Challenges of humanitarian space. A case study of Darfur

A thesis submitted to Aalborg University for an M.Sc. degree in Global Refugee Studies.

Department of Development and international relations

 **Acknowledgement**

I am heartily thankful to my supervisor, Prof. Johannes Dragsbæk Schmidt who supported me throughout my thesis with his patience and in-depth knowledge. It would have been impossible to accomplish this thesis without his help and guidance. I want to thank prof. Bjørn Møller who provided valuable help and gave me a strong base on the understanding of securitization and its theory.

My profound gratitude goes to my beautiful wife Linda Mendi Shitang who has been very supportive morally and financial during my course in Aalborg university. My wonderful parents Mr Ghogomu Edward and Mrs Elizabeth Jipuku and my siblings Numbonui Terence, Tangunu Elvis, Ndwigisha’a Shitang, Tancho Valentine, Mbombouh Joyce and Evans Njoko for their moral support and prayers. To my mother in-law Mrs Mendi Bassong Pauline, I say thank you for your prayers. Finally I say thanks to the all mighty God for being there for me throughout this work

 **Abstract**

The brutal murder of 122 aid workers in 2008 and ambushes, murders of aid workers and kidnapping elsewhere are indicative of the fact that aid workers have increasingly found themselves the targets of deliberate violence and have captured headlines. This changing nature of armed conflicts has resulted in increased need to safeguard civilians including humanitarian personnel which is reflected in the emerging protection of civilian agenda. This project reviewed the prevailing explanations, assumptions and researched on the reasons why humanitarian workers experience these threats and attacks. This research work considers the security of aid workers in Darfur. It specifically examines the extent to which traditional principles of humanitarian action provides security for humanitarian personnel. Some scholarly articles and literature on security of humanitarian actors already exist but this one dealt with the case of Non-governmental organizations working in Darfur-Sudan. The shooting of six nurses of the international committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) in their beds while they were asleep in 1996 accelerated a focus on security amongst relief and development actors. It precipitated the notion of security as an essential element of humanitarian operations and resulted in the development of security training manuals and management strategies. This project dealt with the reason for the rise in violent attacks against aid workers and went further to look at the ways in which humanitarian organizations have been responding to these security threat.

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**List of Abbreviations**

AWSD Aid Worker Security Data Base

CSS Critical Security Studies

EU European Union

ICC International Criminal Court

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

INGO International nongovernmental organization

ISIS Islamic State for Iraq and Syria

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Official Development Assistance

R2P Responsibility to Protect

SLA Sudan Liberation Army

SPLA-N Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North group

TSS Traditional Security Studies

UN United Nations

UNAMID African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNHCR United Nations High Commission For refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

 **CHAPTER 1**

1. **Introduction**

“The shooting of the six ICRC nurses in their beds in 1996 and the bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad in 2003 spurred and then accelerated a focus on security among relief and development actors” (Fast 2010: 12).

The delivery of humanitarian aid is increasingly being a risky business with policy makers, aid agencies and scholars lamenting about the risk involved with the delivery of humanitarian aid. At same time, there is also a growing consensus that first, there is an ever increasing number of nonprofit making organizations in the field delivering humanitarian aid than ever before. Secondly, since the end of the cold war, there has been an increase in the number of aid workers kidnapped, assaulted and killed. Thirdly, humanitarian aid workers frequently find themselves in risky environments. Finally security is a major concern to many aid agencies and their staff (Rudolph 2013: 1). “The aid industry can be defined as those networked assemblages of donor governments, multinational organizations, UN agencies and NGOs, both national and international, that are formally responsible for disbursing international humanitarian and development assistance”(Duffield 2010: 454).

What is humanitarian aid? During conflicts, civilians are affected both directly and indirectly through the complex emergencies resulting from protracted conflict situations. In such situations, the primary objective is preventing and reducing human casualties and also ensuring access to basic needs such as water, shelter, food, health care and sanitation. Therefore humanitarian aid has to do with prioritizing the assistance to displaced persons, support relief work, prevent the spread of conflict and support in rehabilitation.

The changing nature of armed conflicts which are most often than not intrastate has resulted in increased need to safeguard civilians and aid workers. On August 2003, the head office of the United Nations (UN) in Bagdad was destroyed by a suicide bomb killing as many as 22 individuals including the special representative of the UN secretary general in Iraq and wounded more than 160 others (Fast 2010). Following this attack, resolution 1502 was adopted by the UN Security Council which declared deliberate attacks against peacekeepers and aid workers a war crime. Both the UN and many other international organizations have lost dozens and even hundreds in the line of duty. There is an ongoing situation of aid workers being injured, killed or kidnapped and the aid worker security database(AWSD) indicated that 2011 was the deadliest year on record for aid worker fatalities and kidnapping so far (Wille and Fast 2013). With approximately three aid workers losing their lives or being kidnapped every week while previous statistics of 2001 by AWSD statistics indicated some five deaths or kidnappings in an average month (Ibid 2013). As the years pass by, we see an increase in the number of incidences on aid workers. A study released to mark the 2013 world humanitarian day indicated that 155 aid workers killed, 134 kidnapped and another 171 seriously injured in their attempt to help others in some of the world’s most dangerous place, indicating an increase of 66% in fatal attacks from the previous year[[1]](#footnote-1). Also studies of the first eight months of 2014 revealed 79 aid workers lost their lives with Afghanistan remaining the most dangerous place to operate (Ibid 2013). Contemporary beheading of aid workers by the violent militant group ISIS (Islamic state for Iraq and Syria) have been noted with the most recent being the murder of an American aid worker Peter Kassig on November 16. Several explanations have been given, one being the idea that, rather than aid being a neutral institution, would be recipients have come to see international assistance as an extension of western foreign policy (Duffield 2010: 54). From the above statistics, it is obvious that the world is becoming a more violent place for aid workers with the number of victims continuing to rise, illustrating that saving strangers has become a dangerous occupation.

There is a striking upsurge around the globe in organized voluntary activity involving the creation of private or nonprofit organizations. From the developed countries of north America to western Europe to developing societies of Africa, the former soviet bloc and Latin America, people are forming associations, foundations and civil society organizations to deliver human services, prevent environmental degradation, protect civil rights, promote grass roots economic development and many other objectives which were formally unattended or left to the state (state failure-market failure), (Salamon 2004: 109) .As the number of humanitarian agencies increase, these organizations scramble for funds (the NGO scramble) in order to sustain their survival. These agencies are most often pushed on further and further into the front lines of conflicts where the needs are greatest by their funders who are mostly donor governments.

The security development nexus tries to bring out the interconnection between security and development and has attracted a good deal of scholars, donors and practitioner interest. It was believed by scholars that with development (through education, health poverty reduction and even infrastructure), there was a potential to improve local and international security. That is to say development assistance helped people to be self-sustaining which reduced the risk of social tension and hence conflicts (Duffield 2010: 54). On the other hand, insecurity was believed to be very corrosive to development. With insecurity, development projects are slowed down or even halted completely. With the outbreak of what Mary Kaldor 1999 called new wars (intrastate wars), which became prominent in the 1990s with the fall of the soviet union, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) enthusiastically embraced the shift towards using aid strategically as a civilian tool for conflict resolution. This resulted to what Duffield 2010 called politicization of aid (Duffield 2010: 1). This caused humanitarian organizations to lose their apolitical stance in conflict and post conflict areas with these aid workers becoming deliberate targets of violence. Instead of development enhancing both local and international security, as a means of maintaining this inequitable life-chance divide, development has become part of a deepening and ultimately unwinnable global civil war (Duffield 2010: 57). This is what Duffield referred to as the development security impasse, i.e. the security development nexus not working.

The conclusion of a spring 1995 meeting in Madrid of the International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with other humanitarian agencies was that humanitarian aid should be nonpolitical (Seybolt 1996: 521). This code of conduct indicated that aid will be given irrespective of the race, nationality or religious background of the recipients. Aid is also supposed to be neutral but this idea of uncompromised neutrality stems from the historical understanding of humanitarian emergencies as being caused by natural disasters but this neutrality cannot be maintained when responding to complex emergencies. Complex emergencies are wars not earthquakes or volcanic eruptions and are often intentionally created violent situations where at least two sides seek incompatible ends (Ibid 1996: 521).

Arguments by the aid workers security report of 2012 brings out the point that attacks on aid agencies and their workers are a symptom of state failure as well as a product of war[[2]](#footnote-2). They pointed out further that aid agencies always need to analyze the potentials of the host government to assist and protect their activities. Where the capacity or political will for this is absent, these organization becomes fully responsible for their own security. In 2014 the aid worker security report went further into an indebt look at kidnapping which affected more aid agencies than any other form of major violent attacks. Findings indicated that the financial gains were high for the perpetrators and for this reason, it has been increasing been used by criminal and militant groups[[3]](#footnote-3). This is the most common motivation for attack against aid agencies presently in Darfur. Additional investments have been made in insurance policy for aid workers which still has not been sufficient. The fifth edition of the aid worker security report of 2014 provides the latest verified statistics on attacks against aid agencies and their workers from the aid worker security data base. It examined the particular security challenge of road travel showed that ambushes and attacks on the road have consistently outnumbered other forms of violence namely; attacks on projects and raids on compounds. Humanitarian agencies have made use of what Bickleys 2003 called the security triangle involving the acceptance, deterrence and protection strategy. The acceptance strategy which involves reduction of possibility of targeted attacks by reducing or removing the motivation to attack has been used as the primary risk management strategy for decades. Recent evidences have shown that this strategy has become ineffective with the increase in the number of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers (Childs 2003: 3). Aid agencies have gone further to implement new strategies such as bunkerisation (i.e. living in high fences) and smart protection (dressing and behaving like the locals) and still relying on the acceptance-based strategy as the primary mitigating strategy. This research will make use of the securitization theory with the cultural theory being used as a sub theory to explain and analyze the challenges and limitations involved in the securitization of humanitarian aid with a focus on the Darfur region in Sudan. The conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region which started in 2003 has claimed more than 200,000 lives. The country has broken repeated promises to bring peace in it and Darfur rebel groups have shown little concern in negotiating a peace agreement and has resulted to continued suffering of Darfur’s local population.

According to the Copenhagen school, security is about survival and these theorists argue that something becomes a security issue in international relation when it is presented as posing an existential threat to some referent object. This threat always has to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures (Diskaya 2013). The main problem with debates around development and security is that the term security can be used to denote very different things[[4]](#footnote-4). Many scholars have pointed out that security has proven to be a malleable theory which is constantly redefined as murphy points out, by influentialily securitizing actors such as national governments (Murphy 2007: 450). Other scholars such as Vaughn 2009 and Watson 2011 have argued that humanitarian activity itself is capable of promoting a security discourse (Diskaya 2013)

Many funders and donor governments have urged their contractors to provide health services, schools and other basic needs and services to nonviolent civilian groups while avoiding to provide these humanitarian assistance to violent groups. This has resulted into many nonprofit organizations working in such areas to lose their apolitical stance and being viewed as biased by some. One analyst expressed that humanitarian activities seem to be taking place in an environment beset by manipulations and tension between policy choices and neutral philosophy of humanitarianism (Fast 2013).

