



AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

THE LATIN AMERICAN POPULISM OF THE XXI CENTURY A NEW POLITICAL MODEL BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM?

The Case study of Argentina and Venezuela

Author: Inés Arias Iglesias
Master Thesis Project
MSc. European Studies specialization in Latin American Studies
Supervisor: Óscar García Agustín
Aalborg University | 15 December 2015



AALBORG UNIVERSITY
DENMARK

Aalborg University

Title: The Latin American populism of the XXI century. A new political model beyond Neoliberalism? –The case study of Argentina and Venezuela

Master Thesis Period: September 2015 - January 2016

Signature:

Inés Arias Iglesias

Supervisor: Óscar García Agustín

Number of Pages: 65

Abstract

At the beginning of the century, Latin American Countries experienced the emergence of left wing governments led by unprecedented and charismatic figures that have changed, over the course of more than a decade, the way population understands and participates in political life. Given the serious problems that some of those governments are facing at the moment, especially in Argentina and Venezuela, everything seems to indicate that the populist models proposed by the Kirchnerismo in Argentina and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela did not succeed in offering an alternative to the previous neoliberal model.

The presidential elections held in November in Argentina and the elections to the National Assembly in Venezuela in December 2015, provided a real opportunity to investigate empirically the stability of the model proposed by these populist leaders. Argentina and Venezuela represent the most opposite cases inside the Latin American third wave of populism. Therefore, considering the contextual circumstances, this Master Thesis aimed to analyse to what extent the model in Venezuela and Argentina constitutes an alternative new political model to the previous neoliberal regimes. The analytic process has been driven by mixed-method research, the use of two case studies and a multifactorial conception of populism. Moreover, it included a description of the previous and current models together with a contraposition verification to elucidate the answer to the problem formulation proposed. As both trends are included in the so-called third wave of populism, a short description of the wave has been provided.

The research indicates that the Venezuelan Chavismo has offered a new alternative political model to the previous system while maintaining structural features from the previous model that places the *Chavismo* in a highly vulnerable situation towards the fluctuation of foreign markets. In the case of Argentina, the investigation leads to the conclusion that the model proposed by the Kirchnerismo has not offered a new political model but rather a Peronist model reformulation adapted to the Contemporary circumstances of Argentina. Therefore, Kirchnerismo has offered an alternative model but it cannot be described as new. In the same line as Venezuela, this model maintained structural features from the previous regime.

List of Abbreviations

AAB: Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana | *Alternative Bolivarian Agenda*

AD: Acción Democrática | *Democratic Action*

ALBA: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América |
Bolivarian Alliance of the People of Our Americas

ALCA: Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas | *Area of Free Commerce of the Americas*

CAN: Comunidad Andina de Naciones | *Andean Community of Nations*

CESNA: Centro de Estudios Situacional de la Nación | *Center for Situational Studies of the Nation*

COPEI: Unión Republicana Democrática | *Democratic Republican Union*

CTV: Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela | *Confederation of Venezuelan Workers*

EEUU: United States

FEDECÁMARAS: Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela |
Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production of Venezuela

FONDEN: Fondo Nacional para el Desarrollo Nacional | *National Development Fund*

FONDESPA: Fondo para el Desarrollo Económico y Social del País |
National Fund for the Economic and Social Development

FREPASO: Frente País Solidario | *Front for a County of Solidarity*

HDI: Human Development Index

IMF: International Monetary Fund

JP: Partido Judicialita | *Justicialist Party*

MAS: Movimiento al Socialismo | *Movement toward Socialism*

MBR-200: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario | *Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement*

MEM: Ministerio Del Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería | *Ministry of People's Power for Energy
and Oil*

MVR: Movimiento Quinta República | *Fifth Republic Movement*

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PDSVA: Petroleum of Venezuela

PPT: Patria para Todos | *Fatherland for All*

PSUV: Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela | *United Socialist Party of Venezuela*

UCR: Unión Cívica Radical | *Radical Civil Union*

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

URD: Partido Social Cristiano | *Christian Social Party*

US: United States

VEF: Bolívar Fuerte Venezolano | *Strong Venezuelan Bolívar*

YPF: Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales | *National Oilfields*

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
Introduction	1
Problem formulation	4
METHODOLOGY	5
Research design.....	5
Mixed method research	6
Data Collection	8
Analysis of Populism and Reliability.....	9
Structure of the project.....	10
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	12
Populism as leadership style	13
Populism as articulation of people's demands	20
Populism as plebiscitarian system	24
VENEZUELA.....	30
Traditional political model before Hugo Chávez arrived to power.....	30
Hugo Chávez's initial model for Venezuela.....	34
Hugo Chávez's version of populism: Radical Socialist Populism.....	37
Model deployment during Hugo Chávez's mandates	41
The future prevalence of the <i>Chavismo</i> model without Chávez.....	47
ARGENTINA	48
Traditional political model before Néstor Kirchner arrived and 2001 crisis.....	48
Néstor Kirchner's initial model for Argentina	51
The Kirchner's version of populism: Peronist Reformulation	54
Model deployment during Néstor and Cristina Kirchner's mandates	58
The future prevalence of the Kirchnerismo model	61
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	62
Venezuela: populist model contraposition	62
Argentina: populist model contraposition	63
Argentina and Venezuela: Populist models contraposition.....	64
CONCLUSION	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	66

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to lead the reader through the general subject and the problem formulation research that will be covered along the thesis. It establishes the context and summarizes the background information.

Introduction

“El socialismo, nuestro, americano, indoamericano, no debe ser calco ni copia, sino creación heroica”¹

Hugo Chávez, Interview to TVP in 2010

As a result of the legislative elections during the last decade in Latin America, the idea of the “shift to the left” in the overall region has taken place. The electoral victory of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, had triggered an unprecedented decade in Latin American where, for the first time in history, more than the 50% of the population was, and still is, under self-declared left regimes. This regional shift to the left, which is by no means universal, has been characterized, generally, for a common policy of redistribution of the income and fight against inequality, the inward look towards the integration of the region and a general rejection of the policies implemented with the Washington Consensus defined as neoliberal and austerity measures.

Considering the particularities of the Latin American history and context, the rise of populism in the region needs to be studied and defined under a different scope from the generalized global concept of populism.

These governments represent a clear departure from previous regimes. Nevertheless, the process of breakdown is not homogeneous and it is highly influenced and personalized by the particular context of each Latin American state. Therefore, to set common action patterns among this states would lead to a no through road argumentation, as each national project is unique in its form and deployment process. Notwithstanding, the rises of these left regimes is also a consequence of a series of regional factors, such as the persistence of structural poverty and inequality, disenchantment with the traditional party system and the democratic institutions together with the lack of representation and participation mechanisms, among others, that will be further analyzed in the present thesis.

¹ Socialism, our, American, American Indian, it should not be an imitation or a copy, but a heroic creation.

But, what does *Populism* stands for nowadays in Latin America? Populism is a term used on a regular basis with contradictory and even opposite characteristics that, generally, carries with it a stigmatic negative connotation in either the public and academic sphere. This polysemic and variable term has been used to define left wing and right wing political parties, capitalist and socialist economic approaches with appeals for the people and for the elite. Therefore, an exercise of definition is needed to set a fixed theoretical framework stable for the thesis analysis.

Populism maintains a complicated relation with liberal democracy which leads generally to acknowledge populism as democratic diseases. Nevertheless, under other spectrums populism is considered as an actual mechanism to strengthen the democratic regime. The aim of this thesis is, not only to argue different forms that populism takes in Argentina and Venezuela and its proposed model nowadays but, to explore the rationale behind the social support of these voters and the conditions that lead to the rise of this kind of political strategies in the Latin American region.

Populism in Latin America does not relate to the fascist trend of European populism. Meanwhile, European populism is generally exclusive and far right; the new Latin American populism is inclusive and left wing (Mudde & Rovira, 2011). In the Latin American case, the inclusion of social extracts that were marginalized and not politically represented could have set the basis to provide a long-term democracy in Latin American countries under populist left governments or, at least, strengthen the existing democracy by empowering the majority of the population, before not involved in the political processes of the country.

The political models that dominated the power sphere in Argentina and Venezuela have been characterized for an extractivist economic model -that placed the country in a highly vulnerable situation towards variations in the global markets- and a structural corruption based mainly in clientelism and influence trafficking. These political inheritances that have remained for a very long period of time in the institutions are a heavy burden, very complicated to eradicate, specially, for new populist left governments with a short period in power. This structural widespread corruptive system could have led to a new model based on the old practices but with new superficial changes, as it can be the redistribution of wealth approach, without major

structural changes. This dichotomy regarding the new level of change of the political model from the old system is aimed to be answered in this thesis.

The populist governments of Argentina and Venezuela were able to begin a process of political realignment in their national institutional systems after a deep process of disenchantment, and create the structure for a new political model. In a period of profound social disaffection, Néstor Kirchner and Hugo Chávez were able to organize and represent heterogeneous sectors of civil society under a common project of nation based on three discursive pillars: a new independence from the external factual powers and the anti-patriotic elite, a strong state representative of the nation's will and the close relation of the charismatic leader and the supporters of the movement, always placing the patriotic-subject in the center of the discourse. Although, both regimes have general patterns in common and are originated after similar crisis, the essence of the state policy differs enormously. In this way, the Venezuela's change of political model is deeper and more radical than the Argentina's one, getting to be classified as *"radical populist socialism"* and, by Chávez himself, *"socialismo del Siglo XXI"* (Socialism of the 21th century). Meanwhile the Kirchner model was classified as new version of the traditional Peronist populism.

Independently of the populist definition attached to these regimes, it cannot be denied that they had offered, at least in the primary formulation of their mandates, an opportunity for political change and the creation of more equal and democratic nations. If these first intentions have been a success or not, effective or only a strategy to win power, is something that it is aimed to be explored and answered in the present thesis.

Problem formulation

At the time of arrival of Hugo Chávez and Néstor Kirchner to office in 1998 and 2003, respectively, both countries were suffering a deep economic, political and social crisis. In the case of Venezuela, Chávez takes the lead on the country when the previous model, *Punto Fijo*, was immersed in a dramatic decline. Similar context occurred in Argentina where the difficulties of the country to pay its foreign debt, led to harder austerity measures guided by the foreign creditors and the instauration of the *corralito* which triggered, in 2001, a period of deep instability and social protests with five presidents in charge in less than a year.

The new governments of Argentina and Venezuela as populist phenomenon were able to politicize the disenchantment of social actors and unite them in a common national project placing the social subject in the center of the discourse. These new leaders offered the citizens a new way to perceive politics and claim to rule the countries for the general population mass. They seem to have offered a new model to reconstruct the national project and a set of politics focused on achieving the welfare of the general population. However, the first excitement has driven, nowadays, to a general crisis in the both countries.

Therefore, I wonder:

To what extent, the populism in Argentina and Venezuela had offered an alternative new political model to the Neoliberal system that preceded them?

METHODOLOGY

The objective of this chapter is to set a constructive description and explanation of the research design, methods and data collection selected to be applied in this thesis.

Research design

In order to set a methodological framework, the strategy needs to contain the tools necessary to perform an effective analysis. The research design (New York University, 2003) for this master thesis is based on a descriptive and explanatory research. The descriptive research remains in the majority of the text meanwhile the explanatory research is more applicable to the case studies chapter. The approach of this thesis is *probabilistic* rather than *deterministic* as social science investigations tend to follow the first approach (Suppes, 1970). Besides, with the dissertation in this project, it is intended to offer a probabilistic analysis on the outcome of the populist governments in Argentina and Venezuela in terms of offering a new political model to their populations. Despite the intention to offer a deep description of the situation and analysis on the circumstances, a topic as complex as this one is not able to offer deterministic explanations due to the complexity of the matter itself and the different possibilities to answer depending on the approach taken and variables analysed.

The case study methodology is an approach to research that facilitates the exploration of a circumstance by focusing in two cases where the phenomenon occurs. This allows the researcher to analyse the cases within their context and using a broad variety of data sources in order to get a deeper understanding of the general common characteristics among the cases, but also understanding the particularities that take place (Baxter & Jack, 2008).

Regarding the type of case study selected in this master thesis, the multi-case studies approach will be taken. This approach offers the researcher the opportunities to search the differences and similarities of the cases. The final aim of the multiple-case studies is to offer a comparison that can predict similar or contradictory results across the cases (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998). However, our case study approach tend to be descriptive and exploratory in the sense that the case study offers a description of the populist phenomenon and the context surrounding it together with an investigation of the cases where the outcome has either no obvious answer or no one clear outcome (Yin, 1994).

Regarding Stake's terms to define case studies - intrinsic, instrumental and collective - the present thesis will be driven by the second concept. This means that the researcher is interested in getting an insight and a deep understanding of the situation in order to solve the problem formulation (Stake, 1995).

The study cases can also be divided by holistic or embedded studies (Rowley, 2002). For this specific project the embedded study adapts better to the circumstance as this approach allows the analysis of small units within the case which allows offering a deeper overview of the case for after, contrast it with the other case and acquire an overall picture of the situation.

Mixed method research

The mixed method research is the selected approach to inquiry. The alternative knowledge claim that will be taken in this thesis is pragmatic, as this is a position problem-centred, pluralistic, real-world practice oriented and focused on the consequences of actions (Creswell, 2003). The pragmatic knowledge claim is a work performed by Pierce, James, Mead and Dewey. Pragmatism is not committed to one system; therefore, this approach applies to mixed methods research in the sense that allows the researcher to use freely quantitative and qualitative data to strengthen the research. Both pragmatism and mixed method research do not see the world in a unity. Therefore collecting and analysing different data sources, methods and techniques are necessary to achieve a rich perspective to the problem. Likewise, pragmatism accepts that research occurs in social, historical and political context that cannot be exempted from the problem. In this way the mixed method research uses different theoretical lenses and studies to reflect the social and political reality. Moreover, pragmatism allows mixed methods researchers to apply multiple methods, different views and, above all, different data resource and analysis (Creswell, 2003).

The mixed method research is an approach in which the investigator tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic fields and it explores strategies that involve collecting data from different sources in order to better understand the problem exposed. The data collection involves gathering narrative information, qualitative, and numeric information, quantitative. The percentage of each contribution varies freely. In this specific case, the qualitative research will be the priority source meanwhile the

quantitative information acts as a strengthening tool to the argumentation (Creswell, 2003).

According to the definition of mixed method research this concept englobes the use of quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data in this case, as it will be exposed later on, includes economic data, statistics on social welfare, among others that will cover circumstantial closed questions in the case studies. Meanwhile the qualitative data consists of open-ended information that it will be gathered by academic studies, journalist analysis among others that will be explained in the following subchapter. It is not sufficient to collect and analyse the qualitative and quantitative data, but they need to be mixed and interpreted in order to provide a complete picture of the problem that drives this thesis. By mixing this data sources, a door is open for a better understanding of the cases study analysis. There are three different ways in which the data can be mixed: connecting the two data sources, merging the two data sources by bringing them together or embedding one data within the other in a way that one type of data provides a supportive role for the other one (Creswell, 2006). The following graphic defines the embedded method used in this thesis regarding the mixing data:




Figure 1. Personal adaptation from the graphic “three ways of mixing quantitative and qualitative data” of (Creswell, 2006)

The strategies associated with mixed method research recognize that all methods have limitations and, therefore, mixing different types of data provide a richer coverage of the problem. Inside this approach, several perspectives can be followed, namely, sequential procedures, concurrent procedures and transformative procedures. For this thesis, the concurrent procedure is selected:

The concurrent procedures are those in which the researcher converge quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. In this design, the investigator collects both forms of data at the same time during the study and then integrates the information in the interpretation of the overall results. Also, in this design, the researcher nets one form of data within another, larger data collection procedure in order to analyse different questions or units in an organization (Creswell, 2003).

To sum up the mixed method research that will be followed in this master thesis is based on a pragmatic knowledge claim –problem-centred, pluralistic and real-world oriented. Concurrent procedure is a collection of both quantitative and qualitative data and mixing of those sources under an embedded mixing procedure. In this particular case, the qualitative sources occupies the majority of the text meanwhile quantitative data acts as a tool to facilitate the overall interpretation of the case study.

Data Collection

In this thesis, a descriptive and analytical research will be carried out in order to understand if the populism in Venezuela and Argentina had offered an alternative new model to the political system they have claimed to substitute.

The qualitative approach, which will drive the majority of the project content, focus on processes and meanings that cannot be empirically examined or measured in the standards terms of amount, quantity or frequency (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). The most common sources are observation, interviews, review of documents, open-ended processes and audio-visual material (Creswell, 2009). The qualitative research data is an exploratory process based on a description of the problem stated. For this specific thesis, the qualitative source used will be the review of documents and audio-visual material. More specifically, the data will be gathered from specialized research papers, interest national agents as NGO's press releases, investigative journalism information published on media, governmental memos, interviews offered by the populist leaders in either visual or written media, their speeches before and after the arrival at power and published political strategies and electoral programs. The main objective of this approach is to offer the reader an interpretative and naturalistic approach, trying to provide sense in a theoretical and analytical frame of the new rise of populism in Argentina and Venezuela in the XXI century together with its development in power.

