Rio, quo vadis?

A critical analysis of Rio de Janeiro and the impacts of the Olympics 2016

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Master`s Thesis
M.Sc. Urban Planning and Management
Department of Development and Planning
June 2016
Photos on front page: Ilha Pura (source:ilhapuraviladosatletasbarra.com) and Rocinha (author photo)
Title

Themes
Olympics
Mega-events
Critical urban theory
Social justice
Spatial justice
Rio de Janeiro

Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro as well as on regional and local planning strategies and policies at poor people’s expenses.

Mega-events like the Olympics illustrate chances and at the same time risks for the host city. Following a neoliberal growth strategy, the Olympics can be used as a catalyst for economic growth. However, this involves the risk of socially and spatially unjust development. Segregation and exclusion can be the result.

Based on the critical urban theory approach and the concepts of social and spatial justice, the plans, strategies and policies both related to and affected by the Olympics in the context of the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro are analyzed. This analysis builds on: (1) field observations; (2) literature research; (3) national and municipal plans, strategies and policies; (4) one semi-structured expert interview.

The case of the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro shows that national and municipal strategies and policies are changed in favor and because of the mega-event. PPPs are installed to instrumentalize the neoliberal growth strategy, rules of exception are applied and the Olympics are used as means for zoning changes serving real estate developer interests. Caused and intensified by the Olympics, social and spatial injustices are still emblematic for Rio de Janeiro. Due to changing planning strategies and policies in favor of the Olympics, promising strategies, as the social housing program Minha Casa, Minha Vida, to reduce socio-spatial injustices are turning direction and even increase these injustices. Even though the urban planners of Rio de Janeiro are aware of socio-spatial injustices, they have not been successful to reduce them. The municipal government tries to mitigate these injustices, but only focuses on the outcome and not on structures. Instead, the strategies used are still deeply founded in the capitalist system and fail to change the deep-rooted structures giving rise to injustice.

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Printed reports: 3
Number of pages: 49
Number of appendixes and type: 2 on CD
Completed: 02.06.2016
Preface and Acknowledgments

This thesis titled *Rio, quo vadis? – A critical analysis of Rio de Janeiro and the impacts of the Olympics 2016* is the final thesis of M.Sc. Urban Planning and Management program at the Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, Denmark. The thesis was done by Florian Sollacher during the period February 2016 until June 2016.

For referencing the Harvard method is used. When interviews are used as sources, reference is made to the appendix, e.g. (Smith, 2016 – appendix A)

The author of this thesis would like to thank the following persons for contributing to the project:

- Dr. Enza Lissandrello, supervisor of this project
- Daniel Mancebo, head of the Department for Macro Planning of Rio de Janeiro
- Monica Bahia Schlee, employed at the Department for Macro Planning of Rio de Janeiro
- Orlando Santos Junior, Professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ
Table of contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3

2 Problem definition .................................................................................................................... 4

3 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................... 5

  3.1 Justice - explanation of the term .................................................................................... 5
  3.2 Justice in the context of the city ..................................................................................... 6
  3.3 Spatial justice ..................................................................................................................... 9
  3.4 How to implement the theories .......................................................................................10

4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 12

  4.1 Case Study Research ........................................................................................................ 12
  4.2 Field Observations .......................................................................................................... 12
  4.3 Literature Research .......................................................................................................... 13
  4.4 Document Analysis .......................................................................................................... 13
  4.5 Interviews ........................................................................................................................ 14

5 Brazil and Rio de Janeiro ........................................................................................................ 17

  5.1 Brazil`s demography and economic development ............................................................ 17
    5.1.1 Evolvement of marginal neighborhoods in Brazil around the 19th and 20th century   .... 17
    5.1.2 Expansion of marginal neighborhoods as a result of Brazil`s economic boom in the mid-20th century .......................................................................................................................... 17
    5.1.3 Urbanization and rural exodus in Brazil as the basis for the emergence of marginal neighborhoods in the second half of the 20th century .................................................................................. 18

6 Rio de Janeiro`s marginal population and how it is affected by the preparations for the Olympics .............................................................................................................................................. 22

  6.1 Demography and topography of Rio de Janeiro ................................................................. 22
  6.2 Social structure and city shape of marginal neighborhoods in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro .22
    6.2.1 Characteristics of marginal neighborhoods ................................................................. 22
    6.2.2 Marginal neighborhoods in Brazil respectively Rio de Janeiro ................................... 24
  6.3 Poverty in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro ................................................................................... 25
  6.4 Social and spatial disparities in Brazil .................................................................................. 26
  6.5 The informal sector of economic activities in Rio de Janeiro ............................................. 27
  6.6 Political Approaches to reduce poverty and disparities in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro ......28
    6.6.1 The urbanization-program Favela Bairro in Rio de Janeiro in early 1990s .................29
    6.6.2 Morar Carioca Urbanizacao (Urban Housing Program) since 2010 ............................. 30
    6.6.3 Minha Casa, Minha Vida program since 2011 ............................................................ 31
  6.7 Measures and reactions in face of the 2014 World Cup and the Olympics 2016 in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro .................................................................32
    6.7.1 Unicade de Policía Pacificadora ....................................................................................32
6.7.2 Resistance in the population from 2012-2014 .............................................................. 33
6.8 The planning for the Olympics and the contemporary changes/impacts in Rio de Janeiro 34
   6.8.1 Exceptional laws and zoning changes in favor of Olympics ........................................ 36
   6.8.2 The composition of the boards ................................................................................. 36
   6.8.3 The decision making process .................................................................................... 38
   6.8.4 The housing programs and the Olympics ................................................................. 39
   6.8.5 Summary of the Analysis ......................................................................................... 40
7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 43
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 45
1 Introduction

In 2014 Brazil had the seventh biggest GDP in the world (World Bank, 2016), member of the BRIC-countries and home to global-acting companies like Petrobras, Embraer or the biggest producer of iron ore, Vale. In 2010 Brazil had an economic growth of 7.5% (World Bank, 2016), but still a big proportion of its population is living in poverty. The income disparity is one of the highest in the entire world and especially the metropolis regions like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo show large-scale structures of marginal settlements (favelas), whose population usually lives under the poverty-line and without a minimum of hygienic infrastructure (lack of sewage systems, no access to drinking water, etc.).

Brazil, recently, did not only gain global media attention for its big economic growth, which in 2014 shrank to only 0.1% (World Bank, 2016), but also for being host to a series of mega-events, especially sports events like the Pan-American Games in 2007, the FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016, with a central role for Rio de Janeiro.

Since the 1990s the focus of researching Latin American cities has changed. The shift is not only more on the growth of cities and its increasing drawbacks as a result. Much more, researchers draw lessons out of the changes in Latin American urban development in the attempt to introduce new forms of governance of it (Wehrhahn, 2009). This new way of urban development in Latin America evolved through the neoliberal change of policy (Coy & Pöhler, 2002), whose principles can be seen in Brazil by deregulation, decrease of public control function (Coy, 2001) and the increase of privatization (Coy & Schmitt, 2007).

Due to globalization and the influence of neoliberalism, a fragmented development of Latin American cities can be identified, which, according to Scholz, leads to two conflictive effects: on the one hand globalization is the basis for increasing wealth by reducing economic deficits, on the other hand it is the basis for increasing mass poverty and income disparity (Scholz, 2002). But not the whole population is participating on the positive effects of globalization, instead only certain population groups.

These effects can also be identified in the city of Rio de Janeiro. On the one hand the social inequality and income disparities are increasing, on the other hand the city promotes economic growth by hosting this series of mega-events. The interesting issue discussed in this thesis is to analyze how the city tries to manage in face of the Olympics to tackle both challenges, reduce the negative impacts of mega-events on the poor population and at the same time fostering economic development. This issue is discussed in the next chapter.
2 Problem definition

Looking at the history of the mega-events it stands out that more and more newly industrializing countries became host to events like the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics lately. Beginning 2008 with the Olympics in Beijing, 2010 the World Cup in South Africa, and the World Cup 2014 in Brazil respectively the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro. Both organizations, the FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) argue that these events will help the countries to continue and speed up their way to becoming an industrialized country. There is no doubt that such mega-events foster development, especially in relation to infrastructure (Müller, 2015), and help branding the city or country in relation to the global market. On the other, there is an evidence that these events are a big economic challenge for the hosts, sometimes too big, and the planning often comes along with human right violations, namely the right to housing violated by evictions, as it could be seen in the above mentioned examples. Furthermore, these countries and cities are characterized by high social inequalities, for instance in relation to housing, as the shanty towns. As previous events have shown, mega-event-related developments are only concentrated on certain time and areas and therefore the effect of them is often to increase the disparities within the country side and city.

“Planning for mega-events appropriates resources, monopolizes public attention, can suspend the normal rule of law, and often rewrites urban and regional development plans” (Müller, 2015 – emphasis added).

The latest and most recent mega-event of this kind will be the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro. The games are going to be held in South America for the first time, in one of the most emblematic cities in a Latin American context, characterized by socio-spatial disparities (poverty, favelas). As the protests against and reports about numerous evictions and human right violations, especially in Rio de Janeiro, already caused global attention during the World Cup, the thesis takes into account background knowledge gained from previous events, the planning process of the Olympics and its impacts on Rio de Janeiro’s poor population with a special focus on the housing sector. The research question is therefore formulated as following:

How do the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro change local and regional planning strategies and planning policies with an impact on the disadvantage of the marginalized population and therefore limiting “the right to the just city”? 

A better understanding of the point of departure for this research project can be achieved by exploring the research question in diverse sub-parts. This is presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of research question</th>
<th>Elaboration</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“How do the Olympics 2016 in Rio de Janeiro”</td>
<td>Focus on the Olympics-related projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“change local and regional planning strategies and planning policies”</td>
<td>Focus on the decision making process in planning context and how the Olympics have changed these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“with an impact on the disadvantage of the marginalized population”</td>
<td>Focus on the poor population with special emphasis on housing affected by the Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“and therefore limiting the “right to the just city”?”</td>
<td>Using and combining the theoretical frameworks of Lefebvre’s “the right to the city” and Fainstein’s “the just city”</td>
</tr>
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Table 1: Research question divided into single parts
theoretical framework

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework, on which this thesis is based. Because of its context and ideology dependency, it has not been possible to find a widely accepted definition for the term social justice. Therefore, different understandings are discussed of justice are discussed to build a basis, on which this thesis can build on.

3.1 Justice - explanation of the term

One of the first and most important researchers dealing explicitly with the issue of justice was John Rawls in his work *A Theory of Justice* (1971). This can be seen as a turning point in modern thinking where justice was not just seen as an issue within the legal context but concerned more liberal democratic perspectives. Rawls’ theory, which deals with distributive justice, was meant to be universally applicable (Soja, 2010). This liberal theory based on rational choice theory assumed a fair distribution of goods given a ‘veil of ignorance’. That meant that if all goods were to be distributed, an individual would choose a rough equality of primary goods to not risk ending up in an inferior position (Fainstein, 2011). The theory was heavily criticized for the utilitarian approach used by Rawls and the focus on “static forms of social inequality, the unfair outcomes, and not the deep structural processes that produce them” (Soja, 2010).

When addressing fundamental issues of procedural justice, in contrary to Rawls’ focus on distributive justice, the work of Iris Marion Young should be highlighted. Young’s work shifted the focus away from the just distribution of commodities to processes and respecting differences. Young defined five forms of oppression, interacting with each other, which should imply injustice in a procedural context: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. By doing this she emphasized the importance of looking at the structures and institutions, which produce inequality and injustice (Young, 1990).

Another shift in focus was developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum resulting in their *capabilities approach*. Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000) put forward that a focus limited on outcomes, as promoted by Rawls, is not useful and that the focus should be on the provision of abilities and capabilities for the individuals to attain certain basic goods. In other words, following this liberal approach, everyone should have the opportunities (and be aware of the opportunities) to acquire certain commodities. Nussbaum (2000) adds that there are certain basic capabilities which cannot be traded off, e.g. life, health, bodily integrity, access to education and control over ones environment. This is of great importance and mark an essential difference from Rawls’ utilitarian approach; fundamentally this protects the individual from losing basic capabilities for the sake of financial gain (Nussbaum, 2000). Fainstein (2011) sees this approach as an important alternative to the commonly use of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, a method which only relies on aggregates. Within this approach, the story of individuals disappears and illustrates only a small figure in the calculation (Fainstein, 2011). The capabilities approach therefore provides a tool to establish a kind of basic rights framework for all, protecting individuals from the most severe forms of injustice.

Based on this brief explanation of the philosophical debates about (in)justice of the past 40 years, the focus will now be shifted to justice in the context of the city.
3.2 Justice in the context of the city

Influenced by the civil unrests in cities across the western capitalist world in the 1960s many scholars shifted their focus on the causes of injustice issues in cities. Especially the works of French sociologist Henri Lefebvre and British geographer David Harvey need to be emphasized. Both focused explicitly on the urban and sought to explain the social issues within cities of the time. Based on the works of Marx and the critical social theory the field of critical urban theory dealing with “the critique of ideology […] and the critique of power, inequality, injustice and exploitation” (Brenner, 2009) evolved. This includes being critical towards existent structures of society (capitalism) and assumes that “another, more democratic, socially just, and sustainable form of urbanization is possible” (Brenner, 2009). A crucial attitude of critical urban theory is that it should be useful in praxis (Brenner, 2009; Soja, 2010). This is emphasized by the following quote by Edward Soja (2010):

“Critical theory […] is primarily concerned with usefulness in praxis, especially with the regard to achieving freedom from oppression and domination. Although its epistemology is practice rather than norm or truth oriented, it is never entirely divorced from either normative or scientific theory.” (Soja, 2010).