Summarily with the changing nature of war fares being intra state, aid agencies working in conflict and post conflict zone are regularly attacked by violent groups. Despite the apparent difficulties in effectively defining the concept of security, it remains a highly important topic for the humanitarian industry and the international community at large as is evident in the policy and scholarship on development and security. After the cold war, an increasing body of literature provides an entry point for my discussion and analysis. A common assumption that appears throughout this research is the interconnection between security and development. Without security there cannot be effective development and vice versa. Through a case study analysis on humanitarian service delivery in Darfur in Sudan, I document the logic, dilemma and risk on the securitization of humanitarian aid

 **1.1 Research question**

This project is dealing with the challenges of humanitarian aid and the methods through which nonprofit organizations are involved in the securitization of humanitarian aid. The international political influences and transformations in conflict zones and post conflict areas have greatly affected the security and the political environment under which aid agencies seek to operate. This has often been the case in conflict and fragile states such as Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq where there is a growing believe that NGOs are out to propagate western cultures and values (Duffield 2010). That is to say, these humanitarian agencies are believed to be the tool used to spread western culture and philosophy. Some violent groups view this NGOs as soft targets which can easily be attacked go get valuable goods since they are usually rich. In Sudan which is a fragile state, the main super powers namely America and other western powers have considered this zone as a central focus for international stabilization agendas. This has gone a long way to further politicize and securitize the modalities and context of humanitarian work, negatively affecting humanitarian space[[5]](#footnote-5).

Major research question*: Violent attack of humanitarian organizations by violent groups in Darfur on the rise, why? This research will go further to answer the following sub questions:*

1. What are the core reasons and major dilemmas involved in the securitization of humanitarian aid?
2. What organizational strategies and policies have aid agencies developed in respond to the risk and insecurity affecting humanitarian space?

To respond to these questions and at the same time take a broader exploration for security and development, this thesis is setup as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the contemporary security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. It also goes further to look at the deep causes of the conflict and the way that the international community has been responding to it. This discussions lay the foundation for an understanding of the shifting form of governance and power that are emerging in international humanitarian work. This is in line with the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) which works to justify the contemporary increase in the number of humanitarian organizations moving across national borders. Through a theoretical discussion, we will realize that in the context of contemporary atrocities, in line with the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations, refugees and IDPs are considered as both victims and threat to security. Chapter 3 will deal with the methodology, and it will outline the nature and scope of the data collection process. It describes the study population and establishes the appropriateness of Darfur as an interesting site for a case study on securitization of humanitarian aid. Chapter four is going to deal with the analysis and will provide answers to the research question and sub questions relating these answers to the theories and case study. Chapter 5 summarizes the research work.

 **CHAPTER 2**

1. **Background**

Thinking of the violence against aid workers which is mostly not at random but intentionally targeted, terrorist and other violent groups in trouble spots like Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq target NGO workers to force them to leave cutting off avenues of assistance for the population making the state weaker internally. The human suffering caused by the conflict in the Darfur region has resulted to a humanitarian initiative and potentially the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world (Eckroth 2010: 5). However the working condition of aid agencies and their workers has been problematic with many aid workers being attacked with others killed. As a result, many questions arise on how aid workers can guarantee higher levels of security and protection (Ibid 2010: 5). The humanitarian environment in Darfur, Sudan has deteriorated in the last few years and also followed by new conflicts which has resulted to an increased number of internally displaced people (IDP’s) in Darfur. At the same time, aid agencies which have been working to take care of victims have faced continuing attacks making their job more challenging. The lack of security has forced many humanitarian organizations to abandon the region altogether and also those that have stayed have limited access to the most vulnerable people. There is presently the contemporary kidnapping and beheading of some aid workers by members of the militant group ISIS (Islamic state for Iraq and Syria) which has moved to carry out attacks in neighboring Libya and Egypt, very close to Sudan and could easily move into Sudan. It is important to note that they do not only behead Christians and aid workers, they also behead Muslims who go against their laws. There is therefore the need to research on the securitization of aid activities in this region. The Purpose of this study is to investigate the challenges and dilemma faced by aid agencies in the Darfur IDP camps and around Darfur. It will also identifies and examine organizational and operational security concerns of these organizations and the various ways in which these organizations have been responding to these security concerns.

The European commissioner for development and humanitarian aid Louis Michel made mention of the fact that the effects of conflict and natural disasters translate into tens of millions of reasons for a much better humanitarian aid with up to 39 million people displaced from their home mainly living in crowded camps[[6]](#footnote-6). Many of these people suffer from preventive diseases, hunger and malnutrition. With the changing nature of war fares being mostly intra state, civilians are most often the target of violent conflicts. Also, the problem of climate change is bringing extreme and hash weather, increasing the challenges and sufferings of already vulnerable communities. For the purpose of this thesis, with a focus on managing and protecting life, this research work will help throw into relief the political investment in security, humanitarian aid and also for refugee camps. In the same line, an increasing number of aid workers are continuously being targeted by armed groups in conflict zones. The term humanitarian aid aims to provide immediate relief and dignity to those in crisis[[7]](#footnote-7). It is usually short-term, reactive and crisis-oriented ensuring that they can always reach populations in need. Those in charge of providing this humanitarian aid provide this aid regardless of political considerations which has let these humanitarian actors to establish principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence (ibid 2011). This form of aid can be distinguished from development assistance or what is called official development assistance (ODA) which aims to transform the physical conditions and societal or power relations that keep people living in poverty.

 **2.1 Understanding the Darfur conflict**.

The united nations has described Sudan’s Darfur as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with more than 2.3 million people being displaced with most of them living as internally displaced persons in Darfur and some in neighboring Chad with aid workers having little access to the area. It originated when rebels in 2003 took up arms against the government accusing it of neglecting the region. Since then, civilians have been exposed to violence and attack from rebel groups, pro-government groups and government troops with nearly 400.000 people displaced in the first half of 2014[[8]](#footnote-8)

The Darfur region lies in the western part of Africa’s largest country Sudan near the border with Libya, Central African Republic and Chad with a population of approximately six million living in the Darfur region (Ibid 2011). Since 2003, the Darfur region of western Sudan was a site of terrible violence, death and displacement which the Bush administration classified as genocide with the destruction and violence often compared to that of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The Darfur conflict was described as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world in the early 2000s which was characterized by the UN’s emergency relief coordinator Jan Egeland as an ethnic cleansing[[9]](#footnote-9). Despite its being one of the world’s largest relief operations, efforts to calm the conflict and assist the approximately five million affected people produced precious few results by 2009 (Sikainga 2009). Ahmad Sikainga a native of Sudan and professor of Ohio state university explored the origin of the conflict in Darfur and the situation in 2009. The remote area of Darfur has experienced a bloody conflict that has resulted to the death of thousands of people and the displacement of more than two million people (Ibid 2009). Behind the tragic events in Darfur lies a complex history of an environmental crisis, struggle over natural resources, social inequalities, conflicting notion of identity and above all a chronic problem of bad governance which has plagued the Sudan since its independence from Britain in 1956. Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has been bedeviled by succession of internal violence, political instability and civil war (Ibid 2009). Therefore, the Darfur conflict should be seen as part of this ongoing conflict with one conflict spilling over from one part of the country to another. The most notorious of these conflicts in Sudan was the North-South divide, which ended with the signing of a 1995 peace agreement. This took place after two rounds of fighting, 1955-1972 and 1983-2005 (Ibid 2009). These conflicts can be attributed to the deeply rooted regional, economic and political inequalities which have persisted throughout Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial history. In a nut shell, the conflicts that have affected Sudan can be attributed to the deeply rooted political, regional and economic inequalities that have persisted throughout Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial history. These inequalities are exemplified by the cultural, economic and political hegemony of a small group of Arabic-speaking Sudanese elites who have held power and systematically marginalized the non-Muslims and also non-Arabic groups in the countries periphery (Ibid 2009).

 **2.2 Major causes of the conflict in Sudan**

It is well known that the current conflict in Sudan is a product of a combination of factors namely political, economic and environmental.

**2.2.1 Environmental factors**

It is common believe that competition over shrinking resources and environmental hazards have played and continue to contribute a critical role in tensions and conflict in the Sahelian countries namely Chad, Niger and Mali(Ibid 2009). The northern part of Darfur is a desert which stretches all the way to the Libyan and Egyptian borders and crop farming is the main economic activity for a huge part of the population. Crop cultivation depends heavily on land fertility and rainfall rendering the population vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. This was particularly the case in the eighties and the nineties where in desertification, drought and population increase joined to produce a significant decline in food production resulting to widespread famine. The land ownership system in Darfur has evolved over several centuries, which has resulted to increase inter-communal tensions. During British colonial rule, the land tenure system followed the system of indirect rule or what was called native administration. Colonial officials found it convenient to assume that local leaders had defined authority over ethnic groups and jurisdiction over corresponding territory which was a similar practice in other parts of Africa. Both the system of native administration and land tenure underwent major challenges after independence with post-independence Sudanese rulers regarding native administration as an archaic system that was part of the colonial legacy and gradually dismantled them (Ibid 2009). This changes to the land system led to the erosion of the chief’s authority which in turn reduced their ability to settle inter-communal disputes.

 **2.2.2 Conflict between sedentary farmers and pastoralists**

Conflict between farmers and pastoralists caused to some extend by changing land ownership patterns and environmental degradation was one major causes of the violence in the Darfur region. Many families rely on pastoral nomadism as their main source of livelihood with the Arabic-speaking Baqqara being one of the most prominent cattle-herding groups in the region. With the drought of the 1980s due to climate change, the expected dates of crop harvest became unpredictable and many farmers began to switch to animal husbandry and there for required more grazing land. At the same time, the effect of the drought was felt by pastoralist as grazing land in northern Darfur shrank considerably. As a result of this situation, camel nomads insisted on maintaining the traditional arrangements for animal routes which became a source of major clashes between pastoralist and farmers. Many methods were used to resolve this problems namely intermarriage between different ethnic groups, exchange of gifts, most importantly was tribal conferences organized by local chiefs.

**2.2.3 Ethnic tension**

The post-colonial government was dominated by the Arab-speaking elites who tried to forge a national identity based on Islam and Arabism. This resulted to resistance from the non-Muslim and non-Arabic elites in the marginalized region of the south.

Some of the key humanitarian issues in the context of Darfur have been highlighted by the humanitarian policy group.

