's current main focus, the Central Mediterranean route. Therefore, actions in Libya and Egypt are depicted more thoroughly in the third progress report than in the previous reports, with a clear emphasis on gaining results from Libya. (European

Commission, 2017g) This demonstrates the EU's aim to broaden up the Partnership Frameworks to other third countries and underpins the argument made earlier in the second progress report analysis. With creating new compacts, the Union would fortify its approach of externalising migration management and using development aid to fund it. Rinelli's note, that extraterritorial immigration control is at the core of European externalisation of African migration control, supports this argument. In his research of migration control transformation between Europe and Africa, Rinelli defines externalisation as a way to problematise but also ignore movements of people inside, outside, and across the Schengen space. Hence, migrants are made invisible instead of martyrs. (Rinelli, 2016)

The third progress report calls for the same actions as the previous ones, for more tangible results, and better cooperation between the EU and the partner countries, as well as between the Member States. The main statement is that the delivery of the compacts needs to be accelerated (European Commission, 2017m). The report notes that so far based on data, there has not been any or only limited improvement in return rates for the five priority countries. Hence, the report follows the more critical approach of the second progress report when presenting the Compact results.

Following the criticism presented in the second progress report, the third progress report presents how certain policy tools have been linked to the Migration Compact. For example, Erasmus+ and Marie Skłodowska Curie programmes were scaled up by the end of 2016 to offer 8,000 mobility actions for students and 560 for researchers. The report states the next steps to include creating legal migration channels like establishing possible EU-wide offers with third countries. (European Commission, 2017g) This is a needed approach in the EU's migration policies as it can provide long-lasting development effects to third countries and hence, support creating real balanced partnerships. Overall summary of the observations made of the third progress report is that geographical scope of the Compact is broadening despite there are not many concrete results to present in the priority compacts. Even though the report states that "cooperation has increased in a true spirit of partnership", there is a legit reason to believe that collaboration issues is the reason why there still are not many objectives accomplished within the compacts. Emphasising other EU actions in the third progress report, such as the February meetings in Malta, might derive from the fact that there are still not a lot of results to present.

**Table 11 Niger - from December 2016 to March 2017**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Medium-term Action Plan being drafted</li> <li>• Action against smuggling continued with more smugglers arrested and equipment seized</li> <li>• Flow of irregular migrants transiting Niger further reduced</li> <li>• EMLO deployed on 1 February 2017 and Frontex liaison officer deployed in the near future</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa funded projects adopted in December to assist migrants, facilitate return, raise awareness, create jobs, and provide land, accommodation and access to drinkable water</li> <li>• Field missions conducted to assess alternative routes and identify projects to create economic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Feedback to medium-term Action Plan</li> <li>• Intensified monitoring of possible alternative routes</li> <li>• Intensified action against smuggling and trafficking , support to joint investigation team</li> <li>• Full operationalisation of the Agadez field office</li> <li>• Establishment of a working arrangement between Frontex and Nigerien authorities and deployment of a liaison officer to the EU delegation</li> <li>• Swift signing of contacts on actions under the EUTF to ensure concrete implementation and</li> </ul>



alternatives in local communities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for enforcement of anti-migrant smuggling legislation</li> <li>• National strategy on migration being finalised</li> </ul>	provide alternative income opportunities to substitute smuggling economy
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Source: (European Commission, 2017h)

Niger is by far the most successful of the priority countries in terms of achieved objectives in the Migration Compact. The third progress report presents accomplishments in reducing transit migration, arresting smugglers and supporting voluntary return. As pointed by IRIN, there was a fail in the numbers of departures stated in the second progress report. This has been corrected in the third progress report stating that amount of people migrating from Agadez has declined from the peak of 70,000 in May to 6,524 in January 2017. The IOM transit centres have offered training to migrants and local population to develop sources of income in brick-making and production of jewellery. By the end of 2016, over 600 people had benefitted from this training. (European Commission, 2017g) Comparison of the Tables 6 and 11 shows that many planned actions have been started and accomplished in the first months of 2017. However, the number of arriving migrants to Europe is not mentioned in the third report, hence indicating that it has not decreased.

The EU's presence in Niger has been reinforced by deploying officers and establishing a field office in Agadez. A short-term emergency Action Plan against smuggling was adopted in November, and as listed in the Table 11, a medium-term Plan is under preparation. Overall, there have been concrete actions presented in each of the progress reports and actions conducted by both, the local authorities and the EU. However, all actions have been related to migration management and clearly connected to increasing returns and readmissions. Moreover, they are responding to the short-term objectives of the Compact. Regarding long-term actions, the third progress report presents for the first time projects that are not only related to migration management but instead target providing a plot of land, accommodation and access to drinkable water to 28,000 people, while 42,000 people will have access to accommodation and drinkable water. Besides, 2 000 construction jobs will be created. (European Commission, 2017g) Despite the projects are still on a planning level, they are responding to long-term needs to what development aid is usually used for. However, so far there are no results presented of any of the projects, and the amounts of beneficiaries are only plans.

**Table 12 Nigeria - from December 2016 to March 2017**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• EMLO deployed on 1 February 2017</li> <li>• EUTF for Africa projects adopted in December to support reintegration, literacy, and mental health services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Conclude negotiations on Readmission Agreement by June 2017</li> <li>• Continue cooperation on anti-smuggling and trafficking through the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community and the Cooperation Platform on Migrant Smuggling</li> <li>• Identify EUTF for Africa projects with a strong migration focus</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2017i)



Nigeria is, together with Ethiopia (actions presented later), the least proceeded partner in the Migration Compact. The Table 12 demonstrates how few actions there has been done since December and also how little plans there are for the next months. Despite the report notes that return rate has improved in 2016, the identification missions done in November have not had results yet because no emergency travel documents have been issued. Launch negotiations for a Readmission Agreement was arranged in March 2016, and followed by the first negotiation round in October. However, the second round has been postponed several times by Nigeria, and the EU is aiming to conclude the negotiations by June 2017. The third progress report presents projects related to reintegrating migrants but also providing books and literacy lessons for more than five million pupils, and giving access to mental health services for more than 75,000 children.

**Table 13 Senegal - from December 2016 to March 2017**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Focal Points for Identification identified in relevant ministries</li> <li>• 4 EUTF for Africa funded projects adopted in December on reintegration, job creation, and biometric registry system</li> <li>• EMLO deployed on 1 February 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Improve daily cooperation for identification and issuance of travel documents</li> <li>• Follow up missions undertaken, ensuring effective return of identified irregular migrants</li> <li>• Finalise and sign working agreements between Senegal and Frontex by mid-2017</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2017j)

Regarding the objectives set in the Migration Compact, neither Senegal has a lot to report. Results in returns are still lacking, and there have been issues in cooperation of identifying and documenting of irregular migrants. Number of identification missions did not happen, and it has been difficult for the EU to receive travel documents from Senegalese authorities even though migrants would have been identified for return. Like mentioned before, negotiations in migration management are challenging with Senegal because it has a significant amount of citizens residing in Europe. In July 2017 for the first time, Senegalese diaspora will be able to directly elect members of the National Assembly in the legislative elections. As the Senegalese living abroad can vote, the elections will reflect the economic, cultural and social significance of migration in Senegal. (European Commission, 2017g) Against this background, it would be natural to assume that many of the migrated Senegalese express their opinion for migration and not against it. As noted in the chapter above, long history and tradition to migrate to Europe might cause Senegal to slow down various negotiations and actions in the Migration Compact. As long-term actions, the report presents nine projects of which four was adopted in December. The projects are expected to create more than 6,500 new jobs but otherwise they focus on migration management. Also the next steps planned for Senegal are only related to controlling migration.

**Table 14 Mali - from December 2016 to March 2017**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Development of National Border Strategy and a related Action Plan</li> <li>• Capacity building of the police forces in charge of border management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Strengthen cooperation on effective return of irregular migrants</li> <li>• Step up work on the transit dimension, focus on voluntary return of transit migrants</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUTF for Africa funded projects adopted in December to improve biometric population registry, support reintegration and youth employment</li> <li>• EMLO deployed in February 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deployment of a technical level mission to explore options for border management and fight against smugglers</li> </ul>
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Source: (European Commission, 2017k)

The cooperation between Mali and the EU faced a notable setback as Mali refused to sign the long planned and negotiated Standard Operating Procedures on readmission in December. The third progress report states the reason being inaccurate media reports of the negotiations. It can be assumed that this has significantly affected the collaboration within the Compact's other actions as well. Moreover, there have been issues in confirming of nationality and issuing consular travel documents by Malian consulates, this slowing down returning of irregular migrants. Therefore, Mali still lacks concrete results related to the Compact's short-term objectives. Long-term actions are presented as projects, like throughout the documents, most of them connected to controlling migration. The next steps presented in the Table 14 are almost the same as in the previous Table 9. Therefore based on the tables, it is difficult to compare whether there are or are not any actions accomplished. On the other hand, the plans are also expressed fairly vague in the both second and third progress report. Overall impression is that Mali, among Nigeria and Senegal, is still not responding to the EU's objectives within the Migration Compact.

**Table 15 Ethiopia - from December 2016 to March 2017**

Actions done	Next steps
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More various high-level meetings</li> <li>• Regional programmes under the EUTF for Africa adopted in December to support returns, help stranded migrants and their reintegration</li> <li>• EMLO deployed in March 2017</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High-level visits</li> <li>• Finalise actions on the pilot return cases and use them as blueprints for faster returns to be performed in the future</li> <li>• Continue to support Ethiopia as a country of transit and of destination of migrants and refugees</li> <li>• Launch the Strategic Engagement sectoral dialogue on migration</li> </ul>

Source: (European Commission, 2017l)

Ethiopia has most likely been the least successful partnership of the Compact countries. Also the third progress report notes the difficult political situation in the country which is the main reason actions within the compact have not been able to be implemented or even planned properly yet. The report notes that the EU supports necessary political reforms and facilitates inclusive dialogue but is uncertain about future developments in Ethiopia. Cooperation in return and readmission has stayed very slow as even the pilot return cases, submitted to Ethiopian authorities in February 2016, have not yet been finalised (see Table 15). Though, the report notes that issues within returns are not only caused by local authorities: "Dealing with these cases has brought to light the negative consequences of having different reintegration packages among EU Member States for returns to the same country" (European Commission, 2017g). Hence at least in Ethiopia's case, the EU's lack of unity has affected to the third country's willingness or ability to cooperate. Regarding long-term actions, also the third progress report mentions the planned industrial parks which should provide employment possibilities for 30,000 refugees. However based on the report, it still seems like there has not been any actions in establishing the parks.

