The European Union’s Strategy towards the Arctic
- A Normative Power in the Region?

Master Thesis in Development and International Relations

Pernille Grøne
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Supervisor: Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen
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Abstract

The European Union has directed its attention to the Arctic region and started to develop its own EU-Arctic Strategy. This thesis analyses EU's strategy towards the Arctic and examines how the EU as a normative power in the region can be understood. The thesis is structured as a two-fold analysis. The first part analyses EU's strategy towards the Arctic based on official EU policies drafted by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the period from 2008 - 2016. The second part analyses the European Union as a normative power in the region. Ian Manners’ concept of Normative Power and Joseph S. Nye’s concept of Soft Power constitutes the theoretical framework of the thesis.

The European Union initiated its Arctic policy development on a rather unfortunate path by offending the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic with a ban of seal products on the European market and by proposing an Arctic Treaty that implicitly questioned the rights of the Arctic coastal states. As the EU-Arctic policy development has progressed the EU has replaced its controversial statements and drafted several documents with strong focus on international cooperation on fighting climate change, acknowledgement of the international regulatory framework and support for Arctic research. Yet, the official documents are developed without clear objectives and ways to move forward, which leave the impression that the EU seems unable to communicate its own interests towards the Arctic region. Despite the rather unclear EU-Arctic strategy, the EU still has a role to play in the Arctic as a normative power. In relation to climate change in the Arctic the EU is a leading actor setting high environmental standards for the rest to follow. The EU is also a large funder of Arctic research, which further legitimises EU's presence in the Arctic. The EU is only partially a normative power in the Arctic, while the conflict between mainly Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and the EU regarding the ban of seal products has limited the EU in its ambition to be granted Observer Status in the Arctic Council, which is the main forum for circumpolar cooperation.
1. Introduction

1.1. The opening

The Arctic region has evolved on the international stage in a historical short period of time. The European Union has over the last few years become aware of its interests in the Arctic and started to develop its own Arctic policy and strategy. The aim with this thesis is to examine the EU as an actor in the Arctic. The thesis will analyse EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and try to understand the EU as a normative power in the region.

Due to primarily rapid climate change the consequences of the situation in the Arctic involve access to new fisheries, new possibilities for mineral resources and new navigational routes between Europe and Asia (Eritja, 2013). The Arctic region faces a series of challenges that will determine the development within multiple dimensions across this region. As a result, still more actors and stakeholders direct their attention to the North. This is also the case with the European Union. Since the European Parliament adopted its first official resolution on Arctic governance in 2008, the EU has continuously expressed its interest in strengthening its engagement and developing an EU-Arctic Policy¹.

The EU is in several ways connected to the Arctic. Three EU Member States, Denmark (Greenland/Faroe Islands), Sweden and Finland, hold territory in the Arctic. Another two Arctic states, Norway and Iceland, are connected to the EU through their membership of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and are parties to the European Economic Area (EEA). The EU is not a major Arctic power in geographical terms but the EU has strong competences to act in the region directly through its Arctic Member States, and through Norway and Iceland, while the EEA Agreement expands the geographical scope of EU legislations beyond the territorial jurisdiction of EU’s Member States (Koivurova, Kokko, Duyck, Sellheim, & Stepien, 2012). The EEA Agreement creates a single market in relation to the four fundamental freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. The common agriculture policy, the common fisheries policies, justice, home affairs, foreign policy and monetary coordination are excluded from the scope of the EEA Agreement (Keil & Raspotnik, 2014; Koivurova et al., 2012). The EEA Agreement does cover multiple policy areas

¹ See: www.arcticinfo.eu
with Arctic relevance such as environment and research. The EEA Agreement obliges Norway and Iceland to implement all relevant EU legislation in order to ensure a congruent legal framework and the functioning of the common market (Keil & Raspotnik, 2014). The EEA/EFTA states are limited to have a consultative role in the decision making process when EU legislation is adopted. Experts of the EEA/EFTA states will be consulted whenever the Commission drafts EU legislation and communicates it to the Council. If the legislation is adopted it will be integrated into the legal orders of the EEA/EFTA states in accordance with their national decision making process. In practice, this procedure is strengthening the role of Brussels with regard to several policies of two Arctic states – Norway and Iceland. Last but not without importance, the remaining Arctic states, Canada, Russia, and the United States, are strategic partners to the EU (European Commission, 2008a).

Reports show that about half of the total fish caught in the Arctic are consumed in the EU and that one-quarter of oil and gas extracted in the Arctic goes to the EU and thereby contribute to its energy security (Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011). The EU is the largest trading bloc and in control of 40 percent of world commercial shipping, which suggest a natural interest in securing non-discriminatory access to the strategically important Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage (Weber & Romanyshyn, 2011). The EU legitimises its presence and engagement in the Arctic through these various factors.

Since 2008 all three EU institutions, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, have been involved in developing Arctic policies. Yet, EU’s interests in the Arctic has been characterised by much variation and degree of engagement still affected by numerous conflicts. In addition, multiple Arctic stakeholders are present in Brussels - ranging from individual states (both EU and non-EU) to industry associations - with attendance in an endless series of conferences, seminars and other events regarding EU’s engagement and strategy towards the Arctic. The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereafter High Representative) recently published a Joint Communication about the Arctic, which allegedly is an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). However, it seems that until now no specific strategy on EU-Arctic matters has been in place and it can be discussed
whether the new EU-Arctic Policy is representing a clear and defined strategy\textsuperscript{2}. Therefore, it can seem rather difficult to understand what the EU actually want to do in the Arctic and why they have an interest in the region. Hence, the argument of the thesis is that the EU lacks a clear and defined strategy towards the Arctic.

\textsuperscript{2} I have been working as an intern for the Danish Ministry for Higher Education and Science in Brussels. My main focus was research and innovation in the Arctic region. My work in Brussels is what constitutes the background for writing this thesis.
1.1.1. What is the Arctic

There exist several discussions on how to define the Arctic. A simple definition of the Arctic is the region above the Arctic Circle. As illustrated in Map 1, the Arctic Circle passes through the most northern part of the North, Russia, the United States (Alaska) and Canada. It cuts through the southern part of Greenland and the top of Iceland. This definition is recognised by the European Commission, which is a definition that includes the Arctic Ocean and territories belonging to “the Arctic 8”: Canada, Russia, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Finland, Sweden and Iceland (European Commission, 2008a). However, it is only “the Arctic 5”: Canada, Russia, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland) and Norway that have coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean.

Map 1:

*The Arctic. The Arctic Circle marked with stippled blue.*

Source: PCL Map Collection
This thesis takes account of circumpolar Arctic perspectives in cases where it is relevant for EU policy and strategy making or in cases where it is needed for a better understanding of the analysed issues. The Arctic region is considered here according to the boundaries made by Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR, 2004) (Map 2), which is a broader definition than the one recognised by the European Commission, since it can not be excluded that the analysis will touch upon issues that are related to the definition made by AHDR. I recognise the great sub-regional differentiation in the Arctic, while I assume that there is not one Arctic but several.

Map 2:

The Arctic region (marked with purple) as defined in AHDR and the European Arctic (marked with blue) as defined in SADA.

Source: Arctic Portal
No state or organisation controls the territories within the Arctic exclusively. Besides the sovereign landmass belonging to Arctic states the different areas within the Arctic is regulated according to international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulates the Arctic and the territorial seas of the Arctic countries extend twelve nautical miles from the shore (Byers & Baker, 2013). Within this zone, coastal states have extensive regulatory rights over foreign shipping and absolute rights over fish and seabed resources. The area between twelve and 200 nautical miles is called the ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ (EEZ). In this zone, coastal states have fewer rights over shipping but continued absolute rights over fish and seabed resources (Byers & Baker, 2013). Beyond 200 nautical miles, coastal states lose their rights over fish but might still have rights over the seabed. This depends if they are able to scientifically document that the ocean floor is a “natural prolonging” of their landmass (Byers & Baker, 2013).

1.1.2. The Arctic Council

The EU has had a difficult time being granted Observer Status in the Arctic Council, which is the leading intergovernmental forum for circumpolar cooperation. The EU has not been granted the formal status due to primarily a conflict between Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and the EU caused by Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products (a regulation with EEA relevance) (Parliament & Council, 2009). The Arctic Council is the only forum where Arctic states cooperate on a governmental level. Established in 1996 in Ottawa (Canada), all eight Arctic states are Permanent Members of the Arctic Council. Six organisations representing the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic have Permanent Participants Status, which means that they must be consulted in full within the work of the Council. In addition, non-Arctic states, inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary, global, regional and non-governmental organisations have the opportunity to obtain Observer Status, which primarily entails that they contribute through their engagement in Working Groups under the Council. It is important to emphasise that the Arctic Council is a forum and hence not a regulatory or legislative body. It produces guidelines, assessments and recommendations but it cannot enforce or implement these, while this is a task that belongs to each individual Arctic state. However, two legally binding

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4 For more information about the Arctic Council see: www.arctic-council.org
agreements have been negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council and signed by all eight Arctic states.\(^5\)

As a consequence of rapid climate change and the increased interest in the High North, the Arctic Council continues to be very relevant to non-Arctic states as well as other actors including the European Union. Seven EU countries, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy and five non-EU countries, China, Japan, Singapore, India and the Republic of Korea have Observer Status in the Arctic Council, which show that there has been a significant global development within the forum. However, the Permanent Members – the Arctic eight – have been cautious about granting Observer Status to both non-Arctic states and other actors in recent years, which has caused much frustration among several non-Arctic states and indeed also the EU, which still remains to be granted Observer Status. In other words, it is a disputed issue that needs further examination in this thesis.

### 1.2. Problem formulation

This thesis will examine EU’s strategy towards the Arctic in the period from 2008, where the first official EU-Arctic resolution was published, until present time - recognising that the policy development with regards to the Arctic is an on-going process. So far the EU has published eight official policies including Parliament Resolutions, Commission Communications, Joint Communications and Council Conclusions concerning the Arctic.

