The Danish Defence
25 years after Maastricht:
Europeanization as an Intervening Mechanism?

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCDP	Civilian Capability Development Plain
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEMA	Danish Emergency Management Agency
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FPA	Foreign Political Analysis
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TEU	Treaty of the European Union

Abstract

Denmark is currently the only Member State of the European Union, with an opt-out from European cooperation within defense. The purpose of this project is to understand why Europeanization has then occurred within a policy area that is formally delinked from European cooperation.

This project conducts an analysis in order to establish why Europeanization has occurred, as well as the depth of this phenomena. The analysis features two sections resembling two levels of the Danish defense policy, a political and a tactical. This project shows that Europeanization has occurred at the political level of the Danish defense policy, as developments in the Danish Defence Agreements occur almost immediately subsequent to very similar developments at the European level. This project concludes that Europeanization is present at the political level of the Danish Defence, where four intervening mechanisms have been identified, as causing Europeanization. Unexpectedly, Europeanization is not present at the tactical level of the Danish Defence, as it has become anonymized and drowned out, by the Danish emphasis on NATO. This project presents neoclassic realism as an explanatory factor for Europeanization occurring in the Danish Defence. The theoretical claim supports that the material defense capabilities of Denmark are in need of a link in order to reach the foreign political ambitions. Europeanization provides Denmark with such a link, hence why the Danish Defence Agreement feature Europeanized developments.

Keywords: Denmark, European Union, CSDP, Europeanization, process-tracing.

Synopsis

This project is organized in ten chapters. Each chapter has an overall theme and smaller sections, to keep the composition comprehensible. In a manner of good science, several sections are followed by a critique of the presented element, to portray objectivity and attempt to reduce personal biasness. Chapter one introduces the theme, as well as the overall inspiration for conducting the research of the project. The chapter subsequently presents the problem formulation, the research questions of the project.

Chapter two presents the methodology of the project. The methodological framework is a qualitative research strategy with case study as the research design. The chapter also explains the project's research method of process-tracing and semi-structured interviews. By utilizing these, the project is able to keep the focus on mechanisms present in the primary empirical resource. This project sets out to showcase individual research, by conducting a semi-structured interview with Colonel Jess Møller Nielsen, Commander and Garrison Commander in Aalborg, The Logistic Regiment. This chapter also presents David Easton's System Analysis, the analytical structure of the project. In accordance with this structure, the analysis is not conducted in a chronological manner nor does it analyze each Defence Agreement separately. By applying the structure presented by Easton (1965a, 1965b), the analysis is able to portray its analytical results in a cohesive and readable manner. As the aim of this project is not to track the development of Europeanization historically, a chronological order has not been utilized.

Chapter three explains the theoretical structure of project, neoclassic realism. This sub-theory is claimed by some as the optimal one for conducting research on foreign policy (Wohlforth, 2012). This theory has often been utilized for analyzing the behavior of 'great powers', however, the theoretical assumptions are not confined to those, thus allowing for small state political behavior to be analyzed as well.

Chapter four presents two understandings of Europeanization as a concept or phenomena, according to Johan Olsen (2002) and Gorm Rye Olsen (2011). Olsen (2002) distinguishes different usages of Europeanization for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity, while Olsen (2011) explains the two commonly used approaches for Europeanization, top-down and bottom up. Chapter five presents the existing research of the subject of the project.

Chapter six explains the broad contours of the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The chapter includes sections explaining the historical overview, legal basis, decision making, civilian and military capabilities, and battlegroups.

Chapter seven presents elements of the Danish Defence, herein the organizational structure and its international role. Additionally, this chapter features an explanation of the main elements and themes of the five Danish Defence Agreements, spanning 1995 to 2017.

Chapter eight is the project's analysis. The analysis consists of two levels, the political and the tactical, which functions to show the depth of Europeanization of the Danish Defence. The analysis is structured according to Easton's (1965a, 1965b) System Analysis.

Chapter nine presents the conclusions of the project. Besides the analytical conclusion, which answers the problem formulation, this chapter also features concluding remarks on the methodological and theoretical framework. This is done in order to assess the project in its entirety and its overall functionality. Subsequently, the chapter presents a section on further research.

The final chapter of the project features the collective bibliography.

1.0 Introduction

The year 2017 marks the 25th anniversary of the Danish EU opt-outs. Denmark initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, but an agreement between the then twelve Member States gained Denmark its current four opt-outs. Subsequently, a referendum in 1993 secured a Danish yes to the Maastricht Treaty.

Denmark chose in 1992 to opt-out of the defense cooperation within the EU, yet, studies show that this formally delinked policy area has elements of top-down Europeanization. This phenomenon occurs when EU leveled development influences domestic policies, or even whole policy areas. This is not an uncommon development in policy areas where Member States are fully integrated in EU cooperation. However, Europeanization of policies constricted by an opt-out are both rare and unexpected. Existing research shows, that Europeanization is present at both the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defense (MoD), however more prominent with the MFA (Olsen G. R., 2011). Within the MoD, the socialization of civil servants and government officials has seemed to sway the Danish Defence structure and administration, towards a very pro-European integration process. Exemplifying a different angle, this project will investigate which intervening mechanisms have penetrated the Danish Defence's political outcomes, i.e. the Defence Agreements[1]. Through a two-level analysis, this project will attempt to determine the intervening mechanisms and ultimately answer the following problem formulation:

1.1 Problem formulation

Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation?

2.0 Methodology

The following chapter features the methodological elements of this project. Each section presented is followed by a critical assessment, in order to conduct good objective scientific work and as an attempt to avoid personal biasness.

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[1] Danish translation: Forsvarsforligene

2.1 Research Strategy

Setting the framework for any research is the research strategy. In this, many researchers distinguish between quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods research (Bryman, 2014, p. 35). The research strategy functions as the general orientation of the investigator's conduct of research. This project is constructed according to the qualitative research strategy, as will be described below.

Qualitative research often emphasizes the weight of specific elements rather than quantification, in the collection and analysis of data. Furthermore, the qualitative research strategy predominantly places emphasis on inductive reasoning, to the relationship between theory and research. The inductive reasoning emphasizes the process of having the empirical data within research, inspire theoretical assumptions, as opposed to deductive reasoning in which a theory is chosen and then tested in the empirical data. This project has been structured from the epistemological consideration of interpretivism and ontological consideration of constructionism. Interpretivism has been utilized due to the realization that, "the subject matter of the social sciences is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences" (Bryman, 2014, p. 28). In this sense, interpretivism stresses the importance of distinction between people and objects, thus requiring the social sciences, in order to understand the subjective meaning of social action. Constructionism has been applied as it stresses that "social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors" (Bryman, 2014, p. 33) opposed to categorizing social phenomena as independent from social actors.

2.1.1 Research strategy criteria

There exists a set of research strategy criteria for evaluating social research, which include: Reliability, asking are the results repeatable and are the measures consistent?; Replication, focusing on whether the procedures are spelled out in detail, do they allow for replication?; Validity, concerning several aspects on the integrity of the conclusions which are generated from the research[2].

Bryman (2014) notes, that certain case study researchers with a qualitative research strategy, have a tendency to downplay or ignore these criteria. Quantitative researchers on the contrary, more so highlight these as significant for conducting research (p. 69). Supporting this claim, some scholars and have sought to create evaluating criteria tailored to the qualitative research strategy (Lincoln &

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[2] The research design criteria of validity consist of four different types: Measurement validity, also known as construct validity, applies generally to quantitative research and in search of measures of social scientific concepts. Internal validity is mainly connected to causality, "if we suggest that x causes y, can we be sure that it is x that is responsible for variation in y and not something else that is producing an apparent causal relationship?" (Bryman, 2014, p. 47). External validity is concerned which whether a study can be generalized beyond its own framework. Lastly, ecological validity implies a connection between theoretical scientific findings and natural social settings.

Guba, 1985), or creating a middle ground between purely quantitative and qualitative (Hammersley, 1992)[3]. The following will present the four criteria put forth by Lincoln & Guba (1985), which are all rooted in trustworthiness: Credibility, how believable are the findings?; Transferability, do the findings apply to other context?; Dependability, are the findings likely to apply at other times?; Confirmability, has the investigator allowed for a personal bias to intrude into the findings? (as cited by Bryman 2014, p. 390).

Credibility for this project occurs on the basis of two notions. Firstly, the findings use already existing published research on the topic, as a stepping stone for this research. Secondly, good scientific practice dictates that research findings be submitted to the members of the social world, who have been studied or interviewed for a confirmation that the investigator has thoroughly understood that particular element of the social world. This project has conducted a semi-structured interview with a representative from the Danish Defence, who has deemed the findings of this project as consistent with his opinions. Thus, the topic and findings are believable. The transferability is difficult to assess, as this project is a deviant case study, it confirms the qualitative findings as contextually unique. The findings of this project can arguably inspire research of similar cases within other policy fields, containing the same framework as this case, i.e. Europeanization occurring in policy areas outside EU cooperation. The findings of this project still carry an element of transferability, as this project has provided a thick description of the *culture* the investigator is researching, i.e. the CSDP and the Danish Defence. Bryman (2014) paraphrases Lincoln & Guba (1985), by stating that "a thick description provides others with… a database for making judgements about the possible transferability of findings to other milieux" (p. 392). The dependability criterion for the findings have been met, as this project explicitly has stated the academic steps taken to reach the findings. If the contextual circumstances and intervening mechanisms detected in analysis do not change, this project and its findings can be duplicated. Complete objectivity is nearly impossible in the social sciences (Bryman, 2014), however, the investigator of this project has acted in good faith, i.e. personal values or theoretical inclinations have not swayed the conduct of the research or its findings. Thus, the confirmability criterion has been met. Although the researcher of this project shares the nationality of the case at hand, it has not promoted a bias. As Denmark is the only Member State of the EU not a part of the defense cooperation, the academic interest comes from the uniqueness of the case, not the national affiliation of the investigator. Furthermore, as this project is conducted on the basis of inductive reasoning, explained below, no theoretical inclination had manifested itself as a priori favoring.

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[3] Hammersley (1992) proposes relevance as an additional criterion for evaluating research (p. 138-139).

2.2 Research Design

In connection with the research strategy, an investigator must also establish the design for the research. Whereas the strategy provides the general orientation, the research design provides the structure for collecting and analyzing data (Bryman, 2014, p. 46). Due to space limitations, this project will not elaborate on the different types of designs[4], but merely focus on the case study research design. Subsequent to the case study design, and case typologies, this chapter will feature a section presenting the structure utilized for the analysis below, the Systems Analysis coined by Easton (Easton, 1965a, 1965b)

2.2.1 The Case Study

Although the case study is a widely-utilized design, especially in the social sciences, there is no consensus on a proper definition of neither a case nor the case study design (Ragin & Becker, 1992 and Levy, 2002). For this project, a case study entails an intensive and detailed analysis of only a *single* case, agreed by many scholars as the proper amount (Bryman 2014, Lijphart 1971 and Levy 2008). By introducing more than the one case into the research, it is transformed into either comparative or statistical studies[5]. According to George (1979), as quoted by Levy (2008), a case study aims to utilize "theoretical questions or propositions to structure an empirical inquiry on a particular analytically defined aspect…" (p. 2). Adding to this, Bryman (2014) states the importance of considering the settings, in which the case is located within, as an intricate part of the research design (p. 67).

The object of the case study design is thus the actual case, i.e. an object which is interesting in its own right. The investigator seeks to provide an in-depth clarification of the case, "to elucidate the unique features" (Bryman, 2014, p. 69). This definition makes the case study design 'idiographic' as opposed to 'nomothetic', which generate hypotheses generally applicable despite time and place (ibid.). As such, the strength of the case study lies with its focus on the intensive examination of a single case. According to Lijphart (1971), this is especially beneficial if the resources available to the researcher are fairly limited or constricted (p. 691).

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[4] According to Bryman (2014), other research designs include: "experimental design; cross-sectional or survey design; longitudinal design; and comparative design" (p. 50)

[5] See Arendt Lijphart (1971) *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*, for definitions of experimental, statistical as well as comparative studies.

2.2.1.1 Critique of the case study

Bryman (2004) highlights the external validity, generalization and representativeness, as generating a critical discussion of the case study design. The point of lacking elements of generalization, is often pointed to, as one of the critiques of the case study design. Flyvbjerg (2006) seeks to address this matter in his article *Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.* In here he presents what he deems the overall critiques of the case study design, but claims them to merely be misunderstandings pertaining the usage and role of the case study. The five misunderstandings presented by Flyvbjerg (2006) are:

> (1) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (2) one cannot generalize from a single case; (3) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, not hypothesis testing and theory building; (4) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (5) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies (p. 219).

The first misunderstanding is rooted in the critique that it is difficult to generate theoretical knowledge from case studies, as these often single out one instance that cannot lead to generating new theoretical knowledge, but merely underline or support already existing theoretical knowledge. Flyvbjerg (2006) counter argues this misunderstanding by claiming that "predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs" (p. 224). This draws a parallel to the notion often presented by qualitative researchers, that society is a like an organism that often changes and thus cannot be predicted. He further states that concrete context-dependent knowledge is more valuable than searching for predictive theories in human behavior (ibid.). The second misunderstanding claims that case studies are too context specific to generate any form of generalization. Flyvbjerg (2006) considers this a misunderstanding, as he claims formal generalization to be overvalued as a source of scientific development, and favors "the force of example" (p. 228). The third misunderstanding, that a case is less useful for hypothesis testing and theory building, is debunked by Flyvbjerg (2006) as he states that the strategies for selection of samples and cases differ and thus, cases can be utilized for both generating and testing hypothesis (p. 230). His strategies can be seen in the table below.

Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases

Type of Selection	Purpose
A. Random selection	To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample's size is decisive for generalization.
1. Random sample	To achieve a representative sample that allows for generalization for the entire population.
2. Stratified sample	To generalize for specially selected subgroups within the population.
B. Information-oriented selection	To maximize the utility of information from small samples and single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content.
1. Extreme/deviant cases	To obtain information on unusual cases, which can be especially problematic or especially good in a more closely defined sense.
2. Maximum variation cases	To obtain information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g., three to four cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of organization, location, budget).
3. Critical cases	To achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type, "If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases."
4. Paradigmatic cases	To develop a metaphor or establish a school for the domain that the case concerns.

Table 1: Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006)

The forth misunderstanding, the issue of biasness, is counter argued by Flyvbjerg (2006) as follows:

> The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher's preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification (p. 237).

The fifth misunderstanding, that case studies can be difficult to summarize or duplicate, does have an element of truth to it, when it comes to the case *process*. As case studies are often context dependent, the specific societal situation constructing the framework can be difficult, if not impossible, to duplicate. According Flyvbjerg (2006), this critique does not pertain to case *outcomes*, the problem is therefore not with case study as a research method. He further comments: "Often it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies. Good studies should be read as narratives in their entirety" (p. 241).

2.2.2 Case Typologies

Until now, the case study has been described according the overall concept. However, it should be noted, that the actual case can fall under several typologies. Seemingly, there does not exist one framework for determining these types, although overlaps occur between different categorizations. These overlaps can be seen e.g. when researchers borrow terminology from one another, or expand on

already existing typologies. Due to page limitation, this project shall not go through all case categories, but will highlight certain categories.

