Villagization

A case study of Ethiopia's villagization programme

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Abstract

Villagization programmes have been implemented around the world in governments' attempts to realize political agendas, usually with very limited success. Ethiopia is in this regard an interesting country, as succeeding governments have used villagization to promote their own agenda, which is also valid for the current government of the country. The objective for the contemporary villagization programme in Ethiopia is to ensure socio-economic development for the participants by delivering socio-economic services to them. It is promoted as being based on voluntary participation, which would be different from the previous government's and many other villagization programmes in history. Much negative attention to the programme has though been given from large international organizations. They accuse the government of violating human rights, forced participation, unfulfilled promises and relate it to other negative issues such as land grabbing. The government on the other hand emphasize that these are false accusations and portrait the programme as very successful, as the participants already have gained many of the promised benefits by being included in the programme. The research of the thesis unfortunately shows that the portrait painted by the government does not hold up. People of the programme have gained better access to services then before, but to a much smaller degree then promised. Many of the socio-economic services that should have been provided are not and people are thus participating without full knowledge of what they are joining. Participation is therefore still not considered to be voluntary. It is further evident that the people do not have any say in how the new villages are being organized, which from the start of the programme makes them marginalized in their new settings. This top-down implementation approach from the government must be changed if the current villagization programme should have a real change to become a successful development programme. On a more positive note, the programme is found to have a great change of becoming a success if the critical elements of it are changed, as much of the population of Ethiopia knows that a change towards more sustainable lifestyles are needed and they are willing to do so, because of the harsh environment they are living in.

Acronyms

AAU	Addis Ababa University
DAG	Development Assistance Group
DIDR	Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IRR model	Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model
IO	Oakland Institute
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PA	Peasant association
PBS	Provision of Basic Services programme
PSNP	Production Safety Net Programme
SNNRP	Southern Nation, Nationalities and People's Region

1. Introduction

For decades, resettlement programmes have been implemented in different forms around the world. The purposes of these programmes have usually been related to developmental objectives or political ideologies. It can be done on a small scale with only one person being resettled due to e.g. smaller infrastructure projects or whole communities being resettled due to droughts, large infrastructure projects, political agendas or to achieve socio-economic development for an underdeveloped and vulnerable population by for example villagization. Over the years, especially large-scale resettlements have generated much attention. These have mainly been implemented in poorer countries as attempts to develop the particular country and its people. Unfortunately, the attention has mainly been negative due to inefficient implementation and unsuccessful outcomes of these large resettlement programmes, which has made many parties very cautious in dealing with resettlement.

When it comes to resettlement in particular Ethiopia somehow stands out from other countries as it has several examples of unsuccessful resettlement, but yet still promotes different sorts today, including villagization. The combination of former examples of villagization programmes and the current one that is still being implemented creates a very interesting case to research. It provides a situation where the current government has access to much experience and advice from others sources then previous governments in order to secure that this time the programme can have a more positive impact. Furthermore, the current programme has been monitored and visited by many different actors, but a general theoretical assessment on the whole process has not been conducted yet. This thesis thus attempts to fill this gap.

After the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 the communist Derg regime promoted a socialist ideology to the country's policies, which was implemented in the form of producer cooperatives, resettlement, villagization and state-farm programmes (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 443). The regime had two main pillars in their policy of social engineering: resettlement and villagization (Prunier 2015, 224). Both of the programmes had the objective to provide needed

social services, but were distinguished by the fact that the people affected by the resettlement programme usually moved very long distances across regions. Contrary, the people who were part of the villagization programme usually only moved to a larger or newly established village close to their original homelands (Ibid.). Furthermore the resettlement programme was promoted as a way to help food insecure people (Yntiso 2009, 120) and villagization was merely focused on promoting basic social services to improve the country's development (Giorgis 1989, 306).

After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991 the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government took over. The EPRDF had in its early phases as government and during the struggle against the Derg clearly negative thoughts about the resettlement and villagization programmes. They had criticized the Derg for their "inhumane" programmes and thereby gained support from the opposition. However, after having been in charge of the country for more then a decade, the EPRDF launched their first resettlement programme, which relocated about 627,000 people from drought prone areas between 2003-7 (Pankhurst 2009, 138) and in 2010 it launched its first villagization programme that still is being implemented today. The government has initiated a villagization programme, or commune programme as they call them, in four regional states. These are Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, and Afar. In addition to these four states, reports show that villagization also occurs in Southern Nation, Nationalities and People's Region (SNNRP) (HRW 2012, 19-20 & DAG 2014, 2).

According to State Minister of Agriculture at the time, Mitiku Kassa, villagization in the 4 official regions were supposed to villagize about 1,4 million people over three years – 500,000 in both Somali and Afar and 450,000 together in Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz (Davison 2011). The programmes are described as a way for Ethiopia's large nomadic and pastoral populations to take part in the country's rapid development and as a long lasting solution for the country's ever-existing food insecurity. The pastoralists have long been marginalized in Ethiopia and some see their way of life as impossible to sustain in the country and emphasize

that they need to look for alternative ways of life for which villagization programmes, if implemented appropriately, could be a good solution (Ibid.).

Now, after the programme has been underway for about six years the state of it is very unclear. According to the government it is very successful, as it has provided socio-economic services to thousands of people and thus improved their livelihoods significantly (Government of Ethiopia 2014). The international society in Ethiopia has also made assessments from specific field studies in several areas, where their main conclusion is that the programme is going in the right direction, but also that a lot still needs to be done in order to ensure sustainable development for the participants (DAG 2014). Last, but not least, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) have visited some areas of the programme and investigated how the programme is being implemented. Their assessment is highly critical as they accuse the government of violating human rights and of having hidden agendas then stated in their official reasons to villagize some parts of the population. They further state that the programme is involuntary and that people are coerced to participate (HRW 2012).

1.1 What is villagization?

This thesis focuses on large-scale resettlement, more particularly villagization styled resettlement, with a specific focus on the villagization programmes implemented in Ethiopia during the current government. Villagization can be described as *"the concentration of the population in villages as opposed to scattered settlements"* (Oxford Dictionaries 2016). Others have used the definition *"the grouping of population in centralised planned settlements"* (Lorgen 1999, 12). Villagization programmes thereby promote the concentration of people in villages instead of continuing their lives in scattered and often temporary settlements. Villagization often changes the traditional ways of life to a certain extent, as most of the resettled have not been used to living in larger communities and often come from a nomadic or pastoral lifestyle.

Villagization can thus be considered as a resettlement policy, just like resettlement due to infrastructure projects, conflicts, drought, etc. As a resettlement programme, villagization can be classified under more cited phenomena like development-induced displacement and

resettlement (DIDR). According to Chris De Wet villagization programmes are usually implemented in order to render the rural population more legible and controllable and as a rationalist, technicist and modernizing approach to development (De Wet 2012, 396). The core of villagization programmes is usually to change people's ability to improve their current livelihoods by modern means. Hence, it has a close relationship with modernization theory (De Wet 2012, 397).

As a resettlement programme, villagization also differs from the others, as it has the people in the programme as the targets for development. Contrary, most other DIDR projects often want to develop infrastructure, large hydro dams, etc. where the people that needs to be resettled are a bi-product of the "real" developmental aim (De Wet 2009, 41). This also means that the resettled population is the focus of the development policies, which often creates better starting points for them, as for the ones being moved due to other and unrelated development policies. The villagized are thereby often not only supposed to end up living under the same conditions and with the same possibilities, but actually living with improved conditions.

1.2 Research on resettlement and villagization

Many researchers have studied resettlement and many theories and thoughts have been developed on why the programmes turn out successful or not have been developed from this research. According to some scholars, the main reasons for why large resettlement programmes like villagization have often failed are that the inputs to the programmes have been inadequate. These lacking inputs are typically related to the lack of legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-settlements surveys, planning, consultation, careful implementation and proper monitoring. Other scholars have put a larger focus on the often involuntary aspect of resettlement schemes. They argue that the programmes fail to bear fruit due to a range of complexities that involuntary resettlements schemes raise of problems that are much more difficult to deal with than the above mentioned inputs (De Wet 2009, 36-37).

Research on displaced populations has historically focused on the failures related to the programmes. The research and the involved scholars have thus been less interested in the fewer occasions where relocation of people actually have had a positive effect of the involved populations. One of the most experienced and cited researchers on resettlement and particular the subcategory of DIDR programmes is Michael M. Cernea. He has tried to complement these two situations whereby both the failures and successes of resettlement are taken into consideration in order to provide a theoretical model for successful resettlement. This theoretical model for displacement and resettlement is named, the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model (IRR model) (Cernea & McDowell 2000, 4-5) and was developed over about 200 studies in the 1990's (Cernea 2000, 16).

The IRR model's main aim is to explain what happens during massive forced displacements and secondly, to create a theoretical and safeguarding tool that is able to guide policy, planning and actual development programmes to counteract these adverse effects (Cernea 2000, 14). It is thus supposed to generate knowledge about the complex issues, which resettlement policies entails. The model focuses on the social and economic contents of situations of the resettlement process; the displacement and the reestablishment. The name of the model refers to three fundamental concepts: impoverishment, risk and reconstruction. These concepts are further divided into subcategories that each reflects another variable or dimension of impoverishment, such as villagization has the risk of creating landlessness, which also has a close relation to the risks of joblessness. These notions are interlinked and thus influence each other, but not all are equally important in the impoverishment or reconstruction of a specific resettlement programme. The model thus captures the dialectic between a potential risk and its actuality (Cernea 2000, 18-19). The risks of a resettlement programme present a possibility that a certain course of action might trigger a future loss or negative effect for the programme. It is objective phenomena that exists in all resettlement programmes, but can have different levels of seriousness depending on the programme. It is by deconstructing displacement processes that have identified and thus conceptualized the eight most widespread components of impoverishment risks in resettlement programmes in the model and further suggests how these eight risks best are prevented (Cernea 2000, 19). The model will be scrutinized more specifically

in the theoretical chapter in order to see how it is applicable on the contemporary villagization programme in Ethiopia.

1.3 Research question:

The purpose of this thesis is to explore if the contemporary villagization programme in Ethiopia has the foundation to become successful in achieving its socio-economic development goals, which many similar programmes traditionally have been unsuccessful in achieving. The thesis will thereby scrutinize if the implementation of the villagization programme has the theoretical features other scholars and people with specific knowledge to the subject finds necessary in order to achieve the stated goals. It will further be compared to former villagization programmes to see if it has avoided some of the traditional mistakes villagization programmes have had both in and outside of Ethiopia. The research can be summed up by the following research question that will be the objective for the current thesis to answer:

"How is the current villagization programme in Ethiopia succeeding in achieving its socio-economic development goals?"

By using the IRR model as a research tool in my attempt to answer the research question, the thesis will contribute to the model and experience how and if it is applicable to villagization programmes in Ethiopia.

1.4 Reading guide

The structural outline of this paper will commence with a methodological chapter where the approach and methods used in order to answer the research question will be presented. As the research is based on a well-known model within resettlement studies this model will along with other theoretical perspectives be presented in the following theoretical chapter. This will enable the reader to follow the research and its findings in a more simple and structured manner.

After these guiding chapters the thesis moves on to the analytical chapters. This will begin with a presentation of former well-known villagization programmes followed by the Ethiopian case to present the political settings in the country and the villagization programmes this thesis is focused on. This is meant to put the reader in a position to comprehend the people involved in the villagization process and understand their point of view. Afterwards, the real analysis will start. Here the current villagization programmes will be scrutinized in order to see how they are being implemented in reality and see if the IRR model can be used to explain whether the Ethiopian government is on the right track to achieve their stated objectives or if other matters are more important and relevant to assess this.

Subsequently, a discussion about the findings will be conducted, which will be followed by a conclusion that answers the research question and presents the main arguments of the thesis.

2. Methodology

In this chapter the methodological outline and methods used in the thesis will be presented. Before explaining the methodological considerations the research question and hence the foundation for the research will be presented.

2.1 Methodological considerations

The research of this thesis will primarily be based on Cernea's IRR model, as the theoretical perspectives behind the model, as well as the model itself can guide my research in the attempt to answer the research question. The research will thus be based on a deductive theory, where the hypothesis set out in the theoretical section will be subjected to empirical scrutiny (Bryman 2008, 9). As the model have not been used before on villagization in Ethiopia or completely similar cases, the thesis will further assess if the model is relevant and applicable for the Ethiopian case. The thesis will thus also contribute to the model either in a confirmative matter, dismissing or arguing a need for adjustment for its relevance in settings such as the analysed one. Consequently, there will also be elements of inductiveness in the research by the outcomes of research and application of the IRR model to the Ethiopian case.

2.2 Research design

The research of this paper is based on a case study design where the case to be studied is Ethiopia's current villagization programme (Bryman 2008, 52). The Ethiopian case is thus in centre of the research and the outcome will present the specific case of Ethiopia. At the same time it will attempt to bring a contribution to resettlement studies that could be comparable in similar countries, but as a case study it cannot and does not intend to be able to present a generalized product for all future villagization programmes (Bryman 2008, 55). The research is merely focused on collecting and analysing the most valuable data that subsequently will generate the foundation for a thorough analysis of the chosen case. It is the quality of the particular case and its relationship to the theoretical perspectives that is focused on rather than attempting to generate a general consensus on the subject.

The data collection of the thesis will be based on a qualitative research method. There will thus be a larger focus on words rather than quantifications in the analysis of the collected data (Bryman 2008, 22). This approach both relies on the possibilities of field research and time to conduct the thesis. The data is collected through interviews with people of specific knowledge to the subject and gathering of relevant secondary data instead of going even further on the ground to gather data, which preferably would have been interviews with all relevant stakeholders and surveys in the affected villages and thus a mix of both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Bryman 2008, 23). As the research of this thesis rely simultaneously on a deductive and qualitative method it can be considered as an untraditional approach. Even though the approach is untraditional it is considered as the ideal approach to answer the research question of this thesis based on the functionality of the IRR model. Furthermore, even as it might be untraditional to use qualitative data to test a theory, this thesis will test whether the IRR model is an approach that can also be accepted as a durable method, thus providing a contribution to social science research (Bryman 2008, 373).