As the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate, one of the objectives in the first Communication from the Commission in 2008 was to be granted Observer Status in the Arctic Council. This is an issue often discussed in Arctic forums in Brussels and elsewhere. The intention to become an Observer in the Arctic Council, and the reluctance of the Arctic States to grant the status have made EU's aspirations in the Arctic the subject of a continuing debate (Koivurova et al., 2012). Examining the second Joint Communication from 2012, the EU has kept its objectives largely unchanged from the first Communication with a vague emphasis on areas like 'Knowledge', 'Responsibility' and 'Engagement'. Yet, there is no action plan on how to move forward on these areas and no concrete proposals for activities in the Arctic. These

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5 The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic + the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil and Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. For more information see: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work/agreements
points lead to questions like: what aspirations does the EU have in the Arctic and what is it exactly the EU wants to achieve with developing an Arctic strategy? The EU policy-making system is complex and there are many interests to consider when dealing with a multi-policy area like the Arctic, which include policy areas like foreign policy, environment, energy, regional affairs, fisheries, industry and trade (Raspotnik & Østhagen, 2015). The Commission has therefore established so-called interagency working groups from the different Directorate Generals (DG) where officials meet and make sure that all their interests are being heard and incorporated into the EU-Arctic Strategy (Raspotnik & Østhagen, 2015). Perhaps the EU is not fully aware of its own objectives regarding the Arctic, and not only officials within the EU are keen on making sure their interests are being considered. There are many actors and stakeholders present in Brussels attending EU-Arctic conferences, seminars and working groups discussing Arctic matters and thus pulling the EU in multiple directions. Hence, the talk about EU’s strategy towards the Arctic can be a way for different stakeholders to influence the EU to move and develop its policy in their direction; “Consequently, many voices want to be heard and find a seat around the Commission’s Arctic table” (Raspotnik & Østhagen, 2015). Therefore, my primary focus is to map and analyse the development of the EU-Arctic Strategy in order to get an insight in the process and the progress, and also to analyse the EU as a normative power in the region. Following the above discussion the problem formulation is:

**What is EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and how can the EU as normative power in the region be understood?**

This problem formulation calls for a two-fold analysis. First of all, does the EU even have an Arctic strategy, and in that case, what does it look like and what does it entail? In order to answer this first part of the problem formulation it is necessary to start with the process of the policy development and analyse the content of EU’s official documents. Secondly, it is necessary to examine the EU as an actor in the Arctic to understand the power of the EU in the region. In order to do this, the concept of “EU-actorness” will be used to analyse this question in relation to different issues in the Arctic region. This two-fold analysis combined will answer how far the EU has come in its work of developing an EU-Arctic strategy and how the EU as an actor and normative power in the Arctic can be understood.
1.3. **Structure**

The thesis is structured in 6 chapters.

**Chapter 2** contains reflections on the use of theory and introduces the theoretical framework and methodological considerations of the project. Concepts and analytical instruments, which will be applied in the analysis, are introduced and examined.

**Chapter 3** examines the development of Arctic policies in the European Union in the period from 2008 – 2016. An overview of EU-Arctic policies is established and the official documents are analysed based on the theoretical framework in order to understand EU’s strategy towards the Arctic.

**Chapter 4** analyses the European Union as a normative power in the Arctic based on empirical material and the theoretical framework.

**Chapter 5** discusses the findings of the project.

**Chapter 6** concludes the analysis and reflects on the future perspectives for the European Union in the Arctic.
2. Theoretical Framework and Methodological Considerations

2.1. Why theory is not an opportunity but a prerequisite

In order to conduct analysis based on the problem formulation about EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and to understand EU’s power in the region it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework that can guide the analysis in a clear direction. Like any other academic discipline, the field of international relations is dedicated to the task of explaining and understanding some aspect of the world (Lawson, 2015). This task can be done in many and different ways. The basic problem you come across when trying to understand and explain questions related to international relations is the large amount of material to consider, and it can seem difficult to know which things matter and which do not (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2013). In order to make sense of international relations and world politics it is absolutely necessary to resort to theory. Theories offer accounts of why things occurred, and the fact that theories offer a series of reasons for action only reflects the fact that theories have very different assumptions. This is why you will get different answers to questions in world politics when applying different theories (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013). Thus, using theory as an analytical instrument is not an option but a prerequisite. Baylis, Smith and Owens (2013) have a similar approach; “A theory is a kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which facts matter and which do not” (Baylis et al., 2013). Theorizing aims to make sense of events, actions or phenomenon in the physical world as well as the social world, which international relations is a part of. Thus, the concept of theory can be defined as “an organized system of ideas devised to explain a certain set of phenomenon” (Lawson, 2015). Considering the large amount of material and possible explanations of questions related to international relations, theorising is thereby essential in order to make sense of the “certain set of phenomenon”. In this case, trying to understand EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and EU’s power in the region.

How then does one decide which theory is appropriate to apply? It is not certain that one is well aware of which theory is the most suitable when trying to make sense of a certain phenomena. It could seem as just common sense and not something complicated like a theory, or it could be a view inherited from social class, family, peer group or the media (Baylis et al., 2013). However, it is important to be explicit, rather than implicit, about your theoretical
assumptions when it comes to understanding international relations. This will give the opportunity to understand questions or puzzles not by coincidence, but by seeing what is important when considering the “millions of possibly facts” (Baylis et al., 2013). Yet, a theory is not some simply grand formal model that will give you a definite answer, but an instrument that can help sort out the phenomenon being studied. Applying theory will contribute to reach a detailed and nuanced answer to the research questions.

This brings about the question on which theory will be applied in this particular thesis. In order to answer the research questions it is necessary to apply a theory and use concepts that are designed to explain the European Union as an actor in international relations. The concept is labelled “EU-actorness” in the on-going academic debate about how to explain the EU as an actor in international relations. There exist several theoretical approaches to this particular concept, and the nature of EU’s role in international relations is clearly contested in the existing literature. Three broad categories of analysis have emerged as a result of this debate: 

realist, civilian power and normative power. This thesis offers a brief description of each of the EU-actorness approaches in the following section. Ultimately, Ian Manners’ theory of a “Normative Power Europe” will be applied in a combination with the concept of “Soft Power” developed by Joseph S. Nye. Consequently, rejecting the realist approach with the argument that it is insufficient to examine EU’s international actorness based purely on EU’s capabilities in military, defence and security terms. Instead, this thesis holds the argument that the most appropriate framework for analysis is one that draws on the normative power approach with the aim to move beyond the state-centric paradigms represented by the realist and the civilian approach, which has predominated the debate.

2.2. Theoretical Approaches: EU-actorness

The EU is not a state and can therefore not participate as one in the main forum for Arctic cooperation namely the Arctic Council. As mentioned, three EU Member States are Permanent Members of the Arctic Council and they have developed their own strategies and policy objectives towards the Arctic. Other non-Arctic EU Member States have also developed independent Arctic strategies and have Observer Status in the Arctic Council. The question is then, what place is there for the EU in the Arctic as an organisation representing both Arctic
and non-Arctic States, and is the EU a legitimate actor in the region? And further, what is it the EU wants to achieve in the Arctic whether it relies on realist, civilian or normative power?

Ian Manners argues that EU’s role in the international sphere should be understood as something based on normative power. Manners starting point for developing the concept of a “Normative Power Europe” is derived from the discussion between the understandings of the EU as a “Military Power” (realist approach), as formulated by Hedley Bull, and the understanding of the EU as a “Civilian Power”, as formulated by François Duchêne. Hence, a brief look at these two notions of EU-actorness is necessary in order to understand the underlying ideas of the EU as a normative power.

2.2.1. Civilian Power Europe

Applying the civilian power concept in order to answer the problem formulation would require a strong focus on the functional capabilities in the decision making process of the EU regarding the Arctic and the ability of the EU to balance security through primarily economic instruments rather than by military means. Hence, analysing EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and EU’s power in the region would have to be based on an analysis about EU’s functional economic and diplomatic instruments to confront the complexities of interdependence in relation to other Arctic actors, which imply that the EU has the ability to behave like a nation state in Arctic matters.

In Duchêne’s contribution “Europe’s Role in World Peace” from 1972, it is noted that Europe will never become a military power, while already in the 1970s the Western countries had developed into highly pluralistic societies with spectacularly civilian values (Duchêne, 1972). Duchêne talks about civilian power as the need for balancing the security in order to develop civilised politics:

[...] if the security balance can be both maintained and de-emphasized over the years, a de facto regional system in Europe, including the United States, could well emerge. Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something
more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen’s notion of civilized politics (Duchêne, 1972).

The origin of EU’s civilian power position is derived from the wars of the 20th century. According to Duchêne, these wars were a direct result of the inability of European nations to manage their increasing interdependence (Wright, 2011). Like the realist approach, the civilian power Europe analysis is also essentially state-centric because it emphasises the need for functional effectiveness in decision-making as a precursor for influence (Wright, 2011). However, the fundamental difference between the civilian and realist approach remains in their assessment of the relative importance of military power compared to alternative sources of influence. The civilian approach argues that EU’s extensive “soft” power and legitimacy derive exactly from the lack or de-emphasis of military power, and that by using economic and diplomatic instruments it has been able to confront the complexities of interdependence in international relations (Wright, 2011). More precisely, Duchêne defines civilian power as shaping the role of Europe through production and trade and emphasises that more and more security policies consists in shaping the international environment often in areas which at first sight have little to do with security (Duchêne, 1972).

Andrew Moravcsik also challenges the realist approach on how to understand the EU as an international actor. Opposed to Duchêne, Moravcsik argues that Europe is both a military power and a civilian power but emphasises Europe’s ability to use its “power of attraction” and civilian instruments such as democratisation, economic influence, support of international law and neighbourhood diplomacy as factors to why Europe is the world’s pre-eminent civilian superpower (Moravcsik, 2009). Moravcsik finds his argument at the core of liberal theory and uses it to re-examine European power. Moravcsik argues that the EU has emerged as the most ambitious and successful international organisation of all time, and EU’s civilian instruments have seemed to gain in utility against hard military power (Moravcsik, 2009). He points to liberal theory of international relations as the underlying theory that can explain EU’s power. One of the most important features of liberal theory is the focus on the positive-sum component, where interests of more than one country or region are complementary, rather than in rivalry, which will result in positive-sum interactions (Moravcsik, 2009). The trend towards more positive-sum interactions has created significant
advantages for Europe, with European integration being perhaps the greatest evidence. In Moravcsik’s view, despite Europe’s substantial military assets, Europe’s true comparative advantage must be found in its ability to project civilian influence and not exert military hard power (Moravcsik, 2009).

Thus, civilian power is about democratisation, economic power, support of international law and institutions and not military strength and armed forces. As noted in the citation of Duchêne, the task is both to maintain and de-emphasise the security balance, which will provide a condition for civilian politics to emerge. According to Duchêne, lacking military power is not the disadvantage as it once was because the European military weakness is actually the premise for exerting influence (Duchêne, 1972). In the view of Moravcsik, Europe is not military weak, but the true power lies in the civilian power instruments.

The question is whether the EU is using primarily its economic capabilities in the Arctic to secure its interests in the region or if the Union uses multiple instruments from the different power approaches to achieve its objectives. As one of the largest consumer of both fish and energy coming from the Arctic, the EU naturally has interests in the new possibilities for trade and economic development in the region. The EU is in a position where it can economically contribute to development of new technologies that in time can make trade in new products a reality and thereby secure its influence in the region. As will be demonstrated later in the analysis of the EU-Arctic policies, the EU is a major funder of Arctic research, which can be a way for the EU to legitimise its presence in the Arctic and maintain the security balance using economic civilian instruments.

2.2.2. Military Power Europe (realist approach)

The military power approach offers a state-centric framework to explain EU’s strategy towards the Arctic and EU’s power in the region. The realist approach suggests that the EU must use military means in order to secure itself influence in the Arctic, which also suggests that the EU is supposed to be somewhat similar to a nation state. Considering that the Arctic is primarily a peaceful region with strong cooperation between the Arctic states and other relevant Arctic stakeholders there is not much suggesting that the EU is developing its Arctic strategy based on military and defence capabilities and that its power in the Arctic should be
understood in military terms. Manners is also rejecting the military power approach as suitable for explaining EU-actorness, but in order to understand the ideas underlying Manners’ normative power approach a brief introduction to the realist approach is necessary because Manners concepts is derived partly from the limitations in the military power approach.

