

Diaspora Engagement

An Analysis of Mexico's Diaspora Engagement Efforts



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Abstract

This study seeks to understand to how Mexican diaspora engagement efforts have enabled and facilitated diaspora contributions, as well as the opportunities and limitations of these efforts. Governments, scholars and international institutions have gradually showed more interest in the subject of diasporas and, in particular, how diasporas may influence development in the countries of origin. In the last two decades, Mexican governments have strengthened and institutionalized several diaspora engagement efforts, which has led to a considerable rise in diaspora contributions. Specifically, this study focusses on three different efforts; the consular network, the 3x1 program, and the Paisano program.

This study analyzes the driving and restraining forces of Mexican diaspora engagement efforts by including the elements of Agunias & Newand's *Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development* (2012). The analyzed efforts have all enabled and facilitated different types of diaspora contributions to Mexico.

The analysis has four main findings. First, efforts within the consular network have enabled the access to banking services among members of the Mexican diaspora. As a result, now more and cheaper money transfer services are available. Then, with the 3x1 program, organized diaspora members are offered a more structured and institutionalized way to transform collective remittances into community projects. The developmental effects of the 3x1 program are unclear as the projects are chosen based on the collaboration aspects of the program instead of from an economic logic. Next, the Paisano program focusses on the dispersal of information to members of the diaspora, as well as, the training of civil servants. The primary objective of the Paisano program is to support safe homecoming members of the diaspora and the program primarily contributes to increased diaspora tourism. Finally, the study finds no clear relationship between the level of human development, well-fare and the level of poverty in the top remittance receiving states.

Keywords: Mexico, diaspora, diaspora engagement, development, diaspora policy, diaspora strategy, remittances, collective remittances, diaspora tourism.

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Como México no hay dos

List of abbreviations

CONEVAL	National Council of Evaluation of Social Development Politics (Mexico)
HDI	Human Development Index
ILO	International Labor Organization
INM	National Migration Institute (Mexico)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
SEDESOL	Ministry of Social Development (Mexico)
SEGOB	Ministry of Internal affairs (Mexico)
UN	The United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Program

I. Introduction

With the goal of improving the livelihoods of themselves and their families, migrants go to foreign countries to work. The necessity to go abroad might derive from an experience of unemployment or underemployment in their home country while job opportunities are available abroad (Piper, 2008). Scholars have studied the subject of migration and development since the 1950s and 1960s where the focus was on migration in developing countries. Today many scholars focus on the relationship between migration and development (Bakewell, 2012). In the 1980s, among scholars of development, there was a consensus that migration was a consequence of underdevelopment. Furthermore there was an emphasis on brain drain, which is the loss of highly skilled workers. In the middle of the 1990s these previous views were challenged by scholars within a variety of fields who concluded that previous evaluations on the impact of migration on development had *'tended to be too pessimistic'* (Bakewell, 2012, p. xviii). The shift in the way of thinking coincided with a major increase in publications in the new millennium that reevaluated the links between migration and development. In the same way, Hein de Haas (2010) notes that in recent years there *'has been a remarkable renaissance in optimism and the overall interest in the issue of migration and development by politicians and scholars'* (de Haas, 2010, p.1269).

Bakewell (2012) accredits the considerable growth in literature on the subject to several factors. In the beginning of the millennium the number of international migrants was at record levels which, as a consequence, led to a political emphasis on the subject. With globalization it became increasingly easier to travel and communicate and thus the nature of transnational practices changed. Finally, in 2003 the World Bank published their Global Development Finance Report which stressed the growth in international migrants' remittances (Bakewell, 2012).

The scope of international migration has changed considerably over the last five to six decades. The number of international migrants has doubled since the 1960s (Piper, 2008). In 1990, 120 million people were considered international migrants (Kapur, 2005). The number has grown rapidly and at the beginning of the new millennium it was estimated by the Population Division of the United Nations that approximately 175 million people in the world were international migrants. This constituted almost 3 percent of the world population, or one in every 35 persons (IOM, 2003; Piper, 2008). By 2005 the number of people living outside their country of birth had grown to 191 million (UN, 2006). A more recent report from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that the number of international migrants reached 214 million people in 2010 (IOM, 2013). Similarly, numbers from the United States from 2000, which is the largest receiver of international migrants, showed that 47 percent of the foreign population had entered within the past decade (Kapur, 2005).

As scholars have written more extensively on the subject, politicians and officials have similarly become aware of the potential international migrants have to contribute to economic and social development in their home countries. The more traditional political stance to migration has been to see it as a problem for social cohesion and national identity, and even as a threat to national security (Castles, 2009). Piper (2008) argues

that the main interest of the origin countries is remittances, which are the money migrants send back home after having earned them in the destination country, and migrants are sending home more money than before. What is more, the flow of remittances is increasing more rapidly than the number of migrants (Taylor, 2006 in Piper, 2008). Of all the remittances sent worldwide, two-thirds are directed to developing countries (Piper, 2008). In 2004, Devesh Kapur put forward the idea that remittances had become the new 'Development Mantra'. He noted that governments and officials believe that the remittances can be a recipe for both regional and national development (Kapur, 2005). Faist (2008) maintains that migrants are seen as 'agents of development' as the financial contributions, also known as remittances, have had a positive direct impact on poverty alleviation (Faist, 2008). Similarly, de Haas (2005) believes that *'migrant remittances contributes significantly to development and living conditions in sending countries'* (de Haas, 2005, p. 1269).

According to World Bank figures, in 2010 remittances amounted to more than US\$400 billion of which an estimated \$325 billion went to developing countries. This total amount does not include informal remittances; as a result, the actual number may be higher. By 2003 remittances had overtaken official aid flows and were second only to foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Ratha, 2004). In 2010, remittances constituted more than double the total official development assistance (ODA) (Agunias & Newland, 2012; World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, World Bank data from the same year estimates that the annual savings of diasporas from developing countries amount up to around \$400 billion (World Bank, 2011b).

Within the global economy, remittances are a fast-growing element. Remittances are defined by Boyle & Kitchin (2014) as *'private or person-to-person transfers from migrant workers to recipients in the worker's country of origin'* (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.23). Janssen & Escobar (2006) point out that the subject of remittances *'...requires specific government attention and policies aimed at maximizing the impact of remittances on the population's welfare and overall development'* (Latapí & Janssen, 2006, p.6). As a result of the increased flow of remittances in recent years, gradually more sending states seek to develop explicit and systematic strategies that are aimed at creating, managing, and energizing the relationships with their diaspora populations (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Nevertheless, diasporas engaging with their homelands is not a new phenomenon.

For a long time emigrants and their descendants have been involved in development efforts at home; what is new is that governments increasingly recognize the value of diaspora engagements. This goes for governments in both the sending and in the receiving countries which are now progressively exploring ways to cooperate with them (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.13). Homeland governments increasingly recognize the influence of diaspora populations and concordantly design diaspora strategies, policies, schemes, and programs to capture, enhance and ramp up homeland contributions (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). The power and potential of diasporas and diaspora communities is significant and consequently governments increasingly acknowledge their role. By establishing close and productive partnerships governments in both homelands and receiving states try to benefit from what such collaboration may generate (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

In this thesis the diaspora in question are the Mexican nationals, and to some extent their descendants, living mainly in the United States. Globally the largest migration corridor is Mexico-United States (World Bank, 2011a) and about 11-12 million Mexican-born Mexicans live abroad with the majority living in the United States (Latapí & Janssen, 2006). Put in another way, one in every ten Mexicans lives in the United States (Durand, 2004). The author has chosen to investigate the topic focusing on a specific population. The reasons and motivations for this specific choice will be further explained in the methodology section of this thesis.

The overall question is no longer if diasporas can benefit their homelands but rather how they do so. To address matters of migration and development the Global Forum on Migration and development (GFMD) has been held yearly since 2007. Policymakers now face the task of developing policies and programs that can help foster the relationship between homelands and diaspora communities (Agunias & Newland, 2012). Correspondingly, with a focus on diasporas, Brinkerhoff (2012) claims that the question now for national and international bodies is to create an enabling environment with conditions that facilitate diaspora contributions (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Today many larger international organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization, in addition to numerous government established programs, are involved in initiatives on migration and development (Bakewell, 2012). Successive Mexican governments have also changed and increased rhetoric on the subject.

Mexican policymaking regarding migration has historically gone through different stages. Durand (2004) describes five different phases. First, in the early 20th century, policies aimed to discourage migration, then a policy of negotiation during and after the Second World War followed. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a laissez-faire approach which was followed by a damage control policy in the 1990s. The current stage is one of emphasizing shared responsibility which started when Vicente Fox (2000-2006) was elected president (Durand, 2004). Janssen & Escobar (2006) note that from the mid-1960s until the early 1990s, the migration policy of Mexico was “*notable only for its nonexistence*” (Latapí & Janssen, 2006, p. 17). They further explain that a step to overcome the historic lack of trust between Mexico and its emigrants was taken when consulates in the United States began contacting existing organizations and developing systematic exchanges (*Ibid.*)

A wave of efforts were initiated or strengthened after former Guanajuato governor Vicente Fox was elected president in 2000. Fox’ attitude towards emigration was more positive compared to that of the previous Institutional Revolutionary Party governments (Spanish acronym: PRI). The PRI party held power in Mexico for 71 years from 1929 to 2000. The election of Vicente Fox and the National Action Party (Spanish acronym: PAN) in 2000 was seen as a transition to democracy (Durand, 2004). Fox called the Mexican emigrants ‘heroes’ and bilateral migration negotiations with the United States was an important item on his agenda in the beginning of his presidency, however, with the 9/11 attacks the negotiations collapsed (Durand, 2004; Latapí & Janssen, 2006; MPI, 2013b). After the negotiation collapsed, Fox continued to improve relationship with Mexican emigrants, especially by advancing internal policies (Durand, 2004).

II. Research Question

In order to understand the characteristics of different diaspora engagement efforts in Mexico the following question are asked:

What do Mexican diaspora engagement efforts involve? And to what extent do they enable and facilitate diaspora contributions to Mexico?

More specifically the driving and restraining forces of the consular network, the 3x1 program, and the Paisano program will be examined. Furthermore, the relationship between diaspora contributions and the level of development in Mexican states is established.

III. Methodology

Methodology is the processes which form and influence the research in the context of a particular paradigm (Wahyuni, 2012). In this section the both the research methodology and research methods of this study are mentioned. Methodology can be seen as a domain or a map whereas method is the set of steps traveled between two places on the map (Jonker & Pennink, 2009). In order to have a clear coherence throughout this thesis it is essential to include this chapter where ontological and epistemological considerations as well as the research design and methods used are presented.

Aim of Study

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to field of diaspora engagement research. By providing an overview of several of Mexico's diaspora engagement efforts this study can contribute to an understanding of the accomplishments and limitations of several efforts undertaken by successive Mexican governments, as well as the interconnection of such efforts. Diaspora engaging policies can play a significant role in diaspora members' lives as they can influencing the capabilities of diaspora members to and means in which diaspora can contribute to their countries of origin. This study can offer an understanding of the driving and restricting forces the diaspora efforts and their contributions the intend to attract as well as they may have. Finally, this study attempts to establish the connection between the diaspora engagement efforts, diaspora contributions, and the level of development in states. This study offers an in-depth analysis of the accomplishments and limitations of three different, yet interconnected, efforts of diaspora engagement in Mexico which may help to fill the existing gap in literature on Mexican diaspora engaging efforts. To the knowledge of the author, the existing studies on the subject primarily focus on outcomes of a single program or a superficial accounts of one or more Mexican diaspora engaging efforts. The vast majority of such reports is provided by the Mexican government itself.

Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

Ontology and epistemology relate to knowledge. Ontology is the nature of knowledge while epistemology is the development of that knowledge and ontology is the view of how one perceives a reality. Within social research, ontologically one can perceive the existence of reality in either an objectivist or subjectivist way (Wahyuni, 2012). An objectivist perception sees reality as external and independent of social actors and their interpretations of it. In contrast, a subjectivist perception considers reality dependent on social actors as they are assumed to contribute to social phenomena (Wahyuni, 2012). Epistemology on the other hand is *'the beliefs on the way to generate, understand and use knowledge that are deemed to be acceptable and valid'* (Wahyuni, 2012, p.69). In other words, epistemological issues concerns the question of what is (or should be) considered as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2012, p. 27). The ontological position of the author is a constructivist one. Within constructivism *'knowledge is the outcome or consequence of human activity; knowledge is a human construction never certifiable as ultimately true but problematic and ever changing'* (Guba, 1990, p.26). This study is a qualitative research that focuses on human actions and

experiences. The author perceives reality to be socially constructed through social interactions between entities. Thus, reality and knowledge will be perceived to be subjective (Guba, 1990).

Research design and Methods

In order to understand and analyze underlying forces of the Mexican diaspora engaging efforts it is important to examine the theoretical field of diaspora engagement. The initial pages of the thesis offer a brief introduction to the historical research paradigms revolving the connection between policies and diaspora/migrant contributions. In the subsequent section the theoretical framework is established which will later be the basis of the analysis of the diaspora engagement efforts introduced in the case country, Mexico. In the following provides and understanding of the scope of the Mexican diaspora population. Similarly a brief section on scope of the remittances sent to Mexico and the influence they have on the family members of migrants is presented. In the analysis the case-specific perspectives of the Mexican efforts are presented to explain the results and limitations of the country's complex diaspora engagement efforts. In order to reach an answer to the research question the efforts have been selected for the in-depth analysis, the Paisano program, the consular services and finally the 3x1 Program for Migrants. The three efforts cover different foundations of diaspora engagement. Nevertheless are the three interconnected, complementary and to some extent interdependent. In the final section, the conclusion, the research question is answered. Throughout the process a deductive approach is adopted. Given the previous knowledge on the subject the research question are formulated. Guided and influenced by the theoretical framework, the empirical findings are analyzed in order to answer the research question.

Data Collection

The foundation of this thesis is extensive literature research. It is a desk research where the relevant, secondary literature is collected from various institutional and academic sources. The study is carried out without the collection of primary data i.e. no fieldwork is conducted (see Limitations of Study page 12). The literature is primarily found online. Initially, the secondary data included in this work was found through key word searches such as 'Diaspora Remittances', 'Homeland development', and 'Diaspora Policies' on the Aalborg University Library website and on Google scholar. The relevance of the articles to the subject was identified reading the abstracts.