As this thesis uses a mixed method research with an embedded approach, the quantitative data is very important in order to offer support and effectiveness to the qualitative data. The quantitative research is a method used to quantify numerically an issue of importance to be, in the case of social sciences, transformed in useable statistics (Wyse, 2011). In this specific case, the quantitative data used is data applied

to social and political spheres instead of a deterministic approach not applicable for the majority of the social sciences investigations. Therefore, the data selected will focus on statistical and analytical data performed in selected areas before and after the arrival of populism in Argentina and Venezuela in order to analyse effectively the veracity of the statements performed in the case studies. More specifically the quantitative data will cover statistics on demographic welfare, analysis on democratic performance and social rights achievements, redistribution of wealth, salary increase or decrease in the periods needed for an effective comparison and other data that may reflect the evolution and variation in the social protection. Moreover, economic measurements will take place as the GDP comparative along the years, data on corruption, the development of industry or other measures to decrease the extractive tendencies of the economy and investments.

Analysis of Populism and Reliability

For the analysis of populism, the author Flavia Freidenberg exposes a series of dimensions to address the topic in an effective way. In this master thesis, these dimensions are used as an analysis tool. Those parameters of analysis proposed by the author are (Freidenberg, 2007):

- a) *The context in which leadership emerges*: with a special focus on the political and economic situation inside and outside the borders of the case study where the leader begins its relation with the followers and arrives to power. This includes the mechanisms used by the leader to access institutional power. In this thesis, this dimension will be described in the case studies subchapters regarding the *traditional political model before* the arrival of the leader and the *initial model* of those leaders.
- b) *The nature of the leadership style*. This dimension explores the way the relation leader-follower functions considering the linkages and the intermediary organizations, if any. The case study subchapter *way of populism* will include this parameter.
- c) *The basis of social support and the kind of mobilization*. This guideline focuses on the followers' characteristics, real and symbolic and the rationale behind the leader's support. It also includes the way by which the leader mobilizes its

followers. Those factors will be analyzed in the *way of populism* and *model deployment* subchapters.

- d) *Discursive Strategies* that are used by the leader to legitimate its political action, by what means he appeals to the people and its characteristics used in the discursive formulation “us vs them”. This parameter will be presented in the subchapter *way of populism*.
- e) *Economic and political policies*. This is a guideline for the study of the policies deployed by the populist leader and will determine its populist orientation. This is a comparative tool in order to test if the case studies share the same political deployment or on the contrary, to discover which factors differentiate them. This dimension is explored in the subchapter *model deployment*.
- f) *The leader’s departure from power*. In this case the focus is given to the way the leader abandons power. Either if he has left power naturally by electoral means, or if the leaders has abandoned the institutional role in dramatic circumstances such as death, coup d’état or exile, among others. This dimension will be driven the end of the subchapter *the future prevalence of the model*. Furthermore, in this subchapter it will be also included the last events experienced by the model.

The reliability and validity in qualitative research investigations cannot be measured in absolute terms as a quantitative investigation would allow. Therefore, the reliability is a text as this is measured by *the examination of the stability or consistency of responses*. In order to offer an increase of the reliability of a thesis, a well-structured methodology needs to settle. Moreover the validity is based on the accurate findings and authenticity and credibility of the data analysis whose judgement corresponds to the readers of the text (Wyse, 2011).

Structure of the project

This thesis consists of seven chapters: introduction, methodology, a theoretical framework, a general context of the third wave of populism in the region, Argentina and Venezuela as case studies and, to conclude, a comparative analysis and a conclusion.

The introduction describes the general field of interest as a primary background before the statement of the problem, described in the problem formulation subchapter. This section is accompanied with accessory subchapters: the abstract and the list of abbreviations in order to facilitate the full comprehension of the text.

The methodology contains the research structure that is used for the elaboration of the thesis. More specifically, this chapter outlines a) a *research design*, where the case study approach is described, b) *mixed methods research* which be the essential approach for the data collection of the case studies and c) *data collection* where the type of evidence used to reinforce the analysis will be explored.

The theoretical framework is the chapter focused on the conceptualization of populism as a multifactor phenomenon used to provide a deeper academic perspective to the project. In the particular case of this conceptualization, the chapter will be divided in three subchapters in order to offer an extensive approach of the term populism not only regarding the leader spheres, which in this thesis will be based on the redefinition proposal of the author Flavia Freidenberg of “populism as a leadership style”; but also considering the population sector supportive of the leader considering populism, under Laclau’s view, “as an articulation of people’s demands” and the relation established between the leader and its followers under the subchapter “populism as a plebisciterian system” partly also covered by Freidenberg.

Before the empirical studies, the chapter of general context of the third wave of populism intends to give the reader a helicopter view on the situation of the overall region and its evolution regarding the emergence of populism in the XXI Century.

In order to perform a viable analysis and feasible conclusions for the case studies, both will be treated under the same pattern. The chapters will involve a description of the political model before the arrival of the new populism and the reasons that led this model to fall, the characterization of the initial model proposed by those governments, its deployment, and a deeper analysis on the particularities of each populist system together with a description on the current situation.

After the case studies exposition, a comparative analysis will take place resulting with the pertinent conclusion that intends to give the most accurate response possible to the problem formulated.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework set the basis to work rigorously with scientific concepts. It aims to offer a coordinate and coherent system of concepts, prepositions and theoretical approaches that allow addressing effectively the problem formulation under the scope of a social science investigation. The theoretical framework is used to drive the analysis and serve as a basis to test the level of contestation between the theory knowledge and empirical case studies.

The conceptualization of populism that will be driven this thesis is based on the perception of the Latin American populism of the XXI Century as a multifactor phenomenon that occurs due to the contextual confluence of diverse elements: a given context of dealignment, economic and social crisis; population demands; the arise of a leader and the articulation established between the leader and the follower.

Therefore in order to provide a broader approach of the concept three theories will be described. The leading role is taken by the conceptual reformulation of Freidenberg, “populism as a leadership style”. This theory provides a description on the characteristics of a populist leader, the articulation of its discourse and the communication maintained between the leader and its followers. In this sense the theory of Barr is used as complement to the theory of Freidenberg. In his theory, Barr categorizes the leader under different variables and describes different interpellation mechanisms in the relation leader-follower, some of them also included in the theory of Freidenberg and Laclau, and others innovative but not antagonistic to the theories previously described. In the same complementary line, the theory of Laclau, placing populism as an articulation of the people’s demands, proposes a concept of populism born, not due to the leader but due to the context given to a certain sector of the population. In this sense, the conceptualization of populism in this thesis underlines the need for a previous articulation of people’s demand in order to justify the appearance of the leader, the articulation of its discourse and the relation established with the population claiming for a change. The conception of Laclau covers certain areas with the same identification of factors as Freidenberg and Barr. However, his conception of the leader as the result of a signification process is not shared by the conceptualization of populism in thesis. On the contrary, the emergence of the leader is seen as a consequence of the convergence of several factors that appear in a same period of time.

Populism as leadership style

« La tarea clave para poder avanzar en el conocimiento empírico del populismo es poder encontrar las características necesarias (definidoras y definitorias) sin las cuales el concepto no tiene aplicabilidad. De ahí la necesidad de elaborar definiciones mínimas y operativas sobre el término »²

(Freidenberg, 2007, p. 23)

For this theoretical framework is selected the concept redefinition elaborated by Freidenberg that places populism as a leadership style. Under this scope, populism is understood exclusively in political terms regardless of the external conditions, types of policies implemented or the model selected for the national project, allowing its deployment in a broader range of circumstances. It is as vital for the conception as for this theoretical framework the relation settled between the leader and its followers. Therefore, this concept of populism focuses especially in the mechanism that enables, channel and facilitate the connection leader-follower such as the discursive interpellation and the followers' process of assimilation and interpretation of the leader messages.

More precisely, the interpretation given and used in this thesis is defined as follows:

"Populism is a leadership style characterized for the direct, charismatic, personalist and paternalist relationship established between leader and follower that does not recognize organizational and institutionalized mediation. The leader speaks on the behalf of the people and it potentiates the opposition "he" against "them" meanwhile its followers are convinced of the extraordinary qualities of the leader and believe that, thanks to them, the redistributive methods and/or the clientelist exchange that they have with the leader (both material and symbolic), they will be able to improve their personal situation or the situation that surround them"

(Freidenberg, 2007, p. 25)

Before entering deeper in the implication of the concept, it seems necessary to settle what is understood as leadership and what a populist leadership style stands for. Freidenberg differentiates three attributes a leader needs: a) the presence of a leader (the personal attitudes), b) the followers (the way they perceive the leadership, its own expectations, motivations, resources and demands) and c) the context where the relation leader-follower takes place.

² The key task to advance the empirical knowledge of populism is to find the necessary defining characteristics without which the concept has no applicability. Hence, there is the need to develop minimum and operational definitions of the term.

Regarding of what leadership stands for Freidenberg considers three different ways of influential relations performed by leaders and defined previously by Hermann in 1986 as: a) the *Pied Piper of Hamelin Leader* which is based on a leadership focused on the leader, its personal qualities, its seduction and its charisma; b) *The Leader Seller* where the focus is set in the relation maintained between the leader and its followers. In this relation the leader consider the demands and desires of its followers and act accordingly; c) *The Puppet Leader* focuses in the followers. Here the leader is only an instrument of the people's demands; d) *The Firefighter Leader* that appears in a crisis context with the aim of solving the situation (Freidenberg, 2007).

Therefore, the leadership style is a combination of the direct relation between the leader and its followers and the way in which the relation takes place. Under Freidenberg and Herman's vision, the populist leadership style is the combination of the *Pied Piper of Hamelin Leader* and the *Seller Leader* because it is the combination that gives sense to the clientelist relation established between the leader and its followers (Freidenberg, 2007).

Freidenberg has identified a series of characteristics inherent to the concept of populism as a leadership style and that are described as follows:

a) *A direct, charismatic, paternalist and patrimonial between the leader and the followers independent of any form of political intermediation (parties, unions, political movements or representation systems)*

The charismatic leader uses its personal qualities to act in an up-down manner maintaining a hyper personalized system in its own figure independent of any intermediary movement of institution, trying to keep the loyalty and the believe in its extraordinary qualities among its followers. The absence of intermediary channels in the relation leader-followers does not avoid the formation of clientelist structures and organizations of followers or opposition (Freidenberg, 2007).

The connection charisma-populist leadership is not clear. There are charismatic leaders that are not populists, although there is an intrinsic tendency between the populist leader and the charisma. Each charismatic demonstration varies from the social and historical context of each society and therefore, it is crucial to understand the circumstances surrounding the creation of the charismatic leadership (Freidenberg, 2007).

For Freidenberg, the charismatic leader is characterized by a series of elements inherent to definition of charisma. The first element is a legitimating principle of revolutionary nature that turns it into an unprecedented and extraordinary phenomenon that it is extrapolated to the leader and makes him someone “out of the ordinary” that it can be either religious or secular. The second element is the charismatic power that brings the creation of an organization that creates personal links based on loyalty that united in a direct way leader and follower. Moreover, the charismatic power generates the creation of social relations organizations that has no rules and neither a clear division from work tasks. Therefore, the loyalties and delegations of the authority are based on the arbitrary criteria. Another element is a discourse based on opposition “us vs them”, also noted by Laclau and Barr that place him as a leader with a mission: the duty to fulfil the demands of the population. The leader places himself above the individuals uniting them towards a common goal, with an emotional and communal message, selling it as a revolution (although, most of the times it tends to be mainly a reformist. The last element identifies is the leader needs, approval and support of its followers that need to show constantly through compelling evidence that increases its popularity (Freidenberg, 2007).

The role of the followers in the conception is as important as the role of the leader. The demands, expectations and interpretations of the followers are the basis and motor of the relation with the leader. For Freidenberg there are basic functions to be analysed related to the followers: the fixing of the aims, of the group, the creation of the structures needed to achieve those collective goals, maintaining and reinforcement of the structures, the historical context of previous relations established with the power, the ideology of the group, and its own understanding of democracy and the way institutions should function. This people’s dimension is covered by Laclau (Freidenberg, 2007).

The charismatic populist leader uses a discourse that places him as a self-made man, a common man who suffered the same problems the population suffered from in order to make the identification process more effective (Dorna, 2003). The discourse has an accessible language, not very elaborated and clear avoiding complex and academic concepts. It englobes in his discourse a well-defined ideology inserted in the great

contemporary world view ideologies –liberal, socialist or fascist- and it has its personal view of the world, pragmatic and eclectic, vague and in permanent reconstruction and redefinition (Freidenberg, 2007). For the populist, people are a discursive construction. The leader promises to give back the power to the people and redeem them from the domination of the political, economic and cultural elites (Arnson & de La Torre, 2013).

b) The followers' believe in the extraordinary qualities of the leader

The direct relation established between the leader and the followers has great part of emotional share but there is a basis of rationality. The charismatic leader tends to a real analysis of the situation with assumptions that fills the interest and claims of the group. The attitudes of the followers and the claims towards achieving a common aim drive a specific political culture. Although it is the leader the one with the biggest influence capacity towards the nature of the authority, the decision-making process, the types of relations and the channels the relation between the leader and the group take place (Freidenberg, 2007). The concept of people is a central in the way populism understands democracy (Arnson & de La Torre, 2013).

The link established between leader and group is emotional, symbolic and utilitarian, in the sense that the leader can incarnate the best option for the followers in a specific time frame. The leader represents the change it is asked for, including in the political process the group that previously was excluded. The population believes that the leader is able to change the situation, although there is no evidence to think otherwise (Freidenberg, 2007). Furthermore, *"the people are not only a source of political legitimacy but, also, the promise of redemption from oppression, corruption and banality"* (Canovan, 2002, pág. 125). The leader's legitimacy is not only based on the elections and a clear popularity (Arnson & de La Torre, 2013) but it is also based on the perception of the leader as an *"incarnation of the people itself"* (Torre & Peruzzotti, 2008, p. 110).

c) A rhetoric that appeals to the people, rejects the others and praises the relation "friend-enemy"

One of the clearest characteristics of a populist leadership is the use of a well-defined discourse where there is a constant appeal to the people, not as a group of individuals

with their manifestation of power in the elections but a homogenous group without room for individualism and bearer of positive and permanent qualities. It is an anti-individualist discourse that can only be produced in a context of antagonism “us, the people vs them”, an opposition approach with a rhetoric based on the ethical and moral confrontation people vs oligarchy, as Barr defines the “anti-establishment discourse”, differentiating the good against the bad. Therefore, the populist discourse has a strong tendency to gratify the people, self-affirmative and with a Manichean approach. The discourse established by the populist leader has its basis on unify the people against an enemy who is responsible for their misfortune. The identification of the responsible varies considering the political approach of the populist leader. Independently, this discursive mechanism is entitled to unify the people and reinforce the identification of the group in a game of sum-zero that divides civil society between: people and anti-people (Freidenberg, 2007).

d) The relation based in a clientelist and patrimonialism exchange

The clientelist practice does not only refer to the exchange of material favours but also symbolic favours which increase the identification process and the direct relation pattern leader-follower. The definition of Kettering englobes the essence of this practice:

“The term refers to a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers. These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources (money, jobs) to dependents and accomplishes in return their support and cooperation (votes) (Kettering, 1988)”

The clientelist practice apart from ensuring the identification of the followers with the leaders, access for an electoral support and direct relation, it also ensures the decrease of collective mobilizations. Although, the clientelist network is not present in any law, the populist state has it institutionalized. The lack of institutionalized resources to provide civil society access to them facilitates the creation and permanence of such networks (Freidenberg, 2007).

Freidenberg collects the findings of De la Torre regarding the characteristics needed for a clientelist relation (that does not need to be material it can also provide symbolic

power, such as rights) which are: the inequality of resources ownership or the influence marked in the relation leader-follower, the informal character attached, the both-sides and reciprocal dependency of the relation (Freidenberg, 2007).

e) Express rejection of any mediation of representative institutions or social organizations

The populist leaders, although they use the electoral system to arrive to power, they try to put aside the institutions in an attempt to affect the status quo and potentiate a direct relation with the followers (Freidenberg, 2007).

The populist leader can be presented to society by two methods: political party (or other organization) and the populist discourse. It is not mandatory for a populist to have a political party, but in case of having it there are three characteristics they may fulfil identified by Freidenberg: A) no one doubts who exercise the leadership because there never is a conflict that affects the leader's position; B) the party has a dominant coalition cohesive around the loyalty kept by the followers to the leader that are not able to question its leadership; C) the leader's will to choose the elites implies a high level of organizational centralization; D) the party does present bureaucratic patterns. The leader defines its ideological goals, the selection of the social basis, the doctrine and execution of the rules and the organizational development as Freidenberg collects from the Weber's definition of "charismatic party" (Freidenberg, 2007).