The realist approach argues that the EU will never be independent as long as it is limited in military power or lacks a centralised decision-making apparatus to utilise it (Wright, 2011). This argument is based on the core assumption in realism that nation-states are the main actors within an anarchic system. The realist approach assumes that states are rational actors whose primary goal is survival through instruments of coercive (i.e. military) power within their territory (Wright, 2011). Thus, realism considers international organisations as a tool available to governments, which means that in the realist perspective the EU is fundamentally weak as an international actor. Some might even argue that the EU is not an international actor at all, which also imply that there is no place for the EU as an actor in the Arctic.

Hedley Bull criticised the notion of EU’s civilian power in international affairs when he endorsed the realist analysis and defined the role of the EU in areas of security and defence policy, and thereby adopted the notion of a “military power Europe”. Bull’s theme is about the vulnerability of Western Europe states for as long as they remain without the means to provide for their own military security (Bull, 1982). Bull dismisses the role of the EC (now EU), and states that the EC has no claim to speak, while his focus is on state governments. Opposed to Duchêne’s belief that Europe can secure itself through other means than military resources, Bull argues that the countries of Western Europe cannot provide for their own security without being dependent on the United States. Bull explains this form of dependence as:

Possession of scarce resources was a source of power to military weak states only for so long as military strong states chose not to use their force. More generally, the power of influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control (Bull, 1982).
In other words, the EC and the Western European countries would not be able to uphold their security if the stronger states would begin to use their military force. Thus, Bull argues that Europe should build up their capabilities in defence and security and stresses that there is a need for the European allies to acquire a larger element of self-sufficiency in providing for their defence (Bull, 1982).

It could be argued that the EU has some realist considerations regarding the Arctic. For example, the EU is currently developing a new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy in which the Arctic region will be included as an area of priority. According to Nathalie Tocci, special adviser for Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Arctic will remain on the periphery in the strategy, but it still suggests that the EU have some considerations about security in their neighbourhood and hence the Arctic region (Raspotnik, 2016). Yet, even if the EU has security considerations in relation to the Arctic does not mean its strategy is based on security and defence concerns and that EU’s power in the region should be understood in military terms.

2.2.3. Normative Power Europe

In relation to the EU in the Arctic, the focus of the analysis will be to examine if the EU functions as a new type of actor in the Arctic and if the EU move beyond using either realist and civilian instruments and thus can be considered a normative power in the region. At this point it cannot be rejected that the EU uses a mix of instruments from the different approaches, which is not in conflict with Manners idea of a normative power Europe, while he sees the normative basis as a valuable addition to the others. In order to examine Manners’ claim about the normative difference that the EU holds, it is necessary to further explore EU’s normative basis.

Manners’ understanding of a normative power Europe is derived from Bull and Duchêne’s concepts. Manners understands EU-actorness as something that needs to be reconsidered in regards to both military power and civilian power in order to be able to consider EU’s role as a normative power in world politics (I. Manners, 2002). Manners dismisses the shared understanding between Bull’s military power and Duchêne’s civilian power, which is the mutual focus on direct physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities – whether
“long on economic power” or “need for military power” (I. Manners, 2002). Manners explains the main problem with the civilian and military power approaches, which is the assumption that the EU is supposed to be similar to a nation state. Manners provides us with his vision about how to understand a normative power Europe:

What I am suggesting here is that conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions. This is not to say that the EU’s civilian power, or fledging military power, are unimportant, simply that its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations needs to be given much greater attention (I. Manners, 2002).

Manners notes that the concept of normative power should be understood as a valuable addition to both military and civilian power of the EU in world politics. By refocusing away from the debate about the EU being either a military or civilian power, it becomes possible to think of the ideational impact of EU’s international role as representing normative power (I. Manners, 2002). Manners claims that Europe exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and he dismisses the assumption that the use of force in an instrumental way is necessary to exert power. The fact that the EU is different from traditional political forms is what pre-disposes it to act in a normative way (I. Manners, 2002). The EU must then be considered as a “new type” of international actor because it can be considered as essentially non-threatening and as a “magnet” to potential competitors within the international system (Wright, 2011). This is what enables the analysis to move beyond the state-centric understanding of the EU within the two first approaches on how similar to a state the EU looks like (I. Manners, 2002). This suggests that the normative perspective considers the traditional (i.e. state) model of international relations incapable to account for the true complexity of the international system, which is why the EU must be examined as an international actor that is different or unorthodox and “more than the sum of its parts” (I. Manners, 2002).
2.2.4. The normative basis of the EU

To understand EU’s strategy and power in the Arctic the analysis must take account of the normative basis of the EU, while the normative basis is what pre-disposes the EU to represent and legitimise itself as a normative power in the Arctic.

According to Manners, the normative basis of the EU has been developed over the past fifty years through a series of treaties, declarations, policies, criteria and conditions, and it is possible to identify five core norms and four minor norms within the Union, which constitutes EU’s normative basis:

Table 1: The Normative basis of the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core norms</th>
<th>Minor norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Social solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own contribution

The identified five core norms represent the broad normative basis of the EU and they all have clearly historical contexts to them, while for example peace and liberty were features of West European politics in the immediate post-war period. And the norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights came later at a time where it was important to distinguish democratic Western Europe from communist Eastern Europe (I. Manners, 2002). The four minor norms can be placed within the constitutions and practices of the EU. For example the principle of good governance can be found in Commission papers i.e. ‘White Paper on European Governance’ (European Commission, 2001) and ‘EU Election Assistance and Observation’ (European Commission, 2000). Manners emphasises that the identified norms can be reinforced and expanded, which will allow the EU to represent and legitimise itself as being

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more than the sum of its parts (I. Manners, 2002). The normative approach looks at the board notions of values, principles and identity, with the central argument that what the EU symbolises is as important as what is does with its impact as much through the example it sets as the action it takes (Wright, 2011).

However, accepting the normative basis of the EU does not make it a normative power per se. In order to talk about the EU as a normative power in the Arctic it is necessary to address how EU norms are diffused in international relations and in the Arctic.

### 2.2.5. Diffusion of EU norms in international relations and the Arctic

The concept of a normative power Europe can be transformed into a framework for analysing EU’s strategy and power in the Arctic. More precisely, the analysis will be based on Manners’ idea of normative power with the aim to understand how EU-actorness in relation to the Arctic can be explained. Likewise, the analysis will also examine EU’s strategy towards the Arctic region with this framework in mind.

Manners notes that EU’s normative power stems from six factors shaping norm diffusion in international relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Tasks and Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contagion</td>
<td>Unintentional diffusion of ideas from EU to other political actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational</td>
<td>Strategic communications, policy initiatives and declaratory communications from the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Institutionalisation of a relationship between EU and a third party, such as membership of an international organisation or inter-regional cooperation agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transference | When EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely fundamental or financial means. Such transference could be exportation of community norms and standards or financial rewards and economic sanctions.

Overt | Physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations. Examples could include Commissions delegations or EU officials.

Cultural | International norms and political learning. Examples could include learning in third states or organisations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms.

Source: own contribution

These six identified factors contribute to understand how EU norms are diffused in international relations. The most important point Manners makes in his conceptualisation of EU's normative power is that the EU is characterised as something that has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance, and this premise allows the EU to shape conceptions of what is ‘normal’ in international relations.

2.2.6. Framework for analysis

The six factors shaping norm diffusion is also what form the basis of a framework, which can be used to conduct analysis. These factors must be seen as instruments in which the EU can use to actively pursue its relationship with other actors – could be states, groups of states, the Arctic Council or other Arctic stakeholders (I. J. Manners & Whitman, 1998). Therefore it is possible to develop a framework containing each of the six factors and use them in order to answer the research questions.

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2.3. Soft Power

The concept of “Soft Power” can be linked to Manners’ normative power concept because soft power is also about using political ideals, culture, values and policies as opposed to exclusively military or economic means, which also imply that soft power can be characterised as something different that functional capabilities. Analysing the EU as a normative power in the Arctic suggests that the EU is relying on its soft power assets as an actor in the region. Thus, the concept of soft power must be further examined in order to be applied in the analysis.

Joseph S. Nye developed the concept of soft power in the 1990s. It is important to remember that the concept of soft power was developed to explain American power. Nye recognises that his concept of soft power can be used by other actors and in fact designates Europe as being the closest competitor to the Unites States in soft power resources and notes that the EU carries a good deal of soft power (Nye, 2004). Thus, the concept of soft power can be transferred to other nations, regions, and organisations. More precisely, Nye’s definition of soft power is:

It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced (Nye, 2004).

The point of soft power is therefore to get others to admire your ideals and to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want. In other words, if you succeed in using a soft power strategy you do not have to spend as much on “sticks” and “carrots” to move others in your direction, and it can be possible to get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. Like Nye also notes, seduction is more effective than coercion (Nye, 2004). Soft power consists of a different kind of currency than hard power (not force, not money) to produce cooperation. Soft power is about an intangible attraction that persuades us to go along with others’ ideas without any explicit threat or exchange happening (Nye, 2004). However, there is a relation between hard and soft power, while they are both features of the ability to achieve a purpose by influencing the behaviour of others.
The difference between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in terms of the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. *Command power*, which is the ability to change what others do, can rest on coercion or inducement. *Co-optive power*, which is the ability to shape what others want, can rest on the attractiveness of ones culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a way that makes others not to express some preferences because they come off a being too unrealistic (Nye, 2004). The types of behaviour between command and co-optive must be seen in a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Usually, soft-power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of types of behaviour, whereas hard-power resources tend to be associated with command behaviour (Nye, 2004). Not to make the mistake to think that this is a fixed condition, it is however reasonable on a whole to make this association between the types of behaviour, although the lines is sometimes blurred. These assumptions make it possible to develop a figure that visualises the concept of hard and soft power in the light of the nature of behaviours and resources:

**Figure 1: Hard and soft power: behaviour and resources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of Behaviours</th>
<th>Hard</th>
<th>Soft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>coercion</td>
<td>agenda setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inducement</td>
<td>attraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-opt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Likely Resources</th>
<th>Hard</th>
<th>Soft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>force</td>
<td>institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>payments</td>
<td>values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sanctions</td>
<td>culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bribes</td>
<td>policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own contribution

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Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between hard and soft power and the spectrum of behaviours and the most likely resources connected to them. Nye argues that the resources that produce soft power often arise from the values an organisation or country expresses in its culture, but also in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and perhaps most importantly in the way it handles its relations with others (Nye, 2004). Figure 1 can be used as an analytical instrument to analyse the behaviour of the EU towards the Arctic and identify the resources it uses in its Arctic strategy and thus help to analyse which kind of actor the EU is and what power it holds in the Arctic region. This is very much in line with Manners’ concept of the EU as a normative power because his concept likewise rests on the assumption that the EU can be characterised as something different than an actor that uses hard power (realist) instruments.

2.4. The Limits of Normative Power and Soft Power

Considering that the EU has had great difficulty getting Observer Status in the Arctic Council suggests that the EU has failed to reach a desired outcome. The conflict is caused by mainly culturally differences between Arctic Indigenous Peoples and the EU concerning a ban on seal products on the European market. This is in relation to Nye’s soft power concept where it is important to specify the conditions under which normative power and soft power are more likely to lead to desired outcomes, while it is not certain that in all situations it is possible to produce the outcomes you want using this concept. Nye notes that it is more likely to produce soft power, in the sense of achieving preferred outcomes, in situations where cultures are somewhat more similar rather than extensively dissimilar and suggests that all types of power are dependent on the context with questions like: who relates to whom under what circumstances? (Nye, 2004).

