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AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

Understanding a 'War'

an investigation into the framing of terrorism post-9/11

Master Thesis 2016

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Abstract

This study investigates terrorism and sets out to analyze the framing of terrorism post 9/11 and how that corresponds to securitization and institutionalism theory.

For this, we conduct a comparative multiple case study of three cases represented by the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001, July 7, 2005 and November 13, 2015.
The background chapter is a genealogical analysis of terrorism. The genealogy gives an account of how power relations have defined the terrorism discourse.
The background serves as a contextual premise to the policy analysis of counter-terrorism legislative frameworks and political statements by the US, the UK, France, NATO and the UN, through which light is shed on the framing of terrorism post 9/11. The findings generated from the policy analysis will be discussed in the light of securitization and institutionalism theory. On the one hand, the discussion will reveal that terrorism is a highly institutionalized security matter which is predominantly encouraged to be fought by means of a liberalist approach, advocating international cooperation. However, the call for a liberalist approach in counter-terrorism always finds itself to be discoursed within a realist framework. On the other hand, the analysis will also show a change in the terrorism framing as the external threat is increasingly also perceived as an internal threat.

This thesis is not supposed to give a comprehensive picture of the framing of terrorism, but is expected to contribute to the current body of (counter-)terrorism literature and should be seen as a potential point of departure for further research in terrorism studies within the field of international relations.

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List of Abbreviations

7/7	July 7, 2005
9/11	September 11, 2001
11/13	November 13, 2015
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CS	Copenhagen School
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RO	Referent Object
SA	Securitizing Actor
SotU	State of the Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
US	United States
USA PATRIOT Act	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
WPR	What's the Problem Represented to Be

I. Introduction and Problem Formulation

Noam Chomsky: "Do they want to encourage further terrorism, or do they want to end that kind of terrorism? That's the choice. If you want to end it, the first question you ask is: why did it take place? What were the immediate causes and what were the deeper roots? And then you try to address those."

(acTVism Munich, 2015)

On September 20, 2001 - nine days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Virginia - President George W. Bush spoke to a joint session of Congress. In this speech, he declared that the 'war on terror' had begun while linking the attacks to another landmark in United States (US) history; the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 that had seen the US enter World War II (WWII) (Bush, 2001, pp. 66-68). Thus, from what can be described as the onset of the 'war on terror', a narrative placing 9/11 into a historical context was created.

In the fight against terrorism, Noam Chomsky calls political leaders to re-focus on the root causes of the issue. In order to being able to shift one's focus, one must first understand how the issue has been thought about. By investigating in this study how terrorism has been framed post 9/11 and how that corresponds to securitization and institutionalism theory, we hope to gain more understanding about how terrorism has been represented.

In 2016, as we approach the 15th anniversary of 9/11, the 'war on terror' is still ongoing. 9/11 brought about the introduction and tightening of policies in order to combat and prevent terrorism. Notably, the USA PATRIOT Act was immediately introduced in the aftermath of 9/11.
In 2006, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, presenting an international counter-terrorism strategy which demands national and international efforts to address the roots of terrorism, combat and prevent it, while doing so under the rule of law and by respecting human rights (United Nations General Assembly, 2006).

9/11 not only saw a change in policies but also resulted in military action as the attack led to the US-led invasion, supported by among others Britain, of Afghanistan in 2001, and the more than a decade long war there (Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S. War in Afghanistan"). The military operation saw additional involvement of other countries and alliances such as for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which took control of the international security forces in 2003 (Council on Foreign Relations, "An International Mission"). After more than a decade, President Obama announced the partial withdrawal of military forces from the war in Afghanistan in 2014, however with a continued military presence which is supposed to help stabilize the region (Council on Foreign Relations, "Obama Announces U.S. Troop Withdrawal"). Thus, regardless of 'the ended war', the future of what started as a 'war on terror' remains unknown, and has moved way beyond Afghanistan. Existent terrorist groups re-emerge in different form and shapes while new groups have formed such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), also known as Isil, Isis or Daesh (Irshaid, 2015"). The IS in particular represents an arguably somewhat new form of jihadist organization as it namely declared itself as the Islamic State, proclaiming to restore a caliphate (Irshaid, 2015).

Based on this context, the continuous development of framing of terrorism in discourse and how the terrorism narrative corresponds to aspects of securitization and institutionalism in an international relations (IR) context, will come together in this research. This paper seeks to contribute to the, in the post-9/11 era, increasing body of literature concerning terrorism and counterterrorism studies within IR. As can also be observed from recent developments and terrorist activities since 9/11, the face of terrorism is arguably continuously changing in a volatile and fast-moving environment. Therefore, the research surrounding the framing of terrorism requires constant reevaluation in order to be able to keep up the pace in understanding new or changing phenomena. Ideally, our research could be used to further analyze to what extent or how the framing of terrorism influences the challenges and opportunities national and international institutions face in combating and preventing terrorism. We do not want to judge nor evaluate the state of institutions in combating terrorism, however, we believe that our research can contribute to enrich the current body of research and help to identify further fields of research in that regard.

On the basis of the aforementioned contextual premise, we consider following problem formulation:

How is terrorism framed in legislative frameworks and political statements by the US, the UK, France, the UN and NATO introduced in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 9/11 attacks in New York City, the 2005 7/7 bombings in London, and the 2015 11/13 bombings in Paris?
In terms of securitization and institutionalism within an international relations theory context, what notions are the framings related to and what are its potential international consequences particularly concerning cooperation in counterterrorism?

For answering the problem formulation, we conduct a genealogy of terrorism and policy analysis to discuss the findings in the light of the theories of securitization and institutionalism as explained through a liberalist and a realist lense. By critically applying the analytical method and theories, we aim to answer the following research questions:

1. How can we understand terrorism discourse through genealogy within an international context?
2. How is terrorism framed and what purpose do the framings serve in terms of securitization and institutionalism in an IR context?
3. How can the insights gained explain international cooperation efforts in counterterrorism?

In order to answer the research questions and the problem statement, we begin our second chapter by explaining the overall methodology to which this study adheres. We will present our research design as well as the genealogy and policy analysis approach we intend to apply.
We conduct a genealogical approach to analyze the influence of power relations on the terrorism discourse while policy analysis is our analytical method of choice to analyze our primary data. For the analysis, we apply a comparative multiple case study research design whereby we chronologically conduct the analysis by means of

our three cases: September 11, 2001 (9/11) in New York, July 7, 2005 (7/7) in London, and November 13, 2015 (11/13) in Paris.

In the third chapter we genealogically trace back the terrorism discourse and for that also look into the contextual background of the world order from shortly before the end of the Cold War to today. For this, the end of the Cold War as well as 9/11 shall function as two significant turnings points for political development.

In the fourth chapter, we will present the theoretical framework, in which we present securitization as explained by the Copenhagen School (CS) and institutionalism as discussed from a liberal and realist point of view. The findings generated from the policy analysis shall be examined in light of those two theories.

As for the policy analysis of our documents, we intend to analyze how terrorism has been framed within the USA PATRIOT Act (2001), George W. Bush's speech before Congress (2001), the UK Terrorism Act (2006), Tony Blair's speech before Parliament (2005), the legislative framework behind the state of emergency in France (2016), François Hollande's speech before Parliament as well as NATO and UN statements which have been issued as a response to the three terrorist attacks respectively.

The last chapter will be a summary of our findings and will give us the opportunity to conclude our paper by critically discuss our problem statement with the help of the research questions posed.

II. Methodology

In our methodology chapter, we will present the research design, analytical methods and theories which we apply in our research. First, we present our philosophy of science and then move onto to explaining our research design. We apply a comparative multiple case study research design which functions as the overall framework of our research.

For this, the three terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London and 11/13 in Paris will serve as our three cases, according to which we have chosen our data and on which we will contextually base our analysis on. Furthermore, our data can be ascribed to five actors: the US, the UK, and France as national actors, while NATO and the UN represent international actors. In the course of our paper, we will refer to the respective terrorist attacks as 9/11, 7/7, and 11/13.

Next, we present our data collection method subchapter, in which we explain the data selected, and briefly introduce the 12 documents which serve as our primary data.

Hereafter, we explain our methods of analysis; we conduct a genealogy analysis approach to trace back how power relations, as defined by the world order after the Cold War and 9/11, have influenced the terrorism discourse and even created a new terrorism narrative. Our second analytical method is Carol Bacchi's policy analysis approach 'what's the problem represented to be' (WPR), which we will use to analyze the 12 primary documents.

We conclude the methodology chapter by critically evaluating our research design and point out any challenges and limitations which might have represented an obstacle or challenge to our methodology.

2.1. Philosophy of Science

As for our ontological stance, we will work from an ontological-constructivist point of view. Working from that perspective means that we understand the social world to be continuously constructed and shaped by the social actors within it (Bryman, 2012, p. 33). Given that we analyze how the framing of the terrorism has been shaped by power relations within the terrorism discourse, we also perceive the social world as a field, where the social world is shaped by discourses that take place within it. The

development of the framings within such discourses are part of creating this very social world and by investigating those, we can learn to understand the aspects which actually construct and steer the terrorism discourse. Given our problem formulation, we consider the constructivist perspective the most feasible for this proposed project as it helps to analyze the discourse of the framing of terrorism, as well as to understand the developments of the framings within an institutionalist and securitization context.

Moreover, we work from an epistemologically interpretivist point of view. Interpretivism is grounded in the notion that there are fundamental differences between people and their realities; this aspect would therefore fit to accompany our ontologically constructivist approach (Bryman, 2012, p. 28). Moreover, by discussing the framing of terrorism and through genealogically tracing the terrorism discourse, we will include contextual backgrounds interpreted from different perspectives which makes interpretivism the stance of choice.

2.2. Research Design

In this chapter we will give an overview of the thesis' research design by explaining our analytical methods of choice, the theories applied and how the different aspects relate to one another. As per our problem formulation, we intend to analyze how terrorism is framed in legislative frameworks and political statements, and how our findings relate to securitization and institutionalism in an IR context. We will narrow down the scope to three specific events and their respective aftermaths: September 11, 2001, the July 7, 2005 and November 13, 2015. These specific events have been chosen based on involved parties; namely the UK, France and the US who represent our national actors. The UN and NATO serve as the international actors included in this research. We have chosen both national and international actors because we believe that involving more actors would consequently contribute to a broader understanding of the terrorism issue. For this general research framework, we apply a comparative multiple case study research design in the form of a multiple case study.

On a general level, we conduct a comparative research design. According to Bryman (2012), a comparative research design puts two (or more) contrasting cases against each other while applying to them the same methods; through the comparison, social phenomena can be better understood (p. 72). As we intend to look at the framing of the terrorism discourse in legislative frameworks and political statements, the comparative research design will subsequently be of a qualitative nature and can be described as a multiple case study (Bryman, 2012, p. 74).

As for our method of analysis, we apply two analytical methods. We first choose the application of genealogy as based on how Michel Foucault coined the term. Foucault's genealogy theory is similar to Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogy investigation (Lightbody, 2010, p. 184). We use a genealogical approach here as a path of guidance in investigating the influence of power on the development of the terrorism discourse. Given the wide spectrum that terrorism studies cover, we believe that a genealogical approach will help us to work through the complexity of the concept of terrorism.

Secondly, we apply Carol Bacchi's WPR policy analysis approach in order to conduct a qualitative analysis of the data chosen. The data will consist of political statements made in an official institutional setting and legislative frameworks which were taken in response to the respective terrorist attacks. We will analyze one legislative framework and one political statement each made by the US, the UK, and France in the aftermath of the respective attacks. Furthermore, we will include in the analysis one official, political statement made by the UN and NATO respectively in the aftermath of each of the three terrorist attacks; this would mean that a total number of 12 documents will serve as our primary data. We will analyze the 12 documents in chronological order of their date of issuance, and according to the timeline of the three cases. Lastly, the theoretical framework of our thesis consists of institutionalism as explained from a liberalist and realist perspective and securitization as explained by the Copenhagen School.

The findings that result from the analysis will be further analyzed and discussed against the theories which we have picked in a previous step. As we go back and forth

between the data and theories, we can state that our method of reasoning stems from an iterative approach (Bryman, 2012, p. 26).

2.3. (Multiple) Case Study

Using case study as the preferred research method is supposed to contribute to our knowledge and understanding of a certain complex social phenomena and allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin 2009, p. 4), such as, for example, international relations (Yin, 1994, p. 3).
Thus, as a research technique, case studies "contribute [...] uniquely to our knowledge of [...] social, and political phenomena", and has, increasingly, become a favored research strategy within different disciplines (Yin, 1994, p. 2).
The surge of the use of case studies is, however, somewhat new, as the perception of this research method for long was perceived as a less flattering method within social science, as it lacked the tools to quantify results, be objective, and rigor (Yin, 1994, p. xiii). Thus, case studies has been viewed as 'soft' form of research, based on a belief, within social science, that this method only is appropriate for the exploratory phase of an investigation, and therefore cannot be descriptive or explanatory (Yin, 2009, pp. 2-6).
This conception of case studies is, nonetheless, misleading (Bailey, 2010, p. 103; Yin, 1994, p. 3), and is based on what Yin (1994) calls a 'hierarchical view' of how to conduct research (p. 3). Here, as aforementioned, case studies are preferred only for the exploratory stage of the research, whereas surveys are used for descriptions, and an experimental design is "the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquiries" (Yin, 1994, p. 3).
To counter this misconception, Yin (1994, pp. 3-4) argues that a more inclusive and pluralistic view of different research research strategies would be more convenient, as they are overlapping each other, and that each strategy - be it an experiment, a survey, an archival analysis, history, or case study - can be either exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. This, of course, challenges the aforementioned 'hierarchical view' and places case studies on par with other research methods. That, however, does not suggest that case studies should be done without considering whether it is in fact the most desirable research strategy. Therefore, one must meet three conditions in order to establish that a case study is indeed desired; the type of

research question, the control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena (Yin, 2009, p. 2).

In sum, it is, according to Yin (2009, p. 2), favored to employ a case study design when (a) 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.

Quintessential for any sort of research, of course, are the research questions being posed; it is from these - and the problem formulation - the research itself takes off. Following this, it is of utmost importance to recognize what kind(s) of question(s) being asked in order to differentiate between the different strategies (Yin, 1994, p. 7). As aforementioned, a case study is to be favored when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, which indeed is the case for this specific research. 'How' and/or 'why' questions are, nevertheless, not automatically aligned with case studies. These question types are just as appropriately fit to be used to, for example, an experimental design (Yin, 1994, p. 6). Thus, as already mentioned, just as the kind of question being posed is of great importance to the research, likewise is how the question is being posed of significance to decide the favored research strategy.

Accordingly, what we seek to investigate is the framing of terrorism in statements made by politicians and policies aiming to countering terrorism. For us, this implies a need to first isolate and scrutinize our units of analysis, before analyzing and comparing these.

In order to do this, we need not any form of active participation from relevant actors - i.e. the requirement of having little or no control of events - which would have been be required if we were to conduct a survey or an experiment, but, on the other hand, what is needed is to "draw upon a wider array of documentary information" (Yin, 1994, p. 7). Indeed, as Yin (2009) explains, this points to the unique strength of case studies, which is "its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence" (p. 11), thus allowing us to utilize "multiple data sources to explain, [...] phenomena" (Bailey, 2010, p. 103). This leads to the last of Yin's requirements, the focus on a

contemporary event within a real-life context, where “relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated” (Yin, 1994, p. 8).

As we have already established above, any relevant behaviors needed for this study cannot be manipulated as we 1) have no control over the events, and 2) the events have already taken place. Thus, this study employs a multiple case study design, where the events - our units of analysis - have already taken place, and where we as researchers have no control over these. Along these lines, it is argued here, that the 9/11 attacks on the US, the 7/7 bombings in London, and the 11/13 attacks in Paris all are qualified to serve as cases for this study, as they all are contemporary events within a real-life context that have already taken place. Furthermore, the units of analysis are determined by how “the initial research questions have been defined” (Yin, 1994, p. 22). To us this means, that we have carefully chosen these three specific events, after having formulated our problem formulation and research questions, as we believe these events relate to our inquiries.

Thus, by focusing on three events, rather than one, our design, by nature, takes the form of a multiple case study, which can also be referred to as a comparative study (Yin, 1994, p. 45), and as such can be used “ to gain insight into broader phenomena” (Bailey, 2010, p. 103). By applying this research strategy, our main imperative “is rigorous attention to the complexities of the specific case[s] under study” (Bailey, 2010, p. 103). Our prerogative is, thusly, highlighted by Yin’s (1994) definition of a case study as an empirical inquiry where we investigate a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context[s], especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context[s] are not clearly evident” (p. 13). Whereas multiple and single case studies both belong to a case study research design, one particular upside to do a multiple case study is, in comparison to a single case, that such an approach offers “layered evidence” (Bailey, 2010, p. 104), and the findings are “often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 1994, p. 45). Of course, when employing a multiple case study design, we need to make sure that our cases represent a general phenomenon in order to justify why these have been selected. In other words, from the outset these three events have been chosen as we can predict, somewhat, similar results. This is what Yin (1994) calls literal replication (p. 46). Thus, from our research design our

cases have been selected and data collected, we proceed to conduct the three case studies and analyze separately before we compare and draw cross case conclusions (Yin, 1994, p. 49). This rigorous approach allows for us to gain insight into the unique and particular details of the cases in focus (Bailey, 2010, p. 104).

Notwithstanding, conducting case studies includes some limitations. The first concern is the question regarding internal validity, as case studies can produce incorrect causal relationships while it at the same time "[…] involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly observed" (Yin, 1994, p. 35). This latter concern relates also to the question regarding construct validity. Here, the 'inference' is concerned the phase of collecting data. This process can be influenced by measures that are not "[…] sufficiently operational […]" and judgments that are too 'subjective' (Yin, 1994, p. 34).

2.3. Method of Data Collection

As for our data, we choose in total 12 documents for the analysis: one legislative framework and one political statement made by the US after 9/11, the UK after 7/7 and France after 11/13 respectively. Furthermore, we include one official, political statement from the UN and NATO issued after all three terrorist attacks. The three terrorist attacks represent our three cases according to which we select our primary data: September 11, 2001, July 7, 2005, and November 13, 2015. For abbreviation purposes, we will also refer to the attacks respectively as 9/11, 7/7, and 11/13. To analyze the framing of terrorism, we selected the following documents:

1) 9/11: the USA PATRIOT Act (2001), George W. Bush's speech before a joint session before 107th Congress (2001) and the respective UN and NATO statements
2) 7/7: The Terrorism Act (2006), Tony Blair's speech before Parliament (2005) and the respective UN and NATO statements
3) 11/13: The framework behind the state of emergency law declared by Hollande in 2015, François Hollande's speech before Joint Congress (2015) and the respective UN and NATO statements

As we strive to analyze how terrorism is framed and how it can be discursively understood, the main criteria for our sources is to entail the framing of terrorism in a discourse as represented by a political statement, and a legislative framework, made in an official setting, and in the aftermath of the three selected events respectively. This allows for continuity and makes the comparison as well as discussion of all 12 documents at the end of the policy analysis easier and more manageable.

First, we want to make sure that we choose legislative frameworks which could be described as a response to the terrorist attacks. Second, these legislative measures should be complemented by political statements. By doing so, we hope to enrich our potential findings as only analyzing either policies or statements could result in a lack of essential findings. We aim to show a broad picture and believe that the selection of both types of documents are beneficial to the discussion of our research.

The selected statements have to adhere to two main criteria set by us: they need to be made by high-level governing politicians at the respective times of the attacks, and the statements must have been made in an official setting. Official setting meaning here before for example parliament or any other official convening of a nation's representatives. This distinguishes our official statements from for example spontaneous responses made on television or to a newspaper without a formal script. Additionally, though all documents vary in length, this shall not be an essential point in our criteria as we believe that the content is important in the final discussion, while the length of the documents is of minimal significance. If anything, we think that the brevity and potential lack of substance in some statements might even contribute to shed light on the framing of terrorism in the light of the institutionalism theory applied.

As our primary sources of data are documents which we have derived from the state or government officials, such documents can be categorized as "official documents deriving from the state" according to Bryman (2012, pp. 549-550). These data can also be evaluated against J. Scott's four criteria as listed by Bryman: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (quoted in: Bryman, 2012, p. 544).
With 'authenticity', Scott questions whether the document is genuine or not; when we analyze a document for 'meaning', we aim to find out whether it is clear and

comprehensible (Bryman, 2012, p. 544). Bryman considers official documents from the state to be inherently authentic and comprehensible (Bryman, 2012, p. 550). Relating this statement to our documents, we consider that both the selected legislative frameworks as well as the political speeches comply to the two criteria 'authenticity' and 'meaning', as they are authentic and clear. Especially so because we only include statements that have been made by government officials in an official setting as explained previously.

With 'credibility', Scott means to analyze whether the evidence is free from error and distortion (quoted in: Bryman, 2012, p. 544). Bryman (2012) questions whether the document is in any way biased, and cautions to treat official state documents as a representation of reality; at the same time, he points out that such documents are also interesting for any bias they might hold (p. 550). In our case, we agree that the statements and legislative frameworks do not necessarily reflect the reality, as they are issued in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. However, this is not a point of further significance in our paper as we do not analyze the statements or frameworks for the credibility. Interestingly, Bryman's second point would be a far more interesting aspect to keep in mind: as we compare the framings of terrorism, we can come to find similarities or differences within the framings by our five different actors. In this sense, the bias that that may be revealed in the official state documents will help us to differentiate/align the different/similar framings and therefore to compare our findings.

As for the fourth criteria 'representativeness', Scott refers to whether the sources are typical of their kind (quoted in: Bryman, 2012, p. 544). Bryman writes that this aspect is a little bit problematic to asses when it comes to official state documents, as he believes that such documents are rather unique exactly due to their official character (Bryman, 2012, p. 550). As for our documents, we need to look at this aspect two-fold. On the one hand the documents can be considered to be representative to a certain extent. The documents represent one of many of their kind; and simply given the high level of institutionalization of the actors which are behind the legislative frameworks and statements, we can say that the documents are typical of their kind. On the other hand, even though the legislations are typical, they are still tailored to a specific event which is the three terrorist attacks in New York City, London, and Paris respectively. Moreover, as is particularly evident in the

political statements in response to the incidents, we can regard them as customized to the existent climate at the time of the events.

2.4. Method of Analysis

As for the methodological approaches used in this study, we choose to conduct the WPR policy analysis by Carol Lee Bacchi. For this we will primarily refer to her book *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to Be?* (2009). We believe that her approach, which can be generally described as a somewhat mixed analysis form, allows for a more refined analysis of the terrorism framing, which we aim to investigate in this paper. We will explain in more detail in the forthcoming chapter why we opt for Bacchi's approach.

Our second method of analysis is a genealogical approach as presented by Michel Foucault. Genealogy will be used to trace back how notions of power have influenced the terrorism discourse, and subsequently the framing of terrorism. We believe that a genealogy of terrorism will help us to get a more thorough understanding of which aspects have led to how the concept is understood today.
Both analytical methods will be explained in more detail in the forthcoming two sub-chapters.

2.4.1. Genealogy

Through analyzing the terrorism concept through genealogy, we aim to answer the research question *how can we understand terrorism discourse through genealogy within an international context?* The Foucauldian genealogical approach helps us to critically dismantle how terrorism discourse has evolved over time. As we analyze the framing of terrorism, understanding the development of its discourse can help shed light on which notions in the past may have contributed to shape how terrorism is framed in our documents.

Generally said, genealogy does not necessarily offer a framework with the definition of steps and tools to which we can rigorously adhere. It is rather a philosophical framework of thought which could give us a different and timely perspective to the

contemporary terrorism discourse. We acknowledge that Foucault's genealogy explanation is complex and for the sake of simplicity and the scope of the paper, we will only give an overview which, however, should be sufficient enough to utilize the Foucauldian method in our genealogical approach. We begin by laying out Foucault's general thought on genealogy and then explain how it can help us to genealogically analyze the terrorism concept.

Foucault describes the genealogical method as such:

> "it [genealogy] must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history - in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recur-rence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in dif-ferent roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those in-stances when they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized" (Foucault, 1984, p. 76)

Genealogy does not necessarily only concern itself with the mere history of a concept; it rather specifically searches for institutions, social practices and power relations which have contributed to creating truth and knowledge and therefore to steering a discourse (Ruoff, 2013, p. 134). Tracing the historical account of an idea or a concept by only paying attention to the origin of something is regarded as insufficient by Foucault; instead, a genealogy takes into consideration any knowledge, details as well as accidents and events that may have shaped the origin and history of something (Foucault, 1984, p. 80; Lightbody, 2010, p. 2). In looking at unconventional events and elements, genealogy aims to question the established and looks for the irregularities, discontinuity and errors (Ruoff, 2013, pp. 135-136).

With genealogy, Foucault emphasizes the importance of power relations and competing modes of power, as he regards power as the source for contemporary institutions, ideas or knowledge (Lightbody, 2010, p.2). According to the Foucauldian genealogy, a discourse or idea came to be about as we know it today due

to relations of power which have led to one discourse being victorious over another (Lightbody, 2010, p. 2). In the end, "[g]enealogy, therefore, is the diagnostic study of the historical manifestations of power" (Lightbody, 2010, p. 2).
This first basic approach is supplemented with another element which is essential to a genealogical method: to question any truth and knowledge as given notions and to go away from analyzing them within a static discourse (Ruoff, 2013, p. 135). In terms of the connection between truth and knowledge with power relations, Foucault regards that any truth which we take as granted has been established through a hierarchical power system, and labels this power-driven truth discourse a "regime of truth" (Lightbody, 2010, p. 21).

Lastly, there is no strict methodological framework to Foucault's genealogical method which can be deducted from his genealogy. We do not evaluate this genealogy as a good or bad method, but we see it as a complementary approach to how we would conventionally go about tracing a term or concept. Bearing Foucault's general stances in mind, we can set out a few elements to which we want to attach our genealogical analysis of the terrorism concept.
Generally said, what we can take from his thought to our genealogical analysis of the terrorism discourse, is to specifically look for how power has steered the discourse and subsequently has established a dominant knowledge of terrorism as it prevails today. Moreover, the Foucauldian method encourages us to critically go beyond the mere description and the usual accumulation of various terrorism definitions. In a more timely manner, we can take Foucault's genealogy and turn our eyes on elements outside the traditional, and question what has been taken as granted as knowledge in the terrorism discourse.

Foucault's genealogy approach also seems feasible within the bigger picture of our thesis. As we will specifically analyze our documents within an IR context of institutionalism and a securitization framework, it is both fitting and helpful for our following discussion to also focus on the role of power in our genealogical analysis of terrorism. While we still include the usual historical tracing back of the concept, we can question to what extent institutionalized constructs have steered the terrorism framing.

On the one hand, we can investigate how authoritative powers on a national and international level may have steered the terrorism discourse, and carve out whether they have established any 'truth' which we as a society take as given today.

2.4.2. Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is a vast field in which a number of researchers offer various approaches as to how one can conduct a policy analysis and what can be achieved with it. Generally said, policy analysis is a way to analyze public policy problems and, as Hill (2009) puts it, is primarily done three fold: analysis for policy, analysis of policy, or both (p. 4). While analysis *of* policy is related to the study of the policy process or policy content, and usually aims at understanding and explaining a given policy better, the analysis *for* policy deals with investigating ways how one can improve the quality of a policy (Hill, 2009, pp. 4-5). The analysis for policy typically concerns the evaluation or advocacy of a policy (Hill, 2009, p. 5). Policy is often - but not exclusively - applied in the public sector, as an important output of policy analysis "is client-oriented advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values" (Weimar & Vining, 2011, p. 24). Having said that, we do consider that we both conduct an analysis for and of policy. While we in a first instant analyze the content of a policy for a better understanding, one could use the findings of our analysis to improve the formulation and drafting of future policies.