In an attempt at clarifying the misunderstandings of the case study, as mentioned above, Flyvbjerg (2006) identifies four types of cases (p. 230): 1. Extreme/deviant cases, selected to obtain information on unusual cases that can be seen as problematic or particularly good; 2. Maximum variation cases, selected "to obtain information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome" (ibid.); 3. Critical cases, selected to obtain information allowing for logical deduction, i.e. "if this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases" (ibid,); 4. Paradigmatic cases, selected to construct metaphors for the domain in which the case functions in. Another typology come from Yin (2006), who presents five case types (pp. 47-48). These are defined as: 1. Critical cases, chosen to permit better understanding of the circumstances the hypothesis is tested within; 2. Extreme/Unique cases, chosen on the basis of being so rare that the single case is "worth documenting and analyzing" (Yin, 2009, p. 47)[6]; 3. Representative/Typical cases, chosen to capture the circumstances of a common everyday situation; 4. Revelatory cases, chosen to "analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation" (Yin, 2009, p. 48); 5. Longitudinal cases, chosen in order to investigate "the same single case at two or more different potions in time" (ibid.)

Prior to these categories, Lijphart (1971) presented six types of cases (p. 691). He distinguished between: 1. Atheoretical cases, characterized as entirely descriptive and never motivated by a hypothesis; 2. Interpretative cases, characterized as making use of established theoretical propositions in other to "throw light on the case, rather than improving the generalization in any way" (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691); 3. Hypothesis-generating cases, characterized as generating theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists, in an attempt to formulate a definite hypothesis; 4. Theory-confirming cases, characterized as strengthening the case's propositions; 5. Theory-informing cases, characterized as weakening the case's propositions; 6. Deviant cases, characterized as being deviate from established generalizations to "uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or to redefine the definition of some or all of these variables" (ibid.). The typology presented by Lijphart has been utilized to clarify the case type of this project. This is done because both Yin's and Flyvbjerg's typologies has discursive resemblance to Lijphart, and are published later. Furthermore, the projection of Lijphart's typology onto other categorizations, is confirmed by Levy (2002, 2008)[7]. To sum up, on

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[6] In his description of the extreme/unique cases, Robert Yin offers little explanation of selecting such cases outside the field of clinical psychology. Unlike the other case characterizations, Yin merely explains this category with an example from the field of clinical psychology. This makes his definition difficult to transfer unto other scientific fields, such as the social sciences.

[7] Jack Levy also highlights Eckstein's categorization of case studies as one that many other researchers drawing parallels to Lijphart, when defining case types. This typology includes: configurative-idiographic, disciplined-configurative,

the basis of the description provided above, this project continues with the typology provided by Lijphart.

2.2.3 Choice of case

The case of this project has been determined as a deviant case, according to the typology presented by Lijphart (1971). The case study of Europeanization occurring in the Danish Defence is considered a deviant case, on the basis of three points. Firstly, Denmark is currently the only Member State within the EU, not a part of the defense cooperation. As such, it is unlikely that Europeanization has occurred. Secondly, the notion of Europeanization occurring within a policy area a Member State has opted-out from, can lead to the consideration of whether the phenomenon has occurred in similar cases. Thirdly, considering that Denmark may have structured elements of its Defence Agreements around the CSDP, differs from the notion that Denmark's implicitly strong NATO affiliations have shaped its entire foreign political attitude.

2.2.4 Structure of analysis

The analysis is structured on the same premise as that portrayed by David Easton in his Systems Analysis (Easton, 1965a, 1965b). Here, political systems' persistence in the context of stability and change is analyzed (Easton, 1965b, pp. 464-465). Easton approaches this by linking the political system to the environment around it, in an input-output relationship. The emphasis is thus placed on the political system's behavior concerning the inputs of demands and support, and the following effects of these as political outputs (Easton, 1965b). The aim is to map the consequences of political behavior within the system. Input-output relationships effecting other inputs, creating a loop, enables investigation of how a political system copes with the challenges of environmental stimuli. Easton (1965a) states, that this looping is not simply monitoring and adjusting to goals, instead political processes are understood as continuous and interlinked flows of behavior. The political system can thus be presented as a communication system with the ability and capacity to adapt and evolve (Crozier, 2011).

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heuristic, plausibility probe, and crucial case studies (Eckstein, 2000).

2.2.4.1 Critique of analysis structure

According to Crozier (2011), a crucial challenge for an analysis following Easton's approach, is the ability to the track the behavioral consequences of the system itself, as a result of the input-output relationship, within a political system (p. 8). This challenge occurs as Easton (1965b) claims, that outputs not only influence events in the wider society, but play an important role in the subsequent round of political inputs. As the analysis below merely seeks to detect one behavioral consequence, Europeanization, this project is not faced with the task of tracking all occurring consequences. Thus, the phenomena is utilized in a way that allows for the analysis to more easily detect the behavioral consequences and thus, to an extent, alleviate the challenge presented by Crozier (2011).

2.3 Research Method

A research method provides techniques for collecting data (Bryman, 2014). These may include specific instruments or broader processes. This section will feature the two elements utilized for obtaining this project's empirical data, semi-structured interviews and process-tracing.

2.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Interview styles can, simplified, fall under three categories: structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Bryman, 2014). As this project has utilized a semi-structured interview, this will be further elaborated below.

Semi-structured interviews typically entail the interviewer presenting a series of questions in the "form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions" (Bryman, 2014, p. 212). The questions are often more general in their frame of reference, then those found in a structured interview. Within semi-structured interviews lies a benefit for the interviewer to ask further or follow-up questions, in response to what are assessed as significant replies. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are sometimes referred to as qualitative interviewing, mainly due to the primary usage of these in qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative research which often opt for structured interviews. Qualitative interviewing places emphasis on the interviewees point of view, hence 'rambling' can give insight into what the interviewee deems relevant and important. A result of this is interviewing flexibility, which permits adjustments in the course of the interview. The interview schedule for semi-structured interviews, consists of a list of questions or "fairly specific topics… Questions may not follow exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not included

in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees." (Bryman, 2014, p. 471).

For this project, a semi-structured interview was conducted with Colonel Jess Møller Nielsen, Commander and Garrison Commander in Aalborg, The Logistic Regiment, on April 4th at Aalborg Kaserner. In line with the explanation presented above, the aim of the interview was to achieve an inside view of the topic at hand, thus the questions asked during the interview functioned to keep the conversation on track. The interview schedule can be seen in Appendix 1.

2.3.1.1 Critique of semi-structured interviews

It is difficult to locate concise critique of semi-structured interviews, free from overall critical views of either qualitative research or case studies. However, Diefenbach (2009) presents four points pertaining to that of collecting data from a semi-structured interview (p. 891): One, selecting interviewees does not happen systematically or objectively. Two, interviewees are influenced by the situations and thus not a reliable source of information. Three, interviewees may attempt to deliberately mislead the interviewers[8]. Four, "interpretation of the data writing up of the findings are characterized by ambiguity and subjectivity" (ibid.). The semi-structured interview conducted for this research did attempt to counter these critiques. The selection process of the interviewee was done in a systematic manner. The aim was to interview a representative of the Danish Defence, with experience in both political as well as operational matters. The interview was set up as a meeting, conducted in the office of the Colonel in order to keep external disturbances at a minimum. It is not possible to fully remove the potential element of a personal biasness, however as the interviewee is representing Danish soldiers, it is plausible that it is in this individuals interest to represent these in a respectful unbiased manner. Whether the interviewee deliberately mislead the interviewer is not possible to determine, however with the respect for good academic results, this project proposes that such a deliberate act did not take place. As an attempt to have the results stemming from interview be less subjective, this project has formulated an appendix, Appendix 1, featuring the questions and answers from the interview.

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[8] This critique of being unsure if the interviewee is telling the truth or potentially misleading the interviewer, is also voiced by Dean & Whyte (1958) and Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont (2003).

2.3.2 Process-tracing

Process-tracing seeks to analyze beyond "mere identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys)" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 1). Within the social sciences, this commonly translates into tracing causal mechanisms[9] which link the variables in the study (ibid.). Through this, the researcher is able to conduct an "intensive analysis of the evolution of a sequence of events" (Levy, 2002, p. 443). Process-tracing generates tools for studying these causal mechanisms in the single-case research designs (Beach & Pedersen 2013, p. 2, Levy, 2002, Bennett 2010). According to Beach & Pedersen (2013), other methodological literature[10] has wrongly defined process-tracing as a single research method. This has resulted in a grey area of confusion, of the utilizing the method in practice. Process-tracing must then be studied according to purpose, which can be differentiated into three variants: theory-testing, theory-building and explaining-outcome. This differentiation is importance as "methodological implications for research design [are] masked when we treat process-tracing as a single method" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 9). Distinctions between the variants can be found in the research goals of either testing a casual mechanisms' existence in a case, building theoretical assumptions, or explaining a case specific outcome.

The first process-tracing method of theory-testing, highlights causal mechanisms as "present in a population of cases of a phenomenon" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). Here the researcher seeks to evaluate whether there exists a link between X and Y, which functions as theorized. The second method of theory-building, focuses on creating a theory about causal mechanisms, that can be generalized. Thus, the link between X and Y should be generalizable and have a starting point 'in the dark'. The third method of explaining-outcomes, seeks to clarify an exceptional outcome. Here the aim is to construct a sufficient explanation for the outcome, regardless and independent from theoretical assumptions. "Instead of studying mechanisms that cause war (Y), the analysis would focus on explaining a particular outcome such as World War I." (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 11). As the case here is deviant, the aim of the explaining-outcome process-tracing method, and this project are paralleled: examining a little-studied outcome. Thus, this section will move on to a more detailed account of this method.

Researchers practicing the explaining-outcome, also referred to as the case-centric process-tracing method, agree that the social world is "very complex, multifactored and extremely context-specific" and should be studied as such. The case-centric method has a relation to theory application, making it different than the other methods. The ambition here is to prove that a certain theory has

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[9] Glennan (1996) defines a causal mechanism as "a complex system, which produces an outcome by interactions of a number of parts" (p. 52) (Glennan, 2002).
[10] See literature such as: George & Bennett 2005, Gerring 2007, and Checkel 2008.

within it tools which can be utilized to produce "the best possible explaining." (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 13), not to build a theory or prove a theory as correct or incorrect. Furthermore, this method is more case specified than the other two, and seeks to uncover the causes of a single-outcome (Gerring, 2006). In their definition of case-centric process-tracing, Beach and Pedersen (2013) also explain this method's relation to deductive and inductive reasoning. As this project has used inductive reasoning (p. 5 in project), this will be presented in more detail. "The inductive path is often used when we are examining a little-studied outcome" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 20), and gives the researcher an advantage to work backwards from that outcome. This is done be sifting the facts of the case, in order to define the causal mechanism(s) which has produced the outcome. This process is referred to as a bottom-up analysis (ibid.), where focus lies with working *from* the empirical data on *to* plausible explanations for the causal mechanism(s).

2.3.2.1 Critique of process-tracing

The process-tracing method suffers the same limitations as case typology, where no definitional framework is present. "We…lack a set of concrete guidelines for using the methods in practice" (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2). Process-tracing is sometimes also critiqued for not considering causality severely enough. This critique questions whether it is even possible to establish causality from empirical observations as "we cannot know that Y is caused by X and not Z that [has] been omitted from the formal analysis" (Levy, 2002, p. 444). Nevertheless, Beach and Pedersen (2013) have in their book *Process-Tracing Methods* attempted to provide tools for utilizing process-tracing within the social sciences. They argue that process-tracing allows for an in-depth single case study, that is not possible within other social sciences methods (p. 2). By offering several research methods within process-tracing, it allows for a more 'tailored' process. By utilizing the case-centric process-tracing, this project is able to conduct a case study analysis. Although guidelines for process-tracing in practice are lacking, the method still provides overall statements, which can be utilized for analytical results. Furthermore, the point of causality being uncertain can never truly be eradicated. Researchers cannot consider all possible factors influencing causality within qualitative case studies, as the societal context would mean factoring in the smallest details. As such, this project has chosen to consider the most pressing factors, within the given policy area, which may influence the causality.

2.3.2.2 Congruency method:

Another research method focusing on case studies, is congruency method. This method seeks to investigate "how a single case or a small number of cases can be used for theory development" (George & Bennett, 2005, s. 181). As such, it bares resemblances to process-tracing, in that it also looks at causal relations within a case. The focus is generally to provide a relationship between theory and independent and dependent variables, which is often considered deductive or in the form of empirical generalization (ibid.). The method therefore begins with a theory and then subsequently attempts to assess its ability to predict an outcome of a particular case. If the outcome of the case is consistent with that of the theoretical expectation, the analyst can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist between the independent and dependent variable.

This project has chosen not to utilize the congruency method on the basis of three notions. Firstly, the focus of having an outcome predicted by a theory, does not favor this project. In order for the analysis conducted below to answer the problem formulation: "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation?" there was a need for a research method which allowed for explaining the mechanism which ultimately lead to the outcome, i.e. what mechanism lead to Europeanization occurring in the Danish defense policy, not which theory could predict that Europeanization would occur. Secondly, as this project's analysis utilizes existing literature on the topic and the empirical data of the Danish Defence Agreements, as a stepping stone, it would not be possible to utilize a method which is founded on deductive reasoning. Thirdly, the case at hand is considered a deviant case which tend not to contribute to an overall generalization. As such, the aim of this project is not to contribute to an already established generalized notion, but rather to offer insight and thus uncover elements not previously considered or "redefine the definition of some or all of these variables" (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691).

2.3.3 Data collection

The data collected for this project consists of two sources, primary and secondary. The primary sources utilized for this project consist largely of official documents from the appropriate institutions. Information and data concerning the Danish defense policy, and other defining elements, have been collected from the Danish MoD and its adjacent sub sectors. Below, this project will present each Defence Agreement from 1995-2017 (p. 37 in project), the empirical data for the analysis. In here central themes will be highlighted. Additionally, this project has conducted a semi-structured interview

with Colonel Jess Møller Nielsen, Commander and Garrison Commander in Aalborg, The Logistic Regiment of the Danish Defence stationed at the army base Aalborg Kaserner on April 4th 2017, in order to obtain original empirical data. Ideally, this project would have conducted additional interviews with representatives of the Danish Defence as well as the MoD and the Royal Danish Defence College. However, this was not a possibility due to time and financial constraints. Information, data and documents on the CSDP has been collected from official EU websites and EUR-Lex. The secondary sources used in this project, consists of academic articles pertaining to the definitions of theory, methodology, concepts, existing literature and tools for conducting the analysis below. The data collection of this project fulfills the research strategy criteria presented above (pp. 5-6 in project), consisting of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The empirical data utilized is believable, as it is issued by the responsible institution or a representative thereof, i.e. the official information about the policy area, thus being credible. Furthermore, as the data represents defense dimensions of both the Danish MoD as well as the EU's CSDP, the data is transferable unto other research within defense matters, regardless of the inclusion of Europeanization. As the data represents the official information on defense matters, it allows for duplication in both data collection as well as results, the criterion of dependability is fulfilled as well. The last criterion of confirmability is not fulfilled to the same extend as the other. As the data collected from official institutions consists of what was available to the public, it is not possible eliminate a bias. Adding to this, the semi-structured interview was conducted by the researcher of this project in another language than this project is written in, i.e. the interview guide (Appendix 1), is translated from Danish to English by the researcher herself.