In contemporary times the *telepopulism* (Taguieff, 1997) is a new way to project the populist discourse. It does not guarantee the electoral success but it does project its ideology and contributes to the identification process with its followers and it functions as direct channels for communication leader-follower. In this sense

Freidenberg identifies patterns that allow identifying a discourse as populist, independently of the channel. Therefore, the populist discourse is recognizable if it appeals to the popular, promotes social hate to an elite or oligarchy that exercises power, it refers to the population as members of a collective affected by an external agent and reinforces of the traditional values. Likewise, it integrates of popular feeling as religion, interrelates to the frustrated and misfortunate situation of the group and potentiates in the discourse the direct relation with the leader aside of the representative channels. There is an explicit use of emotive mechanisms (hate,

happiness...) together with ecstatic body movements and a presentation of the leader as a man of the people, a self-made person with Manichean and moralist elements. Moreover, there is an obvious opposition to the dominant status quo, creation and appellation to numerous enemies, either real or symbolic (Freidenberg, 2007). In the discourse the people are not facing opponents but “moral enemies” (Arnson & de La Torre, 2013).

To conclude, Freidenberg identifies a series of attributes inherent to populism and that cannot be absent in populism understood as a leadership style: a) direct relation leader-follower, b) paternalistic , personalist and charismatic style that does not know organizational mediations; c) speak on the behalf of the people and potentiation the opposition “us vs them”; d) it is against the institutions of the representative democracy (at least in discursive terms) although he uses to achieve power and rule from them; e) the followers are convinced of the extraordinary qualities of the leader and believe that thanks to them and the clientelist exchange (material and symbolic) they will achieve an improvement in their personal or surrounding situation (Freidenberg, 2007).

The conceptualization of the populism used in this thesis places the leader, not as a consequence of the people’s demands, but as a contextual factor that captures the people’s demands and articulates them into a discourse and communication bias that allow the leader unify homogeneous parts of the population towards the same project. In this sense Laclau identifies the conditions given to theorise of the popular articulation of populist demands.

Populism as articulation of people's demands

Laclau, as Freidenberg, develops a revaluation of the populist concept. For this author populism is not a human practice that can be considered as a factor with clear divisions but, on the contrary, he defends that the *differentia specifica* is an inherent characteristic of this term (Verkerk, 2015). In the conception of Laclau, there are three theoretical propositions that need to be taken into account when referring to populism: A) *that to think the specificity of populism requires starting the analysis from units smaller than the group (whether at the political or at the ideological level)*; B) *that populism is an ontological and not an ontic category*, this means that does not entail political or ideological content but it refers to a *model of articulation either social, political or ideological*; C) *that the articulating form, apart from its contents, produces structuring effects which primarily manifest themselves at the level of the modes of representation* (Laclau, 2014). As a matter of fact, Laclau intends to construct a theory of populism focused on the generation of *equivalential linkages* that connect *disperse social and political demands* that need the creation of *floating and empty signifiers* as a mechanism to build a subjective identity to represent them (Howarth, 2015).

In his third model of hegemony, Laclau, estates that all social relations are built on *social undecidability* or *lack* that is not possible to be fulfilled. In order to fill this gap, a symbolic order is created as, in the case of populism, this symbolic order is generated by the creation of social antagonism that break society in two different and confronted camps. For this author, the articulation of populist demands by the people is a form of struggle for hegemony based on the creation of *empty signifiers* that represent the *absent fullness* of a social system, as it will exposed in this chapter (Howarth, 2015, pp. 2-18). Therefore, *"the logic of populist hegemony is nothing more than an investment in a partial object of a fullness which will always evade us because it is purely mythical"* (Laclau, 2005, p. 116).

For Laclau populism is a social logic and he presupposes an asymmetry between the society as a whole (community) and independent social actors that operate inside it (Laclau, 2014). The basis for this conception of populism is what Laclau identifies as *social demand* (Laclau, 2005, págs. 72-73). When people within a community experience injustice tend to relate to other individual citizens under the same

circumstances or with the same claims in order to demand to their authorities a change that allows the improvement of the situation they are living in (Verkerk, 2015). Considering this, the demands reflect the logic of *democratic demands* understood by Laclau, not as related specifically with the democratic regime, but those demands that *are formulated to the system by* those unlike to win the struggle. This confrontation is defined by *an equalitarian dimension implicit to them* and the very arise of those demands reflect a previous situation of *exclusion or deprivation* (Laclau, 2005, pág. 125). If the demands are solved consequently by the responsible organ, the demand remains as democratic. On the contrary, if the requests are rejected or ignored, the actors that had experience the rejection will join more strongly even with other groups that *a priori* does not claim the same change by that share the fact that their demands are unsatisfied. The unification is done by *negative* dimension focused in those powers that did not fulfil the demands. As a matter of fact, this social situation in which the requests are systematically found unsatisfied is the first precondition defined by Laclau for the articulation of what this author defines as populism (Laclau, 2014). The failure of the institutional structures to *stabilize meaning and identity* generates the perfect condition for the emergence of political actors that aim to reorder the social structure by asserting alternative myths attached to the people and building a *different collective social imaginary*. The order proposed is a pure proposition with an expansive approach that allows heterogeneous demands and identities to be englobed and represented (Howarth, 2015). Laclau exposes that through a generalized form of interpellation, considering that as the demonstration of their demands, a populist leader is able to transform people into political radical populist subjects that are systematically included in a confrontation against the status quo power in struggle for hegemony. The characteristic of this discourse are seen in Freidenberg theory (Krips, 2006).

Laclau uses the so-called *logic of equivalence* to define the fact that all the different demands (that in principal would be distinguishing elements) tend to accumulate and combine forming the *equivalential chain*. This means that the, in principal, different claims will join together in a larger set of social claims, independent but united under a popular subjectivity. For Laclau the subject of a demand conceived as a distinguishing element it is defined as *democratic subject*. Therefore, a subject constituted in the

basis of the demands aggregation logic will be recognized as a *popular subject*. Considering this, the disappearance of a popular subjectivity will take place when the social demands tend to be resolved by a successful institutional system. On the contrary, when the social demands are systematically being neglected by an unsuccessful institutional system, the equivalence links tend to become stronger and the conditions are created for the arising of a popular subjectivity and therefore, a populist rupture. Laclau underlines the fact that equivalential popular discourses divide the social into two camps: power and underdog. This is seen by Freidenberg as the discourse us vs them and by Barr as the anti-establishment discourse (Laclau, 2014).

In this regard, Laclau identifies two correlated features for the rupture of populism: the division of the social space through the creation of an *internal frontier* and the construction of an equivalential chain between the neglected demands. The popular demands have an *anti-institutional* character (Laclau, 2014) because they divide the society into two antagonistic camps: the established order and the populist camp (people's camp) where all the articulated demands come from. The established order is a set of demands that obtained certain institutional fixity with the result that their claims and way of thinking are, in what Gramsci called, *common sense*. On the contrary the populist camp claims that the demands are *for the people* and they are created in an antagonistic approach to the established order. Therefore, there is a problem of representation that increases the discourse of the popular camp and generates a collective identity, defined for Laclau as *popular identity* (Krips, 2006). Indeed, there is no populism without a discourse mechanism that potentiates the construction of a common enemy. As a matter of fact, the transformation of the discourse implicitly changes the nature of the demands from being democratic request to be *fighting demands* (*reivindicaciones*) (Laclau, 2014). The conception of representation developed by Laclau is not restricted to the practices of the liberal democracies. It also involves a complicated mechanism of constructing identities and interest (Howarth, 2015).

The disenchantment of the population triggers the construction of two antagonistic poles with claims that aim to subvert the institutional or political established order.

This situation is defined by Laclau as a *classic experience of populism or revolutionary rupture* that he justifies under the types of crisis of representation defined by Gramsci as *organic crises*. In the moment when the populist rupture success in getting to the institutional power, the differential logic runs by the old status quo and the *equivalential popular identity* decreases in its effectivity and starts developing an inoperative *langue de bois* or *wooden language* (Laclau, 2014). The process of constructing a universal popular signification is crucial for the understanding of Laclau's populism. A particular demand, without abandoning its particularity, becomes the representative of the demand chain as a totality; it is what Laclau calls *hegemony*, a process of formation of a popular identity. For Laclau the *empty signifier* (produced by the unification of demands under a particular one) has as a consequence that the popular identity becomes stronger and fuller in extensional parameters, to embrace demands that are heterogeneous, at the expense of becoming intentionally poorer (Laclau, 2014). That is: *a popular identity functions as a tendentially empty signifier* (Laclau, 2014). The *empty* signifiers are defined as *points of fixation* that are able to embrace very heterogeneous and even contradictories demands in a precarious consensus (Howarth, 2015). At the extreme side of the process, the *homogenisation function* is accomplished by one single name: the name of the leader.

To identify populism, there needs to be a series of *politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject*. The precondition of the emergence of such a subject is, as it was stated, *the building up of that division frontier dividing the social space into two camps*. The logic of that division is generated by the *equivalential chain between a series of social demands* under a situation that favours the creation of an *empty signifier* (Laclau, 2014). In this sense, Barr's conceptualization of populism offers different categorizations of the discourse, appeals and linkages set to establish the relation needed between the leader and follower to build the populist discourse based on the people's demands.

Populism as plebisciterian system

The author Robert R. Barr covers the populist phenomena with three key factors: the appeals used to build support, the linkages established between the citizens and the politicians and the location of the political actors in regard of the party system. These different dimensions provide the investigator with complementary tools to the two previous theories in order to analyse the populist development (Barr, 2009).

Regarding the appeals that build political support, for Barr as well as for Laclau, the context of high public disenchantment with the political system are advantage situations for political actors with anti-establishment discourses. This context is named by Barr as a dealignment process where *a large portion of the electorate abandons its previous partisan affiliation, without developing a new one to replace it*. On the contrary, the redirection of the votes from a large part of the electorate to a new political force is defined by Barr as realignment. The anti-establishment discourse refers to *the rhetorical appeal used in opposition to the elite*. Under this speech the leader focuses on a specific conflict as a *society's fundamental cleavage* which is generally made by the element "us vs them" (Barr, 2009) and the message that politics has *escaped popular control* and the population is silenced by *corrupt politicians and unrepresentative elite* this element is connected with the assimilation of demands described by Laclau (Canovan, 2002, p. 27). This sort of rhetoric has as a main objective to build support. This rhetorical appeal is not exclusive of populists but it is a characteristic very close to them. The anti-establishment discourse has a semi-loyal position towards the institutional system.

Another appeal is the so-called *anti-politics or anti-system politics*. The main differentiation between the anti-establishment discourse and the anti-politics is that the anti-politics challenge the political system as a whole. This appeal constitutes a disloyal opposition towards the system. In this regard, the disloyal position would be that against the overall system, while a loyal position would be offered by an anti-incumbent appeal. The first one is attacking the overall system and the latter is only opposing to an incumbent government (Barr, 2009)

Considering the location of the political actor regarding the party system; Barr makes the differentiation within outsiders, insiders and mavericks. The outsider is *someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established competitive party but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties* (Barr, 2009, p. 33). On the other hand, insiders are politicians who began and progressed within the effective parties in the political system. A position in between is held by the political actor defined as a maverick. A maverick is a politician with previous experience in an effective political party within the system but that in a certain moment abandons the party to compete as an independent, it associates with an outsider party or it radically reformulates the basis of its own party (Barr, 2009).

The linkages are vital for the understanding of the relation established between the followers and the leader. For this author the linkages can either be programmatic linkages or, those defined by Lawson as clientelism, directive participatory, electoral and, within the latter, the described by Canovan as plebiscitarianism.

The programmatic linkages are those established within the party platform and its basis. The loyalty is based on ideological or programmatic commitments. The party platforms are created in order to give a reason to voters to support the party. It is not an interaction citizen-party *per se*.

The linkages identified by Lawson are based in a more interactive connection (Lawson, 1988). In this regard clientelism, also covered by Freidenberg, is a relation established and based on the exchange of material or symbolic elements for support. This linkage creates a patron-client network that, although provide long-standing forms of linkages it can turn a populist model into a patronage-based party. Directive linkages, on the other hand, are those based on coercion in order to control the population. Regarding the participatory linkages are those that offer mechanism for popular participation. In this case, the constituents have a role in governance, a capacity of influence in the policy-making process by having the capacity to initiate proposals. The last linkage defined by Lawson is the electoral linkage which is characterized by the availability of those in specific moments in time, namely, the elections. This linkage does not offer a deep interaction and it reduces the citizens mainly to the role of judges by measuring the government actions in form of turnouts (Barr, 2009).

The purer variation of the electoral linkage is plebiscitarianism. This linkage shares the same mechanisms as the electoral linkages, in terms of its short periodicity and the fact that the choice is given by the policy makers while the population have to choose from already given possible replies. Nevertheless, this sort of linkages offer the citizens a substantial control over the system, as the plebiscites are generally use to test the legitimacy of the leader and to test the rate of approval in controversial government dilemmas. Plebiscitarianism is related to direct democracy but it is also connected with the confirmation of the leader as a direct representative of the people by excluding from the political decision process the rest of the political parties. Plebisciterian linkages tend to emphasize the *personalism* of the populist leader in the sense that offer an unmediated representation. Although the concept of plebiscitarianism refers to direct democracy, the concept has been devaluated to a superficially, *merely formal and illusionary* process of policy making (Green, 2009). One of the reasons is that this phenomenon also leads to the loyal association to the individual leader instead of a set of ideologies, rules or representative organs. Academics as Barney, Laycock and Hayward consider plebiscitarism as an instrument for manipulation of the constituents due to lack of empowerment of public and institutional deliberation and reasoning (Barr, 2009).

The plebisciterian linkages are considered by Decker as a kind of *inbuilt populism in the contemporary representative democracies*. It is directly related to the most radical populist. Plebiscitarianism is seen as a *decisionism* political mechanism where the basis of a unitary will of people replaces public and institutional deliberation. For this author, the use of plebisciterian mechanisms implies the rejection of constitutional-representative model of democracy (Frank, 2006).

Considering the previous subchapter, Barr defines populism as:

“Populism is the specific combination of appeals, location and linkages that suggests a correction based on enhanced accountability rather than increased participation. More specifically, it is a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebisciterian linkages”

(Barr, 2009, p. 38)

GENERAL CONTEXT: THE THRID WAVE OF POPULISM

It's not possible to understand the political Latin America's arena without the existence of populism. Authors as De la Torre claim that populism cannot be understood as a temporal phenomenon born as a result of a crisis or destabilizing causes (De la Torre, 1994). For Freidenberg populism is the only political tool by which popular classes can influence the political elite (Freidenberg, 2007).

After a long process of transformation, the electoral cycle 2002-2009 confirms the evolution of democracy in Latin America, although the coups d'état against Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002, Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009, Rafael Correa in Ecuador 2010 and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2012 indicate the polarization of certain societies and the need for democratic reinforcement. The electoral trend during this period has shown the general and unprecedented tendency towards social-democrats and populist governments that share in common policies regarding social inclusion, democratic participation and fight against inequality (Gratius S. , 2009).

The Latin American populism over time maintains three factors that characterize its arrival. On one side, the political culture system of patronage-based networks, clientelism to attract political support. On the other side, other factor is weak states with an extractivist economy and no other alternative industrialization activity that makes them highly vulnerable to external market fluctuations. And, the third and last factor identified is the incapacity shown by the political elites to provide their nations with stable social representation and sense of citizenship and belonging (Gratius S. , 2007). The lack of representation increases in societies with large sectors of the population living under poor conditions which are traditionally neglected from political participation.

The populist phenomenon is an important part of Latin American recent history. In the case of this region, the populist movements appear in a context of economic, social and representation crisis and go by hand with the disenchantment of the population towards the political class (Gratius S. , 2009). In the recent history of Latin America and, considering the public policies implemented, three populist waves can be identified chronologically through the region: national populism, neo-populism and left-wing populist wave (Gratius S. , 2007).

The first wave of populism defined as *national populism* arose between 1940 and 1950, under the context of the Import Substitution Industrialization marked by policies with a strong governmental intervention character. Examples of leaders under this type of populism are Juan Diego Perón (1946-1955; 1973-1974) in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945; 1951-1954) in Brazil (Gratius S. , 2007).

The second wave of Latin American populism, named as *neo-populism* appeared through 1980 and 1990. It was characterized by neo-liberal economic policies driven by the Washington Consensus. These policies aimed to reduce the size of the state and influence on the economy, social cutbacks and privatisation of state companies. This measure had created a deep political, economic and, above all, social crisis that led to the next form of populism. For instance, some examples of those leaders are Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989-1999), Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) in Peru and Carlos Andrés Pérez in his last mandate (1989-1993) in Venezuela (Gratius S. , 2007).