As established above, the basis of this thesis is secondary data. It is empiric materials such books, articles, journals, reports from international and governmental organizations, from peer-reviewed journals written by scholars and by professionals with in the fields of development, migration, diaspora. Additionally, Mexican government publications and newspaper articles have been included. The data examined for and included in the analysis of the thesis has been in English and in Spanish. Given the nature of the case study, a considerable amount of relevant data is available exclusively in Spanish. Including sources in several languages contributes to further insight and understanding of the subject, resulting in a more wide-ranging, in-depth analysis. The documents are translated by the author herself that, although not being a native speaker of Spanish, possess a high proficiency in the language.

Choice of Theory

The meaning of ‘theory’ is most commonly known as an explanation of regularities (Bryman, 2012). In this thesis, a theoretical framework is included. The theoretical framework is included to guide and influence the collection and analysis of data. It helps the author throughout the work to ultimately answer the research question in an adequate and satisfactory manner.

The first part of the theoretical framework provides clarifications and definitions of the concepts as well as their interconnection. The concepts of migration, diaspora and development are clarified. The clarifications are needed as there are many different and contradicting definitions of the concepts. Next a section on the different diaspora contributions is included. Then follows a model on how government can engage their diaspora in home country development. Finally, the previously presented model is operationalized to fit the context of the research question. The analysis in the subsequent section is be guided by this operationalized theoretical framework

The concepts are clarified a review of current practices within the field of diaspora-centered development is presented. Boyle & Kitchin’s recent article from 2014 is used create an understanding of the different ways diaspora can contribute to development in their home country. Boyle & Kitchin’s theoretical perspective is selected as it offers a comprehensive outline and explanation to the different diaspora contributions. Furthermore, they reflect on some emerging areas of critique within the diaspora-centered development context. First will follow a brief description of the motivations sending countries have as to see their diaspora as a resource. Then an exploration will follow, of the different ways through which diasporas can contribute to development in their countries of origin. According to Boyle & Kitchin (2014) diaspora can contribute as: donor, investors, knowledge networks, markets, brain circulation and as ambassadors. An understanding of the motivations of governments to see diaspora as resources and further how diasporas may contribute to the countries of origin is needed when analyzing Mexico’s diaspora engaging efforts in order to see which contributions they facilitate.

Then elements of Agunias & Newlands’ book from 2012 ‘Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries’ are presented. The book provides an overview of diaspora-led policies around the world. The book outlines a strategy for developing a road map that can guide governments in host and home countries on how to engage and build relationships with diasporas. By including Agunias & Newlands’ work in the theoretical framework it can help in understanding what government actions succeed or fail and furthermore explain the reasons for success or failure. Their road map outlines the critical elements governments should consider in the designing and implementation phases of diaspora-focused programs and policies (Agunias & Newland, 2012). Since the purpose of this thesis is to *analyze* and *evaluate* the circumstances of Mexico’s diaspora engagement efforts, the *how* to engage diaspora is not of primary relevance. The *Road Map* is the foundation for the final element of the theoretical framework where a theoretical model is presented. The model is subsequently implemented to analyze the case specific empirical findings. While it is a limitation to base parts of the framework on a single study, the work of the well renowned scholars Agunias and Newland was

found to be the most comprehensive and including study within the field of diaspora engagement. Thus, for the purpose of this study and the theoretical framework their indispensable book was selected.

Choice of Case Country

The choice of Mexico derived from a personal wish to understand the complexity and particular nature of the Mexican diaspora engaging programs. As outlined in the introduction, Mexico has historically experienced a considerable out-migration to the United States. This fact, combined with the authors' personal experiences in Mexico as an exchange student during her Bachelor's degree as well as an intern at the Danish Embassy in Mexico City just prior to writing this thesis, generated a desire to develop an in-depth understanding of the subject. Thus, have the values of the researcher, that is the personal beliefs and the feelings of the researcher (Bryman, 2012), influenced the choice of research area.

Analysis of data

Methodologically, the author aims *'to identify the variety of constructions that exists and bring them into as much consensus as possible'* (Guba, 1990, p.26) through a hermeneutical approach. Hermeneutics concerns the interpretation of the human actions (Bryman, 2012) (see Ontological and epistemological considerations). In other words, in this study the analysis is *'sensitive to the context in which the texts are produced'* (Bryman, 2012, p.560). In order to examine the three cases in the analysis of this thesis, governmental publications, e.g. the program descriptions, etc., are the primary sources. These descriptions of strategies as well as complementary sources are analyzed to acquire an understanding of the variety of constructions that exists. As the data is collected from numerous sources similarly the method of data triangulation is applied which helps the author to collect comprehensive relevant information and to cross-check data consistency. Thus, this method helps in the search for regularities in the examined data (Patton, 2002; Wahyuni, 2012). There is similarly a dialectic aspect to this study as the analysis consists of a comparison of the contrasting existing human constructions. In terms of a qualitative content analysis the context in which the texts are produced is important and consequently the approach to the forthcoming analysis is hermeneutic (Bryman, 2012).

Limitations of Study

An evident restraint to this study is the limited time frame. Had the time frame been different it would have been interesting collect primary data such as interviews with populations in Mexican communities as well as with members of the Mexican diaspora abroad. Neither the time nor the financial resources are available to conduct such extensive research. An idea for future research would be an in-depth comparative study of two countries with large diaspora populations in the United States. In this context Cuba is particularly interesting as the country correspondingly has approximately 10% of its population residing in United State and, furthermore, because the country has historically taken a very different approach to emigrants (Herrera, 2012).

Thus, to conclude the thesis, after establishing which diaspora contributions and to what extent the different diaspora engagement efforts enable and facilitates the contributions the author will briefly examine the

relationship between remittances and levels of development in Mexican States. By focusing on various indicators of development it is possible to examine the nature of the relationship between the two.

IV. Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the different Mexican diaspora engagement efforts a theoretical framework is developed. An in-depth explanation of the choice of theory is provided in the Methodology section (see page 12)

In order to understand the usage of different concepts, one must first define what they are. The first section of the theoretical framework is dedicated to clarifying and explaining the historical evolvement, variables, and implications of migration, diaspora and development as they are subsequently used in an analyzing context.

Concepts

Migration

Migration, unlike development and diaspora, is a rather straightforward concept to define. Bakewell (2012) indicates migration to be *'the observation of the physical movement of people across geographical space'* (xiv). This definition explains the visible behavior of people moving across the world (Bakewell, 2012). Domestic migration is the most significant form of migration for poor people and it is migrants' level of resources that determines the distances they travel (DFID, 2007). Globally the number of domestic migrants is nearly four times the number of international migrants (IOM, 2015).

The Department for International development (DFID) states that *'poor people often choose to migrate as a way of improving their lives'* (DFID, 2007, p.10). For a long time, international migration has similarly been seen as a means to secure livelihoods when there is a lack of jobs in countries of origin (Piper, 2008). Even though migration and development has always been closely linked, it was not until the middle of the 1990's that a rapidly growing interest about the links between development and migration among scholars arose. Migration is seen by some scholars as an agent of development, whereas as it was previously believed that emigration was a disadvantage (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). However, there are contrasting views on the connection between migration and poverty. The DFID maintains that *'migration can both cause and be caused by poverty. Poverty can be alleviated as well as exacerbated by migration'* (DFID, 2007, p.10). Given the complex nature, it is the specific circumstances of the migration that will determine the link between poverty and migration. Furthermore, the leading emigration countries are typically not among the least developed countries. Instead they are countries with a certain level of socioeconomic development. De Haas (2005) claims that the most important cause of migration is the level of socioeconomic development in combination with a relative deprivation in the form of global inequality of development opportunities (de Haas, 2005).

Diaspora

International migration is a prerequisite for the creation of diaspora communities. It is important to note that not all migrant populations become diasporas, but all diasporas communities are a result of migration. The term diaspora was classically used in the cases of the dispersion of the Jewish, Armenian and Greek people, with the discussions resolutely rooted in a conceptual 'homeland'. Thus, these three diaspora communities

have historically characterized the definition of diaspora. However, the growing interest in the topic of diasporas since the late 1980s has led to the meaning being extended and diaspora today covers a broader semantic field (Brubaker, 2005; Østergaard-nielsen, 2003; Shuval, 2000; Tölölyan, 1991). Brubaker (2005) explains that a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary spaces has occurred to *'accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the service of which it has been enlisted'* (Brubaker, 2005, p. 1). This basically means that the concept of diaspora has no common root which leads to various different and sometimes competing definitions of the same concept. When referring to groups of people as being part of a diaspora, common to them all, is that these displaced people feel, maintain, invent or revive a connection with their prior homeland (Butler, 2001; Shuval, 2000). According to Shuval (2000) diaspora involves a:

"...history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return –which can be ambivalent, eschatological or utopian – ongoing support of the homeland and, a collective identity defined by the above relationship" (Shuval, 2000, p.41).

In 1986, Sheffer proposed a definition of modern diasporas which to some extent is similar to that of Shuval. Sheffer argues that modern diasporas are:

"...ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing in and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homelands" (Sheffer, 1986, p.3)

Similarly, Agunias & Newland (2012) offer a simplistic compilation of Sheffer's and Shuval's definitions in their book from 2012 where they state that the term diaspora refers to:

"...emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin" (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 15)

To the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance a diaspora is a *'community of people who live outside their shared country of origin or ancestry but maintain active connections with it'* (IdEA, 2015). Considering the different definitions above and the fact that Mexico in 2014 was the fourth largest remittance receiver in the world (after India, China and the Philippines) indicates that Mexicans abroad still maintain active connections with Mexico (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a).

As mentioned in the introduction, in the recent decades increasingly more people live outside their country of birth. Butler (2001) argues that this mass movement of people has also contributed to a shift in diaspora discourse and the reorientation of identity may in fact come from within a community itself. Oppressed peoples that used to see themselves in a majority-minority power relation context may have changed to a diaspora discourse. Instead of auto-identifying as a powerless, longing, displaced people the focus is rather on the potential empowerment and how they may mobilize international support and influence both in the

homeland and destination country. Again, communication and transportation technologies have had a great influence as this has been a facilitating factor in international movement (Butler, 2001).

Brubaker (2005) argues that diaspora should firstly be thought of as a category of practice before one can ask whether and how it effectively can be used as a category of analysis. Elaborating he explains that when a diaspora is employed as a category of practice it is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties (Brubaker, 2005). He offers a brief definition indicating that as idiom, stance, and claim, *'diaspora is a way of formulating the identities and loyalties of a population'* (Brubaker, 2005, p.12). Considering this definition, he argues that the people who do the formulating might themselves take part of the population in question yet they may also be speaking in the name of the reputed homeland. More relevant for this study, in the countries of origin, government agencies may play an important role *'in galvanizing groups to think of themselves as a loyal diaspora'* (Délano & Gamlen, 2014, p.44).

Diaspora is increasingly used when referring to any kind of migrant who have recently left their home country for a limited time, as well as to more settled communities (Newland, 2010). Although some scholars still argue that diasporas are different from other communities such as nomadic or migrant communities (see Butler 2001) others argue that diaspora now encompasses a broad range of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, guest workers, expellees and expatriates, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities (Shuval, 2000; Tölölyan, 1991). Correspondingly, Sheffer expresses that the term diaspora can also embrace the labor immigrants who maintain emotional and social ties with the homeland, although the degree of these ties may vary. He specifically mentions the Mexican migrant population in the United States and that they it be conceptualized as a diaspora (Sheffer, 2003). It is clear that the Mexican population in the United States is not a classic case of a diaspora population, as compared to the Jewish, Armenians and Greek diaspora communities, however, with the broadening of the semantic space of the definition of diaspora in recent decades the Mexican-born population living outside Mexico can justifiably be called a diaspora. As several scholars and institutions use the term diaspora to specifically refer to the Mexican migrants in the United States (Agunias & Newland, 2012; IOM, 2015; Latapí & Janssen, 2006; Newland, 2010; Rouse, 1991; Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 2003), the author of this thesis will do the same.

Development

The notion of 'development' has evolved over time and like 'diaspora' it is being shaped by increasing scholarly knowledge across different disciplines and by the different stakeholders in the development field (Banks & Hulme, 2014). It is important to distinguish the difference between economic growth or economic development and human development. Ranis (2004) explain the interrelation between the two as follows:

"To the extent that greater freedom and capabilities improve economic performance, human development will have an important effect on growth. Similarly, to the extent that increased incomes will increase the range of choices and capabilities enjoyed by households and governments, economic growth will enhance human development" (Ranis, 2004, p.3).

Correspondingly, the 1996 Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) states that from a human development perspective economic growth is not an end instead it is a means to an end. Human development encompasses enlarging people's choices (UNDP, 1996, p.11). Brinkerhoff (2012) offers a more elaborate definition of development:

“By development, I refer to the process and capacities that improve people's and communities' assets and quality of life. This may mean contributing to economic (material assets), political (good governance), or social development (e.g., health, education, and civic values)”
(Brinkerhoff, 2012)

While some authors focus on poverty reduction as a development outcome (Banks & Hulme, 2014), a more conventional way to measure development is in terms of economic growth. Here a country's level of development is seen in terms of the size of economy. This results in an income approach where the gross national income (GNI), and the per capita GNI are subjects to be measured (Peet & Hartwick, 2015). However, measuring nations' development with average per capita figures may prove unreliable as they do not reflect unequal income distribution within a country. Furthermore do on average per capita figures not consider issues such as class, ethnicity, gender, and regional differences (Peet & Hartwick, 2015). The income approach is criticized because of the concentration on encouraging market integration and the focus on economic growth instead of an improvement of people's living standards (Rapley, 2004). Considering Rapley's criticism and Brinkerhoff's definitions, in this study several indicators are included to examine the level of development in the top remittance receiving states.

In the analysis development will be examined by looking at factors such as poverty levels, ranking on the Human development Index (HDI), and quality of life. The latter is examined by looking at states' 'well-being' according to OECD's new well-being framework.

Diasporas and Development

As stated in the introduction, migrants are now rather seen as potentially being part of the solution to underdevelopment rather than being a part of the problem. Boyle & Kitchin (2014) argue that the shift occurred due to the change of thinking and practice within the development sector. Many scholars have written extensively on the ways diasporas can contribute to the development of their homeland (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Faist, 2008; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004). Whereas diasporic communities have frequently conceived, financed, and led schemes and programs for improving their homelands, such as Home Town Associations (HTA's) or Diaspora organizations (DO's) it is only in recent times the sending countries have developed policies designed to court, lever, harness and tap into their overseas communities (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2014; Piper, 2008).

