



**LEGAL STATUS, RIGHTS AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION IN
GAZIANTEP, SOUTHERN EAST OF TURKEY**

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Acronyms

YUKK 6458 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu. Law on Foreigners and International Protection

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

MOI Turkish Ministry of the Interior

EU European Union

PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê. Kurdish militant organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan

UDHR 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

ICESR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CRC 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

ECHR 1954 Protocol to 1953 European Convention on Human Rights

CERD 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

NGO Non Governmental Organization

UN United Nations

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

INGO International Non Governmental Organization

MDMA=AFAD Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority

DGMM Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM)

AFAD

DPT Relative Deprivation Theory

PRS Protracted Refugee Situation

UoG Gaziantep University

TÖMER Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Center

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

Abstract

Both the refugee crisis in Syria and the Syria's long border with Turkey both led to the mass arrival of Syrians. Turkey is analyzed here as a transit country to Europe and also as a receiving country of refugees. This thesis describes Turkish and international interconnection concerning Syrian population in Turkey.

Thus, this thesis studies how legislations influence the interactions and roles' formation between Syrians and Turks. There is a reality where, Syrians and locals' patterns of behavior and conflicts can be classified as consequences of how laws and migration policies manage the refugee crisis and its demands. The term local refers to population legally recognized as Turkish citizens. To begin with, there are strong xenophobic and racist feelings among Turkish citizens concerning Syrian community and the international humanitarian aid. Concepts such as, citizenship, transnationalism and diaspora are used to study the case study in Southern East of Turkey.

Keywords: diaspora, liminality, uncertainty, transnational, citizenship

1 Introduction

“It is so complicated because there is a lot of camps here for Syrians. (...) UN gives only some opportunities to this people. Before that crisis, there were Syrians living near the border of Turkey with their relatives and friends (...) They made some customs, trade, businesses (...) After 2011, this situation got complicated. (...) Syrian’s population is getting higher in Turkey (...) There are resentments between Turks and them” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

*(Note: The identity of people who have been interviewed will stay anonymous with using of fictitious names)

This thesis concentrates mainly on Gaziantep, the 6th largest city in Turkey and the largest Southern East city nearby Syria. Gaziantep is currently one of the most important Turkish cities in receiving the Syrian refugees, together with Hatay and Sanliurfa. The majority of the data is collected from Gaziantep and few towns between Gaziantep and Aleppo. Turkey and Syria had had a bilateral agreement, particularly in Gaziantep’s region for trade businesses with next-door countries (3RP 2015).

There are uninterrupted vicissitudes in the next-door countries with Syria since the Syrian crisis began. Syrian war and its fatefully damaged infrastructures imply that the Syrian population will not be returning home immediately. This state requires a long-term approach from the receiving countries and international aid on this refugee matter. Syrian crisis is precipitating reactions from the Turkish population against Syrian presence, such as racism, xenophobia and discrimination (Kirisci 2014).

In general, this thesis analyses the sociological diversity in the groups involved in the crisis and how the refugee concept can be analysed in the Turkish context. To do so I first analyse legislation at macro level. Second, I analyse how legal framework influences the refugee dynamics in practice: the refugee’s trauma experience, the assimilation (or integration) with host society and among Syrians themselves, as well as, how Turks perceive this situation as a threat.

1.1 Research question

This research focuses on the legal protection, definition of refugees in Turkish law, its relation with the international legal framework and how it is reflected on Syrian-Turkish relation. With this framework, the research question addressed in this thesis is the following:

How do policies and legislations influence Turks and Syrian refugee's subjectivity and lives in Southern East of Turkey?

The problem formulation in this thesis involves legal and historical aspects of refugee status at macro and micro levels. It also entails an understanding of Turkish sociopolitical situation and Syrian role on Turkish society. After analyzing few aspects of international and Turkish legislation that influence those perceptions and stages, emotions, perceptions of Syrian refugees in a liminal stage and Turks' subjectivity toward Syrians are discussed (Lacroix 2004).

*"A refugee is defined as a foreigner or stateless person of **European origin** that has been recognized as such according to the criteria within Article 1 of the Refugee Convention by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). An asylum-seeker is defined in Turkish regulations as a foreigner or stateless person of **non-European origin** whose status as an asylum-seeker has been recognized by a decision of the MOI that s/he meets the criteria within Article 1 of the Refugee Convention "* Turkish Asylum Regulation's Implementation Directive, 2006

According to Turkish legislation, a refugee is defined in many ways with all having similar characteristics: a foreigner or stateless person or a person under temporary protection on UNHCR camps and with the aim to resettle on a third country. Turkey has a geographical limitation to define refugees and asylum seekers. If they do not have European background, they cannot apply as asylum seekers for the status of refugees, unless by marriage (YUKK 2014).

These legal distinctions, as the massive arrival of Syrians are one of the elements that allow an understanding of Turks perceptions towards Syrians and Syrian position in

Turkish society and their challenging legal liminal stage. Understanding their needs, experiences and interaction between them will ease what need to amend laws and international approach to reach Syrians as the most vulnerable group by Syrian war and conflicts on the host country (Lacroix 2004; YUKK 2014).

In this Refugee crisis, Syrians are considered as foreigners or stateless persons with temporary protection and with 'non-refoulement' protection. 'Non-refoulement' protection is the mainstay of international law in protecting the refugees. However, lately influx of Syrian refugees has increased restrictive security measures at border controls (Amnesty International 2009; YUKK 2014; Mannaert 2003; Turkmen 2013).

2 Background

This chapter describes laws and legislations, which have been taking into consideration at international and Turkish level. It gives a background context based on timeline and nexus between international organizations, United Nations, European Union and Turkey, where they have their own economic, political and security concerns and aims on this crisis (İçduygy & Yüksek 2010).

One of the most important challenges in the area is the distribution and quantity of humanitarian aid, which has been acknowledged as insufficient to cover all the displaced Syrian population in and outside of Syria. Syrian people are losing their livelihoods and surviving with an alarming level poverty. Since the conflict started, there has also been an important decrease in enrollment school rates and increase in drop out rates. Turkey has already claimed the need of supplies by overwhelming number of Syrians on Turkish land (UNHCR 2015b).

According to official statistics, 30 per cent of Syrian refugees are living in extreme poverty. Thus, the receiving-neighboring countries are important resource providers at Syrian arrival. The number of official Syrian refugees in neighboring countries has risen lately and percentage of documented refugees has considerably increased in Turkey, as compared to the other neighboring countries. This long-term situation generates collateral consequences for the most vulnerable population: Syrians and Turks (UNHCR 2015a).

2.1 Turkey

29TH October of 1923, Turkish Republic was declared after, the military leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk lead the War of Independence in 1919, and eradicated the Ottoman Sultanate. Although the majority of the population is Muslim, by law Turkey is a secular country (Altunisik & Tür 2006).

Turkey is a country with geographical, global, economic and humanitarian relevance. It is the door between Europe and also Middle East. Geographically, it is the nearest meeting point between Europe, Asia and Africa. Due to the Turkey's geographical location, the country has become an important part in this ongoing migration movement (Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006).

Turkey's largest border is with Syria. It is 911 km, hindering the accurate counting of refugees. Officially, the first flood of refugees in 2011 was recorded as 800.000. To date, the arrival of refugees in Turkey has not decreased. The minimum influx of refugees is around 500 per day and above two millions in total (Ümit 2014; Özcan 2004 & Altunisik & Tür 2006; UNHCR 2015a).

The beginning of unsteady relationship between the Turkish and Syrian nations began at the end of the Ottoman Empire (1300-1923). The Ottoman Empire was formally dissolved on 1923 with the Proclamation of the Republic of Turkey (Inalcik & Quataert 1996).

Turkish-Syrian relationship was prejudiced by their role during the Cold War. Both countries associated with different side of the war. After the distribution of territory, giving the Antakya region to Turkey, Syria did not consider Turkey as a Middle East country, but as an international ally of Cold War winners, thus leaving its neighboring countries aside (Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006; Sevi 2014).

Turkey and Syria reached one of their low moments in their relationship with their opposite approaches on Kurdish matters. The tension between both countries intensified in 1984, when PKK targeted Turkey with terrorist attacks to its population. There were attempts to reach agreements on July 1987 and April 1992. In 1996 the

Turkish-Syrian tension escalated almost into a conflict due to their disagreement on Kurdish matters (Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006; Sevi 2014).

Again in October of 1998, the tension escalated to the point of almost going to war. It was not until this highly volatile turning point, under the imminent possibility of war; both countries compromised and signed the Adana Memorandum of Understanding in 1998. Subsequently Turkish-Syrian bilateral relationship, cooperation and negotiations were reinitiated. Turkey even signed a military cooperation agreement with Syria in 2002 and in 2003 during the Bashar Assad's visit to Ankara, proved the progress in the communications between both countries. This improvement on their relationship enabled the Turkish candidature to be a member of the UE (Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006; Sevi 2014).

Syrian uprising in March 2011 brought Turkish-Syrian relations again to instability. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly disagreed with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Ahmet Davutoglu, current Prime Minister and previously Turkish Foreign Minister, made an official statement offering Turkey as a safeguard area for Syrians who ran away from the conflicts in Syria (Bishky 2012; Cebeci & Üstün 2012; Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006; Sevi 2014).

Syria and Turkey long-lasting economic and trade partnership was negatively affected by the crisis in Syria. In spring 2010 Turkey tried to advice the regime to adapt its politics and policies to serve people's demands (Ümit 2014; Özcan 2004; Altunisik & Tür 2006; Sevi 2014).

2.2 Gaziantep

The influx of Syrian population in Turkey has impacted the stability of the areas adjacent with Syria. Unfortunately, there is a deficit of data concerning changes on Turks' conditions and how the socio-cultural and economic context has been wedged by the Syrian crisis (3RP 2015).

Gaziantep is the sixth largest city in Turkey. It is famous for its cuisine and for its largest production of pistachios. Historically, it is known as a political, economic and business center with the Middle East (Büyükşehir Gaziantep n.d.).

The distance between Gaziantep and Aleppo is 97 kilometers, while its distance to the closest Syrian border is only 64 kilometers. The location of Gaziantep makes it a central city for international organizations, such as UN to settle their offices. There are monthly meetings on updates, feedbacks and evaluation of the evolution of the Syrian Response Plan in Turkey. The plans aim to cover the basic needs of local and Syrian communities. Unfortunately, these plans need supplementary economical and logistical resources to reach the real number of Syrian population in Turkish land (3RP 2015; Büyükşehir Gaziantep n.d.).

The majority of Syrians residing in urban areas are concentrated in three regions: Hatay, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa. Gaziantep is under international and national efforts to promote equal resources and opportunities to Turks, Syrians and other minorities. This could also facilitate the recording of the actual number of Syrians living in Gaziantep (3RP 2015; Turkmen 2013).

3 Legislation

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol recognized as refugees people who fled their countries before and after the creation of this Convention as refugees (Mannaert 2003).

The past few decades, Turkey has implemented migration and asylum policies with a more international approach. Constant migration through and to Turkey has regularly brought to Turkish politic debate migration-securitization nexus and its financial consequences to its nation-state (Içduygy & Yüksek 2010).

“Law on Foreigners and International Protection’, (YUKK) passed in April 2014. This law was created to provide international protection for those foreigners who want to get residence permit, those who cannot go back to their countries for safety reason

and to set a national law about refugees, which is compatible with international agreements (YUKK 2014).

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates on its article 26 the right of education to everyone as essential human right. Together with 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), primary education was declared obligatory and with free access to everyone. Though, it stipulated that secondary and high education was no mandatory but it should promote free education and the continuity to study (Elitok 2013; Mannaert 2003:7; Tolay 2014).

However, Turkey made few reservations with ICESR. First, it ratifies only under the Charter UN art.1 *“maintain international peace and security”* and art.2 *“Principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members (...) refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”* (Chapter of the United Nations 1945).

Second, this Covenant is implemented only with states that have diplomatic relations with. Third, it is only applied on Turkish territory and under Turkish legislation and administrative direction. Last, Turkey has the reservation to apply ICESR if it does not go against art.3 *“Its language is Turkish”*; art.14 *“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised (...) aiming to violate the indivisible integrity of the State”* and art. 42 *“right of education”* of its Constitution (Turkish Constitution 1982; ICESR 1966).

Regarding education, Turkey ratifies the following two Conventions and protocols, compromising and recognizing the right of Education to every child: 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the first Additional 1954 Protocol to 1953 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Bircan& Sunata 2015; Kaya 2015; Weissbrodt & Divine 2012:171 by Bircan & Sunata, 2015).

It was not until 2002 that Turkey ratified the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). States ratifying this

Convention have the obligation to insure equal treatment before the law concerning rights to education amongst others (Kaya 2015).

Contrariwise this ratification, Turkey has not ratified yet the UNESCO 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education, which precisely bans any type of discrimination on Education. In addition Turkey does not recognize educational adaptations for minorities by not ratifying the 1998 Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Kaya 2015).

4 Methodology

This chapter describes the research approach for the thesis, the compilation of the data, limitations that have been found previously and during the thesis, as well as the validity and reliability of the thesis and its sources.