## Development and development aid

Notions of development and development aid are analysed to see how the EU defines development and how it is referred to be used in the Migration Compact. Like explained in the literature review, development has many notions and how it is perceived determines greatly also the EU's actions and objectives within development policy. The Union is the world's biggest development aid donor. Hence, this thesis is not arguing that the EU's efforts in development programming should be downplayed or that its actions within the Migration Compact would be similar in other EU development programmes. However, by analysing notions of development in the Migration Compact, it being one of the latest frameworks of the EU in the field of migration and development, this can indicate of what direction the EU is taking in its development programming and funding in the future.

Overall, the EU documents do not have many references to development aid or to the concept of development. Funding of the short- and long-term actions are explained in many documents but this funding is not directly referred as development aid, meaning with the terms 'development' or 'development aid'. In the first communication, the Commission calls for more targeted programming of aid from the EU and the Member States. It does not clarify to what it should be targeted for but states that it ensures "that in the design and implementation of all programmes under all focal sectors chosen in a country, positive impacts on migration flows and management will be maximised". Also the multiannual indicative programmes in the priority countries are made to be in line "with the current needs, in particular to help deliver the compacts". (European Commission, 2016c) The Migration Compact is said to connect various policies and frameworks which is why it is natural to combine different funding mechanisms in it. This can support coherent actions in migration management but also enable more holistic development approaches than before. Targeting development aid more specifically could make it more efficient, decrease the gap between donor expectations and actions, and hence make it more stable. Targeting the aid could improve the aid system that is not currently working properly, as argued by Easterly (2008), and Chuhan-Pole and Fitzpatrick (2008). On the other hand, with the underlying securitisation actions, it is legitimate to raise doubts if the EU is prone to target further development funding only to migration management.

According to Müller-Using and Vöpel (2014), the EU development aid could have a bigger impact on economic development if the aid would be used as small interventions to solve daily life problems in third countries. To be able to do this, the EU would need to understand decision-making done in individual households (Müller-Using & Vöpel, 2014). Also Arjan de Haan sees that improving development policies would require better understanding of capabilities and strategies of people living in poverty (de Haan, 2000). However, the analysis shows that the EU documents hardly refer to migrants' living situation which indicates that the actions are planned and implemented without a precise knowledge of individuals' or households' needs or future hopes. Hence, targeting development aid within the Migration Compact might be more useful for migration management but not the African people.

Another concerning factor observed in the documents is referring to incentives in development aid. The analysis of the establishment report already notes that setting incentives is in contradiction to creating truly equal partnerships. Collett (2016) supports this by stating that conditionality gets in the way of a key element of successful cooperation which is in-depth appraisal of what third countries actually need. It is crucial to improve both national and refugee populations in a country. (Collett, 2016) Moreover, connecting incentives to development funding is in clear contradiction to the EU's own definition of development aid and the main purpose of it to eradicate poverty. There is a concern of the aid becoming a tool to create

pressure or praise third countries. Therefore, it is alarming that one of the first documents note that “a mix of positive and negative incentives will be integrated into the EU's development and trade policies to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure there are consequences for those who refuse” (European Commission, 2016e). Linking negative incentives to development policies shows that the EU's development support to third countries depends on their efforts made within the compacts.

In short, as already argued in the analysis of actions, almost all objectives and actions within the Compact are related to migration management. Funding migration control instead of livelihoods development is a significant issue particularly if this becomes more common in the EU's development policies. Moreover, making development aid conditional is likely to damage long-term plans of eradicating poverty and make third countries reluctant to collaborate with the EU, this causing problems for the EU to create future cooperation with other countries.

### Analysis of the institutions' documents

Like mentioned briefly in the introduction, the Migration Compact received criticism from NGOs before it was adopted. Also now that it has been in operation, some institutions have posed strong criticism for example about the Compact causing human rights violations, undermining long-term development goals and being imbalanced by favouring the EU's aims over the parent countries'. Criticism of all the documents is summarised here first, comparing it to the analysis of the EU documents, and then institutions' solutions for the issues are presented.

Afronline and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) argue that there is an imbalance between the EU and African countries in the implementation and also in the planning of the Migration Compact. DRC sees the Compact representing control-based EU policy that is moving focus from protecting migrants to deterrence and border management (Danish Refugee Council, 2016). The analysis of the EU documents supports this argument. In the documents, the EU refers often to saving migrants and helping them as victims of smugglers. However, the observations show the opposite as clear emphasis is put on return and readmission while at the same time, the amount of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean has increased (Concord, 2016). DRC argues that the EU development cooperation is not based on values anymore, instead on interests (Danish Refugee Council, 2016). Afronline argues the same by stating that predominance of EU interests has narrowed the migration and development agenda to dealing with irregular flows and returns by giving financial concessions. Thus, the compacts are not conducted in a true partnership. This undermines the EU's image as a partner and might also undermine principles of good donorship which is an issue. (Laferrère & Knoll, 2016) Imbalanced cooperation could make the African countries indifferent towards collaborating with the EU. This would cause the perception of development aid stay negative as the results would not be efficient or consistent. Chuhan-Pole and Fitzpatrick argue the same stating that development aid's variability often increases frustration about its effectiveness (Chuhan-Pole & Fitzpatrick, 2008). This could then lead to people supporting less development initiatives in third countries. These countries' economic and social development could slow down, leading to more people suffering from poverty and in the end, deciding to migrate to Europe. Easterly (2008) calls for improvement in aid delivery practises but this will not make development cooperation more efficient if there is a notable imbalance in who the funded actions benefit.

Also the European Association for the defence of Human Rights (AEDH) sees the main issue in externalising migration management to third countries, especially because the countries are not bound by international

conventions or the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and hence do not have the same legal standards as the EU Member States. AEDH sees the Migration Compact as continuity to other recent bilateral or multilateral initiatives, such as the Valletta Summit, the Khartoum and Rabat Processes, and the Mobility Partnerships, that focus to manage migration. (European Association for the defence of Human Rights, 2016) Afronline notes that for this reason re-introducing initiatives in the Compact that have been already rejected by African states collectively in the Valletta Summit may be discomforting to some partners (Laferrère & Knoll, 2016). AEDH explains that one of these initiatives is the European *laissez-passer*, a substitute document for irregular migrants who do not possess a valid travel document to return them to the country of origin. For example in Mali, civil society expressed its strong opposition to the Migration Compact and other EU initiatives, particularly to the *laissez-passer* and signing a readmission agreement, when an EU mission was made to the country in November 2016. The civil society reminded that African states rejected the *laissez-passer* in the Valletta Summit in 2015 because it is in contradiction to national sovereignty of each country. (European Association for the defence of Human Rights, 2016) This supports the observations made of Mali's progress within the Compact. Besides the armed conflict in the country, underlying differences in opinions have complicated the cooperation between Mali and the EU for a long time and are most likely the reason for the slow progress within the Migration Compact. This also explains partly why Mali refused to sign Standard Operating Procedures on readmission despite the EU documents stated the reason being inaccurate media reports.

Both Platforma and Afronline criticise connecting development aid to migration management, and claim this to be short-sighted leading to undermining long-term development. Afronline sees the EU acting in a crisis mode due to the flows of arriving migrants even though it says to respond to long-term drivers of migration. The same argument can be posed based on the observations made in the analysis as short-term actions were pushed forward more than long-term actions. According to Afronline, there is pressure also on the long-term actions to provide quick results. This has led to relaxing usual procedures of quality control. Trust building, consultations and coordination with partners have been cut short. Afronline notes that if there is no longer-term strategic approach on migration, mobility and development, it is challenging to define short-term objectives (Laferrère & Knoll, 2016). Therefore, it could be argued that one reason for low progress in the Compact's short-term actions has been the absence of clear long-term objectives. Long-term objectives need to support short-term actions and vice versa. Hence, emphasising only short-term actions not only jeopardises long-term development objectives but also complicates achieving the short-term objectives.

Concord and Theodore Baird writing for Statewatch are most concerned about the Migration Compact causing human rights violations. Both of them argue that the EU is making compacts with countries that have very bad human rights records. Through the Compact, the third countries' border management is supported notably, however with little guarantees for respect for human rights. Migrants are forced to return to their home countries where they could face prison or death. (Concord, 2016) Baird in his article for Statewatch criticises the EU of cooperating with countries that are authoritarian and at the bottom of several global indexes measuring democracy or various freedoms (e.g. movement, speech and assembly). He notes that the Compact documents do not acknowledge that the partner countries are ruled by authoritarian or hybrid governments actively undermining human rights. Besides, none of the documents mention improving human rights in the partner countries as the Compact's objective. Emphasising only short-term actions that focus on improving control and at the same time disregarding human rights improvements is likely to increase harms and abuses of migrants in the countries of origin and transit. (Baird, 2016)

As explained in the analysis of the EU documents, many of the partner countries are unstable due to terrorism or inner conflicts which have also made the Migration Compact's progress slow. Baird notes that it is unclear how cooperation for example on border management would contribute to peace in the priority countries. He mentions that the EU documents do not either acknowledge the issue that the African countries may be contributing to violence against their own citizens: "When the EU is actively cooperating with countries who are engaging in persecution, there is a real risk that people fleeing from these countries will have limited opportunities to seek protection". Hence, the Compact undermines the EU's own goals of democratic legitimacy and promotion of liberal democratic norms. (Baird, 2016) Baird's arguments published by Statewatch and Concord's arguments are in line with the analysis of the EU documents in that sense that they point out reasons why there have been so few results. As the countries have ongoing conflicts, migration management might not be one of their priority issues, and negotiations with the EU might be interrupted or slowed down by various reasons.