The qualitative research will have a combination of primary and secondary data. Secondary data will be in the form of official documents from the Ethiopian state, press releases, reports from the field conducted by the international society, NGO's, etc. was initially collected and used for this thesis. Firstly, it has been used to find general concepts and theories in order to generate an understanding of the subject. This lead to a preliminary argument on how villagization programmes can become successful based on former experiences and research. Secondly, it has been used as supplement to test the IRR theory and analyse the current villagization programmes in Ethiopia since not all relevant stakeholders were able or willing to participate in interviews during my field trip to Ethiopia. The use of secondary and primary data in the analysis is thereby creating more nuanced and objectivising final arguments in the thesis as it will take into account different interests' point of views.

The primary data has been collected from semi-structured interviews held with people of specific knowledge to the current villagization programmes in Ethiopia. The semi-structured interviews have been chosen in order to get the interviewees' point of view out in the open, and

subsequently compare the interviewed peoples' understandings and opinions of the current villagization process. This is considered important in order too see what the interviewees' sees as important and relevant in relation to the field of research of this thesis (Bryman 2008, 437). This approach further help to ensure that the needed information to test the IRR theory was gathered, as it created flexibility in the interviews to let the interviewees go on when they found it relevant and possible for me to do follow-up questions along the way. It also allowed me to ask the questions and gain the knowledge about the specific topics that was necessary in order to create a strong foundation for answering the research question (Bryman 2008, 438). For the final result of this thesis it provided unexpected insights and opinions from the interviewed that could not be found in secondary data and elements that they found specifically important in relation to villagization in Ethiopia. As the subject is very sensitive all interviews were conducted with one single person for each interview and complete confidentiality was offered, which is expected to have enhanced the credibility of the interviewed.

The analysis approach to both primary and secondary data have been a qualitative content analysis whereby the relevant information has been extracted and referred to in the analysis section of this paper. The approach is thus hermeneutic in character as the context of the documents is treated sensitively and the producers' interest and actions will be considered (Bryman 2008, 533).

2.3 Limitation

Resettlement brings up a range of interesting subjects to investigate. The current thesis has therefore had to make some limitations in order stay under the available pages and possibility to make a thoroughly attempt to answer the research question. The thesis therefore strictly focuses on villagization programmes in Ethiopia from a developmental point of view. Others that have worked with resettlement often use great deal with the often related violations of international and national regulations on human rights. This element will not be a specific focus in this paper. The attention will further only be on villagization styled resettlement and not other close related types of resettlement that also occur in Ethiopia. There are also several relevant national regulations regarding land, indigenous populations, minorities and social

services that are not within the scope of this thesis to describe in details. Where relevant knowledge is needed for the reader to comprehend with the provided information some of the subjects will though be touched upon along the course of this paper.

2.4 Research experiences

In attaining primary data, a field visit to Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa was conducted. The main objective was to gain a broader and more objective view of the current villagization process by conducting interviews with relevant and knowledgeable people within the subject. Ideally interviews with an academic researcher, representative of Ethiopia's international partners, hence the Development Assistance Group (DAG), representative of the government, a local professional within the field, a representative from the UN, and if possible a person who had been affected by the programmes personally would have been carried out. The most important person here would be the academic researcher as their personal interest in the whole process is considered to be much smaller then the others and thus will enhance the thesis' objectivity.

The interviews held were with an academic researcher, a representative of the international partners and a local professional with close relations to the subject. All these interviews were very positive and people appeared very honest and direct in their answers and not afraid of expressing their opinions within this sensitive field of study. This was likely due to the confidentiality offered.

My attempt to gain access to a government official proved impossible as both no reply to emails, difficulties in actually finding the relevant department and further no willingness from others to be the person linking me with the relevant government official. In general the government has also not been willing to talk much with others about the villagization programmes as it has been presented very negatively in the western world. Additionally, NGOs in Ethiopia are by law restricted from doing advocacy on most subjects related to villagization and can be met with reprisals if they do (IRIN 2009). According to HRW and IO many public officials have further been met with harsh reprisals when being critical or questioning the

programme, consequently holding them back from talking to others about it (HRW 2012, 33) (Oakland Institute 2015, 11). This is likely to have influenced the accessibility of a government official working with the subject.

I managed to achieve two appointments with two different departments of the UN in Addis Ababa, but both choose to cancel our meetings in the course of my stay. Even though I managed to get an interview with one person from the DAG I tried to get another one with one of several persons who had followed the villagization programmes very close personally. Unfortunately, after firstly responding positively to my request to interviewing one of them, one withdrew on behalf of them all and instead offered me to gain access to their latest monitoring report that is being finalized at this very moment. The reasons for these unsuccessful arranging of interviews are mainly speculations, but is believed to be the sensitivity of the subject. Furthermore both the DAG and the UN have great interests in not gaining a bad standing with the government from publicly saying anything that could disprove their official statements. The availability of time could of cause also be an obstacle for the contacted people, but from the initial positive responses this is considered unlikely.

Conduction of an interview with a person who had been personally affected by the villagization process did not bear fruit. I had hoped that some of my already planned interviews could help me get in touch with one or more. This was also possible but it would require me to go to some of the affected areas, which I did not have the possibility to do due to time and financial restrains. Furthermore, it came to my knowledge that the villages are not clearly mapped so that it is easy to visit them. All previous visits from agencies outside of the government have been prepared and lager field missions, which was not a possibility for me. This is often the case with resettlement schemes, as visitors often only are allowed to visit the "show cases" (Ergas 1980, 400 & van Leeuwen 2001, 633) Fortunately, both the academic researcher and the local professional were able to present insight from the affected peoples point of view as they themselves had interviewed and talked to several affected people. I therefore believe that their important points of views will be incorporated in the thesis arguments by the data gained from my interviews in Addis Ababa.

The primary data of this thesis is thereby based on the three conducted interviews, which will be the main empirics used to answer the research question, as they are suggested to be the less biased source of information available for the current research.

3. Theoretical considerations

The current chapter will present the theoretical considerations of the thesis. This implies that the theoretical assumption will be clear for the reader, which will enhance the understanding of the research that is to be presented in the following chapters. As mentioned earlier, the theory of this thesis is mainly based on Michael M. Cernea's IRR model, which now will be presented in details. The IRR model will be used in the analysis of how villagization programmes in Ethiopia have done and how it has evolved since the Derg regime. Additionally, it will be used to what eventually still needs to be done before villagization programmes in Ethiopia and elsewhere can turn into successful development programmes. The IRR model will further be related to other more general implementation approaches.

3.1 The Impoverish Risk and Reconstruction Model

Involuntary displacement around the world has brought on impoverishment for the affected populations on a widespread scale. This means that the development programmes have not been able to rehabilitate the populations that are being moved, but in fact only impoverish their livelihoods. This impoverishment risk that exists when resettling people needs to be challenged and safeguards to prevent it have to be implemented in the programmes. Thereby, the development programmes can avoid some of the negative issues related to resettlement. It is not possible to exclude all risks related to resettlement programmes, but many can be avoided by the right means and the burden and benefits that comes with resettlement can be better distributed than it occurs many places today (Cernea 2000, 12-13). Cernea thus calls for changes in domestic development policies so that planning and implementation methodologies of resettlement programmes can improve.

The IRR dual emphasis on both the risks that need to be prevented and how reconstruction strategies can help to encompass this make facilitation and operational usage of the model a guide for resettlement programmes. It enables policy makers and implementers to influence the risks of the programme by informed planning. But it is important to see the components as a

system that influence each other and not separate elements that can be handled individually. Even though the model highlights eight risk components, it is flexible in order to integrate other relevant components and dimensions to adapt to local circumstances (Cernea 2000, 20). The model provides four distinct but interlinked functions that all will be used and valuable in answering the research question of this thesis:

First, it provides a *predictive function,* that is a result of the model's in-depth knowledge gained from past experiences. These are the eight major impoverishment risks that are likely problems when dealing with resettlement programmes. The function helps planners, implementers and the resettlers to recognize the risks in relation to resettlement, and thereby enabling them to mitigate the risks (Cernea 2000, 21).

Second, the IRR model provides a *diagnostic function*. As the programmes often will have different situations on the ground this function is to explain and assess the eight general risks to a specific local diagnosis of the resettlement programme. It is a cognitive guiding assessment tool for fieldwork and in weighing the likeliness of any of the risk to occur in the specific situation. The function thus helps to see the real picture on the ground for planners, implementers and the affected populations (Cernea 2000, 21-22).

Third, the model also provides a *problem-resolution function*. The IRR model is formulated with awareness on the importance social actors in resettlement and thus their contribution to resolution. The function results from the model's general analytical and explicit action orientation. This orientations focus of the model has the objective to find a resolution to the challenges resettlement brings along. To do this, the model uses the two first functions, prediction and diagnosis, in moving towards the direction of relevant actions. The model consequently becomes a compass for necessary strategies to reconstruct resettlers' livelihoods and their future socio-economic development (Cernea 2000, 22).

Fourth and lastly, the IRR model provides a *research function* that provides researchers with a conceptual framework for conducting and organizing a theory-led fieldwork. The model stimulates the hypothesis set out in the model's eight risks and facilitates the exploration of mutual relations between the risks. The research function guides researchers in their data collection and in coherently aggregate disparate the empirical findings and makes it possible to

compare relevant responses to the risks between places and time (Ibid.). All four functions of the model will thus be part of the research of this thesis in order to answer the research question.

3.2 The eight major impoverishment risks

Even though displacement and resettlement programmes around the world often are remarkable diverse the empirical findings from research have revealed some basic regularities when dealing with resettlement. These findings have turned into the IRR model's eight major risks of impoverishment. In advance of the actual relocation, these components are only risks for the involved people, but if not addressed properly they usually turn into actual impoverishment situations for the resettled populations. This impoverishment does not only affect the resettled people. In the long run it also affect the regional and national economy, as these people might stay underdeveloped and in need of support for a long time. The risks differ in importance and relevance from location to location, but the following have had a high relevance when studying former resettlement schemes (Cernea 2000, 22-23). The major impoverishment risks are: Landlessness; Joblessness; Homelessness; Marginalization; Food insecurity; Increased morbidity and mortality; Loss of access to common property and services; and Social disarticulation. These risks will be presented separately in the following.

Landlessness

When people are being relocated to a new place they loose their former lands, which represents a capital loss. Especially in developing countries like Ethiopia where land is the foundation for many people's commercial and productive activities the loss of land is of high relevance. The resettlement programme thus risks impoverishing the resettlers who had land or steady income-generating activities in relation to land produce (Cernea 2000, 23).

Joblessness

In general there exists a high risk of loosing employment when being resettled. Re-creating jobs has shown very difficult and usually a slow process that keeps many un- or underemployed in new settlements. In relation to rural resettlements the joblessness risk is in close relation to

landlessness, as people employed by landowners loose their jobs when landowners loose their lands. Small businesses are also being closed when moving and these need to be re-established for people to reconstruct or improve their livelihoods. Research shows that joblessness is a risk that often is not visible as an immediate issue, since many resettlement programmes provides jobs in relation to the programmes, such as building of houses and infrastructure. But these jobs are not sustainable because when the construction is done, so are the jobs (Cernea 2000, 24-25).

Homelessness

Despite normally only considered a temporary issue, homelessness has proved to be persistent condition. Homelessness can both come in its direct form, but also from a worsening of housing standards and loss of cultural and religious community spaces, which can result in alienation and deprivation for the affected population. One reoccurring problem addressing resettlers is that compensation from old houses often are paid at market values instead of replacement value, which consequently unable the people to reconstruct their housing standards. The use of temporary houses has further often turned out as chronic homelessness as people often are not able to leave them due to financial constraints. The financial constraints are often related to the risks of both land- and joblessness. (Cernea 2000, 25).

Marginalization

Marginalization often occurs when people loose economic power and thereby joins a down-word mobility path. When relocated, human capital is often lost in the sense that people cannot continue their former lifestyles and their skills are not used efficiently anymore. The economic marginalization is often followed by social and psychological marginalization by loosing confident in both themselves and the society in general. Furthermore, a feeling of unjust, worsening social status and becoming more vulnerable is often seen in poorly planned and executed resettlement sites. Some of the worst cases are when the resettlement has involved direct coercion as people's self-image decreases and if resettled in already inhabited villages the host communities often perceive them as a socially degrading stigma. The host community can further see them as strangers and thus often become a marginalized group in the new

settlements. The forms of marginalization are multiple and many of them are overlooked in resettlement planning. Researchers have especially reported psychological and cultural marginalization. The marginalization often occurs before the resettlement actually begins through the lack of investment in former situated areas, agricultural or infrastructural investments taken up access to water, grazing or farming areas, etc. (Cernea 2000, 26). The level of marginalization is further very different from place to place in e.g. in relation to cultural customs of resettlers and host communities.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity and undernourishment have unfortunately been evident where inadequate resettlement has occurred. As resettlement uproots people from their daily lives, it bring along challenges towards sufficient food and income, which particular hits many in rural settlements as they are used to be somewhat self-sufficient. The reconstruction of crop production will always take quite a long time, so food insecurity must be addressed before relocation as it has proven to be a long lasting issue. The food insecurity trickles down to the following risk of increased morbidity and mortality and are in general caused by inadequate counteraction of the land- and joblessness risks (Cernea 2000, 27).

Increased morbidity and mortality

Morbidity following resettlement can occur both psychological and physical as social stress, trauma and illness due to unfamiliar diseases or insufficient nourishment. Illness can further occur due to poor implementation of health and sanitary infrastructure in the new settlements and the empirical research show that the worst affected people are the already vulnerable infants, children and the elders. It is also evident that resettled people have a greater exposure to morbidity then prior to displacement (Cernea 2000, 27-28).

Loss of access to common property and services

This risk is particularly relevant for the poorer communities that in their previously areas had access to common property such as forests, water bodies, pastures, quarries, flour mills but also cultural and religious sites such as burial grounds. In most cases these "values" are not

compensated in the resettlement schemes and can also be difficult to replace. This risk has thus shown very close relations to the impoverishment of many resettled populations and has had long-term negative effects of the affected people. When access to these properties and services becomes unavailable the effect trickles down to other issues. For example overgrazing, fields being destroyed by cattle due to lack of grazing areas, deforestation, encroachment of reserved areas, etc., which all can contribute to conflict between the populations and environmental damage (Cernea 2000, 29).