4.1 Research approach

This research uses different resources: interviews of civil servants, NGO, Turkish army officers, undocumented Syrians, and observations during few six months time working with families. I found several reports, articles, interviews, statistics and projects on Internet about quantitative and qualitative data on Syrian refugees situation in Turkey. The interviews taken by me could be considered an asset for this thesis.

This thesis has an inductive approach, where the data is collected and then theories that could explain it best are found. First, before the interviews, a guide with questions and open topics was written. It was based on personal perception of what would be interesting to analyze according to my personal experiences in Gaziantep. Second, as general inductive approach describes, data was collected by different methods, such as single interview, group interview, telephone and Skype. Examining the data helped to identify the themes of this thesis (Kerse et al. 2004 by Thomas, 2006).

4.2 Data

Most of the interviews were collected in Gaziantep from January - June 2015. I took part on a European Volunteer Service as a volunteer with a local NGO working with refugees in Gaziantep and other border towns with Syria. The identities of the people interviewed have been changed to different names in order to keep their anonymity. Additionally, we signed an agreement stating that we were not entitled to use their real identities.

In 2015, I taught English to a group of undocumented Syrian children for six months in Gaziantep. I went to suburbs areas, cities and towns near to the Syrian border, where a noteworthy percentage of non-documented and documented Syrians are living. Interviews were conducted with a civil servant of the Turkish migration department, Syrian businessmen, Syrian mothers, Syrian teenagers and army officers. My personal experience and continuous talks with this population brought an inside knowledge as data for this thesis.

On the Annex I there are a small description of the interviewees. The qualitative date of this thesis can be grouped as: my six months' observations relationship with the neighborhood, teaching fifteen Syrian refugees two hours five days per week and interviews. The average age of the teenagers was thirteen and thirty for the adult interviewees.

In order to understand better Syrians population in Gaziantep, it is important to highlight that there is a general concern and hostility regarding the number of non-documented migrants, with particular preoccupation on the near future. Having this as background, interviews were planned to be as comfortable and informal for the participants as possible. When participants felt it was a formal interview, they did not talk by fear and anxiety of being identified and the possibility of facing troubles and getting hurt.

Interviews usually took place in people's homes, where there were also other unplanned participants. Those interviews lasted few hours. Observations were carried out as a part of daily activities as a teacher, and a guess and living between the Turks

and Syrians. Daily relations and contact with the participants brought a deep understanding, information, and insights of their routines and daily struggles.

4.3 Limitations

The main limitations with this thesis are the unpredictable war factor and its collateral impacts. There are both advantages and disadvantages with interviewing people who I was working with. When starting the idea of this thesis, I considered collecting my own qualitative data. I started contacting organizations that could provide some quantitative information regarding non-documented refugees and temporary refugees living in the area. They affirmed that the reasons are the lack of resources and the uninterrupted arrival of Syrian through unlawful ways.

There were problems to film and doing interviews with undocumented Syrians because they were afraid of espionage. They feared to be deported to refugee camps or being attacked by other Syrians from different political and/or religious views. Almost all the interviewees were afraid of infiltrated extremist groups. Interviewees claimed that those groups are living on this side of Turkey with the aim to kill Syrians and to collect potential fighters for the Syrian war.

Laws, funding and agreements between members of EU, UN and Turkey concerning the arrival of refugees are being constantly modified and updated. On the other hand, people speaking Arabic as their native language translated most of the interviews from Arabic to English. In order to corroborate the translation, two Arabic persons were asked to check the audio with the translation too.

Another negative side with the interviews is that other volunteers have approached some of the participants before. They have already answered several times similar questions. So it was not until the interview got deeper with more personal questions and details when there was break through and they got into more details, showing more about themselves.

Gender aspect of refugeeeness in the case of Syrians in Turkey has vaguely touched with few quotes. Female Syrians could have being fascinated to study due to seem

more adaptable of changings and confident to dialogue than their husbands (Lacroix 2004).

4.4 Validity and reliability

While researching for quantitative data, most of the articles and reports were intended to be from reliable international organs such us UNHCR, OCHA and official publications.

The validity of the data is due to being the interviewer, personal observations and informal conversations. I had previous contact with the interviewees, making the process of interviewing them easier. The majority of them were living in Gaziantep with a direct perception on the existing situation. Even though, after few months of relationship, they were not comfortable to talk about their situation in Turkey.

Using a critical approach, interviews would have been better if I could have had a female translator. Having a male translator was perceived as a threat when their husbands were not around. Interviews to female refugees were preferred without the present of their husbands. They seemed to talk less when they were around. However, I had to relay on a male translator when those interviews too place.

5 Theory

This theoretical chapter attends to describe theories use on the thesis concerning the nexus between laws, Syrian refugees and Turks.

Understanding how the daily life of Syrians people is interconnected with legislations and Turkish society is necessary to analyze migration theories and concepts. Turkey has specific legal obligations to aid Syrians depending on their legal status.

5.1 Definition of refugee

The 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee and its 1967 Protocol defines that any person would be entitled of refugee status if *“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular*

social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” This definition rules UN member-states on how to describe and approach refugees to embolden alternatives to their situation on their homeland (Lacroix 2004; Malkki 1995; UN Convention 1951).

Along the thesis, when the term refugee is used, it refers to the definition of the 1951 Convention of the Refugee and its 1967 Protocol. YUKK brings relevancy to the complexity of Syrian population status in Turkey and their future in Turkey with its definition of refugee as

“ a person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process” (Art. 61, YUKK 2014: 64).

Turkey makes its geographical limitation to grant temporary asylum on geographical grounds to refugees outside of Europe. Conditional refugee is

“a person who as a result of events occurring outside European (...) as a result of such events (...) is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country” (Art. 62, YUKK 2014: 64-65).

YUKK describes two more definitions on migration stateless person as *“a person who does not hold the citizenship of any state and who is considered as foreigner”* and

foreigner as “a person who does not have citizenship bond with the Republic of Turkey” (YUKK 2014:20).

5.2 Diaspora

The concept of diaspora is an analytical tool to study refugees as forced displaced people. The feeling and memory of forced displacement from their home country pass through generations, and maintains their community united while living in a host society. Though, Syrian diaspora has only few years of history. Hence, Syrians are referred as refugee diaspora with “*transnational social organization*” characteristics. Diaspora helps to describe refugees’ experiences and social interaction with the host community (Cohen 1996; Wahlbeck 2002:221, 2010).

“Diasporas can only be called transnational communities if the members also develop some significant social and symbolic ties to the receiving country”.

Transnational social space for Syrians is not properly defined yet because of the proximity of the conflict. (Faist 1998: 217).

Diaspora attests the link between migrants’ experiences on their host and home land as part of the definition of diaspora. Diaspora members see their lives as combined and everlasting relationship with their homelands, while interaction on their resettled country. Refugee diaspora adds up the factor of forced migration whether they return to their country (Wahlbeck 2002; Shuval 2000).

“Transnational social spaces are combinations of ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that reach across the borders of multiple states (...) dynamic social processes, not static notions of ties and positions”

(Faist 2000:191). There is not always a steady balance of refugee’ sense of belonging to the host land or their homeland. Migrants could assimilate, integrate or isolate.

Diaspora is the bridge to prove this dual positioning to study migrants circumstances and transnational social space, where they are not confined within host land borders.

Becoming a refugee is a reconstruction process to find equilibrium between unfamiliar circumstances, people, host country sovereignty and jurisdiction (Wahlbeck 1998, 2002; Faist 2000; Lacroix 2004).

“Ethnicity, once a genie contained in the bottle of some sort of locality (however large), has now become a global force, forever slipping in and through the cracks between states and borders” (Appadurai 1996: 41 by Wahlbeck, 2002:224).

Ethnicity is connected not only within nation-states' borders, but also with globalization and deterritorialization, where culture and territory ties for refugees can be symbolic. Ethnicity theory is grounded on relations between more than a single ethnic group. This would be applied to refugee diaspora as an ethnic minority group interacting with host society as the majority ethnic group (Wahlbeck 1998,2002; Appadurai 1990:306 by Wahlbeck, 1998).

The concept of diaspora is advantageous to portray refugees' social interactions and their perceptions of being between two nation-states, highlighting transnational social space as part of refugee diaspora. Cultural ties between refugees in a host land do not imply belonging to a community, group's identity and lifestyle. Diaspora requires time to build up a strong community identity, group belonging and awareness. Culture is an aspect of diaspora that facilitates recognition and cohesion as a group (Wahlbeck 1998, 2002; Faist 2000).

“Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrants origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin-their homelands...” (Sheffer 1986:3 by Shuval, 2000:43).

Appadurai (1993) states that migrant diasporas influence the definition of nationalism of their receiving countries. Their definition of territory is restricted to its nationals inside borders, where traditional diasporas were understood as temporary movement and with a period of time to return to their homeland. Hence, this deterritorialization changes the concept of nationalism to one less territorial based to a more flexible and multicultural nationalism based on a collective imagination. Conversely, Appadurai identifies this perception of diaspora as an accentuation of the idea of homeland and territorial belonging of migrants' communities (Appadurai 1993:428 by Sargent& Larchanché-Kim, 2006).

5.3 Liminality

Arnold van Gennep identified human rites with three steady stages, which do not happen simultaneously: separation, margin and aggregation (Turner, 1969:46). Victor Turner studies when liminal beings become invisible passing through one stage to another one on their liminality or marginalization. People's liminality is described by Turner liminal beings who are simultaneously "*no longer classified and not yet classified (...) betwixt and between all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification.*" Turner believes liminal being going through changes, are in a liminal phase where they are on "*sacred poverty*" without status, property neither rank nor affiliation position (Turner 1964:66).

I have selected to embrace the concept of liminality based on Liisa Malkki's interpretation of this notion. She extrapolates Turners' *betwixt and between*' inside a nation state, specifically to refugees, classifying them as invisible and imperceptible. They, as liminal beings with uncertainty of refugee's status, identity and role on the host society, do not correspond on the *national order of things* (Malkki 1995: 516 Turner 1964: 48).

This has the peculiarity and extra complexity that the conflict is not over yet, bringing hesitation and changes over Syrians future on daily basics. Being a refugee, there is not *normal state of things*, where displacement to another country is the only solution not to endanger their lives, leading to liminal state and deficiency on stability and confusion on where they belong in their new context. Syrian refugees live between spaces, past situations, future and their changeable present situation, in an unsteady host society dealing with this new circumstance of Syrian population (Malkki 1995).

"Invisibility (...) you're never quite on the beat. Sometimes you're ahead and sometimes behind. Instead of the swift and imperceptible flowing of time, you are aware of its nodes, those points where time stands still or from which it leaps ahead. And you slip into the breaks and look around" (Gilroy 1993:281 by Clifford, 1994).

Migrants live in a limbo state with the uncertainty of their legal status. There is a elevate percentage of refugees who do not achieve legal status on their receiving

country due to legal requirements. Undocumented migrants are a vulnerable group by their low income and lack of resources to cover the administrative costs, as well as, the difficulty to prove the legitimate of their documentation. Temporarily documented migrants are a vulnerable group to maintain their legal status (Mazzucato 2008).

Living in exile on hold, with just daily goals and without thinking further on the future, waiting for changes back home. Liisa Malkki applies the concept of liminality to refugees adding the nation-state factor, which alters their status, identity, consciousness of belonging and culture into a liminal stage. I argue that refugees stay in a continuous stage of ambiguity regarding their legal status and position on the receiving country, where legislations national perspective regarding refugees stimulate their liminal position. She maintains that being in exile has several consequences on people's perceptions of their world and their social scenarios (Malkki 1995).

5.4 Transnationalism

In order to understand migrants' pattern of behavior is appropriate to analyze the complexity connection between their homeland, receiving country and how is the balance between them. To provide effective resources and coordination between allies on receiving countries of refugees, it is necessary to see refugees as transnational communities, not only, their physical resident space, but also as a combination of economic, social and cultural factors (Foner 1997 by Schiller et al, 1992; Mazzucato 2008).

Transnationalism as social, economic and cultural interrelations that migrants create to stay connected with their homeland while they are settled in a host country.

Transnationalism goes beyond physical and social borders. It has manifold relations such as religious, political and family related (Ibid; Wahlbeck 2002; Schiller et al 1992).

Refugees as migrants differ from other type of migrants that they are imposed to flee their country for safety reasons. This separation creates a strong connection with their

homeland and influences their relationship with the host land (Wahlbeck 2002; Schiller et al 1992).

Transnational communities have been considered a side effect of globalization going beyond nation states and borders. Globalization and transnational communities were considered a threat to the concept of nation-state and nationalism (Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006).

Another perspective to the study of diaspora and transnationalism is the concept of transnational diaspora, where diaspora does not only focus on assimilation on the receiving society, but also in transnational connections of refugees with their homeland. This changing of approach of analyzing diaspora is directly related to globalization facilities to stay in contact. Understanding migrants' situation should be considered a connection between homeland, liminality and host land (Lie 1995 by Wahlbeck, 1998).

“Long-distance nationalism” explains the concept of nationalism of transnational communities, where their nationalism is considered as their ideology, which connects these communities to a sense of belonging to a territory. This space does not have to exist literally. Long-distance nationalism is part of a community's imagination, sentiment, belonging and political beliefs (Schiller& Fournon 2001).