While there exists a plethora of policy analysis approaches, we have decided to use Carol Lee Bacchi's WPR policy analysis approach. We do not analyze policy processes as such but rather we focus on understanding the content as we aim to answer the research question: *how is terrorism framed (and what purpose do the framings serve in terms of securitization and institutionalism in an IR context)?*
Additionally, not only do we analyze legislative frameworks but also political statements, and therefore we regard Bacchi's WPR approach the most feasible to use on both legislative frameworks and political statements alike. We believe that by applying the same approach to all our data, instead of utilizing different analytical methods, we can benefit from a general continuity. And to reinforce what was just touched upon, our analytical focus is specifically and only aimed at the discourses in relation to terrorism as presented in the content of the policies and statements.

Bacchi's WPR approach is not a typical policy analytical method but can be described as a mash up of aspects within framing analysis, discourse analysis and the traditional policy analysis as for example laid out by Eugene Bardach. Unlike other approaches, Bacchi (2009) connects policies to anthropology and views them as cultural products which always take place in a specific context, i.e. national, historical or international (p. ix). According to Bacchi (2009), "[t]his way of approaching 'policy' – asking questions about its sources and how it operates – is part of a larger project: to understand how governing takes place, and with what implications for those so governed" (p. ix). Further Bacchi (2009) explains, the term policy in itself implies that it is regarded as a tool to repair things while policy makers are the ones who do the actual fixing (p. ix). In continuity with this thought stands the next notion: by the implication that policies fix something, it is also implied that there is a problem which requires fixing; while most policies do not necessarily directly declare a problem as such, Bacchi (2009) argues that "this is implicit in the whole notion of policy – by their nature policies make changes, implying that something needs to change" (p. ix). This is where the 'what's the problem represented to be' approach takes effect as we need to elaborate on the problem that is implicitly represented in the policy and analyze them in detail (Bacchi, 2009, p. x).

Bacchi's WPR approach is further fundamentally grounded in three notions (2009, p. 47):

1. We are governed through problematizations
2. We need to study problematizations (through analysing the problem representations they contain), rather than 'problems'
3. We need to problematize (interrogate) the problematizations on offer through scrutinising the premises and effects of the problem representations they contain

Each of the three notions are essential in understanding what differentiates the WPR policy approach from other policy analysis methods. According to Bacchi (2009), the core of her approach is to include the contextual premises on which any policies are grounded and go beyond any forms of rule beyond the state; the approach is novel in the sense that it highlights reflection and critical thinking, and aims to understand

the problematization of issues rather than take any supposed problem for granted as what it is (p. 47).

For carrying out the WPR policy analysis, six questions are posed against which the policy is analyzed (Bacchi, 2009, p. xii):

1. What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
6. How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?

Bacchi's policy approach is based on the grounds of problematization; by problematizing an issue, however, and thereby fitting the issue into a set of categories, several aspects of the problem representation are left out. This is why a critical analysis of the problematization and the problem representation is crucial, in order to find out what aspects have been included and which not (Bacchi, 2009, p. xii). The simplification of problems through problematization is regarded by Bacchi (2009) as a framing process, and the WPR approach aims to explain "the ways *in which problematisations* [sic] *are central to governing processes*" (p. xii). In short, according to Bacchi's (2009) approach, the representations, and the implicit problems in the policies formulated should not be taken as a given but they should be investigated in terms of how these problematization come about and how they are thought about (p. xiii).

This is an important pillar of Bacchi's WPR policy analysis approach as she perceives that, predominantly in the public policy sphere, the focus is on what could *solve* which *problems*, regardless of whether there actually is a problem as such or not (Bacchi, 2009, p. xvi). Such presumptions, though, can be misleading and the WPR

approach moves away from analyzing how policies help to solve a problem, but rather concentrates on how policies imply as well as represent a 'problem' and analyze such problem representations for their validity (Bacchi, 2009, p. xvi). Furthermore, the approach does not investigate intentionality, as in did politician XY really mean what they said in their political speech, but aims to analyze the contextual premises on which the problem presentation is built on (Bacchi 2009, p. xix). Another aspect which is worth noting within the context of our thesis, is the idea that Bacchi's WPR approach encourages a cross-border thinking; we shall investigate the differences and similarities in what Bacchi calls travelling problem representations (2009, p. xx). As for our paper, the WPR approach can help to identify whether different national and international actors problematize terrorism in a similar or different way and how these similarities or differences come about.

In the following, we will explain in a bit more detail what four of the six questions of Bacchi's WPR policy approach aim to investigate. It is important to note here that we will only pose four of the six questions to our data: Question 1, 2, 4, and 5. We believe that only these four questions are relevant for our research as a whole and therefore decide to delimitate questions 3 and 6. We consider the core of Bacchi's approach to being critical and reflective towards the findings we as researchers generate. We believe that this spirit of Bacchi's approach is still present in our analysis even though we exclude two questions.

Bacchi highlights that policies - and therefore governments as the creators of such - are "active in the creation of policy problems" (Bacchi, 2009, p. 1) as they formulate them as such within the policies. This is why it is important here for us to discursively understand how the problem is represented.
1) What is the 'problem' (e.g. of 'problem gamblers', drug use/abuse, domestic violence, global warming, health inequalities, terrorism, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy?
With this, Bacchi (2009) means to clarify the content of a policy by identifying implied problem representations in policy proposals or policies (p.4). It is suggested here by Bacchi (2009) that it makes sense to "work[...] backwards" and starting from the policy or proposal towards identifying the implied problem (p.3).

2) What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?

In a second step, Bacchi (2009) proposes to identify any assumptions, concepts or ideas that substantiate the specific problem representation: what is being left out and what is being mentioned (p. 5)? By presuppositions, Bacchi (2009) means epistemologically and ontologically grounded knowledge as in conceptual logics that underpin the representation; this in turn reflects any meanings that need to exist for a problem representation to work (p. 5). This, however, does not to identify any biases but rather to carve out cultural values or premises; for this, Bacchi (2009) suggests to apply for question 2 a slimmed down version of a typical discourse analysis and she proposes to for example look out for binaries, key concepts or categories that are created within the policies (pp. 7-9).

4) What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the 'problem' be thought about differently?

This questions aims to critically look at the problem representation and basically get to the bottom of the problematization in the policies. The question therefore gives us a chance to critically reflect on findings, and in particular pay attention to any limits and thus silences that are present in the problem representation; what is not being said and how could we think differently about it (Bacchi, 2009, p.12)? Bacchi (2009) suggests to refer to our findings from previous questions and ask whether, for example, the binaries which we may have found, could help explain what is not mentioned in the depiction of the problem (p. 13). It is about finding out which contradictions or tensions that are present in the problem representation, which would then lead to limitations and inadequacies in the way the problem is represented (Bacchi, 2009, p. 13). Moreover, we can get to know more about silences and find out whether and which institutional factors can help to establish the problem representation (Bacchi, 2009, p. 14).

5) What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?

Question 5 is a continuation of the critical reflection that we have started with the previous question and stems from a thought of the WPR policy approach, which is that the problem representation in place benefits some while it harms others (Bacchi 2009, p. 15). The question allows us to critically think about the effects of a problem representation, and Bacchi (2009) distinguishes between three types of effects here: discursive effects, subjectification effects, and lived effects (p. 15). The discursive

effects draw on earlier questions and investigates how silences limit any other understanding or representation of the problem (Bacchi, 2009, p. 16). For instance, Bacchi (2009) writes that in making child sexual abuse in Aboriginal communities an issue of law, it could limit the option to consider connections of the issue to colonization or white supremacy (p. 16). Subjectification effects refers to the fact that within discourse, certain subjects and subjectivities are constituted; Bacchi (2009) in particular points to dichotomies and Foucault's dividing practices (p. 16). In connection to Foucault's dividing practices, problem representations might also include any subject's responsibility for the problem representations and it could result in the identification of targeted groups and responsible parties (Bacchi, 2009, p. 17). It is important to investigate how subjects and subjectivities are depicted and which effect this has on other subjects and subjectivities. Lastly, lived effects refer to the actual material dimension of the impact of problem representations. Simply put, this refers to the question how the specific problem representations have an effect on 'the real world' (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 17-18).

Lastly, Bacchi (2009) points out several critical aspects that one should pay attention to when applying the WPR policy analysis approach. Bacchi suggests to reflect on one's own problem representation (p. 19). Furthermore, she points out that as researchers, we should question 'knowledge' and should refrain from taking any 'knowledge' as a given (Bacchi, 2009, p. 20). One should also be careful in the selection of texts analyzed and pay enough attention to the complexities of policies; here, it is important to note different interpretations within a policy (Bacchi, 2009, p. 20). And lastly, going hand in hand with analyzing any discourse, it is fundamental to include a contextual background for the sake of better understanding the problem representation itself and the environment surrounding it (Bacchi, 2009, p. 20).

2.5. Evaluation Criteria, Considerations and Limitations

Naturally, we have met some challenges and limitations in our research. In the following section, we will evaluate and discuss the most significant limitations and considerations that are associated with the particular type of analysis which stems from our selection of theories and choice of method.

Firstly, by applying a constructivist point of view, we also need to be aware of the fact that we as both individuals and researchers already construct a reality ourselves. We create a (social) world through our individual perspectives by making a conscious selection of the data, theory and analytical method (Bryman, 2012, p. 33). This would mean that our objective point of view could be somewhat clouded but we aim to stay factual by generating our findings strictly based on the analyzed documents.

We acknowledge that given the brevity of some of the analyzed documents, namely the UN and NATO statements, there might be the case that we will only be able to carry out a slimmed down version of Bacchi's WPR analysis. We are aware that being restricted in the scope of our paper, the analysis by no means can be completely comprehensive and may lack some findings. However, we strive to generate the most significant and relevant findings with which we can critically reflect on in relation to the problem statement we posed.

It can be further expected that we write from a predominantly Western point of view while we have also consciously narrowed the focus point of our paper down to a Western understanding of the terrorism discourses. In addition, we made a conscious selection of which data and how many will be analyzed. These aspects could lead to the paper not being as representative as it could be if we would have included a variety of views as well as more data and theories to analyze them against; the findings could result in inconclusive or too broad outcomes. Furthermore, the data is narrowed down to a governmental perspective of the terrorism discourse as we only analyze legislative frameworks and political statements, which have been made in an official political setting and by national or international actor. The media and societal aspects, to mention only two, within the terrorism discourse, are delimited from our research.
However, we do not strive to conduct a holistic research but acknowledge that we restrict our paper to certain actors, subjectivities and geographics. We are aware that our research only represents a small portion part of what could have been a more comprehensive research. For the sake of the scope of this thesis paper, we had to narrow the topic down, however, we do believe that our research paper, notwithstanding, can give a good account and a general understanding of the Western terrorism discourse and how these findings can be analyzed through an

institutionalism and security lense within IR theories. Our research should show the timelessness of the subject matter and the potential for the continuation of our research topic. The findings from this research could also serve as entry points for further research.

In the same vein, the selection of theories makes the analysis somewhat narrow, and there is, of course, a vast selection of theories that we could have applied in order to analyze our problem formulation and research question in more detail. This leads to the fact that our paper from the beginning is arguably somewhat steered into a certain course. The use of different theories could have led to a different outcome within the same subject matter. However, again, given the scope of the paper, we had to narrow our paper down and give it a direction. Despite narrowing the scope down to selective elements, we will make sure that there is a factual reasoning behind our choices which should serve as an explanation and argumentation for the decisions taken.

Lastly, while most of the documents have been written in English language, some of the data is originally composed in French language. Neither French nor English is our mother tongue which could have led to a distortion in meaning when interpreting the documents. However, we strive to treat the documents as objective and clear from bias as possible as well as staying true to their meaning. For translated documents, we consider that the sources from which we pulled the documents have the integrity to translate the official data rightfully to their intended meaning. For any data which has shown to be problematic in understanding, we have cross checked the content with a native-level speaker of the language in which the document was originally written in. Of course we cannot completely exclude some degree of interpretivism from our side, and therefore as a prerequisite to our thesis, specified interpretivism as our epistemological point of view.

III. Background & Context

As we will see in the analysis to follow, it did not not take long after the 9/11 attacks for then-President George W. Bush to informally declare war on terrorism. In 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair recognized that the threat of a 'new' terror had been growing since 9/11 and the UK as well now had fallen victim to this terrorism. Bair, however, did not declare war - perhaps because the UK already were participating in one. Similar to President Bush, the French president, François Hollande, declared in the wake of the attacks that France was at war against terrorism. The perpetrators of the atrocities that occurred in Paris, however, was not al Qaeda but the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Two different organizations that, nevertheless, fall under the same category of terrorism and were met with complementary responses; war - at least a discursive one.

The following chapter is supposed to serve as a background piece to contextualize the political landscape. According to Foucault's genealogical approach, we are looking for power structures which have arguably steered the terrorism discourse. For this, we deconstruct the world order and investigate how power distributions within it might have influenced the terrorism discourse. By understanding the development of the terrorism discourse, we hope to establish a contextual premise to further analyze how this could have contributed to shaping the framing of terrorism in our data. We explain basic power structures in IR as categorized within polarities and multi-/unilateralism. Additionally, we present how the political power structures have developed over time and focus here on the post Cold War era. We then make the connection to the terrorism discourse and include notions about security along the way to draw a line from terrorism to security which are arguably deeply intertwined concepts. Given the regional focus of our thesis, we primarily refer the contextual chapter to the individual national and international actors which are the paper's primary subjects. We note that due to the scope of the paper, the presented background and derivation of the terrorism discourse is by no means a holistic analysis. But following the genealogically Foucauldian approach, which we apply, we focus on specific elements to highlight turning points which we consider were significant in shaping the terrorism discourse. In the end, the genealogy of terrorism

is supposed to help us answer the first research question *how can we understand the terrorism discourse through genealogy within an international context?*

3.1. The Power Structures and the Political Landscape in a Post Cold War Era

We decide to set our genealogical analysis of the vast terrorism concept within the very general context of a post-Cold War political landscape. We highlight two events which we believe symbolize historic moments which are important for the subject matter of this paper: The end of the Cold War and 9/11. The main reason for this decision is that we needed to narrow down a time frame as we cannot present history in its entirety within the scope of our paper. Instead, we set the point of departure for the terrorism discourse to a significant point in time which is essential in understanding the structures of power relations within the international system as they exist today - in the Foucauldian tradition of relating discourse to power. From that moment on, we chronologically move forward in time to today and highlight significant elements which could have influenced the terrorism discourse in connection to security issues. This leads us to point out the potential political effects of potentially historic moments, from which we expect to have affected the terrorism discourse. Subsequently, we intend to conclude with an investigation of how today's terrorism discourse is derived from the power relations and structures marked by the Cold War period onwards to 9/11 and now.

To understand the post Cold War era, we need to go back in time and have a general look at the time during the Cold War first. As Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously noted in his essay 'The end of history?' with regard to the significance of the then approaching end of the Cold War: "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (p. 4). Whether or not this argument holds true, is of course questionable. Yet, the end of the Cold War did bring about significant shifts in the international political system.

When we look at the balance of power in the pre- and post-Cold War era, there has been much debate in the political science sphere regarding which power pursued what kind power in terms of for instance unipolar vs. multipolar or unilateral vs. multilateral, and which power balance structure would be the best way for the international system to function (Van Oudenaren, 2004, pp. 63-64). In this context, Van Oudenaren (2004) points out that one needs to pay attention to the subtle difference between the terms; while polarity explains the distribution of power within an international system structure, unilateralism and multilateralism are policy choices which states option for within an international system (p. 64). Van Oudenaren (2004) suggests that there is a wide discrepancy of views, each entailing strengths and weaknesses of their own (p. 68). Important to note here is that unipolarity does not necessarily automatically and exclusively identify with unilateralism; the same goes for multipolarity and multilateralism (Van Oudenaren, 2004, p. 64). One could argue that European countries inherently act primarily multilateral given the bundling of nations in the European Union (EU). On the other side, not all European countries are member states of the EU and each nation could very well also behave unilaterally. There is no need to go into the details of all potential combinations, but it is important to keep in mind when using the terms, that polarities need to be distinguished from uni-/multilateralism.

Relating the stances aforementioned to the international world order, Kenneth Waltz (1993) notes that the period of time between the World Wars was characterized as a multipolar world, which was prone to potential war (p. 45). The era of the Cold War, on the other hand, were marked by a bipolar power structure in which the United States and the Soviet Union occupied a similar powerful position (Waltz, 1993, p. 45). The bipolarity allegedly led the US to treat international politics, largely, as a zero-sum game between the two powers during the Cold War (Law, 2009, p. 276). The end of the Cold War ended bipolarity in the international arena and gave way to a multipolar international structure. It may also have given way to the emergence of new great powers, such as for example Japan or Germany whose economic developments back in 1993 led to Waltz (1993) predicting that the two nations could take on bigger roles on the international stage (pp. 55-64).
Krauthammer (1991), however, firmly believed in the prevalence of unipolarity in the immediate post Cold War world with the US as the sole superpower, though never

ruling out that a multipolar world would eventually emerge in the decades to come (pp. 23-24). There is no definitive argument for or against Krauthammer's view, but we can at least identify efforts on the side of the US to enter the post Cold War era with a multilateralist spirit albeit in the service of unipolarity (Van Oudenaren, 2004, pp. 69-70). Increased cooperation and multilateral efforts, as represented by transnational agreements, marked the US activities in Europe while it at the same time sought to defend its somewhat unipolar position against an increasingly strengthening Europe (Van Oudenaren, 2004, p. 72).

With the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union, European countries rather acted in the background during the Cold War, and played a minor role in the international world order. With the end of the Cold War, European allies moved forward in establishing itself as a more powerful construct and pushed for European integration (Schmidt, 2007, p. 93). Already existing European joint construct such as for example the European Coal and Steel Community created in 1950 (European Union, "The history of the European Union: 1945 - 1959") or the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 (NATO, "A short history of NATO") were reconstructed and intensified after the Cold War. The EU, for instance, finds its roots in the European Coal and Steel Community and was reconstructed into the European Union in 1992 through the signing the Treaty on the European Union in Maastricht (European Union, "The history of the European Union: 1990 - 1999"). Since then, the majority of European countries are significantly represented on the international stage within the common construct of the EU, which, at its core, aims to pursue "multilateralism in the service of multipolarity" (Van Oudenaren, 2004, p. 74). In the post Cold War era, Europe saw less dependence from the US especially with regard to security issues, even though the US was still deeply intertwined with Europe through NATO (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 352).
The creation of the EU was a big milestone in European history, and helped to put Europe as a whole into a more powerful position on the world stage: from a purely economic perspective, the EU's economy, measured in 2014 by its GDP, is now larger than the US as it held €13,920,541 million (European Union, "The economy"). The EU also has political weight as it counts 28 member states (European Union, "The EU in brief"). However, one must still be aware that the EU is a construct in which the different member states can and by all means do pursue their own interests and

policies independent from the EU. The EU may be built as a multilateral construct but it still is a union which inhabits individual governments (Zimmermann, 2006, p. 124).
As for the United Kingdom and France, both hold a significant position within Europe. Alongside Germany, the UK and France make up the three economies contributing the largest share to the GDP (nominal - current prices, million Euros) as measured in 2015 to the EU (Eurostat, "Gross domestic product at market prices"): the UK's nominal GDP is at roughly €2,569 billion, while France's nominal GDP amounts to €2,184 billion.

In terms of leverage, France, the UK, and the US are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In Chapter V under Article 27, the UN Charter says: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [other than procedural matters] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" (United Nations, "UN Charter"). This gives France, the UK and US a highly powerful position within the UN Security Council and the UN system as a whole. All three nations are also member states of the primarily military transatlantic alliance NATO, which was established after World War II with the primary mission to prevent nationalist militarism to ever happen again in Europe, and to deter Soviet expansionism while maintaining a deep connection to Northern America (NATO, "A short history of NATO"). Or in other words, NATO's purpose was "keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out" (quoted in: Jervis, 1999, p. 60). Among others, NATO as an organization was asked in the immediate post-Cold War era to deal with the ashes left of the Soviet Union after its collapse (Schmidt, 2007, p. 94).

While we will touch upon it along the way, the question of how much power NATO and the UN (Security Council) actually hold and how they fare in comparison to the role of national actors on the world stage is a completely different question, which would require a separate paper on its own. What the Cold War era brought along, however, was certainly the sentiment among European allies concerning the importance of maintaining transatlantic alliances (Schmidt, 2007, p. 93).

The next event which we identify as relevant for the subject matter of our paper is September 11, 2001. This date arguably marked the next significant moment in history for different national and international actors to assert or move away from their power position within the international system.
After the 9/11 attacks, it seems as if the US seemed to pursue its own interests on an international stage more rigorously, perceived by many as unilateralism (Van Oudenaren 2004, p.69; Patrick, 2008, p. 135). It could be argued that the US was acting in a multilateral frame of mind calling for more international cooperation in counterterrorism after the 9/11 attacks, yet we must be aware that the US was very adamant about pursuing those multilateral cooperations with a primarily American objective – making all cooperation efforts a quite unilateral endeavor (Patrick, 2008, p. 135). This unilateralist behavior seemingly culminated in 2003, when the US invaded Iraq in March 2003 (BBC, 2016).

Despite of any unilateralism, the call for a multilateral approach arguably also has had an impact. Thus, the UNSC unanimously adopted the Anti-Terrorism Resolution 1373 in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and did so under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which made the resolution binding under international law (Goldberg, 2012). The fact that that the UN imposed on all UN member states to comply to the international standard of Resolution 1373 represented a significant step for the UN and marked a historical departure from its actions so far (Goldberg, 2012).
9/11 also marked a course of action without precedent in the history of NATO; in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Lord Robertson, 2001). With this, NATO called on its member states to come to the support of the US, as an attack on one is considered an attack all allies according to Article 5 (NATO, “Collective defence - Article 5”). While many allies offered military support for the Afghanistan operations, it seemed like NATO could not offer anything further than invoking Article 5, and was poorly equipped to handle such global issues (Schmidt, 2007, p. 97). This then leads one to question how much power NATO can actually exert, and might even suggest that NATO does not hold any fundamental powers as an institution.

Singling out France's and the United Kingdom's role as European powers in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the two differ in their actions. Both nations acted through the EU, the UN, and NATO, emphasizing the multilateral approach of European countries. The UK, however, also participated in both the invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (BBC, 2016)

In summary, what is important to keep in mind when looking at the post-Cold War power structures, is that the common stereotype of viewing the world order as a unipolar system, in which the US acts unilaterally, needs to be critically evaluated. As Joseph Nye (2003) put it: "power in the 21st century is distributed differently on different issues and resembles a three-dimensional chess game" which entails military, economy and transnational issues outside the control of governments such as illegal migration or transnational terrorist networks. While the unipolar world view might be correct when it comes to the military sector where the US is a heavyweight, the economic sector sees a multipolar balance of power in which the EU holds the position of the largest economy (Nye, 2003; European Commission, "EU position in world trade"). The third field of transnational issues cannot be only defined by a polarity or hegemony but requires cooperation, especially on the side of the US who are reliable on cooperation, among others specifically with the EU, to pursue efforts within the bigger, global picture (Nye, 2003).

The following sub-chapter ties up the previous deconstruction of the world order and the power relations within. The next chapter goes into more detail as to where the terrorism discourse can be placed within the power structures. We aim to understand which forces were at hand that might have pushed to establish a certain truth or knowledge within the terrorism discourse, which may have contributed to how terrorism is framed today as presented in our data.

3.2. Deconstructing the Terrorism Discourse through Power Structures

After laying out an overview of the power structures in the post-Cold War world order and highlighting 9/11 as a pivotal point, we now make the connection between power relations and the terrorism discourse. Due to the different national and international actors in our paper, we will focus on the deconstruction of the terrorism

discourse in relation to an international context. By this, we do not necessarily focus on transnational or international terrorism as such, but we concentrate on the international effects of terrorism discourse, and investigate how those have played out in an international context. To connect the chapter with the rest of the paper, we will also refer along the way to security/securitization and institutionalism notions where appropriate as we expect them to be highly interrelated elements with the terrorism discourse.

To start off with, we need to establish the general notion that there is no single definition of terrorism as it is a widely contested concept (Schmid, 2011, pp. 40-42). Schmid (2011) explains that terrorism is exposed to a variety of perspectives and remarks that anyone "involved in the definition debate often [has] tried to mould definitions in a way that suits their needs" (p. 40). This presumably concerns both individual researchers as well as institutions which would lay out their own interpretation of terrorism, as how they see it fit to their purpose. This brings us from academic research to the political level, where terrorism as well has no universal definition (Fletcher, 2006, p.895; Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth 2011, pp. 100-101). The US government alone has more than 20 definitions of terrorism, describing domestic and international terrorism, federal crime of terrorism or acts of terrorism (Schmid, 2011, p. 44). Jackson et al. (2011) further emphasize that a universal definition is unfit as the meaning and conceptualization of terrorism is fluid; terrorism, as a concept, is subjected to changes in history, politics, and further grounded within different ideologies such as beliefs and values (pp. 103-104). This would suggest that it is impossible to agree on a single definition, and it also explains why there has been, and always will be a debate about the definition of terrorism (see Schmid & Jongmann, 2008, p. 3).

A further significant element that needs to be pointed out in the terrorism definition debate is the subtle difference between terror and terrorism, or rather how one originated from the other. The word 'terror' originated from the Latin word 'terrere' which means making someone tremble through fear (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 21; Schmid 2011, p. 41). The political layer which the term holds today was added during the French Revolution, when terror referred to the 'Reign of Terror' (Crenshaw 2011, p. 21). In the years following the French Revolution, terrorism came to be known as an

"instrument of rule against society, and [...] against representatives of the state" (Schmid, 2011, p. 42). The adding of the suffix –ism to build the word 'terrorism' is sometimes said to loan the original terror term a "systematic character" (Schmid, 2011, p. 41). In that regard, Goodin (2006) remarks that terrorism is also sometimes treated as an ideology – such as anarchism – or a psychopathology such as sadism (2006, p.3 2)

Schmid and Jongmann (2008) surveyed and analyzed more than 100 definitions of the terrorism term in their first Research Guide (p. 5) and came to a comprehensive academic definition of terrorism. Regarding terrorism as a political act of violence is to function as the overall foundation for the terrorism concept as we refer to it in our paper and we base our view on Schmid Jongmann's following definition:

> "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between the terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought." (Schmid & Jongman, 2008, p. 28)

Having established a general terrorism framework, it is important to acknowledge that the general frame still entails many particular typologies in which terrorism can occur. The different types of terrorism are based on particular actors and behaviors which are involved, as well as an array of other characteristics such as ideologies, motives, goals and geographic range (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 151; Marsden & Schmid 2011, pp. 164-166). In our three cases, we have two seemingly connected or similar actors: al Qaeda which was responsible for 9/11 (Martin, 2013, p. 422) and 7/7

(Robertson, Cruickshank and Lister, 2012), and the IS who were responsible for the 11/13 terrorist attacks in Paris (France 24 English, 2015). All three terrorist attacks can be considered as terrorism as per Schmid & Jongman's definition.

This is a rather condensed overview of where the terrorism concept stems from, however, it would be difficult within the scope of this paper to go into all the details and include all layers of the terrorism debate in our paper, nor would it help us to answer our problem formulation and research questions. We also do not regard it as necessary here to explain and discuss all the shapes and forms in which terrorism can occur, as it would not serve the bigger picture of our paper's research questions. Therefore, after having shortly established what we generally regard as terrorism, we will now move on to investigate terrorism in the previously explained power structures, and how such power relations of the post-Cold War era might have influenced the general terrorism discourse.