This approach is characterized by an explicit focus on: the urban; the structures of capitalist society that produce and reproduce injustice; and usefulness in practice (Brenner, 2009; Soja, 2010). Lefebvre’s work mostly dealt with the formulation of the right to the urban as a reaction to what David Harvey later called the continued „creative destruction“ and „accumulation by dispossession“, which was fostered by a capitalist society always on the brink of a crisis (Harvey, 1995; Harvey, 2001; Harvey, 2008; Harvey & Potter, 2011). Most outstandingly Lefebvre promoted the phrase “the right to the city”. From an Marxist point of view he criticized the “bureaucratic society of organized consumption” where “the exchange value of urban space is prioritized over its use value” (Dikeç, 2001). In line with the notion of “the right to the city” he developed “the right to difference” (Lefebvre, 1996 [1968]) and put forward that these can only be reached “through social mobilization and collective political/social struggle” (Dikeç, 2001).

Dikeç (2001) argues that “the right to the city” is not only focused on the participation of urban citizens in urban social life but also their active participation in political life, management, and administration of the city. Going further, he argues, in line with Brown (2013), that “the right to the city” is not a right to the physical manifestation of the city but rather a right to be part of the political sphere that the city is. In other words it can be seen more as an “enabling right” rather than a legal right. And this is the right that has be seized through continuous political and social struggle in the city (Dikeç, 2001). In connection with “the right to the city” Lefebvre developed “the right to be different”, where, according to Dikec, the emphasis should be put on the word “be”. Lefebvre mainly suggested that every citizen had the right to “be” different, for instance to resist from being put into categorization by authorities and therefore not necessarily difference as particularity (Dikeç, 2001).

In line with Lefebvre’s criticism about the capitalist structures of society Harvey explained more in detail the processes and structures of this society which produce the injust outcomes that are apparent in cities. According to Harvey it is impossible to create a just city (urban society) without engaging in the restructuring of the current capitalist system. Moreover, other attempts to create a more just city will be “constrained to mitigating the worst outcomes at the margins of an unjust system” (Harvey & Potter, 2011). Following Harvey’s standpoint, it does
not make sense to talk about justice as long as the current system of neoliberal oppression is still in place, characterized by “creative destruction” and “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2008; Brenner, 2009; Harvey & Potter, 2011). These two concepts, central in Harvey’s criticism, will be elaborated in the following.

The term creative destruction was originally formulated by economist Joseph Schumpeter to describe the “process of industrial mutation [...] that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter, 2003 [1942]). Harvey adapted this term to describe how neoliberal forces continuously use urbanization, urban transformation and investment in physical structures to absorb surplus capital in times of crises (Harvey, 2008). Or like Harvey formulated:

“The effect of continuous innovation [...] is to devalue, if not destroy, past investments and labour skills. [...] Innovation exacerbates instability, insecurity, and in the end, becomes the prime force pushing capitalism into periodic paroxysms of crisis.” (Harvey, 1995).

For further explanation, Harvey (2008) refers to Haussmann’s big modernization and clearance of central Paris in the 19th century, when poor neighborhoods were replaced by boulevards and mansions. According to Harvey, Haussmann had two agendas: absorbing capital and repressing social unrest from the poor urban population. Harvey projects this approach to modern postcapitalist strategies (Harvey, 2008). Closely linked to the creative destruction and the Paris example is the second core concept of accumulation by dispossession, which builds the bridge to the social justice discussion. Harvey uses the term accumulation by dispossession to describe the higher risk for lower class population to be excluded and displaced in favor for profit-generating schemes, mainly linked to high-income housing developments on formerly unwanted land, which was occupied by informal slum dwellings (Harvey refers to examples from Asia, but it can also be linked to Latin America and particularly Brazil’s favelas). This illustrates the example of classic trade-off between exchange-value and use-value (Harvey, 2008).

Another critical urban scholar, Peter Marcuse, goes more in deep with the issues raised by Harvey. He uses an example from the American housing sector and lists how its problems can be solved on the basis of a critical urban theory approach (Marcuse, 2012). His approach promotes to concretely look at the structures and institutions, which create an unjust housing sector. Marcuse identifies three pillars as causes for the current housing crises:

“1) housing is produced in accordance with the rules of the capitalist economic system; 2) how housing is regulated by the state to maximize profit and 3) how housing is supported by manipulated ideological and cultural underpinnings” (Marcuse, 2012).

The third point is mainly referring to the American ideal of private, individual homeownership. In contrast to Harvey, who only provides one (“all or nothing”) approach to changing the system, Marcuse shows two ways to solve the housing problem. One of them proposes to limit the level of profit through for instance provision of housing, which can be achieved by implementing housing policies and other “soft” institutional changes. The other one a more direct and comprehensive change of “the myths supporting the three pillars that underlie the present (and past) crisis” (Marcuse, 2012). This means to change the perception of homeownership and suggests the development and strengthening of new forms of tenure at the expense of profit-oriented, private housing providers, which indicates a much more fundamental structural change (Marcuse, 2012). It has to be mentioned that the
recommendations by Marcuse are limited to the context of capitalist society and not require a shift but only alterations within the housing sector. This illustrates the difference between Marcuse and Harvey’s strict Marxist approach.

Susan Fainstein, an urban planning professor from Harvard University, takes the discussion further, by writing about “the just city” in a more practical-oriented manner, and criticizes the works of Lefebvre and Harvey among others for being too impractical and theoretic when dealing with justice and the city:

“These philosophers [Lefebvre, Nussbaum, Young] then offer a route for considering planning action and identifying their contributions to individual self-realization by providing criteria for evaluating methods and policy. The fairly glaring weakness of their arguments as practical tools is their lack of concern for the methods of achieving their ends, the absence of a formula for dealing with entrenched power, and their indifference to the costs and trade-offs that will be incurred by actually seeking to produce social justice. Nussbaum contends that it is unacceptable to trade capabilities against each other; that all must be achieved. This, however, may not be possible.” (Fainstein, 2011).

Fainstein sees this as an utopian and theoretical view of justice and therefore tries to establish a more applicable understanding of justice in an urban context. Fainstein emphasizes that justice in planning needs to take situational ethics into account, thereby she sees “the just city” somewhere between the universal and the particular (Fainstein, 2011). She put forward:

“Every public space need not be used by a full range of inhabitants, but should also not keep people out. Cities can be diverse and tolerant in macro without each sub-area encompassing a multi-ethnic, multi-class citizenry.” (Fainstein, 2011).

Her interpretation of “the right to the city” seems to be controversial in relation to other theorists, especially Harvey. Fainstein, influenced by Purcell (2008), sees “the right to the city” as more than the right to be physically present in the city “but the right to a city that fully meets needs of inhabitants … Appropriation […] would mean a right to a city where workers could make a short commute to work … and come home to affordable comfortable housing.” (Purcell, 2008 – cited in Fainstein, 2011).

When taking the spatial aspect of “the just city” into account, it has to be questioned if it makes sense to look at justice only isolated for a city. Fainstein argues, drawing on Castells (1977) and Peterson (1981), that “urban movements do have some transformative potential despite being limited to achieving change only at the level in which they are operating” (Fainstein, 2011). Referring to Peterson (1981), she contends that city administrations can foster economic growth, but cannot be part in redistribution without experiencing capital flight, unemployment and a decreasing tax base (Fainstein, 2011). That means that efforts for justice at city level are dependent on efforts on higher levels: “... cities cannot be viewed in isolation; they are within networks of governmental institutions and capital flows.” (Fainstein, 2011). Fainstein lists “urban redevelopment, racial and ethnic relations, open space planning and service delivery” (Fainstein, 2011) as redistributive policies available to cities.

Fainsteins arguments revolve mainly around the relationship between justice and both democracy and diversity, as she highlights the importance of this for developing the “good city” (Fainstein, 2011). Based on the correlations between these factors, she tries to establish criteria for a just city. Fainstein thereby focuses on efforts for creating a broader understanding about
the need to redistribute goods, both substantive and procedural, between the well-off and the
less-well-off. She concludes that it has to be realized “that gains can be had from the collective
enterprise. Such a mobilization depends on a widely felt sense of justice and sufficient threat
from the bottom to induce redistribution as a rational response.” (Fainstein, 2011). Here
Fainstein is in line with other Marxist scholars who see political and/or social struggle as a
precondition for change (Lefebvre, 1996 [1968]; Harvey, 2008; Harvey & Potter, 2011;
Marcuse, 2012) and continues:

“Enough of the upper social strata need to accept a moral code such that they do not resist,
and will even support, redistributional measures. Thus, when thinking about just cities, we must
think simultaneously about means and ends, social movement strategies and goals as well as
appropriate public policy.” (Fainstein, 2011).

Again the inherent structures of capitalist society that create injustice are central instead of
looking only at the outcomes. Even though Fainstein is paying attention to some spatial aspects
in her concept of the just city, she does not, in line with most other scholars in this field, see the
spatial component as a basic precondition. Edward Soja sees this as a fundamental problem
today. In the following, to elaborate the conceptualization of justice in relation to the city, the
concepts of spatial justice and the spatialization of justice, most notably Soja’s work, will be
presented.

3.3 Spatial justice
Soja (2010) criticizes that most knowledge in this context, which has been produced during the
last century, is based only linking socio-temporal (societal-historical) dimensions, whereas the
spatial dimension has been neglected (Soja, 2010). He proposes therefore to also take the spatial
dimension into account and link the socio-temporal with the spatial. Soja argues that this is
necessary as nothing can be perceived without the spatial dimension, thus it is crucial in
analytical thinking.

Even though philosophers like Henri Lefebvre (1968) and Michel Focault (1986) were noting
spatial justice, the spatial dimension does not find consequently consideration in the discussions
about justice to this day. Soja, one of the most notable advocates for the inclusion of spatial
dimension in fundamental thinking, emphasizes this in relation to justice issues, where
disproportional geographical development is a main driver of inequality and injustice (Soja,
2010).

For a better understanding Mustafa Dikeç’s (2001) work is useful. He illustrates how
spatialization (the social production and reproduction of space) repeatedly creates injustices
because of the inherent structures of society. That means that the structural level, that is
producing and reproducing injustices in space, have to be taken into account, otherwise the
solution will only focus on lindering problems caused by a flawed system (Dikeç, 2001). This
can be exemplary demonstrated by the issues of ghettos or favelas in the Brazilian context. For
many years it has been tried to make this clusters of social oppression disappear, but again and
again new favelas evolve as others dissolve. Referring to Dikeç (2001) and Marcuse (2012) it
is the social structures of society (lack of integration, exclusion, segregation), legal structures
(legal rights of lower classes, right to housing), the physical environment (concentration of
social housing in blocks), and national strategies (housing policies, neoliberalization and
merketization of the housing sector, etc.) which repeatedly produce and reproduce the same
problems.
A central part in Dikeç’s work are questions dealing with spatialization and (in)justice and their interaction, based, among others, on Lefebvre’s and Soja’s work. In the paper *Justice and the spatial imagination* (2001) Dikeç highlights the relevance of the spatial dimension and, even more important, issues of spatialization in policy making (Dikeç, 2001). By building on Lefebvre’s “the right to the city” and “the right to difference”, among other scholars as Rawls, Young and Soja, he tries to conceptualize the notion of spatial justice:

“The basic features of the dialectical formulation I propose to consider in the relationship between injustice and spatiality are, therefore, as follows: (a) a focus on spatiality as a process; as a producer and reproducer of, and at the same time being produced and reproduced by, relatively stable structures (permanences), (b) recognition of the interrelatedness of injustice and spatiality as producing, reproducing, and sustaining each other through a mediation of larger permanences that give rise to both of them.” (Dikeç, 2001).

Dikeç, building on the dialectics of injustice and spatiality, argues that (a) spatialization is about the interaction of society and spatiality, that means that stable structures in society produce and reproduce spatiality and in turn spatiality is producing and reproducing the structures of society; (b) that spatiality and injustice are interrelated and that this interrelation also produces and reproduces them both thereby sustaining them. He elaborates on this as following:

“The problem [referring to a case in his paper], in other words, is not “a simple phenomenon of localized exclusion” (Lege, 1995, page 42). Such a conceptualization of the problem would be the spatiality of injustice, in a static sense, which could probably have been addressed, if not with complete success, by policies of ‘integration’. This, however, is not the case. The sociospatial exclusion problem is constantly produced and reproduced by the ways in which the society is spatially organized […] the policies and actions conceived to address the issue should take into consideration the structural dynamics of spatialization (for example, the organization of property markets, housing, rent, and tax policies, etc.), which the notion of injustice of spatiality tries to capture.” (Dikeç, 2001).

Dikeç concludes, in line with Harvey and Lefebvre, that social injustices in society are constantly produced and reproduced through the social production of space sustained by visible (city shape, infrastructure, walls and fences, etc.) and non-visible (spaces of flows, distributions, networks and institutions) structures (Dikeç, 2001; Harvey, 2008; Harvey & Potter, 2011; Lefebvre, 1996 [1968]). But, different to Harvey and Lefebvre, Dikeç’s focus is not on revolt and political or social struggle as means to reach the goal of a more just society. He argues instead that the spatial dimension is vital in policy formulation and emphasizes the crucial importance of understanding spatiality as a source of continued social injustice (Dikeç, 2001).