2.4 Choice of Theory

This project has chosen to utilize the theory of neoclassic realism. The reasoning behind this choice comes from a need for a theory encompassing other power dimensions then those of military staff and equipment. Denmark, a small state[11], does not have the same military capacities as larger states such as, the US, UK or France. Following this, Denmark chose to opt-out of EU defense cooperation, a decision not shared by its fellow small states, such as Sweden, Finland or Belgium. Thus, the theory

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[11] In this project, a small state is understood according to the definition provided by Keohane (1969): "a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system" (p. 296) and Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): "[t]hey are stuck with the power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific relation to it is" (p. 4). Conversely, according to Mouritzen & Wivel, "a great power is a state capable of changing the condition for policy making" (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006, p. 654)

for this project needed to grant the researcher tools to explain the Danish actions. Neoclassic realists distinguish between a state's power resources, i.e. material capabilities, and its foreign policy *interests*, i.e. goals that guide external behavior. Furthermore, neoclassic realism determines a state's ambition for its foreign policy as driven by its placement within the international system and the relative material capabilities that it possesses. The utilization of neoclassic realism allows for recognizing the ambition of the Danish foreign policy and thus its position within the international system. By factoring in incentives, which showcases the state's different abilities, this project is able to recognize the process mechanisms which may influence the policy development of the Danish Defence. These incentives or mechanisms, could include a concept such as Europeanization.

This project acknowledges that other international relations theories, which could have provided results. Such theories could include structural realism, liberal institutionalism and neofunctionalism. With the emphasis on and importance of domestic politics and how these can reflect the concept of power in this project, the usage of structural realism was not a possibility. Structural realism, i.e. as presented by Waltz (1979), tends to have materialist focus to the notion of power, leaving out how domestic politics can contribute to or detract from power. Furthermore, Rathbun (2008) critiques Waltz for doing little to define the notion of power, hence why neoclassic realist scholars have sought to refine power to include not just economic and military capabilities, herein Walt (1987) and Van Evera (1999), who states "power is powerful only if it can be used" (Rathbun, 2008, p. 301). This project did not chose to utilize liberal institutionalism as this theory emphasizes the role of common goals in the international system and ability of international organizations to promote cooperation between states. As this project aims to detect intervening mechanisms in a policy area outside EU cooperation, this theory did not seem fitting. A critique of liberal institutionalism, provided by Hoffman (1999), claims that it was not global institutions who promoted cooperation in a Post-Cold War era, but rather NATO and hegemons such as the US. Neofunctionalism posits functional and political spill-overs to explain regional integration. Should Denmark issue a referendum, in which the EU defense opt-out is abolished, such a regional integrational theory would prove useful in understanding this political decision. However, as Denmark deliberately chose not to engage in EU cooperation, a theory emphasizing integration and offering explanations for upgrading "to common interest[s]" (Pollack, 2010, p. 16), is not useful at this stage of the research.

3.0 Theory

When exploring the theoretical schools of international relations, realism is an inevitable encounter[12]. Realism in this project is referred to as the *political* theory of realism, i.e. that of *realpolitik* or power politics. This distinction is important to mentioned, as realism also exists as a philosophical doctrine[13] as well as the name of a literary school or movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Donnelly, 2000, p. 6). Although a well-established theory, the definitions of realism reveal that the theory is considerable divers. "Realism is an approach to [international relations] that has emerged gradually through the work of a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis." (ibid.). Nonetheless, a set of reoccurring concerns and conclusions work as part of a single tradition.

Within realism there exists an emphasis on the constrains on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Broadly stated, realists make international relations a matter of power and interests (Donnelly, 2000, p. 9). Human nature is considered, at its core, to be egoistic, making the interest in international politics, self-interested. Machiavelli (1970) explained it as such: "it must…be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers" (p. 111-112), and Morgenthau (1946) emphasized "the tragic presence of evil in all political action." (p. 203). Because the interest in power and egotistic human nature of mankind are ineradicable, Niebuhr (1932) claimed that "conflict in inevitable" (p. xv). For realists, this defines the central problems in world politics, alongside statesmanship being overly dominated by the need to control this egotistic side of human nature (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10). Realism also stresses the "political necessities that flow from international anarchy" (ibid.). Here, anarchy refers to the absence of a hierarchical order, based on subordination and authority. In no means is this a parallel to chaos and total absence of order, merely absence of rule and lack of government (ibid.). In the belief that conflict is inevitable, realists claim that this cannot be eliminated, and statesmanship thus involves mitigating and managing this. In the interaction of egotism and anarchy lies a requirement for "the primacy in all political life [to be] … power and security." (Gilpin, 1986, p. 305), because as stated by Morgenthau (1948) "the struggle for power is universal in time and space" (p. 17). The conceptual idea of safe and peaceful, is for realists unimaginable, thus, *security* refers to a less violent and somewhat less dangerous world, which shapes the behavior of states (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10). The realist's core focus on power and self-interests

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[12] Other theoretical schools of international relations include liberalism and constructivism. For an overview of the liberal school see e.g. Hoffman (1987), for the constructivist school see Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt (1999).
[13] See for example: Kulp (1997) and Katz (1998)

leaves little room for ethical and moral considerations. These considerations, realists typically argue, must be subordinated to the *raison d'état* (Donnelly, 2000, p. 11), "realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of the state" (Morgenthau 1954 p. 9).

3.1 The theoretical frameworks of realism

Realism holds within it different theoretical frameworks. Their focal points depend on how these think about the core assumption of realism, and what is seen as the most reasonable expectation about the real-world conditions. These frameworks can be roughly divided between structural realists[14] and biological/classic realists[15]. While the structural realists, place emphasis on the international anarchy element of realism, the biological or classic realists emphasize the human nature aspect. One such structural realist framework, coined by Kenneth Waltz, "sought to revivify realist thinking by translating some core realist ideas into a deductive top-down theoretical framework that eventually came to be called neorealism" (Wohlforth, 2012, p. 38, Dunn & Schmidt, 2014).

Depending on how one might conceptualize neorealism, widely different notions about the dynamics of inter-state politics fall under different sub-schools[16]. For the structural realists, foreign policy analysis (FPA) raises a set of recurring questions, including: "to what degree is state X's policy a response to external pressure and incentives as opposed to internally generated? (Wohlforth, 2012, p. 40). According to Wolhforth (2012), the sub-school called neoclassic realism is the most likely one to exploit the features of realism when conducting FPA. Contrary to structural realism, or neorealism, neoclassic realists such as Schweller (1996) claim that states differ widely both in their ability to extract resources for society and in the capabilities to translate these elements of national power into state power. Due to these differing abilities and capabilities, states thereby cannot be treated simply like units, setting the neoclassic realists apart from structural realists like Waltz (Dunn & Schmidt, 2014). Neoclassic realism accepts the neorealist notion of thinking theoretically about the international system and its external incentives, as distinctive from the internal properties of the states. The neoclassic realist sub-school goes on to factor in incentives which function to generate a more complete explanation for the state's foreign policy. It is these general conditions of neoclassic realism, which allows for a theoretical usage of FPA.

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[14] Examples of structural realist and their works include: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1750) "The State of War; Kenneth Waltz (1979) "Theory of International Politics"; John J. Mearsheimer (2001) "Tragedy of Great Power Politics".
[15] Examples of classic realists and their works include: Thucydides (430-406 BC) "The Peloponnesian War"; Niccoló Machiavelli (1532) "The Prince"; Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) "Politics Among Nations".
[16] Sub schools include offensive, defensive and neoclassic realism.

Neoclassic realism determines a state's ambition for its foreign policy, as driven by its placement within the international system and the relative material capabilities that it possesses. These capabilities, the parameter for a state's foreign policy, can be classified as indirect and complex due to intervening factors causing systemic pressure. According to Rose (1998), there exists two primary intervening factors: the governmental decision-makers' perceptions, i.e. how leaders perceive the distribution of power, as it is through these that the systemic pressures are filtered; and the strength of the state's 'state apparatus' in accordance with its relation to its surrounding society[17]. Although these incentives systemically can shape the broad outline and direction of foreign policy, they need not be so strong as to determine the specific details of a state's behavior. This becomes an important factor to bear in mind, as neoclassic realists distinguish between a state's power resources, i.e. material capabilities, and its foreign policy *interests*, i.e. goals that guide external behavior. Adding to Rose's factors, Dunn & Smith (2014) claim that "perception of state leaders, state society relationship and state identity" (p. 106) are of equal importance. According to Walt (2002), the causal logic of the neoclassic realism lies with placing "domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior" (p. 211).

As paraphrased by Rose (1998), Fareed Zakaria (1998) claims that good foreign policy theories firstly seek to ask what effect the international system has on the state's national behavior. This is because "the most powerful generalized characteristics of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system" (p. 482). In order to analyze this link between power[18] and foreign policy, it is necessary to include a close examination of the context in which a state's foreign policy is formulated and implemented in. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that many neoclassic realists chose to conduct case studies in order to detect these incentives and examine contexts. In Rose's article (1998), one can find examples where neoclassic realists utilize case studies to illustrate points. Such include: Friedberg's (1988) case about the United Kingdom in 1895-1905, Wolhforth's (1993) case of the Soviet Union and US in the Cold War, Christensen's (1996) case of Sino-American relations in 1947-1958 and Schweller's (1998) case of Nazi Germany. Neoclassic realism thus emphasizes historical contingencies, i.e. context, and how foreign policy is conducted. These observations must therefore also be considered as tendencies and not inexorable laws.

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[17] The notion of a state's own conception of its 'state apparatus' and state ability is not confined to the field of neither neoclassic realism nor FPA. Baldur Thorhallsson (2006) introduced the terms of perceptual and preference size in his conceptual framework of categorizing state size. These terms focus on how domestic and external actors regard the state, along with how the ambitions and provisions of the governing elite and its ideas of the international system influence how a state views its own size (*The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspective*)

[18] According to Rose (1998) the term power refers to the state's material capabilities, as it is these which states can use to influence each other.

3.1.1 Critique of neoclassic realism

According to Rathbun (2008), the most incisive critique of neoclassic realism comes from Legro & Moravcsik (1999). Their critique is on the inclusion of domestic and ideational variables claiming these as belonging to the liberal paradigms (Rathbun, 2008, p. 289). Neoclassic realism is "an ad hoc theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism" (Rathbun, 2008, p. 294), that did not meet theoretical expectations. Including domestic politics into a realist theory, the arguments goes, violates the core assumption about the primacy of material power, thus making them indistinguishable from liberalism (Rathbun, 2008, p. 299).

Despite the critical notions of Legro & Moravscik (1999), this project has chosen to include neoclassic realism as its theoretical component. As the empirical data and analysis conducted below focuses on the policy area of defense, it was necessary to utilize a theory emphasizing foreign policy. When analyzing foreign political actions of a small state, utilizing a theory encompassing the distinction between a state's power resources, i.e. material capabilities, and its foreign policy *interests*, i.e. goals that guide external behavior, provides for an important factor, i.e. small states tend not enjoy large material capabilities within defense. Although a point of critique[19], the notion of how leaders perceive the distribution of power does have its merit when this power is not of typical military defense capabilities. Thus, this project acknowledges that the perception of state leaders, state society relations and state identity (Dunn & Schmidt, 2014), do factor in the distribution of power, making these important incentives to have in mind when conducting FPA.

4.0 Europeanization: An Explaining Phenomena

The following chapter presents the two explanations of the concept, or phenomena, of Europeanization. As this project does not utilize Europeanization as a theoretical component, but rather as an attention-directing concept, the two sections below regard the phenomena in a similar manner. This project presents two sections in an attempt to avoid personal biasness towards one specific understanding. Furthermore, the two presentations highlight different notions of the phenomena, important for the analysis conducted below.

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[19] Moravcsik (1997) claimed that the only proper home and inspiration of any argument making individual the key actor in world affairs, was liberalism not a realist theory.

4.1 According to Johan Olsen

In his article *The Many Faces of Europeanization*, Olsen (2002) seeks to break down the phenomena of Europeanization into distinguishable usages, in order to make the concept "useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity … [that] eventually may help us give better accounts of the…development." (p. 922). It is important to note that Olsen's definition of Europeanization focuses on political dynamics and developments tied to the EU, as he regards this as the "core political project in Europe" (Olsen J. P., 2002, p. 927) .

Olsen (2002) distinguishes between five usages[20], of which one will be featured here, 'Europeanization as central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance'. This usage has been chosen based on its connection to the theoretical chapter presented, as well as acknowledging that the form of Europeanization which the analysis below will be detecting, will be found in national empirical data and centers on the national system of governance within the territorial boundaries of Denmark. In accordance with the neoclassic realist notion of historical contingency, Olsen (2002) acknowledges concepts like 'path dependency' which suggest that established institutions may have a slower adaption period, especially in dealing with external conditions. He does however add, that institutional perspectives need not be stasis, as enduring institutions can become both adaptive and responsive to volatile environments. Changes in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, must be understood as a consequence of the development occurring at EU level institutions. Within this usage, focus is placed on the impacts this development has on domestic policies, herein foreign policy. The ability of the European level to penetrate the domestic institutions must not be viewed as perfect or constant. Adaption and administrative reorganization reflects variations in pressure as well as domestic motivations and ability to adapt. It is important to note, that it is through the domestic traditions, institutions and resources that EU leveled signals are interpreted and modified. Olsen (2002) identified two frames for analyzing Europeanization as an adaptive process: experiential learning and competitive selection. Experiential learning refers to institutional changes on the basis of experiences, through which interpretations are made of how actors within the environment respond to "alternative forms of domestic organization and governance." (Olsen J. P., 2002, p. 932). Competitive selection on the other hand, highlights environmental imperatives as the driving force behind chances where "mechanisms of variation, selection and retention" (ibid.) must be

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[20] Olsen's other usages include: Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries, Europeanization as the development of institutions of governance at the European level, Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory and Europeanization as a political aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe

understood. Within this adaptive learning process, both institutions and actors are fixed, thus their success and survival depend on their adaptable ability to match the changing environment. By utilizing competitive selection as the framework, it is not the task of this project to secure convergence towards a 'best practice'. As each state's domestic policies and European leveled external pressure is different, this usage supports the case study design. The research challenge of Europeanization is not one of conceptual clarity, but rather modeling "the dynamics of change in ways that make the simplifying assumptions behind various definitions accessible to empirical tests" (Olsen J. P., 2002, p. 944).

4.2. Europeanization according to Gorm Rye Olsen

This section features Olsen's (2011) concept of Europeanization and the usage of this phenomena in his article *How Strong is Europeanization, Really? The Danish Defence Administration and the Opt-Out from the European Security and Defence Policy*. Olsen (2011) does not provide a clear definition of the concept of Europeanization. In outlining his analytical framework, he refers to several definitions set forth by other scholars. No explicit claim is made for any of the definitions, however he does state the increasing popularity of Vink & Graziano (2008), who defines Europeanization as "opportunities and constraints [affecting] national politics. This new research agenda… focuses on changes in national political systems, that ca be attributed to the development of European regional integration" (p. 3). Olsen (2011) focuses his analytical framework not on defining Europeanization as a concept, but on the different approaches to the study of Europeanization, i.e. bottom-up and top-down.

Academic literature studying Europeanization had for a great time its focus on identifying national tendencies transferred into EU legislation. This bottom-up approach analyzes Member States' influence on the EU, across a broad spectrum ranging from normative and social traditions to the decision-making processes. Systematic research on domestic changes caused by EU policy, did not occur until the 1990's, when Robert Ladrech (1994) introduced a top-down approach. Ladrech (1994) stressed the importance of analyzing instances where parallel lines could be drawn between active participation in EU policy-making processes and changes in "national policy and adaptation of national public administration" (Olsen G. R., 2011, p. 15).

This project utilizes Europeanization as a top-down approach in order to analyze the effects EU level policies has had on the Danish defense policy outcomes. Top-down Europeanization approaches have often analyzed the effects on policies found in the formally known Community pillar, before the

system was abolished[21]. When analyzing policies with a high level intergovernmental decision-making, such as the CSDP, the research literature becomes scarce. This notion supports the characterization of the case at hand, as a deviant case. Nonetheless, the top-down approach is imperative in order to locate and analyze the intervening mechanisms causing Europeanization to occur in the Danish defense policy outcomes.