What we are looking at is the development of the terrorism discourse in two pivotal moments: the post-Cold War period and 9/11.
During the Cold War, national security was largely seen as being massively endangered by the nuclear threat, which subsequently also came to direct the US terrorism discourse (Law, 2009, p. 275). As noted, the bipolarity during the Cold War led the US to focus on a terrorism narrative which encapsulated the vast terrorism concept within the constraints of the Cold War, and primarily aimed at painting the Soviets as the perpetrators of any terrorist activities against the US (Law, 2009, p. 276; Goodin, 2006, p. 73). To some extent, the Soviet Union was such a big threat to US security, that the US created an anti-ideology in the shape of anti-communism (Buzan, 2007, p. 109). Particularly popular during the Cold War era was the concept of state sponsorship of international terrorism, as in directing a war with the help of proxies (McAllister & Schmid, 2011, p. 209). While some schools of thoughts acknowledged that Western governments too backed insurgent groups which used terrorist tactics, the Western narrative primarily attributed the responsibility for all international terrorist acts during that time to the Soviet Union (McAllister & Schmid, 2011, p. 209; Martin, 2013, p. 263). Within this context and albeit whether it is true or false, the communist Soviets were regarded as supporting international terrorist networks and were presented as a great threat to world security, aiming to

damage the democratic West and its allies (Martin, 2013, p. 263). This narrative, as will be shown later, has strongly influenced the US security and terrorism discourse and subsequently, due to the significance of the Cold War and the US' presence in NATO, also partially affected Europe as a consequence.

Europe's main security discourse at that time was to avoid a return to its past which saw two World Wars and to move towards integration (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 356). However, this integration was also met with a certain degree of resistance because it could threaten the individual national identities; in particular the French showed reluctance towards the globalization, or Americanization, movement (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 357). The strong sense for national identity and the memory of its past are two significant notions to bear in mind when referring to the European framework.

Amongst many different aspects, (global) terrorism would also be part of the wider security discourse within Europe in the post-Cold War era. In the immediate post-Cold War period, terrorism would often be presented as a problem in context with international organized crime and illegal migration when it came to policy making, which also led to the perception that migrants were the root of such problems (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 359). While this aspect concerned problems at home in Europe, global terrorism as part of regional conflicts in an environment outside of Europe put the terrorism discourse in an international context (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 360). Significantly, and differently to the primarily military-dominated US discourse, Europe would also respond to these problems with a "developmentalist discourse" which emphasizes that "conflicts from intra-state to major regional wars are ultimately caused by problems of resources and lack of development" (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 360). Europe's approach towards a solution would not be primarily military, as the US to some extent tended to, rather it would resort to redefining and seeking efforts to support for instance regional developments to evolve in the region of conflict itself (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 360).

Lastly, even though we pay attention to terrorism activities that have international effects, it is important to note some internal aspects regarding terrorism in France and the UK.

For the UK terrorism discourse, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) can be seen significant in shaping this discourse. The British Isles saw a grave sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland which started in 1969 (Martin, 2013, p. 220). The IRA has undergone great fragmentation into several sub-groups; the then-Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were responsible for the majority of political violence acts against the British administration in Northern Ireland (Martin, 2013, p. 148). Even though the IRA movements were most active during the 1970s and 1980s (Martin, 2013, p. 220), the dimension of their political violence has very likely defined and affected the UK's individual counterterrorism policies and its view on terrorism until today. Furthermore it is part of a substantial difference between the UK terrorism discourse and the US terrorism discourse. While then President George W. Bush spoke to American anger and fear of terrorism to fuel the terrorism discourse, the UK's official response to the IRA activities, and subsequently to 9/11, had a rather realist and calming tone (Goodin, 2006, p. 165). The terrorist attacks of the IRA and later 9/11 were framed within a realist UK discourse, which suggested that terrorism cannot be eliminated altogether, but the UK as a nation should stay alert and do its best to fight against it (Goodin, 2006, pp. 162-164).
As for France, the nation experienced its own share of terrorist attacks. After a wave of terrorist acts in 1985 and 1986, most notably three bombings within three days in Paris executed by the Hezbollah (Le Point, 2008), France introduced an anti-terrorism legislation in 1986 (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development), and created a counterterrorism policy which puts the centralization of the judicial procedures in the centre of action. This model would serve as a foundation to France's counterterrorism policies in the future.

In sum, the terrorism discourse following the Cold War period could be described as rather insignificant and one could argue that Europe and the US were primarily recovering and reorienting from the Cold War. The US and Soviet Union's global dominance during the Cold War steered their terrorism discourses but did not necessarily affect Europe in many ways. Europe was preoccupied with its own security issues and discourses; even though France and the UK certainly built up their own national terrorism discourses due to domestic events in relation to

terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, the development of a terrorism narrative as a whole was rather independent from any power structures.

9/11 seemingly was a turning point with regard to terrorism and the terrorism narrative (Martin, 2013, p. 421).
Generally, President George W. Bush took a strong unilateral course when taking office in 2001 and moved away from President Clinton's multilateral efforts; the 9/11 attacks only reinforced the US' already dominant unilateral sentiment (Patrick, 2008, p. 135). When going back to state-sponsored terrorism and how the Cold War narrative in that regard directed the US terrorism discourse, 9/11 marked another point in time in which this notion would gain great resonance again. Even though the responsible actors behind terrorism have changed, the US analysis of state-sponsored terrorism has not remarkably changed (Goodin, 2006, p. 74). After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush called out any state sponsoring terrorists, i.e. supporting or harboring terrorists, to in fact also be terrorist states themselves (Goodin, 2006, p. 74). This notion would go so far that the US went to war against Afghanistan and Iraq based on the accusations that theses two states were sponsoring terrorists (Goodin, 2006, p. 75). Especially the Iraq case shows that 9/11 also led to the revival of the relict narrative around weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the Cold War, whereby there is a looming threat of terrorists capable of using WMDs against any enemy targets (Martin, 2013, p. 423).

While 9/11 reinforced those sentiments, it also led to the creation of a completely new terrorism discourse and a variety of journalists, policymakers, and scholars regarded the attacks to be the marking point for a 'new' terrorism (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 51; Goodin, 2006, p. 41; Martin, 2013, pp. 421-422). Two key elements are part of this terrorism narrative: the perception of 9/11 as a unique event symbolizing a unique threat and the (global) war on terror narrative.
In relation to the first element, 9/11 represents a great point of change and the American people felt that the event was an "exceptional moment of national trauma" (Jackson et al. 2011, p. 62). The symbolism of the attack was quite significant as it showed a nation, and the world for that matter, a vulnerable superpower being attacked by a small adversarial group (Martin, 2013, p. 423). The attack led to a severe changes in the American security environment and tied the (counter-

)terrorism and security discourse even more deeply together; counterterrorism in the US would become heavily directed towards being a security issue which culminated in the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the attacks (Martin, 2013, p. 423).

On the other side, is the narrative around the war on terror. In the wake of 9/11 President George W. Bush, in his speech to Congress, explicitly presented the attack as not only a terrorist act but also as an "act of war", declaring that "[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there" (Bush, 2001, p. 66). This would only reinforce the perception of 9/11 as a unique event which would underpin the argument that it also needed to be answered with unique actions such as a war on terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 63). Not only did this narrative greatly resonate within the American public, but it arguably also found solid resonance internationally, as the argument was built on political myths which helped to establish the representation as a regime of truth (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 66). Another reason pointed out by Jackson et al. (2011) as to why this narrative also resonated internationally, is that a range of actors and institutions benefitted from it financially and in a power-related way; the fear of terrorism would for example lead to state-security institutions gaining more authority, academics and think tanks getting more funding for research, and the whole military-industrial complex which has greatly benefitted financially (p. 142).

While this narrative also resonated in Europe, the developmentalist discourse, too, re-emerged in the aftermath of 9/11.

The US' primary response to terrorism was military, followed by some European allies partaking in US-led military anti-terrorism activities. Europe at large, however, seemed to also pay attention to developmentalism and the root causes of terrorism. The November 2005 *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* represents the most poignant counterterrorism policy in Europe post 9/11 and is grounded on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond (European Union, 2005, p. 3). Under the 'prevent' section, it says that the EU aims to "prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment, in Europe and internationally" (European Union, 2005, p. 3). It becomes clear here that the EU, at least on paper, is committed to tackle root causes of terrorism in the fight against it. The EU counterterrorism document further

emphasizes multilateral cooperation, and suggests that the EU can add value by "facilitating European cooperation", "developing collective capability", and "promote international partnership" in "working with others beyond the EU" (European Union, 2005, p. 4). This also shows the acknowledgement of the global dimension of terrorism, as the policy particularly encourages a multilateral cooperation with the UN and other international bodies (European Union, 2005, p. 14). However, given the recent rise in acts of terrorism across Europe, the success of the strategy in reality remains questionable.

The UN, as previously noted, exerted great power when it imposed on all UN member states to comply to the international standard of the Anti-Terrorism Resolution 1373, while this also marked a historical departure from its actions so far (Goldberg, 2012). Moreover, in 2006 the Secretary-General presented recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy, calling for a multilateral approach in fighting terrorism (United Nations General Assembly, 2006, "Secretary-General presents counter-terrorism recommendations to General Assembly").
NATO also acted unprecedented in the wake of 9/11 as it invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Here, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson (2001) declared: "We know that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the world-wide terrorist network of Al-Qaida […] On the basis of this briefing, it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 9/11 was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". As NATO represent a military alliance, it made sense for NATO to adopt a military line in their terrorism discourse and call for the alliance to live up to its basic multilateral goal: to (militarily) support each other.

The UN's introduction of Resolution 1373 and NATO's invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty arguably underpinned the US dominated terrorism narrative which presented 9/11 as a unique incident which called for unique actions – and very well plays into the US terrorism discourse. The call for joint efforts is on the one hand simply based on NATO and the UN's multilateral foundation as organizations,

but on the other hand also fits well into an US terrorism discourse which announced the war on terror.

IV. Theoretical Framework

The following chapter outlines how theories of institutionalism and securitization within an IR context can be used to open up for a more refined discussion of the findings generated from the policy analysis, which can bring us further in answering our research questions: *how is terrorism framed and what purpose do the framings serve in terms of securitization and institutionalism in an IR context?* and *how can the insights gained explain international cooperation efforts in counterterrorism?*

We acknowledge that there is a variety of theories one could apply here to investigate the research questions further. However, given the limit of space, it is only natural to make a selection of theories that we consider on the one hand to be feasible enough to help us answering the research questions on a general level, but also on the other hand to make the choice of theories specific enough so they can be of assistance when answering the particular problem formulation that we are posing.

The focus of our paper is aimed at national as well as international actors. By analyzing legislative frameworks applied to counter terrorism and political statements made in the aftermath of each of the three terrorist attacks, and by putting them into an institutionalist and securitization context, we can investigate how the terrorism framings, as constructed by institutions on a national and international level, can be discursively understood. From there we can further deduce potential implications for international cooperation within counterterrorism.

By applying institutionalism theory through a realist and liberal lens, we hope to gain more insight into how institutions have framed terrorism in an IR context with a particular view to cooperation. Next to institutionalism, we expect that securitization will also play a significant role within the framing of the legislative frameworks and statements, as we expect that both notions are deeply intertwined within the terrorism discourse. We intend to acknowledge all significant elements to the theories, but will reserve the right to only take up specific aspects of our theories which we regard as most relevant for our paper.

4.1. Institutionalism

From the outset, institutionalism can offer, among other things, an insight to how cooperation comes about, and when and why such cooperation works (Keohane, 1988, p. 380). It is thus considered a valuable part of our theoretical framework for this study, in order to understand the premises for international cooperation.

In terms of cooperation, institutionalism holds "that international institutions [...] enable states to forego short-term advantages for the sake of greater long-term gains" (Walt, 1998, p. 35), which thus should make cooperation more desirable. Empirical research has furthermore shown that international institutions can enhance cooperation between states (Simmons & Martin, 2002, p. 199). However, one should not equal correlation with causality. Jervis (1999) points out that though there is a correlation between cooperation and the presence of institutions, that does not mean "that cooperation can be increased by establishing institutions where they do not exist" (p. 43). Thus, cooperation can take place on many levels and is not an exclusive privilege of international institutions. Keohane (1988) argues, however, that "all efforts at international cooperation take place within an institutional context of some kind" (p. 380). This refers to that cooperation does not occur by itself but that a level of mediation is needed. An institutional context can then be seen as laying the groundwork for cooperation, for example by establishing rules that are to guide any potential cooperation; rules are to govern relations and an institutional context would then "prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior" (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 8).

Institutions, and thus an institutional context, can be seen as "formal organizations governed by written laws or rules", such as, for example, "the courts, government departments, parties" (Bevir, 2010, p. 699). Within such arrangements, there are certain sets of rights or entitlements and behavioral prescriptions surrounding the rules or conventions, and it is expected of actors participating in such a framework "to perform their roles [...], and the cost to individual actors of opting out of participation in prevailing institutions is likely to be prohibitive" (Young, 1986, p. 107).

Along the same lines, Martin and Simmons (2013) argue that the term 'international institutions' is used to cover many phenomena, amongst them formal international organizations (p. 327). The UN and NATO both fall under this characterization, according to Young's (1986) description of organizations; here, "[o]rganizations are physical entities possessing offices, personnel, equipment, budgets" (p. 108). Organizations, however, can consist of institutional arrangements such as rules governing relations between members (Young, 1986, p. 108). Thus, we can view organizations as entities to which countries are members of, and institutions as rules to which members are committed (Martin & Simmons, 2013, pp. 326-329). While acknowledging the distinctive difference between international organizations and institutions, we will henceforth use the term 'international institutions'. Following this line of argumentation, according to Simmons and Martin (2002), "[i]n the actual practice of research, the distinction between institutions and organizations is usually of secondary importance" (p. 194).

Institutions exist due to consent between two or more actors that the presence is beneficial in some way or another, for whatever purpose in shaping behavior (Peters, 2013, p. 482). Furthermore, Chun (2013) writes, institutions "should only continue to exist if it remains relevant to its members and they continue to derive a quantifiable benefit from membership" (p. 75). This, it can be argued, somehow points to what Hall and Taylor (1996) argue are the two fundamental issues within institutionalism: "how to construe the relationship between institutions and behavior and how to explain the process whereby institutions originate or change" (p. 937). However, due to the role of institutions in this study, in which we are interested in finding out how our various actors respond to the events in focus, these issues are not of relevance here. That is, unlike, for example, Chun (2013) and Wallander (2000) we are not analyzing institutions in depth to understand them and how they operate, in order to explain the process whereby institutions originate or change, or construe relationship between institutions and behavior. Rather, we view NATO and the UN as potential mediators, and are interested in how terrorism is framed in their reactions to our cases.

Institutions can, among other things, be viewed "as formal or informal 'rules of the of the game'," (Menon, 2011, p. 85) as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,

rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (quoted in: Young, 1986, p. 105).

In his review article focusing on international regimes, Young (1986) suggests that in order to get a better understanding of international institutions, one should look at them as social institutions, such as the institution of marriage or market institutions (p. 107). This need is caused by a "conceptual thinness" (Young, 1986, p. 107) and an objection to ambiguous terms such as "beliefs, standards, prescriptions, and practices" (Young, 1986, p. 106). Accordingly, how are we to understand beliefs, principles, decision-making procedures, and the likes when such concepts are not universally bound. Or, as Young (1986) puts it, "definitions that are not clearly integrated into some larger conceptual system inevitably lead to trouble" (pp. 106-107). And a commonly agreed upon definition of institutions within an IR context somehow falls under this problem as no such definition exists (Keohane, 1988, p. 382; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 8). Following this line of argumentation, Young's proposal of viewing international institutions through the lens of social institutions does seem advantageous.

Accordingly, instead of engaging hard to define truisms such as 'standards' or 'beliefs', Young (1986) defines social institutions as "recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles" (p. 107). Along the same lines, Keohane (1988) notes that cooperation is not necessarily dependent on "on altruism, idealism, [...] common purpose, internalized norms, or a shared belief in a set of values embedded in a culture", although such features may play a role in specific instances (p. 380). Young's definition goes well in hand with Martin and Simmons (2013) who argue that it is commonly agreed upon by most scholars that international institutions are meant to encompass "*sets of rules* meant to govern international behavior" (p. 328, italics in original). In a similar way, Mearsheimer (1994-95) defines "institutions as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other" (p. 8).

Thus, we can look at institutions as important agents in shaping inter-state interactions (Menon, 2011, p. 84), which can serve as an important factor for cooperation in terms of drawing up the lines. Interactions are, nevertheless, not fixed, and can therefore exist on different levels and to various extents. As Mitrany

(1948) points out, the ideal imperative is states being closely associated, for the purpose of "all countries working together for their common good" (p. 359).
Associations between states can be either selective or comprehensive, where the latter exemplifies the aforementioned example about cooperation for the 'common good'. The EU can be thought of as an example of comprehensive association. Contrary, the selective association implies that cooperation only takes place within special areas (Mitrany, 1948, p. 359). Here one can think of, for example, a trade agreement. Regardless of what kind of association, Keohane (1988) suggests that in order for cooperation to occur, states alter their "[...] behavior *contingent on* changes in the other's behavior" (p. 380, italics in original). This implies that some degree of policy coordination between states is needed, and for that, as aforementioned, institutions can serve as an important factor due to their role in shaping inter-state interactions.

In sum, international institutions can be a catalyst for cooperation between states, by serving as an independent mediator. Within institutions, rules exists to which states are bound and thus are mandated to follow, if not to face reprisals. These are meant to serve as guidelines for the way in which states are to cooperate, while at the same the same time mitigate the risk of cheating. Furthermore, if states do not abide to this institutional framework to which they have committed themselves, institutions can use coercion, such as withdrawing aid, suspending trade, or introduce sanctions to make states alter their behavior (Martin & Simmons, 2013, pp. 336-337). Along the same lines, in cases of military intervention action, support from institutions lends support to the action, and may reduce international opposition (Martin & Simmons, 2013, p. 339). Institutions, however, are constructs and exists because states find them to be useful within a certain area, and any institution may cease to exist if it is found to no longer be relevant. How effective institutions are in enforcing rules and behavior, however, is disputed as we shall see in the following.

4.1.1. Realism

Theories of realism dominated IR for much of the 20th century (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 485; Mastanduno, 1997, p. 49; Nye, Jr., 1988, p. 238; Walt, 1998, p. 31), perhaps not surprisingly considering the unstable international system during that century, with

two World Wars and the subsequent Cold War. This fits well into the realist perception of the international system as a 'brutal arena', in which states states struggle for power in order to dominate (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 9), and secure its survival (Grieco, 1988 (1), p. 602). As there is 'no government over governments' (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 10), states find themselves in a self-help world in which today's friend might be the enemy of tomorrow (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 487). In an anarchic world, a state must constantly worry about other states' intentions, and subsequently often assume the worst, which leaves little room for mutual trust and instead fosters fear (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 11). This, in a combination with other factors, makes cooperation difficult to achieve in a realist world.

Needless to mention, there is not one single theory of realism (Jervis, 1999, p. 42; Mastanduno, 1997, p. 50; Walt, 1998, p. 31). The approach taken here is aligned with 'neorealism', in that we follow Waltz's 'top-down' explanation for state behavior, in which anarchy can be seen as the causal force (quoted in: Snidal, 1992, p. 293). Thus, the state of anarchy forces states to seek power in order to survive. Contrary, classical realism holds that the nature of man is to dominate others, and anarchy then provides the setting that permits states to struggle for power in order to dominate (Snidal, 1992, p. 293). Others, such as Jervis (1999), distinguish between 'defensive' and 'offensive' realism; the former, depending on various factors, to some extent favors cooperation and focusses primarily on defense and alliances. Mearsheimer (1994-95), however, argues that survival is a balancing act and that states, accordingly, are both offensively-oriented as well as defensively (p. 12).
In what follows we acknowledge the various theories and their contribution to realist scholarship, but no further distinction will be made and we will thus use the term(s) realism/realist(s).

According to Mearsheimer (1994-95), the 'grim' picture realism paints of world politics (p. 9), is perhaps best epitomized by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's claim that "tranquility is not the natural state of the world; peace and security are not the law of nature" (quoted in: Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 126). Thus, realists view the international system as an anarchical one (Grieco, 1988 (1), p. 602; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 10; Walt, 1998, p. 31), where no central authority

exists and states are pitted against each other in a positional struggle for power (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 9).
According to Grieco (1988 (1)), a state's main imperative is survival "which compels states to be acutely sensitive to threats to their relative capacity to protect their security and maintain their independence" (p. 602). This alleged sensitivity becomes highlighted due to the perception of the international system, which "is essentially a theatre of competition and conflict" (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196). In this system, war is always looming and states, accordingly, perceive each other as potential threats (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, pp. 9-11).

As no higher authority on which states can rely on is present, states perceive themselves as isolated in a sea of potential foes and therefore seek "to provide for its own survival" (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 11). The world, as a result of this perception, is best characterized as a 'self-help' world in which states always ought to seek "their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world" (Mearsheimer, 1994-95). Along the same lines, of significance for the realist tradition is it that all states are treated the same as they "behave similarly regardless of their type of government" (Snyder, 2004, p. 59). Whereas liberalists tends to believe that relationships can be maintained and appreciated through shared values and ideals (Walt, 1998, pp. 39-40), realists clearly do not share this notion. Ideals and values take a backseat here, and are overridden by concerns about power and security.

In sum, as the international system is anarchic, states "are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests" (Grieco (2), 1988, p. 488).

States, however, do cooperate in realist world (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 9), though it is, as Nuruzzaman (2008) points out "extremely difficult to achieve and sustain" (p. 196). Realists identify two main obstacles to achieve cooperation; concerns about relative gains, and concerns about cheating (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 487; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 12; Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196), where the concern about the former is reinforcing the latter (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 13).
The first has to do with the claim, that states are positional in character and therefore not only worry about their own gains stemming from cooperation, but also of those

made by their partners (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 487). States, therefore, before committing to cooperation, have to assess and compare "their own individual performance to the performance of other states" (Grieco, 1988 (1), p. 602). Thus, a state may indeed be willing to cooperate if it considers the gains to be distributed appropriately. It may, however, also choose not to cooperate, despite compliance on the partner's side, if it considers the gains of the partner to be relatively greater than those of its own (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 487).

The concern for realists about relative gains has to do with the anarchical system states find themselves operating in, in which power is the order of the day; in a dangerous world, power can guarantee survival and states thus "aim to maximize their relative power positions over other states" (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, pp. 11-12), while trying "*to prevent advances in the relative power of others*" (Grieco, 1988 (1), p. 602, italics in original). Jervis (1999), however, makes an interesting observation about relative gains in relation to nuclear weapons. Thus, he points out that realist scholars, soon after the first atomic bomb exploded, realized "that once both sides had a sufficient number of these weapons, little could be gained by further increases and there was little to fear from the other side's increases" (p. 46). Mearsheimer (1994-95) suggests, that the various arms agreement between the US and the Soviet Union can be seen through this light (p. 13). Thus, while not arguing that relative gains were of no concerns during the Cold War, certain scenarios may cause states to focus on absolute gains instead.

Unique for the Cold War, of course, was the bipolar structure. In such a world, only two states have to estimate the strengths of each other. In a multipolar world, on the other hand, it becomes more difficult as "a state has to compare its strength with a number of others and also has to estimate the strength of actual and potential coalitions" (Waltz, 1993, p. 73). Accordingly, a multipolar setting is seen as being more war-prone than a bipolar one (Mastanduno, 1997, p. 52).

How power is distributed between states is consequently a concern to realists, as variations in the distribution can "produce different configurations of the balance of power" (Mastanduno, 1997, p. 52). The balance of power, Nuruzzaman (2008) writes, is considered an independent variable in promoting "cooperation, peace and security" (p. 196), and states therefore pay close attention to this balance and potential relative gains or losses when considering cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994-

95, p. 12). States then act out of self-interest when cooperation takes place, weighing the potential benefits against losses and always seek to improve one's own position, with power yielding influence in bargaining situations. This, on the other hand, means that cooperation can be seen as more pragmatic. Or as Mearsheimer (1994-95) puts it a "[…] temporary marriages of convenience", in which today's enemy may be the partner of tomorrow, and vice versa (p. 11).

Somewhat connected to the concern of the balance of power, or at least the distribution of it, is realism's perception of institutions. These are perceived to be creations by powerful actors, "to facilitate realization of their interests," (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196) and thus are nothing but "a tool of statecraft" (Jervis, 1999, p. 43). Institutions, in other words, are based on the self-interest of powerful actors, aimed at meeting these interests. Thus, the rules that govern institutions "reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power", and can be seen as a platform for powerful states to increase their share of power (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 13).

As an example of this, Chang (2007) points to what he calls the 'Unholy Trinity', the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (p. xx). These institutions can, in large, be seen as mediators for a group of rich countries led by the US, attempting to make less-powerful states adopt their preferred economic policies. Loans to the poor, for example, becomes conditional on the consent of specific policies, while the rules for trading remains beneficial to the powerful group (Chang, 2007, p. xx). This, of course, shows that cooperation, at least on economic matters, not necessarily is determined by relative gains concerns, but that it, nevertheless, has everything to do with self-interest. Moreover, institutions can then work to facilitate cooperation - dependent, however, on the interests of the powerful actors in the system.

The concern about relative gains in terms of cooperation, however, does take front-seat, as a state always remains skeptical of another state's intention in a cooperative agreement and of that a potential partner will seek to gain a relative advantage at any given chance. Consequently, while a state can rely on no-one in case of being threatened, it must then itself seek to gain advantage over other countries

(Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 12). Due to the importance that realist tradition places on the balance of power, states "must be motivated primarily by relative concerns when considering cooperation" (Mearsheimer, 1994-94, p. 12). With this concern as a primary object, cooperation becomes harder to achieve, than had states only sought to maximize their absolute gains (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 12).
Thus, because of the focus on relative gains, states in a realist world find themselves in a constant competition for power and security (Walt, 1998, p. 38). This, by nature, makes it difficult for states to cooperate, while it also leads to the second obstacle for cooperation; cheating.

As aforementioned, states in a realist world are inherently distrustful and skeptical of each other's intentions, and states, accordingly, remain cautious about cooperation "for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage" (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 13). To realists, the concern about cheating becomes reinforced by their focus on relative gains. Because states are positional and all seek to advance their own gains while preventing the gains of others, no impediments are left to avoid cheating. Thus, if the only mutual interest existent is one of seeking advance, "mistrust and fear of cheating may be too severe to overcome" (Jervis, 1999, p. 49).

Changes of interests, however, may help paving the way for cooperation and thus limit the fear of cheating, by adopting "standard "cooperation under anarchy" policies", such as increasing transparency and making sure that "both the gains from cheating and the costs of being cheated on are relatively low" (Jervis, 1999, p. 52). Needless to mention, this may change depending on the situation and on how the partner perceived, and a state's willingness to change its interests (Jervis, 1999, pp. 51-52). However, as we have seen, institutions can prescribe acceptable behavior and proscribe unacceptable behavior, and in a similar vein, Grieco (1988 (1)) suggests that "international institutions may serve as an insurance against the danger of cheating" (p. 620). This becomes plausible when, or if, states can be advised of the potential benefits of advancing mutual interests by reducing the gaps in gains from cooperation, rather than opting for noncooperation and the status quo (Grieco, 1988 (1), p. 615). Institutions can then be important in advancing cooperation and discourage cheating by minimizing gaps stemming from cooperation, however, only

as far as it is within the interest of the states that established these institutions, as states will remain to shape their own interests (Jervis, 1999, p. 57).