Social disarticulation

The loss of physical, natural and human capital has been presented in some of the former risks. Loss of social capital compounds other losses and adds a lot of informal networks at risk of being lost. Social disarticulation is like some of the other risks traditionally unperceived and not compensated by planners, which has proven to generate long-term consequences for the resettled. Worst empirical findings are from situations where people are being resettled in a dispersed manner without emphasis on former social and family ties. These social networks have often been used to address common interests and needs and have proven very hard to rebuild in new settings. Results from resettlement have been decreased participation in group activities like burials and feasts, lower cohesion in family structures, alienation and the weakening of control in the villages. The traditional cultures and norms have thus often been negatively affected by resettlement. Resettlement thus becomes more then what can be fixed by financial means. Some of the heaviest costs of resettlement are very personal, as personal ties are difficult to serve in unfamiliar surroundings that both create new economic and social challenges. Impoverishment thus also occurs by the loss of supportive networks, which generates powerlessness, dependency and vulnerability to the resettlers (Cernea 2000, 30).

Despite large variations on the risks intensities in different locations the general IRR model has proven to be present in all studied cases. The level of intensity for each risk can vary by time of resettlement, which type of people being resettled, gender, age, etc. and in the same resettlement scheme even subgroups of the people can experience them differently (Cernea 2000, 31). Risks from resettlement do not only apply to the resettlers. As mentioned,

resettlement often happens in established villages, which specifically often is the case with villagization, and these host communities also have certain risks. If reconstruction of resettlers' livelihoods is not established resource-, social service- and job scarcity often leading to conflicts are reported. If implemented accordingly, the IRR model thus not only captures economic risks but also social and cultural risks, which mean that application of it must be a multidimensional approach (Cernea 2000, 32-33). In the following section reconstruction components to the eight risks will be presented.

3.3 Reconstruction components

The risk identification the IRR model sets out is not the main purpose of the model, but is done to design the relevant risk reversals. The model has the objective to "destroy its own prophecy" by mapping the way to reconstruct the livelihoods if resettlers by avoiding or minimizing the predicted risks. It is this latter function that makes a risks prediction model very useful. It is the knowledge from years of research the IRR model brings along that generates this prediction, planning and reconstruction capacity (Cernea 2000, 33-34).

The reconstruction is divided into four components: an economic; a housing; a community; and a social services component that each covers one or more of the risks.

From landless to land-based reestablishment and from jobless to reemployment

This component lies at the heart of reconstruction, as resettling people on cultivatable land or in sustainable employment have proved necessary for long-term success. Several options to achieve it are identifying arable land; preparation of new land for agriculture; crop intensification; shift to production of more valuable crops; diversification of in-and off-farm activities; implement usage of eventual project related resources such as irrigation systems, dam reservoirs etc.; and investment in employments opportunities (Cernea 2000, 35). It is empirically evident that resettling people on a land-based basis is more successful then by compensating resettlement in cash. Compensation for lost land is not enough in the long run as they run out when other possibilities are not available. On the other hand, compensation for lost businesses has proved more relevant as this can be used to re-start former small businesses

as shops, craftworks, etc. (Cernea 2000, 25). Relocation as land-based resettlement also has its challenges as land scarcity and sustainable land use must be taken into consideration. This means that planners and implementers often must be creative in reconstructing livelihoods economically. For example, if the amount of land available only is half of what people had before, productivity or introduction to more valuable crops must be introduced to the resettlers. Technical assistance in these cases are thereby highly important for peoples' reconstruction of livelihoods in new settings, as provision of land on its own has proven not to be enough. The technical assistance and re-training of people have to be followed up by real prospects such as available arable land or job opportunities for them (Cernea 2000, 36-37). In short, the combination of employment and provision of land is the most sustainable way to secure economic recovery of the resettlers, as most settlement cannot secure full use of labour resources with only one of the mentioned income generating activities (Cernea 2000, 38). Adequate investments and investment incentives from the government are thus necessary to regenerate jobs and thus securing income-generating activities for the resettled.

From homeless to house reconstruction

The rebuilding of proper homes for the resettlers is one of the risks that are easier to achieve, but yet often left out. In order to address this risks reestablishment of houses and relevant community places must be available for the people (Cernea 2000, 25). In general, impoverishment due to worsening of housing conditions can be avoided by allocating a fair rebuilding share in the resettlement programme's budget and by resettlers' found tendency to be willing to invest in better housing standards then prior to resettlement. This further generates immediate job opportunities in the new settlements. These better housing standards have often proved to have a direct effect on improvement of living standards in the resettlement areas. The opportunity for resettlement programmes to quickly improve some parts of a poor living condition that people often have in the developing world is thus by creating affordable ways to improve their housing conditions as empirical evidence show that people have an eager to contribute to this (Cernea 2000, 39-40).

From social disarticulation to community reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, and from expropriation to restoration of community assets and services

The first two components are more firm and acknowledged issues that needs to be dealt with in relation to resettlement. The current is a different case and often tend to be overlooked as a softer component as its focus is on socio-cultural and psychological dimensions. The three risks in this component are different, but have areas that overlap and synergies between them can occur when reconstructing them. For example, reconstructing communities can minimize marginalization as people can take part in the activities that can take place in community areas. The level of reconstruction highly depends on the villages that people are resettled to in regards to cultural similarities and common assets and services. Research shows that initial provision of common property resources often is highly important for a successful start in the new location. It is thus important for planners not only to focus on what people individually or on family basis are entitled to or needs, but also what they prior were part of in their communities in order to reconstruct former social institutions and hence their livelihoods. The function as representing the community and securing its reconstruction further generates empowerment to the community and ensures their share and wishes for their new home and further holds the established cultural structures and institutions in place (Cernea 2000, 41-42).

From food insecurity to adequate nutrition and from increased morbidity to better health care

In the initial phase of resettlement the people will usually need some sort of food aid as their normal food supplies are disrupted. Other health risks than food insecurity such as unfamiliar diseases and clean water resources must also be counteracted by e.g. establishment of health services; vaccinations; good sanitary and waste systems; access to clean water; and a larger focus on the psychological problems resettlement brings along for some. In the long run, sustainable food security relies on the resettlers economic reconstruction and thus access to arable land and employment. In addition to these factors provision of knowledge and capacity on how to build sustainable livelihoods in their new surroundings might be necessary if the resettlers way of life need to adapt to unfamiliar circumstances. More specifically to the health situation of resettlers successful resettlement evidence show that institution building in health and sanitation sectors are highly important (Cernea 2000, 42-43).

After having presented the components of reconstructing the impoverishment risks that resettlement brings it is important to underline the components interdependence. In order to optimize reconstruction means that all components strategically must be addressed simultaneously with focus on local circumstances and needs. If planned and implemented right, the impoverishment risk can be avoided, livelihoods can be reconstructed and even improved, and these successful resettlement programmes can help to replicate in other settings around the world (Cernea 2000, 43).

3.4 Implementation approaches: Top-down or Bottom-up?

Historically villagization programmes and large resettlement schemes have been promoted as national policies and been implemented by a top-down approach. This means that officials on the ground have followed the strategies set out at the top political level and there has almost never been much decisions making power to the target group of the programmes (Matland 1995, 146). When extracting the ideas from Cernea's IRR model a mix of a top-down and bottom up approach for implementations appears as the ideal way forward. He does not question the fact that the decision for resettlement is taken without the influence of the target group as the model is developed for involuntary resettlement, but without defining this concept (Cernea 2000, 11). He also sets out some standards for the resettlement of people that must be taken at a top political level, such as adequate house reconstruction, provision of income generating activities, social services etc. But mainly his model provides a frame for the resettlement programmes and keeps emphasising the importance of local contexts, which only can be defined and implemented in cooperation with the populations destined to be resettled. Cernea thereby rejects the general top-down view that sees implementation of the programme as an administrative process that either ignores or eliminates local and other aspects (Matland 1995, 147). He further supports some of the main arguments from bottom-up theories that see implementation of government policies or programmes such as villagization should differ from place to place due to local circumstances, because otherwise the general programme and its stated objectives are likely to fail (Matland 1995, 148).

There will thus always be elements of both top-down and bottom-up approaches when following Cernea's model. A much greater emphasis on local needs cooperations and so bottom-up approach then seen in former villagization programmes will according to the IRR model be needed if successful implementation is to be achieved.

3.5 Preliminary argument/hypothesis of this thesis

Based on the above-mentioned experiences and Cernea's model that is based on about 200 researches on resettlement schemes the following argument to achieve successful villagization can be summarized to:

"In order to achieve successful implementation and outcomes of villagization programmes the approach towards it needs to be more focused on local conditions and environment than the historical approach that primarily has been based on a one-size fit all top-down approach. This means that the communities and local institutions need to be part of planning and implementation of the programmes and thus move away from the top-down approach. More specifically, the programmes need to address eight documented impoverishment risks: landlessness; joblessness; homelessness; marginalization; food insecurity; increased morbidity and mortality; loss of access to common property and services; and social disarticulation. These have proved to always be in place when resettling people, but to a different degree depending on the local circumstances. These risks must therefore be meet with safeguards that are relevant for the specific location in order to reconstruct and improve the resettled livelihoods."

4. Historical villagization programmes

Countries like Tanzania, Rwanda, and Mozambique and not least this papers case study Ethiopia, all have a history that includes villagization. One of the most cited villagization programmes is Joseph Nyerere's *Ujamaa* that was implemented shortly after Tanzania's independence. The Ujamaa and other well-known villagization programmes will be presented in the following in order to get a glance of what they historically have been used for.

In 1967, the Nyerere government launched the *Ujamaa* villagization programme. The Ujamaa was socialized and based on self-improving the peasants in a collective form. The government thus guided and encouraged the peasants, but never initiated or forced the peasants to change their way of production and living. Hence, the programme was more democratic and based on a voluntary bottom-up approach where peasants were the masters of their own progress. This feature is believed to have contributed to an initially successful villagization programme (Kjekshus 1977, 276). In November 1973, the Ujamaa villagization programme took a sharp turn as it was published that by the end of 1976 all Tanzanian peasants had to live in villages. This proclamation naturally changed the voluntary character of the programme to forced villagization and subsequently changed the support for it. It became a top-down government run programme without consultation or possible influence from the resettled peasants on their new way of life and production (Kjekshus 1977, 277-278). Alterations in the preconditions the programme initially had completely changed the outcome of Ujamaa in a very negative sense. The economic development that was supposed to be promoted lacked several underlying inputs, such as infrastructure, compensation, technology, etc., which the poor country was unable to provide (Kjekshus 1977, 281-282). Technically, however, the programme could be considered a success, as by 1976 13,5 million people, or almost the entire rural population, had been moved into the approximately 7,500 villages established as part of the programme (Ergas 1980, 404). In 1973, the World Bank started to investigate why Tanzania continuously was hit so badly by food shortages. One year later it concluded that the main reason was not droughts, but the failure of the Ujamaa programme, which had made the peasantry less productive than before (Ergas 1980, 405). Today, even though the Tanzanian government has abandoned the

Ujamaa villagization programme, many of the villages still exist and some have had positive developments after it once again became voluntary for people to stay in the villages and decide how they should be organized.

In Rwanda, a villagization programme named *Imidugudu* started in 1997, as approximately 2,5 million refugee returnees arrived home after a period of war followed by the famous Rwandan genocide in 1994. The aim of the *Imidugudu* villagization programme was to villagize all scattered communities in the country (van Leeuwen 2001, 624). As a quite recent villagization programme, the Rwandan government had to distance the programme from the former failed and criticised ones in the region (van Leeuwen 2001, 626). The rational behind the Imidugudu was to ensure best possible land use planning for the rural population, as the returning refugees put pressure on the availability of land (van Leeuwen 2001, 631). Like many other resettlement programmes international partners and NGO's refrained from participation due to the reputation of these programmes but ended up participating indirectly (van Leeuwen 2001, 632-633). In regards to implementation, the Imidugudu – like former villagization programmes – faced its main problems. It was promoted as a voluntary programme, but reports and stories of forced resettlement and resistance from the population quickly arose. Furthermore, reports surfaced of bad planning, lack of infrastructure and social services in the villages. Consequently, and just like former programmes that the government had tried so hard to distance itself from, it was unable to cope with the local complexities in the areas of the villages and achieve its goals (van Leeuwen 2001, 633-634).

In the following chapters, villagization in this thesis case study of Ethiopia will be thoroughly presented in order to make a clear perspective over the former and current villagization programmes. This will provide an understanding on the differences and similarities of the two regimes and their villagization programmes. Consequently, it will provide evidence on if the current government has safeguarded against some of the failures of the former regime and their approach to villagization.

5. The case: Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the case study of this thesis. The reason for this is the country's contemporary villagization programme combined with the country's rich history of resettlement and villagization programmes. In order to provide a solid understanding of why the country continuously promote these programme a comprehensive introduction of the political landscape of the country and a former villagization programme will be presented in the following.

5.1 Ethiopia

Ethiopia is in many ways a remarkable country. Yet for many only a country people have heard of, as a historical story with many tales and more recently of a famine prone country with a starving population. For centuries Ethiopia was a monarchy ruled by emperors who managed to keep European imperialist out of its territory and thus became the only African country that was never colonized (only its Eritrean province got colonized by Italy). The last of these emperors is also the most renown in the western hemisphere, Emperor Haile Selassie, who asserted the throne in 1930. In 1974 Haile Selassie was deposed and arrested by a committee of armed forces, later known as the Derg, who quickly filled the power vacuum. One year later Haile Selassie was (most likely) quietly murdered by the new regime (Clapham 2015, 205).

The overthrow of the emperor was also the beginning of the Ethiopian revolution led by the Derg. The Derg was a socialist military regime that initially wanted to reform the unequal landowning system with social reforms, but the regime turned out to be one of the most brutal "social" regimes ever seen (Prunier 2015, 210). A popular movement as seen in many other states gaining their independence or socialist revolutions never supported the Derg's evolution to power. The army was simply the only group able to fill the power vacuum that was left when Haile Selassie felled, as neither student, peasant nor urban groups had the ability to operate nationally like the army. Following attempts of power sharing were fought down by the Derg who then became the sole leaders of the country (ibid.). After a hectic and bloody first few

years for the new regime, where several main characters were killed, the victorious figure was Lt Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who led the country until the regimes fall in 1991 (Prunier 2015, 218).

The claim of being a socialist revolution led by a communist party was highly contested both within and outside the country. They nationalised all industries, trade and land, which subsequently was given to the peasants, but remained the property of the state. The socialist terminology seems mainly to have been a tactical and short-term way to gain power and support. The regime's hard fight down on civil socialist movements such as the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Front (EPRF) further underlines this (Prunier 2015, 219). During the revolution the regime tried to install a communist regime like the Soviet of the time. It officially happened on the 10 years anniversary of the revolution were the new Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was installed, which was more or less just another name for the same regime (Prunier 2015, 223).