Firstly, civilians are being subjected to indiscriminate violence and forced displacement in the region on a massive scale and one other element of increasing concern is the fact that people are being deprived of basic needs such as water, food and access to relief sometimes deliberately[[10]](#footnote-10). Therefore the securitization of humanitarian aid is very much needed to increase the levels of protection for the local population and allows for increase access to relief assistance.

Secondly, political actions to deal with the root causes of the violence is vital and negotiating a cease fire is the way forward. This has an impact on humanitarian priority as the protection and assistance of civilians could result in organizations being subordinated to other political goals and being influenced by broader foreign policy and security aims.

Thirdly, international response to the crisis has been ineffective and slow. The primary responsibility to protect civilians lie in the hands of the Sudanese government but it is evident that the government is largely responsible for the threats faced by many civilians despite mounting pressure from the international community. With the absence of political action to ensure increased protection for civilians, it brings up the concern on how effectively aid agencies can meet humanitarian needs given the current restricted level of access. There is a shifting form of governance and power that is emerging in international humanitarian work. This is in line with the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) which works to justify the contemporary increase in the number of humanitarian organizations moving across national borders. The United Nations secretary-general in his report of 2009 put the mandate regarding the responsibility to protect as follows: each individual nation has the responsibility to protect its populations from war crimes, genocides, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Mark Duffield (2007) argues that liberal forms of government is always concerned with securing biological and social process at the level of the local population, society and economy in the name of rights and freedom (Duffield 2007: 4).this has resulted to human security distinguishing between effective and ineffective states in order to assert an interventionist responsibility to protect (Ibid 2007: 123). This mandate went further to agree that the international community should assist states in exercising that responsibility and in building their protection capacities. When a state fails to protect its own population from crime and violence, they confirmed that the international community has the responsibility to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the UN secretary general articulated three pillars of the strategy for the implementation of R2P. The first pillar being the protection responsibility of the state, the second being international assistance and capacity building and the third pillar being timely and decisive response. Very important is to note that many big nations worldwide present the Conflict in Darfur-Sudan as purely ethical and religious (but ethnicity is just the symptom of the conflict). There is a lot of literature which is misleading and misinterpreting the problem including the big media outlets which quite often than not present the government of Khartoum as one of the world’s worst governments

**2.3 Contemporary security situation in Darfur**

As of 2013 the UN estimates that the conflict in Darfur region has seen more than 300,000 people displaced, twice as much as it was the case in 2011 according to the UN office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA). Since 2013 many people have had to flee their homes to escape violence including more than 35000 who have crossed the borders into Chad and Central African Republic and the crises is getting bigger.

**2.3.1 Humanitarian situation**

UN agency figures indicate about 1.4 million people living in main camps in the Darfur area. The head of the OCHA office in Darfur testified that the actual number of IDPs [internally displaced persons] in camps are significantly higher as many of the IDPs living in smaller camps are not included in these figures and many IDPs in bigger camps were unregistered. Many of those affected by the conflict are unable to get any humanitarian help as insecurity has hindered efforts by aid agencies to reach them. In effect more than a third of Darfur’s population are in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Road insecurity further hampers movement of aid workers and supplies to central Darfur and further compounded by recent increased clashes between Misseriya and Salamat tribesmen around central Darfur. Recent surveys by MSF revealed that the violence was a major cause of mortality amongst refugees with 9 out of 10 deaths recorded caused by gunshot wounds. In eastern Darfur alone, an estimated 305 people had been killed as a result of violent clashes between the Ma’alia and Rizeigat tribes just in a month alone. Peace keepers too have not been spread and in July 2013 seven of them working with the UN mission were killed in an ambush in Darfur.

Some fifty thousand refugees from Darfur have crossed into Chad and the UNHCR has described it as the largest influx of Sudanese refugees into Chad since 2005. Officials in Darfur have admitted that the violence is now beyond state control.

The conflict in Darfur is waged on from different fronts and by several actors and involves three main rebel groups fighting the government. Namely the SLA-Minni Minawi faction, the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). While these rebel groups are fighting under the canopy of the Sudanese revolutionary front, they also are divided largely along ethnic lines. There has also been new waves of localized conflicts including not only the popular violence between non-Arabs and Arabs but also increase in intra- Arab violence, for example between the Misseriya and the Salamat tribes.

Mark Cutts, the Head of the OCHA in Darfur stated that “Underpinning almost all of the conflicts in Darfur are the disputes over land ownership and land use. Indeed, much of what is commonly referred to as “inter-tribal fighting” or fighting over “economic resources” actually relates primarily to disputes over land and access to water and grazing for animals”. Clashes have broken out between the Beni Hussein and Northern Reizegat ethnic group over control of gold-mining rights in the Jebel Amir area of North Darfur state. Many analyst fear the competition for other valuable resources such as Gum Arabic might lead to future violent inter-communal conflicts.

**2.3.2 Contemporary security situation of Aid agencies**

The deteriorating security situation in Darfur meant many aid agencies are unable to keep their staff on the ground and some have had their offices looted. In July 2013, an international aid agency was robbed of an estimated forty thousand dollars by armed men at their office in central Darfur. In May that same year, two vehicles rented by an international Ngo and carrying seven staff were carjacked in Wadi Salih locality. Earlier in February that same year, the rented vehicle of another aid agency was ambushed in Zalingei and staff were robbed of all their personal belongings. Many commercial transporter are unwilling to transport relief supplies to areas in the southern corridors localities mainly Mukjar and Bindisi due to security concerns.

Eric Reeves, a professor at the Smith College in the United States argued that violence in recent years has called into serious questioning about the viability of any substantial ongoing relief efforts in the region. This is because virtually no international staff remains in Darfur most especially in the remote areas either to provide oversight for aid distribution or for critical assessment of work. Analyst Professor Eric R. added that the recent killing of two aid workers of world vision in their Nyala compound means that there is no place of real safety in Darfur. The continued insecurity and fighting in addition to government restrictions on movement has deeply affected aid agencies ability to operate. The Sudanese government according to the human rights watch continue to deny peacekeepers from UNAMID access to much of Darfur which has hampered the work of the peacekeepers and aid agencies. Armed gunmen attacked and killed peacekeepers in October 2013, abducted Ngo and UNAMID staff and also took away dozens of vehicles[[11]](#footnote-11).

**2.4 Humanitarian response and access in Darfur**

Access to Darfur by humanitarian organizations is extremely limited as a result of insecurity and government restrictions on movements. The government has restricted relief work to camps under its control in the region, this is because the state believed that these camps supplied fighters against it. There has been situations of relief supplies being stolen on numerous occasions after being distributed to conflict affected areas and camps and some vulnerable group have denied assistance because it could attract violence. The border area between chad and Darfur is very remote and also associated with high insecurity making access to refugees in Chad very difficult. Also during the rainy season in May, there is always increased logistical difficulties of reaching vulnerable groups in the remote areas. UNHCR has responded to this by proving camps away from the border in order to provide greater protection. Without sustained access to the civilians, the ability of humanitarian organizations to respond to the crises has been slow and limited and many agencies have been responding mostly to IDPs in urban parts of Darfur while a few have managed to establish programs in the remote areas. That notwithstanding, the capacity of the humanitarian system has been expanding with new agencies gaining access but the overall capacity and output remains low. Therefore there is need for additional efforts to gain access and provide assistance to the most vulnerable population. Statistics from Dan church aid of 2009 indicated an increase in number of attacks on aid workers (Eckroth k 2010: 14). With the arrest warrant issued to president Al-Bashir by the international criminal court (ICC), thirteen humanitarian organizations which employed 40% of humanitarian staff were expelled from Sudan (Ibid 2010) and resulted to less movement on behalf of the remaining organizations. There is an ongoing targeted attacks on aid workers in the region limiting the time spent on aid distribution as seen by OCHA humanitarian office as one of the worst environments in the world in terms of security of humanitarian operations with most killing of aid workers taking place during carjacking. There is also an increase level of kidnapping of NGO workers as a result of negative propaganda of humanitarian organizations by the government of Sudan through the media after the ICC issued their president an arrest warrant (Eckroth k 2010: 15).

**2.5 Origin of civil-military cooperation**

“the nature of complex humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, and reconstruction missions increasingly forces military and civilian actors to operate in the same space at the same time with thereby challenging their ability to remain impartial, neutral and independent” (Franke 2006: 1). Although the distance between the military and civilian aid agencies began to shrink considerably during the Balkan mission, some scholars and observers now believe the relationship created in Afghanistan has changed the image of NGOs worldwide. It was initially clear from the planning stages of the Afghanistan operation that the CIMIC would play a central role in the coalition process to “win hearts and minds” of the local population (Ibid 2006: 10). Shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime, a joint military-civil operation task force was formed between a number of humanitarian agencies and US military to oversee operations on the ground. This joint coalition deployed to key urban centers across the country whose main functions included wining the hearts and minds of the Afghan population, secure support of the local population and gain positive publicity of the war in the United States (Ibid 2006, pp 10). Initially NGOs objected the military involvement in the projects as they saw duplication of many of the projects and a threat to NGO staff by blurring the line between civilian and military actors. Many NGOs criticized this militarization of aid and some even withdrew from the Balkans as they suspected that this trend was going to follow in other parts of the world. Major quick impact projects included health clinics, drilling of wells, bridges, roads, constructing schools and could be viewed as ‘military NGOs’ (Fields 2002: 2). With creation of the provincial reconstruction teams, where military personals carried out humanitarian work in civilian clothes, it went a long way to curtail ‘humanitarian space’ within which humanitarian agencies could operate. The military’s “hearts and minds” approach can result to confusion of the role of aid agencies and military forces on the ground. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that such an approach is largely ineffective and in most cases counterproductive to even short term military ends let alone the long term wellbeing of the local communities. Some scholars argue it should be called militarization of aid rather than the securitization of aid[[12]](#footnote-12).

Frequent targeted attacks on aid agencies illustrates a growing dilemma in stability operations and has caused many aid agencies to express concerns about the impact of civil-military cooperation on their ability to remain apolitical in fulfilling their core tasks.

In Darfur, most humanitarian agencies consider UNAMID which is the main peace keeping mission body in the region to be responsible for alleviating the regions security problems. The international community asked the hybrid peacekeeping force to refocus its efforts on the protection of civilians in 2009 (Seferis 2010: 67). This priority highlighted the tension between humanitarian actors and UNAMID who expect their mission to be able to keep both civilians and aid workers save.

 **Chapter 3**

1. **Methodology and limitations.**

**3.1 Research focus**

The principal concern of this study is to assess the validity of the argument that the delivery of humanitarian aid by major international humanitarian non-governmental organizations is increasingly being a risky business with policy makers, aid agencies and scholars lamenting about the risk involved with the delivery of this aid. This thesis will look at the different arguments by different scholars on the cause of these attacks and the ways these organizations have been responding to this challenge. This project is in the field of international relations and international political economy and this chapter is focused on the presentation of the methodological procedure of our work.