### Institutions' solutions for the Migration Compact

In general, DRC calls for the EU to change its narrative of the refugee crisis to present it through manageability and solutions instead of securitisation. Together with Concord, it argues that there needs to be solidarity and fair responsibility sharing. As an improvement to the Migration Compact, DRC demands the EU to ensure more safe and regular pathways to seek asylum, such as humanitarian admission, resettlement and family reunification. Opportunities to regular migration should be expanded. Besides, the EU should recognise positive contributions of migrants to economic growth and development. (Danish Refugee Council, 2016) Also Concord demands safe pathways for asylum seekers and in addition, a migration strategy that is based on evidence and acknowledges the increase of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. According to it, development aid should not have any conditionalities linked to it. (Concord, 2016) Afronline stresses the need for genuine cooperation that acknowledges interests from both sides and the points where the interests diverge. Like DRC, Afronline calls for the EU to change the narration in sense that it takes into consideration African countries' opinions and moves away from predominant focus of its own objectives. This could be done by improving cooperation with Africa's regional organisations. It would support long-term objectives as regional organisations are in key role in supporting labour standards and reducing irregular movements. (Laferrère & Knoll, 2016) Afronline's demand supports the arguments made earlier in the analysis that there is a lack of acknowledging migrants' living situation. This gives the impression that the EU is acting as a 'planner', with predetermined goals, ignoring individual problems. For the EU to become more of a 'searcher' (see Easterly's definitions p. 10), Afronline's suggestion could be the first step to take. Not only to change the imbalance in Migration Compact's planning but to receive more concrete results, EU should cooperate more with regional and local level actors in the priority countries. These actors could provide important information of individuals' reasons of migration and at the same time be more capable of affecting people's opinions of migration than the governmental level. Hence, Afronline's suggestion could lead to giving voice for the migrants also, this helping to remove their victimisation.

Also Platforma states that local governments in the partner countries should be given a possibility to affect the design, implementation and evaluation of the compacts. According to it, the Migration Compact does not stress enough of funding local capacities either mention what the governing structures of the compacts are like. Hence, it calls for the EU to devote more funds for actions implemented by local governments, and to ensure a permanent presence for local and regional governments in the governance structures of the compacts. Platforma justifies this by presenting three aspects where local and regional governments have core competences when addressing migration issues. First, local authorities' policies determine significantly

country's economic development as there are many small and medium size enterprises that contribute to economic activities and employment of a third country. Second, local and regional governments are in key role of reducing vulnerability of crisis-affected populations by promoting their self-reliance, and hence decreasing push factors for migration. Third, local governments are responsible for receiving refugees and providing them quality basic services. To do this, comprehensive decentralisation framework needs to be created with clear core powers and responsibilities. As one more solution for the Migration Compact, Platforma sees promoting city to city cooperation between European and African cities. Hence, sharing technical expertise could be easier, integrating migrants might be more successful, and creating good conditions for voluntary returns possible. (Platforma, 2016)

### Analysis of the individual interviews

All the interviewees criticise the Migration Compact for connecting development aid to migration management. Solveig Als from DRC sees the pressure put on receiving results as one of the main issues. She notes that migration should not be addressed with the view to achieve short-term objectives. Instead, it would require long-term actions. Though, Als emphasises that not all objectives of the Compact are problematic, for example opening more safe and regular pathways, and the intention of engaging with private sector to find new ways of generating development funding for third countries. However, like Afronline and DRC, Als sees an imbalance between the objectives addressed in the Compact and a dominant focus on border management and deterrence measures. (S. Als, personal communication, April 28, 2017) Yasha Maccanico from MigrEurop states the Compact changing the nature of development aid by shifting its purpose from improving countries' conditions so they could reduce push factors of migration to helping the countries to police their borders. In practise, the EU would help states to introduce new technologies into their social control to monitor their population and borders. This would intensify the countries' power in their jurisdiction, and might lead to stopping people from moving unless they have an explicit permission from the local authorities. Moreover, Maccanico argues the Migration Compact making development aid dependant on third countries readmitting their own nationals unquestioningly. (Y. Maccanico, personal communication, May 15, 2017) Filippo Furri from MigrEurop sees the approach renewing a form of intervention and control to third countries stating that "we are systematically destroying every possibility to break down the control of the Global North." (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017) His argument is in line with the world systems theory demonstrating that migration stems from divided world systems that are strengthened by the policies of the North, Migration Compact being one example. Furri's statement also supports the argument made in the thesis that the current migration-development nexus, development curtailing migration, reinforces only the dominance of the Global North. Thus, there is a contradiction between the objectives of the Migration Compact and the way it has been implemented, mainly regarding using development aid. By increasing control and making development funding conditional, Migration Compact, as it is now, will not be a solution for decreasing migration to Europe. Instead, it will increase the gap between the North and the South making people more prone to migrate from southern states.

In addition, Furri argues that the Compact creates political and economic tension between African countries which then causes destabilisation in the region. As European and African states have naturally national interests, they have created various agreements that can be in discrepancy with broader frameworks. As an example, Furri refers to the tension between European countries, which has been increasing during the refugee crisis, of keeping migrants in the southern states like Italy and Greece. Furri



notes that similar logic of pushing migrants to one place has been used in Niger which produces similar tension between African countries that what European countries have at the moment:

“What is dangerous is that we are transferring the tension we have inside Europe, like Hungary with Balkan countries, Italy with Austria, and France with UK....Migration Compact is good way to give the problem, the tension to other countries.” (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017)

According to Furri, a bilateral agreement between Italy and Niger has made Niger a country where Italy returns migrants. Hence, Niger is the country that “does the worst work” of stopping people and then tries to send the migrants back to their country of origin. (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017) Also Maccanico notes that Niger has received strong criticism from partner countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) because of the actions it has taken to stop migration. According to Maccanico, the EU is trying to set up camps in the country to make it readmit people regardless of them being Nigerien or not. Hence, externalisation of the EU migration policies forces the African countries to introduce hard borders between each other. (Y. Maccanico, personal communication, May 15, 2017)

Though, Maccanico notes that before Niger started cooperation with the EU on migration issues, it stated that it could not restrict migration from neighbouring countries because of its membership in ECOWAS and because the country did not consider migration as a problem. Vimont (2016) explains that there is a fundamental difference of migration narratives between Europe and Africa as the latter one considers migration as natural component of their societal tradition. (Vimont, 2016) Also de Haas (2008) notes that African countries have often little genuine interest in curbing migration, because it serves political and economic interests of the countries. Conni Gunsser from Afrique-Europe-Interact notes that this is a problem for the Migration Compact as not all African governments issue travelling documents for migrants or accept deportations to their countries. Gunsser states Mali being one example with who the EU has tried to negotiate a readmission agreement for many years. Like the EU document analysis shows also, the negotiations failed in December 2016. Also Libya, according to Gunsser, is an example whose interests differ from the EU's. Libyans, who are employed because of the arriving migrants, are against of the EU interfering in migration management because it would lead them earning less money or becoming unemployed. (C. Gunsser, personal communication, April 29, 2017). Because of the differing interests, de Haas notes that African countries might pay lip service to Europe and its aim to reduce migration while using it as a bargaining chip in negotiating aid, economic relations, and immigrant quotas (de Haas, 2008).

Gunsser is most critical towards the Migration Compact and its funding with development aid. Like Als, Gunsser argues strengthening borders causing problems for labour and trade within African countries. She states that when less people are allowed to migrate from Africa, there might be a decrease in remittances. This is also supported by Nyberg Sørensen who notes migration-security nexus being likely to reduce remittances (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). Gunsser explains two issues leading from this. First, as remittances can be more than the official development aid in certain African countries, young people are under pressure from their families to send money home, hence for example enable children to go to school and elderly receive healthcare. Second, if people do not have a possibility to send money home, there will be a social unrest in the countries, and governments are forced to pay the money that was received from remittances before. (C. Gunsser, personal communication, April 29, 2017)

“If the government is really under pressure of the population, they cannot sign such contract. They cannot reduce migration because the governments themselves are interested in migration. They are



interested in remittances but they are also interested in getting rid of opposition people and unemployed youth because if they are on the street, they are also dangerous for the government...On the other hand, the governments are interested to get money from the EU.” (C. Gunsser, personal communication, April 29, 2017)

Therefore, Migration Compact causes contradiction in African states that need the remittances but at the same time are dependent on development aid. Tension within and between African countries could not be observed from the EU documents. However, tension between the EU and the African countries could be observed because of the slow progress in the compacts. The tension indicates of the Migration Compact’s imbalance and pressure noted by Als and Gunsser but also by DRC and Afronline. These notions support the observations made in the EU document analysis that short-term actions are much more highlighted in the Compact than anything else, and that there is a notable need to receive quick results in returns and readmissions. Hence, it can be argued that it is likely that emphasis of short-term actions causes tension in many levels of cooperation between the EU and the priority countries.

Like mentioned earlier in the analysis, short-term actions are emphasised likely because they are considered urgent. However, like Vimont (2016) argues Europe’s response to the refugee crisis been shaped by urgency, also Maccanico sees that the EU’s migration agenda is framed with emergency. According to Maccanico, it gives justification for the EU to put other issues before people. A need for quick actions has caused a shift from negotiating readmission agreements to creating memoranda of understanding. Even though the shift would not seem like an important issue, Maccanico notes that

“in practise it means moving away from formal frameworks and regularity frameworks towards a situation where state power does not really have any counterweight. So it’s kind of like unshackling authorities from what the rules are.” (Y. Maccanico, personal communication, May 15, 2017)

Despite the Compact documents show that the EU is trying to create readmission agreements, the Compact itself is not a solid agreement as the EU documents also point. This is not to say that it would be in any way a less formal agreement but like Als notes, because the compacts are not formal agreements, it makes analysing their actions on the ground challenging.