After the severe famine of 1984 the regime was under attack from several sides where especially guerrilla fighters from the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was remarkable and had aspirations all the way to Addis Ababa. The failed policies towards the peasantry had alienated them from the regime. So, when the fight against the TPLF in 1989 turned in to a conventional battle and the fall of the Soviet Union happened at ones, the Derg regime was in knees. In 1991 the TPLF, with support from other insurgency groups under their common flag: The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), gained control over Addis Ababa and Lt Colonel Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe (Prunier 2015, 226-227)

Since 1991, the TPLF-led EPRDF has ruled the country. The EPRDF consists of 4 regional parties: the TPLF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Oromo People's Democratic Organization and the South Ethiopia People's Democratic Movement (EPRDF 2016). The leading party thus consists of parties from 4 of the country's 9 regional states. The front was created in 1989, only two years before the fall of the Derg and gave the strong TPLF a national-wide legitimacy, as the members of the front never truly challenge their leadership of

the EPRDF (Tadesse 2015, 258). The almost unchallenged leadership has since brought up several insurgency groups against the new regime (Ibid.) & (Feyissa 2016).

In short, the ideological ground pillars of the EPRDF has a predominant focus on self-determination to the regional states of the country, popular administration, revolutionary democracy and a commitment to social and economic development based on the peasantry (Tadesse 2015, 262). One can say that the new government had 3 main trajectories: decentralization of the state as a sort of "ethnic federalism"; democratization of politics with a multiparty electoral system; and liberation of the economy with a neo-liberal international approach (Vaughan 2015, 283-284). In 1994, the government approved the constitution that created 9 regional states and 2 city administrations. All the regional states were based on ethnicity. The states gained a lot of autonomy in the constitution; even the right to succession was included. In 1995, the first democratic elections were held and the EPRDF and its supporters gained a large victory and thus formally became the leading party of the new Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). Even though the constitution gave a lot of autonomy to the regional states, there is no doubt that the TPLF has remained as the leading party in Ethiopian politics ever since the fall of the Derg (Tadesse 2015, 275).

Now, more than 2 decades after the EPRDF took control of Ethiopia a lot has changed in the country. Decentralization has had a massive impact on the architecture of the state, the economy has boomed and several sectors have opened up for investments. The country is still one of the poorest in the world, but it has seen large improvements and is one of the few countries in the world that might reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (The World Bank 2015). Contemporary Ethiopia's ideology can be described by the government's commitment to revolutionary democracy and the developmental state. Being in charge of the developmental state, the EPRDF is both in charge of socio-economic development, but also in strict control with the market to ensure surpluses goes to further development instead of wasteful or rent-seeking activities. It is through the developmental state that the EPRDF sees and gains its legitimacy from the population. Even though the regime is no longer called a socialist regime, like under the Derg, the policies of the EPRDF have many pro-poor objectives

(Vaughan 2015, 306). This state-led development is further seen in the government's large development plans such as the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) from 2010-2015 and the current GTP II from 2015-2020. So even though much has been decentralized by the EPRDF, all large-scale changes and developmental activities comes from the top. Furthermore, as the state enjoys more or less monopoly on decisions regarding distribution of resources and service delivery all the way down to kebele level (lowest community level), it has a huge influence on people's everyday life and can thus influence the population in both a positive or negative way (Vaughan 2015, 307-308). Critics see this approach as the fundamental problem with the country because the concentration of power is so tightly controlled (Vaughan 2015, 284-285). It can be said that while the EPRDF government has improved and broadened ethnic and social access for the people compared to former regimes, but the political access has become less plural during their rule (Vaughan 2015, 294). This has also led to withdraw of political parties, first from the Transitioning Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and subsequently from the political scene, as the playing field for cooperation is almost none existent (Vaughan 2015, 297). The government received large criticism from the media they themselves had freed in 1992. Since most private press turned out to be against the government's policies it was later cracked down by fines, imprisonment, closures, etc. (Vaughan 2015, 300).

As mentioned above, the EPRDF government has the goal of delivering a transition from revolutionary to a liberal democracy, but not until is has become a middle-income country. To achieve this goal the political leadership finds the current type of state-led and controlled system the most suitable and sustainable solution. This should ensure the country does not develop in the wrong way as many other African countries did by adopting full on a neo-liberal approach to early. On the other hand, critics find that Ethiopia's path to its "renaissance" and true political change remains distant. Most observers do though agree that since its coming to power the EPRDF has managed to concentrate more and more power in its own hands for good and bad (Vaughan 2015, 309).

5.2 A history of villagization

Ethiopia has a long history of resettlement and villagization. One of the most cited and ambitious ones was implemented during the Derg era. The regime's socialist ideology was implemented as producer cooperatives, resettlement, villagization and state-farm programmes (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 443). A resettlement and a villagization programme were the two main pillars of social engineering. (Prunier 2015, 224). Both programmes had the objective to provide needed social services, economic development and gain food security, but were distinguished by that the people under the resettlement programme usually moved very long distances across regions where the people under villagization usually only moved to a lager village close to their original homelands (Ibid., Yntiso 2009, 120 & Giorgis 1989, 306).

The Derg regime wanted to "villagize" at least 7 million people and according to their campaign to move 33 million rural people by 1995 (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 435 & Prunier 2015, 224). The official objectives for the villagization programme launched in 1985 were written in guidelines for villagization prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). These were: extension of services to increase agricultural productivity; rationalizing land-use patterns and conserving natural resources; facilitation of schools, clinics, water supplies and service cooperatives for rural people; and strengthening of security and self-defence. Observers emphasised that there were two more objectives not mentioned in the official guidelines, which were: using villagization to advance the revolution and ultimately collective agriculture and to give the regime enough political control to ensure agrarian socialism and reconstruction of the rural society (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 436). Most of the official objectives thus sound reasonable for the population, but the quality and speed of the implementation were very negative features of the whole programme.

Already after the first year of the programme 12 percent of the rural population had been villagized. The programme would in the following years expand to more and more regions. The first target group was small-scale farmers and villages that produce grain and pulse. The second target group was the perennial crop producer regions and the last target were the lowland areas mainly populated by pastoralist (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 437).

According to the head of the government's entire famine relief operations from 1983 to the end of 1985, who also was in charge of resettlement and villagization in this period, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, the rational for villagization in Ethiopia at that time made sense, since the lack of infrastructure and social services made development for these scattered communities very hard (Giorgis 1989, 1 & 306). A poor country like Ethiopia was simply not in a position to afford these services with the settling structures at the time. Consequently, the first villagization scheme began in 1984 and was remarkable upgraded to a full-scale national development programme in 1985, which was in the middle of a devastating famine (Giorgis 1989, 306). The programme attained large criticism both domestically and even more internationally. Securing against advancement of the guerrillas, forced participation, environmental damage, villages without cultural or religious sites, etc. were all negative effects from villagization that was unacceptable for most. Giorgis further explains that the peasants were resentful and hated the fact that they had to move to villages very different from their own and with much smaller plots to farm then before. On top of having their land taken, they had to give their oxen, tools and other belongings to the peasant associations (PAs) that implemented the communal farming system (1989, 307).

The implementation of the programme involved several national, regional and community agencies. Even as the implementation was conducted with a top-down approach, the use of agencies at all levels and local PAs for choosing the location ensured that some local knowledge was applied in order to find suitable locations for the villages (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 448). Unfortunately, many of the sites were selected with a larger emphasis on security measures, such as defence rather than access to water, wood or arable land (Africa Watch 1991, 231). Even as the local agencies helped to find the proper locations there was no doubt that the villagization programme in itself had no local participation in regards to design, conceiving or justifying of it (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 450).

Most reports underscores that villagization was accomplished by force and that people that resisted were punished by public humiliation, detention or even killed (Africa Watch 1991,

230). Others found no evidence of directly forced resettlement, but indirectly it was the case as psychological force by being told to move by a regime like the Derg made questioning the programme a big risk to take (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 452). Furthermore, a lot of hardship was also evident from the programme. The people in the programme had to put a lot of hard labour into it, as the implementation had to be done in such a hasty manner (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 452).

In regards to the promises made to the people of the programme many of them seemed as empty worlds. Houses were build, but latrines, schools, heath clinics, water supply etc. were lacking in most of the villages and enough financial resources for it to come later looked at best uncertain (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 457-458). The promises given were thus almost never materialized and were therefore a tough experience for the participants. The government on the other hand achieved two good things: better fiscal returns, as they could control the markets, and better security control over the population thereby making it harder for guerrillas fighters of the time to gain support (Prunier 2015, 225). Other immediate and long-lasting problems villagization created were longer distances for the farmers to their fields, as they had to keep farming their old fields. It also increased the governments control not only over the people, but also the markets, which appears to have resulted negatively in agricultural outputs. On the other hand, villagization did increase the potential to provide social services, infrastructure, water systems etc. to the populations. The problem was just that the current economic situation of the country made this unlikely or even impossible at the time (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 458). Additionally, the villagization programme had a negative effect on the environment. Much forest was destroyed to build new houses and overgrazing in areas close to the villages became a problem, as more people were located in the same areas. This also led to more pollution and health problems, which spread easily as services to combat and prevent it was not provided (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 460-461). The bigger populations in the villages also needed new employment opportunities, but according to government guidelines this was not allowed. Villagers were only supposed to be in the agricultural sector and people thus had to go to other villages to work or get their needs covered. (Cohen & Isaksson 1987, 461).

Villagization was thereby used as another resettlement strategy to create ideological based social and economic change (Pankhurst & Piguet 2009, 10-11). The main goal was control and regimentation of the country and not development of it (Giorgis 1989, 307). Nationalization of land made it possible for the Derg to move people under the villagization programmes, as they could redistribute new land and further take over the peoples' original lands. In August 1988, the government announced that 12 million people had been successfully villagized. At the time, this was equivalent to about 50 percent of the rural population in the country. Even with differences among the regions villagization was implemented in, the nature of it was involuntary, based of false promises to the affected population and by a top-down approach from the government. On top of the involuntary nature of participation, the villages were mostly lacking basic infrastructure and services that often were in place in their old villages. This means that not only did the government not provide improved services for the people, it in many cases left them worse of then they were before. In March 1990, Mengistu unexpectedly announced the abandonment of the villagization programme and most people went back to their old homes (Africa Watch 1991, 232-233).

5.3 What does the theoretical assumptions say?

When applying the theoretical assumptions of this thesis to the above-mentioned information, it becomes clear why most participants of the villagization programme under the Derg chose to leave the new villages as soon as they got the change.

Looking at the identified risks and their reconstruction individually, the first risk of 'Landlessness' was to a certain degree thought of. People were given new areas both for private and communal production and on top they often were told to or allowed to continue working on their old fields. The main problem was as the distance to the old fields that was to long and the new ones were often in locations with long distances to water and of poor quality. Production did therefore not grow during the programme. In regards to other income generating activities, hence the 'Joblessness' risk, were completely overseen. Due to ideological ideas people were not allowed to open private businesses in the new villages. Therefore all who had having small shops or generated income outside of agricultural production lost their

occupations. In most villages houses were in place or being constructed when people arrived. The approach was almost done in a military structured way and thus people had no risk of 'Homelessness'. 'Marginalization' in the new villages occurred in the form of loss of identity and profession for the ones who were not part of the agricultural sector prior to resettlement. Additionally, the lifestyles, ways of production and structure of the societies were decided for the people and not with the people, hence leaving them powerless on the matter. As the resettlement was not implemented on a voluntary basis this further generated marginalization of the affected people. In regards to the risk and reconstruction of 'Food insecurity' the long-term perspective looked very dim for the Derg's villagization programme, as no alternative income generating activity outside of agriculture was allowed. Furthermore, as no other services or institutions were implemented and the productivity did not increase in the new villages, thus making food insecurity a severe issue. It must though be noted that the programme only ran for a few years thus making this long-term process a difficult issue to conclude in any case. The lack of the promised services such as health care, water, sanitary systems and the collectivising of more people in the same place led to waste issues and spread of diseases, which could not be counteracted due to the lack of health services. 'Increased morbidity' was thus a severe issue for the resettled. It has already been mentioned that the location of the villages were often poorly chosen, thus making access to common properties like water, forests, agricultural services like grinding mills etc. challenging. Most of the forests were quickly destroyed due to the building of houses, thus degrading the environment and loss of access to forests produces. Furthermore, the structured ways villages were build appear to have had no room for religious or cultural sites and the Derg's non-religious ideology further challenged the governments understanding of this important issue. The last risk of the IRR model is 'Social disarticulation' was a severe problem due to the lack of participation in forming the new societies and the lack of focus on social, cultural and family ties and institutions. There was thus a great loss of social capital for many of the people that were villagized under the Derg regime.

It is thereby evident that the implementation of the programme was based on a completely top-down approach. This non-participatory process where the people affected by the programme had no influence over it, rationalises why most people left the areas after the abandonment of

the programme. The model that was used was the same in all areas, thus not taking any local conditions into consideration, which further raised the likeliness for the programme to fail. Conclusively, the preliminary arguments appear to be applicable to one of the largest and most cited villagization programmes in history. There can off cause also be other relevant factors in the failure of the programme, but the theoretical assumptions cannot be dismissed in this case.

In the following chapter the current villagization programme, taking place in Ethiopia will be analysed to see if the theory is applicable on the current case. Later a comparison of the former and current will be conducted to see if improvements have happened or if the programme today resembles with the Derg's.

6. Contemporary villagization in Ethiopia

The villagization programme in Ethiopia today has shortly been touched upon in the introduction. In the following pages it will be presented more thoroughly and the theoretical assumption of the thesis will be applied to it.

6.1 The official objectives of the programme

The villagization programme was set to begin in 2010 and to move approximately 1,4 million people over three years in the four regional states of Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, and Afar. Public statements from the government and other reports show that villagization additionally occurs in SNNRP (Government of Ethiopia 2014, HRW 2012, 19-20 & DAG 2014, 2). The main official objectives are to improve livelihoods in a sustainable way, social services, infrastructure and building of local institutions with people that historically have been disadvantaged in regards to development as the main target group. It further seeks to improve the resettled populations productivity and sustainable income generating activities in the villages. The villagization programme is not the sole programme in place to achieve these objectives but as a part of a larger strategy to improve agriculture and rural development (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 2-4). The direct actions to achieve these development goals by villagization are provision of e.g. water points, health centres, schools, grinding mills, animal heath centres and training centres for both farmers and pastoralists (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 3). Additionally in many places people are supposed to be provided with up to 4 hectares of land and water schemes are to be installed for irrigation (Gambella Peoples' National Regional State 2009, 1).