4.3 Critique of Europeanization

Several critiques of Europeanization touch upon the same point, that is too vague with no definitional framework. If Europeanization is a theory for explaining both "cultural change, new identity formation, policy change, administrative innovation and even modernization" (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4), it overreaches, becoming all things to all people, and thereby rendered useless. Featherstone (2003) deems Europeanization 'faddish', implying that the concept is short-lived and its enthusiasm exaggerated. Another aspect of the critique from Exadaktylos & Radaelli (2009), who states that Europeanization tends to only be interested in discussing outcomes and how subjects are Europeanized, leaving out developing systematic analyses which seek to explain both causes and effects of Europeanization (p. 521-526).

Much of the critique presented here applies to Europeanization as theory, however it has not been used as such in this project. As stated above, this project utilizes Europeanization as a phenomenon bringing attention to a certain process. This project understands "different conceptions of Europeanization complement, rather than exclude each other" (Olsen J. P., 2002, p. 923). This understanding allows for this project to utilize Europeanization to bring attention to a specific area of FPA, as opposed to covering the entire spectrum of effects of Europeanization. Furthermore, in order to account for the critique proposed by Exadaktylos & Radaelli (2009), this project utilizes process-tracing as a research method that detects the causes of Europeanization, which enables the final chapter of this project to conclude on the effects of Europeanization.

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[21] The Maastricht Treaty divided the policy areas of the EU into three pillars: the community pillar with the policy areas transferred by the Member States to be governed by the Treaty, exercised by the Community institutions; the common foreign and security pillar, laid down Title V of the Treaty; and the justice and home affairs pillar, laid down in Title VI of the Treaty. "Titles V and VI provided for intergovernmental cooperation using the common institutions, with certain supranational features such as involving the Commission and consulting Parliament" (European Parliament , 2017)

5.0 Existing Literature

The following section presents the existing literature within the subject of this project. As this project is conducted as a case study and analyzes a less explored subject area, i.e. Europeanization of the Danish Defence, the existing literature focuses on just this. It is not the aim of this project to describe the existing literature of Europeanization in its entirety or other instances of national defense policy experiencing changes in accordance with the EU leveled developments. Because the Danish case is deviant, i.e. the only Member State with an opt-out of from European defense cooperation, no other Member State within the EU can be compared.

In his article, Olsen (2011) clearly states that although Europeanization is a commonly used term to describe processes of change in Europe and the EU, most studies have focused on the bottom-up perspective within policy areas communitized (pp. 13-14). Other areas, particularly foreign and defense policy, have not been studied to the same extent (Major & Pomorsk, 2005). Olsen (2011) determines two factors which can explain the Europeanization of the Danish defense administration: "the results of a process where Danish civil servants make strategic choices as a consequence of participation and cooperation with the EU" (p. 14)[22]; the outcome of "socialisation of government officials embedded in bureaucracy" (ibid.) who are positive towards EU integration and increased cooperation within the Union. These factors play into an already established point, i.e. the domestic environment, political and administrative, in which the Danish civil servants operate within, strongly favor the European integration process (Christensen 2003 & Nedergaard 2005). Olsen (2011) concludes in his article, that the Europeanization of administrative structures and policy-making in the defense policy area, has occurred as an attempt to adjust to what is needed to further cooperate on EU defense issues. Furthermore, it is stated that since the MoD mainly focuses on military and defense issues it can be assumed that the top-down Europeanization present stems from the CSDP[23]. His conclusion consists of four elements: firstly, top-down Europeanization is a strong explanatory phenomenon; secondly, national settings are of great importance when it comes to administrative changes; thirdly, actions taken by government officials who are involved in policy-making processes, are influential; fourthly, "Danish officials are generally positive towards the European integration process" (Olsen G. R., 2011, p. 26).

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[22] With no further explanation provided by Olsen (2011) on how this Europeanization has occurred in matters which Denmark does not participate in, it can be postulated that the observer status and involvement in the EUMC can contribute to this factor as well.

[23] Note that since Olsen's text was published prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the CSDP is thus referred to as ESDP in his article.

6.0 CSDP

6.1 Historical overview of the CSDP

This section presents the historical overview of the EU's defence policy, starting from 1992 as it was here Denmark initially showed its resistance towards defense cooperation within the EU. In order to fill in the gap starting from the initial phase of the European defense policy to that of the Maastricht Treaty, below this section features a figure showcasing the timeline of European defense.


Figure 1: *The Long Road to European Defence* (European Commission, European Political Strategy Centre, 2015)

In the late 1990s, plans to further expanded the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a defense element, which it had left room to develop from the beginning[24], where brought into motion. The defense policy would function as the introduction of a new institutional political sphere for military operations. In December 1998, the British and French heads of state signed the St. Malo Declaration.

> The declaration stated on p. 2:
>
> The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, back be credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis (EU Institute for Security Studies , 2000)

This declaration which would facilitate the path for launching the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the European Council summit in Cologne June 1999 (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, European Parliament, 1999). The summit in Cologne further lead to the establishment of the General Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (European External Action Service, 2016). Another key development at the Cologne summit was the Berlin Plus agreement, which gave the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led crisis management operations, this "reaffirmed the Union's willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces" (ibid.), as was sought at St. Malo. The Berlin Plus package of arrangements[25] was "finalized in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO" (ibid.). The EU-NATO relationship[26] has since been further strengthen, as a statement from NATO claims that "an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of Euro-Atlantic area" (NATO, 2017). Following the establishment of a European defense policy and an agreement with the already functioning defense institution, NATO, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, at the Brussels summit. "The aim of the document is to achieve a secure Europe in a better world, identify the threats facing the EU, define its strategic objectives and set out the political implications for Europe." (Council of the European Union, n.d.). The ESS stated the necessity of a more capable EU within the field of defense mentioning actions such as a defense agency and the need for "more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary" (European Union, 2003, p. 12). Furthermore, the ESS pleaded

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[24] Title V, Art. J.4 of the Treaty of the European Union stated: "including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016)
[25] Further information on the Berlin Plus agreement between EU and NATO can be accessed here:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
[26] Further information on the EU-NATO relations can be accessed here:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170213_1702-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf

for bringing together the different instruments and capabilities, i.e. "military and civilian capabilities from the Member States" (ibid.) in order to have an impact on the European security scene. As was foreseen in the ESS, the EU finalized in 2004 a European Defence Agency (EDA). The agency's aim was to support the Member States and the European Council in improving the overall defense capabilities "in the field of crisis management and to sustain ESDP" (Council of the European Union, n.d.). In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed, and the ESDP was renamed the CSDP. The treaty also brought with it the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (European External Action Service, 2016, Council of the European Union, n.d.). Alongside its name change, the CSDP gained important provisions such as "a mutual assistance and solidarity clause [and] the expansion of the Petersberg tasks[27]". (European External Action Service, 2016).

6.2 Legal basis and decision making of the CSDP

The CSDP sets the legal framework for the EU's political and military structure within the policy field of defense, alongside "military and civilian mission and operations abroad" (European Parliament, 2016). Legally, the CSDP is an integral part of the EU's foreign political apparatus, the CSFP, and outlined in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). "Art. 41 outlines the funding of the CFSP and CSDP, and the policy is further described in Art. 42-46 in chapter 2, section 2 of title V, and in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14." (European Parliament, 2016, Official Journal of the European Union, 2016).

The decision-making process for the CSDP is conducted by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (hereon referred to as the Council), as is stated in Art. 42 TEU (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). The decision-making process is entirely intergovernmental, meaning "national governments retain control over policy-making" (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 63) Decisions are taken by unanimity[28], with exceptions relating to the EDA (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016, Art. 45 TEU) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)[29] (Official

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[27] For more information see for example: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html

[28] Unanimity voting refers to "the requirement for all EU countries when meeting within the Council to be in agreement before a proposal can be adopted". With the installation of the Single European Act in 1985 and Lisbon Treaty in 2007, fewer policy areas remained subject to unanimity voting. These policies are: "taxation, social security or social protection, the accession of new countries to the EU, foreign and common defence policy and operational police cooperation between EU countries" (EUR-Lex, n.d.)

[29] For more information on PESCO see e.g.:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573285/EPRS_BRI(2016)573285_EN.pdf

Journal of the European Union, Art. 46 TEU 2016), to which qualified majority voting[30] applies (European Parliament, 2016, EUR-Lex, n.d.)

6.3 Capabilities of the CSDP

The capabilities of the CSDP fall under two categories, military and civilian. There may exist an implicit third category, civilian-military cooperation, however this is not mentioned officially on EU websites comprising the CSDP capabilities. Nonetheless, the European Parliament (EP) called in their *Report on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities* "on the Member States to concentrate on the concrete delivery of capabilities and to focus on areas with the potential for civilian-military synergies" (European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2010) and commented on improving the EU's Battlegroups' "usability for civilian-military humanitarian relief operations" (ibid.). Following this, the Council agreed in 2016 "that in addition to continuing with civilian missions and military operations, the EU has to improve its ability to foster civilian-military cooperation and to use the [CSDP] as part of coherent EU action." (European External Action Service, 2016). These statements, along with others[31], highlight this implicit capability of the CSDP.

The EU does not possess its own military or civilian management capacity, and is therefore completely dependent on voluntary Member States' contributions (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014). Although both diplomatic and military staff are located in Brussels to participate and contribute to "preparation, support and conduct of CSDP initiatives" (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 12), the policy area is fully controlled by the Member States in terms of decision-making, as referred to above. The following sections will provide an overview of the civilian and military capabilities of the CSDP.

6.3.1 Civilian

According to the EEAS, the civilian aspect is at the core of every CSDP mission (European External Action Service, 2016). Civilian management is expressed in the Civilian Headline Goals (CHG) of 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2008), later replaced in 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2010; Council of the European Union, 2010). These CHGs have their origin in the Helsinki Headline Goal set forth in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council. This stated that a military capacity target

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[30] For more information on qualified majority voting, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/qualified_majority.html
[31] See e.g.: Council Joint Action 2007/245/CFSP of 23 April 2007 or European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 (2012/2319(INI)).

should function in support of the Peterbergs Tasks (Parliament of the United Kingdom , 2008). Based on the CHG "results were achieved by providing political impetus to the processes of recruitment, training and deployment of civilian personnel to international missions." (European External Action Service, 2016). Alongside this, the CHG functions as the basis for the multiannual Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP) established in July 2012, by the EEAS (European External Action Service, 2016, EEAS, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, 2012). The aim of the CCDP is to assist the Member States in addressing shortcomings in terms of the civilian capabilities, through "EU Ambitions, Capability Trends (operational & long term), National Strategies and Lessons Learnt that have consequences in the realm of capabilities." (European External Action Service, 2016, EEAS, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, 2012). Increasingly Member States have adopted a strategy permitting building of "national capacity building for CSDP missions" as well as "establishing national budget lines for civilian crisis management and sharing EU Member States' best practices" (European External Action Service, 2016). According to the EEAS, the CCDP and Member State progress supports the overall civilian aim of the CSDP in terms of "planning, conduct and overall support for civilian CSDP missions". (European External Action Service, 2016). Already in 2003, the process of accumulating more capabilities for the civilian CSDP missions was a priority, and it still remains so (European External Action Service, 2016). Subsequently, in June 2015, European Council restated that the EU must continuously work to towards a more effective, visible and result-oriented CSDP, further developing both civilian and military capabilities (European External Action Service, 2016, European Council, 2015).

6.3.2 Military

In December 1999, the European Council established the Helsinki Headline Goal[32]. This Headline Goal set amongst others, the following targets:

- co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of, the Union will be able to carry out the full range of the tasks up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of tasks stated in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

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[32] For a brief overview of the Helsinki Headline Goal, see:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf

- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework (European External Action Service, 2016)

On November 19th 2007, the Progress Catalogue was approved by the Council, (European External Action Service, 2016). The purpose of the Progress Catalogue, was to identity "quantitative and qualitative military capability shortfalls on the basis of the requirements set out in the Requirements Catalogue 2005 and the contributions compiled in the Force Catalogue 2007" (European External Action Service, 2016). Furthermore, it featured analyses of the potential implications for conducting military tasks in crisis management operations.

The overall conclusion of the Progress Catalogue 2007 was:

The EU, with a view to 2010, has the capability to conduct the full spectrum of military CSDP operations within the parameters of the Strategic Planning Assumptions, with different levels of operational risk arising from the identified shortfalls (European External Action Service, 2016, European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, 2010).

6.3.3 Battlegroups

The EU Battlegroups were introduced in 2004, following the failure to generate military forces up to 60.000 persons, as set forth by the Helsinki Goals in 2003 (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 177). The aim of the Battlegroup concept was to operationalize the military dimension of the ESDP at a European level. An EU Battlegroups was set to consist of 1500 troops, with the appropriate support, at high-level of readiness, i.e. deployable within 15 days, whilst being "highly military effective" (ibid.), meaning capable for operations of high intensity. The Battlegroups can be formed by a single or group of Member States, including non-EU states. All groups must be capable of conducting stand-along operations as well as executing the initial phase of larger operations, e.g. in cooperation with the UN (ibid.). The Battlegroups have not been as prominent a tool for the EU, as was the intension. The concept met complications as the challenges of real-life conflict management often coincided with the different strategic cultures of the Member States, as well as financing problems. Particularly the issue of dependency on the political authorization of states involved, to even utilize 'their' Battlegroups has hindered further evolvement. Thus, there seems to echo an unwillingness to consider these Battlegroups as part of interests essential to national foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 178).

7.0 Danish Defence

This project presents a disclaimer for the chapter. A great deal of the information about the Danish Defence is available in English, however this project recognizes that a small percentage of this information is only accessible in Danish. All Danish information utilized in this project is translated independently by the researcher. The following chapter presents three sections, describing elements of the Danish Defence: the organizational structure, the international role and the policy outcomes, i.e. the Defence Agreements.

7.1 Organizational structure of the Danish Defense

The Danish Defence consists to a degree of four parts: The MoD, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The three armed forces, i.e. the Danish Armed Forces, are located under the authority of the MoD, i.e. all tactical and operational implementations stem from the official Defence Agreements, issued by the MoD. The Armed Forces are furthermore represented in the Danish government by the Minister of Defence, currently Claus Hjort Frederiksen from the Liberal Party of Denmark. The Minister of Defence "determines the structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force in accordance with the provisions laid down by Folketinget, the Danish parliament, in the Defence Agreement." (Danish Defence, 2011, p. 3)

The MoD's self-proclaimed vision is working for "peace, freedom and security – nationally and internationally" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2017). To accomplish this, the MoD has two main functions. One of distinctive political nature, by serving and establishing a basis for the Minister "to create a visionary Danish policy in the field of defence, security and emergency management." (ibid.). Two, implementing and executing the policy of the Minister, by supervising both the combine of the MoD and the "planning of the economy and activities in the agencies within the politically stipulated framework" (ibid.). Within the MoD exists the Department, consisting of several units to ensure optimal performance. The head official is the Permanent Secretary "in charge of five divisions with subjacent departments. Each division has a head of division, and each department has a head of department." (ibid.). Another important subordinate to the MoD is the Defence Command Denmark, commanding approx. 2,300 military and civilian employees of the Danish Armed Forces. This subordinate has the responsibility "for the high-level coordination and leadership of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Defence Command Denmark is also the Chief of Defence. In practice, this is done in close cooperation with the three services' operational commands and a number of functional services,

which are responsible for personnel, materiel, real estate, etc." (Danish Defence, 2011, p. 10)[33]. The Danish Armed Forces' service personnel's overall mission is to "promote peaceful and democratic development in the world and a secure society in Denmark" (Danish Defence, 2011, p. 3) by having the capabilities to fight and win. The top leadership of the Armed Forces consists of the Chief of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff.