### Interviewees’ solutions for the contradictions and issues

Furri notes that there are attempts to find solutions inside Europe. Talking about unity, cooperation and solidarity between citizens and refugees, or trying to work with small powers of local politics are internal solutions. However, he states that the external solution is completely opposite, to stop people from moving. (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017) Furri and Als both see greater responsibility sharing as part of a solution for managing displacement and migration. Als emphasises need for long-term and comprehensive solutions instead of short-term measures. Als notes that there would also be need for further research along migratory routes to analyse the implications of the EU’s migration policies. NGOs including DRC have tried to push for more and regular consultations at Brussels and national level to inform programming and priorities in the partner countries. According to her, a better evidence base would contribute to better understanding of mixed migration: “A better understanding of the drivers of irregular migration will provide a basis for a more well-informed and balanced response.” (S. Als, personal communication, April 28, 2017) Also Furri sees affecting local communities and people as a starting point for responsibility sharing. According to him, there is a need to make people understand that numbers of arrived migrants and refugees are not enormous and that it is possible to share the responsibility:

“When you focus on point of crisis or struggle or tension like Lampedusa or Calais, people cannot have a real vision of the situation. This is a political decision of media and politicians.” (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017)

Furri states the current discourse only to increase the gap between European citizens and “the others”, meaning migrants coming from Africa. Migrants are only seen as victims or illegal, this passivating them or justifying returning them back to Africa. (F. Furri, personal communication, April 25, 2017) Maccanico calls for a procedure that would allow migrants to be regularised after a certain amount of time. According to him, it would stop degradation of migrants as now they are considered irregular always if they have arrived Europe once through irregular pathways. Maccanico notes that regularisation would also be beneficial for the EU’s economy because if migrants are always seen as irregulars, they are not allowed to work regularly. Moreover, regulating migrants could slowly break down resistance to regularising secondary movement which is another solution Maccanico sees for the Migration Compact. (Y. Maccanico, personal communication, May 15, 2017) Also Gunsser calls for legal possibilities for migration such as increasing family reunification possibilities. This would be the short-term demand. In a longer-term, Gunsser sees that the EU should enable freedom of movement for everybody and open borders. African people should have the same rights as Europeans. (C. Gunsser, personal communication, April 29, 2017)

## Conclusion and discussion

During its first year in operation, the Partnership Framework with third countries, often referred as the Migration Compact, has established its status as an approach and policy tool in the EU's migration policies. It is the latest approach aiming to respond to the increased amount of arriving migrants and refugees in Europe. In overall, there has been little progress made in the five priority countries, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, regarding the main short-term objectives of the Compact. Number of migrants arriving to Europe from the African countries did not decrease, and amount of returns did not increase notably during the first nine months the Compact has been in operation. Based on the observations made in the EU documents, Niger is the only country where the actions of the Migration Compact have resulted in decrease of migration, whereas Ethiopia and Nigeria did not have any significant results presented. Moreover, until the beginning of March 2017 when the third progress report was published, there were only plans presented of the long-term actions, most of them expressed in very ambiguous way, and no results.

In the EU documents, 'actions' was the most prominent topic, and short-term actions were presented most often. The analysis demonstrates of a clear imbalance between the emphases given for short- and long-term actions which indicates that short-term migration management actions are held more important than long-term actions, at least in the beginning of the Compact's implementation. This is concerning because the effects of the Migration Compact are likely to be then short-sighted, and as the short-term actions are funded with development aid, they can undermine long-term development goals if the funding is targeted only to migration management related issues.

A particular issue in the Compact is that it makes development aid conditional on how well the third countries cooperate within the short-term actions. The EU documents have a clear emphasis on return and readmission which shows that there is a lot of pressure put on the third countries to accept back their citizens who are considered irregular migrants in Europe. This creates several issues. First, integrating incentives into development aid is in clear contradiction to how the EU defines its development aid purpose, it being eradicating poverty (Europe External Policy Advisors, 2013b). Second, setting conditionalities does not indicate of equal partnerships between the EU and the third countries, instead of an EU-dominant approach. Even though partnership and unity are mentioned several times in the documents, the analysis demonstrates the Compact being part of the migration-development nexus created by the North in which, like Nyberg Sørensen (2012) argues, the South is considered only as a partner for implementation. The slow progress with the priority countries indicates of contradicting stances faced while implementing the Compact, for example with Mali and Senegal. Third, excessive pressure itself can create tension between the EU and the African countries. Besides, like the interviewees note, when pressure is put on objectives that the countries might not agree with or that would be against their sovereignty, this creates tension also. As Vimont (2016) notes, focusing too much on returns and readmissions is likely not to convince partner countries to initiate true collaboration for lack of mutual trust. All in all, creating pressure by linking incentives to development aid is likely to complicate achieving the Migration Compact's objectives and also damage the EU's image as a partner in development.

The interviewees see the Compact creating tension also between the African countries which are pushed to strengthen their border control to stop migration flows between the countries. Hence, as the EU is externalising its migration management to the African countries, it is moving the pressure between the EU Member States to Africa. Moreover, by making development aid conditional and aiming to reduce

migration, the EU creates a contradiction within the African countries as well. If the countries agree to reduce migration, they are likely to receive fewer remittances. On the other hand, if they do not implement actions within the Migration Compact, the EU can decrease their development funding. This is in contradiction to the way Africans see migration, as part of their societal tradition and an important way to improve their livelihoods (Vimont, 2016; de Haan, 2000). Focus on only reducing migration is likely to decrease remittances and thus weaken the migration-development nexus (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). Hence, the migration-development agendas promoted by the North are now contradicting each other.

To remove all tension and make the Compact more effective, the objectives and actions within the Migration Compact should be made truly equal between the EU and the priority countries, thus moving away from the EU-dominant approach and the imbalanced setting the Compact has now. As the thesis argues based on the literature and theories, and also proven by the observations made of the Compact documents, migration to Europe will continue because the EU has not yet created equal compacts that acknowledge individual motives and the demand for migrant labour. Moreover, the actions implemented in the Compact reflect the EU's belief that people in the South are sedentary (Castles, 2009; Bakewell, 2008), and conflicts or poverty are the only reasons why they migrate (Kabbanji, 2013). The Compact does not consider migration as a natural phenomenon, and instead sees development as a way to reduce migration, hence promoting opposite actions what migration scholars like Bakewell and Nyberg Sørensen have called for. Because individual desires or reasons to migrate are not acknowledged in the Compact, it supports the argument made earlier that the EU acts as a 'planner' when directing development aid to the priority countries, and thus according to Easterly (2008), is likely to fail in eradicating poverty.

Giving a stronger role for the African countries in the planning and implementation of the Migration Compact could help changing the negative framing migration has currently. It would also decrease the gap between the North and the South that the world systems theory demonstrates being prominent still (Wallerstein, 2004). Moreover, the interviewees argue the gap to only increase because of the EU's migration control actions in the priority countries. A solution would be to decentralise cooperation which would give a voice for the priority countries and particularly for the lower levels of governance in the countries. Moreover, regional organisations in the African countries should be taken part of implementing the Compact. Another solution would be to offer a way for regularisation after a migrant has been in Europe for a certain time. Hence, the EU would show that it acknowledges the demand for migrant labour which is a permanent part of its labour market and functions as a pull factor for Africans to arrive to Europe as proven by the segmented labour market theory (Massey, 2001; Piore, 1979).

This thesis contributes to EU migration policy research by providing an analysis of the Migration Compact that so far has been analysed by only few scholars and NGOs, and by demonstrating how the migration-development nexus has turned around back to development curtailing migration. According to Boswell and Geddes, migration to the EU is often analysed through two approaches, policy failure and securitisation. The former focuses on states' inability to achieve their migration policy objectives, whereas the latter sees states good at realising the objectives which they then justify by emphasising security threats caused by migration. However, Boswell and Geddes state the approaches to concentrate only on rhetorical construction of migration and thus offer too simplistic account of migration policies. (Boswell & Geddes, 2011) For this reason, the thesis does not try to argue whether the Migration Compact is a failure or not as a migration policy. Besides, there is not yet enough of data of the Compact's progress to assess if it has been successful. Instead, the thesis focuses to analyse what kind of issues there are in the implementation and hence demonstrates contradictions in the direction the EU is currently taking in its migration policies.

There has been a shift of framing migration more negatively than before in the public and political discourse. Also the EU's migration management actions, including the Migration Compact, reflect of intensifying negative perception of migration. In February 2017, Frontex criticised various NGOs for helping migrants in the Mediterranean stating that they are hampering the fight against smugglers. As 40 percent of the rescue operations in Libyan waters are done by NGOs, Frontex claims this to complicate checking migrants' origins or their smuggling routes. (Wintour, 2017) Moreover, for example in France, there has been a rise in court cases against people helping migrants and refugees, French law stating this as facilitation of irregular entry. In January 2017, over 100 French NGOs, charities and labour unions stated this as criminalisation of humanitarian activity and called for authorities to end this. (Brown, 2017) These actions can be argued to criminalise solidarity towards migrants. Hence, there is a shift also in how migrants are been framed lately. Instead of seeing them as victims, the current policies are making them invisible by moving migration management outside of Europe. This might become more common, as the EU documents demonstrate: the Union is broadening the Compact approach to other third countries. Externalising control and supporting it with development aid is becoming an ordinary approach for the EU.

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# Appendix

## Sample of the EU documents

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## Interview guide

1. The Migration Compact has been in operation for almost a year. How do you see EU's and African states' actions that are so far implemented in the five priority countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal)?
2. How do you see EU's objectives within the Migration Compact?
3. Who benefits from the actions and objectives of the Migration Compact? How?
4. What kind of effects does the Migration Compact have on the migration situation in Africa?
5. How do you see EU's policy on development aid?
6. What are the possible issues or contradictions of EU directing development aid to short-term actions to manage migration from Africa?
7. What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions or issues?
8. How should migration from Africa to Europe be managed?
9. What kind of EU policies would be needed to manage the refugee crisis?

## Transcriptions of the interviews

### Filippo Furri

PhD candidate in anthropology, Member of MigrEurop  
Interview 25<sup>th</sup> April 2017

1. Migration Compact has been in operation for almost a year. How do you see the EU's and also five priority countries' actions that have been implemented in Africa?

Furri: About Africa in general. With MigrEurop we are working with externalisation of control. The Migration Compact is a new step of this kind of externalisation and placement of control and everything about managing migration. The organic work of EU and bilateral statements with different countries, if you search in policy papers, you can find a lot of negotiations about the development projects and cooperation projects. I think this is the largest case about the situation. What is interesting for me is about the political pressure that Italy and Germany make. I mean we don't talk about Libya or Egypt. I think Libya, it's just a big chaos, and the projects to create agreement or statement about managing migration and control, and Frontex position about now attacking NGOs, and the Libyan coast guard enforcement by the European countries. You can find a lot of action and participants working in this direction. With this direction I mean put the control out of Europe. They create this kind of wall by wall. You stop and if the wall control doesn't work in Niger, we have a new wall in Libya. This is most dangerous because you will create political and economic tension between the African countries I think. It's hard to understand what the impact of this European approach is in Africa in general and to the relation between the countries.

Interviewer: Can you explain a bit more, why do you see it might create this kind of political tension?