**3.2 Overview and case study**

The security development nexus and the securitization of humanitarian aid suggest a variety of implications on the delivery humanitarian aid. While these broader issues have been raised in literature by a variety of security and development scholars (Duffield 2001), many critics have identified a gap between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence (Fast 2007). This research is designed to address this gap by examining what motivates the securitization process from the perspective of humanitarian organizations, how the process of securitization is undertaken and the impacts of this securitization process on the delivery of aid. It will go further to uncover the nature and impacts of the securitization process in humanitarian aid which will help outline some of the concerns stated in the literature that relates development and security. This research project is focused on a case study of the Darfur region which has seen violent conflict for over a decade.

To explore the securitization of humanitarian aid, this project dealt with a case study approach as the primary research strategy. This research approach allows for the examination of security challenges of some aid agencies in a specific context. The goal here was to deliver a detailed analysis of the context, processes and impact of the securitization of aid and link them with the theoretical issues presented in the theoretical frame work. This case study is descriptive and also partly explanatory. The analysis section explored the basic facts and concerns that motivate the securitization of humanitarian aid in general and goes down specifically to document the security concerns that confront aid workers in Darfur specifically. The case study is explanatory in the sense that it elaborates and expands the empirical basis of the theoretical explanations offered in this research. Specifically this research dealt with aid workers working in the Darfur area of Sudan to illuminate the securitization process amongst aid agencies and then placing these findings within the broader literature and debate on securitization of aid.

While generalization from this research findings will be limited to the Darfur case study, it may also provide additional evidence of the growing importance of security and insecurity as a continuing problematic factor in the delivery of humanitarian aid in conflict and post conflict environments.

**3.3 Humanitarian aid organizations in Darfur**

Some if the main agencies in Darfur namely international rescue committee, Goal, Concern worldwide, Norwegian refugee council, world Vision and Oxfam demanded all parties must urgently agree and maintain a cease fire with immediate effect. The different violent groups must ensure that aid agencies get access to people in need. The regional director of Oxfam Paul Smith stated that “If the deterioration is allowed to continue, the impact on civilians could be devastating. With new displacements and attacks, the presence of aid agencies is more important than ever. Yet every day brings one new blow after another to aid efforts”[[13]](#footnote-13). Surprisingly, there is little published research on the impact of individual and organizational security responses to humanitarian work despite the high rate of violent attacks. Exploring the impacts of security strategies on aid delivery is becoming increasingly relevant as aid agencies are progressively adopting various security strategies that focuses on “how to stay” as opposed to a “when to leave” approach to risk management.

 **3.4 Source**

This study will be based on analysis of secondary data including academic journals, books, articles, UN reports, newspapers, websites, reports, policy statement, information available from NGOs on internet and press release. Triangularization was used to check on the validity of the sources and I am aware of the fact that the material from Darfur is fragile and not completely true.

“Quantitative and qualitative research are not in opposition to one another. Rather, they can complement each other” (Thomas 2009: 83). A quantitative research is one that uses numbers while a qualitative research refers to that which does not use numbers. A qualitative research method was used to gather adequate, resourceful knowledge and facts about the thesis. Secondary data gotten by accessing literature information from already existing data was the possible source we could rely on due to time constrains and limitations. Due to limitations of traveling to Darfur to carry out a qualitative research or survey on the circumstances surrounding aid workers and the actual security problems they face while working on the field. I had no opportunity to volunteer with any NGO so as to be an eye witness on some of the security issues aid workers come across on a daily bases as they do their development and humanitarian works. This how ever did no act as a limitation to this project since the use of secondary data is equally important in any project work if it is used appropriately.

Data was not collected from a particular source but it was collected from as many sources as possible. Also literature was gathered from prominent writers such as Mark Duffield 2007 (development, security and unending war: governing the world of people) and 2010(liberal way of development and the development security impasse) and Mary Karldor 2006 (Old and new wars). Relevant material from school courses semester curriculum in Aalborg University has been helpful in the understanding of the circumstances surrounding the issue of securitization from different dimensions with a focus on aid workers and the NGOs.

**3.5 Why the case study**

The case study approach was used as the primary research strategy to explore the securitization of humanitarian aid. This research approach allows for the proper examination of a variety of main aid agencies and to provide detailed information on securitization of aid. The goal of this project is to analyze the challenges, processes and impact of the securitization of aid and link them to theoretical issues presented in the theoretical frame work.

The case study is primary descriptive and partly explanatory and the analysis explores the basic facts, concerns and settings that motivate the securitization of aid in general and specifically it documents the security concerns that confront aid agencies and their workers in Darfur specifically. The attitude and experiences of aid workers working in Darfur IDP camps was used to illustrate the securitization process amongst aid agencies in a particular context and then placing this findings within the broader literature, arguments and debates on securitization of humanitarian aid.

Generalizations from this research finding will be limited to the case study of Darfur but may also provide additional evidence of the growing importance and influence of security issues in the delivery of humanitarian aid especially in high risk area.

**3.6 Operationalization of the methodology and Analysis strategy**

Writing this thesis, the writer seeks to be constantly conscious of the fact that all the empirical data were written by authors with pre-assumptions and these are influenced by their time and space. The writers own pre-assumptions also are influential by time and space. In the analysis of this project, concepts and theories selected for this project were put into use. The case study was linked to the main principles of neutrality, and the analysis was supported with the theoretical frame work. Other sub theories and concepts such as security development nexus, R2P and cultural theory were made use of.

Humanitarian aid is been viewed in contemporary times as a way of propagating western cultures and values especially in areas that hold their cultural values at high esteem especially in Darfur.

**3.7 Challenges**

I applied to volunteer with the ICRC in September 2014, but unanticipated serious security concerns forced the dwindle trust to rescind their offer of a voluntary opportunity. This same period, the international rescue committee (IRC) and five other aid agencies expressed concerns that about half a million people were increasingly vulnerable after evacuation of more than 250 staff within ten days (www.rescue.org). My access to the aid compounds and Darfur area vanished along with volunteer ship.

Summarily, this project was in the field of international political economy and international relations and a quantitative research method was applied for the project.

 **Chapter four**

1. **Theory**

Security issues have been examined by a growing number of scholars and researchers in a variety of disciplines. This chapter provides an overview of that literature, with focus on the leading debates on culture and identity, R2P, emergency, human security, development and sovereignty. Focusing on development literature, this thesis discuss the dynamic process of the securitization of humanitarian aid and will explore the larger theoretical debates.

The development security nexus will be dealt with which refers to the interconnection between security and development issues. The development security nexus as a macro-level theoretical frame work, gives a clear explanation of increased humanitarian works since the end of the cold war. The securitization theory and other sub theories will be dealt with namely NGO scramble, the cultural theory. The concept of neutrality, impartiality and independence will be dealt with also.

**4.1 Theoretical frame work**

Debates centered on the politization of humanitarian aid and the effectiveness and practice of core principles of humanitarianism have surfaced and developed by the Red Cross. Developed as an extension of universal ethics, which stipulates that all humans have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in humanity. This core humanitarian principles being impartiality, independence, neutrality are based on the Geneva Convention with the goal being to create “humanitarian space” in conflict areas by separating humanitarian objectives from the politics of the conflict.

**4.2 Cultural theory**

The distinctiveness of nation states, societies and cultures is based upon a seemingly unproblematic division of space and also on the fact that they occupy “naturally” discontinuous spaces. “The premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies” (Gupta and Furgeson 1992: 6). For example, Malkki talks of the representation of our world as a collection of “states” as in most world maps, sees it as an inherently fragmented space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each rooted in a particular place (Ibid 1992).

Aid agencies have relied primarily on the acceptance based strategy as their primary security management strategy for more than a decade but evidence suggest however that this strategy has become ineffective (Childs 2013). This is due to an increase in the number of targeted attacks against aid workers over the past two decades. The cultural theory will be used to explain the limitations of this strategy including its challenges.

“An influential theory aimed at explaining risk perception is cultural theory, which was launched by Mary Douglas (1978)” (Oltedal Ed al 2004: 7). The cultural theory aims at explaining how people perceive and behave upon the world around them and this theory claims that it is largely determined by cultural adherence and social aspects (Ibid 2004: 17). “According to the anthropologist Mary Douglas, social units, or communities, exhibit shared worldviews that can be characterized by two variables termed ‘grip’ and ‘group’” (Child 2013: 66). The theory became widely accepted in the 1970s as a frame work for understanding risk perception. “The group itself is defined in terms of the claims it makes over its constituent members, the boundary it draws around them, the rights it confers on them to use its name and other protections, and the levies constraints it applies.” (Douglas 1978: 8). That is, it has to do with measurement of internal factors on the behavior of members (Child 2013). In high group situations, peer pressure is dominant in determining people’s behavior where as in low group societies, members may not even know each other. “The term grid suggests that cross-hatch of rules to which individuals are subject in course of their interaction. As a dimension, it shows a progressive change in the mode of control. At the strong end, there are visible rules about space and time related to social roles; at the other end, near zero, the formal classifications fade, and finally vanish. At the strong end of grid, individuals do not, as such freely transact with one another” (Douglas 1978: 8). That is to say grid refers to the measure of the external factors put on the members of a given community when determining an individual’s role, position and social standing (Child 2013). High grid societies have many rules based on classification such as gender, race, and club membership while low grid societies base their interaction more on people’s personal abilities. Taken together, the two factors result to four world views or ways of life namely individualism, fatalism, hierarchism and egalitarianism (Oltedal Ed al 2004: 18).

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  High FatalisticLow | Hierarchic High |
|   Individualistic Low  |  Egalitarian |

 Grid

Group

 Fig 1: Douglas grid-group model (Oltedal 2004)

An example of an individualistic society is the world street, fatalism is an ordinary North Korean citizen, Hierarchic society is the military and egalitarian society includes secret cults. The cultural theory will be used to explain and understand the risk level of NGO workers on the field. An example is the provision of assistance in the form of food and medicine to two individuals, one from an individualistic and the other from an egalitarian society. Acceptance will be high form the individual benefiting from the humanitarian organization and his immediate family and not furthermore. With the egalitarian individual, there will be high acceptance from the members of the social group to which the beneficiary belongs but very little acceptance outside the group. The size of the social group here is larger than the immediate family. Fatalistic societies believe that the world doesn't care about them. They believe that the assistance was provided to them for some reasons know to the NGOs and not because of any real concerns about their difficulties. They are usually change resistant both internally and externally. Egalitarian societies includes extremist and terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab , Taliban, Al-Qaida and violent groups in the Darfur region and their attacks on aid agencies could be deliberate and carefully planned. However attacks could also be accidental or the work of overzealous individuals and as such, the likelihood of attacks from this group could be hard to predict. Aid agencies registered greater successes in dialoging with terrorist with some few failed cases. If accepted by these terrorist groups, aid agencies can expect a greater level of protection from them whether they desire it or not. This research will make use of egalitarianism to explain how NGOs have been trying to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the dangerous insurgencies they come across in Darfur

**4.3 Securitization theory**

Securitization as a concept originated from the works of a Danish professor Ole Wæver in 1995 who is a member of the Copenhagen school which is part of the constructivist perspective in social science. It holds that nothing exist in hardened, material reality, but only exist as social constructs in people’s minds who in some way agree to act as if something existed. Wæver defined security as a speech act and went ahead to explain securitization as a form of linguistic representation that positions an issue as an existential thread (McDonald 2008).