In the Defence Act from 2001, the purpose of the Armed Forces is further specified to: preventing conflict and wars; upholding "Denmark's sovereignty and protecting the nations' continued existence and integrity" (ibid.); and promoting development in the world, peacefully and with respect for human right, in NATO member and non-member states alike. Furthermore, the Defence Act states that the Danish Armed Forces must seek to cooperate with the armed forces of NATO, and other allied nations striving for conflict prevention and crisis management.

In a publication by the Danish Defence it is stated that

> it is no longer the primary mission of the Army to defend Denmark against an invading enemy, as no neighbouring countries threaten Denmark. This means that Army personnel must be able to deploy anywhere in the world, thus requiring modern equipment and high-quality training." (Danish Defence, 2011, p. 5).

The Navy has units regularly deployed to participate in international operations. The Air Force have aircrafts and radar installations employable both nationally and internationally. According to the information here presented, the work of the Danish Defence, hereunder the Armed Forces, has great focus on international affairs, as will also be elaborated on in the section outlining the Danish Defence Agreements below. This point is further emphasized by Houben (2005) who states, that the Danish Defence rests on two pillars, one for its total national, second for its international engagements.

7.2 International Role

As was commented above, the Danish Defence has recognized the increased need for an international focus, thus the following section will highlight the international role of the Armed Forces.

The Danish Armed Forces have a longstanding tradition of contributing and participating in international operations, especially international peacekeeping operations, e.g. through the UN, since

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[33] See also Appendix 2: Organization of the Danish Ministry of Defence

Figure 2: *Current Operations of the Danish Defence* (Forsvaret , 2017). Red – national operations: Dark blue – NATO: White – Coalitions: Light blue – UN

1948 (Danish Defence, 2016)[34]. According to Jakobsen (2016), the Danish contribution to UN led peacekeeping operations has however lessened, following an increased interest and prioritization of NATO (p. 741). Although this shift created a new warrior identity for the Danish Defense, their focus on the international sphere nonetheless, remains present. Especially the early 1990s European security developments[35] led to a transformed Danish Armed Forces. According to the Danish Defence (2016), it was following this time that "the Armed Forces have increased its international posture - involving Army, Navy and Air Force units - contributing to the Alliance's and coalition military goals" (Danish Defence, 2016). Geographically, this international focus was allocated to the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Baltic Countries, North Africa, of the coast of Africa and other areas. Currently, the Army deploy units to the Balkans, in Iraq and in Africa. The Navy deploys units into the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Gulf of Aden. The Air Force is currently operating in Iraq against terrorism. (Danish Defence, 2016).

Denmark's international ambitions for its Armed Forces can also be detected in the latest Defence Agreement[36]. Here it is stated that defense and government agencies strive for a force contribution, such as a task force for humanitarian operations. In resemblance to the EU's

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[34] See also Appendix 3: Danish participation in UN observer and peacekeeping operations

[35] Such developments include the escalation in Bosnia and the Srebrenica genocide.

[36] Danish translation: Forsvarsforlig

Battlegroups, the Danish Army will have a battalion combat command typically from about 300 and up to 800 soldiers (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012), deployable on short notice for short- or long-term missions (18+ months) supported by Danish special operations forces (ibid.). Likewise, the Navy will have large units and Air Force up to three military air contributions, deployable under same conditions (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 3). In terms of civilian-military operations, the Armed Forces, and Home Guard, will contribute to "the military capacity building, and military support to the civilian capacity building. The contribution must be adaptable into a comprehensive approach together with civilian elements in the combined effort" (ibid.).

7.3 The Danish EU Opt-Outs

EU opt-outs have been implemented in order to give Member States the opportunity to remain outside certain areas of cooperation, with the overall aim of avoiding policy stalemate (European Union , n.d.). Few Member States have EU opt-outs, wherein Denmark currently operates with four such agreements within: Monetary Union (EMU), CSDP, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Citizenship of the European Union (Folketinget , n.d.).

The Danish opt-outs came to be as a result of the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, in a referendum in 1992 (ibid.)[37]. It was subsequently agreed, by the then twelve Member States, that Denmark would gain four opt-outs from EU cooperation, based on a 'national comprise' presented by the Danish Parliament (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016). The opt-outs are outlined in Part B of the Conclusions of the Presidency entitled, *Denmark and the Treaty of the European* Union, in the Edinburgh Agreement of December 12th 1992 (European Council, 1992). Following the Edinburgh Agreement, Denmark has held two referenda concerning its opt-outs. In 2002, the Danes voted no to the Euro, in favor of preserving its national currency, the kroner. In 2015, the Danes again voted no, this time on a "opt-in model for Denmark's participation in Justice & Home Affair" (Folketinget , n.d.). As this project is solely focused on the policy area of defense, the following will comment further only on this particular opt-out.

Due to its opt-out in the policy area of defense, Denmark cannot participate in the EU cooperation within defense matters, i.e. elaboration and implementation of the decisions and actions of the Union pertaining to defense. As such, "Denmark is unable to participate in military operation or in the cooperation on developments and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016). Additionally, Denmark cannot partake in any decisions or

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[37] Denmark held a referendum in 1993 resulting in a yes to the Maastricht Treaty (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2016).

planning in this regard, nor can it prevent further development of closer cooperation between Member States in defense matters. The Danish defense opt-out is formulated in Protocol no. 22 in TEU (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016).

7.4 The Danish Defence Agreements: from 1995 to 2017

The following section will feature a depiction of the five Danish Defence Agreements, thus providing empirical data. This will later on be utilized in the analysis, to answer the problem formulation "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation?". In order to determine potential tendencies or patterns occurring throughout the agreements, this project will describe all Agreements, starting from 1995. These descriptions will consist of the main themes and any additions detected from one text to the next. It is not the aim of the project to provide a full and complete description of all five Defence Agreements, due to limitation of space and overall aim of the project.

The development of the Danish Defence occurs on the basis of political arrangements collectively referred to as the Danish Defence Agreements. The previous years have featured agreements ordinarily lasting for five years at a time (Forsvarsministeriet , 2016). An Agreement indicates the goals and framework for the development of the Danish Defence, within the designated timeframe, covering all authorities under the MoD, except the Danish Emergency Management Agency[38], as this agency is subject to its own agreement. The Agreements typically contain developmental assumptions, e.g. sections concerning security and defense policies, which the involved political parties expect to be relevant for the timeframe of the Agreement. Furthermore, it states which implications these assumptions may have for the development of the overall defense, frequently also featuring a prioritization of these developmental assumptions and other tasks. Alongside this, the Agreements also determines the economic structure and budgeting for the Danish Defence. Because of this, an Agreement may contain detailed economic instructions for each for the Armed Forces, as well as the Home Guard.

7.4.1 1995-1999

The 95-99 Defence Agreement was rather short, consisting of only five pages, not counting the appendices. In this Agreement it was stated, that all international affairs of the Danish Defence was to

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[38] Danish translation: Beredskabsstyrelsen

be economically kept within the Defence Budget (Danish Ministry of Defence , 1995, p. 2). These international affairs included UN, OSCE and NATO missions, as well as participation in EU monitoring operations. The Agreement goes on to mentioned the Danish International Brigade[39] as the primary Danish contributing agency to the UN's Stand-By forces[40]. The international focus was in this Agreement less visible than the following agreements. Mainly, it featured as side comments or short formulations pertaining largely to reaffirming the active Danish membership within UN, OSCE and NATO, as the foundations of the Danish security and defense policies (Danish Ministry of Defence , 1995, p. 9). Two significant elements were featured in the appendices of the 95-99 Agreement. Firstly, the Danish contribution from each of the Armed Forces to the NATO Response Force and secondly, the establishment of a Defence Commission, starting in 1997[41]. This Defence Commission was to asses, if necessary changes were to be made to the Danish Defence, founded in the development of the security scene, herein also assessment of treats. These assessments were to be made on the basis of the notion that active membership in UN, OSCE and NATO functioned as foundation for the Danish security and defense policies, as stated above. The Commission was also to allow for other respective organizations to present their views which could have relevance for the preparation of the Commission's work. It is not stated to what extent these organization were allowed to present their views, nor if the organization where to solely be national or also feature international ones. The Defence Commission was expected to finish its assessment by ultimo 1998.

7.4.2 2000-2004

The 00-04 Agreement stated in its first lines, that significant changes to the security situation would mean considerable changes to the Danish Defence. Following this, the Danish contribution to NATO was stated in the introduction of the Agreement, thereby signaling an increased international focus, outside the Danish territory (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2016). It was stated that Denmark must contribute to the security development by strengthening the internal cooperation between European states. The Danish Defence was to undergo a change, shifting the weight and focus from mobilization to crisis management. Increased emphasis was to be place on reaction forces and the capacity for international operations was to be strengthened. This increasing international focus continued, as the

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[39] The Danish International Brigade was established in 1997 as a high-readiness force within the Danish Armed Forces. The primary mission was to participate in crisis management operations under UN or OSCE (Houben, 2006)

[40] For further explanation of the UN's Stand-By Forces and the Danish thought process to its importance, see Ole Karup Pedersen (1967) *Scandinavia and the UN's Stand By Forces*.

[41] Danish translation: Forsvarskommissionen af 1997

Army's international operations where to be prioritized, especially the contributions to the NATO Response Force. Noticeably, the Danish contribution to the NATO Response Force was moved into the main text in the 00-04 Agreement, as well as an appendix, where previous Agreement merely featured this as an appendix. The emphasis on NATO was also prominent in the other Armed Forces, as the Air Force was stated as being able to participate in a potential collective NATO project concerning Alliance Ground Surveillance[42]. Subsequently, an addition made to the 00-04 Agreement, was an environmental appendix (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2016).

7.4.3 2005-2009

This Agreement was the first to be publically made available in another language besides Danish. Building on the 00-04 Agreement, this text also commented on the development within security policies, requiring Denmark to strengthen two central areas: "1) internationally deployable capacities and 2) the ability to counter acts of terror and their consequences" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 1). The Danish contribution and emphasis on active membership in the larger international organizations, received further explanation in the 05-09 Agreement's introduction. The UN was separated from the collective mentioning seen previously, and stated as the main framework for the development of international rule of law. Alongside this, a goal of the Danish Defence was stated as: "[working] towards international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, especially through conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations" (ibid.). NATO was also in this Agreement stated as imperative for Denmark, described as the central forum for joint and binding cooperation within the policy areas of security and defense. In the Agreement, NATO is regarded as the guarantor of collective European security to which Denmark continuously must make creditable contributions to, including the NATO Response Force. The Danish Ministry of Defence (2004) summarizes the Danish contribution to international operations as follows: "The Danish Defence must be able to contribute with ready, well-equipped and effective forces for international operations as well as strengthened coordination between the military and the civilian, humanitarian effort in a specific area of operation" (p. 1).

A significant addition made in this Agreement is the Danish opt-out with regard to the EU defense cooperation. The Agreement states, that in case of a possible elimination of the opt-out, the Danish Defence should be able to readily "participate in EU efforts outside the EU area" (Danish

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[42] For more information on NATO's Alliance Ground Surveillance, see:
http://www.nato.int/cps/sl/natohq/topics_48892.htm

Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 1). Denmark will, according to Agreement, be able to partake in peace creation, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, humanitarian operations and the overall strengthening of international security, all in accordance with the principles outlined in the UN Charter. It is explicitly stated that the Danish Defence structure of 2005-2009 shall be organized in a manner to allow for immediate satisfactory contribution to future European defense initiatives, "including combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and peace support operations with force contribution from both the EU and NATO." (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 2). The Agreement mentions the lack of conventional military threat to Danish territory, thus lessening the need for mobilization or territorial defense. Hence there exists a continuity between the 00-04 Agreement which mentioned this type of defense as being replaced with defense more so focused on crisis management. Furthermore, the Agreement states that compulsory military service[43] should be adjusted accordingly (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 3) and introduces 'The Day of the Danish Defence'[44] to inform about the Danish Defence in terms of employment and career opportunities, and asses the suitability of individuals. As with compulsory military service, the Danish Defence differentiates between genders for The Day of the Danish Defence as "All young men are required and all young women are invited to attend" (ibid.).

Drawing a parallel back to the abovementioned increased focus on international affairs, the Agreement states a need for reorganizing and developing the Armed Forces so that the Danish Defence may be able to effectively participate in high intensity operations (ibid.). As these operations often take place under difficult and unstable conditions aiming for stabilization of areas of conflict, there is a great need for rapid deployable forces. The aim being that Denmark must have a greater ability to partake "in peace-support operations, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and other similar missions" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, pp. 3-4).

7.4.4 2010-2014

The 10-14 Agreement is relatively longer than the previous texts. Continuing the increased focus on integrating an international mindset into the Danish Armed Forces, the Agreement stresses a pro-active Danish foreign and security policy, that should contribute to preventing conflicts of war whilst

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[43] Danish translation: Værnepligt
[44] Danish translation: Forsvarets Dag

respecting human rights and promoting democracy and freedom in the world. As mentioned above, the absence of territorial threats to Denmark has moved the Danish Armed Forces away from mobilization defense. A reformulation occurs in the 10-14 Agreement, stating that the type of defense or force, which the Danish Armed Forces is transforming into is a modern deployable defense force. The previous formulation stated, moving from mobilization defense to crisis management defense. The Agreement states that by international standards, Denmark has already progressed far in this transformation (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 1), however there is no further elaboration on the statement, nor on what these international standards are defined as. In line with the previous Agreement, the Danish opt-out of EU defense cooperation is restated here as well. The formulation between the 05-09 and 10-14 Agreement in relation to the EU, is almost identical, with an emphasis in both texts that the Danish Armed Forces must be able to participate in EU operations should the opt-out be discontinued. The Agreement highlights "peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance as well as to strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter" as a main goal (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 2).

Several new initiatives or goals were spelled out in the 10-14 Agreement. As an addition to conventional conflicts, the Danish Armed Forces, and other Western military forces, must also consider counter-insurgency, reconstruction efforts and focus on international policing. Examples of these conflicts are mentioned in the Agreement as: stabilization and international policing operations, e.g. KFOR mission in Kosovo and operations against piracy off the Horn of Africa (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009). With a growing interest in the Arctic region where the Kingdom of Denmark has territory, this Agreement is the first to mention the Arctic in its introduction. The increased interest in the Arctic is here tied to global warming which opens up for new opportunities for extracting raw minerals and new shipping routes. The Danish Armed Forces' involvement in the Arctic is stated as such: "The rising activity will change the region's geostrategic dynamic and significance and will therefore in the long term present the Danish Armed Forces with several challenges" (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 2). Furthermore, the Agreement features a special note on Greenland and the Arctic, commenting on the Faroe Islands, cooperation with the Nordic countries, the US, Canada and Russia, and the Arctic Response Force (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 12). According to the Defence Commission, set forth in the 95-99 Agreement, the Danish Armed Forces should comprise capabilities to deploy globally. On the basis on this, the 10-14 Agreement reports of newer operational, more demanding conditions. These may include climate and terrain conditions such as desert and mountain. Additional comments on the subject area include operating in areas with limited infrastructure and exposure to asymmetric instruments of warfare such as "improved explosive devices (roadside bombs) and suicide attacks and more conventional instruments of warfare (e.g. indirect fire

from rockets and mortars)" (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 3). According to the Defence Commission, this causes great demands for the operational unites of the Danish Armed Forces also in relation to training and equipment. Another addition to the 10-14 Agreement is cyberspace attacks against computers. It is stated that this newer form of attacks must be "expected to be used against Danish contingents from all three armed services" (ibid.). On the basis of this, the text states that an agreement has been made in establishing a "Computer Network Operations (CNO) capacity under the auspice of the Danish Ministry of Defence" (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 11) ultimately preventing opponents from exploiting cyberspace with the aim of targeting Denmark.