In this case, the cultural dissimilarities between mainly Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and the EU have been substantial, while the regulation concerning trade in seal products has so far cost the EU its formal Observer status in the Arctic Council. In other words, Canada and the EU have not been able to relate to each other given the circumstance of the highly disputed regulation. Soft power is more dependent on the existence of willing interpreters and receivers with a similar culture than hard power is. This means that if you want to influence with soft power instruments you will be more likely to fail if the receivers are not
open and willing to be attracted to your ideas, which suggest that not every desired objective can be achieved through soft power. The same can be said about the normative power concept, but with the exception that Manners does not dismiss the importance of military (hard power) entirely, but sees normative power as a valuable addition to the scheme. Nor does Nye dismiss hard power entirely but sees the combination of hard and soft power as being smart power (Nye, 2004).

Another aspect to consider is the impression that soft power can seem to have a diffuse effect and thereby creating general influence rather than producing tangible and easily observable actions or outcomes (Wolfers, 1962). This does not mean that general influence is not valuable – otherwise leaders would behave in ways that would mean immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and that is of course not always the case. However, soft power is more likely to have impact on the general goals of a country or organisation rather than direct effects on specific goals (Wolfers, 1962).

Manners argues that what the EU symbolises is as important as what is does. This point can be contested because it is not certain that the EU can achieve influence in the Arctic simply by the virtue of its existence. Perhaps the EU needs to do more than rely on its values and identity. After all, not everyone – could be states, regions or other actors - is similar to the EU and perhaps not everyone has the objective to follow the European example.

The most important thing to be aware of is that not all situations can be handled with soft power exclusively. Some conditions will allow for the normative/soft power strategy to fail. In this EU-Arctic case, the argument is that the combination of normative power and soft power can be used to analyse the power of the EU, but it is not at all certain that these concepts can explain every single issue in relation to the research questions.
3. Development of Arctic Policies in the European Union

The EU starts its policy development in 2008 with a focus on Arctic governance and presents controversial critique about the international regulatory framework of the Arctic. The EU identifies realist problems such as the possibility for instability in the region caused by geo-strategic dynamics but fails to propose solutions on how to move forward. As mentioned, the EU has failed to be granted Observer Status in the Arctic Council and the conflict between primarily Canada's Indigenous Peoples and the EU led the policy development in a more non-controversial direction and the focus on Arctic governance was later replaced with a focus on international cooperation on fighting climate change. The most recent EU-Arctic Policy is a Joint Communication developed by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and has been presented as an integrated policy for the Arctic. As the analysis will reveal the new EU-Arctic Policy is not integrating cross-cutting Arctic-relevant policies but instead builds upon already existing frameworks in which the EU participate in. In order to answer the first question in the problem formulation about EU's strategy towards the Arctic is important to identify precisely which steps the EU has made regarding the development of an EU-Arctic Policy. It is therefore necessary to establish an overview of the policies that have been adopted by the EU, which is illustrated in Table 3.

**Table 3: EU-Arctic Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU-Arctic Policy Development</th>
<th></th>
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</table>
As Table 3 demonstrates the EU has adopted eight official policies concerning the Arctic since 2008, with the most recent adopted on 27. April 2016 during the writing of this thesis. Based on these official documents the following analysis will examine the content and with the theoretical framework in mind try to understand EU’s strategy towards the Arctic. Chapter 3 will thereby represent the first part of the two-fold analysis, with chapter 4 being the second part with the analysis of EU’s actoriness and power in the Arctic.

### 3.1. 2008 European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance

Placing the Arctic on the agenda of the EU has been anything but a linear process. With challenges such as reaching coherence and consensus among its internal institutional bodies and to have its interests and position recognised by other relevant Arctic actors outside the EU, the policy development has been characterised by much variation (Weber, 2014). The shaping of an EU-Arctic Policy must be understood as seemingly constant dialogues between a
series of actors and stakeholders with different interests from both in and outside the EU institutional framework.

The European Parliament initiated the EU-Arctic Policy process with its 2008 resolution of Arctic governance. The Parliament initiates the resolution by stating its clear concern at the effects of climate change and sustainability of the lives of Indigenous Peoples in the region, and underline that “any international decision relating to these issues must fully involve and take account of all peoples and nations of the Arctic” (European Parliament, 2008). According to the Parliament, the time has come for action instead of diagnosis, which is emphasised through the request for a separate EU-Arctic Policy and with great interest in the forthcoming Commission Communication. The Parliament points to four issues that it hopes the Commission will address in its future Communication:

1. The state of play in relation to climate change, and adaptation to it, in the region;
2. Policy options that respect the indigenous populations and their livelihoods;
3. The need to cooperate with our Arctic neighbours and cross-border issues, in particular maritime safety:
4. Options for a future cross-border political or legal structure that could provide for the environmental protection and sustainable orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreement over resources and navigable waterways in the High North (European Parliament, 2008).

The second point it interesting, while the request for policy options that respect the indigenous livelihood seem conflicting with the 2006 declaration of the European Parliament on banning seal products in the European Union (European Parliament, 2006), which was adopted in 2009 and came into force in 2010 (Parliament & Council, 2009). The decision to implement a law that could influence the daily life of the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic with the tradition of Inuit seal hunting can seem in contrast to the declared goal of respecting the livelihoods of these exact people.

The Parliament stirred things up further by suggesting a new multilateral convention for the Arctic based on inspiration from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (European Parliament, 2008). By suggesting this, the Parliament implicitly questioned the rights of the Arctic coastal states under the Law of the Sea as described earlier (Byers & Baker, 2013). The proposal was
rejected entirely by the Arctic states. Reflecting on the principle of the rule of law as one of the core norms identified by Ian Manners in his normative power approach, the Parliament’s proposal is not in conflict with the principle, but it might not be the wisest choice of action considering the aim of becoming an Arctic actor. And not surprisingly, the seal issue has also continued to influence the EU and its ambitions towards the region. Lastly, the Parliament urges the Commission to take a proactive role in the Arctic by taking up Observer Status in the Arctic Council, which is an issue that will be analysed in the following sections, while this is a highly debated part of the EU as an actor in the Arctic.

In sum, the Parliament’s resolution on Arctic governance was the first official document to set the stage for further development of an EU-Arctic Policy. Arguably, the EU did not start with the best possible course with proposals that was not well received by some of the other Arctic states and in particular Canada and its Indigenous Peoples.

3.2. 2008 European Commission Communication: The European Union and the Arctic Region

Following the 2008 resolution, the Commission adopted its first Arctic Communication the same year. The Commission identified 49 proposals for action and placed them under three key policy objectives. However, the first interesting thing in the Communication is the fact that the Commission initiates the document by pointing to climate change as a “threats multiplier” and stresses the need for an EU-Arctic Policy in order to secure European security interests (European Commission, 2008a). The Commission identifies rather realist problems such as the possibility for international instability as a consequence of changing geo-strategic dynamics in the Arctic caused by climate change, but moves on to suggest three rather liberal or normative solutions which is:

1. Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population
2. Promoting sustainable use of resources
3. Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance (European Commission, 2008a).
These three policy objectives presented by the Commission can be analysed as liberal solutions to realist problems, which suggests that the Commission uses some kind of a mixed-approach in its development of an EU-Arctic Policy. From an outside perspective it can seem as an incoherent strategy, but the issue calls for further examination; does these declared policy goals contain concrete proposals for action that can tell more about EU’s strategy towards the Arctic?

1. Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population

As for the first policy objective about protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, the main goal is to prevent and mitigate the negative impact of climate change and to support adaptation to inevitable changes (European Commission, 2008a). The Commission sets out several proposals for action but many of them can be characterised as relatively indefinite and vague. For example: “Promote permanent dialogue with NGO’s on the state of the environment in the Arctic” (European Commission, 2008a). Yet, the Commission does not come with concrete proposals on how they intent to promote permanent dialogue. Scouting over the proposals for action the EU rely on concepts like strengthening cooperation, monitoring, promoting dialogue and assessment, but not they do not specify clearly how they intent to pursue these proposals for action.

The rights of Indigenous Peoples is also a topic in the Communication and here the EU rely on core norms as identified by Manners, while Indigenous Peoples rights are a priority under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights9. The Commission is clearly declaring its respect for Indigenous Peoples based on core principles as human rights and democracy and as the Commission specify: “Hunting marine mammals has been crucial for the subsistence of the Arctic population since prehistoric times and the right to maintain their traditional livelihood is clearly recognised” (European Commission, 2008a). Yet, the Commission stresses its concern for animal welfare and refer to the possibility of banning seal products under the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trade in seal products (European Commission, 2008b). The Commission does not consider this proposal to affect the fundamental economic and social interests of indigenous communities

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that are traditionally engaged in seal hunting, and affirms that seal products resulting from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit communities that will contribute to their subsistence are exempted (European Commission, 2008a). The EU simultaneously respects the rights of Indigenous Peoples and proposes a regulation that challenges the indigenous way of life, which seems controversial and makes the EU appear as self-contradicting. It seems as if the respective EU policies are not well aligned, which is an example of the many interests the EU needs to accommodate. The various policies in different areas can cross each other and create problems for the EU when trying to develop an EU-Arctic Policy.

Research, monitoring and assessment are key priorities of the EU when it comes to the Arctic. The EU Member States and the European Community are large contributors to Arctic research, with more than 50 polar-related projects funded under the European Framework Programmes FP5 and FP6. With a budget that reached 86 million euro to Arctic research in FP6 alone suggests that this is an area where the EU have a clearer strategy (European Commission, 2008a). Chapter 4 will analyse science and research as key features for the EU in the Arctic.

2. Promoting sustainable use of resources

The second policy objective about promoting sustainable use of resources emphasises resources such as hydrocarbons, fisheries, transport and tourism as areas where the EU must take action. The Commission express its interest for securing EU energy demands through the resource possibilities that lie in the Arctic, but with respect for international law and environmental standards (European Commission, 2008a). The EU continues to rely on both core and minor norms identified in Table 1 by respecting the rule of law and sustainable development. This also shows in relation to fisheries in the Arctic high seas waters where there is not yet an international conservation and management regime in place, but where the EU takes the lead and suggests to put in place a regulatory framework that prevent fisheries developing in a regulatory vacuum (European Commission, 2008a). Regarding transport, the EU has interests in exploring and improving conditions for gradually introducing Arctic commercial navigation and defends the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage in the newly opened routes and areas (European Commission, 2008a). Here
the EU actually has some proposals for action that are more tangible than otherwise, including improving maritime surveillance capabilities in the North in collaboration with the European Space Agency and maintaining the competitive lead of European shipyards in developing technologies required for Arctic conditions, which the EU itself considers as important assets for the future (European Commission, 2008a).

3. Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance

The third policy objective about enhancing Arctic multilateral governance is based on the Commission’s concern about what they perceive as a fragmentation of the legal framework:

There is no specific treaty regime for the Arctic. No country or group of countries have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean around it. There are several maritime borders where Arctic coastal states have not agreed upon the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones. Submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf may result in overlapping claims. Moreover, there are different interpretations of the conditions for passage of ships in some Arctic waters, especially in the Northwest Passage (European Commission, 2008a).