The idea of this common ideology and identity of transnational communities proves that belonging to a country, in this case migrants' homeland, does not require physical connection. *Long-distance nationalism* challenges the traditional definition of borders, identity and territory (Schiller & Fournon, 2001; Sargent & Larchanché-Kim, 2006).

Transnational diasporas are living in between receiving countries assimilation, community identity and connection with their life on exile where host land and homeland are tangled, alive and simultaneously operating (Said 1990 by Wahlbeck, 2002).

The complexity of networks on refugee diaspora could not be considered as determined as voluntary migrants diaspora where their networks diversify locally and

internationally with their homeland and countries, where they stay in contact with other migrants. Refugee discourse by the donors and receiving countries do not specify on detail why they decide to flee, conditions, routes or investments. There is lack of information regarding refugees' transnational networks to explain why they decide to leave and how they reach their asylum country in mind. This information determines the role on their transnational network on their smuggling process and profits to the receiving country (Crisp 1999).

5.5 Citizenship

“A status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed” (Marshall 1950: 28-9 by Lister, 2010).

In 1950 Marshall defined the concept of citizenship leaving out the relevancy of recognition of it by nation states' citizens with rights and obligations. Citizenship is related to policies and nation-state social, cultural and political aspects where it influences its citizens and national identity. Human rights and citizenship rights differ on place limitations. Human rights prevail over nation-states as universal, while citizenship rights bond within each nation-state. Being citizens and belonging to a nation-state may be conditioned by excluding others groups based on distinctions (Lister 2010).

1934 Law on Settlement, renewed in 2006 created the concept of *“Turkish citizenship”* and the beginning of the concept of asylum in Turkey. This law brings controversy about the requirements of who could be granted the refugees status in Turkey. *“Turkish citizenship”* is for people with *“Turkish descend and culture”*. It defends that Turkish definition of migrant is directly connected of having Turkish origin as the principal factor to define ‘migrant’ (Elitok 2013; Mannaert 2003:7; Tolay 2014).

Even though transnational communities and diasporas experience more personal freedom within their spatial restrictions, indistinctly their conditions, they have political and economic dependence in the hosting country (Ong 1999 by Sargent & Larchanché-Kim, 2006; Clifford 1994).

6 Analysis

The worldwide migration improves the awareness that the current movement is unavoidable, and also, promotes special attention on refugees' role on transnationalism, citizenship, diaspora, social balance, politics and receiving countries (Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006).

The analysis is focused on how the current refugee situation is influenced by legislations as external factor. Challenges along this chapter are at macro level and micro level, where refugee legislations and refugee as transnational diaspora are interconnected. At micro level the effects of this new situation on Turks and Syrian population are studied.

6.1 Legal considerations as macro level of Syrian refugees in Gaziantep

This thesis identifies difficulties in between the stages of the refugees have to go through from the moment the turmoil starts in their country to displacement and to registration on a receiving country, combined with the bureaucratic and societal complications along the way. Laws and policies should orientate to reduce refugees' insufficiencies on their lives to cover human rights on daily basics (Van Gennep 1960 by Turner, 1964; Lacroix 2004).

This thesis develops across the *invisibility* that refugees acquire. Being a *neophyte* on as refugee and imprecise of belonging to a nation-state set refugees on a continuous a liminal position. (Turner 1964:46)

The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey replaced the 1961 Constitution and later on it was amended in 1995. It does not recognize Turkey as a multinational state. This leaves minorities with no legal possibilities of becoming citizens of Turkey and

gets the rights and obligations, which come with it. The Syrian conflict may last few more years. Thus, the refugees and their situation demand a long-term solution, which would provide more rights and possibilities for the refugees in Turkey (Kalay 2014; Turkish Constitution 1982).

“In order to get the residence permit and also get free health insurance, they need to pay 20% of the cost and bring a rental agreement to prove that they are living in Turkey” UNHCR Turkish worker to register Syrians.

This citation is from a Turkish employee who works in Nizip for UNHCR in a registration trailer. His job is to create identification cards for Syrians under temporary protection. He was interviewed regarding bureaucratic requirements for Syrians to obtain their temporary resident permit. He had received critics concerning the difficulty to reach the location of this trailer. Even we, the group of volunteers from the NGO who had an appointment for an interview, had to call several times for instructions on how to arrive there. Legally this service's objective is to bring some stability and legality to refugees. However, they offer help, but are hard to reach and demand fees and rental agreement, which are not affordable for the majority of refugees.

This serves as an example that describes paradoxes between what it is legally labeled as help but is not in touch with the reality. This bureaucracy perpetuates their limbo in between being unregistered and under temporary protection, does not clarify their status (Turner 1964; Van Gennep 1960 by Turner, 1964).

“Before the crisis (...) we have no visa to Syria, open gates (...) After, people feel unsaved, unsecured and came to Turkey (...) Turkish government has to balance this. They stopped the easy access through gates (...). People started to use illegal ways. (...) We made borders more powerful and now the arrival of legal Syrians has almost stopped” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Ali describes that Turkey's perspective on the arrival of refugees has changed with more restrictive measures in helping the refugees in favor of protecting Turkish citizens. Those security measures define one of the life-crisis of Syrian refugee

seeking shelter in Turkey. It leaves them stuck between borders (Mannaert 2003; Turner 1964).

6.1.1 International agreements

“They (UNHCR, UN) are doing nothing in Turkey. The Turkish Government undertakes all the things, even though they steal a lot of money” Karbi 31 year-old Turkish army officer

In this quote Karbi enquires whether UN follows deadlines and modifications on aid that this humanitarian crisis (OCHA 2015a,b). The second argument against migration is based on the nexus between poverty and migration as one of the triggers to migrate. There is a belief that forced migration brings poverty. Therefore, refugees, labeled as the other group against Turks rights as citizens, are blamed of economic and labor difficulties and alterations on their countries (De Haas 2005; Lister 2010)

Based on previous reports on emergency situation and funds about Syria, UNHCR with other organs, created the synopsis of the 2015 Syria Response Plan (SRP) and the 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and the Resilience Plan (3RP). Regardless of the international laws on human rights, protection of refugees and humanitarian assistance, these two plans recognized their vulnerabilities: lack of protection of local population and ineffectiveness to provide sufficient protection to organizations. Both plans agree to strengthen their coordination to develop better support to receiving governments and to promote long-term solutions (UNHCR 2015b).

“We are not stupid. Western countries want us to believe that we created this chaos. Before we were used to cohabitate Jews, Muslims, Christians all the religions in Syria. Now everything is politics. They say it is a war between people but it is not true. It is an international war (...) Mass media is the big problem. They are destroying everything and they are not showing the things that are truly happening there...this is the problem ” Ahmet 29 year-old Syrian restaurant owner

Ahmed is as an example of what is the general perception on the role of Western countries in Syrian crisis. Internationally authority is a common sensitive issue

amongst the Syrians and Turks. The international community is being blamed on pushbacks on development, coordination, liminal situation and the absent improvements on Syrian situation and Syrian people (Mannaert 2003; Lacroix 2004; Malkki 1995; Turner 1964).

“Helping people is the easiest thing to do (...) this people need help, money, food, education, new lives because if they live nearby Syria, they will not change. It will happen again (...) If you take a fruit that is going bad, you can’t put it in the box with the other fruits, they will go bad too”. Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Ali hypothesizes that Syrian refugees should not stay in Turkey. He criticizes countries of being the cause of problems with resources and coordination. He claims that Turks and Syrians needs are not the principal aim of those organisms. Instead, he complains that donors put their personal interests first. On the other hand, he states that Turks do not welcome Syrians and sets them as a threat to its nation-state.

This Turkish idiom can be interpreted Syrian population as the rotten fruit and Turks as the healthy fruits on the box. He sets Syrians in a marginal position on Turkish society, while defining *structures of positions* where there is not space for Syrian population. Turkish citizens are in a *state of transition* and maturation regarding their new position on their nation-state. Transitioning from a state to another differs culturally. State is defined as a repetitive cultural recognized behavior (Turner 1964:46; OCHA 2015b; Malkki 1995).

6.1.2 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol

The 1951 Convention is extrapolated into Syrian experience on Turkish land as legal framework. The *principle of unity of the family* should be applied to keep refugees and their families together either reunifying in camps or resettling in a third country. The almost nonexistence of centers for Syrians outside refugee camps does not always fit to refugees’ culture and importance to family relations.

“In Gaziantep’s camp, your family is living here but there is no place now. If there is not place you have to move to the one with free places. (...) People in refugees camps

go outside, have permission two or three times a week for shopping, visit their relatives, also have visitors (...) if they make reservation before". Borak, 35 year-old Grant National Assembly Consultant, advising on Syrian situation in Gaziantep region

This quote by a civil servant describes the efforts to promote the *principle of unity of the family* and the *international co-operation in the field of asylum and resettlement* (art.1). However, the refugees living in camps are being controlled and monitored when they are outside of the camp. Few Syrians refugees have complained about the lack of freedom to move outside the camp. They are given only few hours at a time twice per week. Several times Syrians living outside the camps have expressed their dislike regarding camps conditions and damaging treatment by Turkish authorities on the camp.

According to the definition of refugee of the article 1 of the 1951 Convention, a person will not be entitled to the status of refugee if crimes of war, non-political crime, anti peace and anti humanity. However there are difficulties to prove which person of the uncounted number of refugees has committed a crime. It is common to hear accusations between Syrian refugees pointing other Syrians as killers. However, it cannot be proven that those allegations are based on political disagreements or true human rights violation. Concerning the *obligations of refugees* (art.2), there are not specifications how those obligations could be applied to unregistered Syrian refugees

Article 3 of the Convention refugees' receiving countries should not discriminate refugees based on their characteristics and background and after three years of residing in a country as refugee, they are entitled to get protection on legislative reciprocity (art.7). According to YUKK, Syrians could only acquire the status of conditional refugee if they are temporarily living in camps and waiting to be resettled to a third country. Their *personal status* (art.12) of who is entitled to be a refugee should be judge under the country's laws where they are registered. Even if they are legally registered they may have other technicalities and economic difficulties to find an accommodation, to send their children to school and to get involved in Turkish society (Turner 1964; Malkki 1995; Van Gennep 1960 by Turner, 1964).

“If Europe wants to help they will take some children, specially children who don't have fathers, families and no options. Take them their countries making some solutions for both parts (...) is it better to help them by keeping them here rather than in European countries?” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Even though 1951 Refugee Convention aims to protect the status of refugees, it does not contemplate: first, the protection of unregistered refugees; and second, the responsibilities of its signing member-states when one of them has become overwhelmed by the number of refugees.

According to the *prohibition of expulsion or return, refoulement* (art.33), the refugees' expulsion is forbidden unless there are proven to be danger to the national security and public order. Turkey ensures this principle regarding Syrian refugees. However there are some legal obstructions of non-refoulement by having heavier security control with stricter requirements to update documentation. There are uncertainties regarding what would happen when Syrians passports expire because they cannot be renewed. They would not be able to apply for resident permit unless Turkish policy changes. States are entitled to respect non-refoulement. However, those states do not enable physical admission, political asylum or becoming a fully members of the host country (Dinçer et al 2013; Aleinikoff & Poellot 2012).

“It is impossible to enter the camps, unless you work there and after passing all the security requirements. There are a lot of objections and things to hide that I can't say” Belen 34 year-old Spanish Relief agency worker

Belen claims that there is a loophole between what it is officially said and what it really happens inside camps and outside the camps. *Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations* (art.35) where Turkey should provide data and details about refugees. According to articles and reports, Turkey does collaborate with the international community by providing access to information. However, Turkey has been criticized from the international community and INGOs for not enabling Syrians the rights to apply for refugee states based on geographical limitations (Mannaert 2003; Tolay 2014; Fargues & Fandrich 2012ab).

6.1.3 Law on Foreigners and international Protection (YUKK)

Since the 1982 Turkish Constitution, amended in 1995, and until the YUKK, there were two migration laws, the Passport Law (n. 5682) and the 1950 Law on Sojourn and Movements of Aliens (n.5683). Both laws were based on the 1924 Constitution needing implementation and a clear legal structure for migration issues. Hence, YUKK implemented simultaneously a single structure with longer-term solutions and flexible. Implicitly, policies in general and in this particular case Turkish migration policy aims to downgrade asylum applications, recognizing refugee status on Turkish land (Elitok 2013; Lacroix 2004).

Even though there is no recognition of refugee status from non-European countries in Turkey, YUKK brought the concept of ‘*conditional refugee*’ as first step for rights of refugees in Turkey. Similarly, the concept of integration was introduced to promote cohabitation of migrants and Turkish society as a development instrument toward integration (Elitok 2013; Tolay 2014; Mazzucato 2008).

There is a percentage of documented Syrian migrants that either will become non-documented status, if they do not cover all the requirements, or they will decide to go back home based on their conditions they are living in (Elitok 2013; Quiminal & Timera 2002; Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006; Mazzucato 2008).

This law was created as a derived legislation, lacking legal power and with securitization approach regarding migrants as negative factor of national safety and society. The degree of compromise and implementation of YUKK, providing migrants’ rights would define its success on balancing migration-security nexus (Elitok 2013).