The 10-14 Agreement features several comments on civilian-orientated tasks. The text claims that the objective of future stabilization operations "and to a certain extent armed conflict – can only be achieved by integrating military and civilian activities in the area of operation" (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2009, p. 4). The Agreement thereby sends a strong signal of the importance of civilian-oriented tasks. The above statement is further elaborated on, stating that the achievement of the goal of a military operation entails and often depends on civilian initiatives. The Danish Armed Forces must therefore see the necessity of contributing to reconstruction efforts, a civilian initiative, for the overall political success of international operations. This applies especially to situations "where civil reconstruction capacities are unable or unwilling to operate, due to an unstable security situation. This may typically occur in cases where the security situation during a transitional period hampers the ability of the civilian actors to operate" (ibid.). Besides from the additional comments or statements in the introductory text and under other sections, the civilian-oriented tasks of the Danish Armed Forces are further elaborated on later in its own chapter (Danish Ministry of Defence , 1995). This chapter states that the Armed Forces contribute to and perform two types of civilian-oriented tasks:

> civilian tasks of an authoritative nature that fall within the auspice of the Danish Ministry of Defence, such as the operation of the national ice-breaking services, national maritime environmental surveillance and the state maritime pollution control; and occasional tasks for which the national civilian capabilities in the particular area are either inadequate or less well-suited than the national military capabilities (p. 20).

Following this, search and rescue service and maritime environment protection capability is further explained in relation to the Armed Forces' obligation to these.

7.4.5 2013-2017

The 13-17 Agreement replaced the 10-14 Agreement on the basis of a broad consensus "regarding the organization of the defence for the period 2013-2017" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012). The current Agreement has been entered into, by the same partied behind the 10-14 Agreement.

The Agreement starts by stating the international recognition achieved by the Danish contributions to international operations. Furthermore, the Danish Defence constitutes the safeguarding of Danish foreign and security policy while international deployment of military capabilities, safeguards the national security. The organization of the Armed Forces is to have the purpose of contributing "with well-armed and well-trained military forces to all types of international missions" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 1) in short as well as protracted international operations. These include both actual combat as part of a coalition, and peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The introduction of the 13-17 Agreement has a different composition than the previous text. The mentioning of international organizations or institutions is pushed down giving more space to elaborate on the security policy development of recent decades and the Danish contributions and structural reorganizations to alleviate these. Before engaging in organizational emphasizing, the Agreement stresses the Danish Defence's role as an ever-increasing important instrument for symbolizing a pro-active Danish foreign and security policy, "contributing to the prevention of conflict and war in respect of democracy, freedom and human right" (ibid.). The military effort of the Danish Defence is thus put in relation to humanitarian-oriented goals. The Agreement goes on to comment on the Danish relation to NATO, mentioning the need for continued deployment of force contributions "in connection with crisis management, humanitarian disasters, evacuation operations, demonstration of solidarity…" (ibid.). As with the pro-active Danish foreign and security policy set in a humanitarian-oriented setting, so does there seem to be an increased emphasis on the Danish contribution to NATO in terms of humanitarian efforts. The Agreement goes on state the importance of NATO membership for the Danish security and defense policy, as has also been stated in several previous Agreements, while also claiming Denmark as a leading nation and core member of NATO, with special emphasis on NATO Smart Defence[45]. New additions are the mentioning of Article 5 in relation to NATO and the Security Council in relation to the UN. The UN is featured in the Agreement below NATO, and to a lesser extent. The Agreement stresses the importance of Denmark ensuring that the UN Security Council continues as the source of global legitimacy whilst also stating the Danish contribution to

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[45] For more information on NATO Smart Defence see: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/en/smart-defence.htm
For information on the Danish Defence relation to NATO Smart Defence see:
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/en/smart-defence.htm

international operations in accordance with the principle of responsibility to protect[46] (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 2). Drawing parallels back to previous Agreements, the 13-17 Agreement also mentions the increased proliferation of WMD, the newer security threat in cyberspace from government and non-government actors alike and the increased focus on the Arctic. As climate change gives way for increased geographical accessibility, the Agreement states that larger commercial and scientific activity will be seen in the region. With the Danish claim to parts of the Arctic, it is not surprising that the problem of the right to extract natural resources, is also mentioned (ibid.). As part of the Agreements 'Development initiatives', the Arctic has received considerable space with several sub categories, allowing for an elaborate prediction of the Danish focus within this region (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, pp. 14-16). As a new initiative, the 13-17 Agreement introduces an accreditation model for officers' training. The model is aimed at "achieving accreditation of the basic officers' training programs at the diploma level" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 5) allowing for regular wages during training. This model also sets a target of henceforth admitting individuals of a civilian education at the bachelor level, corresponding to 1/3 in total (ibid.). The level of ambitions for the Danish Defence, is to focus on international capabilities in relation to deployment in a UN, NATO or other relevant setting, as to contribute to maintaining international peace and security. It is stated that the Danish Defence must be able to participate in the full range of international missions, including stabilization tasks, preventive interventions, evacuation of Danish citizens from abroad and international rescue and disaster relief. The Agreement states that the tasks of the Danish Defence point to the ability for transverse planning "and to deploying the capabilities of the Danish army, navy and air force in a joint service framework, incorporating the capabilities for the Danish home guard and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 3). These contributions from the collective Armed Forces must go to both military capacity-building and the military support of civilian capacity-building, adapted as a comprehensive approach together with civilian elements in a combined effort.

The 13-17 Agreement's emphasis on joint cooperation between the Armed Forces, as a process of streamlining the organizational structure, is a reoccurring theme. As such, there exists three joint initiatives in the Agreement; joint services military police, joint services planning and command capacity, and joint services command support. Furthermore, the Danish Defence Command is abolished in the Agreement, making way for the establishment of a new Joint Defence Command. Also, the Chief of Defence will be co-located with the Ministry of Defence. A Special Operations

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[46] For more information on the principle, responsibility to protect within the UN, see:
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html

Command was also established, as part of the Joint Defence Command, with the aim of increasing focus on the Arctic "as well as on special operations forces in the new headquarters" (Danish Ministry of Defence , 2015). The Danish Defence's civilian tasks are, as in the previous Agreement, outlined in a separate chapter. The chapter stats the two types of civilian task the Danish Defence must continue to execute: dimensioning tasks, mere regulatory functions under the MoD such as "national maritime environmental surveillance, the national pollution control at sea" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2012, p. 17) and occasional tasks where society's civilian resource are not sufficient or suitable as the capacity of defense. The 13-17 Agreement only features maritime capacity as a separate section to be elaborated on, not search and rescue services, as seen in the previous Agreement. One explanation for this could presumable be, that the search and rescue measure is written into the main text, such as 'evacuation of Danish citizens from abroad and international rescue and disaster relief' mentioned above. Another addition is the mentioning of terror, namely the situation from Utøya, Norway. Here the parties of the Agreement have agreed that the Danish Defence must support the Danish police, and furthermore that "a Danish collection of experience from Utøya, among others, may affect the preferred available level of support." (ibid.).

8.0 Analysis

The following chapter features an analysis conducted in order to produce results, which will assist in answering the problem formulation "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation?". The analysis will present two sections: The first section will concern the political linkage between Denmark and the EU, i.e. input-output relationship with the mechanisms which promote or enhance the Europeanization within the policy area of defense. This section builds on existing literature conducted within the same topic, as presented above (p. 26 in project). The second section will present the tactical linkage to the political decisions determined in the Danish Defence Agreements. The main function of the second section is to provide the soldiers point of view on the EU and in terms of Europeanization of the defense policy area. Thus, presenting a different input-output relationship. By featuring both a political and tactical level, this analysis strives to illustrate the depth of Europeanization within the Danish Defence, and ultimately analyzes the level of penetration from the EU level to the domestic policy. As this project engages in the research method of process-tracing, more specifically case-centric process-tracing, it allows for a detecting of the intervening mechanisms, on an area which has not been extensively studied previously. The analytical chapter below is thus sectioned according to the individual input-output relationships. Each intervening

mechanism detected in the Defence Agreements, thereby represents an input in the input-output relationship, as presented by Easton (1965a, 1965b). This provides the reader with a list, or answer book, of the mechanisms which have influenced Europeanization in the Danish Defence, as opposed to having to locate them in an analytical section for each Agreement.

8.1 The Political Outcome Level

The five Danish Defence Agreements provide the best insight into the Danish defense policy outcome. As there currently exists more than one Agreement, it was possible to detect developments between the texts. Thus, this project considers the Defence Agreements as an appropriate empirical source for this level. In the Defence Agreements, the international sphere, i.e. geographical locations outside the borders of Denmark[47], have gained noticeably more emphasis throughout, as has been mentioned several times above. As the Agreements are issued by the MoD and center around the structure of the Danish defense, the international institution often mentioned first, is NATO[48]. As NATO is a well-established defense institution, this could be expected. Nonetheless, the UN also took seed in the Danish Defence Agreements, mentioned in all five texts, often after NATO. It was not until the 05-09 Agreement that the EU entered the Danish policy text. Still, the influence of the EU can be detected in the Agreements, beyond the explicit mentioning of the defense opt-out.

8.1.1 Danish readiness for EU missions

With the introduction of the CSDP, the EU has tried to establish its own defense capabilities, with respect for NATO and being careful not to overstep institutional jurisdiction. The EU therefore made an effort to stress the civilian-oriented missions, or linking civilian capabilities with military missions. This effort was likewise seen in the Danish Defence Agreements, with several mentions of civilian capabilities (pp. 42, 44-45 in project). By aligning the Danish Defence's ambitions to complement the capabilities of the EU, the 05-09 Agreement stated that Denmark will be able to immediately partake in any EU missions:

> in case of a possible elimination of the Danish opt-out with regard to the EU defence policy, Denmark will be able to participate in EU efforts outside the EU area within

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[47] Note: This project intentionally worded this as merely Denmark and not the Kingdom of Denmark, as the interest in Arctic relations and thereby Greenland, come to be more emphasized in the later Agreements.

[48] The mentioning of NATO occurred in the very first Defence Agreement, but was however more prominent in the following one.

peace creation, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, humanitarian operations and the strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (p. 1).

It is difficult to assess if this measure has been taken in order to do, as is stated in the Agreement, or as a result of top-down Europeanization. However, as the Agreements mentioning the opt-out, fail to set a timeframe, as well as neglecting to mention any future political incentives regarding the opt-out, except the *potential* annulment, this project entertains the notion of this being a consequence of top-down Europeanization. In order to fulfill this notion, i.e. readily being able to partake in EU missions, the Danish troops must then adapt to CSDP operational incentives, in order to adhere to this readiness. The form of Europeanization present here, as presented by Olsen (2002), is Europeanization as central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance. In this instance, the national system of governance in Denmark within the policy field of defense, has been penetrated by Europeanization. This notion is complemented by the definition provided by Vink and Graziano (2008) who state that Europeanization is opportunities and constraints which affect the national policy areas (p. 3). In this input-output relationship, the input, or intervening mechanism, is thus EU leveled pressure. The output then becomes adaptation to the CSDP, in order to readily be able to partake in EU missions. This output can be understood as Europeanization, as the national policy outcome has been altered according to EU level polity.

8.1.2 EU-NATO cooperation

The 05-09 Agreement stated that the Danish Defence structure shall be organized in a manner, to allow for an immediate satisfactory contribution to European defense initiatives "including combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and peace support operations with force contribution from both the EU and NATO." (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 2). As has been stated above (p. 37 in project), the Danish Defence Agreements are drafted on a five-year basis, thus, all EU developments which may induce changes to domestic policies at the time of a functioning Agreement, will not be recognized as policy change until the following Agreement is drafted. Thus, there can exist a delay in the input-output relationship. An EU development occurring at the European level, previous to the 05-09 Agreement, but subsequent to the 00-04 Agreement, was the Berlin Plus arrangement (p. 28 in project). The introduction of cooperation between NATO and EU in EU-led operations, through the Berlin Plus, is an intervening mechanism in the Danish Defence,

as the Danish Defence following this, aligned its policy accordingly, as to allow for similar cooperation to happen between Denmark and EU, as was happening between NATO and the EU. As is determined by Olsen (2002), the ability of the European level development to penetrate the domestic policies, should not be viewed as a constant or perfect mechanism (p. 936). Instead, it should be noted that the variations in pressure as well as domestic motivations and ability to adapt, play a crucial role. This notion explains why the EU's direct penetration, i.e. the first time the EU was explicitly mentioned, of the Danish Defence Agreements did not occur until the 05-09 text.

8.1.3 ESS, CHG and civilian synergies

Following the argument above, there exists a correlation between thematic focal points in the Danish Defence Agreements, which occurred paralleled with developments within the EU's security and defense policy. In 2003, the EU issued its ESS at the Brussels summit (pp. 28-29 in project). Through the ESS, the EU pleaded for bringing together the different instruments and capabilities of the Member States, including both military and civilian, in constructing policies which would ultimately have an impact on the European security scene. A response to the EU's ESS initiative detected in the Defence Agreement, is the mentioning of civilian oriented operations or any type of coordination between civilian and military means, which appeared explicitly for the first time in the 05-09 Agreement, adjacent to the Danish international contributions. This Agreement featured an appendix entitled "Joint Planning of Civilian and Military Efforts in International Operations" (Danish Ministry Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, 2004). Within this appendix, the EU takeover of crisis management in Bosnia is provided "as an example of how further military operations [can] become incorporate in a more broadly coordinated effort" (Danish Ministry Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 1). This broadly coordinated effort is explained, as operations that comprise a combination of military forces, the establishment of a local police system and support for democratic and social developments. This appendix in the 05-09 Agreement is therefore the output, where the publications of the EU's ESS is considered the input. This input-output relationship is thereby analyzed to a top-down Europeanization.

In 2008, later replaced in 2010, the EU issued its CHG, outlining the Union's emphasis on civilian management (pp. 30-31 in project). Within the CHG it was stated, that the development of civilian capabilities has been given exponential visibility at both EU and Member State level (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 2), as well as contributing to the overall improved civilian management quality (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, the 2010 CHG

introduced a developing instrument entitled the Information Exchange Requirement, essentially an "integrated inter-service civilian-military project" (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 4). The CHG placed further emphasis on achieving synergies relevant to crisis management, by identifying and exploiting civilian and military capabilities, as well as possible synergies with other civilian actors in crisis management (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 5). Following the CHG, the EP issued a report in 2010 entitled *Report on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military* capabilities. This report encouraged Member States to focus on areas with potential civilian-military synergies (p. 30 in project). Having civilian capabilities promoted as equally important to military capabilities, was subsequently featured as important in the Danish Defence as well. The Defence Agreement published after these EU initiatives, the 13-17 Agreement, featured a lengthy section on efforts to make the Armed Forces more interconnected, i.e. the joint service initiatives (p. 44 in project). It was furthermore stated, that having the joint contributions from the Armed Forces allocated to both military capacity-building and the military support of civilian capacity-building, were to be adapted as a comprehensive approach together with civilian elements in a combined effort. This analysis proposes, that the increased mentioning of synergies and other actions to combine civilian and military capabilities at the EU level, penetrated the Danish domestic defense policy. As this action is not a direct Danish response to the EU development, i.e. it is not stated as having the aim of supporting the CSDP and its missions, the added emphasis in the Agreement can therefore be stated as a consequence of top-down Europeanization, thus making the CHG and EP report the input, or intervening mechanism.