Sending countries, often poor and middle-income countries in the global south, although not exclusively¹, prepare a diaspora strategy which outlines and guides their diaspora engagement efforts. A diaspora strategy is a:

“...formal and explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted normally by a sending state, or its peoples, aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate communities, diasporic populations, and foreign constituencies who share a special affinity”

(Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.18)

Boyle & Kitchin (2014) argue that five factors influence countries when they formulate a diaspora strategy. First, there is the nature and history of a country's state institutions. Second there is the nature, scale, timing and geography of their diaspora. Third, there are the prior and existing relationships with their diaspora. Fourth, the capacity of domestic private, public, and community organizations and finally there are the countries' geopolitical strengths, weaknesses, and challenges that may influence when countries formulate and later implement their diaspora strategies (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.23). As a consequence, it is very unlikely that diaspora strategies can be copied from one country to another given that the above mentioned factors vary considerably from country to country. There is simply no one-size-fits-all approach in the context of diaspora strategies. The evidence from countries that engage with their diasporas shows that there is no single way to formulate and implement a diaspora strategy.

While the scope of diaspora strategies may vary, the essential logic behind the diaspora engagement remains the same: the overseas communities have resources and attachments which may accelerate economic growth and development in the homeland (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.18; Gamlen, 2008; Newland, 2010). Boyle & Kitchin argue that a sending state's interest in engaging with their diaspora arises in one of four policy fields: economic development, nation building, citizenship, and demographic trends (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Historically, diasporas have had an influence in their homelands through nations and state building projects while homelands have promoted interests overseas by connecting with their diasporas. There is also a new wave of nation and state building efforts where sending states motivate diaspora contributions to, and on behalf of, political, social, and cultural causes in their homeland. Furthermore the growing international migration challenges current models of citizenship in sending states, causing some countries to reexamine and clarify emigrants' entitlements and obligations. Finally, policies in the field of demographic trends often focus on a search for global talent (*Ibid.*).

In recent decades, countries with large diaspora populations have in recent decades increasingly institutionalized their diaspora engagement efforts by constructing renewed connections through already existing transnational relations (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Gamlen, 2014). These new, more formal engagements are often organized through ministries or departments of foreign affairs or by, or in connection with, ministries of economy (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014).

¹ Countries such as Israel, Scotland, Ireland, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are examples of countries that have also pursued diaspora strategies.

Diaspora's Impact on Development

It is clear that members of diaspora communities have multiple roles and may have wide influence in both their homelands as well as in the receiving states. Brinkerhoff (2012) argues that there are various ways in which individual members of diasporas or diaspora organizations (DOs) may make different contributions that can contribute to their homelands' socio-economic and political development (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Specifically she lists: remittances, philanthropy, skills transfers, business investments, and advocacy. Similarly, yet without focusing specifically on development aspects. Others mention that diasporas are increasingly being recognized as: senders of remittances, as investors, philanthropists, and innovators. But they are also being recognized as first movers in important sectors such as tourism and within development of human capital, emphasizing the power and potential diasporas possess (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

Boyle & Kitchin (2014) propose an analytical framework on how diasporas can impact development in their homeland from abroad. According to them, the effects of migration on development can be understood as six different categories of impact. In short, Diasporas can serve as 1) donors, 2) investors, 3) knowledge networks, 4) brain gain, 5) markets, and as 6) ambassadors.

Diaspora as Donors

As donors, diaspora members can contribute to the welfare of their home lands through remittances and philanthropy. According to the Hudson Institute (2010) philanthropy is '*the private and voluntary donation of resources for charitable and public good*'. Furthermore, the institute lists philanthropic types of contributions by importance: private and voluntary organizations (PVO's), religious organizations, corporations, foundations, volunteer citizens, and finally university and college alumni associations (Hudson Institute, 2010). Johnson (2007) has identified two types of diaspora philanthropy; diaspora associations and diaspora foundations. An example of a diaspora association would be a hometown association (HTA). Such organizations are run by and for diaspora groupings which provide philanthropic support to their members. This can both be done in a direct or an indirect manner. In comparison diaspora foundations exists to facilitate charitable giving to a specific country which will often be the homeland (Johnson, 2007). Brinkerhoff notes that diaspora philanthropy organizations can act as '*important intermediaries between formal development actors and diasporas and local communities*' by identifying needs and priorities of communities and by communicating those to donor organizations (Brinkerhoff, 2012, p.77).

A highly recognized contribution from diasporas to homelands is the financial remittances (Brinkerhoff, 2012) which are '*private or person-to-person transfers from migrant workers to recipients in the worker's country of origin*' (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.23). Sending states may attempt to increase the flow of financial remittances by 1) lowering transactions costs and increasing their security; 2) extending transfer services to unbanked communities; 3) encouraging collective remittances by providing migrant organizations with technical and organizational support, matching funds, marketing skills, and other business services; 4) stabilizing exchange rates; 5) encouraging more productive uses of remittances, and 6) improve the functioning of the market of the remittance services (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p.24). Specifically, examples of

such attempts are seen in Mexico. Further on the author will investigate said attempts carried out in the case country and analyze if and how they enable and facilitate development.

Diaspora as investors

When diasporas invest in capital markets and direct foreign investments to their homelands they can be acknowledged as investors. By holding deposit accounts, securing remittance flows, providing transnational goals, buying diaspora bonds and supporting diaspora mutual funds members of a diaspora can fuel capital markets in their homelands (Terrazas, 2010). The institutions affected within this category are banking institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, and government treasuries (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Brinkerhoff (2012) argues that diaspora investment in the homeland may be central to impoverished developing countries as *'their relatively weak institutions, political risks, or lower incomes may discourage the typical, non-diaspora foreign investor'* (Riddle, Brinkerhoff, and Nielsen (2008) in Brinkerhoff, 2012). Since they have knowledge and relationship opportunities that others lack, diasporas are more likely to invest in their homelands, even though others might consider the homelands to be high-risk economies (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

Diaspora as knowledge Networks

Diaspora communities can contribute to development in their homeland as knowledge networks when they enhance the knowledgebase of indigenous actors. An example is when they offer support to public, private, and community organizations in their homeland by assisting these actors to obtain accelerated global command and control capabilities (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Put more simply, members of diaspora communities can contribute with the transfer of knowledge and expertise to their homelands (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Similarly, Nyberg-Sørensen (2004) maintains that developing countries can benefit from the transfers of skills, cultural and civic awareness/ experiences by diaspora members.

Diasporas as markets

As consumers, diaspora members can serve as markets for sending countries. Diasporas may consume domestic goods and nostalgia products in the receiving states as well as returning to their homelands as tourists. Visits from members of diasporas to homelands constitute a significant section of the lucrative tourism market (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Diaspora tourism may include medical tourism, business-related tourism, heritage tourism, exposure tours, education tourism VIP tours, and peak experience tours (Agunias & Newland, 2012). Diaspora tourists are furthermore likely to have a high level of demand for labor-intensive or artisanal products which can affect positively on local businesses and communities (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014).

Diaspora as Brain Gain

In the 1970s, when migration was primarily considered negatively, the concept of Brain drain arose. Brain drain involves highly educated and skilled people migrating (IOM, 2013). With the shift in the migration-development field the attention was turned to the positive effects of *Brain Gain* in the 1990s and later brain

circulation in the 2000s (Piper, 2008). By creating programs some countries keep engaging with their diasporas by encouraging brain incubation or circulation. Members of the diaspora may participate in permanent or less permanent movements and thereby promote brain gain (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014).

Diaspora as ambassadors

By taking advantage of their knowledge, contacts, linguistic skills, and cultural understanding members of diaspora acting as advocates, activists, agitators, and ambassadors, can *'promote peace and security in their homelands and enhance the strategic, diplomatic, and foreign policy objectives of their countries of origin'* (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014, p. 27). In the same context, members of diaspora communities can advocate political causes and thereby either be advocates for the homeland politics or speak for regime change. Diaspora members may benefit from and contribute to the democratization process and thus create a more enabling environment for development (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

Many scholars agree that members of diasporas can contribute to development in their homelands (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Boyle & Kitchin, 2014; Newland, 2010). Boyle & Kitchin disregard the fact that there may also be negative consequences of diaspora contributions and influence on home country development. In contrast Brinkerhoff includes more aspects. She categorizes different conditions to which diasporas in general may interact with their homeland: as 'conflict entrepreneurs', 'competing interests', or 'contributors to stability and development'. Brinkerhoff's categorization emphasizes that assistance from diasporas to their homeland may not necessarily have a positive influence on the homeland but can correspondingly cause conflicts (Brinkerhoff, 2011). Further on in this study it is examined which type of diaspora contributions the Mexican diaspora engagement efforts enable and facilitate.

A Handbook for Governments

This section looks at the connection between diasporas and development and historical aspects of government's diaspora engagement efforts. The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) states that *'diaspora has begun to be understood far more broadly, including all of those born in a specific country or sharing the same ethnic origin'* the institute argues that defining diaspora in this way *'makes the most sense in a development context'*. The emphasis on the common homeland and on the sense of connection *'can support and further the contributions of those living overseas to the home country'* (MPI, 2013a). Thus, the more recent uses of diaspora depends to some extent on the desired outcome. Describing a group of people as a diaspora rather than a group of migrants may therefore strengthen the bond to the homeland and sense of connection which may then result in further contributions that then again may be directed towards development in the homeland.

The basis for the next section of the theoretical framework will be the work of Dovelyn Agunias and Kathleen Newland from 2012. Their book *'Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries'* is in their own words a handbook that *'provides governments with a strategic road map that can help them establish a clear sense of direction in building a constructive relationship with diasporas'* (Agunias & Newland, 2012,

p.3). The book is relevant for governments of both the sending and receiving country, however, given the focus of this study only elements relevant for sending government's diaspora engagement efforts are included. First the different steps of the *Road Map* are explained (see appendix I). Since the purpose of this study is to analyze the driving and restraining forces of existing diaspora engagement efforts a set of new theoretical models are elaborated based on the elements of Agunias & Newland's *Road Map*. It is the new theoretical models that are subsequently applied in the analysis of Mexico's diaspora engagement efforts.

According to Agunias & Newland the goal of policymakers and practitioners both in sending and receiving countries is *to strengthen diasporas' role in development* (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.13). While the overall main goal is the same the *how* to strengthen diasporas' role depends whether it is sending or receiving country. The receiving country may hope to increase the effectiveness of its development assistance, immigration, and integration policies while the sending countries rather hope to attract talents and diaspora resources (Agunias & Newland, 2012). In regards for the continuity of diaspora engagements, Agunias & Newland stress the importance that they are seen as a process rather than as an individual action or series of individual actions (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.16). In the case of sending countries de Haas (2010) maintains that public policies are crucial for creating a fertile ground for development. However, this is only the case if they improve the functioning of social, legal, economic, and political institutions as well as the access of ordinary people to basic amenities and markets. His argument is that such policies may restore trust in governments while also making it more compelling for migrants to invest in and/or return to origin countries (de Haas, 2010).

Based on years of research and sources, Agunias & Newland presents the *Road Map For Diaspora Engagement* which outlines essential elements for governments in diaspora engagement strategies. For greater comprehension a full graphic outline the *Road Map* is attached as Appendix I. The different fundamental elements common for almost all successful strategies of diaspora engagement are the following:

'identifying goals, mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries, and, ultimately, mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development' (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.23)

As can be seen in Appendix I the four stages needed to reach the goal of *effective engagement of diaspora in development* are (1) *identifying goals and capacities* and then getting to (2) *know the diaspora* in question to then (3) *build trust* before (4) *mobilizing different stakeholders*. Agunias & Newland (2012) argue that diaspora engagement strategies commonly include these fundamental elements. In the following section, the different elements are described separately.

Identify Goals and Capacities

In order to facilitate the planning of a strategy for a strong diaspora engagement in development, governments must first and foremost identify their own goals. In combination with identifying its goal, it must also define the tools and mechanisms available, e.g. financial or administrative. Correspondingly it is

essential for governments also identify the capacity of their diaspora. Not surprisingly, strategies will differ according to governments' goals. However, if the goal is poverty reduction or support of the national balance of payments a focus may be on remittances, business investments, and capital markets. In contrast, governments may be emphasizing diaspora members' knowledge and skills, and how they can be channeled to the homeland as a means to improve the country's competitiveness in economic terms (Agunias & Newland, 2012). The importance of skill and financial transfers back to the countries of origin is recognized by many scholars (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Boyle & Kitchin, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Kapur, 2005; Piper, 2008). Governments can and should facilitate the transactions to the extent that it is within their capacity and complies with their overall goal for diaspora engagement (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Boyle & Kitchin, 2014).

Moreover, Agunias & Newland (2012) stress the importance of goals being a fundamental part of development planning, rather than being a sideline or add-on, as experience shows that governments that consult with their diaspora members when setting diaspora engagement goals are more likely have goals that are realistic but ambitious. Furthermore, it is criteria for success that elements of good governance are integrated into development planning (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp.26-27).

Know your Diaspora

After having set some ambitious yet realistic goals, the following step is to get to know the diaspora in question. Every diaspora consists of a wide variety of people who all have different interests, agendas and strategies. This makes it important for governments to establish permanent channels of communication with its diaspora. Through such channels it is likely that the diaspora will express many different and opposing opinions. It is necessary for the government in the homeland to reconcile the different views in their diaspora engagement policies. Successful government interventions are the result of years of continuous, open engagement with its diasporas (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 27).

Knowledge on diaspora can be obtained through the collection of census data, by mapping the location of the diaspora and diaspora organizations, by gathering information about the diaspora's skills and experience, and by having diaspora members that can express what the diaspora have to offer, what they are willing to offer, and further what they expect in return (Agunias & Newland, 2012). Embassies and consulates can also assist in the gathering of information about the capacities and interests of diasporas, however, as large-scale, detailed data-collection is costly, estimates are often made based on destination country data and surveys. The limited scope and/or different area of focus of such studies result in an unreliable quality of data (*ibid.*).