**3.4 How to implement the theories**

In this section, based on the discussion above, the implications of theory for this thesis will be elaborated. Two main points have to be emphasized: firstly the general approach in line with critical urban theory, and secondly the explicit focus on spatiality in line with Soja’s work.

When working with the notion of (social) justice it is beneficial to base this on the critical urban theory. Despite Rawls’ universal justice approach, justice is seen as a normative term. Due to the high dependence on context and ideology, criticism based on justice requires a deliberate choice of a normative basis. The presented approaches, which deal with justice in an urban context, relate to the structures of capitalist society as the (re)producer of (in)justice, which is the focus of critical urban theory. Critical urban theory therefore provides a scientific basis
to, as Max Weber terms it, perform external critique (since the critique is based on the normative notion of justice) (Weber, 2012) by analyzing social injustices in the context of mega-events, as introduced earlier in this project.

When criticizing based on critical urban theory a structural focus is needed, in particular a focus on the structures, institutions and organizations that produce (in)justice (Brenner, 2009). In the context of mega-event planning this concretely refers to plans, policies and strategies which guide effort, as these are either part of or created on the basis of the “flawed” system that critical urban scholars are dealing with.

The second main point is related to Soja’s and Dikeç’s conceptualizations of spatial justice and the spatialization of justice. These two scholars are numbered among the school of critical urban theory as well, this conceptualization therefore is in line with the structural focus explained above. But in addition to the structural focus, an explicit focus on (in)justice in space is required by the concept of spatial justice. Here most notably Soja’s elaboration of focusing not only on the distribution and effects on (in)justice between social groups or over time but in space is crucial.

But maybe more applicable for an evaluation justice in an urban context are the values that urbanists generally regard as goods and bads, listed by Fainstein (2011):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values in relation to:</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Space</td>
<td>Lack of access, homogeneity</td>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Rule of experts</td>
<td>Citizen Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of benefits</td>
<td>Favors the already well-to-do</td>
<td>Redistributes to the worst-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Homogeneity</td>
<td>Recognition of “the other; diversity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But this must only be understood as a guide, when evaluating the mentioned aspects on justice. The listed indicators for either being bad or good, illustrating the extremes, should only be seen as a help for analyzing planning strategies and policies on the background of implementing more just planning.
4 Methodology
This chapter will describe the methodological considerations used within this thesis that consist of ‘Case Study Research’, ‘Interviews’, ‘Field Observations’, ‘Literature Research’, and ‘Document Analysis’. The methods are chosen in order to answer the research question based on the theoretical framework that was set in the previous chapter.

4.1 Case Study Research
In this chapter the findings about theory of case studies and the methodology influenced by Bent Flyvbjerg’s “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research” will be discussed. It will be explained why a case study was used as a method for this research and why this is relevant in this project in relation to the research question.

“In addition, from both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur” (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Bent Flyvbjerg, an economic geographer, who has researched case study theory and the use of case studies in social science argues to develop “general, context-independent theory” (Flyvbjerg, 2006), which means that theory in social science is context-dependent. This does not imply that theories should not be developed or redeveloped, but one has to be aware of this when using theories. In contrast to vain theories, which are not universal, a case study provides context-dependent theory, which is more valuable (Flyvbjerg, 2006): “The advantage of the case study is that it can “closein” on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Robert K. Yin argues in line with Flyvbjerg that case study research is a way to produce context-specific knowledge: “In brief, a case study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and real-world perspective – such as in studying [...] neighborhood change” (Yin, 2014).

Furthermore, Flyvbjerg highlights the importance of a case study in comparison to generalization of a problem: “… formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the force of example” is underestimated” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). That means that a context-dependent case study, which in this project is related to a specific city and event, will provide specific knowledge, which is as important as the aim to generalize.

The Olympics in Rio de Janeiro are here chosen as the object of study as this case seems emblematic for wider socio-spatial transformation, i.e. increasing social and spatial inequalities through mega-events as described in chapter 6. This outlines the study and as a result this research project is conducted as a single-case study, or a critical case study, as described by Flyvbjerg.

4.2 Field Observations
The method of observation in this project has served two purposes: to provide the author a physical impression of Rio de Janeiro and to collect visuals.

When using observations as a method to collect data and while doing observations, special attention needs to be paid to the following things. It has to be considered, how the observations are going to be used in the project: Are you part of the observation or not? Even though you do not participate in the observation, you have to be aware that even your presence can affect the observations (Angrosino, 2004). It can be stated that the observations conducted in relation with
this project were not influenced by the author, because the intention behind the observations was to get a personal impression of the research area. This included the following aspects: get an idea of the areas of interest in the urban context of Rio de Janeiro and not only single pictures, where only limited aspects are displayed; get a feeling for Brazil’s culture and society to better understand specific ways of thinking and decision making; be part of the daily life in Rio de Janeiro to understand issues and problems described in literature. The conducted observations were definitely useful for the further work progress, as they provided important knowledge for a better understanding of the problems mentioned in literature and the interview. Furthermore, it was valuable to observe the life in the favelas, because this is hard to imagine without having been to a country like Brazil before.

Additionally the observations provided a chance to collect visuals for the report. The photos were taken from the author’s subjective understanding of the area and aim to enrich the report with visuals for a better understanding of issues dealt within this project. Therefore it can be that other people might use other pictures or interpret them in another way than done during this project.

4.3 Literature Research

Literature research was used to get a broader understanding of the problems as discussed in scientific articles in specific case studies about Rio de Janeiro.

The literature used in this report can principally be divided into two parts: literature about mega-events and its effects, and literature about marginalized population and housing in Rio de Janeiro. The first part includes literature research about previous mega-events like the Olympics and about the planning of mega-events. This, together with the document analysis (see 4.4) builds the basis for planning context described in chapter 6.8. This provided a basic knowledge about the planning of mega-events and its problems as well as has served as a point of departure for analyzing the planning context of the case study. The second part includes literature about the case-city Rio de Janeiro dealing with topics relevant for this report. That contains case studies about for instance evictions of favelas, or Rio de Janeiro and its mega-events.

4.4 Document Analysis

Document analysis was used as a method to analyze both national and municipal planning strategies and policies. The analyzed documents were planning-reports, plans (most notably the Strategic Plan), and maps to identify, on the one hand, the goals, and, on the other hand, the strategy how these goals should be achieved.

The focus in this analysis was to find out (1) the goals; (2) the strategy; and (3) the actors. The first point aimed at identifying the goals, which means what shall be achieved and which changes are coming along with this, both in relation to the procedure and the outcome. The focus on the strategy should provide knowledge about the intention behind formulating these goals (what do they really want to achieve? Is this a goal to achieve a more general or overall goal?) and the strategy to achieve these that means which planning instruments and policies are used. The third part should show, who is involved, affected and at whose expenses will this development be.

The document analysis could only be conducted to a limited extent, as many documents are only available in Portuguese.
4.5 Interviews

Interviews were chosen as a qualitative method to enrich the other methods, field observations and literature research, in order to gain expert knowledge and have the possibility to ask more specific questions. Furthermore, different perspectives on the topic could be provided by the interviews, which was only possible to some extent (see below).

The interview as a method was used to gain knowledge about the planning process for the Olympics and its impacts on the general planning in Rio de Janeiro as well as about the housing situation and plans for the poor population. Therefore, the initial idea was to find interviewees from different fields. These included employees from municipal and federal planning departments, representatives of the Olympics who can provide knowledge about the planning process of the Olympic-related projects, representatives of community associations from the favelas, and academics from the local universities with connection to this field of research. For a better understanding the specific persons and institutions contacted are listed in Table 2. Furthermore, the table provides information about the intention behind the choice of the specific persons and institutions, and to group them into successful and unsuccessful interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution or Person</th>
<th>Expected field of knowledge</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Macro Planning (Daniel Mancebo)</td>
<td>Municipal planning programs, planning for Olympics</td>
<td>Conducted on April 5th 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Social Affairs</td>
<td>Social Justice, Housing</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Housing (Federal State of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>Housing programs, social justice, just city</td>
<td>Hung up the phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Planning and Administration (Federal State of Rio de Janeiro)</td>
<td>Federal planning programs, planning for Olympics</td>
<td>Neither English nor Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of Planning and Management</td>
<td>Planning programs, planning for Olympics</td>
<td>Referred to Secretary of State Rio de Janeiro and Secretary of Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Planning programs, planning for Olympics</td>
<td>No English speaking person for interview available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Sports</td>
<td>Planning for Olympics</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Social Development</td>
<td>Social justice, just city, housing programs</td>
<td>Required an e-mail, after that no more answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Headquarter</td>
<td>Planning for Olympics</td>
<td>Did not want to talk about this topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando Santos Junior (Professor in Urban Planning at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and member of the Popular Committee of the World Cup)</td>
<td>Knowledge about all fields as he researches in a similar field. As member of a protest group that fights for the rights of the marginalized population considered as critical</td>
<td>Interview guide provided by email, valuable literature on the topic received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilmar Mascaranhas (Professor in Geography at Rio de Janeiro State University, specialized in sports mega-events)</td>
<td>Impacts of sports mega-events</td>
<td>Not possible to get a hold of him</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: List of contacted institutions/persons with an explanation of the expected knowledge and comments on the specific cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/Person</th>
<th>Knowledge about all fields as he/she researches in a similar field</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fabrizio Leal de Oliveira (Professor in Urban Planning, same research group as Santos Jr.)</td>
<td>Knowledge about all fields as he/she researches in a similar field</td>
<td>Not possible to get a hold of him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelma Gusmao de Oliveira (Professor at State University of Southwestern Bahia, wrote a PhD about the impacts of World Cup on poor population)</td>
<td>Knowledge about all fields as she researches in a similar field</td>
<td>Contact was lost after few e-mails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coletivo Papo Reto (Community group in the favela Complexo do Alemão fighting for rights of the residents, gained big media attention)</td>
<td>Providing a perspective from the marginalized population</td>
<td>No English speaking person available for interview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally to the formal interviews it was gained knowledge by some informal interviews with local residents about the topic of this research. This includes a taxi driver, a receptionist in a hostel and an employee in the Olympics headquarter in Rio de Janeiro, all living in the city. This provided some valuable information as they did not have any barriers to talk about unpleasant topics, how it can be the case when you have to represent for instance your company and therefore being limited to answer.

As it can be seen in Table 2 not many interviews that were planned took place in the end. This was due to different limitations, which will be explained in the following. First of all there was the language barrier. Many of the contacted people did not speak English at all and the author does not speak Portuguese. Sometimes it was possible to clarify the intention of contacting them in Spanish, but as the author’s Spanish as well as the contacted people’s Spanish only was elementary, it was neither possible to conduct the interviews in Spanish. Another problem was that many of the contacted municipal departments, which were expected to provide knowledge about the topic (e.g. the Secretary of Planning and Management), either did not have interest in talking about the topic or could not provide the requested knowledge and often referred to the Secretary of Sports, as this is the overall municipal coordinator of the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. In some cases it was not possible at all to get in touch with them, neither via e-mail nor by phone. Because of this, the interviews also show limitations of comprehensiveness. As there did not take place many interviews it is not possible to compare them with each other. Therefore they can only be used as supplementary information or source for the data collected through the other methods.

Additionally to the interviews with experts, the time in Rio de Janeiro was used to also talk with local citizens about topics related to this thesis. The knowledge gained in these talks is used to illustrate findings from reliable sources.

Due to the limited amount of knowledge gained about the topic before the interviews, it was decided to structure the interviews as semi-structured, because this would provide the possibility for the interviewees to come up with new topics the interviewer was not aware of before. In other words, the semi-structured interview type was chosen, because it is more flexible and
provides the possibility to follow the respondent, if he or she brings up interesting aspects (Longhurst, 2010). For the interviews an interview guide was created to serve as a checklist. As mentioned, to leave the interviewees margin in answering and give them chance to mention what they found important, it was not necessary to follow the interview guide. However, the interview guide would secure that all questions were answered. The interview guide (see Appendix B) had four different topic-frames: General/explorative understanding of the Olympics on Rio’s urban development; Housing issues; social justice/the just city; urban planning context of Rio de Janeiro.
5 Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

5.1 Brazil’s demography and economic development

5.1.1 Evolvement of marginal neighborhoods in Brazil around the 19th and 20th century

The first evolvements of shanty towns in Latin America, as they are known nowadays, can be identified at the end of the 19th century. Shanty towns increasingly occurred after World War I, when, amongst other things, a city, a business center as well as trading posts evolved in the big cities in Latin America. The city center turned into a business district, the previously local upper class moved to peripheral neighborhoods in the suburbs and neighborhoods characterized by villas likely European model evolved (Stapelfeldt, 1990). The city shape therefore was in contrast to the formerly ideally core-edge social gradient of the Latin American city in the colonial period (Bähr & Mertins, 1995). This transformation involved the poor and respectively the ones employed by the upper class, small service providers, and groups of former farmworkers, who moved into the cities during the rural exodus (see chapter 5.2.3). This was followed by the evolvement of marginal neighborhoods in the inner-city area (Stapelfeldt, 1990).