In sum, as states in a realist world mainly worry about relative gains from cooperation, the fear of cheating becomes higher as any loss can be seen as a gain for a potential enemy. Cooperation, however, is not entirely impossible, but is difficult to achieve due to aforementioned reasons. Depending on the scenario states find themselves in, cooperation may become more attainable. Power and security are main concerns within this tradition, and states are unlikely to give concessions on these matters.

4.1.2. Liberalism

As we have seen, theories of realism have dominated international relations in the past, yet the sudden and peaceful end to the Cold War opened up new frontiers and was hailed as a victory for liberalism while it restored faith in international institutions capability "to promote international cooperation and stability" (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 194). To scholars adherent to liberalism, it was seen as a new beginning of sorts, in terms of a drastic shift in the global balance of power (Walt, 1998, p. 36). Thus, after half a century with balance of power and realism dominating the debate, it seemed as though the discussion had shifted towards liberalism and the 'promises' this tradition brought to the table.

A main aspect here is a core belief in international cooperation, especially through international institutions (Snyder, 2004, p. 56). Perhaps for this reason, some scholars also refer to liberalism as liberal institutionalism (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 486; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 14; Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 195). Thus, Grieco (1988(2)) uses the term in an overarching way in referring to, what he calls, "the major challenger to realism" since WWII (p. 486), while Mearsheimer (1994-95) argues that it is "a response to realism, [...] challeng[ing] realism's underlying logic" (p. 7). This strain of thought, though not unison, emphasizes the significance of international institutions in helping states to cooperate (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 486). Mearsheimer (1994-95) refers to liberal institutionalism as a theory that views cooperation as beneficial and institutions as an important agent of international

stability (pp. 15-16). Nuruzzaman (2008) argues that liberal institutionalism is a belief that cooperation can be promoted through institutions (p. 196), which is, more or less, identical to the characteristics of liberalism, where international institutions are valued "for their role in promoting international cooperation" (p. 195). As is evident here, the key tools for liberal institutionalists, as well as liberalists in an IR context, are cooperation and institutions, and no further distinction will be made here.

Whereas realism, as we have seen, is heavily occupied with concerns regarding power, survival, and competition in a brutal, cynical international system, liberalism, on the other hand, offers a less dramatic outlook. Accordingly, the quest for power here is "overridden by economic/political considerations" with a strong belief in liberal values and an aspiration for prosperity (Walt, 1998, p. 38), which in a combination with "international organizations will strengthen peace" (Snyder, 2004, p. 59).

That being said, liberalism does not necessarily reject the central claim of realism concerning the tendency for conflict between states due to the anarchic international system (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 486; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 16), rather it proposes measures to lessen such tendencies (Walt, 1998, p. 30). Grieco (1988(2)), however, argues that the liberal tradition has evolved in phases after WWII and that realism's claim regarding anarchy was not acknowledged until the early 1980s (p. 486).

Thus, it is acknowledged here, just as in realism, "that the absence of a sovereign authority that can make and enforce binding agreements creates opportunities for states to advance their interests unilaterally and makes it important and difficult for states to cooperate with one another" (Jervis, 1999, p. 43). The anarchic setting indeed presents an obstacle for cooperation, yet liberalists believe this challenge is more likely to be circumvented, than do realists (Grieco, 1988 (2), p. 486; Keohane & Martin, 1995 p. 42; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 16; Nuruzzaman, 2008, 195). To overcome this hurdle, a main tool within the liberal tradition is a reliance on international institutions (Walt, 1998, p. 38), which "with their ability to provide a common ground for interaction play a mediating role and encourage cooperation among states" (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 195). In addition to cooperation and

international institutions, liberalists also emphasize the impact of interdependence (Nye, Jr. 1988, p. 238).

Institutions themselves, however, do not necessarily cause cooperation. Thus, when states do not have similar interests, cooperation is less likely to occur. On the other hand, when states share interests and have mutual goals, cooperation becomes more attainable (Keohane & Martin, 1995, pp. 41-42). Mutual interests, of course, ought to pave the way and make cooperation easier to achieve. Along the same lines, it is perhaps not surprising that significant focus points for liberalists are the promotion of democracy and economic exchange (Snyder, 2004, p. 56), as a shared belief in these liberal values will shift away attention from security and great power politics (Walt, 1998, p. 40), and thus make cooperation more achievable.

As Keohane and Martin (1995) note in their rebuttal to Mearsheimer's (1994-95) article, cooperation is not to be expected when the actors involved are not able to identify self-interested gains to achieve from it (p. 41). This fits well into the anarchic system, in which states act rational egoistic. Institutions, however, are perceived as a counter-weight to this and thus possess quite some leverage. Nuruzzaman (2008) suggests that liberalists treat institutions "as intermediate variables having significant impact on state behaviour in terms of formulating and/or reformulating policy preferences and choices of states" (p. 195). In a similar vein, Jervis (1999) notes the potential impact of international institutions in altering domestic opinion "in ways that will affect foreign relations" (p. 61). Accordingly, institutions' role within the liberal tradition is of great significance, and is highly valued for their impact on states' behavior while appraised for their importance in providing "continuity in the midst of dramatic political shifts" (Walt, 1998, p. 36).

The value liberalists attribute institutions is caused by the latter's ability to provide information (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 43; Jervis, 1999, p. 51; Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196). Cooperation can be promoted when information is made available, and can be seen, one could argue, as a way of building of trust. Institutions are believed to play a large role by sharing "information about the situation, information about what the other side has done and why it has done it, and information about what the other side is likely to do in the future" (Jervis, 1999, p. 51).

The value of the providing information, Keohane and Martin (1995) argue, is also what makes liberalism relevant to security issues (p. 43). Thus, instead of assuming the worst about other states' intention when deciding on policies, information may be useful to avoid self-help solutions (p. 44), and instead choose cooperation. This view, however, is not shared by all liberalists, as some scholars argue that cooperation is difficult in security dilemmas, to an extent where a feeling of insecurity can preclude cooperation (Nuruzzaman, 2008, pp. 197-198). In his article 'Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001' (2008), Nuruzzaman focuses on exactly this question. Here he distinguishes between abundance and scarcity of security, where the former is characterized by the absence of conflict or war, by mutual trust, and cooperation between states. Contrary, the latter is epitomized by conflict or war and subsequent distrust between states which then makes cooperation harder to achieve (p. 198). As our study very much corresponds to this latter scenario, Nuruzzman's hypothesis is also of relevance here. Thus, he expects that "[a] stable, nonthreatening global security environment means wider scope for states to engage in cooperative endeavors under the auspices of international institutions; the opposite situation drives them away from cooperation" (p. 198). What he finds in his study, is that the US neocon foreign policy conducted by the Bush administration seriously harmed international institutions while it at the same time did little to improve international security, as unilateral actions taken by the US only seemed to have encouraged other powerful states to also pursue self-interests (p. 209). This, of course, seriously challenges Keohane and Martin's notion regarding information and the role institutions can play when security is scarce. However, as we in this paper are looking at how counterterrorism policies and political statements are framed, both arguments remains relevant. That is, how our actors respond initially may have differed from actions being taken down the road. Thus, security related concerns may indeed be applicable to, at least, a liberalist discourse.

Furthermore, liberalists appreciate institutions for their ability to "reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity" (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 42). In sum, institutions are believed to make cooperation easier, as they can modify anarchy by making it costly and difficult for states to withdraw from such

arrangements (Jervis, 1999, p. 56), reduce the risk of cheating by promoting mutual trust while creating an atmosphere of "reciprocity based on standards of appropriate behavior and [the] existence of mutual interests that make joint gains from cooperation possible" (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 196).

As we have seen, in the conduct of cooperation, mutual interests matter a great deal in order to be successful; when interests of states converges, cooperation is more likely to be sustained while differences between states become less relevant (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 195). As aforementioned, institutions can play a role in formulating interests, if they at first are not mutual. Accordingly, states are more likely within the liberal tradition to change or adjusts their interests in order to achieve cooperation, as they believe the outcome will be mutually beneficial (Jervis, 1999, p. 51). Mutually beneficial, however, does not imply that the gains are equally distributed but, rather, that both sides can be seen to have gained from the cooperation, and thus are better off due to it.

As we can see in the previous chapter on realism, realists, to some extent, perceive cooperation as a zero-sum game in which relative gains - or losses - are major concerns. Contrary, as aforementioned, liberalists consider gains from cooperation to be beneficial to all involved; a positive-sum game. Here, absolute gains matter and states aim to maximize these by cooperating, while relative gains of other states are of less concern (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 195). Liberalists, however, do not discard the significance of relative gains but the importance of such gains varies depending on various conditions, such as significant asymmetries among states or the number of major powers present (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 197; Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 44). In situations when relative gains nevertheless matter, such as in distributional issues, institutions can serve as a coordinating mechanism to help states comprehend potential gains from cooperation. Here, institutions can help states to coordinate their actions in order to find the most acceptable solution of the many potential cooperative outcomes (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 45). The problem concerning coordination is but one of two main problems states face when trying to achieve cooperation. The other, as aforementioned, is cheating, exemplified by a 'prisoner's dilemma' (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 45). This fear is mitigated by mutual trust and sharing of information, and a general believe that both sides will be better off by

mutual cooperation rather than if both were to cheat (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 17). Institutions' role on this matter is not only significant in terms of its ability to share information but also in making cheating seem unattractive by deterring it (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 17).

Nonetheless, as states find themselves in an anarchic setting, liberalists, too, at times acknowledge the presence of adversaries and may thus attempt to seek a relative advantage vis-á-vis adversaries (Jervis, 1999, p. 47). Keohane and Martin (1995) nevertheless point out that if the absolute gains stemming from cooperation are perceived to be substantial, relative gains take a back seat (p. 44). Thus, cooperation, becomes more achievable when states find themselves in a peaceful setting, in which relative gains are of less, if any, significance (Nuruzzaman, 2008, p. 197), and in cases where such gains are perceived to matter, liberalists believe that institutions can play a significant role in encouraging cooperation.

To sum up, liberalists value institutions for their role in making cooperation achievable, and their role in mitigating risks of cheating. In order to achieve cooperation, liberalists emphasize factors such as mutual interests and values, relationships, and sharing of information.

4.2. Securitization

The second theoretical framework for this paper is securitization theory as presented by the Copenhagen school (CS). First, the general thought behind the CS securitization framework is presented. In a second step, we will go into more detail and explain the basic concept of securitization as well as its application within the military and political sector. The chapter will be concluded with some critical points which reflect on the theory.

Generally, when we speak of security in the course of this paper, we always treat the security concept within an IR context. We relate international security to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde's (1998) view that in an IR framework, an international security issue is primarily anchored in a military-political understanding of the term which means that "security is about survival" against a specific threat (p. 21).

Furthermore, the CS connects the securitization concept to language theory; the process of securitization is based on the notion that framing something within security - or securitizing an issue - is a so-called speech act: "The utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)" (quoted in: Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26).

With this in mind, we refer to Buzan et al.'s (1998) basic formulation of the technicalities behind framework and we use their conceptualization as the cornerstone for our paper:

> "[...] security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying "security", a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development" (quoted in: Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21).

According to this definition, securing (national) survival is at the centre of the CS securitization framework. The survival could be threatened by an existential threat which is usually targeted at a referent object (RO); for example from a military perspective, the RO is usually the state while in the political sector, fundamental principles such as sovereignty are usually the RO (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 22).
The CS further states that because the core of its framework is about the "survival of collective units and principles" in the face of an existential threat, this core concept can be applied to a variety of sectors other than the typical military-political area, such as economic, societal and environmental (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27). According to the CS, it is important to distinguish between sectors because it is expected that the different sectors will differentiate in elements such as units, values and the subsequent nature of survival and threat (agenda) (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27).

Furthermore, depending on an issue's recurrence, securitized matters can be institutionalized or ad hoc (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27). Based on the subject matter and analytical direction in which we expect our paper to go, we will only take up the basic features of the military and political sector.

Furthermore, the CS dictates that when someone frames a matter as a security issue, the issue is framed as "a special kind of politics" or even to be "above politics"and can to some extent be regarded as an extreme subcategory of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). A case of securitization therefore is present when "a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is "normal politics"" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). However, this is only a so-called securitizing move; a successful and comprehensive securitization, so to speak, of an issue is only then completed when an audience accepts the framing. Acceptance here needs to be understood in the sense that the framing has found a significant level of resonance within the audience which would allow the securitizing actor (SA) to apply exceptional measures in order to combat the special threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25).
Further to conclude whether or not and to what extent a securitization has been successful, the CS defines "facilitating conditions" which refer to conditions that need to be met for a speech act to work successfully; the conditions can be first divided into internal and external conditions (quoted in: Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). While the former refers to linguistic-grammatical aspects, the latter relates to the appropriate contextual social environment in which the speech act takes place (quoted in: in Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32).

While we acknowledge the importance of all components to securitization, we want to point out that we are primarily interested in certain steps of securitization and not all elements within the theory as a whole. For instance, it is not our aim to identify successful securitization speech acts nor to evaluate whether something has been successfully securitized. We only intend to pick up aspects which we consider relevant for our case. This is why we from the beginning regard all our data to be speech acts, which will be analyzed for the elements which concern the SAs' framing of an existential threat to a RO, and the exceptional measures taken based on it.

Briefly recapitulating the securitization theory so far, the most significant element is that securitization is regarded to be a speech act which involves the interconnection between existential threat targeted at an RO, the SAs, and the audience.
The interconnection between an RO and an SA within the securitization move is the most interesting aspect to us. Even though the definition of an existential threat can be quite vast and overarching, it is also self-explanatory. The RO and the SA, on the other hand, need further explanation. While SAs securitize issues and declare them to be existentially threatening towards ROs, ROs in turn are defined as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). ROs, generally said, can be literally anything, however, most traditionally it is the state or the nation (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Even though the ROs in theory could be anything, the facilitating conditions limit the SAs in what they can construct as an RO; simply speaking, some ROs make the securitization more successful than other more trivial ROs (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). For example, threats towards a nation or its sovereignty are more likely to be considered severe, far-reaching threats in contrast to a threat towards an individual RO.

As aforementioned, the CS argues that security can be seen as comprising of five sectors, with each of them entailing a pairing of their particular RO and threat agenda (see Buzan et al. 1998, pp.49-161). For the purpose of our paper, we will briefly explain the theory against a military and political sector context.

The military sector is still the most significant and traditional division related to security studies, in which any securitization is most likely to be highly institutionalized (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 49). As mentioned earlier, the state is usually an RO within the military sector. However, states are not manifested constructs but rather an ideal construct; for example, internal tensions could create other units such as tribes, nations or autonomous movements within a single state, which would further break down the concept of a state (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 52-53). Another RO in the military sector, which is usually connected to the state RO, could be religion. Thus, Buzan et al. (1998) argue that religion has not yet exceeded the state as an RO in the military sector, but that Western fears of Islam, for example, have made it clear that religion could become more significant and further entangled with the state object (p. 53). Given what has happened from 9/11 to now, we consider that

religion has gained more importance in becoming an RO in the military sector. Whether or not religion can be clearly identified as an RO and whether it has succeeded the state as a primary RO is questionable. Furthermore, military securitization can go beyond the traditional state cluster and entail ROs which encompass the claims of joint states such as NATO or the EU; the former was for example invoked as representing the military security of the West during the Cold War (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 55). In this context, ROs could, for example, be collective principles such as non-proliferation, the balance of power, or as shown later, values such as freedom and democracy (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 55).

As for the SA, we can assume that an institutionalized RO such as the state will have a highly institutionalized SA who would usually be a state-representative. Connecting this to the collective system level, the Secretary-General of the UN or leaders of autonomous movements can also act as SAs, given that they speak in behalf of a unit (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 55-56). As for functional actors in the military sector, the biggest potential influencing factor in the military securitization discourse could be the arms industry (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 55).

When looking at the political sector, political security aims to protect social order and organizational stability, and aims at fighting threats towards state sovereignty (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 141). The threat agenda within political security mirrors military security, with the major difference that it usually deals with non-military threats against state sovereignty (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 141). However, on a broader level, we can say that the political sector encompasses all other sectors as it is deeply intertwined with each sector (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 141-142). As for who can assume the role of ROs in the political sector, it is a variety of institutions within the international political system capable of doing that. Typically, it is the territorial state. If we move away from the traditional state, there are also other state-like organizations such as the EU, minorities, tribes or movements including religious movements like the catholic church in earlier times which can function as ROs (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 145-146).

As for the role of the SAs, it is only very few who can assume such a role in the political sector. Given that highly institutionalized states or state-like organizations

are usually the RO, we can also expect highly institutionalized SAs. All states (and usually also all state-like organizations) usually have a well defined figure of authority and work within a given structure; therefore, it is usually the government - or other authoritative units - which assume the role of the SA (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 146).
It is interesting to note that on the one hand, weak states often times are subjected to internal threats to their organizational and institutional structure because the general public does not assume that the government acts on the public's interest, but rather on its own. Therefore, any decision by an authority will be questioned internally. On the other hand, stronger states, typically liberal-democracies, have governments which are generally assumed by the public to act as agents of the nation-state and largely deal with external threats to protect the nation-state's collective security from outside elements such as terrorism (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 146-147).

We acknowledge that for the subject matter of our paper, it would have been interesting to include the threat agenda, and further specification of SA and RO against a societal and even economic sector. However, restrained by the scope of the paper, we believe that it is important to narrow down securitization to specific sectors which we expect to be the dominant backgrounds for our analysis.

Of course, the CS securitization theory is a very specific conceptualization of securitization within security studies, and we acknowledge that it can be seen as a somewhat narrow theoretical framework. Holger Stritzel (2007) points to some noteworthy critical aspects of the theory to which we want to call attention to, and to keep in mind when applying the framework to our analysis.

Generally, Stritzel (2007) argues that the CS securitization concept is too static in its conceptualization and does not sufficiently consider the dynamic social environment in which the articulation of a speech act takes place; Stritzel (2007) emphasizes that the CS securitization concept is based on a fixed process, with a fixed meaning when it highlights the exceptionality of a security speech act - which is not always given (p. 366).

In this context, Stritzel (2007) further argues that one should also include an externalist position and not focus as much on the internalist position of securitization as is arguable done by the CS; any articulation of security should be related to a discursive, dynamic context in which the SA is located and in which any 'performative power' of the articulated security speech act can actually be powerful (p. 360).
Stritzel (2007) therefore proposes a three-layered framework which connects the "text, context and positional power", thereby aiming to include the socio-political context in which a text generates meaning through power relations (p. 368).
We generally agree with Stritzel's critique of having to further involve the socio-political dynamics and contexts when applying the securitization theory. The critique, however, does not necessarily apply to us. We circumvent the critique by including a socio-political context in our background chapter and our analysis. We look at the securitization of terrorism within a specific terrorism discourse, which we earlier traced back with a genealogical approach that basically carves out the influence of power relations on discourse. Additionally, Bacchi's WPR policy analysis approach (2009) also requires us to illustrate a contextual premise in which the documents we analyze are set in. We acknowledge that our approach is expandable; however, while we do not give a detailed account and deconstruction of each of our 5 actors and socio-political contexts, we still believe that we do justice to Stritzel's critique and sufficiently embed securitization within a specific discourse and context.

As another critique point, Stritzel (2007) criticizes that the CS focuses too much "on the semantic side of the speech act articulation" (p. 358). This is a significant critique which we also have to reflect on in our paper. The CS highlights and defines securitization to being a speech act. This aspect is certainly relatable to the three speeches we analyze and arguably also to the NATO and UN statements. However, all three legislative frameworks are primarily written material which would play to Stritzel critique's and lead to questioning whether the theory can be used for written material or only documents which also entail speech acts as such. We do believe that securitization can also exist outside of traditional speech acts as the legislative frameworks for instance can be regarded as extensions of the speech acts represented by the political speeches. As we will see, the legislations spell out the specificities of the measures which the respective state representatives have already mentioned in

their speeches. Therefore, we acknowledge Stritzel's critique but still consider, given the arguments just presented, that the CS securitization is a relevant theory, which can still be applied to all the data of our research. In light of the critique, we circumvent it by choosing to further interpret what a speech act actually is and expand it to written material. This shall not reduce the quality of the discussion of our findings in relation to securitization as we focus on the content of any speech act and not the identification of speech acts.

V. Policy Analysis

In this chapter, we will analyze the framing of terrorism in the 12 documents as previously presented in the data collection chapter in chronological order of their date of issuance and according to the timeline of the three cases:

1) "Secretary-General Condemns Terrorist Attacks On The United States"
   "Statement by the North Atlantic Council"
   "George W. Bush's speech before Joint Congress on September 20, 2001 9/11"
   "The USA Patriot Act"
2) "Secretary-General says vicious london bombings 'an attack on humanity itself', world stands shoulder to shoulder with British people"
   "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on terrorist attacks in London"
   "Statement to Parliament on the London Bombings"
   "Terrorism Act 2006"
3) "State of Emergency" (d'état d'urgence)
   "Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the multiple attacks in Paris"
   "Speech by President of the Republic of France François Hollande before a joint session of Parliament"
   "Statement by the North Atlantic Council in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris"

In applying Bacchi's WPR policy analysis approach (2009) to the selected documents and discussing them in the context of securitization and institutionalism, we intend to shed light on the following research questions posed:

How is terrorism framed and what purpose do the framings serve in terms of securitization and institutionalism?
How can the insight gained explain its potential international effects especially in terms of international cooperation efforts in counterterrorism?

We conduct the policy analysis in several steps and follow an iterative approach as we go back and forth in data (Bryman, 2012, p. 26). Firstly, we as researchers

individually make an initial reading of all 12 documents. The reading process is followed by an analysis whereby we relate the major themes we gathered and put them into relation to four of Bacchi's WPR questions which we have selected previously. After the analysis, we draw a line from the findings generated from our analysis to the theories of institutionalism and securitization through individual discussions of each of the three cases. The analysis chapter will then be concluded with an overall cross-case conclusion. The cross-case conclusion of our three cases gives us the opportunity to critically reflect on our data and theories, and to compare the cases to each other.

Given the focal point of our paper, we do not intend to discuss all aspects of which we find in the course of our analysis. Our aim is to carve out the major elements which we consider most relevant for the discussion of such findings afterwards.

5.1. Secretary-General Condemns Terrorist Attacks On The United States

This statement by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was released on September 11, 2001, and represents a specific international institution. The contextual premise on which this statement is grounded on what has occurred; the US has been attacked and "[t]here can be no doubt that these attacks are deliberate acts of terrorism" (Annan, 2001).

The problem represented here, along the same lines, is terrorism, "which must be fought resolutely wherever it appears" (Annan, 2001), suggesting that a problem exists that must be dealt with. Little, however, is said specifically about the terrorists who committed these acts of terrorism, stemming from the date of origin of this document; it is simply too early to know who the terrorists were, what they wanted to achieve, let alone how many they killed (Annan, 2001).
Terrorism, as aforementioned, anywhere is regarded as the problem, notwithstanding that why this problem is being represented arguably is due to specific acts of terrorism. The prominence of the problem is highlighted by the, at that time, unknown objective of 9/11; that even though the attacks may have been carried out for a purpose, "no just cause can be advanced by terror" (Annan, 2001).

That no act of terrorism, despite what its cause may be, can be justified, implies that a separate category is created for whomever that fits into this category. Interestingly, however, is that no specific values are being attributed terror other than it cannot be justified and accordingly needs to be 'fought wherever it appears'. This, one could argue, also implies that anyone fighting or seeking what they may consider a 'just cause' would abandon this cause by turning to terror. The assumption that underlies the alleged problem can then be seen as overarching; terror in general is 'evil' and kills, which this act of terror only exemplifies. That the attacks were "carefully planned and coordinated" (Annan, 2001) emphasizes the cynicism of terrorists and their willingness to kill, in this case on American soil.

This last point highlights the second category created in this statement, the victims of the attacks, those who were killed and their families, and, more broadly, "the people and the Government of the United States" (Annan, 2001). The creation of this victim category is of significance as it highlights the scope and danger of terror, while it underlines the impact of such acts. Furthermore, as this latter category encompasses not only the actual victims, but also the people and Government of the US, the attack can be seen as an attack on the US, and not 'only' on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Annan (2001), furthermore, implicitly recognizes that a victim to a crime like 9/11 may be in its right to respond to such attacks as "[t]errorism must be fought resolutely", but warns that a "cool and reasoned judgement is more than essential ever".

As this statement was released on the day of the attack, many details surrounding it remains unknown, except for the fact that it was a terrorist attack targeting the US. This fact, however, is being presented without any argumentation or justification of why this is the case (Annan, 2001). Thus, rather than referring to why this is considered terrorism, it is being stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that these attacks are deliberate acts of terrorism" (Annan, 2001). It is, accordingly, being established that the attacks, from a UN perspective, are terrorism simply because there can be no doubt about it. This, however, is not to suggest that the problem could be thought about any differently, but it does highlight, one could argue, what is being left unproblematic in the problem representation.

Thus, the argument – that 'there can be no doubt' – serves, as a reminder of that no internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism exists. Yet, despite the absence of

such a definition, it is nevertheless possible to define the attacks as acts of terrorism. Moreover, and along the same lines, it is argued by the Secretary-General that terrorism must be fought (Annan, 2001), yet it is not suggested how, perhaps because it is not exactly clear *what* needs to be fought. The decision to deem these attacks as terrorism, and at the same time encourage fighting it can accordingly be seen as highly problematic due to a lack of consent of the international community of what constitutes it.

To sum up, the problem – terrorism – caused a "terrible tragedy" (Annan, 2001), but it is unclear how this problem can be fixed, despite the explicit call to fight it everywhere (Annan, 2001). Moreover, what a "cool and reasoned judgement" (Annan, 2001) implies is arguably left for the individual state to decide, as no framework to overcome terrorism is present.

Terrorism is seen as an evil here, and the only apparent way to fix the 'problem' is to fight it everywhere (Annan, 2001). Along the same lines, it appears that what the problem is represented to be is nothing new, the 9/11 attacks have only highlighted this problem. The terrorists who committed the attacks, for whatever reason(s) (Annan, 2001), can then be seen as having shed a light on terrorism in general and made the problem appear. Thus, the 'problem' is not 9/11 per se, rather 9/11 serves to mark that a problem exists; with terrorism comes tragedy (Annan, 2001). Moreover, by stressing, "that no just cause can be advanced by terror" (Annan, 2001) it is being underlined that terrorism can never be justified. By so forcefully condemning terrorism, any reflection of what might have caused the act in the first place is excluded. Though the means to pursue a potential 'just cause' should never involve terror, what is omitted is a willingness to try understanding why there was/is a reason to pursue such a cause.
Instead, committing attacks such as 9/11 underlines the 'evilness' of terror, wherever it may occur. Therefore it needs to be fought, perhaps by those targeted; the 'victims'. This fight is justifiable in the sense that what was brought upon the victims was unjustifiable terrorism; the 'victims', representing 'good', fighting terrorism, representing 'evil'.
The need to fight terrorism "resolutely wherever it appears" (Annan, 2001) pits 'good' against 'evil', and has the discursive effect of making this fight a 'just cause' as

what is being fought can never represent something 'just'. Thus, in fighting terror, the end seems to justify the means.

5.2. Statement by the North Atlantic Council

NATO, an alliance whose "[…] *purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means"* (NATO, "What is NATO? - Basic Points", italics in original), has at its core the principle of collective defense, which is enshrined in Article 5 in its founding treaty, the Washington Treaty of 1949 (NATO, "What is NATO? - Basic Points").