The third wave of populism called *left-wing populism* was initiated with the election of Hugo Chávez Frías in Venezuela in 1998 and continues nowadays. It was born as a direct consequence of the rejection of the neo-liberal measures driven by the previous system. The policies implemented by these populists have in common the re-establishment and increase of state intervention in all areas but especially on the economy, nationalization of natural resources, increase of popular participation and educational and health programs. Under this denomination are Hugo Chávez (1998-2013) in Venezuela, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernandez (2007-2015) in Argentina, Evo Morales (2005-) in Bolivia and Rafael Correa (2007-) in Ecuador (Gratius S. , 2007).

The third wave of populism it is also characterized by the use of collective symbols in order to unite the masses under the same aim. The selection of those symbols varies depending on the cultural identity of each country. The rejection and blaming of the national and foreign elite or oligarchy is also a shared characteristic. In this case the polarization of the population is explicit under a discourse with a great impetus in the formulation “us vs them”. With the exemption of Argentina, the rest of the countries within the wave had gone through constituent processes to create a new Constitution. This practice aimed to create a state based on a participatory/direct democracy, a

tendency towards the increase of the executive power and reinforcement of *presidencialism*. Moreover, under this populist approach, the defence of independence, sovereignty and patriotism places an important role. This leads to a clear position, more or less externalized, against the so-called *US Imperialism*. Meanwhile Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia maintain a more belligerent position. Argentina under Kirchner has kept a lower profile but a clear rejection of the Washington consensus policies (Gratius S. , 2007).

Therefore, and considering the previous exposed, the third wave of populism can be identified as a movement with a close relation to the historical national populism of the middle of the century but preserving differentiating characteristics that enable a new trend.

The populism deployed in Bolivia is defined under a nationalist and refoundational ethnic approach to populism led by the Aymara and representative of the coca-growers, Evo Morales. Bolivia is the poorest country in South America, without a long populist tradition, is the only one presenting a majority of indigenous population. This popular sector has been neglected systematically from political representation, although it has a strong tendency for civil society mobilization. Considering this, the indigenous movement and the ethnic identity places a crucial role in the populist rule of Morales government and it became more relevant than the president's charisma. Evo Morales created a new Constitution, governs through plebiscites and has strong populist appeals that lead to the polarization of society (Gratius S. , 2007).

The populism in Ecuador follows its own path under the leadership of the charismatic and outsider leader, Rafael Correa. He, as well, changed the constitution with a high level of population support during his first mandate. He also has a strong support from the indigenous movements. This country has a considerable dependence on oil, which constitutes the 35% of the state revenue. This natural source has been used under this government to exercise power internally and externally. Ecuador entered again in the OPEC during Correa's mandate. This leader uses an anti-establishment discourse, has reinforced the executive power and developed numerous social programs and deep reforms of the institutions. Both Bolivia and Ecuador share a strong inwards look towards Latin American integration (Gratius S. , 2007).

VENEZUELA

Traditional political model before Hugo Chávez arrived to power

“Vendrán nuevas situaciones y el país tiene que enrumbarse definitivamente hacia un futuro mejor. (...) Solidario les agradezco su lealtad y yo ante el país y ante ustedes, asumo la responsabilidad de este movimiento militar bolivariano.”
Hugo Chávez, Press conference after the coup attempt in 1992

In the 23th of January 1958 the recent democratic tradition began in Venezuela with the creation of the *Pacto de Punto Fijo*, signed on the 31th October 1958. This political agreement set the basis for a long political system marked by the *turnismo*³ in power of civil governments in Venezuela that lasted until 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez Frías (Cruz and Rojas, 2005).

The agreement of governability was possible due to consensus achieved by the main political actors involved, the parties AD, COPEI and URD, remaining over time only AD and COPEI in a bipartisanship system. Moreover, this pact included the Catholic Venezuelan Church with the signature in 1964 of the *Convenio entre Venezuela y la Santa Sede*, the business sector (FEDECAMARAS) and the workers union (CTV) under the pact *Avenimiento Obrero-Patronal* signed in 1958 and with the support of part of the military forces. However, the Communist Party, who played a vital opposition role against the previous dictatorship was neglected from the pact due to the incompatibility of its proposal with the new propositions presented by the AD, COPEI and URD. The new political system was based on basic consensus points and institutionalization patterns such as: the acceptance of the party system diversity, a minimum and common program to govern, the agreement for the reduction of the “systemic opposition” in order to maintain the national stability and the promise of political inclusion from the rest of the political parties (Cárdenas, 2012).

The main objective of this pact was to provide long term stability to the country and avoid the triennium (1945-1948) where a government of AD under Rómulo Gallegos governed without consensus which led to a major instability and ended up in a military coup. This military intervention, preceding the *Pacto de Punto Fijo*, was perpetrated by

³ *Turnismo* is the orchestrated exchange of power between the main political parties.

the Minister of Defence, Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, with Luis Llovera Páez and Marcos Pérez Jiménez. (Cruz and Rojas, 2005)

The basis of the political and legal system of Venezuela until 1999 were based on the *Pacto de Punto Fijo* and the Constitution approved in 1961 under the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt. The political system implemented had a corporatist tendency due to the participation vote given to the business and workers representatives in the decision making process regarding, above all, economic and social policies. The radical problem of this corporatist consensus was to give Fedecámaras and the CTV the monopoly of the social representation neglecting the right to participation to other sectors of the civil society not able to join the two big representative organs. (Canelón and González, 1998)

Besides, this political model created after the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez, was characterized for being a “party democracy” where the membership to the selected parties was the only way to have political influence and where the parties were the only mechanisms to channel civic demands. (Canelón and González, 1998)

The statism and the centralism are also characteristics for this model. The political system created made the state the basic player for the economic development of the country. They initiated the Import Substitution Industrialization with a strong role of the extractivist economy centred in the oil production and the use of the oil revenues to build the state as the redistributor of the national wealth between those supporters of the regime. The bipartisanship used systematically the distributive practice of wealth in order to reconcile interest and maintain the political stability. The use of this practice, clientelism, is a structural practice of this bipartisanship regime (Sabino, 2005). An example of this practice is the creation of artificial state jobs in 1970 creating a surplus of hired professionals of over the 60% (304.988 people) of the real demand. (Baptista, 2005)

The most dangerous characteristic of this period was the definition of the state as a *petro-state*. Venezuela was highly dependent on the oil revenues which generated the vulnerability social stability in the periods where the market was not favourable to this product. The petro-state is defined as a political practice that is based on the transformation of the oil revenues into political power. It converts the control over the

oil income into state control generating a feedback cycle complicated to overcome, above all, in the case of Venezuela. This nation started the oil industry at the beginning of the last century, transitioning from an economy based on agriculture, to become a worldwide major oil producer. Venezuela during the *Punto Fijo* regime became dependent on the tax income derived from the sale of crude oil in order to pay the clientelist networks (Cárdenas, 2012).

The causes of the fall of this democratic regime can be summarized as follows: the system of resources and perks redistribution that allowed the social stability in a clientelist practice decreased with the decline of the oil economy. The second cause was the deterioration of the homogeneity generated by the elite pact due to the explosion of diverse social actors and other syndicalist actors that claimed part in the political arena. The third cause, the disenchantment of the population was continued and upward over time as the statistics prove at the end of this section. (Canelón & González, 1998)

The first coup d'état of the *Punto Fijo* regime was perpetrated on the 4th of February 1992 by four army lieutenant colonels: Hugo Chavez, Francisco Arias Cárdenas, Yoel Acosta Chirinos and Jesús Urdaneta. Moreover, on the 27th of November 1992, another coup took place directed by Hernán Grüber Odremán, Luis Enrique Cabrera Aguirre, Luis Reyes, and Francisco Visconti Osorio with the support of the parties *Bandera Roja* and *Tercer Camino*. Both attempts failed but Carlos Andrés Pérez, president at the moment was not destitute until 1993 under accusations of corruption (Canelón & González, 1998).

The caracazo in 1979, a popular protest by the poorest sectors of the population against the neoliberal measures implemented by the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez, lasted from the 27th of February to the 8th of March 1992 causing the death of hundreds of people due to the repressive military reaction. This is a clear evidence of the dealignment process the population was going through. The neoliberal readjustment strategy of Carlos Andrés Pérez's last mandate was seen by the population, not as a solution, but as a worsening mechanism for their actual situation. After Pérez abandoned power in 1993, the faith of the system was focused on Caldera's administration. However, his decision to keep the neoliberal measures of Pérez under the name of *Venezuelan Agenda* deepened even more the trust of the

population on the capacity of the regime. The *electoral abstention* in the national elections shows graphically the disenchantment of the population towards the *Punto Fijo regime* and underlines its decline (Canelón & González, 1998) :

Year	Voters	Abstention
1968	4.134.928	5.64%
1973	4.737.122	3.48%
1978	6.223.903	12.44%
1983	7.777.892	12.25%
1988	9.185.647	18.08%
1993	9.688.795	39.84%
1998	11.013.020	36.54%

Source: Own elaboration based on (Romero, 2001)

The *Punto Fijo* regime at the end of its cycle left an economy with great deficiencies, macroeconomic, due to the inflation rates, and social. The rate of households under the poverty line was 48.1% while the people under the poverty line were 54.48% (Weisbrot, Sandoval, & Rosnick, 2006). The unemployment rate percentage was 10.6% and the primary school dissertation had a rate of 30% (República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2010). To reflect the situation between the year 1980 and 1995, the HDI indicator can better englobe the general situation of the country.

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011PPP \$)	HDI value
1980	68.2	10.0	4.9	19.924	0.639
1985	69.2	10.5	5.1	14.951	0.643
1990	71.1	10.5	4.8	14.448	0.644
1995	71.9	10.8	5.3	15.1997	0.660

Source: (UNDP, 2014)

Hugo Chávez's initial model for Venezuela

"Nosotros debemos pararnos, allá arriba en el Ávila, y mirar doscientos años atrás y decir: Bolívar, no araste en el mar, aquí estamos tus hijos haciendo realidad tu sueño de patria grande (...)"

Hugo Chávez, speech's extract in the program of TeleSUR *Presidentes de Latino América* (2010)

Hugo Chávez had started his political journey in 1982 with a clandestine and revolutionary movement in the military forces under the name MBR-200 with which he orchestrated the coup of 1992. After the coup, Chávez was in jail for two years and from there he started a strategy based on the call for electoral abstention, call that was clearly successful, not only because of Chávez's charisma, but also as a direct consequence of the population dealignment.

Due to the national restriction to use any name related to Bolívar in the political run after 1992, Chávez and his followers needed to modify the name of the MBR-200 in order to run for the elections of 1998. Therefore, in 1997, the name of the *Movimiento Quinta República* (MVR) was born together with a political-electoral structure more in accordance with the national circumstances (Romero, 2001).

The initial model followed by Hugo Chávez with the MRB-200 from 1982 until 1996 was based on a discourse "us vs them" keeping an insurrectionary perspective. This discourse claimed for a violent exit from the national crisis as the coup attempt proved. Under this period, the vision of Chávez regarding the system was that it did not offer enough democratic bias to allow a system change that could satisfy the population and end the overall national crisis (Romero, 2001). The model changed radically with the election, in December 1995, of Francisco Arias Cárdenas supported by the party *Causa Radical* (*Radical Cause*) - militant in the MRB-200 and active actor in the 1992 coup- as the governor of the State of Zulia, removing from power the traditional parties AD and COPEI. The possibility of getting factual power in the institutions generated the second model designed by Hugo Chávez before arriving in power in 1998. The opportunity to govern gave the movement the chance to prove the democratic spirit of the insurgents of 1992 (Romero, 2001). With this change in the political scenario Chávez created an electoral mechanism that could englobe civil society in it (Muñoz, 1998).

His proposals before arriving to power in 1998 were characterized mainly by the ground-breaking discourse towards the *Punto Fijo* regime, and the emphasis on the need for a historical process to change the political system through a Constituent Assembly in order to reform radically the apparatus of state's power. (Romero, 2001)

The specific proposals for the national elections of 1998 were content in the *Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana* (AAB) signed in 1996 by Hugo Chávez Frías. This document placed in the spotlight the neoliberal measures implemented by the Venezuelan government from 1980 and the fourth "oligarchic" republic. In the AAB he identifies three problematic pillars: the neoliberal/capitalist regime, the poverty (social crisis, extreme poverty and regressive income distribution) and the denationalization (foreign debt and oil opening and privatizations). To fight these matters, the AAB proposes (Chávez, *Agenda alternativa Bolivariana*, 1997):

- Overall the creation of a new system alternative to capitalism with a humanistic, integral, holistic and ecological focus.
- A restructuration of the State, including all the political system through a reconstitution or refunding of the National Power.
- The macrosocial imbalances will be a priority over the macroeconomic imbalances.

The basic human needs will be placed in the first actions:

- Increase in the short term the quality level of the Venezuelan population: physical needs (health, alimentation and housing), social needs (equality...), cultural needs (education...) and political needs (participation and leadership)
- Contribute to the claim of national sovereignty and reaffirmation of Venezuela's sovereignty.
- A *Proyecto de Transición Bolivariana* (*Bolivarian Transition Project*) for the short and medium term objectives of justice, equality and freedom and the *Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar* (*National Simon Bolivar Project*)
- Economy model *humanistic* and *self-managed*. In a short-term proposes to transform the full dependence of oil into the *true* axis of *industrialization, development, independence* and *reverts the denaturalization process of the oil industry* through the oil internalization.
 - Oil internalization based on the State's property and control of the industry.

- The ABB proposes a five sectors ownership scheme for the socioeconomic model: “basic and strategic factories” own by the state, “essential consumer goods and essential services” (health and education, among others) mixed ownership, “bank systems and finance” mixed but regulated and controlled by the state. “Industry generating good and services not essential”, mostly private ownership.
- Regarding education it is proposed the *Plan Alterno Simón Rodríguez* to achieve the democratization in the education, culture, science and technology with a social welfare approach and the integral transformation of the educational system towards the infancy and the youth. It was also proposed the *National Rescue Program Training-Educational* to include the overall society in the educational process in different forms: schools, circles and workshops.
- Dealing with the problem of the foreign debt is placed in a priority line to avoid deepened the crisis. The proposal by the MVR goes from trying to restructure the foreign debt and modify the parameters of payment in a way that allows the government, to deploy the new changes to negotiate the cancellation of the debt. It was also proposed the restructuration of the public spending in consonance with the national objectives.
- For the ABB the social policy is a priority and, therefore, national plans are proposed to address the most problematic matters in their view: employment (*National Employment Plan*), Social security (*Bailout Plan for Social Security*), public health (*Integral Health Program for all*), housing (*Emergency Housing Plan*), redistribution of income (*Special Adjustment plan and equalization for the distribution of wealth*), social integration system (*Reintegration social plan*) and public security (*National Plan of public safety and shelter save*).

As it was seen in this subsection, Hugo Chávez’s initial model proposed to overcome the crisis Venezuela was based on the creation of a new political model with a radical reform of the political power, the economic and social system. The main ideological driver of this new model is to re build the Venezuela sovereignty. Under the deep Venezuelan crisis, Chávez offers a brand new system that intends to eradicate neoliberal measures –the austerity measures prescribed in the Washington Consensus- and include sectors of civil society, before marginalized.

Hugo Chávez's version of populism: Radical Socialist Populism

"You are not going to re-elect Chávez really, you are going to re-elect yourselves, the people will re-elect the people. Chávez is nothing but an instrument of the people"

Hugo Chávez, (2006 cited by Howkins, 2007:2)

Chávez was an *outsider* to the political system under Barr's categorization. Regarding the type of leader considering its behaviour described by Freidenberg, Chávez is identified as a *Pied Piper of Hamelin* as his leadership and his movement is highly dependent on his charisma, ability to perform inspiring discourses and his natural qualities. However, he can be also identified as a *Leader Seller* and a *Firefighter Leader* if we consider the important focus set by Chávez in articulate a direct relation with his followers. He considers the demands of the population and acts consequently as it will be stated in the following chapter. Regarding the second notion, Chávez appears in a crisis context and aims to solve the situation with an alternative political model.

Under the same scope of Freidenberg, Chávez contents charismatic elements of a populist leader. He presents his model as a revolutionary phenomenon, which makes him someone "outside of the ordinary" and his movement unprecedented. His charismatic power also impulses the creation of grass-roots organizations that have no clear division or rules, parallel to the traditional organizations. Furthermore, he places himself as a representation of the population, *an instrument of the people* in order to fulfil their demands.