Furri: Tension between, in the large sense of cooperation and development agreement in the central sub-Saharan Africa, so you have national interest, national influences as in Italy, Niger, Mali, UK, Egypt. This is kind of a projection, imaginary situation, but you could have the same situation you have now also inside Europe. The EU project, idea of managing migration, and then you have the tension between states. As EU and Italy, two built statements and agreements with different countries and different actors, would probably produce tension in largest sense as you can understand it. There is a bilateral agreement with Niger where we as Italians, Italian government, more or less transform Niger to a big pre hotspot, push back hotspot, in the sense that Niger accepted to be the place where Italy pushes back migrants. The logic is very bad. Niger would be the country where you push back migrants coming from Sudan or everywhere just to do the worst work, to stop them and probably try to send these people back to the country of departure. Everyone is talking about hotspot as a local and physical space. We in MigrEurop focus on the fact that hotspot is an approach in internal sense. And then you have the same outside. So hotspot is kind of logic, an issue to apply. If you apply the same logic in Africa, you produce the same tension we have in Europe, between Italy, Greece and France.

Interviewer: Do you think the problem is that this would not be a long lasting solution?

Furri: No solution. If you remember the pressure Italy and Germany made on Tunisia a few weeks ago. It was just political pressure, no papers, nothing technical. The pressure Germany and Italy produce against Tunisia was about the idea to delocalise selection of asylum seekers. The idea was that we take people into the sea, they go to Tunisia, they submit in Tunisia the asylum request and then if they have it, they can move to Europe. If not, no. This is very important point because as European Union, as individual country, you are disengaging your responsibilities of basic human rights and of respect to Geneva Convention. Then

we can justify and understand agreement with “illegal”. We can understand the logic to control people, to push back in Africa, you can understand it because you say “they are not refugees”. It's in the same logic of control of migration that we have had in the last 10 years. Nothing really new. What is new is the geographic sense when pushing away. Not to do it inside or on the border, but outside. It's invisibilisation of the migration process. What is very hard, the same idea to externalise, to give responsibility to third countries with economic exchange. Germany and Italy saying to Tunisia "if you do this, probably we can give you more money to everything about development". What is dramatic is the idea to delocalise the process of asylum. It's the way to deny any possibilities to people to escape this logic and EU's responsibility of human rights. It's kind of end of every possibility to talk about asylum and human rights in Europe. Because of the situation and what's happening in the sea, we are focusing on borders but I think it is very interesting to understand what the larger scale of control is.

#### 5. How do you see EU's policy on development aid?

Furri: We discovered something a few years ago. We were looking bilateral agreements between Italy and third countries about readmission. We discovered that they start to put few lines or little information about development cooperation in the larger agreement.

Interviewer: You mean connecting development to migration management?

Furri: Not connecting, just stating that I give you the money and you do the job I need you to do. It's like a market, not a connection. There's not a logical connection, just market with money. They did the same with Turkey. Countries use this way of development cooperation to negotiate and have help to sort migration. I think France does the same with Mali, paying development aid to help to fight Islamic groups. I'm talking about development cooperation in its largest sense. "We have the economic and technical power, we give you things you need and in exchange you do the job, stop people". It's very cynical approach. There is nothing behind it, it's just a market. The problem is that in this way you try to erase the problem. Migration will stop being an European problem. This is the logic they are building. The European Union and the different countries are refusing their responsibilities and their position they claim for themselves. The contradiction is that we are talking about democratisation of world and so on, and then we refuse our responsibility to be democratic and respect human rights. For me the problem is that normal people need to understand this process. They need to know that we are trying to hide the reality, in the Mediterranean and everywhere. Try to disconnect the logic of migration which is completely coherent. What's dangerous is that we are transferring the tension we have inside Europe, like Hungary with Balkan countries, Italy with Austria, and France with UK. The relocation problem is the biggest example of this tension. I think Migration Compact is good way to give the problem, the tension to other countries. We pay to be free of this problem and just to not have anything to do about it because you are doing the job for us. With these policies you will increase tension between states in Africa. They will fight against each other of who does the job for Europe. This political and economic intervention in Africa is very dangerous way, you produce more destabilisation. This is the risk I feel. We only think about our own problems as Europeans and if you just push away these problems to countries of origin or transit migration, it is dangerous.

#### 7. What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions or issues?

Furri: It's interesting because we try to find solutions inside Europe, talking about asylum, unity, cooperation and solidarity between citizens and refugees, try to work with the small powers of local politics. This is our internal solution. The external solution is completely opposite, the idea to stop. The development cooperation approach we have is not a solution. It's a mean that we are using to renew the form of intervention, form of control and colonialism. I don't know how you can disconnect this kind of logic. We are systematically destroying every possibility to break down the control of the Global North. We need to solve our internal problems of democracy and fascism before trying to go to teach other countries.

It's not a solution but it's a way to change the logic. Till now we are justifying all economic and military interventions by talking about human rights and democracy. We have a big problem inside Europe in terms of responsibilities and ethno-centric vision and approach of global politics. The solution should be to change this way of thinking. Problem is that African countries are enchained because they can't refuse help. Help is useful for political stability. The problem is that how they can refuse it, how we can build a society where people don't need to move to Europe just to be safe. With Migration Compact we are just increasing the gap between the North and the South and we are just building conditions for more humanitarian and economic crises in the South.

#### 9. What kind of EU policies would be needed to manage the refugee crisis?

Furri: I'm working on local powers, which is one way to change, to make local communities and people to understand that numbers of refugees aren't enormous, that the idea is to share responsibilities and create conditions to host people. This is the starting point. Then talking about integration or hospitality or waiting the conditions change better to go back in the country. Most of the refugees wish to go back home and we know it. But the conditions are getting every day worse so they can't go back. Integration and temporary presence is second step. First step is just to share the responsibility. When you focus on point of crisis or struggle or tension like Lampedusa or Calais, people can't have a real vision of the situation. This is a political decision of media and politicians. We have many places with good situation hosting migrants. It's not just possible but also good for the communities, economically and socially. We need to explain that it is possible to share responsibilities. The problem is that the decision makers are stuck in a national position. For example the initiative of relocation 160,000 people to Europe and till now we've had around 20,000 people. Italy and Greece are coming hotspot countries, detention countries. It's a stupid way to approach a problem. The solution would be an European policy, not of control and security, of hospitality and offer human rights. Now we are just increasing the gap between the citizens and the "others". It's hard to talk about solution in the present. Solution is to start to change the perspective. European Union says that they don't need people but they do need bodies as illegal workers. But these people don't need personal rights. We need people to work and do our jobs but we don't need people with privileges or rights. The migrants are seen only as victims or illegals, passivating them or seeing them as illegals and then pushing them back. This is the same logic we are applying in the Migration Compact. The solution is to stop seeing the Migration Compact as a solution.

1. The Migration Compact has been in operation for almost a year. How do you see EU's and African states' actions that are so far implemented in the five priority countries?

Als: The EU migration compacts consist of intensified cooperation and partnership between the EU as well as EU Member States and certain priority countries in the area of migration, rather than actual formal agreements and this makes a little difficult to monitor exactly what the outcome of the partnership is. They are not set in stone in that way. There are initiatives at the Brussels level to monitor the implementation of the EU Trust Fund roll-out, some coordinated by NGO platforms, like Concord. Generally the compact process has been very non-inclusive and NGOs like DRC have collectively attempted to push for regular consultations both at Brussels and national level to inform programming and priorities in the partnership with the priority countries. Consultations have been taken place in Niger and Mali. We see as key issues of concern the outsourcing of border management, also lack of monitoring of human rights violations. We have for instance seen in Niger that when you increase border control it pushes people to take more dangerous routes. There are also more general issues like lack of reference to support to reintegration and assistance to the most vulnerable. The Compact generally has very much a migration management approach.

Interviewer: Could you clarify a bit, what would the consultations help?

Als: To be honest we have not seen much outcome of the consultations but we are continuing to push for consultations to try to open up dialogue, to create avenues for informing priorities and actions on the ground.

2. How do you see EU's objectives within the Migration Compact?

Als: DRC supports comprehensive and joint response to the global displacement and migration situation, and acknowledges the financial resources being committed by the EU. We also in principle see engagement with private sector as a positive thing, new funding initiatives are needed. But we're concerned of possible implications of an approach that focuses on deterrence and border management rather than protection of refugees and migrants. We agree that we need to increase safe and legal pathways to Europe, and to address root causes. Our concern is the imbalance with which the objectives are being addressed. We see emphasis on disrupting smugglers networks for instance and for increasingly restrictive border measures but we don't see any progress in terms of ensuring legal pathways for those in need. Development aid has been instrumentalised, there should not be conditionalities attached. This is a huge concern. It also contradicts EU's development aid as they define it.

3. Who benefits from the actions and objectives of the Migration Compact?

Als: There are many good actions under the EU Trust Fund. I want to emphasise that not all is bad. It provides more funding that is needed. But the migration partnerships are very clearly EU interest driven with an overarching objective of increasing return and readmission rates. EU is the benefactor of it. A key concern lies in the instrumentalisation of development aid which the new partnership framework institutionalises. Conditionalities based on returns and readmission and the ability of states to prevent onward movements to Europe should not form the basis of partnership or of the allocation of development aid. By focusing so strongly on countries of origin and transit of migrants reaching the EU, there is a risk that the EU may disregard other countries that have significant development or humanitarian needs.



4. What kind of effects does the Migration Compact have on the migration situation in Africa?

Als: We absolutely need research and data along migratory routes to detect how policies affect the situation and to understand also unintended consequences of the policies. Increasing border management has consequences, it makes other things more difficult too and can for instance create unnecessary difficulties for regional mobility and seasonal labour migration. Also the EU as a global actor must be aware of the export value of European policies and the ripple effect that these can have also on African states.

Interviewer: Do you mean that this could work as an example to other countries?

Als: Yes, the EU is an influential actor and the way its policies are now developing, we have concerns in the way they set examples. Or how it is managing the situation in Europe for example in Greece, what kind of an example that gives to other countries.

5. How do you see EU's policy on development aid?

Als: It has been a champion in its adhering to humanitarian and development effectiveness principles in providing aid. This support has helped set the standard internationally for how humanitarian and development programming is implemented. In recent years, particularly in 2016, prioritisation of migration has changed the dynamics of their development aid. With the carrot and stick approach they compromise the good tradition, breaking the good tradition of ownership and of defining development priorities with stakeholders and decision-makers in the countries of concern. We are seeing an increasingly instrumentalisation of development aid.

6. What are the possible issues or contradictions of EU directing development aid to short-term actions to manage migration from Africa?

Als: Key dilemma is exactly that EU puts a lot of pressure on demonstrating results with increased return and readmission and decrease in arrivals to the EU. This does not go well along with development. Migration and displacement should not be addressed with short-term approaches, it requires long-term approach.