This is of significance to keep in mind, in order to understand the contextual premise on which this statement is grounded. Thus, as a member-state of NATO has been attacked, the alliance assures the US that it "can rely on its 18 [sic] Allies in North America and Europe for assistance and support", although it stops short of invoking Article 5 at this point of time (NATO, 2001). The significance of the circumstances for this statement is emphasized by the claim that this was "an unacceptable act of violence without precedent in the modern era" (NATO, 2001). In the course of events, what followed was also without precedent as Article 5 eventually was invoked, as mentioned elsewhere.

The way the US was attacked, one can argue, makes the problem representation here three-folded. Thus, not only was the US attacked, it was attacked in a way which "underscores the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism" (NATO, 2001). Remarkably is it that the attacks themselves are not explicitly referred to as terrorism, but rather linked to an ongoing fight against it. It is therefore only implicitly recognized that the "barbaric acts committed against a NATO member state" (NATO, 2001) falls under terrorism. This, one could argue, underlines that the attacks were not merely attacks; "these [were] unspeakable crimes", epitomized by "[t]he mindless slaughter of so many civilians" (NATO, 2001).
The problem – the attacks – can then be seen as one highlighting another problem – terrorism – which is already trying to be fixed, or in other words, 'combated' (NATO, 2001). The significance of this latter problem is emphasized by that it is a battle that needs to be won (NATO, 2001). However, having the aforementioned purpose of

NATO in mind, the problem represented is moreover that a member was attacked. This member, accordingly, is not alone (NATO, 2001).

In short, the problem representations in this statement reinforce one another, and all have as their starting point the attacks on the US. The US was attacked (problem I), and as the US is a member of NATO, the attacks are also considered a concern for NATO (problem II), and (problem III) the way the attacks were carried underlines the need to fight terrorism. As the representations reinforce one another and all find their roots in the attacks on the US, the 'main' problem then is the terrorist attacks themselves (problem I). Problem II, and III can therefore then be seen as sub-problems, arising or reemerging as a result thereof.

In terms of presuppositions and assumptions underlying the representation of the problem, the US has been attacked, and these attacks have different consequences in terms of highlighting other problems and raising concerns.
The manner in which the US was attacked is somewhat unique, as such an "act of violence [is] without precedent in the modern era" (NATO, 2001), emphasizing the extraordinary scope of the attacks, and hence the significance of the problem. That the attacks were 'barbaric', and that those who lost their lives on 9/11 were not merely killed, but were "mindless[ly] slaughter[ed]" makes it "an unacceptable act of violence" (NATO, 2001).
This characterization allows for the distinction between 'victim' and 'perpetrator', where the 'perpetrator' has committed something 'barbaric' by 'mindlessly slaughtering' "so many civilians", thus emphasizing the "urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that the NATO countries – indeed all civilized nations – must win" (NATO, 2001). NATO members and civilized nations then come to represent 'good' as they are fighting those who are 'barbaric' and 'uncivilized'. Any response to the attacks can then, one could argue, be seen as appropriate as it will be against 'evil'.
Moreover, though Article 5 is not mentioned in this statement, it is stressed that "NATO solidarity remains the essence of our Alliance", and that it will support and assist the US (NATO, 2001). By doing so, a message is conveyed that those who committed the attacks "will not get away with it", as "[a]ll Allies stand united in their determination to combat this scourge" (NATO, 2001).

Thus, as a result of the attacks 'we' stand united in the fight against 'them', and the brutality and mercilessness of 9/11 emphasizes the significance and importance of this fight.
Despite the diagnosis of problem, it remains unclear exactly what this entails and how it should be overcome. This statement too was released on the day of the attacks, which leaves details surrounding the attacks unknown. There are thus no references to who committed the attacks, and for what reason they did so (NATO, 2001). It is, as aforementioned, however being implicitly recognized that it was terrorism, which, in turn, is represented as part of the problem here (NATO, 2001).

Any underlying motives that could help explaining why the US was attacked are not presented, which may, as aforementioned, has to do with the proximity of time to the attacks. However by omitting even an acknowledgement that there might have been an objective on the perpetrators' part, an attempt to understand why the attacks occurred are excluded. This, in turn, can be seen to justify the call to step up the fight against terrorism. That is, such a seemingly brutal act of killing innocent civilians simply needs to be fought; there is no other way to approach this problem. Along the same lines, by only identifying terrorism as what needs to be fought, the essential question of how this fight will be executed and who will partake in it, let alone how it will succeed, remains unanswered and it thus left unproblematic (NATO, 2001). Thus, what "intensifying the battle against terrorism" entails and on sight will result with, becomes speculative (NATO, 2001).

As the fight against terrorism is being presented as not only NATO's but the civilized world's (NATO, 2001) fight, the problem representation can be seen to benefit both NATO and the US as a consequence. That is, if the US should choose to respond to the attacks unilaterally, any such measure can be seen as one taken on behalf of the civilized world. Similarly is the case for NATO which then not only would protect the security and freedom of its members, but of all civilized nations. Lastly, by appealing to all civilized nations, NATO encourages entities other than its member-states to also partake in 'fixing' the problem. This way of representing the problem can then, one could argue, be seen as an attempt to legitimize potential measures to be taken, while it also encourages cooperation. And measures will be taken, as "those who

perpetrated these unspeakable crimes [...] will not get away with it" (NATO, 2001), thus making lived effects arguably a foregone conclusion.
Noteworthy, in terms of discursive effects in this statement, is the few direct references to the perpetrators (NATO, 2001). Thus, instead of referring directly to them, they are defined by how the attacks are described; it was 'barbaric', 'unacceptable violence', 'unspeakable crimes', 'mindless slaughter' (NATO, 2001). Depicting the attacks, and thus the perpetrators, in such a manner, leaves for little space to think about it differently. This seemingly serves to reason why terrorism must be fought.

5.3. Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress

Once every year, the President of the US delivers a State of the Union (SotU) to Congress and the American people. SotU is the only speech that the President is constitutionally mandated to give, and it is, as the name of it suggests, more or less a presentation of where the country finds itself; what has been done and what will be done (Nelson & Riley, 2010, p. 147). Thus, Bush starts his address saying that "[i]n the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report the state of the Union" (p. 65), acknowledging that his appearance before Congress is not a 'normal' one.

What happened on 9/11 was, in a US context, an almost unprecedented event. Despite the country's relative short history, the US has been no stranger to wars, but these have, for the most part, taken place on foreign battlegrounds, with the exception of "one Sunday in 1941" (Bush, 2001, p. 66). What Bush alludes to here, of course, is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which marked US entrance into WWII. Just as the Sunday in 1941 was an act of war, so too is 9/11 considered an act of war committed by "enemies of freedom" (Bush, 2001, p. 66). Here the two events are being linked for a contextual purpose, but the latter is presented as extraordinary due to how it unfolded: "Americans have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack" (Bush, 2001, p. 66).

This lengthy quotation is significant for two reasons; first, we get to understand the contextual premise for the speech, and the policy(ies) that may follow. Here it is being emphasized that 9/11 is a, somehow, unique moment in US history, as an attack of this character never has taken place on US soil before. Whereas Japan in 1941 struck a military base, 9/11 is here characterized as targeting civilians. To this, a response is needed and President Bush (2001), accordingly, presents various initiatives to be taken by the US government to prevent similar attacks to occur (pp. 69-72), while promising that regardless of "[w]hether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done" (p. 65). The attacks have forced the US to respond and President Bush to act, which then leads to the second reason, which is related to Bacchi's notion that we are governed through problematizations. The problem presented in the quotation above, that freedom is under attack, leads us to the first of Bacchi's six questions; what is the problem represented to be?

The problem represented in this speech is to some extent multifaceted, while it at the same time can be seen as very straightforward. Foreign agents, belonging to a terrorist organization called al Qaeda (Bush, 2001, p. 66), have attacked the US, with thousands of civilians being killed as a result. This, it can be argued, is the 'simple' problem representation – a terrorist attack on the US. The attack, however, is by nature also what makes the problem multifaceted. Thus, it is not only an attack on the US as such, but an attack committed due to the hatred of US values such as the belief in the democratic process and freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to "assemble and disagree with each other" (Bush, 2001, p. 68). Connected to the values presented here, it can be argued, is the aforementioned claim that the world's freedom is under attack. As a result, the US has been "called to defend freedom" (Bush, 2001, p. 65).

Along the same lines, it can be seen as an attack on the global position of the US, as the perpetrators aim to "remak[e] the world – and impos[e] [their] radical beliefs on people everywhere" (Bush, 2001, p. 66). According to Bush (2001), as an obstacle for the terrorists to achieve this, stands the US who will not retreat from the world nor forsake its friends (p. 68), which, of course, emphasizes the global position of America. The US may be what stands in the way for the terrorists to meet their objective, but by presenting their objective in such a manner also implies that 9/11 is

not only a problem for the US, but one of global character. Following this line of argumentation, the problem represented by Bush (2001) is not only one facing America, but the world at large (p. 70).
In the face of an evil ideology, resembling "the murderous ideologies of the 20th century[,]" following "the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism" (Bush, 2001, pp. 68-69), those who "believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom" have to unite to fight evil (Bush, 2001, p. 70). Invoking such sentiments, and presenting the terrorists as a group threatening 'our' way of life may lend credibility and support to any measures being taken as an outcome of 9/11. Or as Bush (2001) says, by referencing the NATO Charter: "[a]n attack on one is an attack on all" (p. 70), thus stressing the scope of the attacks while calling for the backing of allies.

In sum, the problem represented in this speech is a murderous, extreme terrorist organization with global ambitions. In pursuing these, the terrorists are commanded by their leaders "to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and [to] make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children" (Bush, 2001, p. 67). The problem, however, does not stop with the terrorists; thus, any state sponsoring or harboring such groups are part of the problem as well, and will be considered an enemy of the US (Bush, 2001, p. 69). Lastly, to emphasize the significance of these threats, Bush (2001) suggests that what is at stake is the freedom of the world, highlighting the urgency of 'civilization' to stand against this evil (p. 70).

The use of terms such as 'civilization' and 'freedom' somehow leads to Bacchi's second question, in which she proposes to look out for binaries, key concepts or categories that are created, in order to answer what presuppositions or assumptions underlie the representation of the 'problem'.
It quickly becomes apparent in this speech that two categories are created; on the one hand is the perpetrators of the terrorist act – the terrorists, and those who support or harbor them, and on the other hand, broadly speaking, 'the rest'. The latter category is indeed a large one, encompassing not only the civilians killed on 9/11, but America as a whole – as this was an act of war (Bush, 2001, p. 66), and, more broadly, the 'civilized world' – described as "all who believe in progress and

pluralism, tolerance and freedom" (Bush, 2001, p. 70). Rather self-explanatory in this context, this latter category can be described as 'good' or 'us', while the former is seen as 'evil' or 'them'.

As this speech, in large, can be seen as how the US intends to respond to 9/11, the creation of categories and binaries as these are impactful, and only serves to highlight the problem represented. That is, besides the domestic initiatives, such as the creation of the Office of Homeland Security (Bush, 2001, p. 69), the US is now at war with al Qaeda, and with terror in general (Bush, 2001, p. 68). By creating a war rhetoric, Bush (2001) puts this 'new' enemy on par with enemies fought in other wars (pp. 68-69), while emphasizing the righteousness of any measures the US may take to win this war (pp. 69-70). In such a representation, the dehumanization of 'them' becomes essential in order to justify one's actions, both in terms of potential casualties (i.e. die for a cause) and domestic support (i.e. strengthen security to be safe), and for international support (i.e. 'they' are threatening us all). Here the perpetrators are presented as "the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century" intending to kill 'us' all (Bush, 2001, pp. 67-68). The perpetrators, moreover, come to be seen through the attacks themselves. Thus, the sheer willingness to kill civilians in this manner emphasizes how the perpetrators are perceived. This is turn implies that no compromise is possible and that the problem needs to be eliminated (Bush, p. 70); as, 'they' are committed "to plot evil and destruction" around the world, and support a vision for the world in which, among other things, "[w]omen are not allowed to attend school" (Bush, 2001, p. 67). 'They' kill without distinction of targets (p. 67), and 'they' hate everything about 'us' and what 'we' believe in (Bush, 2001, pp. 67-68). Where 'we' represent 'freedom', 'they' represent 'fear' (Bush, 2001, p. 72), and the two are now at war.

It is, however, not only a war between 'freedom' and 'fear' but also one in which 'justice' faces 'cruelty' (Bush, 2001, p. 73). With divine interference, however, it is assumed that the former will ultimately be victorious (Bush, 2001, p. 73). The assumption here that God is on 'our' side, illustrates the presumption that what 'we' will do is the 'right' thing, as opposed to what 'they' have done – and allegedly will continue to do – is 'wrong' and 'evil'. As such, how 'we' are perceived further adds to the dehumanization of 'them'; with the strength of God, and convinced by the 'rightness' of 'our' cause will we "lift a dark threat of violence from our people and

our future", as "the advance of human freedom [...] now depends on us" (Bush, 2001, p. 72).

In sum, two opposing sides are drawn up against each other, characterized by their stark contrasts which allows for no immediate equilibrium, thus the ultimatum that "[e]ither you are with us, or you are with terrorists us" (Bush, 2001, p. 69). This, of course, also implies that what 'they' represent must be dealt with, as 'they' are posing a threat to not only America, but to the world (Bush, 2001, p. 70). Accordingly, an assumption of inherent conflict between 'good' and 'evil' is represented, in which the only way to overcome those who represent 'evil' and "threat our way life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows" (Bush, 2001, p. 70).

As for what is left unproblematic in the speech's problem representation or what is left unsaid is the absence of finding any aspect other than the 'we were attacked by an extremist terrorist organization and need to respond (with war)' problem representation, to which the terrorist attack could be linked to. President Bush (2001) connects the terrorist attack directly to al Qaeda, but also repeatedly brings Islam into the conversation by saying that "the terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism" (p. 66), and that the terrorists "who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah" (p. 68).
Along the same lines, Bush (2001) further argues that "al Qaeda is [...] imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere" (p. 66). Bush (2001) does emphasize that the violent extremist act should be distinguished and does not represent Islam: "[th]e enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends, it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists" (p. 68). However, by pointing out and emphasizing the religion and ethnic minority as repeatedly as he does in his speech, Bush, even though unintentionally, makes a connection between Arab and Muslim communities and the terrorist attack. This finding corresponds to Bacchi's argument which states that the implication that policies fix something also imply that there is a problem which requires fixing. In a similar vein, we could say that Bush repeatedly tries to paint Arab and Muslim communities in a good light leading the audience to think they need that positive representation, as they may get stigmatized with some kind of negative image. President Bush's seemingly insignificant action of putting

terrorism and Islam into one context arguably connects the two aspects, with potentially far-reaching consequences.

President Bush (2001) also makes a specific connection to Afghanistan and in particular accuses the Afghan Taliban regime to be "threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder" (p. 67). The reason for the attack as represented in the problem, is seen in the existence of al Qaeda and its alleged allies, and how these groups endanger America and the rest of the world.

This aspect is also deeply intertwined with one of the discursive effects of this representation as it, as aforementioned, does not offer any option to link the terrorist attack to something else than the simple starting position that a group of Islamic extremists who threatened and attacked America's freedom. This narrow and one-sided problem representation does not allow for room to consider other roots of the issues such as for example any underlying motivation of al Qaeda.
The inadequacy and limitation of the problem representation furthermore too simply follows the narrow binary of 'we' against 'them'. Such a dichotomous problem representation is not new and is reminiscent of the times during the Cold War, where the US as 'we' fought against 'them' - the Soviet Union. Bush further undermines the binary with a strong rhetoric and repeatedly puts two parties against each other. By doing so, he again creates the discursive effect which leaves the reader with the thought that there is only one way and no other option; he does not leave any room for any stances in between, but forces any party to choose a side. He specifically asks the world to stand by the American side, while he considers an appropriate response to the attack as being war. By also specifically calling other nations to choose a side, Bush makes his unilateral stance clear and emphasizes that the world should join the US – and along with it; join the game but play according to American unilateral rules.
The created dichotomy also leads to a representation of the US as the victim of an attack while al Qaeda as the terrorist organization and its supporters are the clear perpetrator and enemy of the US. The effects of such a binary are the creation of two opposing subjects and the dominant American subjectivity. Only two subjects are

presented and as previously mentioned, therefore do not leave any room for inbetweeners.

5.4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the US passed the *USA PATRIOT Act*: Preserving Life and Liberty *(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism)*. The longer title for the Act, which also sets the goal for the piece of legislation, is stated "[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes"; we will refer to it as the USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act was passed nearly unanimously by the Senate with 98-1 and in the House with 357-66; Members of Congress and the Senate across the political spectrum have voted for the enactment of the Patriot Act (U.S. Department of Justice). The Act was approved and signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, within two months of the attack (Congress, 2001, p.1). The legislation introduced a variety of new legislation measures but largely entails amendments to existing law. The Act is structured into 10 Titles (Congress, 2001, p. 2-6):

Title I:	Enhancing domestic security against terrorism
Title II:	Surveillance procedures
Title III:	Anti-money-laundering to prevent terrorism
Title IV:	Border security
Title V:	Removing obstacles to investigating terrorism
Title VI:	Victims and families of victims of terrorism
Title VII:	Increased information sharing for critical infrastructure protection
Title VIII:	Terrorism criminal law
Title IX:	Improved intelligence
Title X:	Miscellaneous

Given the nature that the USA PATRIOT Act was passed due to and immediately in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Act could be seen as an exceptional measure. Therefore, as a first problem, we can say it is terrorism which is identified as the issue at hand. The problem can be further broken down by noting that just the mere creation of the Act is a consequence of the US seeing itself being under attack by terrorism. As a consequence, the US needs to take (special) measures in form of the PATRIOT ACT to better protect itself against another adversary entity for security reasons. September 11 is specifically mentioned 18 times in various contexts in the Act (Congress, 2001, pp. 143, 144, 145, 215, 228, 233, 236, 237, 241, 257, 262 (2), 264, 315, 216 (3), 332), which backs up the argument that it was created due to the 9/11 incident.

The idea that the U.S. needs to (better) protect itself due to an attack comes out in several formulations within the document. On a superficial level, the title of the Act states that it was created to "deter and punish terrorist acts" (Congress, 2001, p. 1) while the subtitle emphasizes the "uniting and strengthening [of] America" (Congress, 2001, p. 2). Title I as a whole revolves around "enhancing domestic security against terrorism" (Congress, 2001, p. 2), Title IV regards "protecting the border" (Congress, 2001, p. 4) and Title VII aims to "increase[…] information sharing for critical infrastructure protection" (Congress, 2001, p.5).
The sense of need for more protection further shines through in the content of the individual titles, were the phrase "[…] to protect against […]" comes up several times. Existent law is for example amended by the phrase "to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities" (Congress, 2001, pp. 35, 37, 39, 247, 248, 249, 250) in various passages of the Act. As a consequence, we can firmly state that the protection of the nation against an adversary entity, primarily existing of terrorism and terrorist agents, are prominently given as reasons for why passages of legislation are amended or introduced. This is, accordingly, the overarching problem represented in the Act.

The measures to protect itself comes in the shape of 10 Titles, which entail new regulations or amendments to existing law as to how U.S. officials can improve their work by, overall, being given more power and authority – which could be regarded as the second layer of the overarching problem within the 'we need to protect ourselves

against terrorism' frame. This in turn leads us to deduct that a grand underlying problem is apparently seen in the insufficient authority, officials and institutional departments had in the first place to prevent the nation from an incident such as 9/11.

We can carve out individual actors such as the President, the FBI and CIA, the Attorney General and several US Departments (i.e. State and Treasury) whom are given immensely more power as evident in the course of the PATRIOT ACT. Title I sec. 106 for example gives the President the power delegate his authority to a designated person by him (Congress, 2001, pp. 12-13).

In sec. 103 of Title I, the FBI is given increased funding to "help meet the demands of activities to combat terrorism" (Congress, 2001, p.10) while Title II sec. 205 authorizes the Director of the FBI to employ further personnel (Congress, 2001, p. 23). Further, regarding any disclosures to governmental agencies for counterterrorism purposes, it says in the Act that "nothing in section 625 shall be construed to limit the authority of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section" (Congress, 2001, p. 148), and in Title V sec 506 relating to the extension of secret service jurisdiction, that the FBI "shall have primary authority to investigate offenses [...] for any cases [...] for reasons of national defense or foreign relations" (Congress, 2001, p. 251).

Title II generally expands any activities to enhance surveillance procedures (Congress, 2001, pp. 13-15) and furthermore gives out general authority to anyone who holds information about a 'foreign power', which is connected to U.S. national defense or security issues, to share any criminal investigative information with other authorities such as law enforcement officers (Congress, 2001, pp. 17-18).

The Attorney General is given more authority to interact with domestic and international actors (Congress, 2001, pp. 124, 162, 185, 187, 192) and is given in particular great authority in judicially handling suspected terrorists (Congress, 2001, pp. 208-214) and regulating visas to enter and exit the country (Congress, 2001, pp. 215-234). The Department of Treasury, or the Secretary of the Treasury, as a final example, is overall given more power and authority to tackle money laundering issues (Congress, 2001, pp. 64-66). These are just some examples to underline the increased authority given to various officials.

The third layer, being the problem of the 'increased power and authority' frame, consist of further underlying problems which we can extract from the different Titles. Given the regulations that are tightened (through expansion of the existing law) or newly added through the Act, we can identify several general problems such as inadequate intelligence work especially regarding information retrieval and sharing both on a national and international level, immigration issues specifically regarding visa regulations and border protection, money laundering, and insufficient criminal law regulations.

Title II, VII and IX are intended to tackle the inadequate intelligence work and allow to intercept and disclosure information more easily (Congress, 2001, pp. 15-19), while title VII goes further and seeks to "establishing and operating secure information sharing systems" (Congress, 2001, p. 269). Title IX regulates and opens the door to a wider collection of foreign intelligence, and to maintain intelligence relationships which could benefit in combating terrorism (Congress, 2001, pp. 303-305).

Immigration is another aspect which is supposedly seen as a root problem. Given that the terrorists were foreigners who had to go through the process of US immigration at some point, it comes as no surprise that immigration regulations and the granting of visa to enter and exit the country would be tightened as a result of 9/11. Title IV in particular tackles the protection of borders as well as immigration provisions and amends several passages of various paragraphs of the Immigration and Nationality Act. For example, the Act states that criminal records of visa applicants shall from now on be accessed by the Department of State (Congress, 2001, p. 187) while the Attorney General and Secretary of State, in consultation with other federal agencies, shall develop a technology to identify applicants to enter the U.S., as well as enhancing the already existent Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Congress, 2001, pp. 190-193).

Criminal law regulations are strengthened by title VIII, which primarily amends definitions of terrorism-related terms and actors such as domestic terrorism (Congress, 2001, pp. 274-275), and significantly amends the US Code by adding §2339 "Harboring or concealing terrorists" (Congress, 2001, p. 276), which allows the U.S. to prosecute not only terrorists but also any actor which is accused of harboring or concealing suspected terrorists. It is noteworthy to mention that the Act also includes the tightening of criminal law regarding the misuse of nuclear facilities

as well as prosecute terrorist acts specifically mentioning the involvement of nuclear material (Congress, 2001, pp. 276-286, 335). Title III takes up a big bulk of the Act, covering 125 pages (Congress, 2001, pp. 60-185) in addressing money laundering issues. Money laundering is perceived as a great problem, which most likely benefits terrorist activities. It is, however, an aspect which we choose not to discuss further in our paper, as we deem irrelevant considering the scope of this paper.

In summary, we identify three layers of the problem representations: the first overarching layer is the core problem of the U.S; terrorism, which requires the US to take exceptional measures to better protect itself after 9/11. The second layer, which corresponds to the first layer, is that the problem of the attack lies in the insufficient power and authority officials (and various departments) had in conducting their work. Lastly, the third layer formulates all the various legislation pieces which are represented in the 10 Titles of the Act.

As for which presuppositions or assumptions underlie the problem presentations, we can find a couple of concepts such as, for example, security along with protection, power/authority, money, and some degree of categorization within the document.
In relation to the created categories the U.S. seems to base its categorization on the earlier mentioned notion that the country needs better protection; it aims at ensuring this in order to protect the freedom and security of every US citizen. The Act states in Title X: "Congress declares that, in the quest to identify, locate, and bring to justice the perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Sikh-Americans, should be protected" (Congress, 2001, p. 316). The Act does not necessarily create a generalized 'we vs. them' binary but it emphasizes the protection of all US citizens against anything which falls under the umbrella term of 'foreign'. The Act allows for greater access to data of people who want to enter the United States with a visa (Congress, 2001, pp. 189-191), while a whole section in Title IV deals with the mandatory detention of suspected terrorists who fall under the category of so-called "terrorist aliens" (Congress, 2001, pp.208-2010). According to the Act (2001), the Attorney General can detain such an alien if the (s)he "has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien [...] is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States" (p. 209).

The adjective 'foreign' is further ascribed to a few entities within the document. The Act (2001) adds and amends existing law especially regarding the need for information sharing in order for the US to protect against endangering activities "of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" (pp. 17-18, 21-22, 245-246). Passages in Title III, referring to combating money laundering, often mention money laundering regulations in relation to "foreign banks" (Congress, 2001, pp. 62-63, 76,83, 85, 89-90, 103-110, 127). What these 'foreign' entities have in common is that the Act mostly depicts these as having to undergo particular scrutiny, as they are generally suspected of potentially endangering the US.

In line with the protection for security reasons goes the apparent assumption in the Act that power and authority as well as money are enabling tools which will contribute to successfully combating terrorism. Already analyzed in the problem representation section as the second layer within the problematization of terrorism in the Act, several domestic national agencies and actors are given more power and additional authority in order to undertake various measures meant to combat terrorism. As a way to exert their power and authority, money in the form of financial funds is being allocated to US agencies. A few funds for instance are introduced to both re-establish offices and facilities which have been damaged by terrorist incidents, but also to combat terrorism (Congress, 2001, p. 8). A counterterrorism fund was founded to "counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international terrorism" and to "conducting terrorism threat assessments of Federal agencies and their facilities" (Congress, 2001, p. 8). The FBI receives additional funding which should "help meet the demands for activities to combat terrorism and support and enhance the technical support and tactical operations of the FBI" (Congress, 2001, p. 10).
The exceptional measure of seemingly unlimited power goes together with the high intrusion into people's private lives as Title II allows for significantly more intrusive surveillance procedures (Congress, 2001, pp. 13-22). This goes so far that the Act (2001) calls for multilateral cooperation between domestic and foreign governments to combat terrorism (pp. 214-215) which extends the circle further.

While the freedom aspect does not fall into the focal point of our paper, we still want to include this aspect in the general presupposition of the Act, that the freedom and

security of the American public should be ensured through the PATRIOT ACT, yet it seemingly takes away liberty as it intrudes on people's life.

What is left unsaid and unproblematic in this problem representation is that it conveys to the American public a very rational perspective to the global terrorism issue. The Act (2001) defines different terminologies related to terrorism, stating for example that domestic terrorism involves "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States of or any State" (p . 275). A further amendment foresees that the US can share intelligence with a foreign government regarding an alien if that helps to "preventing, investigating, or punishing acts that would constitute a crime in the United States, including but not limited to, terrorism" (Congress, 2001, p. 214). An antiterrorism emergency reserve is supposed to compensate victims of international terrorism (Congress, 2001, p. 261).
The Act represents terrorism as a crime act which should be treated and handled like a crime, however, full of exceptional measures given the scope of 9/11. The Act strips the terrorism issue off its ideological component and reduces global terrorism to an issue which should be best countered with power, money and stricter (criminal) law enforcement.