The articulation of the Bolivarian discourse changed over time from moderate in the first mandate, to a radical discourse initiating the Bolivarian revolution and the socialism of the XXI century after the coup d'état in 2002. The polarization discourse identified by Laclau, Freidenberg and Barr intensifies over time. Chávez's populist discourse has a strategic use of the nationalistic symbols, especially the use of the national liberator Simón Bolívar which occupied a strong role in the discourse named as *Bolivarian*. The use of Simón Bolívar -which is a historical figure that incarnates the national unity of Venezuela and even Latin America under *La Patria Grande* (The great fatherland) - provides Chávez's discourse with a legitimization source and *empty signifiers*. Although the strong basis is Simón Bolívar, the tree of his discourse has another two roots, namely Simón Rodríguez and Ezequiel Zamora. Such strategy defines this appeal as *ancestralism* (Villa, 2005). Therefore, Chávez discourse has a

reinforcement of the traditional values combining them with the integration of popular feelings.

The characteristics of the *Bolivarian* discourse match with the Latin American trend of *neopopulism*. Chávez uses an anti-establishment discourse against the *enemies of the people*, namely the political and business class, the transnationals, the imperialism and the IMF (Patriau, 2012). Following the criteria of Freidenberg and Laclau it is possible to identify two main characteristics in the *Bolivarian* discourse: personalism and polarization. The personalism is Laclau's first criteria, and identifies the central role of the discourse in the idea of the people (Espinal, 2013). For Chávez the people are the majority of the population, meaning the marginalized and poor sectors of the society (Patriau, 2012). Therefore, as Freidenberg and Laclau identified for the populist discourse, there is a popular appeal, a direct blame of the people's situation to the identified as adversaries and there is a strong element of polarization.

The crucial approach is based on "us vs them"-under Laclau named as equivalential popular discourses- a polarization discourse that divide the social camp in two confronting poles. In this case Chávez's discourse is based on the confrontation and it uses the threat of these *enemies* as a mechanism of people unification (Espinal, 2013). Indeed Chávez bases his leadership in offering justice and dignity to the neglected masses. As a matter of fact, his discourse is a maniquean discourse, zero-sum game, where all the virtues belong to the majority and the negative assumptions and blame on the situation to the elites. In order to be able to use the antagonist discourse "us vs them", the leader, in this case Chávez, shows himself as a self-made man, a man that "comes from the low class". He also emphasized the multiracial composition of his family that shares with the common Venezuelan national identity: the native, the black and the white (Patriau, 2012). He uses expressions that identify him as one more among the people (Ellner, 2004) and the representation of the majority "*Chávez no soy yo, Chávez es el pueblo*" (AlbaTV, 2013). Considering the identification of an enemy, the appeal to the people and the self-identification of a person that comes from the marginalized class places the *Bolivarian* discourse and a *pure populist discourse* (Patriau, 2012).

There is a special element that gives *Bolivarian* discourse, a differentiation tool from other populist rhetoric, the appeal for revolution. By revolution, Chávez refers to the

concept introduced in 2004 in order to name the revolutionary change in the political agenda under the principles of, what Chávez defined as, *socialism of the XXI century*. The utilization of this concept will become gradually more important in the way Chávez performed populism. This implied a greater implication of the state in the economy, more extensive land reforms and innovative forms of local and regional government together with more anti-poverty measures (Espinal, 2013).

As we have seen in the theoretical framework, populism is much more than the singular ability of the leader to attract the people it claims to represent. Populism can also, and in the Venezuelan case, it does, come from a sector of the population under what Laclau defends as populism as an articulation of the people's demands.

The *Caracazo* represents the first turning point that manifests the break of Venezuelan civil society with the political elite. The violent political repression to the *Caracazo* riots structured what Laclau defined as *equivalential relations* among the Venezuelans and ended in a common shared feeling of frustration. The joint perception and consequent demands focused on the lack of representation from *Punto Fijo* regime and its leaders. This confrontation marked the Laclau's *antagonist frontier* between the representatives of the *establishment* and the constituents with the transformation of the demands into *fighting demands* due to their anti-institutional character.

The second turning point is the coup d'état against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez on the 4th of February 1992 staged by the lieutenant colonel, Hugo Chávez Frías. Although the attempted failed, the symbolic meaning for the marginalized people was extremely powerful. Instead of causing repulsion, an important part of the population admitted an implied consent. Chávez's televised speech after the coup attempt was the beginning of the unification of the population's demands under a *signification stable system*. Therefore, people's demands found in Chávez the leader able to defend the interests of the disenchantment population with its political regime and offered them the possibility of a real change, reflected under the words "for now" and "better future for the country" and the responsibility assumed, established itself in the populations mind (Colombet, 2015).

Chávez took advantage of the situation to reorder the social structure by asserting alternative myths to build a different collective imaginary through his discourse. An

imaginary based on the creation of an institutional renovation and the use of empty-signifiers such as the *Patria Grande* or *hijos de Bolívar* in order to unite heterogeneous groups of populations under a same project. The *homogenization function* of the demand chain was achieved in Venezuela as the demands were identified by one name: Chávez

Chávez as a populist leader had a strong tendency for *decisionism* (personalist decision-making tendency). For instance, he did not adapt to the institutional framework design by the previous system. On the contrary, as a president he decided to change the institutional framework by creating a new constitution, the replacement of the Congreso de la República (Republic's Congress) for the unicameral Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela (The National Assembly of Venezuela) (Petras, 2008), together with the celebration on numerous referendums all along his mandates fulfilling the condition of Freidenberg of continuous proofs of legitimation (Kenneth, 2012).

Regarding the relation leader-follower, as we can see, the Electoral appeal and more precisely, the plebiscitarianism appeal are characteristics of Chávez ruling style. The plebiscites, the grass-roots organizations, that we will see further in this text, and the use of *telepopulism* –with his Sunday program *Aló Presidente*– shaped the direct relation established between Chávez and his followers. The plebiscitarianism is a characteristic of the direct democracy included in the Constitution approved in 1999.

Despite the fact that Chávez's government was poorly institutionalized and dangerously dependent on his charisma and authority figure, the *Chavismo*⁴ contains strong popular forms of organization. These grass-roots organizations, identified by Freidenberg as non-mediated forms of direct communication with the leader, were a crucial factor for deepening in the social reforms and building an effective block against the opposition. Instead of being centralized and with a tendency to homogenization, the organizations created around the *Chavismo* are fluid, heterogeneous and decentralized. After Chávez received the presidential pardon in 1994 for the coup attempt, Chávez created the *Bolivarian committees* and *local and regional assemblies* –both intended to formulate the national doctrine of the

⁴ Understood and named by the Venezuelan population, as the *anti-party movement built around the figure of Hugo Chávez and dedicated to the fundamental change of society* (Hawkins, 2003).

movement-, and local committees coordinated at a municipal level and connected vertically to the regional organization and to the national directorate.

With the intensification of the social conflict after 2000, the grass-roots organizations re-shaped under a renovated energy from Chávez to strengthen the popular participation. The heirs of the *Bolivarian Committees* were the *Bolivarian Circles*, which proved to be vital for the maintenance of Chávez in power after the coup perpetrated against him in 2002. The counter-mobilization of the circles of the lower-class urban districts and the military allied forces restored him to power. Other grass-roots organization were created or re-shaped after 2000, as the *local land committees* and general committees. Moreover, *Bolivarian* organizations for youth, women and other topics that, apart from mobilize votes, help to coordinate local work of national objectives. The use of popular organizations is more common in traditional forms of populism rather than in the known as *neopopulism* (Kenneth, 2012).

Model deployment during Hugo Chávez's mandates

Since Hugo Chávez assumed power on February 1999, after the victory of the coalition *Polo Patriótico* (MVQ, PPT, MAS), the country began to experienced deep political, economic and social changes (Lander & Maya, 2010). The radicalization of the discourse has been developing intensively along the years that began with a change of the political framework and radicalized with the initiation in 2006 of the *Bolivarian revolution*. Therefore, and in order to englobe the process effectively, this chapter will be divided in four chronological stages: "A framework change, the end of *Punto Fijo*: 1998-2001"; "The rise of radical opposition and its consequences: 2001-2004"; "Accelerated transition towards the socialism of the XXI Century: 2005-2010; "Chávez's illness and revolutionary consolidation: 2010-2013".

A framework change, the end of Punto Fijo: 1998-2001

The same day Chávez took his mandate as the President of the Venezuelan Republic in January 1999, he announced a referendum in order to consult the population about the construction of a Constituent Assembly. This plebiscite was approved with the 71% of the valid votes in favour and in the election for the conformation of the Assembly the governmental coalition obtained 125 out of 131 seats. The new constitution was drafted in December 1999 and approved by the 88% of the population, closing like this

the institutional framework installed by the *Punto Fijo* constitution of 1961. In the first years of Chávez's mandate, the economic project was not clear yet. The most radical differentiation with the constitution of 1961 is the frame of new forms of popular participation in the policy-making process. This new participatory regime combines traditional political forms (such as separation of powers, election of legislative and judicial authorities at the municipal, state and national level) and innovative forms based on direct democracy. It is important to highlight the crucial role given in the constitution to the economic and social rights with special focus in health, education and social security. Those pillars will drive the government's future actions (Lander & Navarrete, 2014). The oil policy is an exemption, as it suffers significant reorientations since the beginning of the mandate. In 1999 the MEM initiates an aggressive campaign with the aim of recuperate the OPEC and the oil prices. Moreover, the first steps were to recover the executive power over the oil policy and the basic features of the oil company which in the previous years had achieved a strong independence (Lander & Navarrete, 2014). Therefore, during these first years the economic concept design expressly dissociates from the previous neoliberal system. Although, it does not discard the privatization of the oil industry, the state acquires stronger economic responsibilities. However, there is no explicit rejection of capitalism (Lander & Navarrete, 2014).

Regarding the social policies, in September 2001 it was approved the plan called *Líneas Generales del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2001-2007 (General guidelines of the Economic and Social Plan of the Nation)*. This document was intended to focus on five areas: economic, social, political, territorial and international. In the social terrain there is a clearer guidance than in the economic terrain. The first plan established was the *Plan Bolívar 2000* (1999-2001) based on a civic-military emergency plan to improve the most deteriorated infrastructure in schools, district and hospitals, provide medical care and distribute food in the remote areas of the country. This plan was a renovation from the *Transition Economic Program 1999-2000* (Hernández & Avedaño, 2008).

The year 2001 ends with the first inflexion moment for the model. In November 2001 the *Ley Habilitante (Enabling Act)* composed of 49 laws was approved with the

intention of *democratize the property and the production* in order to finance and promote alternative economic models (Villa, 2005). The Fondo Único Social (*Single Social Fund*) was created as a microcredit system for medium and small enterprises. Among the 49 laws approved the case of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law is particularly important because it changes the energetic model against the general trend of Latin America at the moment. In this law a tight public control over the oil company was established (art.8), it underlined the state ownership on the hydrocarbon fields (art. 3) and it set royalties of 30% over all hydrocarbons extracted as a basic model on the industry (art.44) (Lander & Navarrete, 2014).

The rise of radical opposition and its consequences: 2001-2004

The second period is based on a great political instability due to the economic crisis and the opposition mobilization. The approval of the *Enabling Act* triggered the insurrectionary opposition. Three moments reflect the symptoms: the petroleum industry strike at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, the attempt of coup d'état in April 2002 and the presidential referendum in August 2004, where Chávez obtained a massive vote with the 59.1% (Villa, 2005). This coup reinforced the importance of the military in the public administration, not only for the survival of the movement but also of the government. The crisis generated a strong recession in 2002 and 2003 with a fall of the GDP of 8.9% in 2002 and 7.8% in 2003. Regarding the GDP of the oil sector the fall in 2002 reached the 38.1%. As a direct consequence of the oil strike led by the company executive elite, the government decided to fire around 18.000 employees of the PDSVA, 60%, from the medium and high executive elite, and they were replaced with military forces. The important role of the militaries in the civic life and the substitution of the old elite from a Bolivarian one are characteristics of Chávez model (Maya, 2009).

After the coup d'état, Chávez used a language of national conciliation and tried to unite the popular sector and the middle class under the social plans called *Bolivarian Missions* in 2003. These missions proposed different structures of public administration based on the participation and organization of the communities parallel to the traditional model (Maya, 2009). Those plans were social emergency plans focused on different areas in order to palliate the most important humanitarian problems in the country. The short and medium term mechanism were: the health

program *Barrio adentro I (Inside the neighbourhood)* which doctors were offering primary medical consultations and remain on call 24h in the poorest areas of the country; the *Mercal I and II people's market* programs, where people could access essential products at a subsidized price; and the distribution program of cooked food for those sectors of the population living in nearly indigent conditions. The long term plans were concentrated in three areas of education. The *Robinson Mission I and II*, with the intention to make 1.5 million literate in the years 2003 and 2004; the *Ribas Mission* in order to motivate people to enrol in high school and the *Sucre Mission* to offer more university places in the educational system (Villa, 2005).

The resources needed for financing these missions came directly from the oil company, PDVSA that in May 2004 created under Chávez government two mechanism for the distribution of financial resources: the FONDESPA (*National Fund for the Economic and Social Development*) and in July, the FONDEN (*National Development Fund*) (Barros, 2006).

Accelerated transition towards the socialism of the XXI Century: 2005-2010

In 2005 in the *Quinto Foro Mundial de Porto Alegre* Chávez manifested his intention to abandon the “*third way*” and direct his political model towards the *socialism of the XXI Century*. After the electoral victory in December 2006 with the 63% of the valid votes, Chávez began the process of deeper changes in the model towards the *socialism of the XXI Century*. As a strategic step, Chávez initiated the creation of the *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV) and asked for the dissolution of the rest of the coalition parties, which declined and generated protests all around 2007. This political tension contributed to the electoral defeat, with 50.7% of the votes, in December 2007 about the constitutional reform aimed to create a social institutional model *unprecedented* and *endogenous* that included the president unlimited re-election. (Maya, 2009). Nevertheless, a second referendum of the in February 2009 approved the constitutional reform allowing Chávez to run for the national elections in 2012.

Regarding the structure of the transition towards the *Socialismo del siglo XXI*, Chavez's government designed a first *Socialist Plan for the Nation (2007-2013)* and a second *Socialist Plan for the Nation (2013-2019)*. These guidelines established the objectives, strategies and projects needed to drive the country to a new post-capitalist era. The

first socialist plan is based on a *New Socialist Ethic with the re foundation of the Venezuelan nation under the socialist thinking and the thought of Simón Bolívar*. It includes a *Revolutionary participatory and protagonist democracy* with the consolidation of the social organizations and a *Socialist Productive Model* and a *New International Geopolitics plan* focused on Latin American integration, the creation of a multipolar world and the use of oil as a mechanism to build the international position of Venezuela as an energetic global power. The objectives of the economic model were based on nationalization processes, the deepening on the creation of mix enterprises, develop basic non energetic industry and ensure the food security (República Bolivariana de Venezuela Presidencia, 2007). In 2005 a new mechanism was created in order to redistribute the revenues from the oil in the following way: the price of the oil barrel until 26US\$ would be destined to pay the tributes of the PDVSA and over the 26US\$ per barrel the resources would be given the executive power who would distribute it in the social programs and new economic programs through FONDEN and FONDESPA (Barros, 2006).

In 2006 the missions accounted for twenty, as the *Identity Mission* to provide an identity document to all Venezuelans, the *Guaicaipuro Mission* to enable native population to access their rights, the *Christ Mission* in order to stop extreme poverty and the *Miracle Mission* for the ophthalmologic services, among others together with the ones started in 2003 (Maya, 2009). Apart from the organization of the missions, in 2006 the Communal Council Law was approved and in 2009 was replaced by the Organic Law of the Communal Councils. These organs of parallel administration are defined as a mechanism of popular participation that allows citizens to exercise a community govern and manage directly the public policies and projects. This project comes along with the reduction of power of the traditional structures of the municipal governments (Gaceta Oficial de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2006).

Regarding the International scenario, the Bolivarian strategy turned into a more aggressive approach towards the unification of Latin America under supranational structures. This new strategy is based on the extension of previous initiatives as the *Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas (ALBA)*, a proposal for alternatives to the ALCA. It also, deepened and expanded *PetroCaribe* and it constituted *Petrosur* for South

American countries. Considering the media and with the same inward Latin American look, it opened *Telesur* in order to provide an alternative to the mainstream mass media. Another decision taken was removing Venezuela from the *Comunidad Andina de Naciones* (CAN) and it reinforced the efforts to join Mercosur –in which he succeeded in 31 of July 2012. The relations with Cuba became stronger and ties were created economically and politically with, mainly, Russia, Iran, China, Algeria, Nigeria and Byelorussia. The relations with United States were highly confronted with an exacerbation of the anti-imperialist discourse (Maya, 2009). The strategic international model was based on the use of the oil resource for geopolitical, cultural and political means, what it constitutes a *Petro-State* (Mantovani, 2014). The dependency on the oil revenues is still very high if we consider that in 2006 the 89% of the exports were oil.