7. What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions or issues?

Als: The topic is very polarised and have become a political issue. We need data, evidence of movements of people. We need to understand better the situation because it is manageable. We can contribute as DRC to have a better understanding of this, so that policy making is not based on underlying fear. It is also a matter of convincing people to take the data and analysis into account in policy making. A better understanding of the drivers of irregular migration will provide a basis for a more well-informed and balanced response.

9. What kind of EU policies would be needed to manage the refugee crisis?

Als: We need joint solutions and a strengthening of the collaborative forums of the UN and EU. We have to make sure that responsibility sharing actually happens. Need to look for long-term solutions instead of quick fixes or short-term actions. EU is fragmented and short-sighted in its policies now. We need comprehensive solution. The key is to share responsibility, help countries like Kenya and Jordan that host thousands of refugees. We see now lot of commitments from the EU to responsibility sharing but not a lot of action on the commitments in practise beyond financial aid.

Member of Flüchtlingsrat (Refugee Council) Hamburg and Afrique-Europe-Interact

Interview in 29<sup>th</sup> April 2017

1. The Migration Compact has been in operation for almost a year. How do you see EU's and African states' actions that are so far implemented in the five priority countries?

Gunsser: I know that there is some resistance in the African countries so not everything is implemented. They are put in a pressure to introduce biometric passports, to issue travelling certificates and if they do not do that, the governments are pushed to accept the EU travelling document. All this is for deportation so that the EU can identify people better and know which country they come from so they can send them back. But I think all this doesn't yet really work even if they have biometric passports. All the technology is not yet working in these countries, either the organisation of the authorities. It is not like they can identify every person, if he or she lived in that village, but that's what they try to do. So that's one thing. They also want to introduce scanners at every border inside Africa, and I can imagine that's also not reality because often there is no electricity. Big pressure or topic is the signature of readmission contracts. I can take an example, in Mali there was a big discussion about it for years already because the Malian government didn't want it and they said "we don't sign such a treaty". And now they signed something which was something like a readmission contract at the end of last year but the government said afterwards "no, this is not a readmission contract, it's just a memorandum of understanding". So there's a big debate about it. But of course some governments are put under pressure or they don't get money anymore if they don't fulfil certain conditions. It is a big problem in many countries now. I think the Migration Compact means that there is a connection between development aid and migration policy which means the countries should prevent migration, so-called illegal migration, and should accept the deportation of their nationals and identify them and issue papers to be able to deport them. This is a big pressure at the moment. We had a conference with a member of the Malian embassy. He told exactly that the German government puts pressure on them to deport about 200 Malians before the elections in Germany which take place in September so that the German government can say "we fulfil now our task to do lot of deportations". Merkel is travelling around Africa and talking with many governments, especially with countries of origin and transit migration, and promises money if they fulfil all these conditions.

2. How do you see EU's objectives within the Migration Compact?

Gunsser: The European governments want to reduce or to prevent so-called illegal migration and they want to deport those people who don't get refugee status here in Europe, and that African governments accept them. This is a big problem because not every government issues papers or accepts all these deportations. That's the aims. Officially they want to give money so that the smugglers don't do their job anymore, and that the African governments fight against smuggling and all kinds of illegal migration. But I think the most important measure is on these governments to accept all these deportations and do what prevents migration that is not wanted in Europe. They also promise that some legal migration would be possible but it's not really fulfilled what Europeans promise.

3. Who benefits from the actions and objectives of the Migration Compact? How?

Gunsser: Of course the European governments want to benefit. They get rid of the unwanted migrants. That's clear. But I also think that the electronic industry gets a lot of profit because they send lot of equipment to African countries and declare it as development aid. I read that export of such equipment is now almost as much as the export of arms and often these are mixed because they use a lot of electronic facilities for wars or for border protection. Also some of the governments profit because they get the money and most of the money will not be used to improve the situation of poor people in the country even if they say like this. In reality they will keep it for themselves. I think almost no money will go to the poor

people even if they promise to create alternative jobs for the smugglers like in Agadez, one of the aims what Merkel said when she was in Niger. She said smugglers should get another kind of jobs but what kind of jobs. If they close the borders, they cannot even make trade in the desert, they cannot do agriculture. Before most of them were active in the tourism but there is no tourism anymore because of the wars or the terrorist attacks in these countries. All this is no real alternative. I cannot imagine what kind of jobs Merkel wants to create for those people. Of course some projects will be created but I think all this won't help because most of the young people want to travel and they are under pressure from their families to send back money. All this money is more than the official development aid.

Interviewer: Do you see that migrants benefit in anyway of the Compact?

Gunsser: I cannot imagine that migrants benefit from these programmes. I think for the migrants, for all those who try to come to Europe in all these dangerous ways, I think the effect of this closure of the borders will be that migration will become more dangerous, that they have to take more dangerous routes, they have to pay more money, and they have to take worse boats. The alternative would be to create legal possibilities to migrate but very few people can do that. It's more difficult to get visa or family reunification. They are reduced more and more. For example now in Germany for the Syrian refugees who are even recognised, they cannot have family reunification, only after two years. All such possibilities are reduced.

4. What kind of effects does the Migration Compact have on the migration situation in Africa?

Gunsser: The governments are under pressure to introduce electronic passports and registers. Also to force people to register in every village because up to now it has not been like this that every child who's born is registered. If less people have the possibility to go abroad and send money, the families will not have the money. I think it's a contradiction because the governments are interested in this money of the migrants also. If the migrants don't send the money, to send the children to school or to make it possible that the grandmother goes to hospital, there will be social unrest in these countries. The governments will be forced to pay in another way. I think remittances can also help the governments to have more quiet situations. In many countries the money, which is sent back by the migrants, is much more than the development aid.

Interviewer: You believe that the Migration Compact might cause decrease in remittances?

Gunsser: If it really works like Europe wants, that fewer migrants can move or that migrants have to pay more for their illegal migration route, then it can have these effects. It's of course different concerning different countries if there's a war like in Syria or you leave country like Gambia, Togo or Nigeria where they say you have only economic reasons which is also not true. There are also political reasons or the reasons are connected. It also depends on the governments if they have lots of demands, if they really want projects so that not all young people would migrate. Maybe the projects could help a little bit but I think much more has to be changed. Most of these young people don't only migrate for economic reasons. Instead, they go like other young people because they want to see the world. Also this kind of migration, to see the world or something else, can be good for the development of these countries because they have new experiences, more education.

6. What are the possible issues or contradictions of EU directing development aid to short-term actions to manage migration from Africa?

Gunsser: If the government is really under pressure of the population, they cannot sign such contract. They cannot reduce migration because the governments themselves are interested in migration. They are interested in remittances but they are also interested in getting rid of opposition people and unemployed youth because if they are on the street, they are also dangerous for the government. And the government has no money to give to them. On the other hand, the governments are interested to get money from the EU. So that is a contradiction. I think it depends a lot on the people's movements in these countries that whose interest wins. Sometimes they take the money but on the other hand they let people to migrate. There are different interests if you look at Libya for example. There are lots of people who have no other

job at the moment and they just exploit the migrants. They put pressure on the migrants, or put them in prisons and force them to call their families to send money. Libya is not interested that Europe organises camps there because militias and people who are organising these camps now would not earn a lot of money anymore. All of these are contradictions. Only solution would be freedom of movement and other kind of migration policy.

Interviewer: I want to specify a bit, what do you think about EU directing development aid specifically to short-term actions?

Gunsser: I think most of the money is of course put in border technology and electronic passports and such things. Also they educate the staff at the airports and authorities of these countries. The Europeans want this to reduce or prevent migration but the question is if it works. On the other hand, all these people are also interested to get money and if somebody at the airport is interested to earn more money, he takes more money and lets people go.

5. How do you see EU's policy on development aid?

Gunsser: They say they make it easier to invest in Africa and to create jobs but on the other hand Europe exports a lot subsidised agricultural products to African countries. This is not stopped, on the opposite, it is increased what they send, like tomatoes and onions. Gambia is an example. The previous government which was criticised very much but on the other hand introduced higher taxes on products like onions and tomatoes from Europe to support local agricultural production. But now they changed it again. They lowered the taxes so that European products are sometimes even cheaper than the locally produced. There are many agricultural products that they cannot export to Europe or even inside Africa. If this does not change, it will not help. If there are factories put in these countries and there are only low paid workers it will also not help very much. If Africans develop their own kind of industry and define own kind of development or what they think about development, I think that is an important solution.

7. What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions or issues within the Migration Compact?

Gunsser: I think the only solution would be freedom of movement and open borders. It's not impossible. It's not a long time ago when there was no visa necessary from many African countries to go to former colonial states. Lot of people did this and also returned. They went to Europe for some years to learn a profession or work and then went back. Such kind of migration was possible at that time but not anymore because people in Africa invest a lot in so-called illegal migration and they cannot go back because they cannot afford to go and come. I think such a policy should be introduced that Africans can, like the Europeans, go and come as they want. I don't want to say that everybody has to migrate but everybody has to have the possibility, either to learn a profession in another country or work some time or only to look and have new experiences. I think the same rights should belong to African people. It's also one argument the young people in Africa say that "you come here and you travel as you like but I'm not allowed to do it, why not?". Of course it is also important to have a right to asylum and protection but I think there are lots of other reasons for migration too which must be accepted. Of course this would be a big change but I think there is no other solution. A lot of money is put in border technology. If they would be used for other things, the world would be much better.

Interviewer: Do you think it is sustainable or that Europe could have open borders?

Gunsser: Of course they say we can't accept everybody in this world but I think that is a question of how the world is going on. Of course if there are more catastrophes, wars and economic problems, it is probably true that more people will come to countries where the situation is better and peaceful. Also this has to be changed. But I think we cannot say that we close our borders because this is not a solution. We are one world and we have to find a solution for the whole world.

9. What kind of EU policies would be needed to manage migration coming from Africa?

Gunsser: It's difficult to talk about management because I think migration should not be managed in a way. We should have a world where everybody can decide where he or she wants to live. That is my vision. At the moment people talk about migration management but I think migrants are no things which you can put from one country to another.

Interviewer: Then, what do you think, how the EU should act in this situation?