The discursive effect of the unproblematized issues is the severe extent to which it limits other possible understandings of the global terrorism issue. It is too simple to represent terrorism as a crime issue which is fought with conventional (and unconventional) crime prevention regulations. One does not even consider the option to connect the issue to other issues. One could question why the Act does not address other potential root causes of terrorism which for instance relate to which actions have impacted the rise of al Qaeda in the first place. There is a complete lack of reflecting the US' potential joint guilt in the development of such terrorist organizations.
Moreover, the stricter immigration control and the discursive creation of a vast foreign threat could lead to people regard immigration as a whole as an issue of global terrorism - which would miss other core aspects of the terrorism issue such as the motive behind the terrorist act. This could be considered both a subjectification and lived effect. The foreign threat discourse defines a targeted group as the US in form of the 'victims', while responsible parties are largely identified as being 'foreign'.

This creates a discursive divide and could potentially fuel societal tensions. The indicated potential growing resentment towards immigrants, or people resembling an 'imagined terrorist' seem to have already proven true as the Act specifically condemns violent acts against minority groups such as Arab, Muslim and South Asian Americans, which have increased as a direct result of 9/11: "The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States should be and are condemned by all Americans who value freedom" and "[w]hen American citizens commit acts of violence against those who are, or are perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim descent, they should be punished to the full extent of the law" (p.9).

In summary, the effects are that a deeply complex issue is reduced to superficial layers of global terrorism which could lead to a misunderstanding by the public as to what really needs to be combated, while the methods and tools to combat the issue are equally questionable in moral.

5.5. Secretary-General Says Vicious London Bombings 'an Attack on Humanity Itself', World Stands Shoulder to Shoulder with British People

The attacks in London took place during a G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. Participants at this Summit were not only heads of states, but also heads of various international organizations, including the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan (University of Toronto Library, 2014). This is of significance in order to appreciate this statement released by the Secretary-General on the day of the attacks, as the Summit plays quite a prominent role in this text (Annan, 2005). Accordingly, a remarkable amount of space is reserved for the challenges facing the Group of Eight and others gathered at the summit, in a way that nevertheless reflects on what has happened in London (Annan, 2005).

Despite of its role, the G8 is not, per se, part of the problem representation. Instead, the problem represented in this statement is "the atrocious bombings that struck London today", which, as the headline suggests, are considered "an attack on humanity itself" (Annan, 2005), underlining the significance of how the attacks are perceived. Regardless of what can arguably be seen as a forceful depiction of the

attacks, how the problem is represented is rather limited as there are no further details concerning the attacks, besides the consequences of the bombings; people have been hurt, traumatized, and killed (Annan, 2005). This, of course, can be seen as part of the problem.
Lastly, of importance for this problem representation is how the attacks are described; they may be described as 'attacks on humanity', but there are no mentioning of them being acts of terror (Annan, 2005).

In terms of presuppositions and assumptions underlying the representation of the problem, it becomes evident that the victim of this crime comes to define the problem. It should be noted before we continue, that the use of 'victim' as a category here refers to the UK as whole.

Whereas, as aforementioned, there are neither explicit characterizations of the perpetrators nor any assumptions of who they might be, they are responsible for "vicious acts" which have caused a tragedy (Annan, 2005). This has been put on a "wonderful [...] city that is home to people from so many countries and cultures" (Annan, 2005), emphasizing a perceived openness, tolerance, and goodwill of London, which then in turn can serve to portrait the cruelty of the attacks. This is further highlighted by that "the British people," in advance of the G8 Summit "had mobilized so powerfully against poverty and climate change" (Annan, 2005). This, of course, serves to further underline the noble character of the victim. Following this line of argumentation, instead of mentioning the perpetrators by name, the way the victim are depicted, in combination with the character of the attacks themselves, comes to illustrate them.
The victim can be seen as representing 'good', 'caring', as someone who aims at "addressing the aspirations of billions" around the world (Annan, 2005), which then reminds us of the 'evilness' and 'cynicism' of such an attack, and of those who committed it. Or put differently, 'they' represent the few, while 'we' represent the many (Annan, 2005).

Along the same lines, "the violence committed by a few" ought not "to deflect us from" confronting the concerns of the many (Annan, 2005). This, it can be argued, leads us to what is left unproblematic in this problem representation. Accordingly,

whereas there are no explicit references in this statement to the perpetrators of the bombings, except for the argument that they are but a 'few' (Annan, 2005), the way the problem is represented here can be seen as defining the perpetrators. This, in turn, also implies that motives or objectives are ascribed to them. Thus, by mentioning the attacks when talking about the importance of the Summit, the perpetrators come to represent someone opposing the 'aspirations of billions' (Annan, 2005). Along the same lines, perhaps it is for this very reason the problem represents an 'attack on humanity itself', which again points to the 'many' against the 'few'. It is not only an attack on the UK, but an attack on humanity due to what the UK stands for and what it aspires. Describing the attack in such a way can be seen as problematic as it does not allow for any dissenting opinion towards this representation of the UK and the attacks. Lastly, any such opinion represents the 'few', as the 'many' stands with the UK (Annan, 2005).

In terms of effects produced by this representation of the problem, most evident are the discursive and subjectification effects. The discursive effects can be seen as a continuation of the 'few' against the 'many' discussion previously. Here it is assumed that the 'few' do not share the aspirations of the 'many', and can be seen as disrupting the 'good' the many seek. This in turn, though implicit, becomes the explanation of why the UK has been attacked. Moreover, one could argue, this points to subjectification effects as the victim becomes identified through the discursive effects. Of significance in this context, is that the victim does not stand alone as "the world stands shoulder to shoulder with" it (Annan, 2005). Here Annan points to the international community, while emphasizing the importance of cooperation when facing problems (Annan, 2005), underlining that together 'we' are the 'many'.

5.6. Statement by The North Atlantic Council on Terrorist Attacks in London

A day after the attacks, on July 8 2005, the North Atlantic Council gathered for "extraordinary session [...] following the barbaric and criminal terrorist acts perpetrated [...] in London" (NATO, 2005). Self-explanatory as it may be, the contextual premise of this statement is the attacks in London, though not exclusively. Whereas, considering the circumstances, the attacks may be the most obvious

premise, they moreover serve to highlight the importance of emerging victorious in the ongoing "battle against terrorism" (NATO, 2005). The attacks in London are then being placed into a larger terrorism context.

This, of course, also points to the problem represented in this statement, terrorism (NATO, 2005). The problem, as aforementioned, is not a 'new' one, rather is it a re-appearing one. That is, the terrorist attacks in London, one could argue, only reaffirms that there is, from a NATO perspective, a problem which already is being dealt with (NATO, 2005). In turn, this underlines the significance of the problem and the urgency and importance of 'battling' it. That a NATO member has been the victim of an attack only underlines this. Along the same lines, terrorism represents a threat to all, as it "desire[s] to impose extremism on the world", and as such, all forms of terrorism be combated and condemned (NATO, 2005).

In this respect, the representation of the problem can be seen as a tool to justify why terrorism is being fought and the importance of this battle. The justification is based on the presupposition that fighting and subsequently defeating terrorism is essential "to defend [...] the Alliance's values of freedom, tolerance, and democracy" (NATO, 2005). This presupposition is based on an assumption that if not fought, the terrorists will have it 'their' way, which is incompatible with 'ours' – the 'only' way (NATO, 2005). Hence, it becomes 'us' against 'them'; 'good' and 'solidarity' against 'death' and 'destruction'. Along the same lines, where 'they' "kill and destroy indiscriminately" when attacking, 'we' are, despite engaging in combat, 'defending' ourselves "with all means of [...] disposal" against 'them' (NATO, 2005). Following this line of argumentation, even offensive measures taken in the fight against terrorism can then, accordingly, be seen as defending and protecting 'us', as 'they' are threatening us and are perceived as the aggressor.
An aggressor of such character as those of the terrorists is what defines the problem, while it on the other hand underlines why this problem must be fixed. And it will be, as it is argued that the "determination of NATO countries is far stronger than the will of those engaged in terrorism to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world" (NATO, 2005). This last point is noteworthy, as it can be seen to sum up the assumption and presupposition underlying this problem representation. Here, the role of NATO and its members are

highlighted as NATO come to represent a bulwark against terrorism and its aforementioned objective, and as the protector of freedom. In this representation, it is assumed that NATO and its members, by combating this 'evil', is the solution to the 'problem'. That is, if 'we' not fight 'them', 'we' will not be.

This leads us to what is left unproblematic in the problem representation. The threat the problem poses, amounts to what can be considered as an existential one as 'they' want to impose extremism on the world and destroy what 'we' hold dear (NATO, 2005). Here the problem and what it represents are very clearly defined. Yet, on the other hand, it is not clear what "the terrorists seek to do" (NATO, 2005). This, of course, is a departure from the aforementioned well-defined problem representation, and consequently can be seen to create a confusion of what the problem represents. What 'they' desire may, of course, still be imposing extremism on the world, but at the same time it points to that there is not one form terrorism (NATO, 2005), and accordingly, one could speculate, not only one desire. Despite of recognizing that there is not one form terrorism, they are all perceived as the same "scourge," which "kill[s] and destroy[s] indiscriminately" (NATO, 2005). What is problematic here is that while terrorism can be of different natures, ranging from environmental to political motivated acts of terrorism, they are all perceived as one only thing here despite their differences. Terrorism in this connection comes to be a vast concept, which needs to be fought. What is left unproblematic here is that terrorism encompasses many kinds of terrorism, yet the solution to the problem(s) is but one.

Regardless of this, the problem representation can be seen to benefit NATO in their battle against terrorism. Accordingly, by acknowledging that there are different forms, yet perceiving them as the same, can be seen to allow for more room to operate for NATO, as they are fighting terrorism at large – and not a specific kind. Furthermore, as aforementioned, placing the attacks in London into a broader context concerning the battle already being fought against terrorism also benefits NATO, it can be argued, as the attacks come to illustrate why terrorism needs to be and is being fought. On the other hand the problem representation harms anyone perceived to belong to the vast concept of terrorism.

The discursive effects mirror the assumption underlying the problem representation. Having binaries of 'good' and 'solidarity' opposite of 'death' and 'destruction' creates

a situation of conflict in which 'death' and 'destruction' need to be fought and defeated in order for 'good' and 'solidarity' to remain (NATO, 2005). As 'they' seek to destroy what 'we' represent, there are but no choice to fight 'them' to defend "freedom, tolerance, and democracy" (NATO, 2005). The discursive effect places the actors into the two categories of 'good' and 'bad', while it also creates a subjectification effect as 'we' – the 'good' whose acts are justified as they are 'right' and necessary – stand against an adversary which represents the 'bad', the perpetrators, whose acts by implication are 'wrong' and unjustifiable.

5.7. Statement to Parliament on the London Bombings

On July 7, 2005, London was hit by a series of explosions on its underground trains and on a bus (Blair, 2005). On the very day of the bombings, appearing alongside other world leaders at a G8 Summit, Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that "[i]t's reasonably clear that there have been a series of terrorist attacks in London", while explaining that he would leave the G8 Summit and go to London to get briefed on the attacks from relevant authorities (BBC, 2005).

It is in this light we need to view the statement given to Parliament four days after the attacks on July 7, 2005 and after the G8 Summit had been concluded. Here, Blair informs Members of Parliament on what is known of the attacks, and what can be expected to happen as a result thereof (Blair, 2005). The contextual premises on which this statement is grounded are to be found in the fact that London, and thus Britain, are victims of terrorist attacks, and that these attacks likely were "carried out by Islamist extremist terrorists, of the kind" that also were responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Blair, 2005). This depiction is of significance when looking at the contextual premise, as what happened in London is arguably linked to similar events elsewhere thus pointing to a broader problem. Along the same lines, when it is 'probable' that it was the 'same' kind of terror as 9/11, it is of importance to keep in mind the active role of the UK in the aftermath of these attacks in the 'war on terror', and its engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Along the same lines, the problems presented here can be seen as the attacks and, due to the how these are perceived, terrorism. However, as these are intertwined, and

as the latter is defining the former, it is more appropriate to consider the attacks and terrorism as one problem; terrorism. As it seems 'probable', as aforementioned, that the perpetrators of the attacks resemble those of other recent attacks (Blair, 2005), the problem takes on an international dimension. That is, the problem is not only one facing Britain, as it has shown itself in many countries from Spain to Yemen "and of course in New York on September 11" (Blair, 2005). The linkage to other attacks underlines that the problem can be considered a reemerging one which knows no boundaries and, accordingly, is one facing many nations, thus emphasizing the significance of terrorism. This, of course, also implies that the problem to some extent is not merely terrorism, but a specific kind of terrorism; it is "carried out by Islamist extremist terrorists", perceived as a "particular type and 'new' kind" of terrorism (Blair, 2005). The perpetrators, nevertheless, did not act alone, and the problem representation thus extents to include "the planners of this outrage, wherever they are" (Blair, 2005), emphasizing, again, the international dimension of the problem.

Despite that the attacks are being put into an international context, they did take place in London and part of the problem representation, accordingly, focuses on the national aspects of the attacks (Blair, 2005). The attacks, despite the passing "of the Prevention of Terrorism Act [PTA] earlier this year", could not have been prevented (Blair, 2005). Rather the attacks, one could argue, only underline the need "to introduce a further counter-terrorism Bill", a pledge made already after the PTA was passed (Blair, 2005). Such a new bill may give relevant authorities "additional powers which they might need to prevent further attacks" (Blair, 2005). Along the same lines, the problem represented here is not only terrorism, but also that it needs to be prevented and defeated (Blair, 2005).

In short, there was awareness of the 'problem' before the attacks took place, and measures already existed that were meant to prevent the problem to appear (Blair, 2005). Yet, the attacks did happen, because the "very nature [of] people callous enough to kill completely innocent civilians in this way, are hard to stop" (Blair, 2005).

This last quotation plays well into the presuppositions and assumptions underlying this problem representation. Bombing means of public transportation "at the peak of

the rush hour [...] to cause maximum death and injury" (Blair, 2005), is being presented as the 'very nature' of the perpetrators, underlining a perceived indifference to human life. This all at a time, of course, when no certainty appears of who the perpetrators are, except for assumptions of who they might be (Blair, 2005). Accordingly, their 'callous nature' has resulted in a "murderous carnage of the innocent" (Blair, 2005). Not only have 'they' caused damage and killed in a ruthless manner, how 'they' did so, one could argue, further emphasizes the 'very nature' of the perpetrators and their associates. Thus, the explosions aimed to kill and injure as many as possible resulted in carnage. Further, by using bombs, "[t]he effect [...] is to make identification sometimes very, very hard and harrowing" (Blair, 2005). Following this line of argumentation, not only did they attack in order to kill, they did so in a way intended to also make the aftermath of the attacks devastating and difficult for those responding. Assuming that it is Islamist extremists who are behind this, their apparent willingness to kill 'completely innocent civilians' in such a ruthless manner arguably underlies the problem. These traits, it is assumed, are why 'they' are hard to stop (Blair, 2005), thus implicitly recognizing and suggesting that fixing the problem will be a difficult task. "We are", nevertheless, determined that it will be defeated (Blair, 2005). That terrorism needs to be defeated is based on a presupposition that it is essential for 'us' to do so. Thus, by defeating terrorism, "they will never destroy the way of life we share and which we value," which then leads to an assumption of the problem as an existential one, it can be argued. That is, if 'we' will not defeat 'them', 'we' will be no more. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance "not to be defeated by such terror but [...] defeat it" (Blair, 2005). Noteworthy here is it to keep in mind that part of the problem representation here is to prevent terror, and it is thus assumed that additional anti-terrorism legislation will do so (Blair, 2005).

In terms of categories and binaries created within this statement, it becomes evident, that there is on the one side 'them', and on the other side 'us'. The former includes, however, not only the perpetrators and those who planned the attacks but, more broadly, 'Islamist extremist terrorists' as a linkage is made to other attacks (Blair, 2005). The latter category, along the same lines, can then be seen to be extended to not only the UK, but to others who have shared the same faith and, furthermore, those who also consider terrorism an enemy (Blair, 2005). This is highlighted by "the huge outpouring of international support" received by Britain in the aftermath of the

attacks, an “unanimous resolution of condemnation of the terrorists” passed by the UNSC, and the “immediate offers of help from all the world’s main intelligence agencies” (Blair, 2005), illustrating that it is ‘us’ vs ‘them’. Moreover, this plays well into the aforementioned international dimension of the problem representation.

Whereas the character of the attacks defines ‘them’, ‘we’, despite being victims of the attacks, have shown “stoicism, resilience, and sheer undaunted spirit” and “continue to respond with a defiance and strength that are universally admired” (Blair, 2005). Thus, whereas ‘they’ are murderous, ‘we’ are brave. ‘Heroes’ try to prevent such attacks (Blair, 2005), ‘villains’ carry them out. Simply put, it is ‘good’ against ‘evil’.
Lastly, of significance for ‘them’ is the religious aspect attributed to their characterization. They are not merely ‘extremist terrorists’, but ‘Islamist’ ones. By referring to them as so, it is established that the terrorists adhere to a specific religion, and as a consequence a third category is created, that of “the moderate and true voice of Islam” (Blair, 2005).

This last category leads to what can be considered as being left unproblematic in the problem representation. If this latter category represents the ‘true voice’ of Islam, it can be seen as redundant to refer to the terrorists as Islamists and thereby stress their religious affiliation and thus by implication make this an aspect of the problem. Moreover, as previously mentioned, who the perpetrators are, is at this point of time not certain (Blair, 2005). Notwithstanding, including this aspect in the problem representation, despite of uncertainty, makes it part of the problem. What is being left unproblematic then can be seen as what potential impact such a characterization may have on those who represent the ‘true voice’ of Islam. What do those representing the moderate and true voice of Islam, have to say in order to have this voice “heard as it should be” (Blair, 2005), one could ask. Furthermore, if “[f]anaticism is not a religion but a state of mind” (Blair, 2005), then it is noteworthy that the religious affiliation of the perpetrators is being emphasized, and, even more so, that the moderate voice needs to be heard. These points will be touched upon further in the section concerning the effects of the problem representation.
Lastly, before we turn to the last question, the issue concerning new anti-terrorist legislation is of interest here. As we have seen previously, the argument presented by Blair is that the attacks happened because perpetrators of acts of such violence “are

hard to stop" (Blair, 2005). Despite that this may indeed be the case, it is assumed that further anti-terror legislation may help 'fix' the problem (Blair, 2005). How and why this is the case is left largely unanswered, only suggesting that additional powers to "the police and the agencies" might be needed in order "to prevent further attacks" (Blair, 2005).

The powers, however, will not only help preventing attacks they will also be used "to combat terrorism" (Blair, 2005). Preventing and combating terrorism are the objective; how it will be done, however, is left unsaid. These are the only ways presented to solve the problem, yet initiatives for exactly that were already present when the attacks took place (Blair, 2005). Problematic for this is arguably how the problem is approached; it is, as it appears here, the same way as prior to the attacks, just with 'additional powers' to the police and intelligence agencies (Blair, 2005), which then is supposed to help overcome the problem. Thus, 'tougher' legislation and a continuation of the fight against terrorism will help 'us' defeat it this time, despite that this approach clearly had not succeeded prior to the attacks.

Somewhat connected to this approach, is the lack of introspectiveness. The attacks took place seemingly because the perpetrators are evil and have a lust for killing innocent civilians. Missing in this explanation is any kind of willingness in trying to understand *why* 'they' wanted to kill (Blair, 2005). Thus, there are no references to the active military role of the UK in the 'war on terror' and its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, which can be seen as a silence limiting an understanding of the problem. Instead, as aforementioned, there will be a doubling-down on the ongoing fight against terror and those who commit and plan such acts of violence (Blair, 2005). Despite that this has apparently not succeeded so far, it is expected that by continuing this very approach, with some additions, that "it is to us and not to the terrorists, that victory will belong" (Blair, 2005). Another silence, accordingly, is *how* this approach will prove successful now.

Though Blair stresses that victory is certain, there are no explicit references to war (Blair, 2005). There are, nevertheless, 'them' who threaten 'us' and "the way of life [...] we value" (Blair, 2005). This, of course, pits one group against another with little, if any, room left for compromise. The discursive effects in the problem representation here serves to underline the importance of fighting a 'callous' enemy, and to justify why the police and intelligence agencies may need additional powers.

By not referring to the 'war on terror', and the potential role the participation in this 'war' may have played, it limits the possibility of connecting the attacks to it. On the other hand, while referring to the perpetrators as being 'probably' of the same kind of those who committed atrocities elsewhere (Blair, 2005), 'their' destructiveness around the world is why it is imperative to defeat 'them', and thus why something needs to be done.

The perpetrators, as we have seen above, are not only defined by their crime, but also by a certain trait; they are Islamists (Blair, 2005). The terrorists who committed the attacks, of course, are the responsible party for this problem, and targeting 'them' becomes essential to properly deal with the problem. However, as we argued in the previous question, the effect of including the religious affiliation of the perpetrators can be seen as problematic. The problem represented in this statement is terrorism, yet the perpetrators are being characterized as Islamists, Blair, for some reason, addresses the Muslim community specifically (Blair, 2005). Implicitly, by doing so, it is acknowledged that those who did this are connected to this community, because they are Muslims. This, one could argue, reduces the complexity of the problem represented, as a focus point then becomes the faith of the perpetrators instead of merely what they have done. Even though Blair emphasizes that "[f]anaticism is not a religion but a state of mind" (Blair, 2005), he still arguably makes religion an issue of terrorism. By shedding light on this aspect, Blair – albeit unintentionally – highlights one aspect of these terrorist attacks while excluding others, such as motives or possible explanations for why. It is noteworthy that Blair prominently frames the Muslim community in a positive way, highlighting the contributions of this community (Blair, 2005), as this community does not represent the perpetrators of the attacks.

5.8. Terrorism Act 2006

The Terrorism Act 2006, received Royal Assent on 30 March 2006 and was implemented in the wake of the London bombings on July 7, 2005 (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006 - Explanatory Notes", p. 1). Needless to mention in this regard, it remains unclear whether the Act was introduced faster than intended, as Blair in his statement to Parliament suggested might happen in case additional

powers to law enforcement was perceived to be needed immediately to combat terrorism (Blair, 2005). However, what is clear is that the measures presented in the Act entail both those which have been put together before the attack place, and those which have been included due to the July incident (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006 - Explanatory Notes", p. 1), making it also a direct response to the terrorist attacks.

Given that the UK has continuously has introduced anti-terrorism legislations, this Act, to a large extent, amends existing legal frameworks such as the Terrorism Act 2000, but it also introduces new offences (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006 - Explanatory Notes", p. 1). The Act is divided into three parts: Part 1 'Offences', Part 2 'Miscellaneous Provisions' and Part 3 'Supplemental Provisions' (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", 2006, pp. i-iii). Part 1 mainly deals with defining and regulating a variety of offences related to terrorism while Part 2 entails the expansion of investigatory powers and the right to proscribe and detain terrorist organizations and suspects; Part 3 is considered of less importance to our analysis, as it only defines miscellaneous aspects.

When moving onto the actual analysis of the document, we shall start with the overall problem representation. First off, as expected, the overall problem here is identified as terrorism as the purpose of the Act is defined to "make provision for and about offences relating to conduct carried out, or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with terrorism" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 1). As terrorism is established as the foundation of the Act, it is safe for us to state that terrorism is regarded as the centre of the problem. The main problem is then complemented with two essential aspects when it comes to combating the terrorism issue: insufficient investigatory powers (of authorities) as well as lack of definitions of offences relating to terrorism (with particular reference to the encouragement of terrorism, distribution of terrorist-related body of thought, as well as the possession and (mis)use of radioactive material).

The Act formulates several measures to be taken against those issues - which we identify as sub-problems to the main terrorism problem.

As a first step, we can continue with an essential aspect which we just highlighted in the contextual premise: the fact that the 7/7 London bombings were carried out by British nationals is reflected in the countermeasures presented in the Terrorism Act 2006 and constitutes a part of the problem represented here. Part 1 of the Act for instance defines an offence which applies to "a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 1), while section 2 of Part 1 deals with what defines an offence in relation to the dissemination of terrorist publications, both of printed but also electronic material, which provide information or encourages people to engage with terrorism (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 3, 4-5). We assume that by defining aforementioned offences, the Act directly responds to 7/7 London bombings as it particularly spells out how to prevent potential domestic proliferation of such a critical subject. Backing this argument up is the fact that the definition of aforementioned offence represents a new offence as introduced by the Terrorism Act 2006 (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006 - Explanatory notes 2006, p. 1). We could even go so far as to argue that the measures defined in Part 1 also are put in place to prevent radicalization as such.

This argument is based on the fact that British nationals who apparently supported radical views were involved in the London bombings (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006, pp. 12-13). It is repeatedly emphasized in the Act that any material or act which glorifies terrorism is regarded an offence (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 6) and also allows the proscription of organizations which allegedly glorify terrorism (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 19). The aim of the Act to prevent the 'glorification' of terrorist-related material can be regarded as supporting our claim that radicalization might also be regarded as another sub-problem to the core terrorism issue.

As the Act further aims to restrict the distribution of terrorist ideas, it sets out to proactively deal with any potential developments which take place before an attack can be carried out. The Act naturally includes aspects here such as any preparation or training for terrorist acts (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp .7-9) and more interestingly also the possession of radioactive material with the intent to use it

in connection to an act of terrorism (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 10-12).

Notable is that the possession and (mis)use of radioactive material, as well as the unlawful use of nuclear facilities is highlighted in this Act, despite the fact that the terrorist attacks did not involve radioactive material and/or nuclear facilities. Interestingly so, the offences relating to the misuse of radioactive material is also a newly introduced offence (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006 - Explanatory Notes, 2006, p. 1).

Secondly, turning to the next sub-problem of the overall terrorism issue, given that the Act grants authorities additional powers, particularly investigatory powers, we can generally state that the Act identifies insufficient (investigatory) power and authority as a second major sub-problem to terrorism. It seems that the argument here is grounded in the belief that more power will help to combat terrorism. Part 2 of the Act for instance amends the Terrorism Act 2000 and gives namely the Secretary of State more power in proscribing (terrorist) organizations (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 19-20). The second part of the Act also reinforces police, intelligence service and investigatory powers as it for instance reaffirms the right of judicial authorities to detain suspected terrorists (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 21) and moreover lays out the grounds for extending the detention period such as to "obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise" or to "preserve relevant evidence" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 24). The section goes on to specify the expansion of investigatory powers as it amends an existing legal framework which already allows for searching any premises in Great Britain (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 25-28), including vehicles and internal waters adjacent to searched premises (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 30). The right to search suspected premises is widened to such an extent that it allows authorities to enter and search a premise, based on a suspicion of terrorist publications present there (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 28). The Act also spells out in that context that "[a] person exercising a power conferred by a warrant under this section may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 29), which underlines the power frame. The Act further amends other investigatory powers to authorities such as the Intelligence Service as it changes regulations regarding authorizations and warrants for carrying out acts

(Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 30-31). While the act specifies a variety of more additional powers, the previously referred to amendments to investigatory powers are to be seen as examples and not a comprehensive picture of every measure.

To sum it up, the British government seems to present several underlying problems to the core terrorism issue. Generally said, and significant for our paper as a whole, are following sub-problems which the Terrorism Act seems to 'fix': insufficient investigatory powers (to authorities) as well as radicalization. We deduct the general radicalization issue as grounded in the formulation of further problems which the Act aims to fix: offences in relation to terrorism such as the proliferation and encouragement of terrorist-related body of thought.

In terms of assumptions and presuppositions underlying the problem representation, it is possible to identify concepts such as security, protection, and preemption. These concepts, of course, can be seen as being linked to each other as security is meant to protect, which in this Act, to some extent, takes on the form of preempting the problem. The particular notion of preempting terrorism domestically is of significance, due to the characteristics of the attacks; the perpetrators were all British nationals. This raises the question, though not posed in the Act itself, concerning why these four individuals committed the attacks. Here it is assumed that terrorism is being encouraged in the UK, directly as well as indirectly (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 1), in unspecified elements of society, and through different means (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 3). This, it can be said, points to the concept of preemption; something needs to be done about the problem before it shows itself.