Several theories exist about the emergence and naming of the favelas. According to the most common literature, the name favela refers to marginal neighborhoods and it comes from a plant. After the war between the civilian population of the city Canudos and governmental troops, the surviving civilian population occupied a hill in the northeast of the country and named it Morro de Favela, to remember a plant, which caused painful incinerations during the war. The occupied Morro de Favela should be as painful for the government as the injuries caused by the plant (Santos, 2001; Killisch & Dietz, 2002). In Rio de Janeiro the returned soldiers from the war in Canudos occupied the hills Morro de San Antonio and Morro da Providência (Segre, 2010) to wait for their land promised by the army. In the beginning they were just camping, but time after time they started to transform their tents into fixed cottages (Perlman, 2010) and in 1904 the first marginal settlement of Rio de Janeiro already domiciled more than 1000 people (Segre, 2010). Santos identifies “processes of favelization” already around the turn of the century (Santos, 2001). In the 1920s the term favela became a general umbrella term for all forms of shanty towns and illegal settlements respectively for land occupations in Brazil (Perlman, 2010).

Subsequently new favelas emerged on inner-city hills, where the land was of low or none economic value (Stapelfeldt, 1990). In the first half of the 20th century signs of gentrification have been identified, when many houses, which were home to employees of the upper class, got modernized and as a result became then too expensive for the poor. The only chance the poor saw, was to build their own houses where they could find space, this usually happened in peripheral regions (Vaz, 1996). In the second half of the 20th century the expansion of marginal neighborhoods was primarily characterized by trends of global immigration, rural exodus, and new processes of urbanization (see chapter 5.1.3).

5.1.2 Expansion of marginal neighborhoods as a result of Brazil’s economic boom in the mid-20th century

While Sao Paulo has already been classified as global city for several years, the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro has been discussed as one of the losers of globalization. In Rio, the industrial modernization was not promoted to the same extent as in the nearby Sao Paulo, additionally the lack of international networks complicated the settlement of knowledge and technology (Wehrhahn, 2002). The business location Sao Paulo, however, grew, amongst others,
also due to foreign capital and formed the city in a special way. Furthermore, Rio lost its importance as political center already in the 1960s through the building of the plan-city Brasília, which took over Rio’s role as Brazil’s capital (Wehrhahn, 2002).

Social consequences of the globalization in parts of Brazil are amongst others an increase of social and spatial disparity, increase of informality, social segregation within cities caused by the disparities, and the exclusion of poor and rural groups. The consequences on the political level can be identified as deregulation, structural adjustments, and privatization. As core problem for a positive social development Coy reports the fact that economy policy receives preferential channels over social, environmental and regional policy (Coy, 2001).

In developing and newly industrializing countries the disparities caused by globalization can be generally seen in both spatial exclusions and segregation of single population groups within an area. The process of globalization involves only a few regions and within these regions it is only a few, privileged population groups that are both involved and benefitting, whereas the lower class and nearly the whole population of marginal neighborhoods is excluded from this process. On a national scale, big regions and a big part of the population is excluded from this development and therefore gets even more marginalized (Neuburger, 2003).

The effects of globalization, as we know it nowadays, just started in the late 1990s in Brazil. Before that, Brazil’s economy policy was primarily focused on the inland market (Wehrhahn, 2002) and the 1980s were seen as a lost decade (Segre, 2010), characterized by a high foreign indebtedness, the declaration of illiquidity, and extreme rates of inflation. Only from 1989 on the government started to focus on deregulation and liberalization of the economy, which symbolizes the beginning of the way out of the crisis (Wehrhahn, 2002).

Due to this change, the import rate increased and the modernization of the economy increased its productivity. During the 1990s the foreign investments drastically increased, starting from 2.2 billion US$ in 1994 to 32.8 billion US$ in 2000 (Wehrhahn, 2002). In comparison to other Latin American countries, especially Mexico, the key market of Brazilian export goods is much more differentiated. But the ‘dark side’ of the modernization was that an increasing unemployment rate due to the abolition of whole sectors of industry showed a new phase of Brazil’s opening to the global market (Wehrhahn, 2002). Additionally, new technologies in the agricultural sector were introduced benefitting mostly the great land owners, because they are only profitable on big areas. This leads to more segregation and marginalization, which are the basis for rural exodus described in the next chapter (Dünckmann, 1998).

5.1.3 Urbanization and rural exodus in Brazil as the basis for the emergence of marginal neighborhoods in the second half of the 20th century

According to BMZ1 with data from UN and bpb2, the global urbanization concentrates on newly industrializing and developing countries. The 2.3 billion people living in urban agglomerations means double as much as in industrial countries; for 2030 the estimation is 3.9 billion people, which then will be fourth times more (BMZ, 2014), 60% of them aged under 18.

Hoffmann distinguishes between a demographic urbanization, which respects the absolute numbers of people, and an urbanization of land use (Hoffmann, 1995). In the following urbanization is primarily used as demography-related. Between 1940 and 1991, Brazil’s population grew by

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1 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Ministry of economic cooperation and development)
2 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education)
105.6 million inhabitants, which illustrates an increase of 256%. The urban population, however, increased significantly more by 918%. During this period, a change of the formerly relations between rural and urban conditions occurred and especially in Brazil’s southeastern region, that includes the metropolitan regions of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, characterized by a high degree of urbanization (Kaiser, 1995). The population in the ten northeastern federal states instead decreased. In 1970 for the first time the urban population was bigger than the rural population (Wehrhahn, 1998), Latin America was then characterized by an urbanization degree of 71.5% in 1995 (Hoffmann, 1995). Brazil had an urbanization degree of 81.2% in 2000, however, different to the other countries, the capital Brasília is not the biggest metropolitan area of the country (Kohlhepp, 2003).

![Graph of Degree of Urbanization](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html)

As it can be seen in Table 4, Brazil’s southeast including the metropolitan areas Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro show the highest degree of urbanization within the country. Furthermore Table 3 shows that Brazil, in a global context, shows a high degree of urbanization. Santos calls the high speed and big scope of the urbanization in Brazil “hyper-urbanization” with a simultaneous change of the labor market towards the tertiary sector (Santos, 2001). Due to this speedy urban transformation the social and sanitary infrastructures in Brazilian cities got heavily overloaded (Coy, 2003). Around the turn of the new millennium the growth of the metropolitan areas’ core cities slowed down and the concentration of urban growth was relocated to Brazil’s inland (Coy & Schmitt, 2007). But as there still is a high concentration of population in a comparatively small area, talking of decentralization would go too far. In the early 2000s about ¾ of Brazil’s total population lived on only 10% of Brazil’s total area. 30% of the total population lived in the metropolitan areas Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, which together, however, only cover 3% of Brazil’s total area (Kohlhepp, 2003), the whole southeast inhabits 42.6% of the population (Coy & Schmitt, 2007). The reasons for Brazil’s urbanization, besides the push-and pull-factors described in the following, lay in the historical context of the foundation of towns by the
Spaniards and Portuguese as well as their settlement and economy policy during the colonial era (Hoffmann, 1995).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>27,7</td>
<td>29,6</td>
<td>37,8</td>
<td>42,6</td>
<td>50,3</td>
<td>59,0</td>
<td>69,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>23,4</td>
<td>26,4</td>
<td>34,2</td>
<td>41,8</td>
<td>50,4</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>69,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>25,9</td>
<td>35,0</td>
<td>50,9</td>
<td>70,8</td>
<td>81,2</td>
<td>86,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>39,4</td>
<td>47,6</td>
<td>57,3</td>
<td>72,8</td>
<td>82,8</td>
<td>88,0</td>
<td>90,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>61,2</td>
<td>72,6</td>
<td>78,8</td>
<td>87,9</td>
<td>91,8</td>
<td>95,2</td>
<td>96,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>44,1</td>
<td>52,5</td>
<td>62,6</td>
<td>80,3</td>
<td>88,6</td>
<td>92,8</td>
<td>93,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>27,7</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>37,5</td>
<td>44,6</td>
<td>62,4</td>
<td>74,1</td>
<td>80,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>24,9</td>
<td>30,6</td>
<td>36,1</td>
<td>58,6</td>
<td>73,3</td>
<td>81,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td>36,2</td>
<td>45,5</td>
<td>56,0</td>
<td>67,5</td>
<td>75,5</td>
<td>81,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Degree of urbanization in regions and selected metropolitan areas in Brazil from the years 1940-2000 in %. (Source: own illustration based on Zirkl 2007).

The reasons for urbanization, especially the migration into metropolitan areas and the rural exodus during 20th century can be divided into push- and pull factors. The pull factors that make urban life most attractive, amongst others, are better chances for education, primary health care, social aid programs and the hope to find a job, in Latin American context often within the informal sector (Kohlhepp, 2003). Push factors and therefore causes of rural exodus in newly industrializing and developing countries in general and Brazil in particular are unemployment, mechanization and modernization in agriculture, no or limited access to land, and the bad living conditions in rural areas (Zirkl, 2007).

Another problem is the uneven distribution of land between the agricultural businesses. Only 3% of agricultural businesses ruled 60,7% of agricultural lands in 1996, and 75,9% of agricultural businesses ruled only 10,8% of agricultural lands. According to Dünckmann, about 60% of agricultural land in Brazil are ruled by “minifundia”, which are too small to supply a family with food (Dünckmann, 1998).

Problems of migration within a country occur, according to Santos, when there exists no appropriate policy (Santos, 2001). To avoid problems, urbanization has to happen in the course of planning. That means that new regulations must be in place, which define where people are allowed to settle down and build their homes, as well as restricted areas, where it is prohibited to settle down, which for instance can be achieved by zoning. On the other hand problems of migration can be reduced, if the city provides enough housing, so that the migrants do not have to settle down informally.

Due to the rural exodus and urbanization, especially in the 1970s and the turn of the millennium, Brazil got transformed from a previously agricultural characterized country into a state characterized by the urban society. A process, which occurred in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile already in the previous century and to which Brazil, relating to its structure, has converged (Wehrhahn, 1998). The big numbers of people migrating into cities require place to live. This can usually only be achieved in the marginal neighborhoods of cities, the favelas.

In the current section the frame for the case is set by explaining the development in Brazil with a special focus on the history of marginalized neighborhoods. In the following the city of Rio
de Janeiro is taken as the case for this thesis to illustrate the development and growing problems described before, and link these to the effects of the preparations of the Olympics.
6 Rio de Janeiro`s marginal population and how it is affected by the preparations for the Olympics

This section first provides an overview of the poor, marginal population of Rio de Janeiro and is then followed by the introduction of some selected projects related to the Olympics. These projects will be evaluated on the basis of the theoretical framework in relation to their effects on the marginal population.

6.1 Demography and topography of Rio de Janeiro

In 1974 the urbanized region of Rio de Janeiro was declared as metropolitan region. It is located between the Atlantic Ocean and coastal mountains Serra do Mar, which also limits the growth potential of the metropolitan region. The city is divided into 28 administrative regions, which are subdivided into different neighborhoods (bairro) (Dietz, 2000). In the census year 2010, Rio de Janeiro has been reported to be the home for a bit more than 6 million people (IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2016), while the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro counts about 12 million inhabitants (Albrecht, et al., 2013). The spatial and physical development of Rio de Janeiro has been influenced by its special topography, so that the urban hills (morros) characterize the cityscape and distinguish Rio de Janeiro from other Brazilian cities (Bähr & Mertins, 1995). The most famous one in Rio de Janeiro is the so called sugarloaf (Pão de Açúcar). Another characterizing part of the cityscape are the favelas (shanty towns), which often are located on these urban hills. The city can basically be divided into the rich southern part (Zona Sul), the poor northern part (Zona Norte) and the historical center (Centro), which also is the business center nowadays. During the continuous growth of the agglomeration several sub-centers evolved. Yet recently the urban expansion slowed down due to shortage of land for building and massive traffic problems, whereas the periphery is still growing (Ribbeck, 2003). In line with other Latin American cities, Rio de Janeiro has to deal with poverty, crime, real estate speculations, housing shortage, informal business and environmental problems. Because of the disparities, the local population (Carioca) calls Rio de Janeiro Cidade Partida, in literature often named as Broken City or Divided City (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013).

6.2 Social structure and city shape of marginal neighborhoods in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

6.2.1 Characteristics of marginal neighborhoods

In the year 2001 31,6% of the global urban population lived in shanty towns respectively marginal neighborhoods (UN-HABITAT, 2003). Bähr & Mertins divide between two types of marginal neighborhoods worldwide. On the one hand informally emerged irregular settlements, on the other hand constructional and infrastructural degraded, highly densified formerly neighborhoods for the upper and upper middle class (Bähr & Mertins, 2000). Besides that degraded quarters like worker-neighborhoods can be considered as marginal neighborhoods, too. The term shanty town is often used as a synonym for all marginal urban settlements (Bähr & Mertins, 2000).

But as there is no distinct definition of the term shanty town respectively marginal neighborhood, problems in relation to comparability can occur. Due to the difficult data-comparability the clearance of problems that come along with these settlements becomes more difficult (Staub, et al., 2008). The problems of finding a distinct definition are caused by the complexity of marginal neighborhoods, which cannot be limited to a few parameters. But shanty towns, too, need to be seen in relation to the context, as a quarter that can be considered as a shanty
town in one country, in another country or city can be not considered as such compared to the rest of the city. Furthermore, marginal neighborhoods often change too fast to find a long-lasting definition (Staub, et al., 2008). Differences also occur between shanty towns on different continents. Inhabitants of Brazilian *favelas* often have to wait years for getting legal access to electricity and therefore use illegally tap electric wires meanwhile (Figure 1). Whereas in Africa and Asia this is often not possible at all, because the access to any kind of electricity or water can result improbable also in the long term (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992). Following UN-HABITAT, Staub et al. (2008) identify the following indicators to rate a quarter as shanty town or marginal neighborhood: lack of access to water, lack of access to sanitation, quality, safety and location of houses, overpopulation, and uncertainty of land tenure (Staub, et al., 2008). Füchtner continues discussing the poor in relation to their small share in societal consumerism and especially their position within the labor market “marginal mass”. This marginal mass is spatially, economically and socially pushed to the edge of society (Füchtner, 1991).