Yet, the Commission does not move forward on the earlier proposal for an Arctic Treaty inspired by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as suggested by the Parliament (European Parliament, 2008). Instead, the Commission recognises UNCLOS as the appropriate international legal framework in regulating Arctic matters, but stresses problems with ineffective instruments, absence of an overall policy-setting process and gaps in participation, implementation and geographic scope. In other words, the EU is critical towards the existing legal framework, but does not share how they plan to amend the situation, other than to uphold further development of a cooperative Arctic governance system based on UNCLOS. In fact, despite the rather explicit critique of the functioning of the legal framework the EU does not propose new legal instruments but instead assure full implementation of already existing obligations. This criticism was not appreciated and welcomed by some Arctic states (Weber, 2014), and furthermore the EU notes that it will not support “arrangements which exclude any of the EU
Member States or Arctic EEA or EFTA countries” (European Commission, 2008a). The first step the Commission wants to do in order to support its third policy objective is to apply for Observer Status in the Arctic Council. Other proposal for actions is based on reflections, dialogues and discussions.

In conclusion, the Commission states that the suggestions in this Communication are created with the purpose for a more detailed reflection - signalling that this Communication constitutes the first layer of an EU-Arctic Policy. Interestingly enough, it took four years before the next Commission Communication was published.

In the early phase the EU pursues a strategy in its policy development that relies strongly on norms in which the EU traditionally represents. At the same time, the EU challenges the Arctic community by proposing a regulation that bans seal products from the European market. Although they exempt seal products from Inuit communities in which they rely on for subsistence, the proposal still touch upon a sensitive issue for the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic. In the end, only the Permanent Members of the Arctic Council can grant the EU Observer Status, which must be based on consensus, which imply that the EU is risking its chances of taking up Observer Status by implementing this kind of regulation. Moreover, the EU is very explicit in their critique about the functioning of the international legal framework on Arctic matters but fails to give specific proposals on how to solve the problems.

Overall it can be argued that the EU needs to align its various proposals for regulations in order to achieve its desired outcomes. In other words, the EU has not been able achieve its desired outcomes in relations to Nye's concept of soft power. The EU has not been successful in getting Canada and its Indigenous People to admire its ideals and go along on the ban of seal products without consequences, while to this day the EU has still not been granted Observer Status in the Arctic Council. Considering Figure 1 that describes hard and soft power in terms of behaviour and resources, the EU have used agenda setting as a type of behaviour and policy as their resource, which means that the EU can be placed in the co-optive end of the scale. The Communication is in itself an expression of EU norm diffusion in international relations. Developing this kind of official Communication can be identified as the “Informational” factor in Table 2, in which the EU tries to diffuse its norms and ideas for the Arctic into the international sphere. However, the policy objectives of the Communication are
not the most clear and falls short of a specific action plan on how to move forward on the declared three goals. In addition, it seems that the Commission, perhaps unintentionally, tries to solve realist security threats with normative instruments, which leaves the impression that this Communication is not adequately developed.

3.3. 2009 Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues

In 2009 the Council adopted conclusions on Arctic issues and welcomed the Commission Communication of 2008. The Council considered that EU policy on Arctic issues should be based on effective implementation of adequate measures to mitigate climate change through multilateral governance and UNCLOS (Council of the European Union, 2009). The three key policy objectives proposed by the Commission was approved with the awareness of the need for further work. The Council formulates 23 steps that need to be considered in the development of an overarching EU-Arctic Strategy including:

- Support for sustainable development for indigenous peoples livelihood
- Increased collaboration with the Arctic Council in which the Council recognises as the primary competent body for circumpolar regional cooperation
- Increased support for research on Arctic related issues, which should be reflected in the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP7) (Council of the European Union, 2009).

The Council expresses its continued support for the Commission to become an Observer in the Arctic (Council of the European Union, 2009). The Council ends its conclusion by requesting the Commission to draft a report on progress made on Arctic issues by the end of June 2011.

It seems that the Council is less critical towards the international legal framework than the Commission and hence the conclusions is characterised by a more positive attitude about cooperation in the Arctic. Yet, the Council conclusions were not enough to convince the Permanent Members of the Arctic Council to grant the EU Observer Status. This was firmly established at the 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in Tromsø, Norway, where the ad hoc observers was rejected in their bid to be granted Observer Status. This was a setback of the Council conclusions, but the decision was unsurprising given the angry reaction from
Canada’s Indigenous Peoples regarding EU’s decision to ban trade of seal products on the European market.

Concerning the rejection of EU’s bid for Observer Status in the Arctic Council, the issue can be analysed with particular two factors from Table 2, which is “Procedural” and “Overt”. The EU is de facto highly active in the Arctic Council on an ad hoc basis, but the relationship still remains to be institutionalised with the formal status of Observer. The EU has tried to diffuse its norms and strategy towards the Arctic and aimed to get their presence in the Arctic Council firmly established through the Observer Status but has only achieved ad hoc membership. In other words, the EU is physically present in the Arctic Council, which suggests that the EU’s has been successful using the “Overt” factor in Table 2, but still lacks the official Observer Status. The issue is not about what factor is the most influential, but surely the EU wants to use its full range of instruments in order to place itself around the Arctic table, and so far it has not fully succeeded.

3.4. 2011 European Parliament Resolution on a Sustainable EU Policy for the High North

Following the Council Conclusions in 2009, the Parliament was ready with a new resolution on sustainable EU Policy for the High North in 2011. The resolution considers the Commission Communication as the first step towards an EU-Arctic Policy and the Council Conclusions as a further step in defining an EU-Arctic Policy (European Parliament, 2011). Like the Council, the Parliament states that the gradual formulation of an EU-Arctic Policy should be based on recognition of the existing multilateral international legal framework such as UNCLOS and thereby reaffirms:

the legitimate interest of the EU and other third countries as stakeholders by virtue of their rights and obligations under international law, its commitments to environmental, climate and other policies [...] thus concludes that the Arctic region is not to be regarded as a legal vacuum, but as an area with well developed tools for governance; nevertheless points out, due to the challenges of climate change and increasing economic development, those existing rules need to be
further developed, strengthened and implemented by all parties concerned (European Parliament, 2011).

Hence, the Parliament follows the same course as set forward by the Council and strongly advocate for developing an EU-Arctic Policy based on recognition of the existing international law despite the critique presented by the Commission in 2008. This suggests that the EU is moving in an even more normative direction, while the talk of geo-political concerns in the Arctic is practical non-present in the resolution or in the prior Council Conclusions. Worth noticing is also the Parliament’s statement that the EU must play a leading role in fighting climate change, while the EU holds a special responsibility in this area as a highly developed region in the world (European Parliament, 2011). It is thus the first time the EU articulates something about what role they should play in the Arctic - even if it is not clearly specified how the role of being a leading fighter of climate change should be carried out. In general, the resolution pays more attention to the role of non-Arctic states, which they hope will be included in the decision-shaping process of the Arctic Council and thereby the resolution can be seen as document that contains some desired objectives that the EU hope will be realised. The need for a united and coordinated EU-Arctic Policy, in which EU's priorities and strategy are clearly defined, is once again stressed by the Parliament in this resolution, but the need for coherence in all EU policies towards the Arctic is also emphasised (European Parliament, 2011).

3.5. 2012 Joint Communication: Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: Progress since 2008 and next steps

Finally in 2012 the Commission and the then newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) published a delayed Joint Communication, which was initially due in June 2011. This document is entitled as a “progress report” of an EU-Arctic Policy and represents a follow-up of the first Commission Communication in 2008 and responds to the 2009 Council Conclusions and the 2011 European Parliament resolution. The Communication sets a way forward on how the EU should engage in the Arctic based on three words: knowledge, responsibility and engagement (European Commission & High Representative, 2012).
Following the terminology of the 2008 Communication this document represents the second layer of an EU-Arctic Policy.

In the executive summary, the focus is clearly on fighting climate change and enhancing cooperation with Arctic partners. The EU considers itself as the world’s strongest proponent of greater international effort to fight climate change (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). The EU is conscious about where it has a strong position that it can use to gain influence. Thus, the EU can use its ability to take the lead in fighting climate change to legitimise its presence in the Arctic.

Apart from the executive summary, the Joint Communication is an elaborated detailed description of EU’s contributions to the Arctic ranging from fighting climate change, funding research, investing in sustainable development, supporting Indigenous Peoples, shipping and maritime safety (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). For example, it is noted that the EU has contributed with more than 1.4 billion euro in financial support for sustainable development of the Arctic in the period from 2007-2013 and provided around 200 million euro of EU funds to international research activities in the region through the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). In the 2014-2020 financial period, EU officials have declared to bring Arctic research to an even higher level through the eight Research and Innovation Programme, Horizon 2020 (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). These contributions are a clear sign of the EU relying on its fundamental norms with sustainable development being the prominent example.

Basically, this document provides a rather detailed description about the progress made in relation to the first three policy objectives presented in the 2008 Communication. The Joint Communication also presents a way forward for the future EU engagement with Arctic partners and once again underlines the need for a coherent and targeted EU-Arctic Policy towards the Arctic. The policy development is based on three new policy objectives:

1. Support research and channel knowledge to address the challenges of environmental and climate changes in the Arctic;
2. Act with **responsibility** to contribute to ensuring economic development in the Arctic based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise;

3. Intensify its constructive **engagement** and dialogue with Arctic States, indigenous peoples and other partners (European Commission & High Representative, 2012).

Interestingly, the way the EU presents its policy objectives to the international community has changed from the first Communication with new prominent ideas of *Knowledge, Responsibility*, and *Engagement*. Previous controversial references to multilateral governance in the Arctic are replaced by value-free headings of international cooperation. Perhaps shaped by the negative reaction of some Arctic States to previous statements and the need to make more friends in support of the Commission’s bid for Observer Status, in which the Arctic Council was to decide on in 2013. With regards to the actual policy, the objectives are nearly unchanged in relation to the 2008 Communication.

1. **Support research and channel knowledge to address the challenges of environmental and climate changes in the Arctic**

In the first objective about *knowledge*, the EU aims at targeting its actions to further its understanding of the Arctic by investing in Arctic research, monitoring the Arctic from space, supporting information and observation networks, and building know-how and technical expertise (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). The formulation of research priorities is vague and imprecise, and likewise is the formulation of cooperation on establishing research infrastructure with Arctic states. No budget of how much from the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme should go to Arctic related activities is presented, other than the total funding of 80 billion euro represents a significant increase compared to previous EU research programmes and that it will allow the EU to make a larger contribution to Arctic research.

2. **Act with responsibility to contribute to ensuring economic development in the Arctic based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise**
In the second objective about responsibility, the EU states its strong link with the Arctic as an importer of natural resources and with its concern and responsibility of the global environment (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). The EU aims at contributing responsibly to the Arctic through its funding programmes like it wants to promote safe and sustainable management and use of resources in the region. The EU points to sustainable development of shipping as a key priority and affirms that it is ready to assist in the development of this issue. Yet, there is no specific proposals for action on how move to forward other than to follow the developments in Arctic sea transport closely. Another example, the EU states that it has an interest in the resource policy developments in the Arctic because the EU is a major consumer, importer and technology provider of energy and raw materials. In order to influence the policy developments, the EU will look to build stable and long-term partnerships with suppliers and actively pursue raw materials diplomacy with relevant Arctic states with the aim to secure access to raw materials notably through strategic partnerships and policy dialogues (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). This is arguably not a very specific action plan from the EU to secure its influence in perhaps one of the most important areas of interests. While it is important for the EU to ensure access to raw materials and maritime routes, there are made no references to fundamental principles such as a level playing field, reciprocal market access and anti-discriminatory practices, which suggest that the EU seems to move away from incorporating the norms that are traditional principles of EU's international relations.