“...I had to go several times to inform myself of what I needed to bring. They spoke poor English and I had to ask favors to be able to get it done. Without a Turkish person helping me, I couldn’t have certified all the documents. You even had to pay to get stamps from random offices, which were not official Turkish administration offices. Getting a resident permit in Turkey is a profitable business ...” Belén 31 year-old INGO worker in Gaziantep

YUKK tends to ease the process to acquire Turkish citizenship and resident permit with technologies. This law pretends to bring transparency to administrative process regarding citizenship and resident permits. It was created to spread trust on Turkish system with electronic methods to follow applications and to facilitate the access to information and requirements to submit applications. There is only single administration for migration issues. However, based on my personal experience while I was applying for resident permit, there were not clear signs that this law has been executed. Requirements to apply for resident permit for foreigners still requires a physical presence to specific police station to inform what documentations are necessary (Elitok 2013).

Even though Turkey restructured its legislation and structures based on international criterions, not only EU, there is disbelief on the accomplishment of YUKK. Migration and security policies, in EU and international context, have a relevant role on the determination of migration, justice and securitization. A successful implementation of YUKK would require strong compromise, educational help and commitment to put it into practice. For instance, there should be staff's training on migration to be able to work with a human right approach with those more vulnerable (Elitok 2013).

6.1.4 European and Turkish borders

The relevance of EU regarding the Syrian crisis and the role of Turkey is influenced by EU's stance toward Turkey and its actions on this refugee crisis. For instance, EU law on European citizenship sustains that any person with nationality from a European state acquires European citizenship too. European citizen has several rights, such as free movement inside the EU, right to vote in any European elections, diplomatic and consular protection by any other EU member state, right to do petitions and complains to the European organs (European Commission, 2015).

Concerning Syrian crisis, each European country has applied and assumed responsibilities in different degrees. Without obligation to intervene with emergency measures, EU countries tend to have a severer security approach on border control and migration policies (Tolay 2014; Içduygy & Yürkseker 2010).

“No one helps us, no long, no Europe, no country. They are all liars (...) leave us alone, in peace (...) United States and Israel if you leave us alone, everything will go better”. Ahmet 29 year-old Syrian restaurant owner

On refugee diaspora tend to be opinionated ideas regarding external help by several countries. Ahmet is just an example of what a person can frequently hear in Gaziantep. Refugee diaspora as ethnic diaspora is a new type of diaspora with transnational networks. With the instability on Syria and lack of trade, there is continuous influx of goods and people back and forward through dishonest structures and networks. With security concern and the mass arrival of asylum seekers, states tend to slow down asylum requests by verifying documentation and by claiming priority to coordinate border control methods (Rider 2014; Vertovec 1999).

We cannot accept an understanding like ‘give us money and they stay in Turkey’. Turkey is not a concentration camp 26th October 2015 Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Despite the differences and changes on the approach to the Syrian crisis, EU is examining international deals with neighboring countries with Syria. Hence, the arrival of refugees to EU will be reduced and Syrians will stay in Turkey (Fargues & Fandrich 2012; Aljazeera 2015).

“...European Union try to help the Syrians, but why don’t they take some Syrian families to the European Union countries? (...) they don’t want Syrian people in their country (...) There is a Turkish idiom ...it is the best love to love you from far away and they try to help but they don’t want to become part of the solution. they only send money and people” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

European multifaceted approach has two layers: external, providing humanitarian aid and assistance in and out of EU and an internal response by increasing their EU protection and security pro European countries stability and against the arrival of Syrians. Next, EU internal actions could be simplified as *assist and contain* the protection of asylum seekers to a minimum. European countries do not receive the

same amount of refugees nor they fully collaborate to solve this international crisis (Fargues & Fandrich 2012).

“They always say that Turkey is making discrimination and racist activities to Syrians but what do they [EU] do for it!? This is the biggest paradox” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

In this quote Ali suggests that EU has negative reputation on its lack of loyalty, commitment and collaboration on this matter. Notwithstanding the fact that European countries have common migration agreement, they also have national migration policies, budget and maximum number of receiving refugees without an agreement of their quota of Syrian refugees to resettle. There is not a common policy that could compel EU member states to provide asylum to a specific percentage asylum seekers based on countries' limitations (Fargues & Fandrich 2012).

“now after some terrorist attack happens we really take very strict precaution to stop killing people(...) If you have passport then you can move from the border, otherwise you are not entitle to pass the border” Borak, 35 year-old Grant National Assembly Consultant, advising on Syrian situation in Gaziantep region

At the beginning Syrians with passports and Syrians without documentation were allowed to enter to camps. Initially they were received as ‘guests’ with refugees needs covered and with certainty of *non-refoulement*. With their continuous arrival Turkish government capacity was affected by the number of refugees and difficulty to control legal and unlawful routes inside the country. Border control between Turkey and Syria has been always complications to control due to its dimension (Dinçer et al 2013).

“I was lucky. I came three years ago and it was really easy to come here legally. Now the situation is bad and it is hard for new Syrians to come legally here and live free and get a job”. Ahmet 29 year-old Syrian restaurant owner

Ahmet expresses his gratitude to the fact that he was among the first refugee arriving from Syria to Turkey. They crossed the border legally with authorized documentation,

temporary protection and working options, which led him to working visa. It might seem as if Ahmet describes how over the time, having minimum conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey are tougher to reach (Fargues & Fandrich 2012).

“When we came here we paid as other foreigners who wanted to get resident permit, because if we get the Syrian Guest Identity Card, my mother is not allowed to work and we need money to live. Now that our resident permits will expire soon, they are demanding us to have proof in our bank account of seven thousand dollars if we want to have it renew and stay here. My mother and I need to decide to stay here illegally if we can’t be refugees in Finland”. Karem, 17 year-old Syrian high school student

Karem and his mother experience an indirect discrimination by Turkish migration policy due to legal difficulties to maintain their resident permit and her job to stay in Turkey. Those uncertainties may lead them to stay unlawfully in Turkey or find asylum in a third country. Nowadays, if your passport has expired they could stay at the border control, not allowing getting into Turkey. Hence, they would cross illegitimately to Turkey and likewise to EU (Fargues & Fandrich 2012).

“We came in 2013. I am not happy here because I am the only one in my family with legal passport. My wife and children have to stay at home all the time because if they [police] catch them, they will be sent to a refugee camp and we will never be able to get out of there” Mustafa 29 year-old Syrian father in Gaziantep.

Mustafa experiences double dilemma because he brought his family to Turkey but he could not registered them there. They do not want to go to a camp, so they live in a constant liminal state of uncertainty of what could happen if the police find this out (Turner 1964).

The bigger affluence of Syrians is centralized based on geographical proximity to Syria. For instance, Greece is the country receiving the bigger percentage of Syrians who want to enter in Europe. Sirkeci and Martil (2014) hypothesizes that countries referring to migration as illegal one, means their failure to update to migration movements and changes. Illegal means that migration policies are not advancing as quickly as migration requires. The concept of migration should be approached as a

globalized concept. It needs cooperation within stakeholders at international, regional, national and local level to provide a human rights protection, legal recognition and consequently appropriate management (Ibid; Fargues & Fandrich 2012).

Even though Turkey has not ratified the 2013 Dublin III Regulation, it does keep a non-refoulement approach. Countries part of this Regulation agrees on non-refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers indistinctly where they come from (NOAS& NHC& Aitima 2009).

Dublin III regulation stipulates that states where asylum seekers apply for asylum have the obligation to examine their applications. If a member state considers that the first state where the asylum seeker has entered in EU has responsibilities, asylum seeker could be sent to this country. For instance, refugees who are not entitled to stay in Greece, have to go back to Turkey. They could be sent back to their country if these asylum seekers do not have European origin (Dublin III Regulation 2013; NOAS & NHC& Aitima, 2009; Tolay 2014).

1994 Asylum regulation was a backfire of European constraints measures on their migration policies, where their potential asylum seekers redirect their asylum goal to Turkish land. Only asylum seekers with Turkish upbringing and with five days timeframe to apply for it from their entry location, with a possibility of fifteen days to provide legal documentation (Mannaert 2003).

EU members position to Syrian war is related to its geographically position with Syria. It is not the same Greek perspective with Finnish perspective to approach Syrians asylum impact. Likewise, EU member states could protect themselves with stipulation of Dublin III where all the asylum seekers should stay in the first country they arrive. This only promotes a protective reaction of countries with a security approach. On the other hand neighboring countries with Syria are overwhelmed with the percentage of refugees. It worsens the possibility to proportionate basic need (Tolay 2014).

6.2 What are we?

“I want to go home but I like to be around other children like me: I am Syrian; I live with my family; I miss my home and I need friends here to be happy. My mom says that it is important to find good Syrians and to be a big family. Other kids from my streets are good too and we do a lot of things together”. Safe 13 year-old Syrian refugee

This quote identifies few of elements on the definition of diaspora, which has evolved to a flexible, uncertain and active concept that includes transnationalism, displacement, work migrants, refugees, utopia, minorities, communities and groups. They could be considered diaspora with the characteristic of not residing in their homeland, which does not only study physical aspects, but also symbolic associations with homeland such as shared identities and deterritorialization (Safran 1991:83, Shuval 2000; Tölölyan 1991 by Brubaker, 2005; Sheffer 2003 by Shuval, 2000, Ben-Rafael 2010).

The concept of diaspora has been criticized by its dispersion of definition. Diaspora is identified as dispersed on space; focus on their imagined homeland; and having norms to maintain the diaspora unified (Safran 1991:83, Shuval 2000; Tölölyan 1991 by Brubaker, 2005; Sheffer 2003 by Shuval, 2000, Ben-Rafael 2010).

“They [Syrians] are working in illegal way for a low amount of money and for that reason some prices are getting lower but the things like transportation, phones, internet, renting prices and other prices are getting higher for that reason” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Anderson (1983) defines the concept of ‘imagined communities’ as hazardous diasporas with nationalist and political behaviors supporting their home countries while residing on host countries as migrants. Anderson (1983) did not study the social networks of migrations and its positive effects on nation-states. He emphasizes how technologies improve nationalism and diasporic feelings for migrants without needing to be in their home countries. Furthermore, transnational imagined communities provide information to enlighten theories and refugees’ reality with their meaning of

territory, community and origins. (Smith 2003; Lister 2010; Christou 2011; Anderson by Clifford, 1994; Horst 2013).

Syrian refugees prefer to live in urban areas for the independence of movement. Capacity of mobility living in the camp is limited and controlled. This freedom of movement allows families to find options where to live, communities and work. However, conditions have decreased to a level where Syrian families live in abandoned structures (Dorman 2014).

Forced migration puts every displaced person in a vulnerable situation to violence. Violence could outbreak and endanger displaced people in all the different stages of the migration: first, before leaving their home and homeland; second, the route between their home and the border with the receiving country; third the uncertainty when they reach safe areas at receiving countries as their asylum process is settled, bureaucracy complications and camps minimum conditions on human rights (Rider 2014; Aleinikoff & Poellot 2012).

“I don’t know what to feel or believe. We have good and bad Syrian and Turkish neighbors. I want to go home but I can’t now. I want to stay but I can’t have a normal life here. I want to go somewhere but we can’t with three children”. Mira is 25 year-old undocumented mother of three children

Sirkeci & Martin (2014) argues that migration is interrelated with the perception of human insecurity and human security. The higher sensation of human security, the lower possibility of migration is. Human security can be described by high percentages of income, work, languages similarities, independence, and human rights.

Migration in Turkey is connected with socio-economic improvements, cultural and religious similarities and crisis on neighboring countries, which required changes on Turkish legislation to adapt and define its protocol toward them to prevent national crisis (Sirkeci & Martin; 2014; Malkki 1995).

6.2.1 Transnational social spaces

Refugee diaspora gives a new approach to study migration as changeable and unpredictable to stipulate refugee's neither trajectory nor residence on the long run. It suffers from stronger transformation on several aspects related to refugees such as identity, discrimination, xenophobia, liminality, nationalism, and living conditions. Transnational relates to diaspora as the tool of modifying, consciousness to adapt and to build their identities, ties and diasporic groups here (Vertovec 1999; Witteborn 2008).

Refugee diaspora is understood as apolitical in the host country and engage on political changes back home. Refugees' transnational ties are linked on refugees' involvement with their homeland. There is not a determined minimum or maximum percentage of participation with their homeland to be considered transnational tie. It does not require physical presence. Refugees are continuously balancing their feelings of loss and hope (Shuval 2000; Witteborn 2008; Cohen 1996; Vertovec 1999; Horst 2013).

Short-term and long-term perspectives of effects of integration and migration policies of receiving countries, in this case Turkey on refugees are studied. As a reminder, the definition of refugee by the 1951 Conventions is divided in different categories by Turkish law: refugees in camps, people under temporary protection, conditional refugees, foreigners and stateless person. Those legal perspectives affect in complex levels their groups as diaspora and communities, lacking unity as a Syrian diaspora based on political ideals and status in Turkey (Vertovec 1999; Shuval 2000; Horst 2013).

Their home country ideology, religion, economy, hierarchy and political ties are brought to the settlement country as part of their identity. Those characteristics plus Turkish own peculiarities and context assist to comprehend the concept of Syrian refugee diaspora (Vertovec 1999; Shuval 2000; Horst 2013).