A good relationship between destination and sending countries may furthermore contribute to a more successful integration of the diaspora into the destination country's society and on the destination country's foreign policy priorities (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.28). Similarly, the European Commission and United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (EC-UN JMDI) stresses the importance of collaboration. According to them the most successful and sustainable migration and development interventions '*are those with strong anchorage with the local governments in countries of origin and destination*' (JMDI, 2015).

Build Trust

The third stage involves establishing mutual trust between governments and diasporas. In order for diaspora engagement to be successful it is necessary for all parties to understand that it is a two-way street and all stakeholders must feel they benefit from the relationship.

It can be beneficial for governments to develop wide-ranging legal, regulatory, and/or institutional frameworks that promise to encourage increased diaspora investment. Furthermore, elements of good governance and rule of law are central in attracting diaspora engagement. Relevant steps during this stage could involve improving the domestic business climate, introducing greater transparency in regulations and licensing requirements and ensuring property law is applied consistently (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 30). Other ways in which a homeland government can reach out to its diaspora is by sponsoring cultural events in destination countries or by promoting and providing teachers for 'mother tongue' education.

Jointly governed institutions and programs are more likely to have positive outcomes as both sides are represented in the organizational structure and take part in the development and implementation stages. Through collaborating they can identify needs, set priorities and allocate resources in a manner that accommodates all. Correspondingly, offering privileges to non-resident citizens may also result positively on diaspora engagement. Such privileges can consist of duty-free imports of goods, tax-free repatriation of foreign-currency income, or the ability to buy assets or hold jobs normally reserved for resident citizens (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

A major subject that governments of countries with large diaspora populations have to deal with is that of political rights. Governments can demonstrate and can earn trust by facilitating political rights such as overseas voting and access to political participation

Mobilize Stakeholders

When the previous three stages have been implemented partnerships promoting the role of diaspora in development can be mobilized. This may involve the creation of new government institutions or adaption of existing ones.

Some countries create dedicated ministries that focus on diaspora matters while others create sub-ministerial offices or institutions under the management of the government (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Agunias & Newland (2012) stress the importance for sending countries to have a national-level institutional framework *'to communicate with their diasporas, coordinate policies, and provide support for and follow-up on engagement'* (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p.32) however if efforts are perceived as being overly government-driven it can act as a deterrent for diaspora engagement (JMDI, 2015; Newland, 2010).


Agunias & Newlands list an example of the many stakeholders can be mobilized with the purpose of engaging diasporas in development such as to; host high profile events and invite profiled diaspora members who contribute to the homeland or promote better understanding between destination and home-country; or having well-known diaspora members can be spokespersons on diaspora issues, be opinion leaders and raise

awareness; they can attract business governments can launch initiatives with the purpose of facilitating financial flows; create partnerships on a regional or local level with state and municipal governments as diaspora member contributions are usually directed towards their specific places (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

An Evaluation Road Map for Diaspora Engagement Efforts

Based on Agunias & Newland's *Road Map For Diaspora Engagement* (see Appendix I) the author has operationalized the theory presented above in a way that makes more sense in the context of examining existing diaspora engagement efforts. Since the purpose of this thesis is to *analyze* and *evaluate* the circumstances of the present diaspora policies and initiatives present in Mexico, the *how* to engage diaspora is not of primary relevance. In the evaluation, the primary stakeholders are presumed to be the diaspora and the government. Thus, compiling a new theoretical model is necessary in order to have an appropriate model in relation to which the empirical findings can be analyzed to subsequently answer the problem formulation.

Figure 1




Seen in light of and guided by the elements of the *Road Map*, Figure 1 has been compiled. It shows how the author conceptualizes the four steps of the *Road Map* and their interconnections in an evaluation context. It shows that all the elements are linked in both directions. The goals and capacities, the knowledge of diaspora and finally the element of trust can be results of, as well as contribute to, the mobilization of stakeholders. E.g. Mobilization of stakeholders is linked with trust. On one hand, the mobilization of stakeholders and creation of programs may generate trust among diasporas; on the other hand trust towards the government may contribute to the creations of new programs and thus the mobilization of more. In the same way trust is connected to the goals and capacities as these may vary depending on the level of trust. Governments may adapt the goal and capacities according to the level of trust their diaspora have towards a government. As stated above all the elements can both result from and contribute to each other. If the diaspora engagement strategy is successful, with time the government and the diaspora should obtain more knowledge about each other, gain more trust, and correspondingly adjust their goals and capacities.

In the beginning of an evaluation of diaspora engagement efforts, the most important element is to identify the mobilized stakeholders. This includes examining the multiple ways stakeholders are involved in engaging diasporas, e.g. the diaspora, the government which engages the diaspora, the different diaspora institutions, as well as the specific programs and efforts. In this study the different stakeholders in the Mexican context are identified and three specific programs and efforts are then analyzed.

Since Agunias & Newland argue that the prerequisite to successful diaspora engagement is to acquire knowledge, to establish trust and to set realistic goals and capabilities, accurate knowledge of the diaspora and its capacities together with clear goals and mutual trust must facilitate the creation of successful diaspora engagement efforts. In other words, there must be correspondence between reality and the presumed goals, capacities, knowledge, and trust. The gaps between the existing and expected goals and capacities, knowledge and trust are studied in this thesis to examine the driving and restraining forces of the Mexican diaspora engagement efforts. The analysis will establish the correlation between goals and reality.

Figure 2 shows how the elements of the *Road Map* may be included in an evaluation process. In the subsequent analysis, the author will follow the first two steps of Figure 2 to answer the research questions. A third step is added to explain how information obtained in the first two elements may be employed by governments in order to improve the efficiency of diaspora engagement efforts.

Figure 2: Evaluation process for Diaspora Engagement Efforts



As Figure 2 shows, the three main elements of an evaluation process are to first 1) identify the different mobilized stakeholders, then it is possible to 2) evaluate them, or in other words establish if there is a gap

between reality and the presumed goals, capacities, knowledge and trust. The final step 3) is to adapt the different initiatives and programs created to enable an even more effective diaspora engagement. A more elaborate explanation of the three steps of *Figure 2* will follow.

Identify

The first step includes the identification of the different stakeholders. It is important to obtain broad knowledge of the diaspora in question such as geographic and demographic information but also what the goals and capacities of the diaspora are. Quantitative data such as census data can be valuable to get an idea of the scope and dimensions of the diaspora, whereas qualitative case studies can give indications of the capacities and goals of, and desired outcomes for, diaspora members. Additionally, during this first step it can be relevant to include the opinion of prominent diaspora members and spokespersons. Again, this can give some indication about the capacity and goals of the diaspora. It is important to remember that individual objectives and goals are subjective and that there may be conflicting goals and objectives within the same diaspora and diaspora communities.

This step also includes the identification of the existing government institutions, initiatives, programs, and policies that concern the overall diaspora affairs and especially those that aim to engage the diaspora in development. It is important to include all levels; national, regional, and local. During this first step all stakeholders and their capacities are identified.

Evaluate

The second element is the most comprehensive. It involves evaluating if the knowledge the different stakeholders have of each other's goals and capacities corresponds to their actual goals and capacities, i.e., if there is a correlation between expectations and reality. In this case study, the knowledge of diaspora put forth in government publications as well as in program and initiative descriptions are explored. Furthermore, since the overall goal of governments is often to create development in the homeland through the different diaspora engagement programs and initiatives, it is examined *if* and *to what extent* the existing programs enable and facilitate development. In the process, there will be an emphasis on the elements of *Figure 1* when establishing *why* the set goals and estimated capacities, the trust and knowledge may or may not be consistent with reality.

It is the first two steps, to identify and to evaluate, that are most relevant to this thesis. Analyzing the proposed elements in depth forms a foundation for satisfactorily answering the research question. However, the third element, to adapt, would be relevant for governments when working further with the subject of engaging diasporas.

Adapt

Although the focus of this thesis is limited to the first two steps on the Evaluation Road Map it is important to consider what can be done after having examined and evaluated the diaspora engagement efforts. After following the model, a government should have acquired valuable information as to *why* existing diaspora

engagement efforts may or may not work as expected. Correspondingly, it should have obtained new or updated knowledge of the diaspora and its capacities. If the set goals and anticipated capacities are found to be inconsistent with reality, the subsequent steps would be to apply the new knowledge before improving or implementing new efforts. First, one must identify new goals or change previous ones so that they are (more) realistic. After that, the government must (re)mobilize stakeholders either by creating new or improving existing initiatives and programs, all while continuing to build trust. All in all, this third step concerns the improvement of programs and initiatives. If governments continuously adapt programs to (modified) realistic goals that reflect the actual diaspora and government capacities while maintaining and building mutual trust the author believes it will lead to increasingly effective engagement of diasporas.

As can be seen, the components of the *Evaluation Road Map* for Diaspora Engagement efforts are deeply rooted in elements of Agunias & Newland's (2012) *Road Map*. The *Road Map* (Appendix I) shows how the four stages of identifying goals and capacities, getting to know the diaspora, building trust and finally mobilizing different stakeholders are needed to reach the goal of effective engagement of diaspora in development. Accordingly, it is suggested that by exploring the possible gaps between the supposed and actual trust, goals, capacities and knowledge present in existing diaspora programs and initiatives, it is possible to evaluate and explain their outcome and furthermore establish the reasons for their level of failure or success. It is important to note that *Figure 2* ought to be seen as circular process, i.e. identification, evaluation and adaption are steps that should be applied repeatedly to diaspora engaging efforts. In theory, continuous evaluations and subsequent adaptations to address shortcomings facilitates increasingly effective diaspora engagement.

Summary

In the theoretical framework the concepts of migration, diaspora, and development used in the analysis were first clarified and explained. Then the different types of diaspora contributions were outlined. The last part of the theoretical framework explains the steps home country governments can take in order to engage diasporas in development. Finally, a new model was conceptualized. It is elements of the new model which will guide the analysis of three of Mexico's existing diaspora engagement efforts and more specifically the driving and restraining forces of these efforts.


V. The Mexican diaspora

Countries adopt different ways of referring to their diaspora. The IOM argues that the ways in which countries refer to their populations abroad is a sign of the policy interest in them (IOM, 2008)². It is relevant to mention that the most common terminology used in Mexico when referring to Mexican national and their decedent abroad until now has not been diaspora. However recent government publications use diaspora to a higher extent (INM, 2014c). Some departments of the Mexican government and scholars use other terminology such as ‘Mexicans abroad’; ‘co-nationals’³; ‘fellow citizens’ (SRE 2014); ‘people with Mexican roots’; ‘Migrants’; ‘Mexicans that live abroad’ (SEDESOL, 2013; SEGOB & INM, 2015) or refer to them as ‘the Mexican-born population in the United States’ (Escobar Latapí, 2009); and finally some use the term diaspora (IME, 2015a). In the same way, different terminology is even used interchangeably within the same reports and government entities (e.g. IME, 2014). For the purposes of the consistency of this study, a single terminology, ‘diaspora’ or ‘members of the Mexican diaspora’, is utilized when referring to the Mexicans residing abroad.

This section will be dedicated to empirical evidence, which may explain the key figures and overall dynamics of the chosen case study. It will include information about the Mexican diaspora, information about remittances and shortly about the overall living conditions for affected family members in Mexico and for the Mexican diaspora, of which the vast majority is found in the United States. There is a great amount of information available on the topics since Mexican and international institutions continuously carry out researches and censuses.

After India and Bangladesh, Mexico has the highest number of emigrants in the world (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014b). The United States is by far the country with the largest recipient of immigrants. As of 2013, 45.8 million immigrants lived in the United States constituting almost one fifth of the global total (19.8%) (*Ibid.*). The United States is historically also the principal destination country for Mexican emigrants. The vast majority of the Mexican diaspora, or 98%, resides in the United States. Canada and Spain follows with 0,5% and 0,4%,

Figure 3: Mexican immigrants in the United States 1994-2014
(in millions)



² IOM outlines some examples: Nationals abroad, permanent immigrants, citizens of (X) living abroad, non-resident of (X) origin, persons of (X) origin, expatriates, and transnational citizens.

³ ‘Conacionales’ and ‘connacionales’

respectively (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014b). In 2013, 11,8 million Mexicans resided in the United States. Including 2nd and 3rd generation Mexicans the number added up to a total of 34,7 million Mexicans (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a). The Mexican diaspora in the United States constitute more than 30% of the migrant population in the country (Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). *Figure 3* shows the trend in the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States from 1994-2014.

According to census data from 2010, of the 31 states and the federal district in Mexico, 14 were considered to have a *high* or a *very high migration intensity degree*. Another 8 was considered medium. The four states with very high migration intensity were; Zacatecas; Guanajuato; Michoacán; and Nayarit (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a). This goes along with preceding data which showed that the origin of the Mexican population in the US, numbers from INEGI from 2005 indicate that 61% of the 21, 5 million Mexicans originated from the states of; Jalisco; Michoacán; Guanajuato; Zacatecas; Guerrero; Puebla; San Luís Potosí; Hidalgo; Oaxaca; and Chihuahua (Raccanello & López Velázquez, 2008). In contrast, states in the Southeast have low migration intensity (Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatán). The main receiving states are California, Texas, and Illinois with 35,6%, 22,3%, and 6,1% respectively, constituting 64% of the total Mexican diaspora in the United States (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a). The main motive for Mexicans to migrate to the United States is the search for work (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a; BBVA & CONAPO, 2014b; Hazán, 2013a; MATT, 2013).

Remittances

The growth of remittances has grown faster than the rates of migration (UNDP, 2007). This is also the case for Mexico which is among the principal remittance-receiving countries in the world. Although Heredia (2006) believes that remittances should be considered an indicator of failure of the national economic politics (Heredia, 2006) others argue that they unquestionably represent a source of income for the country (Raccanello & López Velázquez, 2008).

For Mexico the remittances sent in 2012 represented 2% of the country's gross domestic product GDP (PROFECO, 2013). In 2013, Mexico received the 4th highest amount of remittances in the world after India, China, and the Philippines (*Ibid.*), totaling approximately USD \$22 billion constituting 4% of global remittances (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a). The amount of remittances sent to Mexico reached a record high in 2007, just before the economic crisis, reaching over 26 billion dollars. The vast majority of remittances (97,5 %) to Mexico are sent by electronic transfer and were on average USD \$292 in 2013 (*Ibid.*).