**4.3.1 Traditional security studies (TSS)**

Traditional security studies was based on the assumption that “the referent object is the state: security refers to protecting the state from external threats, and the people living within the territory of the state are considered secure to the degree that the state is secure” (Mutimer 2007, pp 88). TSS belongs to a state centric tradition, in which security is being analyzed through the balance of power polarities (Busan et al., 2003). That is states prioritize their own survival (realism) and failing to do so will jeopardize their existence (Betts 2009: 61). Self-interest and the prioritization of state survival creates a balance of power and an absence of conflict, which is also a priority to citizens (Betts 2009). The main threat to states is the military capacity of other states and international order is not achieved through international cooperation, but through balance of power, established through the pursuit of the military capabilities of each state (Ibid, 2009). In a nut shell, the state is viewed as the referent object, the object in connection to which threats are analyzed and security is obtained through military capabilities.

**4.3.2 Critical security studies (CSS)**

CSS developed out of a conference in 1991 during which scholars and academics criticized TSS assumption that states are the only possible referent objects, as this assumption ignores and leaves out other scenarios (Mutimer, 2007). The CSS scholars introduced individuals and communities as referent objects and went further to consider other threats than military threats (Ibid 2007). Other sub-approaches such as the Copenhagen school approach of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have developed from CSS.

After the cold war, there was a general move to broaden the security agenda with one approach being the move from a strict focus on the security of the state (national security) towards a broader or alternative focus on security of people(Lipschutz 2010: 1). The security of people can be affected in numerous ways namely, cultural identity, environmental concerns and political rights (Ibid 2010). The major problem with such an approach is deciding on how to get a clear sense of the specific nature of security issues, as distant from other problems that beset the human condition.

A second approach which is also opposed is that of Ole Wæver which I argue that such criticisms fundamentally misconceives the analytical goal of the securitization theory which is mainly to offer a tool for practical security. The main argument of the securitization theory of Ole Wæver is that security is a speech act that solely by uttering security, something is being done (Taureck 2006: 3). Therefore, it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes a security threat. By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extra ordinary measures to make sure that the referent object survives (Ibid 2006: 3). The logic of securitization here is based on the argument that if humanitarian organizations are not adequately protected, they will be unable to provide the relief needed by victims of humanitarian crises (Vaughn 2009). These security incidents turn to have negative consequences on organizations ability to assist victims of humanitarian crises as the attacks result to suspension of programs, closures and even complete withdrawal (Ibid 2009). Therefore the loss of one life i.e. the aid worker results to the potential loss of thousands of other people (refugees and IDPs) whom food and medical care can no longer reach them. This link that that exist between the risk faced by aid agencies and their workers and threat to substantial loss of life of affected persons is the base line to the process of securitizing humanitarian aid delivery. The securitization process has also been motivated by situations of theft in ware houses where aid stock piles are kept and also international compounds have been targeted by arm groups to steal food, cars, medicine and other valuable stuff. Francis Stewart argues that grievances as a result of horizontal inequalities (i.e. economic, political, and social dimensions or cultural status) between culturally different groups are a potential of civil wars and rebellion (keen 2012). As a result of economic inequalities, many violent groups in Darfur are attracted to the wealth and riches of aid workers who carry expensive watches, heavy and expensive cars and also cash along with them. This results to situations of violence, theft and kidnapping of aid workers. All these including violent attacks on aid workers have prompted the securitization of aid at the operational level involving the shift from humanitarian principle of neutrality and impartiality to include other securitization strategies namely deterrence. This concept of securitization of aid will help in exploring the ways NGOs in Darfur have been responding to security threats by making use of the security triangle

Another approach to security is that of Johan Galtung and Jan Oberg based on four sets of positive goals related to needs of humans namely survival, freedom, development and identity. Here every individual has various needs and can he hurt by threats to these needs and this makes everything a potential security problem (Ibid 2010: 2). Widening the referent object axis i.e. security is not only at the level of military defense of the state, but it is also X, Y, and Z (Ibid 2010). The major criticism of this approach is that it has the effect of expanding the security realm endlessly until it encompasses the whole political and social agenda. This approach falls in line with the definition of human security as the freedom from fear and wants. For example, to reinforce the notion of poverty as a serious security threat, Thomas 2001 compared the over thirty million people killed during the first and second world wars to the fifteen million who die yearly from hunger related causes (Thomas 2001, pp 163). That is to say in two years, the number of people killed by hunger is equivalent to eleven years of world war (Ibid 2001, pp 164) indicating divergent security threats. The human security paradigm, which articulates these divergent threats as freedom from wants and freedom from fear has come to represent this widened security agenda (Rudolf 2013: 16). Freedom form wants refers to threats posed by structural violence while freedom from fear describes the threats of human violence (Ibid pp 164). A critical look into the trajectory of the human security paradigm after the cold war provides us with a valuable insight into the interconnection between human security and development. From the discussion above, it follows that a major interest on security studies should be the process of securitization and de-securitization. When, who and why people label developments and issues as security threats. It also involves when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are made by other groups (international community) to put securitization on the agenda; whether we are able to point to efforts to keep issues off the security agenda or even de-securitize issues that have become securitized (Lipschutz 2010: 8)

**4.4 Security-development nexus-impasse**

“Since the end of the cold war, it has become common –place to assert that security and development are interlinked, interdependent and mutually reinforcing” (Hurwitz and Peake 2004, pp 1). Long term development is regarded as hinging upon security, and lasting security on the other hand depends on sustainable development. Consequently, programming in what traditionally were considered as two discrete sectors is increasingly meshing. Institutions conventionally associated with security are becoming more interested and involved in the development sphere and vice versa (Ibid 2004). Bilateral and multilateral donors have also integrated security and development considerations in respond to intra-state conflicts. The recent emphasis on the need to address the structural as well as the operational causes of violent conflicts has propelled development policies to the forefront of the conflict prevention agenda. The added value of coining security and development at the implementing level has been less than clear. For example two main tools in the conflict management arsenal; early warning reports and conflict assessment frame work still suffer from serious methodological flaws and appears to be of little use when a quick respond to a crisis is required. Based the logic that war is far more costly to contain than peace, conflict prevention will remain one of the top priority of the international community, requiring further research on different ways to ensure effective partnership between security and development actors.

Following the global flurry of what kaldor 2007 calls new wars and also new conflicts in the post-cold war era, a lot of research has been done on the causes of violent conflict in the global system (Amer et al 2012: 1). With the unstable and violent African development context and the relatively sustainable peace followed by very successful development in Asia, reflections of the relationship between security and development became too relevant. Security and development are inter related and development was viewed by many scholars and researchers as a tool to promote regional as well as international security (Duffield 2010). The former UN secretary general Kofi Annan in 2004 made mention of the notion that even people in reach countries will be more secured if their government continue to help poor countries to defeat poverty by meeting the millennium development goals (Stern and Ojendal 2012: 13). It is also believed that if aid is directed and used effectively, divided communities can be brought together. This caused many NGOs in the nineties to engage in a method of donor-endorsed shift towards using aid as a civilian tool for conflict resolution (Duffield 2010). This has resulted in many nonprofit making organizations adapting their aid programs by adding a conflict resolution component so as to attract more donor funding (Ibid 2010).

 This concept of security development nexus will be used to bring out the dilemma which NGOs face as argued by David keen 2009 that economic sanctions has a great role to play in conflict resolution and the prevention of further conflict but this short term initiatives are unlikely to tackle the deep-rooted causes of armed conflicts. “the current bunkering of the aid industry and increasing risk aversion on the part of the aid workers, however, are more indicative of a deepening development security impasse rather than a new beginning” (Duffield 2010: 54). Furthermore, many NGOs have lost their apolitical stance in conflict zone as aid agencies find themselves having to work more directly and in an integrated way with donor governments than in the past since they have one and the same aim of peace and stability (Duffield, 2010).

**4.5 Neutrality, impartiality and Independence**.

“Humanitarian aid should be non-political” (Seybolt 1996: 521). That was the code of conduct adopted in 1995 by the International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other NGOs. The principle of neutral deals with aid agencies maintaining their apolitical stance while doing their work in conflict and post conflict zones. It also has to do with the rights of very human being to liberty and independent of nationality, creed or race. It is very important to note that, when humanitarian agencies are seen as neutral, these organizations will find it easier to relief and food supplies to those in need without having to rely on military protection, something all aid agencies are loathe to do (Seybolt 1996: 521).

The idea of NGO neutrality stems from the historical understanding of humanitarian emergencies as being caused by natural disasters. In the case of complex emergencies such as civil wars, it become more challenging to maintain this neutrality (Ibid 1996: 521). It is different from earth quakes, typhoons, floods as they are often intentionally created violent situation where we have at least two conflicting sides existing. Any significant action on the ground by a third party (outsider) will probably affect the outcome even if it is humanitarian. Therefore, despite the desire for neutrality by NGOs, it is virtually impossible to have a neutral effect in a conflict situation (Lischer 2005). With the changing nature of war fares being mostly intra state, where achieving political objectives relies on raping, killing, torturing, such as in Darfur, aid agencies try to stop these and in so doing, get themselves involved in the politics of the problem. Integrated missions have been set up bringing humanitarian and development actor together with military and political actors under same unitary command (Duffield 2012). This has resulted to NGOs losing their neutrality and being involved in conflicts. It is very important for humanitarian organizations to recognize the political consequences of their actions in order to help them avoid losing their neutrality. Some scholars have criticized the principle of neutrality as not applicable in complex emergencies as active involvement in complex emergencies cannot be strategically neutral. Other scholars have documented the possibility of humanitarian activities to prolong or even escalate violent conflicts (Lischer 2005). An example treatment of wounded fighters who get well and pick up their guns to go continue fighting there by prolonging the war. Lischer make an argument that aid agencies in an attempt not to contribute to the spread of conflict cannot approach their work in isolation from the military and political context surrounding it (Lischer 2005). The humanitarian, political and military situations all become significantly affected by what outsider will do in the name of ‘humanity’ (Seybolt 1996). To be neutral means not to favor either side and not to care who wins or loses, therefore the only neutral party in complex emergencies are those who don't get involved. This is what is referred by scholars as the myth of neutrality.