![Usage of illegally tap electric wires in Latin America’s biggest favela Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro. (Source: Author photo, (2016)).](image)

In general one can say that in these areas, a high percentage of marginal population lives in poverty and has a high share of workers in the informal sector. Further characteristics are a high crime rate, often caused by poverty and rivaling (drug) gangs as well as oppression and discrimination, often a result of the exclusion from urban public life (Bähr & Mertins, 2000).

The built volumes described as disadvantageous can be advantageous, though, as inhabitants can self-build and therefore no rents have to be paid. In times of inflation, which especially hit hard the inhabitants of a *favela* due to lack of certainties and the increasing costs of food, they
at least can keep their homes (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992). But as recent developments have shown, this is not always the case anymore.

6.2.2 Marginal neighborhoods in Brazil respectively Rio de Janeiro

Füchtner finds the term marginal strange for a country like Brazil, in which more than half of its society is considered marginal population (Füchtner, 1991). In his qualitative study in Salvador, Rothfuss (2014) identifies that *favelas* are, in the understanding of the upper and middle classes, “not seen as worker neighborhoods anymore, but synonymous for crime, drug-trafficking and as ungovernable […]” (Rothfuss, 2014 – author’s own translation). On the contrary, some authors, amongst others Perlman (2010), argue against the term shanty town to describe the Brazilian *favelas*, because this for instance does not express the spirit and pride, which the inhabitants of the *favelas* feel.

Around the turn of the new millennium about 4000 *favelas* exist in Brazil (Segre, 2010). Kohlhepp characterizes the Brazilian *favelas* as cottages built of building material leftovers, corrugated metal and plastic film as well as hygienic and infrastructural deficits of any kind (Kohlhepp, 2003). Furthermore areas can be found, which the municipal government completely avoids. In these areas the drug-mafia rules, which is a problem especially in Rio de Janeiro (Kohlhepp, 2003).

Within the whole metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro exist between 500 (Ribbeck, 2003) and 660 (Segre, 2010) *favelas*, according to the mentioned authors. In the future, it is expected to be more. In 2016 different sources talk about more than 1,000 *favelas* (Municipal Government, 2012). In the census year 2010, 22.2% of Rio de Janeiro’s population was living in a *favela* (IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2016). Solving the *favela*-related problems occurs to be very problematic, as every mayor of Rio de Janeiro, as well as every political party and every government had a different *favela*-policy, which made it impossible to define a clear course of action on this topic. The different strategies reach from improving the situation by integration into the city towards eviction and pacification (Ribbeck, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population living in favelas</th>
<th>Population Rio de Janeiro</th>
<th>Percentage of favela population</th>
<th>Population growth in favelas (in %)</th>
<th>Population growth in Rio de Janeiro (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>169.305</td>
<td>2,337,451</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>337.412</td>
<td>3,307,163</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>563.970</td>
<td>4,251,918</td>
<td>13.26</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>628.170</td>
<td>5,093,232</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>882.483</td>
<td>5,480,778</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,092.958</td>
<td>5,857,879</td>
<td>18.66</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,393.314</td>
<td>6,288,588</td>
<td>22.16</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Population growth in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and the city Rio de Janeiro as well as the share of the favela population on Rio de Janeiro’s total population. Source: Own illustration based on JOVCHELOVITCH & PRIEGO-HERNANDEZ 2013.*

In Rio de Janeiro the *favelas* are seen as manifestations of poverty and symbol of inequality (Fiori & Brandao, 2010). Yet, especially in Rio de Janeiro, special social structures and cultural characteristics like Rio de Janeiro’s famous samba-schools have their roots in the *favelas* (Füchtner, 1991). The upper and middle class do take advantages of the *favelas*, too. Many
employees in the industrial sector, house services, trading, housing construction, and public service live there and are cheap workforce (Santos, 2001). Additionally, they have an important potential for consumption and are therefore an important source for the economy.

Besides all these negative connotations, the favelas usually show quite stable social structures, neighborhood- and self-help have a great importance (Kohlhepp, 2003). The residents of a favela feel relatively comfortable within a favela. The atmosphere is often described as familiar, the rules are tough but clear, the city outside the favela is unknown and through the eyes of the favela-population dangerous, because there every citizen is just an individual. Laws do exist, but the police and public administration often is corrupted or do not even go into the favelas (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013).

The following chapter will cover some characteristics of the favelas like poverty, crime and drug conflict as well as the informal sector in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro.

6.3 Poverty in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is the first millennium development goal MDG1 of the United Nations (BMZ, 2010). As a sub goal was defined to improve the living standards for more than 100 million shanty town-inhabitants (BMZ, 2014). On a global scale every second person lives with less than 2 US$ per day, every fourth lives in extreme poverty, which means with less than 1,25 US$ per day (BMZ, 2010). The BMZ defines poverty not only monetary as income-poverty. The development policy sees poverty also as a lack of possibilities to develop their own potentials, live in dignity, make use of their own rights, or participate in economic, political and societal life (BMZ, 2010).

The IBGE defined the following definition for monetary poverty: "Poor is one, who earns up to two governmental determined minimum wages; people who have to live with less than 2 US$ per day are considered extremely poor" (Santos, 2004).

According to this definition 17,4% respectively 29 million people of Brazil’s population were living in extreme poverty in 1999 (Santos, 2004). In 2012 the statutory minimum wage was 545 BRL (ca. 238€) per month, which was earned by 29,1 million both registered and not registered employees (Rothfuß, 2012). Another definition by the university Fundacao Getúlio Vargas (FGV) considers people extremely poor who earn less than 80 BRL (ca. 20€) per month. This illustrates a sum, according to FGV, just enough to not die of hunger. According to this definition, about 50 million people in Brazil were living in extreme poverty in 2001 (Santos, 2004).

No matter which definition of poverty is taken into account, poverty illustrates a big problem in Brazil. But first in 1988 poverty found its way into the Brazilian constitution. The eradication of poverty and marginalization as well as reducing social and spatial disparities were determined as part of the basic national objectives (Madlener, 1995). In the same year a gratuitous health care systems was established, to provide the poor population access to health care (Rinke & Schulze, 2013). But according to a local taxi driver, there are significant differences between the different health care institutions: "...there [pointing at a building] is a hospital, but I would never ever go there, if I had the choice...I would rather go to a private one or the military hospital" (Interview by the author with local taxi driver, March 2016)

But not all projects that in theory were thought to improve the conditions for the poor were in concrete or actually successful. For instance the social housing construction is not an alternative
for the poorest population groups and therefore does not help to improve their living situation, as they are not able to pay the monthly costs (Wehrhahn, 1998).

Causes for the poverty go back to slavery and the historically emerged social inequalities. The lion’s share of the poor population has African or indigenous roots (Rinke & Schulze, 2013), while the upper and middle class is characterized by white Creoles, which results in a racist social structure (Stapelfeldt, 1990). It also stands out when walking through Rio de Janeiro that most of the jobs with less required skills are done by black people, whereas for instance office jobs are predominantly occupied by white people. But also the concentration of income on a small upper class during the repression under the military dictatorship beginning 1964 increased the poverty within a big part of Brazil’s population (Santos, 2001).

Big hope to improve the poverty situation was set into a stricter implementation of compulsory education by the President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In 2000, 97% of all children were registered in schools, which resulted in only 9.9% of all Brazilians aged over 15 years being ana-phabets in 2008. In 1992, the percentage was 17.2% (Rinke & Schulze, 2013). Cardoso supported this project with subventions for the poor. Before that, many children could not go to school regularly, as they had to seek, usually informal, work to support their families (Santos, 2001). But recent developments seem to lead in an opposite direction, as it can be seen in an informal talk with a local: “The problem is that many children from the favelas don’t finish school or go to continuing education. They don’t earn any money while going to school. So what they do, is to quit school with 13, 14, 15 years and try to earn money. This can be more or less legal work [e.g. trading in the informal sector], or they become members in one of the drug gangs, which often rule the favelas, and do drug trafficking. In this way they can at least earn money, often it’s not even that less what they earn with selling drugs, and support their families.” (Interview by the author with Rio citizen, April 2016)

6.4 Social and spatial disparities in Brazil

Wehrhahn & Sandner Le Gall divide between ethnical and social segregation, which, however, often overlap (Wehrhahn & Sandner Le Gall, 2011). In Brazil, too, both forms of segregation are linked, as the poor population often has African or indigenous roots. Caldeira identifies three different forms of urban segregation in his case study in Sao Paulo, which also can be projected on Rio de Janeiro, and which characterize certain timespans (Caldeira, 2000). The first phase reaches from the end of the 19th century to 1940, when urban segregation was characterized by different social classes, which lived close together in urban areas and only differed in their housing-types. During the second phase, from the 1940s to the 1980s, the different social groups were segregated by a big spatial distance. The third phase, which has been starting in the 1980s and is still now occurring, brought the social groups closer together again, but now the segregation is caused by walls and security technologies, and the lack of interaction in the public space.

Through processes of urbanization and rural exodus, besides ecological problems like air pollution, land consumption, water pollution and soil degradation (Zirkl, 2007), it comes, forced by the privatization of public space (Rothfuß, 2012), to a transformation in the structure of the Brazilian city. New privileged-neighborhoods emerged after the model of “gated communities” in Northern America. In Brazil these are called condomínios fechados and not only limited to metropolitan areas, but also expand to regional centers (Coy & Pöhler, 2002). Rothfuß calls them “spatial manifestations of power and social inequality” (Rothfuß, 2012). In Rio de Janeiro
these neighborhoods can be found in different places spread all over the city, but Barra da Tijuca, the main center of the Olympics, stands out of it and is experiencing the most changes lately (see chapter 6.8). Recently more and more inner-urban condomínios can be seen, which are called condomínios horizontais, and which are similar to the peripheral ones characterized as luxury neighborhoods. This voluntary relocation process, with the preferred locations of the upper class, correlates with the trend of self-segregation. The rapid dispersion of the condomínios reflects the influence of globalization on the lifestyles of the upper and middle class as well as the change of urban development in the face of neoliberalism (Coy & Pöhler, 2002).

Coy & Pöhler identify some parallels between the condomínios of the privileged population and the marginal neighborhoods of the poor: “Both represent distinct small cities with a range of shopping and services offered within the city. The favelas as well as the condomínios hold own forms of organization on which the municipality only has limited influence. Furthermore, both spaces, condomínios and favelas, reduce the public space accessible for everyone as urban space” (Coy & Pöhler, 2002).

Fischer & Parnreiter therefore talk about a multi-fragmented city in the Latin American context, as the complex picture of urban development does not represent anymore a formerly clear spatial differentiation (Fischer & Parnreiter, 2002). Through the increased emergence of the condomínios, the large-scale models of segregation got set aside and transformed into smaller but more intense models of segregation.

The residents of these security-complexes automatically limit their contacts with the outside world and become more amenable to phantasies of fear, produced by the others, the poor, homeless and marginalized, who live outside their security-areas and are recognized as threat (Fischer & Parnreiter, 2002; Caldeira, 2000).

Employers often block the access to work for favela-residents, as they do not want to employ favela-residents because of the existing stereotype embedded in the upper and middle classes’ heads (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013). This mental segregation can also be seen, as poor people usually can move without problems in neighborhoods of the rich, but in turn, the rich usually would never intend to go into a neighborhood of the poor, they live in a culture of fear within their self-exclusion (Rothfuß, 2014).

6.5 The informal sector of economic activities in Rio de Janeiro

It is impossible to completely include the growing population in metropolises like Rio de Janeiro into the formal labor market, therefore they get predominantly included in the informal sector (Stapelfeldt, 1990). According to the IBGE more than 13 million people were “employed” in the informal sector in 2003 (Wrublevski Aued, 2006), more recent numbers about the informal sector are not provided by the IBGE.

The term informal sector is used in literature since the 1970s, when Hart recognized the diversity and dynamics of the urban informal activities, during his research about the urban informal sector in Ghana, for the first time (Santos, 2001). Stapelfeldt defines the informal sector as activities, which are not an explicit part of the industry, trade or the tertiary sector (Stapelfeldt, 1990). Due to its informality this sector is independent from administrative bodies (Wülker, 1991). In a collection of literature from the 1970s to 2001, Santos characterizes the informal sector, based on his research about Rio de Janeiro’s informal sector, as the following: no taxes, labor-intensive and capital-intensive production, use of predominantly basic tools, usage of old technologies, low production numbers, high labor-intensity, lack of social securities, and low
quality of the products (Santos, 2001). Another characteristic of the informal sector is the high share of child labor, according to Santos more than 80% started their work before turning 18 (Santos, 2001).

Public space is often used as workplace (Stapelfeldt, 1990) and, especially in the small businesses, working and living is closely linked. Many employees in the informal small business are suppliers for the trade and industry of the formal sector (Hannemann, 1995). Therefore the formal and informal sector are closely linked. There are also many people, who are employed within the formal sector, but try to increase their income with additional activities in the informal sector (Santos, 2001). On the contrary to the informal sector, the formal sector, at least in theory, respects the existing laws, also the tax-, labor-, and social-laws. The produced goods from this sector fulfill the legal requirements (Santos, 2001).