The percentage of households in Mexico that receives remittances is decreasing. In 2006, 7,1 % percent of the total amount households in Mexico receives remittances. In 2012, the number was 4,5% (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a). *Figure 4* shows that remittances receiving households primarily spend the remittances to pay debts, to eat, to eat, and to purchase a car or appliances.

Figure 4: Uses of remittances sent to Mexico 2013(Multiple answers, % of total)




Figure 4 is from (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014b, p. 164)

Figure 5 shows the top ten remittance receiving states in 2013. Not surprisingly there is a correlation between the states with the highest numbers of emigrants to the United States and the main remittance receiving states which are; Michoacán; Guanajuato; Jalisco; the State of Mexico; Puebla; and Oaxaca. The six states alone received close to half of the national remittances total in 2013. Michoacán and Oaxaca, together with Guerrero, were also the states with the greatest dependence of remittances. In 2013, remittances constituted 7,4%, 6,2 %, and 6,9% of the states GDP, respectively (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a).

Figure 5: Remittances by States in Mexico (million US dollars), 2013



Figure 4 is from (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a, p. 135)

VI. Mexico's Diaspora Engagement Efforts

Consular Services

Having about one tenth of its population residing in the United States, the majority Mexico's foreign representations are similarly concentrated there. As an example, in 2014, the vast majority (97,6%) of consular protection and assistance cases in the areas of human rights, legal help, immigration etc., were acquired in the United States (SRE, 2015a). In 2011, of the 73 embassies and 67 consulates, 50 consulates were in the United States (Hernández Joseph, 2012). The expansion of the consular network in the United States started in the 1980s (MPI, 2013b), and the heavy concentration in the United States is successive governments responding to domestic demands, it being a '*consequence of its own internal reality, needs and priorities*' (Hernández Joseph, 2012, p.236).

The Mexican consular network offers a wide range of traditional services, such as the issuing of official documents and protections. Approximately 55 % of the Mexican nationals in the United States do not have the proper immigration documents, and thus reduced mobility (Hernández Joseph, 2012). As a consequence the consular representations in the United States are the only places undocumented diaspora members can acquire official documents (Waldinger, 2014). In addition, primarily in the United States, there is also several other information campaigns offered through Institute for Mexicans Abroad (Spanish Abbreviation: IME) in areas such as health; education; culture; financial education; taxes; banking services; work rights; wages; immigrations issues; voting abroad; Paisano Program; etc. (SRE, 2015a,p. 213). Gathering the efforts of various agencies calling them 'consular services' has raised the social and political expectation and similarly increased the pressure on the consular services (Hernández Joseph, 2012).

The Mexican consular network is vital for the diffusion of information to members of the Mexican diaspora, as they are in contact with millions of members of the diaspora each year. In 2014, the representations in the United States carried out more than 4.4 million consular acts. The total turnover of consular services was USD \$287 million during the 2014-2015 period⁴, considerably more than the USD \$208 million turnover in 2013-2014 201 side (SRE, 2015a, p.203). The 2014-2015 figures included more than 1.24 million passports (worth close to 110 million dollars) and just over 1 million consular IDs (more than 27 million dollars). The significant rise in turnover in just one year can among other things be explained by the rise in issued consular identification cards (up 25 %), passports (up 40%) and furthermore the SIDEA- system (SP: Sistema de Impression de Actas) which granted the consular network access to the Civil records in Mexico. Since January 5th 2015, members of the diaspora are able to request certified copies of their birth certificates at the representations abroad (SRE, 2015a, p.180). As for the funds acquired from the consular services, the Mexican congress voted to earmark the funds to stay within the consular network. As a consequence, this considerably increased the resources and thereby the capacity to provide services through the consular network (Hernández Joseph, 2012).

⁴ The period goes from September 1st until June 30th the following year.

According to the National Migration Institute (INM) in their Special Program of Migration 2014-2018, it is stated that '*the consular capacities will be strengthened to promote access to services and integration in the host society*' while also expressing an objective to '*foster the integration and reintegration of migrants and their family members*' by designing and implementing actions for social, cultural and political integration (INM, 2014c). Thus, there are multiple expectations towards the consular network to better conditions for the diaspora by ensuring access to public services in host countries as well as to promote personal development and social cohesion.

One of the services that are commonly requested throughout the consular network in the United States is the *Matrícula Consular* (Hereafter *Matrícula*), i.e. the consular identification card. Much consular effort has been put into the promotion of the *Matrícula* as an official means of identification in the US society (INM, 2014c), e.g. in financial institutions, with police and government departments, and in some states to obtain a driving license (ILO, 2015). Although in different versions the *Matrícula* has been available for more than a century, in the aftermath of 9/11 it saw an explosion in requests of *Matrículas* when the United States tightened security measures (ILO, 2015; MPI, 2013b). Thus, an initiative such as the *Matrícula* has been helpful for the Mexican diaspora in a world where immigrants are regularly and increasingly demanded to document their identity (Gamlen, 2008).

One of the first bank to accept the *Matrícula* as an official identification - which is required when opening new accounts - was Wells Fargo in 2001. Other banks, like Bank of America and Citibank followed shortly after. By 2005, the *Matrícula* was considered valid identification in 33 states, by 1180 police departments as well as in 178 financial institutions (Bruno & Storrs, 2005). It is similarly worth mentioning that Bank of America began to finance part of the expenses for Mexico's Mobile Consulates, in exchange of having bank employees on board, creating an opportunity to promote their remittance services and other banking products (Lindenmayer, 2005; Waldinger, 2014). Thus, the previously unbanked members of the Mexican Diaspora in the United States represented millions of potential clients for the banks that accept the *Matrícula* as an official means of identification; furthermore, it established additional options for the diaspora to access banking services and to channel remittances back to Mexico through banks at a lower transfer cost compared to other remittance transfer services (ILO, 2015). From 2000 to 2012 there was a decrease in fees of, on average, 9,7%, for sending money from cities within the United States containing large Mexican populations, such as Chicago, Miami, Dallas, Houston, etc., e.g. fees in Chicago and Miami decreased around 50% within the mentioned period (PROFECO, 2013).

Figure 5: Remittances 2000-2007 (in million dollars)




Figure 5 is from (Moreno, 2008, p.16)

As Figure 5 shows the remittances sent to Mexico grew three-fold from 2000, and especially fast from 2002 to 2006. In the same period the population of Mexican immigrants in United States experienced a mere 37% growth. Instead, a contributing factor to the increase in remittances was the decreasing transaction costs and the emergence of new money transfer companies with lower rates (Moreno, 2008). Correspondingly, Fernando Lozano notes that the increase in remittances was a consequence on the greater participation of banks and other companies in the money transfer business and similarly lower transfer rates through informal channels (Lozano Ascencio, 2004). The growing recognition of the *Matrícula* as a valid form of identification has increased the access of undocumented diaspora members in the United States to banking services and diaspora members with access to banking services send back significantly more remittances to Mexico than unbanked members of diaspora (Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansak, 2006).

Thus, the consular efforts in regards to the *Matrícula* have facilitated and affected the flow of remittances to Mexico positively appear to have been successful and enabled increasingly more remittances to be sent back to Mexico. This is backed up Thomas Rivera Policy Institute survey from 2003 showed that 95% of Mexicans recognized that there were more options to send and receive money than five years earlier. According to the respondents the best known transferring companies were Western Union (60%), Bancomer (45%), and Gramcon Money 15%. 5% and 3 % responded Bank of America and Wells Fargo, respectively (Moreno, 2008).

Expatriate Voting

As mentioned in the theoretical framework are political rights are often a high priority for diasporas. Expatriate voting and access to political participation can give diasporas a strong sense of belonging to the homeland and thereby intensify diaspora engagement (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 31). In the two recent presidential elections Mexican diaspora members have been able to vote from abroad. Hernandez Joseph (2012) considers the Mexican initiative for expatriate voting a '*result of the state –diaspora relationship*' (Hernández Joseph, 2012, p. 234).

Since March 1998, when constitutional reforms took place '*no Mexican by birth may be deprived of his nationality*' (González Martín, 1998). With the reforms Mexico opened up for a more flexible citizenship law that allows their diaspora and their descendants to acquire dual citizenship (Migration News, 2000). In 2005, the expatriate voting right was approved; however, the expectations of the advocates of the cause were far from met. Among other things, the voting right only included presidential elections thus excluding state and local elections. Furthermore, parties were not allowed to campaign abroad. Instead of having the option of voting at consulates only postal voting is possible. Additionally, the requirement to hold the electoral credential which can only be acquired in Mexico limited a large share of the Mexican diaspora from voting in elections. Moreover, eligible voters were required to send a request for participation in forthcoming elections well in advance, before the intensive campaigning had begun (Waldinger, 2014). In other words, '*the legislation that allowed expatriates to vote[...] made it practically difficult for them to do so*' (McCann, Cornelius, & Leal, 2009, p.145). As a result 40,786 people registered to vote in the 2006 election of which 80% participated (Navarro & Carillo, 2007). Figures from the 2012 presidential election show a similar degree of participation with 40.714 postal votes from abroad of which approximately three-quarters came from the United States. In total, the voters abroad represented just 0,52% of the total Mexican diaspora (CNN México, 2012). There are multiple reasons for the low level of participation, such as the undocumented nature of Mexican migration, as over half of the diaspora populations in the United do not have the proper immigration documents, together with the low socio-economic background of diaspora members (Waldinger, 2008). Since the 2012 presidential elections in Mexico many changes have occurred in regards to expatriate voting for the Mexican diaspora. In 2014, an electoral reform took place and it is now possible for Mexicans abroad to vote for the Senate. Similarly it will soon be possible to acquire the voter's credential at consulates (CNN México, 2015; Pedroza, 2015). In the future the option of voting electronically may similarly become a reality. For diaspora members from certain states such as Michoacán, Chiapas, and Zacatecas it is possible to vote in lower government level elections. These days it is correspondingly an option for diaspora members from Guerrero, Chiapas, and Zacatecas to become Migrant Candidates and take seats in local legislatures (Pedroza, 2015).

Discussion

The Mexican consular network in the United States is vital in connecting with members the diaspora. Additionally information and programs promoted through the consular network can be instrumental in the

channeling of diaspora contributions to Mexico, as seen above the contributions are primarily financial. The consular networks can similarly help improve the situation for the members of the diaspora in the United States. Consular protection has long been characteristic for states' engagement with their diaspora. The considerable official presence of Mexico via consulates and embassies in the United States is both necessary, for the issuing of documents for the millions of undocumented people, and important in the engagement of the diaspora. Waldinger (2014) argues that the outcome of extensive consular services is closer diaspora involvement. Through cultural and educational services, consulates can strengthen the diaspora's sense of a national belonging (Waldinger, 2014). Agreeing, González Gutierrez states that the Mexico's consular service is the *'fundamental glue of the effort of rapprochement'* (González Gutierrez, 2006, p. 23).

The lack of valid immigration papers, especially since 2001, has made it increasingly harder for members of the Mexican diaspora in the United States to fully integrate in society which conflicts with the view of Hernandez Joseph (2012) who describes Mexico's diaspora a *'truly bi-national community'*, that is *'simultaneously turned socially and politically towards Mexico and towards the United States'* (Hernández Joseph, 2012, p. 234). However, the growing validity of the *Matrícula* as official identification has contributed to more banked members of diaspora, and has ensured a greater and cheaper range of transfer services that can enable the flow of remittances to Mexico. Although only a small part of remittances are used for productive projects, it is important not to disregard the social and human development benefits it has for their family in Mexico.

Expatriate voting is a complicated and sensitive issue. It is clear that an additional 10% in votes in Mexican elections can have a significant influence on results. The results affect residents but may have little, if any, practical consequence for diaspora members and their daily lives. On one hand, it complicated to establish people's attachment, engagement, and loyalty to their country of origin (opposite family loyalty) after several decades (or generations) of living abroad (Waldinger, 2009), on the other it is a human right to take part in the government directly or through freely chosen representatives (UN, 1948). In the last two presidential elections primarily the undocumented nature of the Mexican diaspora restricted the democratic participation in both Mexico and the United States (Waldinger, 2008).

In the first elections where expatriate voting was possible only a small part of the diaspora participated. Due to several restrictions mentioned above, less than 1% of the Mexican diaspora voted in the Mexican Presidential elections in 2006 and 2012. With the new electoral reform the opportunities for the diaspora to vote has included facilitated registration process and more ways to vote. The option of expatriate voting influences the diaspora and make them take a more direct role in their countries of origin. According to María Gómez the option of expatriate voting made Mexicans *feel more included in the system*. The inclusion resulted in *added funding and support for projects in Mexico* (Gómez in The Guardian, 2010). In the same way, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Mexico's The Federal Electoral Institute believe that expatriate voting *'enhances democratic participation and peaceful development'* (IDEA & IFE, 2007, p. IV). Thus, the changes under the new reform may be an incentive for greater diaspora

engagement and participation in politics in Mexico which may result in the channeling of more resources to Mexico in the future.

3x1 program for Migrants

One of the most mentioned programs when it comes to Mexican diaspora engagement is the *3x1 program for Migrants* which is placed under the Mexican Ministry for Social Development (acronym in Spanish: SEDESOL). The results of the matching funds program, and lessons learned are repeatedly being reported and highlighted by the Mexican government, scholars, as well as international organizations, e.g. (Fernández de Castro, Zamora, & Freyer, 2006; Latapí & Janssen, 2006; Newland, 2010; UNDP, 2007). Matching funds programs are in general considered to be best practice programs (Escobar Latapí, 2009; Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). Inspired by the Mexican matching funds experiences other countries have created similar initiatives (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Delgado Wise & Covarrubias, 2008; OECD, 2014).

History

The 3x1 program has over time evolved and grown to be a national program. In the 60s, Zacatecans in the United States supported social infrastructure projects e.g. repairing squares, churches, sports parks and cemeteries in their home towns. The projects were financed entirely by migrants hence the first period came to be known as ‘Zero for One’ (Garcia Zamora, 2007). The program structure expanded from the 0x1 to the 1x2 programs in Zacatecas and later Guerrero as the governments on different levels joined in. The popularity of the matching-funds programs with migrants and migration communities rose in Zacatecas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Guanajuato. During his presidential campaign in 1999 the governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox, promised to extend the program to become a national initiative (Iksander, 2005). After having won the election, the program was implanted on a national level and municipal governments similarly started complementing.