This is emphasized by the focus on the issue concerning the encouragement of terrorism. Thus, as the main assumption underlying the problem here is this encouragement, as those encouraging it are considered part of the problem and accordingly also must be dealt with. This in turn also implies that the problem expands, as is it not merely terrorism, but also any "statement that is likely to be understood by some or all members of the public [...] as a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 1).

Part of this problem, however, is not only the person publishing such statements which "glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of" terrorism, or from where it can be "infer[red] that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated" (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 2), but also anyone who might distribute or circulate such terrorist publications; thus anyone who "gives, sells or lends such a publication; offers such a publication for sale or loan; provides a service to others that enable them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan; transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or has such a publication in his possession" intending to conduct any of those misconducts just listed (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 3) are considered part of the problem. Accordingly, by implementing such measures, it is assumed that terrorism may occur due to specific kinds of material available concerning terrorism. Additionally it could be argued that it is assumed then, that anyone carrying out the function of providing what is perceived to be terrorist-related material, is identified as the root of the problem and therefore is what must be solved.

Lastly, before turning to what is being left unproblematic in the problem representation, is an assumption related to additional powers given to what is deemed relevant authorities for a variety of purposes, including for example, but not confined to the 'detention of terrorist suspects' (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 21-24) and 'searches etc.' (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", pp. 25-30). The assumption here is that any such power relates to the previously explained assumption that terrorism should be tackled at its roots; the additional powers here are supposed to benefit the potential investigation of a suspected terrorist, which then in theory should help preventing acts of terrorism.

Noteworthy for the main assumption presented above, is that this assumption represents an attempt to tackle the roots of the problem, and thus try to understand the cause of terrorism. Yet, on the other hand, how this is executed can be seen as problematic. That is, the process of getting to the root of the problem creates a broader problem, as the approach becomes a fight against anything/everything that is perceived to encourage terrorism. What constitutes the encouragement of

terrorism remains an interpretative question for the individual, despite its definition in the Act. Moreover, by including any form of what is perceived as an encouragement of terrorism from "the past, [...]" as well as the future" as an offence (Parliament, 2006, "Terrorism Act 2006", p. 2), the Act also criminalizes people retrospectively. This, in theory, could make anyone a general suspect.
Lastly, despite recognizing that part of the problem is that it is being encouraged by elements in the UK, there is no mentioning of what draws people to encourage terrorism and furthermore why it may be influential on some. That is, what is being left unsaid in the Act can be seen as a lack of introspectiveness on behalf of the UK. If terrorism is seemingly fostered at home, why is that so, one could ask. Taken further, one could choose to think about the problem differently: if the Act tackles the domestic encouragement of terrorism, why then does the government not implement measures which actively discourage terrorist-related ideas, which, arguably, would represent another step of preempting the problem. Apart from military, police and investigatory powers, one could for instance make use of educational means as a way to make people aware of the problem, as well as force people to truly understand the roots of the issue. One could argue that understanding the why and how of terrorism are just as important as combating terrorism.

Therefore, by making terrorism first an issue of law and more precisely a matter of more powerful law enforcement, contextual issues of the problem are deflected from. We identify this as a discursive effect, which underlines the limits that the problem representation seems to pose. The counterterrorism approach does tackle the encouragement and glorification of terrorism, as proposed by the Terrorism Act, and shows an effort to tackle the contextual issue such as understanding the roots of why terrorism comes about. However, by only proposing law enforcement powers to combat the issue - i.e. forbidding terrorist publications and punish the encouragement of terrorism - only touches upon the surface of the problem and in fact does not actually go to the roots of the problem. Here, we can pick up the main assumption underlying the problem representation; the Act is based on the assumption that there is some sort of encouragement of terrorism existent in society, however, the problem representation cannot stop there but needs to be taken further in asking why that is and then how this can be dealt with.

5.9. Loi n° 55-385 du 3 Avril 1955 Relative à L'état D'urgence (state of emergency)

Given that it differentiates in some aspects to any other previously analyzed policy, the state of emergency (*french* d'état d'urgence) requires us to present a more comprehensive contextual premise before we can begin the analysis.
The law titled "Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence" (Légifrance, 1955) dates back to 1955 when it was adopted and constitutes the regulations regarding the declaration and circumstances surrounding a state of emergency in France (Légifrance, 1955). François Hollande proclaimed the state of emergency hours after the terrorist attacks took place on the night of November 13, 2015 (Hollande, 2015). While the content of the legislation was not written in direct connection to the 11/13 attacks, it nevertheless represents a first response in the wake of the attacks. Therefore, given its declaration's points of time, we deem it an important piece of legislation in direct response to the November attacks. There have been other laws in place to combat terrorism such as the *LOI n° 2014-1353 du 13 novembre 2014 renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme* (Légifrance, 2014), and the law on electronic communication surveillance: *LOI n° 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationals* (Légifrance, 2015). While the latter, as set by our data collection criteria, was drafted and adopted in direct response to the 11/13 terrorist attacks, we select the state of emergency as the legislative document of choice for the analysis of the French case as it was the first measure taken. It is important in the analysis of the state of emergency law to draw a contextual connection to the November 2015 attacks in order to get a comprehensive picture of the generally designed legislation and the attacks themselves.

Bearing this context in mind, we now move onto the policy analysis. It is important to highlight the simple nature of the law: as the state of emergency only can be declared by the Council of Ministers, and may only be declared if a situation poses an imminent danger to the public order or if a situation represents to be of a disastrous nature (Légifrance, 2015), the law itself can be considered an exceptional measure to what is regarded to be an exceptionally endangering situation to the public's security.

For identifying the problem represented it is necessary to note that the state of emergency law restricts the civil liberties of citizens and bestows authorities such as the French Ministry of Interior and other security-related forces with more power to act. Article 5 of the law for instance empowers the prefect of the affected territory set under the state of emergency to 1) massively restrict the movement of people and vehicles, 2) establish strictly regulated security and protection zones, and 3) prohibit people to reside in a specific area if they are considered to being a severe impediment to the authorities in carrying out their work (Légifrance, 1955). Article 6 allows the Minister of the Interior to place people under house arrest if they pose a threat to public security while Article 8 of the law empowers the Minister to close public establishments and forbid public meetings (Légifrance, 1955). We can conclude that the imminent problem represented here is any sort of threat to the public, that requires and justifies the severe measures as stated in the law to be taken. Contextually therefore, Hollande and the Council of Ministers regard the 11/13 terrorist attacks to represent such a severe threat - and thus a problem. An underlying problem to this threat is the apparent lack of power to act, as the law evidently empowers authorities heavily. The apparent lack of power prior to the state of emergency can therefore be regarded as an underlying issue to the terrorism issue, as the government seems to believe that more power to authorities will help to combat the imminent threat in the shape of terrorism.

As for which presuppositions and assumptions underlie the problems presented in the law, we can namely identify one substantial argument: the repetition of the gravity of a threat to public order and safety which would substantiate the problem and the measures taken to resolve it.
The title of the law itself already states the seriousness of the situation as a case of emergency is declared; further, the state of emergency law specifically refers to a case of imminent danger of disastrous nature as a result of breaching public order (Article 1), and also allows for the detainment of people due to them potentially posing a threat to public safety (Légifrance, 1955). Further, Article 6 highlights that people can be put under house arrest if they are a threat to public security and order while Article 9 allows authorities to ask for people to surrender any weapons to protect public order (Légifrance, 1955). Finally, Article 9 allows authorities to carry out house searches based only on a suspicion that it is used by people who are considered

to be a threat to people's security and to order (Légifrance, 1955). Protecting people's security and maintaining public order are the essential notions in the law which substantiate the problem and its solution: the terrorist attacks are a problem because they endanger people's security and public order while the state of emergency law is intended to restore those conditions.

As the law itself and, by implication the immediate response to the terrorist attack, is framed in such a security and power frame, all other layers to the problem are left unproblematic. As the state of emergency law makes an imminent danger situation (such as terrorism in this case) an issue of security, stricter regulations and power, ideological aspects of terrorism such as for instance the motives behind the terrorist attack are silenced. In particular interesting in this case is the fact that the terrorists were French citizens. In this case, potentially quite relevant issues such as the roots of radicalization (at home) or a variety of other domestic problems as for example the social divide or poor education are left out of the conversation.

The silencing of such issues as opposed to the power, security and surveillance frame, can be identified as a discursive effect. The understanding of the complex terrorism issue is limited to a few aspects which play into the hands of government authorities as they are bestowed with more authority and power. In making a vastly defined threat (in this case terrorism) an issue of law regarding public order, security, surveillance and power, any other social or ideological components of the issue are silenced. It seems that maintaining the exceptional powers and tightening surveillance regulations are considered to be the primary measures of choice of the French government (for now) as opposed to policies which would for instance tackle the domestic issues which could have led to nurturing the growth of homegrown terrorists in the first place.

5.10. Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Multiple Attacks in Paris

The UN statement was published on November 13, 2015 and is a direct response of the UN regarding the 11/13 attacks.

Regarding Bacchi's first question, the problem represented is only shortly mentioned but clearly named in this statement as being "despicable terrorist attacks" (Ki-moon, 2015). Due to the brevity of the statement, we cannot identify any further implied problems which the UN intends to fix nor are there any additional problematizations evident in the statement. It is notable here that the UN does not go into more detail of the terrorist attack – perhaps given the fact that there had been no further knowledge about the specific circumstances of the terrorist attack. However, it is significant that the UN immediately defines the event as a terrorist attack while leaving any other potential information out.

This selective response could also be a finding in relation to Bacchi's second question: what presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem? While we cannot find any conceptual logics or presuppositions as such, it would make sense in this case to focus on looking at what is not being said in the problem representation. We can detect the role of a 'perpetrator' as well as an opposing 'victim' role. While the victim stands in relation to the 'government and people of France' (Ki-moon, 2015), there is no further identification of the perpetrator of the terrorist attack, the motives or any other specification. The focus is simply on the problem represented as a terrorist attack in itself and only consists of the UN condemning the terrorist attacks (Ki-moon, 2015), but refraining from any other formulation which could potentially manifest the roles of actors or concepts.

This leads us to question 4 of Bacchi's WPR approach. As aforementioned, a lot is left unsaid. Given the time when the response was issued, we could simply say that the UN did not know more at the time and was cautious not to give out false information. However, it is questionable then, why the UN can identify the problem as a terrorist attack, or rather why the UN chose to only make a statement defining the incident as a terrorist attack but states nothing more. It is also notable how the UN in the very short statement seems to put the responsibility for solving the issue on the French authorities. It is questionable here why the response for example does not involve any mentioning of a multilateral approach given its institutional character. Particularly the institutional character of the UN is worth mentioning here because it might explain the ambiguity and brevity of its response. Institutional factors usually can help to shed light on why issues are framed in a certain way given a tight and

rigid system that is in place for institutions. In this case, when paying attention to which institutional factors might have played a role in establishing the problem representation, it is notable to highlight the lack of substance in the UN statement. It is rather significant here that the institutional character of the UN arguably does not allow the organization to make any more statements than essentially necessary.

Given the lack of information the UN statement entails, there are not any major themes regarding the effects that the problem representation could bring about. As there is no elaborate categorization or the application of concepts or certain ideas present in the statement, we also cannot deduct any discursive effects which could have stemmed from them. Even though we could find a quite light version of a subjectification regarding the rather general we subject of a 'perpetrator' vs. a 'victim' in the form of the French people (Ki-moon, 2015), we cannot make any conclusions for a crucial subjectification effect as such. The same goes for any lived effect as the statement does not present any potential actions or measures which should be taken in order to respond to the terrorist attack.

To its core, this statement only acknowledges that there has been a terrorist attack, but refrains from supplying information and presenting any substantial response. The UN puts any responsibility to act in the hands of the French as the statement states that "[t]he Secretary-General trusts that the French authorities will do all in their power to bring the perpetrators to justice quickly" (Ki-moon, 2015).

5.11. Speech by the President of the Republic Before a Joint Session of Parliament

The following document is a speech by the President of the Republic of France, François Hollande, before a joint session of Parliament on November 16, 2015 in Versailles. The speech was given three days after the 11/13 terrorist attacks in Paris, and was President Hollande's first speech before a joint session of Parliament in direct response to the incident.

The imminent problem represented in the speech is terrorism in the form and shape of the IS, a terrorist organization referred to by Hollande (2015) as 'Daesh'. The

problem is further specified in that Hollande accuses Daesh of having carried out an act of war against France which now requires the nation to defend its people's safety and values. In order to do so, Hollande proposes a number of exceptional measures that need to be taken to fight the adversary.

The imminent problem in relation to the terrorist attack is spelled out in a repeated phrase by Hollande whereby he emphasizes that the terrorist attacks were an act of war (which results in France now being at war against the terrorists). Hollande (2015) states within the very first sentences that "France is at war. The acts committed in Paris and near the Stade de France on Friday evening are acts of war" and repeatedly refers back to the war notion, emphasizing "[f]riday's acts of war", "[g]iven the acts of war committed on our soil", "with the acts of war on November 13" , and "we are at war" (Hollande, 2015).

Even though President Hollande acknowledges that the attacks were directed against the French people by French nationals, he includes the responsibility of the international community in the wider context of the terrorism problem (2015). He states "[w]e are in a war against jihadist terrorism that threatens the entire world, not just France" (Hollande, 2015) and that the attack also cost the lives of people from 19 different nationalities (Hollande, 2015). Hollande goes on and refers to several terrorist attacks that have happened in different countries during the last years and reasons that this "is why the need to destroy Daesh concerns the whole international community" (2015). The problem is represented as a global issue which spans the global community and therefore also calls for global action: "Now, all of us – the neighboring countries, the major powers, but also Europe - must live up to our responsibilities" (Hollande, 2015). Hollande invokes unity – nationally within France but also in particular refers to European unity, whose apparent divisiveness could be identified as a side-element which resonates within the problem represented (2015). Hollande calls on the EU to live up to article 42 (7) of the Treaty on the EU to come to France's help and for a meeting of the UNSC in order to jointly seek for possible actions to combat terrorism (2015). Both aspects firmly underpin Hollande's multilateral approach in combating the global terrorism problem.

Moreover, President Hollande describes the war to be a consequence of the November 2015 terrorist attacks and regards Daesh as a different kind of enemy that France ever has known (2015). He remarks that with "the acts of war on November

13, the enemy has taken things to a new level" and further specifies "this war is a different kind of war, we are facing a new kind of adversary" (Hollande, 2015).

Hollande concludes that "in the face of this new context of war", France will seek to completely destroy terrorism by means of exceptional, new measures (2015). Hollande for example proposes to revise parts of the constitution which would include the deprivation of French nationality from a terrorist, strengthen the nation's resources regarding justice and security, and prolonging the state of emergency (2015). It is worth noting the extent to which Hollande suggests to empower the judicial and legislative institutions. Hollande thus also sees flaws in the constitution and insufficient resources for the French justice and security system as reasons for the problem. We could say that those aspects are further layers of the problem representation as they constitute problems to the global terrorism problem.

Of significance for which assumptions substantiate the problem presented, is that Hollande repeatedly states that the problem needs to be fought under the principle of the rule of law. The President highlights the significance of the French institutional systems, and the rule of law can be regarded as the most significant concept which substantiates Hollande's problem (and combined solution) representation. With regard to changing the constitution as a consequence of the terrorist attacks, Hollande states that a change would "allow the government authorities to take action against terrorism that incites war, in accordance with the rule of law", and any decisions concerning the constitution need to be made in consideration of principles as "it has a preamble which shows that France is a state governed by the rule of law" (2015). These are just two examples of Hollande repeating in his speech that any measures taken or frameworks adopted to fight terrorism should be done so under the principle of the rule of law. We could define the rule of law as a grand theme or concept that Hollande applies in order to differentiate France from the terrorists – that France is a state governed by the rule of law. On the other hand the terrorists who are opposed to a concept such as the rule of law.
Besides the rule of law frame, another logic which substantiates the problem represented and how it needs to be combated, is the simple reasoning that a nation needs to defend and protect itself from an attack. Hollande draws a connection from the attack on France to the bigger picture, as he states that "[w]e are fighting

terrorism wherever the very survival of States is under threat", referring to France's involvement in Mali, the Sahel-region, Iraq and Syria (2015).
As for France particularly, Hollande "marshal[s] the full strength of the State to defend the safety of its people" (2015). Given the Charlie Hebdo attacks from January to which Hollande also refers to, Hollande argues that France needs to be 'merciless' in its fight against the terrorists; "[it] is therefore urgent for us to defend ourselves, on a long-term basis. What's at stake is the protection of our fellow citizens and our ability to live together" (Hollande, 2015).
He concludes his speech by emphasizing that the nation intends to combat the attack and guarantee the safety of its people by eradicating terrorism (2015). The logic is arguably clear: a severe attack such as this one needs to be responded with a merciless war. This general logic not only substantiates the problem represented but more so the solution that is presented to the problem; the underlying assumptions justify the cause of the fight to the problem.

As for what is being left unproblematic, it seems that Hollande is seemingly careful in his speech not to leave anything unproblematic as such. He refers to the motives of the terrorist attacks and explains that the terrorist attacks "were carried out by a jihadist army, by Daesh, which is fighting us because France is a country of freedom, because we are the birthplace of human rights" (Hollande, 2015) and further states that Daesh attacked a "France, which values life, culture, sports, celebrations" (Hollande, 2015). Hollande also goes on to explain France's military involvement in for example Iraq and Syria with the aforementioned logic that France has always fought terrorism when a state is under threat (2015). Moreover, while he clearly identifies Daesh as the perpetrator, Hollande holds back from creating a 'we' vs 'them' binary.
Hollande is moreover careful not to pay too much attention to the religious aspect of the terrorist attack. While he mentions that Daesh is a "jihadist army" (Hollande, 2015), he focuses on the ideological motives behind the terrorist organization and thereby keeps away from a far-reaching distortion of the attackers' motives.

Even though, one might argue, Hollande attempts to debunk the assumed motives behind the attacks in a way which does not create too narrow or tense categorizations, a sense of introspective is still left unproblematic. Hollande defends

France's way of life and justifies its military action in the Middle East and Africa but falls short of posing the questions of joint responsibility the French may have had in the situation which has led to the resentment on part of the IS. The lack of reflecting on France's responsibility towards the attack leads to a one-sided representation of the problem and might lead to inadequacies as to how the problem is depicted.

The unproblematization of France's potential joint responsibility also presents a discursive effect. Hollande actively denies any wrong-doing on part of France and thereby excludes any other root issues terrorism might entail. The terrorism problem is reduced to being an attack on France despite, as it is illustrated, good deeds in the world. The problem becomes a one-sided issue.

Further, as Bacchi notes, this question goes to the bottom of the basic fact that a problem representation benefits some while it harms others. As noted at the beginning of our analysis of Hollande's speech, we deduce that Hollande represents the basic issue as a global terrorism issue. France has been severely attacked and it is therefore necessary to fight an exceptional enemy and an exceptional attack by means of exceptional measures. These measures should include, according to Hollande, the state of emergency he declared, further military operations, constitutional changes and a stronger multilateral, unified approach specifically in reference to Europe's quarrel in the refugee crisis. Within the problem he presents in his speech, Hollande does not necessarily create categories as we stated before, but he does identify target groups and responsible parties. Target groups are the French and the international community, as Hollande points out that Daesh is a threat not only to France (2015). Moreover, Hollande expands the target group to the refugees and inhabitants of countries in which Daesh controls territories, as "[t]hey are victims of this same terrorist system" (2015).

On the other hand, Hollande clearly identifies Daesh as the responsible party of a global terrorist network which needs to be combated. There we have the terrorist system which opposes the aforementioned target groups. We can attribute this to the subjectification effect within Bacchi's WPR analysis approach. The subjectification goes so far that Hollande depicts the target group as a unified group – or at least that the target parties should become a unified group.

Several times during his speech, Hollande calls for unity in the light of such an attack. Hollande states that the French need "to demonstrate those virtues that are a credit to our country: perseverance, unity, lucidity, dignity" and calls the French government to act "in a spirit of national unity" (2015). He concludes the speech by referring to members of the Congress and the Senate, that those who represent the nation as "an invincible people, when it is united and comes together" (2015) .
Hollande (2015) not only calls for French unity but international unity: "France has called for this unity, which is so necessary in order to act" and stresses that they "need all those who can really combat this terrorist army to unite as part of a large, single coalition" (2015). Through that, Hollande finally opposes two subjects: those who are part of the global terrorist network vs. all those who suffer under them and need to fight it.

5.12. Statement by the North Atlantic Council in Response to the Terrorist Attacks in Paris

The NATO statement regarding the Paris terrorist attacks were issued on November 16, 2015, three days after the attacks took place Besides being issued in writing, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also read out the statement after a minute of silence held at the NATO headquarters (NATO, "North Atlantic Council condemns terrorist attacks in Paris, stands in solidarity with France").

The statement by the North Atlantic Council condemns the "barbaric terrorist attacks in Paris" (NATO, 2015). Terrorism is immediately identified as the grand problem and NATO further specifies the underlying problem to the problem represented as it states that the attacks "were an attack on our core values of freedom, democracy and human rights" (NATO, 2015). The statement is also concluded with the same notion as it reads "[t]errorism and extremism can never defeat democracy and our open societies" (NATO, 2015). Based on these statements, we can identify terrorism as the major problem represented; however, terrorism is accompanied by the notion of extremism which could be identified as another problem whereby both are considered to have attacked the core values of NATO and its members.
In combination with the problem stands the problem solution which merely states that NATO is "determined to counter and defeat the threat of terrorism and

extremism" (NATO, 2015). The problem solution only mirrors the representation of the problem which once again puts terrorism and extremism at the centre of the issues at hand, and both notions are regarded as a threat. As for a solution to the problem, which could tell us more about the problem representation, it is declared that "[w]e stand in strong solidarity with the government and the people of France in their unwavering determination to deal with the terrorist threat. We are all more than ever determined to counter and defeat the threat of terrorism and extremism" (NATO, 2015). No specific measures or counter-actions are presented, but NATO only ambiguously states that they will 'do something'.

After having identified the problems presented here, we can move onto identify assumptions, concepts or silences which might substantiate the problem representation. As a logic to substantiate the problem represented, NATO considers the terrorist attack as a threat to core values of NATO such as democracy, freedom and human rights (NATO, 2015). This is not necessarily a categorization but it does oppose NATO members against an identified threat which is supposedly attacking those values. Accordingly, we could say that there is a binary present.
The binary also to a certain degree substantiates the problem represented: as notions such as freedom and democracy are highly valued by the NATO members, anything that could endanger them – such as terrorism and extremism – represents a problem. While the binary is clear in that it opposes two parties in a way which would substantiate the problem from the point of view of NATO, there are various aspects which are left unproblematic in this problem representation.

Due to the brevity of the text, we do not go into depth regarding what has not been mentioned in the statement, but are rather interested in the issues which are silenced through what has been stated.
If we go back to the binary created for example, while we can identify a subjectification effect through the creation of a binary, it is not spelled out who exactly sits at each side of the table. On the one hand we have the alleged proponents of freedom, democracy and human rights – to this group, we can by implication count NATO members as they are the issuer of the statement. Based on this presupposition, any nation based on democracy for instance is also automatically put in this category. Given that the opposing group – represented in the statement by

terrorism and extremism - is a threat to aforementioned values, how is one supposed to categorize other nations in that tight grid? It is important to bear in mind how such a subjectification in binaries by implication could exclude or include other actors in the opposing groups.

When turning our focus to a potential discursive effect of the problem representation, there is not much we can take away from the statement given the scarcity of information it entails. Noteworthy is that as the terrorist attacks, and thereby terrorism overall, are identified as problems which endanger core Western values; as NATO does so, it brings extremism into play as it is mentioned twice in connection to this terrorism: “We are all more than ever determined to counter and defeat the threat of terrorism and extremism” and “[t]errorism and extremism can never defeat democracy” (NATO, 2015). By making terrorism an issue of extremism in the statement, NATO refrains from narrowing the terrorism issue down to specific motives of the terrorists. NATO does not limit or reduce the complexity of the terrorism problem but rather only points out the extreme fundamentals on which the terrorists base their actions. This could help to curb the discursive effects of limitation or silencing aspects which could in the end lead to distorting the essentials of the terrorism issue.

VI. Discussion

In the following chapter we will first summarize the three cases individually. Each case will be discussed separately against the institutionalism and securitization theory. We are aware that by discussing them in separate points, we are more prone to repeat our findings. However, we do not want to marginalize the importance of one deduction over the other and for the sake of oversight believe that it is more reasonable to discuss them first separately. After we summarized each case, we will then compare the cases and unite our findings in a cross-case conclusion subchapter. We also want to point towards a point from earlier on in the theory section, which shall be kept in mind for the reading of the discussion. We do not only consider material which has been spoken as speech acts but also consider the legislative framework and the statements by the UN and NATO as a form of speech act.

6.1. The US Case

Evident in the documents analyzed for this case is the specifics of what took place on 9/11; terrorists attacked the US. This, subsequently, points to the 'problem' in these documents; terrorism. The ways in which the problem is to be fixed are unequivocally clear; it needs to be fought and defeated. The USA PATRIOT Act and President Bush's address to Congress, however, differ quite a bit from the other documents, as they introduce domestic measures meant to prevent terrorism abroad. Needless to mention, preventing terrorism can arguably be seen as part of fighting and defeating it. Despite of this, it is of significance to notice how the attacks and terrorism is framed.

The US is regarded to be the victim of these acts of terrorism. Yet terrorism is a not only a problem for the US, but for, in the words of NATO, "all civilised [sic] nations" (NATO,2001). This claim is supported by President Bush, who in a similar way proclaims that fighting the problem is the world's and "civilization's fight" (Bush, 2001, p. 70). The UN in a somewhat similar fashion also shares this sentiment, arguing that [t]errorism must be fought resolutely wherever it appears" (Annan, 2001). The similar perceptions of the problem points to an important finding in the

framing; as terrorism poses as a threat to the many, 'we' must stand together against this evil.

As the international scope and impact of terrorism is a main aspect in the documents analyzed here, a significant facet of the framing becomes international cooperation as a mean to fix the problem, emphasized by the aforementioned perceptions of terrorism. This logic is evident in Bush's address to Congress, the USA PATRIOT Act, and NATO's statement. The UN statement, on the other hand, does not explicitly encourage cooperation but nevertheless stresses, as aforementioned, the importance of fighting terrorism everywhere. Thus, as this argument emphasizes the need to fight terrorism without explaining how, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the way it ought to be fought, from a UN perspective, should include cooperation.

It is, accordingly, possible to identify a so-called 'common good', or mutual interest - in this case in the form of combating the scourge that is terrorism, which will benefit all and thus, in theory, make cooperation more likely and desirable; states *vis-à-vis* or through an international institution such as NATO. Thus we can deduct from the analysis above, that a liberal framing of how to counter terrorism is present, on the one hand. Present as well, on the other hand, is a realist framing; at the end of the day, the US may act against terrorism as it sees fit according to what is perceived to best serve its own self-interest. As no authority exists to protect the US from terrorism, it needs to protect itself from this threat. This logic appears or is acknowledged in all of the documents analyzed in various forms.

The US case furthermore complies with many aspects of the securitization process as we are able to identify securitizing actors and referent objects as components of securitization.