“To be impartial means not to favor any side a priori, but to favor a set of principles” (Seybolt 96: 522). An impartial player is like a judge, and how the disputing parties behave determined her behavior towards them. He doesn't care about the winning side in a conflict except that it should be the party that honors humanitarian principles more closely (Ibid 2010). A human rights organization that monitors and reports all violations of human rights laws are acting impartially. Aid agencies active in complex emergences need to maintain their impartiality as their action will affect the conflicts outcome, they should act according to standards benefiting the civilian population. “Finally, the principle of independence represents the need for humanitarian organizations to maintain their autonomy and not be subject to government control, so as to uphold the fundamental principles of neutrality and impartiality”(Eckroth 2010: 91).

Other writers such as Eckroth argue that humanitarian principles namely independence, neutrality and impartiality provide protection and are pivotal for the securitization of humanitarian aid (Eckroth, 2010). She goes further to point out that these principles do not protect against all threats and there is always the need to be supplemented with other strategies such as bunkarization, security training and armed guards. This concept of impartiality and neutrality will be used to analyze the arguments that NGOs in Darfur are losing their apolitical stance as they get involved into the war and as a result become deliberate targets.

**4.6 Theoretical shortcomings**

The securitization theory has been criticized for adding to the process of securitization itself, as scholars and researches are reaffirming and reiterating the speech act which securitizes people (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Academic material dealing with securitization theory are not readily separable from the speech act itself and thus potentially fuel the speech act and give priority to the elites by referring to their securitizing moves (Ibid 2010). The theory has further been criticized for focusing on elite discourse which has the risk of ignoring physical actions, which also potentially endanger and threaten referent objects thereby ignoring situations where speech act does not occur (Ibid 2010). The focus on speech act also removes the possibility for non-elite actors to make their voice heard against a threat as actors with low social positions do not have the ability to securitize. This theory has also been criticized of being Eurocentric in its arguments and devoting too much meaning to identity. It is argued by some scholars that in states with low levels of democracy and ethnically homogenous parts of the world than Europe, a securitization process would be less relevant. This is because dictators for example are not always ready to wait for the acceptance of the audience before imposing extraordinary measures. The intense focus on identity might result in too much distinction between the “us” and “them” and this distinction might potentially fuel ethnic conflict, violence, racism and xenophobia (Ibid 2010).

Summarily, the logic behind securitization of humanitarian aid is based on the notion that if aid agencies are not adequately protected, they will not be able to provide the relief needed by needy people. The cultural theory will be used to understand the risk and acceptance level of NGOs working in fragile zones. The notion of neutrality and impartiality were dealt with (humanitarian agencies maintaining apolitical stance in delivery of aid). The security-development nexus which bring out the relationship between security and development were dealt with and further went to deal with the security-development impasse (i.e. the nexus not working)

 **Chapter 5**

1. **Analysis**

The human suffering caused by the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region has resulted to an unprecedented humanitarian initiative and potentially the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. However, the working conditions of aid workers here have not been unproblematic, with many aid workers have been attacked and several have been killed. “Traditionally, humanitarian agencies have located security and protection in the principles of humanitarian action, such as neutrality, impartiality and independence” (Eckroth 2010: 87). This principles, meant to guide the conduct of aid agencies have their roots in the emergence of the humanitarian system and has served to provide relief agencies a safe passage and safe haven in conflict areas to do their job. However, voices have argued that the aftermath of the cold war and even more so the post 9/11 period has complicated the work of aid agencies more ambiguous and political (Ibid, 2010). This has in turn reduced the ability of aid agencies to protect themselves behind the principles of humanitarian action and resulting to them continuing to face violent attacks in conflict and post conflict areas.

This project argue that impartiality, neutrality and independence are the main elements for aid agency’s security in Darfur, however such principles are not enough to provide adequate protection. They need to be supplemented by other measures such as protective walls (Bunkers), armed guards and security equipment. The Dilemma with this supplement is that it helps to distant the aid agencies from the local population

**5.1 A focus on the deep causes of insecurity on aid agencies**

Security has long been an issue for aid agencies and their workers and many of them have died or disappeared in the line of duty long before the appearance of security manual (Fast 2010: 12). In the wake of complex emergencies in the early 90s, critics charged that the provision of humanitarian aid served as a substitute for decisive political actions in response to complex emergencies. In some cases it has turned to prolong the war (Duffield 1997). New forms of military humanitarianism has been surfacing with new UN policies of peace making, peacekeeping and peace building strategies resulting to increase deployment of UN military forces in complex emergencies. The so-called integrated missions have become a favored response in complex emergencies that concurrently calls on military, humanitarian, political development actors of UN system (Eckroth 2010: 93). Mark Duffield, a high profile proponent of this perspective, articulated the dangers of this approach. “He argued that a fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity and international instability has created a new humanitarianism that has invested development tools and initiatives with ameliorative, harmonizing and transformational powers that, it is hoped, will reduce violent conflict and prevent its recurrence” (Fast 2012: 13). Although there is no universal agreement of what constitutes an integrated mission, it has as aim to restore stability, law and order, protect civilians, development and democratic governance. Such goals are not easily reconciled with the principles of humanitarianism and have caused part of the aid community to raise concerns about the infiltration of impartiality, neutrality and independence (Ibid 2010). The aid community argues that given the political leadership of these integrated missions, such operations have inevitably ended up prioritizing the political goals of the mission, even when this contrasts humanitarian core principle of saving lives. “The resulting ‘politicization’ of aid produced a series of mutually reinforcing factors and challenges to humanitarian action, including the loss of neutrality and impartiality, merged mandates, the association of NGO operations with military intervention, the privatization of assistance, and the proliferation of NGOs providing humanitarian assistance” (Fast 2010: 13). Other scholars argue that working side-by-side with military and political factions of these missions, aid agencies run the risk of being identified with the non-neutral groups. This has resulted to aid agencies and their personnel’s being identified as ‘soft targets’ for enemies of the mission. Therefore the deployment of UN peacekeepers to protect aid workers often cause a blurring of the lines between security and humanitarian segments of the mission with aid agencies losing their perceived independence and neutrality (Eckroth 2010: 94).

When researching the micro dynamics of one specific case, in this instance Darfur, political decisions, misunderstanding, and cultural differences all affect the security situation on the ground with banditry being the main security concern for humanitarian staff today. This is reflected by the arrest warrant issued for President al-Bashir in March 2009 by the International Criminal Court (ICC) which deteriorated the security situation of aid agencies in Sudan as a whole (Ibid 2010). On March 4 and 5 2009, the national congress of Sudan expelled thirteen of the world’s most renounce aid agencies from the Darfur region (Reeves 2009), namely the international Red Cross (IRC), CARE, Oxfam and medicine without borders (MSF), Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee, Action contre la Faim, Solidarites and CHF international[[14]](#footnote-14). Police and officials from the state humanitarian aid congress moved in to the affected organizations offices in Khartoum and Darfur, confiscating mobile phones and laptops, and even escorting staff to banks to verify their account numbers[[15]](#footnote-15). “Humanitarian actors, unable to effectively shake the ‘Western-ness’ that characterizes so much of the aid enterprise, have become proxy targets of choice for those seeking to strike at the western powers or to sow fear and instability in order to advance their agenda” (Stoddard and Harmer 2010: 3)

There were about 76 international NGOs operating in Sudan during that period but the above mentioned organizations did the lion share of the job according to UN officials. About 4.7 million people at that time relied on food, medical or water aid in Darfur including 2.7 million people who were displaced then by fighting. Two local organizations, the Khartoum Amal Center for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Violence and the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Environmental Development were expelled after evidence showed their cooperation with the ICC through a number of memorandums of understanding between them. These local NGOs according to the government of Sudan loosed their apolitical stance by cooperating with a political organization. The government based on the securitization theory (speech act) saw these organizations as a threat to its security and responded by expelling them. Before the expulsion, the humanitarian operation in Darfur was the largest in the world with more than 16000 aid workers in the region according to the UN-OCHA 2009. This large operation has been warranted by state failure (weak capacity of the government to address the crises) and also because the government has limited access to much of Darfur. Based on the securitization theory of Ole Wæver, security is a speech act that solely by uttering security, something is being done. Therefore, it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes a security threat. By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extra ordinary measures to make sure that the referent object survives. President al-Bashir accused the humanitarian organizations of activities that act in contradiction to all regulations and laws[[16]](#footnote-16). The expelled organizations were accused of passing evidence to the ICC and also made false accusations of genocide and rape. The aid agencies were accused of taking humanitarian aid as a cover to achieve political agendas that affects the security of Sudan and its stability. These aid agencies were believed by president al-Bashir to have connections with the ICC and therefore posed a security threat to him and his comrades. Based on securitization theory of the Copenhagen school, it argues that if humanitarian organizations are not adequately protected, they will be unable to provide the relief needed by victims of humanitarian crises (Vaughn 2009). These security incidents turn to have negative consequences on organizations ability to assist victims of humanitarian crises as the attacks result to suspension of programs, closures and even complete withdrawal (Ibid 2009). Therefore the loss of one life i.e. the aid worker results to the potential loss of thousands of other people (refugees and IDPs) whom food and medical care can no longer reach them. In the Darfur area, the suspension of thirteen aid agencies. The European commission called on Sudan to reverse the expulsion orders immediately. John Clancy the EC’s spokesperson for humanitarian aid at that time said “Let’s be very clear, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people are at stake”. We see the role of the speech act of Ole Wæver’s securitization theory coming into play by naming the expulsion a security threat to thousands of lives. All sections of Darfur were affected by the expulsion of aid agencies from Sudan including food distribution, water and sanitation, food security, health, shelter and protection. The most affected areas were water supply and health care which almost all the organizations expelled were involved in providing. IT had an effect on supply in large IDP camps such as Kalma and Kass in southern Darfur, Abou shook in the north and Zalingei camp in west Darfur. Estimates vary but the shutdown and expulsion of these aid agencies reduces the overall humanitarian capacity in Darfur by fifty percent (Reevers 2009). A report to the UN Security Council by a senior UN official (Rashid Khalikov) stressed that they had observed significant signs of an erosion of humanitarian response capacity with a concurrent impact on the lives of people in Darfur as a result of the expulsion of 13 international and 3 domestic NGOs (Ibid 2009). With shortages in water supply, people were forced to turn to other water sources with increased risk of water-borne diseases such as diarrhea and cholera. Diseases also spread rapidly when people are living in overcrowded camps and on just basic needs. The situation was particularly critical in Kalma camp where sixty three thousand IDPs resided and depended on Oxfam (one of the expellees) for water supply.