The 3x1 program for Migrants (Sp: 3x1 para Migrantes) supports initiatives of Mexicans living abroad. The 3x1 program became national when the Fox administration put the Micro Regions Program within the Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL) in 2002 (Garcia Zamora, 2007).

The 3x1 program gives migrants the opportunity to channel resources to Mexico for ‘*works of social impact that will benefit their communities of origin directly*’ (IME, 2015b). The program works with the contributions from organized clubs or federations of migrants living abroad, the Federal Government, through SEDESOL, the State, and Municipal governments. For every peso contributed by migrants, the Federal, state and municipal governments add 3 pesos, hence the name 3x1. In short, according to the SEDESOL website the 3x1 program⁵:

- 1) *Supports the proposals of migrant groups;*
- 2) *Promotes and maintains identity ties;* and it

⁵ A comprehensive description is found in the official the 3x1 Program’s Rules of Operation (Spanish abbreviation: ROP , Reglas de Operación del Programa 3x1 para Migrantes)

3) *Promotes initiatives of shared responsibility between community and the government* (SEDESOL, 2013)

Yearly, the National Council of Evaluation of Social Development Politics (SP: CONEVAL) conducts an evaluation of the 3x1 program. The evaluation is to a large extent only a comparison between recent and past numbers, whether the 3x1 program has lived up to its quantitative goals set by SEDESOL, i.e. increase and decrease in approved projects, affected localities, presented projects, etc. The evaluation offers some suggestions to what causes for the qualitative findings, yet it repeatedly emphasizes the further need to analysis the underlying reasons.

Goals

The general objective expressed for the 3x1 program is to *'contribute to strengthening the social participation to promote community development through investment in social infrastructure, community service, educational and/or productive projects jointly financed by the three levels of government and organizations of Mexicans abroad'* (SEDESOL, 2014, p.1). The strategic diaspora contribution to the 3x1 program from the Mexican diaspora are collective remittances, i.e. savings.

In the program description it is stated that through collective remittances migrant communities *'strengthens relationships, practices, organization and further promotes the development of their home communities'*. The ROP acknowledges that projects funded by collective remittances have a long history, and only recently has the government decided to *'support and guide'* such projects in order to favor the *'development of communities of origin in Mexico'*. In regards to the motives behind the creation of the national program, the Mexican government has recognized that collective remittances are *'a space of opportunity for citizens to take part in social development'*. Furthermore, collective remittances have had *'a favorable effect on the families' welfare in receiving communities'* which has allowed *'lower levels of poverty in large segments of the population'* (SEDESOL, 2014, p.2).

Knowledge

In regards to the knowledge of its diaspora the ROP it shortly states that Mexico is one of the countries with *'the largest flow of migrants'* and that the *'United States is the main destination'*. In explaining the causes of migration, the document simply states that although *'migration is a complex phenomenon'* most of the people who migrate *'seek to improve their living conditions and that of their families'* as well as *'to have resources'* (SEDESOL, 2014, p.1). Clearly, the ROP of the 3x1 program is not the place to discuss and examine the underlying causes and motives of migration in detail; however, stating that migration is a *complex phenomenon* is undoubtedly a somewhat vague description. The numerous aspects of migration are downplayed to a simplistic minimum.

Although financial diaspora contribution is necessary for the 3x1 program, it is not mentioned in the ROP that the 3x1 program is intended as a means to channel funds from Mexicans abroad to be used for development projects in Mexico. Instead the wording repeatedly emphasize the collaboration aspects of the program and the development potential it has, primarily stressing the positive effects collective remittances can have on home communities. The information about the program differs, on the SEDESOL and in the

ROP an emphasis is placed on collaboration and the benefits the projects lead to in home communities. In contrast, on the Consulate of Denver's website the 3x1 program is instead expressed to be an '*economic development program*' which, among other things, '*channels collective remittances into social projects*' (SRE, 2015b). Thus, the wording of descriptions of the program is inconsistent. Some government entities emphasize the social aspects of the program, while others stress the financial aspects to a higher extent.

Capacities

From the government's side, the 3x1 program is merely '*a response to the interests shown by the Mexican diaspora to cooperate in necessary actions and works in their communities of origin in Mexico*' (SEDESOL, 2014, p. 2). It is the expansion of clubs and organizations of Mexican migrants as well as *their interest* in funding projects in and support of communities of origin which underlies the creation of the program (SEDESOL, 2014).




Figure from (CONEVAL, 2015a, p.8)

Not surprisingly, *figure 6* shows that the most attended municipalities in the 3x1 program are concentrated in the central part of the country, which, at the same time, are the states with the highest degrees of out-migration (CONEVAL, 2015a). Since the start of the program there has been an increase in the number of localities attended which is a clear indicator of the 3x1 program's territorial expansion. The program goal in terms of localities rose over 10 % between 2013 and 2014. The set goal was reached and 1312 localities in 611 municipalities in 28 states benefited from the program (CONEVAL, 2015a).

Despite the territorial expansion in 2014, the program also shows some negative trends. From 2013 to 2014 considerably less of the presented projects were approved, from 79,82 % in 2013 to 62,56 % in 2014. Though the fall in approved projects on one can be a positive tendency, as it results from a fast growing quantity of presented projects, from 2533 to 3296 projects in a year, the fall, on the other hand, may also be due to budgetary restrictions (CONEVAL, 2015a). The CONEVAL evaluation puts forward a suggestion to determine on what grounds the projects are rejected. If it is due to lack of feasibility, technical problems, etc., and that it is relevant to consider if it is first time applicant-projects that are being rejected, as this may demotivate them to participate in the 3x1 program in the future. Correspondingly, the evaluation expresses a need to establish if a connection exists between areas and towns of the rejected projects and first time participants (CONEVAL, 2015a). The evaluation mentions several areas of concern, however they are not elaborated. Deeper analyses of correlations has not been available.

The restrained growth of the 3x1 program is correlated with budgetary restrictions. From 2009 to 2012 the program budget fell with almost 20 % and since 2012 only a minor increase in the budget has occurred. The

cause of this may be explained by the fact that local governments cannot channel extra funds into the 3x1 program (CONEVAL, 2015a, p.3). As stated above, the interest in the program from the diaspora's side is growing with increasingly more projects presented in recent years. Yet the number of approved projects in 2014 was 25% less than expected. Despite a goal to carry out 2512 projects, just over 2000 were approved. As these figures show, there has been an increased interest from organized diaspora members to participate in the 3x1 program, however, primarily due budgetary restraints many projects are rejected. Although the number of approved projects and affected localities grow, the budget has fallen or at best remained steady. From the diaspora's side there is a growing demand for the program which is not met with a corresponding increase in the budget from the government's side. This is one of the major restraining forces of the program and this fact is repeatedly pointed out in the 2014 CONEVAL evaluation.

The way in which diaspora members can channel financial resources towards community projects in Mexico has been institutionalized with the 3x1 program. As seen above, a current restraining force of the program is budgetary restrictions, which appears to be a persistent problem. In 2007, according Escobar Zamora the biggest problem with the 3x1 program was that '*it is too small*' (Escobar Zamora in Marketplace, 2007). Out of every USD\$1,000 sent to Mexico, only about USD \$2 were invested the 3x1 program. He argued it would be very good for the public works in Mexico if the program grew to about 10 times its current size. Of course this would be at the cost of increased bureaucracies, something he at the time stated, the government was not willing to spend on. This is consistent with the newest figures examined above, budgetary restraints are currently a major problem for the growth of the program (CONEVAL, 2015a; Marketplace, 2007). However other options for channeling collective remittances back to Mexico are available. Data shows that the majority of migrants' contributions to their hometowns are actually made through other channels than the 3x1 program (Escobar Latapí, 2009). This goes along with Fernandez de Castro *et al.* (2006, p. 12) that estimate that 11% of remittances are used for are spent community infrastructure and services (Fernández de Castro et al., 2006, p.6). Several states have their own 2x1 or 1x1 programs and, in the case of Jalisco, the local program have more funds available than the federal program. Escobar Latapí argues that the diversification of programs is an advantage for the members of the diaspora and subsequently for their home towns (Escobar Latapí, 2009, p.93)

Mirror clubs

One of García Zamora's critiques in 2007 was the lack of knowledge about the program among most of the population in the home towns. Despite being the beneficiaries of the program there was a low level of participation by the population in the beneficiary communities (Garcia Zamora, 2007). Newer data indicates that the social participation within the affected communities is increasing. The number Mirror Clubs⁶ (Clubes Espejos) in the home localities grew from 987 clubs in 2011 to 1436 clubs in 2014. Even though the

⁶ A mirror club is an organized group of people in the beneficiary towns. The mirror club oversees the 3x1 projects to ensure they are carried out according to planned.

2014 CONEVAL evaluation stresses the importance of evaluating the capacity and efficiency of such clubs when it comes to following up on the projects and their ability to supervise the use of funds, it is an enabling factor that there is a rising involvement by mirror clubs in the affected localities. Consequently García Zamora's point of critique may to some extent be outdated. A contributing factor to the rise may be caused by the increasing number of workshops held to promote social participation for the actors linked to the 3x1 program (from 148 in 2013 to 256 in 2014) (CONEVAL, 2015a). Seemingly the rise in workshops has increased the social participation in the beneficiary communities, nevertheless, it is unfortunate if people do not possess the capabilities needed to carry out efficient supervision of projects.

Trust

As established in the theoretical framework mutual trust is important in order to achieve good results when dealing with diaspora engagement efforts. Historical evidence shows that trust was also an issue when the program started as an informal 1x1 initiative in Zacatecas. In 1986 and the following years, state governor Borrego travelled to the United States to engage in dialog with the different federations of Zacatecans. Borrego has expressed that the program was initiated to “*create a feeling of trust (darles confianza); the risk that (the migrants were running by putting a dollar into a public program, well, I was running the same risk. I wanted them to know that we were in it together)*” (Borrego in Iksander, 2005, p. 256) The objective of the first informal 1x1 initiative was to draw on migrant resources for projects that the migrants wanted to see completed in their home communities, yet also to generate a relationship of trust between the state government and the migrants (Iksander, 2005). She argues that the matching-funds program was a success in Zacatecas because the necessary social infrastructure to support it was built. Zacatecas' state government promoted the efforts of the organization of Zacatecan migrants in hometown organizations in the United States (*Ibid*). In 2007, it was argued that many Mexicans were still skeptical about the 3x1 program. The former leader of the Mexican Center at the University of Texas, Bryan Roberts, claims that when people hear about the 3x1 program, they are, at first, reluctant towards it and say that they would not trust their home state governor, etc. to be in charge of their money. Robert argues that this to some extent may be connected with the historical memories of the communities (Marketplace, 2007).

The 3x1 program has existed in over decade and there has been a growing interest in it from diaspora members and home communities. This increase in interest demonstrates the establishment of a considerable amount of trust between the stakeholders. Although the budget is restricted the exercised budget is as good as identical to the proposed budget. Hence, it is fair to say that *there is correct and efficient planning and use of the assigned funds* (CONEVAL, 2015a).

Discussion

Several scholars agree that the 3x1 program improves the life of beneficiaries in the localities where the projects are carried out (Escobar Latapí, 2009; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Iksander, 2005; Raccanello & López Velázquez, 2008). Nevertheless, they disagree to which extent the program contributes to development. Raccanello & López Velázquez (2008) argue that the program helps fight poverty significantly but also that

it provides more social than economic benefits. Furthermore they maintain that the benefits go beyond the satisfaction of basic needs of social infrastructure and services as the works in their words ‘*affect the physical and emotional welfare*’ of community members (Raccanello & López Velázquez, 2008, p. 13). Along this line, Hazán argues that 3x1 projects have represented ‘*an important contribution to the general well-being of many communities of origin*’ particularly in poor states (Hazán, 2013b, p.53). Iksander (2005) on the other hand, is less enthusiastic and argues that the public works have a mild mitigating effect on poverty in migration communities as the 3x1 program has only resulted in sporadic economic activity through the employment in construction or through the use of the constructed community facilities (Iksander, 2005). Iksander’s somewhat tepid attitude towards the program is shared by Escobar Latapí, who maintains that while the construction of roads have contributed to the development of the communities, the majority of projects have had no or little direct developmental effects (Escobar Latapí, 2009). García Zamora (2007) who has written extensively on the topic of the 3x1 program in Mexico argues *that there are more positive than negative impacts from the program*. Still he is aware of the many challenges the program faces and emphasizes that the program needs thorough adjustments, if it is going to be a true instrument of local and regional development underlining the importance that such adjustments are carried out in collaboration with the communities of origin and migrant organizations (Garcia Zamora, 2007). Said differently, local ownership is the key to the future success of the program.

It is evident that there are conflicting opinions among scholars and organizations on the developmental effects of the 3x1 program. The ROP states that the program supports ‘*necessary actions and works*’ (SEDESOL, 2014, p. 2). The Mexican government and SEDESOL are aware of the present development challenges in Mexico and with a co-funding program like 3x1 for migrants the Mexican government can, in theory, save 25% on development projects, given that the works are already encompassed in governments and municipals existing development plans. However, what distinguishes projects carried out under the 3x1 program from other governmental development projects is that under the 3x1 program, the *projects are proposed by the organized migrant groups and organizations* to be carried out in the specific localities of *their choice* (Ibid.). The fact that the projects under the 3x1 program are carried out on localities chosen by migrants, does not comply with the objective of improving the livelihood in the poorest areas of the country since individuals who migrate typically do not come from highly marginalized areas (Raccanello & López Velázquez, 2008). Consequently the projects are mainly carried out in non-marginal communities, i.e. communities that are less poor, where migrants to a larger extent are able to accumulate the funds for important improvements (Escobar Latapí, 2009, p.93). Thus, while one of the motivations of DOs to channel funds into the program, is the ability to choose the type and location of projects, is it at the same time one of the underlying causes as to why the program does not contribute to development equally throughout Mexico. The most marginalized areas of the countries are to some extent bypassed by the program since they are areas with low degrees of out-migration. In some cases the 3x1 projects can even create ‘mausoleums of nostalgia’ for the members of the diaspora, i.e. beautiful towns equipped with basic public infrastructure that nonetheless are sparsely populated due to high levels of out-migration (García Zamora in Iksander, 2005).

This leads to the question whether the 3x1 program can truly be considered a development program. Agunias & Newland (2012), argue it cannot be considered as such and that the 3x1 program is more similar to solidarity programs, for the reason stated above i.e.; the projects are chosen based on the collaboration aspects of the program instead of from an economic logic (Agunias & Newland, 2012).