8.1.4 Unintentional Europeanization

Of all the Nordic Member States of the EU, i.e. Denmark, Sweden and Finland, Denmark is the least formally engaged in the CSDP, because the opt-out. This is despite it being the only 'double integrated' Nordic state, i.e. a member of both EU and NATO, and claimed as having the defense doctrines and practices closest to what may be deemed as mainstream European (Bailes, 2006, p. 11). Bailes (2006) states, that it is not a secret that the Danish defense elite find the consequences of the opt-out frustrating[49] and have sought other "ways of working around it in specific cases to avoid an

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[49] In May 2017, the researcher of this project participated in a simulation game entitled **Brussels Model European Union**. The task was to discuss the CSDP in the European Council, the researcher of this project represented Bulgaria. A personal conclusion of this simulation game was that Denmark felt it difficult to participate in formal discussions and was left out of many informal discussions. It was made clear that the Danish representation was unable to vote in the Presidency Conclusions, thus other presentations felt it unnecessary to include Denmark to the same extent. This was

unacceptable degree of marginalization" (p. 11). It is not specified who is determined as the Danish defense elite or what the frustration about the opt-out specifically is. This project proposes one such frustration can be detected in Larsen's (2002) article *Denmark and the EU's defence dimension: Opt-out across the board?,* where a voting situation within the EUMC for the head of the committee, caused "EU partners, leady be Italy... [to demand] to know in more precis terms what Denmark could participate with" (p. 121). The Danish representation, Chief of Defence General Hvidt, had voted for the Finnish candidate, General Hägglund. Due to pressure from its EU partners, the Danish government felt it necessary to clarify the Danish vote. This situation gave rise to a lengthy political debate on why Denmark had not supported its fellow NATO member Italy, and whether Denmark should have taken part in the voting at all. Following this, the Danish government "released documents which showed that the Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Secretary of State for Defence" had urged General Hvidt to support the Italian candidate, not the Finnish, in consideration of Denmark's NATO interests. Nonetheless, the General had followed his own preferences. This illustrates a situation in where the Chief of Defence, who can be considered a part of the Danish defense elite, faced frustrations within an EU settings. Another such frustration can be found in both the Danish government and opposition of 2006, wanting to opt back in the defense policy, in order to position Denmark as a dependable core state within European integration. This view has been supported by a sizeable majority, determined in opinion polls (Herolf, 2006). Furthermore, Pedersen (2006) claims that as a direct action to compensate for the defense opt-out the Danish foreign, security and defense policy has developed to being more assertive (p. 43).

The Danish defense elite experiencing frustrations tied to the opt-out, can perhaps be confined to matters only relating to defense issues, i.e. the defense opt-out does not affect political dialogue in other policy areas. This can be postulated as Olsen & Pilegaard (2005) claim in their article, that little suggests that "the opt-out has had negative consequences for Denmark's influence on capabilities in the EU" (p. 339). The point of minimal influence[50] in defense matters, not effecting other policy fields, is according to Olsen & Pilegaard (2005) remarkable, as the opt-out can signal incoherent and consequently unreliable Danish foreign, security and defense policies, rendering Denmark a reluctant defense ally (p. 341). If this premise is accepted as shared by the Danish defense elite, it can perhaps contribute to the explanation of why Europeanization has occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements in the year following these articles. As a consequence of this frustration, the Danish Defence

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frustrating for the Danish representation who did not feel the Danish opinions were heard. Ultimately Denmark sought out the UK. However, as the UK is leaving EU, this alliance did not gain support of any of the other representations.

[50] This project proposes that Denmark may still have some influence, although very limited, on the basis of its participation in the EUMC and through its membership in NATO, wherein it partakes in NATO-EU defense negotiations.

Agreements may have been more unintentionally susceptible to or accepting of EU level policy developments penetrating the domestic policies, thus making then policy outcomes more accepting of Europeanization.

To sum up, if influence within the EU defense matters is solely obtained by participating in the CSDP, Denmark has had to seek other ways of implementing its foreign political defense ambition in an EU setting. As was claimed by Rose (1998), a state's foreign political ambitions are driven by its placement within the international system and the relative material capabilities it possesses (p. 21 in project). With a placement outside the EU cooperation, de facto a consequence of the opt-out, and with limited material defense capabilities, Denmark presented its Armed Forced as readily able to partake in EU missions should the opt-out cease to exist (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004), which can be postulated as intentional Europeanization. The effort to align domestic policy outcomes to those of the CSDP, as a means of enhancing defense power, is an example of Europeanization penetrating the national government system. The intervening mechanisms, or inputs, detected in this analytical section are as follows: the eagerness of Denmark to ready itself for participating in potential EU operations and being considered equal to its fellow EU Member States despite having the opt-out; the relationship EU has with NATO; and civilian synergies emphasized in the CHG and EP report. This analytical section has shown that the Danish Defence Agreements include modifications and developments which occur parallel to those happening at the European level. Adding to this argument is the fear of potential marginalization in EU policy discussions, thus the notion of intentional Europeanization showcases an acceptance of the overall EU integration, as well as respecting and supporting the increasing relationship between EU and NATO in defense matters.

8.2 The Tactical Level

The following section will introduce a different perspective to the analytical section presented above. On the basis of a semi-structured interview conducted with Colonel Jess Møller Nielsen at Aalborg Kaserner, this section will analyze whether the level of Europeanization, which has been conclusively recognized as present at the political level, has penetrated the tactical level, i.e. the operational space where soldiers carry out the initiatives, aims and goals portrayed in the Defence Agreements. This project considers the statements gathered from interview with the Colonel, as a fair representative of the tactical level of the Danish Defence, as the Colonel has had tremendous experience both at the tactical and political level of the policy area (J. Nielsen, interview April 4th, 2017).

The Colonel initiated the interview by stating, that all international relations regarding the Danish Defence, are rooted solely in political concerns. This includes Denmark's involvement and military mentality towards to NATO, UN, OSCE and EU. This then concerns all political incentives for Danish involvement in the organizations, as well as bi- and multilateral cooperation. This point of view was later reaffirmed by a statement claiming that the defense opt-out is in its entirety and solely, a political decision. When asked whether the transiting into the EU's CSDP would be difficult, the Colonel claimed it to be unproblematic as soldiers are trained to adapt and 'make it work'. Distributing resources to deal with EU missions is thus merely a structural matter. Although the tone of the interview stayed respectful towards the EU, when asked whether the opt-out effects soldiers in their everyday work, the Colonel presented it as being "not noteworthy. Maybe it was in 1992, but not anymore" (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017). At the tactical level, the EU and its CSDP does seemingly not play a significant part. In fact, the EU is here solely regarded as an economic institution, which later added a defense element. It was stated that the EU simply does not contain the same defense skeleton, or foundation, as NATO (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017). In the event that NATO would cease to exists, the Colonel finds the NATO foundation to be still equally as strong, as relations between the then 'former' NATO members would still be present, ultimately leading to bi- and multilateral cooperation. Accordingly, there was little to nothing the EU's defense policy could do to fill the gap of a potential NATO collapse (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017). The tactical level of the Danish Defence thus sees NATO and bi-lateral cooperation as superior to EU initiated defense[51]. This point is further emphasized by the statement, that all mentions of the EU in the Danish Defence Agreements, as seen in the 05-09 and 10-14 texts (pp. 39-41 in project), are merely political opinions, not something of substance. "The amount of lines or words [mentioning the EU] depends on the political affiliation of the ruling government" (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017).

In the above featured analytical section, it was concluded that Europeanization has penetrated the Danish domestic defense policy outcome, i.e. the Defence Agreements. One observation utilized to make this conclusion was the unification of military and civilian resources occurring in the Danish Defence Agreements, parallel to or immediately following the CHG and the EP report in 2010 (p. 30-31 in the project). This civilian-military capacity building, alongside the readiness to partake in EU missions should the opt-out be lifted, was understood as a consequences of EU leveled development. However, this point of view is not shared at the tactical level, as further incorporating civilian resources and capabilities into military operations is regarded as having "nothing to do with the EU" (J. Nielsen,

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[51] Colonel Nielsen presented following examples of bi- and multilateral agreements favored by the Danish Defence: the UK and the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

interview, April 4th, 2017). More so, this measure was stated as solely done to promote nation building (SIC!). This concludes, that Europeanization has not penetrated far enough in domestic politics to reach the tactical level, and thus influencing the way in which the EU is utilized and thought of by soldiers.

When presented with the findings of Olsen (2011), Colonel Nielsen explicitly stated his disagreement. He argued for this disagreement on the basis of draft process of the Defence Agreements, wherein the Chief of Defence is involved. This individual is, according to the Colonel, apolitical and offers military assessment and realistic knowledge about the notions drafted for the Defence Agreements. Due to the presence of the Chief of Defence in the draft process of the Agreements, it is not possible for Europeanization to influence the draft process for the Defence Agreements regardless of the socialization of civil servants and government officials, favoring European integration (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017) (SIC!). It is only what is deemed necessary and realistic for Denmark in terms of defense, and the threats it faces, which factor in when the Agreements are drafted, not the EU or specific individuals positive attitude towards European integration (SIC!). Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Danish soldiers' raison d´être[52] potentially could collide with the objective of some EU missions. According to the Colonel, the Danish soldiers are trained to combat major warfare and have a warrior mentality, this is their raison d´être. He states that having this point of view incorporated into their mentality from the beginning of their military career, offers "little to no room for civilian and humanitarian aspects" (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017) (SIC!). It is can therefore be stated, that Danish soldiers have not been Europeanization, as their raison d´être more so resembles NATO objectives, not the CSDP. "[U]sing the Danish military for humanitarian tasks, is using the wrong toolkit" (J. Nielsen, interview, April 4th, 2017). Drawing a parallel back to the notion put forward by Bailes (2006), claiming the opt-out as a point of frustration for the Danish defense elite, it is proposed that this frustration still only occurs at a political level, not at the tactical level.

It can be concluded that Europeanization has not penetrated the tactical level of Danish Defence. This analysis postulates, that this penetration will not change or even continue further, until Denmark faces an immediate threat that relies on its cooperation with the EU or when the Europeanization of the political level compels political action to opt back in. In such a case, the Danish Armed Forces will analytical restructure its conditions and operational resources. This restructuring is, according to the Colonel, solely a military instance, not a political one (J. Nielsen, interview. April 4th, 2017). At the

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[52] Raison d´être is a French phrase meaning: reason or justification for existence https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/raison%20d%27être

tactical level, the input-output relationship thus looks a little different than at the political level. At the political level, this analysis presented several relationships where the input was a EU leveled development and output was domestic alignment to the development, i.e. Europeanization. The relationships at the tactical level have the Defence Agreements as the input, but no Europeanized outputs. Instead, the outputs here more so resemble the NATO mindset. Thus, regardless of the inputs, Europeanized or not, the outputs at the tactical level seem to remain solely supportive towards NATO.

9.0 Conclusions

The following chapter presents the conclusions of this project. Subsequent to answering the problem formulation "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation", this chapter will feature concluding remarks on several chapters of the project, in order to assess the overall project and to what degree the framework established was successful.

9.1 Final analytical conclusion

The following will present the analytical findings of this project, which will function to answer the problem formulation "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation". The analysis was conducted in two sections showcasing two levels, a political outcome and a tactical one. This project structured the analysis as such, in order to detect the level of Europeanization. Existing literature on the topic had concluded that Europeanization had occurred in the MoD, as the behavior of civil servants and government officials indicated a socialization towards a positive mentality of European integration, i.e. top-down Europeanization. Building on this, existing research also showcased that the defense elite of Denmark found the opt-out frustrating and, to an extent, a hindrance. Although the claim was not backed by examples or further explanations, this project postulated that one such frustration could be detected during the voting procedure in the EUMC, where the Danish vote lead to doubts of the Danish contribution and eventually spilled over into internal political debates (p. 50 in project). This project sought to conduct an analysis focusing on Europeanization of political outcomes, i.e. the Danish Defence Agreements, and why this had occurred. By engaging in process-tracing, the analysis was able to detect certain mechanisms, which

could explain the why Europeanization had occurred. These mechanisms where then structured according to Easton's (1965a, 1965b) System Analysis, and presented as input-output relationships.

The political outcome level of this project's analysis first and foremost concluded that Europeanization had occurred within the Danish Defence Agreements. This conclusion is imperative to state, as the existing literature on the subject did not factor in the current Defence Agreement, as it was published before the 13-17 Agreement came into place. In analyzing why Europeanization had occurred, this analytical section found four input-output relationships, which can explain the phenomenon's presence in the Danish Defence Agreements. The first input detected was the Danish eagerness to display a readiness of the Danish Armed Forces to participate in EU operations, should the opt-out be lifted. Secondly, the merging of civilian capabilities with military one, either directly or indirectly as can be seen in the CHG developments of the EU (pp. 30-31 in project), flowing into the Danish Defence Agreements. Furthermore, it was observed that efforts of joint services happened in the Danish Defence Agreements, almost immediately after similar developments occurred in the EU defense policy area. The third mechanism can be labelled as wanting to showcase support for overall development within the EU, regardless of the policy area, in fear of being marginalized. This intervening mechanism can be tied to the existing results put forth by Olsen (2011), i.e. Europeanized socialization of civilian servants and government officials, as well as the notions of neoclassic realism which claim the states' foreign political ambition are tied to the international position and available material capabilities. Seeing as Denmark has the defense opt-out, it has to seek other ways of carrying out its domestic foreign political ambition within the EU, as it cannot explicitly do so within the CSDP as other Member States. Through intentional Europeanization, the Danish Defence Agreements showcase developments, which can be postulated as attempts to hinder possible marginalization, in defense[53] as well as other areas. A counter argument has found that the defense opt-out has not affected the Danish voice in other EU policy areas (Olsen & Pilegaard, 2005). However, this project concludes that certain political elements seemingly are effected by the Danish hesitant attitude towards the EU. The EUMC vote (p. 50 in project) indicated a lack of confidence in the Danish representative, as defense intentions were questioned at the European level. As it led to a lengthy national debate, ultimately resulting in a document stating that the Danish representative has acted against national suggestions, this signaled an unclear and inconsistent domestic defense policy. The final input is tied to the strong explicit Danish support of NATO, an element very prominent all five Agreements. As NATO and the EU engaged in further cooperation, simultaneously did the Danish Agreements become

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[53] As has been pointed out above, Denmark does participate in EU defense matters, to an extent. It can attempt to persuade decisions through its observer status as well as have direct influence through its official participation in the EUMC.

Europeanization and featured the similar elements to those found in the institutional collaboration. These elements consists of emphasizing the civilian capabilities as imperative for military operations, as well as recognizing the EU's contributions to the European security scene, by explicitly stating that the Danish Defence structure of 2005-2009 would allow for immediate satisfactory contribution to future European defense initiatives, "including combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and peace support operations with force contribution from both the EU and NATO" (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 2). Such EU leveled developments can be recognized as the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU (p. 28 in project) as well as the statement by NATO emphasizing an active and effective EU as essential to the contribution of the overall Euro-Atlantic security (p. 28 in project). Additionally, these similarities found in the Danish Defence Agreements, demonstrates towards NATO, as well as the other double integrated EU Member States, the Denmark supports the EU-NATO relationship and welcomes the EU as defense ally of NATO, and per de facto Denmark as well. This development at the EU level has thus penetrated the Danish domestic policy. This form of top-down Europeanization can perhaps be labeled as a more intentional Europeanization, as Denmark wants to publicly show its support of the developments in NATO and in order to do so, it must also consider aligning itself with the developments occurring at the EU level, which involves NATO.