Gunsser: Of course you can talk about short- and long-term demands. Short-term demands should be that there would be some legal possibilities to migrate, instead of taking boats and dying in the sea, like family reunification. People suffering from war or political persecution, refugees, should really have the right to migrate but they don't have it at the moment. My vision is that everybody can travel like us in Europe. This would be the long-term demand, freedom of movement for everybody. I would not talk about refugee crisis either. I think it is not that. The European countries have enough money and space to welcome all the people. This was shown in 2015 when a lot of local people did a lot to welcome refugees. It is a crisis for the governments because they don't know what to do. The situation is exaggerated and even the numbers are not that big.

1. The Migration Compact has been in operation for almost a year. How do you see EU's and African states' actions that are so far implemented in the five priority countries?

Maccanico: Niger is one particular point of interest because it's a country from which the EU feels that many of the people arriving to Libya, and often been trapped in Libya, are coming through from. Niger is crucial in the EU's geostrategic thinking on migration from Africa. The EU is trying to set it up as a place in which to set up some camps in order to get them to readmit people regardless whether they are from Niger or from other African countries. It's becoming a bit like a sorting centre for returnees. You've already got IOM operating there and UNHCR setting up camps. Though, Niger has had some strong criticism from partner countries of ECOWAS because of this road it's taking, which it was very opposed to only a decade ago, in introducing migration policies or causing problems for people entering the country. When the Commission and Frontex visited Niger in 2004–2005, which was the beginning of this cooperation, the Nigerien authorities said that they didn't feel that migration was a problem and they didn't feel that they could restrict migration from neighbouring countries because of their membership of ECOWAS. Very much like the EU model based on the idea of free movement to improve development, the same thing had happened in Africa. The externalisation of EU migration policies, this is crucial in the context of the Compact, pushes them to introduce hard borders between each other which could be a way in which the EU is going beyond its competences and interests in Niger because of problems in the neighbourhood. Niger has very important strategic role.

Nigeria is very important because it's the country where readmission is advancing the quickest. It means that at the moment in Italy, because this cooperation is working on returns, the Interior Ministry has provided direct instructions to police forces to target Nigerians. Technically that would be discrimination, regarding ethnic profiling by police forces. The Commission used to complain about things like that when you had instructions to police forces to target specific groups. We had a clear example of that in 2010–2011 when the French and Italian governments were conducting operations and adopting measures against Roma camps. There was a strong diplomatic conflict between the Commission and France because some instructions had appeared which instructed police forces to target informal camps, but Roma camps were a designated priority. Now following this cooperation between Italy and Nigeria, which is working on the basis of a memorandum of understanding, you had the Italian authorities saying "we have cleared places in the detention centres in Italy so that you can detain Nigerians. These places which we have cleared must be occupied by Nigerians. We have already booked some interviews with the Nigerian consulate and we have already booked a flight for people to be deported to Nigeria". That is the model and that is why the whole issue is particularly problematic. The Migration Compact is meant to subordinate other issues to an interest in returns. There are two ways in which it is linked to development aid and both of them are very problematic. The first reason is that in order to have a higher power of bargaining, the idea is to make development aid dependent on the prerequisite that countries readmit their own nationals when they are going to be expelled from Europe. That amounts to blackmail in a way because they are being coerced into doing something in exchange for development aid. The second, very problematic issue, is that it's introducing a change in the nature of development aid because a lot has been done in order to help the countries which are considered as migration risks in terms of stopping the countries' people from arriving in Europe. So development aid is shifting from improvements in the conditions in a country of origin in order to reduce the push factors which push people to migrate from their country, to a matter of helping countries to police their borders. That's often in countries which have questionable human rights situations, where regimes are authoritarian. It's a way to supposedly help them but in practise you're helping states to further develop and introduce new technologies for social control, possibilities to control their population, and particularly their borders. It's a way to intensify their power as well. Immigration

historically has been an escape valve when the situation in countries became unbearable. By helping them to police their borders, in effect it works towards putting them in cages which people cannot leave unless they have explicit permission from government authorities. It's a way in which borders are used to intensify the power which states have in their jurisdiction.

That's where my work towards a PhD crosses with my work for Statewatch which is documenting all these developments. The angle which I'm taking in my PhD is to treat immigration policy as not being particularly concerned with immigration or immigrants but about the possibilities for states to control people under their jurisdiction which means intensified control: the use of fingerprinting, the use of iris scanning. That goes all the way towards the control of telecommunications where now some security measures, which are being introduced with regards the people entering, include the idea that they should hand their passwords to their email accounts and telephones so that the EU security checks upon entry can have access to lots of more information about them, about their contacts, and also with a view to being able to dismantle the stories they tell in the context of asylum proceedings. This is very important because it is part of the EU Agenda on Migration which was unveiled in the spring 2015 and which has been the way to intensify and multiply the initiatives which are being taken, sort of a big final push in order to impose a policy regime which has caused a lot of damage throughout Europe. It means blocking everyone in Greece and Italy.

That's the nature of the hotspot approach. They pretended to set up a system for relocations whereby there would be a degree of solidarity with the two countries in the front line. That meant the other 27 countries taking 160,000 people which was a ridiculously low figure considering the numbers that were entering. They haven't managed to do that because they can always invent some prerequisite before they can implement the relocation. Security controls are not adequate. Some countries complain they wouldn't take any Muslims which is a direct definition of discrimination on religious grounds. Some countries have problems taking children. Although there has been an increase in unaccompanied children, children were not meant to enter hotspots, but they do because of the unavailability of sufficient places in specialised facilities. That means children are been held in hotspots for their own good in theory, according to the Commission, because otherwise they are at risk of abduction, disappearance, or exploitation in sexual grounds. The fact is that in a year and half after the hotspot approach started, we've had an enormous increase in children arriving. In Italy, only one unaccompanied minor has been relocated. One of the reasons justifying this is that the minors could be sort of a Trojan horse. If the minors came in then that could be grounds for later having to let in their parents. And they were perceived as a threat. The whole system has been predicated on treating people first as illegal entrants, then as potential refugees and only after that as people.

In Statewatch, one of our main focuses is study of official documents. It was very surprising to see something that was never been seen explicitly before which was the mention of violence in official documents with regards to taking fingerprints. Taking fingerprints was the main priority of the hotspot approach so Italy and Greece could self-harm in a way. Because once the people are fingerprinted and added in the EURODAC database, they are perpetually these two countries' responsibility. Italy and Greece were forced to self-harm in order to benefit from the solidarity which Member States were meant to show through relocations. They didn't happen, around 16,000 have been relocated until the end of April 2017 and the latest Council document even hinted that they might reduce what they had planned to do through relocations because the method for the exclusion of people from relocations has been so efficient that of those nearly 1.5 million people who entered in two years, they managed to whittle down the number who were potential candidates for relocations to 40,000.

Interviewer: But is that really true because they argue also in the Migration Compact that there are issues in returning people.

Maccanico: Yes exactly. What the hotspots have been now is an exercise for a mass exclusion from rights to apply for asylum, at least initially. They decided basically that only the people from nationalities from which more than 75% of applications were accepted were applicable for relocations. It was a way of saying

"seeing as we can't really argue that Syrians are not refugees, we'll accept the fact that we have to treat Syrians as refugees". They could not just do that, they had to invent objective criteria so they invented this criteria of 75% of accepted applications. For example in Italy in the last quarter, because they change every quarter, the only nationalities for which relocations were applicable were Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, and Eritreans. Even though none of those nationalities were arriving in great numbers in Italy. That means that everyone who arrived, mainly through Libya though Central Mediterranean route which is the deadliest, except for Eritreans, meaning that people from Sudan, South-Sudan where there is famine at the moment, Nigeria where trafficking is enormous problem, and Gambia where there was a very problematic authoritarian regime until the last election, basically they'd be systematically excluded from becoming candidates for relocation. That does not technically exclude them from the possibility of applying for asylum but it does initially exclude them from the possibility of becoming relocation candidates. What the Commission has been doing, and this is a very crucial game that they are playing with statistics, is to treat anyone who is not a relocation candidate as an illegal entrant and someone who needs to be deported. Basically that process means that in Italy they estimate that there are only 6,000 people who are candidates for relocation. In effect, by September they might complete their commitment if they increase the rate of relocations.

In Greece the situation is different. You have 20,000 people who are in the reception facilities and they are considered the only people who the relocation process should consider. There are a lot more Syrians who arrived in Greece but what they have done is to exclude them from being relocation candidates. You got the whole EU-Turkey deal that says that everyone who arrived after the 20 March 2016 has to be deported back to Turkey. That's the way when the numbers can't be whittled down ridiculously, you have an illegal agreement. That's an agreement which breaches the EU law, international law and traditional judicial accountability. An attempt was already made to question the legal validity of this agreement. And what came out? The ECJ could not make a ruling on it because it is not a formal agreement. Very much has been done on the basis of statements of intent, a press statement which is not even a legal document. The second problem, not only it is not a legal document, it's stipulated by an authority that has no legal personality, that's the EU heads of state or government. That's nothing, it's not the Council, not the Commission, not the Parliament, not an EU agency. It's an authority which came into use because they knew the illegality that they were doing. That's the moment when the Commission abandoned even the pretence of legality of these actions. The first paragraph of the deal is the clearest example of the doublespeak that's taking place: "everyone who enters Greece through Turkey after a certain date will be returned while respecting human rights and the principle of non-refoulement". As is the model of readmission agreement which the Commission is pursuing. The Compact and GAMM are all about introducing the basic principle, which is in the Cotonou agreement, whereby non-EU countries must unquestioningly accept the readmission of their own nationals without any further formalities. That's the theory behind the Migration Compact. Basically any development cooperation would be conditional on that issue of systematic acceptance of people who must be readmitted.

The model which Frontex and the Commission want to follow is the model which was established on the basis of bilateral agreements around 2010 which was applied effectively after the Arab spring in 2011. These are the agreements between Egypt and Tunisia with Italy. They meant that anyone arriving from these two countries, and there were lots of people arriving from these countries because of the uprisings, would be sent back in two days. That means that possibility of applying for asylum does not exist, because diplomatic cooperation with these countries is possible. The fact that they have working readmission agreements means that you can also assume that they are safe countries. That is not the case. The situation after the old regime returned to power in Egypt means that the human rights situation is a particular cause of concern. And it is an example of why this sort of deals, agreements and these forms of cooperation are dangerous because it's a period when disappearances in Egypt are rife and death sentences have been imposed in a large number of cases. Political parties, including Morsi's one which had won the second last election, have been listed as terrorist organisations. That means you have large amount of the population who is actually potentially suspicious of terrorism. Similar developments are underway in Turkey. This is the



model which as far the Commission and Frontex are concerned are best practises. The cooperation works with Tunisia as well. It's not as quick with Egypt because they've established some process for the numbers of people who can be repatriated so that you don't get the image of mass repatriations.