It is clear that most scholars and institutions argue that the 3x1 program contributes with many positive outcomes, although most of the projects are not directly correlated with noticeable economic development. Still the 3x1 program meets the objectives of maintaining a connection between the Mexican diaspora and the home communities, together with and the promotion of projects of joint responsibility. Since the program started in 2002, the social participation has increased considerably, the knowledge about the program is spreading and so is the economic capacity of the diaspora groups, which is primarily seen in the number of proposed project as well as the increase in mirror clubs.

A major critique posed by CONEVAL of the 3x1 program is that in neither 2014 nor in 2015 was the problem, the program sought to address, clearly clarified. The main objective of the program refers to what the targeted people (members of the diaspora) gains access to through the program, e.g. investment projects. It is not the changes or results from the investments and how they affect the population in Mexico. However, in order to establish the relevance of having a program like the 3x1 program within the national social development budget, although it represents a minor part of the total budget, it is relevant to examine in more detail how and if the projects affect the social development in the affected communities in Mexico.

Although the 3x1 program has a potential to grow according to the increased participation on the part of diaspora organization abroad and participation in the beneficiary towns, it is important to remember the 3x1 constitutes a very small part of the fiscal area of Mexican social development, and that this part on a decrease. In 2014 and 2015 the 3x1 program respectively constituted 0,491% and 0,482% of the total social development budget. In real terms, the social development budget was 0.4% lower than the year before (CPFP, 2015).

The organization of the 3x1 program and the rising demand on the part of the clubs may constitute a challenge for the Mexican government in the coming years. On one hand, there are more vital developmental projects and problems within the Mexican society the government could take care of instead of adding funds to the 3x1 program that, as established above, meets less urgent needs primarily in non-marginalized areas of the country. On the other hand, not accommodating the increasing interest in the program from the diaspora clubs and federation could result in declining trust in the Mexican government among the diaspora. Nevertheless, the home communities may still benefit from collective remittances. As figures show, diaspora members channels collective into community projects in a multiple ways apart from the 3x1 program, which suggests that the diaspora will continue funding projects through other options.

In conclusion, the author argues the main driving forces of the 3x1 program for migrants are: 1) The collaboration aspect. Funds are matched by the three levels of government. 2) the increased interest shown in the program by members of the diaspora which indicates increased trust and capacities. 3) The direct

diaspora influence in selecting projects and location. Some restraining forces are: 1) In terms of development, diaspora influence in selecting the types of projects and locations 2) The falling budget which does not meet the increasing demand. 3) The recent delay in the reinforcement of the program

The Paisano program

The last effort to be examined is the Paisano program⁷, which is a permanent program under an inter-ministerial commission that has two technical committees, a national board, three representations in the United States and 32 state committees in Mexico (Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). The efforts of several agencies (See appendix II) are coordinated under the inter-ministerial commission which is headed by Mexico's Ministry of Internal affairs (SP: Secretaría de Gobernación or SEGOB). The national coordination of the program is managed by the National Migration Institute (SP: Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM).

There are several services available to members of the Mexican diaspora provided under Paisano program. The main service is the free Paisano guide (In English: *Compatriot Guide* and in Spanish: *Guía Paisano*) which is available at consulates in the United States and Canada, online, as an App (since 2013) and hard copies are handed out at strategic entry points at throughout the country, among other things at bus stations and at toll road, with increased presence during holiday seasons (INM, 2014b). The guide compiles the most useful information from all participating Ministries and agencies to members of the diaspora about consulate services, in depth information of requirements for obtaining or renewing Mexican passports or the consular identification cards (see page 34). Furthermore it offers information on the protection offered to Mexicans abroad, useful information on migration and customs procedures, temporary import of cars, available health services in Mexico. The Paisano program encompasses numerous elements beneficial for diaspora members whether they wish to go back to Mexico, temporary or even permanently, send money home either to family members or for community projects (see page 38), but similarly on how to obtain documentation in Canada and the United States (Programa Paisano, 2015). Additionally, the program features toll free numbers in Mexico, Canada, and the United States where questions regarding consular services and travels to Mexico as well as complaints over civil servants can be directed (*Ibid.*).

Knowledge

The Paisano program was a response from the Mexican government to the reservations of and claims from diaspora stakeholders and members in the United States. The first elements of the program started in 1989 after the Mexican government became aware of the scope of the problem of misconduct among Mexican public servants toward visiting members of the diaspora. Actions were implemented to improve the services of federal civil servants at borders, ports, and international airports (Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). The initial objective of the program was '*to control and phase out rates abuse, extortion, theft, corruption and arrogance among public officials in various governmental entities that Mexicans experienced when entering the country*' (SEGOB, 2015b). The Paisano program acquired greater importance with 'Mexican Nation'

⁷ Paisano can be translated into 'fellow countryman', 'compatriot' or 'fellow citizen'. Paisano derives from the word *país* which means country in Spanish.

initiative within the 1995-2000 National Development Plan (SEGOB, 1995)⁸. The initiative aimed at integrating a series of programs to strengthen the links and ties between the Mexican community abroad (Ibid, p. 22).

With time the program has become a permanent program with increased operation during holiday seasons. It is hard to estimate the level of knowledge about the program among the diaspora, however considering the long duration of the program, the presence in key entry points, the information available online and the consulates, and the qualitative evaluation data from the program itself, most many members of the diaspora may have had a chance to get familiar with parts of information provided in the Paisano guide or by the observant volunteers. Nevertheless, the contact does not automatically mean that the members of the diaspora have benefited from the program.

Goals

Like the 3x1 program (see page 38), the Paisano program was a response to problems diaspora members faced when visiting Mexico. Collaborated and proposed by various stakeholders in the United States, the overall goal of the Paisano program is to guarantee a dignified treatment for Mexicans entering, transiting, or leaving Mexico by: 1) *informing about rights and ensuring the compliance of obligations*. 2) *By protecting people's physical integrity and property*. To 3) *raise awareness and train civil servants and civil society* and finally to 4) *address and monitor complaints and accusations* (Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011, p.38). The program operates under the motto '*Welcome home, compatriot, you are our commitment*' (SP: Bienvenido a casa, Paisano, nuestro compromiso eres tú) the Paisano program offers guidance and information. The Paisano program is primarily an information service directed at the Mexican Diaspora and includes a training element for civil servants and a follow-up service for complaints and reports of abuses of civil rights. If the Mexicans who enters, transits or leaves Mexico are more informed and aware of their rights and obligations it may be instrumental in creating a more efficient border and customs services. Furthermore, the option to directly report misconduct among civil servants and delinquency can help combat the problems such acts and as a result may lead to added trust.

Capacities

The Paisano program is two-fold with an informational aspect on one hand and the educational aspect on the other. As for the spreading of information to diaspora members, during the winter operation of 2013, the program had 352 information and observation modules in Mexico and registered over 8500 phone calls resulting in over 1.26 million *attended* 'paisanos' (INM, 2014b). In the summer period, the number of the places of observation and information is greater. As an example, there were 535 places of observation in the summer of 2010 (Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). In total, 2013 the holiday operations in 2013 resulted in almost 2,5 million *attended* paisanos, a number that has been fairly stable since 2008 (SHCP, 2013; Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). Nevertheless, brief contact does not automatically mean that the members of the

⁸ The 'Mexican Nation' initiative involved integrating a set of programs to strengthen cultural links and ties with the Mexican communities and people with Mexican roots abroad.

diaspora have benefited from the program. Thus, the unit of evaluation, *attend paisanos*, does not provide a clear image of the program's actual impact.

The foundation of the Paisano program is the volunteers which enable the capacity to cover important points of entry to the country. Every year, the number of observant volunteers is approximately 3000, of which 80% are students between 18-25 (INM, 2014b; SEGOB, 2010; Weiss & López Chaltelt, 2011). In this way, the Paisano program is very cost efficient as it has a high impact potential and a fairly low expenditure. The volunteers hand out the Paisano guide, index cards with specific relevant topics, and can answers any doubts people may have, Mexicans as well as foreigners. Furthermore, during the holiday periods, there is an increased tax exemption for goods brought into the country Mexican nationals. Each Mexican entering the country may bring up to USD \$500 worth of goods. The regular tax exemption on goods is USD \$300 (SAT, 2015). The increased tax exemption may be an incentive for visiting diaspora members to bring more gifts intended for family members in Mexico.

The educational aspect of the program may similarly benefit the visiting members of diaspora, and subsequently Mexico. The continuous training of civil servants on the topic of migration is a positive action taken by the Mexican government (INM, 2014a). By attempting to improve the effectiveness and work of civil servants, ideally ensuring unproblematic encounters (civil servants that are often initial contact within Mexico), the reputation of said civil servants, as well as that of the country in addition to the level of trust in the Mexican government, may improve. In other words can this educational aspect of the Paisano program be contributory to the establishment of mutual trust between the Mexican government and the diaspora. As a consequence, members of the diaspora may be more inclined to revisit Mexico as tourists on several occasions in the future.

In addition to the national Paisano program, some states provide additional personnel available in state territory to ensure safe homecoming of its people visiting for the Christmas holidays. During the 2015 winter holidays, approximately 35-45 thousand diaspora members are expected to visit Hidalgo, and as a consequence extra police forces are mobilized and additional secure rest areas are set up on the most traveled roads in the state (La Region, 2015; Velarde, 2015). Similar initiatives are seen in the north-eastern state of Tamaulipas, which is one of the principal routes diaspora members visiting Mexico (SEGOB, 2010).

As specified above, the Paisano program offers information to diaspora members who wish to return to Mexico permanently. This may be a new area to focus on in the future as nature of the migration flow is changing. Between 2005 and 2010 more than a million migrants returned to Mexico resulting in the net migration falling to zero (Passel, D'Vera Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). Some events that have contributed to the elevated levels of return migration is the financial crisis, tightened American immigration policies, as well as the reform of the Mexican immigration law in April 2011 which resulted in a facilitated return and reintegration of former diaspora members into Mexican society (Hazán, 2013a; MATT, 2013). Although the Paisano program offers relevant information and could indeed be a helpful tool for returning migrants, the 2013 report from the organization Mexicans and Americans Thinking Together (MATT),

showed that a mere 2 % of respondents in their survey had benefitted from a return migration program, of which the Paisano program is only one of several programs implemented by the Mexican government. The vast majority received no information that could facilitate return, while 33% relied on information regarding return migration from family and friends (MATT, 2013). In other words, the information available under the Paisano program did virtually not reach members of the diaspora who wished to return permanently to Mexico who mostly receives little or no information or rely on information that could facilitate return from family members and friends. It becomes clear that the information spread by the program does not reach a significant part of the intended target population which is a clear restraining force of the program.

Although the tightened American immigration policies is responsible for part of the return migration, as about 11% were deported, most Mexicans still return to Mexico voluntarily as they were drawn emotionally to Mexico after 1-5 years in the United States (*Ibid.*). The recent figures on return migration shows a tendency back towards more circular migration patterns. While back in Mexico, returning diaspora members can ideally apply skills acquired abroad. The majority earned slightly more than prior to migrating, although over half of the respondents continued to earn less than USD \$500 per month (MATT, 2013, p.43). The necessity for increased focus on the subjects is further emphasized by the fact that diaspora members who wish to return permanently to Mexico in some cases show a positive impact on local development. A study from Lapatí & Janssen (2006) showed that 36% of returning migrants wished to open a small business upon returning to Mexico, of which many did. The business employed an average of 1.6 people, often the returned migrant and another person. Accordingly, the return of diaspora members should also be seen as positive due to the possible job creations in Mexico which can have a positive impact on local development. Thus, in the future, diaspora engaging programs and initiatives must to a higher extent focus on the attempts to successfully reintegrate returning diaspora members into the Mexican labor market and society so they become an asset for development instead of risking them constituting a new social problem. Specifically the Paisano program could include additional information on how to set up a business upon return to Mexico as many returning diaspora members wish to do so, especially considering the positive aspects such businesses may have on local development in Mexico.

Returning diaspora members themselves can also add value to the Paisano program. New to the Paisano program in 2015 has been the integration of repatriates as volunteers under the Paisano program. Repatriates have experience with the procedures, which is necessary to provide efficient and proper help to the arriving compatriots. Similarly, SEGOB argues that this may be a way to repatriates to reincorporate into the Mexican society (SEGOB, 2015a).

Trust

The Paisano program is important in the building of trust and to ensure safe home coming of members of the Mexican diaspora from the United States. In the late 90s about one million Mexican residing in the United States visited Mexico each year (Migration News, 2000). The number has increased significantly. Figures from the summer operations of the Paisano program show a growth in the number of Mexicans that visited

Mexico with 2,6 million to approximately 3 million in 2014 and 2015, respectively. These figures indicate there is and increased trust among diaspora members to visit Mexico, visits in which the Paisano program may to some extent have been instrumental (INM, 2015). Another contributing factor may be the possibility to obtain dual citizenship for Mexicans after 1998, where increasingly more naturalized diaspora members reclaimed their Mexican nationality. Moreover, in 1999, Mexico imposed a tax on foreigners travelling beyond the border area (Migration News, 2000).

In 2010, the Commissioner of the National Migration Institute, Salvador Beltran del Rio, expressed the importance of the Paisano in fighting corruption and abuse of authority *'We are confident that the information, transparency in the procedures, the attention, and the follow-up of complaints from our citizens, are the main weapons with which we fight corruption and abuse of authority'* (SEGOB, 2010). Despite the positive development in the number of visiting diaspora members, critics have been made due to a delay in the reinforcement of the program. This summer, local PAN representative in Tamaulipas, Francisco Elizondo Salazar, emphasized the importance to continue and strengthen the efforts of the Paisano program, otherwise Mexico may face the risk that diaspora members may stop visiting their home states, and consequently financial resources that help the local business is lost; *'...if the issues are treated in time, it can generate trust among the paisanos so they keep coming back every year'* (Elizondo Salazar in de la Fuente, 2015). Thus, continuous reinforcement of the program is essential.

Discussion

The numbers of *attended* paisanos in various government evaluations and disclosures make the Paisano program appear to be an exceptionally successful high impact program. Nevertheless, as the numbers in the study from MATT mentions, only a few people obtained information from the Mexican Government which may well have facilitated their return to Mexico. The information accessible through the services of Paisano program is certainly relevant and useful to members of the diaspora. The Paisano program makes the compiled information easily accessible in the form of the Paisano guide, at consulates abroad and at information modules upon arrival to Mexico, however, the challenge is to have people to actively seek and make use of the information relevant to their situation.