Firstly, we begin by analyzing the SAs; we identify President George W. Bush (as a representative of the US) and representatives of international institutions NATO and the UN respectively as primary SAs. The USA PATRIOT Act does not have a SA per se; however, given that the US Congress passed the Act in its function as part of the federal government, we can say that the US Congress is a SA. As Bush and the USA PATRIOT Act can be seen as state representatives, the US as a whole can be regarded as an overarching SA.

First off, we deduct from our findings that the mere introduction of the Act as well as Bush's address in itself to represent extraordinary situations. The Act, along with

Bush's address to Congress as well as the statements further frame the terrorist attack as a special threat in various ways. The overall problem presented in all four documents is terrorism and the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The act of terrorism is specifically regarded by SAs George W. Bush (as representative of the US), NATO, and the UN as an exceptional act action of violence. NATO for instance considers the attack to be "without precedent in modern era" (NATO, 2001) while President Bush quickly goes into framing the attack as an act of war.

Moreover, terrorism is framed in many instances as an international issue, making it even more extraordinary in nature. This is backed up by our finding in, for instance, Bush pointing out that the attack is a challenge to the whole (civilized) world. The global ambitions of terrorism as such are further cemented in NATO's statement as it highlights the importance of the Alliance in standing by the side of its afflicted NATO member. Notably here is it that both President Bush and the USA PATRIOT Act strikingly identify 'foreigners' as the perpetrators, making it an issue which originated abroad and therefore also could bear implications for other nations than the US. This finding also complies with the argument in securitization that especially strong states, which are typically liberal-democracies, face external threats, which is arguably the case here.

By making terrorism a global issue, NATO and Bush also see citizens and states of the world at large as under threat. Therefore, while the US as a state is a clear RO, the two SAs also consider the international community as ROs of the terrorism threat. As NATO expresses its stance of solidarity with the US, NATO can be identified here as another significant RO. The UN is too vague in its response and we can only carefully assume that the UN and its member states are meant as ROs. The USA PATRIOT Act does not spell out any ROs, but it certainly refers to the US and its people as ROs, given that the Act is supposed to protect US citizens from terrorism. Most notable in President Bush's speech are collective principles such as democracy and freedom, which are seen as being under attack. Neither NATO, the UN or the Act do so, though one could argue that the aforementioned collective principles (or rather the protection of those) resonate in the USA PATRIOT Act. According to the binary we found in the course of our analysis, the ROs are all, to some extent, related to representing the 'good' as opposed to the 'evil them' who carried out the terrorist attack.

Interesting to point out here is the fact that Bush mentions the religious dimension behind the motives of the attack. We would not go so far to say that we can clearly identify religion to be an RO, as Bush does not pinpoint that religion is under threat. However, Bush (2001) does state that terrorism wants to "kill Christians and Jews" (p. 67), which we would cautiously point out as a first step in potentially making the claim that religion is under attack.

As all SAs represent 9/11 as an exceptional terrorist attack and, as an outcome, terrorism more broadly as an exceptional threat - by some actors regarded as a global problem - they call for equally extraordinary measures to combat and prevent the issue. The UN highlights the casualties caused by the attack and therefore calls to resolutely fight such a remarkable threat. The USA PATRIOT Act repeatedly refers to the underlying notion that the nation was attacked from abroad and therefore needs protection – in the form of 10 Titles on more than 300 pages which are supposed to facilitate the securing and protection of the US. NATO specifically states that the attack on the US is such a grave crime which requires an intensified fight against terrorism (NATO, 2001). The intensified fight should come in the form of generally said more power to authorities and thereby protect the citizens, as formulated by the Act and Bush. Once again, though NATO and the UN are very vague in what the measures should look like, they certainly frame terrorism in such a way that it requires immediate and relentless action.

6.2. The UK Case

In respect to this case, it is interesting to note how the impact of the attacks is perceived. Thus, somewhat similar to the case concerning 9/11, the terrorist attacks in London are being placed into an international context, again underlining the threat terrorism poses and accordingly the significance of fighting it. This is underlined by how the event is perceived by the UN, arguing it was "an attack on humanity itself" (Annan, 2005), thus emphasizing the scope of the attacks. NATO, in a similar vein, stresses that terrorism seek to destroy "freedom, tolerance and democracy" and "to impose extremism on the world" (NATO, 2005). NATO and the UN subsequently both accentuates the need for international cooperation, however in somewhat different fashions.

For NATO the core value is to protect its members, and as terrorism is perceived as a threat, NATO will stand together to fight terrorism; there is a mutual interest in combating terrorism as it a threat to members of NATO as well as to everyone also believing in freedom, tolerance, and democracy. The UN, on the other hand, does not explicitly refer to cooperation as a mean to counter terrorism, but rather the significance of cooperating in general. As such, facing and addressing a problem together is considered desirable and urged (Annan, 2005).

Due to these responses, it is possible to identify a liberal framing of how to counter terrorism. People around the world are facing various problems, and addressing them together is preferred. Moreover, a dominating logic here is that together we are stronger, again underlining the significance of international cooperation.

Tony Blair, in his statement to parliament, does not necessarily differ remarkably from these representations, as he, too, refers to terrorism as a general problem, while highlighting proposals from intelligence agencies around the world to help the UK, underlining the prospect of cooperating against this shared enemy. However, as these attacks occurred in London, the UK intends to fix this problem based also on its own self-interest, yet it by no means excludes cooperation.

When looking at the SA in the four documents, we can identify SAs Kofi Annan, as the representative of the UN, as well as NATO. Moreover, Tony Blair is another actor, and as he and the British Parliament, which passed the Act, are representative figures of the UK, the UK can be in turn regarded as an overarching SA.

The existential threat which dominates the threat agenda in three cases is namely terrorism. Prime Minister Blair, NATO and the Act itself present terrorism as the grand problem at hand. The UN on the other hand is rather coy and does not refer in its statement to an act of terror but only namely regards the 'atrocious bombings' as the issue. What all four actors do, however, is to highlight an outrageous attack. The UN sees the incident as an "attack on humanity itself" (Annan, 2005). The binary of the 'good' vs the 'evil' as found in Blair's speech, as well as in UN and NATO statements, affirm this notion as the dichotomy highlights the role of the good – also the victim here – opposed to a perpetrator which is related to destruction and therefore needs to be fought. In addition, NATO highlights that this has been a long-lasting issue. NATO arguing that one needs to continuously fight terrorism goes together with Blair linking the attack to 9/11, and thus emphasizes the international

dimension of the issue as well as invoking the exceptionality 9/11 seemingly posed. The Terrorism Act also reflects by means of newly introduced offences, that these terrorist attacks shows up a special kind of threat. What is interesting about the threat, is that it is both external and internal. As the terrorist attacks are related to al Qaeda, the threat is external in character. However, given that the perpetrators were British nationals make the issue two-folded as it also represents an internal threat.

The Terrorism Act reflects the notion that the exceptional measures introduced are notably aimed at preventing the encouragement and distribution of terrorist-related material domestically. In this context, further extraordinary measures to combat the exceptional threat are once again the delegation of more power to authorities, as highlighted through Blair and the Terrorism Act.

Furthermore, the extraordinary character of the terrorist threat and its complementary countermeasures are further complemented by the ROs as referred to by the SAs. Blair for instance emphasizes the grave motives behind the attacks and mentions that the British 'way of life' has been attacked. This is of course free for interpretation, but as Blair frames London as an city of many cultures, we could deduct that he regards a sense of openness and multiculturalism as part of the British way of life. The statement by Kofi Annan also represents this line of thought as it refers to London as a city of various cultures and countries. Additionally, NATO mentions in the statement that the "Alliance's values of freedom, tolerance and democracy" must be defended (NATO, 2005). The UN, on the other hand, makes no mentioning of collective principles. While the Terrorism Act does not specifically identify certain values as being under threat, its purpose of ensuring security to the UK citizens mirrors the values stated by NATO and Blair. The SAs in the UK case therefore primarily identify collective principles as ROs, but also national traits as represented by the British way of life as ROs. Another aspect appearing in the Act and in Blair's speech, is the notion that the attack was first and foremost perpetrated against the UK, but in a larger sense also at international community when the issue is extended to its global impact. Therefore, the UK as a state and to some extent also the international community represent further ROs. The endangered ROs are depicted to be seen in context with the 'good' side while the terrorist attack (and generally said the perpetrators) are connoted with anything which is 'bad'.

6.3. The French Case

Of importance in this case is the call made by President Hollande, concerning the need of intensifying international cooperation to combat terrorism. This need, of course, also underlines how terrorism is perceived here; it is a threat to the entire world and thus a concern for the international community (Hollande, 2015).
Significant for this context, as we have seen previously, is the identification of the terrorists. That is, though the attacks may have been planned in Belgium and carried out in France, the 'real' problem, according to Hollande, is in civil war torn Syria where, among other places, the self-proclaimed IS operates (Hollande, 2015). It is against exactly this problem that further cooperation is needed. That being said, the French 'war against terrorism' as a whole extends beyond this terrorist organization.

As aforementioned, a significant portion of Hollande's speech relates to urging international cooperation and it is thus possible to identify a liberalist framing of how to counter the threat posed by terrorism, which is also evident in NATO's statement. This is underlined by Hollande's appeal to the EU to invoke article 42 (7), his asking of the UNSC "to meet as soon as possible to adopt a resolution expressing our common will to combat terrorism", as well as the call to all possessing the means to fight terrorism to appear as "a large, single coalition" (Hollande, 2015).
While the advocacy for cooperation against terrorism appears as the most dominant argument here, we can nevertheless also identify a realist framing. Here, France can be seen as acting based on its own self-interest especially relating to the security threat terrorism poses. That is, France needs to protect and defend itself against terrorism in order to stay safe, be it alongside other nations or by itself, as no authority exists to protect France from terrorism.

As for SAs, both the UN and NATO appears as suchs. François Hollande, as the President of France, is identified as another SA, and both he and the Council of Ministers, which is the organ to declare the state of emergency, further represent authorities which overall stand for the state of France – and thereby, an additional SA.

The threat agenda is dominated by terrorism and namely the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks from 11/13 in Paris. All SAs identify the terrorist attacks as an existential threat. While the UN speaks of a 'despicable terrorist attack' (Ki-moon, 2015), NATO calls the incident 'barbaric' (NATO, 2015) and President Hollande emphasizes throughout his speech that Daesh is the illustration of a different kind of enemy which France has not known before. The President even goes so far as to say that the attacks were an act of war. Hollande repeatedly applies war rhetoric to emphasize that France is so gravely threatened by a specific group of terrorists, and as such the country now needs to respond with war to defend itself against this threat. This is an extraordinary response to a threat, while it attributes a highly severe nature to terrorism. The declaration of the state of emergency is further a testament to the exceptionality of the situation. While the law very generally is supposed to find application in situations where an exceptional threat endangers public order and security, we can contextually relate this notion to the 11/13 attacks themselves. It is generally emphasized by all SAs that the attacks are seen as such a grave attack to France, that it now needs to step up and defend itself by exceptional means, which Hollande also repeatedly states in his address. Moreover, the 11/13 terrorist attacks represent both an external and internal threat, as the perpetrators are emphasized to be French citizens.

The existential threat is grounded in the reasons for why France was attacked. Hollande (2015) illustrates France as a country "which values life, culture, sports, celebrations", and moreover as the country of "freedom, because we are the birthplace of human rights". NATO mirrors this perceived 'attack on values' in its statement, remarking that the terrorist attacks threaten the Alliance's 'core values' such as freedom, democracy, and human rights. As the core of the state of emergency aims to secure public order and the safety of the French citizens, we can deduct that collective principles such as aforementioned common values are regarded as ROs, namely here by the state of emergency law, President Hollande and NATO. NATO also emphasizes that one of its member states has been attacked and calls the Alliance to defeat the threat of terrorism and extremism. By that, not only the state of France as the target of the attack, is an RO, but also all NATO members. The international dimension of terrorism is highlighted by Hollande, who remarks that Daesh presents a global threat to anyone who suffers under terrorist acts, thus

making the international community at large an additional RO. What is further significant to point out here is that the threat is perceived to be aimed at ROs which stand for the 'right' or 'good' values in the world. In relation to our analysis, a targeted party which represents the 'good' and, as Hollande repeatedly emphasizes, upholds the rule of law is gravely threatened by another entity which chose to act unlawfully.
As these essential ROs are threatened by terrorism, the previously mentioned exceptional measures find their justification. Hollande proposes, and the state of emergency in fact allows for, more power to authorities. The extent of the existential threat particularly shines through President Hollande's proposal to change the constitution. This measure is an extraordinary counterterrorism action, which arguably infringes the civil liberties of the citizens in many ways. However, the SAs justify such measures by framing the terrorist attack as an existential threat to France and the international community.

6.4. Cross-Case Discussion

In comparing our three cases, we can detect a number of similarities as well as a development in how terrorism is framed from 9/11, to 7/7 and ending with 11/13.

First off, the SAs of the three cases are all similar in nature. As all SAs operate within highly institutionalized settings, this does not come as a surprise. The national actors fulfill a representational function in which a state is commonly the overarching SA. Transnational, the UN and NATO in themselves are additional SAs which represent clusters of state. We further found that there is a mix and match between ROs and SAs from both the political and the military sector. As the CS suggests, the political sector can be regarded as an all-encompassing sector in which many branches come together and are deeply intertwined. This notion resonates in the found mix and match between the threat agendas.

The similar SAs share a striking commonality in their depiction of terrorism: It is evident throughout the three cases in this study that the majority of the SAs frame the terrorist attack as a global threat. Not only the attacks, but terrorism at large is perceived as a common danger to the international community. The majority of the

SAs go as far as identifying the threat as an existential and extraordinary threat. Our analysis showed that the terrorist attacks have been characterized for example as a threat to the civilized world and humanity as a whole; the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks also are identified as representing an unconventional kind of threat. The common identification of the threat is further established in the largely similar ROs we found in our analysis. The threat agendas in all three cases entails both the individual state as the victim of the attack, as well as NATO and UN to be a RO. On a meta-level, a number of SAs regard the international community, including all those states which suffer under the common terrorism threat, to be a RO at large. The notion of the intertwined global network being threatened also shows in our finding that unifying elements are likewise regarded by the SAs as jeopardized. Collective principles in the form of common values, such as democracy and freedom, are often times invoked as representing fundamental elements which are attacked - and thereby made ROs. The threat agendas are completed with the proposal, and in the end implementation, of rather rights infringing counterterrorism measures (primarily directed to the domestic sphere), which in the first place revolve about giving authorities more power.

Framing terrorism in such a way can be seen as a call for cooperation to combat terrorism, while it at the same time serves as a justifiable tool for any action that might be taken against terrorism. As terrorism is perceived as an increasing international threat, the logic appears to be that despite an act of terrorism happened 'here', next time it can happen 'there' if it is not defeated; the enemy, terrorism, is a shared one. Along the same lines, 'we' must, or should, stand together against this 'evil', as destroying it will benefit all. On the other hand, this framing presents any potential unilateral measures against terrorism as being not merely based on self-interests, but as acting for the greater good at large. Accordingly, destroying terrorism is generally seen as a mutual interest throughout the analysis, and the end can then be seen as justifying the means.

In this respect, evident is a liberalist framing combined with a realist one of how to counter terrorism. Whereas the former can be seen as the dominant one, the latter is at the same time constantly present. Thus, while each of our national actors advocates cooperation, it is with a constant reticence. Following this line of

argumentation, the liberalist framing is the initial one; here, cooperation is encouraged as it is imperative to destroy this common enemy, and doing so is perceived to be mutually beneficial. Whether or not cooperation will be initiated via- or occur through the auspice of an institution takes a backseat, as the driver here is the need to cooperate. The same framing is also found in the documents by the transnational actors. Here, NATO facilitates cooperation to fight terrorism, whereas the UN can be seen as promoting cooperation, as well as condemning terrorism through resolutions. As such, all SAs acknowledge the merits of cooperation in this framing as stipulated by liberalism.

On the other hand, however, the realist framing resonates in the notion: we *can* cooperate if you *choose* to join, but we will proceed regardless. Cooperation in this framing then becomes contingent on the willingness to join forces. This is underlined by the characteristic of the anarchical international system; only states themselves can ensure for their own survival as there exists no higher authority that can protect them. This, of course, points to that our national actors first and foremost pursue their own self-interests, which then become the main concern. In this regard, however, international institutions such as NATO can be of significance as they are considered a tool of statecraft for powerful states, aiming at promoting the interests of these. This logic, it can be argued, is evident in NATO's framing.

While these similarities in the framing are striking, we can detect a shift in the framing of the terrorism problem. The basic nature of the threat remains the same but it shifts from being depicted as a primarily external threat to seemingly also as being an internal threat. The US case shows that after 9/11, terrorism was generally regarded as a threat from outside; as a 'foreign' phenomenon which accordingly needs to be primarily fought outside the US. On the other hand, in the British and French case it is emphasized that the perpetrators of the respective incidents were citizens of the country in which the terrorist attacks occurred, thereby increasingly paying attention to the domestic dimension of the problem. The threat should now also be fought more forcefully at home instead of focussing exclusively on operations aimed at entities abroad. This shift in the perception of terrorism strongly resonates in the countermeasures put in place domestically after the 7/7 and 11/13 incidents.

In summary, we conclude the discussion as such: given the many similarities in the framing of terrorism, we can hence reason that terrorism is a highly institutionalized security matter. The securitizing actors moreover predominantly encourage a liberal approach to fight the problem, however, a realist notion still prevails as the problem is deeply intertwined in a political and military dominated discourse. The main problem which arises then, is that the rigid framing leaves many aspects of the issue unproblematic.

However, besides the commonalities, we can also detect a change in the terrorism framing as the initial external threat is increasingly also perceived as an internal threat. Albeit this development, the core mechanisms behind how the problem should be fixed, remain the same; more power to authorities in the fight against terrorism.

VII. Conclusion

Based on our findings generated through the WPR policy analysis against the backdrop of the theories of securitization and institutionalism seen through a realist and liberal lens, we will now return to our initial problem formulation and research questions:

How is terrorism framed in legislative frameworks and political statements by the US, the UK, France, the UN and NATO introduced in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 9/11 attacks in New York City, the 2005 7/7 bombings in London, and the 2015 11/13 bombings in Paris? In terms of securitization and institutionalism within an international relations theory context, what notions are the framings related to and what are its potential international consequences particularly concerning cooperation in counterterrorism?

1. How can we understand terrorism discourse through genealogy within an international context?
2. How is terrorism framed and what purpose do the framings serve in terms of securitization and institutionalism in an IR context?
3. How can the insights gained explain international cooperation efforts in counterterrorism?

We want to focus on the connections and contradictions which our analysis of the three cases has shown and aim to build an overall picture to answer our problems statement.

As a general point of departure for answering our problem statement, we presume, according to Foucault's genealogical approach, that power structures have greatly influenced the terrorism discourse within an international context. For this, we have defined the (end of the) Cold War and 9/11 as pivotal moments in time. Secondly, we need to emphasize the contextual premise that no single academic or legal definition of terrorism exists but many, each of which underpin the fluidity of the term and mirroring the presumption that terrorism is subject to a changing discourse. As we

see today, while the agenda of the terrorism issue seems to remain the same, the problem seems to repeatedly occur in a new guise.

The US discourse during the Cold War was primarily concerned with the ever present threat of WMDs and one enemy in the form of communism and the Soviet Union. Interestingly so, the notion of the nuclear threat has prevailed until 9/11 and further, and not only in relation to the US, but for instance also to the UK as countermeasures in the UK Terrorism Act 2006 showed.
The bipolar structure of the international arena between the US and the Soviet Union, ended with the end of the Cold War and gave way for the development of a multipolar power structure. In reality, one could argue that while the US made multilateral efforts, they were made with a unilateral agenda in mind, perhaps especially post-9/11. After the Cold War, Europe emphasized a multilateral approach and was occupied with its own security concerns which were only minimally touched by the existent US terrorism discourse. European countries were primarily concerned with their individual, national security discourses. However, international acts of terror showed that a transnational dimension to terrorism certainly already then existed (in Europe).

Based on this genealogy of terrorism, we can conclude that Europe and the US were largely occupied with recovering from the Cold War in the immediate aftermath of its ending, and individual and nation-bound terrorist discourses were thus dominant. We do, however, believe that within those discourses, terrorism was nevertheless acknowledged to also be an international issue.

As our genealogy has further revealed, 9/11 is seen as a unique turning point in the terrorism discourse, both within the US but also internationally. This also shows throughout our analysis, as not only 9/11 was depicted as a unique event, but also 7/7 and 11/13. The uniqueness of the events is mirrored in the response it generated; the US called for a multilateral approach in responding to the 9/11 terrorist attack, namely informally declaring war on terror, but was more aggressive in pursuing a unilateral agenda. The UN imposed on all members to comply to Anti-Terrorism Resolution 1373, while NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; both being unprecedented actions for each institution. Similar responses are found in the 7/7

and 11/13 cases, as all actors in our three cases call for cooperation and support a multilateral approach in fighting terrorism.

An additional commonality in this regard is terrorism being framed in all three cases as an international threat, and to some extent even as an existential one. Within securitization, the threat agendas for each case resemble each other in that the same referent objects, primarily the state, the international community at large, and collective principles are regarded as being under threat by the securitizing actors. This shows that terrorism is a highly institutionalized security matter as the level of similarity in how all actors securitize the terrorism issue is striking. This institutionalization further shows in the concurrent framing of terrorism as a global threat. The individual attacks can be seen as reinforcing the perception of terrorism as an international threat, especially considering the frequent mentioning of the many other countries terrorists have attacked. Referencing other terrorist attacks, it can be argued, furthermore highlights the international characterization of terrorism; it attacks everywhere with a perceived indifference to who it kills in order to 'change' the world. As such, though a religious affiliation is ascribed to the terrorists in connection to the attacks, the fundamental 'problem' is terrorism in general. That is, *all* terrorism needs to be fought, as is evident from our analysis. In this framing, terrorism and terrorists are not representative of anything or anyone but terrorism and terrorists. This, of course, adds to the perception of terrorism as a common enemy. Accordingly, terrorism is not a problem for one, but for all. This notion is strongly mirrored in the responses of our SAs within the three cases.

9/11 moreover led to the development of a new terrorism discourse which found resonance on the international stage: not only were the attacks represented as a symbol of an international threat, but 9/11 also represented a 'new' kind of terrorism which subsequently led to a more intense (counter)terrorism and security discourse. As we have seen, some actors also picked up that narrative as the terrorist attacks were seen as the consequences of a somewhat 'new' kind of terrorism. In doing so, the actors arguably also justified the introduction of a number of new countermeasures which were supposed to counter the new threat.

Also the 'war on terror' frame in relation to terrorism found resonance outside of the US. Thus, also 7/7 and 11/13, are regarded as somewhat unique attacks, which therefore require a strong, international response.
According to our findings, we can then conclude that the US discourse spilled over internationally and had an impact on the framing of subsequent terrorist attacks post-9/11. However, while the US discourse was occupied with the symptoms of terrorism, such as how to fight it militarily, France and the UK also strived to involve efforts which would tackle root causes of the terrorism. As such, the US discourse spill-over also resonates in the UN and NATO framing of terrorism.

However, besides the commonalities in the framing of terrorism within its discourse, we can also detect a change in the terrorism framing as the initial external threat is increasingly also perceived as an internal threat by the state. We found that the perception of terrorism as an issue which also has its roots causes 'at home', has increased since the 9/11 case. Albeit this development, the core mechanisms behind how the problem should be fixed, seem to remain the same.

As the problem is perceived as a common, international problem for all, everyone should also contribute to fix this problem, it seems. As the threat is not bound to a specific geographic area, this also poses one of the major challenges for national and international institutions as to how one can fight such a borderless danger effectively. A main component of this framing of terrorism - its international potential - serves to underline that it needs to be countered internationally and preferably through cooperation.

Following this line of argumentation, framing terrorism as an international threat capable of and willing to attack everywhere serves to justify the response to this evil; it needs to be fought, destroyed, and eliminated internationally on the one hand, while exceptional measures are being introduced domestically to prevent further attacks on the other hand. The measures taken domestically do not entail cooperation as such, though the USA PATRIOT Act encourages, for example, intelligence sharing between countries, while Tony Blair also acknowledges this possibility. Fighting terrorism internationally, on the other hand, ought to entail some degree of cooperation. The continuous emphasis on terrorism as a global evil

threat nevertheless points to that as long as this problem exists, there will be what Nuruzzaman (2008) refers to as scarcity of security which makes cooperation harder to achieve due to mistrust between states (p. 198). As we have seen, despite what can be considered as scarcity of security due to conflict/war with terrorism, any mistrust which would make cooperation harder to achieve is overridden by a perceived mutual interest in fighting terrorism. How terrorism is framed, in our cases, serves to encourage cooperation, states *vis-a-vis* and under the auspices of international institutions, as the payoff from cooperating against terrorism are seen as joint gains; once defeated, there will be abundance of security and lack of conflict/war. The framing of terrorism and how it should be countered can then be seen to appear through a liberalist framework, emphasizing the virtues of cooperation and institutions role in promoting it.

This liberalist approach, however, has a caveat which points to a realist aspect of the response, which subsequently corresponds to Nuruzzaman's claim concerning scarcity of security. Though cooperation by no means is off the table, the mantra of self-help prevails. Terrorism, of course, is still perceived as an international threat, but the main imperative becomes the realization of own self-interests.

This leads us to critically reflect the success of the countermeasures, both in general but also with a view to international cooperation. It seems that given the re-occurrence of terrorism, one could say that the endeavors have been insufficient in fighting the problem. If it continues to happen, should our actors not think about another approach to combating terrorism?

Here is also where the unproblematic issues of the terrorism, as found in our analysis, come into play. As the problem is primarily perceived as an international threat in which more power to authorities seems to be regarded as the ultimate tool to counter terrorism, other issues are left out of the conversation. Those aspects for instance involve getting to the bottom of the root causes of the problem. In the military and politically dominated discourse, terrorism becomes a too simplified problem as it is stripped off the complexity of its many ideological components and narrowed down to a few aspects. While there are efforts such as by the UK to tackle root causes such as the encouragement of terrorism, such issues must be dealt with more rigorously. The problem needs to be thought about differently and the framing

of terrorism and its surrounding discourse cannot only focus on the problem's symptoms and be met primarily with military and political response. In this context, it is also the complete lack of introspectiveness which is missing in all three cases. As we found through our analysis, no actor actually reflects on their potential responsibility in the creation of the problem; both domestically but also abroad as no actors involves their respective responsibilities in the ongoing mingling of foreign military forces in the Middle East and Africa. The seemingly little signs of success in the counterterrorism should be a point of reflection as to how the problem should be presented differently in order to tackle it more effectively.

Moreover, interestingly to note in this context, is that in terms of agreeing to cooperate, this seems, from the framing at the very least, to be attainable. Gains connected to cooperation on this matter can be seen as being mutually beneficial, as one would assume that defeating, or at least limiting terrorists' capability to attack, would represent a mutual interest and furthermore moves beyond concerns about distributional issues. While institutions may play a role in promoting stability and peace, their causal influence remains unknown as they here mostly are seen as an encouraging state behavior, but cannot be perceived as altering state behavior in any relevant way as states themselves define the problem and the preferred way to address this. As such, what this paper shows is that in an anarchic world, states rely first and foremost on themselves. This, as we have seen, does not imply that mutual interests are not present - rather the contrary - and cooperation is thus an option. Figuring out *how* to cooperate most effectively against terrorism, however, remains to be seen.

While the heart of the problem is still the same, its face has changed over the years which has noticeably also resonated in the increasing acknowledgement of terrorism as both an external and internal threat. However, the main ways to combat terrorism have remained persistently unchanged, resulting in an equally unchanging outcome which shows in the continuing fight against terrorism.

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