The confrontation situation with the mass media increased in June 2010 with the creation, by decree, of the CESNA (*Centre for Situational Studies of the Nation*) which gave a bigger power to the president to limit the broadcast and publication of *information, facts or circumstances* considered as confidential. The problematic with this law is the broad language used that provides a place of manoeuvre for censure. (Human Rights Watch, 2011). In September 2010 under a context of economic crisis due to the price of oil and the strongest drought in four decades, Chávez lost the qualified majority in the National Assembly which proved that the opposition was becoming electorally stronger.

Chávez's illness and revolutionary consolidation: 2010-2013

In 2011 Chávez's cancer was revealed. In the elections of 2012 Chávez had a victorious result with the 55.7% of the votes. This year confirmed the consolidation of Chávez's government and it kept strong the Fifth Republic until his death the 5th of mars 2013. Before he passed away, on the 8th of December 2012, he asked the Venezuelans to vote for his successor Nicolás Maduro, in case he did not survive. The economic situation of 2012 was suffering from an unstable period and, although, the poverty was reduced by half since 2002, the criminality and the shortage of basic food were considerably worrying. The missions were a success and in 2011 the government began with the so-called *great missions* with a stronger investment. The entrance in Mercosur was also considered a success. Although Chávez won the elections with a large majority of 55% but, from a historical perspective, this has been the most hard-

fought elections. This result proves that, despite the economic problems, Chávez remained with a loyal support of the majority of the population and the opposition under the direction of Enrique Capriles did not succeeded in offering a competitive proposal against the *Bolivarian movement* (Cyr, 2013).

The future prevalence of the *Chavismo* model without Chávez

The absence of Hugo Chávez in the presidential inauguration on the 10th of January due to his health problems generated a judgement from the Supreme Court of Justice in order to allow the continuity of the executive without Chávez under the “*principal of administrative continuity*”. With the death of the President on the 5th of mars and under the regulation of the article 233 of the Constitution, the Electoral National Council called for elections for the 14th of April 2013 (Sagarzazu, 2014).

Maduro’s campaign was based on his union with Hugo Chávez until the point to present himself as the “*son of Chávez*”. The lack of charisma of Chávez’s successor was evident in the intention of vote, which dropped from 60% to around 50% between Mars and April. The results of the elections, clarified in the graphic bellow, ratify the loss of political support in the institutional party and consolidated Chávez as the basic element of the unification of the *Bolivarian* Revolution.

	October 2012	April 2013
Chavismo	Hugo Chávez / 55.07%	Nicolás Maduro / 50.61%
Opposition	Henrique Capriles / 44.31%	Henrique Capriles / 49.12%
Participation	15.160.289 / 80,49%	15.057.480 / 79.68%

Source: National Electoral Council (CEN)

In the first elections since 2013, the 6th of December 2015, the opposition has won the elections to the National Assembly with 99 seats against the 46 achieved by Maduro (not definitive results). This has as a direct consequence that Maduro will have to rule with the Assembly against his policies. This underlines the strong crisis living by the model at the moment and indicates a *punishment vote* due to the economic crisis, the criminality rates and the food shortages that Venezuela has been suffering since 2012.

ARGENTINA

Traditional political model before Néstor Kirchner arrived and 2001 crisis

The political system of the last century in Argentina has been characterized for its instability. Between 1946 and 2003 twenty-two presidents have ruled the country from which nine were military, eight Peronist and five radicals (Malamud, 2004). Three factors marked this period until the crisis of 2001: the arrival to power of the populist Juan Diego Perón, the most violent dictatorship of the history of Argentina under the rule of Jorge Rafael Videla and the transition period from 1983 until 2001 characterized by a bipartisanship model.

Peronism was born in 1946 with the first mandate of Juan Diego Perón. Since that moment, populism, as a *Peronist historical populism*, has become a traditional feature of the modern history of Argentina's politics. Through Peronism, Argentina has created its own political model. During the time of the *Peronist historical populism*, the charisma of Perón under the Justicialist Party (PJ), the *descamisados movement (the shirtless ones)* and Evita Perón were symbols of the period. His political model was based on the inclusion of workers and trade unions to the political system with a tendency to authoritarianism and repression of the opposition. Moreover, he performed a constitutional reform in 1949 to be able to get re-elected unrestrictedly. In terms of economy, his model lied on policies beneficial for the national industry and state intervention. He declared to follow a *third way* between capitalism and socialism. The intrinsic problematic attached to Peronism is that it can shelters from radically different political models, from right to left wing, which implies that its ideological position is vague and flexible. Nevertheless, his figure will inspire the following actors in the political stage (Gratius S. , 2007).

The bipartisanship system created in the 50's and re-established after the dictatorship of Jorge Videla, characterized itself not only by the *turnismo* in power between the two traditional parties, *Partido Judicialista* (PJ) and *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), but also by the discursive rhetorical use of the political renovation and redistribution of wealth as an electoral tool. (Patrici, 2005). Moreover, the competitive relation between the two main parties was shaped as Peronism and Anti-Peronism and has perpetuated over

time in the Argentine political arena. In this sense the PJ was the reference for the Peronism and the UCR the representative of the Anti-Peronism. As a direct consequence of this political axis, the population had a strong polarization and a bimodal distribution of the electoral votes (Galván, 2006). However, the polarization of the society and the political model has changed over time in Argentina. While in the 70's the Peronism polarization still remained, in the decade of the 80's the polarization had a lower impact. In the elections of 1983 and 1989, third forces came into the political scenario, although the bipartisanship remained with more than 80% of the votes. During this period, the PJ started to suffer from internal ruptures that led to the creation, by its dissidents and the anti-Menem, of the party *Frente Grande* and then *Frente País Solidario* (FREPASO) (Galván, 2006). With the mandate of Carlos Menem, who proclaimed himself as the *disciple of Perón*, started the neo-populism and right populism in Argentina. The model implemented by this president was based on a return to historical populism, creating like Perón a constitutional reform that could allow him to be re-elected. This constitutional reform is particularly important due to extension of the presidential time in power extended to two mandates of four years, the inclusion social rights as a guarantee and the independence of the judiciary power. He has a tendency to authoritarianism by strengthening the executive power and using abusively the emergency decree as a form of ruling (545 emergency decrees were approved under his mandate). Unlike Perón, his economic model was based on the doctrine of the Washington Consensus. Menem's economic guidelines where following a neo-liberal approach. Therefore, under his mandate, the public sector was reduced in terms of size, almost all national firms were privatised and the *convertibility law* that allows the parity between US dollar and the Argentine peso was approved. His position towards United States also changed from Peron's approach. While, the latter had a distant position towards the US, the first one tried to get closer. His government lasted from 1989 until 1999, when he left power under a great economic recession and corruption scandals⁵ (Gratius S. , 2007).

⁵ In June 2013 Menem was formally convicted to seven years of prison for selling illegally arms to Croatia and Ecuador during his mandate (La Nación, 2013). By the first of December 2015, Menem together with Domingo Cavallo –former minister of economy – were convicted for corruption to four and six months and three years and three months of prison, respectively, and perpetual disqualification for Menem (El Mundo, 2015).

During the decade of 1990, the political and social representation started to be fractionated. The previous Peronist polarization, in the elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003 was transformed into a polarization based on centre-left and centre-right. Acting against the Neoliberal policies of the state, different social actors began to protest. This highlights the beginning of the construction of individual and joint demands against the system, creating an exponentially bigger *internal frontier* between the ruling elite and the population. With the increase of the crisis dimension, the demands joined in the popular slogan *everybody out!* (Patrici, 2005).

After the mandate of Menem, Fernando de la Rúa, with the anti-Menem alliance of UCR and FREPASO, took power with a discourse based on the political renovation and the fight against corruption in an attempt to unite the social demands. However, his first intention ended in failure as during his time in the executive he saw the collapse of the monetary parity that, together with the overall economic and social crisis, led the government to declare default and froze all bank deposits. This was an inflection point for social crisis. The famous *Cacerolazo* took place characterized by massive popular demonstrations where citizens were hitting pots as a sign of protest under the slogan "*todos fuera!*" (*Everybody out!*). These civil mobilizations obliged the president De la Rúa to resign generating the greatest crisis in the history of Argentina (Gratius S. , 2007). After the resignation, the social protests were transformed into neighbourhood assemblies, which opened a public space for political discussion. These spontaneous expressions of popular will for participation in the political life made clear that new forms of politics and leaders were needed in order to unify the social discontent into a political project and a stronger process of social representation (Patrici, 2005).

The incapacity of De la Rúa to fulfil its public agenda ended in a deep electoral crisis in the elections of 2001 where the invalid votes and the blank votes accounted for a total of 39.73% of the votes. This situation, never seen before in the history of the country, reflected not only the disenchantment of the population with its ruling elite and its legitimacy, but it also had shown the deep crisis of representation existed in the country at the moment (Mustapic, 2002).

In January 2002, the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde was in charge to rule the country during the time lapse until the elections of April 27, 2003 (Gratius S. , 2007).

Néstor Kirchner's initial model for Argentina

"We know where we are going and where we do not want to go or come back"
Néstor Kirchner inauguration speech (La Nación, 2003)

In the elections of the April 2013 in the first round, the parties with more votes were the former president Carlos Menem (Juan Carlos Romero as vice-president) with the party *Alianza Frente por la Lealtad-UceDé* and Néstor Kirchner (with Daniel Scioli as vice-president) under the coalition *Frente para la Victoria* with 24.45% and 22.24% of the votes respectively. For the second round Menem decided to renounce running due to the polls results that gave a large percentage victory to Kirchner. And, therefore, Néstor Kirchner, former governor of a remote province of the Argentine Patagonia arrived to power with the smallest percentage of votes in the history of Argentina.

Kirchner's model for Argentina was contained in a book titled *Plan de Gobierno (Government's Plan)* with 152 proposals with the only introduction of a page signed as *Néstor Kirchner, Argentino*. This was the first sign of the nationalist tendency of his program. This model design was claimed to be the result of two years intensive work performed by 8.000 technicians that congregate in 40 different cities and did 15 plenary discussion sessions. The proposal was divided in five different chapters identifying the basic pillars of the government actions, namely, social development, employment and production, infrastructure and public works, economy and Justice, security and the rule of law (Clarín, 2003).

The social development was designed to be achieved by public federal policies with the axis on the individual and the family. In this sense the proposal is to reinforce and strengthen the control mechanism and to open it to the auditing and social participation. The basic thought of the proposals in this chapter is the fight against corruption through a deep institutional and political renovation and reinforcement of the public institutions in order to generate public trust in the system (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003). Another proposal is the use of law to improve the criminal action against corruption and the implementation of State audit for the cases of crimes against public administration and advertising of the results. Other aspects are the creation of laws to access information, transparency registers and the implementation of control organs for the participation of users and consumers (Clarín, 2003). In terms

of health system, the State would *assume* its role as an articulated arm and regulator for achieving an integral health policy. Moreover, it proposes a full renovation of the health system. For the education, it is proposed an increase of investment and the creation of educative projects focused on the *national identity* and the guarantee for a free and public education with more efforts to ensure its accessibility (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003).

The employment and production was presented as the fundamental pillar of the economic and social development. One of the proposals is to combine production and public inversion in order to create stable employment, a model that potentiates competitiveness and social inclusion (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003). The elimination of the privilege retirements is contemplated together with the redistribution of the income in order to provide higher salaries (Clarín, 2003). Regarding the infrastructure and public work, it should be used for the improvement of production as a strategy for the regional development. In this sense, the proposal is centred on the creation of public employment programs for the production of public works and infrastructure services (Clarín, 2003).

Regarding the economy, under the model proposed by Néstor Kirchner, was formulated as a fundamental tool for defining the national project. This model is based on neo-Keynesian policies as a leading force to exit the economic depression. There is a clear rejection of the neoliberal measures and an approach towards the combination of production and public inversion (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003). In this sense the electoral promises made were the reform of the public bank in order to specialize it internally as a retail banking focusing on the general public through small credits for services and consumption and in order to favours projects for private and public inversion, social development and external trade. Following the same trend, for small enterprises it is proposed the creation of a Trust Fund not pending on bureaucracy to subsidize the interest rate applied to the small enterprises and absorb part of the indebtedness (Clarín, 2003). For the medium size companies, Kirchner promised credits at an international rate for also mitigating the indebtedness. In terms of monetary policy, the model is against the dollarization and it proposes the finalization of the rigid exchange-rate in order to beneficiate the producers, consumers and incentivizes exports. Regarding the foreign debt, the proposal is to renegotiate a

reduction with the creditors of around 50 to 70% of the interest and the renegotiation of the deadline payments. Considering the strong privatization process of the mandate of the former president Carlos Menem, Kirchner proposed the revision of the privatizations that have been done in order to recuperate the state for managing the wealth of macroeconomic tools and ensured the efficiency of the services. There is a special reference to Repsol-YPF, as the government intended to control part of the oil revenues and create a Hydrocarbons Law that regulates the oil sector in Argentina. There is also an explicit support for the intervention in the railway sector (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003).

The Justice, security and the rule of law chapter places those features as basic for the human development. The model proposal lies on providing the institutions with legal security and make a public consultation to decide the future of the Supreme Court. In terms of security, the proposed reform englobes normative and preventive policies with a long-term approach that were intended to be approved with the consensus from the majority of the parties possible (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003). Furthermore, in terms of security, there was an intention to provide the legal system with technology and communication tools, reform the police and ensure the prevention of marginality and re-establish the order in the district under the basis of the common discussion (Clarín, 2003). In terms of international policy, the model proposed by Kirchner is based on *coming to the world with national identity*. It has a strong look towards Latin American integration, the elimination of tariff asymmetries between the Mercosur countries and the slight separation from United States to re-direct the focus on the relations with the European Union (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003).

The national plan proposed by Néstor Kirchner was based on a national capitalism and the reinforcement of the State, above all, in the economy. The state is seen as mechanism that regulates the market disparities. This is a model with a clear position against neo-liberal measures, understood as the measures implemented by Carlos Menem, and with a fiscal reform based on the position against the dollarization, the rigid exchange system and with a strong fight against corruption. There is a consensus approach and interest in the sum the rest of the parties to the national project. In the international sphere, there is a strong regional look and bifurcation of alliance, before focused on EEUU, and now between EEUU and the European Union (La Nación, 2003).

The Kirchner's version of populism: Peronist Reformulation

*"I remember that 25th of May, when they left us Argentina set on fire
and we had to stand up to reconstruct the homeland"*
Néstor Kirchner (La Capital, 2008)

Néstor Kirchner worked from an early age with the Peronist Youths. Since 1992 he was the President of the Provincial Council of the Judicialist Party and from 1991 until 1999 he held the position as governor in the Province of Santa Cruz. In the elections of 2003 he was the leader of the coalition *Frente para la Victoria*. This progress in the party system gives him the Barr designation of *insider*. In the case of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, she started working with the Judicialist Party in 1989 and she held the position of deputy and senator with the party until 2005. Therefore, she can also be englobed as an *insider* (Real Instituto Elcano, 2003) . Considering Freidenberg's categorization of leaders in function of their behavior, Néstor Kirchner can be considered as a *Leader Seller* as he focused on the close relation with the neglected groups of the previous model in order to incorporate them to their support basis, he considered the demands and acted accordantly. He can also be defined as a *Firefighter Leader* as he appears in a conflict context with the aim to solve the situation. In this sense, Cristina Fernandez can be defined as a *Pied Piper of Hamelin Leader* based on her personal qualities and charisma and, partially, as a *Leader Seller* as she considers the demands claimed by social groups.

Although the *Kirchnerismo* is included in the third wave of Latin American populism, it does not have the close connection Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia share. Argentine populism under the Kirchner has not an explicit revolutionary trend, it does not aim to change the political system and it operates in a largely democratic framework regulated in the constitutional reform of 1994 where Néstor Kirchner was a constituent. Although, there is reference in the discourse of historical figures, the most important one is Juan Diego Perón (Gratius S. , 2007). Nevertheless, there is tendency to mention other populist leaders such as Mariano Moreno, Manuel Belgrano or José San Martín. It can also be observed, above all in Cristina Fernandez, the narrative of the homeland pride and the Bicentenary of the foundation of the nation. This appeal is a narrative anchorage of the *Kirchnerismo* discourse (Patrouilleau, 2010). The Kirchner discourse has two different registers of interpellation under the conception of a *dream*

used as an *empty signifier*, “vengo a proponerles un sueño” (I came to propose you a dream) as Néstor Kirchner said in the inauguration speech of his mandate. The first addressees are the citizens with a high level of abstraction, all united under the name *argentinos (argentine)* and the second addressees are groups that organized protests in the decade of the 90s. The interpellation of the *argentines* in order to englobe heterogeneous groups of populations is included in Freidenberg’s categorization of a populist discourse (Retamozo, 2014). The *Kirchnerismo* discourse establishes a polarizing discourse, as Freidenberg and Laclau identify, using as an antagonism tool the “us vs them”, “*nosotros, el pueblo argentino*” (*We the Argentines*) against the enemies of the Argentine people. The anti-status quo was established against neoliberalism. For Néstor Kirchner the people were those, not only suffering from the neoliberal measures, but all the Argentines with a great emphasis on the identification of the demands and the reconstruction of the national identity. On the other hand, the identified adversaries are the corrupted politicians, the inefficient justice, the private corporations during 1990, neoliberalism, the International Monetary Fund and the military dictators; more specifically, Videla and his allies (Montero & Yun, 2014).