Therefore the loss of one life i.e. the aid worker results in the potential loss of thousands of other people (refugees and IDPs) whom food and medical care can no longer reach them. This link that exist between the risk faced by aid agencies and their workers and threat to substantial loss of life of affected persons is the bottom line to the process of securitizing humanitarian aid delivery. On the other hand the government of Sudan is concerned about securitization of humanitarian aid by blocking the delivery of these aid to areas that are believed to be supplying fighters against it. Both aid agencies and the state are concerned about securitization of humanitarian aid with different interests.

Security is not static, changes constantly and rapidly, and consequently there can never be any guarantees that security incidents will not occur in a conflict context. The security situation in Darfur has changed dramatically over time and continue to change this day with banditry being the main security concern in Darfur today (Eckroth 2010: 94). Statistics of aid workers in Darfur in 2008 revealed that up to 277 humanitarian vehicles were carjacked, there were 192 armed assaults (break inns) on humanitarian premises, 218 humanitarian personnel were temporarily kidnapped in relation to the carjacking with 11 people killed (Eckroth 2010: 94-95). According to an OCHA humanitarian official stationed in Darfur, the area can be seen as one of the worst environment in the world in terms of the security of humanitarian activities because of banditry of assets. The target for attacks has always been assets such as communication equipment or vehicles for the purpose of financial gains with most of the killing of aid workers happening during such carjacking. Francis Stewart argues that grievances as a result of horizontal inequalities (i.e. economic, political, and social dimensions or cultural status) between culturally different groups are a potential of civil wars and rebellion (keen 2012). As a result of economic inequalities, many violent groups in Darfur are attracted to the wealth and riches of aid workers who carry expensive watches, heavy and expensive cars and also cash along with them. This results to situations of violence, theft and kidnapping of aid workers. The humanitarian community in Darfur remains under intense pressure with continuing violence and rising numbers of attacks on aid convoys. According to UNICEF-Sudan, and hijacking and theft of a UNICEF supported drilling rig and equipment in North Darfur in March 2008 exposed 180000 people to risk of impure water that year[[17]](#footnote-17). With the regular theft on aid agencies, they find it hard to guarantee sustained quality programs on the ground, and resorted to using ‘windows of opportunity’. That is using helicopter missions to visit areas which are inaccessible by road to deliver what they can as quickly as possible. This affects the quality of their service negatively. A new trend evolved in 2009 which was not seen before in Darfur which as kidnapping of aid workers for the sake of abduction itself (Ecrkoth 2010: 95). Such actions are believed by many aid agencies to be a direct result of negative propaganda of aid agencies by the state media of Sudan which took place after the arrest warrant issued to president al-Bashir. Based on the cultural theory, using Douglas grid-group model, we see that an ordinary Darfurian citizen is of the high grip and fatalistic society. Such publications by the media greatly affected the perceived neutrality of aid agencies as they were perceived as part of the west. This had a negative consequence on their security.

It is vital for aid agencies and their workers to stay flexible in terms of security, in order to adapt to new risks and be able to react to them. Without doing so, aid agencies and their staff may be ill prepared when new situations occur, thus making the security situation worse than what it could have been. The program coordinator for the Norwegian refugee council for Sudan and Somalia Adam Combs explain:

“Security situations vary from place to place. In Somalia, for instance, the security situation is very different for humanitarian workers compared to Darfur. Although they are both incredibly different, in Somalia aid personnel are targeted and international staff is at greater risk of being kidnapped. Thus, different strategies are applied here than in Darfur. It is extremely important to understand the context you are working in, which changes daily and can change quickly. Non-understanding of the conflict in which you are working is the biggest threat to security” (Eckroth 2010: 96).

**5.2 Difference between national and international staff**

The number of humanitarian workers killed, kidnapped or injured has risen to unprecedented levels in recent years and majority of these fatalities and kidnaped victims are nationals of the country in crises. This therefore indicates that exposure to violence has shifted from expatriates to national staff members. “International staff: an employee or consultant to an international aid agency (UN, Red Cross or INGO) working in a country in crisis who is not a citizen of the host country” (Wille and Fast 2013: 5). “National staff: an employee of an international aid agency (UN, Red Cross or INGO) who is locally employed or a citizen of the host country” (Wille and Fast 2013: 5). Within the humanitarian community, risk transfer refers to shifting physical security risk between international agencies and from international actors to national actors. In Darfur, the majority of security incidents involving aid workers have affected national personnel rather than internationals. This is because many aid agencies have increased the number of national staff while reducing the number of international staff working in fragile areas. Norwegian Church Aid for instance has 7 expatriates compared to 250 national staff in the region (Eckroth 2010: 101). This of course increase the probability of attacks on national staff. Second, the conflict in Darfur is to a certain extend characterized as an ethic conflict between different tribal groups. As all national staff are of a tribe, based on the cultural theory and acceptance, they are in some ways partly involved in the conflict and may be seen as biased. International staff are not part of a tribe in Sudan and are therefore seen as more neutral in relation to the conflict in Darfur (Ibid 2010: 101). Finally, it is widely held that the repercussions for the attackers if an international staff is wounded or killed than if the same happened to a national, so attacks are higher on the national staff.

Even though national staff represent the group of humanitarian workers who have suffered the most from security incidents like killing, rapes they still are an important asset to humanitarian operations in terms of security. First, they have access to vital security information that would not have been given to international staff such as crossfire between tribes along the route chosen for a humanitarian convoy. Second, they know they are well and are more acquainted with the political dynamics on the ground which might not be obvious to an outsider. Finally they are able to move freely in some context than international staff. Darfur being a landscape of fragmented groups which are often in conflict with each other, the recruitment of national staff from various tribes is important for neutrality and impartiality. This helps aid agencies avoid situations where aid agencies are perceived as taking sides or as spies, which is what happened to Save the Children UK in working in Darfur (Eckroth 2010: 101-102).

**5.3 Dilemma of the securitization process in Darfur**

The security context has continued to change during the course of the violence in Darfur which possess a serious challenge to aid agencies. In the early stages, it was easier to identify the different parties involved in the conflict making it easier to get into negotiations (acceptance strategy) and also easier to predict levels of security (Eckroth 2010: 96). In recent years, the groupings have been increasingly fragmented thus making it extremely difficult to identify the different groups and predict what motives they have. In addition, the map of those areas considered as perilous in terms of security has varied greatly in Darfur. The cultural theory which is used to determine risk level was effective up till 2005 as it was easier to pinpoint on the map where incidents had occurred and were likely to occur in the future.

When analyzing the deep causes on the conflict in Darfur, there are mostly external to or beyond the control of individual humanitarian actors making aid agencies to appear as passive actors in the face of the changing nature of conflict. “Humanitarian actors may protest the blurring of the boundaries between military and civilian humanitarian activities, but they cannot, by themselves, command changes from donors and military actors” (Fast 2010: 16). They can advocate for example military personals wear uniforms but have no enforcement power to this issue.

In the “we shall overcome” category used to respond to the myth of neutrality is the concept of “humanitarian space” (Seybolt 1996: 525). Humanitarian spaces allow humanitarian organizations to operate in conflict zones without a high food loss rate, without overtly taking sides in the conflict and most importantly without being targeted for violence (Ibid 1996). In Darfur the absence of humanitarian space in some localities in Darfur resulted to aid partiality, which is helping one side more than the other. In January 2015, the Brussels-based section of MSF announced it could no longer reach communities in the greatest need and happened when a Sudanese Air Force fighter jet targeted and bombed a hospital run by MSF in South Kordofan state. MSF has been consistently denied access to the Blue Nile state in Darfur where conflict erupted in 2011 between government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North group (SPLA-N). The Sudanese government has a strategy to shut off access to area believed to be against the government and also supplying fighters for opposition group. The absence of humanitarian space in this locality and many other anti-government area causes aid agencies to end up giving aid mostly to areas in support of the government causing them to lose their impartiality[[18]](#footnote-18).

Many areas in Darfur are not served by the world food program (WFP) air service especially in areas where there are ongoing conflict. The delivery of aid in this areas are only possible by road under proper guard to respond to attacks from armed group. On the other hand, using a military escort exposes humanitarian teams to a double risk: that of being wounded if there is a skirmish or of sharing the responsibility for the deaths of civilians or soldiers if the escort uses its weapons (Weissman 2008: 14). By sharing the responsibility for one or more killings, aid agencies risk being seen as a part to the conflict. This dilemma has caused UN aid agencies to deny escorts by international troops they had used in 2005 and later realized the danger to which they were exposing themselves (Ibid 2008). Other NGOs have continued to use arm guards on a limited bases.

Protection which is a common strategy applied by most agencies (i.e. Living in high fences and barbed wired compound’s) to respond to security threats in conflict area but this strategy can often countermand acceptance (Child 2013: 65). For example a five meter barrier to establish and maintain cordial relations with the surrounding local communities.

**5.4 The security triangle: protection, acceptance and deterrence**

The security triangle was developed by a group of individual within the humanitarian community in response to new threats and security amongst aid workers in risky zones. The strategies of the security triangle do not necessarily conflict with independence, neutrality and impartiality but can be used to a certain extend to reinforce and inform about the principles of humanitarianism.

 **Acceptance: Reduces threats by**

 **gaining acceptance of your work**

**Protection: reduces the risk, but**  **Deterrence: Reduces the risk containing**

**not the threat by reducing vulnerability the threat with a counter-threat**.

**Source: Paul D 2014**

The traditional model of ‘security triangle’ was put forward by Koenraad Van Brabant and states that there are three routes to security namely acceptance, protection and deterrence (Paul 2014).this can be seen in the diagram above.

**5.4.1** **Protection**

The main security equipment used by aid agencies in Darfur are protected walls and gates (Bunkarization), communication equipment, barbed wire, bomb shelters and safe rooms (Eckroth 2010: 109). Which physical protection measure was employed depended on the local environment and varied from day to day basis, even though communication equipment has always been used by all humanitarian teams. If a humanitarian team travels out of their base to an insure area, they are often ordered to report to base every thirty minutes for security reasons. If they do not report back, measures are set in motion to find out what has happened and to trace their location. Bunkarization is used to shield humanitarian workers from criminals, bombs and bullets. Many Ngo workers believe that this is not an effective security strategy as it does not confront the threat which is behind the security incidents. Security training is very important for aid agency workers especially practical security trainings following different country specific problems (Child 2013). It is important for aid agencies to provide security training outside the conflict area so that trainees can better digest what they have learned. Most importantly it helps aid workers to decide if they would want to undertake such risky international assignment and if they are able to handle tense security situations. In Darfur, due to time constrains, sometimes aid workers are sent to the field without any training. Instead, aid agencies seem to base the security knowledge of their workers more on experience rather than training (Eckroth 2010: 110). Instead, many aid agencies seemed to base the security knowledge of their staff on experience rather than training with experienced staff taking the responsibility to guide and look after their new colleagues. The only organization according to Eckroth that seemed to have sufficient training system for it workers before being sent to the field is the ICRC with the newly recruited undergoing a nineteen hours of generic theory of working in the field (Eckroth 2010: 111). At the end of this course the trainee attends an exam and participate in a second course (focused on preparing and performing international humanitarian work) upon passing the exam. There is finally a theoretical and a practical segment in which trainees participate in simulation exercises of ambushes, carjacking just to name a few. The ICRC has strict security rules and specific guide lines for its staff partly in order uphold organizations neutrality and for protection (Ibid 2010). If workers in the field break any of the rules and regulations, they are sent back home with no questioning. UN humanitarian staff have three different security segments which they need to accomplish before departing to Darfur. There are two online training programs called ‘basic security in the field’ and, advance security in the field’ which they need to pass. It is followed by two days of practical training which is similar to that of the ICRC (Ibid 2010: 111).