"I am happy and sad here. I am safe and I am a prisoner because I don't have documents and I don't want to go to camp. I like these few streets around us because we are normal Syrians who want peace. We try to help each other. We meet in Mosque and talk about our special community about other Syrians (...) We talk on the

phone with relatives in Syria, abroad, Facebook (...) send them money and do business with them (...) we talk about our experiences since the war started, politics, husbands, life in Gaziantep, safety, Turks, future and what will happen tomorrow (...) I barely go out but a lot of Syrian and Turkish women and children come to my home” Mira 25 year-old undocumented mother of 3 children

Mira lives with her husband and three children of one, three and four years old in Gaziantep. Her husband is the only member of this family under Turkish temporary protection. Even though they live with fear they may be sent to a refugee camp, there is a comradeship between Syrian women (Sargent& Larchanché-Kim 2006; Tölölyan 1991 from Brubaker 2005; Brubaker 2005).

There are differences between female and male Syrians roles. Female Syrians are mothers; suffer more on war situation; wives and providers of stability on their homes. It leads them to an unwritten rule of *each for all, and all for each* (Turner 1964:50). Undocumented migrants suffer a superior degree of vulnerability and complexity on the determination of their identity and belonging to a community (Sargent& Larchanché-Kim 2006; Tölölyan 1991 from Brubaker 2005; Brubaker 2005).

On the other hand, Mira explains few characteristics of their ethnic transnational diaspora inside the Syrian refugee movement. They are a refugee diaspora concerning their status, uncertainty, their unity based on their refugee condition. On the other hand, their transnational aspect could be identified when they refer to resources to embrace any kind of possible ties with their homeland, relatives, and businesses. This Syrian refugee transnational diaspora stretches the traditional definition of diaspora being a community inside the brand new Syrian refugee diaspora in Turkey, where they differentiate from other Syrians and they have a network of support (Sargent& Larchanché-Kim 2006; Tölölyan 1991 from Brubaker 2005; Brubaker 2005).

Syrian transnational social space in Turkey gives the opportunity to analyze refugee diaspora on their linkages by their politics beliefs, cultural affinity, common language, solidarity, religion, ties and solidarity (Faist 1998).

“We want to go back to Syria when the war ends. We want to go home. (...) we are killing our own people. Everything that it is happening to us is because we have sinned. (...) People are fighting on Allah’s name and Allah is punishing us (...) all our friends from here think the same”. Fatima 30 year-old mother of Halem

Fatima argues that the reason of their current state is punishment by Allah due to her country’s behavior, disrespecting and misrepresentation of the Islam. There is a current focus on the Islamic aspect and feelings of nostalgia on the refugee diaspora. Refugee diaspora refers to traumas by forced migration and displacement. Refugee diaspora as transnational social spaces brings up more characteristics and expectations of refugee diaspora on the receiving country. Syrians may have family ties as transnational social and identify themselves with political and social groups. Nation state should incorporate a mixed approach to refugee diaspora between assimilation, ethnic pluralism and *border-crossing expansion of social space* (Faist 1998:215; Horst 2013; Brubaker 2005).

Refugee diaspora is studied as triadic relationships (Faist 1998: 217) with Syrian as diaspora group, host society and homeland as its central components. Space not only as physical one, but also it refers as social, economic and cultural structures. Space refers to various places as *social ties, symbolic ties, social capital, reciprocity as a pattern of social exchange, reciprocity as a social norm, solidarity* (Ibid; Shuval 2000; Turner 1964; Malkki 1995).

“We have a grocery store and my children have to go and help my husband a lot of times. We help good Turks and Syrians. We exchange their rice for something that they can’t buy (...) In our Syrian community, the good ones, we are peaceful people but we have an unfair government and we want freedom. We don’t want anyone to punish us to say what we feel” Fatima 30 year-old mother of Halem

Solidarity is identified as a collective feeling and representation as (we) and institutionalized way but also as a tool to retaliation against others. *Social assets* as intra kinship amongst refugee are necessary for new migrants as a bridge to establish them in a new country (Faist 1998, 2000; Shuval 2000).

Transnational social spaces are metaphoric space. There is a reciprocity chain of favors by multiple mechanisms of social and symbolic ties within its. Hence the number of existing social and symbolic ties relies on the network of the community. Nonetheless, social and symbolic ties are difficult to maintain from a country to another one. They could be built and create again, but it is complicated to transfer them, as well as, they are use as a bridge to connect nation-states and transnational communities (Faist 1998, 2000; Shuval 2000).

“We live really insecurity and without knowing what will happen tomorrow. We need to pay for everything. Turkish neighbors are really nice or they hate us(...) People have no idea what is going on here (...) We want to pay fair prices for food, taxes and flats. We are from the lucky group but still we live six people in one two rooms and we try to help other good Syrians from our streets, Mosque’s members and back in Syria”. Mohamet, 35 year-old owner of a Syrian shop

Mohamet explains the triadic relationship (Faist 1998,2000) and their troubles to keep up with the Turkish taxes for opening a business. Even though, he and his family seems to be in a good economical and social condition in Turkey, comparing with other refugees, he admits that they are still very much attached to Syria and they are helping other Syrians from their community and also the ones in Syria, without specifying the nature of the help, political or humanitarian.

There are concerns about what will happen when refugees living outside of camps ruin out of their savings, if they don’t have jobs. The majority of refugees are living with relatives, who took care of the financial responsibility temporarily. However, the situation in Syria became a long-term crisis, leaving those types of families on the limits to debt or unable to support all those relatives. Those refugees do not receive support from government, only from NGOs, which do not reach all the non-camp refugees. (Dinçer et al 2013; Brubaker 2005; Tölölyan 1991 by Brubaker 2005; Clifford 1994).

Syrian Refugee diaspora has a dilemma of loyalty in Turkey. This dilemma is based on Syrian targeting its citizens and destroying Syria on its turmoil. While, Turkish citizens have struggles to accept Syrian refugees as long-term neighbors. Both

populations, by gathering on a Mosque, are provided with a neutral social structure where they interact and communicate, leaving out their differentiations (Faist 1998, 2000; Turner 1964).

6.3 Beginnings and exclusion

Turkish politics has improved to a liberal approach on migration policy. This transformation of approach influences the concept of national identity. There has been national pressure to bring up a law that recognizes Turkish ethnicity, national identity, diversity and multiculturalism. The new Settlement Law 2006 gives a concise notion of a long-standing Turkish perspective regarding foreigners and non-local population (İçduygı 2014a; Kearney 1991 by Schiller et al 1992).

“Turkey is not and it will never suffer with the Syrian crisis. Otherwise they (Syrians) would be living in my country better off than us in our own country. We can’t let them” Karbi 31 year-old army officer

Kabi’s quote represents Turks common discourse about Turkishness as Turkish identity should be over assisting refugees, where Turkish people should be the first priority for Turkey to protect. Turks have feelings of fear and threat concerning their Turkish national identity, power and citizenship by Syrian.

“They [Turks] don’t like us. It is safer than in Syria but they want to hurt us too. Two of my school friend and their family moved back to Syria. They couldn’t pay rent and they earned too little money. The situation in Gaziantep is getting more difficult to live that in Syria”. Halem 13 year-old Syrian refugee

Kearney (1991) sustains the *end of the empire* by transnational communities because nationalism does not describe the up-to-date demands and changes on countries, where its borders and territory of nation-state becomes undetermined. These current existences of transnational communities confront the nation-state power over its territory. Thus they also challenge its nation-state structure, its migration and integration policies (Kearney 1991:57-59 by Schiller et al 1992; Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006).

“All my friends keep telling me that Turkish women are afraid of us because they think their husband want to marry us as second wives”. Mira 25 year-old undocumented mother of 3 children

Safe and Mira refer to hostilities and difficulties in living in Turkey, where they have a network of support around them. The establishment of high standards to become lawfully migrants and difficulties to integrate and find jobs stimulate disengagement behaviors. Subtly, it incites mostly leading migrants to the point of leaving the country. It could be considered a side effect of states policies, which are not supportive of receiving migrants or elevated the amount of them (Mazzucato 2008).

In Syria, polygamy was legal and usual in Syria, while Turkish law forbids polygamy. As collateral consequences, nowadays, there have been marriages with young Syrians girls with Turkish men; Turkish men taking Syrian women as second wives. Furthermore, Syrian families in precarious situation could see this a short-term solution for their lack of basic needs to survive. Those bring loopholes and confusion on how children would be registered as citizens, society reactions and illicit marriage market (Dinçel et al 2014; Sheffer 2003 by Brukaber, 2005).

“If our society gets affected by Syrians, it will be more dangerous for Turkish people and Turkish government. (...) This is a place where they don't belong. They should stay where we decide they can” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

As Ali expresses there is a general feeling of rejection. This rejection differentiates two groups, Turks as We-group and Syrians. It can be argued those feelings have the aim to perpetuate national identity, in this case Turkish identity. On the surface, they welcome refugees. Turks and Syrians go under the doubt of their new role on Turkish society. On the one hand, Syrians people are in a limbo situation with their liminal position due to living instability on their legal status, basic needs, and Turkish society's resentments.

Ethnicity and the meaning of nation for refugees contend details to describe refugee diaspora, not only as a security topic, but also as transnational actor (Smith 2003; Lister 2010; Christou 2011; Anderson by Clifford, 1994; Horst 2013).

As Van Gennep (1960) describes there are three phases describing transition's rites: separation, margin and aggregation. On the other hand, Ali, as a Turk, could be considered going through a liminal period regarding how the Syrian crisis is affecting and demanding changes of actions in Turkey, their role and national identity and rights (Faist 1998; Kalay 2014; Kirisci 2014; Turner 1964:45; Van Gennep 1960 by Turner, 1964).

"While Syrians are living in my country, they obtain 5 year permanent Turkish ID and passport. I believe, it is because a politic benefit of Turkish Government. They [Turkish Government] uses them [Syrians] to win the election, to gain international recognition and support" Karbi 31 year-old army officer

Karbi defends that the reason why refugees are allowed to live in Turkey is based on governmental interest. Refugee movement challenges natural order of receiving countries on its identity and dealing with changes. It is defined as a continuous movement that challenges control, asylum and migration policies. It dangles on how Syrian influx is being deal with (Malkki 1995).

According to UNHCR Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS) is defined as *continue to be trapped...for 5 years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solution*. Based on this definition Syrian refugee situation in Turkey must be from the international community and Turkey with durable solutions for the wellbeing of refugees by full integration on the host society, resettlement or repatriation (Aleinikoff & Poellot 2012; UNHCR 2012).

"There are bad Syrians and terrorists, army groups coming to our country and create problems. They stay in camps, outside camps, on the streets. They are everywhere. They want to fight and take people back to Syria to fight. Bad people come to our country and we can't prove they are bad on the border and they come here to destroy us. They are stupid. They destroyed their country and now they come here

complaining”. Anonymous Turk in a demonstration against Syrians in Gaziantep July 2014

This anonymous speech took place in Gaziantep where there has been several other demonstrations against Syrians over the few months I lived there. Turkish ‘open door’ policy has been addressed as controversial. For instance when they claim that *there are bad Syrians* and it is not safe for them to talk openly about Syrians because they do not know who is listening. They claim there is an overflowing of Syrians, what can be seen everywhere on the streets. Demonstrators see Syrians a risk to their national identity and future, where their personal interests are put on hold. It is argued that vulnerable refugees in precarious conditions on a receiving country, they may have a disposition to join radical communities (Kirisci 2014; Faist 1998: 232).

“The situation in Gaziantep is getting worse. There are lot groups of Turks attacking us, Syrians just for being Syrians. On the other hand, there are Syrian retaliations against those Turkish actions. We are not all the same. I know there are bad Syrians, who think Turkey has to help them to gain back Syria. I don’t feel as safe as when I arrived. I don’t say bad words about Turkey”.Karem, 17 year-old Syrian

Karem defends that there is a continuous battle between Syrians and Turks. This ‘open door’ policy has helped Syrian refugees but there are difficulties in detecting who is a refugee and who was involved in the war as fighter and terrorist. It brings insecurity and unstoppable revenge actions between them, without know where it could lead. Both Turks defenders of Turkish nationalism (Turkishness) justify themselves and their actions blaming Syrians. (Kirisci 2014; Lister 2010).

On the other hand, Syrians defenders of refugee status (refugeeness) as diaspora right in Turkey define themselves disagreeing Turks. Refugee camps could be used as protection for Syrians, as well as, a rest place and recruitment resource for fighters to go back to Syria. When Syrians interviewed talked about bad Syrians, they refer to fighters and well connected people back in Syria, who could harm them (Kirisci 2014; Lister 2010).

Most of the Syrian interviewees admit going back to Syria on business matters, to visit relatives and also to check on their home, either because they have rented them out, they need to collect the rent or to check their conditions. Gaziantep is not the only city in Turkey that has experienced an enlarged number of legal Syrian businesses, what also implies that the percentage of unlawful and underpaid job is considerable. For instance, Even though Gaziantep is one of the regions, which its unemployment rate declined, jobs are being done paying less salary, from 60 liras to 20 liras (Kirisci 2014; Turkmen 2013).

Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce recommended to facility the procedures for Syrians to obtain working visa, even if it is for short period of time. Currently, employers need to prove that there are not Turkish citizens available to accomplish their job (Kirisci 2014:22).

“Our unemployed people hate them [Syrians]. They were looking for some jobs for many years, for a long time but when they applied, they see that Syrian people are already working in those fields for cheaper salaries. That's why people hate Syrian (...) they came to Gaziantep. They rent almost all flats and houses. Now is almost impossible to find a free flat in Antep”. Geli Director of a local NGO in Gaziantep

Geli explains how Turkish unemployed people justify their reasons to dislike Syrians. A percentage of Turks have misconceptions, prejudging due to Syrians presence in Turkish land. Turks have sensitiveness about public funds use for Syrian refugees claiming that this money is Turkish and it should be for Turkish. Insecurity level rises since the mass arrival of Syrians living on the streets (Kalay 2014:33).

“They [Syrians living in Turkey] have good conditions and better than the Turkish People. They have a free consultation, education, no tax, and have a good unemployment compensation. On the other hand the Turkish government does no give similar privileges to its own citizens, the ones with the right of the government support” Karbi 31 year-old army officer

In 2014, few members of the Turkish Parliament had already expressed that Syrian population in Turkey would probably stay for minimum 10 years due to the economic,

welfare and structural destruction level in Syria. It raises the question of how laws, politics and measures about citizenship, rights, welfare, education, and economy amongst other factors may have to be adapted to this long-term situation in Turkey. Turkey could create an integration program, where Turkish languages course and embracing legal jobs and aids to moderate submerged economy (Kirisci 2014, Lacroix 2004).

It is important to underline that this Syrian crisis has brought benefits to those regions nearby Syrian. Turkish demands that the majority of goods for humanitarian aid should be bought from Turkey, the increment of funds of those regions and new Syrians businesses is benefiting Turkish economy (Dinçer et al 2014).

Vertovec (2001) defends that migrants' identity should be studied as a sum of conditioning factors of stereotypes, differences on cultures and background. Syrian transnational bonds to their homeland, host country and their role in Turkey define Syrian refugees' identities. In order to understand the reinforcing of the nation-state process, the recognition of the "*age of transnationalism*" seems crucial in understanding migrants' multiple concerns with identity (Vertovec 2001; Schiller et al 1995:59; Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006; Horst 2013).

"...A lot of Syrian people are living in left houses, buildings (...) They are dirty and uneducated" Karbi. Seeing from the local population perspective, this reinforcing of the nation-state intensifies apprehension, negative stereotypes and xenophobia towards migrants, security concerns over their borders and own protection, as well as, interested on the positive side of globalization related to economy. As Turner describes *the unclear is the unclean* to recognize Syrians in Turkey. Receiving countries to reinforce their migration policy, they make clear "*distinction between categories of belonging*" of migrants (Vertovec 2001; Schiller et al 1995:59; Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006; Horst 2013; Turner 1964).

6.3.1 Neighbors and Suriye

Refugee diaspora is a transnational community in continuous changings. It requires long-term solutions to lessening radical division between Turks and Syrians. However, there is existence of solidarity between them as a normal pattern too (Clifford 1994; Kirisci 2014; Dinçer et al 2013).

“We are Muslims, brothers and sisters. If we don't show our responsibilities, friendship, they will never forgive us in the future (...) maybe we will need it as well. This connects us together” Borak, 35 year-old Grant National Assembly Consultant, advising on Syrian situation in Gaziantep region

Borak identifies the obligation to help and addressees the solidarity in their common religion, as they are all brothers and sisters. He claims that it is Turkey's responsibility to help because there is no certainty what the future will bring. Syrians in Turkey is a new refugee movement, a new community (Clifford 1994).

However, when several local people from Gaziantep were asked about their opinion of seeing children begging on the streets, they claim that it is their parents' fault, they are not helping them *“Turkish people will love to help children. We can all take a child to our home but we have lost our hope with those Suriye. How kind of parents are they? They don't do anything and they sent their children to work. They only want money and if we help those children with clothes and food, they hit them ”* Karbi 31 year-old army officer

In general, in Turkish streets is common to hear Turks referring to Syrians as Suriye. It means Syrian in Turkish and it is used as xenophobic pattern since Syrians repeat a lot that they are Suriye to identify them (Clifford 1994; Turner 1964).

“My sister lives and studies in Germany since 2009. My dad lives in Damascus and works there. He doesn't want to join us. He rather dies there. We talk with him on Skype if he has Internet connection (...) But we are just my mom and I here, and my sister in Germany” Karen, 17 year old Syrian student

Karen and his family are an example of transnational social spaces as an ethnic neighborhood who do not only interact within the host society, they keep ties with their relatives in their home country and where they have settled. Syrians living in Gaziantep are still linked to their home countries with social, economic, family networks, while they live and work in other country. Transnational social spaces are moved by reciprocity within small groups, exchange of interests and solidarity between communities. Migrants are connected to different countries simultaneously, challenging the concepts of citizenship and transnationalism by states' meaning (Smith 2003; Faist 2000; Lister 2010).

"I own a Syrian grocery store. I sell Syrian products. Before coming to Turkey, I drove a lorry. I know how to go to Syria and where to buy things (...) People want to have the same things as when they were living back home. Turkish people like our things and prices. It is dangerous but they need to see it". Mohamet, 35 year-old owner of a Syrian shop

Rough conditions in Gaziantep had made already few families to decide to return to Syria. There are difficulties to consolidate themselves as one ethnic diaspora. The complexity of the relations between Syrians, whose do not trust other Syrians because they claim insecurity security of who is your neighbor, easy access to weapons, lack of concern from police if undocumented or documented Syrians kill each other. This phenomenon has settled xenophobia and racism between Syrian groups based on their legal status, working conditions, living places and Turks. Maintaining their Syrian identity is considered one of the main aspects of the diaspora. (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991; Cohen 1996; Brubaker 2005)

"I was married when I was fourteen and I don't want this for my daughter. We are Syrians but I see here girls going to school and being a girl till they are older"

Fatima. Living on another society influences the traditional concept of their identity, which could develop to a hybrid identity taking aspect from Turkish identity. It influences identities in positive and negative behaviors. As Mira has expresses, after seeing girls' lifestyles in Turkey, she wants more freedom for her daughter. Turkey stimulates Syrian identity, where mothers tend to be more open-minded to changes. Mohamet states *'we must maintain our traditions as always'*. It represents how often

several Syrian fathers feel their family power and identity thread by external influences. It may lead to drastic ideals to protected what they have lived as the only option (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991; Cohen 1996; Brubaker 2005).

“We see a lot of Syrians living illegally and in bad conditions but we don’t know them and we don’t want to know anything about them. They are dirty and bad people from Syria”. Fatima 30 year-old mother of Halem

Ethnic neighborhood does not have diaspora sense of distinction nor the possibility to return home due to lack of resources and the probably to die. Transnational connections instead of diaspora connection bring into context Syrians community and Turkish perception of assimilation, confrontation, we-they relation, discrimination and exclusion (Hannerz 1992 by Clifford, 1994)

Through forced migration there are changes at different levels on subjective, identity, belonging and specially gender roles on diasporas, where emotions and social interaction are also part of it. Genders are produced, maintained and changed by feelings of belonging, liminality and identity (Christou 2011).

Syrian women could be described as network preserving traditions and culture and also as the pioneers to adapt to host conditions and bring solutions to provide support. A Turkish family has a cafeteria Gaziantep, where they have employed a Syrian woman to work for them. After being asked, how they came to the conclusion to provide a job for this woman, they said, “ *we are all Muslim brother and sisters. She is alone with her six children. We need to give her help and hope in those difficult moments. We are a solidary society, even though the government and international people have exploited our kindness*”

The emotional dimension of migration, men wanted to keep a head of the house role, however, diaspora puts women on a position of finding jobs and easier to integrate in the host land society. This could evolve to improvement into marriages or isolation where women are set totally aside to keep men power on the cost of basic needs (Christou 2011).

Sheffer (1991:100) states that there are classifications into categories inside the diaspora itself: *dormant members, core members and marginal members*. Conversely, others have criticized him by its fragile to measure those categories. Even though this thesis data has limited interviews, living six months in Gaziantep in this neighborhood, I have seen and heard Syrians who justify these three patterns. (Mazzucato 2008; Sheffer 1991:100 by Brubaker, 2005)

Dormant members are those Syrians refugees who refuse to identify themselves or interact with other Syrians by their need of time to absorb their journey's experiences to safe land. Core members could be identified as active Syrians who interact on their community and neighborhood, sharing, helping as well as gaining something in return. The last classification of members is called marginal members, who are those identifies as bad Syrians by Syrian people. Nonetheless, this classification does not imply a general rule on Syrian population in Gaziantep. (Mazzucato 2008; Sheffer 1999:100 by Brubaker, 2005)

Refugee movement has two main differences from the transnational voluntary migrants on their feeling of belonging to their host and homeland; their lack of control or power to choose to stay in their home country; and psychological effects of exile and trauma (Crisp 1999).

"I own a Syrian restaurant since I came here two years ago. Now everything is difficult, expensive and with influence. We don't receive help. We pay for everything (...) There are not legal jobs and they [Syrians] only come here to create troubles (...) Refugee camps are in horrible conditions. There are no human rights and they don't allow people to get inside and visit. It is humiliating" Ahmet 29 year-old Syrian restaurant owner

Despite the fact that Ahmet came to Turkey as an economic migrant, nowadays he is foreigner with residence permit but he is also a refugee because he can not settle back in Syria. Ahmet differentiates between Syrians who arrived before with better conditions as him, and other Syrians. He is an example of division within groups in the refugee diaspora, where political divergences and Syrian social classes separate it up. Migration continues to happen with another legal label. However, those

differentiations are also a tool to create, help, integrate, solve problems and unify communities (Sirkeci & Martin 2014; Wahlbeck 2002; Shuval 2000; Horst 2013).

6.4 Apprehension of loosing Turkish citizenship

“Syrian communities move in and out of my country, moving freely. They are very comfy especially on the border in their refugee camps. They should stay there (...) They are Syrians and we are Turks. We can help them but they can’t have the same rights as us. (...) They are not Turks ” Karbi 31 year-old army officer

YUKK describes “Turkishness” as one of the few challenging parts of its migration policy. Turkish identity as “Turkishness” repeats the preceding Turkish unraveling attitude toward migration, based on: language, religion, where being born in Turkey or with Turkish ancestors as the main core of the past and current definition of Turkish identity. (Içduygy 2004; Malkki 1995)

The concept of citizenship could be considered a form of state solidarity with obligations and rights between the state and its citizens, insights of belonging with the constitution as a first legal manifestation. Succeeding on gaining legal nationality on their receiving countries is a long process, which it could be legally unreachable, while refugees could also be stateless depending on their countries’ situation (Sargent & Larchanché-Kim 2006; Faist 2000; Malkki 1995; Lister 2010).

Non-citizens question the concept of nation-state and citizenship’s. It leads to a “transnational citizenship” with the creation of international obligations, rights and power. Transnational citizenship implies the possibility to belong to a two states. For instance, EU is an example of a unification of nation-states and creation of common area of rights and obligations with its own definition of citizenship, without belonging to two physical states. *“I like to live here if I can go to Syria sometimes”* (Halem). Refugee experiences are individuals and unique but being a refugee could be described as a common aspect for those who experience crossing borders, legal boundaries, up rootedness exile from their homelands (Soysal 1994; Held 1991 by Faist, 2000; Lacroix 2004).

“Why Turkish children are different than us? I want to do things as them but we do only few. At least I meet Turkish girls at the park sometimes” Halem 13-year-old femaly Syrian student

Halem compares how in several times Syrians cannot have the same rights as Turks citizens and the uniqueness of being Turk cannot be learnt. For instance, Syrian children born in Turkey do not gain Turkish citizenship just because they were born in Turkey. They would only be registered as Syrians if there were a father figure. According to Syrian law, nationality passes through fathers. Those children are in a liminal and vulnerable state if they do not have a Syrian father. They would become stateless, without nationality and an easy target for their exploitation (Reynold & Grisgaber 2015; Malkki 1995; Turner 1964).

“I want my children to have documentation and passport to walk without fear in Turkey but I am afraid they will take them away if my husband goes alone to register them. We don’t know anything and no one can tell us what to do.” Mira

Turkey in collaboration with international donors and agencies should create a program to improve Syrian children status, reducing their liminal state, identity’s troubles with education programs and legal births’ certificates. Mira is an example of limitation of information concerning daily welfare strains. Syrian children can access to education and welfare with their births’ certificates under their temporary protection status. It is not a definite status. They are under temporary protection with unlimited time but without securities. If they want access to those resources, they need to go to camps. They could be symbolically labeled as structurally living and dead (Turner 1964; Reynolds & Grisgaber 2013; Malkki 1995; Lacroix 2004).