This illustrates the importance of the informal sector in Latin American cities and especially in Rio de Janeiro. It can be seen as a “give and get” as the informal sector is widely accepted among the lion’s share of the population: the informally employed may sell their goods in many different places, for instance on beaches or streets, and the remaining population suffers and even supports that with buying their products. Speaking from own experience, there are consumers from all classes of population, reaching from the poor, who can't afford goods from the formal sector, to the rich, who on the one hand want to support and on the other hand enjoy the fact to not have to go somewhere to buy their goods as they are “coming” to them. So the informal sector is not only important for the economy, it is also a part of the culture. But with recent developments of globalization and neoliberalism, especially the increasing privatization of public space, the existence of the informal sector is challenged and therefore the means of existence for millions of people.

6.6 Political Approaches to reduce poverty and disparities in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

When looking into the past, there can be found different approaches in policy, to overcome the problems of the favelas, starting with the authoritarian eviction policy from 1962 to 1974. In this timespan, 80 favelas in Rio de Janeiro were cleared by force and about 139,000 residents were relocated by force to peripheral neighborhoods (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). Favela-organizations played an important role in the resistance against these evictions by mobilizing the residents against these measures and forming protest groups against violations through the government (Santos, 2001). This was followed, in 1975, by three years of a “transition period of the laisser-faire-policy” (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). Before, from 1979 on, a housing policy change in Rio de Janeiro occurred and the simultaneous identification of favela-restoration was established as a means for solving the housing problem. The military regime approved reforms, which on the one hand prohibited the continuation of an authoritarian favela-policy and on the other hand ended in several, independent from each other, programs for infrastructural supply in the favelas. This for the first time, resulted in a visible improvement of the living conditions in these areas. After the central government’s pullback from the housing policy in 1987, the municipality itself had responsibility for housing policy, which meant better frame conditions through strengthening the local autonomy, even if the effect of it was a decreased capital capacity. During the preparation of the municipal land use plan “Plano Diretor” the restoration of the favelas got embedded in the city law. In this way the favelas were titled as special zones, which created the basis for comprehensive urban favela-restoration programs (Killisch & Dietz,
Former president Cardoso recognized the necessity for decreasing the disparities in Brazil, too. As he put it: “On the one hand we are a modern and industrialized nation, on the other hand a mass of “from progress excluded” exists, whose living conditions are comparable to those in the poorest countries on earth” (Cardoso, 1995).

Cardoso claims that the economic development model of the 1970s increased the disparities between rich and poor even more, and that especially children, black, women and elderly people were affected by inequalities (Cardoso, 1995). The recent president Dilma Rousseff stated in her inaugural speech: “The preferential goal of my government will be the unrelenting fight against extreme poverty and the creation of chances for everyone” (Rothfuß, 2012). But in the face of the protests between 2012 and 2016, and the latest political crisis in Brazil, it is doubtful to which extent these promises are seen as fulfilled by the Brazilian population.

The next section focuses on three different urbanization/housing programs (the Favela Bairro program, the Morar Carioca Urbinazacao program, and the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program) in detail.

6.6.1 The urbanization-program Favela Bairro in Rio de Janeiro in early 1990s

The Favela Bairro program, enacted in 1994, was in the beginning financed with urban funding and implemented in 15 favelas in Zona Norte (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). The program aimed to transform the favelas into regular bairros (neighborhoods) and to regain public control over these urban enclaves (Ribbeck, 2003) as well as making the city accessible for everyone (Segre, 2010). It was supposed to reduce spatial as well as psychological distances between politicians and residents (Paiva, 1999). In this context, it was also a goal to include the favelas into the land- and housing market, so that these could become liable to tax. Requirement therefore is the mapping and legalization of these plots (Ribbeck, 2003). The numbers of favelas included in the project vary, for instance Paiva talks about 19 favelas in the year 1994 (Paiva, 1999). The overall goal was to upgrade all medium-sized favelas until 2004, which defined a size of 500-2500 households and corresponds to about 1/3 of all favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Fiori & Brandao, 2010; Paiva, 1999).

After getting granted a credit of 300 million US$ from the “Inter-American Development Bank” (IDB) in 1995, it was possible to expand the program onto additional 50 favelas. In comparison to former measures for favela-restorations, many private architecture- and planning offices were included in inventory, analysis and planning (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). The planning of single projects was the result of a competition organized by the municipality in 1994 (Paiva, 1999) and had the advantage that architecture- and planning offices, which usually avoided the favela-topics, dealt with this matter (Segre, 2010). The following areas should be covered: “stabilization of hillsides vulnerable to erosion, restoration of the road network and the sanitation, public lighting, street cleaning and waste management, and construction of public services buildings” (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). Ribbeck adds the building of small public plazas, creation of a structured center in the favelas, extension and fixation of access routes, implementation of elderly homes, building of replacement accommodation, installation of play- and sportsgrounds, and construction of kindergartens (Ribbeck, 2003). After getting granted another credit from IDB worth 300 million US$, the program Favela Bairro II could restore an additional 63 favelas between 2000 and 2004 (Killisch & Dietz, 2002).

Besides the central Favela Bairro program, other programs like Grandes Favelas (big favelas), aimed at the bigger favelas, as well as the EU- and Caixa Económica Federal (CEF)-financed
program *Bairrinho* (small neighborhood), aiming at small-sized *favelas* with 100-300 households, were applied. These comprehensive programs were supplemented by special programs like for instance a program for adolescents of *favelas*, an educational program, which should increase the chances for education and further education through collaboration with relevant institutions, and the *Tele-Centro*, which promotes the extension of technical infrastructure and therefore was supposed to provide job opportunities (Paiva, 1999).

However, the *Favela Bairro* program, which in theory is quite remarkable in terms of goals to be achieved, had some weaknesses, especially due to the small amount of public participation. Due to the lack of communication with the affected residents, it was difficult to deal with their explicit needs. Furthermore the first *Favela Bairro* program was strongly focused on technical infrastructure, only the second program dealt with measures for income acquisition and improvements of the social infrastructure. Omnipresent is the drug trafficking, which can hardly be influenced by such a program (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). Additionally, problems with the decentralization of authority in the guidance and coordination of all subprojects occurred, because of the involvement of numerous private companies (Paiva, 1999).

The weaknesses were the result of the learning process in which the city was at this time since the program was the first of its kind and had never been applied to this extent. Yet it is seen as a success, as it is assumed that the living conditions of 376,000 *favela* residents were improved (Killisch & Dietz, 2002). The program is still seen as one of the biggest upgrade-programs in Latin America and internationally honored (Perlman, 2010).

Two additional housing programs have been implemented in the Strategic Plan as described below.

### 6.6.2 Morar Carioca Urbanizacao (Urban Housing Program) since 2010

One of Rio de Janeiro’s urban housing programs is the *Morar Carioca Urbanizacao*, the “*Integration of Informal Precarious Settlements Programme*” (Municipal Government, 2012). The program was created to be the urban and land ownership arm of the Municipality’s Social Housing Plan. It aims at the “*effective integration of precarious informal settlements*” (Municipal Government, 2012). The goal of the program is to upgrade 584 units (of a total of 642 units, corresponding to 1041 settlements categorized as *favelas*). According to the Strategic Plan the actions within the program include the following fields:

- Implementation of Infrastructure and Urban Equipment (water, sewage treatment, drainage, public road lighting, garbage collection, hillside contention, road paving, and public equipment), Public Urban Services, Housing Construction, Household Interventions, Ownership Regularization, and Social Developments in 251 units with over 100 houses.
- Intervention in 131 units with 70% of their area at risk, requiring analyses by the competent municipal agencies as to the need for resettlement.
- Upgrading and integration of the 202 units with less than 100 houses to the formal city fabric (Municipal Government, 2012).

The municipal government (author of the Strategic Plan) therefore sees an alignment with the following municipal government goals:

- Upgrade urban services – water, sewage treatment, drainage, road lighting, garbage collection, hillside contention and paving – to 156 thousand homes by 2016, as part of the *Morar Carioca* initiative.
- Reduce by at least 5% the areas occupied by favelas in the city by 2016, benchmarked to 2008.
- Ensure that by the end of 2016 there are no more families living in high risk areas (hillsides).

6.6.3 Minha Casa, Minha Vida program since 2011
In 2009 housing production became prioritized and one means to that is the Federal Government’s Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life) housing program, which got adopted by the Municipal Government. By 2011 more than 35,000 new housing units were contracted to be built for families with an income up to R$5,000. The goal of this program is to build 50,000 new housing units for families with income up to 10 minimum wages, which illustrates the group in which the housing deficit is concentrated. A part of the new units is for families coming from high risk areas and/or areas that are extremely precarious. Even though 35,000 new units had been built by 2011, the city’s housing deficit was still estimated at ca. 300,000 units. The municipality therefore expects to deliver new housing units for approximately 100,000 families and reduce the number of people living in extremely poor, precarious, and high risk areas. The Minha Casa, Minha Vida program is supposed to match the following Municipal Government's goals:

- Promote the construction of 100,000 new housing units by the end of 2016, aiming at at least 30% of them for the 0 to 3 minimum wage bracket, through partnerships with the private sector and other spheres of government, benchmarked to 2008.
- Reduce by at least 5% the areas occupied by favelas in the city by 2016, benchmarked to 2008.
- To ensure that by the end of 2016 there are no more families living in high risk areas (hillsides) (Municipal Government, 2012).

But when looking at the budget it is not apparent in which ways the partnerships with the private sector takes place since all funding comes from Governmental Funds (Municipal Government, 2012).

At a first glance the program looks like a great chance for many poor to find a place in the formal housing market. But as it can be seen in Figure 2, big parts of the new housing units built within the program Minha Casa, Minha Vida are located in the periphery and far away from many favelas, which can lead to problems described in chapter 6.5. The impacts of the Olympics on the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program will be explained in chapter 6.8.
6.7 Measures and reactions in face of the 2014 World Cup and the Olympics 2016 in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro

6.7.1 Unicade de Policía Pacificadora

In 2008 in view of the upcoming sports mega events in 2014 and 2016 a new police unit was established in Rio de Janeiro: the Unicade de Policía Pacificadora (UPP). The UPPs are police units used as pacification police in the marginal neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro.

The goal was to make the police unit more citizen-oriented. To date, mistrust existed on the part of the favela residents in relation to the state and police. The common picture of the police is negative, many favela residents have made bad experiences with the police in the past. Violence, corruption, discrimination and the loss of friends and relatives were associated with the police. Not the police but the drug gangs were often seen as a protective institution (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013). The newly invented UPPs were an attempt to change this picture, therefore predominantly police officers, who have their roots in the favelas, were recruited (Prutsch & Rodrigues-Moura, 2013). They did not only try to advance into a favela, how it was practiced in previous maneuvers by the police, but also understand the favela (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013).

In 2013, 19 favelas in Rio de Janeiro were officially considered pacified (Prutsch & Rodrigues-Moura, 2013). Especially in the district Cidade de Deus, which formerly was considered very dangerous, the UPPs contributed to the improvement between police and favela population. 55% percent of the questionnaire participants had a positive picture of the UPPs. However data about the popularity of the police before is not available (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013).

In the beginning of 2014 a total of 40 UPPs was installed, covering 256 favelas with an estimated population of 1,5 million people. The security situation in Rio de Janeiro has noticeably improved (Stolte, 2014). But why only 19 favelas are seen as pacified is worth questioning. This improvement also occurs mentally. The favelas become thereby integrated step by step in the heads of the other city residents. Some favelas on the hillsides get connected to the city center through new cable cars and therefore provide the opportunity for its residents to work.
there. In numerous *favelas* restaurants, hotels and bars have been opened. The “new” neighborhoods are also introduced in urban magazines. But despite an increasing number of new protests, starting from 2014, a psychological change in perception can be recognized (Stolte, 2014). Stolte describes such throwbacks like the protests in the years 2013 and 2014 as unavoidable. It is impossible to change an attitude over night that has been existing for decades. Simultaneously it is impossible to eliminate well established drug gangs over night. But it seems like there is no other effective alternative to the *UPP* right now, which can be deduced by, amongst others, the increased numbers of acts of violence and murders in other Brazilian cities that have no long-term program similar to the *UPP*-program in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo (Stolte, 2014). For instance in Salvador the number of murders increased by 69% between 2006 and 2010, also caused by the latest pacification measures in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Therefore the drug trafficking relocates to the country’s northeast (Rothfuß, 2014). Hence the number of murders have decreased in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, a survey about that has not been yet published.