The people are only supposed to be relocated within their original area to an ideal place for provision of socio-economic services. People are thus not meant to be moving to unknown locations. The implementation should be conducted by different steering committees on regional and local levels based on an implementation manual made by the regional government (Gambella Peoples' National Regional State 2009, 2). According to the programme document

for Gambella, the programme has reached support from grassroots to federal level and all stakeholders have been included in the process in order to reach consensus on the it (Gambella Peoples' National Regional State 2009, 1-2).

Socio-economic infrastructures are supposed to be in place before moving the beneficiaries into the villages. The regional government is aware that this will include significant cost for the new villages that need to be established. It has therefore made few basic things that need to be in place before moving people, which subsequently should be supplemented by others. These are: rural roads to the villages; access to primary schools, health posts, animal health posts; water schemes; flour mills; and ware houses (Gambella Peoples' National Regional State 2009, 2-3). As the goal is to achieve food security and socio-economic development for the people, their production and productivity must be raised. To do so three agricultural extension agents, or similar service, will be engaged in each community for consultation. Furthermore, food aid must be provided in the first 8 months, thereafter the participants should be able to rely on their own production (Gambella Peoples' National Regional State 2009, 3-4).

6.2 Assessments of the programme

Much has been said and written about how the contemporary villagization process in Ethiopia, but currently there does not exist a proper and completely independent assessment on the overall picture of this latest version of villagization in Ethiopia. Various reports and articles based on visits to some of the affected areas and statements from both government officials and opposition of the programmes do though exist. From outside it is difficult to actually understand if the programme is on track and already has improved the livelihoods of thousands of people, or if it is a complete failure like the former, and the true agenda of the government might be different then the stated ones. In the following pages the main arguments set out by the government, its international partners and its critics will be presented. Subsequently, my own empirical findings from the field will be analysed to see how it correlates with these other assessments.

The government of Ethiopia's assessment

The government underscores that the programme is both planned and executed by the regional governments and local authorities, but under the policies, strategies and guidelines of the government. The first and most important element here seems to be the voluntary participation the programme has followed. The government underlines the voluntary movement and consent of the people and communities as well as the provision of information and consultation in the decision making process of the programmes. According to the federal government, all the regional governments have followed these practices and participation of the programme has thereby been fully voluntary as the decision is left completely to each household. Furthermore all households that decide to participate are allowed to move back to their old homes at any time without facing any discrimination in access to services (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 1).

Communities that have decided to participate have always joined the decision making process in regards implementation, risks assessments and mitigation, site selection, provision and management of services and facilities (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 2). One of the only problems the government has found in keeping to these guidelines has been the limited capacity for delivering the promises at the local level. Even after much investment on this matter the government recognises that the capacity development will be a long-term process and therefore continues to invest in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the regional and local governments (Ibid.). The government further recognizes that this lack of capacity and the inaccessibility to some areas led to services not being provided on a timely manner and of the required quality, but this mainly occurred in the initial phase of the programme (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 3). Even with these challenges the government concludes that in the first 3 years of the programme most people who participated gained access to safe drinking water, health centres, schools, grinding mills, animal heath centres and training centres to both pastoral and sedentary farming to increase productivity. All of these services and facilities are according to the government running smoothly as regional and local authorities have recruited the needed number of staff to ensure the service provision. This means that all who have joined the programme have gained better access to these elements (Ibid.).

The programme particular focus on improvement of productivity and gaining sustainable income-generating activities for the people and has in addition to the mentioned services and facilities provided different types of agricultural tools and water pump generators for irrigation. These are mainly elements for the farmers, but the grinding mills; drinking water access; animal health post and development agents have been features that have improved the production of respectively women and pastoralists as well. These facilities have according to the government further only helped the populations not to disrupt their traditional ways of life and production but only raising their productivity. The government reports that these interventions have started to improve the communities' livelihoods (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 4).

Another element that the government according to themselves has put a large emphasis on is the implementers commitment to accountability, rule of law and adherence to good practices at all levels and that appropriate measures will be taken if someone do not adhere to these principals of good governance. In order to ensure these principals are achieved several arrangements for monitoring, safeguarding, grievance appeals, etc. have been put in place at the different government levels. Additionally, the programme are been monitored by what the government call institutions outside the governmental organ, such as the Ethiopian Ombudsman, Parliament, Ethiopian Human Rights Council and Social Justice offices (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 5). It must though be noted that the Ethiopian parliament only consists of the EPRDF and parties that support the government and thus no opposition (The Guardian 2015). As there already has been accusations of human rights violations of the programme the government and other of the mentioned institutions have investigated these accusations, but none of them found any evidence of human rights violations in relation to the villagization programme. The government argue that these allegations are nothing but politically motivated and attempts to dismiss the positive achievements of the government in relation to socio-economic development and good governance (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 6-7).

Conclusively, the government emphasize that already after a few years the villagization programme shows positive results as participants have gained access to more and better services, infrastructure, human, social and economic development, better living standards and thus making their livelihoods better and more sustainable. Additionally, the programme has strengthened accountability and rule of law, given voice to local communities and thus deepening democratization (Government of Ethiopia 2014, 7).

The critics' assessments

Resettlement programmes are in general subjected to criticism and the contemporary villagization programmes in Ethiopia is no exception. The critique given will mainly be focus on the assessments of two organizations that have followed the process closely since the initial phase of the implementation. These are Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Oakland Institute (OI). HRW and OI have been very critical towards the programme and suggested the government to stop the implementation of villagization until their criticism has been taken into consideration. Their main findings will be summarised in the following.

In 2012, HRW published the report "Waiting here for Death", which closely follows the villagization programme in the Gambella. It shows that villagization is implemented in two ways. The scattered communities were either moved to existing villages or in newly build villages. In general the movements respected ethnic lines, as movements only were short distanced in known areas for the people, but villagization nonetheless changed the people's ways of life remarkably (HRW 2012, 22-23). The main accusation from the report is that the current EPRDF government pursue its villagization strategy without any respect to human rights, just like the former regime did. HRW found that government officials had violated widespread human rights during the implementation of the programme, including: forced displacement; arbitrary arrests; beatings; rapes; etc. Furthermore, Gambella residents have been denied food aid, education and proper housing. These findings were similar in all the visiting areas of the report (HRW 2012, 25).

Before the movement occurred communities were typically informed about the programme in meetings with government officials several months in advance. The police was also present at each meeting. At these meetings the communities were told, not asked, to move and if they were not cooperative or refused, the next meeting often included the Ethiopian army, more police or/and militias along with the government officials. These meetings often resulted in beatings, arrests and intimidation if the people still questioning the programme (HRW 2012, 25-26). When the people had to move to the new villages, they were usually not told in advance but by officials showing up and said that now it was time. When they arrived in the new villages the houses were not ready and villagers had to construct their own houses. It was not only the houses that were not prepared. The promised social services such as schools, clinics, water access, etc. that should have been ready in advance did not exist in the majority of the villages (HRW 2012, 26). Lack of land clearings, grinding mills and limited amount of food aid were also common sights in the villages. Consequently, many left the villages, since the promised socio-economic infrastructure were not delivered. The people that could not go back to their old homes fled to either South Sudan or Kenya (HRW 2012, 27).

The level of coercion is according to the report very high. Interviewees said there was no consultation or dialogue, just information. Questioning of the programme was simply met with violence. The government tried different ways to make the people support the programme, like persuasion, intimidation and direct violence. Those who even resisted this had their houses and crops burned down by soldiers leaving them with absolutely no choice but to leave (HRW 2012, 29). HRW further experienced that many people were afraid of talking to them, as the government like its predecessors has been effective in silencing any opposition, which also is seen in this programme. The people simply fear reprisals from the government if they criticise them, which many of the ones that did criticise it felt by arrests, beatings and according to some interviewees, even kills. Cases where government officials had questioned the programme also resulted in threats, demotion or imprisonment (HRW 2012, 32-33). Almost all that were willing to criticize were people that had already fled the country due to the programme (HRW 2012, 67-68).

In addition to the coercion and violence, HRW found in their field visit that most other promises for the people in the programme appeared to be empty words. As noted earlier the programme was initiated with the prime objective to deliver socio-economic services to the scattered communities in Gambella. In most of the visited villages HRW concluded that people had been hastily moved from smaller villages with schools, clinics access to water to places where none of these existed and those build were often not operational. Similar situations were found in relation to the promised water schemes and grinding mills (HRW 2012, 39). In regards to primary schools, many were willing to join the programme in the belief that their children would be closer to schools. This has not been the case according to HRW, as no schools were operational in the newly established villages. Children thus either had to walk back to their old schools if they still were operational or as the majority did, not attend school (HRW 2012, 49). The programme also stated that the participants would be given up to 3-4 hectares of land. But HRW reports that most households only got 0,5 hectares (HRW 2012, 45). Regarding food security, the implantation of movement happened at a bad time – just before harvesting. Additionally food aid was not as abundant as promised and fields were not prepared for cultivation on arrival. Further, the agricultural extension workers promised to each village were also absent, which made cultivation extra hard as most people came from shifting-cultivation or as pastoralists meaning that they had to learn new farming techniques. The timing of movement therefore came at a very bad time for most (HRW 2012, 40-41).

Consequently, the aim to ensure the participants socio-economic development was not possible from the beginning, as the promised infrastructure and services to achieve it were not in place. As the field visit was conducted in 2011 they could be in place now, but the goal to have it all in place before movement did not happen in most cases according to HRW. In addition to that the official aim was not achieved in the beginning of the programme, HRW found evidence that the land people were moved from was destined to investors for commercial agriculture. Several people that HRW talked to informed that the government officials had told them to move as the land was to be used for "cash crops". A former regional official told that there was a clear link between villagization and the transfer of land to investors and that all was initiated at the federal level. This is further emphasised by the fact that most land deals appears to

happen in the four regions were villagization officially is being implemented (HRW 2012, 54-55).

The US based policy think-tank Oakland Institute has particularly followed this element of the villagization programme and land deals in general in Ethiopia. According to OI, the rational for the government to conduct land deals is Ethiopia's future development as it provides much needed FDI, technology transfer and potential for transforming famers to modern farming. Additionally, both employment and self-employment opportunities are believed to increase in the country. This is subsequently believed to increase food security in the long term (Horne 2011, 20). It is impossible to assert how much land that is "up for grab", as both the regional and federal governments are able to lease out land in Ethiopia, where all the major deals (over 5,000 ha) are done at federal level (Horne 2011, 15). According to the Federal Land Bank in 2009, 32 % percent in Gambella and 14 percent in Benishangul-Gumuz of all land were "for sale" (Horne 2011, 21, Table 6). It is worth noting that these figures are only the major lands for sale. The lands under 5,000 ha for sale by the regional government is thus not included in these large figures.

Another point worth noting is that villagization is being implemented in both these regions by moving scattered populations into sedentary villages, thus taking up less space in the regions. Under the OI's many interviews with government official they never mentioned the indigenous of the areas, but underscored that land investment only were possible in areas where there were no human settlement. This claim was identified as false by the OI, as many of the lands for sale in Gambella were already occupied by many small indigenous settlements (Horne 2011, 26). Furthermore, OI concludes that land investments deals have virtually no transparency and consultation with local communities never happened before land was leased out (Horne 2011, 30-31).

IO saw a strong correlation between land deals and where villagization was being implemented. They did not find evidence that villagization was being implemented to move people away from areas by including them in the programme and afterwards leasing out their original home

areas, but making land available for investment definitely became easier with the programme (Horne 2011, 41). Furthermore, evidence was found that several small villages within a large newly leased out area had been relocated as part of the villagization programme in Gambella (Horne 2011, 32, Box G) and many local people believe that villagization is being used as an excuse to clear land for investments (Horne 2011, 43).

In 2015 OI followed up on their initial findings and published a report of several interviews with indigenous from Gambella, SNNRP and Benishangul-Gumuz conducted in 2014 and 2015. The interviewed all tell that they have been forced out of their home areas and involuntarily join the villagization programme, so their fertile ancestral land with access to water could be sold to investors. In their new villages they were promised schools and clinics, social services and food, but the promises were not fulfilled. Furthermore, the plots given to the families were much smaller than what they had before and consequently not producing enough food for the people. In some cases the people had completely left the villages (Oakland Institute 2015, 5 & 6). An interviewed anonymous government employee stresses that villagization is related to land investment and no consultation is held with the local communities (Oakland Institute 2015, 8). Another anonymous government employee also emphasize that the relocation of people into villages is not voluntary and resembles it with the forced resettlement programmes that occurred under the Derg. He further underscores that the regional governments are under the federals authority on these matters and just follow orders. (Oakland Institute 2015, 13). Many of the traditional life forms of the areas are also highly challenged by villagization and land investment. Forests are being cleared that traditionally was used by locals for food, medicine and oil. Furthermore, the areas sold were used as grazing areas, which made it difficult for the people to feed their livestock (Oakland Institute 2015, 9-10).

The possible benefits such as technology transfer, infrastructure improvements, increased wage employment and a general better economy in Ethiopia have thus not occurred. The only local people that have so far only been employed in new farms are in low-skilled labour with very low salaries. The good jobs usually goes to the people the investors bring along (Oakland

Institute 2015, 10). In regards to food security, the populations are according to OI worse off, as the commercial agriculture will take much of the resources used by people that already are vulnerable for food insecurity. The lands these people use are traditional ancestral lands that are not recognized by the country's tenure system and people are afraid of fighting for their constitutional right to the land at different levels because of their intimidation of reprisals. (Horne 2011, 36 & 38). The people that have been relocated did not receive any compensation, as the government insist that no one have been moved from farmland, which is the only case that would require compensation. Additionally, compensation would only be given to people with legal land titles, which do not exist in most of the regions with land investments and villagization programmes (Horne 2011, 44).

The findings of HRW and OI suggest that the current villagization programmes in Ethiopia resembles a lot with the one implemented under the Derg and does not correspond with the stated motives and assessment from the government. There are strong signs on forced and violent resettlement of the target group and that the promises made to the participants not are provided. Furthermore, it appears at there is a strong connection between land investment deals and villagization, which could either be a hidden agenda for villagization or a durable solution with the available land the villagization programmes leave behind.