“After that chaos ends, everything, I wish, everything will be better and they will turn back to their country. But if they do not turn and stay here, the situation will be complicated because they want citizenship” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Long-term situation of Syrians bring into debate citizenship. They would be a refugee diaspora with their transnational aspects, while they should be provided with certain rights and civic participation in Turkey (Horst, 2013; Lister 2010)

According to Habermas (2001) the principles of the citizenship's for nation-states are being threads by two trends. First one from is at macro level with globalization and its lost meaning of borders. The second one is at micro level from below where the current influx of migrants and their identities, connections and belonging through borders to different (Habermas 2001 by Lister, 2010)

"We do not want Syrian people in Gaziantep. They always create chaos and bad things. We do not want here even one person. They open shops in here but they do not pay tax and we do. They take money from European Union and Turkish Republic. We do not want them here. They steal. They fight. We want them to go out from our country" Anonymous on demonstration, January 2014 Gaziantep

The relation between citizenship, migrants and national identity has been used as a weapon for countries to argue how negative migrants are. They defend that migrants do not involved themselves on their host land with loyalty and commitments. Policymakers defend that migrants' behavior disturbs their true meaning of national citizenship. (Foner 2001; Lister 2010)

Leitner and Ehrkamp (2006) study the concept of citizenship *from below* by gathering information on migrants' value of national citizenship (host land); their feeling of belonging; their imagining citizenship they create with their routines as transnational community in their transnational lives (homeland) and also with the local population with their routines in their host land. Specifically, in Leitner and Ehrkamp's study migrants are asked to talk about their experiences and feeling of identity towards their host and homeland from their transnational position.

"There are different Syrian communities and we can't integrate and be safe here. There are a lot of fights and attacks to us (...) we don't compare ourselves with the illegal Syrians who beg on the streets and steal. We want to have better rights that the other Syrians" Mohamet, 35 year-old owner of a Syrian shop

Their positionality as individuals in this two interrelated environments could modify locals' perspective on citizenship, belonging as national citizens, security, migration and identity. Migrants' position in their host land could change the nation-state power. Diasporas cannot provide the same support and resources as a state does for its citizens. They consider diasporas as oppression community other citizens nation-states (Ong & Nonini 1997 by Clifford, 1994: 312; Sheppard 2002 by Clifford, 1994).

“They could become a minority in our country and if they get citizenship, they will get the same rights as me. It is not ok for everyone” Ali, 30 year-old army officer

National citizenship's definition by Marshall in 1950 puts into context from where some countries security positioning on migration come. Marshall connects national citizenship to a one country. Citizen would get national rights and benefits if they reciprocate what obligations and loyalty are expected to return. However refugee and migration perspective where borders are not longer defined challenge its definition (Marshall 1950 by Lister, 2010).

“Why don't they [other countries] take and give citizenship to these families, especially to children and women. (...) they can give citizenship to them”. Ali, 30 year-old army officer

Soysal (1994, 2000) argues that immigration helped to develop the concept of citizenship closer to the reality of migration. This improvement permitted that migrants living in a host country could have more rights and benefits from it, with or without being legally considered citizens of this nation-state. Leitner and Ehrkamp (2006) explore the relation between transnational communities of migrants, their meaning of national citizenship and their citizenship behaviors (Bruman 1988:3 by Lacroix, 2004:153; Shuval 2000).

Citizenship is directly related to deterritorialization, which is not longer associated to an individual nation-state definition. Consequently peoples' identity is not defined by their location or territory of residence. Hence, it also means that citizens' rights are not bounded by a nation-state subjective definition of them. Their rights would be

grounded on international human rights agreements. (Bruman 1988:3 by Lacroix, 2004:153; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006; Shuval 2000)

This perception of citizenship challenges the traditional definition of nation-state within borders, as well as, national and social identity for a state and its miscellaneous inhabitants. On the other hand, the absent citizenship for refugees and their doubtful identity at any level, where unemployment, social isolation, housing difficulties, family loss amongst others factors affect their identity and set them on a *cycle of marginalization* (Bruman 1988:3 by Lacroix 2004:153; Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006; Shuval 2000)

Ong (1999) defines this new citizenship approach as flexible. Even though the concept of citizenship has developed to a more migrants inclusive one, it does not protect nor entitle migrants to have full access to those human rights (Bosniak 2001 by Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006; Ong 1999 by Clifford, 1994).

“Take them and give them a chance to live, for example Italy, France, Germany, Belgium. They are the same European countries they pay for them but they don't care”. Ali, 30 year-old army officer

There are continuous changes on the definition of citizenship by countries because migration is flexible and unpredictable movement that does not leave countries concept of citizenship unaltered (Leitner & Ehrkamp 2006).

6.5 Education

In 2014 UNICEF stipulated that there is an alarming percentage of Syrian children not attending school outside the refugee camps (74%) and even inside (40%). The right to education on refugee crisis takes longer to organize long-term solutions. Where there is an outbreak of war in a country, education is one of the first sectors to suffer. There is fear and measures to avoid a *lost generation*. Children growing up on camps and urban areas have a probability not to receive educational opportunities.(Kirisci 2014:23; Aleinikoff & Poellot 2012; Özer & Sirin & Oppedal 2013).

“At the beginning, we were using this prefabricated schools to teach children who were doing nothing all day in camping area. (...) We were doing something specially for homeless children, women under violence, children, we were trying to provide learning opportunities for them” Geli Director of a local NGO in Gaziantep and English teacher

In this quote Geli states how at the start of refugee influx in Turkey, there was improvised help by local NGOs to provide education and distraction for children from their personal war situation. It could be months, in the worse case years, till refugee children could start receiving education again. Instability in Syria has kept children away from school before reaching asylum in another countries, living a period of minimum a year without attending school (Bircan & Sunata 2015; Kirisci 2014).

“Even my son, he is twelve years old and he has to work. I want him to go to school and learn. He can’t. Schools are too far away. We can’t pay transportation and we can’t take them (...) our family and other Syrian families send our kids to the local NGO around the corner, if we know them”. Mohamet, 35 year-old owner of a grocery shop

Mohamet is an example of a family who cannot afford to send their children to school due to geographical location, or because it is too expensive and/or due to safety concerns. As an alternative, they send them intermittently to the local NGO or to Syrian schools run by international NGO, where they learn English taught by volunteers. Education in Syria was separated between boys and girls, creating a gender issue to attend mixed schools in Turkey. Families demand to get to know the volunteering teacher and they are demanding separated children to be separated according to gender. After long negotiations, families agreed to let their children to be in the mixed English classes, only because Syrian children met other children (Turkmen 2013; Dorman 2014).

Right to access to education is primordial right. Education implies different factors to consider: accessibility, enough institutions, acceptability and adaptability of teaching methods. Teaching on children’s mother tongue is part of rights of education for minorities. However, Turkey does not recognize educational adaptations for

minorities by not ratifying the 1998 Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Based on that Syrians could attend either Turkish schools, or Syrian schools run by the Government or NGOs (Kaya 2015; Dorman 2014).

Syrian schools establish in Turkey have a version of the Syrian curriculum with the necessary variations in teaching and erasing all allusions to Bashar al-Assad government. Syrian Education Commission located in Turkey stipulates this curriculum's adaptation. This similar curriculum is applied in schools at refugee camps, in Turkish and international NGOs who are providing education. In 2014 Gaziantep had two governmental Syrian schools arranged. Turkish government has been planning to enlarge the number with school for children between one to twelve grade (Kirisçi 2014; Dorman 2014).

Children begging on the streets help the family to cover their basic needs. More often than expected, children working on the streets are the only income for family, which is one of the reasons why parents do not want to send their children to school. Over the time, education support has improved from spontaneous help from locals and Syrians towards more logistic education help.

"In our camps there are more than 70.000 children, are educated in nearly 800 classes, they have schools. This is on the camps also we have school outside the camps as well" Borak, 35 year-old Grant National Assembly Consultant, advising on Syrian situation in Gaziantep region

Borak interview was taken in Summer 2014, where the number of refugees on camps was lower than presently. He talks about concrete official numbers of children inside camps. He always refers to official actions to register Syrians, living education to undocumented Syrians on the limbo with ambiguity of education.

By 3rd November 2015 Turkey had officially registered 2,181,293 refugees in Turkey. Thus Turkey is facing major issues in fulfilling their responsibility to deliver the basic needs and education. The country is receiving supports from NGOs and INGOs. There is a gap, where children refugees become liminal beings due to lack of natural order of the things. There is not stability on schools and socially for children. In order

to help Syrian children to get out of this liminal situation, few measures should be taken: safety to reach schools and free resources to send them to school (Bircan & Sunata 2015 by UNHCR, 2015; Dinçer et al 2013).

ICESR, UDHR, the *Convention against Discrimination in Education* (1960) and the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of their Families* (1990) entitle states to provide education among other human rights. Specifically, those international frameworks demand states members' protection and their responsibilities to cover same rights of education to their citizens and migrants (Bircan & Sunata 2015 by UNHCR, 2015; Dinçer et al 2013).

"Syrian schools are far away. I can't send my daughters alone. It is not safe. They need to go with their brothers but it is too expensive for us. Our children go to an organization. They have English lessons everyday 2 hours and we know what they are teaching them." Mohamet, 35 year-old owner of a Syrian shop

Mohamed refers to difficulties to reach schools for their children because of long distance, economic cadency to pay for it and lack of awareness what they are being taught. Officially, Syrians with residence permits are authorized to go to any Turkish school if they want. However, Syrian children do not have the minimum Turkish level to stay in Turkish schools. By Turkish level means minimum of writing, reading, speaking and listening skills. As well, they will be taught under Turkish curriculum, which could have negative allegations of Turkish Syrian relation over the decades. They cannot afford the materials or being so many hours at schools due to working obligations. Hence, Turkish case regarding Syrian education resources is an example of the international inadequacy of education's coverage, despite of every country's obligation to provide the right of education (Bircan & Sunata, 2015; Kirisci 2014).

There are several NGOs providing school programs to compensate these narrow circumstances. On average a Syrian family has to spend 50 Turkish liras per month and/or circa 100 Turkish liras to get to schools (Bircan & Sunata 2015; Dinçer et al 2013; Dorman 2014).

“Syrian children receive education in the refugee camps. Syrians go to school there. Outside the camps, they don’t want to go and they find too many excuses. We have university options for them but programs stay empty” Karbi 31 year-old army officer

Karbi argues that Syrian refugees do not make the most of Turkish government efforts to have better conditions. He is an example of a general accusation towards Syrian concerning their way of not taking all the chances offered. By Turkish law, any child has right to education till high school, likewise for refugee children in camps if they have resident permits. If they don’t reside in camps they are allowed to go as guest students or without official registration if schools allow it, which it is not the usual case in Southern east of Turkey. There is lack of information about their educational rights (Bircan & Sunata 2015; Kirisci 2014; Dorman 2014).

The Higher Education Border of Turkey is promoting access to university studies for Syrians as guest students. For instance, Gaziantep University (UoG) cooffers with Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs a scholarship for Syrians to assist to courses. Certification of Syrian education to continue it in Turkey brings a lot controversy, since Syrian Students can’t prove their education specializations in order to join Turkish higher education and University studies (Kirisci 2014; Gaziantep University 2015).

Education in Temporary Protection Centers in cooperation with UNICEF, UoG and TÖMER (Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Center) are imparted under Turkish educational curriculum. Those students get high school certificate and with support of those organization they have possibilities to register in universities. Though those resources are insufficient to reach all the target population (Dinçer et al 2013).

Turkish Constitution refers to education on the article 42, as *Education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk*. On the 1983 Basic Law of National Education highlight Turkishness, nationalism and fidelity to Atatürk as raise all individuals as *“citizens who are committed to the principles and reforms of Atatürk and to the nationalism of Atatürk (...) founded on human rights (...) to increase the welfare and happiness of Turkish citizens and Turkish society (...) and to*

make the Turkish Nation a constructive, creative and distinguished partner of contemporary civilization” (Kaya 2015:20).

Education rights for Syrian refugees should come with educational programs for Turkish national to erase and decrease racism and xenophobia toward refugees. Turkish Education law has already difficulties with the minorities and their rights of specific education based on their religion, beliefs and ethnicity. Even though Turkey is progressing, there are still a lot concerns and facts to improve Turkish educational system to include minority rights (Bircan & Sunata 2015; Kaya 2014; Kirisci 2014; Dorman 2014).

“I just want to go to a normal school and study like my Turkish neighbors (...) I only feel free and happy between my Syrians and Turkish neighbors”. Halem 13 year-old Syrian refugee

Turkish Constitution does not recognize minorities. For instance, Turkish schools do not teach in Kurdish or using Kurdish curriculum for Kurdish population, which it is a significant percentage of the population in Turkey. Hence, Turkish government would not allow teaching in Arabic or with Syrian curriculum in public schools. However, it provides Syrian schools and easing Syrian education by third actors, INGOs and NGO (Kirisci 2014; Dorman 2014).

“I want to study in Finland because I have friends there. Here I can’t study in Syrian school in Gaziantep because they are really bad and unsafe. So I am studying distance high school from Istanbul. Sometimes I have to go to take some exams. I normally study at home all day, still it is better that schools here”. Karem, 17 year-old student

Karem comes from middle high class in Syria and his mother works in Turkey as psychology. Even though their situation is not ideal, he still has possibilities to choose between schools in Turkey. Though, he and his mother are in a liminal situation because of their uncertainty with their legal status in Turkey (Dorman 2014).