### 6.7.2 Resistance in the population from 2012-2014

According to a statement of Brazil’s General Accounting Office in April 2013, the costs for the FIFA World Cup 2014 in Brazil are about 9,9 billion €, the real costs are probably higher. The FIFA earns about 3,1 billion € through marketing and licensing during the World Cup, according to their own statement (Glüsing & Großekathöfer, 2014). Civil protests occurred not only as an effect of the high costs for the World Cup and Olympics. One cause of the protests is rooted in the rapid social change during the first decade of the new millennium and the emergence of a new middle class in Brazil resulting from that (Stolte, 2014). Caused by the economic boom with an economic growth of 7,5% at its top in 2007, how Stolte calls it, a new income class C evolved, following the upper class A and the traditional middle class B. The members of this new, lower middle class often still live in poor neighborhoods, but have, through increasing income and governmental support, higher living standards available compared to previous years and therefore have the opportunity to participate in a consumption that is alike the one of the upper and traditional middle class (Stolte, 2014). Within 10 years about 30-40 million Brazilians moved up to the new middle class (Albrecht, et al., 2013). According to Stolte (2014), 54% of the Brazilian population are member of this new middle class. The growth in spending, number of vehicles, flights, and the like overloaded the national infrastructure. Therefore the civil protests have their basis primarily in the traditional middle class, who do not want to accept a relative deterioration of their own situation. An example can be the waiting time at the doctor’s or longer traffic congestion times, because the state missed out to keep pace with the growing middle class (Stolte, 2014) and rather invested public money into sports stadia or the like. All protest groups have in common that they complain about the condition of both the educational and healthcare system, the poor public transportation, and political corruption (Fraundorfer, 2013).

But the publicly interesting protests during the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013 did not occur all of a sudden, they had a past history. Since 2012, the civil movements led by teachers, doctors or policemen to claim for better payment and working conditions occurred again and again in the whole country. Another factor that increased the common dissatisfaction was the election of Renan Calheiros, who was facing allegations of bribery, as president of the senate (Fraundorfer, 2013). Catalyst of the escalation, which ended up in the civil protests, was the rise in prices for public transport, which is the most important means of transport especially for adolescents and students, in several Brazilian cities. When the population could see, after the
opening of the Confederations Cup, on what the public money was mainly spent on, the globally recognized demonstrations (Fraundorfer, 2013) under the umbrella of the *passe livre* (*free journey*) movement followed (Albrecht, et al., 2013).

Besides the street protests, violent conflicts in Rio de Janeiro’s *favelas* occurred again in the beginning of 2014, especially in those which were supposed to be pacified and occupied by the *UPPs*. The number of attacks by drug gangs as well as the complaints by residents about the *UPPs* piled up, which in contrast to the initially planned course of action, were then suspected of violating human rights (Stolte, 2014). As a blueprint for the character of this fragile ‘social peace’ built in the *favelas*, a protest in a *favela* nearby Copacabana escalated in form of burning barricades and one dead in late April 2014 (Stolte, 2014).

Another example is the clearing of houses by the police, which was not always peaceful. According to BBC, the police cleared a plot in April 2014, which belonged to a telecommunications company and where about 5000 people lived on. The problem was that the displaced people did not have any place to go. When they get displaced from the illegal land, they have to live on the streets. There were also many children who got displaced. The public authorities argue that there was a team of social workers in place to help those people. But in reality just 177 of the displaced people accepted support (BBC, 2014).

### 6.8 The planning for the Olympics and the contemporary changes/impacts in Rio de Janeiro

As mentioned before, Rio de Janeiro was not only host to the Pan American Games 2007 and the FIFA World Cup 2014, but is also going to be the host city for the Olympics 2016. As the Olympics are the biggest sports events in the world, major changes in the host city are required. Numerous new stadiums are built as well as the ‘Athlete’s village’, the latter constructed to become home to thousands of athletes and staff members of the Olympics. The existent infrastructures are undergoing major changes of expansion, just to name the biggest changes in Rio’s cityscape. As many changes are required to meet the Olympics’ requirements, major planning actions are required, too, the next part investigates how the planning has been done so far in Rio de Janeiro.

In 2009 Rio de Janeiro was chosen to become the host of the 2016 Summer Olympics. In 2011 the latest and still effectual municipal master plan came into effect, hence after it was clear that Rio de Janeiro will host the Games. This, of course, affected the existing master plan and Olympics-related projects have been established herein as the projects for the Olympics have an impact on the whole development of the city. Initially, just one Olympic center in Rio de Janeiro was planned that should be located in Barra da Tijuca, about 30 kilometers west of the center of Rio de Janeiro. However this decision changed in the course and the Olympics 2016 will take place in four major hubs. The main center will still be in Barra da Tijuca, including the Olympic Park, the ‘Athlete’s village’ and a range of different stadiums. Besides that, Olympic competitions will be held in Deodoro (poor neighborhood (Mancebo & Schlee, 2016 – Appendix A) located in the Zona Norte), Copacabana (due to the famous beach with the same name, the most famous neighborhood of Rio with wealthy residents, located in the Zona Sul) and Maracanã (located at the western edge of the CBD, linking the wealthy southern part of the city (Zona Sul) with the poor northern part (Zona Norte), location of the famous Maracanã stadium).
The intention behind the decision to have several clusters for the Olympics was because the municipal planners recognized that it was better for the city not to catalyze all the flows to one big cluster like it was initially planned in Barra da Tijuca. The main idea was instead “to distribute the benefits to different parts of the city” (Mancebo & Schlee, 2016 – Appendix A), whereas Müller (2015) argues, by quoting the former mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, that there can also be different rationales behind a city’s planning strategy for a mega-event like the Olympics:

“I didn’t bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics because it’s the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the Government to develop the East End. (quoted in Davies, 2008)” (Müller, 2015).

A major planning task was then to connect the different clusters with each other as well as to connect each of these with the city center. This problem has been tried to be solved by introducing several new BRT-lines (Transcarioca, Transoeste, Transolímpica), especially from Barra da Tijuca to the center, but also connecting poor neighborhoods like Deodoro with the rest of the city (Mancebo & Schlee, 2016 – Appendix A). Another infrastructure project is the new line and an extension of the Metro to better connect Barra da Tijuca with the city center. It is worth mentioning that Barra da Tijuca is a highly securitized, predominantly wealthy district, characterized by high-rise condominium complexes, shopping malls, and commercial centers connected with an extensive road system and “because of the car-dependence and securitized environments proximate to kilometers of beach, Barra da Tijuca is jokingly referred to as the Miami of Rio de Janeiro” (Gaffney, 2015). Even though the area is located within the city barriers, it looks more like a suburb, due to its far distance from the denser city center and the topography of the two massifs, which take the view on the center away, in between. The main problems with Barra da Tijuca is thus the location far from the center and the traffic congestion on a daily basis that requires about two hours driving by car during rush-hours from the southern
neighborhoods like Ipanema and Copacabana to Barra da Tijuca. It can be argued that the BRT and Metro can be a good solution to better connect the suburbs with the city and reduce traffic. However, this public transport infrastructure will “only” connect a wealthy neighborhood with the city center. The BRT and Metro project thus does not help to increase job opportunities for the poor population in Barra da Tijuca, in terms of being able to commute to the city center, as they cannot afford the costs for public transport. Therefore it might predominantly benefit the upper and middle class by making their travels more comfortable, and strengthen Barra da Tijuca as the new business center of Rio de Janeiro. Own observations have shown that the Metro is predominantly, judging by outer appearance and color of the skin, used by the upper and middle class citizens. Furthermore another rise in prices for a Metro ticket took place in April 2016. A one way ticket costs 4,10 R$ now, which is the same prize like two bottles of water in a supermarket.

6.8.1 Exceptional laws and zoning changes in favor of Olympics
The Olympics-related projects in Rio de Janeiro show the trend of an increasing number of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) as mentioned earlier. PPPs widen the opportunities for the municipality to develop the city with less amount of public money, needed for other projects, but also strengthen the private sector by providing space for exercising influence and power in decision making and in the planning process. PPPs can be seen critical in relation to a socially just urban planning approach. The PPPs are often characterized as focusing on single projects in the city and, due to the nature of the private sector, market and profit oriented. This can lead to improvements in the specific areas where the projects are actually implemented but without an overview on the whole city. This can constitute a limit that can foster segregation, when only certain parts of the city are developed and many other parts are instead left out (Santos Junior & Santos, 2014). Furthermore, PPP-projects foster socio-spatial segregation on a district level, when the municipality gives away the ruling power over the space. This can for instance result in the so-called ‘gated communities’ or the privatization of public space, e.g. parks or public places, which then can end in limitations of accessibility for citizens and therefore limiting some ‘rights to the city’. That means that private owners of these places can decide whom they want to grant access to their property and whom not, which is often at poor people’s expense (Brenner, et al., 2011). Therefore it is worth questioning, why the city of Rio de Janeiro, characterized by a high social inequality, uses PPPs, with the mentioned affects, as an instrument for urban development. But this becomes clearer when looking at the boards of the Olympic projects and the decision making processes that take place for different projects.

6.8.2 The composition of the boards
Disproportional financial distribution is illustrated by the composition of the different committee members. Speaking about the World Cup 2014 costs, 75% of the total R$24 billion were contributed by the federal government, another 23% from other spheres of public authority, and only 2% of the budget came from private sector. The budget for the Olympics is about R$31 billion, of which 45% will be used for “roads, railways, and urban inheritance”, and another 15% for the construction of “sporting installations, the Olympic Village, and the media” (Melo, 2014). Most of the financial resources are used on infrastructural projects, but the main complaint is the massive contribution of public money and the little participation of the private sector. But when looking at the influence on the decision making, it seems to change this financial distribution picture.

In relation to sporting mega-events, there are two types of agencies, organizations and parallel structures that function as preparation for the events: “those of a decision-making/executive
nature and those of an advisory nature” (Melo, 2014). While the first are “legally responsible for deciding and implementing guidelines and actions related to the projects for the mega-event”, the latter provide information, opinions, studies and representations of interest of specific groups which “subsidize the decision-making of the groups that are effectively responsible” (Melo, 2014). Furthermore it is possible to distinguish the groups between governmental and non-governmental.

Looking at the dozens of agencies created for the World Cup and Olympics it can be identified that a grand majority is of consultative and governmental character.

“The effective decision-making power is concentrated in a very reduced number of deliberative state and non-state organizations, directly connected to multinational organizations, who debate and discuss amongst themselves according to their respective stipulated responsibilities in agreements and contracts signed between the federal and municipal government, FIFA or the IOC, and local communities” (Melo, 2014).

When looking at the different boards the “absence of civil society representatives and [...] popular strata” is outstanding (Melo, 2014). It is necessary to mention that “the proceedings, advice, and participatory instances that are integrated into the Brazilian institutional-legal apparatus” (Melo, 2014) are completely missing when shaping the new agencies, which have been created for being responsible for the urban projects related to the World Cup and the Olympics. In the context of the preparations of the World Cup, which is organized in a similar way to the Olympics, only one agency (a Work Group created by the Federal Secretary for Human Rights) can be identified in representation of the social movements, but limited to advisory work. The key player in the preparations of the World Cup is the Ministry of Sports, which coordinates the principal deliberative and consultative organizations. Along with this the “massive presence of representatives from most varied federal organizations is identified” (Melo, 2014). Santos Junior calls this constellation a type of “decentralized centralization [...] in which the federal government calls on the most varied components to participate in decisions, without, meanwhile, promoting an effective decentralization through the opening of institutions for civil society” (Melo, 2014). In the context of the Olympics it is the Public Olympic Authority taking over the role of governmental decentralization unaccompanied by participation. The rare openings to participation are limited to institutions associated with private companies, which Santos Junior put as following:

“In the few moments when civil society was called to participate in the decision-making process, it was restricted to only corporate face and business-like NGOs were privileged” (Melo, 2014).

Emblematic for this is the composition of the Legacy Board for the Olympics with its five representatives of the city of Rio de Janeiro, one representative of the state government, representatives of the organizing committees of the World Cup and the Olympics, five representatives from the private sector and four representatives from the civil society (Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian Institute of Architects, Association of Directors of Real Estate Companies, NGO Rio Como Vamos, which underline the limited access for civil society) (Melo, 2014).

In conclusion, three different characteristics of the mentioned agencies created for the preparation of the mega-events can be identified. First, they are decentralized in relation to sharing responsibilities between governmental spheres and organs. Second, they are extremely limited
to public participation. The third characteristic of this exceptional governmental structure is that
the entities represented by the state as participatory seems to be more pseudo-participatory.

6.8.3 The decision making process
Several protest groups have been mobilized in relation to the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. The
two most important are the Popular Committee of the World Cup (ANCOP) and Project Fair
Play, the first one especially fighting for the right to the city, by discovering for instance human
rights violations, limitations of the right to housing, exclusions of specific social groups from
the city, whereas the latter one associated to “social responsibility initiatives of companies,
surrounding combat of corruption and the amplification of transparency” (Melo, 2014). Both
groups criticize the arbitrariness’ of public authorities and the lack of transparency in decision
making.

A major criticism evolves around the eviction of favelas. Before the World Cup 2014 and the
Olympics 2016, numerous favelas were evicted by public authorities and the police. Many pro-
test groups argue that the favela residents do not get fair compensation and are threatened by
public authorities to accept the disproportional compensations they get offered. Furthermore
these protest groups raise the fact that public authorities use reasons like the existence of the
favela – many of them located in environmental risk areas - to justify the eviction, but after-
wards these locations are re-used for private housing construction. One of the examples regard-
ing an eviction with disproportionate compensation is the case of the favela Vila Autodrómio in
Barra da Tijuca. This favela is located in the area of the future Olympic Park. During the plan-
ning and construction of the Olympic Park numerous families had to leave their homes in Vila
Autodrómo (Gaffney, 2015), some voluntarily agreed on the compensations offered by the pub-
lic authorities, others were threatened so much that they felt like having no other choice than
agreeing on that. Gaffney illustrates the majority of the criticism as following:

“No criteria for removals were given, leading to suspicions of strategic targeting of valuable
real estate. No plans for resettlement had been discussed with residents of these areas and no
processes of negotiation initiated, yet the government announced an offering price of R$1.04
per square of land and nothing for the material elements of houses. The average market cost
per square meter in January 2010 was R$4.82 and had risen to R$9.22 by January 2014
(Gaffney, 2015)”.