The international partners in Ethiopia's assessment

Ethiopia's international partners have rejected to be part of the villagization programme, but through their cooperation on other related fields they are to a smaller or bigger degree indirectly involved in the programme. This is particular through food aid, job creation, provision of social services programmes such as the Provision of Basic Services (PBS) and the Production Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Due to this indirect involvement accusations based on the negative attention of the programme, issues have also being raised against the international partners, in particular the UK Department for International Development (DfID) (Kelly 2014) and the World Bank (IDI 2015). If the accusations towards villagization are true and the government of Ethiopia are systematically violating human rights it would have huge impact on the country's ability to cooperate with other countries. On the other hand, the

international partners have a large interest in that Ethiopia does not violate human rights, as they want to continue their cooperation with a rapidly growing economy like Ethiopia. The international partners have through their common umbrella; the DAG therefore monitored the villagization programme in all implementing regions to ensure their cooperation with the Ethiopian government is acceptable and legit. Their findings will be presented in the following.

In Gambella, the DAG met communities that had rejected the programme and thus lived like before the programme started its implementation and still received social services from the government (DAG 2015c, 1). In the villages, families had received up to 4 ha of land each and were able to go back and forth to their original home areas for farming and grazing. In regards to the promised socio-economic services schools and water access were in general considerably improved, but health clinics, grinding mills and the promised agricultural technical support were either absent or of bad condition. In addition, land certification was still not delivered or of bad quality, which created frustration among the villagers. The DAG also noted that much of the given land was not prepared for cultivation, which hinders the objective of improving productivity. The monitoring team stresses that if these issues are not addressed continued food insecurity will persist in the areas (DAG 2015c, 2). Even though social services were not in place in many of the villages, access to them had generally improved. The DAG conclusively suggested that the government should try to deliver the promises and to continue the good work the programme already had done (DAG 2015c, 3).

In 2014, DAG members also conducted a visit to SNNRP. The report concludes that no direct forced resettlements have occurred, but also that no alternatives were provided for the communities if they wanted social services The government has promised that no grazing land will be taken from the population, but at the same time it will not allocate any official land certificates to them. Furthermore, conflicts with some investors in the areas have already occurred as they have cultivated former grazing land. Only very limited consultations have been conducted with the communities being resettled and the rapid villagization programmes will, according to the DAG report, inevitably change the local livelihoods. Additionally, the DAG suggest that the government should try to consult with traditional leaders and focus on creating

full consent for the participants as they do not seem to understand the programme completely. Most villages communities are moved to are in general found to be in good conditions. But the report express a need to enhance access to water; too high cost at health clinics; lack of secondary schools, income possibilities for women, alternative job opportunities; and improvement of land/house allocation processes. One visited site in South Omo was completely insufficient to live in, as there were no services provided for the people at all. As a remark it must be noted that the translators used at the visit the delegation found out to be governmental officials, which could discredit the mission's findings (DAG 2015b, 1-4).

In the DAG members mission to the Somali region the overall findings were in general positive. Here, mainly former pastoralist had been villagized, as their way of life seemed difficult to sustain, which was emphasised both by the government and the people themselves. The resettled did though complain that officials had exaggerated the promises about their new villages. The DAG found that considerable improvements for the people had been made, particularly in relation to water and irrigation infrastructure. The government was also supposed to deliver adequate housing, food aid, education and health clinics to the villages, but this was not implemented or operational in all villages yet. In general, the mission found that the programme had benefitted the people's situation, but that proper implementation of the lacking socio-economic services is necessary to secure the programmes long-term success and encourages the government to continue its efforts in the programme (DAG 2015a, 1-2).

Even before these recent missions were conducted the DAG had been on several visits in the above-mentioned regions and in Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar. The DAG has thereby been an independent monitor in all the regions that villagization is being implemented in. In some of the first visits conducted in Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNRP they met few people that alleged the government of using threat and abuse to implement the programme, but insists that they did not find widespread accusations of human rights violations as reported by others. The DAG members find that implementation has improved over time and where the programme has been in place over a longer period all communities were either on the same level or better of than before. The group still believe it is to early to conclude if the programme will benefit

the people and the country on the long term, but that the provided socio-economic services certainly have the potential to achieve that (DAG 2014, 1-2).

Conclusively, the current villagization programme in Ethiopia has received a lot of attention internationally and several reports have been published. Critics underline that villagization is being implemented with the use of force, thus violating human rights and expelling people from their lands to make room for investors. Additionally, promises made by the government to the people in regards to socio-economic infrastructure and services are in most cases not provided. The DAG underscores that no use of systematically forced participation has been found in the programme, but also that the programme had signs of the use of force in few locations in the beginning. It does though find that the implementation has been considerable improved over the years and that people in the programme in general either are better of or at least on the same level as prior to resettlement, as most of the villages have gained some of the promised socio-economic services and infrastructure. If the programme should be successful in the long run all promises must though be implemented in each village.

That there exist a strong contrast between the findings of the government, HRW, OI and the DAG cannot be ignored. It is worth noting that the findings from HRW and OI are from 2011 and 2010 and 2014/2015 and from smaller focus areas. This could relate to the DAG's first findings that signs of coercion and less services provided from the initial phases of the programme and that these matters might have been improved over the years. At least it seems so from the DAG's recent monitoring missions. But an assessment on how the villagization programme actually is being implemented will not be possible to conduct from the investigation of published reports from the field. This would result in a very positive outcome if the theoretical assumptions from the IRR model were applied to the assessment by the Ethiopian government's. Contrary, a negative outcome would be the case if one based the research on HRW or OI's findings. A somewhere "in between" would be made from the assessments based of the DAG's findings. It is also important to keep in mind the different interests and agencies the presented parties represent. There are large differences on the focus point the parties have in the programme. For example, HRW is looking for human rights

violations, where the government is looking for improvements of living standards of the people. These different agents and interest the parties represent will be further discussed in the next chapter.

In the following, my own assessment will be conducted based on interviews with people that have specific knowledge of the programme and who do not have the same conflict of interest in expressing their views. This will bring the investigation closer to answering the research question of this thesis.

6.3 Assessment based on empirical findings from the field

The primary data of this thesis is collected from three separate interviews with professionals in Ethiopia and is thoroughly described in the methodological chapter. These three interviewees are considered to be more objective in their views of the villagization programme as they do not have a particular personal interest in it. The European Diplomat's views can of cause be based on the interest of the international partners. The Senior Programme Officer and the Professor from Addis Ababa University are considered to be people outside of this conflict of interest and will therefore be used as the primary sources for the assessment. It can though not entirely be dismissed that they may have a personal interest that could bias their portraying of the programme in a certain manner.

In the following pages the IRR model will be used to make an assessment of the current villagization programme. Each risk and reconstruction component will be evaluated based on information extracted from the interviews conducted in Addis Ababa. Differences in standpoints by the interviewed will be stressed along the way. Following application of the IRR model, the main arguments and views of the interviewed will be scrutinized. This will present what they see as most relevant factors in an assessment of how the current villagization process is succeeding and enable the thesis to see if the IRR model captures all the relevant elements to ensure successful villagization in Ethiopia.

From landless to land-based reestablishment and from jobless to reemployment

The landlessness issue is a controversial subject in Ethiopia. As mentioned before, the state owns all land, which means they always are allowed to expropriate if it sees it in the interest of the broader society. The populations that in general are targets for villagization usually either uses land for grazing to their livestock or for agricultural production. Land is as such the foundation of their livelihoods, food security and income. So this risks is very important as if not handled appropriately it can have severe effects for the people.

The land-based reestablishment of the resettled has proved to generate some severe challenges for the involved. In most locations, people are being given at least one hectare of land for each household, but the land-based reestablishment is not achieved from this, as water access is often not provided for irrigation (Programme Officer 2016a). On the positive side, people of the programme usually get registered on their new lands, which means they are more secure then before. This subject different for the many livestock raisers in the villagization programmes as grazing areas for cattle is not included in the planning (Professor 2016). Both the Programme Officer and the Professor from Addis Ababa University (AAU) underlines the villagization programme is closely related to resettlement due to infrastructure, agricultural schemes or similar. This means that when the people are moved, their old lands are often sold to investors or used for other purposes, which limits the pastoralists' ability to find suitable grazing lands all year.

As with landlessness, joblessness for the participants of the villagization programme is closely related to people's way of life, as pastoralism and small-scale farming are the main lifestyles. So, either a system where same lifestyles are offered in the new settlements or new income-generating opportunities should be implemented. As the interviewed saw a direct relation between large agricultural schemes, often large private farms, some jobs were created that the people could gain, but these were mostly low skilled labour as private businesses brought on the needed staff and in general too few job opportunities exists in the villages (Programme Officer 2016a). In some places where large plantations or farms have gained access to land, some mechanisms as using the villagers as out growers have been implemented. This means

that people who gained one hectare of land used about 25 percent to household needs and 75 percent were produced and sold to a large farm nearby (Professor 2016). The general picture is though that people are not having access to large areas of land that people had before and they do not feel they have being compensated appropriately for these losses in terms of new land, jobs or other income-generating activities, thus making participants sceptical and against the programme. The implementation of land provision is further often not in place in many of the areas, as expressed by the Professor from AAU: *"They have not yet been resettled, they have not started the new way of life. They are just floating. Their land has been taken away and it has been brought into the common area as they call it."* (Professor 2016). The situation in many places has thus made the people alienated with a feeling of being displaced with no alternative lifestyles provided.

The general picture of the land-based reestablishment and employment for the resettled people are thus not components that the government has handled ideally for the resettled. People do gain access to land for production, but often without direct access to needed elements such as irrigation or other needed systems. Some areas have been good at making people out growers, but even in these areas people do not feel compensated enough compared to what they had before resettlement. Off farm activities are not taken into consideration by the authorities, as new ways to gain income is not being planned as part of the programme. It is though allowed for the people to start up businesses if they have the ability, which was not the case under the Derg's villagization programme. But systematic promotion of new income generating does not exist. The risk of particular joblessness thus persists in the villagization programme, but also the risk of landlessness for the pastoral people that no longer have access to adequate grazing areas all year.

<u>From homeless to house reconstruction</u>

The reconstruction of homes to the resettled people is an element that is included well in the planning of the villages, but proper implementation is often lacking and people get stuck in temporary homes, as new houses often are not in place before resettlement occurs (Professor 2016). The houses in the villages further have severe problems from the way reconstruction is planned, as they are both very small in size and placed in long rows very close to each other.

This is very untraditional for most people joining the programmes (Programme Officer 2016b & Professor 2016). The planners and implementers have thus not communicated with the people about how they want to install their houses, but just build them in a systematic way decided by a top-down approach (Programme Officer 2016b). In many cultures in Ethiopia homes are build with room for the larger family with one larger construction in the middle and then smaller ones around for the respective family members. Furthermore, areas with room for growing food crops within the compound is very normal. The people resettled to these houses in the villages do therefore not like their new way of living (Ibid.). There are though few positive sides of the approach conducted by the implementers. There are now toilet facilities for the families and the livestock are separated from the peoples' homes, which is good from a health perspective (Ibid.). But there is also another issue arising from this, as livestock raisers no longer have good oversight of their animals, farmers often have longer to their plots, and the women need to go longer distances to collects food crops.

The people who has a title or a legitimate claim to their house are usually also compensated economically when being resettled. The guidelines for compensation has actually improved in the phase of villagization, as prior people only got the value of their homes, not relating to market price, but simply the value the building was worth. Now people are getting the market value for their old homes, their agricultural land and its produce (Programme Officer 2016a). But this can still be problematic if their old homes are worth less then the new ones, and thus cannot ensure at least a similar living standard from what they had before. Additionally, not all get compensation if they cannot prove their right to the previous house and land (Professor 2016).

The opportunity to create better housing standards for the villagers is thus not achieved by the government. The positive notes regarding toilets and separation of humans and animals are of cause positive health improvements. But the chance for people to create new settings that would improve their livelihoods compared to their formers has not been achieved, which mainly can be based on the non-participatory approach conducted by the government on how people should be installed in the new villages. In addition none of the interviewed expressed

that any community places and buildings had been established. Hence, the risk of homelessness in the form of worse housing standard and the lack of housing in the initial phase of resettlement appear to still be part of the villagization programme.

From social disarticulation to community reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, and from expropriation to restoration of community assets and services

Community reconstruction is a very challenging case in Ethiopia. As already seen in the previous sections, not much decision over cultural and social reconstruction are given to the affected populations, which already have created greater detachments to families' traditional lifestyles. Villagization is a phenomenon that inevitably challenges and changes communities, by the fact that former ways of life will be erupted, but this can of cause be minimized. According to the Programme Officer, the traditional clan systems that were in place in many areas of the country have been erupted and changed by the villagization. Her response to how cultural institutions and common areas are being affected by villagization is that; *"It's breaking down"* (Programme Officer 2016b). These institutions and traditions are being degraded as the government structure is too strong in these new settlements, where local government officials have more power then what people are used to. This affects many of the citizens psychologically, as they do not know where to go with problems, conflicts or for help. Traditionally, a clan will protect you and feed you in hard times, but as the clan system looses influence it also looses the ability to help people when needed. Furthermore, these old structures and traditions also managed the lands in the sense that specific grazing areas were protected and only used in the dry season. These factors and local knowledge is no longer in place as well functioning institutions, which creates frustration and insecurity for the people. The consultations with clan leaders also vary a lot from place to place. When a government official is from the same clan, then there still exists a lot of respect for the clan leader, whom he will consult for important decisions. But when the official is from a different clan or area, they usually do not see a need for this, which can create conflicts and a more top-down implementation approach and powerlessness for the people in the new localities (Ibid.).

The consultations with the people who are being resettled have so far proved to be on a minimum and the case is no better for the host communities. Some of the villages already exist but are set to grow tremendous by the arrival of new villagers. The host communities in these settlements are often completely neglected in the whole process, which is unfortunate, as they will be sharing their lives, services and natural endowments with a large number of new people. These original communities in the villages do not have a say in the process and are further not in centre of the stated objectives, only the resettled are. This generates marginalization of them as their lives are affected very much and new benefits are often only provided to the resettled, but not the host community. These factors have led to conflicts and even clash between the government and the host communities, which likely could have been avoided by not rushing the programme through and use more time on conscious planning and implementation with both host and resettler communities (Programme Officer 2016a). Additionally, the resettler communities are also being marginalized by the programme, as the mentioned lack of focus on cultural and traditional heritage is not taken appropriately into consideration, thus creating a loss if human and cultural capital. The participants, particularly the pastoralist, have from a historical perspective even been marginalized before they were included in the villagization programme. They have not been provided with services such as education and health or other important facilities. So, by joining the programme they were now supposed to finally get these services (Professor 2016). It must though be noted that nomadic pastoralists per definition are a challenging group of people to provide with permanent services.