The people’s populist articulation process began with the implementation of the neoliberal measures and increased dramatically in the crisis of 2001 when the Laclau’s *internal frontier* between the establishment and the population was explicit. The *empty signifier* that united the pluralistic set of *fighting demands* was collected in the slogan *everybody out!* The extreme homogenization of demands in the leader’s name does not take place in the case of Argentina as it does in Venezuela.

In order to answer to the people’s demand, the main strategy of *Kirchnerismo* was from one side, to separate itself from the previous regime and the policies that led to the 2001 crisis and, from the other side, the incorporation of social movements such as the *piqueteros* (unemployed and informal workers) and the *fábricas recuperadas (recuperated factories)* and the labor unions which had lost part of their influence during the neoliberal era of Carlos Menem. There is no explicit leader-follower relation, which contradicts Freidenberg’s conception of populist relation.

Concerning the authoritarianism mentioned before, it mainly refers to the tendency of the Kirchner to take unilateral decisions without considering the parliament and using

abusively the Emergency Decrees. For instance, during the mandate of Néstor Kirchner only one third of the new laws were approved by the national parliament (Gratius S. , 2007). To compare the former president Raúl Alfonsín used 10 Emergency Decrees between 1983 and 1989, Néstor Kirchner used 270 between 2003 and 2007 (Calvo & Murillo, 2009). This hyper-presidencialism strategy aimed to set up his political authority (Montero & Yun, 2014). Despite the fact of this authoritarian use of the Emergency Decrees, the case of Argentina differentiates itself from Venezuela in the sense that it does not represent a threat to the representative democracy. Nevertheless, Argentina shares with Venezuela the populism based on *top-down* or *presidential populism* due to the legitimacy based on the economic growth, in both countries with a strong dependency on extractivism of natural resources (Gratius S. , 2007).

The *Kirchnerismo* does not seek for a direct relation leader-follower. On the contrary, the relation in Argentina is mainly mediated by two democratic institutions: the Judicialist party and the unions (Gratius S. , 2007). The strongest appeals used by the Kirchner populism, identified by Barr, in order to secure electorate are clientelist appeals, programmatic linkages and electoral appeals. The use of these mechanisms is not innovative but a reconstruction of the national populism of Perón in 1940 (Gratius S., 2007). Moreover, element of the Peronism continuation is the strong role of women in the Peronist state, Eva Perón in 1940 as a representative to the popular and the social rights, the *Madres y Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo* (*Mothers and Grandmother of the Plaza de Mayo*) as symbols of the demands for justice after the dictatorship and law of historical memory and Cristina Fernandez as a continuation of the policies of Néstor Kirchner (Patrouilleau, 2010).

As a matter of fact, the commodity boom that Latin American largest commodity exporters enjoyed from 2003 until 2011 it was fundamentally important for the expansion of the populist strategy in Argentina (Gruss, 2014, pág. 8), as it provided financial means for the populist distribution. This is not a new characteristic of the *Kirchnerismo* but a heritage for the Peronist political machine in order to gather the vote from the poor classes by providing them with basic resources (Montero & Yun, 2014). Hence, the *Kirchnerismo* way of populism is highly dependent of the traditional structures to gather electoral support: clientelism and an economy based on an

extractivist model of natural resources. Both are interconnected and the first is dependent on the second, which creates a regime with a political stabilization based on the external market situation and, therefore, highly unstable (Montero & Yun, 2014).

Therefore, the *Kirchnerismo* is a left-wing nationalist Peronism that shares similarities with the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador in its economic approach (socio-economic policies), nationalism, its estrangement from United States and its identification of the *enemy* in the discourse. These characteristics distance the Kirchner from the neo-populism of Carlos Menem and bring them closer to the historical populist tradition (Gratius S. , 2007). Moreover, the *Kirchnerismo* is a deep Peronist model that has been able to adapt to the circumstances of the moment after the 2001 crisis. The populist hegemony was constructed by the response to heterogeneous demands and the inclusion of previous neglected groups in the political participation system. The *Kirchnerismo* did not aim to develop a deep democratization process but to amplify the rights and consolidate the empowerment of the middle classes (Svampa, 2013).

Model deployment during Néstor and Cristina Kirchner's mandates

The crisis of 2001 allows the social-democrat discourse of Néstor Kirchner with an explicit position against neoliberalism to build an alternative political model and create a consensus space where the previous marginalized groups and the affected civil-military dictatorship could found a channel for political participation. He opened a new political subjectivity where the social demands were accepted and canalized. This strategy propitiated that Néstor Kirchner gathered the approval of the 75% of the population in the second year of his mandate, after winning the elections of 2003 with 22% of the votes (Patrici, 2005).

The development policy after the crisis of 2001 has two main changes in what regards the deployment compared with the previous administrations. The first one was the response to the financial crisis, which involved the renegotiation of the debt, the active promotion of the state intervention in the economy over the rule of the market, to establish itself as a mechanism to control the prices, improve the social policy and *win back* the national sovereignty. The second main change was to challenge, between 2003 and 2008, the expanded notion that fiscal restriction and social cuts are needed in order to get out of an economic depression. With the implementation of heterodox methods and self-financing, Argentina succeeded in growing annually an 8-9% and, after the crisis of 2009, kept on growing above the Latin American average. The economic approach taken by Néstor Kirchner was the deployment of a new developmentalism oriented towards the global economic prioritizing the industrialization oriented to exports and the state subsidiary strategies towards strategic sectors. The open market approach is combined with social equity and State intervention. Indeed the macroeconomic circumstances around the years of Néstor Kirchner's arrival to power are favorable for the economic recovery. The commodity boom that started in 2003 was a major factor for the *Kirchnerismo* (Montero & Yun, 2014). Kirchner knew how to canalize the benefit of the commodity boom of basic products, especially of the soybean export, which during his mandate increased to a 60% of all exports. The favorable exchange rate created the financial surplus needed for the rapid economic recovery and social programs (Doyran, 2015).

Despite the fact the Kirchner's administration announced new policies that can be considered innovative regarding the previous governments, they had no improvement of the mitigation of the clientelist political structures. Nevertheless, the degree of clientelism was reduced during Kirchner's mandate due to the reduction of poverty but the patronage system remained stable and visible as a mechanism to win political support (Montero & Yun, 2014).

In terms of the social situation before the arrival of Néstor Kirchner, the unemployment was 21.5% in 2002 and in May 2003 the poverty englobed the 54% of the population. Considering this, the model deployed by the Kirchner was based on the employment as a central axis. The government also implemented income transfer programs. In this sense, the executive reformed the *Plan de Jefes y Jefas del Hogar* (*Heads of Household Plan*), created in 2002 under the transition government of Duhalte, into two programs. The first program was the *Seguro de Empleo y Capacitación* (*Employment and Training insurance*) addressing unemployed citizens in order to improve their employability. In 2007 it was calculated that 700.00 people under this program had access to formal jobs. The second program was *Familias por la Inclusión Social* (*Family Programme for Social Inclusion*) aimed to cover families in a vulnerable situation. Under this program, each family would receive a subsidy per child in schooling years, with the obligation of attending sanitary controls and mandatory scholar assistance. (Alonso & Costa, 2011). Apart from the *Employment and Training insurance program*, the Kirchner government implemented a fixed minimum salary and the work inspectorate was re-established (both derogated during the mandate of Carlos Menem in the nineties) and the labor reform approved in 2000 was eliminated under the corruption suspicions. Between 2003 and 2010 the unemployment rate went from 20.4% to 7.5% and 2.900.000 jobs were created (Alonso & Costa, 2011). Another important feature on the improvement of a social situation was the derogation in 2003 of the Amnesty Laws of the transition process guaranteeing the prosecution of the people guilty of human crimes during Videla's dictatorship (Smink, 2013). In education, in 2005, it was approved the *Law on Education Financing*, which increased the investment in education, science and technology until 6% of the GDP in 2010 and set a minimum salary for the teachers and its harmonization within provinces. It was also approved the National Education Law in 2006, with a broad

consensus in order to solve the fragmentation problems and inequality in the educative system structure (Alonso & Costa, 2011). In the health system, three main plans were deployed: the *Birth Plan* in order to provide with attention related to maternal and child care; the *Remediar Program* and the Law for Generic Drugs both to allow the equitable access to medicines. In the mandate of Cristina Fernandez it was approved the universalization of the Universal Child Allowance (Alonso & Costa, 2011). Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner assumed the presidency in the elections of 2007 and continued for two consecutive mandates until 2015. Her decision in 2008 to increase the tariffs on soy export, which was a basic feature for the economic model of the Kirchnerismo, generated the biggest challenge suffered by the model. The support of the vice-president, the radical Julio Cobos, to the farmers marked a brake inside the government coalition. The protest that lasted months, united the opposition, paralyzed the country and continued over 2012 with the expropriation of the Argentine Rural Society (Smink, 2013). Another contraposition factor of the period was the 2009 *Media Law* that intended to regulate the monopoly of the media and provoked the opposition of the general media, with particular focus on group Clarín (Smink, 2013). In the last period of the *Kirchnerismo*, the negative elements attached to the system were more apparent. The concentration of power in the executive rose strong critics when international actors such as *The Economist* and the IMF denounced the government manipulation of the inflation rates. Therefore, the data provided had an impact in the calculation of poverty rates, social development and the GDP (Montero & Yun, 2014). The government's rejection to accept the inflation rates in 2011 led to the rupture with the Union movements and it turned the Kirchnerismo in a model without unions base which until that moment where the solid support base of the *Kirchnerismo* (Smink, 2013). On the 31st of January 2014, *La Nación* published the 23% value loss of the national currency, peso, later the presidency admitted a loss of a 30%. The failure in controlling successfully the inflation depleted the support of a part of the followers of Cristina Fernandez. The social support rupture was evident in the elections of October 2013, when the *Frente para la Victoria* loss a large number of seats in favor of the opposition (Montero & Yun, 2014).

Despite the economic unbalances of the time, two laws regarding social rights turned Argentina into the leading force in this area: in July 2010, the law allowing the marriage of same sex couples was approved and in 2012 the Law for Gender Identity passed, enabling transsexuals, transvestites and transgender, to choose freely their gender and the sex change with full state coverage (Smink, 2013). Furthermore, in December 2008, the Law 26425 of the renationalization of the transitional funds modified dramatically the structure of the system by eliminating the capitalization regime and substituting with an apportionment structure. This law proved the central role of the state in the social security management and stability (Alonso & Costa, 2011).

The unemployment rate was reduced from 17% to 7.9% in 2013 and the poverty decreased from 54% of people living under poverty conditions to a 5.4% government data and to a 25% by the calculation of private organisms. If we attend to data provided by the Central Bank, the middle class doubled its size in the last decade. It is the country with the highest growth rate in the region. The same pattern follows the social security coverage that had reached in the period the 94.3%. The economic features show a reduction of the GDP debt from 138% in 2001, the economic model of the Kirchnerismo was able to reduce it until a 40% and it succeeded in re-structuring the 93% of the debt with a reduction of the 60% of the initial value. Nevertheless, the measures to control the inflation and devaluation of the currency together with the conflict of the farmers, the media and the disagreement with the kirchnerist union basis drove the presidential elections of 2015 (Smink, 2013).

The future prevalence of the Kirchnerismo model

The presidential elections of the 8th of November 2015 marked the decline of the Kirchnerist model. Against all polls predictions, Daniel Scioli (*Frente para la Victoria*) achieved the 36.8% of the votes and Mauricio Macri (party *Cambiamos*) the 34.3%, an almost technical draw that led to the candidates to face a second round on the 22th November. In the second round, Mauricio Macri achieved a tight victory with the 51.4% of the votes against Daniel Scioli, with 48.6%, a difference of 700.000 votes on a country of 32 million inhabitants. Despite the tight result, these presidential elections are an explicit proof of the decline of the *Kirchnerist* model.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Venezuela: populist model contraposition

The Punto Fijo model and the Chavismo model were both born as a consequence of a crisis in the Venezuelan political system and a process of dealignment in the second case. While, the first offered national stability after the dictatorship of Jiménez, the second offered to the population a solution to the decline and crisis of the previous regime. Nevertheless, the solutions are different. The Punto Fijo regime was based on an elite pact relied on a bipartisanship system under the scope of a representative democracy with channelled and limited social participation mechanism. On the contrary, the model deployed by Chávez performed a constituent process to change the Constitution of the previous model and enabled a direct democracy model based on plebiscitarianism and parallel organizations to the traditional model.

Nevertheless, both share the dependency on the financial means from the oil revenues to finance the clientelist network that make both systems highly vulnerable to the external market fluctuations. Both are considered as petro-states and having an extractivist economy. However, the intervention of the Chávez's model in the economy and more precisely in the oil sector was considerably bigger than the previous model. Another factor that differentiates both models is the conception of economy itself. Meanwhile the Punto Fijo regime was set in an open market and deployed neoliberal measures with privatisation process and state intervention related to the oil sector, the Chavismo, over time, achieved an anti-neoliberal position, proclaimed the transition towards a socialist state, promulgated state intervention in all economic and social areas, with strong social programs and numerous nationalizations. The model performed by Chávez had a strong focus in solving the social problems generated in the neoliberal time of the Punto Fijo. The social basis of the Punto Fijo regime was based on a social and fragile consensus with the unions as the biggest base support maintained by clientelist mechanisms. In the case of the Model deployed by Chávez, the basis is set by the marginalized group of the neoliberal measures maintained by social programs and a nationalist plan, charismatic discourses and clientelist networks. In the international realm the close ties of the Punto Fijo with EEUU differs from Chávez's strong regionalization look and change of global relations.

Argentina: populist model contraposition

The model before the arrival of Néstor Kirchner was a model based on a bipartisanship system established after the dictatorship of Jorge Videla. This model had a strong influence from the Peronism, dividing the political parties and the electorate between Peronism and non-Peronism and maintaining the clientelist network and a rhetorical discourse based on the political renovation. In the last period of the model, under the mandate of Carlos Menem, a neo-populist model was established based on the economic doctrines of the Washington Consensus, such as privatizations of national companies, monetary convertibility and social cutbacks. This model is characterized by a tendency to authoritarianism, the abuse of emergency decrees to rule and the reduction of the state size. Towards foreign policy the model was focused in strengthening the ties with United States. On the contrary, the model deployed by Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez was an explicit anti-neoliberal model that canalized to a national capitalist model with a strong intervention in the economy and it set the state in the centre role of the social security. The model included as basis of support the groups neglected from the previous regime and the dictatorship of Jorge Videla. Nevertheless, despite the differences in the economic and social approach, both models are regulated under the same institutional network, the constitution of 1964, and it shares the presidentialism approach with a recurrent use of emergency decrees to approve laws without counting on the parliament. The dependency on the natural export revenues for maintaining the clientelist network and the national stability is a common factor as well.

The populist model initiated by Néstor Kirchner, despite the differences with the previous neoliberal model, represents the continuity of Peronism. Nevertheless, it presents some variations born due to the historical context of the moment. Following the Peronist trend, the Kirchnerismo retuned to a more moderate way, maintaining the role of the state in matters such as economy supervision, social equality and workers' protection. However, the left-wing tendency of Kirchner political model, its pluralism, its tolerance towards the opposition and its protest- oriented approach are aspects of differentiation with the classical Peronism.