The tactical level analysis of this project indicated that Europeanization has not fully penetrated the policy area of defense in Denmark. This can be concluded as the tactical level, does not consider the EU to have an impact on the future development of the Danish Defence. At the tactical level, the EU is still merely considered a political economic institution, with limited defense knowledge and capabilities, when compared to NATO. As was claimed by the interviewee representing the Danish Defence, all Danish relations with the EU, also those dealing with defense matters, are considered political and based on the political affiliations and decisions of the Danish government, rendering them not noteworthy at the tactical level (pp. 52, 68 in project). Although a redistribution of defense resources to potentially include EU operations was deemed manageable, the interviewee considered utilizing the Armed Forces for humanitarian operations as the wrong toolkit, stating that it could ultimately go against the Danish soldier's raison d´être (pp. 53, 69 in project).

If Europeanization had fully penetrated all levels of the Danish Defence, the outputs of all input-output relationships would be a form of Europeanization. As can be seen in Figure 3 below, this has not occurred. The outputs detected at the tactical level, can conclusively be understood as supporting a NATO mindset, and an acceptance of potential structural and material changes, to incorporate the EU as a defense element. In the figure below, the black arrows indicate the level of Europeanization according to the analytical results of this project. As can be seen, there is no arrow, i.e. Europeanized

penetration, from the MoD to the Armed Forces. This indicates that Europeanization has not occurred at the tactical level. This illustration also shows that Europeanization has occurred beyond the existing literature portrayed in this project. It can therefore be concluded that Europeanization of the Danish Defence has penetrated beyond the normative level as presented by Olsen (2011), to also include political outcomes, i.e. the Danish Defence Agreements. It can be postulated that the lack of Europeanized penetration at the final level, is because Europeanization has become anonymized at the tactical level, as EU is drowned out, by the Danish emphasis on NATO.


Figure 3: *Extent of Europeanization Penetration in the Danish Defence Policy Area*

In order to answer the problem formulation "Why has Europeanization occurred in the Danish Defence Agreements; outcomes embedded in a policy area formally delinked from European defense cooperation?", this project concludes that the intervening mechanisms presented above, have caused the political outcomes of the Danish Defence to become Europeanized. The analysis has shown that Europeanization, has penetrated beyond the normative level, i.e. studies by Olsen (2011), to the policy outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 3 above. This project thereby expands on the already existing research. This project postulates, on the basis of the results presented here, that Europeanization can occur both intentionally and unintentionally. This is claimed as there seems to be intentional measures taken by the Danish Defence, which enhances its reputation as a double integrated Member State and showcases support for NATO. As all five Agreements explicitly states several times, that NATO is the main defense institution contributing to the Danish foreign and security policies, public support for

EU affairs, backed by NATO, could strengthen the Danish position in NATO as it showcases cooperation and accept of institutional decisions. As such, Denmark has openly allowed for a Europeanized modification of its Defence Agreements. On the other hand, some Europeanized developments occurring within the Agreements, seem more unintentional. Denmark, on the account of its opt-out, does not state its support of the CSDP within the Defence Agreements. However, similar developments can be detected in the Danish Agreements, following developments in the CSDP. By aligning its national defense policy to that of the EU's, Denmark is showcasing support of EU measures by acknowledging them as important enough to include in domestic policy documents.

This project found one explaining factor for why has Europeanization occurred to be the theoretical explanations provided by neoclassic realism. This theory claims, that state actions, i.e. its foreign political ambitions, has a direct correlation to their position in the international system. Denmark has a limited defense power, i.e. limited material capabilities, and foreign political ambitions of: having strong international presence, not being politically marginalized, supporting EU integration and having NATO as a central piece of its foreign, security and defense policy. It can thus be concluded, that the Europeanized developments of the Danish Defence Agreements, is the link between its foreign policy ambition and its actual defense power. Intentional Europeanization, thus becomes the element that is able to link the Danish foreign political ambitions with its actual defense capabilities. This means, that Denmark is able to actively carry out its foreign political ambitions, despite limited defense capabilities, as Europeanization allows for this to happen. It can be postulated that the Danish position in the international system influences its foreign political ambition to be somewhat depend on a link such as Europeanization, in order to reach these ambitions with limited defense capabilities.

9.2 Theoretical and methodological conclusions

The theoretical chapter of this project proved to be less useful in the analysis, than predicted. In recognizing and analyzing the intervening mechanisms and input-output relationships, which illustrated Europeanization of the Danish Defence Agreements, the theoretical notions of neoclassic realism were not as apparent as expected. Instead, the methodological research method of process-tracing and the explaining phenomena of Europeanization, provided the analytical results. However, the theoretical notion of neoclassic realism did play a role in the assessment and overall conclusions presented above. Here, the neoclassic realist theoretical definition of how a state carries out its foreign political ambitions, despite limited defense capabilities ultimately aiding in answering the problem

formulation. Had the theoretical chapter not been present, the intervening mechanisms detected in the analysis would not have been able to set the concluding results in a context of international relations, in cohesive formulated answer. Instead, the analytical results would have been fractured elements listed as a causal effect between the EU and Denmark, not a concluding result.

The methodological notions put forth in this project were essential for the framework of the project in general, as well as structuring the analysis. By determining the research as a qualitative deviant case study utilizing process-tracing and semi-structured interviews with Easton's Systems Analysis as an analytical structure, this project was able to: confine the parameters of investigation, i.e. data collection; utilize the time and space given for research in a constructive manner, i.e. conducting a case study of a single country; as well tools for analyzing the data found. In order to answer the problem formulation of why the phenomena had occurred, this project found it helpful that process-tracing provided analytical tools to categorize the findings, and ultimately provide a concise and comprehensible analysis. By adding the element of System Analysis, this project was able to further structure these findings into input-output relationships. On the basis of the composition of the analysis, the concluding results for this project were presented in a such a way that the answer to the problem formulation is recognizable.

9.3 Further research

If the time and page parameters were expanded, this project would have engaged in further research, in order to analyze to what extent, the Europeanization mechanisms detected in the existing literature by Olsen (2011) and the ones determined here, still exist in the upcoming Defence Agreement, currently being drafted. Geopolitical contextual changes, e.g. Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and escalations in Syria, have occurred since the publication of the 13-17 Agreement, thus the mechanisms causing Europeanization may be enhanced, lessened or new ones may even intervene. Depending on the outcome of the upcoming Defence Agreement, the future research would either remain a case study or be a longitudinal research design[54]. This conclusion proposes that in further research, the concept of Europeanization be extended, beyond the page limitation set for this project. This extension would then include Morten Kallestrup's *Europæisering af Nationalstaten: EU's konsekvenser for dansk reguleringspolitik og de nationale aktørers undervurderede rolle* from 2005, where the concept of goodness of fit is introduced. Other works for further research could be: Hill &

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[54] Longitudinal research designs consist of several cases or themes observed over a longer time period in order to establish patterns (Bryman, 2014)

Wallace (1996) Smith (2000), Tonra (2000), Aggerstam (2004), Beyers (2005), Checkel (2005), Qualia et. al. (2008).

It is postulated, that the theoretical notions would remain the same, as neoclassic realism has been confirmed as the optimal theory for explaining foreign policy (p. 20 in project). The empirical data would consist of the same primary sources utilized in this project, as these lay the foundation for the analysis. However, this conclusion acknowledges that there would be a need for more interviews, if further analytical conclusions were to be made about the tactical level presented in this project. These interviews would be conducted with additional personnel of the Armed Forces, as well as personnel within the MoD and MFA. Furthermore, to verify the conclusions provided by Olsen (2011), interviews with the government officials responsible for the upcoming Defence Agreement, or civil servants working within the policy area, would be preferable. An imperative element needed for further research is a discussion of Europeanization vs. Globalization in foreign policy. This comparison is important firstly, in order to fulfil the research strategy criterion of dependability, and secondly, to provide further objectivity to the results produced. Such a discussion can be found in the works of: Wallace (2000), Verdier & Breen (2001), Graziano (2003) and Jacoby & Meunier (2010).

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Appendix 1: Interview Schedule

Date: April 4th 2017

Time: 1300-1400

Location: Aalborg Kaserner

Interviewee: Colonel Jess Møller Nielsen

Interviewer: Nanna Kirstine Søndergaard Holt

Q: What is the soldiers' view of the EU and the Danish defense opt-out?

A: The EU is always political. The EU does not have the same defense background as NATO, it is an economic institution first and foremost and this is its initial background. Defense was added later. Within NATO forums there is often a representation from the EU, it is therefore involved in NATO affairs which Denmark contribute to.

Q: Does the opt-out agreement effect you, i.e. the soldiers?

A: It is not noteworthy, not anymore. Maybe it was in 1992, it is not mentioned in the news now. The opt-out in 1992 was a political decision.

Q: What defines the Danish Defence?

A: Strong bilateral connection between Denmark and the UK, the Danish Armed Forces is modeled according to the UK's structure. Political cooperation in NORDEFCO, which is not a defense alliance. Denmark is pragmatic we make it work, regardless. Important topics for Denmark include, the Baltics represented by NATO, and the Arctic represented by the Arctic Council. NATO is imperative and norm setting for the Danish Defence. Denmark is a small state, we have fewer and better alliances, these primarily include NATO and UK.

Q: Can the Danish Defence delegate its resources, in the future, to participate in EU missions?

A: Yes, it would be unproblematic, however the EU must say for Denmark to participate.

Q: What is your opinion of the following statement: *Academic research shows that civil servants'* *and government officials' positive attitude towards the EU has led to Europeanization of the MFA* *and MoD?*

A: In disagreement, political unity across parties should hinder this. The Chief of Defence has a say in the direction the Defence Agreement will take. There exists a cooperation between the politicians'

opinion of which way the Danish Defence should go, and the Chief of Defence's realistic knowledge of the Department.

Q: What is your opinion of the following statement: *Academic research has suggested that the Danish Defence is training for EU missions in terms of stabilization and other humanitarian incentives, despite the opt-out? Furthermore, some claim this is something unique for Denmark and could enable Denmark to be a 'frontrunner' in these types of EU operations.*

A: It is merely nation building and capacity structuring. This is not distinctive for Denmark. The Danish Defence creates a warrior mindset, not one for humanitarian operations. It is in their raison d´être, it has absolutely nothing to do with the EU. It is kill or be killed. New security and defense challenges include major warfare. NATO looks ahead and this feeds into the raison d´être of the Danish Defence. Training soldiers for both major warfare and stabilization, humanitarian or other civilian operations needs clarification from the politicians. This usage is wrong use of the tools, and conflicts the raison d´être.

Q: What is your opinion of the EUMC vs. the CSDP?
A: EUMC is about division of labor in terms of international relations and politics, ultimate seeking symbiosis between NATO and EU.

Q: What is your opinion of the mentioning of opt-out in the Danish Defence Agreements?
A: It is solely political and does not equal substance in relation to the EU.

Q: If the US leaves NATO, and it collapses, in your opinion, would Denmark look to the EU for defense matters?
A: EU has too little of a defense integration. The multilateral defense foundation between NATO members is much better. It is difficult for Denmark to integrate when no real threat is detected. We see that defense expenditure has been cut by 15%.

Appendix 2: Organizational Structure of the Danish Ministry of Defence

The Organisation of the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD)

FORSVARSMINISTERIET
DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Executive Management
Permanent Secretary of State for Defence

Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence for Strategic Management

Corporate Internal Audit of the Ministry of Defence (FIR)

Legal Office (JS) — Legal (JUR)

Minister's Private office and Executive Secretariat (MLS) — Press and Communication (PK)

New Fighter Program (NFP)
- Military Evaluation (NKA)
- Strategy and Industry (NSI)
- Finance (NOEK)

Security Policy (SP)
- Policy and Strategy (SPP)
- Defence Policy (SPF)

Operations (OP)
- National Operations (OPN)
- International Operations (OPI)

Strategic Planning (PLA)
- Acquisitions and Capability (PMK)
- Infrastructure, Environment and Energy (PIM)
- Emergency Management and Home Guard (PBH)
- Strategic IT (PSI)

Corporate Finance (KOD)
- Finance (KFI)
- Controlling (KCO)
- Strategic Resources (KOL)
- Analysis and Business Optimisation (KAK)
- Corporate SAP (KDB)
- Business Partner Defence Command Denmark (VOEA)
  - Finance Unit (OES)
  - Specialist Unit (FGS)

Corporate HR and Services (KHS)
- Strategic HR (KSH)
- Service and Administration (KSA)
- HR Partner (HRP)

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Appendix 3: Danish participation in UN observer and peacekeeping operations

Table 1. Danish military participation in UN observer and peacekeeping operations.

Mission	Duration	Participation	Peak contribution	% of mission peak
UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East	1948–	1948–	20	3.5
UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949–	1949–2009	7	14
UNEF I – First United Nations Emergency Force	1956–67	1956–67	565	9.3
UNOGIL – United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	1958	1958	12	2
ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo	1960–64	1960–64	262	1.3
UNYOM – United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	1963–64	1963–64	3	1.6
UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964–	1964–94	1,000	15.9
UNIPOM – United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	1965–66	1965–66	4	4.2
UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights)	1974–	1974	4[a]	0.4
UNGOMAP – United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	1988–90	1988–90	2	4
UNIIMOG – United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	1988–91	1988–91	12	0.5
UNTAG – United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia	1989–90	1989–90	130	1.7

UNIKOM – United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	1991–2003	1991–2003	54	16.9
UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force	1992–1995	1992–95	1,295	6.1
UNCRO – United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization in Croatia	1995–1996	1995–96	891	13.2
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	1993–1999	1993–1999	88	7.9
UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	1993–2009	1993–2009	7	0.5
UNMOT – United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	1994–2000	1994–2000	4	4.9
UNMIBH – United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995–2002	1995–2002	1	0.05
UNMOP – United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka Peninsula	1996–2002	1996–2002	1	3.6
UNPF – United Nations Peace Forces in Zagreb (HQ)	1996	1996	11	4
UNTAES – United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	1996–98	1996–98	12	0.2
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo	1999–	1999–2011	1	16,9
UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor	1999	1999	3	6
UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	1999–	1999–2008	2	0.01
MONUC – United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999–2010	2000–10	2	0.05
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	1999–2002	1999–2002	4	0.04
UNMEE – United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	2000–08	2000–06	214	5.1
UNMISET – United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	2002–05	2002–05	4	0.07
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia	2003–	2003–	6	0.04
UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan	2005–11	2005–10	41	0,4

Table 1. Continued.

Mission	Duration	Participation	Peak contribution	% of mission peak
MINURSO – The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991–	2005–07	2	0,8
UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	1978–	2006–11	193	1.5
MINURCAT – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	2007–10	2008	12	0.2
MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2010–	2010–11	2	0.009
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	2011–	2011–	16	0,2
UNSMIS – United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	2012	2012	10	3.3
MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	2014–	2014–	109	1

[a]Transfer from UNTSO to facilitate mission start up.
Sources: Forsvaret, *Internationalt engagement*; UN, *Country contributions detailed by mission 1990–2015*.

Data collected from Jakobsen (2016)