When being resettled people generally also loose access to what they had before in terms of communal land, facilities and services. One of the main arguments of the whole villagization programme is that the target group now finally can be provided with adequate socio-economic services, hence gaining more sustainable livelihoods and becoming more integrated in the Ethiopian society. The main loss for the communities taking part in villagization is their loss of access to the land that following their leave will be used for other purposes. As mentioned earlier, provision of grazing land to pastoralists still have not been properly included in the programme, which challenges their way of production. These breakdowns of structures that administered sustainable use of resources have now made access to water, grazing land and

other resources very challenged due to overexploitation, which has made it impossible for may pastoralists to keep a suitable size of livestock thus increasing their food insecurity (Programme Officer 2016a).

On a positive note, the Programme Officer underscores that the Ethiopian government has a strong capacity in starting and making large-scale initiatives, such as irrigation systems that sincerely can improve famers' productivity. In the current case they have thus also been good in creating the frame for this and service provisions by building schools, health clinics, water points, veterinary clinics, etc. The problem is more the substance of these services. Often funds run out or are used inappropriately, so there are no or not enough teachers, doctors, veterinary doctors, medicine and so on (Programme Officer 2016a). Often, the government have actually started the implementation well by e.g. creating the foundation of the services and even large irrigation and road infrastructure, but they then leave it without properly passing it on to the villagers or creating institutions to keep things in order. Consequently, people's livelihoods never improve and many abandon the areas as the programmes and services start to degrade (Programme Officer 2016b).

The Professor from AAU has a similar conclusion to how the promises of socio-economic services have materialized in the programmes, which he concludes simply: they have not (Professor 2016). According to him, the situation resembles terrifyingly much with the things participants went through under the Derg's villagization programme. Many promises of irrigated agriculture, education, proper financial compensation, support to change lifestyles, etc. were promised but never materialized back then, and the same is happening now. Even going back to their old areas is impossible for most as it quickly get leased out to others thus making the people stuck in the programmes. During his visits to the field he saw the same picture as the Programme Officer expresses about the service provision either not working well or being poorly managed (Ibid.). Even as things are running far from the stated promises, one must also keep in mind what many people came from. According to The European Diplomat, there are also examples of children expressing their happiness from finally being able to attend school

and actually get an education and a change for a different lifestyle then their parents (Euorpean Diplomat 2016).

Community reconstruction, social inclusion and access to services and other communal assets do not seem to be implemented in a constructive sense. There is a lack of focus on what these people need based on their social and cultural backgrounds and a too short-term objective from government officials that are to focussed on reporting large numbers of participants and are thereby *"Rushed to achieve the targets"* (Programme Officer 2016a) instead of ensuring a step-by-step implementation of the programme with focus on the long-term development objectives officially stated by the government. As promises are thus not being held, people ones again feel cheated by the government as their old lands are gone to investors and what they were supposed to get in return never materialized. Safeguards against these risks have thus not been appropriately implemented, which is challenging the main objectives of the programme tremendously.

From food insecurity to adequate nutrition and from increased morbidity to better health care

Food security is officially at the centre of the whole villagization programme. The Ethiopian government has a large-scale plan to ensure food security for all its populations, where under villagization is one cluster (Programme Officer 2016a). One would therefore think that this specific element has been improved under the current programme; unfortunately this does not appear to be the case. On a more short-term basis, most people either receive food aid in the initial phase of resettlement (Ibid.), but this does not change the fact that gaining long-term food security looks unlikely for the people in the resettlement programmes.

The Professor from AAU describes the situation by a comment from a man living in a new village in Afar that he recently visited: *"We can't be food secure because we have lost our lands, it (villagization) is making life worse!"* (Professor 2016). The professor believes that due to the loss of land, people of the programme have in many places become more food insecure then they were prior to villagization. He emphasizes that if the main aim is to ensure food security, the approach should have been different. For example, making the pastoral participants more food

secure by improving their pastoral productivity and additionally teach them sedentary productive measures, so they could be agro-pastoralists, which some already are practising now on their own initiative. He further underlines that even though pastoralists are a special type of people they are not as portrayed in the media and by many international NGOs. If they see an opportunity for life improvement or additional income they take it. But they still consider themselves pastoralist and want to remain able to conduct their nomadic ways of life to a certain degree (Ibid.). The Programme Officer's argument is the same, as she describes pastoralist as rational people like everyone else. So if they see benefits in the programme then they will want to participate (Programme Officer 2016a). These arguments show the programme can be very beneficial if improvements on food security happen, but according to the interviews the basics to reach this target are not properly implemented.

There is though a not completely agreement between the interviewees on if the programme has brought improvements in regards to food security. As noted, the Professor's personal research shows that the programme has only made food insecurity worse. The Programme Officer on the other hand see that for some it must have improved their situation, as many have been unable to feed themselves and their livestock, but also that it depends on where in Ethiopia people are from, as there is much more fertile land in Gambella and SNNRP then in Somali and Afar (Programme Officer 2016a). She further does not accept the claim from some critics that if pastoralist had been left alone they would have been better off and accuses the climate change as a relevant factor for why traditional pastoral ways of life must change for many, as their lifestyle simply is not sustainable anymore (Ibid.). This means that the implementers must become better in coping with this issue, as traditional ways can no longer take care of all who become food insecure.

In regards to health care, the villagization has the right frame for improvement of service provision to the participants. But as mentioned, heath workers and medicines are often lacking in the villages due to lack of funds and bad implementation. The separation of animals and people is further a good initiative to improve the risks of illness of the people. Sufficient measures taking for the people that have lived in highland areas and now moved to lowland

areas also seem to have been inadequate. This means that new deceases such as malaria have been introduced to some of the resettled (Programme Officer 2016a). Furthermore, the concentrating of people and large-scale farming in the same areas have made pollution to the rivers used for drinking of both human and animals evident, which have increased their health risks (Professor 2016). On the other hand people not participating in the programme usually have nowhere to go with health problems. So, even though the health services are not working accordingly, it is an improvement from before, but needs to be considerably improved in the future.

Main arguments from the interviewed

The interviewed were given the possibility to come with their own assessment of how they considered the phenomena of villagization in general and what they thought about the current programme in Ethiopia. These arguments will be presented and scrutinized in the following to see how well the IRR model's assumptions are compatible on the Ethiopian case.

Regarding the much criticised approach for rural development both in Ethiopia and in general around the world, all three interviewees thought the phenomenon of villagization in general is a good idea. They actually supported it, primarily based on the fact that the target group for participation future looks grim if they do now change their ways of production in some regards. Furthermore, the target-group itself would also join if the promises where held and a larger focus on sustaining cultural and traditional ways of life along the new one, as it definitely would improve their livelihoods on a general basis. This view is supported by a recent visit to Afar conducted by the European Diplomat. He met pastoralist communities of Afar that due to the current drought had lost about 90 percent of their livestock. They have therefore become aware of that their lifestyle is simply not sustainable anymore in their current form, because every time they get their livestock sizes at suitable levels another drought hits that again kills many of them. These droughts unfortunately appear to come more often then they have been used to, so in these locations agro-pastoralism have been introduced in the villages, which helps the people to become more sustainable in the changing conditions (Euorpean Diplomat 2016).

The major problem with the current villagization programme appears to be that it ones again deliver many promises of socio-economic benefits, but fails to materialize them. Additionally, one of the main arguments between the critics and the government of Ethiopia has been the voluntary character, or lack of it, the programme is being implemented with. Unfortunately, both the Programme Officer and the Professor, is very clear on the matter and express that it is based on involuntary character where false promises are given. The literature does not provide a general definition of voluntary resettlement, but one of the agencies that have been most involved with resettlement is the World Bank and it describes involuntary resettlement as: *"The lack of informed consent and power of choice on the part of the people directly affected by the acquisition"* (The World Bank 2004, 1). According to the World Bank, in order to be voluntary, resettlement thus needs: "informed consent and power of choice". This means that the affected populations should have fully knowledge about the programme and its implications and be completely free to participate or not. Without informed consent and power of choice, resettlement is consequently involuntary according to the World Bank (2004, 21). According to the interviewed, and even the DAG's own assessments, the government usually does not live up to this definition.

The Programme Officer underlines the programme will not be successful until this involuntary aspect is removed and emphasises that this is absolutely possible. There are examples from the field where NGO's have implemented similar resettlement schemes, but on a voluntary basis where people themselves choose how they wanted to participate. Another important factor is time. Currently it is being implemented in such a hasty manner with to much focus on numbers instead of real long term success or as the Programme Officer expresses it: *"If you convince, maybe 10 families (will participate), but if you force it then you get the whole community."* (Programme Officer 2016a). If the government used the appropriate time to talk to people, choose sites, mitigation, preparation before resettlement and made sure services were ready, then it would be successful and people would happily join. This was exactly the case for the mentioned NGO, where others saw the benefits and then wanted to join them selves (Programme Officer 2016b).

The professor stresses many of the same factors. He sees the main problems with the current way of villagizing people are the way the government think of it, the way of implementation and the lack of engagement with the people. The implementation lacks to many of the promises, the people have no choice of participation or influence on how the new villages and lives should be. Consequently, the programme reminds him entirely with the way the Derg implemented villagization. But just like the Programme Officer, he believes that the idea is good for Ethiopia and could be successful if these components are being changed and done properly. If this was the case, he is also certain that the people would join (Professor 2016).

The European Diplomat emphasizes that the most important factors for the villagization programme to succeed is that the government must be in cooperation and dialogue with the affected communities. He underlines that the promises given to the communities must be delivered, so that relocation actually becomes a real alternative to the participants' current ways of life. He further calls for a more rational approach to ensure the continuing development of the country. To achieve this there are some things that must change, which could include large developmental projects, such as a dams, roads or agriculture schemes, which could entail the relocation of affected people in these areas (European diplomat 2016). This must of course be done in full dialogue with these communities to ensure sustainability.

As critical as both the Professor and the Programme Officer are towards the current programme and the way it is being implemented they do support the idea in Ethiopia. They see it as a necessary and a durable way to improve the livelihoods of a challenged part of the population. In order to ensure socio-economic development for the target group, the European Diplomat express that villagization can be a suitable and needed solution. He underlines that this will be hard to achieve without facing any resistance of some groups, including the affected populations. It should therefore be implemented in a proper and inclusive way, so that both the government and its international development partners can vouch for. Both he and the professor further emphasises that the rosie picture of the pastoral way of life is not anything he has encountered, quite the contrary (European diplomat 2016 & Professor 2016). According to him most of them seem to live under very hard conditions without widespread access to social

services, proper housing, etc. Therefore villagizing them and hence creating new and better living conditions for them can be a suitable resolution to their challenges.

Conclusion from the field

The top-down and involuntary approach currently being used must be changed and the way of both planning and implementation must be transformed for the villagization programme in Ethiopia to become successful. The interviewed emphasized many of the same aspects to be relevant as Cernea's IRR model does, but they also underscored other important elements to achieve successful villagization in Ethiopia. For the IRR model to be a durable model to the Ethiopian case a larger focus on voluntarism must be included. It should though be noted that, an assessment of validity of the model in Ethiopia could not be conducted completely, as so much of the guidelines for implementation resettlement programmes from the model is not being followed on the ground. It is therefore difficult to confirm or dismiss the validity of the model based on these findings as so many of them are not being implemented accordingly. This further means, that according to the IRR model and the theoretical assumptions of this thesis, the villagization programme in Ethiopia does currently not look very promising for the involved people, as so many of the identified risks of the model is not being prevented appropriately by proper reconstructions. This could, and has according to some of the interviewed already, lead to impoverishment of the participants. This latest attempt to implement villagization to ensure socio-economic development and food security for a large number of people unfortunately looks to go in the footsteps of many former ones as an unsuccessful strategy.

7. Reflections

In the current chapter a reflection over the analysed empirics will be discussed. This implies a discussion over the different assessments from the former chapter, why they seem so different and where my assessment of the current villagization programme lies. Other perspectives that are perceived important to bear in mind when talking of villagization in Ethiopia will likewise be discussed. Additionally, the approach for my research and attempt to answer the set out research question will be discussed and other possible ways to approach it will be presented. Finally, a section with policy suggestion for the Ethiopian government and its future usage of villagization policies will be provided.

7.1 Why such different assessments and what is the real picture?

The former chapter showed the different conclusions provided by some of the villagization programme's stakeholders. For the purpose of this thesis, how they arrive at what appear to be very different conclusions will be discussed in the following.

The governments' own reporting and assessments of the programme appeared very positively and by reading them one ends with a feeling that the participants must have improved their livelihoods by joining the programme. On the other hand, when reviewing the findings of particular the HRW the picture looks very different, as no positive elements arriving from participation of the programme in presented. Somewhere in between we find the reports from the DAG's visits. They see many structures and improvements in general, but also a need for improvements due to non-functioning services or the lack of them and other factors they find must be implemented in order to gain the promised socio-economic development for the participants. The conclusion compiled from my own interviews provides a general picture of a good idea from the government, but with huge lacks in planning and implementation. The views of particular the Programme Officer and the Professor, lies closer to the more critical reports then the positive assessment of the government, as they imply a certain level of coercion and significant lack of promises in many of the places. On the other hand, both the

DAG and the interviewed underscored that in many places the foundation for many of the service provisions are now in place and people have access to more of them then before. But also that many of them are either not running effectively or at all.

Even as the presented findings of the mentioned parties are very different, they might still be able to be compiled and be collected from the same areas, but with emphasis on different themes highlighted by the parties in their assessments. For example, the government's claim that there has build clinics, schools, grinding mills, etc. this might be very possible, but if they are not functioning well, or if they are not in all the villages it could still correspond with both the findings of the DAG and the interviewees that emphasizes that service provisions are lacking. It could even correspond with the HRW and OI, as their prime objective in their reports are to find out if human right violations have been committed and if land deals are related to villagization. HRW emphasized that the given promises were not provided and that people were coerced to participate under harsh conditions. But the villages might still have rooms, buildings or locations provided for the services, which could give the government the opportunity to say that services has been constructed. Furthermore, it must again be underlined that the findings of HRW is from the initial phase of the programme where both the government and the DAG have admitted to also have encountered unsatisfied findings in some areas of the programmes. The aspect on voluntary or involuntary can though not be compiled. The government insists on a voluntary participation, the DAG has more or less the same argument, but both the critics and two of the interviewed stress that voluntary participation is not the case in the current villagization programme. They further sees it as one of the greatest obstacles for the programme's future success, as it would not need to be involuntary if all promises where kept and the current rush in implementation time would be stopped.