**5.4.2 Acceptance**

“While the concept of acceptance-cultivating good relations with local actors and communities-has long been the cornerstone of the humanitarian security approach, many agencies in the present have made the mistake of assuming acceptance without being proactive about it” (Stoddard and Harmer 2010: 3). Many aid agencies still agree acceptance is still the main strategy used by humanitarian organizations to ensure their security. This involves creating acceptance by the local communities to ensure security through impartiality, independence and neutrality. For aid agencies, the greatest advantage of acceptance is in reducing the likelihood of targeted attacks by reducing the desire by others to harm them (Child 2013: 65). Constant communication with the local population is a vital security measure and access is usually negotiated through this dialogue (Eckroth 2010: 107). In order to maintain impartiality, neutrality and independence, it is important for aid agencies to communicate with all main groups in an area. In the case of Darfur, this entails dialogue with the police, Arab militia, different rebel groups, and local authorities not leaving out the local population (Ibid 2010: 107). The aid agencies in order to gain acceptance and access often inform the different groups about the principle of humanitarian action, what sort of aid the organization will provide, who they are , where they work and why they are there. In recent years, a few of the large and financially independent NGOs such as the ICRC and others have made significant efforts to pursue an active acceptance approach and it involves spending a considerable amount of resources and time investing in the promotion of their mandate and adhering to the humanitarian principles(Stoddard and Harmer 2010: 3). What level of acceptance is generated depends on three factors; the quantity and quality of the aid provider (and secondary benefits such as business or employment), the social distance between the potential attacker and the persons benefiting from the aid and the degree to which a potential attackers value the aid (Child 2013: 65). Many organizations still face challenges with the acceptance strategy mainly UN agencies who are identified as political actors despite their humanitarian role hence making it difficult for them to cultivate acceptance as independent humanitarian actors. For many other NGOs, it is difficult to justify the cost of an active acceptance approach most especially to donors as it requires a long term investment. In North Darfur, the ICRC was more successful than the OCHA in maintaining dialogue with the Arab militia. This is because the government always tried to block the OCHA as they suspected them to be relaying information to the ICC (Eckroth 2010: 108). To get acceptance, a close proximity to the local population is important since the closer one is to the locals at risk, the better place one is to analyze events and formulate strategies to respond to them (Ibid 2010: 108). Walking on the streets and talking with people means that aid agency employees are approachable and may debunk possible beliefs they are spies from the west or have alternative motives (such as propagating western cultures). Staying close to the local population on the other hand may have negative effects, for example the expulsion of thirteen international aid agencies from Darfur could be caused by this idea of staying close to the locals.

**5.4.3 Deterrence**

Aid agencies in Darfur do not employ armed guards for deterrence and protection. Rather, they use unarmed guards that are more like watchmen by definition. This guards look after agencies compounds all round the clock, making sure criminal and unwanted people do not get into the building. The guards are briefed in case of attacks and armed robbery not to stand in the attacker’s way and to release to them what they want as there is no need to shoot back when object and equipment and not humans are the target of the attack. We see that armed guards in Darfur are mostly used for protection not deterrence. Because movement between locations is characterized as the most dangerous circumstance in Darfur, some agencies have utilized armed guards and armed escorts usually performed by UNAMID or by guards recruited from private security companies (Eckroth 2010: 113). NGOs such as ICRC and MSF would never use this Escorts. It is important that deterrence measures are not seen as a provocation as it could escalate violence, and the very presence of guns can in some cases deteriorate the security situation. When humanitarian escorts and violent groups have guns, tension could increase and result to potential deadly situations. This happened in south Darfur when one of the managers of Italian Corporation visited a humanitarian project and travelled with his own armed body guards. Stopping at a check point, tension increased and the body guard began shooting at some of the soldiers (Ibid 2010: 114).it is important to note that such incidences are quite rear in Darfur.

**5.5 Issues of humanitarian access**

In Darfur, aid agencies have experienced obstacles by the Sudanese government in the implementation of their aid missions. Even before the arrest want was issued to president al-Bashir, aid agencies faced difficulties in relation to obtaining travel permits and visas. Even though not directly linked to aid agency staffs security, it affects the mission on the ground and may have an indirect effect on the security situation. This is so because, travel restrictions and expulsion of NGO by government orders affect humanitarian actors’ proximity to the local population which in turn may affect their acceptance

**5.6 Security development impasse in Sudan**

“Indeed, for most of the post-cold war period, the promise that development can promote international security has been embraced in a spirit of aid-industry optimism born out of feelings of policy innovation and mandate renewal” (Duffield 2010: 54).

From a policy perspective the inter relationship between development and security looks straight forward and direct, i.e. satisfying the basic needs of people reduces the risks of social tension and conflict. Many scholars and policy makers believed that the use of economic initiatives such as aid suspension, economic sanctions, favorable trading agreement or investment could cause perpetrators to abstain from conflicts (David keen, 2009). Sudan which has experienced decades of protracted civil war and its fundamentalist government accused of human rights violations and supporting international terrorism has faced sanctions, policies put in place by the international community. The EU policy response due to the conflict in Darfur has ranged from the suspension of development aid, its replacement by the flow of humanitarian assistance resumption and continuing dialogue with the Sudanese government. The US has maintained its sanctions against the government which will be removed if only president al-Bashir is out of power. Up till now with the splitting of the Sudan, the conflict in Darfur still remains as Sudan’s bloody stalemate. Based on a theoretical talk with Mark Duffield in 2011, the Idea of security-development nexus emerged during the 90’s out of debates within humanitarianism around the alleged role of international assistance in prolonging civil war. During this period, the book by Mary Anderson (do no harm) became influential with the main debate being that humanitarian aid could prolong civil wars and at the same time could also do the opposite by selectively altering the balance of power between social groups in the interest of peace. Based on this ground work, beginning clearly with the intervention in Kosovo in the late 90’s, donor governments and other funders had begun defining international assistance and humanitarian assistance as legitimate tool of foreign policy. This was reflected in increase donor calls for greater cooperation between aid, politics and trade in securing desired international outcomes and it was around this period that the idea of security-development nexus entered popular debates.

“An unaccountable and un-impugned security sector impinges directly upon development: it disenfranchises communities, contributes to poverty, distorts economies, creates instability and stunts political development” (Hurwitz and Peake 2004: 5). Security reforms consequently provides the opportunity to make a clean break from repressive traditions and provides a safe and secure environment to give political institution and the economy opportunity and space to grow. In Darfur where security problems still remains for over a decade, it becomes hard for development to follow.

To conclude, the changing nature of armed conflicts which are most often than not intrastate has resulted in increased need to safeguard civilians and aid workers. Aid workers haves increasingly become deliberate target in armed conflicts and post conflict zones. This resulted to the development of the security triangle to help aid agencies respond to such violent attacks with acceptance strategy being the most commonly used by agencies to ensure their security.

 **Chapter 6**

1. **Conclusion**.

Humanitarian organizations believe that the core principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and operational neutrality are supposed to ensure that aid workers remain out of the conflict even as they respond to violence and suffering. Aid agencies have made use of the acceptance strategy (i.e. reduction of the possibility of targeted attacks by reducing or removing the motivation to attack) as their primary risk management strategy for decades. Evidence over time suggest that this strategy has become ineffective with the increase in the number of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers (Childs 2013) and they have gone further to implement new strategies such as smart protection and bunkerization.

The security development nexus tries to bring out the interconnection between security and development and has attracted a good deal of scholars, donors and practitioner interest. It was believed by scholars that with development (through education, health and poverty reduction), there was a potential to improve local and international security. That is to say development assistance helped people to become self-sustaining which reduced the risk of social tension and hence conflicts (Duffield 2010: 54). With insecurity, development projects are slowed down or even halted completely. With the outbreak of what Mary Kaldor 1999 called new wars, which became prominent with the fall of the Soviet Union, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) enthusiastically embraced the shift towards using aid strategically as a civilian tool for conflict resolution. This resulted to what Duffield 2010 called politicization of aid (Duffield 2010 p.1). This caused humanitarian organizations to lose their apolitical stance in conflict and post conflict areas with these aid workers becoming deliberate targets of violence. Instead of development enhancing both local and international security, as a means of maintaining this inequitable life-chance divide, development has become part of a deepening and ultimately unwinnable global civil war (Duffield 2010: 57). This is what Duffield refers to as the development security impasse, i.e. the security development nexus not working and resulting to rise in violent attacks on aid workers.

In Darfur, while the humanitarian principles in themselves may not provide protection, how aid agencies convey them through their proximity to the local population is of great importance. Performing their work in a transparent manner and courteous individual behavior affect the way they are being perceived and thus their security (Eckroth 2010: 115). This principles are not sufficient to ensure the securitization of aid in Darfur and need to be supplemented with other strategies such as protection. Relying too heavily on these measures may in turn diminish the security situation as aid workers are alienated from the locals omitting valuable security information. On the other hand, evidenced found during the course of this research suggests that staying close to the local population may help diminish security situations as well especially in the case of Darfur where the national government is a party to the conflict. This bring out the major Dilemma in the securitization of humanitarian aid in Darfur. This is because aid agencies that develop a close relationship with the locals may be viewed as taking side, and thus face the risk of being expelled by the government as was the case with many NGOs (Ibid: 115). With banditry becoming the most common form of security incident on aid workers in Darfur, adopting a low profile (for example not identifying their vehicles with humanitarian logos) in the field could be of help. In addition compulsory security treating for all aid agencies which should consist of both a theoretical as well as a practical sections where staff participate in simulation exercise. This would go a long way to increase aid workers ability to protect themselves, which will be beneficial in the Darfur context as aid agencies avoid being protected by UN peace keepers as they are believed not to be neutral.

To conclude, the securitization of humanitarian aid in Darfur provides significant evidence for the broader thesis concerning the securitization of humanitarian aid. Ideally, this case study could benefit from comparative analysis with other IDP and refugee camps. Every conflict zone or refugee camp has its own particular historical, cultural and political context, with some of them having significantly higher security and risk profile than others. The choice of Darfur as the research case study was in part due to the contemporary security issues there and may or may not be representative of many other refugee camps.

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