These models are based on readmission agreements. Italy has started saying "well readmission agreements are very useful for the external dimension of this action plan on migration but they are bit time consuming in order to reach the deal" (in the hotspots roadmap of September 2015). They are expensive, time-consuming and they offer to some level of human rights guarantees on paper. Although they are not very strong considering cooperation with Egypt which often involves consular of authorities. Apart from the speed of deportations, you also have the problem of the authorities of the home countries, of these people being involved in their identification before readmission. That means if someone has applied for asylum, the authorities will be able to harass their families in the country of origin. That's a very strong element discouraging people from applying for asylum. The speed of procedures, regarding Egypt in particular, also means that there will not be time for applying for asylum. That's the model they are seeking to impose. Everyone who's excluded from the hotspots and relocation process was leaving them with an order to leave national territory until NGOs reported what was happening. That's an expulsion order. Except, it wasn't an expulsion order because the Italian authorities didn't even accept that they enter the territory. So it was technically a deferred refusal of entry which meant that they didn't assume the responsibility that the state has for people who are on its territory regardless of whether they are legal or not. There is this continuing drift towards heightening the power that states have by denying statuses that human beings have as human beings.

We also saw another interesting thing in document and particularly in "non-papers" which was the subordination of rights to registration. So it became an issue of subordinating rights to fingerprinting. Then with a couple of terrorist attacks happening at the same time, they started to terror-proof them as well before they become human beings. There has been this movement where formal norms do not apply because there is an emergency, because there is an agenda on migration. This puts other issues before the fact that these people are actually human beings to whom states have a duty of care. In the Italian roadmap for hotspots from September 2015, what they said is "these readmission agreements suit us very well, they function but they would be better, quicker, and more effective if instead of doing that, we do technical, operative cooperation agreements. These go under the name of memorandum of understanding. We had a very interesting example of these with Sudan in August 2016. The fact is that the procedures have been set up to be so fast tracked that you even find a measure that seems like an attempt to externalise the identification of people. First you have the apparent bilateralism or reciprocity. Each country agrees to identify and return their own citizens who are present in the other party's territory in irregular situation. However, the cooperation in the field of returns is only for the Sudanese authorities to participate in the system and support the identification of irregular migrants. So it's obvious that it is for one-way traffic. They proceed to interview the people who must be repatriated and on the basis of the interview, without any further test as to their own identity, they will issue a laissez-passer to enable the Italian authorities to organise repatriation. Here you're opening a way for mass repatriations without even a proper control system of their nationality.

Interviewer: Do you think this is likely to happen in the five priority countries?

Maccanico: It's already happened in Nigeria. With Libya they just signed the memorandum of understanding in February 2017 which was a real disgrace because it was the time when the Commission was complaining about Trump's wall in Mexico. That agreement resuscitates article 19 of the deal between Libya and Italy in 2009. It means that it's restarting a plan for virtual wall in the desert of southern Libya, and we are talking about hundreds of miles of desert, something comparable to Trump's proposal. The article 19 of the deal in 2012 basically envisages enormous funding for Italian companies because Libyan companies don't have the necessary technology, in order to create a virtual wall based on the system which was set up in Spain in 2005–2008 for the electronic surveillance of the Strait of Gibraltar. That worked, dealing with the entries coming from Morocco. It cost over 20,000 deaths as the routes shifted to the

Atlantic coast at the time. When they closed the routes from Morocco, you got people leaving from the coast of Senegal and Mauritania, and Morocco towards the Canary Islands with an enormous increase in deaths. Same is happening when they shut the Turkish routes and now people are coming through the Central Mediterranean route towards Italy.

The shift from readmission agreements to memoranda of understanding would seem like it's not something very important. In practice it means moving away from formal frameworks and regular frameworks towards a situation where state power does not really have any counterweight. So it's kind of like unshackling authorities from what the rules are. The people who came in weren't that many, it was 1.5 million. It is an enormous pressure from the viewpoint of the EU's irrational immigration policy but in a large territory with a population of over 500 million people, it's not a very large number. That's the only saving grace of the relocation process because even if the number was tiny (160,000), it showed that if you distributed them evenly among the countries on the basis of wealth, size, population, it's not actually that many people that were coming in and most of the EU countries actually need that kind of immigration. But the countries have refused to take even these and they keep on complaining about Italy and Greece having inadequate reception facilities but Italy at least in its formal structures has practically created a new city of reception facilities that's approaching 200,000 places where other countries have refused to take even 1,000 or 2,000 people.

We need a strong reaction against the whole of the four pillars of the European Agenda on Migration. Italy and Greece urgently need to refuse to cooperate like they have done, because their cooperation is paid by the degradation of the countries. The crisis at the points of arrival has been artificially created and maintained. If you read the documents on relocation and resettlement of Commission, they explicitly say that people who managed to make it to the north have got to be sent back to the south. So you're not just talking about turning two countries into enclosures, people are being transferred even within the countries in order to sustain an emergency. The instrumental usefulness of emergency is that if you have an emergency situation, an emergency means that you can violate every rule without being held accountable for it because you're acting in a situation of distress where there's a legal principle you're breaking but there's another one you can pretend to be upholding. It's a drive towards absolute power for the implementation of the EU migration policy. It's causing enormous damage to the countries on the frontline. It's so aggressive at the moment that Frontex and the Commission are now pushing for the criminalisation of solidarity towards migrants because they treat that as a pull factor. Like they treat the fact that NGOs started intervening off the coast of Libya, where people were dying, because the numbers of deaths had been increasing. After ordering the Italian navy not to save the people who were drowning off the coast of Libya, which happened in the end of 2014 when they withdrew Italian operation Mare Nostrum which had saving lives as priority, it was replaced the Operation Triton, coordinated by Frontex, and it moved away from the Libyan coast, directly causing an increase in deaths in the water. Now you have NGOs, which have been complaining about the deaths for ages, in these circumstances they began trying to equip themselves to save people at sea. Now they are the latest target of the EU's campaign against traffickers. The EU tries to portray them as accomplices of traffickers. Now there is a strong level of cooperation with the Libyan coast guard taking a greater role on. In the last few days there have been attacks on the NGO boats by the Libyan coast guards. This is reaching a new level. Italy has now announced opening of 11 new detention centres. Everyone who's waiting now for relocation must be hurriedly treated as an irregular migrant, detained as quickly as possible in a detention centre, and swiftly deported once there are readmission agreements or a memorandum of understanding in place with most African and Asian countries. They are establishing the European asylum system based on systematic exclusion.

7. What are the possible solutions to overcome the contradictions or issues in the Migration Compact but also in the current situation?

Maccanico: It can't be overcome without a strong opposition to the EU's agenda at the moment, particularly with regards to restoring the credibility of its return policy. That has started in Italy already. The Commission says that only 40% of the return decisions have been effectively implemented, leaving 60%

which need to be done. That doesn't consider that there are numerous cases in which return decisions are been issued by police forces illegally, irregularly, and for instrumental purposes. First, we need to go against the agenda on migration because it means mass detention and manhunts all over Europe. Second, a solution would be to regularise secondary movement which is an anathema to the Commission's approach. Another solution would be Italy closing the hotspots, stopping taking fingerprints and allowing people to leave. That would also mean that Frontex would have to leave Italy with the hotspots and EASO. The only way is for there to be a route to regularisation because the only way in which this drive towards the mass degradation of people and territories can continue is if you decide that everyone who's ever come irregularly in Europe can never be regularised. This is the policy that has been followed. This is an attack on countries' economies as well because if they are in the countries, the authorities know they are in the countries, the EU knows that they are in the countries, they must remain irregular even if they've been there for ten years and work regularly, albeit un lawfully, because they can't work regularly because they are not allowed. You've got to have a procedure whereby they are allowed to be regularised after a certain amount of time. That would prove beneficial for the economy of the countries concerned and might be useful for slowly breaking down the resistance of other countries to secondary movements. What you'd need at the moment is an alliance between Italy and Greece who are under extreme pressure. Greece has problems rebelling. They know the system is absurd but they can't rebel because they are under a stranglehold in economic terms. It's now up to Italy to refuse to implement these policies but there is no political party that would do this. The Democratic Party did this in 2014 which is the same time when the boats in the Mediterranean started having, instead of securing borders, a priority in saving lives. That was Operation Mare Nostrum. Because there were so many people coming, they stopped fingerprinting them. The problem in Italy vanished. For a few months it seemed like the problem was resolved. That is why the Commission has come down so hard on Italy and Greece because the same thing happened in Greece. They started saving lives rather than controlling borders and they stopped fingerprinting which meant people wouldn't be returned there. Just to give an example of how absurd the whole thing is they're making a big deal of the relocation process as an act of solidarity but in the two years 2015–2016 more people have been sent back to Italy in terms of Dublin returns, than have been relocated from Italy under the scheme. It's never been solidarity, instead it was always about coercing Italy and Greece into self-harming basically, to protect a system that places them in a structural disadvantage.

Interviewer: Would we need more real data of the situation then?

Maccanico: We don't need more data. Collection of data is becoming very dangerous because every piece of data there is gets used by Frontex and the Commission to mystify reality of the situation. We have enough data so that every time they put out their estimates and plans, it's clear that they are irrational. We need to be very careful in what kind of data is been collected and how it is used, and the selective use of data by the Commission. There are people in institutions who realise how absurd the situation is but it's the moment when there needs to be concerted effort, and it is happening in the universities where there's lot of people saying that we need to approach this in multidisciplinary way because taking things one aspect at a time is not working. The EU is managing to hide what they are doing in this way by saying that relocations are different from hotspots. It's not. It's part of the single drive which is very destructive.

I am very critical of EU policies on migration. I think they can almost be qualified as crimes against humanity but I'm not saying that as in anti-EU discourse. Because I'm Italian and half-German by nationality. I've lived in England most of my life and lived in Spain for a long time so I consider myself as European. I think at the moment opposition to this migration policy regime is necessary in order to save Europe. The EU is acting as though in order to create the EU, there is a need to degrade Europe. Security and migration are the two key ways in which this has been done. The solution is very rational, to make the relocation system work on a wide level and scale, without prioritising exclusion from asylum. Secondary movements are the only solution to this problem.