The information presented within the different actions of the Paisano program may enable that Mexicans who travel to Mexico to experience fewer issues in migration and customs processes. The increased focus on and continuous training of civil servants reduced the cases of misconduct since the 1980s, however, misconduct and transparency in public services remains a challenge (OECD, 2015b). Nonetheless, the facilitated movement and professional behavior from civil servants may be influential to the fact that diaspora members are increasingly traveling to Mexico, however other factors such as increased resources, change in immigration status, etc.

Visiting diaspora members can contribute to both the touristic market in Mexico as well as to the economy for businesses in home towns. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, one of the ways diaspora can contribute to development in their country of origin is through the consumption of domestic products and by

visiting as tourists. Considering that tourism is the world's fourth largest industry (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014), facilitating customs and migration processes and safety enhancing procedures is an enabling factor for diaspora contributions to the country. The large diaspora population in the United States and the geographical proximity are good starting points for attracting and increasing amount of tourists to Mexico, and the Paisano program facilitates the flow of people and goods to Mexico. The Paisano program offers information which can ensure preparation of diaspora members, and the educational aspect can contribute to unproblematic encounters with civil servants in Mexico, and increasingly more diaspora members (re)visits Mexico. Thus, the logic behind the program is that the lower the risk of an event-free homecoming to Mexico and return to the United States, the bigger the chances are of receiving visits (and revisits) from the diaspora. Such visits channels resources and goods into Mexico.

In conclusion, the author argues the main driving forces of the Paisano program are: 1) The continuous training of civil servants which benefits the general Mexican population, as well as anyone visiting the country. 2) the dispersal of relevant information at key entry points to the country and at consulates, and finally as a result of the of the former more members of the diaspora may be inclined to visit Mexico, which can strengthen social and cultural ties and thus increase diaspora contributions to Mexico. 3) The program is very cost efficient, as the foundation is the work of volunteers. Some restraining forces are: 1) The quantitative evaluation of the impact of the program. 2) Very few diaspora members returning to Mexico permanently seeks out the information provided by government programs directed them. 3) The evaluations of the program are highly quantitative. The program lacks in-depth analysis of underlying causes as a supplement to the quantitative findings.

Diaspora contributions and development in Mexican States

In this section the relationship between remittances and level of development in Mexican states is examined. The remittances Mexico receives yearly have a major development potential on a national scale, that is, given the money is invested in productive projects or in national poverty reducing efforts. However, this is not the case. Only a small part of the remittances sent to Mexico are meant for savings or entrepreneurial projects. The majority of remittances are intended for family consumption which *'demonstrates that the resources sent by migrants are not part of a development processes geared toward social transformation'* (Delgado Wise & Covarrubias, 2008, p.1372). In contrast, individual and household consumption can be *'an important element in increasing human development'* according to Ranis (2004, p. 3).

Although the programs have clearly enabled and facilitated the channeling of diaspora contributions to Mexico, primarily financial, it is important to remember that in total the remittances represent a small proportion of the country's GDP. From 2000 to 2007 remittances as a percentage of GDP grew from 1,1% to 2,7%, hereafter it experienced a fall in as a consequence of the economic recession. In 2014 remittances constituted 1,9% of the Mexico's GDP (World Bank, 2014). In economic terms Mexico is an upper middle income country migration (*Ibid.*).

Even though the amount of remittances that enter Mexico has considerably increased in the last decades, so has the level of poverty in the country. Although, the level of extreme poverty among the Mexican population has decreased slightly from 9,8% in 2012 to 9,5% in 2014, the level of people living in poverty has increased from 45,5% to 46,2% i.e. almost half of the Mexican population equal to over 55 million people (CONEVAL, 2015b). The World Bank estimates are slightly higher. According to the World Bank the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line grew considerably from 42,9 % in 2006 to 52,3 % in 2012 (World Bank, 2012).

Table 1: Development indicators

Top remittance receiving states (2013)	Percentage of total national remittances (July- Sep. 2015)	Remittances of state GDP (2013)	Most poverty in 2014 (/32)	Change poverty (from 2012)	Rank HDI (/32)	HDI classific. (2012)	Rank OECD 'well-being' (of 32)	Change in ranking over time 'well-being'
1. Michoacán	10,1	7,1%	5	Negative	29	low	19	positive (2)
2. Guanajuato	9,4	4,2%	14	Negative	26	low	24	no change
3. Jalisco	8,8	N/A	21	Positive	13	high	9	negative (1)
4. Mexico	6,2	N/A	12	Negative	16	high	26	negative (3)
5. Federal District	4,1	N/A	32	Positive	1	very high	15	no change
6. Puebla	5,5	3,4%	4	No change	27	low	29	no change
7. Guerrero	5,0	6,9%	3	Positive	31	low	32	no change
8. Oaxaca	5,3	6,2%	2	Negative	30	low	31	no change
9. Veracruz	4,4	N/A	7	Negative	28	low	23	positive (4)
10. San Luís Potosí	3,6	N/A	13	Positive	23	medium	21	negative (1)

Table 1 is compiled by the author with data from (Banco de México, 2015; BBVA & CONAPO, 2014a; CONEVAL, 2015b; OECD, 2015a; PNUD, 2015). How to read table 1: Red: The lowest 10 states, low and negative. Yellow: the middle 12 states, medium, or no change. Green: top 10 states, high, and positive change.

Assuming that poverty causes migration that in turn produces remittances would imply that Mexican states with lower levels of income *per capita* would have larger number of migrants and consequently receive larger amounts of remittances. However, this is not the case. Data from Mexico show that there is no clear relationship between the amount of remittances a state receives and the level of human development. In absolute terms the states of Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Mexico, Puebla, Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and the Federal District received 70% of the total remittances to Mexico in 2004. In the same year, six of the states (Michoacán, Puebla, Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Hidalgo) at the same time belonged among the 10 states with lowest levels of human development. The other four states (Jalisco, Guanajuato, State of Mexico and the Federal District) were among the 10 largest state economies in the country (Delgado

Wise & Marquez Covarrubias, 2007). In other words, with the data from 2004 it is difficult to distinguish the specific impact of remittances on human development on state level.

More recent data from CONEVAL & BBVA (see *Table 1*) show an unclear, perhaps even negative, relationship between the top remittance receiving states and the level of poverty in states. In 2014, five of the top ten remittances receiving states are also to be found among the ten poorest states in Mexico (Oaxaca (2nd), Guerrero (3rd), Puebla (4th), Michoacán (5th), and Veracruz (7th)). Additionally, among the states that increased in poverty and extreme poverty from 2012 to 2014 one finds Veracruz, Oaxaca, and the State of Mexico, ranking 9th, 8th, and 4th, respectively, on the list of the top ten remittance receiving states in 2014. Only one state, the Federal District, is among both the top ten remittance receiving states and the ten states with least poverty in 2014 (BBVA & CONAPO, 2014b; CONEVAL, 2015b). According to Rodríguez, one of the main functions of remittances has been to ease the problem of poverty (Rodríguez, 2005), however the recent data show no clear correlation between the remittance receiving states and the level of poverty of states.

Looking at another indicator of development, the Human Development Index (HDI)⁹ also shows an unclear relationship between the top ten remittance receiving states and their HDI ranking. Although the Federal District ranks first on the HDI for Mexico, there are many top remittance receiving states that rank among the states with the lowest ranks on the HDI. In fact, 7 of the top ten remittance receiving states are among the 10 states with the lowest HDI scores in Mexico (Guerrero (31), Oaxaca (30), Michoacán (29), Veracruz (28), Puebla (27), Guanajuato (26), San Luís Potosí (23), see *Table 1*) (CONEVAL, 2015b).

The recent OECD ‘well-being’ indicator uses twelve well-being dimensions; income, jobs, housing, health, access to services, safety, education, environment, civic engagement and governance, work-life balance, social connections, and life satisfaction. Again, the results show no clear connection between the top-ten remittance receiving states and ranks on the well-being scale. Six of the top ten remittance receiving states scores among the ten lowest on ‘well-being’ scale for Mexican States. For 8 out of ten states there has been *negative* or *no change* since the former ranking. The Federal District, which in terms of low poverty level and HDI takes first place among all states, surprisingly takes an intermediate position as number 15 on the new indicator (OECD, 2015a).

Reviewing different indicators of development does not show any visible correlation between the states that receive the most remittances and development. Despite receiving large amounts in remittances, many top remittance receiving states have high levels of poverty, low levels of human development, and low level of ‘well-being’. Thus, receiving many remittances does not automatically indicate low poverty, high ranks in terms of human development and ‘well-being’ on a state level.

⁹ The Human Development Index assesses long-term progress within three dimensions of human development: Health, Education and living standards.

Concluding remarks

Mexican governments have started taking a more proactive role in engaging its diaspora. Efforts made by Mexican governments have in majority been introduced or strengthened within the last two decades, and the nature of the policies was more inclusive unlike the historical *'policy of no policy'*. With the New Migration Law from 2012 Mexico is officially taking a new position on aspects of migration where *'migrants do not displace the domestic workforce, rather they complement and contribute to the economies of the sending countries (remittances) and receivers (consumption tax, social security, employment opportunities)'* (SRE, 2015a, p 197). In other words, today Mexico focuses on the welfare both migrants in Mexico as well as with their diaspora abroad, by focusing on facilitating and managing migration to and from Mexico, by giving priority to national security, protection, and respect of human rights.

The examined diaspora engagement efforts show that the intention from Mexican governments has been *to respond* to the needs expressed by diaspora members. The foundations of the majority of programs and efforts created under the IME since 2002 are results of have been developed . Nevertheless, it is important to note that these efforts have equally resulted in facilitation of the flow of diaspora contributions to Mexico, through more and cheaper remittance transfer services, more structured and institutionalized ways to transform collective remittances into community projects. Finally, the Paisano Program may assist and contribute to diaspora member's safe returns to Mexico, which is also a way to channel diaspora resources into Mexico. Given the focus on this study the consular network and services significant potential to influence the life of the diaspora members in the United States have only briefly been mentioned.

The topic of diaspora engagement efforts and their success are subject to countless conflicting evaluations and opinions. The lead economist and manager of the Migration and Remittances Unit at the World Bank, Dilip Ratha, says the future focus and efforts of governments should be to increase savings and improve the allocation of expenditures *'should be accomplished through improvements in the overall investment climate, rather than by targeting remittances'* (Ratha, 2012). In contrast, some recent key recommendations from the OECD emphasizes the importance to *'give more attention to remittances when analyzing the bigger picture of developing countries' external resources'*. This recommendation is given although the OECD acknowledge that *'remittances are not technically development finance'* (OECD, 2014, p. 129).

Remittances should primarily be regarded as a source of household income (Ratha, 2012) and it is important that they are not seen as substitutes for socio-economic public policies (Delgado Wise & Marquez Covarrubias, 2007). In line with Ratha and Delgado Wise & Marquez Covarrubias, in the future, Mexican efforts should, to a greater degree, focus on national socio-economic policies rather than having a continued emphasis on facilitation of remittances channeling to Mexico. Especially, since the amount of remittance receiving households is falling and that the correlation between development and remittances on state level is unclear. In the end, remittances are generally used to meet basic livelihood needs in the recipient households (Heredia, 2006; Tuirán, Fuentes, & Ramos, 2001). Although remittances may reduce inequality it is important to bear in mind that non-migration reduces inequality even more (Escobar Latapí, 2009, p.88).

VII. Conclusion

What do Mexican diaspora engagement efforts involve? And to what extent do they enable and facilitate diaspora contributions to Mexico?

The research shows that Mexican diaspora engagement efforts have been institutionalized and strengthened gradually, contributing to facilitated and enabled ways of channeling different types of diaspora contributions to Mexico. First, the consular services, among other things, have contributed to more banked diaspora members with the increasing acceptances of the *Matrícula Consular* as an official identification. This led to more and cheaper remittance transfer services. In the years following the consular efforts, remittances to Mexico increased significantly, multiplying almost three-fold from 2000 and 2006. The approval of the expatriate voting right is also said to have enabled the flow of funds to Mexico. However, the diaspora participation in first elections remained low. The recent electoral reform aims to simplify the procedures regarding expatriate voting in elections on several levels of governments. Second, the 3x1 program offered a more structured and institutionalized way to transform collective remittances into community projects. Through organized diaspora organizations, diaspora members channel collective remittances to projects and towns of their choice. The program facilitates the channeling of collective remittances to Mexico. Finally, the Paisano Program involves the dispersal of information and training of civil servants which may assist and contribute to diaspora member's safe returns to Mexico. In combination with numerous other diaspora engagement efforts, the three examined efforts have unquestionably had a considerable facilitating and enabling effect on the channeling of different types of diaspora contributions back to Mexico.

Including different indicators of development does not show any visible correlation between the states that receive the most remittances and their level of development. Despite receiving large amounts in remittances, many top remittance receiving states have high levels of poverty, low levels of human development, and low level of 'well-being'. Thus, receiving many remittances does not automatically indicate low poverty, high ranks in terms of human development, and 'well-being' on a state level.

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
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Appendix I: Road Map for Diaspora Engagement



(Migration Policy Institute, 2009 in Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 24)

Appendix II : Agencies

Agencies under the inter-ministerial commission of the Paisano program

Ministry of Economy	Secretaría de Economía (SE)
Ministry of Public Education	Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)
Ministry of Foreign Relations	Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)
Ministry of Tourism	Secretaría de Turismo (SECTUR)
Ministry of Finance and Public credit	Secretaría de Hacienda y Credito Público (SHCP)
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare	Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS)
Ministry of Communications and Transport	Secretaría de comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT)
Ministry of Public Administration	Secretaría de la Función Pública (SFP)
Ministry of Health	Secretaría de Salud (SALUD)
Ministry of Social Development	Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL)
General Attorney of the Republic	Procuraduría General de la Republica (PGR)
Mexican Social Security Institute	Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social (IMSS)
Federal Public Defense Institute	Instituto Federal de Defensoría Pública (IFDP)
National System for Integral Family Development - Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF)	
Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection - Procuraduria Federal de Protección al Ambiente (PROFEPA)	

Information from (SEGOB & INM, 2015)