This argument illustrates the problem of the population who have to leave their homes. Often
there is no planning behind displacement as were they can find new homes or they get offered
housing far away from their previous homes. This hits hard especially the poor. They are often
employed in the informal sector and usually have their workplace closely linked to their living
place. In case of an eviction they do not only lose their social environment, which is of special
importance in favelas, but also lose their work. Gaffney sees the state-led, mega-event-related
projects answering the demands of the upper and middle class for more affordable residential
housing:

“The expanding closed-condominium residential landscape is attending the demands of Rio`s
rising middle and upper-middle class who are seeking an affordable residential alternative to
the hyper-valorized Zona Sul. State-led, mega-event-related projects are partially filling this
demand but in order to maximize rents, there is a need to have “clean territories” free of fave-
las. The Olympics itself is generating significant real estate pressures at the same time the city
government has changed zoning laws to maximize real estate speculation” (Gaffney, 2015).
One of the examples for such a zoning change is the golf course for the Olympics. It is built in Barra da Tijuca, close to the beach and sea. The land were the golf course will be located was an environmental protection area, but the zoning got changed ahead of the Olympics and the related projects. The critics not only complain about the golf course itself, as Rio de Janeiro already had two high quality golf courses, they even more criticize the plans of turning the area into a housing complex including high-value condominiums and hotels (Focus online, 2015).

Whereas the criticism mentioned above focuses on procedural aspects, the criticism about the Athlete’s village is about the fact that lots of public money was used for private, market-oriented construction of housing. The consortium called *Ilha Pura* (Pure Island), formed by the civil construction firms Carvalho Hosken and Norberto Odebrecht, received R$2,33 billion (ca. $900mio.) in public financing for the project. However, there is no affordable housing provided. The complex, consisting of 31 buildings, will have 3,604 apartments in which the Athlete’s and staff members are going to live during the games. After the games “these residential units will be sold on the open market as condominiums with an expected market value in excess of R$4 billion” (Gaffney, 2015). According to the sales-flyers of the apartments it is hard to imagine that these apartments will be affordable even for the middle class. Instead it will be a super exclusionary complex of high-end luxury apartments for the upper class.

![Figure 4: Ilha Pura, the Athlete’s Village during the Olympics. (Source: own illustration, based on sales flyer, 2016).](image)

“This type of state-sponsored project is repeating exclusionary residential landscapes across the Barra da Tijuca region” (Gaffney, 2015).

### 6.8.4 The housing programs and the Olympics

As described in chapter 6.8, the Olympic clusters are supposed to boost diverse areas in the city. But not all stakeholders, e.g. citizens, retailers, developers, in these areas will benefit from
this boost, as the Olympics will put pressure on some groups, especially the poor, by for instance the estimated increase of land prizes. According to Mancebo (2016) the municipality is aware of such problems, but they are to some extent hogtied as the following part of the interview illustrates:

Author: „Is it possible for the population in those areas to benefit from it or is there a danger of living cost increase, so that they get pushed out or is there any safety backup to avoid that?”

Mancebo: “Ja this is a good question. And this is a challenge, even to our low income program of providing houses here in Brazil. This risk exists and this is something that occurs even with the program “Minha Casa, Minha Vida”. […] This has also occurred with this program. One of the housing projects that were derived from the cluster, was one “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” that was made in Jacarepagua […] Near the cluster of Barra [da Tijuca], but it’s a more poor region, it’s not a high income region. And this is a project of “Minha Casa, Minha Vida”, which will be destination to low income people. This mechanism makes sure that the prize of land increase we don’t have [the program avoids the increase of land prizes].

It’s important but we don’t have that in Rio yet. Because there are some instruments, urbanistic instruments that have already been regulated in the executive, but it’s in analysis and waiting for approval in the legislative.”

Author: “Is it like, maybe that’s a bit straight forward now, but can it be that it takes so long [on purpose]?”

Mancebo: “Yes, yes, it’s taking a long time because 2012, they went from here to the legislative to be analyzed and approved but it took a long time.”

Author: “Do you think it’s, maybe because they want to get other projects through before this gets approved or is it just such a big thing to analyze. Does it take so long?”

Mancebo: “Ja, Ja both. Ja because it’s really a very huge amount of laws that they have to analyze and also there is something […] it has to be a political force, interest to be approved.”

(Mancebo & Schlee, 2016 – Appendix A – emphasis added).

As this quote shows, the urban planners try to establish instruments to protect the poor population under pressure of neoliberalization and globalization, but there are several things hindering a bigger success. On the one hand, the notion referring to the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program confirms the previously mentioned problems in relation to the provision of social housing, since the housing explained in this case, is in an even poorer region. On the other hand evolves the question, why these instruments to avoid increases in land prizes did not go to the court earlier than 2012 or were evaluated quicker by the court, as it was already clear for three years that Rio de Janeiro will host the Olympics 2016.

6.8.5 Summary of the Analysis

To create a basis to build on later in the chapter, some special characteristics of Rio de Janeiro were introduced. This covered a general description of the social structure (demography) and topography, and an elaboration on the characteristics of the emblematic marginal neighborhoods (favelas). By doing this, the relevance as well as the importance of favelas in the Brazilian and Rio case context were highlighted. Building on this, some problems that either cause the emergence of marginal neighborhoods (e.g. urbanization, lack of housing) or are caused by marginal neighborhoods were identified. These problems include the topics of poverty, social
and spatial disparities, and the informal sector of economic activities. Relating these results to, for instance, the capabilities approach by Sen and Nussbaum, it can be identified that not all citizens have the same opportunities.

The next section is more focused on the structures, institutions and organizations that, referring to Brenner (2009), produce (in)justice. In these chapters (6.6; 6.7), the government, federal as well as municipal, and the police can be identified as institutions that are producing (in)justice. Even though the institutions aimed at reducing injustices and increase justice, the result, however, was even more injustice. The mentioned urbanization and housing programs are planning strategies created by the government, they can therefore be seen as an instrumentalization of the public authorities’ course.

This section is followed by a chapter about the resistance in the population about recent developments in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, using the sports mega-events (World Cup and Olympics) as a platform for gaining more attention and therefore linking the previously mentioned issues to these mega-events. Also here, it can be referred to the theoretical framework, namely the ‘right to the city’, that is used as a “banner which has unified a global struggle roll back the commodification and privatization of urban space, and sparked conflicts over who has claim to the city and what kind of city it should be” (Brown, 2013).

Building on the frame that was set by the previous chapters, an Olympics-related analysis of Rio de Janeiro took place, by looking at the planning that has been done for the Olympics and its contemporary changes/impacts in Rio. First, the focus was on showing where the Olympic-centers will be located and which major changes of the cityscape were related to these projects. By doing this, it could be identified that, instead of the initial plan of having only one major center for the Olympics in Barra da Tijuca, four Olympic-centers were planned. This was, according to urban planners (Mancebo & Schlee (2016)), to distribute the benefits of the Olympics to more parts of the city. But at least two of the neighborhoods, in which the Olympic-centers will be located, are already wealthy neighborhoods (Barra da Tijuca, Copacabana). The neighborhood of Maracanã, which links the rich ‘Zona Sul’ and the poor ‘Zona Norte’, is more a middle-class neighborhood, whereas the neighborhood of Deodoro is the only poor neighborhood that will host Olympic-competitions. The effort by the municipality to distribute the benefits is an attempt of “mitigating the worst outcomes at the margins of an unjust system” (Harvey & Potter, 2011) (by not having only one center in the wealthy neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca) and thereby creating a more just city. But following Harvey, it does not make sense to talk about justice as long as the current system of neoliberal oppression is still in place (Harvey, 2008; Brenner, 2009; Harvey & Potter, 2011). Another indicator of injustice in this distribution is that it favors the already well-off (Barra da Tijuca, Copacabana) more than the least well-off (Deodoro). Based on this brief explanation of the physical changes (infrastructure projects, Athletes village) of the cityscape related to the Olympics, the focus of the analysis was shifted towards the structure and changes in the planning strategies and policies. This analysis identified changes in form of exceptional laws and zoning changes in favor for the Olympics, a composition of the boards responsible for the Olympics, which is clearly dominated by public authorities and characterized by limited public participation, accessible only for privileged actors (covering the commercial and real estate sectors). This is in line with Müller (2015), who identified the following “symptoms” and related “consequences” coming along with mega-event planning:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event takeover</td>
<td>Event priorities become planning priorities</td>
<td>- Event-needs displace urban infrastructure needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of exception</td>
<td>Suspension of regular rule of law</td>
<td>- Displacement&lt;br&gt;- Reduced public oversight&lt;br&gt;- Limited public participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite capture</td>
<td>Inequitable distribution of resources</td>
<td>- Spatially uneven urban landscape&lt;br&gt;- Gentrification</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Symptoms of mega-event planning. Based on Müller (2015)*

In the end, the housing programs are set in relation to the Olympics and it is elaborated on how the Olympic-related changes, which took place on the mentioned levels, affect the justice aspect of these programs.
7 Conclusion

During the 20th century, Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in particular experienced, due to neoliberal growth strategies, a massive population growth, an economic boom and processes of urbanization. This led on the one hand to social advancement and even the establishment of a new social class, the lower middle class C, but on the other hand not everyone participated in this economic boom, which resulted in increased socio-spatial inequalities, apparent by ‘clusters of poverty and crime’, the favelas. But only in 1988, the fight against poverty was established in the Brazilian constitution for the first time, in order to reduce social inequalities and empowering the poor, marginalized population. Rio de Janeiro is emblematic for this development in the Latin American, but has been facing new challenges by hosting a series of mega-events with the biggest of all sports events, the Olympics, at its end.

The case of the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, once again, has shown that national and municipal planning strategies and policies are changed in favor and because of the mega-event, namely the Olympics. The neoliberal growth strategy, fostered by the Olympics, has been instrumentalized through PPPs. These were increasingly established for the preparation of the Olympics. Additionally, rules of exception are identified, which means the suspension of the regular rule of law. Examples therefore are the eviction of numerous favelas, justified by dubious reasons and serving the mega-event as well as private developer interests; and the composition of the boards, neglecting the proceedings, advice, and participatory instances that are integrated into the Brazilian institutional-legal apparatus. Furthermore, the Olympics are used by the municipality for zoning changes in order to serve real estate developer interests.

Rio de Janeiro is still characterized by both social and spatial injustice, caused and intensified by the Olympics. Even though the national and municipal government established urbanization and housing programs (e.g. Minha Casa, Minha Vida) to achieve a more just planning approach with the strategy of legalizing informal neighborhoods and distributing services more fair, it (1) was only partially successful due to weaknesses in the programs and (2) socio-spatial injustices were intensified under the pressure of the Olympics. The social injustices are identified as: (1) exclusion from the city in relation to public participation, illustrated by the PPPs and the composition of the boards; (2) projects favoring the already well-off (e.g. Athlete’s village, golf course), backed with public money; (3) exploitation and marginalization through trading-off basic capabilities, illustrated by the procedure in the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program. Similar to the social justice approach, an attempt by the municipal government was undertaken to make Olympics contribute to more spatial justice by distributing the expect benefits to four instead of one neighborhood, but here, too, weaknesses are discovered. The spatial injustices are identified as: (1) disproportional geographical development, mainly favoring the already well-off in ‘Zona Sul’; (2) displacement of favela residents, sending them into poorer regions (e.g. within the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program) and at the same time (3) excluding them from the city (-life), the privatization of space through for instance PPPs can be added here.

The following structures in the case of Rio de Janeiro are producing and reproducing the same problems again and again: (1) social structures of society (lack of integration, exclusion and segregation); (2) legal rights (legal rights of lower classes, right to housing); (3) the physical environment (concentration of social housing); (4) national strategies (housing policies, neoliberalization and marketization of the housing sector). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the social structures can be seen in the favelas, which lack integration in the city through missing infrastructural connections, and its residents, who are excluded from the city, as well as the high rise
condominium complexes and gated communities (Barra da Tijuca), which illustrate self-segregation and exclude the poor population. The structure of legal rights is illustrated by limited legal rights of lower classes and limited right to housing, as many of them are living in informality and therefore lacking for instance titled land. The physical environment in the context of Rio de Janeiro is illustrated by the clustering of social housing in peripheral and poorer regions of the city, as it is practiced within the Minha Casa, Minha Vida program. Finally, the national strategies are discovered as producer and reproducer of these problems, too, in particular the housing policies, which support the profit-oriented schemes by “cleaning” the formerly unwanted land, which was occupied by favelas through provision of supplementary housing in peripheral regions, neoliberalization, apparent in the PPPs and the privatization of public space, as well as the marketization of the housing sector, emblematic therefore the real estate developments in the main center of the Olympics in Barra da Tijuca.

Responsible for these structures are (1) the government, both national and municipal, (2) private real estate developers, and (3) the IOC. The government by repeatedly reproducing the same structures, by enacting laws and policies that do not change these structures. The private real estate developers that are working market- and profit-oriented and thereby reproducing the social structures. And the IOC, causing the same problems again and again, by forcing the government to prioritize Olympics-related over national planning strategies and changing these planning strategies and policies in favor of the Olympics.
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