The different interests of the parties following the programme on how it is been portrayed have shortly been touched upon before. The government, the international partners and the critics of the villagization programme all have specific interests in it. The government is interested in showing a great progress and capability to ensure socio-economic growth for the populations and its international partners. Additionally, it is interested in attracting investments in land that

has proved to be so closely related to the villagization programmes. The international partners interest in the programme lies in the implementation of it will be better then the historical ones in terms of human rights violations, coercion and false promises. Furthermore, they are of cause interested in the improvement of livelihoods of the people that they themselves support by other means. Last but not least, they are interested in the ability to continue their cooperation with the government and the country in general without any obstacles, which an inappropriately villagization programme could generate. The critics of the programme also have interests in it. HRW is not in Ethiopia to see how a poor country in general is during regarding the implementation of a large-scale development project as villagization. They are there for the sole purpose of seeing if this programme has violated any human rights, which they find they have. The OI is particular looking for unfair land deals. They therefore look on the connection between the loss of land for the participants of the programme and the land deals subsequently done by the federal and regional governments. They too find that there is a strong connection of what they are investigation and the villagization programme. Their negative attitude towards the programme is as such not based on large-scale investigations on the programme in it self, but other related issues. Finally, the interviewed, and in particular the Programme Officer and the Professor do not have a specific interest in how they want to portray the programme. Therefore my conclusion on the programme is primarily based on their thorough knowledge of the programme. As mentioned in the previous section, their arguments are also able to incorporate many of the accusations and arguments presented by the different parties, which supports the assessment I have extracted from the interviews.

7.2 Is the current programme any different from the Derg's and other historical villagization programmes?

The presented villagization programmes, including the Derg's, was based on an involuntary participation where hidden agendas such as security measures and control over the populations were larger objectives then life improvements of the affected populations. The villagization today is according to the findings of this thesis also based on an involuntary character either in the sense coercion or due to the fact that full knowledge and consent was not in provided. The level or form of involuntary participation appear to have changed, but is still a main element in

the villagization today. The same can be said about the many socio-economic promises given in the 1980's and today. The service provision today is better then in the 1980's, but they are still not good enough and not as promised. The planning and implementation of the programme are also strikingly similar, as they are based on a top-down approach from the federal government with no participation of the affected communities. So, there are unfortunately many similarities from the former failed programmes.

Luckily, there are also much dissimilarity between them, especially when looking specifically on the Derg's and the current. The former one was founded on some strict ideological ideas with no flexibility at all. For example, all had to work within the agricultural sector. Anything else was simply not allowed. Today, the government praises when people find income-generating activities outside of this sector. Even as the current programme on a national basis is very large, the programme under the Derg was much larger and incorporated huge part of the rural society. Today, it also appears as if people actually want to join the programme if the official statements actually were true. So, if planning and execution of the programme were conducted on a different manner, support of it from the people would be a possible and very positive feature of the programme. But as this is currently not the case the Ethiopian government still has a long way to go before successful villagization can be achieved and the programme's critics are consequently right in many of their critiques of the programme and their comparison with the Derg's villagization programme. When using the IRR model to assess whether or not the programmes have or had the right features to become successful villagization schemes both of them also failed on several factors in my theoretical application on the two cases. Consequently, even as the programme have many improvements compared to the one during the Derg, the programme still needs many improvements in order to become a successful programme and the resembles with the former one will unfortunately likely persist for some time.

7.3 Other possible theoretical perspectives

Michael M. Cernea is not the only person who has developed theoretical perspectives, models and assumptions about resettlement and villagization. Other scholars, such as Chris De Wet, have modified Cernea's theory with their own suggestions and perspectives and criticised some

elements of the IRR model. The criticism is mainly that others sees it as an attempts to be a "one size fits all" model and does not emphasize enough the complexities that resettlement brings along.

De Wet argues that where Cernea and other scholars on the area focus on inadequate inputs that often can be combatted by economic means and proper policies and political will, he focuses more on what he calls 'inherent complexities'. The inherent complexities are based on the fact that involuntary resettlement's nature is characterized by complexities that generates certain problems that are so difficult to deal with that the right amount of inputs are not enough (De Wet 2009, 36-37). De Wet further finds Cernea's use of the terminology 'risks' to be wrong and suggests that he should have used 'threats' instead, but emphasizes that he agrees with Cernea's assumptions on that these factors exists (De Wet 2009, 38). So even with his change of terminology and emphasis on 'inherent complexities', the threats he sees are more or less the same as Cernea's. (De Wet 2009, 38-40). All these elements are accordingly also incorporated in the IRR model, but De Wet underline that these threats happen because the resettlement is involuntary in nature. De Wet's 'inherent complexities' further argues that the identified threats hit different levels of society: the individual/household; the community; the resettlement project as an institution; the regional/national; and the international level. These levels are affected in different ways from for example marginalization at the individual/household level to economic decline at the national level (De Wet 2009, 44-46). Many of the threats under each level De Wet refers to Cernea's risks and his theory thus seems to be just a different way of explaining the risks/threats that large resettlement schemes most likely will encounter and why they exist. De Wet also support the IRR model's arguments in most ways, the difference is just that he does not believe in reconstruction can be achieved as simple as he understands Cernea is suggesting and thus calls for a much more open ended and flexible approach (De Wet 2009, 46). This flexible approach De Wet is unable to provide a definition or model off that planners and implementers can use and his arguments are therefore more based on identifying risks/threats then trying to provide a solution to the problem as Cernea tries to provide. He does though underline three elements that should be included in the safeguarding of the threats: a democratic and participatory approach to planning and

implementation; a wide range of resettlement and compensation options; and a flexible and learning open-ended approach to resettlement (De Wet 2009, 47). All three are considered to be included in the IRR model by primarily its large emphasis on local consultation and determination and large focus on reconstruction of sustainable livelihoods.

Other researchers on, for the case of this thesis, resettlement programmes in Ethiopia main arguments on some of the country's former programmes are lack of feasibility studies, proper planning, adequate preparation failed to respect people's own life choices, bad formulation of compatible and sustainable projects, address concerns of host populations, prevention of environmental losses and to provide safeguards to deal with adversities, which all lead to bad outcomes of the programmes (Yntiso 2009, 128). It is further underscored that the best way for the government in the future to avoid unsuccessful resettlement is to avoid them being involuntary, and when they are not they must be affordable, attainable and sustainable. Moreover, plans should be based on comprehensive assessments of all social, cultural, economic, human and environment consequences all in cooperation with the affected people. Reconstruction of homes, services and infrastructure should all be in place prior to resettlement and last but not least, the willingness for people to join should not be based on false promises (Ibid.). A well-known scholar on resettlement is Alula Pankhurst. He stresses that future resettlement programmes in Ethiopia should be based on a more careful processual approach where more consideration is given to different phases of resettlement, allows for proper planning, costing, preparation, settler recruitment, site selection adaption to new areas, creation of sustainable conditions, favourable conditions for host communities and addressing environmental issues. He thus focuses on taking a more human centred approach and interactive approach where the affected people work in close relations together to ensure good social livelihoods that for the long-run a just as important as more firm threats such as food security. He also stresses the importance of joint development where there exists host communities and large emphasis on explaining the programme and opportunities to the people. Furthermore, future resettlement should be conducted on a smaller scale as large scale programmes with predetermined targets in an overambitious time scale has proven not to work out in Ethiopia (Pankhurst 2009, 176). These valuations of a case studies in Ethiopia relates

fine with some of the main arguments of the IRR model. Even as emphasis can be considered to be focussed on specific issues they can be included under some of the broader risks and reconstruction possibilities of Cernea's theoretical model. Additionally, it must also be kept in mind that the both Yntiso and Pankhurst base their findings on specific case studies and not a large compiled set of studies incorporated to an applicable theory, such as Cernea has attempted to do.

The reason this thesis insists on using the IRR model as research tool and to investigate how the current villagization process in Ethiopia is doing is based on its solid empirical foundation. It has been developed over almost 200 researches and is the model most other scholars refer to either as their own research guide or as a revised version like de Wet has done. It is very neutral in its application, as there are as such no particular geographical, economical, political, etc. situations needed for its usage and is supposed to be compatible with all advanced resettlements policies in the world today (M. M. Cernea 2000, 44). It is therefore not biased in any sense. It emphasises the need to use it for further research, use local contexts when applying it, which means that the accusation of being a "one size fits all" does not hold up. Additionally, the model has not only been tested as an implementation tool for the programmes. Other researchers have also used the IRR model for monitoring, supervision and planning of resettlement programmes, which resembles as lot with this thesis' use of it (Ibid.).

One point that does challenge the IRR model is its non-focus on the situation the countries that promotes villagization or resettlement might be in. I here refer specifically to the countries' economic foundations. Villagization often occur in poor countries, which means they might not have the financial means to live up to the 'rules' of the IRR model. This element is not touched upon in Cernea's theory and could mean that he does not suggest anyone to resettle people unless they have the sufficient amount of resources for it. This is though an unhelpful fact for many challenged African countries, including Ethiopia.

7.4 Policy suggestions

To finalize the thesis a section with policy suggestions for the Ethiopian authorities based on the findings of this paper will be given in the following. What is clear from the thesis so far is that the contemporary villagization process, taking place in Ethiopia is not as successful as it could have been which is very unfortunate for the participants and the country in general.

First and foremost, the government need to live up to the promises given to the participants. If the presented promises were kept, then most of the impoverishment risks from Cernea's IRR model would also be safeguarded. This means that proper housing, prepared fields, schools, health clinics, etc. should as far as possible be ready when people are being relocated. Additionally, promises of local participation must be realized. It is mentioned by the government and its policy papers, but never reported back from the field. If this element is rightfully incorporated, wasteful economic use on items, services and infrastructure that the people do not demand could even save the programme some funds. Taken the state of the country into perspective this would mean a slow down of the implementation process and thus ensure quality of the programme instead of large quantity of participants, which appear as a main objective for the implementers.

If this is achieved, the second suggestion is already well underway: make it voluntary. Voluntarism participation can be defined in many ways, but what I mean is the definition presented in this thesis and used by the World Bank. Voluntarism of the programme consequently relates closely to the promises given, as these must be provided or else voluntary participation is not in place. Furthermore, other reported forms of coercion or lack of other possibilities for the people must be stopped, as this becomes a question of violation of human rights and Ethiopia's national and international commitments. I do though remain positive for the government's possibility to achieve this. As we have seen more and more of the vulnerable populations in the country eager after change as their traditional ways of life has become to difficult to sustain. As both the Professor from AAU and the Programme Officer noted, people are opportunists, and if the government is able to provide a new, better and sustainable way of life, then people would join voluntarily. The people affected the most from the harsh

environment of the country might join due to lack of other good solutions, but many other would join if they saw the possibilities it could give them and their kin in the future. This argument was seen come true in the villagization programme initiated by a NGO, where other people saw the benefits of the programme and then became part of it (Programme officer 2016a & b).

The third and last suggestion this thesis will give is one that almost never is incorporated in resettlement programmes and has proven to be a severe issue to resettlement and villagization in Ethiopia: the cultural aspect. Local participation in planning the new villages is mentioned in the official policies, but not cultural aspects in itself. As so many bad experiences in the past has been related to change in cultural traditions and practices I suggest that the government puts a much larger focus in this feature, so that the people of the villages actually can practise a lifestyle that is not different from their former in all aspects. Their professions and ways to make a living might change, but there is no reason not to make room for important cultural and social institutions that would help the participants' adaptation to the programme. A few comments to one of the main found cultural changes regarding the villagization process in Ethiopia is considered to be relevant here. That is the breakdown of the clan system that still is used in many Ethiopian societies. This issue is important for the Ethiopian society to deal with in a proper way for the country's future development and in their effort to become a liberal democracy. Even as many people in the new villages becomes frustrated by the new institutions in them, the clan system is usually not based on a democratic foundation. It is not the purpose of this thesis to touch upon this general issue, but it is relevant for the authorities implementing and planning the villagization programme to find an acceptable solution to how the villages and the governing bodies within them should be run and maybe more relevant how the people want them to be installed. Ultimately, it should be based on a democratic foundation, as that is the path the country wants to take.

8. Conclusion

After having analysed and discussed the findings of my research, I will now attempt to answer the set out research question in a collected manner. The purpose of the thesis was to discover how the current villagization programme is succeeding in achieving the governments stated objectives taking the accessibility from former experiences and professionals' recommendations into consideration. Furthermore, as my research was structured by using the IRR model as a research tool this model was further examined to see if it was applicable on the villagization programme, taking place in Ethiopia.

To answer the research question, assessments from different parties that have followed the programme, as well as my own assessments based on interviews with professionals in Addis Ababa have been analysed. The assessment of the parties had very different conclusions, which left much room for speculation on how the reality is. When combining all of them and my own assessment a sadly negative picture about villagization in Ethiopia comes up. The stated socio-economic development goals that were based on the provision of needed socio-economic services to the participants of the programme have not yet been adequately provided. These were supposed to be the foundation to ensure development for a population with lifestyles that are very challenging to sustain in today's world. There are though some improvements in some of the areas and villages of the programme, as people have been living under such harsh and unsustainable conditions prior to participation. Furthermore, on a general basis people of the programme have better access to services then before, but it is far from the promises they were given and not enough to deliver the socio-economic improvements that the programme is intended to do.

Many factors from the IRR model could have prevented this if it had been used in the implementation of the programmes. It would have captured the lack of local participation and planning, thereby moved away from the top-down approach that all the mentioned unsuccessful villagization programmes historically have been based on. The local participation would further have enabled the structuring of the new villages to be more applicable with local

and cultural conditions, hence making the social and cultural settings more positive for the participants.

From the conducted interviews, it did though also prove that the IRR model does not entirely capture all elements to ensure successful villagization in Ethiopia. A larger focus on making it voluntary is needed. Reconstruction of the people's livelihoods is not enough, as they must be improved to ensure a voluntary participation. If this factor is changed the support of the programme will be enhanced and people in Ethiopia will join, as they know their current lifestyles are challenging, but it must be done in cooperation with the people to ensure efficient use of resources, planning and implementation. The current programme is as such closer to be a success story then the other presented ones, but it still has a long way to go to achieve real support and provide socio-economic development for the people in the programme and thereby be considered as a successful villagization programme.

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