Argentina and Venezuela: Populist models contraposition

	Venezuela	Argentina
Model definition	Radical Socialist Populism	Peronist Reformulation
Model description	Foundational Nationalist model based on a new reformulation of socialism	Reformulation of Peronism. Nationalist model with National Capitalist approach
Context for people's populist articulation	Decline of the bipartisanship model, Punto Fijo regime, after the implementation of neoliberal measures. Process of dealignment and realignment	Decline of the bipartisanship model after the implementation of neoliberal programs and entrance in economic default and the frozen of bank credits. Process of dealignment and realignment
Type of leaders	Outsiders, combine all types of Freidenberg behavior, highly charismatic	Insiders, both as <i>Leader Sellers</i> . Néstor Kirchner also as <i>Firefighter Leader</i> and Fernandez as a <i>Pied Piper of Hamelin Leader</i>
Linkages	Ancentralism, electoral linkages, plebiscitarian and Clientelism. Direct relation through: telepopulism, grass-roots organizations	Clientelism, programmatic and electoral linkages. Mediated relation with follower through unions and political parties.
Discourse	Anti-establishment, highly polarized, personalist and with a revolution discourse	Anti-establishment discourse, not highly polarizing with a strong emphasis on Nationalism
Support Basis	Population and groups neglected by the previous regime.	Population neglected by the previous regime and the dictatorship of Jorge Videla. Special support from unions
Relation with Representative Democracy	Conflictive. The constituent process in 1998 set the basis for a direct democracy	Harmonised relation. There is no constituent process but changes applicable by the law framework
Economic Model	In the moderate phase of the model: open market with strong control on the oil industry. In Radicalized model: strong intervention, centralism, nationalization process. Extractivist model	Is a model defined by New Developmentalism or National Capitalism with a strong focus on state intervention in economy and social security, redistribution of wealth and dependent on an extractivist economic approach
Social Model	Strong state intervention and centralism. Strong social programs financed by the oil revenues.	Strong state intervention and centralism. Social programs orientated to employment, social security, education and civil rights.
External Strategy	Strong regional view. Increasing rejection of EEUU linkages.	Strong regional view. Bifurcation of alliance, EEUU and European Union.
Own elaboration: information collected in the present thesis		

CONCLUSION

Taking into account the information given in this thesis, it can be concluded that the populist model proposed and deployed by Hugo Chávez has been a new political model alternative to the neoliberal model previously implemented. It differs in the approach and essence of the understanding of the conception of the state, its role in the economy and social security and its foreign policy without having previous similar models in the history of the country. However, the Chavist model maintains features from the Punto Fijo Regime such as, the use of clientelist networks, the instauration of an establishment –substitution of the previous with Bolivarian ones- and the accumulation of executive power. Moreover it has the dependency on an extractivist economic model in order to maintain the national stability, which places it in vulnerable position to the cyclic economic crisis of the foreign market. The current crisis of oil prices that affects the financing of the social programs and clientelist networks, together with the uncharismatic ruling of Chavez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, has drawn the model into a deep crisis, as it shows the large victory of the opposition in the elections of the 6th of December. The majority achieved by the *opositores* is predicted to be enough to change the constitution and revoke Maduro from power.

In the case of Argentina, the model deployed by Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez did not offer a new political model to the previous regime but a reformulation of the Peronist populist model. The variations with the previous neoliberal regime are strong in the economic approach, social security coverage and social rights. Nevertheless, both act in the same regulatory framework and share the dependency on the export revenues (the *Kirchnerist* model increased the dependency on soy) in order to finance the clientelist network and guarantee the social stability. The basis of the *Kirchnerismo* were the unions together with disenchantment groups with the neoliberal period, in the moment Cristina Fernandez lost the support of the basis her popularity dropped fuelled by the economic crisis and the failure to manage it effectively. In the elections of the 22th of November, the victory of the opposition closed the *Kirchnerismo* cycle in Argentina. Macri's conception of the state as neoliberal, the less enthusiastic approach towards the regionalization and the critics towards the Kirchner leads to conclude that the kirchnerist model has ended.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abad, Á. (2012). *¿Qué es el Neopopulismo? Replanteamiento conceptual para una investigación empírica*. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca – Instituto de Iberoamérica.
- AlbaTV. (2013, October 04). "*Chávez no soy yo, Chávez es el pueblo*". Retrieved November 17, 2015, from Alba TV: <http://www.albatv.org/Chavez-no-soy-yo-Chavez-es-el.html>
- Alonso, G., & Costa, V. d. (2011, July 7). *Cambios y continuidades en la política social Argentina, 2003-2010*. Retrieved November 24, 2015, from Asociación Argentina de Estudios de Administración pública: https://aaeap.org.ar/wp-content/uploads/2013/6cong/ALONSO_DI_COSTA.pdf
- Arnson, C. J., & de La Torre, C. (2013). *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics. *Party Politics*, Vol 15. N°1, 29-48.
- Barros, P. S. (2006). Chávez e Petróleo: uma Análise da Nova Política Econômica Venezuelana. *Cadernos PROLAM/USP (ano 5, vol.2)*, 209-237.
- Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008, December). *Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers*. Retrieved October 24, 2015, from The Qualitative Report Vol. 13, n° 4: <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>
- Calvo, E., & Murillo, V. (2009). Selecting clients: partisan networks and the electoral benefits of targeted distribution. *Comparative Politics Workshop, vol. 11 Yale University*.
- Campbell, R., & Ahrens, C. E. (1998). Innovative community services for rape victims: An application of multiple case study methodology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, n° 26, 537-571.
- Canelón, F., & González, F. (1998). El modelo político puntofijista, desarrollo, agotamiento y perspectiva. *Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura Vol. IV N°1*, 11-42.
- Canovan, M. (2002). *Taking politics to the people: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy*. Yves Mény and Yves Surel (eds) *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*; New York: Palgrave.
- Chávez, H. (1997). *Agenda alternativa Bolivariana*. Caracas: Ediciones Correo del Orinoco.
- Chávez, H. (2007, November 10). Radio Interview. (Telesur, Intervieweur)
- Chávez, H. (2009-2010, For Encuentro and TeleSur 31:02'). *Presidentes de Latino América: Hugo Chávez*. (D. Filmus, Intervieweur)
- Clarín. (2003, 05 18). Clarín. *Plan de gobierno: buenas intenciones sin decir el "como"*.

- Colombet, T. (2015). El liderazgo populista de Hugo Chávez Frías, características e implicancias sobre la ciudadanía venezolana. . *Revista de Ciencia Política: de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires a la Aldea Global*, 1-14.
- Connif, M. (2003). Neo-Populismo en América Latina. La década de los 90 y después. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. XXIII, núm. 1, 31-38.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches. 2nd edition*. Retrieved October 14, 2015, from Harvard University. SAGE Publication. Thousand Oaks:
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1334586.files/2003_Creswell_A%20Framework%20for%20Design.pdf
- Creswell, J. W. (2006). *Understanding Mixed methods research*. Retrieved October 14, 2015, from SAGE Publications: http://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/10981_Chapter_1.pdf
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. 3rd Edition*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Cyr, J. (2013). Que veinte años no es nada: Hugo Chávez, las elecciones de 2012 y el continuismo político venezolano. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, vol. 33, n°1, 375-391.
- de la Torre, C. (2001). Redentores populistas en el Neoliberalismo: nuevos y viejos populismos latinoamericanos. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 171-196.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2000). *Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. Handbook of qualitative research*, 1-29. California: Thousands Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Deusdad, B. (2003, August). *El concepto de liderazgo político carismático: Populismo e identidades*. Consulté le November 12, 2015, sur Scielo:
http://www.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?pid=S1012-15872003000200002&script=sci_arttext
- Dorna, A. (2003). *La democracia... ¿un espejismo?: Populismo, maquiavelismo, carisma*. Buenos Aires: Lumen.
- Doyran, M. A. (2015). Argentina y su desarrollo posterior a la crisis financiera. *Revista Problemas del Desarrollo*, 180(46), January-Mars, 151-170.
- El Mundo. (2015, December 01). Condenan por corrupción a Menem y a su primer ministro Cavallo. *El Mundo*.
- Ellner, S. (2004). Hugo Chavez y Alberto Fujimori: Análisis comparativo de dos variantes de populismo. *Revista venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales*, vol. 10, n°1, enero-abril, 13-37.
- Espinal, C. (2013, November 18). *A case study into the making and evolution of populist discourse: Examining Hugo Chávez's discourse and its radicalisation through time*.

- Retrieved November 27, 2015, from London School of Economics:
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/government/degreeProgrammes/programmes/undergraduate/pdf/GV390-Cristina-Espinal.pdf>
- Frank, D. (2006). Firekte Demokratie im deutschen 'Parteienbundesstaat'. *APuZ*, n°10, 3-10.
- Freidenberg, F. (2007). *La tentación populista: Una vía de poder en América Latina*. Madrid: Síntesis.
- Gaceta Oficial de la República Volibariana de Venezuela. (2006). Ley de los Consejos Comunales. *Gaceta Oficial de la República Volibariana de Venezuela*, n° 5086, 1-11.
- Galván, F. G. (2006). Elecciones y Centro Político en Argentina (1983-2005). *Revista Collección*, n°17. Ed. Dialnet, 115-145.
- Gratius, S. (2007). The "Third Wave of Populism" in Latin America. *FRIDE (Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el diámogo exterior)*, Working Paper 45, 1-26.
- Gratius, S. (2009). Reflexiones sobre izquierda y populismo en América Latina, Ed. Universidad del País Vasco and Diputación Floral de Bizkaia. *Collección de Estudios Internacionales*, n°6, 1-28.
- Green, J. E. (2009). *The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship*. Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Gruss, B. (2014). After the Boom—Commodity Prices and Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean . *IMF Working Papers*, 1-42.
- Hawkins, K. (2003). Populism in Venezuela: the rise of Chavismo. *Third World Quarterly*, 1137–1160.
- Hernández, M. G., & Avedaño, R. R. (2008). Análisi de la Política Económica de Venezuela.1998-2006. *Revistas OIKOS año 12*, n°26, 25-47.
- Howarth, D. (2015). Discourse, hegemony and populism: Ernesto Laclau's political theory. Dans *Ernesto Laclau: post-marxisim, populism and critique* (p. 295). New York: Routledge.
- Human Rights Watch. (2011, January). *Country Summary: Venezuela*. Retrieved November 05, 2015, from Human Rights Watch:
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/venezuela_2.pdf
- Kenneth, R. (2012). Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America: A Comparison of Fujimori and Chávez. *Comparative Politics*, 2-39.
- Kettering, S. (1988). The Historical Development of Political Clientelism. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 419-447.
- Krips, H. (2006). Interpellation, populism and perversion: Althusser, Laclau and Lacan. *Filozofski Vestnik (Vol XXVII, n°2)*, 81-101.

- La Capital. (2008, July 15). Las frases más importantes del discurso de Néstor Kirchner. *La Capital*, pp. (<http://www.lacapital.com.ar/politica/Las-frases-maacutes-importantes-del-discurso-de-Neacutestor-Kirchner-20080715-0038.html>).
- La Nación. (2003, May 25). El texto completo del discurso presidencial. *La Nación*, pp. (<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/498849-el-texto-completo-del-discurso-presidencial>).
- La Nación. (2003, April 23). Kirchner presentó las bases de su plan. *La Nación*, p. 4.
- La Nación. (2013, June 13). Carlos Menem fue condenado a siete años de prisión en la causa armas. *La Nación*.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. (2014). Populism: what's in the name? Dans E. Laclau, *Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique* (pp. 153-170). Taylor & Francis Ebooks.
- Lander, E., & Navarrete, P. (2014, January 22). *La política económica de la izquierda latinoamericana en el Gobierno: el caso de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (1999-2006)*. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from CEAPEDI: <http://ceapedi.com.ar/imagenes/biblioteca/libros/79.pdf>
- Lander, L. E., & Maya, M. L. (2010, June 08). *Venezuela. La victoria de Chávez: El Polo Patriótico en las elecciones de 1998*. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from Biblioteca Hegoa: http://biblioteca.hegoa.ehu.es/system/ebooks/7498/original/Venezuela._La_Victoria_de_Chavez.pdf
- Lawson, K. (1988). *When linkages fail: emerging alternative organizations*. Princeton: Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds). University Press.
- Malamud, A. (2004). El bipartidismo Argentino: evidencias y razones de una persistencia (1983-2003). *Dialnet Colección año X, n°15*, 13-43.
- Mantovani, E. T. (2014, September 28). El actual modelo venezolano es un modelo neoextractivista. *Correo del Orinoco*, pp. 2-7.
- Maya, M. L. (2009). *Venezuela: El gobierno de Hugo Chávez y sus fuerzas bolivarianas*. México: Instituto Federal Electoral.
- Montero, A., & Yun, J. (2014, March 14). *¿Qué es el Kirchnerismo?: Interpreting Political Economy of Kirchnerismo (2003-2013) Based on Elements of Contemporary Populism*. Retrieved November 07, 2015, from Comps 400: <http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/Janghun%20Yun.pdf>
- Mudde, C., & Rovira, C. (2011). Voices of the people: Populism in Europe and Latin America compared. *Kellogg Institute Working Paper #378*, 1-43.
- Muñoz, A. B. (1998). *Habla el Comandante*. UCV: Catedra Pio Tamayo.
- Mustapic, A. M. (2002). Argentina: La crisis de representación y los partidos políticos. *América Latina Hoy, n°32*. Ed. Universidad de Salamanca, 163-183.

- New York University. (2003). *What is research Desing?* Retrieved November 14, 2015, from New York University Website:
<https://www.nyu.edu/classes/bkg/methods/005847ch1.pdf>
- Patriau, E. (2012). El populismo en Campana! Discursos televisivos en candidatos presidenciales de la Región Andina. *Colombia International* 76, julio-diciembre, 293-325.
- Patrici, N. (2005). Normalidad y crisis: El caso argentino y el problema de la representación. *Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles (11. 2005. Tordesillas): La comunidad Iberoamericana de Naciones*, 881-892.
- Patrouilleau, M. M. (2010). Discurso y narración en las dinámicas de constitución identitaria. La experiencia kirchnerista en Argentina. *CONfines* 6/11, January-May, 37-58.
- Petras, J. (2008, May 14). *Salvador Allende and Hugo Chavez: Similarities and Differences on the 'National Road to Socialism'*. Retrieved November 14, 2015, from Global Research:
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/salvador-allende-and-hugo-chavez-similarities-and-differences-on-the-national-road-to-socialism/8975>
- (2009-2010, For the Canal Encuentro and TeleSur). Presidentes de Venezuela: Hugo Chávez. (D. Filmus, Intervieweur)
- Real Instituto Elcano. (2003). Informe: Elecciones presidenciales argentinas 2003. *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos*, n°58, 1-15.
- República Bolivariana de Venezuela. (2010). *Cumpliendo las metas de milenio*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela.
- República Bolivariana de Venezuela Presidencia. (2007, September). *Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar: Primer Plan Socialista -PPS- Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2007-2013*. Retrieved 20 October, 2015, from República Bolivariana de Venezuela:
<http://www.curricular.info/PNF/pnsb.pdf>
- Retamozo, M. (2014). Populismo en América Latina: desde la teoría hacia el análisis político. Discurso, sujeto e inclusión en el caso argentino. *Colombia International* 82, Colint 82, September-December, 221-258.
- Romero, J. E. (2001). El discurso político de Hugo Chávez (1996-1999). *Espacio Abierto Vol 1, N° 2*, 229-245.
- Rowley, J. (2002). *Management Research News*. Retrieved October 22, 2015, from Using Case Studies in Research, Volume 25, Number 1: http://arf-asia.org/resources/using_case_study_in_research.pdf
- Sagarzazu, I. (2014). Venezuela 2013: Un país a dos mitades. *Revista de Ciencia Política, Vol. 34, n°2*, 315-328.
- Smink, V. (2013, May 23). 10 cosas que cambiaron en 10 años de Kirchnerismo en Argentina. *BBC World*, p. 18.

- Stake, R. E. (1995). *The art of case study research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Suppes, P. (1970). *A Probabilistic Theory of Causality*. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
- Svampa, M. (2013). La década Kirchnerista: populismo, clases medias y revolución pasiva. *LasaForum, Fall, vol. 44, issue:4*, 14-17.
- Taggart, P., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2015). Dealing with populists in government: some comparative conclusions. *Democratization. ISSN 1351-0347*.
- Taguieff, P.-A. (1997). Le populisme et la science politique: Du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes [Populism and political science: From conceptual mirage to real problems]. *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 125.
- Torre, C. D., & Peruzzotti, E. (2008). Populismo y Representación Democrática. In *El Retorno del Pueblo. Populismo y Nuevas Democracias en América Latina* (p. 110). Quito: FLACSO.
- UNDP. (2014). *Human Development Report*. Retrieved 05 November, 2015, from United Nations Development Program:
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/VEN.pdf
- Verkerk, A. (2015). Laclau and the question of populism. Dans A. Verkerk, *Popular Politics: re-thinking populism with Laclau & Deleuze-Guattari* (pp. 7-20). Leuven: Leuven University .
- Villa, R. D. (2005). Venezuela: political changes in the Chávez era. *Estudos Avançados* 19, 153-172.
- Weisbrot, M., Sandoval, L., & Rosnick, D. (2006). Poverty Rates in Venezuela: Getting the Numbers Right. *Center for Economic and policy Research- Issue Bried*, 1-10.
- Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics'. *Comparative Politics*, nº 34, 1-22.
- Wyse, S. (2011, September). *What is the Difference between Qualitative Research and Quantitative Research?* Retrieved 11 24, 2015, from
<http://www.snapsurveys.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-qualitative-research-and-quantitative-research/>
- Yin, R. (1994). *Case study research: design and methods. 2nd edition*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications.