

**A Curious Case of Political Legitimacy: The Illiberal democracy of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**





Mark Nygaard Brinch

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Abstract

The Arab Spring of 2011-13 reignited the study of political legitimacy in the Middle East. Especially the vulnerability of republics versus the resilience of monarchies drew much scholarly attention. Among the resilient monarchies Morocco and Jordan stands out as monarchies that succeeded in navigating rather peacefully through the Arab Spring. The case of the resilience of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan in the Arab revolts is of particular interest since the power dynamics within Jordan seem to contribute to the stability of the regime in spite of the authoritarian nature of the constitutional monarchy. Scholars have cited the efficiency of the security agency, the Hashemites’ ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammed or a mix of selective minor democratic initiatives as the main reasons for the continued stability in Jordan. However, a more throughout analysis of the sources of the Hashemites’ legitimacy needs to be carried out to fully understand the societal power relations behind the stability of the Hashemites. This research therefore aims to clarify the Hashemites’ use of legitimacy during the Arab Spring of 2011-13. This is done by applying Max Weber’s Traditional -, Legal-rational, and Charismatic authority to examine the sources of legitimacy for the Hashemite monarchy during the Arab Spring. By applying these concepts it is possible to identify the strategic use of different tools to in the monarchy’s pursuit on legitimacy. The three major societal groups selected for this analyses is the institutionally discriminated Palestinian majority, the pro-Hashemite bedouin tribes and the reform-eager Islamists, then latter is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated political party the Islamic Action Front. By applying the Weberian authorities to the different societal groups in the span of the Arab Spring the Hashemites’ sources of legitimacy within different societal groups in Jordan is outlined. Thus, it is proven that the different sources of legitimacy is rooted in the Monarchy’s strategic use of authorities that provide legitimacy based on religion, tradition, charisma and adherence to democratic principles. From the analysis of the societal groups three main tools used by the Hashemites during the Arab Spring of 2011-13 are identified. These tools are (1) the maintenance of the status quo in the power relations between the major social groups in Jordan, (2) the establishment, through charisma, of the King’s image as a leader committed to democratic principles and (3) the reliance on an embedded transferred legitimacy as monarch and as a Hashemite member. Lastly, the potential consequences of the monarchy’s strategy of marginalising the Palestinians is also touched upon, as it is a potential source of instability in Jordan. This is due to the regime’s discriminatory policies against the Palestinian majority, which eventually will have to be removed on the expense of the preferential treatment of the tribes potentially causing a decrease in support of the Hashemites.

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# Introduction

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011-13, now that the momentum of the different ideological movements no longer thrills a western audience to the edge of their seats, it is time to rewind and start taking a closer look at why some events occurred and why some did not. Only a few people could foresee that the revolutionary movements of the Middle East would turn into the scenes of today, where countries like Libya and Yemen are on the verge of breaking down.

The most famous cases are the ones in Syria and Iraq, where borders are practically erased and new nations are proclaimed as in the infamous case of the self-proclaimed caliphate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ‘Daesh’ as it is known in the Arab world. For many people in this region the ‘Spring’ is not over yet and the struggle for change has long ago turned extremely bloody, although for a minority of the people living in the Middle East some change have occurred, almost without any bloodshed. The difference in the turnouts of events in the Arab Spring has been subject to much debate both politically and scholarly, although it seems like each country is unique in this context even though efforts to make general presumptions were not spared attention.

Some cases have taken up particularly much attention, while some have escaped the light of mainstream international news media, which is rather paradoxical, as the lesser exposed cases to some extent could be considered even more complex than the most exposed cases like Egypt and Syria. Although, a great deal of scholarly attention has been dedicated to some of the less exposed cases by the media. One of the most curious observations that has taken up much attention among scholars of the Arab Spring is the resilience of monarchies versus the vulnerability of republics during the wave of revolts. It has spurred the questions of how did Morocco, Jordan and the rich Gulf states managed to survive the mass demonstrations in the region together with calls by their populations for economic and political change? Why is it that these countries, which often constitute that of absolute monarchies - often contrary to their own perceptions - live on, even though they typically are the ones that carry out the most authoritarian of regime practices?

Some studies have aimed at trying to explain the political and socio-economic dynamics tied to these questions, and in the case of the rich Gulf States, many have been quite successful. However, the cases of the Gulf do not hold the same complexity as the scenarios of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Morocco. The majority of the literature produced on the stability of monarchies vs. republics in the Arab Spring has confirmed that there truly is a different story for every country. Looking at the oil-rich rentier states of the Gulf, these cases might be easier to explain as few demonstrators appeared on the streets in these countries compared to that of the republics of the region thereby making a strong argument for a causality between stability and rentier states. However, some irregularities do exist when tying the Gulf monarchies to stability, as the al-Khalifa family of Bahrain saw large demonstrations and calls for political change. Furthermore, the occurrence of demonstrations in Kuwait also saw the light of day, however, the Kuwaiti demonstrations were different as they were not rooted in political dissatisfaction and they were more or less a release of long-term tensions between the ruling family and parliamentary factions (Yom and Gregory Gause lll, Resilient Royals: How Arab monarchies Hang on 2012). The cases of the kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan seems like the odd ones out during the Arab Spring, and these cases demand further research in order to identify the dynamics inside these countries and their importance to the stability of the regimes.

Because of the apparent uniqueness and complexity of the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of the research conducted in the wake of the Arab Spring focuses on Jordan and how the monarchy has managed to avoid its people bandwagoning the regional demonstrations.

Considering the authoritarian nature of the reign of the Hashemites it is puzzling how the Jordanian regime has managed to weather the storm during the Arab Spring in 2011-13 as well as earlier previously. Scholars like Daniel Brumberg and Sean L. Yom have listed the use of strategic political and economic reforms and the Hashemite’s historical kinship ties to the Prophet Muhammed as the key reasons for the resilience of the Jordanian monarchy and its perceived legitimacy to rule (Yom, Jordan: Ten more years of autocracy 2009) (Brumberg 2002). Various studies performed on the issue of legitimacy in Jordan indicates that the roots of the Hashemites’ legitimacy could be tied to the strategic use of reforms, however, the importance of the major societal groups in Jordan are missing.

## Research question

The monarchy’s use of reforms as a means to satisfy the popular demands for economic and political change seems like a plausible argument in the study of the questions tied to why Jordan experienced such a peaceful Arab Spring. However, the study of the strategic use of reforms in Jordan needs closer examination, as the connection between these reforms and other actions by the regime needs to be tied to concepts of legitimacy to make sense in a sociological context. Especially in the wake of such a ground-breaking regional event as is the Arab Spring, it is more vital than ever to try to explain the connection between legitimacy and actions by the regime in Jordan during this period as this could provide us with inside into the roots of the authoritarian nature of regimes in the Middle East.

The mapping of how the application of reforms and other actions by the regime affected the legitimacy of the kingdom to various social groups in society has not been examined to a satisfactory extent and it therefore provides fuel for a study aimed at doing so. This paper therefore embarks on an effort to clarify how the concepts of legitimacy can be applied to the Jordanian monarchy’s actions and efforts to appeal to different societal actors.

Even though this paper will provide several sub-conclusions to various minor problem statements, the underlying research question of this paper will be ‘*how did the Jordanian monarchy, through various strategic tools, manage to create and reaffirm its legitimacy to various socio-political groups during the Arab Spring of 2011-13?’*

## Relevance of research

The choice of Jordan as the country of study is rooted in the apparent uniqueness of the country’s rather peaceful manoeuvring through the period of the Arab Revolts of 2011. Looking at the 2011-events in the Middle East in a broader perspective a pattern can be identified; the resilience of monarchies vs. the vulnerability of republics. No kingdoms have fallen during the Arab Revolt making scholars anxious to theorise on the issue in pursuit of furthering the understanding behind the dynamics that initially sparked and sustained the revolts.

Regarding Jordan, the discussion of national dynamics during the Arab Revolts has primarily aimed at trying to explain how the Hashemites have been able to sustain their rule. Some of the more successful efforts of outlining the regime’s success is Sean L. Yom’s 2009-article entitled *Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy* (Yom, Jordan: Ten more years of autocracy 2009) in which he emphasises the use of ‘selective economic’ reforms together with constrains to civil society and the creation of democratic principles as the main reasons for the stability of the current King Abdullah II’s regime. In 2002Daniel Brumberg went as far as to label the oppressive means of Jordan, Morocco and other authoritarian Arab states “a type of political system” (Brumberg 2002)*.* The idea of the use of strategic means for preserving the monarchy’s stability is a well-explored topic, although the sources of the monarchy’s legitimacy still needs further mapping. It is therefore vital to study how the regime has nurtured its relations with various societal groups in order to get the full picture and provide conclusive results on the regime’s sources of legitimacy. In the end, by being able to map out how the Hashemites has preserved their stability it could pave the way for a better understanding of the dynamics of the Middle East together with the constant challenges to the legitimacy of political authorities that arise in this region.

## Aim of the paper

Through the use of Weber’s authorities of legitimacy, this paper will aim to provide a clarification of the underlying mechanisms behind Jordan’s rather peaceful Arab Spring, and show how the Hashemites have successfully managed to appeal to various societal groups through various types of authorities. In the end the analysis of the Hashemites’ use of different methods of appealing to different societal groups will contribute to identifying the strategic tools used by the monarchy during the Arab Spring to preserve its power.

# Methodology

In this chapter the methodological considerations of this study will be outlined including thoughts on research design, the general approach to the study of legitimacy, choice of literature and on the limitations made in this study. In order to identify the sources of legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan a categorisation of the different events in Jordan during the Arab Spring has to be made. These events in Jordan during the Arab Spring deals with the relations or actions by the Hashemites and how it has effected different societal groups. It could be the implementation of laws restricting the possibilities of one group on behalf of another or the simple promises by the King to create such laws. In order to approach a better understanding of the actions and events that could potentially effect the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy therefore needs to be made. This categorisation of observations should also be made to simple further the comprehension of source(s) of legitimacy in any Arab country, as the appeal of the authoritarian regimes to its people might be multiple and complex even though a dictatorial form of regime-practice is often carried out..

To make this categorisation Max Weber’s three authority types of legitimacy will be used in this paper. It will thereby be possible to categorise the sources of legitimacy and divide them into the Weberian classifications of Religious, Legal-Rational and Charismatic authority types of legitimacy. This is termed Part One of the analysis.

When the observations are categorised, a general overview of the sources of legitimacy is thereby established and the next step can be initiated, which is the analysis of the effects of the use of the strategic tools of the monarchy. This will be the main task at hand in Part Two of the analysis.

This methodological structure consisting of a pre-classification of source(s) of legitimacy into Weberian concepts has been chosen to shed light on the multiplicity of the monarchy’s sources of legitimacy and their different meanings to different societal groups. This is done to equip the reader with a better understanding of legitimacy in Jordan in general before engaging in a discussion concerning the monarchy’s strategies for sustaining its legitimacy.

## Research design

In order to answer the stated problem the most suitable design for this research must be considered. Considering the stated aim of this paper to reach an explanation of the effect appealing to different socially constructed authorities, relying on quantitative data would not provide us with a result which is adequately elaborate. Thus, being a study of the social construct of legitimacy, the nature of the results will be qualitative and thereby investigative and open for an interpretative type of research.

## Choice of literature

The choice of literature reflects the interpretative nature of this social science study as the use of empirical material is based on written sources and no interviews are carried out. The inclusion of primary data has been discarded as primary sources are rather unattainable in this case. This is partly due to the nature of the Jordanian regime, as freedom of expression could become an issue in regard to the quality of data. Instead secondary data will be used in this paper, consisting of an array of articles from various scientific journals together with reports and books of academic nature. The empirical material of this research is traced in various sources, primarily from online encyclopaedias such as the Encyclopaedia Britannica but also articles of journalistic nature from media such as ‘CNN’, ‘BBC’ and ‘Jordan Times’. The inclusion of Jordan times could potentially hold some controversy as government effort to control the editors of the media is continuous, particularly in regard to criticism of the monarchy, making self-censoring a reoccurrence in Jordan (Freedom House 2015). Finally, organisations like Freedom House and Human Rights Watch have also been used for referencing throughout this paper – mainly to indicate the state of political affairs. In terms of the theory applied in connection with the analysis, the sources used stem from a wide range of scholars that have been in the forefront of the study of legitimacy throughout the 20th century going in to the 21st century. Max Weber is frequently applied as his work on legitimacy was essential to the very founding of the study of the concept. More contemporary scholars concerned with legitimacy are also applied to reflect current trends within the study of legitimacy.

## Approach to the study of legitimacy

When embarking on a study of a socially constructed concept the right contextual concern needs to be addressed. In the case of legitimacy the study of this concept needs to be addressed properly, the social framework within which this study will operate in has to be outlined.

In his book *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility* political scientist Jean-Marc Coicaud introduces his study of legitimacy by stating that “The examination of the question of legitimacy … will lead us into the heart of the history of ideas – but also a history of modern societies” (Coicaud 2002, 2). Coicaud’s approach to the study of political legitimacy is in others words a study of the history of sociological development. It is a matter of identifying the contemporary context that the political legitimacy is observed within to fully comprehend its composition and the faculty of judgement of the people at the time.

When drawing on this approach one might be tempted to use a theoretical template from development studies, namely that of Modernization theory. At first hand Modernization might seem as a plausible companion to the development of political legitimacy although some issues arise later on. In this paper the Modernization theory to examine political legitimacy will not be used. The reason is that the study of political legitimacy in many cases seem detached from the level of development of a country. This detachment is observed when examining legitimacy expressed as stability in the wealthy Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. In these countries stability is relatively high and the leaders are popular, however, democratic concepts such as human rights and freedom of speech are either lacking or completely absent.

### The Arab context

Keeping in mind the listed examples of Gulf States and its odd nature, one might be tempted to wonder if the Arab world is a particular attraction for odd cases of political legitimacy. In pursuing an answer to the stated research question, one might approach an answer to whether likeliness of legitimacy derived through traits unique to the Arab World is the case, however, no indication of specific elements of legitimacy being tied to the Arab world seems clearly proven. Even though the presence of religion seem fundamental to political legitimacy in the Arab World it extents further than the religion of Islam and of the MENA region. A further elaboration of the influence of religion on legitimacy in a Jordanian context will nevertheless be pursuit in this study.

### Conceptualising democracy

A clarifying disclaimed has to be made since this paper is concerned with the sources of legitimacy and the definition of this concept. This research on Jordan’s societal composition and its actors could be marked by an ontological perception of democracies as an absolute and finite concept instead of a concept available for empirical imperfections. Some aspects of this research therefore could hold an embedded preconceptionalised ideal of democracy, although this issue have been minded throughout the research process eliminating any further concerns regarding this matter.

## Timeframe

The Arab spring was an epiphany for many scholars of political systems and legitimacy as it not only reignited the discussion of democracy and the MENA region but also exposed the fragility of many regimes and their structure. This paper will seek discuss events in Jordan that occurred during the Arab Spring, which in this case is 2011-2013. That said, some of the events in the period leading up to the Arab Spring will also been touched upon in this paper in order to provide context.

## Delimitation of the study

In this paragraph, the limitation to this study is elaborated upon in terms of scope and use of material. As have been outlined earlier in the section on the design of the research limitations have been made to the use of data. The uncertainties and improbability attached to the use of primary data have resulted in a discard of such data collection; therefore, secondary data is used solely.

In regard to the research method applied in this study, the use of qualitative data always gives rise to interpretation, however, even though this aspect could easily be a subject of critique it at the same times provides us with the material needed to explore the concept of legitimacy in Jordan.

A theoretical limitation to this study is the leaving out of Modernization theory in connection to analysing the nature of appeal of different societal groups in Jordan. Even though it can be argued that modernization might provide us with a very extensive and complete tool for our study, it will not be used in this case. The application of modernization theory could make for a very interesting study on an international level by compared the types of legitimacy and the levels of impact in different cultural set-ups, rather than just internally in Jordan.

## Selecting the empirical material

In terms of the selected empirical data an issue of interpretation arises as the choice of empirical data needs further elaboration.

### Choice of societal actors

The study sets forth to investigate the importance relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and some selected societal groups, but how should these groups be designated in a proper manner? To find groups that suit for this research some criteria needs to be outlined as the groups need to depict the reality but at the same time the amount of groups needs to be limited to fit the scope of this research. Firstly, the terminology of ‘groups’ does not entail individuals and their individual actions towards the government, this means random protest-arrest single articulated critique against the government or the monarchy. In other word, the critique made by an individual that is a member of a group will be regarded as an indicator of the general opinion of that group on the monarchy. Secondly, groups vary internally, meaning that the people inside a group might be different from one another in they react to a statement or action by the government making a unified position towards these comment impossible to identify without the use of extensive quantitative measures. To make up for this, the reactions used for analysed will only be public statements made by groups that identify themselves as a collection of individuals being they Ethnic, religious, political, national, gender-based etc. In other words, the statements and actions subject of these groups subject to scrutiny in this paper show clear signs of being representative for that specific group. This is decided by looking at whether the group, which the individual in question regard himself as part of, distances itself from the statements or actions of that individual. Thirdly, the criteria for the selection should seek to enable the inclusion of groups that has actually played a role during the Arab Uprisings in Jordan. Naturally, this criteria is inevitable in this research as selecting a group that has been inactive in the Arab Uprisings in Jordan would make an analysis of their actions during this period rather sparse. Although, to what extent should a group have been active to be eligible in this regard? As the point of departure for our research is the Royal Family, represented by King Abdulla II. The selected groups therefore need in some way to have expressed themselves, its attitude or stance towards the actions and statements carried out by the monarchy or the government for them to be included. In regard to religious groups picked for analysis a few methodological issues needs to be addressed.

#### Religious actors

The selection of the actors of Jordanian society becomes delicate when the issue of religion is raised. Having in mind that Jordan has a state religion the role of religion in this study seem to be a key aspect for us to pay attention to, as it is plausible that much political legitimacy is rooted in religion and the appeal to religious standards and norms.

The deep-rooted religiosity in Jordan manifests itself in various ways. One of the institutionalisations of religion that has been heavily criticised by many human rights groups and organisations is the National identity cards, which stipulates one’s religious affiliation (Lipton 2002, 55) (Human RIghts Watch 2007). This form of institutionalisation of religion has some consequences for our study of religious legitimacy. A consequence of the institutionalisation of a religion in Jordan is that it leaves us with a difficulty in paying attention to each religious group’s activities during the Arab Uprising. This is because one must suspect the attention of the media has primarily been caught by religious movements generally supporting the royal family, or general utterances from these groups in favour of the monarchy have been selectively picked up by the media to some extent. Aside from the example of institutionalisation of specific religions and the neglect of others, the reasons for this suspicion is also rooted in the continued efforts of the government to control the media and the editors, which have increased self-censorship among editors (Freedom House 2015). The imbedded scepticism concerning the media of Jordan is also outlined earlier in this paper in the ‘Choice of literature’-paragraph.

In spite of methodological issues the institutional neglect of some religions and the promotion of others in Jordan gives rise to an elaborate discussion which will be introduced in Chapter 5.

## Sub-conclusion

In Chapter 2 the methodological considerations for this study of legitimacy in Jordan has been discussed. Furthermore, the choice of literature for this paper, the selected timeframe and delimitations in this study. Finally, the basis for selecting the societal groups for the analysis is discussed.

Regarding the process of choosing the societal actors for analysis a range of criteria have been applied. The criteria states that any societal groups used in this study should 1) consist of actual groups and not only individuals, 2) the groups should have been visible or active during the Arab Uprising in Jordan and 3) the individual who articulates something or carries out an action on behalf of a group needs to perceived as a legitimate representative of a that group.

# Theory

In this chapter the concept of legitimacy will be presented. Moreover, a suitable definition of legitimacy will be discussed. Finally, the empirical and normative approach to the study of legitimacy will be presented before outlining Max Weber’s three authority types.

## The concept of legitimacy

Before outlining Weber’s authority types a clarification of the concept of political legitimacy and the approach to the study of legitimacy in this paper is needed. When discussing a question related to legitimacy one is inherently discussing power and the right to hold that power. Legitimacy and power can almost be labelled fully interchangeable concepts as one is key to the other. If a position of power is held, it is because the legitimacy to hold that power is recognised in the eyes of the power-holder but also by the subordinates to the powerholder.

## The interdisciplinary study of legitimacy

The study of legitimacy in politics is an interdisciplinary effort; philosophy, political science, law sociology, religious studies and political anthropology are just some of the fields which have been concerned with the constitution and nature of legitimacy (Coicaud 2002, 10). The interdisciplinary nature of the study of legitimacy indicates the complexity in the study of this theme, while at the same time providing a very flexible tool for understanding the sources of the legitimacy in the case of the Jordanian Monarchy. With all these different disciplines in play when discussing legitimacy, a clarification in regard to the different approaches to the study of political legitimacy is needed to form a more complete understanding of the study of the concept.

## The empirical vs. the normative approach to legitimacy

There are two main approaches to the study of legitimacy: the normative and the empirical/descriptive. The normative approach is the one frequently used by political philosophers as it deals with the philosophical arguments for the standards rulers should be upheld to in order to be described as legitimate (Ansell 2001, 8704). The empirical approach on the other hand is concerned with why people give their consent to be ruled, and thus whether the standards set up by the normative approach are met (Ansell 2001, 8704).

In this paper the normative standards developed by Max Weber that being his concepts of authority types of legitimacy will be applied. This means the use of the empirical approach will be used in this paper to study how a normative set of standards of legitimacy is connected to the situation in Jordan during the Arab Spring of 2011-13

## Defining legitimacy

Various definitions of political legitimacy exist, and they vary significantly in quality of applicability in regard to this study, a definition to be used in the analysis need to be found.

A useful definition is Klassen and Dowding’s. They state that legitimacy is “what grants those in power the general consent required to govern” (Dowding and Klassen 2011). This definition is useful as it emphasises a ‘general consent’ instead of describing consent as something definite, something that can either be or not be. The use of the wording ‘general consent’ include the acceptance of a varying degree of legitimacy, which will be taken into account in the formulation of a definition. In a sense, Klassen and Dowding’s recognition of the existence of ‘general consent’ instead of what might be labelled ‘total consent’ is important to the conceptualisation of political legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, the discussion of legitimacy is ultimately a discussion of power or the right to power. Being ‘political legitimacy’ power in this case encapsulates governing, our definition should therefore seek to embody ‘the right to govern’.

The next step for us is to locate who is involved in the formation of legitimacy. This sparks the question of ‘who’ has the right to govern. What should be taken into consideration is that the very basis of who has the right to govern is twofold in the sense that legitimacy is not only a matter of the consent of the governed but also of the governing power. A ruler casting doubt about his own right to power can be argued to lose his legitimacy in that very moment. As has been the case in a range of countries all over the Middle East and North Africa throughout the Arab Uprisings, country leaders have left their offices when subject to certain levels of pressure - with some, as in the case of Colonel Gaddafi, too late. This stubbornness is a reflection of the leader’s belief in his own right to be in office. In liberal democracies votes of no confidence is usually enough to make leaders step down, because they rely on the democratic processes to be an indicator of their state of legitimacy. In the definition of legitimacy will refrain from focusing too much on the monarchy’s own perception of its right to govern as the main subject of analysis throughout this paper is the societal groups and their perception of the monarchy’s legitimacy.

Returning to the definition of legitimacy, it is established that legitimacy encompasses ’the right to govern as perceived by the governed and the governing power’. Now the people being governed needs to be looked upon. Coicaud argues that the right to govern only exists if there is a group to be governed, as one being cannot be considered to govern himself (Coicaud 2002, 11). This spares us from clarifying the form of governed in our definition as the presence of more than oneself is the only requirement for establishing any type of legitimacy. The presence of a group to govern is thereby embedded in the constitution of legitimacy itself. With Coicaud’s statement in mind the following can now be stated as the definition of legitimacy: *‘Legitimacy is the perceived right to govern and the general consent to be governed ’.*

#### The multilateralism of legitimacy

As stated by Klassen and Dowding, legitimacy is constituted by a ’general consent’ of the governed (Dowding and Klassen 2011). Many scholars, like Klassen and Dowding have touched upon the issue of ‘when legitimacy is achieved’ and so it is important to realise that questions of legitimacy rarely depends on the standpoint of a single observer within a group. This might be quite evident but for the sake of clarification some questions might have to be ironed out.

When a group perceives a leader as legitimate, all of the members of the group might not agree. This leads us to a small methodological hurdle regarding Weber’s religious legitimacy specifically, because when is a leader religiously legitimate? Is it when he is perceived as a legitimate political leader to the majority of the population in a country which has a state religion? Is it when he is perceived as legitimate by the majority of religious people? Or is it when he is perceived as legitimacy by the majority of the people subscribing to the state religion? The point here being that legitimacy within a group is, naturally, established multilaterally by a ‘general consent’, an average sought to speak.

## Weber’s legitimacy types

Now that the approach to the study of legitimacy is outlined together with definition of the concept, an introduction to the authorities of legitimacy that will form the basis for this study will be made. One of the most influential scholars on legitimacy is German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). Weber did extensive research on legitimacy and the conceptual framework for legitimacy. This eventually led to the development of in his four ideal types of legitimacy, the Traditional, the Charismatic, the Legal-rational and the Value-rational ideal types (Månson 2000).Weber further extended his research by narrowing the four ideal types down to three authorities of legitimacy, which has formed the basis for much contemporary research on legitimacy. Weber approached legitimacy as a social phenomenon that is present on different levels of power structures, as he argued that bureaucratic and administrative processes also require a belief in the rationale in complying, in a sense “every system of authority … attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in ‘legitimacy’” (Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation 1947, 325) (Ansell 2001, 8705). Even though Weber also acknowledged that systems of power, which relies on brute force and coercive measures does exist, he argued that the presence of legitimacy could limit the resources required to uphold such oppressive measures (Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino 2011, 5). Max Weber’s authority types is widely used even though some misfits exists and challenges the approach to legitimacy. In line with Weber’s acceptance of power structures that do not rely on legitimacy so too is this research concerned with explaining the odd case of legitimacy of Jordan.

One of the primary reasons for the inclusion of Max Weber’s work on legitimacy in this paper is that it provides an interdisciplinary tool for understanding the sources of legitimacy. Having the interdisciplinary form of the study of legitimacy in mind, when looking at the sources of legitimacy in Jordan, it is an ideal choice of theory. This is simply because the sources of the monarchy’s legitimacy in Jordan requires interdisciplinary studies to be fully comprehended, as will be shown in the analysis.

Looking at the three authority types in a history context, Weber’s introduction to his study of legitimacy becomes even more visible as the authority types overall seem more present in or associated with different historical periods. Even though they can be applied universally, which is shown in the analysis, the different authority types are more or less connected to different periods and the general development of history of ideas. This could naturally appeal to the belief in some authority types of legitimacy being more modern or appealing more to ‘developed’ societies than developing societies, much in line with the ontological approach by Modernization theory. Max Weber himself also recognised the correlation of a significant historical development and legitimacy through his authority. Weber argued that a general trend of progression in the West towards the Legal-rational authority type existed, which became more widespread on the expense of the Religious and Charismatic authorities (Ansell 2001, 8705).

### Ideal types vs. authority types

The ideal types that Weber presents should only be considered ‘ideal types’ for analytical purposes, as they cannot be applied in their pure form anywhere, or as Weber himself described it: “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view” according to which “*concrete* individualphenomena … are arranged into a unified analytical construct; in its purely fictional nature, it is a methodological utopia [that] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.” (Kim 2012) (Weber, Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy 1904/1949, 90). Weber hereby argues that methodologically the ideal types have an embedded inadequacy in their reflection of reality, meaning the ideal types should not be expected to be found in their purest form anywhere, but should still be used as analytical tools for guidance. If we applied Weber’s ideal types of legitimacy we would therefore not expect to find them in their purest form in Jordanian society and they would not be able to provide us with satisfying analytical tools. Weber revised his study of legitimacy types by creating three authority types based on his four ideal types, with the exception of the value-rational ideal type. These three authority types will be applied instead as they describe “the reasons a member hold to view the powerholder as legitimate” (Månson 2000, my translation), which is what in this paper will be explored in the case of Jordan.

### The Traditional authority

The first authority that will be introduced is Weber’s Traditional authority. Its authority derives from history and traditions, and it is legitimated by the sanctity of history itself. Weber describes Traditional authority as “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them” (Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation 1947, 328). This authority is created through the belief in upholding the order of the traditional ways of finding a ruler, being it through hereditary rule or through other means (Månson 2000). The observance of traditions and the belief in the authority of old customs often leads to organisations, which ascribe to this authority type, not to support social change and transformation. Weber manages to encapsulate the limits of these organisations well when he states that “The creation of new law opposite traditional norms is deemed impossible in principle.” (Weber, The three types of legitimate rule 1958, 4). Certain societal groups are often nursed through this type of authority and as Badie states “The use of traditional legitimacy is a major method for mobilizing different kinds of structures, like communitarian groups, family, tribes, and clans, or for fuelling social relations, like clientelism or kinship” (B. Badie 2001, 8707). Because the Traditional authority is rooted in history and customs, the presence of a system of hereditary rule is usually linked to Traditional authority. As an effect of this, older regimes are often associated with this type of authority. A commonly used example of Traditional authority in a political structure is the medieval kingdoms of Europe. In moderns times few regimes constituted solely by Traditional authority exists. The absolute monarchies of the Emirates in the Gulf are contemporary examples of power systems that rely on Traditional authority.

Religious authority

Legitimacy through religion is a sub-category to Traditional authority as the mythology of religions rely on historical references and traditions in a sense, references to religious scriptures, events and rituals carry an embedded authority of tradition. Two kinds of Religious authority is often discussed, (1) the ruler as being God and (2) the ruler as being placed on the throne by God. Legitimacy derived from the perception of the ruler as a God will not be applied to this paper as it is often solely associated with ancient regimes such as Ancient Egypt and therefore not relevant to our discussion of modern Jordan. The second kind of Religious authority is when the ruler is associated with God or thought to be placed on the throne by God. Historically, this is exemplified in the Chinese principle of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, the concept of “Dei graita” - by the grace of God, or in case of Charlemagne, who was “Deo coronatus” - crowned by God (Schmidt 2014).

Some newer regimes are also legitimated by Traditional authority. The current theocracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which came to power as early as 1979 in the Islamic Revolution, is an example of this. Even though the regime itself is fairly new, it proclaims to be an Islamic Republic based on Islamic scriptures. The regime in Saudi Arabia is another example of Religious authority and thereby Traditional authority, as its constitution is based on the Quran itself, although a case for Legal-rational authority in Saudi Arabia will be made in a later paragraph.

Weber’s concept of Traditional authority will be given great attention in the case of Jordan because of the great historical importance of the Hashemites in the context legitimacy.

### The Legal-rational authority

The Legal-rational authority is the ‘odd one out’ compared to the other types of authority. This is due to the embedded attribute of rationality central to this authority; in this case the belief in absolute rationality of a set of rules or laws. This authority is based on a prescribed formal order where the general attitude is goal-rational (Månson 2000, 95-96). The legitimacy of bureaucrats and professionals in general rests upon an authority of legal-rationality (Barker 1990, 50), making this authority the most impersonal Weberian authority, as the presence of a legal or rule-based structure is the source of legitimacy. The Legal-rational authority is expressed in many power structures throughout the world. One of the most evident examples of Legal-rational authority is in constitutional political systems. This is exemplified by the liberal democracies of Europe where the legitimacy of the right to rule of prime ministers or presidents derive from the electoral process and the constitutions.

Earlier the issue of rationality in legalism was discussed, and looking at the Legal-rational authority it is important to keep in mind that the rationality of a legal-system varies in accordance with the context of values it is founded within. In Islamic societies the Quran’s laws and norms might be viewed as rational whereas this might not be the case in liberal democracies of Europe. In other words the perceived rationality of the Legal–rational authority relies upon the value-context. An example of this ‘clash of rationality’ is the ‘Cartoon Crisis’ in Denmark in the 2000s which was a clash between values as the ‘freedom of speech’ was expressed by a newspaper in the form of several satirical drawings of the Prophet Muhammed. This caused a large uproar throughout the Middle East as depicting the Prophet is regarded as unlawful and a great insult to many Muslims.

Looking at the example of Saudi Arabia once again, an important source of legitimacy for the royal family, is the Islamic scriptures of the Sharia, the Hadith and the Sunna, because the King is the protector of the holy city of Mecca, therefore the laws of the Islamic texts provide the King with Legal-rational authority.

### The Charismatic authority

The third authority Weber identified is the Charismatic authority. The legitimacy of this authority rests upon a belief in the exclusivity of the characteristics of an individual like holiness, intellect, leadership skills, bravery or something else (Månson 2000, 95). As Bernard Badie accurately states; it is “the legitimacy of the prophet, the hero, the warlord, the plebiscitary ruler, but also the demagog.” (B. Badie 2001, 8706). According to Weber, the Charismatic authority is fragile as expectations of performing well are higher than with the other authorities. This is the case in a Legal-rational authority-based system where the legitimacy of a ruler is based on his institutional role in the system rather than his characteristics (B. Badie 2001, 8706). The challenge for a charismatic leader is that he has to prove himself unique. On the other hand, charismatic leaders have a much better chance to break the traditional system as they can get the support of the people based on their characteristics rather than in accordance with tradition (B. Badie 2001). Because the charismatic leader holds this potential, this type of authority has often surfaced in severe crisis (Schmidt 2014). The appearance of a charismatic leader in tough times is most visible in the example of the rise of Adolf Hitler in Nazi-Germany in the in the 1930s, who rose to power in the aftermath of a devastating defeat in WWI and during an economically low tide. The Charismatic authority, according to Weber, has been a revolutionary force in history, as it holds the potential for changing the dynamics in society (B. Badie 2001, 8706)

Other examples of the exercise of charismatic authority include Napoleon Bonaparte in the early 19th century, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in the 1950s and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 1969 and throughout the 20th century. The most well-known examples of a regime striving for legitimacy through the establishment of Charismatic authority is the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, where a ‘cult of personality’ has been successfully created around Kim Il-sung and eventually around every succeeding leader in the authoritarian country.

### Value-rational – an ideal type or an authority type?

Weber presented four ideal types but only three authority types. He left out the ‘Value-rational’ ideal type. The inclusion of the Value-rational ideal type as a type of authority is widely disputed among scholars, as Weber himself did not label it an ‘authority’. Weber described the value-rational ideal type as having “by virtue of a rational belief in its absolute value” (Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation 1947, 130). This ideal type is most easily explained in comparison to the Legal-rational authority; the Legal-rational authority bases its legitimacy on the belief in the complete rationality of a set of formal laws, whereas the value-rational is attracted by a belief in the complete rationality of an ideology - a set of ideas and norms (Satow 1975, 2).

One of the best arguments for excluding the value-rational authority was given by Roberta Lynn Satow when she argued that the existence of a value-rational authority in an organisation entails that everyone within that organisation is committed to an absolute ideological goal. She found this quite paradoxical as “all organizations must balance adaptation for organizational survival with commitment to organizational goals; yet a value-rational orientation involves commitment to an absolute goal regardless of consequences to the organization.” (Satow 1975, 3). Satow thereby argues that because an organisation by definition has values, which it is founded upon, it is paradoxical to discuss whether value-rationality exists in any organisation.

#### Leaving out a value-rational authority?

Much discussion about the including or exclusion of the Value-rational authority has taken place. In this discussion Rodney Barker has managed very well to describe Weber’s reasons for not siding a value-rational authority, as it is connected to Weber’s perception of the state. Barker points to the difference between legitimacy in an organisation and legitimacy in a state. He argues that Weber’s neglect of the value-rational authority is rooted in his approach to the study of legitimacy that focuses on domination in general and not in a state (Barker 1990, 49). Barker’s argument describes how the Charismatic, Traditional and Legal-rational are all characteristics of government, whereas substantive values are detached from government (Barker 1990, 50). The state thereby becomes merely an apparatus and an instrument with a set of values solely depending on the values of its citizens, because the state becomes legitimate through the pursuit of “valued objectives” (Barker 1990, 50).

Having Barker’s analysis of Weber typology in mind the application of a value-rational authority might be counter-productive to the objective of this research since it interferes with the methodological approach to the study of societal groups. The reasons for this is the distinction, according to Barker’s analysis of Weber that should be drawn between a state and organisation values. A state does not have values itself, it only portrays the values of its citizens whereas organisations on the other hand are founded with a set of values which drives it.

If a value-rational authority is applied to the Jordanian monarchy, it will be an odd outcome as the monarchy then ought to be viewed as the rational agitator of the values of the societal actors in Jordan. Barker exemplifies the methodological problems of values-rational authority in the state well by arguing that “To assert the authority of the state in terms of value-rationality would involve for example saying we obey and support it because it correctly interprets Islam; to assert its authority in terms of the categories Weber employs would be to say that it is led by true prophets.” (Barker 1990, 52).

Because of the ambiguity concerning the inclusion of a potential value-rational authority it will not be applied to analyse Jordan. Furthermore, the inclusion of a value-rational authority would entail a deviation from our methodological considerations.

## Critique of the theory

Weber’s typology of legitimacy holds to its disadvantage that it is several decades old and many political changes has come about since the three authorities first were introduced. However, they are still frequently used because of their universality, even though political scientists have been troubled by the fact that Hitler and Roosevelt are comparable as they both were driven by Charismatic authority (Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino 2011). The rise of the religious regime in Iran and the increase in Islamic Fundamentalism in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century has revitalised and actualised Weber’s Religious authority, possible paving the way for a new renaissance for his work on legitimacy.

## Sub-conclusion

Several aspects of legitimacy has been touched upon in this chapter. The concept of legitimacy has been defined as well as discussed in relation to ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of the study of legitimacy has also been outlined.

Besides giving a thorough presentation of the concept of legitimacy, the two approaches to the study of legitimacy have been presented - the two approaches being the empirical and the normative approach. Of these two approaches the empirical approach as Weber’s normative typology of authorities will be applied to an empirical study of Jordanian society. Weber’s three types of authority, which have been presented in this chapter (the Traditional, the Legal-rational and the Charismatic) will be used in the analysis. Finally, a discussion regarding the exclusion of a value-rational authority has been carried out together with a general critique of the presented theory.

# Jordan – Overview and historical context

Following Jean-Marc Coicaud’s claim that an inclusion of the history of ideas is needed to fully examine the question of legitimacy, this chapter will present the contemporary history and the history of ideas in Jordan. This will be done to provide the framework for understanding the societal dynamics of Jordan later presented in this study for analysis. Some of the key democratic challenges for Jordan will likewise be touched upon.

## The History of the Hashemites

In order to analyse upon the royal family and to provide historical context for present action, the history of the Hashemites and the history of Jordan will now be outlined.

The House of the Hashemite prides itself by been able to trace its lineages back to the Prophet Muhammed and further. Originating from the Hejaz region in Saudi Arabia, which includes the Holy city of Mecca, the Hashemites have historically been held in high regard throughout the Arab world with family members having served as Kings in both Syria (Faisal I), Iraq (Faisal I, Ghazi I & Faisal II) and in present day Jordan.

### The loss of Mecca and the gain of Jordanian independence

The Modern political history of the Hashemite family begins with Hussein bin Ali (1854-1931), who was Emir of Mecca and King of the Hejaz region during Ottoman rule. The Hashemites had held the Meccan emirate since the beginning of the 19th century and so the title of ‘Emir of Mecca’ passed to Hussein ibn ʿAlī. In 1916 Hussein Bin Ali became leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and proclaimed himself ‘King of the Arab Countries’, his allies although only recognised him as King of Hejaz, a title he was forced to abdicate in 1924 after the tribal leader Ibn Saud, who later founded Saudi Arabia, attacked the Emirate of Mecca (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013).

Hussein Bin Ali’s son Abdullah was also very much involved in the Arab nationalist movement and the fight for independence of the Arabs from the Ottomans. After the defeat of the Ottomans Abdullah embarked on a quest to create a united Arab kingdom spanning Syria, Iraq and Transjordan (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013). He initialling moved his forces up north from Hejaz. The British decided to take advantage of the status of towards Syria to assist his brother Faisal regain power after the French ousted him. The British were although not interested in been drawn into a conflict with their French allies, and Churchill eventually talked Abdullah into refraining from attacking the French. The British rewarded Abdullah for his decision by naming him Emir of Transjordan and on 1 April 1921 Abdullah ibn Hussein al Hashimi was crowned King of Transjordan and a new constitution replacing the British Mandate was enacted (Federal Research Division 2006).

King Abdullah I, as he came to be known, was the only Arab ruler to accept the United Nations’ plan of dividing Palestine into two states in 1947 (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013). This move, together with his annexation of the West bank and East Jerusalem in the Arab-Israeli War of 1949 angered many of the Palestinians living in Transjordan. His popularity soured domestically among Arab Nationalists and in 1951 he was assassinated by a radical Palestinian Nationalist (Federal Research Division 2006). Two years before his death, he changed the name of his country from Transjordan to The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as he now controlled both sides of the Jordan River (Federal Research Division 2006).

After a short period of reign under King Talal I , who was forced to abdicate due to his declining mental health, Talal’s son Hussein was crowned King of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1953.

### Jordan’s contemporary history

During King Hussein I’s long rule from 1953 to his death in 1999, he managed to steer Jordan through an era filled with regional tension, wars, assassination-attempts and increasing domestic pressure from Palestinians and Arab Nationalists unhappy with Jordan’s occupation of the West Bank or peace-talks with Israel. Not least was the 1950s and 1960s an eventful challenge for King Hussein as he had to perform a balancing act with tensions between his traditional and conservative monarchy of the Hashemites in Jordan, his close relations with western governments, and the surrounding socialist republics of Egypt, Syria and Iraq backed by the Soviet Union (Federal Research Division 2006, 4).

In 1967 King Hussein’s Jordan, alongside with its Arab neighbours entered what came to be known as the Six-Days War. At first, Hussein were reluctant to join in on the attack against Israel, but Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser tricked Hussein by saying he had destroyed the Israeli air force when in fact it was the Egyptian air force that had been wiped out (CNN World 1999).

The failure of King Hussein to stay out of the conflict in 1967 is a stain on Hussein’s rule that took time to heal. In spite of the fact that his engagement in the conflict gave him support among the Palestinians living in Jordan he was still fairly unpopular among the Palestinians both domestically and abroad (CNN World 1999).

The Hashemite’s tense relationship with the Palestinians has led to several encounters with Jordanian-Palestinians over the years culminating in the events of ‘Black September’ in 1970, where King Hussein’s forces drove out the Palestinian Liberation Front from Jordan and massacred several thousand Palestinians (Zahran 2012). In the late 1980s King Hussein allowed the first real parliamentary election since the Six-Days War to be held, which also led to the first Islamist candidates with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood to run as independents in the early 1990s (Schwedler 2012).

After King Hussein’s death in 1999, his son Abdullah was crowned King Abdullah II. He quickly faced problems as the Palestinian-Jordanians took to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the 1994 peace accords with Israel and their support for the Palestinian Intifada (Uprising) against Israel in 2000 (Freedom House 2012). King Abdullah II continued interfering with politics in 2001 where he dissolved parliament and introduced over 200 ‘temporary laws’, which made him limit freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and made him rule by decree for two years (Freedom House 2012).

In November 2009 the King dissolved parliament and followed up by ruling by decree for a year until election were held in November 2010, during this period 34 new laws had been introduced, among these being a new election law (Freedom House 2012). The election in 2010 were boycotted by the Islamic Action Front on claims of a flawed election-system ensuring the support of the Hashemite monarchy (Freedom house 2013).

## The Arab Spring in Jordan

In this section an overview of the main events in Jordan during the Arab Spring with relevance to our analysis will be outlined. A timeline of the important events in Jordan during the Arab Spring from 2011 to 2013 can be found in Appendix I.

### The coming of the Arab Spring

In the years leading up to the Arab Spring, several ‘irregularities’ had been carried out by the monarchy in the political system. The 2009 dissolution of parliament by the King and the subsequent rule by decree of a royally appointed government, during which 34 new laws were introduced, were among these irregularities (Freedom House 2012).

**2011**

**January 14 -** In the wake of the regional protests all over the Middle East in 2011, Jordan experiences its first demonstrations in January. The elimination of corruption and the creation of more jobs is cited as the main reasons for the protests (BBC News 2013). Thousands of people where in the streets of Amman protesting for political change with Trade Unionists, demanding political and economic reform, joining a protest arranged by an Islamic group (Beaumont and Sherwood 2011). Calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifai but not the King were heard.

**January 26** – King Abdullah announces that its time for political and economic reforms in Jordan.

**February 1**- Marouf al-Bakhit is appointed Prime Minister as Samir Rifai is sacked, the King’s choice of PM receives heavy criticism from the IAF recalling accusations of electoral fraud and corruption against al-Bakhit under his last term in office from 2005 to 2007 (Nada 2015).

**February 4 –** Massive demonstrations erupts all over the Middle East, with 5000 taking to the streets of Jordan calling for political reform. In an interview the head of the Islamic Action Front, Sheikh Hamza Mansour said that “Reform has become a necessity that cannot wait” he continued by saying that “it’s the demand of all Jordanians”. The protestors could be head chanting “the people want to reform the regime”, “We want a fair electoral system”, and “people want an elected government.” (Sherwood and Finn 2011)

**February 6** – 36 tribal leaders from the conservative East Bank tribes sign a petition to King Abdullah II urging him to stop his Palestinian wife Queen Rania’s interference in politics. Among others the petition said that "She is building power centres for her interest that go against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing and is a danger to the nation and the structure of the state and the political structure and the institution of the throne” (Al Arabiya News 2011).

**March 25** – Protests turn deadly as one man is killed when security forces breakup clashes between pro-reform and pro-monarchy protesters.

**September 30 –** King Abdullah approves suggested constitutional amendments paving the way for the creation of a constitutional court, the trial of minister in civilian courts and the creation of an independent assembly to inspect elections (Nada 2015).

**October 17** – Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit is sacked by the King after lacking democratic reform, accusations of corruption and of cracking down on pro-democracy protesters (Black 2011). Awn Khasawneh is appointed Prime Minister.

**2012**

**October 4 -** King Abdullah once again breaks up parliament and new elections are coming (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 10:** Reformist politician Abdullah Ensour is chosen as prime minister and Jordan fifth government in two years is to be formed (Nada 2015).

**November 13-16 –** In a span of four days three people are killed during protests in the streets of Amman where thousands participate. Fights between police and protesters occur and people are heard chanting “The people want the fall of the regime,” and “Go down Abdullah, go down.”, and The Brotherhood joins in on the protests on the fourth day (Nada 2015) (BBC News 2013).

**2013**

**January –** Two years prior to the original date for the parliamentary elections, parliamentary elections are held in Jordan. Islamic Action Front once again boycotts the polls as they argue that changes to the electoral law favouring rural indigenous Bedouin against the urban Palestinian populations from where IAF enjoys great support (BBC News 2013).

**February 10** – The King acknowledges the need for reform as he states that the parliamentary elections in January “were held under a law that was not ideal.” (Nada 2015).

**March –** King Abdullah insists he can a transition to democracy to make sure Islamists would not seize power. He further accuses the secret police of stopping his efforts of carrying out political reform (BBC News 2013).

**November 3 - The** King describes his new reforms to come as a “White Revolution” and he appeals to appeals a range of political parties to create a two coalitions, a conservative and a liberal for the coming elections (Nada 2015).

## Tribes, Islamists and Palestinians

Various interest groups were visible in Jordan during the Arab Spring and in its aftermath. In accordance with the criteria listed in the ‘choice of societal actors’ section a brief introduction to the interest groups that will be subject to scrutiny in the analytical chapter will now be carried out.

### The criteria and the societal actors

The criteria listed in the methodology stated the following; (1) the societal actors subject to analysis had to have been visible during the Arab Spring or in its immediate aftermath, (2) the actors/groups needs to have expressed an opinion or carried out some action connected to the monarchy or the government, (3) people that have expressed an opinion or carried out an action needs to be a legitimate representative of that group.

#### Tribal relations

Historically, an important source of cohesion in the Jordan is by tribal affiliation, which often transcends socio-economic status. The importance of tribal affiliations have often been reflected in voter-behaviour in rural areas, where voters usually cast their vote for their local tribal candidate (Fondren 2009, 53).

The Hashemite monarchy have enjoyed great support from the tribes of the rural area since Jordan’s 1948 occupation of the West Bank. The favouring of the tribes by the monarchy is reflected in Jordan’s electoral system, which provides structural advantages for the tribes (Bank, Richter and Sunik 2014) (Schwedler 2012). The monarchy’s good relations with the tribes of the East Bank is also seen in the king’s appointment of Marouf al-Bakhit as Prime Minister in February 2011, al-Bakhit, who is from the largest TransJordanian tribe (Bank, Richter and Sunik 2014, 170). Bedouin tribes of the rural areas tends to dominate government, security forces, police and the army – making them an increasingly powerful societal group in Jordan (Zahran 2012). However, in spite of their powerful position in Jordanian society, the bedouin tribes have recently been very concerned as talks about the possibility of stripping generations of Palestinians of ‘their right to return’ surfaced in 2014. This would lead to the Palestinians becoming a permanent majority in Jordan, leading to a second Palestinian state (The Economist 2014). Eventually, this would mean that the tribes would eventually lose their easy access to governmental jobs together with ending the structural mechanisms of the electoral system favouring the tribes (The Economist 2014). The ongoing denial of the Palestinians of their right to jobs and political representation by the Hashemite together with the 1948 occupation and the events of ‘Black September’ in 1970, where the PLO was expelled by the King Hussein’s bedouin-army, continues to spark tension between Palestinian-Jordanians and the tribal community to this day (Zahran 2012, 5). The tribal pressure on the Palestinians and the monarchy became very visible in February 2011 when top tribal figures accused Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian descent, of corruption and of “stealing from the country and the people” (Lister 2011).

Even though the Hashemite monarchy finds its base of support in the tribal community, the bedouins are pushing the King with demands as was seen in the protests during the Arab Spring, which saw the presence of tribal-youth movements, known as the Hirak (Schwedler 2012). Because of the Hashemites relying on the tribes for votes to continue their rule the Hashemite-tribal relations is built on mixed feelings. For instance, the tribes have called for a Constitutional Monarchy, which would deprive the King of his political powers. Considering these demands from the tribes the monarchy seem to have its hands full as a continuous rejection of these demands could lead to further increases in tribal violence, which in 2010 amounted to an average of five killed per week (Zahran 2012).

#### Tribes and Islamists

Looking at the relationship between the bedouin tribes and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, these two groupings have traditionally been close with many leading figures in the Brotherhood originating from tribes all over Jordan. The connection between the Brotherhood and the bedouin tribes is reflected in the case of Abdul Latif Arabiat, who is a very influential tribal figure and considered “a godfather of the Brotherhood in Jordan” as Mudar Zahran describes it (Zahran 2012, 5). Another example of the link between Islamists and bedouin tribes were the “celebration of martyrdom”, which were carried out by tribal communities in the cities of Ma’an, Kerak and Salt upon the announced death of Osama Bin Laden (Zahran 2012, 5).

#### The Muslim Brotherhood - Islamic Action Front

Being both a religious and political group the Muslim Brotherhood has been prosecuted and sought removed often through violent means in many countries of the Middle East, with Egypt serving as the primary example of this prosecution. Since the Brotherhood’s founding of its Jordanian branch in 1945, in opposition to the Palestinian issue and the increased western influence in Jordan, they have managed to become a legitimate part of the political system. Although, tension still exists between the Hashemite and the Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood is part of the political rlandscape as it has umbilical ties to Islamic political party - The Islamic Action Front (IAF), which is the largest oppositional party in Jordan (Schwedler 2012). Despite the inclusion of the party in the political system tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government persists to some extent, as displayed in 2014 with the arrest of Brotherhood leader Zaki Bani Rushaid for his criticism of the United Arab Emirate’s labelling of his organisation as a terrorist group (Ghazal 2014). Zaki Bani Rushaid became subject to an amendment to Jordan’s Anti-Terrorism Law of 2014 that broadens the definition of Terrorism to include “disturbing [Jordan’s] relations with a foreign state” (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Even though the monarchy continues to keep the IAF from power through undemocratic means the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemites can be argued to have had somewhat of a symbiotic relationship, as both the Islamic Action Front and the Brotherhood previously have expressed support for the monarchy (Schwedler 2012). The Muslim brotherhood for example build schools, hospitals, youth clubs and, charities in the 1950s ,1960s and 1970s and eventually entered the political scene where they supported the monarchy (Georgetown University: Berkley Center n.d.).

In contrast to other branches of the Brotherhood, the IAF is not affiliated with Al Qaeda or any Salafi group, even though a Salafi trend has been on the rise in Jordan. The IAF have a solid tradition of being an active part of the democratic institutions of Jordan and have frequently articulated opposition to proposals for lacking democratic substance (Schwedler 2012). The 2010 and 2013 boycotting of the parliamentary elections by the IAF is an indication of their commitment to the democratic processes as much as it is an attempt to increase their own influence.

#### The Palestinian-Jordanians

Primary urban-based, the large Jordanian-Palestinian population - 4.5 million as of March 30, 2015 - continues to be subject to extensive discrimination by the Jordanian government (The Economist 2014). The discriminations can be seen in the falling number of Jordanian parliamentarians, the general exclusion of Palestinian-Jordanians from joining the army or the security forces and the fact that no Palestinian is serving as governor in any of Jordan’s 12 governorates even though they constitute over half the population (Zahran 2012) (Freedom House 2012). The Hashemites has tormented the Palestinians majority frequently fuelling tensions between them and the Palestinians. These tensions developed during King Hussein’s reign and his occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the Black September clashes between the PLO and Jordanian forces in and Jordan’s 1994 peace accords with Israel (Zahran 2012).Tensions between bedouin tribes and Jordanians of Palestinian descent also exists and continues to rise as Palestinians keeps see being bedouin takes jobs in government and in the military, a military Palestinians majority sponsors through heavy discriminatory taxation but are not allowed to join (Zahran 2012).

## Sub-conclusion

A historical presentation of Jordan and of the rule of the Hashemites have been presented together with more contemporary issues that still is a source of tension between the societal groups, such as the events on Black September 1970 leading to the expelling of the PLO from Jordan. An introduction to the more general democratic and institutional challenges Jordan faces have also been introduced to explain some of the sources of tension in Jordanian society. The major interest groups of this study have also been presented in this chapter. The groups being the Islamists in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and their political extension – the Islamic Action Front, the Palestinian-Jordanians majority and the powerful Bedouin tribes. Lastly, an overview of the main events connected to our analysis of the Arab Spring in Jordan within out stated timeframe is presented. A more complete overview can be found in Appendix I.

# Analysis

## Part I: The Hashemites and the Weberian authorities of legitimacy

As we previously have outlined in the theory section, the study of legitimacy is interdisciplinary, it therefore makes sense that many different types of authority, which relies on different fields of study, have been developed. The study of history and religion have paved the way for the development of Weber’s Traditional authority as well as political philosophy and philosophy of law having provided the basis for the Legal-rational authority. As this analysis will show, the various types of legitimacy authorities created by Weber reflects the reality in Jordan very well, as the monarchy tries to establish legitimacy from different sources.. In other words, the sources of legitimacy for the monarchy truly varies in Jordan, making the application of the Weberian concepts very appropriate to shed light on the many aspects of the monarchy’s use of these authorities.

### Traditional authority

Much of the Hashemite’s legitimacy has been argued by scholars to be rooted in tradition and history. This is fairly plausible as the very foundation of the country Trans-Jordan, later Jordan, were synonymous with the Hashemites. Moreover, King Abdullah II’s great-grandfather Hussein Bin Ali’s struggle for Arab Independence against the Ottomans in the 1910s helped pave the way for Hashemite-rulers in the Levant. These events have contributed greatly to the establishment of Traditional authority for the Hashemites. The founding of the state of Jordan cannot be separated from the Traditional authority of legitimacy that the Hashemites rely on, this is exemplified best in the Hashemites’ main base of support which consists of the conservatively minded bedouin tribes. The support of the Hashemites within the tribal community goes back to Hussein Bin Ali’s independence struggle where he fought side by side with the bedouin tribes. Thus, the tribes’ support of the Hashemite monarchy is fairly reliable, and it is very much in line with one of the common characteristics of the Traditional authority. As Bernard Badie argues, the Traditional authority is an ideal way of “mobilising different kinds of structures, like communitarian groups, family, tribes, and clans, or for fuelling social relations, like clientelism or kinship” (B. Badie 2001, 8707). Precisely these features have been frequently used by the Hashemites to assure their continued legitimacy. However, during the Arab Spring of 2011-13 the Hashemites did not make much use of appealing to traditional sources of their legitimacy, which might seem peculiar at first but actually has a very good explanation. The tribes wanted the Hashemites to remain on the throne as they benefitted significantly from this. Tribal members have favourable access to hold high positions within government, the army, the police and the security forces, and if democratic reforms becomes implemented to the extent that many pro-democracy protesters had wanted during the Arab Spring, the discriminated Palestinian majority would take over Jordan, eventually ridding the tribes of their benefits and marginalising them (Zahran 2012). The tribes and the Hashemites therefore have a mutual interest in politically aiding each other, and because both parties are aware of this King Abdullah seeks further support elsewhere. The King turns to seek support from groups that does not necessarily regard Traditional authority as an authority, thus rendering Traditional authority less important in this case and eventually limiting the King’s use of traditional appeal during the Arab Spring. Even though the deep roots in tradition have often been characterised as the main source of legitimacy for the Hashemites, during the Arab Spring the majority of demands by the people was aimed at democratic reforms and modernisation. The steady rise in the influx of Palestinian refugees and the constant pressure from the Islamists were a great headache for the monarchy and it is not issues that deep roots in tradition and history can solve. The King’s headache is attributed to the nature of the case of Jordan, since it is a very odd one as the largest group of people is either refugees without voting rights or a group that have voting rights but face great political and economic discrimination. Even though the discriminated Palestinians are the largest groups they have limited influence. The Monarchy therefore turned to its true source of legitimacy is a small but strong minority, the conservative bedouin tribes. Even though the tribes is considered the base of Hashemite-support the appeal to traditions and conservative groups were not that apparent.

One might wonder if the use of religious appeal in order to establish Religious authority could have been a gateway to gain support from another groups, namely the Islamists. However, in the following section it will be explained why the monarchy did not make use of Religious authority during the Arab Spring.

#### The Religious legitimacy

In spite of Religious authority not being an independent Weberian authority but a sub-category to Traditional authority, it will be included to the same extent as the established types of authority in the following section, as religion itself is a large source for legitimacy in Jordan and the Middle East in general. The most evident observation that can be made in connection to the regime’s legitimacy, in a religious context, is how entwined the Hashemite monarchy is with the early roots of Islam. Even though the Hashemite monarchy is not considered a very religious regime in practice it is still highly associated with religion. Thus, religion is often described as a key source of legitimacy for the Hashemites, due to the Hashemites’ ancestral ties going back to the Prophet Muhammed. Being able to trace their ancestral lineages back to Prophet Muhammed has provided the Hashemites with much respect and essential support within conservative groupings in the Levant and the Arab world in general, the bedouin tribes not the least. With the introduction of the issue of Religious authority the question of how much it affects the monarchy’s relationship with the Islamists in Jordan surfaces. In theory it might seem evident that King Abdullah had to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the Islamists by using Religious authority, as the Islamists frequently articulated their dissatisfaction and sometimes even were the principal organisers of protests during the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, efforts of appealing to religious legitimacy by the monarchy remained almost none-existent. A few questions then arise, why did the Islamist not call for the King to step down and for the transition to a republic during the Arab Spring? What interests did the Islamist have in letting the monarchy stay in power? To answer these questions one has to bear in mind that the Islamists called for democratic reform and promoted the general adherence to the democratic processes themselves. Even though the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood has its roots in religion they repeatedly promoted devotion to the democratic processes, possibly because they realise this is their shortcut to influence but also because they have an interest in the Hashemites staying in power. Looking at the Islamists, it was mentioned in Chapter 4 that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood is predominantly tribal leaders (Zahran 2012, 5). Considering this fact, the reasons for the monarchy’s lack of promoting a Religious authority becomes clearer; the monarchy did not want to emphasise religious legitimacy because many of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood have ties to the tribes that make up the core base of the Hashemites support. Thus, members of the Islamic groups also had interests in the survival of the Hashemite monarchy during the Arab Spring, rendering special religious appeals unnecessary.

Earlier in this study the tribes’ concerns regarding the Palestinian majority’s potential of access to government jobs was mentioned together with the subsequent potential loss of job privileges of the tribes if liberal democracy where implemented. This further supports the argument that Islamist also had interests in the King staying in power as neither the tribes nor the Islamist have any interests in the Palestinians gaining access to power positions, as Palestinian gains would result in losses for the tribes and the Islamists.

Aside from the strategic considerations of the Hashemites, it is apparent that if the Hashemites had appealed to the Islamists only to a limited extent this would have been a very dangerous strategy as thousands were on the streets demanding democratic reform. Thus, religious appeal would be aimed only at a minority and the effects might have been inadequate to have any substantial effect. The potential of appealing to and pleasing Islamists also carry in it a big risk for the monarchy since western powers constantly keep an eye on which way the leaders in the Middle East are going, and which kind of politics they are carrying out. If the Kingdom has turned to pleasing the Islamists and religiously conservative groups of society the risk of an increase in pressure from foreign leaders might have been imminent. To some extent the monarchy could also have pursued a simple ‘strategy of silence’ towards Islamists, however, since the bedouin tribes tend to represent an ideological conservative base this might not have been a smart move, as these two groups have some overlapping interests and the tribes might then potentially have felt ignored. The monarchy instead frequently tried to paint the picture of the Islamists being a potential threat to the stability and the regime in Jordan (Zahran 2012). The Hashemites have sought to present the scenario that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemites are the two choices for power in Jordan, even though the bedouin tribal community, traditionally in support of the Hashemites, have ties to the Brotherhood. The existence of these ties were seen in the ‘celebrations of martyrdom’, which were carried out in three cities in Jordan. Among these cities were the city of Kerak, which is known as the base of the Majali tribe, a tribe that traditionally has held many political position under Hashemite reign (Zahran 2012). From this observation we can identify the incentives for the monarchy in pursuing legitimacy through the use of Traditional authority and for the leaving out of an emphasis on religion.

#### Tribes and Traditional authority

As Mudar Zahran argues, the monarchy is vulnerable to any serious conflict with the tribes since they make up a vast part of the police, army, security forces and public jobs (Zahran 2012). Because of this vulnerability the monarchy relies on its ability to appeal to Traditional authority to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the tribes. The Hashemite monarchy thereby relies on the bedouin tribes to reaffirm its legitimacy to be able to navigate politically, as too much political intervention by the King himself might cause public distrust as his rule would lose Legal-rational legitimacy as he would interfere with democratic practices.

After heavily interference with democratic processes in 2009 and 2010 the King realised that in order to sustain his country’s democratic legitimacy domestically and abroad, he needed to carry out reforms in a democratic manner. This is why he made the concession in February 2011 stating that “it is time to enact more political and economic reforms” (Nada 2015), simply because he acknowledged that he had to assert himself as a ‘pro-democracy monarch’ to please reformists.

#### The irreligious nature of the revolts

A lot of attention have been devoted to the discussion on whether the uprisings in the various Arab countries were secular, in Jordan several of the protests have been with a mixed crowd although with a single message: there is a need for democratic reform. Some of the very first large scale demonstrations in Jordan took place on January 14, 2011. In the cities of Irbid, Kerak, Ma’an and Salt, which is known to be tribal cities, protests against the poor economy where held. What is significant here is that the protesters were university students and Ba’athist party supporters calling for democratic reform (Schwedler 2012). Even though the first major demonstrations had hints of secularism the Brotherhood joined in on the demonstrations just a week later on January 21 when this lead thousands of protesters in a demonstration that focused on changing the electoral system and the economy. It is therefore very difficult to label the uprisings in Jordan secular per se, as many Islamists participated in the demonstrations, even though they demanded democratic reform. An indication that the uprising had little religious root could be found in the monarchy’s lack of pleasing the Islamists, as earlier discussed in this section. If this is the case, then we could blame a possible secular nature of the uprisings on the lack of traditional and religious appeal by the monarchy during the Arab Spring. Although, since the protesters saw the participation of a very wide range of social groups it’s seems the protests in Jordan were of no secular nor any particularly political nature.

Religious authority in relation to the Palestinians-Jordanians is an unusual one in Jordan. As described in the presentation of the societal interest groups, the Islamists in Jordan and the members of the Muslim Brotherhood is made up of bedouin tribes and in general non-Palestinians, even though Hamas traditionally has had a seat in the Brotherhood’s Shura council (Zahran 2012). This means in regard to religious legitimacy the Hashemites have had limited manoeuvring space to satisfy the Palestinian-Jordanians, as religion is not a major source of appeal within this group. To analyse upon the Hashemites’ relationship with the Palestinian-Jordanians we therefore turn to Max Weber’s Legal-rational authority type, which has also been frequently pursued by the Hashemites.

### Legal-rational Authority

The protests in Jordan like the majority of the protests in the Middle East, aside from being centred on the poor economic conditions, were rooted in people’s dissatisfaction with the lack of adherence to democratic principles by their regimes. So was the demands of protesters in the first large protest in Jordan centred on democratic reforms. As the protests become more and more frequent, King Abdullah needed to meet these protests or at least indicate that he to some extent was willing to reform. Besides pleasing the demonstrators eager to see democratic reform he also painted the picture of a reform-willing and a ‘modern’ monarch. Because King Abdullah indicated on several instances that he embraced the idea of democratic reform he managed to re-establish a Legal-rational authority. The King portrayed himself as respectful for democratic principles when he asked his Prime Minister to create a Royal Committee to review the constitution on April 26, 2011. By accepting not only the need for reform but leaving it to the democratic mechanisms and processes to identify the types of reforms needed the King preserved his legitimacy as adhering to the authority of the Jordanian constitution, even though that might not entirely be the case as the committee might have been royally handpicked.

Even though the democratic nature of Jordanian politics is highly disputed in the period from 2010-2013 the King managed to paint the picture of himself as a King that was deeply concerned with the state of democracy in Jordan. This is exemplified in the King’s easing of the possibility of trialling minister in civilian courts and the establishment of a constitutional court, even though these changes was made during the King’s rule by decree. This example is a perfect illustration of the ability of King Abdullah II to successfully appear as a ‘democratic’ and modern monarch while on the other hand not fully committing to navigate Jordan in the direction of an actual constitutional monarchy. This exercise have been repeatedly performed by King Abdullah and could serve as one of the main reason for the continuation of the rule of the Hashemites. However, one thing that does not speak to the benefit of the King’s advantage in the Arab Spring, in the light of Weber’s Legal-rational authority, is he continued meddling with democratic processes. No matter how much the King states that it is time for reform and no matter how many democratic reforms he implemented during his rule by decree or by pressuring his Prime Ministers it is still not a pure democratic process. Even though the King’s meddling in democratic affairs does not seem to be harming his image as a leader adhering to democratic principles and the Legal-rational authority he is still interfering. Although, this seems to be widely accepted as the King was rarely called upon to step down during the Arab Spring. This rather puzzling acceptance of democratic limitations could be interpreted as a Middle Eastern preference for charismatic leaders rather than democratic ones. If that is the case King Abdullah has seemed well aware of the existence of such a phenomena. This is well illustrated in a frequently recurring statement in interviews, where the King Abdullah II notes that the Arab Spring “was not so much a threat as an opportunity” for Jordan (Ryan 2014). Even though he hereby implies that there is a need for change he manages to embrace the possibility of changes at the same time but blurring the discussion of the exact path to this.

#### The Muslim Brotherhood and the ambiguity of the Legal-rational legitimacy

Returning to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, it was previously mentioned that the Brotherhood in Jordan is different than the Brotherhood in for example Egypt, as it is a much more legitimate part of the political system. This is the case even though at times the Brotherhood have been subject to very suppressive means in Jordan. At first hand, discussing the Legal-rational authority in connection to the Muslim Brotherhood is not an easy task as the Brotherhood’s set of values could be interpreted as antithetical to the democratic political system. Because the relationship between Islam and democratic is a fiercely debated issue the discussion of the attractiveness of the Legal-rational authority for the Muslim Brotherhood is uncertain. Publicly, the Islamists in this case represented by the Muslim Brotherhood have several times called for political reforms with specific attention to the structural errors of the electoral system, which is very unique for a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. One might argue that the real motives behind the Brotherhood’s calls for democratic reform were only a method of easing their access to political influence. If that was the case the monarchy’s efforts of trying to ease tension caused by the massive protests for democratic reform seem short-sighted and mere ‘firefighting’ and not as a strategy per se. Even though the King’s eventual embracement of reforms seem as a desperate move, it is evident that the monarchy have carried out a set of strategy moves, when it comes to keeping its legitimacy in the eyes of the Islamists. During the Arab Spring, King Abdullah watched Hosni Mubarak’s fatal errors of using brutal force in his efforts to weaken the Brotherhood. The Hashemites did not want to make the same mistake and they therefore tried to embrace the calls for democratic reform as stressed by the Islamists, but only after continuous protests and casualties. The dilemma for King Abdullah therefore were to find a balance between satisfying the groups calling for reform and not given in to too many concessions of power as the King did not want to risk having to face the consequences of a potential Islamic wolf in democratic sheep's clothing. Thus, King Abdullah had to embrace the consequences of pursuing a Legal-rational authority instead, which simply entailed minor concessions of power.

#### Minding the Jordan - U.S. relationship in domestic politics

Another observation worth discussing in connection to the Legal-rational authority is the international community. Because of Jordan’s poor economy and heavy dependency on foreign aid as the Kingdom does not have the same abundances of natural resources as the Gulf States, an extra aspect to Jordanian domestic politics should be made. This aspect focuses on the international community and in particularly the United States as they, by far, are the biggest financial aider to Jordan. The relationship between Jordan and the United States is built on two things, economy and security intelligence. In return for the economic aid Jordan collaborates closely with the U.S. intelligence agencies. Because of their reputation of ‘efficiency’ all over the Middle East, Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) or *mukhabarat* has been a close collaboration partner of the CIA on anti-terror matters (Ryan 2014). This collaboration was perhaps best reflected in the 2006-killing of the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by U.S. Forces rumoured to be based on Jordanian intelligence (Filkins and Burns 2006). Because Jordan is heavily dependent on U.S. economic aid the King needs to portray himself as a democratic reformer. As the U.S. have few allies in the Middle East that carries the same legitimacy as King Abdullah II when it comes to portraying a genuine image of being a democratic reformer. The King constantly needs to affirm his democratic image internationally as well as domestically, in order to seem as a legitimate pro-democracy leader and not an authoritarian leader. The Legal-rational authority therefor needs to be nursed internationally as wellI, even though it is not his primary concern compared to domestic politics. An example of the King nursing his international image as a ‘democratic monarch’ is his appearance on the satirical news show ‘The Daily Show’ in September 2012, where his comment to show host Jon Stewart’s question on Jordan‘s Arab Spring was that ‘he supported the idea of the Arab Spring, but argued that each country should have its “own unique experiment” with democracy’ (Asher-Schapiro 2014). By participating in this interview and making such comments he asserts himself and his country as being committed to democratic changes of some sorts. King Abdullah’s statement of ‘supporting the idea of the Arab Spring’ portrays him as a leader committed to a Legal-rational authority, as it could be interpreted as a sign of willingness to reform. However, by stating that ‘each country should have its “own unique experiment” with democracy’ he indicates risks connected to reforming the system too quickly. When King Abdullah shows concern about being too hasty in reforming the system he becomes the Charismatic authority. When he says ‘experiment’ he once again manages to portray his judgement in the applicability of democracy in Jordan as the best one. This is well in line with Weber’s description of the Charismatic authority as being one to show leadership skills, and being one that surfaces during times of turmoil or crisis (Månson 2000, 95) (Schmidt 2014).

### Charismatic authority

As discussed in the last paragraph, King Abdullah has often aimed at being portrayed as a leader that constantly works for improving the democratic system in Jordan. Even though we touched upon King Abdullah’s adherence to the Legal-rational authority perhaps the most visible pattern of behaviour displayed by the King is the characteristics of Weber’s Charismatic authority. As also observed in the section concerned with Legal-rational authority, King Abdullah had to make people believe he was willing to make democratic reforms, although if he simply went along with the demonstrators his willingness to reform and to be a Legal-rational authority might ultimately mean the beginning of the end of the monarchy. He therefore used very selective actions preserve legitimacy, such as sacking Prime Ministers. This strategic move has been proven fairly efficient as it serves to keep the Charismatic authority of a leader. As seen in the case of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Gaddafi in Libya, regime without a ‘buffer’ in the shape of a Prime minister regimes can be fragile, as is further the case if the regime is personified with its ruler (Abrams 2012). This use of a ‘scapegoat’ is very interesting in the light of Weber’s Charismatic authority as will now be demonstrated.

The monarch’s use of a scapegoat to support his Charismatic authority is, as previously outlined, most visible in the case of the many sackings of Prime ministers. The King’s situation is as follows; in order for the King to be perceived as a legitimate ruler, who is committed to improving his country, he needs a scapegoat to promote himself. The scapegoat often takes the role of Prime Minister. Even if that Prime Minister does a good job the Charismatic leader still have the option of blaming him if any animosity or dissatisfaction against the political process or the regime should surface. The choice to fire that Prime Minister will ultimately be viewed as a very decisive move and the move of a strong and effective leader. This will contribute to supporting the image of King Abdullah as a Charismatic authority, which has been the case several times during the Arab Spring. The fact that Jordan in the course of just two years have had four different Prime Ministers is a clear sign of the use of this strategy by the Kingdom. The effects of scapegoating on the King’s legitimacy is multiple. If we look at the example of Prime Minister Marouf Al-Bakhit, a conservative and former general, who was sacked as he had been subject to criticism for not implementing reforms fast enough (Black 2011), the sacking of Al-Bakhit makes the King seem powerful and willing to act. He is thereby viewed as generally concerned with the lack of democratic progress. Especially, in the case of Al-Bakhit it could have been interpreted as a sign of determination to improve the democratic system in Jordan. This is because Al-Bakhit is from the East Bank tribes, which is the monarchy’s main base of support. The sacking of minister’s bods well for the public perception of the King as powerful and competent, and it is even more the case when the person sacked constitutes a part of your backbone support. One might argue that it is only charismatic legitimacy that is visible here because the King ‘breaks’ with the system to carry out an executive decision, although the incentives for the King’s sacking of the prime minister were also influence by the fact that 70 out of 120 Members of parliament voted in favour of al-Bakhit’s resignation. As this was an action democratically taken, being in accordance with the constitution, the Legal-rational authority is actualised in the King’s decision. The King could have overruled the decision of parliament if the decision turned out to be in the Prime Minister’s favour, although this would have undermined both the Legal-rational authority and the Charismatic authority of the King. However, the firing of Al-Bakhit turned out to be a ‘win-win’ situation for the monarchy as it contributed to legitimating both of these authorities.

#### The fragility of the Charismatic authority

Another indicator of King Abdullah’s efforts to assert Charismatic authority is by constantly distancing himself from protests, the security forces and violence against the people. The King’s strategy of distancing himself from any protest or violence can be seen in the denial by many officials of an attack on the King’s motorcade 125 km south of Amman in June 2011. A security official confirmed the existence of an attack by saying that the King was unharmed, whereas reports of an attack on the King’s motorcade were rejected by government spokesperson Taher Edwan and other government officials. The conflicting accounts on the existence of an attack seems in line with a strategy to preserve the King’s legitimacy as popular figure and competent leader (The Telegraph 2011). If the King had acknowledged the attack he would have recognised opposition against either himself or the monarchy, which is something he wants to deny to preserve legitimacy as a competent and popular Charismatic authority.

It is evident that the Charismatic authority type has been applied in Jordan during the Arab Spring, however, even though it might seem as the strongest opportunity for the King to assert an authority and retain legitimacy it was also a risky move. As described by Bernard Badie; one of the weaknesses of the charismatic leader is that the more he relies solely on charisma the more a lack of institutional structure and order tends to be the case, which ultimately contributes to the ruler’s fragility (B. Badie 2001, 8708). In spite of the King’s successful depiction of Charismatic authority he is still a fragile leader as he relies solely on the support of the bedouin tribes. If the King doesn’t deliver the results expected or preferred by the tribes he could easily see his Kingdom beginning to disintegrate. The reason for this vulnerability is the fact that the bedouin tribes take up the vast majority of public service positions, military jobs and positions within the security forces. Thus, if the tribal community is dissatisfied and starts to organise they have the ability to paralyse the governmental apparatus and the public system. The potential of such situation perfectly exemplifies the fragility of Weber’s Charismatic authority in a Jordanian context as the King’s institutional apparatus potentially could become fragile if the Bedouin tribes decide to stop supporting him. Even though the fall of the monarch in Jordan potentially could have negative consequences for the bedouin tribes it seems as the biggest threat to the stability of the Hashemite monarchy in the long run.

### Sub- conclusion

In the section on Traditional and Religious authority the discussion have primarily been concerned with the lacking promotion by the monarchy of these authorities. Nevertheless, what we have clarified is the logic in refraining from pursuing the two authorities by the monarchy during the Arab Spring, especially significant being the abstention from appealing to religious legitimacy. The incentives for leaving out the promotion of a religious source of legitimacy by the monarchy is because King Abdullah is afraid of the Islamists. If he becomes too associated with Islamists foreign and domestic pressure on him to implement further democratic reforms will rise eventually threatening Jordan’s status as a Kingdom. In regard to the Legal-rational authority in Jordan the King has continuously put efforts into creating the image of him as adherent to the Legal-rational authority in Jordan. Many examples of this exist even though actual democratic reforms have been quit sparse. An example of the King’s versatility when it comes to adapting to different authorities is his comment of every country having their ‘own unique experiment’ with democracy, which could be interpreted very ambiguously and therefore makes him seem committed to democratic change without promising any change. In this situation he also manages to portray himself as a charismatic leader as he articulates hesitation to change instead of naively embracing it. Thereby he is seen as showing leadership skills eventually leading to the establishing of Charismatic authority. It is evident that King Abdullah have pursued legitimacy through Charismatic authority during the Arab Spring the King made frequent use of scapegoats in the shape of Prime Ministers to certify his legitimacy by Charismatic authority, which is something that have been observed throughout Middle East.

In Part One of the Analysis we discussed and presented the monarchy’s use of the Weberian authorities of legitimacy during the Arab Spring, in Part Two of the analysis the King’s strategic use of tools will be discussed and the monarchy’s incentives for using them will be explained by the use of Weber’s authorities.

## Part II: The Use of the Toolbox

In this section the findings in the first section will be discussed to show how the Hashemite monarchy have managed to stay in power during the Arab Spring by pursuing different sources of authority within different social groups. In other words, an overview and comparison of the strategic tools used by the monarchy will be presented.

### Legitimating the means of the regime

When discussing Charismatic authority it is importance to notice that this type of authority have the potential to be transferred from one leader to his successor, a concept which Weber labels ‘Hereditary charisma’ (Szelényi 2009). This has been the case in Jordan, although only to a limited extent. As previously mentioned, the bedouin tribes in Jordan have an embedded interest in the Hashemites’ retaining power, and the succession of one monarch by another therefore does not make much difference to the tribes as long as the Hashemites stay in power. However, one might suspect that former King Hussein I’s designation of Abdullah as his successor could have contributed to legitimise King Abdullah’s rule and strengthen his Charismatic authority. Although, this is rather difficult to find a useful answer to giving that the source of the transferred authority King Hussein died 12 years prior to the protests of the Arab Spring. Instead we will turn to briefly looking at the legitimacy of a monarchy as a political system in the light of Weber’s ‘Office charisma’ (Szelényi 2009). This concept can introduce Traditional authority and hence be a method of retaining legitimacy over generations. If the Office charisma has been transferred to the current King Abdullah II this can assist in providing the explanation for the continued legitimacy of the Hashemites and providing an argument for the consistency of support for the Hashemites in conservative circles. Besides the previously outlined rationale for the tribes in upholding the status quo in power relations in Jordan, the tribal community’s support for the Hashemites could also be argued to partly derive from Weber’s conceptualisation of Office charisma. The fact that that only a minority of demonstrators called for the deposing of the King, whereas many simply called for the implementation of political and economic reforms to the political system serves as a sound exemplification of this.

##### The ability to adapt

One of the things that enabled the Hashemite monarchy to navigate rather safely through the Arab Spring were their willingness to adapt. This might seem as an obvious aspect of retaining the rule of an illiberal democracy in the 20th century, although Gaddafi and Mubarak are examples of leaders that did not compromise and did not seek to reassert their legitimacy strategically. However, the willingness to adapt is one of the keys to the long rule of the Hashemites. King Abdullah’s use of different types of authority to assert not only his right to rule as a monarch but also to assert his political choices as legitimate requires very good statesmanship. The balance of these different authorities is puzzling but seems essential to the regime’s resilience, likewise does it seem key to the legitimacy of the political system of a monarchy in Jordan and the legitimacy of political interference of the monarch in Jordan. Even though the acceptance of a monarchy and the acceptance of a specific monarch seem separate the Hashemites themselves hold the key to the continued existence of these two dimensions of the Jordanian regime. Looking at the very presence of a monarchy in Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy is basically synonymous with the founding of Trans-Jordan and later Jordan creating an unbreakable bond between the monarchical structure in Jordan and the Hashemite family. It would therefore be unthinkable to even consider a Jordanian monarchy not ruled by Hashemites. The reasons for these can be found by applying Weber’s Traditional authority. The traditional source of support for the Hashemites has always been the bedouin tribes going back to Hussein Bin Ali’s rallying of the tribal community against the Ottomans in the 1910s. Since then the bedouin tribes have been the source of legitimacy for the Hashemites rule as monarchs and to some extent also as monarchs that interferes with politics.

#### The legitimacy of interference

The legitimacy of the monarchical interference with politics is by far a much more complex issue, as various sources of legitimacy is displayed here.

Turning to the bedouin tribes, it could be observed that the tribes are not only the biggest source of legitimacy for the Hashemites in general, they also provide the basis for the legitimacy of the Hashemites’ political involvement. This goes back to the Arab revolt against the Ottomans almost 100 years ago. Although, as King Hussein experienced to some extent, and what King Abdullah II faced during the Arab Spring; the pleasing of one specific societal group for the benefit of gaining legitimacy as a monarch to get involved in politics is not that easy. Even though appeals to the King to step down has been very limited in Jordan during the Arab Spring the sharp critique of Queen Rania’s political involved expressed in the petition to King Abdullah II on February 6 2011 by 36 tribal leaders is a sign that political interference for royals does have its limits. That said the critique by the tribal leaders is primarily rooted in concerns within the tribes that Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian descent, is seeking to interfere with the current relations of power between Palestinian-Jordanians and the tribes in Jordan. The petition signed by the tribal leaders is an indication that the Hashemite monarchy’s legitimacy in the eyes of the conservative and very powerful tribes of Jordan cannot be built solely on history. Naturally, the king’s legitimacy in the tribal communities cannot only be tied up on historical events even though this might previously have played a central role. During the Arab Spring another authority of legitimacy had to be formed to nurse the relationship with the bedouin tribes. Since the King does not have that many options when it comes to the tribes because his government and police is heavily reliant on the consent from them the King does not have much political manoeuvring space if the tribes does not approve the overall direction he is going. The different types of authority that he might try to establish to various groups is of limited importance to his relationship with the tribes. The real challenge for the King during the Arab Spring lay in the pursuit of legitimacy from the Islamists.

### Tribal Relations, Religious Considerations and the Value-rational authority

Despite Weber not acknowledging the existence of a fourth authority, the value-rational authority, the special case of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascription to democratic principles in Jordan could be analysed from applying such an authority. In Chapter 3, Roberta Lynn Satow argued for the existence of a value-rational authority and based upon Satow’s argumentation I have chosen to apply it in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Satow argued that a since an organisation is always founded upon a set of values, and that ”all organizations must balance adaptation for organizational survival with commitment to organizational goals; yet a value-rational orientation involves commitment to an absolute goal regardless of consequences to the organization.” (Satow 1975, 3). She thereby meant that organisations always have values, but they just have to make compromises when pursuing those goals. When we look at the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its commitment to the democratic principles, even though its set of values might not be a complete match, the presence of a value-rational authority seems fairly evident. Weber did not acknowledge the existence of such, however, if we look at the Brotherhood’s active participation in the protests against the monarchy and its calling for democratic reform the Brotherhood thereby articulated a rationality in a democratic set of values, even though that set of values does not necessarily reflect its internal values. In other words, when the monarch depicts himself as representing democratic values the Brotherhood ‘goes along’ and applaud such initiatives as it is a necessary means for them to get more influence and ultimately pursue their organisationally constituted values.

Despite the Brotherhood’s articulation of dissatisfaction with the lack of political reforms they remained generally supportive of the Hashemites during the Arab Spring. This could reflect an intention of the Brotherhood to keep the Hashemites in power but still being willing to put pressure on them the King to carry out reforms. This willingness to look beyond the political ambitions to preserve stability is quite unique and require some mapping of the Brotherhood’s incentives for doing so. If we examine the often describe main source of legitimacy for the Hashemites, their traceable ancestral linage to the Prophet Muhammed, this could be a plausible source of Religious authority for the monarchy even though the monarchy is not heavily associated with traditional and Islamic values and has been known to monitor religious sermons at mosques (Freedom house 2013).

Despite the monitoring of sermons and the dissatisfaction towards the flawed electoral system the Islamists frequently articulates their general support for the Hashemite monarchy. This was also the case when Islamic Action Front Secretary General Hamza Mansour was asked about the comparisons between the Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan during the Arab Spring: *There is no comparison between Egypt and Jordan. The people there demand a regime change, but here we ask for political reforms and an elected government. We recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Hashemites’* (Oleynik 2013, 127)*.* By stating openly that the Brotherhood is not interested in a regime change and that they perceive the Hashemites as legitimate leaders it is evident that there has to be some sort of source of the legitimacy. Even more puzzling then is the regime’s lack of religious emphasis during the Arab Spring. What is it then that makes the Islamists articulate support for the Hashemites?

To shed light on this we turn to political scientist Mark Tessler, who conducted a series of interviews during the period of 2000-2002 to clarify public opinion towards democracy, legitimacy and Islam. Particularly noteworthy is the answer to the question “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office”; among Jordanian respondents a total of 73, 9 percent said they “Strongly agreed” (Tessler 2002, 238). If we regard this as still being the case during the Arab Spring it could seem to add to the confusion of the monarchy’s lack of the use of religious appeal. However, on the other hand it could also explain the reasons why the monarchy did not actively tried to establish Religious authority. The reason is that the embedded religiosity of Jordanian society seen in the institutionalisation of Islam, the Hashemites’ ties to the Prophet Muhammed and to Mecca is a sufficient source of legitimacy to create Religious authority for the Hashemites. Even though King Abdullah is known to a very ‘modern’ King eager to please western leaders, his authority remains tied to Traditional and Religious authority. Previously, the importance of Office charisma was touched upon as a sub-category to Charismatic authority whereas Hereditary charisma was doubted to be of any significant relevance to the current King’s legitimacy is seems the connection to tradition and history, in a religious context, has paved the way for a continued Hashemite rule. In other words, the proud heritage going back to the times of Hussein Bin Ali in the 1910, his position as the ‘guardian of Mecca ‘ and his fight for the Arabs still play an important role as a source of Traditional authority for the Hashemites. As indicated by the results of Mark Tessler’s research, there is a general consent in the tolerance and sympathy of religious consideration in a leader. Thus, the Hashemite could be argued to hold religious legitimacy in but marginalising the Islamists of Jordan. The high level of religiosity in Jordan thereby provides religiously-based legitimacy for the regime simply because their refrain from suppressing the religious community.

In spite of a solid base of authority within conservative circles because of the outlined ties to key events in Arab and Islamic history the monarchy have also been subject to pressure from conservative tribal groups during the Arab Spring, as will be discussed in the following paragraph.

#### Tribal pressure on the monarchy

An indicator of the power of the tribes and their willingness to push the monarchy is the example from February 2011, where leading tribal representatives made a petition rtegarding Queen Rania as they accused her of corruption. The tribal members stated that "similar events to those in Tunisia and Egypt and other Arab countries will occur" if things did not change (Lister 2011). This should be interpreted as a clear threat to the monarchy not to take the tribal support as given, however, given the Queen’s Palestinian origins it was also a reminder from the tribes to the Hashemites of not simply become too associated with the Palestinians. Another challenge by the tribal community to the King is in the wake of an interview with King Abdullah in March of 2013, where he spoke ‘negatively’ about rulers in the Middle East, the tribal community that supported his regime and some of his family members (Nada 2015). In the aftermath of this interview a tribal council, which had been a long-time ally of the royal family, deemed the King a Zionist agent on March 24 (Nada 2015). These examples show that pressure is constantly on the Monarchy to pursue mutual interests for the Hashemites and the tribes as the tribes are willing to pressure the King into getting their will and to assert their power because he relies on their support. This means that King Abdullah also had incentives to refrain from being an active adhere to take the role as a democratic reformer while at the same time being forced to satisfy the pro-reformists in the streets, as the tribes are interested in keeping the status quo.

### The Potential of the Palestinian Problem

Returning to another large group in Jordanian society - The Palestinian majority – they also play an important role in the King’s reassertion of his legitimacy in the long run, even though they were not very visible during the Arab Spring. What has so far been the case is the King’s neglection of the Palestinian majority, which did not cause him any trouble during the Arab Spring, as Zahran argues the Palestinian acceptance of the general discriminatory is embedded in a proudness connected to their excellence in private business ownerships. The excelling Palestinian businesses leaves King Abdullah with a dilemma; since the Palestinians provide the back bone of the economy in the poor country of Jordan at some point the King has to seek to appeal to the Palestinians as the apartheid politics of the Kingdom is not sustainable (Zahran 2012). However, the tribes will then still force the King to keep the status quo. As seen in the Arab Spring, King Abdullah constantly managed to navigate his way out of conflict by pleasing various groups at the same time although the long-time consequences of the Palestinian influx and the continuous discriminatory policies toward a majority of the Jordanian population could force him to make some serious concessions in the future. In this Arab Spring one very good example of how aware the tribes are of the King not given any concessions to the Palestinians is response of the tribes to Queen Rania’s political activities, in the form of the petition signed by 36 tribal leaders. In the end, much of the King’s legitimacy relies on Charismatic authority and if the tribes publicly point out any flaws in the behaviour of royals, such as in the case of the Queen, this could truly harm the King’s legitimacy fatally.

### Sub-conclusion

In Part Two of the analysis the different tools used by the monarchy in relation to the various societal groups were examined. The tribal support for the Hashemites was looked at, particularly in the light of the Weberian concept of ‘Office charisma’. By looking at the reasons for the consistent tribal support of the Hashemites it was established that the founding of Jordan is synonymous with the Hashemite monarchy, which explains the strong support of the Hashemites within conservative communities such as the bedouin tribes. Thus, by applying Max Weber’s concept of Office charisma it was proven that the transferred Charismatic authority of King Hussein I and the previous Hashemite monarchs does hold significance in terms of pointing to other reasons for the tribal support of the Hashemites besides the tribes’ interest in retaining the status quo of inter-group power relations in Jordan. However, it was also pointed out that the tribe does seem willing to put pressure on the monarchy if the road taken by the Hashemites are not favourable to the tribes. In regard to the Islamists of Jordan, represented by the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood the reasons for their support of the Hashemites during the Arab Spring was examined. It was found, that a Religious authority does exists in relation to the Hashemites and that the traceable ancestral lineages to Prophet Muhammed together with the abstention of the Hashemites from suppression religious community, provides them with religious legitimacy.

Finally, the potential of the Palestinian problem in Jordan was outlined. What was thereby identified was the upcoming legitimacy dilemma that the Hashemite monarchy are presented when the tribal communities continues to advocate for preserving the status quo of the power relations in Jordan while the Palestinian majority will demand change, on the expense of the tribes paving the way for future instability in Jordan.

# Conclusion

Having examined the roots of the Hashemites’ legitimacy during the Arab Spring of 2011-13 it seems apparent that many different tools were applied to create the sources of legitimacy for the monarchy. The strategic tools used by the monarchy encompassed the establishment and reassertion of several authorities of legitimacy to different groups in society. The ways that the Hashemites’ managed to reaffirm its legitimacy to various social groups during the Arab Spring of 2011-13 can be summarised into three main strategic tools. The three tools are (1) the maintenance of the status quo in the power relations between the major social groups in Jordan, (2) the establishment through charisma of the King’s image as a leader committed to democratic principles and (3) the reliance on an embedded transferred legitimacy as monarch and as a Hashemite member.

One of the main tools used by the Hashemites’ to assert their legitimacy were by pursuing the status quo. In other words, by appealing to the conservative tribal areas, which for many years has remained the backbone support of the monarchy. Thus, the monarchy retained legitimacy and support within the tribal areas by only making minor reforms in spite of mass protests for political reforms from other social groups. This was done because the tribes of the East Bank and the Hashemite monarchy have mutual interests in preserving status quo. The reasons this interests from the tribes is their favourable access to military-, police-, and public jobs given by the Hashemites’. If the Hashemites’ make extensive democratic reforms the discriminated Palestinian majority could end up becoming part of the democratic process pushing for democratic concessions to their benefit eventually depriving the tribes of their favourable access to public jobs. Thus, the Hashemites’ efforts of reaffirming its legitimacy during the Arab Spring were aimed at other social groups such as the Islamists. For the King to assert his legitimacy in the face of other social groups than the tribes he amongst other articulated the need for changes to the much-criticised electoral system.

The second tool used by the Hashemites’ to establish legitimacy were through constructing an image of King Abdullah II as a democratic reformer. Thus, the King’s post-election articulation of the electoral system as being ‘not ideal’ was in particular aimed at pleasing the Islamists, who had advocated for structural changes to the electoral system for many years. Because of the King and the tribes’ interest in not implementing too many reforms the King only partly succumbed to the pressure by the protesters for democratic reforms. Nevertheless, since many tribal members hold leading position within the Muslim Brotherhood, and because the King feared a marginalisation of the Islamists, the King made some more democratic reforms in his period of ‘rule by decree‘ and made symbolic sackings of Prime Ministers.

The third tool used by the Hashemites is more of a ‘passive’ tool than an actual action by the monarchy in the sentence that it is an embedded source of legitimacy in the Hashemite monarchy and has been so for many years. The transferred charisma of the Hashemites is rooted in the founding of Transjordan and the successive inherent charisma in being a Hashemite. The transferred charisma of the Hashemites, which has roots in the Arab Independence war against the Ottomans and the historical association with the roots of Islam and the Hashemites, is one of the main reasons for the continued support of the Hashemites in the conservative tribal communities. Thus, it is one of the key reasons for preserved legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy during the Arab Spring of 2011-13 and continuously.

## Perspectives

In a long term perspective, it seems like the only option for the Hashemite Kingdom to retain power is by confronting its Palestinian problem. Since the legitimacy of the Hashemite’s does not rely on the Palestinian population it will continue to be a destabilising factor to the extent were a recognition of the Palestinians has to be extended by the monarchy, although since this most likely will interfere with the power relations and the source of legitimacy in Jordan such initiative does not hold a bright future. Looking at the potential of future threats to the monarchy the continued growth of the Palestinian population in Jordan remains a ticking bomb. If King Abdullah and the Hashemites carry on with their pretentions of wanting to adhere to democratic principles the political and socio-economic inclusion of the urban Palestinian population has to addressed as the King’s democratic legitimacy easily could be challenged on this. It is evident that King Abdullah II will be facing a serious challenge in the future because of the Palestinian majority’s economic importance for Jordan. King Abdullah will therefore be facing a great challenge to his legitimacy and the stability of his regime, as the eventual necessary removal of discriminatory policies banning the Palestinians form certain public offices will be introduced on the expense of the preferential rights of the bedouin tribes. This will fuel instability as the tribes will be forced to withdraw their support for the monarchy. Further research on the potential of the removal of the discriminatory policies against the Palestinians in Jordan will therefore be welcomed to shed light on the potential consequences of this.

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Front page images

1. Sharif Hussein Bin Ali

<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c9/Sherif-Hussein.jpg>

2. King Abdullah II

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3. The Hashemite emblem

<http://www.unofficialroyalty.com/current-monarchies/jordanian-royals/kings-of-the-hashemite-kingdom-of-jordan/>

4. Protestors in Jordan

<http://www.arabiangazette.com/tag/arab-spring/page/2/>

5. Muslim Brotherhood

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6. Palestinian protests

<http://972mag.com/photos-of-the-week-palestinians-return-to-jordan-valley-village/86821/>

7. Jordanian Protests

<http://www.arabianbusiness.com/incoming/article377933.ece/ALTERNATES/g3l/108216010.jpg>

Appendix I

Timeline of Jordan’s Arab Spring 2011-2013

**2011**

**Jan. 14:** After the events in Tunisia 5000 demonstrators turn to the streets to protest high food prices and unemployment all over Jordan. University students and Ba’athist party supporters rallies in Irbid, Kerak, Ma’an and Salt demand Prime Minister Samir Rifai’s resignation (Nada 2015).

**Jan. 21:** In many cities the Muslim Brotherhoods heads thousands of demonstrators protesting the poor economy. Calls for a revision of elections law based on proportional representation, electoral redistricting, and having the prime minister elected instead of picked by the king (Nada 2015).

**Jan. 26:** King Abdullah II acknowledges that it is time to enact more political and economic reforms in Jordan (Nada 2015).

**Jan. 28:** Thousands take to the streets again to demand the prime minister’s resignation and worsening economic conditions. Some 3500 opposition activists from the Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front, trade unions and left organizations gather in Amman while another 2500 reportedly demonstrate in six other cities (Nada 2015).

**Feb. 1:** Samir al Rifai resigns and King Abdullah picks Marouf Bakhit as Prime minister. The Islamic Action Front argues that corruption, mismanagement and electoral fraud during Bakhit’s previous term from 2005 to 2007 is a dark shadow over the appointment of Bakhit (Nada 2015).

**Feb. 4:**  Hundreds of protestors headed by the Islamic Action Front protest in Amman against government corruption and demand further political reforms (Nada 2015).

**Feb. 6:** 36 tribal leaders from the conservative East Bank tribes sign a petition to King Abdullah II urging him to stop his Palestinian wife Queen Rania’s interference in politics. Among others the petition said that "She is building power centres for her interest that go against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing and is a danger to the nation and the structure of the state and the political structure and the institution of the throne” (Al Arabiya News 2011).

**March 14:** Prime Minister Bakhit and his cabinet announces the creation of a national dialogue committee to increase reform initiatives (Nada 2015).

**March 15:** Many refuses to join the 52-member national dialogue committee because it is not appointed to discuss the constitutional changes that could limit the powers of the monarchy (Nada 2015).

**March 22:** In a letter to the prime minister, King Abdullah urges the government to take quick and decisive action on reforms and warns that he will not tolerate delays (Nada 2015).

**March 24:**Some 500 protestors set up a camp in central Amman and pledge to stay until the government implements promised reforms. The group, largely mobilized via Facebook, calls itself the March 24 Movement (Nada 2015).

**March 25:** Some 200 pro-government demonstrators attack March 24 Movement protestors in Amman. Riot police are called in to break up the fighting. They also storm the protest camp in Amman, leaving one man dead and injuring more than 100 others (Nada 2015).

**April 1:** Police separate hundreds of government supporters and pro-reform demonstrators holding rallies outside municipal offices in Amman (Nada 2015).

**April 15:**More than 2,000 people press for further political reforms in a demonstration in Amman. In Zarqa, some 350 Salafists and a slightly smaller group of monarchy loyalists clash. Police disperse the crowds using tear gas but 83 are injured (Nada 2015).

**April 26:** King Abdullah tasks Ahmad Lawzi, a former prime minister, to head the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, a 10-member group formed to consider recommendation for reform, including constitutional amendments (Nada 2015).

**May:** The Public Assembly law is amended so public demonstrations no longer require approval by administrative governors. Organizers are only required to notify the authorities within 48 hours (Nada 2015).

**June 12:** King Abdullah announces sweeping reforms in a nationally televised address. He pledges to establish a parliamentary majority government and reform the tax system. But he does not specify a timeline for implementation (Nada 2015).

**June – August:** Smaller scale pro-reform protests are held across the country (Nada 2015).

**Aug. 14:** The Royal Committee on Constitutional Review presents 42 proposals for reform and constitutional amendments. The king welcomes measures requiring elections to be held within four months, instead of two years, after the lower house of parliament is dissolved. The committee also recommends lowering the minimum age of parliamentary candidates to 25 from 35. A constitutional court is to be set up to oversee and safeguard law making and a new independent commission is to be formed for supervising election (Nada 2015)s.

**Sept. 30:** The king issues a decree approving several constitutional amendments that provide for trial of ministers by civilian courts, establishment of a constitutional court and the establishment of an independent body to supervise elections (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 16:** More than half of parliament, 70 of out 120 lawmakers, call on the king to sack Prime Minister Bakhit for failing to quickly implement reforms (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 17:**King Abdullah sacks Prime Minister Bakhit and asks Awn Khasawneh, an international jurist, to head a new government.  He also appoints a new intelligence chief amid accusations that security forces had intimidated demonstrators and journalists.

**Oct. 26:** The king announces that he will give lawmakers a say in appointing the cabinet, which had previously been appointed solely by the crown (Nada 2015).

**Nov. 18:** More than 1,000 youth, Islamists and leftists protest in Amman for an end to corruption and more political reforms (Nada 2015).

**2012**

**March 17:** Some 200 women protest in southern Jordan to demand the release of political prisoners. The gathering is reportedly the first all-female rally since pro-reform protests began in 2011 (Nada 2015).

**April 16:** Jordan’s lower house votes, 46 out of 83, to add an item banning political parties based on religion to the draft political parties law (Nada 2015).

**April 26:** Prime Minister Khasawneh abruptly resigns after six months in office, reportedly due to harsh criticism of his draft election law that could have favoured Islamist politicians. Fayez al Tarawneh, a U.S.-educated economist and former prime minister, is tapped as a replacement (Nada 2015).

**June 4:** Some 150 imams protest outside the royal palace to express their discontent with the government and call for an end of security service interference in religious affairs. The imams also urge an investigation into possible corruption at the Islamic affairs ministry (Nada 2015).

**June 19:** A new electoral law is passed, giving each eligible voter two votes instead of one. One vote will go to a local candidate and the other towards a 17-seat national list. The change is thought to benefit Islamists and other groups with nation-wide popularity a better chance at competing. But the Islamic Action Front dismisses the reformed law as “cosmetic.”

**Oct. 4:** King Abdullah dissolves parliament, clearing the way for fresh elections.

**Oct. 5:** Thousands of Jordanians participate in an Islamist-led protest in Amman to demand more democratic reforms. The gathering is reportedly the largest since 2011 (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 10:** King Abdullah appoints reformist politician Abdullah Ensour as prime minister and tasks him with forming Jordan’s fifth government in just two years (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 21:** Jordan issues a statement describing a foiled attack by al Qaeda-linked militants to launch near-simultaneous attacks on civilian and government targets in Amman, reportedly including the U.S. Embassy. The government announces that it has arrested 11 in connection to the plot, described as the most serious since 2005 (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 23:** King Abdullah directs the government to release 20 pro-reform activists who were accused of insulting him. He also [calls](http://cnsnews.com/news/article/jordans-king-pushes-elections-reform-path) on the fragmented opposition to organize and run in the next elections in January (Nada 2015).

**Oct. 24:** The Independent Elections Commission publishes a draft of the executive regulations governing the proportional national list, seeking feedback from the public (Nada 2015).

**Nov. 13-16:** Riots break out across several Jordanian cities after the government announces an increase in fuel prices. Thousands of demonstrators in Amman chant, “The people want the fall of the regime,” echoing the chant that was popular in Egypt and Tunisia. Protests turn violent on the second night, after police shoot and kill a 22-year-old.  On the third day, protestors [throw](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/protesters-in-jordan-call-for-ending-king-abdullah-iis-rule.html) rocks and police respond with tear gas. The Muslim Brotherhood [joins](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-jordan-protest-idUSBRE8AF0LK20121116) the protests on the fourth day. Some 3,000 chant “Go down Abdullah, go down.” Three are killed during the days of protest (Nada 2015).

**2013**

**Jan. 23:** Some 1.3 million Jordanians vote in parliamentary elections, about 56 percent of registered voters. The Islamic Action Front boycotts the pol (Nada 2015)l.

**Jan. 24-26:** Riots break out all over Jordan due to preliminary election results showing huge victory for tribal forces in support of the monarchy. Police break up masses with teargas, but are attacked with fire some places. Demonstrators question the legitimacy of the election. The Islamic Action Front [rejects](http://bigstory.ap.org/article/some-islamists-win-seats-jordans-parliament) the results (Nada 2015).

**Jan. 28:** The results of the elections are endorsed by the Independent Elections Commission. The majority of the 150 seats go to regime loyalists. But at least 37 go to [opposition](http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/islamists-win-seats-in-jordan-s-parliament-1.496191) figures, including more than a dozen moderate Islamists unaffiliated with the Brotherhood (Nada 2015).

**Feb. 10:** King Abdullah tells the opening session of parliament that electoral rules must change to support multi-party democracy. He acknowledges that the previous month’s elections, boycotted by the Islamic Action Front, “were held under a law that was not ideal.” (Nada 2015).

**March 9:** King Abdullah reappoints Abdullah Ensour as prime minister after consulting with the new parliament for the first time after the constitutional changes (Nada 2015).

**March 18:** A wide-ranging profile of King Abdullah by *The Atlantic*causes a furore in Jordan.  The king had spoken negatively in several conversations with Jeffrey Goldberg about other Middle Eastern leaders, his tribal supporters, his siblings and others. A tribal council long allied with the crown [labels](http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/world/la-fg-wn-abdullah-zionist-20130324) the king a Zionist agent on March 24 (Nada 2015).

**June 23:** Prime Minister Ensour reveals that some 900 U.S. military personnel are in Jordan to bolster its defences and ensure the Syrian civil war does not spread across its border (Nada 2015).

**September:** Tens of thousands of Syrian refugees are stranded at their country’s border with Jordan, which tries to limit the inflow of people after already accepting 520,000 Syrians (Nada 2015).

**Nov. 3:** King Abdullah pledges to press ahead with wide-ranging reforms, referring to them as a “white revolution,” in an address to parliament. He says he would like to see Jordan’s 23 small political parties coalesce into two coalitions based on liberal or conservative ideology for the next parliamentary election (Nada 2015).

**Dec. 9:** Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian representatives sign a milestone water sharing agreement (Nada 2015).