Syrian education in Turkey faces other challenges than teaching in Arabic. Those could be identified as impediments to school participation, educational tools, psychological support, social isolation by language barrier and a percentage of child marriage. There are difficulties to find infrastructures and qualified Arabic teachers to cover the number of Syrians children. Plus Syrian population is mostly areas nearby the border, with higher population of Syrians, have also worse educational results (Dorman 2014).

6.5.1 Trauma

Safran (1999) states that being a refugee in a host country implies characteristics of nostalgia, being on exile and traumatic experiences. Refugee diaspora shares those diasporic aspects that Safran described as well as transnational characteristics. Furthermore, refugee children and in this case, Syrian refugees are more vulnerable to suffer traumatic experiences, develop traumas and psychological disorders. The situation of refugee children eases to detect legislative loopholes, consequences of inefficiency of coordination and resources to prevent a lost generation and future difficulties (Johnson et al 2009 by Dorman 2014).

“I am happy to come to school because we are all from the same streets and all our families are really happy with each other (...) We are a big family” Halem 13 year-old Syrian refugee

Collective trauma is lived by several people that have experienced the same distressing situation while, *individual trauma* are traumas faced individually and not as a community. Refugees could suffer collective and individual trauma, where children are more vulnerable to them. Belonging to a community, its support and routines are positive coping mechanisms (Johnson et al 2009:411; Taylor & Osborne 2010:106 by Rider, 2014; Kirisci 2014; Turner 1964).

Traumas are not only related to specific events. Instead, trauma could be identified as long-term situation and several events on their lives. Syrian children attending schools generate better coping mechanisms to traumas and to evade from daily uncertainty of being a refugee. I worked with Syrian children who had conduct disorders. I taught

them English and work with coping mechanisms. It was not after two months that children started to express themselves about their situation. (Johnson et al 2009:411; Taylor & Usborne 2010:106; Kirisci 2014; Özer & Sirin & Oppedal 2013)

Annex II is a drawing of two cousins did for the class on their free time. It is a colorful airplane with flowers and bombs. Those two children were happy to share the story in class. They were proud of their drawing by showing it around. Those two cousins were experiencing uncertainty of residence in Gaziantep or going back to Syria. They had concentration problems and aggressiveness problems with other children. Over time they became more sociable and they interacted peacefully with other students. (Johnson et al 2009:411; Taylor & Usborne 2010:106; Kirisci 2014; Özer & Sirin & Oppedal 2013)

Turkey as provider of education has not fulfilled educational needs for Syrians. There are safety problems and discrimination issues when Syrian and Turkish children share school. Turkish education contains ideological references such as patriotism with Kemal Atatürk, creator of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish nationalism references. For instances, generally every educational Turkish book has in the first page Atatürk picture and Atatürk quote, who appears several times over the books (Bircan & Sunata 2015; Kaya 2015).

“I want to kill bad Turkish people” Drawing Annex II. Those two cousins always worked together and on an art workshop of expression they wrote this in Arabic. Indirectly they were asked to explain their work of art. Surprisingly, they showed confronted feelings and being in a liminal period with doubts regarding identity and belonging to a community. On one side, they expressed hatred towards Turkish people because they said they pushed them aside, forced them not to complain about so many images of Atatürk and because their community said so. On the other hand, they admitted they are confused when they found nice Turkish people who help them and defend them against other Turks (Turner 1964).

There are difficulties to safeguard Syrian children's rights. Turkish people of the local NGO, where I volunteered, did not allow the entrance of refugees. When they allowed them to enter, they did not respect or let Syrians to have a proper lecture. Normally

they were interrupting and deciding to stay there and to criticize them. Over time, they were not allowed to interrupt their lectures due to several complaints to the boss on human rights basis. Thus, this NGO received some European money to create a project with Syrian refugees. It made their behavior changed radically towards those Syrians children, who did not know what to expect from them.

Belonging to a community where trauma is the common element, it helps to acknowledge of the trauma, to moderate its declarations and create a sense of community and identity against others, who have not the same experience. Children have expressed their traumatic experiences in Turkey. Only after a month children began to talk about their traumas by painting and through writings. There was not demands to talk about it, but after time and gaining their trust, they started to bring up the topic of their war's experience by paints, essays, girls' topics, gossiping about their neighbors and their complains about the locals. English lectures were dynamic, flexible and mostly confidential, where only the two teachers were allowed to stay there and no one else was permitted to stay in the room (Rider 2014; Safran 1991; Turner 1964; Malkki 1995).

“We are really happy to be in Turkey because we are alive, even though we left our dad behind. My brothers are working and earning money but we do not know what will happen to us tomorrow. We are also happy because of all our neighbors. We are Syrian and we all talk with each other a lot. We are a big family here. I also like my Turkish neighbors. They give me cookies and help us” Safe 13 year-old Syrian refugee

Safe explains her mixed feelings of happiness to be alive, as well as, stress not to know what could happen to them next day, since her brothers' jobs are unstable and badly paid. She and her family expresses how important are to belong to their street community where they have each other support. Syrians fleeing their home country in a group have experienced a collective trauma. (Taylor & Usborne 2010:106 by Rider, 2014; Alexander et al 2004, p. 12 by Rider, 2014; Safran 1991; Turner 1964: 47; Malkki 1995)

However, the individual trauma could be experience in the receiving country as liminal beings and bureaucratic uncertainty. Safe's family is in contact with Turkish neighbors where not all Syrians from this neighborhood approve of. Her family does not follow the structural type expected from this Syrian community. They share some characteristics but not all the moral values (Taylor & Usborne 2010:106 by Rider, 2014; Alexander et al 2004, p. 12 by Rider, 2014; Safran 1991; Turner 1964: 47; Malkki 1995)

“ Our Turkish community wants them (Syrians) to go back to their country. Especially our people living near the border. They want Syrian gone. Unemployment is rising because there are a lot of fugitive laboring refugees. The flat fees are also rising too ”
Karbi 31 year-old army officer

Turkish migration policy has settled some controversial debate pro and contra by several parties. There is international pressure over Turkey by its involvement on humanitarian aid and demanding improvements of Turkish assistance. Similarly there are opponents to current administration and consequently there are Turkish parties showing resiliency to Turkish policy approach concerning Syrian refugees (Kalay 2014:33; Kirisci 2014).

7 Conclusions

In this thesis I have been investigating how far policies and legislation relate to the interactions and perceptions between Syrian refugees and Turkish people in Gaziantep. In the first chapter of the analysis, how the viability of legislations and policies reach the target population is studied. I found my data, with a symbolic number of interviewees enlightening since, I have lived in Gaziantep for six months while working with this Syrian and Turkish community. This data shows strong ideas of differentiation by Turks and Syrians, setting them on extreme positions.

Turks talk about in what way that the large number of refugees is damaging their feelings of nationalism and citizenship, while the international community stay put.

Meanwhile, Syrians make their own differentiation by classifying different types of Syrians as the good and the bad ones. Nonetheless, I claim that Syrians are in

continuous liminal stage between legal loopholes, place on Turkish society and uncertainty on their future. Those deficiencies can be easily detected on Syrian children.

Observing children perceptions on their context and traumas clarify and help to define what things need to be approach to avoid long-term problems of discrimination, racism, violence and integration.

I wanted to demonstrate on this thesis that Syrian refugees are studied as a refugee diaspora with transnational aspects. Syrian refugees movement has started recently. So, there are uncertain effects and aspects still to define their identity as a group in a receiving country.

Syrian refugees with expired documentation and unable to renew their residence should have the opportunity to prolong their residence permit till they could go back to Syria. To develop education role there are necessities for an increment of funding, international and local collaboration, economic facilities to attend school, reachable without transportation, education recognition by Turkish government and teachers' remuneration (Dorman 2014).

Integration programs aim to easy the interaction between Turks and Syrians on community centers, local organization and ngos for children, women, and men. Giving economical support housing or jobs facilities to families may reduce child labor and any type of illegitimate jobs or measures to provide economical support for the family (Dorman 2014).

Studies are necessary to deliver efficiency long-term solutions with continuous evaluation. The main aims of the international community should concentrate on reducing the percentage of official refugees by them becoming citizens on the host country or by relocation and repatriation, instead of centralizing their efforts on providing camps amongst other assistance (Aleinikoff & Poellot 2012).

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Annex I Details of interviewees

Ali 30 year-old army officer

He is a 30 years-old officer who lives and works in Gaziantep for two years. He is the head of the Medical Unit at Gaziantep base. Previously, he was working in the Syrian border building fences and obstacles against smuggling refugees and products. At the age of 13 he joined the Turkish army. He declares himself a son of the Ottoman Empire and a patriotic. He wants to help Syrians but he claims it should be one in equal amount with other countries.

Borak 35 year-old Grant National Assembly Consultant, advising on Syrian situation in Gaziantep region. He is in charged of information and interviews in Gaziantep region. His interview was half filmed and half out of the record.

Karen is 17 year-old. He was born and raised in Damascus till 5 years ago when he went to Egypt with his mother. His mother is a psychologist for an international NGO in Kilis. She travels three hours everyday to her work place. His father still lives and works in Damascus. His sister is studying in Germany since 2009. Karen is doing high school on distance study because he does not like the schools in Gaziantep. Karen and his mother want to move to Finland because they have friends there and they do not feel safe in Gaziantep anymore. He and his mother have residence permit to live in Turkey but they are having difficulties to fulfill Turkish renew requirements.

Nizip There is a registration trailer in Nizip for Syrians who have arrived to Turkey. Nizip is a small town between Gaziantep and Aleppo on the border with Syria, where there is an elevated population of Syrian people registered. An UNHCR Turkish worker was interviewed with simultaneously translation from the direction of a local ngo.

Anonymous speech 20th of January of 2014 there were an illegal demonstration on the Democratic square of Gaziantep. It was promoted and shared through social media: Facebook. It was not the first demonstration against Syrians but it was one of the few illegal ones. There used to be violence linked to those type of demonstrations.

In this specific one there was strong police measures. Almost each police was carrying special equipment such as tear gas, police horses, plastic bullets, etc.

Geli has been a director of a local ngo in Gaziantep for the last two years. He is an English teacher in the morning and director of this ngo on the evenings and weekends. This ngo is supported by European Union's funds through EVS projects. This ngo has short-term and long-term projects all around the year about Syrian children, Afghan children and ecological projects. It is located on the city center and nearby the Syrian neighborhood where the interviews took place.

Belén is a 34 years-old Spanish international relief agency worker. She has being working in Gaziantep for a year and half with an INGO to coordinate resources for undocumented Syrians. Before that, she was working in Hatay coordinating the logistic of a British NGO. This NGO provides humanitarian aid to Syrians inside Syria. She was also working in a refugee camp nearby Gaziantep.

Karbi is a 31 years-old army officer in Gaziantep. Originally he is from West side of Turkey. He has being working in Gaziantep for two years teaching self-defense tactics to Turkish soldiers. Previously he was working in the central part of Turkey and on the border with Syria Kobane.

Ahmet is 29 years-old Syrian restaurant owner. He came to Gaziantep when there was the first turmoil in Syria between the first arrivals of Syrian refugees. He lives in a wealthy neighborhood where the building is fully rented to Syrians. He lives with his family in a flat. His restaurant is in the same Syrian neighborhood as the interviews took place. He and all his family have residence permits.

Mohamet is 35 years-old owner of a Syrian shop and husband of Fatima. He owns a grocery store where he sells any type of Syrian products. It is located in the same neighborhood and between the local NGO, Ahmet restaurant and where the interviewees live. His shop has a central location on the neighborhood in front of a mosque. He was a trailer driver in Syria and he and his brother bring Syrian products to Gaziantep, while they also visit relatives in Aleppo.

Fatima is 30 years-old mother and wife of Mohamet. They have five children in total and she walked to Turkey while she was pregnant with her youngest child. She is taking care of her family, stay in contact with their relatives and she also keeps the Syrian families on their streets unified. She was married when she was fourteen and she does not want her daughters to marry till they are almost eighteen years-old.

Halem. She is the daughter of Mohamet and Fatima. She is in class with Safe and she is always in charged of domestic tasks and similar of a leader and the voice for the other children in class.

Mustafa is 29 years-old Syrian father in Gaziantep. He lives two houses below Mohamet. He lives in an abandoned two rooms apartment, for which he also has to pay rent. He lives with his wife, Mira and, their three children. Only Mustafa is under temporary protection. He is searching for jobs because he does not want to live in a refugee camp.

Mira is 25 years-old undocumented mother of three children. She is Mustafa's wife. She and her children barely leave their home. She could not get Syrian passport before coming to Turkey because where she is from was under the control of the Free Syrian Army, which is against the Syrian government. Bassad's government did not expedite any official documentation for people living in this area.

Safe is 13 years-old Syrian refugee. She lives in Gaziantep with her mother and three siblings. Her family shares a house with other two families and there is no information where her father is. Her family lives with her two brothers' salary from working illegally in a company. Her mother wants her two daughters to study but they do not have enough income to send them to Syrian schools in Gaziantep. This is why she attends the local NGO. Safe and Halem were the spokeswomen for other students.

Syrian children begging and living on the streets. Those children attend to school once per week when their families allow them. Their families asked the local NGO for money if they want to teach their children. Consequently, few children could not join any class because they were forced to work on the streets. Their families, Turks and police expose them to violence and traumatic situations.

Annex II Drawing