3. Intensify its constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic States, indigenous peoples and other partners

In the third objective about engagement, the EU intends to refine its developing Arctic Policy in close cooperation with Member States, the five non-EU Arctic States and local inhabitants including Indigenous Peoples (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). The key interest for the EU is to maintain good international cooperation in the Arctic and to support the stability of the region. In contrast to the 2008 Communication there is a strong acknowledgement of the international legal framework including UNCLOS, which is now considered as a key basis for the management of the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, the EU firmly stresses the Arctic Council as the primary forum for international cooperation in the region.
and view Observer Status as an important feature that will allow the EU to intensify cooperation and gain detailed understanding of the concerns of Arctic partners, which the EU perceives as important when developing its own EU-Arctic Policy (European Commission & High Representative, 2012). In terms of engagement, and the support of stability in the region, there are made no references to any specific objectives, as well as there are no means presented. In fact, the Joint Communication seems to have more focus on continuing existing activities rather than bring new proposals for action on the table.

The main objectives in this Joint Communication are similar to the ones presented in the first Communication with emphasis on climate change, cooperation with the people living in the Arctic and research. The EU wishes to engage more with its Arctic partners in order to become aware of their concerns and also to address common challenges in a collaborative approach. Compared to the 49 proposals for action in the 2008 Communication the new Joint Communication has no indication of any benchmarks and no action plan is presented or mentioned. This suggests that the document lacks a strategy on the way forward and proposals for action on how the EU can reach its goals in the Arctic.

Yet, the form in which the new document communicates the objectives to the international community is significantly different from 2008. The Joint Communication provides a balanced report of EU’s engagement, contributions, interests and details about the progress made since 2008, but lack some specific proposals for action and vision. The new document is more in line with the tone of the Parliament resolution, perhaps due to previous critique from Arctic states on EU’s assertive rhetoric, and presents knowledge, responsibility and engagement as ideas that underlies the principles of EU’s approach. Said differently, the former reference to better multilateral governance, which caused some resistance, has been replaced by headlines of international cooperation. With no doubt, this Joint Communication is also a message to the Arctic Council, while all scepticism of the governance of the Arctic is removed and replaced by a strong advocate for international cooperation. The document also stands as a plan to legitimise EU’s presence in the Arctic.

The EU can be placed in at the most co-optive end of the scale in Figure 1. The Communication is using “attraction” as the type of behavior by emphasising EU’s strong position in fighting climate change in order to attract Arctic States to welcome them into the core of the Arctic
Council. The policy objectives presented in the Joint Communication represents the resources the EU will use to legitimise its presence in the Arctic. The EU is relying on the Joint Communication as representing values that will be attractive and important to other Arctic stakeholders. In other words, the EU is using soft power in order to achieve its desired objectives in the Arctic. In terms of the policy, the EU still remains to develop a clear, coherent and ambitious strategy for the Arctic.

3.6. 2014 European Parliament Resolution on the EU strategy for the Arctic

The European Parliament published a resolution on EU strategy for the Arctic in 2014 in the continuation of the Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative in 2012. The Parliament welcomes the Joint Communication, but characterises it as a building block and still calls for a coherent strategy and concretised plan on EU’s engagement in the Arctic (European Parliament, 2014). The ban of seal products is again on the list of issues, while the EU did not achieve Observer Status in 2013 at the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden. The Arctic Council decided to “affirmatively receive” EU’s application with the condition of resolving the seal issue between the EU and Canada positively (European Parliament, 2014). The Parliament urges the Commission to follow up on the outstanding seal issue with Canada and regrets the effects that the EU regulation has caused for the indigenous culture and livelihood (European Parliament, 2014). The Parliament calls for a more coherent alignment in EU policies and emphasises:

[...] in particular, the need to bear in mind the interests of the EU and the European Arctic states and regions when utilising, amending or developing EU programmes or policies that do or can affect the Arctic, so that they serve the Arctic region as a whole (European Parliament, 2014).

Perhaps this is a message from the Parliament to the Arctic Council that the EU will develop its policies in a way that supports the Arctic region containing the message that the Arctic Council should grant the EU Observer Status. Generally, the Parliament recognises the progress since 2008 but requests the Commission to continue the development of an EU-Arctic Strategy.
3.7. 2014 Council Conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region

The European Council welcomes in 2014 the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative and takes note of the 2014 Parliament resolution. The Council agrees that the EU should further enhance its contribution to Arctic cooperation and sees the region as one of growing importance (Council of the European Union, 2014). Regarding the seal issue between the EU and Canada, the Council urges Canada to use the positive momentum in EU-Canada relations in order to resolve the remaining issue and thereby allow the full implementation of the Kiruna decision about granting the EU Observer Status when the issue is positively solved (Council of the European Union, 2014). Later in 2014 it was announced that the EU and Canada had reached a deal. The EU would exempt indigenous seal products from the European market ban. According to the Commission, Canada should in return agree to lift its reservations concerning EU’s bid for Observer Status in the Arctic Council (Depledge, 2015). Canada formally lifted its veto at the 2014 Iqaluit ministerial meeting. Yet, this time Russia prevented the EU from gaining its formal status as Observer in the Arctic Council (European Parliament, 2015). Moscow apparently had its own strategic considerations most likely related to the deteriorating relations between EU and Russia concerning Ukraine. The situation is unlikely to change until at least the next Arctic Council Ministerial meeting in the US in 2017.

The Council concludes by requesting the Commission and the High Representative to present proposals for the further development of an integrated and coherent EU-Arctic Policy by December 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2014).

3.8. 2016 Joint Communication: An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic

After some delay, the Commission and the High Representative recently presented their Joint Communication to the Parliament and the Council. Following two policy Communications without a clear and coherent direction it could be argued that its time for the EU to carve out its strategy and role in the Arctic. Thus, the time has come to analyse the third layer of the
policy development and to examine whether the EU has managed to develop a more specific EU-Arctic strategy.

Firstly, the headline of the Communication stands out from the previous, while this one is titled as: an *integrated* European Union policy for the Arctic (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). The emphasis on integration is interesting because at no point in the Communication is it defined what is actually meant by “integration” in relation to EU-Arctic Policy. Contemplating about the common understanding of the word “integrated” it would mean that the policy is more than just a sum of its parts and somehow is representing cross-cutting Arctic-relevant actions supporting each other. This is unfortunately not the case and in the Communication there is no longer references to common policy objectives – these are now called “priority areas”, which basically display EU presence in the Arctic. However, the “priority areas” calls for further examination to see if they contain more specific proposals for action in relation to the Arctic – integrated or not.

The introduction in the Communication sets out the case for an EU-Arctic Policy with focus on international cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate change and promoting and contributing to sustainable development with a particular focus on the European part of the Arctic\(^\text{10}\) (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). This indicates for the first time that the EU has become more aware of its own strategic priorities in terms of where it should engage in the Arctic and addresses the European Arctic as an area of special priority. The Communication notes that dealing with climate change in the Arctic will form part of EU’s wider efforts to combat climate change. According to the Commission and the High Representative, the EU-Arctic Policy will be an important element in implementing the global agreement reached in Paris at the 21st Conference of the Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015, which sets out a global action plan to limit global warming to below 2 °C (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). The EU sees itself as a leader in fighting climate change and stresses its duty to protect the Arctic environment through the Paris Agreement. Further, the focus in the introduction is on developing the European Arctic with funding in sustainable growth and job creation that can

\(^{10}\) The European Arctic is here understood as the part of the circumpolar Arctic located between Greenland and Northwest Russia based on the definition made in the *Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic (SADA)* (Arnarsson et al., 2014) A report ordered and funded by the European Union. See Map 2.
have potential benefits across the EU. It seems that this Communication is more specific about engaging in the European part of the Arctic, while previous the focus was broader and without references to this specifically. Finally, the introduction points to the growing strategic importance of the Arctic and underlines the higher profile of the Arctic region in international relations with countries like China, India and Japan having Observer Status in the Arctic Council, and stresses that it is now more important than ever to ensure that the Arctic remains a zone of peace, prosperity and constructive international cooperation (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). Against this background, the Communication proposes three areas of priority:

1. Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment;
2. Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic;
3. International Cooperation on Arctic Issues
   (European Commission & High Representative, 2016)

The EU views research, science and innovation as particular important and foresees these to play a key role across all three areas of priority (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). The EU envisions the actions in the priority areas as a contribution to the implementation of Agenda 2030 and being in line with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in September 2015. At a first glance, these three priorities seem to be somewhat similar to the areas in the 2012 Joint Communication with a strong focus on international cooperation and climate change - though presented in another form and with a change from being policy objectives to priority areas.

1. Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment

In the first priority about climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment, issues related to the area are identified. The Communication points to tangible effects of climate change with the summer sea ice having decreased by more than 40 % since 1979. The melting permafrost is causing land to subside, depleting habitats and damaging infrastructure. Rising temperatures contribute to the melting of the Greenlandic ice sheet, which adds to the rising sea levels and play a role in changing precipitations patterns in the northern hemisphere. The
Thawing permafrost has the potential to release carbon dioxide and methane in a large scale, which could change the Arctic as well as the global climate (European Commission & High Representative, 2016).

The policy responses to these issues are first and foremost based on research. The EU is a major contributor to Arctic research and considers a better understanding of the developments in the region as a fundamental response to dealing with the issues. The main policy responses regarding research are:

- The EU wishes to maintain its current funding levels for Arctic research, which has been around 200 million euro in the past decade, under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (2014-2020);
- The EU-PolarNet initiative will be a central plank of EU’s Arctic research efforts. The plan is that 22 European research institutions will develop and deliver an integrated European polar research programme. The EU-PolarNet initiative supports an EU-wide consortium of expertise and infrastructure for polar research to better assimilate the scientific and operational capabilities of Europe in the Polar regions;
- EU space programmes will support EU research on climate change in the Arctic through the operational infrastructure and services of Copernicus (European Commission & High Representative, 2016).

In addition to research as a policy response, the Communication sets out other objectives, which are in line with the Paris agreement to limit global average temperatures increases to well below 2 °C and make an effort to limit the temperature increase to 1,5 °C. The EU is committed to reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions with 40 % by 2030 and 80 % by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Moreover the EU has committed itself to spend 20 % of EU budget on climate-related objectives (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). In other words, the policy objectives presented in this Communication, which is supposed for the Arctic, is de facto a copy of the commitments made by the EU in the Paris agreement. Perhaps because the EU considers climate change as a global challenge and hence does not need to be directed exclusively to the Arctic, or because the priorities set forward in this Communication are actually put in place to “contribute to the implementation of Agenda 2030 and be in line
with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in September 2015” (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). It could also be an expression of the EU building on its general policies, existing frameworks and activities and thus it can be understood as some kind of integration of EU-Arctic polices into the broad EU policy context.

Finally, in the first area of priority the EU encourages full respect for the provision of UNCLOS and aims at protecting, preserving and improving the Arctic environment. The EU is ready to work with Arctic states and other international partners to develop an instrument under UNCLOS for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas that are beyond national jurisdiction (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). Actually, the EU is using the “Cultural” factor from Table 2, which is about international norms and political learning, while the EU support effective implementation of the Stockholm Convention with a view to preventing and reducing emissions of mercury. The EU is proposing to share its experience and best practices due to the comprehensive waste legislation. The EU is proposing this to diffuse EU norms into the international community and hence show that they are ready to cooperate on Arctic issues and thereby EU presence in the Arctic becomes further legitimate.

2. Sustainable Development in and around the Arctic

In the second area of priority about sustainable development in and around the Arctic, the EU has a particular focus on the European Arctic, while the region has a sparse population spread over a wide area and can be characterised by a lack of transport links, which is considered as a specific challenge. More precisely, the EU does not hold a complete north-south traffic connection, which hinders the region from supporting the growth in the rest of Europe (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). To solve this specific challenge the EU notes that it can play a key role in shaping the future development of the European Arctic through its Member States and its close ties with Iceland and Norway as well as Greenland. The EU then continues to list its already existing polices and funding programmes such as:

- EU’s cohesion policy that supports investments as well as capacity building in the European Arctic;
• The Interreg North Programme;
• The Botnia-Atlantica Programme;
• The Baltic Sea Region Programme;
• The Northern Periphery Programme and Arctic Programme;
• The Karelia and Kolarctic cross-border cooperation programmes under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (European Commission & High Representative, 2016).

The issues is not about questioning the quality of all these existing programmes but to stress the fact that instead of developing new proposals for action the EU simply lists already existing programmes and fails to communicate how the EU plan to use these programmes to solve the issues in the area of transportation links.

The EU aims at supporting sustainable innovation and deployment of innovative technologies in the Arctic and notes that in addition to the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme the European Structural & Investment Funds (ESIF) provide funding for research and innovation activities in the European Arctic (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). No new proposals for actions are put forward and the Commission is keen on continuing to support activities through mainly its funding programmes and already established networks.

According to the Commission and the European External Action Service, the European Arctic is suffering from underinvestment and the Commission’s ambition is to set up a European Arctic stakeholder forum with the aim of enhancing collaboration and coordination between different EU funding programmes (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). This is perhaps one of the most specific and tangible proposals for actions in the second area of priority and the work of the forum even has a definite timeframe, while the work is scheduled to be completed before the end of 2017. In addition, the Commission will fund and facilitate an annual Arctic stakeholder conference in the European Arctic region in order to strengthen collaboration and networking between stakeholders (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). Again the enhanced focus on the European Arctic becomes visible in the Communication.
As for the “integration” part of this policy, the EU states: “The EU’s integrated Arctic policy is therefore consistent with the Investment Plan for Europe, which offers a range of ways to encourage investment in the Arctic region to benefit citizens and businesses both above and below the Arctic Circle” (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). Hence, the EU is again building upon an existing policy framework, which could be a way of integrating the Arctic policy. Furthermore, EU’s objective is to find suitable solutions for the Arctic in relations to space technology. The EU is already contributing through the Copernicus programme, but envisions an integrated pan-Arctic observing system in order to secure sustainable development in the Arctic (European Commission & High Representative, 2016).

3. International Cooperation on Arctic Issues

The third area of priority about international cooperation on Arctic issues is mainly a listing of the places where the EU is already cooperating with international organisation, while it is listed that:

- The EU recognises UNCLOS;
- The EU will continue its active participation in the Arctic Council;
- The EU will continue to support regional and sub-regional cooperation including through its membership of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Dimension Policy;
- The EU wants to cooperate with all Arctic partners, including Canada, Russia and the United States and engage with all states that take interest in the Arctic such as China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore;
- The EU will continue to engage with Arctic indigenous peoples and local communities (European Commission & High Representative, 2016).

The EU sees itself as a global leader in science and considers science to be the most suitable instrument to promote a common understanding, enabling jointly agreed solutions and foster peaceful cooperation in the Arctic. The EU uses this third area of priority to promote its fundamental norms such as the respect for the rule of law, promotion of international cooperation, dialogue etc. rather than to provide new proposals for action.
In sum, the EU-Arctic Policy appears more as a list of already existing EU-Arctic relevant policies and activities rather than new proposals for action. Thus, the main role of this Joint Communication is to communicate the range of EU’s presence in the Arctic and thereby show the key Arctic audience – Arctic States, EU Member States and other Arctic partners – that the EU has a proper understanding of the region and to explicit state the fundamental principles and norms in which the EU intends to follow in its various Arctic activities. However, it leaves the impression that the Joint Communication is more a list of facts rather than commitments to action – except actions that are largely part of already existing EU activities. The document provides a limited number of new proposals for action and thereby it becomes a list that constitutes studies, projects, funding and other activities that is under implementation or that has already taken place. On a positive note, it seems that the EU has become more aware of the European part of the Arctic as an area of importance and has increased its references to the European Arctic significant compared to the first two Communications, which imply that the EU has come a step further in defining a more specific strategy towards the Arctic.

All in all, the Joint Communication is not an action plan on how to move forward and the reason for this could be that the Commission and the High Representative is careful about offending any of the Arctic States, which has been the case with earlier policy documents. Yet, it does represent a slightly more specific strategy with the enhanced focus on the European Arctic. As one of the first articles about the new Joint Communication is titled “The EU’s New Joint Communication: Not-So-Integrated, Not-So-Disappointing” sums up the overall result of the policy well (Stępień & Raspotnik, 2016).
3.9. Summary

Analysing the eight official EU-Arctic policies from 2008 - 2016 and in particular the Communications from the Commission and High Representative, the development in terms of policy focus is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Overall policy focus in EU-Arctic Policies from 2008-2016

The EU started its EU-Arctic Policy development in 2008 on a rather unfortunate path. By presenting controversial critique about the regulatory framework of the Arctic and suggesting to develop an Arctic Treaty inspired by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which implicitly questioned the rights of the Arctic States, and further to implement a ban of seal products on the European market, the EU did not start its policy development on the best terms. The EU identified realist problems such as the possibility for instability in the Arctic caused by geo-strategic dynamics due to climate change as a “threats-multiplier”. The EU saw security challenges in the Arctic, but failed to come with a strategy on how to move forward. Following the first policy documents the EU did not succeed in achieving Observer Status in the Arctic Council due to primarily its conflict with Canada and its Indigenous Peoples regarding the seal issue. This led to more non-controversial policy documents that replaced the focus on Arctic governance with international cooperation on fighting climate change. The second layer of the EU-Arctic strategy was primarily a detailed description of EU's contributions to the Arctic. In
particular EU’s large funding contribution to Arctic research was emphasised. The intention with the second Communication was to develop its policy objectives based on three keywords *knowledge, responsibility* and *engagement*. Unfortunately, the EU did not manage to present many specific proposals for action on how to reach its objectives and with what means to do it. If anything, the second Communication was more a message to the Arctic Council than a vision for the EU in the Arctic. After some delay, the third Communication was published in 2016. The third layer of the EU-Arctic Strategy is presented as “*An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic*” (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). Since 2008 there has been a desire from the Parliament and the Council for the Commission to draft a coherent and integrated EU-Arctic Policy. Despite the success in developing a more specific strategy with a clearer focus on the European Arctic, the policy does not appear as integrated, while there are no references to cross-cutting Arctic-relevant actions that could make it integrated. The EU does however manage to build upon already existing policy frameworks such as the Paris Agreement and incorporate the climate objectives into its EU-Arctic Policy, which could be analysed as some form of integration. As the development of EU’s Policy towards the Arctic has progressed there is now an enhanced focus on EU-Arctic research as an area of high priority and the EU has gone from having security concerns to develop policies based almost entirely on soft power instruments.

This analysis of the official EU-Arctic policies supports my argument that the EU, after three Communications, European Parliament Resolutions and Council Conclusions, continues to lack a clear strategy towards the Arctic. This does not mean that the documents and in particular the Communications are without importance and that the EU does not play a role or hold some degree of power in the Arctic region. Developing this kind of policy documents is a strategic way for the EU to communicate its Arctic activities and to diffuse its fundamental principles in which the EU and its institutions acknowledge. Even if the EU remains to carve out its own strategy and role towards the Arctic there is still reasons for analysing the EU as an actor in the Arctic.
4. The European Union as a Normative Power in the Arctic

4.1. The European Union and the Arctic Council

EU's bid to become an Observer in the Arctic Council has affected the debate for several years. As mentioned, the EU application for Observer Status was “affirmatively received” at the 2013 Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna and agreed in principle but deferred until the issue with ban of seal products was resolved with Canada, and it was agreed the EU should continue its engagement in the Council as an ad hoc observer (Weber, 2014). After years of attention to the issue, the EU subsequently has to decide how much energy it wants to spend on obtaining a more or less symbolic Observer Status, while EU’s participation in the Working Groups of the Arctic Council is not hindered by the lack of formal status. In addition, EU representatives have been participating on an ad hoc basis in the various meetings of the Arctic Council for the last decade. The EU is de facto already actively present in many aspects when it comes to the Arctic Council and perhaps the EU should try to move beyond the question of Observer Status and use their political influence in other aspects of its Arctic engagement. The EU is also highly active in other Arctic bodies, with for example membership in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and has actively helped develop and pursue relevant regulations that influence the Arctic, such as the Northern Dimension, the Polar Code, and Integrated Maritime Policy etc. In other words, the EU certainly has a role to play in both the Arctic Council and in many other forums for Arctic cooperation – formal status or not.

EU’s role in the Arctic Council and the question of Observer Status is intrinsically linked to the conflict between Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and the EU and their decision to ban seal products on the European market. Despite the exemption in the regulation concerning the seal hunt of Indigenous Peoples for their livelihoods, the EU has absolutely no normative power in this particular issue. This has been proven several times by Canada in the Arctic Council with their veto against EU Observer Status and EU’s failure to reach its objectives in this particular matter. The Commission and the Directorate General for Environment ordered a report about EU’s footprints on the Arctic environment based on current EU policies, which were published in 2010 (Cavalieri et al., 2010). The report showed that the EU has not...
secured an indigenous component into the policy-making process, which could be a reason why the EU has failed to be granted the Observer Status:

A strong Arctic indigenous component is also lacking in EU trade and environmental policies and because of this, the rights and interest of indigenous communities are often not included in the policy-making process. [...] The adoption process for the EU seal regulation showed that there are not permanent venues for indigenous peoples from within or outside the EU or the EEA to enable them to be meaningfully consulted on EU activities potentially affecting their livelihood and environment (Cavalieri et al., 2010).

If the EU had included the interests of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and all other (sub)-Arctic sealing communities in the policy-making process about banning seal products on the European market, the situation for the EU in the Arctic Council could perhaps have been handled better and EU’s legitimacy as an Arctic actor may have benefitted (Sellheim, 2016). EU’s normative power would most likely have been stronger if they had included all relevant stakeholders and indeed if they had included the Arctic Indigenous Peoples in the policy-making process.

4.2. Arctic research as science diplomacy

The Arctic region has been given much attention in recent time due to the on-going transformation with important drives such as climate change, geo-politics and globalisation. Scientific cooperation has proven effective as a feature for building bridges between Arctic actors and securing stability in the Arctic region. It has been argued that where there is scientific collaboration there is less risk of military conflict (Goodsite et al., 2015). The reason is that science diplomacy has the ability to create cooperation across borders and develop common understandings among stakeholders, which also has a positive effect on decision-makers (Bertelsen, Li, & Gregersen, 2015).

The EU is a major contributor to Arctic research. The previous Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation (FP5 and FP6) support more than 50 polar-related projects and
within FP6 alone the Arctic related budget reached 86 million euro (European Commission, 2008a). For the current Framework Programme Horizon 2020 the EU has indicated that it has the opportunity to take Arctic research to an even higher level. As the EU stated in their recent 2016 Joint Communication: “the EU has a duty to protect the Arctic environment and strengthening ecosystem resilience” (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). An interesting statement that tells something about EU’s self-perception as being a key actor in fighting climate change and protecting the environment. Research, science and innovation are presented as the key instruments that the EU can use in order to meet its commitments.

Considering the concept of power in relation to EU’s engagement in Arctic research and environmental protection, it is important to distinguish the definition of power according to behaviour and resources. In terms of behaviour, the EU can through its strong commitment in fighting climate change transform the behaviour of others through the high environmental standards it sets forward, which is also central in Nye’s soft power concept. When the EU can be successful in setting attractive standards, it will draw others to follow the European example, which implies that the EU can get others to change their behaviour. In terms of resources, the EU has the economic resources to fund Arctic research, which can help resolve relevant problems the EU faces in relation to the Arctic. Being a major funder of Arctic research also legitimise EU’s presence in the Arctic and can be an expression of EU’s normative power, while being a frontrunner in Arctic science helps shaping the rules of for example shipping and endangered species. The EU contributes to creating new knowledge that is not only valuable for the EU but also for other actors in the region. In other words, through research and science the EU takes part in developing international norms relevant for the Arctic, which is especially true when it comes to climate negotiations (Stepien, 2015).

The Arctic Council have six scientific Working Groups and promotes cooperation in the Arctic among nations and people interested in the region. The EU is participating actively in the scientific Working Groups, which is a way for the EU to further legitimise its presence in the Arctic and to enhance its normative power through collaboration with other actors. Arctic research is perhaps the area where the EU has the greatest leverage and possibility for diffusing its ideas for the Arctic, while the EU is economically strong and have so far shown its willingness to provide substantial funding to Arctic research. Being a frontrunner in science
and research gives the EU the possibility to shape what is normal in international relations, which is a central point in Manners’ normative approach. When promoting science and research as key instruments for collaboration, the EU is at the same time signalling to the rest of its Arctic partners that science and research is the way to move forward and hence science diplomacy could become another core or minor norm for the EU to rely on in international relations.

4.3. The EU as an actor in fighting climate change in the Arctic

The EU often portrays itself as a leading actor in fighting climate change (European Commission, 2015). Despite the somewhat diplomatic failure of the EU in climate negotiations in the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Meeting, the EU has been successful in setting standards and examples in terms of climate change and taking initiatives to move the negotiating processes forward (Elgström & Skovgaard, 2014). As identified in the recent published Joint Communication from 2016, the EU bridges its efforts to deal with climate change in the Arctic with its international commitments through the Paris Agreement (European Commission & High Representative, 2016). In general, the EU puts a lot of emphasis on climate change when developing its EU-Arctic Policies, which suggests that the EU has deep concerns about climate change both in and outside the Arctic, and that the EU sees itself as a leading actor in fighting climate change and in negotiations. By continuously promoting its own efforts concerning climate change the EU is at the same time diffusing its norms to the international community. By setting international standards and commitments the EU is relying on the “Cultural” factor in Table 2 as a factor that shapes EU norm diffusion in international relations, while these climate standards can be seen as a kind of political learning to adaptation of the initiatives set forward by the EU. When the EU is setting a good example in fighting climate change by drafting policies with objectives and commitments its normative power is enhanced. When the EU is perceived as a leading actor regarding climate change is makes the other actors and stakeholders want to follow the EU example, which is in line with Nye’s concept of soft power, while the idea of soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and to get other to admire your ideals (Nye, 2004).
5. Discussion and Findings

To be a normative power it requires that you are able to shape the conception of what is “normal” in international relations (I. Manners, 2002). You must be able to use other instruments than the ones offered by the realist and civilian approach and present yourself as different from pre-existing political forms and exercise power in other ways than just instrumental. As mentioned, the EU is not a state and can therefore not be compared directly as one, which imply that the EU can be considered as a “new” type of international actor and as being more than the sum of its parts (I. Manners, 2002).

The EU can be considered as non-threatening and as a magnet with its strong position within Arctic research and fighting climate change. In fact, research in the Arctic is perhaps the place where the EU holds its greatest leverage and can be characterised as an important actor. Despite the unfortunate start for the EU in their EU-Arctic policies, the EU has managed to develop its strategy based upon both core and minor norms, with human rights, the rule of law and sustainable development being the most prominent. By developing eight official EU-Arctic policies, observing in the Arctic Council on an ad hoc basis and contributing to the work in the Arctic Council Working Groups, participating actively in Arctic research and providing substantial funding, the EU has relied on diffusing its norms into the international community. More specifically, these factors has been particular present in EU’s strategy towards the Arctic:

• **Transference:** when the EU exchanges good, trade, aid or technical assistance. In this case the transference of funding and technical know-how about technologies relevant for the Arctic has been a key feature for the EU.
• **Overt:** physical presence of the EU in the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and other relevant Arctic organisations.
• **Cultural:** EU providing political learning regarding the comprehensive legislation and setting a leading example in fighting climate change.

Regarding EU’s soft power, the Union has in some cases been less successful in using its “power of attraction”. The seemingly endless conflict between EU and Canada’s Indigenous Peoples has limited the EU in getting what is wants, namely Observer Status in the Arctic
Council. The initial legislation on banning seal products on the European market was not legitimate in the eyes of the Indigenous Peoples of Canada and EU's soft power seemed to be in decline. As Nye so perfectly puts it: “Government policies can reinforce or squander a country’s soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based in a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power” (Nye, 2004). The point of soft power is to get others to admire your ideals and to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want (Nye, 2004). To a start, the EU was not admired and failed to influence the behaviour of other Arctic actors, mainly the Permanent Members of the Arctic Council. However, perhaps the EU has been misunderstood regarding their engagement in the Arctic (Koivurova et al., 2012). The intention from the EU has arguably not been to upset other Arctic actors, but perhaps the EU got caught in between its various legislations that did not complement one another and thereby created problems elsewhere. It could also be that the EU has been profoundly uninformed about the Indigenous Peoples way of life and has therefore had a hard time understanding the angry reaction from the people affected in Canada and elsewhere. This has made the EU appear as rather ignorant towards the interests of the Indigenous Peoples and their traditional way of life and in general made the EU seem naïve and unaware of the nature of Arctic societies. Given these circumstances, why should Canada and Arctic communities give the EU a seat around the table, when the EU seemingly has a hard time developing appropriate regulations that takes account of Arctic societies and their needs?

Despite this issue, the EU generally has been trying to use its soft power assets with resources and a behaviour that can be found in the co-optive in of the scale as illustrated in Figure 1. Yet, along the way the EU also had to realise that the simple virtue of its existence was not enough to influence its Arctic partners in the desired direction, which has now resulted in much more diplomatic and friendly, although not clear, strategies from the EU towards the Arctic. It seems that there is excellent cooperation between Arctic actors and only the seal issue has caused some degree of conflict. This could suggest that the EU and its Arctic partners agree on almost every other issue, which raises the question if the EU holds any power since the level of agreement is so high. In other words, there is not much left to fight about around the Arctic table and therefore the EU does not have to use its power whether its normative, civilian, realist, hard or soft. Only one issue has (so far) caused conflict: the ban of
seal products on the European market, which is an issue where the EU has had absolutely no normative power.
6. Conclusion and Future Perspectives for the European Union in the Arctic

6.1. Conclusion

Analysing the official EU-Arctic policy documents it seems the EU has not been able to develop a distinct strategy with specific objectives and proposals for action. This supports my initial argument that the EU lacks a clear and defined strategy towards the Arctic. To answer the first question in the problem formulation about what strategy the EU has towards the Arctic the conclusion must be that the EU aims to engage in the Arctic through international cooperation with research and science being the key instruments for collaboration. The answer must also be that the EU intends to pursue this strategy without clear statements on how to move forward. The EU-Arctic policy development has gone from security concerns to focus on international cooperation with clear recognition of the international regulatory framework.

Concerning the EU as a normative power in the Arctic, the EU has shown itself as a normative power as it takes the lead in fighting issues of global concern with climate change being the prominent example. This is one of the areas where the EU can make a difference simply by its virtue of existence based on Manners’ argument that what the EU represents is as important as what is does. When it comes to fighting climate change and promoting Arctic research the EU is perhaps the leading organisation and has enjoyed success with diffusing its norms to other actors and stakeholders and through its high standards attracted others to follow the European example. Yet, the EU cannot be characterised as a normative power regarding its relations to the Arctic Indigenous Peoples. These groups has certainly not admired the European example and with Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products the EU has been forced to modify the regulation in order to secure itself the formal Observer Status in the Arctic Council and in general to be accepted among its Arctic partners. In this case, it was the EU that had to change its behaviour and not the other way around, which imply that only to some degree the EU can be described as being a normative power in the Arctic. To answer the second question in the problem formulation about how the EU can be understood as a normative power in the Arctic, the conclusion must be that the EU is only partially a normative power depending on the particular situation.
In conclusion, as an international actor the EU does more than reflect the preferences of its Member States, as the realist approach suggests. At the same time it is also clear that if the EU wants to be a true and meaningful actor in the region it must develop a more competitive and ambitious strategy towards the Arctic with policies that takes account of all relevant perspectives and in particular the peoples of the Arctic.

6.2. The future perspectives of the European Union in the Arctic.

The EU should concentrate on the European Arctic, while this is the area where the EU has the most leverage in terms of their relationship with its Arctic Member States, Denmark (Greenland/Faroe Islands), Sweden, Finland and its close ties with Norway and Iceland. As the conditions under which soft power will emerge are dependent on the situation and because the similarity of cultures is important, it would be wise for the EU to further its focus on the European Arctic. (Nye, 2004) notes that the types of power are dependent on the context with questions like: who relates to whom under what circumstances, which imply that the EU has the best chance to secure influence through soft power instruments in the European Arctic, while this sub-Arctic region is somewhat the most similar to the rest of the EU.

Is has been pointed out that Arctic actors have difficulties in comprehending the complexities of the EU as a supranational organisation (Koivurova et al., 2012). Despite the controversies between the EU and the established Arctic actors, the EU regulation on banning seal products on the European market is a reason why there should be a stronger involvement of the EU in Arctic governance. Accepting the EU as a relevant policy entity in Arctic governance could set the stage for a mutual learning process. This could make the EU more aware of Arctic realities and create an opportunity for the established Arctic actors to learn about the EU as a complex policy entity and thus develop a constructive relation (Koivurova et al., 2012).
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